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POPE'S DISCONTENTS

Pope's Discontents

The successful creation of a new Department of External Affairs, as a fulfilment of the desires expressed in his brief to the Royal Commissioners in 1907, should have filled Pope with satisfaction. But no architect or builder is fully satisfied withhis completed edifice. He sees, and learns by seeing, its defects or its shortcomings.

Pope was proud of the achievement for which the Government, urged by Earl Grey, supported by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and prompted largely by Pope, was responsible.

But he was a conscientious and sensitive man; and he could not fail to feel a number of discontenting factors.

Premises

The sad story of the official premises for his new Department has been related. In fact the struggle, during the summer of 1909, to gain suitable space in the East Block for his Department was so disappointing that Pope went off disheartened to the "exile" of Trafalgar Building for the next five years. Throughout that period he bore a smouldering sense of frustration and disappointment. He was, as he complained, relegated to quarters "over a barber-shop", after several earlier makeshift moves. He was excluded from his proper base in the East Block, among his associates and colleagues. This was an obstruction to efficiency of operation. It caused inconvenience and loss of time, and interfered with close discussion. While nursing this grievance, he continued to seek space in the enlarged East Block; but this, even

after the new addition was completed, was inequitably allocated, and none of the occupants would yield their claims. The Governor General tried to persuade the Prime Minister to persuade the Minister of Public Works and the Secretary of State, and other Deputy Ministers, to surrender rooms in the East Block, or authorized Pope to pre-empt them, for the External Affairs Department; but without success.

Unpopularity

Pope was proud of the new Department. But it would be enough to dismay and discourage him to receive Mr. Murphy's brutally frank letter to him of November 29, 1909, saying that:

> As I explained to you, the Department of External Affairs is not popular with some of my colleagues, and still less with many of the Government supporters. For this reason it would be advisable to justify its existence by allowing it to continue to work smoothly and without attracting the attention of Council or Parliament to unimportant details that would be sure to excite opposition and suspicion.

Was this the kind of backing, support and encouragement Pope had expected from his Chief, and which, in Pope's view, the more effective conduct of Canada's external affairs merited?

Staff

Also in the first few years, Pope did not get all the staff he wanted. Several proposed transfers to his Department did not materialize; the Customs Department would not release Mr. Laroque as a translator; he had to struggle to borrow a messenger and a typist from the Secretary of State's Department;

he had some difficulty in acquiring a typist. One of his earliest senior clerks, Mr. Brophy, soon left Pope to return to the Secretary of State's Department, then headed by Mr. Mulvey. Some of his lady-staff also dropped out and left him. On one occasion he wrote that he was unable to send over a certain book to a friend, because his only messenger was ill and he had no one to deliver it. After 1912 some of his staff were co-opted for service in the Prime Minister's Office, and he was deprived of their benefit in the Department. Largely for financial reasons, the establishment grew slowly; there were only two, or later three, officers until after the War was over - indeed until 1925, the year Pope retired; and the clerical staff, although steadily expanding and supplemented by temporaries and war-time special clerks, was apparently never quite sufficient for the Department's needs.

Pope was bitter that his own Assistant Under-Secretary, Mr. W.H. Walker, could not get formal recognition as such, or a salary that his position and qualities justified on a level with the Assistant Deputy Ministers of most of the other Departments; as he dejectedly said in a letter to Mr. Meighen:

> You will see that, with the exception of one or two, they are all higher - most of them much higher - than the maximum assigned to Mr. Walker . . . There are other indications in the Civil Service classification of an apparently settled resolve to regard this Department as one of small account.";

and on Mr. Meighen's admission that "no practical step or remedy is available to me," Mr. Pope suggested that Mr. Meighen ask the Civil Service Commission "Why this

office should be graded lower than the large majority of Assistant Deputy Ministers."

His Status

Besides being hurt that his Department was "unpopular" and open to "suspicion", Pope seems to have resented the fact that for several years it was classified in the Auditor-General's annual reports as a branch or sub-division of the Secretary of State's Department, as an annex rather than as an independent and coeval Department (as it became listed after 1914).

The result of this was to give the impression that Pope was subordinate to the new Under-Secretary of State, Mulvey, instead of being his equal and, by background and experience, his senior. Senator Ferguson, in the debate on the 1912 Bill, hinted at this. He felt that by the transfer, "Mr. Pope would be turned over to this new appointment which would, in point of seniority, be inferior to the deputyship of the department as it is at present constituted": i.e. inferior to the position which Mr. Mulvey was now occupying in his place, at his former desk in the East Block. For his personal prestige and amour propre, Pope suggested changing his title to "Deputy Minister for External Affairs", but Mr. Mulvey brushed this aside, not wishing to tamper with the existing statute or "to excite opposition or suspicion".

Pope was many years older than his Ministerial chief, Mr. Murphy, and far more experienced than both his chiefs and his successor, Mr. Mulvey. He had held Mulvey's office for nine years before yielding it to

the latter, and his own close connections with the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers gave him some sense of equal if not superior importance. He wanted to be a full Deputy Minister, as he had been in his old Department, and not to be a joint Deputy subordinate in appearance to the other, and acting under a chief who belonged titularly to another Department.

Title of Secretary of State for External Affairs

Likewise, Pope was not happy over the title of the chief under whom he served. Leaving aside his predilection that the Department should be headed by the Prime Minister - which was solved by the Statute of 1912 - he was disappointed that as Deputy or Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, his chief was not given the substantive title and portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs, thereby symbolizing a genuinely separate Department. Mr. Murphy, although occasionally signing departmental letters as "Secretary of State for External Affairs", was never sworn in as such; there was no portfolio of External Affairs; and Pope felt that he had no direct master, but was working in an annex to another Department, having a second Under-Secretary, Mr. Mulvey.

Pope was so irked by this lack of real title for his departmental chief that he referred to it in a note to Borden dated December 30, 1911. He suggested that the Secretary of State should be designated Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and that there should be a separate, official Secretary of State for External

for External Affairs (whom he urged and hoped would be the Prime Minister himself). He wrote:

> There are reasons of convenience which would be served by this plan. At present every passport issued by this Department has to be sent to the Secretary of State for sealing. Under the system I advocate, the Secretary of State for External Affairs could be entrusted by the Governor General with a separate seal for this and kindred purposes, - in short would occupy as such a status which I am afraid he can attain in no other way. Sir Wilfrid Laurier evidently intended this. The first recommendation I laid before him was prepared for signature as "Secretary of State". Without any suggestion on my part he added, with his own hand, the words "for External Affairs" and directed that that title should always be used.
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> Further, does not the existing statute, in creating the office of "Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs" appear to contemplate that there shall be a Secretary of State for External Affairs? I do not quite see how there could be an Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs without a Secretary of State for External Affairs, but if there were, such official would popularly be regarded as in some sense amenable to the jurisdiction, not merely of the Secretary of State, but also (as is more or less the case at the present moment) of the officer at present known as "the Under-Secretary of State".
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> The existence of two Secretaries of State, one for Home, the other for External Affairs, is so reasonable in itself and so accordant with British usage that I feel it would speedily commend itself to public opinion, in so far as public opinion takes any interest in such matters.

Editorial Committee

Pope also smarted, on several occasions, over delays and other difficulties with the Bureau of the King's Printer - although it may be said that this was, and is, a chronic and common source of complaint in every Department of Government. But he was especially put out with the interference of the Editorial Committee, (headed by the Deputy King's Printer, Mr. Cook), set up by the Privy Council to check extravagance in public printing

and stationery. On two occasions at least, Pope addressed letters of protest to the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, as well as to other Ministers.

This protest over interference in the printing of his "Confidential Prints" is reproduced in the chapter on that subject.

Even much later, in 1920 he again complained over the refusal to provide him with certain printed envelopes for the safe transmission of confidential documents. To his chief, Sir Robert Borden, he wrote on December 7, 1920, in which once more he found it necessary to blame Mr. Cook:

> Private
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> I enclose a copy of certain reports of the Editorial Committee, which you expressed a wish to see. You will observe that these are approved and "made mandatory" by Order-in-Council,(p.45). It is difficult to suppose that Council when making mandatory these reports of the Editorial Committee, could have given them any real consideration. I have always believed in and practised economy, but some of these regulations are surely a travesty of that excellent principle. With one or two trifling exceptions, no discrimination is shown between a Minister of the Crown or his Deputy, and the general staff. For example, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his Under-Secretary are, as you know, in frequent communication. Papers are continually passing between them. In these circumstances, it is extremely convenient to use envelopes with the Prime Minister's name and address printed thereon (as we always have used them), yet when I sent in a requisition for the renewal of a small supply of these envelopes, it was refused by the Editorial Committee, on the ground that they were "unnecessary". I should have thought that I was the best judge of the necessity in this case.
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> These regulations contain many similar vexatious and even humiliating restrictions, commonly believed to be inspired by a man who, ignorant of the usages and requirements of the public service, and lacking in any sense of proportion or of the fitness of things, is filled with the idea of making a little cheap popularity for himself, by posing as an advocate of economy.

> I do not wish you to understand from this letter that I am making any complaint. Your kind intervention saved my confidential prints from extinction. Their continuance was almost vital to the proper conduct of this Department. The rest is a matter of small importance to me, and I have no intention of worrying the Ministers with trifles of this kind, but I cannot help feeling it detrimental to discipline and the best interests of the service that a comparative newcomer like Mr. Cook should be placed in a position to impose, under the plea of economy, and without any previous reference to or consultation with them, a series of irritating and annoying regulations upon the permanent heads of the public departments. (1)

These and various other indications of Pope's discontents and touchiness may be found in his correspondence with his colleagues or Ministers, betraying his personal sense of frustration or derogation, not only concerning himself as de facto head of what he proudly conceived as a very important Department of State, but also concerning its whole establishment, its financial limits, its restricted staff, its isolated location, its limits on promotion, and its inadequate prestige.*

(1) Pope ~~Session~~ Semi-Official Papers. 1920.

* We may note a certain parallel between Pope and one of the earliest Under-Secretaries of State for Colonies in England, Sir James Stephen, who served under a joint Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. "As Permanent Under-Secretary, a post he assumed in 1836, Stephen shaped the character of the nineteenth century Colonial Office. . . In the organization of the Colonial Office he showed the same zeal and thoroughness that marked his advocacy of liberal social causes. When he became the permanent head of the Office he found many archaic procedures in force which he simplified, thereby reducing the element of 'red tape' and inefficiency in departmental business. For instance, he reduced the volume of private unofficial correspondence with Colonial Governors - a cause of much administrative confusion in earlier years. Throughout his official career he was handicapped, in an era before competitive examinations, by a lack of good subordinates, and frustrated by exasperating delays with other departments which continued to plague the Office despite his best efforts to reduce them. Secretaries of State, during his association with the Office, tended to be numerous and often mediocre, and inevitably Stephen became the target for charges that he wielded irresponsible power. Even his friend Taylor could declare that for a generation

Relations with Mr. Murphy

In this review of Pope's discontents in the first few years of his new office, it is perhaps not inappropriate to examine another aspect which may have been a further irritant. This is the question, which is difficult to assess, of Mr. Pope's personal relations with Mr. Charles Murphy. Murphy, as has been stated, was a forceful impetuous Irishman. He was able, and aggressive, and apparently high-tempered; he was also a well-read scholar, an orator, and generally well-disposed toward his colleagues. He had a due respect for Pope's longer experience, seniority of age, and expert knowledge of his area of duties.

Both Charles Murphy, and Joseph Pope after 1878, were Ottawa men; and no doubt were known to one another, the one as an active politician and the other as an official within the inner circles of government. Murphy was nine years younger than Pope. When he became Secretary

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he 'ruled the Colonial Empire'. The easy judgments made by the Colonial Reformers regarding 'Mr. Oversecretary Stephen' must be reassessed, however. A closer study of his work has revealed that Stephen was extremely amenable to direction from his parliamentary superiors and conscientious in seeking their opinion on important colonial issues. The administrative processes of the Colonial Office were complicated, and it naturally took some time for a new Secretary of State to understand them. This meant that in the absence of specific direction, or sometimes in the face of the neglect of Departmental responsibilities by a Minister, Stephen was forced to take decisions. Even when this qualification has been recorded it is still true that Stephen's constructive steps in organizing the work of the Colonial Office make him the prototype of the perfect Under-Secretary and one of the most distinguished figures in the history of British administration in the nineteenth century." (D.M. L.Farr: The Colonial Office and Canada, 1867-1887. pp.30-31).

A study of the early history of the Colonial Office reveals a state of unpopularity and internal problems similar to those experienced in the early history of the Department of External Affairs. (See, for instance, H.L. Hall, The Colonial Office. pp.16-18 and pp.265-266.

of State in 1908, he was forty-five, while his subordinate, Joseph Pope, was fifty-four, with more than twenty-four years of experience in public service behind him, and already twelve years as permanent head of the Office of the Secretary of State. It was natural, therefore, that Murphy leaned heavily on Pope in the administration of his complex and unfamilar Department.

However, Pope, by long affiliations, was a strong Imperialist, an admirer of Great Britain, a real Tory; he could tolerate no Canadian flag or anthem other than the Union Jack and "God Save the King"; he was a student of British "honours" and decorations. Mr. Murphy, a Home Rule Irishman, had the opposite attitude, and for this reason of private political opinions, may have clashed with his deputy.

It is difficult to ascertain from available records how Murphy reacted to the project, already maturing for several years, for the bifurcation of the Department of the Secretary of State. Pope dutifully kept him advised, in personal discussions and in letters; but there is little correspondence on record to reveal what Murphy thought of it all. Pope seems to have been in much closer communion on the subject with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who also invoked the support and practical help of the Minister of Justice, Mr. Allan Aylesworth, in the drafting of the legislation and in piloting it through Parliament.

Murphy might have felt, on the one hand, that the proposal to establish a new Department meant truncating his own large and over-worked one; and also the separation of his invaluable aide, Joseph

Pope from a part of his diverse responsibilities. On the other hand, for the present at least, Murphy would not lose; he would remain as Minister over two Departments, with two Under-Secretaries, both under his direction; and the change would represent merely a useful "division of labour" under his personal command. (The unforeseen physical separation of the new Department of External Affairs to the Trafalgar Building was an inconvenience which he had not anticipated; but this was an impairment affecting Pope more than Murphy).

There are occasions when it would seem that Murphy resented Pope's apparent defection from his old Department, especially when Pope made his views clear that he would rather serve as Deputy to another Secretary of State for External Affairs - preferably the Prime Minister, - than serve as head of a kind of departmental annex to the older Office of the Secretary of State. This would superficially appear to Murphy that Pope no longer wished to work under his chief of one year, unless that chief became an independent Minister and real, instead of nominal, head of the new Department.

At times Murphy, because of his strong Irish character, was somewhat rough in his attitude toward Pope; and there are few signs of any warmth of sympathy. Where not positive, he was often noticeably negative toward Pope's aspirations or needs. He spoke but briefly in Parliament on behalf of the External Affairs Bill; he let Sir Wilfrid Laurier carry the ball in the drafting, in the debate, in the approval of the implementary

legislation, in the scramble for premises. He said bluntly that the new Department was not popular. For several years the Department of External Affairs was listed in the Auditor-General's Report as an appendage to the Secretary of State's Department.

Introduction of Bill

Beyond moving the Bill No.90, in 1909, for consideration and approval of the House, and adding a few very brief explanatory remarks in a speech mostly drafted for him by Pope, Murphy took no further part in the debate and made no attempt to defend the proposed reform. All that was done, in a series of replies which reveal the Prime Minister's own conviction in favour of the scheme, were speeches by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and by Mr. Aylesworth, Minister of Justice. One may be tempted to wonder over Mr. Murphy's comparative silence in the debate on a scheme which concerned his own Department. He was to remain in charge of the new "branch", but under him the Department of the Secretary of State was to besplit into two sections, with his valuable and indefatigable Under-Secretary moving over into the second branch, in other rooms (and, indeed, as it turned out, in another building) than his old seat close to the Minister. By the bifurcation, Mr. Murphy, besides gaining an additional Department and additional Under-Secretary (Mr. Mulvey), was to lose his old colleague and right-hand adviser, and a few members of his own staff.

Unpopularity of New Department

Another indication of Mr. Murphy's coolness toward the new Department was expressed in his letter

of November 29, 1909, to Mr. Pope. This must have hurt Mr. Pope to the quick, and must have made him feel that he was not to enjoy the warm support of his chief in the new enterprise. This was the paragraph already quoted, indicating that the Department "is not popular with some of my colleagues, and still less so with many of the Government supporters. . . It would be advisable to justify its existence by allowing it to continue to work smoothly and without attracting the attention of Council or Parliament. . ."

It has not been made clear why this opposition or unpopularity should have arisen, except for the small additional vote required in the Estimates for the new Department. As the Bill passed through the Commons and the Senate relatively smoothly and with relatively little debate, it cannot be seen that the opposition, unpopularity or suspicion was serious. But what there may have been, Mr. Murphy did little to allay. His own negative attitude revealed his lack of enthusiasm in support of Pope.

Correspondence

At first glance, it might also seem that the two men preferred to write notes to one another rather than consult in person.

Although, before June, 1909, when Pope had to move to other buildings, they occupied adjoining rooms in the East Block, in the Secretary of State's Department, where personal discussions would be the normal thing, Pope wrote notes and memoranda to Murphy. Perhaps as a good bureaucrat he felt that all matters should be "recorded

in writing"; perhaps both men were too "desk-bound". Pope "discussed" things with the Prime Minister, - as Laurier stated, - and sometimes with the Governor General, Earl Grey, and his written notes to them are fewer. But with his own Minister, there are more written notes and memoranda, and fewer hints of personal discussions.

In an exchange of notes of July, 1910, as we have seen* Mr. Murphy asked Pope, by letter, to prepare his Department's annual report; and Pope replied that most of the report was completed, and he was "awaiting an opportunity to talk it over," and hoped that Mr.Murphy could spare him a few minutes to discuss the draft. This suggests that the two men were on a basis of formal relationship rather than on an intimate basis of personal collaboration. This apparent distinction of relationships is, however, possibly exaggerated. It was the custom (and to some extent still is) to indite or dictate notes and memoranda from desk to desk or from room to room or from colleague to colleague, as readily as discussing matters in a personal chat. Grey, the very energetic Governor General, not only discussed matters personally with Sir Wilfrid Laurier almost daily (their offices being on the same floor of the East Block), but sent him flurries of little handwritten notes and memoranda. Pope no doubt had personal discussions with Mr. Murphy (although his offices were far remote in different buildings) as often as he wrote him interdepartmental letters and memoranda. It is not possible to draw any deductions from the

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* See Chapter "Confidential Prints and Annual Reports."

aspect of correspondence between the two colleagues, nor to guess how much they also exchanged views tête-a-tête. But there has been found no correspondence indicating any warmth of feeling or sympathy between the two men.

Permission for Absences.

At various times in 1909, 1910 and 1911, Pope, apparently according to custom, sent handwritten notes to Mr. Murphy advising his chief that he proposed to leave Ottawa for an indicated week-end. In one note he stated that he would be absent on Saturday, returning on Monday "or - since Monday is a holiday, possibly Tuesday". These absences usually fell on an August week-end, year after year. (1) This practice, faithfully observed by Pope, hardly justifies the sharp admonition written by Mr. Murphy on one occasion.

Could a senior official of Joseph Pope's distinction, experience and standing consider as anything but an unreasonable reproach from his chief - a younger man - such a letter as he received from Mr. Murphy dated July 13, 1910:

> On my return from Montreal today I received your letter of the 11th instant, stating that you had to go to Montreal on private business yesterday, and would return last evening. Having met you on the train in advance of the receipt of your letter an acknowledgement might be dispensed with, but in future it would be well to acquaint me with your intention before you actually leave town. Permission for such a purpose I am always pleased to grant.

This carping criticism by a Minister to his Deputy Minister, for a day's absence in Montreal, without

(1) A series of these notifications is found among Pope's Semi Official Papers, in the Public Archives.

permission but after a note of request and explanation had been previously sent but not received beforehand, seems to betray some small personal discord between the two men, - which may explain some of Pope's more general complaints.

Separation of Portfolios

As has already been pointed out, Mr. Murphy was well aware of Pope's desire to separate his Department from that of the Secretary of State, and either to have an independent Minister in charge, with a separate portfolio, or to place the External Affairs Department under the Prime Minister. It is obvious that this desire would appear to Mr. Murphy as a reflection on himself. Moreover, he was aware that Pope wished to "restrict" the role of the Secretary of State's Department to something analogous to a "Canadian" Department or "Home Office", implying a more specific truncation of its past comprehensive functions and interests. The divorce of all external business from the old Department would, in fact, have left the residual functions limited to "home affairs" in practice; but Murphy must have regarded it as tactless for Pope to propose that this delimitation should be made specific.

When Pope was examining the prospect of new quarters in the East Block, he wrote to the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, on January 29, 1914:

> If I am to have any say in the matter, I should prefer to have the old rooms, that is the rooms which Mr. Meighen is already in and those dependent thereon. My chief reason for this is that there is already a good deal of confusion in the public mind, and also in the Services between the

Department of External Affairs and the Secretary of State of Canada. While both, of course, are equally Secretaries of State (in England, as you know, there are five Secretaries of State) in Canada we have hitherto had only one, and when both Departments were under one Minister, the impression was very general that the External Affairs Department was an adjunct to that commonly called The Secretary of State's. Besides this popular confusion, a division of functions between the two Departments has never been authoritatively made, and there is certain overlapping. I have been always hoping that some day you will have leisure to settle this question with Mr. Coderre. I have submitted to you my views on the subject and would naturally like to see them prevail, but if they are not to prevail, I should like Mr. Mulvey's views to carry, in order that we may have a definite settlement one way or the other to the advantage of public business.

The connection between this subject and that of rooms is this: - If the External Affairs is brought into the East Block and placed alongside of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, in rooms which that Department is actually dispossessed of to make way for us, it will accentuate the feeling between the Departments which already exists and will retard the acquisition of an individuality by the Department of External Affairs, besides involving more or less unpleasantness.

This is my principal reason for hoping that ultimately I may get the old rooms formerly occupied by the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs.

Personal Notes

So far as has been observed, the records of correspondence do not reveal the personal or intimate notes between Murphy and Pope, as are found, for example, between Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Pope (and Lady Pope) or between Sir Robert Borden and Pope. Between these latter there were thank-you notes, notes of appreciation, notes of felicitation on birthdays, notes of sympathy on occasions of illness or bereavement, etc. No such cordiality and little messages of friendship have been found between Mr. Murphy and Sir Joseph Pope.

These details may perhaps be rather circumstantial, as suggesting that the relationship of Mr.

Murphy and Mr. Pope in the initial days of the new Department, were not perfect or ideal. If Mr. Pope were as sensitive concerning his role as the evidence suggests, this aspect, it may be assumed, might have added something to his disappointment and frustration. Nevertheless, too much emphasis should not be placed on this problem. Mr. Murphy's tenure was, as it turned out, only of short duration, - from October 10, 1908, until October 6, 1911; and he had a heavy burden of other duties - political and administrative - to preoccupy him. He may not have possessed so keenly the desire which Pope had to split the old Department for the greater efficiency of conducting the external business.

On the other hand, he was, at least formally, reasonably cooperative. He lent, during his absence from Ottawa, his own office-room to Pope; he loaned or transferred some of his clerical and messenger staff to Pope's Department. He supported - without avail - the common desire to find quarters for the new Department in the East Block, on grounds of obvious convenience. He approved Pope's requests to make certain staff appointments; he approved Pope's request for an extra telephone for Mr. Walker; he approved his request that he have his printing done outside the King's Printer Bureau; and he approved (after the Prime Minister had given Pope his consent) the temporary transfer to the Trafalgar Building when the East Block offices could not be obtained.

Mr. Murphy went out of office in 1911,*

* After a period of eleven years in Opposition, Murphy became Postmaster General, 1922-1926, in the Mackenzie King Government, and was appointed to the Senate on September 5, 1925.

while Pope, as permanent Deputy, stayed on. In the course of time, many of these early difficulties were solved. The Prime Minister became Secretary of State for External Affairs; the office of the Secretary of State limited itself mainly to internal affairs; the importance of the Department of External Affairs became recognized, and the personal prestige and independence of its Under-Secretary were enhanced. Staff was gradually enlarged and salaries were improved; the position and title of Mr. Walker as the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs were recognized. The Department returned to more suitable quarters in the East Block, close to the Office of the Prime Minister, of the Privy Council, and of the Governor General. Joseph Pope received a knighthood, and attained a high respect and reputation, both within and beyond government circles, and retired in 1925 with a personal renown and the knowledge that his Department also was acquiring a greater prestige.

There remained, however, one other source of discontent which was to last throughout Pope's term of office. This was the tension between Pope and fellow-Under-Secretary Thomas Mulvey.

Pope and Mulvey

It was perhaps not unnatural that with the division of the old Department, some loose ends remained, in which the respective jurisdictions of the two sections, or their respective functions, should create misunderstanding, and should require rectification. Pope, ever sensitive to his new responsibilities, took issue over certain channels of communication and onus of distribution which Mulvey claimed fell to his Department. Pope addressed

on June 13, 1912, a letter of remonstrance to him, pointing this out, with a reasoned argument. In the course of the letter, he said:

> I think perhaps the root of the difficulty is to be found in the erroneous view generally held in this community that the office of Secretary of State is necessarily one and indivisible; that the Secretary of State of Canada is the Secretary of State, and that the office of Secretary of State for External Affairs is, if not exactly subordinate, at any rate, a lesser dignity which has been evolved from the former. I need not of course remind you that under the British system there may be, and are, in England several Secretaries of State of equal rank. Now the Secretary of State for External Affairs (as such) is as much a Secretary of State, as the Secretary of State of Canada (who is the Secretary of State for Home Affairs), and the Department over which the former presides, is as truly and properly a department of state as the Department hitherto more commonly associated with that name, or any other department of the public service. A glance at the statute and constituting Order-in-Council of the Department of External Affairs will I think bear out this view. . .

Pope then concludes his letter raisonné in this paragraph:

> I trust that these little differences on official matters may in no sense affect the pleasant relations which have hitherto existed between us. I have no doubt we shall get disentagled after a while, and pursue our respective courses without danger of collision.

In his reply, dated October 2nd, delayed because of his absences, Mulvey said:

> My sole and only reason for taking up the subject under discussion is to effect, if possible, an orderly method of doing business between our Departments. Of late there has been considerable discussion of overlapping of work between various Departments, and of the confusion which sometimes arises in determining the exact Department with which transactions should be had. I deem it my duty to prevent, if possible, the creation of difficulties such as this, and to prevent the spread of this anomalous state of affairs.

Mulvey then discusses without rancour his view on certain particular issues which had become contentious, and then concludes:

> As to your wish that the little difference on official matters may in no sense affect the pleasant relations which have existed between us, I beg leave to say that I regard matters such as those under discussion as of a purely business nature, and that I have difficulty in understanding how such a discussion can in any way affect our personal relations. I have merely the interests of the Government and of my Department in view, and my only purpose is to make business relations between our Departments more smooth. Under these circumstances, a plain discussion of the matter is all that is necessary to accomplish our purpose. In passing, I may say that such smoothness and pleasantness is not added to by statements you make for the purpose of calling them absurd, when a person who had not read all the correspondence would believe that they were made by me. I refer to this not in any carping way, but merely for the purpose of suggesting that the impersonal and business method of dealing with them is more likely to lead to the solution of the difficulties involved.

Meanwhile, Mulvey expressed the intention of referring the points at issue to his chief, Dr. Roche, and Pope forwarded a complete outline and summary of the contentious matter to his chief, Sir Robert Borden.

On October 14th, Pope returned to the discussion with Mulvey, repeating his own arguments, and concluded:

> I may add that the concluding sentence in my letter of the 13th June was prompted by an impression, variously derived, that you rather resented my action on these purely official concerns as in some way unfriendly to yourself, an impression which the tone of your last letter does not wholly dispel.

On the next day, October 15th, Mulvey replied in a not unconciliatory tone, but added:

> I beg to add that you are absolutely in error with respect to the impression you had - no matter how it may have been derived - that I resent any official matter as unfriendly to myself, and I regret that anything in my last letter should have added to that impression. My object in this correspondence is purely of a business nature, and although I may be unfortunate in some of my expressions, I have no desire to have any personal element whatever enter into the matter.

The Pope-Mulvey correspondence in this connection then ceased; and the issues were laid before the Secretary of State Dr. Roche and the Prime Minister-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sir Robert Borden, by mutual agreement. The passages quoted above, however, betray a peculiar and revealing tension between the two colleagues, both mature and experienced men of high office, in their personal relationships.

It is not difficult to see some of the causes of this unhappy friction. Mulvey, like Mr. Murphy, was an Irishman in background and temperament. Pope was strongly pro-British. Both men had force of character and personality, and were "positive" types. Mulvey sat in Pope's old chair and office; and this made him seem closer to the Secretary of State; Pope was cast adrift in the remoter exile of the Trafalgar Building. Mulvey had inherited the Departmental Library which Pope had "founded". Pope at least felt that Mulvey was acting as - or was regarded by outsiders as - the senior of the two Under-Secretaries, and that Pope was regarded as a subordinate to him.

Pope was conscious of the fact that he had had decades of experience in East Block affiliations before Mulvey appeared on the scene, but that Mulvey nevertheless assumed an authority more officious than his past experience warranted. Brophy had come over to Pope's Department as a senior clerk, but apparently was not happy and returned to his old Department under Murphy and the new Under-Secretary Mulvey. Both Mulvey and Pope

had definite but conflicting notions as to their respective jurisdictions and responsibilities with regard to certain correspondence. Pope felt that Mulvey, in communications with the Provincial Lieutenant Governors, was not getting prompt results and replies which he, Pope, might have obtained. In fine, there clearly existed a jealousy between these two senior heads of department, - which did not go unnoticed by their respective staffs.

The difficulties which Pope endured as head of the new Department - his general problems, his difficult but short-lived relations with Charles Murphy, and his rivalry with Thomas Mulvey, of much longer duration, afforded him much discouragement in the early years; but under Sir Robert Borden some of the problems disappeared; the war-time exigencies eclipsed the more minor or personal difficulties, and the Department gradually began to ride on a more even keel as better premises and a larger clerical staff were obtained.

Pope and Christie

It is not clear what personal relations were between Pope and Loring Christie after 1913. Both were men of considerable governmental experience, Pope in Ottawa administration, Christie in the Department of Justice and State Department in Washington. Both were originally Maritimers. Both were Conservative in background and affiliation. Both had a friendship and respect for Sir Robert Borden, and had close intercourse with him, - Pope on administrative matters, Christie on constitutional matters. Christie, as Legal Adviser, possibly did not relish being subordinate (at a salary

of $3400 a year) to Pope, (salaried at $5000) and Walker (at $4000), although this problem does not seem to have made itself evident. Pope, on the other hand, might have resented the apparent favours shown to Christie by the Prime Minister; after Christie's appointment, Pope made no more tours abroad on Conferences or special missions with his chief, as Christie usurped that function. However, there is little to indicate any ill-feeling between the two. Their functions in the Department fell into different lines. Christie performed his own advisory tasks, without much interest in, or any interference with, the administrative and routine matters of the Department, which Pope and Walker supervised. Christie was a lawyer, Pope was an administrator. Christie had imaginative ideas on constitutional relations; Pope was apparently indifferent to them.

CONFIDENTIAL

23.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ACT, 1912

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ACT, 1912

Amendments to the Act of 1909 seem to have been considered by Pope and Walker within a few months of its passage. In essence, Pope wanted three things. First, that the office of Secretary of State for External Affairs should be a separate portfolio or Ministry, and not an appendage to the office of the Secretary of State of Canada. Secondly, related to this, that the Secretary of State of Canada should be designated Secretary of State for Canada (i. e. for "Canadian" in home affairs, only) to differentiate clearly his duties distinct from external affairs. Third, that the portfolio of External Affairs should be assumed by the Prime Minister himself.

The desire for a separate portfolio was apparently based on personal grounds. There is some reason to believe that Pope was not in the most sympathetic relation with Mr. Charles Murphy, or with the deputy, Mr. Mulvey. He wanted, as his chief, an independent Minister of External Affairs, and not a Minister of another department, who was not even sworn in as Secretary of State for External Affairs, nor held that commission, nor signed his name in that capacity. He did not want his new Department to be simply an annex to the old one, as it was described in the earlier Auditor-General's Reports. He did not want to feel that where two Under-Secretaries of State now existed, Pope was to be mistakenly regarded as secondary to Mr. Mulvey, or subordinate to him.

The second objective derived from the first. If there were to be two departments and two Secretaries of State, their respective capacities and jurisdictions should be more clearly defined and stipulated. The matter was largely academic. Pope was obsessed with the comparison with the British system, in which there was a Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs

and Colonial Affairs. He wanted to see this division and delimitation of duties defined by a title, covering the domestic side, Secretary of State for Canadian, internal or home affairs. In many memoranda he advocated this re-definition. No alteration however took place, - partly because, on Murphy's departure, and Borden's assumption of External Affairs, the antithesis was not so troublesome, and the succeeding Secretaries of State satisfactorily confined their work to "home" matters with no encroachments into the field of external affairs and no overlapping of authority as under Murphy; and partly because the full title of "Secretary of State of Canada" had been abbreviated to "Secretary of State", which made a change of affix unnecessary. The third objective, that the Prime Minister should be also Secretary of State for External Affairs, naturally eclipsed the first objective, and made the second one unnecessary. If the Prime Minister assumed the new portfolio, it automatically removed the jurisdiction of external affairs from the Secretary of State; and recognized a new and independent department. It consequently also left the Secretary of State's functions automatically limited to matters for Canada, and of domestic concern.

There was some discrepancy between the aim of Pope, and the conception of Earl Grey and certain members of Parliament as to the role of the Department were it to come under the charge of the Prime Minister. Pope saw the case from the point of view of the Department head; the others saw it from the point of view of the Prime Minister.

Pope saw the Department as a new structure, whose apex should be crowned by the Prime Minister; as a new State organ and organization, whose presiding director should be,

not the Secretary of State, but the Premier. The "company" was formed, and then its appropriate presiding director was to be designated.

This was possibly an inversion. Earl Grey, it is true, in reference to the proposed London reforms, first wished for a new and separate Dominions Office, and then considered that the Prime Minister, if practicable, should head it and if not, possibly the Lord President of the Privy Council. But Earl Grey, in advocating a special Department of External Affairs in Canada, conceived it - as some members of Parliament did - merely as a bureau or group of special advisers attached to the Prime Minister; in other words, not a Department of State per se, but a Prime Minister's advisory bureau; virtually a special section of the Prime Minister's Office.* This conception would automatically take this group away from the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State and bring it under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister; but at the same time it would reduce it from being an independent department of State to a subordinate position of being an advisory bureau. The debates on the 1912 Bill show that some of the members of Parliament conceived, as Earl Grey did in 1910, that this was all that was necessary.

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* Even after the new department became a true, distinct, Department of State, under a Minister, a portion of it was, in fact, coopted and seconded into the Prime Minister's Office as a bureau of advisers and assistants: e. g. the Private Secretaries, from External Affairs, and a considerable clerical and filing and messenger staff.

The Prime Minister

By way of recapitulation, it will be recalled that when Mr. W. Sanford Evans in 1901 advanced the suggestion of a distinct department of "Imperial and Foreign", or "External", Affairs, he suggested, though with some reserve, that this portfolio "might be held conjointly with another. Lord Salisbury combined the Premiership with the Secretaryship and Foreign Affairs; and Colonial Premiers might be the most suitable Ministers of Imperial and foreign affairs."[1] A later British example was Mr.Ramsay Macdonald. The Australian example of combining the two offices has already been mentioned. Earl Grey had a similar concept.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, as has been said, necessarily took an active part in all matters connected with Canada's imperial or foreign relations, especially as he was in daily association with the Governor General on such matters, and attended the Colonial, Imperial and other conferences. His direct concern for external affairs was closer than that of the Secretary of State, Mr. Murphy.

In first drafting the outline of the proposed new Department, Pope had placed the presiding authority in the First Minister. Laurier had struck this out, "in his own hand" and substituted "Secretary of State". In the next draft, Pope obediently stated that all external correspondence should first be sent to the Secretary of State; but Laurier again amended this, and while not seeking to take the portfolio, inserted that all external affairs correspondence should first be referred to the Prime Minister, as well as to the Secretary

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[1] Op.cit. p. 339

of State as head of External Affairs. As Dr. D. D. Skelton says, "Mr. Laurier, profiting by the experience of Mackenzie and of Macdonald, determined not to take charge of a department. That would have meant either, as in Mackenzie's day, the work of policy-shaping and party guiding or, as in Macdonald's day, the work of the department would often go undone. As President of the Council, he would be free to give to all the tasks of the government the general supervision he had planned."(1)

In this reference to Laurier's reluctance to to take charge of the Department, the explanation seems somewhat ambiguous. It is said that to do so would have meant the work of policy-shaping, or that it would have interfered with his freedom to give general supervision to all the tasks of the government. In actual fact, the work of policy-shaping was largely the responsibility of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and as Laurier pointed out in the 1909 debate, he looked to the Department only to collect the necessary "historical" data in order "to be prepared to advise as to the policy to be followed." It is difficult to see how in the light of Laurier's own activities and those of his successors, Sir Robert Borden, Mr. Bennett and Mr. Mackenzie King, "policy-shaping"

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(1) O. D. Skelton. Life and Letters of Sir W. Laurier. ii p. 6.

would have been affected whether the Prime Minister did not head the Department of External Affairs (e. g. Laurier) or did head the Department (e. g. Borden, Bennett and King). Dr. Skelton's statement that "Mr. Laurier determined not to take charge of a department", while literally true, for whatever alleged reason, may be contrasted with a memorandum which Mr. Pope sent to Sir Robert Borden dated December 30, 1911, in which he said: "Sir Wilfrid even in the beginning was so impressed with the necessity for his having supervision over the Department that he added to the draft Minute of Council a provision that a duplicate of all despatches should be sent to him." When the earlier Bill came up for debate in March 1909, the Justice Minister, Honourable A. B. Aylesworth, who had finally drafted it, including the substitution "Secretary of State", admitted that he would have approved the original suggestion. He understood that Mr. Foster "thinks the details of the scheme so far as outlined might be improved upon if a small staff of expert assistants were attached to the First Minister himself. I may say at once that so far as I am concerned that step would meet with my entire approval."(1)

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(1) House of Commons Debates. Mar. 4, 1909, p. 1994.

Likewise, Borden, the Leader of the Opposition, while strongly deprecating the proposal for the creation of an additional separate department for external affairs, had gone on to argue in favour of its work being put in charge of the First Minister instead of a Secretary of State or Secretary of State for External Affairs.(2) (To this view he remained consistent, for in 1912 when he had succeeded as Prime Minister, the new Act placed the Department under his own charge). He drew attention to the Australian parallel where the Minister of External Affairs was, in principle, the Prime Minister. "If we are to concede what the Prime Minister has argued for - and I am not disposed to concede it because I am not yet convinced - but if one were disposed to concede the argument of the Prime Minister that a new department is necessary for mere purpose of organization, then I say that that department should be under the control of the Prime Minister and not under the control of the Secretary of State."

From then on, Pope and Walker had been drafting, one after another, a whole series of proposed amendments to the 1909 Act. Most of these amendments accepted the provision that the Department should be under the Secretary of State, as Laurier had substituted, but endeavoured to assert the full title of "Secretary of State for External Affairs" and to set forth more precisely his scope of duties, at the same time delimiting the scope of duties of the Secretary of State.

It will be recalled that Pope had written a note to Mr. Murphy in November 1909 suggesting an amendment to the new Act, which would place the position of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in proper focus, but Murphy had turned down this suggestion, on the ground that as the new Department was unpopular among the Cabinet

(2) Ibid. p. 2002

and Parliament, it was better to let sleeping dogs lie and not provoke suspicion. To this disappointing reply, Pope wrote on November 30th:

> " I have your note of the 29th instant on the subject of the non-expediency of amending the Act establishing this department, and will make no move until again spoken to on the subject.
>
> You will always find me ready to observe your wishes in this or any other matter".

Nevertheless, Pope, with Walker's help, continued to jot down various suggestions for amendments, which were held back until Mr. Borden took office.

Earl Grey, in discussions with Laurier, had likewise been dissatisfied with the Act of 1909, and felt that the new Department should be transferred, if not to the Prime Minister, at least to some separate Minister; and consideration was given to an amendment in this direction. On April 29, 1910 Earl Grey tried to prod the procrastinating Premier into action:

> " I omitted to remind you this morning of your intention to pass an Amending Act to enable you to transfer the External Affairs Department to any Minister* nominated by the G. G. in Council.
>
> I hope the opportunity offered by Pope's absence will not be closured by the time limit.(1)

It remains mysterious as to why the temporary "absence" of Pope, who was so keen on amending the 1909 Act, should be referred to as an "opportunity". One may surmise that if Pope had been present at the time of these considerations, he would not have been satisfied with an amendment transferring the Department to "any Minister", but might have

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*This precise form was not incorporated until the Amending Act of 1946, which allowed the portfolio of External Affairs to go to a Minister not specifically the Secretary of State (1909) or Prime Minister (1912).

(1) Laurier Papers. Vol 735: Gov. General's Correspondence 1910. (Doc. 206739).

proved embarrassing by urging the transfer to "the Prime Minister". Possibly between Grey and Laurier a compromise Amendment could be better formulated and passed without the presence of uncompromising and headstrong Pope.

As events turned out, nothing further was done before the defeat of the Laurier Government in 1911, and the departure of Earl Grey the same year. Then Mr. Borden became Prime Minister, taking office on October 10th; and, Pope lost no time in presenting his views to him. He submitted a memorandum on October 19th; another on November 9th, another on November 25th, another on December 30th, and one on January 10th. He was not letting any grass grow under his feet!

Barely was Borden installed in office than Pope dug up his memoranda of 1909, already quoted, which he noted "had come to nothing", and started again, with drafts which were almost identical with the previous ones.

It may be noted, in passing, that henceforth, all communications on this matter were addressed by Pope directly to the new Prime Minister, and not through the new Secretary of State, Dr. Roche. Mr. Murphy, who usually, though not always, was party to Pope's representations to Laurier, was out of office; and apparently Pope by-passed his new chief, Dr. Roche, and made his representations directly to Mr. Borden whom he hoped would soon become his own chief. This procedure seems somewhat irregular, but may be explained by the nature of the subject at issue. It is possible that Mr. Borden had invited Pope to express frankly his views personally to him.

By this time Earl Grey had left Canada, and the new Governor General, the Duke of Connaught, does not seem to have taken the interest in this administrative question which Lord Grey had done with Laurier.

In one of his suggested revisions, Pope proposed amending Section 1 of the 1909 Act as follows:

> " Substitute for the words "Secretary of State for the time being shall preside", the words "Member of the King's Privy Council holding the recognized position of First Minister shall preside, and shall be the Secretary of State for External Affairs."

The file copy of this draft was date-stamped November 9, 1911; Pope wrote across it: "I gave a copy of this, the latest revise, to Mr. Borden, on the 9 November, 1911". On another 1911 file copy he wrote: "Suggested changes early part of session 1909-1910 which came to nothing".

Following this submission, Mr. Pope sent a letter dated November 25, 1911 to Mr. Borden, part of which read:

> The proposal to place this Department under the First Minister without any special designation might raise among other questions the minor one:- Could there be an Under-Secretary without a Secretary. It seems to me that the effect of this plan would be to make conflict of jurisdiction possible between the two departments.
>
> My last choice would be to leave the Secretary of State of Canada as he is, and style you "Minister of External Affairs". I confess I do not care for this, although that is how it is in Australia, where, however, the Minister is not now the Prime Minister.
>
> When we were considering the establishment of this department, I corresponded with the Under-Secretary for External Affairs in Australia, and afterwards met him here. There does not seem to be any close analogy between our External Affairs Department and theirs, which includes the Privy Council Office, that of the Governor General's Secretary, Indian Affairs, certain fisheries, and more besides. I enclose a copy of Mr. Atlee Hunt's letter to me in case you care to see it . . .".

President of Privy Council

While Pope and others had continuously been advocating this arrangement ever since the creation of the Department, there had at some stage been introduced a variant form and suggestion that the Department should be placed under the "President of the Privy Council" instead of specifically under the "Prime Minister". In the debate on the earlier External Affairs Department Bill on March 4, 1909, Mr. Foster had alluded to this suggestion, that all the external business should be dealt with "by a few experts in the office of the Privy Council over which the Prime Minister presided." In reply, Sir Wilfrid Laurier had said:

> The Prime Minister may not necessarily be the President of the Council. Sir Charles Tupper when he came into office, took the portfolio of Secretary of State. When Sir John Macdonald formed his government in 1878 he took the portfolio of the Interior in addition to his duties as Prime Minister. When the present government was formed in 1896 I came to the conclusion that the Prime Minister should be President of the Council. I am still of that opinion. Very shortly after I took office I discussed this point with Sir Charles Tupper and he thought I should have taken the portfolio of the Secretary of State. I differed with him; I thought the Prime Minister should be President of the Council. Whenever there is change of government my hon. friend on the other side of the House may not become President of the Council but he may become Secretary of State or take some other portfolio. It does not matter under which Minister the Department of External Affairs may be placed, it is sufficient that it should be under a responsible Minister.(1)

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(1) House of Commons Debates, 1909, p. 2003.

N. B. The practice of combining the offices of Prime Minister and President of the Privy Council had its inception in 1883, on October 17th when for the first time the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald was sworn in to the office of President of the Privy Council. Prime Minister Sir John Abbott continued this, but Prime Minister Sir John Thompson did not assume the extra office. Sir Mackenzie Bowell did so, but Sir Charles Tupper did not, preferring to add the office of Secretary of State to that of Prime Minister. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was President of the Privy Council, and so was Sir Robert Borden in his first Ministry. When he became Prime Minister of the Unionist Government, in 1917, he appointed Hon. Newton Rowell as President of the Privy Council, as Borden had the additional portfolio of External Affairs. Since Dec. 29, 1921 however the Prime Minister has also been President of the Privy Council, although there is no rule requiring him to hold that office.

Apparently the suggestion was revived a year or two later. Pope, in a letter to Mr. Borden, dated Dec. 30,1911, commented:

> May I take the liberty to offer a few observations on the suggestion that the Department of External Affairs should be placed under the President of the Privy Council, as such. I fear the effect of this would be to make the External Affairs an annex, as it were, of the Privy Council office, which is not a department of State at all, though commonly so reckoned. The President of the Privy Council may not always be the Prime Minister. In the last Conservative Ministry (Tupper) the Presidency was not held by the Prime Minister. Nor was it in Sir John Thompson's administration. Of your seven predecessors in the office of Prime Minister, three never held the office of President of the Privy Council when Premier, and a fourth was necessarily Minister of Justice, Interior, and Railways. To transfer the External Affairs from one portfolio to another, would not tend to its prestige or importance."

Having disposed of this suggestion concerning the President of the Privy Council, Pope proceeded in the same letter, to argue his case for the Prime Minister. He went on to say:

> I still venture to hope that you may see your way to take this office under you as Prime Minister, and to make it a separate secretariate, designating the present Secretary of State, the Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
>
> There are reasons of convenience which would be served by this plan. At present every passport issued by this Department has to be sent to the Secretary of State for reading. Under the system I advocate, the Secretary of State for External Affairs could be entrusted by the Governor General with a separate seal for this and kindred purposes, in short would occupy as such a status which I am afraid he can attain in no other way. Sir Wilfrid Laurier evidently intended this. The first recommendation I laid before him was prepared for signature as "Secretary of State". Without any suggestion on my part, he added, with his own hand, the words "for External Affairs" and directed that the title should always be used.
>
> Further does not the existing statute, in creating the office of "Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs" appear to contemplate that there shall be a Secretary of State for External Affairs? I do not quite see how there can be an Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs without a Secretary of State for External Affairs, but if there were, such official would popularly be regarded as in some sense amenable to the jurisdiction , not merely of <u>the</u> Secretary of State,

but also (as is more or less the case at the present moment) of the officer at present known as "the Under-Secretary of State."

The existence of two Secretaries of State, one for Home, the other for External Affairs, is so reasonable in itself and so accordant with British usage that I feel it would speedily commend itself to public opinion, in so far as public opinion takes any interest in such matters."(1)

It is incomprehensible why Pope should bombard the new Prime Minister with so many notes and memoranda on this subject, largely repetitious, unless Mr. Borden, in communications not on record, had replied to him and encouraged him to elucidate certain points.

Nevertheless, Pope ventured to send him still another memorandum, partly reviewing the past background of the Act of 1909 creating this Department of External Affairs and the Order-in-Council prescribing its procedure. The typed-in date of the typed memorandum, signed by Pope, is January 10th, 1912; but (possibly in error) Pope wrote across his file copy by pen, "November 30, 1911". (This may have been merely his private notation that the original had been drafted on that date, and was resurrected and retyped in January.)

The original Act was drafted with the intention that this Department should be presided over by the Prime Minister. For some reason of which I am ignorant, this was changed at the last moment, by the substitution of Secretary of State for Prime Minister, but Sir Wilfrid even in the beginning was so impressed with the necessity for his having supervision over

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(1) File 666/1912

the Department that he added to the draft Minute of Council a provision that a duplicate of all despatches should be sent to him.

The despatches sent to the Secretary of State in due time reached me, and such as could not be dealt with direct were by me referred to the several Departments by means of letters to the Deputy Heads, asking the views of his Minister thereon, according to the English practice. In the meantime I studied the subject, digested the departmental replies, and in unimportant matters prepared reports to the Governor-in-Council or the Governor General, as the case might be, for the Secretary of State's signature.

All important subjects of negotiation were however laid by me before the Prime Minister, according to Sir Wilfrid's instructions. He discussed them with me, and when he had decided on a line of action (which might or might not be in accordance with the view of the Department immediately concerned, or perhaps before the despatch had reached that Department) I would, after acquainting that department with the Prime Minister's wishes, prepare a report to be signed - not however by the Prime Minister but by the Secretary of State, whose first knowledge of the subject was thus a cut and dried report set before him to sign. This was naturally embarrassing to me who had two chiefs to deal with. Then again, some of the Ministers or at any rate their Deputies, did not relish the idea of reporting to the Governor-in-Council through, it might be, a junior Minister. Respect for the Prime Minister's well understood wishes gradually overcame this, but had it not been for Sir Wilfrid's support, and also for the fact that the Secretary of State's time was more than occupied by his manifold duties elsewhere, I do not see how we could possibly have got along. These difficulties inherent in the dual headship would disappear if the original design were to prevail, for under the Prime Minister there would be only one head, and that the several departments should report on External Affairs to him is both natural and fitting.

Mr. Borden will observe from the foregoing that since its inception the Department of External Affairs has really been quoad all important questions of foreign policy, as it must necessarily be, under the head of government. What is proposed is merely to give legislative sanction to the actual conditions and thus ensure a more satisfactory administration of the Department besides relieving the Under-Secretary from a position which in the past has been wellnigh intolerable.' (1)

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(1) File 666/12

It will be seen from this memorandum that Pope, had several reasons, partly personal, for advocating the Australian practice of placing External Affairs under the Prime Minister. Besides the larger aspect of the Prime Minister's overriding supervision and responsibility, as head of government, for Canada's external policies, Pope found that it was administratively burdensome to keep both the Prime Minister unofficially advised and the Secretary of State officially advised; that it created some extra work, some inefficiency, some jealously among colleagues of other departments, and "a position which in the past has been wellnigh intolerable." In these words, and other phrases quoted, it is evident that Pope was a sorely overworked official, and was suffering under the strain, as well as the psychological indignity of serving two masters, "embarrassing to me who had two chiefs to deal with."

Apparently this pressure from Pope and others, the precedent of Australia, and the obvious practical value of having the person most responsible for external policy, i. e. the Prime Minister himself, placed in charge of the External Affairs department, prevailed upon Sir Robert Borden and his Cabinet; for early in the year, 1912, revised legislation was drafted and laid before them for favourable consideration.

The New Act

This was then presented to Parliament as Bill No. 58; after debate it was passed, as Statute 2, George V. ch. 22, and assented to on April 1, 1912, as an "Act respecting the Department of External Affairs", which repealed the Act of 1909. The new statute provided in section 3 that "the member of the King's Privy Council holding the recognized position of First Minister shall be the Secretary of State for External Affairs." This was the very phraseology proposed in Pope's draft of

November 9, 1911, which he set down in a memorandum handed to Borden the same day. It even goes back to the first rough drafts Pope had made as early as 1908 and 1909.

ACT OF 1912

The provisions of this Act, which received assent on the 1st of April, 1912 were as follows:

His Majesty by and with the consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enact as follows:

Short Title.

1. This Act may be cited as The Department of External Affairs Act.

Department constituted.

2. There shall be a Department of the Government of Canada to be called the Department of External Affairs over which the Secretary of State for External Affairs shall preside.

Department to be under First Minister.

3. The Member of the King's Privy Council for Canada holding the recognized position of First Minister, shall be the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and in this Act he is hereafter referred to as "the Minister".

Deputy head.

Officers

4. The Governor in Council may appoint an officer who shall be called the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, and who shall be the deputy head of the department, and may also appoint such other officers and clerks as are requisite for the due administration of the business of the department, all of whom shall hold office during pleasure.

Powers and duties of department

5. The Minister as head of the department, shall have the conduct of all official communications between the Government of Canada and the Government of any other country in connection with the external affairs of Canada and shall be charged with such other duties as may be assigned to the department by order of the Governor in Council in relation to such external affairs, or to the conduct and management of international or inter-colonial negotiation in so far as they may appertain to the Government of Canada.

Foreign Consular Service .

6. The administration of all matters relating to the foreign consular service in Canada shall be transferred to the Department of External Affairs.

Annual Report to Parliament.

7. The Minister shall annually lay before Parliament, within ten days after the meeting thereof, a report of the proceedings, transactions and affairs of the department during the year then next preceding.

1909 c. 13 repealed.

8. Chapter 13 of the statutes of 1909 is repealed.[1]

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(1) 2 George V. chap. 22

In this final form of the Bill, reference is made to the transfer of foreign consular affairs, but not of passport issuance. In this respect, it follows, without improvement, the original Act.

It also omits any reference, suggested by Pope, that the Secretary of State of Canada should be designated the Secretary of State <u>for</u> Canada, (i. e. for solely "Canadian" internal or home affairs). Having indicated the matters for which the Secretary of State for External Affairs should be responsible, it was considered unnecessary specifically to delimit the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. In any case, by this period, the affix "of Canada" had been dropped, and therefore needed no alteration. The phrasing of the Bill, while not overtly, made it implicitly clear that, as in Great Britain, there were to be henceforth two Secretaries of State, - one the "Secretary of State", who would deal with domestic affairs, and the "Secretary of State for External Affairs" whose duties were explicit in the title.

DEBATE

When this new Amending Bill came before the two Houses for debate, it encountered little opposition. It was, after all, merely a reallocation of portfolios. There was very little discussion in the House of Commons, which read it through its stages and passed it perfunctorily. In the Senate there was a brief discussion on the second reading during the Committee stage, and again on the third reading. Sir Richard Cartwright, Opposition Leader in the Senate, while not objecting to the Bill, expressed the opinion that the Prime Minister was already too busy to be burdened with the duties of the Department. In reply Senator Lougheed and others declared that the importance of the work of the Department made it almost imperative that it should be handled by the Prime Minister.(1)

As we have seen in an earlier chapter, by anticipation, while this Bill was under discussion in the Legislature the old controversy over the use of the phrase "conduct of official communications" was revived; but in the outcome no amendment was made and the wording remained in the new Act. Lord Grey, the Governor General, was no longer in office to keep the question active.

Senator Cartwright's reservation against specifically conferring the duties of Secretary of State for External Affairs upon the Prime Minister, without the provision "that at any time, if found expedient, another Minister might be charged with the administration of same", was indeed prescient. He pointed out that, by not including this qualification in the present Act, inconvenience might

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(1) Senate Debates, 31 Jan. 1912, pp. 124-5.

arise if in future, "a formal Act would have to be passed - which is always to be avoided if possible - transferring it from the First Minister to some other Minister." (This is indeed, as he imaginatively foresaw, what occurred in 1946, when Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King, wishing to lay down the extra burden of External Affairs, had the Office transferred, by a special Act, to another Minister /Mr. L. St.Laurent, succeeded by Mr. L. B. Pearson/ But in 1912, Mr. Borden could not anticipate the necessity of this delegation of duties, and chose to retain the portfolio himself.)

In the course of this debate, Mr. Power gave perhaps the best justification of this measure. He said:

> The external correspondence of the country must, as a matter of course, come before the Prime Minister; and it is above all things desirable that the correspondence should be, as far as practicable, confidential. Now, under the system which has been in operation during the last two years or so, this correspondence had to pass through three or four hands after leaving the Prime Minister's office. That was objectionable, and I am glad that this Bill proposes to do away with that objection. As to the case of absence of the Prime Minister, I think it is the universal practice that when the Prime Minister is absent from the capital some other hon. gentleman acts as Prime Minister, and of course he would be the acting Prime Minister with respect to this department as well as the department which the Prime Minister for the time being occupies. Then, while there is no doubt that the duties of the Prime Minister are now more engrossing than they were some years ago, still I do not think that, considering that he has to see this correspondence, this Bill is going to impose any very great additional burden on him." (1)

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(1) Senate Debates, Jan. 31, 1912 p. 125.

A secondary consideration induced Borden to agree to this proposal, which although not mentioned in the debate, was no doubt the prospect which Borden may have seen, of being able to bring over to his own Office the services and staff of the Department. It was scarcely a year before he was appointing, nominally under the Department of which he had become titular head, a legal adviser (Christie) and two private secretaries (Boyce and Merriam) and some clerical staff, to be attached to

Note: Sir Robert Borden's decision to assume the portfolio of External Affairs was followed by Mr. Meighen, Mr. Bennett and Mr. King (until 1946). Mr. King justified it, as a Second World War necessity, as Borden might have justified it as a First War necessity after 1914. Mr. King told the House of Commons on July 12, 1943:

> May I take advantage of this moment to explain why I myself have retained the position of Minister of External Affairs while holding the office of Prime Minister at this time of war.
>
> I can assure hon. members that it has not been through any desire on my part to carry the extra portfolio. I would point out that in time of war nine-tenths of the Prime Minister's work is related to external affairs, and it would be making his task in some ways more difficult were he to try to assume the responsibility of the office of Prime Minister without being responsible as well for external affairs, when practically every decision of vital importance at this time, which has to be made by the Prime Minister, is one that is related to external affairs and would have to come as a recommendation from a Minister of External Affairs. I am perhaps stating this in an exaggerated way, but it is impossible to separate the two at this time.(1)

(1) House of Commons Debates, July 12, 1943, p.4670

his personal service as Prime Minister. Moreover, as Mr.King later pointed out, the Prime Minister's Office had no appropriations for staff, while the External Affairs Department could obtain appropriations for staff and administration useful to the Prime Minister's Office. These were practical considerations, not declared in the debate of 1912, but possibly not overlooked.

Passage of Bill

The Bill was approved on February 6, 1912.

As a result of this new statute, Sir Robert Borden took up this additional portfolio and was sworn in on April 1st, 1912 as Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Sir Joseph Pope must personally have been pleased to see his conviction and objective thus realized, and to have a single chief instead of two, and a Minister actually bearing the title of the Office to which Pope had been the Under-Secretary.

The wheel had turned. As Pope wrote in his memorandum to the Royal Commission in 1907, - "in the early years of Confederation the Prime Minister of the day kept them [external affairs questions] pretty much in his own hands, but with the growth and development of the Dominion this is no longer possible.". In 1912 these matters were again put under the control, this time more formally, of the Prime Minister, in his joint capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs, and with the difference that he now had, to assist him, a special Department of External Affairs and an expert Under-Secretary and staff. This arrangement was to continue for the next thirty-four years, until once more the wheel turned, and in 1946, the Prime Minister, Mr. King cut off the extra portfolio (but not the inevitable responsibility) for external affairs, and yielded it to a separate Minister.

There may however have been a boomerang, in this development, at least from the Under-Secretary's point of view. While Under-Secretary under Charles Murphy, who held office only three years, Pope had because of his vast experience, been the dominant personage of his Department under the Secretary of State. When, however, Sir Robert Borden took over the Department of External Affairs, and when the War broke out in 1914, Borden became more and more his own foreign minister, and Pope's influence progressively diminished except as a bureau chief. Borden went to the Imperial meetings in London without Pope. From 1917, and at the Peace Conference, he took with him Mr. Loring Christie, the legal adviser of the Department. Thereafter, Canadian external relationships were handled more and more by the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Department of External Affairs as such, was neglected, and apparently had a minor role. In the early twenties it still was small and unimportant, with only three officers and a small clerical staff. The Prime Minister had come to overshadow his own Department, and Sir Joseph Pope. Or, to put it another way, the Department was retarded in its own development by the paramountcy of the Prime Minister and his borrowed staff.

While the key-role of Sir Joseph Pope in external business apparently diminished to that of a bureau chief and administrator, Sir Robert Borden took more and more of the responsibility on himself, he relied on his legal adviser, Mr. Loring Christie, he attached to his own office a whole group of secretaries and clerical staff nominally belonging to the Department of External Affairs; and, finally, he appointed a Parliamentary Under-Secretary with nominally fairly wide powers that could, if applied, partially eclipse Sir Joseph Pope.[1]

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(1) See chapter on "Parliamentary Under-Secretaries."

In the tenth Ministry, from October 12, 1917, to July 10, 1920, when Sir Robert Borden was re-elected during the War to head a Unionist Government, he continued to be Secretary of State for External Affairs. Almost immediately after his re-election, an Order-in-Council, P.C.3073, dated October 23, 1917, was passed providing that the Minister occupying the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs should be granted a salary, to date from October 12th. Prior to this time, no provision had been made for a separate salary to be paid for the encumbent of this office, since it had been held by the Secretary of State of Canada, who then held no true portfolio of External Affairs, and later by the Prime Minister, in that senior capacity.*

It may be noted that, having by statute in 1912, been given the concurrent position of Secretary of State for External Affairs, none of the Prime Ministers - Borden, Meighen, Bennett and Mackenzie King (except rarely) - chose to use the title of Secretary of State for External Affairs except on rare occasions.(1) Within the Department, and intra-departmentally, the usage was to address most correspondence concerning external business to him as Prime Minister (Sir Robert Borden

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* In 1943 Mr. Mackenzie King, somewhat incorrectly at that date, made the statement in the House of Commons that as Prime Minister he got no appropriation from Parliament and "what he receives in the way of salary comes to him from External Affairs. Matters of bookkeeping and many other things of the Prime Minister's Office are managed by External Affairs - the two have been carried on, on the business side, pretty much exclusively by the Department of External Affairs." In fact, since 1920 or previously, a special Prime Minister's salary, over and above the sessional indemnity as a Member of

Borden apparently preferred "First Minister" - the statutory title); although informal letters from Cabinet colleagues were sometimes addressed "My Dear Premier". The designation as Secretary of State for External Affairs was presumably regarded as eclipsed by, or inferior to, the senior designation as Prime Minister.

Parliament and extra allowances had been authorized by a series of statutes. Whereas all other Ministers members of the Privy Council were to receive $10,000 "the member of the King's Privy Council holding the recognized position of First Minister shall receive $15,000 per annum."

(1) The Act of 1912 stated that "in this Act, the Secretary of State for External Affairs is hereafter referred to as 'The Minister'". However, the title "Secretary of State for External Affairs" continued in official usage. By an Order-in-Council in 1946, the designation of "Minister for External Affairs" in place of "Secretary of State for External Affairs" was authorized, but, as before, the title, "Secretary of State for External Affairs" has continued to be used officially.

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24.

THE ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

BORDEN, MEIGHEN AND KING, AND THE DEPARTMENT

The Role of Prime Minister: Borden, Meighen and King, and the Department

Prime Minister's Responsibilities

The role of Prime Minister in the formulation of policy and the implementation of it through his own diplomatic efforts, through assistance of the various departments, and through legislation enacted by Cabinet and Parliament, has been referred to in a previous chapter ("Laurier"). The manifold functions and tasks, even in the executive field, of the Prime Minister as premier and as Secretary of State for External Affairs, were vastly increased since the days of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In parliament, he was the representative of his constituency, the leader of his party, the head of the government; in addition to the premiership, he was Secretary of State for External Affairs and President of the Privy Council. He was the representative of the Government ~~and Parliament~~ in relations with the Governor General. He had personal relations with the foreign consuls-general and impersonal relations carried on by correspondence through the External Affairs Department on matters of foreign concern. Later these were to be augmented by personal relations with the foreign diplomats and the Commonwealth High Commissioners in Ottawa. He necessarily took part in numerous public events and ceremonial functions, and met visiting foreign personages. His Parliamentary and executive

functions did not stop at home; every Prime Minister found it necessary to undertake diplomatic missions abroad, both to the United States and overseas. In foreign affairs he had increasingly heavy responsibilities, as the following pages will indicate.

Sir Robert Borden and External Affairs

For a decade - 1911 to 1921 - Sir Robert Borden was Prime Minister; and after the new Act of 1912, he was also Secretary of State for External Affairs. He considered the two positions as inseparable, as Mr. Mackenzie King was later to declare to the House of Commons.(1)

The overriding role of the Prime Minister in all governmental formulation of external policy has

(1) H. of C. Debates, July 12, 1943. p. 4670

already been emphasized. (See chapter on "Sir Wilfrid Laurier"). Borden was perhaps more energetic in this field than any of his predecessors, but this can partly be explained by the fact of the four-year World War, which raised special problems of imperial and international relations and threw the chief burden on the head of government and his Cabinet, acting very largely by Order-in-Council under the blanket enabling legislation of special war-time statutes. Between 1911 and 1914 Borden was primarily concerned with the question of Canada's share in imperial naval defence in the face of rising German naval armament. This involved, as in most other external matters, the question of status and form of imperial obligation, always a contentious subject in Canadian political thinking. It also involved the question of cooperation in Imperial foreign policy, which was necessarily directed from London. Laurier had eschewed such responsibility in British policy; Borden, on the other hand, believed that cooperation in defence had as its corollary, collaboration or a "voice" in foreign policy. Towards this objective he worked throughout his period in the premiership with a great degree of success. But to gain this objective, it was not sufficient to maintain formal correspondence through the usual channel of the Governor General; it was necessary for the Prime Minister to maintain personal contact and consultation with the British leaders. This became more imperative after 1914, when Canada was ~~automatically become embroiled in the Anglo-German war,~~ commited to participation in the war with Germany

and soon became one of the principal belligerents - the only belligerent of the Western hemisphere until 1917 - making a very heavy contribution in expeditionary forces and materiel to Europe. Borden therefore made repeated visits to London, ~~acting in the nature of ambassador as well as premier, and in this dual capacity,~~ became virtually Canada's "foreign minister", combining his roles as Lord Salisbury had once done, and as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald was later to do. Because of the inseparableness of the two functions, Borden had accepted the External Affairs portfolio, and could not envisage any divorcement of the two, or any separate Minister of External Affairs.

An outline of his external policy, both in its imperial and in its foreign aspects, need not be given here.(1) It is only appropriate to refer to the methods in which he conducted his foreign relations, as Prime Minister and as Secretary of State for External Affairs.

That he made some use of the staff of the Department, appointing departmentally a number of Private Secretaries and a Legal Adviser, will be shown anon. That he formulated his external policies himself, or in consultation with his fellow Ministers, was natural in the system of government, especially where there was no other Foreign Minister in the framework of administration. That he found it necessary to consult personally with the authorities in Great Britain has just been mentioned; and indeed, so useful was this personal contact found to be, that the British Government itself repeatedly invited him, and drew him into its inner councils and

(1) Reference may be made to the Memoirs; to Glazebrook's A History of Canada's External Relations, and F.H.Soward's study: "Sir Robert Borden and Canada's External Policy" in the Canadian Historical Association Proceedings, May, 1941. pp.65-82.

War Cabinet, to directly share in the imperial war policy.

In 1912 Borden had gone to England to get a first-hand understanding of the imperial defence problem arising out of the German naval threat. In 1915 he went to London to gather information on imperial war plans, and while there was invited to sit with meetings of the British Cabinet. He laid stress in England on the status of the dominions and emphasized that their participation in the war must lead to closest participation in imperial foreign policy. With the change of government in Great Britain in December, 1916, he was again invited to England in 1917 to sit with the British War Cabinet created by Mr. Lloyd George, and took an influential part in consultations on foreign policy and defence. On that visit he was accompanied by L.C. Christie and J.F. Boyce. In that meeting the Resolution Nineteen was adopted on the motion of Borden, that a special imperial conference on constitutional readjustments should be called immediately after the cessation of hostilities, and which recorded the view that such readjustment should be based upon "a full recognition of the dominions as autonomous nations of an imperial commonwealth, their rights to have an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations, and provision of effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common concern and for such necessary concerted action founded on consultation, as the several governments may determine."

In the summer of 1918 Borden again was in England and shared in the Imperial War Cabinet and War Council; and at that time a lengthy discussion took place on the channel of communication between the dominions and the Imperial Government. As a result, the War Cabinet concluded that "The prime ministers of the dominions, as members of the Imperial War Cabinet, have the right of direct communication with the prime minister of the United Kingdom and vice versa. Such communication should be confined to questions of Cabinet importance. Telegraphic communications between the prime ministers should, as a rule, be conducted through the colonial office machinery, but this will not exclude the adoption of more direct means of communication in exceptional circumstances." Borden returned to Canada in August, but, as the War was seen to be drawing to an end, he was urgently invited by Lloyd George back to London; and he and his delegation sailed in November. Besides a number of ministerial colleagues (Sir George Foster, A.L. Sifton and C.J. Doherty, each with his own Secretaries), Borden took with him from the Department of External Affairs L.C. Christie, J.F. Boyce, and Buskard.

It is true that, handicapped by the limitation of the Department to only three officers, there was little preparation made in Ottawa for meeting the complicated problems of the Peace Conference, and Borden and his ministerial associates left Canada relatively unprepared, with Christie the principal technical adviser. As

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Mr. Eberts thinks that a Winnipeg newspaper article on file, indicated that Christie had resigned two or three weeks before the Beauharnois scandals came out. We are hoping to relocate this file and reference.

K. P. K. nov. 28. 1958

Glazebrook has pointed out, "there was no staff of permanent officials to study foreign affairs in general and the Peace Conference in particular, and in the available sources there is no hint of consideration in 1918 by the Cabinet of current international questions from a Canadian point of view. . . Indeed there was little preparation of any kind except, apparently, some study of the constitutional aspect. No special committee or other group seems to have been set up to examine the issues likely to come before the Peace Conference, and certainly no standing organization was capable of undertaking such a task. The Department of External Affairs still existed in skeleton form only, and was in no position to supply background memoranda or experts on the various subjects of a conference. The only member of the Department to go, in fact, was the Legal Adviser - a situation which was in line with the concentration by the Ministers on legal and constitutional matters." (1)

Borden quickly acquired a position of prestige in the imperial and allied councils that received a recognition equal to that of Smuts. In the absence of Lloyd George, Borden presided over various British meetings. He was invited by Lloyd George to be the chief British delegate to a conference with the Russians at Prinkipo, in the Sea of Marmora, in February, 1919; two Ministers cabled him from Ottawa urging him not to go, but having reluctantly accepted, he felt he must proceed; but that conference in the end was cancelled. In the middle of April he attended the council of foreign

(1) Glazebrook. op.cit. p. 308.

ministers (Council of Five) as the chief British delegate, when the main topic under discussion was the German position in Egypt. He was also appointed one of the two British Empire representatives on the Commission for Greek and Albanian questions and subsequently was elected Vice-President of the Commission. Borden was also tentatively proposed as British Ambassador to the United States, but this suggestion did not materialize.*

Borden and his Canadian associates were kept busy in the preliminary discussions in London and in the Allied discussions in Paris until early 1919. The Prime Minister spent four months in Paris, but did not remain for the signing of the Peace Treaties at Versailles; he left Sir George Foster to represent him. Political affairs in Canada, including strikes in Winnipeg and agitations among the demobilized war veterans, required his immediate return. Sailing on the ~~S.S.~~ R.M.S. Aquitania, on which President Wilson was also returning home, he arrived in Ottawa on May 26, 1919. Opinion in Canada was beginning to feel that his absence on diplomatic business abroad was too prolonged. The Toronto Globe of February 1, 1919, said:

> It was doubtless a good thing to have the Premier of Canada and several of his colleagues at Paris when these tremendous decisions which will affect the course of world events for centuries were under consideration. The good feeling that already existed among the British overseas Dominions must have been increased by the support given by Canada to South Africa and Australia when the question of the future of the German colonies came up. But that issue having been disposed of, is there any reason why the Premier of Canada should

* A parallel was to be found in the 1880's, when Sir Charles Tupper earnestly besought Sir John A. Macdonald to accept appointment as British Minister to Washington. Macdonald, like Borden, rejected the suggestion.

> should remain in Paris in what is manifestly a subordinate capacity until the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland are arranged, the tangled mess of Balkan intrigue is sorted out, and the last comma is inserted in the Peace Treaty? . . .
>
> If the President of the United States can return to his duties at home, leaving the diplomats to settle the details involved in the great decisions arrived at during the past few weeks, would it not be possible for the Premier of Canada also to come home and put a little energy into the Administration at Ottawa? It is notoriously weak on the executive side. This becomes more marked as time passes. That weakness is accentuated by the prolonged absences of the Prime Minister. Diplomacy seems to fascinate him. In 1917-18, and now in 1919, he has found it necessary to answer calls to take part in the larger affairs of the Empire in London or in Paris. His presence on each occasion for ashort time was probably necessary, but in the last analysis Canada must be governed by Canadians for Canadians. The proper seat of such a Government is Ottawa. Sir Robert Borden should come home and meet Parliament at the end of the month. There are plenty of footloose statesmen in Paris to attend to Czecho-Slovakia and Bolshevist Russia.(1)

Such was Borden's recognized prestige and skill as a negotiator that, even after he had gone into Opposition, he was continued* by King to be Canada's chief representative on the British Delegation at the Washington Naval Limitation of Armaments Conference in 1922, at which he was accompanied once more by L.C. Christie and by Merriam as his Secretary, and J. Mailhot as filing clerk and messenger. As a reflection on the still under-staffed Department, Glazebrook remarks of Borden's mission on this occasion that in addition to a Private Secretary, he was accompanied only by the Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs - though even this meant one-third of the officers of the Department.(2)

(1) Borden Papers, O.C. 553.

* Borden had been appointed Canadian delegate to Washington by Mr. Meighen while the latter was Prime Minister, on October 3, 1921. (File 1518-20). After the King Government was elected, Borden, on December 26, 1921, offered to resign, but on January 3, 1922, King asked him to continue. (File 1518-20).

(2) Glazebrook: op. cit. p. 353.

This brief review of the principal activities of Sir Robert Borden in this sphere, in conjunction with the British and other empire premiers, suffices to indicate the key role of the Prime Minister in the conduct of Canada's external affairs, and in the development of its increasing autonomy in its imperial relationships. A former Private Secretary to Mr. Mackenzie King and a member of the Department of External Affairs, Professor James A. Gibson, told an audience at Carleton University in Ottawa on March 18, 1958, of Borden's great contribution. "The working-out of Canadian autonomy was after all, a lengthy process; but the working-out had to be done, and this required activity and persuasion rather than passivity and hopefulness. Autonomy was a corollary of the acceptance of responsible government. In theory, control by Britain of foreign relations lasted until at least 1917, when Borden's celebrated memorandum, looking to the future of a British Commonwealth of Nations, in effect altered the whole concept of the imperial relationship. Any Canadian in Sir Robert's position, from the time of his visit to England in 1915 and on all his subsequent visits until his return to Canada in May of 1919, would have been bound to insist upon status. Status was the only basis upon which the full weight of the Canadian argument could be brought to bear. If it had not been insisted upon during the active conduct of hostilities, the occasion for insisting upon it might not then have arisen for many years. There would have been a slowing down of interest, and perhaps of initiative, and it might have been very difficult to

arouse any enthusiasm for what the Imperial Conferences of 1923 and 1926 were finally able to achieve.

"It is of course possible that Sir Robert Borden exaggerated his personal position in these myriad negotiations. If so, it may be asked, upon whom was he to rely? He was the Prime Minister, and Secretary of State for External Affairs; there was no single person among his ministerial colleagues to whom he apparently was prepared to entrust the main business of negotiation, and it may be concluded that Canada was better served by his efforts than by any other combination of effort . . . The forms of words and refinements of detail which came after Sir Robert's retirement took away nothing from his achievement. In a day when external relations were a very personal concern the Prime Minister could, and did, give the guiding impulse to what was said, to what was done, and to much that was imagined for the future."(1)

Sir Robert Borden and the Department

Throughout the ten years of Borden's premiership, and nine years as concurrent Secretary of State for External Affairs, he necessarily had to rely to some extent on the assistance of that small department and its permanent officials.

In the first place, there was the experienced head, Sir Joseph Pope, who remained throughout as Under-Secretary. Now that the Prime Minister himself was titular head of the Department, some of the personal friction, and feeling of serving "two masters" which Pope had formerly

(1) Ottawa Journal, March 10, 1958.

experienced under Mr. Murphy, was eliminated. In a letter dated April 24, 1957, written on behalf of the then Under-Secretary (Mr. Leger) to Mr. John E. Bisson of the University of Virginia, G. Glazebrook pointed out that "Prime Ministers in all countries having Cabinet government must take a particular interest in foreign affairs. When the Prime Minister was also Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Under-Secretary was dealing directly with the person in whose hands the right of final decision rested (subject of course to the overriding authority of the Cabinet as a whole). This eliminated one of the steps normally taken in very important matters, when the Under-Secretary advises the Minister and the Minister advises the Prime Minister, and receives instructions from him which are then passed on to the Under-Secretary."(1) Pope thus had only one chief to deal with. Moreover, the transfer of the Department in 1914 from the Trafalgar Building back to the East Block brought Pope and his staff in closer proximity and more convenient contact with the Prime Minister and his Office, and Borden was able to share in the use of some of the Department's staff. The relationship, both officially and personally, grew cooperative and apparently intimate, even with the appointment in 1913 of Loring Christie as a tertium quid.

The small Department of External Affairs was necessarily called on to perform increasing tasks. It coordinated, so far as it could, the work of other departments; it had, just prior to the War, supervised the

(1) File 1 EA-57.

preparation of the War Book; it was to some extent, a channel of communication to and from the High Commissioner in London, and special agencies in Washington, as well as to and from the British authorities through the Governor General. Some of its staff served in the Prime Minister's bureau, or were attached to Sir Robert Borden on his overseas missions. Borden appreciated the documents and Prints which the Department provided. He listened sympathetically to Pope's complaints or various proposals for administrative reforms, and in many cases intervened to attain the desired improvements. It is true that Pope and the rest of his Department came to be overshadowed by the services, of an advisory nature, of Christie, the Legal Adviser (who also became Secretary of the War Cabinet); and Pope's personal influence became secondary; but Pope, the conscientious executive, had never aspired to be a ~~political~~ policy adviser as Christie was.

In the chapter on "Staff", the growth of the Department's clerical staff during the Borden regime, necessitated largely by the pressures created by the War, has been described. Besides the several Private Secretaries who were taken on the Department's strength and used in the Prime Minister's Office, the number of clerks, typists and messengers increased; under the War Appropriation, a considerable number of "temporaries" were added, and the Passport Bureau hived off in a special section with a numerous staff. Although this expansion was largely promoted by the Under-Secretary,

with the cooperation of the Civil Service Commission, Borden, as titular head of the Department, had some responsibility for approval; and in this respect may be credited with the initial growth of the still embryonic Department after its war-time return to the East Block.

It has been mentioned elsewhere that for nearly a decade (1913-1921) Borden used L.C. Christie as his most intimate external affairs adviser, both in Ottawa and on his various visits to England and France. Christie accompanied him to the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917 and 1918, the inter-Allied meetings on the peace settlement in 1918, and the preliminary meetings of the Peace Conference in 1919, and later the Washington Conference of 1922. At all these imperial and international gatherings, at which Borden played a significant role from the point of view of the promotion of Canada's status in the Empire, its autonomy in external relations, and the new structure of the British Commonwealth; he leaned on the intelligent advice of his expert on constitutional and international law, possibly more in the capacity of a personal special adviser than as an official or representative of the Department of External Affairs.

However, he did not altogether overlook the permanent head of the Department, and in various ways, both officially and privately, their relations begun in 1911, were maintained.

Relations between Pope and Borden

Under the Borden administration, Pope first had

as his chief Dr. W.G. Roche, as Secretary of State, also in charge of the Department of External Affairs for five months,(October 10, 1911 to March 31, 1912), when Sir Robert Borden took over the latter portfolio, while Dr. Roche retained the former until October 28, 1912, when he became Minister of Interior and of Indian Affairs. Pope's association with Roche was brief, and unremarkable; Roche would be new and unfamiliar, and would trust to Pope for guidance and instruction. As soon as the Prime Minister became head of the Department of External Affairs, and thus Pope's direct chief, all Pope's notes and memoranda and consultations were addressed directly to Borden. For the next few years, Pope was, departmental-wise, Borden's,and afterwards Meighen's, right-hand man in external matters.

The personal relations between Pope and Sir Robert Borden were, as with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, cordial and close, judging by the number of personal memoranda on departmental matters which Pope sent him. As Private Secretary to Sir John A. Macdonald, Pope's former relations with that Prime Minister had obviously been intimate; he had accompanied Macdonald on most of his Canadian tours and on some of his diplomatic missions as a personal adviser and amanuensis. With Sir Wilfrid Laurier, there were many evidences of personal confidence and advice; he had accompanied Sir Wilfrid on several diplomatic missions; he consulted Sir Wilfrid in every matter concerning the new Department and its problems - and had used Sir Wilfrid's consent or support in his appeals to

other heads of departments for facilities, premises, staff, privileges of printing, etcetera. This was despite the fact that Laurier was not Pope's actual chief.

With Sir Robert Borden, he appears to have been perhaps a little more formal in official business, though on very friendly terms in private, for Borden possessed a warm heart and considerate disposition toward his colleagues and staff. Pope and Borden exchanged many private handwritten letters, both on current politics and on family matters. But after the addition of Loring Christie, Pope's relations seem to have become slightly more formal. When he addressed correspondence directly to him, in his official capacity, he almost invariably addressed it to Borden as Prime Minister or, alternatively, as "First Minister", and very rarely as Secretary of State for External Affairs.* Also, curiously, correspondence from Pope or from other departments was generally addressed to the "Right Honourable R. Borden", and not to "Sir Robert Borden" - (although Borden addressed his letters to his deputy as "Sir Joseph Pope"). A possible explanation may lie in the assumption that the Privy Council title "Right Honourable" represents a higher honour than a companionhood in an order of Chivalry, and thus takes precedence or eclipses the title of knighthood if both are not used together.

But a large proportion of Pope's more formal correspondence, and the relaying of departmental documents, was addressed to Mr. A.E. Blount, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister or First Minister; and similar transmissions in the reverse direction came through the Private

* This mode of address continued under Meighen and under Mackenzie King.

Secretary, to the Under-Secretary, Mr. Pope, or the Acting Under-Secretary, Mr. Walker. In other words, although they were (after 1914) in almost adjoining offices in the East Block, there was still a Private Secretary interposed, in correspondence, between the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. It would appear that Pope accepted this arrangement without question although it meant an intermediate stage (unnecessary except for required registering) between himself and his chief, in matters of formal correspondence. The fact that the Private Secretary, Mr. Blount, was attached to the Prime or First Minister, and not to the "Secretary of State for External Affairs", suggests how little Sir Robert Borden considered himself as head of his coeval Department. Although in due course he added two more Private Secretaries, (Boyce and Merriam), from External Affairs, this scarcely changed the arrangement: on a few occasions Pope addressed a letter to J.F. Boyce, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but generally he addressed his letters for Borden to A.E. Blount, Private Secretary to the First Minister. It was Blount who, on Borden's behalf, wrote to Walker asking him to arrange for an extra allowance ($600) for the "Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs", i.e., the joint Secretaries Boyce and Merriam who were fiscally attached to Pope's staff, and not to the personal staff of the Prime Minister. (The Prime Minister had no separate funds for staffing his Office, except for Mr. Blount as a Personal Secretary). These

were matters of formal procedure, curious, but of no great importance. They reveal the manner in which Pope sometimes had to deal, indirectly, with his immediate chief. However, in less official matters, the connections were more direct and cordial. There are numerous evidences, in more formal and private correspondence, of a feeling of good-will and consideration between the two men, on a personal level. Pope endorsed privately some of Borden's policies; he wrote to him passing on the appreciation of others. His wife wrote personal notes (in French) to Sir Robert; Sir Joseph, on behalf of himself and his wife, sent notes of greeting to Sir Robert; and on Sir Joseph Pope's retirement, Sir Robert Borden wrote a warm letter of friendly appreciation to his great Under-Secretary. There seem to have been the most cordial relations between the two.

In contrast to the tart and reproachful attitude of Charles Murphy when his elder Deputy absented himself to spend a day on private business in Montreal, after notifying his chief but the note not having been received, we find a greater sympathy and consideration between Sir Robert Borden and Sir Joseph Pope. On one occasion, Pope again had suddenly to absent himself in going to Montreal for a serious family reason. In a short handwritten personal note, dated August 22, 1913, W.H. Walker wrote to Borden:

> I have just had a telephone message from Sir Joseph Pope at Montreal to say that he had come up there for a nurse to attend his little girl who is seriously ill with pneumonia at Ste. Irénée. I had had previous word that he had been prevented by the same cause from returning on Tuesday last

and he now asks me to explain to you the reason of his continued absence. He hopes his daughter will be well enough for him to return on Monday.

Apparently Sir Robert immediately wrote a note of sympathy, for on his return to Ottawa, Sir Joseph Pope wrote by hand, on August 28th, a note marked "Personal":

I thank you for your kind note with reference to my little girl's illness. She was at last account a little better, though still seriously ill. I propose to go down to St. Irénée tomorrow (Friday) afternoon, returning to Ottawa on Monday - or as Monday is a holiday, perhaps Tuesday.

On January 25, 1925, Lady Pope, signing herself "Henriette Pope" wrote a personal letter of thanks, in French, to "Mon cher Sir Robert". On another occasion, Borden's birthday, Pope wrote by hand, on June 26, 1924, a note: "Dear Sir Robert Borden, My wife and I congratulate you on reaching the 'Grand Climacterie', which I understand you attain today, and we hope that you may see many birthdays in as good health as you at present enjoy". In an equal friendly spirit, Borden very considerately wrote a note to Pope on December 7, 1925:

My dear Sir Joseph: In going over my diaries today I observed under the date of February 3, 1915, following entry:

"Long letter from Spring-Rice as to conditions of public opinion in U.S. Also as to settlement of Fort Erie shooting case. He pays high compliments to Pope's ability in dealing with it."

It occurred to me that perhaps you would like to be reminded of this, although, doubtless, I mentioned it to you at the time. With kindest remembrances and all good wishes, etc.

Pope acknowledged this on December 9th: "Dear Sir Robert: I have to thank you very cordially for the courtesy you have shown me in acquainting me with the extract from

Sir Cecil Spring-Rice's letter regarding myself, which I highly appreciate". These were the amenities and courtesies of two good official colleagues on the personal plane, and show that Christie, who enjoyed equal favour and similar private letters, had not effaced Pope from the warm-hearted friendliness of their mutual chief.

Prime Ministers' Delays

Reference has been made in a previous chapter ("Laurier") to the irritating delays in the handling of correspondence caused by the dilatoriness of the Prime Minister who had personally to see all important despatches and who had to pass on all minutes, memoranda or despatches, outgoing or incoming, which crossed his desk.

Although in the course of the ensuing years these complaints were lessened, and the machinery under Borden and his successors (with an External Affairs staff in his own office to assist him) apparently worked somewhat more smoothly, there occurred from time to time occasions for further complaint, not wholly attributable to the Prime Minister but for which he, as head of the Department, was held responsible.

As already indicated, the problem of delay in correspondence was a prepossession of Pope's. Where the Colonial Office channel was concerned, it had been a source of irritation and criticism both in England and in the Colonies during the nineteenth century. A part of that delay was due to inadequacy in the Colonial Office itself; a part was due to the fact that other British

Government departments, such as the Treasury, the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Foreign Office, were often involved and were blameworthy for dilatory treatment of correspondence. These conditions, which characterized almost all bureaucractic elements of government, inspired Dickens to create his "Office of Circumlocution". Red-tapism was known long before Dickens, and the term, borrowed from the field of legal practice, dates back to 1690. The dictionaries describe it as addiction to excessive routine, "resulting often in vexatious delay". Whatever the causes, those in England were of course conditions which the Canadian Government could not control.

On the other hand, as has been exemplified in references to Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Provincial Governments, and some other departments, there were cases where delay occurred in the Colonies, for various reasons. These were noted and envisaged in the Colonial Office Instructions to the Governor General, which remained relatively unchanged from 1878 till the 1930's. The Instructions, as they stood in 1909, included:

> 180. With a view to facilitating the despatch of business, the Governor will send home by the first mail every month -
>
> (1) A schedule of despatches received from the Secretary of State which have been more than a month in his hands without an answer. The cause of the delay should be briefly stated in each case.
>
> (2) A schedule of despatches sent by the Governor to the Secretary of State which appear to have remained unanswered for more than a month after receipt. Attention should be called to any case where inconvenience is occurring or likely to occur by the delay in answering.(1)

(1) Colonial Office List, 1909. p. 613.

Such delays were almost inevitable in any complicated system of government, where various departments and provincial governments are involved. Nevertheless, to an efficient and orderly bureaucrat like Pope, these were anathema, and he sought to reduce them in so far as new machinery would permit. This was implicit in his memorandum to the Royal Commission on Civil Service in 1907 proposing a central department for the expedition of business. It was also inherent in his abortive effort to short-circuit the Secretary of State channel of correspondence with the provincial governments. He would have liked to expedite also the Prime Minister's handling of correspondence, but was reluctant to intervene. To a considerable extent, however, by means of his own Department, and an enlarged Prime Minister's office staffed with External Affairs personnel, these delays were reduced if not eliminated. In 1909 and also in 1912, the Colonial Office had cause to complain of delays in receiving copies of Statutes assented to in Canada, which had to be reviewed by the King, who, within a two-year period, had the prerogative of dissenting. These delays, however, were caused by a confusion over the despatching authority in Ottawa, and prompted Pope, in 1913, to bring the matter to the attention of the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden. Among the Borden Papers there is a "Memorandum for the Prime Minister" dated January 9, 1913, signed by Pope, which reads as follows:

Memorandum for the Prime Minister

Herewith are two files of the Department of External Affairs, Nos. 288 of 1909, and 1228 of 1912.

On the first mentioned file there is a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 31st March, 1909, calling attention to the delay which took place at that time in regard to the sending home of authenticated copies of the Acts of Parliament of Canada for signification of His Majesty's pleasure.

On the same file there is a letter addressed to me by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, at that time Prime Minister, dated 11th October, 1909, asking me to undertake to see to the transmission of these statutes in future without undue delay.

In pursuance of this direction, on the 6th December, 1909, I requested Major Chapleau to forward me a certified copy of a certain Act for transmission to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He replied to the effect that he had sent this Act "through the usual channel". I reported Mr. Chapleau's unwillingness to send me the Acts to the Prime Minister, but nothing more was done.

On file 1228/12, there is a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th December, 1912, again pointing out the great delay which takes place in forwarding certified copies of the Acts of Parliament of Canada. On this file is a letter from Major Chapleau stating that the delay is due to the Printing Bureau.

I venture to submit that the responsibility of seeing that these statutes are forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with all convenient speed, should be clearly attached to some particular official, whose duty it should be to see that the volume in question reaches the Office of the Governor General's Secretary within a reasonable time after the Royal Assent has been given.(1)

In this particular case, the blame was not laid upon the Prime Minister, but to a faulty allocation of authority and duties; but it is significant that Pope felt obliged to call it to the attention of Borden, in his capacity, either as Prime Minister or as Secretary of State for External Affairs, as the senior person having the authority to rectify any causes of inter-departmental delay in external correspondence. However,

(1) Borden Papers. 2997(1)

with Sir Robert Borden and succeeding Premiers, it seems that some of these difficulties of delay, procrastination or neglect were remedied. Since the Prime Minister became also Secretary of State for External Affairs, he was in a position to augment the Prime Minister's Office, (as Grey had suggested in 1908), with additional secretaries co-opted or seconded from the External Affairs Department. Besides having senior executives like Pope, Walker and Christie who now came directly under Borden, he appointed, through the Department of External Affairs, special Private Secretaries like Boyce, and Merriam, Armstrong, Buskard and his own brother, Henry Borden, to help him with his external affairs work; and thereafter there is less evidence of delays and tardiness on his personal part.

Nevertheless, the new system did not attain perfection. As the operations of the High Commissioner's Office in London became, during the war, an overseas Canadian military office in addition to its more normal diplomatic functions, correspondence became more direct, especially between Sir George Perley and Sir Robert Borden. The Department of External Affairs came to be overlooked or side-tracked (the High Commissioner's Office was not yet directly under the jurisdiction of that Department), and even despatches on military matters sometimes were not sent directly to the Ministers of Naval Service (Mr. Hazen) or Militia and Defence (Sir Sam Hughes), but were sent to the Prime Minister, and there, in some cases, they failed to be properly passed on or circulated.

On December 12, 1917, for example, Commander R.M. Stephens, Chief of Staff of the Department of the Naval Service, complained of this defect to Sir Joseph Pope, saying: "There have been a good many similar occurrences connected with the Prime Minister's Office. . . I write now to ask if it would not be possible for the Prime Minister's Secretary to send you a copy of all correspondence from the High Commissioner for distribution to Departments instead of the attempt being made by the Prime Minister's office, or better still that all communications from the High Commissioner should be addressed to you direct." To this letter Pope replied: "I am as much alive as you can possibly be to the inconvenience caused by the High Commissioner's practice of telegraphing on matters affecting international relations, without notification being sent to this office, but I do not see what I can do to prevent it. I am afraid it would not do for me to suggest to the Prime Minister and the High Commissioner how they should conduct their correspondence. At the same time, I quite agree with what you say."(1) From the High Commissioner in London, the channel of major communication thus remained that of the Prime Minister, with its occasional drawbacks, until 1921, when the London Office came directly under the Department of External Affairs and directed its correspondence through that channel, as well as, under the new instructions to Mr. P.C. Larkin, to the Prime Minister.

(1) Pope Papers. S.O. Vol. 99. No.738.

Mr. Meighen and Imperial Foreign Policy

The relations of Prime Minister Arthur Meighen with the Department continued to be similar to those of Sir Robert Borden. But Meighen's terms of office were short, the first lasting only eighteen months - from July 10, 1920, to December 29, 1921, - and the second only three months, - June 29 to September 25, 1926. During his first period, he was mainly concerned with domestic political affairs, and had less opportunity than Borden to participate in international matters, nor is it evident that he possessed quite the same degree of interest in or familiarity of overseas affairs. He did, however, take an active part in the question of Anglo-American-Japanese relations, and played an extremely influential role in the Imperial Conference of 1921 at which the question of the renewal or abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed. In this he was thoroughly briefed by Christie, who accompanied him, as also did J.F. Boyce as Secretary.

Mr. Meighen's Foreign Policy Procedure

At the Imperial Conference of 1921 Mr. Meighen, on June 28, made a declaration of Dominion rights setting out what in his judgment should constitute an adequate voice for the Dominions in the foreign affairs of the Empire. One can almost perceive the hand of Mr. Loring Christie in this statement. The Montreal Gazette stated that "although the speech and the discussion which ensued have not yet been made public, and may for the time being be regarded as confidential, it is understood his four points were as follows:

"First - That on all questions of foreign policy which more directly concern the British Government, such as matters arising in connexion with the Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the Middle East, the Governments of the Dominions should be kept thoroughly and constantly informed.

"Second - That upon all questions of foreign policy affecting the Empire as a whole the Dominion Governments must be consulted.

"Third - That the British Government should enter into no treaties or special alliances without consultation with, and the advice of, the Dominions, and that all such treaties, when entered into, be subject to the approval of the Dominion Parliaments.

"Fourth - That upon all questions arising as between the United States and Canada, the advice of the Dominion Government must be accepted as final."

"The foregoing doctrine", commented the Gazette, "is by no means revolutionary, and, in fact, represented nothing more than that Hon. N.W. Rowell, former President of the Privy Council, laid down in Parliament last session."

"Premier Meighen", the paper continued, "combatted a statement by Premier Massey of New Zealand, that the Imperial War Cabinet had advised the King and that, therefore, the continuation of the War Cabinet would give the Dominions a greater voice in the Empire's foreign policy than a mere Conference such as that now being held. The Canadian Premier argued that the Dominion Ministers in the Imperial War Cabinet did not advise the King, but by consultation with the British Cabinet, merely

helped influence the advice which the latter gave to the Sovereign. In this respect, indeed, Mr. Meighen is probably not prepared to go as far as Premier Smuts or even Sir Robert Borden or Hon. N.W. Rowell, who, it will be remembered, have practically advocated that the Dominion Cabinets advise the King direct. Premier Meighen apparently sees difficulty and danger in this, while willing to accept a condition under which guarantees would be secured that the advice of the Dominions, on all matters exclusively affecting them, be taken."(1)

How far these desiderata were approved is not clear. A few months later, on December 14, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in the British House of Commons on the Irish question, made his remark that "The machinery is the machinery of the British Government - the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors. The machinery must remain here... The instrument of the foreign policy of the Empire is the British Foreign Office. That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable. But they claim a voice in determining the lines of our future foreign policy. We are now acting upon the mature, general decisions arrived at with the common consent of the whole Empire. The sole control of Britain over foreign policy is now vested in the Empire as a whole. That is a new fact." Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a public address in London, emphasized the same opinion. He said: "In former days the policy of Great Britain

(1) Montreal Gazette, June 28, 1921. Cit. in R.M.Dawson: The Development of Dominion Status. p.210.

was the foreign policy of Great Britain alone. Now it is the foreign policy of the British Empire. The initiative, and, to a large extent, the executive action, must necessarily remain in the Foreign Office; but in the various conferences assembled in London full statements were made to the Ministers assembled from all the Dominions on foreign affairs. Every aspect of them was discussed, a foreign policy for the whole Empire was framed, and in the intervals when the Dominion Ministers were not here, full papers were sent to them, and on no matter of first-class importance was a decision taken without their being informed . . . This is a great change, and it will readily be seen what enormous strength it adds to the position of the Foreign Secretary. He feels that he is not only speaking for Downing Street or for the British Isles but for the states which constitutes the British Empire."(1)

But those aspirations and prospects of consultation seriously broke down, over Lloyd George's failure to consult the Dominions at the time of the Chanak crisis in 1922, and subsequently the failure of consultation over the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. However, in 1921 the aspiration seemed to have some justification. The British foreign policy with regard to the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, though supported by the Dominions of the Southern Seas, was deflected and changed under the pressure of Canada and its spokesman, Premier Meighen, at the Imperial Conference of 1921. On his return from the Conference, he optimistically stated

(1) Cit. J.W. Dafoe, Manitoba Free Press, July 6, 1925, and by Dawson, op. cit. p. 216.

in a speech in Toronto on September 2, 1921, "Great Britain in reaching her decisions invites the advice and viewpoint of every portion of the Empire." At that time it was confidently believed that, thanks largely to Sir Robert Borden's and Mr. Meighen's advocacy, a corner had been turned in imperial foreign policy, and that Canada was reaching a new position of responsibility and participation in imperial policy-making.

Mr. Meighen and the Department

As regards Mr. Meighen's relations with the Department of External Affairs, there seems little to say. Apart from routine business, there is no indication that he utilized the services of Sir Joseph Pope, the department administrator, to any significant extent. He continued Borden's practice of benefitting, in the Prime Minister's Office, by the temporary co-option of some of the Department's secretarial and clerical staff, since he lacked financial appropriations to cover employment of a staff of his own office, other than a Private Secretary. Many of the administrative difficulties over which Pope had worried Sir Robert Borden had apparently been solved in the course of the years; and no complaints addressed to Mr. Meighen have been noted. The Department had by then begun to sail on a more even keel, though still diminutive in size. Meighen, in his relatively short incumbency, did nothing to further the implementation of decisions already reached in 1920 concerning independent Canadian diplomatic representation in the United States or elsewhere, although, according to Mr. John A. Stevenson,(1) Borden was prepared

(1) Foreign Affairs (U.S.A.) Vol.1. No.3. March, 1923. p. 118.

to do so if he had not resigned on account of ill-health.

It is difficult to equate Loring Christie as a personal consultant and adviser to Mr. Meighen, as to Borden, with the Department as a whole. Although Christie was still nominally Legal Adviser of the Department during Meighen's first term of office, he retained a certain independence from the Department as such, and took relatively little part in its administration or operations. Christie, as he had been of Borden, was a confidant of Meighen;(in 1920 he was addressing the Prime Minister as "My dear Arthur", and receiving letters from Mr. Meighen as "My dear Loring"); and even after his resignation in 1923, remained a confidant to both, through correspondence from England. But these services seemed rather more personal than official and departmental.

If Meighen did nothing for the Department, the Department, as such, had little opportunity of helping him in the broad questions of external policy. It continued, as in the earlier stages, to be an apparatus in the machinery of government, and little else. It was still very small, with a large amount of routine business to handle. The Department, in fact, was not yet conceived of as a policy organ or "foreign office"; and foreign policy still remained the prerogative of the Prime Minister, his personal advisers, and his Cabinet.

Mr. W.L. Mackenzie King as Diplomat

Mr. Mackenzie King had previously, while Deputy Minister of Labour, established his reputation as a diplomat. In 1905 immigrants from Great Britain were being imported for strike-breaking purposes, and several unions had complained. King conducted an investigation, and in 1906 he went to England to discuss the matter with the British Government with a view to having the British Parliament legislate to prevent fraudulent practices connected with inducing residents of the British Isles to migrate to Canada. He was successful in his negotiations. In September, 1907, anti-Japanese riots, led by organized labour and instigated to some extent by American exclusionists, broke out violently in Vancouver. The Canadian Government promptly appointed a Royal Commission to investigate; there was one Commissioner, Mackenzie King. Following this, Mr. Lemieux and Joseph Pope were sent to Japan to negotiate a Japanese-controlled immigration agreement; meanwhile Mr. King was asked to deal with the deliciate question of Hindu immigration. Laurier first sent King to Washington, in January, 1908, to speak directly to President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root on the subject, in company with Bryce, the British Ambassador. These talks were successful in bridging various differences, and Roosevelt described to "dear Sir Wilfrid" his "particular pleasure" in meeting Mr. King and "at the steps that have been taken to bring our several peoples into a closer and more friendly connection." King was then sent to London, and in March visited Whitehall with the object of effecting an arrangement

with the Government of India for preventing the emigration of Indians to Canada, although they were British subjects. In 1909 King stopped off in India on his way to a meeting of the International Opium Commission in Shanghai, and in Calcutta saw the Viceroy, Lord Minto, a former Governor General of Canada, and made a very happy impression, which Minto passed on through the Colonial Office, to Earl Grey and Sir Wilfrid Laurier. King then attempted, somewhat less successfully, to negotiate an immigration agreement with the Chinese; the matter was left to be further discussed by the Chinese Consul-General in London and later in Ottawa. In 1909 King acted as a British representative on the International Commission for regulation of opium traffic, which had penetrated into British Columbia. In June, 1910, King visited Berlin, the namesake of the small Ontario town where he was born (afterwards renamed Kitchener).

Mr. King as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs

Mr. Mackenzie King, having been chosen leader of the Liberal Party on the death of Laurier in 1919, became Prime Minister on December 29, 1921. At the same time, he assumed the portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs, like his predecessors Borden and Meighen.

His most active period in the field of external affairs, in the expansion of the Canadian diplomatic service, and in relation to the Department of External Affairs, did not come until after 1926, when Dr. Skelton was Under-Secretary. A brief reference, however, may be given to his

activities in relation to the Department up to the time of Pope's retirement in 1925.

The accession of Mr. King almost coincided with the establishment and initial phases of the League of Nations; and the work of that organization, so largely concerned with the tangled web of European affairs, brought a special burden on the Prime Minister, on the official delegations which he appointed to the annual Assembly meetings in Geneva, and on the Department of External Affairs. Canada was particularly interested in the International Labour Office, to which Dr. W.A. Riddell had been appointed permanent Canadian representative. The unpopular Article X of the League Covenant was under close scrutiny and bitter fire by the Canadian Government and its spokesmen in Geneva. The High Commissioner's Office in London had been brought nominally under the Department of External Affairs in 1921, and in 1922 Mr. P.C. Larkin, the millionaire "tea-king of America" and an intimate friend and supporter of Mr. King, replaced Sir George Perley as High Commissioner. The Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament was held in 1922, with Sir Robert Borden as Mr. King's envoy and Canada's representative on the British Empire delegation. In (September) 1922, also, occurred the urgent Chanak crisis, in which, over a brief Sunday and Monday, Mr. King had to make a decision - after a hurried consultation with his Cabinet but without reference to Parliament or apparently to his departmental advisers - to evade Mr. Lloyd George's invitation to promise military assistance if necessitated

by events in Turkey.* It is rightly claimed by most commentators, as it was by Bonar Law, Curzon, Viscount Grey and other British political leaders, that the British Government was remiss in not having kept informed or consulted the overseas Dominions on the impending crisis. Professor Dewey, however, makes the point that Mr. King and his Government were also in part to blame. "It might well be argued, as a Liberal newspaper in Canada did with regard to Premier King, that with the Treaty of Sevres before him, with the press for weeks carrying reports of Greek vicissitudes, Turkish success and ambition, and French policies, the time for a Dominion Prime Minister to ask for information was before events had reached a critical stage.(1) In this particular case, the will was lacking. It stands to reason that a Dominion Premier, eager for concerted action within the Empire, would maintain the closest possible touch with developments abroad, even without pronounced encouragement from the British Cabinet of the day, in order to be ready for all eventualities."(2) On the basis for this proposition, Mr. King was remiss, and this also implies that the Department, as a whole, was not performing its reasonable function of being, if not advisory, at least adequately informational. It shows, as Dewey puts it, that "the will was

* Mr. King did not actually refuse the appeal of Lloyd George and Churchill. He merely cabled for more information, and enquired whether the crisis was such as to justify him in convoking Parliament to reach a decision. However, as Prof. Dewey has remarked, "stating that the matter must be reserved for decision of Parliament cannot under the circumstances be interpreted otherwise than as a refusal to recommend affirmative action, as a refusal on the part of the Dominion Government to co-operate." (The Dominions and Diplomacy. II. p.128.)

(1) The Toronto Star, cited in Round Table.Vol.XIII.p.394.

(2) Dewey, op. cit. II. p. 131.

lacking." *

In 1923 King saw to it that a new treaty with the U.S.A. on Halibut Fisheries was signed (on March 2) in Washington on behalf of Canada by the Canadian plenipotentiary alone (Mr. Lapointe), without customary co-signature of the British representative. This marked a revolutionary advance in Canada's constitutional status and treaty-making power within the Empire, and achieved the frustrated wish of Laurier at the time of the Alaska Boundary Award. Authority for this independent action had of course to be requested from and granted by the Imperial Government in London, through correspondence by the Canadian Government through the Governor General and by the Foreign Office with the British Ambassador in Washington.(1) When the debate for approving the treaty ~~on ratification~~ took place in the Canadian House of Commons, most speakers endorsed the innovation with enthusiasm, including the Opposition Leader, Mr. Meighen, who had always upheld the desideratum of Canadian diplomatic autonomy.

* Whatever the results were, the will had not been lacking toward the end of Borden's regime. Mr. Christie had been sent to London in 1920 to study certain Foreign Office procedures; and in a letter to Mr. Amery, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Borden wrote in part: "We are anxious, also, as the previous correspondence shows, to improve the existing means by which we secure intelligence respecting foreign affairs. Recent developments have naturally stimulated Parliament's interest in such matters; this tendency will doubtless become more marked, and while it would not be feasible at this time to attempt any elaborate organization, yet it should be possible to make some improvement." (Departmental file 1576/1920). Nevertheless, there seems to have been little effect given to this aim, in the period referred to under Mr. King. The former efforts of Borden, and of Meighen, to seek more regular means of both "information" and "consultation" had broken down; and the Department, theoretically responsible for informing if not advising the Prime Minister, was unable to do so for

(1) See A. Lawrence Lowell: "Canada's Treaty-Making Power.", Foreign Affairs (U.S.A.). Vol.2. No1.1. September, 1923, pp.16-20

In 1923, also, King attended the Imperial Conference in London. There Churchill, though at that time out of office, was renewing Joseph Chamberlain's former concept in regarding the meeting of the Empire heads of government an "Imperial Cabinet", and even the London Times hailed the "executive authority" of the Empire. Pressure was strongly renewed for a centralized organization, and the Round Table Movement took up the theme under the leadership of Lionel Curtis. But, as Laurier had similarly resisted such pressure, King resisted it stubbornly, and, with the precedent of the Halibut Treaty in mind, held out for independent dominion diplomacy. But on his return to Canada, he made no attempt to explain or justify this important policy before Parliament. The Canadian public apparently were satisfied that their status had been protected.

Mr. King and the Department

The long reign of Mr. Mackenzie King as Premier brought many changes and developments in the history of the Department; but, as remarked above, most of these did not begin to materialize until after the term of Joseph Pope was ended and Dr. O.D. Skelton had replaced him. In the first few years from 1921, while foreign policy questions were stepped up in volume and urgency, the

lack of adequate sources of information and of senior expert staff. A further speculative comment may be made here. There is some reason to believe that Mr. Mackenzie King at that period kept many external affairs papers, despatches, and telegrams to himself, without the complete knowledge of his Department, and therefore was inclined to act on his own or in consultation with his Cabinet colleagues without calling on the services of the Department, or of Pope or certainly of Christie. Christie himself in 1922 had no knowledge of important Foreign Office telegrams received by Mr. King.

Department hardly rose to the new needs until after 1927, when the new Commonwealth "equality of status" led to the creation of diplomatic missions abroad and a Canadian diplomatic service.

Within the Department a few changes occurred. Henry C. Borden, Private Secretary to Sir Robert, retired when his brother left office; H.C. Armstrong, Private Secretary to Mr. Meighen retired with his chief, in 1922. Christie resigned as Legal Adviser in 1923. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for External Affairs, F.H. Keefer who had succeeded Hugh Clark when the latter went to Militia and Defence, resigned at the end of the War, according to statutory provisions, and was not replaced until, "informally", Mr. King appointed Lucien Turcotte Pacaud as Parliamentary Under-Secretary on December 29, 1921, for a brief period before assigning him to the London Office.New Private Secretaries were appointed; Mr. Measures, Mr. McGregor, and Mr. Campney. Mr. King advanced the Borden practice of co-opting from the Department of External Affairs an increasing number of personnel to serve him in the Prime Minister's Office; and this led to an over-all expansion in the numerical strength of the Department's clerical staff.

In 1923, Dr. O.D. Skelton, Ph.D., of Queen's University was invited by Mr. King to accompany him as an adviser, at the Imperial Conference held in London from July 30 to December 1. (Dr. Skelton received, besides his travel expenses, a per diem allowance of $50). He

was appointed by Mr. King in 1924 as Counsellor in the Department, and attended the session of the League of Nations Assembly of that year as Adviser to the Canadian Delegation. On Sir Joseph Pope's retirement at the end of 1925, Dr. Skelton was designated Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

In the same year, Mr. Jean Désy entered the Department by examination, as Counsellor, while Dr. W.A. Riddell, Mr. Dupuy and several others came under the Department as representatives abroad.

Mr. King postponed the action, already approved in principle, of opening a Legation in Washington, although since 1920 appropriations were annually voted for the purpose; and it was not until 1927 (spurred perhaps by the prompter action of the Irish Free State and the expressed intention of Australia) that the schemes for dominion diplomatic representation, approved in London, Washington and Ottawa in 1920-21, began to take form.

At the commencement of his first premiership, Mr. King had the services of L.C. Christie, but there is evidence that those services were not utilized. Christie in a subsequent letter to Sir Robert Borden said that "During the year that followed (King's accession to the premiership) I saw him on business possibly a dozen times, including meetings in the corridor, and scarcely ever for more than a few minutes. . . All I did throughout the year might have been done in three weeks." (1) Christie, although a Civil Servant, had come into the service,

(1) Borden Papers: Folder 59. L.C. Christie. (Doc.148306).

without examination, virtually as a Conservative patronage appointment; he had been selected by Borden, and for eight years had served closely the Conservative Prime Ministers, Borden and Meighen; he could hardly expect to enjoy the equal confidence of Mr. King. Therefore, he soon felt the desire to leave the service and did so in May, 1923. (See Chapter 26 on "Loring C. Christie"). A couple of years later Dr. Skelton, as Under-Secretary, came to play the role of Christie as policy adviser to the Prime Minister.

For three remaining years, Sir Joseph Pope continued in office as Under-Secretary of the Department under his new chief, but there is little evidence that his relations to Mr. King were very intimate other than formal and administrative. By nature, and long experience under Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Robert Borden and Meighen, he was a die-hard Conservative and imperialist in his outlook to his last days. He belonged, as Earl Grey had put it, to "the Old School". Mackenzie King represented a new school of modern Liberalism.

Despite the enlargement of the clerical staff, part of whom helped to man the Prime Minister's Office, Mr. King, in the early years, was loath to increase the estimates or to ask Parliament for larger appropriations for the Department of External Affairs, with the result that no additional senior officers, so much needed, were appointed within the period of this review. (Dr. Skelton,

as Counsellor, merely replaced Christie in 1924; and as Under-Secretary, replaced Pope in 1925).

Mr. King and Documents

While the old complaints over delays over correspondence attributed to former Prime Ministers almost disappeared,* apparently it became a habit of Mr. Mackenzie King, in his early premiership, to hoard telegrams and despatches, with or without the knowledge of Mr. Pope and Mr. Walker. Mr. Christie has recorded, in a letter to Mr. Meighen, that he personally, while Legal Adviser and former confidant of previous Conservative Prime Ministers, did not see important telegrams from London, (e.g. relating to the Turkish crisis in 1922 and the Lausanne negotiations in 1923-24), and did not even know that they existed. Christie, however, was at that time no longer in the confidence of Mr. King and rarely saw him. It is not clear whether all these telegrams or despatches, received by Mr. King from the Governor General, were seen by either Sir Joseph Pope or Mr.W. H. Walker; although the presumption is that as a matter of recognized routine they must have had cognizance of them. In a few cases in April, 1922, on the Turkish problem, Pope sent brief memoranda to Mr. King, presumably based on correspondence and telegrams. It is on record, however, that some of the telegrams sent by Mr. King to the Colonial Secretary in London a month or so after the Chanak episode, were drafted by Mr. King himself, and not

* Mr. Baker, Chief Clerk, nevertheless in the early 1920's kept private memoranda listing monthly all departmental correspondence which was over a month undealt with.

by his departmental advisers (as Christie had drafted Mr. Meighen's telegrams to London in 1921 on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance question); these King telegrams were relayed through the Governor General, Lord Byng, who occasionally accompanied them by supplementary "personal and private" telegrams of his own explaining or interpreting Mr. King's official telegrams.

One passing word may be added. Mr. King had set the example, back in 1908, of Civil Servants entering a political career. From being a Deputy Minister of Labour, and Civil Servant, he became Minister of that Department and entered the Cabinet as a Privy Councillor. After a long period of suspended activity, spent partly in the United States, and afterwards as leader of the Liberal Party in opposition, he rose to be Prime Minister. Eventually other Civil Servants entered the political arena as Cabinet Ministers, following the precedent of Mackenzie King. J.W. Pickersgill, formerly a member of the External Affairs Department and Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, entered the Cabinet as Secretary of State and subsequently Minister of ~~Immigration and Citizenship~~ Citizenship and Immigration. L.B. Pearson, after a long career as a Civil Servant in the Department of External Affairs and as Under-Secretary, became the first separate Secretary of State for External Affairs, and subsequently leader of the Liberal Party and contender for the premiership. In the Department of National Defence, R.O. Campney had been a Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, later Parliamentary Assistant in National Defence, and entered the Cabinet as Solicitor General, Associate Minister of National Defence, and ultimately Minister of National Defence.

25.

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1916-1921

Parliamentary Under-Secretaries

British Practice

It had long been the practice in England of having, besides the Permanent Under-Secretaries who were Civil Servants, Parliamentary Under-Secretaries who were Members of Parliament and who in Great Britain held the position of junior Ministers. There was a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. These Members of Parliament usually sat in the House in which their chief was not a member, i.e. either in the House of Commons if their superior was in the Lords, or in the House of Lords if their chief was a member of the House of Commons.

Their primary activity was in answering questions or in defending government policy. Lord Buxton, who was Ripon's Parliamentary Under-Secretary, once remarked "The position of an Under-Secretary of State in a great Department - even where specific and prescribed duties are allotted to him - is somewhat difficult and anomalous. He feels not infrequently that he is neither fish nor flesh nor fowl nor good red herring. His use and want, his authority and responsibility, his enjoyment of and interest in his post, depend in a very large degree on his chief." The Parliamentary Under-Secretaries for Colonial Affairs read all the important Canadian despatches prior to 1887, and sometimes complained if they were not promptly furnished with Canadian correspondence. But this perusal resulted in few comments or suggestions. For the most part they simply minuted the papers before passing them on to the Secretary of State.

Canadian Proposals

Even as early as 1909, when the question was discussed of appointing Mr. Pope as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Senate Leader of the Laurier Government, Sir Richard Cartwright, favoured the creation of Parliamentary Secretaries or Under-Secretaries, anticipating Mr. Borden and Mr. King by many years. He said: "It would be a very considerable improvement on our present practice if we had fewer Ministers of State, and a very considerable number of Under-Secretaries, as in England. That is my individual opinion and I give it for what it is worth. The more I see - and my experience is pretty large - of the working of our constitutional system, and the more I see of the needs of this country, the more I am convinced that the English system is a very great improvement on ours in the way of providing for the education of a number of younger members of Parliament, and enabling from them to be selected men who will in time become ministers. If my hon. friend remembers, when Sir John Macdonald introduced the proposition he alluded to, I pointed that out, and I quite agreed with him. I say that as a matter of opinion, and I think it will be found as a matter of practice, the appointment of Under-Secretaries of State chosen from among the younger members of the party would be of great advantage to Canada, both now and in the future. In a federal constitution like ours, covering half a continent, with nine or ten provinces, there is no doubt whatever that it is highly desirable that we should train and bring forward young men." (1)

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(1) Senate Debates, April 29, 1909. pp. 396-7.

Nothing came of the suggestion, however, until some years later. In the course of time, the Prime Minister, Borden, after he had by statute assumed the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs, found the British practice might be useful in relieving him of some of his manifold duties as Government Leader. He invited a British expert, Sir George Murray, to advise him, and, as a result, in due course he decided to appoint one or more assistants in Parliament. This was apparently made necessary in consequence of the increasing burdens of the War during its mid-years. With Mr. Sam Hughes as Minister of Militia and Defence, there was appointed by P.C. 1720 of July 17, 1916, a Parliamentary Secretary of Militia and Defence, who, in the absence of the Minister, presided over the Department but reported, when necessary, to the Governor-in-Council through the Prime Minister. Submissions to Council were made by Borden as Prime Minister and not as Acting Minister of Militia and Defence. At the same time, Borden decided to appoint also, an assistant in Parliament for External Affairs. Accordingly, an Order-in-Council, P.C. 1719, was approved on July 15, 1916, stating the reasons for the action and including the regulations covering the powers of the appointee.

Order-in-Council
P.C. 1719 of 15th July, 1916.

Privy Council

At the Government House at Ottawa
Saturday the 15th day of July, 1916.

Present

the Deputy of
His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council:

Whereas the Right Honourable the Prime Minister submits that by reason of the War his duties as Prime Minister and as Secretary of State for External Affairs have increased the demands upon his time and energies to such an extent that the efficient and prompt attendance to such duties makes necessary the assistance of a Parliamentary Under-Secretary;

Therefore the Governor General in Council is pleased to authorize and doth hereby authorize the appointment of a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs during the continuance of the War.

The Deputy of the Governor General in Council, under and in virtue of the provisions of the War Measures Act, 1914, is further pleased to make the following orders and regulations and the same are hereby made and enacted accordingly,-

Regulations respecting the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

1. During the continuance of the present war the Governor-in-Council may from time to time appoint a Senator or a Member of the House of Commons to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

2. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary shall, with respect to the Department of External Affairs, perform such Parliamentary duties as may from time to time be assigned to him by the Governor General-in-Council.

3. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary shall, subject to such instructions as may from time to time be issued by competent authority assist the Prime Minister in administering the Department of External Affairs, and may, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister, conduct such official communications between the Government of Canada and the Government of any other country in connection with the external affairs of Canada, and perform such other duties in the said Department as from time to time may be directed.

4. In the absence of the Prime Minister the Parliamentary Under-Secretary shall, subject to the direction and approval of the Acting Prime Minister for the time being, preside over and administer the Department of External Affairs; and in such case he shall have authority to report to and make recommendations to the Governor-in-Council through the Acting Prime Minister.

5. Until Parliament otherwise provide, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs shall hold his office, commission or employment without any salary, fees, wages, allowances, emolument or other profit of any kind attached thereto.

(Sgd) Rodolphe Boudreau
Clerk of the Privy Council

It will be seen that, in principle, the powers granted to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary were fairly extensive. Whereas a "deputy minister" such as Pope claimed to be, may and does administer his Department but cannot, in Canadian practice, deputize for a Minister or represent the Department in Parliament; the Parliamentary Under-Secretary was, in accordance with British practice, not only to perform "Parliamentary" duties and represent the Department in Parliament, but also could assist in "administering" the Department. Thus his duties ostensibly overrode the powers of the Permanent Under-Secretary. They permitted him to deputize for the Prime Minister or Acting Prime Minister, in Parliament, under instructions of the Governor-in-Council; but they were also ostensibly administrative: he could, under direction, "preside over and administer" the Department of External Affairs, reporting to the Governor-in-Council through the Acting Prime Minister (since he was not a Minister himself). He could conduct official communications on external matters, on behalf of the Prime Minister, though of course any such correspondence "between the Government of Canada and the

Government of any other country" would, as usual, go through the Governor General; thus the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, subject to the directions and approval of the Prime Minister, could become the direct link between the Department and the Governor General, thereby acting in a ministerial capacity. He could perform "other duties" to assist in the administration of the Department. He was provided with an office in the Department of External Affairs, besides his parliamentary office, which, in view of space shortage in the East Block, gave Pope some cause for worry, as he mentioned in a letter to Mr. Robert Rogers, the Minister of Public Works.

These wide administrative prerogatives, as they were set forth or implied in his Regulations, of the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary for External Affairs immediately gave Sir Joseph Pope great concern. Was Pope once more to be relegated to a secondary rôle as head of the Department? Was he again to serve two masters? Was he to be under the direction not only of the Prime Minister, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, but also of a non-ministerial member of Parliament? Was the Permanent Under-Secretary, or the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary, to be the real deputy minister? Pope promptly raised the matter privately with London.

In a private letter dated July 26, 1916, from Pope to Mr. C.A. Harris, the protocol expert in the Colonial Office, he said:

> There is a movement here, how general I do not quite know, to appoint at any rate in some departments, parliamentary under-secretaries. What I wish to ascertain is in what relation

does the parliamentary under-secretary at home stand to the permanent under-secretary; which is the higher officer as regards the administration of the department? Does the parliamentary under-secretary have anything to do with matters of administration? Is the permanent under-secretary in any way responsible to the parliamentary under-secretary? According to the books of reference, the parliamentary under-secretary is the higher officer, that is to say, his salary is larger, and he is mentioned first. . ."

Mr. Alexander Harris replied, on August 16, 1916:

Speaking broadly, I should say that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary and the Permanent Under-Secretary are considered as equal in position, though, as a matter of courtesy (almost as it were to a guest) the Parliamentary Under-Secretary is considered to have a certain precedence.

As regards the administration of the department, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary has, as a rule, nothing to say; and there are also certain matters in the Department which are practically never referred to him. Perhaps the most interesting instance of a differentiation in his work is this - the Parliamentary Under-Secretary has practically no say in the Secretary of State's patronage:- on the other hand, personal questions which may affect the individual after he is in the service are primarily submitted to him before they go to the Secretary of State.

The original object of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary was to secure the representation of the "Offices of State" in both Houses of Parliament. You will find on looking back that the rule is to have the Under-Secretary in the House of Commons when the Secretary of State is a Peer, and the Under-Secretary in the House of Lords when the Secretary of State is a Commoner. The present arrangement whereby both the Secretary of State and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary are in the House of Commons, though not without precedent, is to be regarded as exceptional.

I give you an anecdote which will illustrate the general attitude of the service towards the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. When a certain Peer was Under-Secretary in this Office he was a good deal upset at something happening without his being immediately summoned back to the office. I had

> occasion to discuss the matter with a leading Private Secretary who made the remark: "Lord - has forgotten that he is only the fifth wheel to the coach". I do not myself think that this was quite fair or right, but it does illustrate the matter that you want.(1)

This reply presumably allayed Pope's fears as to his own relative position. As it turned out, neither of the two successive Parliamentary Under-Secretaries for External Affairs, Mr. Hugh Clark or Mr. F.H. Keefer, attempted in any way to dominate or interfere with the normal work of the deputy minister, Sir Joseph Pope. They were indeed criticized the following year for their own passivity in this connection. In any case the position was stipulated to be temporary, until the end of the War, when in fact it lapsed for a time.

There has been found no indication that either of the war-time Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, Clark or Keefer, exercised their prerogatives in such a way as to encroach on or usurp Sir Joseph Pope's functions. In 1917, critics in Parliament maintained that Mr. Clark had been more active "politicking" for his party and his constituency than in his assigned task, which he was said to have neglected, - in which case there would have been no collision with the Permanent Under-Secretary, Pope. A departmental memorandum refers to Mr. Keefer as having "taken charge" of the Passport Office, but this seems to have been merely nominal. There is no evidence that there was any interference by either incumbent in the routine administration or operations of the Department, or, for that matter, any significant assistance.

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(1) Papers of Sir J. Pope, S.O. Vol. 99.

Nor does it appear that either Mr. Clark or Mr. Keefer exercised the opportunity of advising Sir Robert Borden in external matters in the way that the Department's legal adviser, Loring Christie, did at that time.

Mr. Hugh Clark

Although Order-in-Council P.C. 1719 was approved on July 16, 1916, authorizing the appointment of a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, no appointment was actually made for several months. By an approved Minute of the Privy Council, P.C. 2576 of October 21, 1916, Mr. Hugh Clark, member of the House of Commons for the electoral district of North Bruce, was appointed, and was sworn in on October 27th, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs "during the continuance of the present war". The office, said Borden was considered of the Ministry but not of the Cabinet, although this assumption was ambiguous and later caused some confusion which Borden had to clarify.

Mr. Clark resigned under P.C. 2746 of November 7, 1918, (which then referred to him as Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Clark), to become Parliamentary Secretary of Militia and Defence.*

Salary Proposal

At that time the extra Parliamentary duties as Under-Secretary were unpaid. The Member received no emolument for them. The tasks were carried out on a

* It is not clear why the Department of Militia and Defence should have a Parliamentary Secretary and the Department of External Affairs should have a Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Actually their positions were similar, their salaries were the same, and there was apparently no distinction in their roles, only in their designations.

voluntary basis. But after a year's operation, Sir Robert Borden felt that such services as they may have rendered should be recognized by statutory compensation; and in 1917 he proposed a measure providing for an extra salary for these extra duties. The salary proposed ($5,000) was identical to that of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, - at that time Sir Joseph Pope; in addition to these remained, of course, the sessional allowance of a Member of Parliament ($2,500). This proposed additional salary was to be made retroactive to the date of original appointment nearly a year before. Some considerable discussion arose, firstly over the point that the Parliamentary Secretary of Militia and Defence - a man of personal wealth - offered to forego the proposed salary, and this raised questions of principle; and secondly, because there was some feeling that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Clark, had not conscientiously earned the proposed salary, and also, that with Mr. Pope as Permanent Under-Secretary, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary was unnecessary, redundant, and a sort of fifth wheel.

Sir Robert Borden moved the amending Bill No. 122 in the House of Commons on August 7, 1917.(1) In the debate which followed, Mr. Lemieux took exception both to the duties and the cost. "I say, without fear of being contradicted, that, with the Prime Minister as head of that branch of the service and with Sir Joseph Pope, who works night and day for his country, who attends to his duty as no other officials in the

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(1) H. of C. Debates, 1917, p. 4195.

Government attend to their duties, an (parliamentary) under-secretary is not needed. . . I repeat that, with Sir Joseph Pope at the head of the Department, no under-secretary is needed, and nobody in Ottawa will believe he is needed." (1)

Sir Robert Borden replied: "I know what the duties of the Prime Minister as Secretary of State for External Affairs have been during the past two or three years. I know those duties better, perhaps, than any other hon. member of the House, and I venture to say that they have been twenty times as great as they were under normal conditions. The correspondence with the Mother Country, on matters frequently of the greatest importance, has been as much in a month as under ordinary conditions it would be in a year; I believe I am understating the fact in that respect. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs has been occupied with the duties of his office during very long hours. He has rendered very important assistance, he has done very good work, relieving me from very many matters which previously occupied my attention. My only regret is that I did not take steps early in the war to have an (parliamentary) Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs appointed; it would have been better for the interests of the country had I done so. I would have had more time to give to general considerations; my attention would not have been so much taken up with matters which, though important, were nevertheless of a somewhat routine character."

Mr. Lemieux somewhat critically pointed out that "some years ago, at the request of the Prime Minister, Sir George Murray, an English authority on civil service,

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(1) H. of C. Debates. p. 4202.

came to Canada to investigate the whole of our Civil Service and our Government organization. Sir George Murray reported favouring the establishment of under-secretaryships. The Government has thought fit to ignore the report of Sir George Murray and it is during the dying days of this Parliament that the right hon. gentleman comes before this house with a resolution which carries recommendations thus made."

Sir Wilfrid Laurier said: "I am prepared to believe what my right hon. friend says with regard to the work of the Department of External Affairs. I knew the work when I was in office, and I am sure that during the war it has increased immensely. That the inside work has increased, and that the member for North Bruce (Mr. Hugh Clark) - with whom nobody has any quarrel, whom everybody in this House respects - has done a good deal to relieve the Prime Minister of the discharge of duties which would otherwise have fallen upon him, I am prepared to believe. But in what way has the Prime Minister been relieved upon the floor of this House by the member for North Bruce? Whatever the member for North Bruce may have done in his office, so far as the work of this House is concerned he has not earned the salary which it so proposed to give him as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State."

Status

But Sir Robert Borden continued, in the debate, to defend the proposed measure. In doing so, he became somewhat confused as to whether the Parliamentary Under-Secretary would be a "Minister of the Crown" or not.

Some of the Members participating in the debate were under the assumption that he was, and in fact the resolution as first introduced stipulated this, apparently on an English precedent. In such case, on appointment as "Minister", the encumbent, it was debated, should go to the electorate for re-election, although as Mr. Borden pointed out, that requirement had been waived in the English precedent.(1)

He said: "The hon. member for South Renfrew (Mr. Graham) referred to the fact that in the sections of the Bill which establishes the office of (Parliamentary) Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the office of Parliamentary Secretary of Militia and Defence, the Secretaries are spoken of as Ministers of the Crown. That language is entirely the work of the Parliamentary Counsel, to whom I entrusted the duty of preparing the resolution and also of preparing the legislation upon it. . . He informs me that in using this language he followed British precedent; that Parliamentary Secretaries in Great Britain are technically Ministers of the Crown, and that therefore he thought it desirable to employ that language. . . They are not members of the Cabinet. They do not attend the deliberations of the Privy Council." (2) Later on he repeated that in England they are Ministers of the Crown.

Apparently on that explanation, Mr. Sinclair said: "Our parliamentary secretaries are appointed by the Crown, and are made ministers of the Crown. It is a departure which I think is not a wise one, nor is it

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(1) H. of C. Debates. August 7, 1917. p. 4205.

(2) H. of C. Debates, 1917. p. 4439.

justified by the constitution. . . But we are here introducing a new system, and I do not say it is a bad system. . . Now that we are embarking on it, I think we should follow the constitution, and require under-secretaries, appointed by the Crown, to hold their position as minister of the Crown, to go to their electors."

This aspect of re-election on receiving an appointment as Parliamentary Under-Secretary created some further debate, since there was manifest reluctance to produce this embarrassment. Sir Robert Borden had to reverse his position, and said, contradicting himself, that "The distinction in Great Britain is that they are supposed to be appointed by the minister under whom they serve, and therefore, not being appointed by the Crown, they do not have to go back for re-election." (1)

Finally Borden, in Committee said, "I really did not observe until it was brought to my attention this afternoon by the hon. member for South Renfrew (Mr. Graham) that these words 'shall be a minister of the Crown' had been inserted. I have asked the Parliamentary Counsel for a memorandum as to the reason for their insertion, and he has given it to me. I do not think that, on the whole, there is any necessity or that they ought to be inserted. Therefore I move to amend this section by striking out the words 'shall be a minister of the Crown', and also by substituting for the word 'minister' in the last line the words 'Governor in Council', so that the clause will read:

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(1) Ibid., p. 4446.

> The Governor in Council may appoint a Senator or a member of the House of Commons to be Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Militia and Defence, and such Parliamentary Secretary shall have and perform such powers and duties as the Governor in Council shall from time to time prescribe. And referring to Section 2. Appointment of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, I move to make the same amendment to this section as has been made to the section providing for the appointment of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Militia and Defence, that is to strike out the words "shall be a minister of the Crown" and to substitute for the words "Secretary of State for External Affairs" the words "Governor in Council". (1)

Notwithstanding a recent Government publication ("Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation", 1957. Public Archives) which states that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was "of the Ministry but not of the Cabinet", it would seem from Sir Robert Borden's declaration that Mr. Clark and his successor, Mr. Keefer, were not Ministers of the Crown, (which would make them, on appointment, subject to re-election), but were only Parliamentary Assistants with certain privileges and departmental duties, and the right as members, to speak in Parliament in the name of their Minister.

Professor R. MacGregor Dawson, many years later, comments on this point: "Another unsatisfactory factor is that the status of the assistant is as yet far from clear. The Prime Minister announced unequivocally that "the functions of the parliamentary assistants . . . will be similar in all particulars to those of the parliamentary under-secretaries in Great Britain." (2)

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(1) H. of C. Debates, August 13, 1917. p. 4454.

(2) Mr. Mackenzie King, H. of C. Debates. April 20, 1943. p. 2365.

Yet in the same debate he made the astounding statement that an assistant would have to be persona grata not only to the Minister (who is responsible for his actions) but also to the deputy minister (a civil servant), a pronouncement which seemed to justify the unflattering description by one member of the House that the assistants would be nothing more than "official coat-tail bearers" for the Ministers. . . There would appear to be a very definite effort in some quarters to keep the parliamentary assistant in a humble position in the Government. Indeed, he is not, strictly speaking, included in the Government at all. He occupies a parliamentary no-man's land where he is no longer an ordinary member of the House nor is he listed in the official Ministry. The invariable British practice is that the under-secretaries form part of the Ministry, and this circumstance naturally adds to the prestige and enhances the desirability of the position. The Canadian refusal to make a similar concession is but another sign of the reluctance to accept the new office and to make the most of its possibilities." (1)

New Act

The Bill was passed and assented to on September 20, 1917, (7-8 George V. Ch. 35), confirming by statute the existing arrangements and with a retroactive salary attached. This Act read:

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(1) Dawson: The Government of Canada. pp. 266-7.

Whereas by orders of the Governor-in-Council made under the provisions of The War Measures Act, 1914, the offices of Minister of the Overseas Military Forces, Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Militia and Defence, and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs were created and appointments were made to the said offices; and whereas it is expedient to make provision by Statute for the said offices; Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:-

...

2. The Department of External Affairs' Act, statutes of 1912, chapter twenty-two, is amended by inserting the following section immediately after section three thereof:-

> "3A. The Governor-in-Council may appoint a Senator or a member of the House of Commons to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and such Parliamentary Under-Secretary shall have and perform such powers and duties as the Governor-in-Council may from time to time prescribe."

3. The Salaries Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, chapter four . . . is amended by adding the following subsection to section five thereof:-

> "(2) The salaries of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Militia and Defence, and of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, shall be five thousand dollars each per annum."

4. Nothing in the Dominion Elections Act or in the Senate and House of Commons Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, chapters six and ten respectively, or in any other statute or law, shall render ineligible any person accepting or holding either of the said offices . . . Parliamentary Under-Secretary of External Affairs, as a Member of the House of Commons, or shall disqualify him for sitting or voting therein.

5. The several persons holding the said offices shall each be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada the several salaries prescribed by section three of this Act for the several periods during which they have, respectively, held the said offices, and the salaries for

the said offices shall be paid from the following dates, that is to say:- . . .

. . . The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, on and from the twenty-first day of October, one thousand nine hundred and sixteen;

Any such payments shall not render the persons receiving the same ineligible as Members of the House of Commons, or disqualify them from sitting or voting therein.

6. This Act shall continue in force during the continuance of the present war and until the end of the session of Parliament held next after the end of the said war, or, if Parliament is sitting when the war ends, then until the end of such session of Parliament.

Mr. F.H. Keefer

On the transfer of Mr. Hugh Clark to become Parliamentary Secretary of Militia and Defence, Mr. Francis Henry Keefer, K.C., was appointed by Order-in-Council P.C.2748 of November 7, 1918, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Sir Robert Borden took him to the Governor General to be sworn in.(1) He had no claim to a Privy Counsellorship and no access to Cabinet meetings. In Parliament he could act for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, speak with departmental authority, and answer departmental questions on his behalf. He had a departmental office in the East Block, as well as his Member's Office in the House of Commons building; he had access, if he wished, to all the confidential and secret papers pertaining to the Department. Mr. Keefer was also nominally, or ex officio, head of the Passport Office, though the Chief Passport Officer, a departmental Civil Servant, was in practice the administrative head. In addition to his Parliamentary

(1) R.L. Borden: His Memoirs. II. p.864.

Member's salary, he drew the extra stipend of $5000 as Under-Secretary.

The arrangement made effective during Borden's administration lapsed at the end of the war, as it had originally been intended that it should do. Under the provisions of 7-8 Geo. V, Ch.35, the offices of Parliamentary Secretary of Militia and Defence, and of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs terminated at the end of the session in which the war was brought to a conclusion, i.e. July 1, 1920, and Mr. Keefer resigned on July 10th.

Mr. Lucien T. Pacaud

Nevertheless, a year later, by 1921, the post-war activities, including League of Nations problems, weighed so heavily on the next Prime Minister that Mr. Mackenzie King re-introduced the practice, at least in respect to the work of his Department of External Affairs. He tried to induce some of his overworked Ministerial colleagues to do likewise, but without success. For some reason he did not ask Parliament or the Privy Council to legislate for a formal position, with an attached salary, as Mr. Borden had done. The designation of a willing Member of Parliament to act as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, on a voluntary and unpaid basis, was, as he said, an "informal" appointment. No Order-in-Council had to be approved, no salary had to be voted, and the incumbent did not have to be sworn in to the additional position or

duties, and did not receive a commission.

The first to be appointed was Mr. Lucien Turcotte Pacaud (December 29, 1921 - October 27, 1922). The following quotation from the House of Commons Debates, 1943, p.2343, explained Mr. Pacaud's position in the Government:

> Mr. Mackenzie King: Shortly after the Liberal administration came into office in 1921, I sought to have the ministers at that time adopt the practice of having under-secretaries. No provision was made by parliament for their payment, but I thought a beginning might be made by appointing members of the House who would be prepared to act for a time at least, in a voluntary way as do parliamentary private secretaries in Great Britain. I appointed at the time as under-secretary for external Affairs Mr. Lucien Pacaud, the then member for Megantic. Mr. Pacaud was of real assistance to me in the course of the session. But my colleagues did not follow my example at the time, and I was not in a position to compel them to, especially as there being no salary attached to the position, members were not too keen about giving the extra time required without some emolument.
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> Mr. Graydon: May I ask if the gentleman to whom the Prime Minister has just referred was formally appointed as assistant, or was it done in an informal way?
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> Mr. Mackenzie King: Just in an informal way, much as is done in the case of the parliamentary private secretaries to ministers in the House of Commons at Westminster. Mr. Pacaud was subsequently appointed to an important post in the high Commissioner's office in London. His association with the Department of External Affairs helped to qualify him for the appointment which he subsequently received." *

Mr. Bennett's Suggestion

On April 13, 1927, Mr. Mackenzie King proposed to the House of Commons the appointment of an "executive assistant" at a salary of $8,000, who would not be

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* Order-in-Council P.C. 2258 of October 27, 1922, records of the appointment of Pacaud as Assistant Secretary to the High Commissioner's Office in London.

appointed under the Civil Service Commission. In the course of the debate, Mr. R.B. Bennett, the Leader of the Opposition, suggested that such an appointee should be a Parliamentary Under-Secretary or Assistant, selected from the Members of Parliament and acting only so long as the Ministry remained in office. He said to Mr. King:

> I thought perhaps he might have followed the course that was tried, not without some favourable result, in days gone by, of the Prime Minister appointing some member of the House to act as his executive assistant, without his being subject to an election, but retiring with the administration . . . For instance, the parliamentary secretary in England very frequently served the Prime Minister without compensation. Sir Philip Sassoon acted for Mr. Lloyd George, without any salary of course. In a country such as this it does seem to me that it might offer an opportunity to well qualified, ambitious young men to get an excellent knowledge of parliamentary procedure while serving a very useful purpose, not being in the Cabinet but acting as confidential secretary and adviser or representative of the Prime Minister. . . I think my right hon. friend overlooked the fact that we had several under-secretaries during the war. Between 1911 and the breaking out of war Sir Robert Borden discharged the duties of President of the Privy Council, Minister of External Affairs, and Prime Minister. The Department of External Affairs was at that time in charge of Sir Joseph Pope. Sir Robert had no deputy as Prime Minister, nor had he as President of the Privy Council, except to the extent that the clerk of the Privy Council then discharged and still discharges more or less confidential duties with respect to the Prime Minister. He is a permanent official and retains his place notwithstanding changes of administration. The same may be said with regard to the deputy head of External Affairs. . . It will be remembered that Sir George Murray, who came out here at the request of Sir Robert Borden, made a special report on the matter and he suggested that these (parliamentary) under-secretaries might serve very usefully in the organization of the Canadian administration. It was tried during the war, but I am not sure that it was the success Sir George Murray hoped it would be. I still think that with respect to the office of the Prime Minister the experiment might be made. . .(1)

(1) H. of C. Debates. April 13, 1927. p.2460.

However, this suggestion was not taken up at the time, although the proposed item for a Prime Minister's "executive secretary" was approved.

After Mr. Pacaud's departure for London in 1922, the position of Parliamentary Under-Secretary seems again to have lapsed. It was not until the session of 1936 that the Speech from the Throne indicated the Government's intention to introduce new legislation providing for Parliamentary Secretaries;(1) but no resumption of this office was adopted until 1947.*

(1) H. of C. Debates, February 10, 1936, p.31. See also Mr. Mackenzie King, H. of C. Debates, April 20, 1943, pp.2366-7. See also R. MacGregor Dawson: The Government of Canada, pp.265-267.

* Mr. Walter Edward Harris was Parliamentary Assistant for External Affairs from October 30, 1947, to November 14, 1948, when he became Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and later of Finance.

Under Rt. Hon. L. St. Laurent, there was a succession of Parliamentary Assistants:

Mr. Hughes Lapointe, January 19, 1949, to April 30, 1949, and from July 12, 1949, to August 23, 1949, when he was appointed a member of the Privy Council and Solicitor General, and later Minister of Veteran's Affairs and Postmaster General;

Mr. Jean Lesage, in External Affairs, from January 24, 1951, to December 31, 1952, when he became Parliamentary Assistant to the Finance Department; and subsequently Minister of Resources and Development, and Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources;

Mr. Roch Pinard, October 14, 1953, to June 30, 1954, when he became Secretary of State;

Mr. Lucien Cardin, from February 9, 1956, to June 10, 1957, when the Government was defeated at the General Election;

ff.

(Cont'd)

Sir Richard Cartwright, in 1909, Mr. Bennett in 1927, Mr. Slaght in 1936, and other speakers in various debates, had emphasized the value of appointing Parliamentary Under-Secretaries or Assistants as a means of training them for higher posts. This objective was fulfilled to some extent; since Mr. Harris, Mr. Lapointe, Mr. Lesage, and Mr. Pinard each subsequently became Privy Councillors and Cabinet Ministers.

It may also be noticed that, - as in England the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries counterbalanced in one House their chiefs in the other House, - in Canada the majority of the above-named Parliamentary Assistants or Under-Secretaries were French-speaking and counterbalanced their English-speaking chiefs. In the case of the Parliamentary Assistants for External Affairs under the English-speaking Secretaries of State, Mr. Mackenzie King and Mr. L.B. Pearson, their official deputies in Parliament were French-speaking Canadians. This preserved a desirable balance in bi-racial and bilingual legislature. This, however, is doubtless more accidental than a fixed rule.

MR. LORING C. CHRISTIE

1913-1923

Loring C. Christie

Legal Adviser

Sir Robert Borden, though a lawyer himself, began to feel the need of a trained constitutional and international lawyer to advise him on the current questions of Canada's external and imperial relations. From his knowledge of the British Foreign Office and Colonial Office, he was aware that both those offices had such specialists attached to them.

In England the position of Legal Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office had been in existence since 1876. Before that time it had been the practice to refer matters of law to the Queen's Advocate, or where important principles of international law were likely to be discussed in Parliament and consequently to require the advocacy of the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General to refer them to the Law Offices of the Crown. There was, however, an obvious convenience in having a lawyer in the Department, and, after Pauncefote's promotion to be Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, the post of "Counsel" or more popularly and incorrectly "Legal Assistant" was established in 1886, the designation being changed, about 1893 to that of Legal Adviser.(1)

Early in 1913, if not before, Sir Robert Borden appears to have been contemplating the appointment of such an additional officer to the Department of External Affairs. Apparently he asked Mr. Pope or Mr. Walker for advice as to the current British system of Legal Advisers; for in

(1) Algernon Cecil: Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. III. p. 609.

the Borden Papers is a memorandum on the subject by the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Memorandum for Mr. Borden regarding the organization of the Foreign Office

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An examination of the establishment of the Foreign Office shows that it includes a permanent Under-Secretary of State, three assistant Under-Secretaries, whose spheres of supervision are assigned with some particularity along geographical lines, and in addition two legal officers entitled 'Legal Adviser' and 'Assistant Legal Adviser', whose duties are not further defined than by the indication given in their titles.

The term 'Councillor of Embassy' seems to be reserved for the highest grade of the diplomatic service below that of Minister Resident, though in the United States State Department, Mr. Chandler Anderson, its legal adviser, has the title of "Counsellor".

Sgd. W.H. Walker(1)

Ottawa, 1st February, 1913.

It is not clear as to how or why Sir Robert Borden began to take a special interest in Loring Christie, and to wish to engage him as a special consultant or adviser. They were of course both Maritimers, Borden a graduate of Dalhousie University, and Christie an Amherst man and graduate of Acadia University. They were thirty-one years apart in age. There may have been an old family friendship, for Sir Robert Borden later became godfather to Christie's son, and Christie was asked to befriend Borden's ~~son~~ nephew, Henry, while he was a student at Oxford. Or Borden may have seen Christie's work on the Harvard Law Review, or known of his work in Washington with the Department of Justice of the United States. In any case, Borden had his eye on Christie and began to take steps

(1) Borden Papers. 2997(1)

to bring him back to the Canadian fold and appoint him to Borden's Department of External Affairs as a special adviser particularly on legal and constitutional matters, for neither Pope nor Walker were lawyers.

A .E. Blount, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, thereupon wrote on February 19, 1913, to W.H. Walker:

> The Prime Minister would like to have as soon as convenient the Order-in-Council for the appointment of a legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs.
>
> Will you also be good enough to prepare an item for the Supplementary Estimates of $3000, as the salary for the legal adviser of the Department of External Affairs.
>
> Also be good enough to prepare an item of $600 for allowance to Private Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Walker replied in a handwritten note dated February 20th:

> I enclose for submission to Mr. Borden the draft report in connection with the appointment of a legal adviser to this Department.
>
> The questions of salary and of the title of the office will of course be fixed when the appointment is made. This is merely to create the office. I am sending to the Finance Depart. supplementary estimates for the salary of $3000 and also for a Private Secretary's allowance of $600.
>
> Enclosure:
>
> Duties of Legal Adviser Department of External Affairs.
>
> To have charge of the legal work of the Department of External Affairs; to advise the Government and the Department on questions of international law, the ratification, denunciation, and interpretation of treaties, and matters involving the Dominion's international and Imperial relations; to prepare the text for treaties, legislation and Orders-in-Council respecting Imperial and foreign affairs, and for Parliamentary material explanatory thereof; to prepare references to the International Joint Commission and similar arbitral tribunals, and to prepare the argument on behalf of Canada;

to attend International and Imperial Conferences in an advisory capacity; to undertake confidential missions abroad as directed, and to perform other work as required.(1)

Mr. Walker also enclosed a submission, under Sir Robert Borden's name, to the Governor General, dated the same day:

Department of External Affairs, Canada

To His Royal Highness the Governor General-in-Council:

The undersigned would beg leave to submit to Your Royal Highness that the necessity has become apparent for the appointment in the Department of External Affairs of an officer to pay more special attention to the legal aspects of questions considered by that Department, and that as such an officer would be required to possess professional and technical qualifications of a high order he should be appointed to Grade A of the first Division of the Civil Service. He would therefore recommend that in order to make provision for the proposed appointment the organization and classification of the Department of External Affairs as at present established be amended by the addition thereto of a clerkship in Sub-Division A of the First Division.

Humbly submitted:
(Sgd) R.L. Borden
Secretary of State for
External Affairs

Ottawa, 20th February, 1913.

There is also found the carbon copy, unsigned, of a letter apparently typed in Mr. Blount's office but purporting to be addressed by the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Borden):

I have the honour to report that provision has been made in the estimates for a legal adviser to this Department at a salary of $3000. The knowledge and ability requisite for the position are professional and technical; and I recommend that Mr. Loring C. Christie, Barrister, be appointed to the said position at a minimum salary of $3000 per annum, subject of course, to his producing the necessary statutory certificate. (2)

(1) Copy found in Borden Papers. Folder 59 (Loring C. Christie.(2)).
(2) Borden Papers. (This is an unsigned, undated carbon copy which seems to have been typed as a draft in

The following letter, the carbon of which is on file, bears no signature, would appear to have been sent by Borden to Sir Joseph Pope, by now returned from his holiday in Italy:

Ottawa, Ont. June 10th, 1913.

Dear Sir Joseph Pope:

> Arrangements have been made for the appointment of Mr. Loring C. Christie, Barrister, as an officer in sub-division A of the First Division in the Department of External Affairs, at a salary of $3000 per annum, the said salary to be fixed as the minimum salary attached to the position, with the title of Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs. A sum has been voted in the estimates to cover his salary. Will you be good enough to have the necessary papers prepared for Mr. Christie's appointment. Here with is a letter from Dr. Adam Shortt of the Civil Service Commission providing for Mr. Christie's appointment without examination. The appointment should date from the 15th of April.

Loring C. Christie

Who was this Mr. Loring Cheyney Christie whom Sir Robert Borden had invited to join the Department of External Affairs as special Legal Adviser?

Mr. Christie was born in Amherst, Nova Scotia, on January 21, 1885. He was of Scottish and English descent. His grandfather had come from Scotland to Pictou, N.S., in the ship "Hector"; and his mother was of U.E.L. stock. He was educated at Amherst Academy and Acadia University, Wolfeville, where in 1905 he took his B.A. degree with honours in mathematics. For two years he was editor of the Acadia Atheneum, and was also on

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Mr. Blount's Office for Mr. Walker. This is the first mention in the correspondence of Mr. Loring Christie's name, and the "I recommend" is more likely to have been initiated by Sir Robert Borden (and passed on to Mr. Walker through Mr. Blount) than to have been initiated by either Sir Joseph Pope (who was then in Italy) or by Mr. W.H. Walker himself.)

* See next page

* Birth at Amherst, N.S.

The Toronto Star observed: "Amherst, Nova Scotia, a town of less than 8,000 inhabitants, has probably given more notable men to Canadian public life than any other place of similar size: three Fathers of Confederation, including Sir Charles Tupper who became premier of the Dominion; Hon. J. L. Ralston, who also held the federal finance portfolio and is now minister of national defence; and Mr. Loring Christie, who was Canada's minister at Washington until ill-health forced him recently to seek leave of absence. (Toronto Star, April 9, 1941).

the staff of the Amherst Daily News. He won the Zwicker Prize and tennis championship at Acadia College, and was also Captain of the Acadia hockey team. For one year he was in the service of the Bank of Nova Scotia.

In 1909 he graduated as LL.B. from Harvard University. His Harvard connections included being a proctor of the University, and editor (1907-8) and editor-in-chief (1908-9) of the Harvard Law Review.

He commenced his law practice in New York in the law office of Messrs. Winthrop and Stimson (Senator Root's former firm), from 1909 to 1910; and then became an attorney in the United States Department of Justice (1910-13) and assistant to the Solicitor-General of the United States from 1911 to 1913. Of this American phase of his life, the Ottawa Journal later said:

"Intellectually Loring Christie was the refined product of the Harvard Law School. From that renowned institution he took a reverence for law, in its truest meaning, and a reverence also for public service. After a brief period in the law offices of George Wickersham, he went to the Justice Department in Washington. It was in the era of Woodrow Wilson and the "New Freedom"; the years when young American liberals like Walter Lippmann were launching the "New Republic". Loring Christie was of their circle, a circle which had the late great Justice Holmes as its prophet, and which included Felix Frankfurter among its members. From that environment, rich in its ideals and doctrines, Christie inherited and developed much of the philosophy which inspired and coloured his career."(1)

(1) Ottawa Journal, editorial. April 9, 1941.

Sir Robert Borden, also a Nova Scotian, knowing him and his record, and desiring to obtain his valuable services in the Canadian public service, arranged for his appointment. The steps taken are given above. "It was the beginning of an association that grew for both into comradeship and that was as rich in gain for both as it was for Canada. In successive Imperial and international conferences, gatherings that left their imprint on what Canada became and remains, it was Loring Christie who was Sir Robert's right hand." (1)

It was as Sir Robert Borden's adviser that Christie made his name. But he was little known to the public or in the headlines. "Shy, reserved, he would be the last to seek praise or publicity, and believed in the tradition of civil service anonymity. Yet it can be said truly of Loring Christie that he was one of those who over a long stretch of momentous years made a difference to Canada's story. Sir Robert Borden , in his Memoirs, gave testimony for that." (2)

Christie, when he joined the Department in February 1913, was a tall handsome young man of 28, quiet and generally reserved, very self-sufficient, and a competent and reflective lawyer. He was keenly interested in politics and both Canadian-American and Canadian-Imperial relations, largely from a constitutional angle; and he maintained this interest throughout his life. He made many friends, was ever ready for discussion in these fields

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

of interest, and apparently was listened to with respect. But his absorption in his own work often left the impression that he was more or less oblivious to the departmental personnel around him or the activities and administration of the office, which were so much the prepossession of Pope.

Leaving out the period spent in the United States, in New York and Washington, in the profession of law, Mr. Loring Christie's career in relation to Canada falls into three parts. During the first, from 1913 to 1923, he was Legal Adviser in the Department of External Affairs. During the second, from 1923 to 1935, he was out of public service, and was engaged privately in business and finance; but his political "advisory" correspondence with both Prime Minister Borden and Prime Minister Meighen was maintained. In the third period, he returned to the Department of External Affairs, first as Counsellor in the Department (1935-39) under Prime Ministers Mr. R.B. Bennett and Mr. Mackenzie King, and then from 1939 till his death in 1941, as Canadian Minister to the United States.

In the early years of his service with Borden, Christie continued to keep in contact with some of his old American associations. He remained on good terms with Stimson, who later became Secretary of War and Secretary of State; he seems to have written articles for, and at least once, attended a meeting of the editorial board of "The New Republic", which was one of the few United States journals that during the period of neutrality was willing to devote sympathetic attention to Canada,

its northern but "belligerent" neighbour.

In the nature of things it is difficult to determine how far questions of policy were formulated first by Borden and then commented upon or supported by Christie's memoranda, and how far they were put forward first by Christie for the consideration of the Prime Minister. There was considerable give and take and probably many verbal discussions which would lead to the preparation of special memoranda.

On one occasion, during the summer of 1916 Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, was greatly concerned lest the United States should impose an embargo on munitions exports to Great Britain. He confided his fears to Borden in strong terms. Borden sent Christie on a special mission to Washington to assess the situation, and this undertaking was no doubt facilitated by Christie's many intimate friends and former official connections in the United States Government. On his return, Christie prepared one of his customary long and able memoranda, which tended to belittle Spring-Rice's anxieties. Borden in the end declined to intervene on behalf of Great Britain by resorting to Canadian-United States good-will, arguing that intervention by Canada in a British problem might do more harm than good; and in this view Borden appears to have been influenced by the advice given to him by Christie.

When Christie was appointed, the Department was still installed in the Trafalgar Building. But Christie did not join that establishment. He found an office for himself in the East Block, close to the Prime

Minister whom he served. When in 1914 the Department of External Affairs at last moved into the East Block, and spread its offices along the south end of the second floor, Christie's office remained detached from that group of offices; his own was further up the corridor near the Prime Minister's and Privy Council Offices. During the decade of his first period of service in the Department, he was thus detached from it; he cared little for its administration, its organization or its staff, which were left to Pope's superintendence. He appears to have co-operated little with Pope in these matters. He scarcely considered himself as a part of the departmental apparatus. He remained almost completely independent as a legal, constitutional and political adviser to Sir Robert Borden and later to Mr. Meighen.

When the War Committee of the Cabinet in Ottawa was created at the time of the Coalition in 1917, parallel to that created in England by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, Christie was appointed its Secretary, like Sir Maurice Hankey in England. He kept himself fairly busy with "administrative work connected with the war" and "a few pieces of research", but he gradually found that the work as Secretary of the War Cabinet was routine and unproductive.

It might almost be said that the Department of External Affairs was broken into two distinct sections: the Pope-Walker Section, and the detached Legal Section of Christie. The first Section did the routine work, such as documentation, reference work, passports, consular relations, and information, but gave no advice. The other Section was mainly advisory; Christie's task,

apart from his duties in the War Cabinet, was the preparation of memoranda for the Prime Minister. He also had personal consultations almost every day.

Christie's Attempted Resignation, 1918.

Despite all his earlier war-time activities, Christie began, at the end of 1917, to grow very restless, first because he felt that his work was becoming perfunctory and could be done as well by another, and, more important, because he was feeling the urge to "join up" when the demands for further Canadian recruits were becoming urgent in the later stage of the War. He was of military age, and he increasingly felt the universal patriotic urge to don uniform and enlist. At that particular time, also, there was a trend among many eligibles, to "volunteer" in order to avoid the stigma of probable compulsory service as "conscripts" under the Military Service Act.

In a personal letter to Sir Robert Borden, dated January 7, 1918, he wrote:

> When, in October, in response to the suggestion that I undertake the Secretaryship of the War Committee, I raised a point as to the propriety of my doing so in view of my eligibility for military service, you suggested that this point should remain over "for the present". As you were good enough to say that you appreciated my position, I hope, now that the election is over, that I shall not be considered importunate in bringing up the matter again.
>
> . . . .
>
> Up to the summer of 1917 I could feel some solid ground for the view that by urging this step I might conceivably cause some real inconvenience - not certainly that I was indispensable but that through the accident of my being here I had acquired a familiarity with the processes of administration and a

knowledge of affairs touching your office that were perhaps useful to you. An perhaps no one has had a better opportunity than myself to realize - what is I think quite inconceivable to people in general - the extraordinary and quite unique nature of the burden that has been thrown upon you. So that while the circle seemed an endless one - that is, the longer I stayed the harder it would be apparently to get away - I felt there was some reason, not for being complacant, but for acquiescing. What you had said to me and the way in which it was said seemed insuperable.

But for the past six or seven months, since your return from England, I have felt that there has been a noticeable difference in the conditions. Formerly you were obliged to bear the brunt of a vast deal of the administrative work connected with the war and it was with this work that my duties were largely involved. I think there has been a change in this condition whether because much of this work has settled into departmental routine or for other reasons. At all events, beyond a few pieces of research, I have not during this period been conscious of any special usefulness.

I think it is also true that the recent additions to your office staff * have changed the position in this respect and have shown that it would be easy to let me go. Nor, to complete the case, is there any need for me in the External Affairs departmental organization.

As for the War Committee position, I gather from some remarks which Mr. Rowell (1) let drop the other day that its duties would take about all my time and would probably involve what would be in effect a transfer to a position as an assistant to him plus a recording secretaryship.

After a good deal of thought I venture to express here my great doubt as to whether the keeping

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* In the year 1918-19 the only new senior appointments to the staff of the Department of External Affairs were J.F. Boyce, and A.W. Merriam, G.F. Buskard and H.C. Borden as "private secretaries"; but they could hardly have been rivals to Mr. Christie in his eminent advisory position. Mr. Hugh Clark, M.P., had been replaced in that year by Mr. F.H. Keefer, M.P., as Parliamentary Secretary of State for External Affairs; but there is no evidence that his position, as a member of the House of Commons, would in any way usurp or interfere with the functions of Mr. Christie. Mr. Christie's reference to recent additions in the staff is therefore not clear, except perhaps in so far as he felt himself, with these other persons around the Prime Minister, as no longer the indispensable aide.

(1) At that time Hon. Newton Rowell was President of the Privy Council and Chairman of the Cabinet War Committee.

and circulating of minutes will turn out to serve any really useful purpose. The position is I think rather different from that in England. There the minutes of the War Cabinet serve both to record actual decisions of the Government and to give notice to the various department heads to whom they are circulated of what action they are expected to take. In Canada (as you observed in one of your speeches in Great Britain) that function is and has always been fulfilled by our "Minutes of Council". It has so far been the practice of the War Committee here, when a decision or measure has been definitely determined upon, to depute to the Minister of department concerned the business of embodying it in a formal Report to Council. Then, if it is approved by the Governor in Council, the Minute of Council constitutes the real record and notification to the departments - and also to the public in a proper case. This practice seems both sound and convenient and I should think therefore that it will perpetuate itself. If this view of the matter is sound, the War Committee minutes seem rather superfluous. On this aspect I respectfully submit the principle that, unless clear reason to the contrary appears, it is better not to disturb the constitutional convention as to the secrecy of Cabinet discussions. The circulation of these minutes throws them open to a good many people in the various offices to which they are sent.*

I am therefore apprehensive lest I should later find myself practically in the position of having accepted a new post which did not need any special qualification such as I may have acquired in your office and which might easily be filled by some one of non-military age or by a returned soldier.

For these reasons I have come to the conclusion that I am justified in renewing my application for leave of absence in order to enlist.

To this the Prime Minister replied on January 19, 1918:

I have read with much interest your letter of the 7th instant and you may be assured that I appreciate most fully your patriotic desire to serve in the military forces of Canada in the present critical conditions.

The proposals of the Government embodied in the Military Service Act were based upon the importance of securing from each citizen the best service of which he is capable.

The duties which devolve upon you, as Legal

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* Lord Hankey deals with this question at length, with the opposite conclusion, in Diplomacy by Conference.

> Adviser of the Department of External Affairs, especially in relation to communications of great moment between the British and Canadian Governments with respect to a great variety of subjects, are highly important. To these have been recently added duties as Secretary of the War Committee of the Cabinet.
>
> I have no hesitation whatever in saying that your best service to Canada and the Empire is to be found in the continuance of these duties and I hope that you will acquiesce in this view, which is entirely shared by Mr. Rowell, with whom I have discussed the subject.
>
> Let me add my warm appreciation of the fine service which you have given since you entered the Department of External Affairs and especially of your notable service during the past three and a half years, in relation to the participation of Canada in the present war.(1)

So Christie remained with the Department, and soon found himself busily occupied with journeys abroad accompanying Sir Robert Borden, and with the forthcoming problems of the Peace Settlement.

Wartime Activities and After

In his capacity as Legal Adviser, and as a consequence of the War, Christie soon found himself not merely a consultant in the Department in Ottawa, but a busy diplomat undertaking numerous missions abroad, generally companioning his chief, Sir Robert Borden, though sometimes acting on his own as a special emissary.

The list of parleys which Christie attended is impressive. He accompanied Sir Robert Borden to London for the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet and Imperial War Council in 1917, and in June-August, 1918, the Imperial War Cabinet in November-December, 1918, the

(1) Borden Papers: Vol.55. File 58. (Loring Christie).

Peace Conference preliminary meetings in London in 1918-19, and to Paris in 1919, and remained with the Canadian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference after Sir Robert Borden returned to Canada; he attended the International Labour Conference in Washington in 1919, and the first Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1920, which he reported in long personal letters to Sir Robert Borden. He made a special visit to England in April, 1920. He attended with Mr. Meighen the Imperial Conference in London in 1921, and with Borden the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in Washington in 1921-22, when Merriam of External Affairs accompanied the delegation as a secretary. He was delegate of the Canadian Government at the Inter-Allied Conference on Electrical Communications in Washington in 1920, and at the Sixth Session of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office in Geneva in 1921, and was a member of the British Debt-Funding Mission to the United States in Washington in January, 1923. He later attended the Special Assembly of the League of Nations in 1936, and another Conference of Prime Ministers in 1937. As a representative of the Ottawa Government, he also discussed mutual problems facing the United States and Canada in the early twenties, such as aviation, power, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and so on.

While for seven years he was a close adviser to Sir Robert Borden on imperial relationships within the Commonwealth, he was equally an adviser to Mr. Meighen

on American questions with which he was so familiar. The Imperial Conference of 1921, when Meighen represented Canada, marked a turning point in Anglo-American-Japanese relations, and brought about the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Peace Conference

The end of the war being in sight, Lloyd George telegraphed Borden in October, 1918, suggesting that he should be ready to leave again for Europe as soon as possible to participate in inter-allied conferences preceding the Peace Conference. Borden hurriedly organized his delegation and proceeded to England early in November. His principal colleagues were Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce, A .L. Sifton, Minister of Customs, and C.J. Doherty, Minister of Justice. Foster had as his secretary Chester H. Payne from his Department; Sifton took T.W. Quayle, Doherty had Major Oliver Asselin, Legal Officer of the Department of Justice, who proved rather ineffectual. There were two principal military advisers, Lieut.Gen. Sir Arthur Currie, Commander of the Canadian Army Corps, and his A.D.C. Col. Ralston, and Lieut.Col. O.M. Biggar, Judge Advocate General. The Prime Minister, as usual, took with him his legal adviser, Loring C. Christie, and also from the External Affairs Department, as private secretaries, J.F. Boyce and G.F. Buskard.

In general, this group were ill-prepared for the business before them. Almost no preparatory work had been done in the Departments in Ottawa, and the delegation sailed without briefing. On reaching London, they were at

once plunged into discussions on many diplomatic problems with which they were unfamiliar, and busied themselves with studies. Biggar, and one or two military experts, prepared in London a series of memoranda analyzing the various proposals for the Covenant of the League of Nations; Doherty in Paris carried on the study in a memorandum on certain aspects of the same subject. The problem of the proposed Article X of the Covenant, on the guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity was examined in a brief prepared by Borden and a critical memorandum by Doherty. Christie, of course, - perhaps the most expert in the group on international questions and on constitutional and legal aspects, - was constantly consulted and was kept busy preparing notes and memoranda and in contributing suggestions or advice.

The story of Canada's role, under Sir Robert Borden, at the Peace Conference in London and Paris, has been told in detail elsewhere.* Naturally, Borden as the prime actor, takes the limelight; his adviser, Christie, stands obscurely in the wings. We know from Borden's Memoirs that during Conference periods, Borden usually had a morning and often an evening conference with the other members of the Canadian delegation to discuss the questions arising during the day; and Christie was normally present. During many of Borden's social attendances and week-end excursions, also, he frequently took Christie along with him. While the Ministers busied themselves preparing various memoranda and attending meetings, Christie was ever present to assist. At Borden's high-level discussions with the other Prime Ministers and delegates

* For example in: G. Glazebrook: Canada at the Paris Peace Conference; and A History of Canadian External Relations. F.H. Soward: "Sir Robert Borden and Canada's External Policy" Proceedings Canadian Historical Association, 1941.

and with the American representatives like Wilson, Lansing, House and Shotwell, Borden would need the knowledge and behind-the-scenes guidance of his expert; and on every point regarding status and Dominion representation, which Borden persistently fought for and argued inch by inch, he needed the help of his constitutional adviser. Moreover, Christie also had close and valuable contacts with colleagues of his own level, such as Philip Kerr, the Private Secretary and right-hand man of Lloyd George, and other Commonwealth and American and French officials; and, as Borden admits, was able to bring to Sir Robert from time to time useful information which he thus acquired.

Even in the midst of the arduous work of the preliminary Peace Conference, Borden managed to take half-a-day off on Easter Sunday, April 20th, in the company of J.W. Robertson of the Canada Food Board and Christie. They attended a service at the Cathedral of St. Denis, then visited the St. Denis market, and then lunched at a café at St. Germaine and finally set out for Versailles where they had an hour's walk. Borden wrote in his diary: "At five o'clock we returned to the Majestic. Then six hours' work, dictating, studying, reading, etc. Here is my Easter. My wife will tell me that I did not pay enough attention to religious duties. I shall reply that this is true, but that Robertson and Christie caused me to leave the straight and narrow path and she ought to blame them." (1)

(1) Borden: Memoirs. II. p.941.

Christie accompanied Borden and Sifton to the session at Versailles when Clemenceau, on behalf of the Allies, presented the Peace Treaty to the German delegation. That was on May 7, 1919, Borden described it in his Memoirs, (Vol.II. pp.962-963), and ends: "So the curtain rang down upon the first scene of the last act of the terrible drama which had occupied the world's stage for nearly five years."

Finally, in May, 1919, before the final signature, Borden was urgently obliged to return to Canada, while President Wilson was to return to the United States. The two statesmen returned by the same vessel. Christie remained in Paris, with others of the Canadian Delegation - Foster and Doherty - for the Treaty signing in the Hall of Mirrors.

Separate Representation

While, between 1917 and 1919, the somewhat vague notion of a Canadian permanent diplomatic representative to be appointed to Washington was taking shape, Christie was ever present to offer his legal suggestions and advice to Sir Robert Borden. One aspect that impressed him was the fact that Canada had obtained the right of separate representation at the Peace Conference and at the League of Nations; this gave Canada a stronger position and status as a sovereign nation, and opened the way to

a further step at Washington. As Christie noted in a memorandum for Borden, dated September 17, 1919, "The whole question of status has been greatly altered by what happened at Paris - the Treaty, the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization, etcetera."(1)

In 1919 Christie was sent to Washington to seize the opportunity of the visit there of Lord Grey and Sir William Tyrrell and to discuss the Canadian plan. Sir William, Private Secretary to Lord Grey, was on a special mission to the President, to last only a few months. He was therefore unwilling to discuss the general question of Canadian representation or to report on it to the Foreign Office; he appreciated, however, being consulted by the Prime Minister through Christie. Christie added, however, in his secret memorandum on his visit:

> I had some informal conversation on the subject with Sir William Tyrrell and Mr. Lindsay on the subject. Neither of them seemed in the least bit startled by the proposal; nor did they suggest in any way that there would be any difficulty either legally or practically. Both thought the scheme workable provided there was goodwill on both sides and the right men were appointed. Sir William Tyrrell entirely recognized that the importance and political status of Canada made the step necessary, and he agreed that it ought to be tried. Mr. Lindsay emphasized especially the importance of having the Canadian establishment housed in some building either adjoining the Embassy or in that immediate vicinity, since this would tend greatly to facilitate the work. . .(2)

(1) File 603-19C, Part One.

(2) Christie Memorandum, October 15, 1919. (File 603-19C, Part One).

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(2) Christie Memorandum, October 15, 1919. (File 603-19C, Part One).

Foreign Office

In 1920 Christie was sent to London, as Pope had been in 1910, to investigate Colonial Office and Foreign Office procedure. A letter dated March 5, 1920, was addressed, presumably by Sir Robert Borden (the carbon copy on departmental file 1576-1920 shows no signature) to Lieut. Col. L.C.M. S. Amery, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, stating:

> As you will have seen from the Governor General's telegram of today we are sending Mr. L.C. Christie, Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs, to London to confer with your authorities on the spot concerning the matter of channels of communication between the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the British Member of the League. You are, I believe, already known to one another.
>
> We are anxious also, as the previous correspondence shows, to improve the existing means by

> which we secure intelligence regarding foreign affairs. Recent developments have naturally stimulated Parliament's interest in such matters; this tendency will doubtless become more marked, and while it would not be feasible at this time to attempt any elaborate organization, yet it should be possible to make some improvement.
>
> In this connection also I have asked Mr. Christie to look into the organization of the Foreign Office with a view to getting suggestions for improving the organization of our Department of External Affairs, and I feel confident you will be glad to facilitate his mission in this as well as in other matters.

Christie had interviews with Lord Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir George Perley, Colonel Amery, Sir Maurice Hankey, Philip Kerr, and General S.B. Wilson of the League of Nations Branch of the Cabinet Secretariat. He also dined with Sir William Tyrrell and saw various other officials in the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. On his return to Ottawa in May, he prepared a series of reports, on the organization of the Foreign Office, on the system of communication between the Government and the League of Nations, on the question of departmental cyphers, on the High Commissioner's Office in London, and on other matters of related concern.

League Assembly

We next find Christie an advising member of the Canadian delegation to the First General Assembly of the new League of Nations. The three official delegates were Sir George Foster, C.J. Doherty, and N.W. Rowell, K.C. We have a summary opinion of this meeting in a letter which Christie wrote in longhand from Geneva to Sir Robert Borden, dated December 12, 1920:

We have every hope of getting away from here by the end of this week and I think everyone is glad of it. The Canadian party are sailing on the 31st except Mr. Doherty who has some legal questions to take up with H.M.G. and myself.(I am to assist him). We are to sail on January 5th.

The Assembly, simply as a machine worked better I think than I had expected. It goes. So perhaps the sheer inertia of institutions will see it a long way. What it produces is another matter and depends upon what people want it to produce.

The delegates are intelligent in large part. There is a frank and friendly air about. The Assembly has developed a corporate consciousness - displayed in the resentment at the intransigence of the Argentinians, and in the wave of emotion,that swept over it during the discussion of typhus in Eastern Europe when delegate after delegate mounted the tribune to announce the contribution of his country (all of them by the way very small compared to Canada's) - like the wave that sweeps over any body of men engaged in generosity.

On the other hand, it is susceptible to the appeals of oratory directed to devious purposes. . . The other day for my instruction and amusement I put down the chief delegates in rows according to their official positions, and I found there were 9 Ministers or Members of Governments (only 5 of them Foreign Ministers - and all of these from small Powers), 9 ex-Ministers and 23 diplomats (including High Com'rs for South Africa, New Zealand and India). In many cases there is no great degree separating an ex-Minister from a diplomat for the purpose in hand. One is inclined to wonder what confidence the acts of such a body will command, how much attention governments will pay to them. And as this Assembly has dragged so long it may be that next year even fewer Ministers will come. So I should think we must be content to expect a quite limited activity on the part of the Assembly. It will do one job worth while this year in producing the scheme for a Permanent Court of International Justice.

The effort to set up a number of other technical organizations (economic and financial, communications and transit and health) involving further annual conferences, permanent commissions, and secretariats brought into high relief a difficulty and a divergence which seems certain to arise again and again in the future, and it seems to me very serious and baffling. Europe is ready and anxious to set up all kinds of bodies of this sort. Her countries are sick and tired and sore and afraid and perhaps for that reason ready to huddle together for comfort and relief. And these proposed machines are to be centred in Europe. On

the other hand, the other world, especially the New World and more especially North America, doesn't feel the need. And it is impossible to expect North America to join cheerfully in shows run at such a distance where it is so difficult to keep in touch with them especially when North America feels that the seat of power is moving west if it has not already definitely moved.

I feel sure that Mr. Rowell was touching something real when he opened a fight against the tendency here to rush these organizations and set them up in all their elaboration at once. He succeeded to the extent that what was done can now be regarded as temporary, tentative, and open to review in the future. He did it practically single-handed. But in my view he marred the performance by some words that need not have been said in quite the way he said them. Some words about European statesmanship. They hurt and stung many people and caused resentment. It seems to me the case should have been based on the power and importance of the New World and the necessity to take account of our point of view.

While he was speaking I could not help wishing you had been here to do something. But possibly the thing hasn't taken on such strong colours in getting to the world. This seems such a remote secluded spot, it is difficult to imagine how these things are seen from a long perspective by busy people.

. . .

Judge Doherty's amendment to strike out Article 10 also caused a stir. As soon as he handed it in I recommended strongly that the paragraph from your Paris memorandum ought to be published, for I found that a great many were suspecting us of a manoeuvre in the direction to the south. That would do great harm. There was only one way to put the matter straight and I should think the whole thing shows Canada's position is consistent and sound. . .

All these things have brought Canada into a good deal of prominence. They have also done much, I think, to dispel many foreign illusions about the place of the Dominions in the Empire. They have had a great effect on many of the American newspaper men here if one can judge by what they say. The A.P. men said to me last night that the Canadian delegation had done more to put life and reality into the Assembly than any other delegation.(1)

(1) Borden Papers. 26-4. Folder 58: L.C. Christie.

Representation at Washington

Ever loyal to his chiefs, Sir Robert Borden and Mr. Meighen, Christie espoused whole-heartedly the idea of distinct Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington. (Elsewhere - in the chapter on Canadian Consular Service - it will be shown that he also envisaged, over twenty years prematurely, the idea of a distinct Canadian Consular representation in New York and in other regions of the United States). Christie had had long official service in Washington before joining the Canadian Department; and he knew that the American authorities would welcome a distinctively Canadian diplomatic representative, if for no other reason than to eliminate the roundabout channel of London and the Foreign and Colonial Offices. He also was aware, and often repeated Lord Bryce's assertion, that from two-thirds to three-quarters of the diplomatic work of the British Embassy in Washington dealt with Canadian matters; and a subdivision of labour by means of a special Canadian diplomatic agent would be a welcome relief to the British Embassy. Christie was not prepared, however, to accept the extreme suggestion, (as adopted later by the Irish Free State), of a separate Canadian Legation and independent Canadian Minister. As a constitutional lawyer, he was concerned with preserving the imperial constitutional forms and diplomatic unity by a compromise arrangement. The "independent" position, which alarmed so many Canadian constitutionalists, was not envisaged

as feasible; it would, as so many others thought, strain if not rupture the unified imperial front, complicate the imperial diplomatic machinery, confuse foreign governments, and be a presumption of Canadian power which did not yet in fact exist. (Christie could not, in 1920, foresee that in the course of two decades of constitutional devolution, he himself in 1939 would be an independent Canadian Minister to the United States, at the head of a separate Legation.)

Whether, in fact, leading or following Sir Robert Borden's thinking along these lines, Christie at any rate gave his expert support, and prepared, both for Borden in 1920 and for Meighen in 1921, elaborate memoranda or briefs on the subject of improved Canadian diplomatic representation.(1) In this, he seems to have been paralleled by his colleague, Sir Joseph Pope, who, however, argued on practical grounds rather than struggle with constitutional difficulties. Both advisers, however, strove to avoid "independent representation", while urging a special Canadian official within the British Embassy.

Most of the telegrams from the Prime Minister, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, for the Governor General's transmission to the Colonial Secretary during 1919 and 1920 seem to have been drafted by Christie.(2) The joint announcement (May

(1) To be found in file 603-19C, Part One.

(2) Ibid.

10) of the agreed arrangement of 1920 was partly drafted by him. On October 27, 1920, Christie sent a long memorandum to Premier Meighen on the Bureau of Information in New York and the Canadian War Mission in Washington, in which he advocated the postponement of the closing of the War Mission until a new form of diplomatic establishment was arranged, unless the latter was to be indefinitely deferred. (On December 12, 1920, Sir Joseph Pope submitted a somewhat similar review of these agencies).

In April, 1921, Christie prepared a draft outline of the history of the proposals for representation at Washington, for the use of Sir Robert Borden in his long speech in the House of Commons on April 21.(1)

Christie resigned in 1923, and his contribution to the Government's discussions and planning ceased. In 1924 Dr. O.D. Skelton, then Counsellor in the Department, had taken over the tasks of preparing memoranda on representation in Washington.

Imperial Conference, 1921.

In 1921 Mr. Arthur Meighen became Prime Minister when Borden had to resign because of ill-health.

(1) File 603-19C, Part One; H. of C. Debates, April 21, 1921, pp.2463-2474.

Christie was a close personal intimate of Meighen, and addressed his unofficial letters to "My dear Arthur". Meighen almost immediately was called upon to attend the first post-war Imperial Conference in London, and naturally took Christie with him, as Borden had done. At this Conference, the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed. Throughout the previous year it had been earnestly considered in Canada, and in correspondence with London and Washington. No one in Canada had studied the matter more earnestly than Christie. He was in touch with American official and unofficial opinion, which was opposed to the renewal. He received letters from J.W. Dafoe, the influential editor of the Winnipeg Free Press. He received many letters and documents from, and had various personal meetings with, Mr. Lennox Simpson ("Putnam Weale"), a leading "China hand" and official representative of the Chinese Government, and head of the "China lobby", who not only corresponded with Christie, but who made a special visit to Ottawa. Christie was convinced that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should not be renewed, and gave Meighen convincing memoranda arguing his views, and drafted the Government's long telegrams to the British Government on the Canadian attitude and suggestions.(1)

It was later suggested by some critics that this Canadian initiative was influenced by United States pressure and that Canada was a "stooge" of that country, but this was denied and the secret documents show that Christie did his own thinking.

(1) The large departmental files on this topic contain innumerable memoranda and draft telegrams by Christie.

He himself sought for an alternative to the Alliance, and suggested a multilateral naval limitation conference to take its place. He proposed to London that this alternative be explored unofficially with the United States authorities as soon as the new President and Secretary of State took office. Both Borden and Meighen were consulted, and were persuaded along these lines.

When Meighen went to London, well briefed by Christie, he succeeded in overcoming the claims of Australia, New Zealand and Mr. Lloyd George for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and won over the British Prime Minister to the Canadian view, which emphasized the supreme importance of co-operation with the United States.

Disarmament Conference

Lloyd George's reversed decision was made on July 1st. A week later the new American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, apparently "inspired" indirectly by the British Government, extended an invitation to the Pacific Powers to a conference in Washington to discuss a general Naval Disarmament Agreement the following year. But by December, 1921, Meighen was out of office, and Mr. Mackenzie King had become Prime Minister, but the retired Sir Robert Borden, because of his familiarity with the problem and his recognized negotiating ability, was appointed by King as chief Canadian delegate, and once more took his indispensable adviser, Christie, with him, together with R.W. Merriam, Borden's and Meighen's Private Secretary, and J. Mailhot, from the Department of External Affairs, as filing clerk and

and messenger. Once again Christie's help proved invaluable through his intimate knowledge of the Washington scene and the American officials, his acquaintance with British and foreign delegates, and his thorough knowledge of the whole question regarding American, British, Japanese and Chinese relationships.

Search for Other Employment

However, after attending this and several other international conferences of that period, Christie was again becoming restless and dissatisfied with his position, now that his patron and friend, Sir Robert Borden, was retired, Arthur Meighen was out of office, and Mr. King was the new head of the Canadian Government.

From the Department of External Affairs he wrote, on October 11, 1922, to Borden saying he expected to leave shortly for England and asking for a note to Mr. Bonar Law:

> . . . not exactly a letter of introduction, for I have met him on various occasions with you; rather some letter to recall me to his memory, for I never had any special direct dealings with him. It seems to me his advice would be most valuable, not only in respect of the financial and business world, but also on the prospects of finding an opening in the service of H.M.G., e.g. in the diplomatic service (Foreign Office or outside). For while I have been exploring the idea of business, my mind keeps returning to the other notion, and I intend to look into it when I reach London. I cannot avoid the feeling that I should be happier and more satisfied intellectually doing that sort of work, given the good conditions that obtain in the British public service. As a matter of practical politics I think the chances are probably slim in that direction: there are doubtless all sorts of regulations and factors, political, departmental and otherwise, that would enter into such a question, and aside from these things, there seems little

> probability that an opportunity into which I might fit should happen to occur at the very time when I happen to be available. Still it will do no harm to enquire when I am on the spot, and if the notion turns out to be impracticable, I can still pursue the other. If Mr. Bonar Law were willing to give me the benefit of his advice in either direction - I should not ask him for more - I am sure it would be very sound.

However, nothing came of this notion to join the British foreign service if he could. Christie's sailing to England was postponed for various personal reasons. On October 19th he wrote to Borden:-

> Another matter has arisen that might conceivably interfere with or postpone my plans. Two days ago I got a cable from Hankey saying that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had asked the Prime Minister here if I could be spared to assist in the British-American debt-funding negotiations at Washington, and pressing me to accept if permitted. I learn that such a cable has in fact come from the Chancellor, though so far nothing has been said to me about it. Today's newspapers however state that in view of the political developments in England the Chancellor, who was to have sailed next week, will now postpone his trip - though it is not given as an official announcement. But should he come and should I be permitted to accept the suggestion - (as I am idle I can see no reason why I should not be "spared"!) I intend to do so, for I do not feel I should decline such a request. The pursuit of my other inquiries would have to wait.(1)

This would seem to indicate that Christie had already submitted his notice of intended resignation, and was about to sail for England to seek other employment either in British diplomatic Service or in business. He stated that as he was "idle" he could be "spared"; he was quite prepared to accept a special British mission, if "permitted" to do so. The tone of the two above-quoted letters suggest that his mind was made up to leave his Canadian Government service.

(1) Borden Papers. Folder 58. Correspondence to L.C. Christie (1).

We find also that in 1922 Mr. Meighen was sponsoring Mr. Christie for further and more active employment. He wrote to the Colonial Secretary, and received the following private reply from the Duke of Devonshire, at the Colonial Office, dated November 20, 1922:

> Mr. Churchill had ceased to be Secretary of State when your letter of October 12th reached him, and he therefore asked me to reply to it.
>
> I remember Mr. Christie well, and I know the high opinion held of his qualities and capacity not only in Canada but also by those in London who have worked with him, or for whom he has worked, at Imperial and International Conferences.
>
> I fear that, as matters stand at present, there is no opening for Mr. Christie either in the Colonial Office or in the Foreign Office. I hope, however, that you will not take this as an indication of any lack of sympathy on my part with your idea of the participation of men from the Dominions in the Imperial Services. On the contrary it is one with which, in spite of the considerable practical difficulties, I have much sympathy.
>
> You may have heard, since writing, that there is a possibility of Mr. Christie going to Washington to join the staff of the British mission which is to discuss the Funding question with the United States Government. There can be no doubt, I think, that he would be very useful in work of this kind.
>
> A possible opening for Mr. Christie might be an appointment under one of the bodies now in existence which have an International staff. I am thinking particularly of the League of Nations and the Reparations Commission. I do not know, however, whether this kind of work would be acceptable to him, and, as I expect you have heard, it has often been suggested that the British Empire has already had a good deal more than its fair share of the posts of this kind which are available. There might be, therefore, difficulty in finding a vacancy for him even if he wished to apply; on the other hand the practice here is to "second" officials in the Civil Service to such posts, so that they do not sever their connection with the Government Service altogether.(1)

(1) Borden Papers. Series 4. Vol.55 (File 28, L.C. Christie).

As it turned out, Christie was induced to join, temporarily, the British Mission to the Debt-Funding Conference held in Washington in January, 1923; but after that he again felt that he wished to leave Canadian Government service, then under Mr. Mackenzie King.

Resignation in 1923

On March 13, 1923, Christie again wrote from the Department to Borden saying:

> I had already decided to leave for England at the earliest possible moment, so on Saturday afternoon I put this up to the Prime Minister. I told him frankly what my intentions were, and I offered to resign at once if he felt that that would be the proper course in the circumstances. He was good enough to express regret on behalf of himself and his colleagues at the situation, and he himself suggested at once that I should rather take my regular leave of absence now and leave the other question until my return. Accordingly I am sailing from St. John on Friday, the 16th, on the "Montrose". (1)

Loring Christie resigned from the Department in May, 1923, thus ending a pregnant seven-year official connection with Sir Robert Borden and three additional years under Meighen and King. His main reason for this step was probably restlessness and frustration in his job, but also was to some extent personal.

It would appear that Christie was influenced toward resigning by some action of Mr. King's. Nearly three years later, on January 29, 1926, J.W. Dafoe wrote in a personal letter to Borden:

> Christie is in the first flight of my friends . . . I thoroughly agree with what you say about Christie and I share to the full your indignation

(1) Borden Papers. Vol.264. Folder 58. L.C. Christie. (Doc. 148073).

at the folly which cost the people of Canada his services. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the incident is that the party who was chiefly responsible for the loss of Christie's services appears to be entirely unaware that he is responsible. He made quite a long speech to me once about how well Christie had been used and how heartbroken he was about losing him. I don't think he was hypocritical about this either. As the saying goes, "the king can do no wrong".(1)

Loring Christie's resignation is described, atthis three years' later period, by himself as follows, in a personal and confidential letter to Sir Robert Borden, dated March 15, 1926:

> The pathetic picture of the chieftain mourning over my loss, if it moved Dafoe, ought perhaps to move me, but I fear I am hardened to such suffering! The same picture was apparently shown elsewhere after I left, for it was described to me from various quarters. There were some artistic variations. It was, as I recall it, to Hance Logan that the kindly intimation was made that I had been bought by the "big interests" - which may be supposed perhaps to have taken some edge off the mourning. Before I had considered leaving I used to hear of other pictures. One was through Sam Jacobs who had it direct from the artist that I had been too long associated with Conservative Prime Ministers to be really useful. From some one else there was another about the impossibility of bringing Harold Armstrong into the Department* because that would have meant too much of one family. It was through Charlie Murphy that the picture came of the Cabinet meeting when Mr. Fielding complained that your report of the Washington Conference had been printed without authority, and the valiant chieftain whose Department was thus attacked turned the blow by saying that it was Christie who killed cock robin. Perhaps some day I may find the meaning of this cinematograph. All I could make head or tail of at the time were the facts which I knew myself, viz., that the first time I saw him after he became P.M. - just after returning from the Washington Conference - he called me in to say to me at great length that my relations and work with him would be exactly the same as with you and Mr. Meighen; that during the year that followed I saw him on business possibly a dozen times, including meetings in the corridor, and scarcely ever for more

(1) Borden Papers. Christie.

* Mr. Armstrong, brother of Christie's first wife, was appointed Private Secretary to Meighen on January 14, 1921, resigned on the defeat of Meighen in 1922.

than a few minutes; that I had very little to do, and thus though it was decided that I should not go to the Genoa Conference or to Geneva on the ground that there was important work at home, the important work never turned up, and all I did throughout the year might have been done in three weeks. Afterward I recalled that at our original interview he had talked about his political creed at great length, contrasting it with Mr. Meighen's and so on, and that at one or two appropriate pauses I had either been silent or had sought to talk about the Department. It was one of the most amazing and egostistical performances I have ever seen and I do not doubt, though I could not prove it, that it was simply a crude invitation to declare myself his faithful slave and what a wonderful time we would have together.

There is more, but I will not labour it. I don't know whether I have spoken to you before of all this. I have said little about it to anyone, for it seemed to me the relevant fact was that I was kicking my heels on my office chair.(1)

Sir Robert Borden acknowledged this on April 15, 1926:

Your personal and confidential letter of the 15th March is before me. I read with much interest, and, I think, with full realisation, your description of the incidents which followed the advent of the present Prime Minister to the control of External Affairs. Your estimate of what he intended and desired is doubtless correct.(2)

It seems clear that after Mr. Mackenzie King's accession to the Premiership, Christie had very little to do, and was no longer cognizant of external matters dealt with by Mr. King, and was not used as a consultant.

In a letter from Christie to Meighen, dated April 24, 1924, he said: "The telegrams /about Canadian representation at Lausanne/ were exchanged from October to December, 1922. I did not leave the department until

(1) Borden Papers. Folder 59. Letters to Christie(2). (Document 148306).

(2) Ibid (Document 148359).

May, 1923. Until I read King's statement in the Hansard you sent me, I did not even know of the existence of these telegrams."(1) If Christie knew nothing of these quite important communications it is possible that there were others of an earlier date in 1922 of which King had sole knowledge. There is no indication that either Pope or Christie were consulted on the Sunday and Monday of the Chanak crisis, when King hurriedly consulted with his Cabinet Ministers and sent his reply to Mr. Lloyd George in September 18, 1922.

Even before this private exchange of letters retrospectively explaining Christie's resignation, and while Christie was beginning to enter a business career in London, Sir Robert Borden, ever a faithful friend, wrote to his erstwhile protegé a private letter of appreciation of his former services and a message of good wishes. That appreciation had found expression in Borden's diaries, and later in the Memoirs edited by his nephew, based on the diaries. In his letter of December 11, 1925, Borden wrote:

> It is a great satisfaction to me that your work in the immediate future is likely to become more interesting and congenial. You acquired a remarkably wide and useful experience while you were with me, especially from 1914 to 1919, and it ought not to be lost as it should serve an important purpose in any relevant sphere. Recently I have had my little diary typed and I have found frequent references in the later years to your complete acceptance and fulfilment of the increased responsibility that I placed upon you from time to time...

In a later letter of recommendation and character which Sir Robert Borden wrote to C.A. Magrath on July 10,

(1) Meighen Papers. Series 4. No. 177. Part II.

1935, he said of Christie:

> In 1913 he accepted my invitation to join the Prime Minister's staff as legal adviser of the Department of External Affairs and he continued in that capacity during my Premiership, acting also as my confidential Private Secretary.
>
> He was of invaluable assistance to me at the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference (1917 to 1918) and at the Peace Conference in Paris (1919). As Canadian Delegate at the Washington Disarmament Conference (1921-22), I had the great advantage of his very efficient service as my Secretary.
>
> Mr. Christie is highly educated and cultured, endowed with unusual ability, a broad outlook and wide experience. He is well acquainted with general literature and is thoroughly versed in many phases of international and diplomatic affairs.(1)

L.C. Christie and Sir Robert Borden

The personal relations between Christie and Sir Robert Borden, separated in years by a generation, were uniquely intimate and unusual.

Even after both of them were out of office, the former close association was continued. From England, Christie wrote regularly and at length to his patron, on matters both of political interest, and on personal matters. And strange to say, Borden, already elderly, semi-retired, without the benefit of official secretaries, and beginning to feel the weight of advanced years and chronic ill-health, maintained a friendly and intimate correspondence with Loring Christie, and took a constant interest in his career and his interests and ambitions. The Borden Papers, preserved in the Public Archives, have several files

(1) Borden Papers. Folder 60. Document 148479.

of intimate correspondence with Christie.

There were, besides official, personal reasons for this. Christie, by his first marriage, had a son Paul, and he did Sir Robert Borden the compliment of inviting this elder statesman to become the child's godfather. Borden, through the years to come, took a family interest in the development of this child, and always relished the parental reports. Later, Paul Christie, growing up, had a brilliant scholastic record.

In the same manner, when Sir Robert's nephew, Henry, went off to England as a student and Rhodes Scholar, undecided whether to go through Oxford University or to take up a law course in London, Christie, while in England, was constantly consulted. He became friend, counsellor and guide to Henry; he befriended him in his home; he advised him, and his uncle, as to his career and studies; he wrote frequently to Sir Robert concerning Henry's career and progress and future plans.

Both Borden and Christie exchanged cordial letters of greeting, on such anniversaries as birthdays, or of sympathy in certain cases. There was a deep affection on the part of both. In one long personal letter, of five foolscap typewritten pages, which Christie wrote to Borden, on January 5, 1925, he added the postscript:

"P.S. I am afraid this is rather lengthy again, but I owe you a debt of an intangible character greater than I owe to any living man and it rather compels frankness."

The same personal attachment existed with many of Christie's friends. Among the collection of papers of

Meighen at present in the Public Archives of Canada (the principal papers are not yet deposited there), the only reference to Christie is a brief note which expresses Meighen's supreme admiration and respect for him.

As has been recorded, Borden took Christie, as often as possible, with him on conferences abroad, where they no doubt hobnobbed in closest intimacy. When, in 1917, and 1918, Christie desired to leave his departmental duties to enlist, Borden persuaded him, in flattering terms of appreciation, to remain in Ottawa, and the Hon. Newton Rowell, another honoured friend, was induced to support this appeal. It would appear that Christie was, to Borden, what Philip Kerr had been to Lord Milner in South Africa, and later to Mr. Lloyd George in Great Britain.

Borden's attitude of older to younger man is shown in one of his frequent letters to Christie in London. At the end of a long letter of April 16, 1926, he concluded:

> In twenty years of political leadership I learned very thoroughly the lesson and value of patience. Youth is splendidly impatient, but in these matters the mills of the gods grind very slowly, although in two generations since Confederation there has been wonderful development.
>
> You will be astonished to learn that winter is still with us and that nearly six inches of snow (fell?) last night, probably more serviceable than if it had come in the form of rain. Very soon I shall dismiss national problems from my mind and return with much eagerness to contemplation of those "Majesties of Nature" of which a poet sang long ago, and especially to my wild garden, with its trees, shrubs, flowers and birds, in which during these later years I find my chief enjoyment.
>
> But with you it is different. There are wonderful years still before you, and I heartily concur in the advice of our good friend, Lionel Curtis, that you should not think of leaving the Round Table. But, as for me, I must cry "Ave, Caesar" to the younger men as I pass on.(1)

(1) Borden Papers. Folder 59. To Loring Christie (2).

Even if not recorded on paper or in the documents preserved, Christie played a role in policy-making, which was recognized and appreciated at least by the inner circles of Borden'sCabinet, if invisible to others. That type of influence or policy-guidance could not be attributed to Sir Joseph Pope, the more rigid Departmentalist; but it had its parallel in Dr. O.D. Skelton, who seems to have been the same kind of private counsellor to Mr. Mackenzie King, and even to Mr. Bennett, as Loring Christie was to Sir Robert Borden and, briefly, to Mr. Meighen.

The further services of Christie fall in a later period, and need not concern the present part of this survey. He resigned in the spring of 1923; he entered business and finance in London, meanwhile keeping up a steady correspondence with Borden and Meighen on British politics, imperial affairs, the Round Table movement, and international problems. He returned to Canada and was connected with the Ontario Hydro Eelectric Commission and the Beauharnois development; in 1935 he returned to the Department of External Affairs, and in 1939 was appointed Minister to Washington, where he died in 1941.

The Civil Servant

The Civil Servant, it has often been remarked, is a public servant who normally works in obscurity. He is not a public politician nor a demagogue; he does not appear on the hustings, nor in the forum or market place, nor in the august Chambers of Parliament; he rarely may give public utterance to his own political views, and, because he is publicly voiceless in his own defence, he usually is protected from public or parliamentary criticism.

In H.G. Wells' Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, the modern Civil Servant is likened to the ancient professional class of "Scribe". Among the oldest and more renowned sculptures of Pharaonic Egypt, in the National Museum of Antiquities in Cairo, are two statues, in carved wood, of Egyptian scribes with their tablets on their knees.

Such Civil Servants work without public glory or acclaim, or even general public recognition, and rarely with such statuary as the ancients made. They prefer to labour in obscurity and anonymity, their dedication to their task being their virtue and their reward.

It is not usually easy therefore to penetrate that curtain and evaluate the real value of their invisible role.

On the death of the late Oscar Douglas Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, for example, Mr. R.O. Campney, M.P., later Solicitor-General and Minister of National Defence, referred to him as a "very able self-effacing, and industrious man";(1) Mr. W.A. Mackintosh, writing in The Canadian Banker(2) described him as "preferring to remain anonymous and in the background"; and the Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King referred to his "selfless and self-effacing labour" and to his "modesty".(3)

Likewise, on the death of Mr. Loring Christie, in the same year, Mr. Mackenzie King said in the House of Commons: "Men who spend their lives in the public service, even in the most responsible posts, are rarely

(1) H. of C. Debates, November 17, 1941, pp.1886-1888.

(2) Canadian Banker, April 1941, p.278.

(3) H. of C. Debates, November 17, 1941.

well known to the general public. By the very nature of their work, they do not come in contact with the public, and uninformed persons know little of the contribution they are making to the solution of difficult questions or the administration of public affairs."

It is difficult therefore to indicate precisely the influential role performed behind the scenes of Mr. Loring Christie during his first period of service as Legal Adviser to Sir Robert Borden and to Rt. Hon.Arthur Meighen and Rt. Hon. Mackenzie King, from 1913 until 1923. During the latter years, he complained that his services were not being utilized and that he was rather idle, which led him to resign from the public service, not returning until twelve years later. But his earlier years as adviser to Sir Robert Borden were pregnant with influence.

That influence, so far as has yet been ascertained, is not manifested in documents or departmental records, although he did prepare various memoranda on special problems. As a personal intimate of the Prime Minister, most of his advice seems to have been oral and therefore unrecorded. It was only in the period after Sir Robert Borden's retirement, and his own resignation for a business career in London, that a part of his voluminous correspondence on political affairs with both Borden and Meighen has been preserved in the Public Archives, among the Borden Papers.

Nevertheless, both Mr. King and other Ministers paid tribute to "his influence that made itself felt in the shaping of national affairs and international relations", and to "one who had contributed largely to the diplomatic service of Canada, whose sound judgment was invaluable". The Hon. R.B. Hanson, Leader of the Opposition, said: "References to Mr. Christie as a highly efficient public servant and as a beloved companion are frequent and numerous throughout the pages of the Memoirs of Sir Robert Borden, whom he served so well." (1)

(1) House of Commons Debates. April 8,1941. p.2252

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION ABROAD

(To 1924)

Canadian Representation Abroad

When in 1909 Senator Lougheed expressed the fear that the proposal for a new Department of External Affairs might imply that it might become a "foreign office" or hub of an independent "foreign service" of Ambassadors and Attaches, he was anticipating a possibility which did not materialize for nearly fifteen years and then only after a World War had intervened and had changed the de facto status of Canada in 1920 and the de jure or constitutional status in 1926. During those passing years the Department of External Affairs did nothing to promote the development of a foreign service, although it found itself, in one or two instances, made financially and administratively responsible for certain Canadian representational missions already set up, or to be set up, such as the Office in Paris (after 1913), the International Joint Commission (after 1914), the Canadian War Mission in Washington (from 1918), the High Commissioner's Office in London (from 1921), and the Canadian Advisory Office in Geneva (in 1925).

These accretions were more or less accidental and unintentional. They were not originally conceived as a part of the role and responsibilities of the Department. Nor did they influence the development of the Department in Ottawa until after 1925, when the expansion of permanent Missions abroad necessitated an expansion of the headquarters at home.

Nevertheless, parallel to the discussions for a specialized Department in Ottawa, there were concurrent

discussions of wider Canadian representation abroad; and it is not without interest and is of some historic importance to refer to them. This aspect has been authoritatively covered elsewhere, especially by Professor Skilling; but the following notes provide some supplementary comments on the period before 1925.

International Conferences

While Canada lacked a permanent diplomatic service abroad, except for such agencies as the High Commissioner in London and the Commissioner General in Paris, its participation in international conferences were by no means negligible, and while many of these were technical or departmental, it is safe to say that the Department of the Secretary of State, responsible at least for passports and protocol arrangements, and subsequently the Department of External Affairs, necessarily had some finger in these special missions.

There were, of course, the periodical meetings in London of Prime Ministers and other Cabinet Ministers, usually with their small secretarial staff, at the Colonial Conferences of 1887, 1897, 1902 and 1907, and the Imperial Conference of 1911; the war-time meetings in London in 1915, 1917 and 1918; the Peace Conference, and the Imperial Conferences of 1921, 1923, 1926, 1930, etcetera.

There were, in addition, numerous international technical conferences. As early as 1883, at the International Cables Conference in Paris, Sir Charles Tupper signed the protocols on behalf of Canada. There were many other meetings in ensuing years. In 1906 Dr. Coulter,

Deputy Postmaster-General, attended the Universal Postal Union Convention with a Commission under the Great Seal of Canada. Mr. Mackenzie King, Deputy Minister of Labour, attended the International Opium Conference at Shanghai in 1907. The Report of the Dominions Department of the Colonial Office for 1910-11 records that in that year Canada participated in a Conference on Unemployment, held in Paris in September; the Congress on Conservation of Natural Resources held at St. Paul, U.S.A., in September; the Congress on Dry Farming held at Spokane in October. Also in October Canada sent delegates to the Prison Congress at Washington.

Canada was represented at the Conference of the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1911, the Radiotelegraphic Union in 1912, and the Convention for the Safety of Human Lives at Sea in 1914.

All these contributed experience of international affairs to an increasing number of Canadians, and established precedents for more important meetings later on in which a "Canadian voice" found expression. The contacts with delegations from many other countries of the world were bound to widen the horizon and outlook of the Canadian delegations and their departments at home. The Department of External Affairs, after its creation, would not be left out of these activities or conference arrangements. Joseph Pope personally attended some of them; Loring Christie attended others, and secretaries such as Boyce, Merriam, and Buskard also attended those to which the Prime Minister went.

Early Permanent Representatives

In Canada's external relations, especially concerning commerce, immigration and finance, there had been forms of permanent representation abroad for special purposes for nearly fifty years before a Department of External Affairs was thought of.

From pre-Confederation days, from the 1850's, there had been resident representatives or Agents-General of the separate Provinces. After Confederation, the Canadian Federal Government had appointed, in 1869, a financial agent in London, Sir John Rose, a British Member of Parliament, who had formerly been a Canadian Minister of Finance. In 1880 he was replaced by Sir Alexander Galt, who was given the title of High Commissioner. He was succeeded by Sir Charles Tupper and Lord Strathcona. In 1880 Senator Hector Fabre, first acting in France as Agent-General for Quebec, was appointed Commissioner General of Canada in France. There were, in addition, Canadian Emigration Agents, and Commercial agents, later entitled "Trade Commissioners", posted in various foreign countries.

All these performed specialized, non-diplomatic duties and functions; and reported to the particular Departments which they served. They made no breach in the Imperial diplomatic unity, and did not infringe in any way on the constitutional right and practice for Great Britain, through its embassies or other diplomatic machinery, to act on behalf of Canada in all diplomatic business with foreign countries.

This arrangement, implicit in the constitutional structure of the Colonial Empire, continued relatively unbroken until the 1920's. A few exceptions, like the International Joint Commission and the war-time Canadian missions in Washington and London, provided Canada with some independent representation for the pursuit of its international business; but the system of reliance on British machinery was recognized in principle and adhered to, in general practice.

This principle of Imperial unity and control by Downing Street of Dominion diplomatic relations, did not, however, go unquestioned or unchallenged. Occasionally the suggestion for reform was based on a growing sense of nationalism and desire for a more autonomous status within the Commonwealth; but more often it was based on particular occasions of disatisfaction with supposedly unsympathetic or ill-informed British cooperation.

As early as 1889 Sir Richard Cartwright, who had been Minister of Finance under Alexander MacKenzie, recommended the appointment of a permanent Canadian agent at Washington.(1) In the previous year, 1888, Sir Charles Tupper, writing from London to Sir John Macdonald, also made this suggestion, and recommended even further, that Sir John A. Macdonald himself be sent to Washington as British or Imperial Minister, that post being vacant in 1888. "As the duties devolving upon the British Minister at Washington are almost altogether in connection with Canada, and the United States complain bitterly of the circumlocution

(1) H. of C. Debates. Feb.18, 1889. p. 174.
Sir R. Cartwright Reminiscences (1912) pp.172-4.

and time lost in sending to England - back to Canada - back to England, and then back to Washington and so on ad infinitum, I would meet their objection by sending a Canadian statesman to Washington. Next to having an influential representative here (in London), the interests of Canada demand one at Washington."(1)

"If I were Her Majesty's Government", he wrote on December 1, 1888, "I would offer you a peerage and the position of Minister at Washington. . ."(2) But this suggestion, even if it had been taken up seriously, would not have interested Macdonald. He wanted neither the honour nor the job... The position of British Minister at Washington was, he knew very well, the only suitable position of sufficient dignity which could be offered to him if he retired from active political life. But he was not like Howe, whose life had been embittered by his unhappy, unavailing search for an appropriate imperial appointment; and he was not by any means convinced that this particular appointment at Washington was one to which any Canadian ought to aspire as yet. "I greatly doubt the expediency of having a Canadian permanent Minister at Washington," he wrote to Tupper. "The present system of uniting the British Minister ordinarily appointed with a Canadian whenever a question affecting Canada arises works more satisfactorily than the proposed change. I won't trouble you with all the arguments, but if you sit down and think

(1) Pope. Correspondence of Macdonald. pp.431-2.
Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper: Supplement to the Life and Letters of Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Tupper. p.p.129-30.

(2) Donald Creighton: John A. Macdonald.Vol.II. "The Old Chieftain". p. 525.
Pope: Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald. pp.431-2.
Macdonald Papers. Vol.528.

it out, I am sure you will agree with me."

In 1882 Edward Blake, in 1889 Sir Richard Cartwright, and in 1892 Mr. David Mills introduced resolutions in the House of Commons proposing that Canada acquire the power of negotiating commercial treaties with foreign countries through its own agents or representatives appointed on the advice of the Canadian Cabinet. All three resolutions were defeated, but long parliamentary discussions of them took place.(1) These were all Liberal suggestions, and they received the endorsement of Laurier at that time, although he changed his view later.

In 1892 a Conservative, Dalton McCarthy, moved a similar resolution, advocating the appointment of a representative of the Dominnion of Canada, and attached to the staff of Her Majesty's Minister at Washington.(2) Sir Charles Tupper supported, with a slight amendment, this proposal.(3) Mr. George Foster gave his support, while Sir John Thompson criticized it.

"In the final analysis", comments Dr. Skilling,(4) "the British Government expressed the belief that there were 'serious difficulties. . . in the way of Canada having representatives at foreign capitals with ambassadorial or ministerial functions,' and decision of such representation at Washington ceased for the time being in

(1) H. of C. Debates: April 21, 1882, pp.1068-95; February 18, 1889, pp.172-194; April 7, 1892, pp.1104-52.

(2) Ibid: May 2, 1892, pp.1950-1.

(3) Ibid: May 11, 1892, pp.2463, 2467.

(4) See Skilling, op. cit. p. 188.

Canada". Generally speaking, those who made these suggestins had not thought out the implications.

About that period, also, the position of the High Commissioner to Great Britain was frequently under discussion. Sir Alexander Galt sought special diplomatic status and powers, which the Colonial Office was reluctant to accord. The story of the long struggle, supported by Sir John Macdonald, to obtain for Galt these wider powers is told in detail by Professor Skilling (Chapter 3). The Marquis of Lorne, while Governor General, was also active in this aspiration.(1)

Lord Lorne had had some private correspondence on the subject with the Colonial Secretary, and, later, on his return to England, published in 1885 his book -Imperial Federation, where he made a strong argument in favour of increased diplomatic powers for the High Commissioner. He was, if anything, over-optimistic or ahead of his time; moreover, he was grinding an axe on behalf of an Imperial Council in London in which the Dominion representatives would be members. "There is reason to believe", he wrote, "that Canada is fully satisfied with the position which has been given to her first two High Commissioners. They have both been granted all opportunity they have demanded of making separate commercial treaties with foreign Governments, under the auspices and with the cordial advice and assistance of the British Ambassador, although he represents a Free Trade country and they were negotiating for reciprocal trade relations under a high tariff. If Canada

(1) Skilling makes no reference to the activities of Lord Lorne in this connection; but A.G. Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, makes a brief reference. (Vol.I.p.361).

cares to have her envoy associated more intimately with the Imperial Government machinery, she has probably only to ask that such a position be assigned to obtain all that she asks. It would seem on all accounts to be wise that in questions likely to lead to war or trouble, our Colonies should have a voice, and that no difficulty be incurred which could harm them, without warning being given to them to the risk to be run. They should be embraced in, and made part of, the machinery of Imperial Government. . ."(1)

This concept of a Federal system, an Imperial Council having Dominion representatives sitting in it, was unsatisfactory to most Canadians.

It is true that Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his early days had not only envisaged an Imperial Parliament in London in which his own countrymen might sit,(2) but also advocated Canadian representation in Washington; but soon after coming into power in 1896 he abandoned the notion of Imperial Federation, with a "parliament" or Council, as being impractical, and made no move to create Canadian representation in Washington, except for a trade commissioner there. He seems at one time to have given some consideration to the idea of a High Commissioner to Washington with the same status as the representative in London, and Mr. Lemieux, some years later, also made this suggestion. Laurier's Minister of Interior, Sir Clifford

(1) Marquis of Lorne: Imperial Federation. pp.107-115.

(2) Skelton: Life and Letters of Sir W. Laurier. Vol.II. p. 72.

Sifton, in 1898, favoured a Canadian attache in the British Embassy in Washington.(1) Although Henri Bourassa, leader of the Nationalist movement in Quebec, had fallen out with Laurier over Canada's participation in the South African War, Bourassa, like others, after the unhappy Alaska Boundary Award, favoured the presence of a Canadian representative in Washington. This idea was taken up again in 1905 by Lord Strathcona,and in 1906 by Earl Grey.

Many years passed without important developments regarding special Canadian diplomatic representation abroad. The question was revived again, however, in 1906-7 by another Governor General, the enthusiastic Earl Grey, who saw a vision of the future of Canada as an autonomous sovereign state of equal status within the Empire, self-directed in external affairs as self-governed in national affairs. Once again, however, he was ahead of his time; the Colonial Office and Foreign Office offered little encouragement, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself,deterred in part by the conservatism of some members of his Cabinet, like Mr. Fielding, was reluctant to impair the existing constitutional practice and the unity of the Empire. While rejecting the various proposals for greater Imperial centralization which Joseph Chamberlain advocated, he was at the same time averse to any extreme decentralization in the conduct of Canada's external relations.

(1) H. of C. Debates, June 1, 1898. pp.6692-3.

Earl Grey's Proposal.

In 1906, Earl Grey, irritated by the circumlocutory channel of London in the diplomatic relations of Canada and the United States, and perhaps prompted by Cartwright's suggestions, wrote privately to Lord Elgin, the Colonial Secretary. He limited his suggestion to proposing the designation of a Canadian official to be attached as adviser to the British Ambassador at Washington. He doubtless exaggerated the alleged lack of direct contact, of Laurier's supposed dissatisfaction and lack of confidence in the Ambassador, Sir Mortimer Durand, and the alleged use by Laurier of private Canadian emissaries or "secret agents". In his first letter he believed that he was the first to propose a Canadian permanent diplomatic representative, even before consulting with Sir Wilfrid Laurier on the matter, but was informed by Elgin that the question had been discussed by Lord Strathcona, the High Commissioner, the year before. Grey of course foresaw some objections being made in Downing Street to such an "irregular" proposal, by the Foreign Office if not by the Colonial Office. But Elgin replied that the proposal, even in its limited form, was not acceptable at that time.

After commenting on the difficulties of correspondence between "my Gov't" of Canada and the British Embassy at Washington, which he discussed with Gleichen, the Military Secretary at the Embassy during a visit of the latter to Ottawa; and after pointing out that a single communication and its reply required ten stages

in transmission and ten separate communications, said to Elgin on March 1, 1906:

> The consequence of all this is that Ottawa and Washington don't know each other. Laurier not feeling in touch with the British machinery entrusted with the duty of fighting his battle for him, sometimes has secret agents of his own at Washington and is always suspected by our Embassy at Washington of working behind their backs. Now this is obviously an evil state of things, and you will I feel sure agree with me that it is desirable to bring my Minister and the Washington Embassy into closer touch and to establish a feeling of mutual goodwill and confidence with the object of securing a good working relationship between Ottawa and our Embassy in Washington. Sir R. Cartwright has suggested to me in a quite private and informal manner that it would be a good plan in the interest of all concerned if Canada were to be allowed to be represented in the British Embassy at Washington by a man nominated, of course to my approval, and paid by them, whose business it would be to keep the British Ambassador fully posted on all points touching Canada's hopes and requirements. I am asking Gleichen to obtain for me a confidential expression of Durand's opinion on this proposal. I have not discussed it with Laurier yet, as I should prefer to have your view and that of Edward Grey first. I think it not impossible that the Depts. may object to the adoption of a proposal which may appear to them irregular and possibly dangerous, - but as the British Ambassador would never make an important diplomatic move on a Canadian matter without first obtaining authority from home, I am strongly in favour of Cartwright's proposal. The Canadian attaché to the British Embassy would of course only advise his chief and would not appear officially at all. (1)

Lord Elgin replied on March 22nd:

> You wrote at some length about correspondence with the Embassy at Washington. I have enquired and find that the idea of a Canadian representative at Washington was discussed last year, I think on the initiative of Lord Strathcona, and the opinion of the F.O. was very decidedly against it. I have reason to believe that a renewal of the proposal now would meet with the same objection and after all it is not unreasonable. The Imperial Govt. still remains in charge of the foreign relations of even the greatest of the Colonies, and I think this argument for the staff of the Embassies remaining wholly Imperial is

(1) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.13. Folder 7. (Doc. 003503-4).

the strongest. I regret much to observe what you say of secret agents, for which I cannot see any justification. I should have hoped that the Premier of Canada, had he any real difficulty with the Embassy at Washington, - of course minor differences of opinion, or even suspicions cannot be altogether prevented - would have appealed, and with success, to the Gov.-General. From what you have told me of your relations with Durand, I cannot doubt that you would easily clear away unwarrantable suspicions, and forward negotiations on important subjects. At any rate I am afraid I see no other method more promising at present.(1)

To this letter Earl Grey, who was then visiting New York and having conversations with President Taft and Secretary of State Root, wrote again, on April 3rd:

Your letter of Mar.22 has reached me at New York just as I am starting for Washington. With regard to the suggestion that a Canadian attaché should be permanently attached to the Washington Embassy I expected the F.O. would raise difficulties, & I appreciate fully the obvious objections to its adoption. I have however received a private letter from Edward Grey wh. causes me to believe that if you consult him you will find that he takes a more liberal view than his department. The objections that can be urged against a permanent appointment do not apply with equal force to the proposal of a temporary appointment of a Canadian attaché to assist the British Ambassador in a specific bit of his work, & in view of Mr. Root's suggestion to Sir M. Durand that negotiations for the settlement of all outstanding questions between Canada & the U.S. would be assisted & expedited if a Canadian expert could be attached to Sir M. D.'s staff - I hope that the objections of the Dept. (F.O.) may not be allowed to interfere with the desire of its chief.

I cannot impress upon you too strongly that there is at the present moment a really good opportunity of "clearing the slate" between Canada and the U.S.

If it were possible for Laurier & Root to meet I am confident that all outstanding questions could be arranged. As I fear such a meeting cannot take place, I strongly recommend that you should get as near to this position as possible by allowing Laurier to send officially a Canadian expert to Washington to help Durand in his negotiations with Root. The closer you bring Ottawa & Washington together the greater the chance of clearing the slate. . . (2)

(1) Ibid. (003521-4).

(2) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol. 13. Folder 8. (Doc. 003531-3).

Lord Elgin replied, on April 18, 1906:

> ". . . I will at the same time call his (Sir Edward Grey's) attention to the question of the Attaché - though for this special occasion it might be almost a necessity to have a representative of the Canadian Government to assist Durand. I confess I rather share the opinion that a permanent of that kind at the British Embassy might prove inconvenient. . . (1)

Grey replied, on May 3, 1908:

> Re my suggestion as to a permanent Canadian Attaché at the British Embassy at Washington, the difficulties arising out of the personality of the man are so great as to make it desirable, for the present at any rate, to drop it.(2)

Although/their great personal intimacy, Earl Grey usually discussed his views with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, it is noteworthy that in this case he apparently corresponded on the subject with Lord Elgin privately and confidentially, saying: "I have not discussed it with Laurier yet, as I should prefer to have your view and that of Edward Grey first." As it turned out, Laurier was unenthusiastic over any such proposals for Canadian representation jointly with the British, except ad hoc in particular negotiations.

Grey and Japan, 1905-07.

Earl Grey, as has already been mentioned in Chapter 1, took a close interest in such matters as Canadian trade with Japan. As early as 1905 he was writing letters on the subject to the Minister of Agriculture, Sydney Fisher, who had been in Japan two and a half years earlier. Fisher confirmed Grey's impression (received from Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Ambassador

(1) Ibid. (Doc. 003545).

(2) Ibid. Folder 9. (Doc. 003553).

in Tokyo) that the Canadian commercial representative in Japan, Mr. McLean, an elderly man of 72 who had spent some fifty years in that country, was too old and ineffectual.

> We ought to have a good smart young business man in Japan, the type of a successful commercial traveller. Mr. McLean is too old and has not had experience in recent business lines in Canada. . .
>
> In writing on various matters to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, I have referred to your letter and suggestion about a Canadian envoy to Japan. As soon as I come back from the West, I will reiterate my remarks and press the subject. (1)

Subsequently W.T.R. Preston, formerly Canadian Superintendent of Emigration in Europe, was appointed in 1907 as Canadian Trade Commissioner.* By the Governor General, Mr. Lemieux and other Ministers, he was provided with letters of introduction to high officials in the Japanese Government and to Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Ambassador, and Mr. Harrington, his Commercial Attaché; and these proved very useful and Preston acknowledged them with great gratitude. However, Preston, apparently handicapped by having no diplomatic status or contacts, also became unpopular on personal grounds, except with the Japanese;(2) he failed to be effectual, and

(1) Grey of Howith Correspondence. Vol.26.(Doc.006393).

* William Thomas Rochester Preston (1851-1942) was born in Ottawa and graduated from Victoria University, Cobourg. He was successively a shopkeeper and commercial agent, journalist, political organizer, civil servant, and commentator on political affairs. From 1883 to 1893 he was Secretary of the Ontario Liberal Association, and was several times unsuccessful parliamentary candidate. He was an alderman in Toronto (1896-98), and Librarian of the Ontario Legislature. He was Superintendent of Emigration Agencies of the Canadian Government in Europe in 1899-1907; he visited South Africa and Australia, and then was appointed a Canadian Government Trade Commissioner in Japan, also visiting China and Korea. In 1910 he was appointed Chief Trade Commissioner for Europe, and made Amsterdam his base. He was the author of an autobiography My Generation of Politics and Politicians, and also The Life of Strathcona.

(2) For details, see W.T.R.Preston: My Generation of Politics and Politicians. pp.280-293.

his replacement was again urged by Grey. In a confidential memorandum by Grey, dated May 19, 1907, he summarized Canadian trade with Japan after a call on him by Mr. Nosse, the Japanese Consul General in Ottawa. Grey concluded his memorandum with the following remarks:

> However enterprising the Canadian representative of the Government may be it is almost impossible for him to get as much knowledge of the trade requirements of Japan as a young and pushing representative of such a trade organization as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association could hardly fail to obtain; and possibly it might not be considered right that a Government official should accept orders for a private firm; nor do I suppose that a Government official is supplied with the information which would enable him either to canvass for Japanese orders or to advertise Canadian goods.
>
> What I have written causes me to believe that it would be to the advantage of the Dominion if a private agent who shall represent Canadian producers and manufacturers should be stationed in Yokohoma, with sub-agents in the principal towns.(1)

This kind of analysis of Canadian-Japanese trade, a memorandum on it, and recommendations on commercial representation, is unusual for a Governor General, but it was characteristic of energetic Earl Grey. He took upon himself, out of enthusiasm for Canada, interests and tasks that properly belonged to the Departments. He was a keen "adviser" to his Canadian Ministers, even in their own special fields. And in the foregoing citations from his correspondence concerning Japan, we see not only his close interest in Japan and Canadian-Japanese trade, but also his great concern over adequate Canadian representation in that country.

(1) Ibid. Vol. 26. (Doc. 006551-2).

Lewis Proposal

A revival of the old proposal for a Canadian representative at Washington occurred in 1909, a few months after the creation of the External Affairs Department, when, on December 15th, Mr. E.N. Lewis in the House of Commons moved for the appointment of a Canadian Attaché at Washington, but, on Sir Wilfrid Laurier's rejection of the suggestion, the motion was withdrawn. Mr. Lewis's introductory speech was as follows:

> . . . The question I raise now is a matter purely of business relations with our nearest great trade neighbour. I submit, Sir, that the manner in which our business arrangements are now carried on are altogether too round-about, and that we should have some one at Washington, not to conduct our business relations altogether but to advise the British Ambassador with regard to them.
>
> I have in support of this proposal the President of the United States who has said that it would be a good thing. I believe it is an absolute fact that seven-tenths of the business of the British Embassy at Washington concerns Canada. Now the British Ambassador, as a rule, has never been in Canada and he knows nothing of Canada. The conditions in Canada are different from those in England; our business interests are different, and I submit that we would be better able to conduct purely business relations with this nearest great competitor of ours, in a friendly manner, if we had a representative of our own at Washington. . . I may remark that for the first time in the history of Canada there is now in the press gallery a representative of that great newspaper the New York 'Herald'. Some remarks on this question appeared in the New York 'Herald' on December 10. The Chicago 'Tribune' has also intimated its intention of sending a representative here and had some remarks on the subject in its issue of December 10. We have direct relations with the United States on almost every question. We deal with that great nation with regard to our waterways; why should we not do so in other matters? I could quote various hon. gentlemen who have expressed their opinion publicly in favour of this motion - the hon. member for North Lanark (Mr. Thorburn), the hon. member

for East Huron (Mr. Chisholm), the hon. member for St. Lawrence Division, Montreal (Mr. Bickerdike), the hon. member for Hamilton (Mr. Stewart) - two from each side of the House. Though at one time I was not in favour of this, I have seen the importance of it, and the cost of it will be small in comparison with the benefit to be gained. I consider that under all the circumstances we should have a representative of Canada to advise the British Ambassador at Washington.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier replied:

. . . I am glad to be able to say that at no time since the war of the revolution have the relations between ~~Canada and~~ Great Britain and the United States been so friendly as they have been for the last six or seven years. . . This improved feeling on the part of the two nations toward each other has had its good effect in Canada's relations with the United States. . . I am glad to acknowledge also that the British Ambassador at Washington at the present time is giving more attention to the affairs of Canada than was ever done before. There was a time, perhaps 20 years ago, when, if my hon. friend had made the motion he has now made, I would have been strongly inclined to vote for it, but I must say, in the present condition of things, that my ideas on this subject have been very much modified. If we had an Attaché at Washington, I do not know that it would be possible to have more attention paid to the business of Canada than is paid to it by the present occupant of the office. Mr. Bryce has taken special pains to give to Canadian affairs as much attention as could be given to them by a native Canadian. First of all, he did one thing that was not done by any of his predecessors. As soon as he became Ambassador, he visited Canada, coming to Ottawa and some of the other large cities of the country, to familiarize himself with all the issues between Canada and the United States. The result has been that, in all our relations to that country, if anything has not turned out well, no blame can be attached to Mr. Bryce, because he has taken no action with regard to Canada except after ample conference and with the full sanction of the Canadian authorities. I do not believe that if we had an attaché at Washington we could improve very much the conditions which exist at this moment. I do not know that it will always be so. Perhaps the time will come when we shall think it advantageous to have somebody to take charge of our diplomatic business at Washington; but so long as the conditions continue to be what they are at this moment, I do not think this want will be seriously felt. It is also somewhat difficult to conceive what would be the status of a Canadian attaché at Washington.

> He would have to be under the British Ambassador and at the same time be under instructions from the Government of Canada. So that the position, while it would have good in it, would also have some very serious difficulties. . . (1)

It will be noted in this exchange of views that Mr. Lewis who had formerly been against Canadian representation, was now converted in favour of it; while Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who might have voted for it 20 years before, was now converted against it! It is also significant that although earlier in the same year, 1909, Laurier had given his full support to the project for creating a Department of External Affairs, he could now, within a few months, reject the proposal for representation abroad, - clear evidence that at that time the growth of an independent diplomatic service under the Department was not contemplated. (Nevertheless, Laurier, open-minded as usual, added that "perhaps the time will come when we shall think it advantageous to have somebody to take charge of our diplomatic business in Washington" - a vision which Borden in 1920 was to see materialize in principle and which Mackenzie King in 1927 brought to fulfilment.)

Nevertheless, some American newspapers took up the suggestion made in this brief debate. In a private letter from Grey to Lord Crewe, dated December 16, 1909, he said: "Two American papers, the 'New York Herald" and the 'Chicago Tribune' have recently established agencies here in Ottawa. The statement of the 'New York Herald' that Canada desired to have an Ambassador of her own in Washington is a creation of its own imagination.

(1) H. of C. Debates, 1909-10. December 15, 1909.

Laurier's statement in the House of Commons last night has pricked that bubble."(1)

By this time Bryce had become British Ambassador in Washington, and Earl Grey, who had long been a personal friend, was impressed by the capability and support of Canadian interests. He was repeatedly praising Bryce to Laurier, and asking Laurier to express tokens of his appreciation of Bryce's assistance.

Grey - 1911.

It is not without interest that Grey, by 1911, was so confident in Mr. Bryce that he protested against the proposed appointment even of a Canadian Trade Commissioner to Washington - a far cry from Grey's earlier advocacy, in 1906, of this very step! In a personal letter to Laurier, dated February 3, 1911, Grey wrote:

> . . . There is another matter on which I wish to have a little talk with you. I understand you have informed Bryce that it is in your contemplation to appoint, on Sir R. Cartwright's recommendation, a Trade Commissioner at Washington. This is the 1st intimation I have heard of your intention. I think perhaps it might have been better had you discussed this recommendation of Sir R. Cartwright's with me, before writing to Bryce to make a proposal which would appear to be a poor return to him, for his services in cleaning the slate of your differences with the U.S.
>
> It may be necessary to take eventually some such step as you have suggested to Bryce, but do you think this is the right moment to do something which could hardly avoid being regarded as giving a black eye to the Embassy, which ever since I have been Governor General has been the Embassy of H.M.C. Govt. in everything except appointment and cost.
>
> My impression is that many questions relating to this proposed appointment have not been fully considered, & that your letter to Bryce was only for the purpose of eliciting his opinion.(2)

(1) Grey of Howith's Correspondence. Vol.16. Folder 39. (Doc. 004254).

(2) Laurier Papers. Governor General's Correspondence. 1911. Vol.736.

Here again we see the characteristic of the Governor General in interesting himself in questions of Canadian representation. He had earlier proposed an attaché to Washington, now he objected, as a possible derogation to Ambassador Bryce, to a Trade Commissioner there. He had earlier proposed a replacement in Japan of the aged commercial representative, McLean, and had given a recommendation of Preston; later he found Preston inadequate, and recommended a non-governmental resident agent such as a representative of the Canadian Manufacturer's Association.

Attention had been drawn to these various interventions of Grey, firstly because they are revealing as to the qualities of the man himself and his personal interest in Canada's external affairs - relations with the Colonial Office, the desirability of a Department of External Affairs, relations with the British Embassy in Washington, trade with Japan, and diplomatic representation abroad; secondly, because they indicate the role, as acted at that time, of a Governor General in policy matters and administrative matters concerning Canada's external relations; and thirdly, because they show how the Governor General worked along with the Prime Minister in the diplomatic problems of the Dominion. On the question of representation in Washington, Grey did not consult with Laurier, but he was aware of the views of other leading men in the Government, such as Cartwright, or outside the Government such as Bourassa, and was reiterating views already expressed in London by Lord Strathcona. As it turned out, however, he was

ahead of his time and did not overcome the objections of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, or the hesitations of the "old procrastinator" Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

Sir George E. Foster's Consular Arrangement.

Earl Grey left Canada in 1911. In the following year an arrangement was made with the British Government for Canadian business representatives, official or non-official, to utilize the services of British consuls in foreign countries, to share offices with them if need be, and even for members of the Canadian Commercial Service to enter the British Consular Service. This was a beginning of "having a voice" - at least in commercial fields - in the imperial service and in principle, of participation - although more as "British subjects" than as Canadians - in the British imperial consular service. There had, of course, always been a theoretical co-operation; and Canadian trade agents posted abroad, as well as visiting Canadian business men, had enjoyed the local assistance of H.M. Consuls; but that had been mainly by courtesy rather than by regular instruction and intergovernmental exchange of information on commercial matters.

On September 17, 1912, an announcement was made in Ottawa of the conclusion of an arrangement between Mr.George E. Foster, Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by which the whole British Consular Service was by instruction made available to Canadian commercial agents and business men.

After careful investigation, early in May an Order-in-Council was passed through Cabinet which formed the basis of the agreement. The Order-in-Council, after giving a digest of the British Consular system and describing its completeness and excellence, observed that much of the information collected by British Consuls would be of use to Canadian business interests and that the British Consulates scattered over the world should also be kept supplied with the latest information respecting Canada. During his visit to England, Mr. Foster carried on negotiations with Sir Edward Grey, and the final arrangements were as follows:

1. The Foreign Office agrees to furnish the Department of Trade and Commerce with copies of all trade reports from its Consular officers, as soon as they are published, from any districts which may be specified by Canada as of interest to Canadian trade.

2. Any Canadian firms or business men will be at liberty to apply direct to any of His Majesty's Consuls in any part of the world for information as to the sale of Canadian products, methods of business pursued, and the best means of getting in touch with markets. Persons so enquiring will receive all possible assistance.

3. His Majesty's Consuls will be supplied through the Foreign Office with statements of Canada's commerce, resources and development, with lists of the principle industries and sources of supply, and the questions upon which Canadian merchants and manufacturers desire information.

4. Canadian Trade Commissioners will have full liberty to apply to His Majesty's Consuls for assistance and advice in trade matters. Special trade representatives sent out by Canada to study and report will have the advantage of the personal assistance of the Consular staff; they will be supplied with interpreters and will be introduced to the principal officials and merchants, foreign and native, of the country they may be visiting.

5. Office room in British Consulates will be afforded to Canadian Commercial representatives when it is possible and convenient to arrange therefor.

6. Members of the Canadian Commercial Service will be eligible for selection for and entrance to the British Consular Service on the terms and conditions applicable to other entrants thereto, subject to the regulations of the British Government in carrying on its Service.(1)

The final clause of this agreement, providing for members of the Canadian Commercial Service to enter, if they so desired and under qualifying terms, the British or "Imperial" Consular Service, was not entirely an innovation. Properly qualified Canadians, being British subjects, had been admissible to the British Army and Navy, the Colonial Service and the Indian Civil Service. Just prior to Mr. Foster's agreement, W.L. Mackenzie King, then in the Opposition, declared in a speech at Toronto on February 9, 1912, that the time had come for Canadians to have a share in the Consular and Diplomatic Services of the Empire. He thought that the Universities should train men to pass the prescribed examinations for entrance to the Imperial Service and that the Canadian Government should confer with the British Government for the purpose of securing the privilege for those Canadians who should qualify themselves.(2)

(1) Castell Hopkins: Canadian Annual Review, 1912, pp. 110-11. See Also Skilling: op. cit. pp.54-55.

(2) Castell Hopkins: The Canadian Annual Review, 1912, p. 265. (The text of King's Toronto speech has not been located).

Note: In 1922, the Duke of Devonshire, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, replying to Mr. Meighen's enquiry as to the possibility of Mr. Loring Christie entering the British Foreign Service, said in a letter dated November 20, 1922: (Con'td)

(Continued):

> I fear that as matters stand at present there is no opening for Mr. Christie either in the Colonial Office or in the Foreign Office. I hope, however, that you will not take this as an indication of any lack of sympathy on my part with your idea of the participation of men from the Dominions in the Imperial Services. On the contrary, it is one with which, in spite of the considerable practical difficulties, I have much sympathy. (Meighen Papers. Series 4. Vol.55, File 247. (L.C. Christie.))

It might also be added that when Christie visited Washington in October, 1919, and conversed with the special British Minister there, Sir William Tyrrell -

> Sir William Tyrrell made an interesting suggestion in connection with this whole matter. He suggested that there might be periodical exchanges of officers between the Foreign Office and the Department of External Affairs. He thought that it was particularly important that there should be a Canadian in the American section of the Foreign Office who should be there, not as an individual who happened to be a Canadian, but as a member of the Department of External Affairs, and that he should not stay too long but should come back to Canada after a period, to be replaced by another. (Christie memorandum for Prime Minister: December 6, 1919, file 103-19C-Part I).

Thus, at this time shortly preceding the First War, there were trends in two opposite directions. Under Canadian prompting, the British Government was prepared to open the doors of its Imperial Diplomatic and Consular Services to properly qualified Canadians; and from time to time thereafter, a number of Canadians, being British subjects, did so enter those Imperial British Services, as they also occasionally joined the Colonial Service and the Indian Civil Service.* In the other direction was the trend toward creating special Canadian services, distinct from the British; an arrangement which had been in use as regards commercial and emigration agents, in the preceding century, which had been repeatedly advocated as regards diplomatic attachés in the first decade of the new country, and which developed in the diplomatic field in the 1920's and in the consular field in the 1940's. This latter trend gradually eclipsed the former, as the sense of Canadian nationalism deepened during and after the First War.

In 1911 the question of revised machinery for the control of the Dominions external affairs was debated in Ottawa and indirectly at the Imperial Conference in London. But Sir Wilfrid Laurier had grown to be conservative in his views on this subject, and had no great desire to disturb the existing constitutional arrangements.

He maintained this attitude after he had become Leader of the Opposition. In connection with the 1912 debate on a Canadian naval contribution, he took issue

* For example Dr. O.D. Skelton, on graduating from Queen's University, had applied for admission to the Indian Civil Service.

with Sir Robert Borden as to Canadian participation in an Imperial Council, although he tried not to be too dogmatic. In words previously quoted elsewhere, he said: "Whether we shall or shall not have a voice in all questions affecting peace or war is a very large proposition, and I would not at the present time pronounce finally upon it, but there are certain objections. . . The diplomatic service of England is carried on by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and it is today in as good hands as it ever was. These transactions are very minute, very serious, and sometimes must be carried on with great secrecy. I understand that (Sir Robert Borden) proposes to the English Admiralty that there should be a representative of the Canadian Government all the time in England to confer with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on all questions on which war may probably arise. If this is done for Canada, it must be done for Australia, for New Zealand, for South Africa, and for Newfoundland, and I doubt very much if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would receive much assistance from such a multitude of advisers. Supposing they did not agree, or supposing they do agree, how can we pretend to dictate in these matters?" (1)

Thus the question of greater independence or voice in foreign affairs - except in commercial matters, - remained in abeyance; the Canadian Government still did not feel the necessity of direct protection of Canadian

(1) Skelton. Life and Letters of Sir W. Laurier.II, p.404.

interests, or of sharing in Imperial foreign policy which was directed centrally from London.

International Joint Commission.

One exception to the principle of British responsibility for Canadian diplomatic relations and representation was the creation of the permanent International Joint Commission on Waterways. Although, except for that in Paris (1915), it was the first agency abroad to be placed under the jurisdiction of the new Department of External Affairs, it acted more or less independently. It had been authorized by the Boundary Waters Treaty with the United States, of January 11, 1909, in the time of Laurier, and before the External Affairs Department was in being; but it did not take form or come into operation until 1912, and was not transferred from the Department of Public Works to External Affairs until 1914; but its three Canadian Commissioners and three United States Commissioners functioned within their terms of reference with little direct Departmental control.

Apart from the practical services it performed in the settlement of a number of boundary water disputes, the International Joint Commission was regarded optimistically as a valuable experiment in diplomatic machinery and also as a mark of Canadian independence and autonomous diplomatic status.* On January 21, 1909, Earl Grey, in expressing congratulations to Mr. Gibbons, the chief Canadian negotiator of the Treaty, wrote him that "You are entitled to the chief credit attached to a treaty which, so long as it continues, will prevent questions involving

* "True, this treaty was made by Great Britain, not by Canada. Lord Bryce signed on behalf of Great Britain and Mr. Root on behalf of the United States". (R.B. Bennett, H. of C. Debates, May 26, 1938, p.3271).

matter of dispute between the two countries, and pregnant with possibilities of future trouble, from creating friction or disturbing the peaceful relations between Canada and the United States. . . You have planted the germ of a principle which,under the fostering care of the two countries concerned, will I hope grow into a goodly tree under whose permanent shade the peaceful fellowship of Canada and America will continue to grow and flourish."(1)

In the Senate in 1914, Mr. Casgrain spoke of this International Joint Commission as having advanced the idea of Canadian autonomy: "Before this law was passed and this Commission was established, I do not think there can be found any other instance in which the high contracting parties - that is the United States and Canada - were allowed to deal absolutely for themselves, without having one or more representatives of the Imperial Government on such commission. . . This has been a great step towards our obtaining absolute control of our affairs."(2)

It may be noted, however, that in this step the diplomatic unity of the Empire remained unimpaired, and the appointment of the three Canadian representatives on the International Joint Commission was made through the Imperial Government and their commissions emanated from the Crown in England, on the advice of the Canadian Governor-in-Council.

Some dozen years later, the success of this

(1) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.15. Folder 32. (Doc. 004127).

(2) Senate Debates. March 24, 1914. pp.224-226

permanent International Joint Commission so impressed L.C. Christie, Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs, that even after having left that office, he wrote a long personal letter to Dr. O.D. Skelton, in 1927, praising the value of this Commission as a permanent instrument of diplomacy possibly even more efficacious and important than formal Embassies or than the proposed new Canadian Legations (one of which he was subsequently to head!)*

Apart from this International Joint Commission at Washington, and the Office of the Commissioner-General at Paris dating from 1882 which was brought under the Department of External Affairs in 1913, there was, prior to the First War, no Canadian diplomatic organization abroad of a permanent character under the direction of the small Department with its three senior officers and small handful of staff. There is little evidence that there was any Departmental - or even Parliamentary - conception of an autonomous or separate Canadian Diplomatic Service of which the Department would act as a sort of "foreign office" or home headquarters. Such a conscious and deliberate plan would be a challenge to existing imperial constitutional practice; it might diminish the still-respected and sacrosanct role of the Governor General and Colonial

Note: On July 12, 1927, referring to the diplomatic value of the International Joint Commission on Waterways, and the new Canadian Legation in Washington, Christie wrote: "A diplomatist is simply an agent; his establishment no more than a convenient extension abroad of the departmental machine at home; his job more to bargain on the lay of the cards at the moment than to administer a set of rules and build an ordered regime. . . All that the establishment of the Canadian Legation meant was moving a set of files and office furniture across a Washington boulevard and changing the persons who manipulated them. It is an essential instrument, and I have not the least intention of belittling its great value; but diplomacy has its limitations."

Office; there was not yet an overwhelming necessity for it; parliament and public were generally indifferent or apathetic, even on grounds of "status", over constitutional reform so long as existing administrative machinery in external matters worked, however creakily. It is doubtful whether Pope's imagination ever envisaged such an innovating change or such a wrench from the conventional practice.

Public interest in international matters was sluggish; on the whole, the public were inadequately informed, and Parliament itself was apathetic; and Canadian foreign interests, except in American relations, were slight. The developments of German ambition, power and rearmament, while recognized to some extent in the inner circles of government, were almost unnoticed by the public and Parliament; the assassination at Sarajevo was remote and uncomprehended, and the outbreak of war in 1914 came as a complete thunderclap to the Canadian people. This indifference to affairs in Europe was coupled with a traditional and blind trust in British diplomacy, without any desire for Canadian participation; and with a parochial unwillingness to make public expenditures for a national diplomatic machinery which was not regarded as essential or constitutionally feasible.

Round Table Proposals.

The "Round Table Movement", started mainly by Mr. Lionel Curtis, flourished from early in the war years for a decade or more, reviving its activity in the mid 1920's. Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), who had been an influential Private Secretary to Prime Minister Lloyd George, became an ardent supporter; and because of a long

personal friendship, Loring C. Christie, while in England, was for a time a close collaborator, and member of the editorial board of the "Round Table" Journal. The Round Table Movement advocated closer imperial bonds by means of a centralized organization of the member-states of the Empire. Its arguments and propaganda were so cogent that it obtained a powerful following in Canada; although in the outcome its ideas were repudiated by Canada and by other Dominions.

While the ideas of Lionel Curtis were still fresh and impressive - during a war in which Canada was heavily participating in the "imperial" forces, the Department of External Affairs, for some curious reason, was induced to propagate the Curtis message. In the fiscal year 1915-16, the Department made an outlay of $3,806.68 for the official reprinting of 100,000 copies of a "Round Table" pamphlet.(1)

Despite the basic ideas of a closer Imperial connection, or perhaps as a part of them, Lionel Curtis in 1915 somewhat paradoxically advanced the theory, under certain conditions of imperial cooperation, of an independent diplomatic service for the senior dominions. Although the Department was by no means ready to promote this concept, it sponsored the publication of Curtis's ideas. These, in part, included the following proposition:

> Until near the middle of the nineteenth century the final responsibility in all public affairs throughout the British Commonwealth was centralized in London. Since 1848 these powers, with few though important exceptions, have been transferred, one by one, to

(1) Auditor-General's Report. 1915-16.

> Colonial or Dominion Governments. And of these powers there are three, at any rate, which have never been decentralized in any other state in the world - the powers of framing tariffs, of controlling immigration, and of creating and maintaining fleets. But this process of decentralization has always stopped short of anything which clearly affected the issues of peace and war. The whole power of conducting foreign affairs has remained vested in the Government responsible to the people of the United Kingdom. In the Imperial Parliament the people of the Dominions have neither voice nor vote. They have cabinets and parliaments of their own, but no vestige of final responsibility which affects the issues of peace and war has ever been acquired by them, nor can be so long as the constitution remains as it now is. Some change must be made in it before they can begin to control the ministers who handle their foreign affairs. . . Now clearly the simplest of all changes is for the governments severally controlled by the Dominion electorates to assume a final responsibility for foreign affairs, as formerly they assumed a final responsibility for all other matters of government, including tariffs, immigration and the maintenance of fleets. . . If a Dominion government is to control its own relations with foreign powers, it must of necessity do so through agents of its own accredited to their capitals, and through agents of foreign governments accredited to itself. There must be an exchange of ambassadors. Clearly the ambassadors responsible to the British Government cannot take orders from those of the Dominions. At present the British Ambassador in the Mexican capital can do his best to satisfy the wishes of the Canadian Government, but in the last instance his conduct must be determined by instructions from London. The Government at Ottawa does not become responsible for Canadian relations with Mexico until it has accredited an ambassador of its own to the Government of that Republic.(1)

This argumentation was in advance of subsequent developments; it was novel, perhaps, in its day, or at least more positive than some of the earlier and impulsive outbursts of Canadian nationalists. It was also, to some extent, exaggerated, for Canada had, in the past, obtained some of its foreign desires through the sympathetic collaboration of the authorities in London and their British ambassadors abroad.

(1) Lionel Curtis: The Problem of the Commonwealth. (1916). pp.127-28.

But it is interesting to note that the Canadian Department of External Affairs officially sponsored and circulated these views, even though, as Curtis said: "This particular method, though simple in appearance, involves revolution and not reform." (1)

Curtis, however, having prophetically advanced this proposition, retracted it a few pages later. "We can, therefore, reject without any hesitation any proposal for reforming the existing system which all the statesmen who have wished that system would agree to condemn. . . Mr. Asquith", - in reply to Sir Joseph Ward's proposal for joint Commonwealth control of foreign affairs - "affirmed (and rightly) that responsibility for foreign affairs could not be shared between two authorities. . . Sir Joseph had allowed himself to be taken as meaning that two Imperial authorities were to exist side by side, that ministers in charge of foreign affairs were, for a time at any rate, to be answerable to different legislatures; and Mr. Asquith's condemnation of such a proposal went and will always go, unchallenged."(2)

Both Laurier and Borden rejected the Ward proposal of a joint Commonwealth Council for the direction of imperial foreign affairs; but Borden found a compromise during the war by sitting in the British Cabinet councils, offering criticism, advice and recommendations, along with other Dominion Prime Ministers, and in fact endorsing as a temporary emergency measure, an "Imperial Council" suggested by Lloyd George. But at the war's end, Borden

(1) Ibid p. 131.

(2) Ibid p.139.

strove for independent representation at the Peace Conference, in the League of Nations, and in other international conferences. He swung from the war-time pragmatic Imperial Council arrangement to a policy of decentralization. In the outcome, in about 1918-20, he obtained from Lloyd George, the fellow-Dominions, the Canadian Parliament, and even the leaders of the other Great Powers, an acquiescence in Curtis's premature suggestion of 1916 for independent diplomatic representation.

Canadian War Mission, Washington, 1918.

The perennial question of Canadian representation in the United States was revived by Sir Robert Borden in the third year of the First War, when the issue was no longer one of autonomy and status, but of imperative necessity because of war-time cooperation between the two North American belligerent countries. Sir Robert Borden relates in his Memoirs:

> On October 27th (1917) we considered in Council my correspondence with the Colonial Secretary as to representation at Washington; and my reply was approved except by Sir George Foster who felt that we were entering on the path to independence. Eventually the proposal for representation at Washington was abandoned for the time being. Later I discussed with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, when he was in Ottawa, the proposal for representation at Washington. He was entirely sympathetic but gave us a rather appalling account of the cost of living in that city.(1)

According to Mr. Casgrain, the proposal was opposed by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, British Ambassador, though Borden describes him as "entirely sympathetic".

(1) Borden Memoirs. p. 760.

Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was apparently favourable to dominion representation in Washington, provided the unity of diplomatic representation could be preserved for imperial questions. He believed a formula could be found "which would ensure the separate and independent treatment of local questions without affecting general unity of representation." (1)

However, the question, which had been allowed to languish, was soon raised again when Mr. Lloyd Harris, a Canadian member of the Imperial Munitions Board, proposed a special Canadian Mission. Borden further relates:

> Lloyd Harris who represented the Imperial Munitions Board in Washington was in communication with me during this period, and on January 19th in an interview, he informed me that daily he was dealing with many Canadian matters but that he was doing so without any express authority. He suggested that Canada should have a trade organization at Washington, and he urged that the Canadian Government should utilize his services, without remuneration, on a War Mission apart from the Diplomatic Service. I discussed the subject with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and he approved. Eventually on Feb.2nd, an Order-in-Council was signed constituting a Canadian War Mission at Washington, and on the same day Lloyd Harris was appointed Chairman. (2)

Sir Joseph Pope, on June 30, 1918, described it in the Annual Report of the Department for 1917-18, as follows:

> To provide for the necessity of frequent and prompt communication and negotiation between the Canadian and United States Governments in the numerous and important matters affecting Canada's participation in the war, it was found necessary in the early part of February, 1918, to establish a Canadian War Mission at Washington, the Chairman of which was empowered to represent the Cabinet and the heads of the various Departments in respect of negotiations relating to purely Canadian affairs

(1) Letter of November 17, 1918. Stephen Gwynn, ed. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. II. pp.414-15.

(2) Borden: Memoirs II. p. 768.

with the heads of Departments of the United States Government and other United States officials, and with the other British or Allied Missions operating in the United States in connection with the war. Of this Mission, Mr. Lloyd Harris was appointed Chairman."

The Order-in-Council creating this Mission, noting some of the effects of American participation in the war and the imperative need for "the greatest possible understanding and harmony", read in part:

> That out of such considerations there has arisen the inevitable necessity for frequent and prompt communication and negotiation between the authorities of the Canadian and the United States Governments. In view however of the extent and complexity of the war organization which has necessarily been developed by both, such negotiations are subject to serious delay if conducted through the usual diplomatic channel; for His Majesty's Embassy in Washington are obliged in the prevailing conditions to deal with an ever increasing multitude of important affairs not directly concerning Canada, and indeed the negotiations in question are not diplomatic in their nature, but rather are largely of a business and commercial character requiring different, more direct and prompt treatment. As a consequence, the custom, which had already arisen before the war, of arranging conferences from time to time between Canadian and United States officials for specific purposes of common concern, has since been greatly developed with marked benefit. . ."(1)

Professor Skilling discusses its diplomatic character. "The actual status of the War Mission was somewhat anomalous and requires further analysis. 'In effect though not in form', according to Borden, it was 'a diplomatic mission', its duties extending to questions usually classified under the diplomatic heading. Because, however, by all the canons of diplomatic procedure, Canada was still incapable, as a colony, of having its

(1) P.C. 272. February 2, 1918 (not printed).
H. of C. Debates, April 21, 1921. pp.2388-9.

own diplomatic establishment, a 'subterfuge' had to be adopted. The Order-in-Council, indeed, while referring to the need for 'a suitable and dignified status' for the new representative in Washington, had stressed the fact that no step should be taken 'which could be construed as being in any way incompatible with the unity of the British Commonwealth in its relations with a foreign state'. The Order therefore authorized the Chairman of the War Mission 'to represent the Cabinet and heads of the various departments and other administrative branches of the Government of Canada in respect to negotiations relating to purely Canadian affairs' which it might be necessary to conduct with American heads of departments or other administrative branches, or other officials of the United States Government. The Chairman, moreover, was to keep the British Ambassador 'generally informed of the main lines of his action' and was entitled in return, to be informed of all negotiations between the British and the American Governments in so far as they affected Canada. Finally, the Order-in-Council empowered the Chairman of the Mission 'under special direction from the Prime Minister and in complete conjunction with His Majesty's High Commissioner and Special Ambassador at Washington, to engage in negotiations with the Government of the United States relating to affairs which, while directly concerning Canada, may also affect the interests of the British Commonwealth as a whole." (1)

(1) H.G. Skilling: Canadian Representation Abroad. pp.198-9.

Although the Canadian War Mission was placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Harris, its Chairman, was not a member of that Department. He had been Director of Massey Harris, and had then served on the Imperial Munitions Board (an agency of the British Government) in Washington. When the Canadian War Mission was set up, four other prominent Canadian business men were included, some of whom had been associated with Harris in the Washington branch of the Imperial Munitions Board.

In 1918, four days before the Armistice, a Trade Mission was created overseas, and Mr. Lloyd Harris was appointed its Chairman. It was to be resident in London, with branches in France, Belgium and Italy, and was to co-operate with the Trade Commission in Ottawa. On Mr. Harris's departure from Washington, the Canadian War Mission there was headed by Sir Charles Gordon, while Mr. Mahoney continued as Secretary.

Mr. Merchant Mahoney had been a Trade and Commerce official. As Secretary of the Canadian War Mission (1918-1921) he seems to have been considered as an official of the Department of External Affairs, as is evidenced by the following excerpt of a letter to him from Sir Joseph Pope, dated May 11, 1921: "Under this temporary arrangement (continuing the services after the closing of the War Mission) you will consider yourself an official of this Department as heretofore."

Mr. Mahoney stayed on in Washington after the closing of the Mission, as Agent of the Department of

External Affairs, occupying an office in the British Embassy, and keeping the Canadian Government informed on matters of concern, especially commercial. He was not attached to the Embassy staff and had no diplomatic status. Although this arrangement was purely a matter of convenience to the two Governments and not intended to be permanent, it was the immediate predecessor of the Legation. When the Legation was opened in 1927, Mr. Mahoney remained as Commercial Secretary, until appointed High Commissioner to Ireland (Eire) in January, 1946, in which post he died. (May 4, 1946, four months after his arrival in Dublin).

However, while this special War Mission was functioning, there seemed to be almost a premonition of something more enduring and permanent in Canada's relations with the United States Government; and the very old question of special Canadian representation, either within or outside of the British Embassy, came under consideration, even before the War was reaching its termination. As soon as it came to a close, the question was more vigorously examined.

Right of Legation in Washington

Impressed by the valuable work done in Washington by the separate Canadian War Mission, Sir Robert Borden sought to secure British approval for a more permanent diplomatic mission there. In October, 1917, he broached the subject in correspondence with the Colonial Secretary.

On September 17, 1917, the Chairman of the Canadian Trade Commission, Ottawa, Mr. C.B. Gordon, prepared a memorandum for the President of the Privy Council, Mr. N.W. Rowell, in which he emphasized that the British Embassy in Washington was incapable of adequately handling Canadian affairs, that the United States Government would "welcome a proper Canadian representation, as they were most anxious to have all questions between the two countries dealt with in a thorough-going manner", and that a Canadian High Commissioner should be appointed at Washington, to be attached to and to work through the British Ambassador.(1)

On October 13, 1917, Sir Robert Borden telegraphed to Sir George Perley, the High Commissioner in London:

> From many sources it has been made clear to the Government that a special Canadian representative at Washington should be immediately appointed. Lord Northcliffe is strongly of this opinion and urged it in most emphatic terms. War conditions have brought about the necessity of prompt and immediate communication with the United States Government in respect to our affairs. The multiplicity of departments and commissions in Washington leads to disastrous delay if negotiations are conducted through the Embassy which is overwhelmed with a multitude of important matters not directly concerning Canada. I propose therefore to appoint Hazen and to give him the designation of High Commissioner or some suitable title. In matters that may concern the whole Empire he will of course consult with the Embassy but in matters solely touching our own affairs he would communicate direct with the United States Government and its various commissions. As the appointment will be made without delay I shall be glad to receive immediately any observations of the Colonial Secretary.

(1) File 603-19C. Part One.

On October 16 the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Long, brought the proposal before the Cabinet, and the same day telegraphed the Governor General that approval had been given that Mr. Hazen should be attached to the British Embassy at Washington "while of course the Dominion Government would retain full control over him". The appointment, however, would be only for the war period and future arrangements would be open to consideration.

On October 18 the Governor General, in a telegram to the Colonial Secretary, cited Mr. Borden's view that although the conference during his visit contemplated the appointment of a Canadian official who might properly be attached to the Embassy, he feared "that having regard to Hazen's position during the past three years as an important member of the Government, his attachment to the Embassy would be liable to misconstruction and that there is every reason to believe that it would not be congenial to Hazen himself".

On October 24th Mr. Long replied through the Governor General, the Duke of Devonshire, that "Mr. Borden's proposal that Canada should have at Washington a representative who should have recognized diplomatic status in respect of matters directly and solely concerning Canada and should not be attached to our Embassy appears to raise a grave constitutional issue and as such it will call for the most serious consideration by the Cabinet."

On October 27th Mr. Long again telegraphed to the Governor General pointing out that this proposal seemed "to be incompatible with the unity of the British Empire in its relations with a foreign state", and as it would almost certainly be followed in regard to other Dominions, "the position would be I think equivalent to a break-up of the Empire as at present constituted." [This was almost the very language used by Mr. R.B. Bennett, Mr. T.L. Church, and other critics of separate Canadian representation in later years.]

On October 31st Sir Robert Borden replied, through the Governor General, re-emphasizing the need of special Canadian representation, but disclaiming any desire to create anything in the nature of a separate Embassy. On November 5th, however, the Governor General cabled to say that the question would be deferred until after the Canadian election in January; and that Hazen meanwhile had been appointed Chief Justice of New Brunswick.

In December, 1917, Borden was again in London, and on December 13th cabled the Acting Prime Minister, Hon. N.W. Rowell that he had absolutely no opportunity of discussing the matter of representation with the Prime Minister or Foreign Office. He suggested that the Canadian War Mission in Washington be continued until the Peace Treaty was signed.(1)

(1) Foregoing telegrams on file 603-19C.

The matter received further consideration during 1918, but it was not until 1919 that decisions were reached. In September, 1919, Loring Christie prepared a memorandum on "the present position", and the title of "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary" was proposed, instead of "High Commissioner". On September 30 Christie prepared a draft Order-in-Council on the subject. On October 3, 1919, the Governor General cabled the Colonial Secretary a long resumé of the question and said in part:

> My advisers propose therefore that such representation should be established upon the following lines which express conclusions to be embodied in an Order-in-Council:
>
> I. The Dominion of Canada shall be represented in the United States by a diplomatic agent duly accredited to the President of the United States to reside at Washington in the character of His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada.
>
> II. The Canadian Minister shall be appointed by and be directly responsible to the Government of Canada. He shall receive his instructions from and shall report to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
>
> III. The Canadian Diplomatic Establishment at Washington under the direction of a Canadian Minister shall, subject to an agreement to be made with the Government of the United Kingdom, constitute a part of the establishment of His Majesty's Embassy.
>
> IV. The Canadian Minister shall conduct the negotiations and be the channel of communication at Washington in matters between the United States and His Majesty in respect of the Dominion of Canada.
>
> V. The Canadian Minister shall hereafter be the channel of communication in all matters between His Majesty's Embassy and the Government of Canada.

VI. With the object of promoting the most complete co-operation and unity of purpose, effective arrangements, to be agreed upon between the Canadian Minister and His Majesty's Ambassador, should be made for continuous consultation in all important matters of common concern and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as they may determine. Any matter which they may be unable to adjust by consultation between themselves shall be referred to their respective governments for settlement.

VII. In particular such forms and mode of procedure shall be agreed upon as will prevent confusion or embarrassment on the part of the United States in respect of channels of communication.

VIII. The further negotiation at Washington of matters pending between the United States and Canada shall be conducted by and through the Canadian Minister.(1)

The Colonial Office informed the Australian Government of the proposal. In October Christie had conversations on the subject with Lord Grey and Sir William Tyrrell in Washington. On October 28th the Colonial Secretary telegraphed the Governor General agreeing to the appointment of a Canadian Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington, who would hold the second ranking position in the British Embassy.

During the early part of 1920 numerous telegrams were exchanged discussing details of accrediting procedure, and bringing the United States Government into the discussion, and the timing and form of public announcement.

On February 27, 1920, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, Ronald C. Lindsay, addressed a formal note to Hon. Frank L. Polk, Acting Secretary

(1) File 603-19C.

of State, informing the United States Government of the proposal to appoint a Canadian Representative, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, as a member of the Embassy staff. He would receive credentials direct from His Majesty the King "on the analogy afforded by the existence at His Majesty's Embassy in Paris of a minister in the diplomatic service ranking next to the Ambassador". Mr. Polk, in private conversation, expressed a number of misgivings on points of detail as to status and credentials, and foresaw that pressure might be brought to bear on the United States Government to send diplomatic representatives to the Dominions and possibly to Ireland.

Thus the British Government had reluctantly acquiesced in this proposal, insisting, however, that it should not in any way derogate from the diplomatic unity of the Empire. Having at length conceded the point in principle, the British Government had gone further than Borden's first proposal, and proposed that the Canadian Minister would be next in rank in the Embassy to the Ambassador, and in the absence of the latter, should take charge of the Embassy. The British also proposed that, in place of a Letter of Credence from the King to the President, the Canadian Minister should be accredited merely by an official letter from the Secretary of State to the United States Government.

After lengthy consideration of the various suggestions for this novel compromise arrangement,

which would emphasize and preserve imperial unity rather than Dominion status and autonomy, tentative approval was reached in Ottawa, and an appropriation was voted in reply in 1919 for the prospective expenses of representation. On April 26, 1920, the United States Department of State hinted that, with the approval of the British Government, definite overtures had been made by Canada for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations, and that these were acceptable to the Administration.(1)

As regards the official announcement, a premature leakage occurred in Washington and the terms of the arrangement discussed between the Canadian and United Kingdom Governments were published in the United States and Montreal press on April 28, 1920. This hastened the agreement by the new Secretary, Mr. Colby, who conveyed the United States Government's approval on May 4th to the new British Ambassador, Sir Auckland Geddes. A simultaneous public announcement was thereupon made in London and Ottawa on May 10, 1920.(2)

In April, 1920, Mr. Christie was sent to London to discuss various procedural problems with the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. A part of his consequent report, dated May 6th, says:

(1) Canadian Annual Review, 1921, pp.140-1. Text quoted in Dewey, op. cit. II. p. 103.

(2) File 603-19C. For text of announcement see Dewey, Dominions and Diplomacy, ii, pp.103-4, Canadian Annual Review (1921) p.141. Journal, i. pp.476-477.

> After reaching London I was instructed to take up with the Colonial Secretary and the Foreign Office the question of Canadian representation at Washington with particular reference to the precedence in the diplomatic corps which was to be accorded to the proposed Canadian Minister. This was discussed a number of times with the officials in the Foreign Office who had been dealing with the matter. I asked them to look into any past or existing precedents and especially to examine the cases of Bavaria and Saxony, which had maintained Ministers at a number of European courts before the war concurrently with the presence of a German Ambassador. I asked them also to see what precedence was accorded by the French Government to the British Minister at Paris, who is maintained there along with the British Ambassador. For this purpose it was necessary for the Foreign Office to communicate with their Embassies in various European capitals in order that they might search their archives for the data needed. This search had not been completed before I left London but the Foreign Office undertook to cable Ottawa the result of their enquiry. The information has been received since my return.(1)

Instead of indicating the settlement of the issue, however, these announcements seem rather to have marked the opening of more serious and prolonged discussions of it. They did, however, place the matter more directly in Canadian hands. For some years the issue was regularly debated in supply in the Canadian House of Commons, and each year Parliament voted appropriations for "Canadian Representation in Washington". It was debated and discussed intermittently on other occasions, with general support of all parties, but with occasional hesitation and objection on grounds of breaching the Imperial

(1) Departmental file 1576-1920. See also file 603-19 for full correspondence.

Unity.*

On April 11, 1921, L.C. Christie prepared for Mr. Borden a lengthy memorandum arguing in favour of Canadian representation in Washington, on grounds not so much of status as of practical necessity. Some of these notes were used by Borden in his speech in Parliament on April 21st, and a long summary of Christie's memorandum or of Borden's speech was published in the Ottawa Journal on May 3rd.(1)

Delay in Implementation

(1920) Once the agreement in principle had been reached with London, and announcement both in London and Ottawa, and by leakage prematurely in Washington, in 1920, Borden took immediate steps to implement the decision, beyond having Parliament in 1919-20 vote an estimate of $50,000 for "Canadian representation" in the United States, which was repeated each year thereafter.(2) It was known that in Great Britain there was some opposition to this agreed innovation, and in Canadian Parliament there were opponents who feared the implications of such a step on traditional

* In Australia, also, the Government officially announced in the Senate on May 12, 1920, its intention of securing separate representation in Washington. But this intention was abandoned in about 1924 by the new Prime Minister, Mr. Bruce.
In South Africa, General Smuts pointed to the Canadian move as a new and far-reaching precedent regarding Dominion status, which opened the way for any Dominion to demand representation in any foreign capital; and General Hertzog and Mr. Beyers held that South Africa should have her own representatives not only in the United States but in Europe as well.
In New Zealand, on the other hand, this development met with little favour.

(1) File 603-19C, Part 1.
(2) 1919-1920: $50,000; 1920-1921: $80,000; 1921-22: $60,000; 1922-23: $60,000; 1923-24: $60,000; 1924-25: $60,000; 1925-26: $60,000. (File 603-19C. Part 1).

imerpial unity.

(1921) When, in July, 1920, Borden had retired on grounds of ill-health (having rejected the suggestion - apparently initiated by his friend Lord Beaverbrook - that he might himself go as "British" Ambassador to Washington), and Mr. Arthur Meighen became Prime Minister, the question of postponement was again warmly debated. In the House of Commons on April 21, 1921, Borden made a long historical review of the history of the proposal; Meighen supported the proposal, but explained the delay of implementation on the sole ground that the right man had not been found,(1) (Mr. Borden's original candidate, Mr. Hazen, having withdrawn his candidature by becoming Chief Justice of New Brunswick). Mr. Crerar, in the debate, scouted the excuse that there was no qualified man for the position: "There are plenty of able men in Canada who can fill the position".(2)

After a very lengthy and argumentative debate on that occasion, Mr. Rodolph Lemieux bluntly said: "This is the third or fourth time I have voted for this matter. Now, I would ask my hon. friend, in all sincerity, whether it is the intention of the Government to appoint this representative within the fiscal year?" Mr. Meighen replied: "It is not only the intention but the sincere hope. The reason why this has not yet been done so far is the reason that has been given - the only reason." (3)

(1) H. of C. Debates, April 21, 1921, p.2485.
(2) Ibid, p.2498.
(3) Ibid. p.2513.

Nevertheless the matter still hung fire. Mr. Meighen was apparently harassed by too many pressing domestic issues to devote as much attention to external affairs as his predecessor. He attended, in 1921, the Imperial Conference in London which discussed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance among other matters; and, with Christie's help, fought a successful resistance to the British and other Commonwealth positions in favour of renewing the Alliance, and supported the alternative of a Naval Limitation Conference to be called by the U.S.A. When Mr. Meighen fell from office on December 6, 1921, the new Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, appointed Sir Robert Borden as Canadian representative, to the Naval Limitation Conference in Washington. These pre-occupations may explain Meighen's failure to proceed with the appointment of a permanent Canadian Minister to Washington.

For the next two years the question was still in abeyance, for various alleged reasons.(1) Some of these were probably political; there was alleged to be some opposition on the part of certain sectors of the British Government, including Lord Curzon; some reluctance on the part of officialdom in the United States Government and divided opinion in Canada itself. Other suggested reasons include the alleged difficulty of finding the right man, both

(1) Prof. Dewey (Dominions and Diplomacy, II, pp.104 f) has summarized the relevant debates for the earlier year or two. Prof. Skilling (Canadian Representation Abroad, pp.208-212) has analyzed the reasons in general for the procrastination.

suitably qualified and wealthy enough to meet the social expenses of the position; the awareness that the initial step would lead to further proliferations and expansion; the fear of undue expense; and the weakness of the Department of External Affairs at home, small in personnel, qualifications and resources.

(1922-23) During 1922 and 1923 the Prime Minister, Mr. King, had his attention centred both on more domestic matters, and, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, on such international problems as the League of Nations, the Chanak crisis, the Lausanne Treaty, the Geneva Protocol - critical matters which required high policy in Ottawa but did not require special diplomatic Ministers in residence abroad. When the Halibut Treaty was negotiated, and independently signed in 1923, a special envoy, Mr. Lapointe, was accredited for the purpose; and the urgent need of a permanent resident Minister in Washington was circumvented. By this time, Christie, one of the departmental advocates, had left the service (1923); and Sir Joseph Pope was in his tired last stage as Under-Secretary.

(1924) By 1924 the question was rather acutely revived by the action of the Irish Free State Government in appointing their first Minister to Washington, Mr. Timothy Smiddy;[1] and this seems to have spurred Mr. King and his Department to some new initiative.

(1) For texts of statements, see Dewey, op. cit. II, p.III.

Meanwhile, Australia, which in 1920 had announced that it would follow the Canadian project, had in 1924, under the new Prime Minister, Mr. Bruce, backed down and indiated that it had no intention of following suit, although it maintained a Commissioner in New York. New Zealand was unsympathetic to the idea.

What seems, however, to have been a more crucial deterrent upon Mr. King at that time was the strong opposition of his trusted Cabinet colleague, Mr. Fielding, Minister of Finance and Receiver-General. Mr. King had no wish to allow a Cabinet conflict, or to face a rupture with that worthy and grand old colleague. He therefore procrastinated.

Mr. Fielding had made his position very clear in the House of Commons on April 21, 1921.(1)

In March, 1923, J.A. Stevenson, Canadian correspondent of the Manchester Guardian and par-parliamentary correspondent of the Toronto Star, wrote that "Wm. Mackenzie King, the present premier, had given his cordial approval to the principle of a Canadian Minister at Washington, but unfortunately the veteran Minister of Finance, Mr. W.S. Fielding, who commands great authority in the Liberal Party by reason of his long services, is an inveterate opponent to the idea and has successfully thwarted any appointment."(2)

(1) H. of C. Debates, April 21, 1921. p.2476.

(2) Stevenson: "Canada and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (U.S.) March 15, 1923, p. 118.

On April 24, 1924, Mr. Fielding prepared a Confidential Memorandum on the subject which he sent to all members of the Cabinet. In this he opposed the idea of separate Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington, beyond the official (Mr. Mahoney) who was presently there, with an office attached to the British Ambassador. In this he argued that:

> When there is important diplomatic work to be done, it can better be attended to by a Minister from Ottawa than by any resident representative in Washington. A Minister of the Dominion Cabinet, fresh from consultation with his colleagues, and reaching Washington within a few hours, would be a more capable and efficient agent of Canada. The comparative proximity of Ottawa to Washington and other important American cities makes it easy for business to be done directly by Canadian Ministers . . .

Alternatively, he added, "if representation on a larger scale than at present is necessary, might it not be better to have a commissioner in New York? . . ."(1)

Mr. Fielding's opposition seems to have been a weighty factor in deterring Mr. King from forcing any action past a reluctant Cabinet. However, Mr. Fielding resigned from the Ministry on September 4, 1925 leaving the way clear.

(1925) By 1925 the sleeping question was stirring again, doubtless stimulated by the action of the Irish Government. The departmental files show that the consideration of the question was being revived. (By this

(1) Copy of memorandum on file 603-19C, Part I.

time, Sir Joseph Pope had retired and Dr. Skelton was the new Under-Secretary and adviser to Mr. King). It appears that the Prime Minister was beginning to turn his attention to the long outstanding and uncompleted question of Canadian diplomatic representation in Washington. Prospective candidates were not yet considered, although several names were put forward.(1) But the principles were re-examined and Dr. Skelton prepared a very detailed analysis of the whole problem,(2) * which apparently was considered by Mr. King and several of his Cabinet colleagues. Discussions were also informally and confidentially carried on with the British authorities, including Sir Austen Chamberlain.

Debates on the proposal began to appear more frequently in the House of Commons and Senate. It is repeatedly said that Mr. King's reasons for procrastination are obscure or secret; but some of the above facts were contributory to his slowness of

(1) See file 603-19C, Part I.

(2) Ibid.

* In that Memorandum dated December, 1924, it was pointed out that the earlier 1920 agreement had provided that "in the absence of the Ambassador the Canadian Minister will take charge of the whole Embassy and of the representation of Imperial as well as Canadian interests". That notion had been dropped out of the agreement of 1924 concerning the appointment of an Irish Minister. Mr. King had never approved the earlier Borden formula. Dr. Skelton's memorandum proposed that "if any appointment is made under existing circumstances, the present Government contemplates that the proposed Canadian Minister will have charge of Canadian affairs only", and reference to his taking charge of the British Embassy was dropped. (Memorandum on file 603-19C, Part I).

approach. Separate Dominion representation was clearly a crucial innovation, which had to be carefully consulted over with the Imperial authorities. The Irish precedent had aroused some misgivings in London,-especially, in that year, on the part of Lord Curzon. The Canadian signature of the Halibut Treaty had created some re-examination of constitutional status. There were still in the Canadian Parliament some of the old guard die-hards who placed their trust wholly in the traditional British Foreign Office diplomatic machinery. The conception of Commonwealth autonomy had not yet been crystallized, until the Imperial Conference of 1926. Nevertheless, by 1925 the movement was beginning to take shape departmentally.

In March, 1925, Senator N.A.Belcourt had been asked to draft the different documents constituting the procedure for the appointment of a Canadian Minister at Washington. These he submitted to Dr. Skelton, Counsellor of External Affairs, on March 17, 1925.(1) They were then discussed sometime in late April.

In July, 1925, the Prime Minister announced in Parliament that it was the intention of the Government to proceed with the appointment very shortly of a Canadian Minister at Washington. No decision had yet been reached as to the name of the candidate.

In 1926 Mr. King (despite his electoral difficulties) had crystallized his thinking. When

(1) Ibid.

he went personally to the Imperial Conference of that year (though it was not the Constitutional Conference which had been anticipated), the formula for independent Dominion diplomatic representation - separate from the British Foreign Office and British Embassy - had become clarified. It was discussed at the Imperial Conference. Miss M. McKenzie wrote a departmental memorandum on this stage in which she pointed out that at the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference of 1926, Sir Austen Chamberlain said on November 11th that in off-the-record discussions about October 25, Mr. King had pointed out that the arrangement for a Canadian Minister at Washington to act for the British Ambassador would not be desirable, as it would involve the Canadian Minister having to act on instructions from the British Government, which would not be satisfactory. He further wished to discuss some phases of the Washington appointment with Sir Austen before formally requesting His Majesty to issue the necessary letters of credence. The precedent of the Irish arrangement was evidently in Mr. King's mind.(1)

The fact was, however, that Mr. King had by then made up his mind; had requested very much more explicit advice from Dr. Skelton; and had, indeed, sometime before June, 1926, selected his candidate as first Canadian Minister to Washington, Mr. Vincent Massey.

(1) File 603-19C. Part II.

Consideration by Mr. King and the Cabinet of Mr. Massey's selection as First Minister to Washington had been given before the middle of 1926, but how early is not clear. On June 11, 1926, Mr. Massey wrote confidentially to Dr. Skelton saying that he had been in communication with the Prime Minister. "The Prime Minister feels that the announcement of the actual appointment should be made after prorogation of Parliament, and I entirely agree with him in this."

From then on the ball rolled faster. After June, Mr. Massey was discussing details of his prospective appointment, title, salary, and staff, and in November, 1926, Mr. King obtained British and United States consent, and authorized a public announcement of the appointment of Mr. Massey. (Meanwhile there was the constitutional contretemps; the displaced King Administration; Mr. Meighen's regime of three months without a legal Cabinet; and an acrimonious election which brought Mr. King back into power.)

The long gap of six years between 1920, when Canadian representation at Washington was agreed in principle, and 1926 when the first Minister was appointed, is repeatedly held to be mysterious or unexplained, and the reasons for delay to be obscure. There may have been personal considerations and factors in the minds of Borden, Meighen and King which have not - and probably cannot be - elucidated. But the above review of almost each year's deterrent problems may suffice to explain the adventitious causes of delay in

implementing the innovation first suggested in 1917 and better formulated in 1920.

Fundamentally Mr. King, holding the premiership from 1921, with one slight interruption, was a leader never to be hurried; a politician who weighed public opinion or opposition forces; and who tried so far as possible to escape political criticism. He was still to some extent a respecter of the old Imperial traditions and Constitution, and did not wish to move drastically or rebelliously against those traditions, either in his relations with London, or among his Imperial-minded opponents at home. His procrastination may be basically put down to political strategy or tactics.

As events turned out, the Department was not inflicted with responsibility for a diplomatic Mission in Washington, other than Mr. Mahoney's small office, until 1927.

Representation in London

The history of the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom has been fully told by Dr. Skilling and in the personal biographies, memoirs and correspondence of the first incumbents. Over the course of the years, and especially as a result of the Colonial Conference of 1907 and the

the Imperial Conference of 1911, the prestige and status of the High Commissioner steadily advanced until, just prior to the First World War, his diplomatic functions and status were recognized by the British Government as having almost the importance which Lord Lorne had wished to give them as early as 1885. This accession of importance was gained during the long regime of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and was enhanced at the beginning of the War in 1914 by Borden's appointment of Sir George Perley to the London post, and as a result of the wartime demands on the Canadian Office.

It may be of interest to record the notes of William L. Griffith, in 1911, Secretary to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada. In his book The Dominion of Canada, published that year, he reviews the origin and history of that Office since 1880, and concludes:

> When it was first established the High Commissioner's Office was not well known, and received but little attention from the powers that were. It has, however, as the years rolled on, steadily grown in importance and, it can safely be said that, largely through its efforts, Canada has become, in Great

> Britain, the best known portion of the Empire. Canada has, as promised, given of her best to conduct the affairs of the Dominion in this country, and the three High Commissioners who have already served her here - Sir Alexander Galt, Sir Charles Tupper, and Lord Strathcona - are all names to conjure with.
>
> The High Commissioner's Office has performed useful service, and has gained a widespread influence. It has not only brought the Dominion prominently to the front in the most important centre in the world, but at the same time it has helped to educate the public mind as to other parts of the Empire. The almost triumphant reception recently extended to the newly appointed High Commissioner for Australia, at which Canadians rejoiced equally with their Australian cousins, was in vivid contrast to the indifference shown by the public, at least to the first High Commissioner for Canada; and, at the same time, enables us to gauge the great change in national feeling towards the great British communities overseas. (1)

Mr. Griffith remained as Secretary of the Office of the High Commissioner until the 1920's, even after the appointment by Mr. King of Mr. Pacaud as Assistant Secretary. In 1912 Sir Robert Borden, who sought to prevent the 92-year old High Commissioner, Lord Strathcona, from retiring, felt that perhaps additional staff might relieve him of some of his burdens. Borden has recorded: "During the autumn before his death he visited Canada, and I discussed with him then, as well as in the summer of 1912, his continuance as High Commissioner. On both occasions I strongly urged him to continue the discharge of his duties, and I offered him additional secretary or secretaries, to be selected by himself, and otherwise I assured him that any arrangement to lighten his labours would be willingly made by the Government." To Borden's letter of December 19, 1912, Strathcona replied on February 8, 1913: "You, with much generosity, offer to give me any additional clerical or other

(1) W.L. Griffith. The Dominion of Canada. pp.196-7.

assistance I might desire which would make my duties less exacting and less onerous. But the fact really is that . . . although the volume of work has largely increased, the duties are really much less exacting than they were, and the staff which has been considerably increased, is, as it at present exists, quite capable of coping with the requirements." (1) *

(1) Beckles Willson. The Life of Lord Strathcona. pp.569, 574.

* New Zealand at that time had considered the appointment of a Cabinet Minister, even a Minister of External Affairs, to reside in London and to supplement the High Commissioner, whose duties were considered to be largely commercial. At a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute, held in the Hotel Victoria on March 10, 1925, Hon. Sir Thomas Myers, ex-Minister of Munitions and Customs, New Zealand, read a paper on the position of New Zealand within the Empire. In part he said:

> Consultation by cable and despatch is ineffective unless supplemented by frequent personal contacts. I brought this question up in the Parliament of New Zealand in 1912, suggesting the appointment of a Minister of External Affairs, who would stand aloof from domestic and internal problems, and who would be located during the greater portion of the year in London. . .
>
> An assembly of Ministers of External Affairs in London would permit of these representatives discussing from a non-political point of view and in a broad Imperial spirit, the various problems of Empire which are continually arising, and would help the Empire in speaking with one voice on foreign and other important questions. As an alternative I subsequently suggested than an hon. Minister, who would remain in constant touch with the British Government, might be appointed to carry out the task just referred to, thereby relieving High Commissioners from those political duties which at present absorb much of their valuable time.(2)

(2) Financial News, London, March 11, 1925. File 844-1924.

During the 1914-18 War years, after the death of Lord Strathcona in 1913, the need of greater Canadian representation abroad, especially in London and Washington, grew. There were innumerable special missions throughout those years; Borden made regular visits to England, accompanied by Christie and other departmental secretaries; and there was inevitably much intercourse with the United States Government departments, both through the British Embassy and directly by Canadian agents.

The Office of the Canadian High Commissioner in London became an increasingly important agency, both as a political-diplomatic mission with a Cabinet Minister, Sir George Perley, in charge, and as a military headquarters.* But it was not formally brought under the Department of External Affairs until 1921. Before that, the High Commissioner was responsible to the Prime Minister, although he also corresponded

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* Sir George Perley was Minister without Portfolio from October 10, 1911. He was in London when war broke out on August 4, 1914. He remained there and from that date to October 12, 1917, he exercised the functions of High Commissioner, although not officially appointed to that Office. He was appointed Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada in the United Kingdom on October 31, 1916, by Order-in-Council P.C.2651 of October 28, 1916, under the War Measures Act; he was sworn in in London on November 2nd. He was to reside in London and submit reports and recommendations to the Governor-in-Council through the President of the Privy Council; (Borden until October 12, 1917; Rowell 1917-20). On October 12, 1917 he was appointed High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom. Sir Edward Kemp, who had also been Minister without Portfolio from October 10, 1911, and Minister of Militia and Defence from 1916 to 1917, was then appointed Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada in the United Kingdom on October 12, 1917. He returned soon after the end of the War, and was again Minister without Portfolio from July 13, 1920, until the defeat of the Meighen Government on December 29, 1921, when he was appointed to the Senate.

directly with other Departments in Ottawa, and in part with External Affairs. There was an attempt, in 1909, to clarify the obligations of the High Commissioner (Lord Strathcona) in respect to correspondence, as the following letter dated July 9, 1909, from Pope to W.L. Griffith, Secretary of the Office of the High Commissioner in London, indicates:

> The procedure of my new office is not yet settled, but I think perhaps it would be more convenient all round if in matters requiring communication with the Provincial Governments you were to address the Under-Secretary of State of Canada as heretofore. The same rule might apply to all ordinary routine matters, as well as matters connected with the London Library, at any rate for the present, and only the more official and important communications or despatches which relate to matters of foreign or external concern be addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.(1)

During the war years, correspondence direct with the Prime Minister and President of the Privy Council was of course inevitable and essential. In the first place, Sir George Perley was a member of the Cabinet, resident in London; in the second place, Sir Robert Borden was also Secretary of State for External Affairs; in the third place, the exigencies of war made the most direct and expeditious channel of communication with the head of government imperative; and in the fourth place, with

(1) File 1/09.

the Imperial Conferences and Imperial War Conferences and War Cabinets, Sir Robert Borden was frequently in London himself, and the High Commissioner's Office, increased by military responsibilities, obviously was at Borden's disposition.

It has been noted in a previous chapter how the Chief of Naval Staff in Ottawa complained to Sir Joseph Pope that Perley's despatches, being directed to the Prime Minister, failed to be duly forwarded to the Chief of Naval Staff (as they should have been and would have been had they been addressed to the Office of the Secretary of State for External Affairs), but Pope, while agreeing to the complaint, pleaded that he could not remedy the procedure or lapses of the Prime Minister.

An interesting commentary on the position of the Canadian High Commissioner in London as it was in 1920 was given in a Secret and Personal Memorandum dated May 11, 1920, by L.C. Christie on his return from a special investigational visit to London:

> It was no part of my mission to London to examine or report on the High Commissioner's Office. But during my visit I had office room there, and this experience, together with other special opportunities I have had in recent years to observe the Office in action, has left certain impressions which I venture to set down simply as my personal view.
>
> I believe there exists among Canadians who have had dealings with the High Commissioner's Office that it is inadequate and that somehow it ought to amount to more in London than it does.
>
> . . . I venture to suggest the view that whatever inadequacy there is results very largely from conditions for which no High Commissioner is responsible and which no High Commissioner could correct; conditions which are partly inherent in the present status of the constitutional machinery

of the Empire and which are partly to be attributed to the failure of Canadian Governments and Departments in the past to give careful study to the organization and coordination of their representation in London.

The constitutional aspect of this question seems to me very important. The great bulk of our dealings with the United Kingdom Government are conducted by correspondence between the Governor General and the Colonial Secretary. Originally the Governor General filled in some sense the capacity of an ambassador of the British Government in addition to his capacity as the representative of the King; but so far at all events as written communications between the two Governments are concerned this function has become less and less prominent, and today communications may for practical purposes be said to pass directly and automatically between the two Governments. It is important to note that the whole tendency is to conduct correspondence on the most important subjects directly with the Colonial Secretary. All this, of course, must inevitably lessen the importance of the functions and status, and, therefore, of the influence of the High Commissioner.*

Ordinarily the representative of one country at the capital of another is the medium for the dealings great and small between his country and another. In our case the High Commissioner is shown the greater part of the correspondence, but except rarely he is not brought into active participation in the matters dealt with. This analogy to other countries is not suggested here for the purpose of pressing it or of arguing for a change now; doubtless this is the sort of point that will be considered by the Special Constitutional Conference; it is simply cited here to indicate the actual condition which must be kept in mind in considering the High Commissioner's Office and the question whether in existing circumstances anything more satisfactory could be achieved.

Another factor which perhaps militates against the effectiveness of the Office is the practice of conducting the most important discussions through visits of members of the Government to London. This admirable practice represents the best possible method of negotiations between Governments, and of

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* "On several occasions in discussing official matters with British officials I have felt that they were under the impresssion that Dominion Governments did not place much reliance on their High Commissioners' Offices and were not prepared to use them in important dealings. Of course these officials did not say this sort of thing in so many words but I felt clearly that this was one of their working assumptions. The result is naturally to weaken the position of the High Commissioners."

course it is not intended to suggest that it should be curtailed. On the contrary it is most desirable that such visits should take place as often as conditions will permit. But it would seem that this should be borne in mind in counting up one's expectations of what the High Commissioner's Office should accomplish.

Another condition limiting the High Commissioner is surely the existence in London of a number of separate offices representing Departments in Ottawa and having no very direct or definite relation to the High Commissioner. It would seem that these office have been allowed to grow up in past years in response to the needs of the different Departments, but without much attention to the needs of the Government as a whole or to the principles which should govern a properly organized system of representation in London. The existence of these separate offices must result in a good deal of confusion in the minds of people who have dealings with them; it must often create difficulties in settling questions; and there must be considerable overlapping of work. It must also have the effect of weakening the position of the High Commissioner in London, and this must mean for practical purposes the weakening of the whole Canadian machinery there; for what is subtracted from the High Commissioner is really not in practice added to the others.

The conclusion from all this which I venture to put forward is that in these conditions you really cannot expect the High Commissioner's influence and achievements to be striking and that no occupant of the office, whatever his ability or personality, could possibly measure up to the demands implied in the various criticisms that one hears. Indeed it is my observation that given the conditions the Office is doing about as well as could be reasonably expected of it.(1)

At the close of the War, and during the discussions of the Peace Settlement, and the Peace Conference, and the establishment of the League of Nations, Canada's independent role was further promoted by Sir Robert Borden, who became in reality the "foreign minister" of Canada; and several Canadian Ministers were attached to his suite, usually including the High Commissioner. But

(1) Departmental file 1576-1920.

except for Christie, the Department of External Affairs, as such, - with only two senior officers left in Ottawa - played no dynamic part. The special delegations consisted of Cabinet Ministers, assisted by Secretaries or Advisers of their own Departments. These delegates were special envoys despatched on "special mission", or attached to the mission; they came and went as the need arose. They were chosen by Borden and perhaps some of his Cabinet consultants. It does not appear that the Department, as such, interposed its views or recommendations. It was, at that time, an executive bureau, but not a policy-guiding agency.

By Order-in-Council of March, 1921, as already mentioned, the Office of the High Commissioner in London was placed under the Department of External Affairs, and was recognized more fully as a diplomatic agency in the United Kingdom. By degrees the role, and finally the formal status, of the High Commissioner of the Dominion was assimilated to that of Ambassador of foreign states accredited to the Court of St. James. He became, also, a few years after the Imperial Conference recommendations of 1921, a substitute channel of correspondence between the Canadian and British Governments, in addition to the Governor General, and in 1927 in place of him; and this arrangement was fortified by the appointment in 1928 of a corresponding United Kingdom High Commissioner to Ottawa.

Sir George Perley, having been Resident Cabinet Minister in London and Acting High Commissioner from 1914 to 1917, and High Commissioner from 1917 to 1922, was

succeeded in the latter office by Hon. F.C. Larkin (1922-1929), Succeeding Mr. Joseph Grose Colmer, C.M.G., who had been official Secretary to Lord Strathcona, Mr. William Linney Griffith had been from 1903 to 1922 Secretary of the Office of the Canadian High Commissioner. He was the author of an admirable book, published in 1911, on The Dominion of Canada, in which he paid tribute to successive High Commissioners. In 1922 he was assisted by Mr. Lucien Turcotte Pacaud, K.C., formerly, under Mr. Mackenzie King, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Order-in-Council P.C. 2258 of October 27, 1922, records his appointment as Assistant Secretary to the High Commissioner's Office in London.

The appointment of Mr. Larkin in 1922 was the occasion for redefining the scope and duties of the High Commissioner, especially in relation to the representatives of other Canadian Departments attached to his Office and placed under his jurisdiction, and to the various Provincial Agents-General in London. Although in general the Office was (from 1921) placed under the direction of the Department of External Affairs, each of those special representatives attached to his Office could, in routine matters, correspond directly with their own Departments, but in policy matters should do so through the High Commissioner. It was reasserted, however, that the latter "should in all matters of public policy communicate direct with the Prime Minister."(1) *

(1) P.C. 330, February 10, 1922.

* In the early years of the Bennett regime (1930-35) new instructions required that "when questions of policy" were involved, the High Commissioner was to communicate such matters through the Secretary of State for External Affairs (who was, of course, the Prime Minister).

Mr. Pacaud resigned April 30, 1931. (File 130-22).

Representation to League of Nations

With the creation of the League of Nations in 1920, Canada's independent participation resulted in a further step forward toward diplomatic autonomy. Canada obtained separate membership, and sent strong delegations to the early Assemblies in Geneva. In 1920 the delegation included Sir George Foster, Mr. C.J. Doherty, and Mr. N.W. Rowell, K.C., together with an advisory staff, including L.C. Christie from External Affairs. In 1921 the delegation included Mr. Doherty and the High Commissioner Sir George Perley, and advisers. In 1922 it included Mr. Fielding, Mr. Ernest Lapointe, and Mr. P.C. Larkin, the new High Commissioner. As a result of these visits to Geneva, senior Canadian leaders rapidly acquired a knowledge of international affairs which had been so conspicuously lacking in the pre-war days when such esoteric matters were generally left to the more experienced British authorities.

This annual assembling of international statesmen and Canadian delegates began to take the aspect, in Canadian eyes, of a forum of foreign policy discussions which would be a substitute both of the war-time Imperial Conferences and Cabinets, and of separate permanent Canadian missions. Borden called it a "kindergarten" or school for the training of Canadian international experts; and one of its chief values was that of discussion and consultation on foreign affairs. As Prof. Soward remarked: "If anything, the yearly gatherings at Geneva have deepened the ties of friendship between Empire statesmen and

facilitated the exchange of ideas. The part played at Geneva, successively, by Mr. Rowell, Sir George Foster, Senator Dandurand and Sir Robert Borden has helped to convince the Canadian student of world affairs that the statesmen of his country may meet on terms of equality with those from other nations. Equally creditable has been the record of those Canadians who have served in the League Secretariat, in the International Labour Office, or upon League Commissions."(1)

Representative at Geneva.

As a consequence of the demands of the League of Nations organization and its subsidiary agencies like the International Labour Organization, Canada found it desirable to appoint a permanent official in Geneva, at first to represent Canadian interests in the I.L.O., and shortly afterwards to keep the Canadian Government closely advised on all the political and diplomatic developments in the League, and to represent Canada on the innumerable ad hoc committees and commissions.

As one of the first Canadian diplomatic representatives, apart from the Commissioners in London and Paris, a reference may be made to Dr. Walter W.R. Riddell.

He had been in Germany and France in 1912, doing research for a doctoral dessertation for Columbia University. He had then visited the Netherlands, England and Scotland, and had returned to Canada shortly before the War broke out. It may be said, therefore, that he was internationally trained and experienced. He was Director

(1) F.H. Soward: "Canada at the League of Nations". International Conciliation, October, 1932. No.283. pp.393-395.

of Social Surveys for the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches in Canada, but in 1915 and 1916 continued his advanced studies in New York. In 1916 he accepted the new post of Superintendent of Labour for the Ontario Provincial Government and later became Provincial Deputy Minister of Labour. In that capacity he was appointed a member of the Canadian delegation, headed by the Hon. Newton Rowell, then President of the Privy Council, and later Chief Justice of Ontario, to the first International Labour Conference at Washington in the autumn of 1919. He was put on the Secretariat of the Conference as Secretary of the Unemployment Commission.

He was then invited to join the staff of the International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) in London, and took up his post in 1920. Almost immediately after his arrival, he followed the agency to Geneva, and then went to the Maritime Conference at Genoa, where he was in charge of the Committee on Employment. He remained associated with the I.L.O. for the next twenty years.

In December, 1924, he was appointed by the Canadian Government as their permanent representative accredited to the League of Nations and the International Labour Office, under the title of "Canadian Advisory Officer." *

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* As to the appellation "Advisory Officer", Dr. Skilling remarks: "The original title was perhaps chosen to avert the criticism that would have been levelled at home at a semi-diplomatic appointment ("permanent delegate") and to postpone such a step until the first fully diplomatic appointment had been made at a more significant point - Washington. Whatever the reason, the designation was from the first erroneous, since the Advisory Officer was a resident representative of the Government and performed essentially diplomatic functions." (1) In 1938 the name was changed to "Permanent Delegate of Canada to the League of Nations". Dr. Riddell was replaced in 1937 by Mr. Hume H. Wrong.

(1) Skilling. op. cit. p. 167.

To quote Dr. Riddell: "My new post of Canadian Advisory Officer was not considered by the Canadian Government to carry any diplomatic status but I soon found that my diplomatic functions were legion. Apart from a High Commissioner in London and Agent-General in Paris, two countries racially linked with Canada, I was the first Canadian representative to be accredited to the outside world, although in my case it was to an institution instead of to a Government or to the head of a state. . . My new duties, I soon discovered, consisted primarily of representing my Government at Conferences and Committees. There were years when I sat in League and International Labour Organization meetings more than two hundred days." (1)

"The Geneva Office", as Skilling remarks, "served as a listening post in connection with European developments and a source of information on these matters for the Department of External Affairs, its importance enhanced by Canada's lack of permanent representation in any other of the great European capitals east of Paris, including Berlin, Rome and Moscow." (2)

It was noted, however, that Dr. Riddell's actual appointment was accomplished somewhat differently than that of a diplomat - by the Canadian Government itself, through a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the League.(3) Dr. Riddell opened an office at 41 Quai Wilson, Geneva, with one Secretary to assist him. The salary and cost of office were first included

(1) W.R. Riddell: World Security by Conference. p.28.
(2) Skilling, op. cit. p. 167.
(3) Ibid. p. 168.

in the Department of Labour's vote, though in 1925 that post was under the joint jurisdiction of External Affairs and the Department of Labour.

Representation in France

As already indicated, the Office of the Agent General or Commissioner in Paris came under the Department of External Affairs in 1913, the first overseas office to do so. It had been created mainly as an Emigration Office, in 1882, and was first headed by the Hon. Hector Fabre, appointed to that position on July 12th. Born in Montreal on August 9, 1834, he had been educated at the Colleges of L'Assomption and St. Hyacinthe and at St. Sulpice Seminary, Montreal; then studied law with Sir George E. Cartier who was his brother-in-law; and was called to the Bar of the Province of Quebec in 1856. For many years he engaged in journalism. Defeated for the House of Commons in 1873, he was called to the Senate in 1875. In 1882 he was appointed Agent for the Quebec Provincial Government and for the Dominion Government at Paris, and resigned his seat in the Senate. In 1886 he was honoured by a C.M.G. in recognition of his services as a Commissioner to the Colonial Exhibition, London.(1) Fabre's original status was best described as "a general agent, with immigration as one of his functions," paid by a separate vote under the Secretary of State and reporting directly to the latter on his work.(2) He also received directives and a supplementary grant of $1000 from the Department of

(1) Parliamentary Guide, 1910. p. 524.

(2) House of Commons Journal, 1888. App.5, p. 81.

Agriculture, then responsible for immigration matters. In 1903 the emigration work was taken over by M. Paul Wiallard, who continued in that capacity until 1915 when the emigration office was closed for the duration of the war. In 1902 the commercial work of M. Fabre was transferred by Laurier to Mr. A.F.A. Poindron, and the commercial agency continued to be separated until recombined on Mr. Roy's appointment as Commissioner-General. The position of the Agent-General (afterwards Commissioner-General) in France was of so little account that in the various negotiations of a commercial or diplomatic character between Canada and France, either the High Commissioner in London (Galt and Tupper) or a specially accredited Minister from Ottawa, was sent to Paris to work with and through the British Ambassador there, who was the sole imperial diplomatic representative accredited and recognized in France for purposes of negotiation with the French Government.

The story of the Paris Agency is fully told by Professor Skilling. It is only necessary to remark that, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, M. Fabre lacked some of the qualities of a diplomatic negotiator, although his qualities as a Canadian information officer and public relations agent were recognized, he published a Canadian newspaper in Paris, and he had an important and wide circle of friends in the influential classes of France. In diplomatic business, either the High Commissioner in London or special emissaries from Ottawa resorted to Paris to collaborate with the British Ambassador there.

Senator Fabre, following his death on September 2, 1910, was replaced as Commissioner-General to France by Senator Philippe Roy, on May 1, 1911.* There was, at that time, no change in the status enjoyed, or in the functions discharged by his predecessor. In 1913 he became directly responsible to the Department of External Affairs, and acted under its instructions. During the First War years, Mr. Roy began to assume quasi-diplomatic duties, communicating directly with the French and foreign Governments, although as Commissioner-General he was not then a formally accredited diplomatic envoy. In other minor matters, however, he could approach the French Government only through the good offices of the British Embassy and the courtesy of the French Government. But as in practice the relationships necessarily grew closer, the position of the Commissioner-General became, as Mr. Mackenzie King remarked, "in reality much more nearly that of a Minister", so that ultimately that position was formally recognized, when in 1928 he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Canada in France.

In 1920-22, Mr. G.A. Langlois was listed as Secretary to the Office of the Commissioner-General then under Mr. Roy. As departmental records have not been found,

* The Parliamentary Guide 1912 (page 619) and 1914 (page 655) describes Mr. Roy as "Canadian Trade Commissioner" as well as "Commissioner-General", but this was probably an error. The Parliamentary Guide of 1916 (page 553) states that Mr. Roy was appointed "Commissionaire Général du Canada" in France on May 1, 1911, and also that he was appointed Agent-General for the Province of Quebec on January 15, 1912.

details of his position and status under the Department of External Affairs are not available.

In 1922 the first of what later became External Affairs Foreign Service Officers in the outside service was appointed, if such special agents as Mr. Mahoney, Mr. Griffith and Dr. Riddell, who were only partially responsible to that Department, are disregarded. This was Mr. Pierre Dupuy, appointed as Secretary to the Paris Office in November, 1922. He was born in Montreal on July 9, 1896, took degrees at Ste. Marie College, Montreal (B.A. 1917), University of Montreal (L.L.L. 1920) and the University of Paris (L.Litt. 1922). He had been called to the Bar of Quebec in 1920. A writer, he was in later years President of the Association Internationale des Ecrivains de la Langue Française, Paris. His hobbies were literary, tennis, and boating, and on his transfer from the Embassy in The Hague to the Embassy in Rome he sailed his own boat around Europe. When the Paris Agency was made a Legation in 1928, he continued there as Second Secretary (Mr. Jean Desy being appointed Counsellor), and, from 1938, First Secretary. Thereafter he has had a long and brilliant diplomatic career, being appointed Minister and subsequently Ambassador to the Netherlands, in 1945, and then Ambassador to Italy in 1952, and Ambassador to France in 1958.

Conclusion

This review of Canada's diplomatic representation abroad, with its very slow development from the 1880's to 1924, shows the reluctance and hesitation of successive Canadian Governments to interfere with the Colonial system

and long traditions of British responsibility for the Dominion's external relations. Canada had long acquired responsible self-government in its internal affairs. It was slow to do so in its external affairs, first because of its integral imperial connections, with the seat of Empire in London, and secondly because, with some exceptions, it was satisfied with the imperial diplomatic machinery under the more experienced British aegis. Even the early nationalists in Canada, while seeking supplementary Canadian representation, did not envisage an extreme rupture in imperial constitutional practice such as might be involved, nor did international issues arise which could not, even cumbrously, be dealt with on Canada's behalf by the experienced British agencies. Only during and after the First War did Canada begin to feel its own power, militarily and later diplomatically, and, led by Sir Robert Borden, attempt to assert its independent claims in handling matters of diplomatic character. It was under Mr. King in 1923 that Canada first independently signed a foreign treaty, the Halibut Treaty with the United States. It is debatable whether the later development of wider Canadian representation abroad necessitated and caused the expansion of the Department of External Affairs, or whether the Department, as it gained force, especially under Dr. O.D. Skelton, realized the necessity of, and promoted, the expansion of a purely Canadian diplomatic service abroad. Both in fact were true. In the outcome, particularly after 1926-7, the apparatus had a scissor-like character, each part subserving and cooperating with the other. As the activities

in external matters by Sir Robert Borden and his successor, accompanied by advisory delegations, increased, permanent Canadian representation in such places as London, Washington, Geneva and Paris were necessitated; and the business with and supervision of those permanent missions necessitated a stronger departmental organization at the "hub" in Ottawa. Sir Robert Borden added a Legal Adviser, and, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, appointed to the Department and then coopted to his Office various Private Secretaries and clerical staff, to assist him in his international activities. The embryonic representation abroad, however, did not result in an enlargement of the senior staff at home, consisting of three officers, until the rapid expansion of diplomatic missions after 1927, when the Department expanded correspondingly.

On the other hand, the small Department did not itself create a demand for permanent missions abroad, and Pope did not promote them. It did, however, sub-consciously feel that the need of more independent sources of foreign information than that supplied from London; and in the long run this implied Canadian agents stationed abroad and reporting to Ottawa, as in the case of the Canadian Advisory Officer in Geneva. It was not the Department, but the inevitable involvement of Canada in international matters in the League of Nations and elsewhere, that instigated the beginnings of a Canadian diplomatic service. Once this process had been begun, mainly in the 1920's following the First War, it gathered momentum, until in

recent years it may more truly be said that the Department itself has in many cases advocated the opening of new posts and expansion of representation abroad. This contrapuntal effect is expressed by Professor Skilling when he says: "The proliferation of Canada's external representation has of necessity involved a corresponding expansion of the Department of External Affairs, which in its turn has been the generative force in the whole process of development. From the Department, under its responsible Minister, has come the initiative for the successive representative offices abroad. The Department has in addition been the chief source of manpower for each new diplomatic mission and has itself drawn upon the missions for men of experience needed to assume the added responsibilities of the Department at home. . . The growth of foreign representation was in a special sense dependent on a corresponding growth in the numerical strength and capacity of the Department's personnel, which provided some of the staff of the offices abroad and had to supervise and direct its members stationed abroad. One could not move faster than the other. As a result there has been a uniform growth at home and abroad, each stimulating and promoting, or handicapping and retarding, the other, as the case might be." (1) This of course was more true after the period of expansion from 1927 but as has been shown, in the decade of 1914 to 1924, if the number of officers in the Department at home

(1) Skilling. op. cit. pp.260-261.

did not increase beyond three,* the total staff, including special secretaries to the Prime Minister acting as Secretary of State for External Affairs, and clerks and passport staff, steadily increased; while Canadian foreign representation under the Department increased, from Paris in 1913, Mr. Mahoney's Office in Washington, the High Commissioner's Office in London in 1921, the Advisory Officer in Geneva in 1924-25, not to mention the numerous special delegations during the war, at the Peace Conference, to the League of Nations Assemblies, and at various diplomatic conferences in Washington.

* Sir Joseph Pope, W.H. Walker, Loring C. Christie (1913-1923). Dr. O.D. Skelton was also appointed as Counsellor in 1924, before Pope's retirement, but he was then replacing Christie.

CONFIDENTIAL

28.

APPRAISAL OF THE DEPARTMENT IN 1925

Setting

The Department of External Affairs, in its first period of sixteen years (1909-1925) under Sir Joseph Pope, was an experiment in government administration. For newly evolving tasks, new machinery had to be invented and constructed; and it was largely Sir Joseph Pope who invented and constructed it. He had the support of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Robert Borden, partly as a result of his own persuasion and enlistment of their interest; he also had the support of the enthustiastic Governor General, Earl Grey. He had behind him the precedent of Australia; and had heeded the suggestions of men like Sanford Evans and J.S. Ewart. He informed himself by visits to the British Foreign Office and Colonial Office, and by study of the State Department in Washington and the Department of External Affairs in Australia.

The new tasks which necessitated the new machinery in Canada were largely imposed by outside factors. The Empire was gradually decentralizing, with the increase of nationalism and desires for autonomy in its self-governing portions. More rapid and frequent steamship connections and the introduction of cable communication, stepped up the tempo of diplomatic business. Foreign commercial matters affecting Canada were steadily increasing, involving diplomatic negotiation. Questions of imperial defence, especially naval, involved Canada in international issues. By 1914 the War broke out, implicating Canada in relations with Britain, France, and other Allied countries, and in delicate relationships with the still neutral United States. The Colonial Office with its Dominions division,

and the Foreign Office, sprang to life.* The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in London, and the Office of the Commissioner-General in Paris, acquired higher importance and responsibilities. The channel of communication through the Governor-General was found to be cumbrous and increasingly inadequate, and supplementary channels had to be gradually evolved, calling for improved apparatus in the governmental administration in Ottawa. Increasing visits of Allied dignitaries required improved ceremonial and protocol direction; the heavily increasing travel of Canadians abroad or to the U.S.A. required a larger passport bureau. The increasing number of foreign consuls in Canada required greater attention to their needs and problems. The Imperial Conferences before and after the War, and the participation in the Imperial War Cabinet during the War, required assistance to the Prime Minister by a bureau of specialists and advisers.

These were some of the factors which built up the need of a special Department for dealing with them..

New machinery was required in these new circumstances; and a part of this was the auxiliary institution - still experimental and formative - of the Department of External Affairs as a part of the process of government in Canada. Foundations had to be laid, and a skeleton structure contrived. Upon this base the Department, in its next phase of growth under Dr. Skelton, would be erected.

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* See e.g. Lord Strang: The Foreign Office, pp.31, 34.

Balance Sheet

Toward the close of Sir Joseph Pope's career he might look back and ask how far his aspirations had been realized.

His aspirations, it is apparent, were limited. He envisaged the Department over which he came to direct as an administrative bureau or department in the domestic structure of government. He did not conceive it as a great policy-making department of State, like the Foreign Office in Great Britain, or as the hub of a widespread independent diplomatic service abroad; he still belonged to his era's prevailing school of thought that relied on the Imperial Government to conduct the foreign affairs of the Dominions. He had little if any notion of changing the constitutional system of the Empire, in which the Colonial Office and the Governor-General were integral and essential cogs. Indeed, in his declining years he was unable even to realize that the old trusted system had already begun to change, from 1920 onwards, largely under the influence of Sir Robert Borden; he wrote in a private letter to Senator Sir George Foster in 1923: "I am one of those who do not see in what way Canada's international status has varied in the last half-century." Pope had no desires or aims in these directions, when he promoted the idea of a separate Department of External Affairs.

Yet within the more modest limits of his aspirations, a certain amount had been achieved. The Department became an auxiliary government agency for centralizing and regulating certain work - not a dynamo but merely a governing wheel. It assimilated to itself a number of chores that had formerly encumbered other departments, such as passport issuance, consular connections, centralization or distribution of files and correspondence. Its staff remained small, and relatively static; there was almost no senior expansion in the sixteen years between 1909 and 1925, and with only three officers, it was regarded more as a personal department of Sir Joseph Pope than as an impersonal but larger and more influential department of government which it later became. It was

still tied, in contacts, to the Colonial Office; for, without a foreign service of its own, and without Canadian diplomatic autonomy, both its sources of information and its promotion of diplomatic business with foreign or other Commonwealth countries, had to be dependent on Downing Street. Neither Pope nor his Department tried to alter that. The change came gradually as the result of discussions at successive Colonial and Imperial Conferences and through occasional experiments in independent diplomatic negotiations.

With very minor exceptions (e.g. the Paris Agency and the International Joint Commission) the Department of External Affairs neither possessed nor developed a representational diplomatic or consular service abroad, during Pope's regime. It was, therefore, limited. Its functions were confined to the Ottawa arena, to the inner circles of government, with a certain link of contact with the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. It lacked any filaments extending its role abroad, acting both as nutritional sources for its own diplomatic needs and as agencies for carrying out its diplomatic requirements into foreign fields. The question of imperial relations involving status, was handled by the Prime Ministers and Cabinets, although Loring Christie of the Department contributed advice. Practical questions of defence, both in the pre-war years when the navy question was an imperial issue, and during the War, belonged to the Defence Departments and special agencies in London. Questions of commerce belonged to the Department of Trade and Commerce and its corps of Trade Commissioners abroad. The policies of the Canadian Government in connection with the Peace Settlement and the League

of Nations were largely unformulated, and the Department was barely called on to prepare the ground or give guidance and direction. Sir Robert Borden and his handful of unprepared Ministers groped their way through these new problems, with the technical - or even political - advice of only the Legal Adviser of the Department, L. C. Christie, mainly on matters of dominion status in the brave new world.(1)

Therefore the Department of External Affairs remained, in Pope's day, a shell. It had small dynamic power or influence. It was not a "foreign office". Sir Joseph Pope did little in this respect; apparently it was not his particular "métier". He was not a formulator of policy, but a professional administrative Civil Servant. He had served faithfully under ten Prime Ministers, yet he does not appear to have substantively influenced any of them in policy formulation. But his Department was a useful adjunct to the Prime Minister. After Laurier's time, i.e, in the eras of Borden, Meighen and Mackenzie King, the Department remained static and neglected; the staff still remained inadequate; the Prime Minister did not want to swell the estimates and Pope personally became more inert as the Deputy Minister of a small Department, in proportion as Borden and Mackenzie King became more and more their own "foreign ministers" in their policy-formulating at home and at their missions abroad, and as they took with them on their missions such special advisers as Loring Christie, and (at the Imperial Conference of 1923 and at the League of Nations in 1924), Dr. O.D. Skelton, Dean of Arts at Queen's University.

(1) Glazebrook: History of Canadian External Relations. pp.308-9.

In an appraisal of the Department of External Affairs during Sir Joseph Pope's incumbency, from 1909 to 1925, the achievements and the failures may be summarized.

Achievements. Pope had attained his objective in simplifying and regularizing the chaotic system of handling external affairs papers and despatches, and in centralizing the business of collating them and, with the advice of other departments concerned, of preparing properly-considered replies or memoranda.

Pope had succeeded in having the conduct of Canadian external affairs taken out of the hands of a Secretary of State of Canada, overburdened with other duties and relatively unfamiliar with international affairs, and, after 1912, placed under the direct control of the Prime Minister, ~~acting as Secretary of State for External Affairs~~, who was necessarily and in fact the Minister chiefly responsible for foreign policy,

From the Prime Minister's viewpoint, the Department was a useful annex or auxiliary bureau appended to his own Office. It was a means of obtaining financial appropriations from Parliament which did not accrue to his own Office directly, but which could be utilized by him. It provided him with additional personal staff, bookkeepers and file clerks and messengers and typists. In this way it facilitated the Prime Minister's work and relieved him of many functional burdens. It provided him with several Private Secretaries, and the special Assistant who held the position of Legal Adviser.

The Department canalized much of the diplomatic contact work with the foreign consuls established in Canada, relieved the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the obligation of dealing directly with them except on high matters, and gave them a more regular access to the Government.

The Department took over much of the protocol work connected with the visits of foreign princes and potentates. The records have shown how numerous these were, how burdensome, and how Pope, a master of protocol and ceremonial, assisted in their facilitation.

The Secretary of State's Department was relieved of the task of issuance of exequaturs to foreign consuls and passports to Canadians, and, as the volume of this work rapidly increased, the Department of External Affairs not only took over the burden but ultimately created a separate Passport Bureau or Office, heavily staffed, and by 1925 issuing 25,000 passports a year.

After five early years "in the wilderness", the Department had established itself, as originally planned, in the East Block, which thereafter became the "foreign office building" of Parliament Hill. Pope finished his public career in the same building as he had commenced it nearly half a century earlier. After many frustrations, he had created a physical establishment and premises which were to remain permanent, and while overflowing into other annexes, still form the centre of Canada's external business.

During those sixteen years, the imperial relationship of Canada had evolved and had been transformed

into one of equality and partnership, with increasing autonomy in the field of foreign affairs. As a consequence, the machinery in England had been adapted to the new relationship; a Dominions Office was created; the channel of communication was amended. There was more direct intercourse and correspondence between Prime Minister and Prime Minister; the channel of the High Commissioner was enhanced, and the role of the Colonial Office and the Governor-General as the primary channel of communication proportionately declined. These shifting relationships and machinery of intercourse were paralleled by the greater functions of the Department of External Affairs in centralizing them on the Canadian side. By degrees the Department became "responsible" for the Canadian offices in London, Paris, Washington and Geneva. It also became the auxiliary bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, and logically was placed under his direction as Secretary of State for External Affairs.

During this epoch, Canadian diplomatic representation abroad inconspicuously began to take, in a tentative manner, a new character and influence. Canadian negotiators to an increasing degree participated with or without their British colleagues and tutors; at times they substituted for British statesmen as chairmen of conferences or committees; by 1923 a treaty (the Halibut Fisheries Treaty) was signed by a Canadian negotiator without British counter-signature. Canadian delegates attended international conferences, and League of Nations Assemblies, and Canada had independent representation and separate votes. One or more

members of the Department of External Affairs usually accompanied these special missions or delegations as secretaries or advisers. As regards permanent diplomatic Missions, there had been the High Commissioner's Office in London, with increasing diplomatic functions; the Commissioner-General's Office in Paris; the permanent International Joint Commission created in 1909, coming into operation in 1912, and coming under the Department of External Affairs in 1914; the Canadian War Mission in Washington from 1917, which preceded the subsequent Canadian Legation there; the Canadian Representative in the I.L.O. at Geneva, who in 1925 became Canadian Advisory Officer at the League of Nations, and who represented Canada at innumerable international meetings and conferences in Geneva. All these were experiments in Canadian diplomatic autonomy, in the more direct conduct of Canadian external affairs, and in the incipient growth of a Canadian diplomatic service.

By 1919-20, the Department of External Affairs was controlling, or paying the expenses of:

	Cost
	$
A Bureau of Public Information (Privy Council)	16,763.
A Canadian Bureau of Information in New York (with a staff of 8)	14,428.12
The Canadian Mission in London (with a fluctuating staff of 28)	88,105.28
The Paris Agency (with a local staff of 14)	37,516.38
A Canadian Munition Resources Commission	8,513.52
The Canadian War Mission, Washington, (with a staff of 9).....	32,558.33

Shortcomings. Throughout the long incumbency of Sir Joseph Pope, the number of senior officers in the

Department never surpassed three. Pope's original position had included the desirability of training a group of experts in international affairs, but this objective was not attained. Sir Joseph Pope and W.H. Walker were the only senior "experts", with the addition for a ten year period (1913-1923) of L.C. Christie, the Legal Adviser. In 1924 Dr. Skelton, as Counsellor, joined the Department, which Christie had left.

The Department, as has been stated, did not concern itself with matters of policy-making. There were no personnel, with the possible exception of Christie, qualified in this field. Sir Joseph Pope and Walker were administrators rather than foreign policy makers, and apparently had little interest in the questions of high policy.

The outposts abroad were for the most part agencies, but were not full-fledged diplomatic missions. For diplomatic negotiations, special envoys, often Cabinet Ministers, were usually sent afield, whether on particular negotiating missions, or to attend general conferences, or to represent Canada at League of Nations meetings. Lacking such "observation posts", the Canadian Government had almost no intelligence sources of its own abroad and no staff in the capital to analyze international affairs as seen from Ottawa. A flow of information came from London, but its value was limited in view of the lack of experts to digest

it and relate it to other material. Even the technique of international relations was little understood in Ottawa, with the result that frequent enquiries were addressed to London on questions of procedure.(1)

Parliament, reflecting national public opinion, was relatively apathetic respecting matters of foreign affairs, and left them to the Cabinet, with only perfunctory debate. The Department did nothing to stimulate public interest in foreign affairs, or to provide the public and Parliament with information.

To some extent, Sir Joseph Pope helped to create in Canada a new instrument of government. He saw the beginning, but not the end; he saw only the first twenty-four years of the new Department of External Affairs.

He saw the centralized collection and distribution of documents; he set in train the compilation of reference prints; he arranged for a rendezvous and centre of contact for local foreign consuls and later diplomats; he brought the passport business under his control until it became a sub-department in itself. He formed the tiny nucleus of a staff. He saw the Department suitably linked with the Office of the Prime Minister.

But he did not survive to see the recruitment and training of specialists or experts in foreign affairs. He did not see the opening up of true Canadian diplomatic and consular missions abroad, independent of the British missions. He did not see the expansion of the Department into a largely staffed "foreign office",

(1) Glazebrook: A History of Canadian External Relations. p.346.

nor the prestige that later gathered around the Department at home and abroad. He did not survive to see the elimination of the slow channel of communication through the Governor General and the Colonial Office; nor the creation of the Dominions Office; nor the decline of the rôle of the Governor-General in more direct government-to-government consultation. He did not live to see the results of the Balfour Report, the Imperial Conference Resolution of 1926, the Statute of Westminister, which crystallized the constitutional changes and the autonomy of the self-governing Dominions.

All these fulfilments came to fruit after Sir Joseph Pope had left his pioneering post. He had laid the foundation, but he did not see the edifice completed, by his successors.

Conclusion

After reviewing this first period - the Pope Epoch - of the Department of External Affairs, as has been attempted in the foregoing pages, one must ask why in the sixteen-year period, the Department had not developed more fully into a dynamic organ for the conduct of commonwealth and foreign relationships and policies.

The assumption must be reached that, in general, the status and powers of the self-governing

dominion of Canada did not, at that time, demand such a dynamic agency. It was long accepted that foreign policy-making lay primarily in the hands of the leader of the Government of the day - the Prime Minister - and his Cabinet. Public opinion, which was not deeply interested in external matters so long as Canada's status as a maturing autonomous nation was not jeopardized, was apathetic, or took a remote and almost academic view of outside world affairs. Parliament itself, or at least the majority of its "back-benchers", reflected the apathy or acquiescence of the electorate. Foreign affairs abroad were thought of as a kaleidoscopic "game" to be understood only by experts or specialists. Foreign relations directly involving Canada perhaps came home more intimately to the business and bosoms of the Canadian people, so far as those relations reacted on the domestic scene. But they

were rarely discussed in Parliamentary debate, until the aftermath of the first World War brought home to the Canadian people and to Parliament the important interconnection between domestic and foreign affairs.

a decade or two later, in the late 1930's, the former Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett, clearly enunciated this point of view, which applied even more truly in the earlier period of this survey:

> Parliament never makes foreign policy. His Majesty's advisers make the foreign policy of the country and parliament approves or disapproves. Parliament says yea or nay. This is the old constitutional practice, a practice as old as the hills themselves. Ever since our institutions have developed to what they are now we have provided that his majesty's government, always with a majority in the commons, shall initiate and formulate policies - foreign policies. It is not given to me nor to any private member of this house to indicate the foreign policy of Canada. You can express your views, as I am expressing mine, you can offer your criticisms, as I am, but the declaration of external policy in this country must come from his majesty's advisers, the government, the Crown in reality. You will find the matter much discussed in the speeches that took place in the time of Palmerston. It is the Crown's policy. The Crown no longer speaks as the sovereign; the Crown speaks on the advice of the ministers of the Crown, and the policy is the policy of the government of the day.(1)

It follows from the foregoing that if Parliament had only a small part in foreign policy-making, and only a somewhat academic interest in international affairs, there would be little interest by the public or by Parliament in the necessity of

(1) H. of C. Debates, May 24, 1938, p.3196.

having a department of government specially organized and competent to deal with those subjects. International relations were not of such direct or domestic interest as, for example, fisheries or trade. The interconnection of foreign relations with overseas trade, or with fisheries, was not realized; therefore the importance of a specialized department, - something more than a coordinating bureau - was not appreciated.

Moreover, throughout this period up to about 1926, not only was it accepted that foreign policy was the preserve of the executive government, as Mr. Bennett said, acting in an advisory capacity to the Crown; but also it was normally accepted that imperial - and hence Canadian - external policy was controlled by the Imperial Government in London, through the Colonial Office which, while attentive to Canadian representations transmitted through the Governor General, advised the Crown. First, it was accepted by Laurier and his successors, that the British Government representing both the "mother country" of the colonial empire, and the senior imperial authority, was more experienced and better informed; had a wider purview of commonwealth and imperial problems and needs, and generally could be trusted by the dominions; "mother knew best". Secondly, it was recognized that Great Britain had competent diplomatic and consular machinery for the conduct of all such affairs; and the somewhat

unfledged dominions did not have the experience or the apparatus, and at that period, did not aspire to have independent machinery of their own.

It might be true that in a few circles there was a vague desire to begin the establishment of an expert policy-guiding department, a "Foreign Office" which would be the functional manifestation of a desire for an independent foreign policy; but during the period under review, this desire had not developed. Borden, Christie and, toward the end, Pope and Skelton, saw glimmerings of this trend, and saw in the future, independent diplomatic machinery; but neither the public pressure nor the practical demand had yet moved from a static to dynamic state.

Consequently, throughout this period, the Department itself remained largely an administrative bureau, a functional piece of apparatus, for the assistance of the executive government, i.e., of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, who retained the power of policy-making.

There was no idea or intention that the Department of External Affairs, an organ of civil servants, should usurp the prerogatives or role of the policy-branch of government, or should set up as a policy-organ itself. This was never implied in the original views of Sir Joseph Pope, or of Laurier or Borden, or of Earl Grey. There was not intended to be a special Foreign Minister or Secretary of State State for External Affairs, functioning as a policy-

maker like the Foreign Secretaries or Colonial Secretaries in Great Britain. Since the power rested mainly with the Prime Minister, Pope's view from the beginning, (supported by the precedent of Australia and by the suggestion of Sanford Evans, and others), was that as the Prime Minister's authority was paramount, the Department should be placed under his charge, carrying the extra honorific but unessential title of Secretary of State for External Affairs, (largely for administrative reasons). Thus, the Department was still conceived as an administrative annex or advisory and informational bureau connected with the Prime Minister's Office, (as in practice it became), as Earl Grey had originally envisaged it.

There was no conscious effort through the Department to train international experts. That experience might be acquired by parliamentarians as a result of their participation in international conferences or special diplomatic missions to foreign countries, or in what Borden called the "kindergarten" of the League of Nations. Pope's conception of trained experts was apparently more on the administrative level - specialists who, by study, training, and familiarity in the Department, could provide technical information and advice, (when sought), to the political makers of policy.

But even this pragmatic aspiration was not realized in the Pope period under review. Pope was already a seasoned expert; Walker, from the Governor

General's Office, was an expert; Christie, who was brought into the Department after a background of training in the United States public service, was an expert. But no other officials were brought into the Department, until Dr. Skelton first replaced Christie and then replaced Pope. The fact that there were no accretions to the senior staff was sufficient evidence that there was no public, no parliamentary, and no governmental demand for such Departmental experts, while leaders like Borden, Meighen and Mackenzie King did the policy-making and had Pope, Walker, Christie or Skelton at their elbow to give them technical advice.

[redacted]

APPENDIX

ATTEMPTED REORGANIZATION OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE

Reform of the Colonial Office

For a long period before Confederation, the Colonial Office in London administered the domestic and imperial affairs of the Provinces of Canada, through Governors. After Confederation, it continued to supervise the Dominion's imperial and foreign relations, through the Governor General.

As has been shown, the Governors General, according to their personal qualities, could make a strong impress and could contribute a great personal influence on Canada's external relations. But in the final analysis, it was the Colonial Office in Downing Street, and the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, which exercised dominant control.

Canadians, with but few exceptions, did not chafe under this traditional and constitutional arrangement. But there were times when the trends of autonomy, nationalism, awakening sense of nationhood, and amour propre, inclined some leaders in each of the overseas Dominions to urge a distinction between the self-governing colonies of dominion status, and the non-self-governing Crown colonies.

This manifested itself in an embryonic desire to have the Colonial Office divided in some way into a department administering in the old manner the non-self-governing Crown colonies, and a special department supervising, in a slightly different manner, the self-governing responsible dominions, with recognition of those dominions' growing desire to manage their own external affairs.

At the Colonial Conference of 1907, at which an Imperial Conference Secretariat was established under the Colonial Office, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said: "The Colonial Office, which is already divided into departments, is the proper Department to deal, under Ministerial responsibility, with the self-governing Colonies and Crown Colonies"

But a suggestion came from elsewhere, for removing the "Dominions" work from the Colonial Office. It was put forward by Mr. Deakin, and also by Sir Joseph Ward for New Zealand. Mr. Deakin said:

> It appears to me that it would be for the advantage of the Colonial Office, and it would be to our advantage, if we were dissociated altogether from the Dependencies which are governed, and admirably governed, from this Office." . . . "I do not belittle the work of the Colonial Office - it is simply gigantic - but the Colonial Office finds it necessary to omit India. It was recognized to be perfectly impossible for this Office to include the administration of that vast country with its enormous population. In the same way the Colonial Office must expect to see the self-governing communities outgrow its capacity for control, which is not capable of being indefinitely extended. . . You have an enormous task of administration there" (in the Crown Colonies); "but the successful administration of those Colonies calls for methods of administration and treatment and begets an attitude of mind based on presuppositions and preconceptions, which cannot be escaped from but which do not at all attach to self-governing states, which are quite foreign to us, and give us a general sense of discussing a question with persons who have already made up their minds upon it on another basis altogether. Consequently, it is no reflection to say that this great department has already ample and growing work on its hands apart from the self-governing communities, and that in the course of time it must expect to see these communities, first of all releiving the Department by undertaking a good deal more for themselves, and next, by sending their despatches to the Prime Minister, where they will not be jostled in a Department overburdened with administrative work alike and yet different in character. . . The whole tendency of the whole of

this department, and of its officers, is to become imbued, both consciously and unconsciously, with principles of government properly applicable to the great countries with which they are dealing day by day and hour by hour, but which are very foreign, and in some cases almost antagonistic, to the principles on which the affairs of self-governing Colonies are conducted."

Sir Joseph Ward stated:

In regard to the machinery that has existed up till now, we are not reflecting upon it in any way whatever, nor have I ever had the impression that the Colonial Office have done anything other than their duty in every possible way and with the greatest possible satisfaction to the people of our country. . . While I would not for a moment presume to say how it should be arranged for internally in the Colonial Office, there should certainly be a division of administration. . . There is a natural desire on the part of the governments of the self-governing Colonies to have a more distinct recognition of what we are trying to carry on in our respective spheres. To a very large extent, what I want would be met if we were to get out of the position of the self-governing countries being regarded as on a par with the Crown Colonies. . . In view of the very important statement made by Lord Elgin as to division of self-governing and Crown colonies, I have only to say that I heartily congratulate him and the Conference upon it. We have his assurance that he proposes to divide the administration of the Colonial Office in such a way as he may think best in his own Department, so that the self-governing Colonies will be treated separately from the Crown Colonies.

Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had said, during these discussions:

It is quite true that this Office has grown considerably, and that the section of it which deals with responsible governments has not as yet been so clearly differentiated and defined as it may quite naturally seem reasonable now that it should be, but which everybody will understand was not at least as necessary in days gone by. I take considerable responsibility upon myself, but I am prepared to say that we will endeavour, I think we shall succeed, to so separate the departments of this Office that you will have in the Office in the form which we shall present it to you, a distinct division dealing with the

> affairs of the responsibly governed Colonies. I will not say it will be exactly apart, because there is, and must be, at the head at any rate, a connecting link between the several parts of any office, but there will be one division which you will feel will be concerned with the business of all the self-governing Colonies, and not directly with that of the Crown Colonies. That is what I aim at. Whether I can carry it out today or tomorrow, or at what particular time I cannot promise.

In due course, Lord Elgin sent a despatch, dated September 21, 1907, to the Dominions setting out the reorganization that he had carried into effect, to redeem his pledge to the Conference - the formation of a "Dominions Division" within the Colonial Office.

Lord Crewe, in a letter of March 25, 1909, wrote to Earl Grey that at the Colonial Conference of 1907, Deakin and Jameson, and in a lesser degree, Sir Joseph Ward, advocated differentiation between the business of the self-governing Dominions and the Crown Colonies, with the establishment of a Secretariat of a composite and semi-independent character under the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was entirely opposed to the idea of an Imperial Council, which Australia and New Zealand were prepared to favour, and only accepted the Secretariat on the distinct understanding that it would be under the ministerial responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He realized and emphasized the fact that the Prime Minister being a very busy man, could not be expected to undertake the responsibility for the Secretariat, and it was understood that he had no complaint to make as to the way in which Canadian business was conducted by the Colonial Office. (1)

(1) Crewe to Grey. Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.15 Folder 34.

The Permanent Secretariat, under Mr. Just, was set up in 1907. It was to be a liaison and information office, in the interim between periodic Colonial Conferences. It was set up within the Colonial Office, and under the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Sir Wilfrid Laurier acquiesced in its establishment, as offering some practical benefit. From the above letter, and from the evidence available in the published proceedings of the Colonial Conference of 1907, it would appear that Sir Wilfrid Laurier sought no greater change in the existing arrangement or structure of the Colonial Office.

On the other hand, however, Earl Grey gained the distinct impression that Sir Wilfrid Laurier wished to have the Colonial Office bifurcated into two separate departments. On April 8, 1909, he wrote to Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary:

> Sir Wilfrid Laurier confided to me on his return from London that in his opinion the policy of two necks to one bottle, under the roof of the Colonial Office, was not sufficient. He favoured two bottles - each bottle in a cellar of its own, with its separate butler.(1)

To Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Grey wrote on January 10, 1910:

> You will remember that on your return from the Conference in 1907, in discussing the results of the Conference, you pointed out to me that although the resolution of H.M. Government to make a complete separation of the Departments of the Colonial Office dealing with (1) the Self-Governing Dominions, and (2) the Crown Colonies, Protectorates, Spheres of Influence, etc., was a satisfactory step forward towards the fuller recognition of the autonomy of the Dominions, in your opinion it was desirable that further steps should be taken in this direction, and that the Department of His Majesty's Government dealing with the affairs relating to the self-governing Dominions, should be a separate Department under a roof of its own, and with a Minister of its own.(2)

(1) Ibid. Vol. 15. Folder 32.

(2) Laurier Papers. Vol. 735.

There was, in fact, no resolution of H.M. Government to make a complete separation of the Departments of the Colonial Office. What did occur was the division of the Colonial Office, under the single Secretary of State for the Colonies, into two "departments", one for the self-governing dominions and one for the Crown Colonies and Protestorates, the former to be under a separate Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary of State. (In form, this resembled the division, in Canada in 1909, of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada into the Secretary of State's Department and the new Department of External Affairs, under separate Under-Secretaries).

No evidence has been found in Laurier's correspondence, to confirm Earl Grey's assertions that Laurier actually advocated either the partial bisection or a complete separation. He repeatedly said that the existing arrangements of the Colonial Office were amply satisfactory.

1909-10

Nevertheless, Earl Grey adhered to this impression of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's opinion. He himself ignited from that spark, and in 1909 began to carry the torch for Laurier. In his own enthusiasm for increasing Dominion prestige and for the autonomy which he foresaw was developing, he ardently endorsed the idea of a separate Dominions Office; he argued in its favour in his private letters to London, and he repeatedly urged Sir Wilfrid Laurier to submit it as an item of agenda for

the next Conference in 1911, and to take the lead in advocating this reform at the Conference. But to Earl Grey's enthusiasm, Laurier evidently remained very cool. The following correspondence of Earl Grey with Lord Crewe and with Sir Wilfrid Laurier is of great interest.

On March 11, 1909, he wrote to Crewe:

> I have not yet been able to obtain from Sir Wilfrid Laurier any official reply to your despatch asking if Canada has any suggestions to offer for the consideration of the Imperial Conference of 1911.
>
> I have pressed him more than once to give expression in the shape of a Minute of Council to his view that the business of H.M. Government with the Self-Governing Dominions should be conducted through a separate Department with a Roof and Minister of its own. If this idea of his were to be adopted by the next Conference and by H.M. Government, we should have a Colonial Minister for the Crown Colonies etc., and an Imperial Minister for the Self-Governing Dominions.
>
> I have discussed with him the desirability, in the event of his suggestion being adopted, of throwing the London Offices of the High Commissioner of Canada into the building of the new Imperial Office. If you could house under one roof all the London establishment of the Self-Governing Dominions, the Imperial Minister would be in a most favourable position for enabling him to lead a movement towards the establishment of Unity of Organization in all the self-governing parts of the Empire. I doubt whether Sir Wilfrid will include this recommendation in his suggestions, as he at present considers it would come up as a natural corollary to his motion to make a more complete divorce between the Colonies and the Dominions than the present half-hearted separation.(1)

On March 25th he received a reply from Lord Crewe, part of which read:

> The latter part of your letter has caused me some surprise, because it seems to indicate a remarkable change in the attitude of Sir Wilfrid Laurier as compared with that taken by him at the Conference in 1907. At that time, Deakin and Jameson,

(1) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.15. Folder 32. (Document 004141).

and in a lesser degree Sir Joseph Ward, advocated differentiation between business of the Self-Governing Dominions and the Crown Colonies, with the establishment of a Secretariat of a composite and semi-independent character under the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was entirely opposed to the idea of an Imperial Council, which Australia and New Zealand were prepared to favour, and only accepted the Secretariat on the distinct understanding that it would be under the ministerial responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He realized and emphasized the fact that the Prime Minister being a very busy man, could not be expected to undertake the responsibility for the Secretariat, and it was understood that he had no complaint to make as to the way in which Canadian business was conducted by the Colonial Office. Now, as I understand from your letter, the proposition has taken a somewhat different form, the suggestion being that two Ministers, both I suppose of Cabinet rank, should be appointed in place of the present Colonial Secretary; and the further proposal to house under one roof all the London Agencies of the Self-Governing Dominions, would either be a substitution for, or a tentative advance towards the creation of an Imperial Council. I shall be very grateful if you can tell me what has caused this apparent change of thought and attitude on Sir Wilfrid Laurier's part, and in particular whether you conceive it to have simply proceeded from further consideration of the entire question, or whether it is founded on any dissatisfaction with action of ours.

You will, I am sure, agree that the question is a very large and serious one, demanding the closest and the most thorough investigation. It is evident that if the Self-Governing Dominions as a body, put forward this demand, and were prepared to agree on the precise method in which it should be carried into effect, the idea could not be dismissed except on the highest grounds of public policy. I have imagined hitherto that some fear was felt by those who are content to let the existing arrangements stand, at any rate for the present, lest the creation of an Imperial Minister in London, as such, especially if combined with more regular and continuous joint action between him and the representatives of the different Dominions, would lead in fact to some loss of liberty by each of the members of the Imperial body. This might be inevitable and even not undesirable, but we have understood that some of the Dominions shrank from it, partly because at present the Mother Country is bound to be able to throw the heaviest weight into the scale, and must continue to do so for some time to come.

From another point of view, there are difficulties which cannot be ignored. Such an important and

powerful Colony as Ceylon; such great progressive commercial communities as the Straits Settlements with the Federated Malay States; such ancient Colonies as Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados, which have been self-governing and in some respects are so still; all these would probably resent being lumped together with the new Protectorates, in what might be regarded as an inferior category.

I mention these points, though I refrain from dilating on the subject at the length which it may seem to deserve, and my principal object is to ask you, while going rather more fully into the subject, not to commit us in any way. The particular point has not, so far as I know, been before the present Government, but I certainly could not foretell approval from them for it, and so far as I am myself concerned, I should need a good deal of convincing that such a step, quite apart from questions of expense or of the multiplication of Offices, is anything but premature in the existing circumstances of the Empire.(1)

Earl Grey replied to this in a further letter to Crewe, dated April 8th:

With reference to the suggested divorce between the Crown Colonies and the Self-Governing Dominion sides of the Colonial Office - Sir Wilfrid Laurier confided to me on his return from London that in his opinion the policy of two necks to one bottle, under the roof of the Colonial Office, was not sufficient. He favoured two bottles - each bottle in a cellar of its own, with its separate butler. This suggestion did not proceed from any feeling of dissatisfaction with the action of the Colonial Office. It was the fruit of further consideration by him of the entire question.

.....

The housing of all the London Agencies of the S.G.D's under one roof, is neither a substitution for, nor necessarily even a tentative advance towards the creation of an Imperial Council, but simply an arrangement more conducive to unity of organization throughout the Empire.

If Sir Wilfrid were to think that the adoption of any such plan as we are discussing would lead to an Imperial Council, then good-bye, a long good-bye, to any hope of Sir Wilfrid moving in this direction.(2)

(1) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.15 Folder 34.(Document 004152-56).

(2) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.15. Folder 32. (Document 004181-3).

In the early part of 1910 Lord Grey returned to this subject, to which he had given his unreserved support, and started again prodding Sir Wilfrid for a Minute on the matter, which might receive Council consideration and might then be incorporated in the Canadian agenda proposals for the 1911 Imperial Conference. As in the parallel suggestions for a Department of External Affairs, equally espoused by Earl Grey, he was impatiently frustrated and exasperated by Laurier's inherent tendency toward procrastination, and also by the excessive "modesty" which he attributed to Laurier. On January 10, 1910, he wrote by hand to Laurier:

> You will remember that on your return from the Conference in 1907, in discussing the results of the Conference you pointed out to me that although the resolution of H.M. Government to make a complete separation of the Departments of the Colonial Office dealing with:
>
> 1. the Self-Governing Dominions;
> 2. the Crown Colonies, Protectorates, Spheres of Influence, etc.,
>
> was a satisfactory step forward towards the fuller recognition of the autonomy of the Dominions, in your opinion it was desirable that further steps should be taken in this direction, and that the Department of His Majesty's Government dealing with the affairs relating to the self-governing Dominions, should be a separate Department under a roof of its own, and with a Minister of its own.
>
> On more than one occasion since, we have had discussions on the same subject, in which I have unreservedly concurred in your view that such a change as you have suggested is inevitable, demanded as it is by the dignity of the Dominions, and by the growing consciousness that they have risen from the status of subordinate to the higher position of co-ordinate States in the Empire.
>
> I have received private intimation from London that it seems certain that the next Conference will consider this proposition.
>
> I confess I should like, for many reasons, the lead in this direction to be given by Canada, who

under your guidance has given the lead so often along the pathway of Imperial evolution, and especially by you individually.

.....

It is unnecessary in this letter to point out the advantages in drawing more closely together the co-ordinate States of the Empire, that would result from the establishment of a Dominion Department, in a building in which ~~might~~ room might possibly be found for the housing in a manner befitting the dignity of the Dominions, of the London Offices of the various High Commissioners and Agents-General.(1)

To Lord Crewe he wrote, on March 3:

I have had several talks with Sir Wilfrid in 1909, and as far back as 1908 and 1907, with regard to the subjects which, on Canada's suggestion, should be discussed at the 1911 Imperial Conference.

There are two most important subjects which he inclines to suggest as fit and proper matters for discussion, but so far I have been unable to obtain from him any note giving official expression to his views. This reluctance on his part does not proceed from want of conviction. It is the result of a natural habit to procrastinate, strengthened by his belief in procrastination as a safeguard against mistakes, and by a pretty but excessive modesty which prevents him from pushing himself into the limelight.

Question No.1: The desirability of making a complete divorce in your home Department between the Self-Governing Dominions and the Colonies. I have already informed you of the line in which Sir Wilfrid's mind is travelling in this direction, and will say no more now on this question. . .(2)

To Sir Wilfrid Laurier Grey wrote, on March 18:

I omitted to ask you yesterday whether you had been able to carry Council with you in support of your proposal to suggest to the C.O. that the complete divorce of the Dominions from the Colonies should be one of the subjects for discussion at the next Imperial Conference.

I noticed in one of the newspapers yesterday that Ld Crewe had made some suggestion tending in that direction. May I suggest that before the English papers arrive containing a verbatim report of Ld Crewe's remarks, your letter to Mr. Asquith shd be mailed. - The credit of this suggestion belongs to you, and I regard it as important but you should not be robbed of it.

(1) Laurier Papers. Vol. 735 (Doc. 206523-6)

(2) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.16. File 40.(Doc.004285).

(3) Laurier Papers. Vol. 735. Governor General's Correspondence, 1910. (Doc.206689).

To Grey's letter, in a "private and personal" one of April 16th, of miscellaneous comment, Lord Crewe replied:

> You wrote me on the 3rd March with regard to the subjects to be discussed at the Imperial Conference next year. I note what you say once more as to a possible division in this department between the Self-Governing Dominions and the Crown Colonies. I flew a kite on this matter at the Dinner to Sir George Reid the other day, and the possibility seemed to be well received generally. . .(1)

~~Lord~~ Grey then replied to Lord Crewe on April 28, 1910:

> I noticed the kite you flew at Sir George Reid's dinner. I am glad to hear it was generally admired. A complete divorce between the S.G.D's and the Crown Colonies is the next step in Imperial evolution. It has got to come. The only question is who is to give it the lead. I want Canada to give the lead. I have not yet given up hope. Laurier when he brought the matter before Council came up against an unexpected snag in Fielding. He told me yesterday that he was unwilling to press his suggestion upon Council against Fielding's protest, but that he could carry Council if he wished.
>
> Parliament prorogues next Wednesday. I shall urge Laurier to tackle Fielding privately again, as soon as possible. I had a little talk with Fielding some time ago. He took up the position of an English Conservative. "Canada was a Dependency"; the present mix-up of S.G.D's and C.C's at the C.O. was alright, etc., etc., etc. I shall be disappointed in Laurier if he has not grit enough to overcome this sort of opposition. . .(2)

On the same day, April 28th, Grey wrote to Laurier:

> Lord Crewe tells me in a private letter that he flew a kite on the proposed divorce between the Self-Governing Dominions and the Crown Colonies at the Dinner to Sir George Reid, the Australian High Commissioner, the other day, and that the possibility was generally well received. For reasons that I have already stated to you, I regard a complete divorce between the Departments dealing with matters relating

(1) Ibid. Vol. 16. File 41 (Doc. 004306).

(2) Grey of Howith Collection. Vol.16. File 42.(Doc.004314).

1 to the S.G.D's, & 2ndly to the Crown Colonies as certain to come in the near future.

It is the next step in the slow but sure growth of our Imperial evolution. Who is to take the step? Who is to give the lead? That is the question which interests me.

On grounds personal to yourself and on public grounds also, I regard it as most desirable that Canada, under your Premiership, should give the lead.

I know that you are in favour of making this move, but that you hesitate to press this matter upon the acceptance of Council, out of regard to Mr. Fielding who is opposed to it. Now I venture to hope that Mr. Fielding's opposition is not founded on any bedrock principle. A slight conversation I had with him in the passage of the Hotel at Albany on the very subject led me to believe that his opposition to the adoption of your suggestion was not based on any strong conviction, but rather on a sentimental affection for things as they are. He appeared to be quite satisfied with the present mix up in the Colonial Office between the Dominions and the Colonies, & not to share the desire that Canada should rise above the status of Colony and dependency!

It certainly was a surprise to find myself as an Imperialist Governor General engaged in an endeavour to plant in His Majesty's Canadian Minister of Finance a proper respect for the dignity & status of Canadian Nationality. I need not repeat what I said in a former letter to you on this subject. Since I wrote on Jan. 10 what appeared only a probability now looks more like a certainty & I am more than ever anxious that the opportunity which is now up to Canada to give the lead as she has so often done before, should not be lost. (1)

In 1910 Earl Grey was on a visit to England, and had talks with Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary. From London he wrote to Laurier on June 22nd:

With a view of helping public opinion to appreciate more fully the difference that should exist between Domestic and Imperial Legislatures may I suggest to you once more the desirability of formally presenting to Asquith as a subject for the consideration of the approaching Imperial Conference, your recommendation that the Department relating to the affairs of the Overseas Dominions, should be under a roof of its own, and responsible to a Minister of its own.

(1) Laurier Papers. Vol. 735. Gov. Gen.'s Correspondence 1910. (Doc. 206754-206767).

Crewe has told me that this proposal will eventually be made, and in all probability carried. I have put in at once a plea that you should be allowed to initiate this proposal on the ground -

(1) that it yours originally, and

(2) that no one could bring it forward with greater effect.

Crewe has promised me that you shall have the place of leadership in this proposal. The difficulties are rather administrative than political. The Prime Minister says he has too much to do. An alternative that has presented itself to the mind of Crewe is that this Department should be presided over by the Lord President of the Council, who might be called, in addition to the title, the Imperial Minister. It is worth considering whether he should be called the Federal Minister, rather than the Imperial Minister.

The advantages appear to me to be in favour of the Prime Minister being the responsible Minister rather than the President of the Council. Asquith's reluctance, probably the result of laziness, must be overcome. The Prime Minister could be represented in the other House by a younger Minister whose duties would include the cultivation of close personal relationships with overseas Ministers and others visiting London.(1)

All this urging and prodding by Earl Grey, which leads us to suppose that Sir Wilfrid Laurier was equally keen on the proposal, was, however, unsuccessful, and for some reason Sir Wilfrid did not feel inclined to promote or even support it. We have by implication, Lord Crewe's indication that Laurier never supported such a suggestion at the Colonial Conference of 1907. We have, on the other hand, Earl Grey's repeated assertions that Laurier had advocated it. No further views expressed by Laurier have been found, although Grey states that he had discussed the proposal with Laurier in 1907, in 1908, and in 1909. Laurier's lack of response was attributed by frustrated Grey to Laurier's natural habit of

(1) Laurier Papers. Vol. 735. Gov. Gen's. Correspondence 1910. (Doc. 206961-70).

procrastination; and also to the opposition of Mr. Fielding, an influential and respected member of Laurier's Cabinet. It may also be assumed that Laurier shied away from any suggestion which either would seem like a reflection on the existing role and functioning of the Colonial Office, or would seem like interference in a long established constitutional system. Although to some degree an autonomist (resisting any scheme of an Imperial Council), he was also modestly reluctant to interfere with the administrative structure of the British Government, or the existing Colonial framework.

1911

The Imperial Conference of 1911 took place, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier attended. Notwithstanding the urgings of Earl Grey, he made no special proposals for discussion, and did not take the lead in any suggestions on the structure of Colonial administration.

Although nothing further developed from this Conference regarding a Dominions Office, Earl Grey, nevertheless, after he returned to England in 1911, continued with all seriousness to urge the creation of a separate Dominions Office and to plan a group building in London, something like the Commonwealth Building of Rockefeller Centre in New York, which would house all the Dominions' London offices as well as the new Ministry. He kept this dream alive for three or four years.(1)

In 1912 Grey consulted with Lord Strathcona, the High Commissioner, on his project, but the latter

(1) Castell Hopkins. The Canadian Annual Review, 1911, pp.626, 628.

was not at all enthusiastic. Nor was Sir Robert Borden, who wrote to Strathcona on December, 1913, that the Ministry "did not consider the time opportune for expending a very large sum of money". To this Strathcona replied to Borden at some length on January 17, 1914, only three days before he died; he composed and signed it on his deathbed, the last letter he wrote. In it he said:

> In view of the circumstances mentioned in your letter I am by no means surprised that you and your colleagues do not consider the time opportune for expending a very large sum of money in connection with the site and buildings for a business home in London for the Dominion of Canada. . .
>
> An enormously expensive edifice near the Strand on the plan put before me by Lord Grey, with an elevation overtopping not only the Commonwealth and other buildings in the immediate vicinity, but the dome of the great Cathedral St. Paul's, I could not possibly regard as other than an unpardonable expenditure, and in my mind such a vast building, with a dominating pinnacle erected as a striking advertisement, would provoke ridicule rather than bring advantage to our great country and its people. I am more convinced every day that it is not in the grand architectural effect of the offices of the Dominion in London that the requirements of the situation are to be found, but in the work that is actually done within them in the interests of the Canadian people.
>
> At the same time a Syndicate or Company registered as the Exchange of International and Colonial Commerce, Limited, has formally asked me to place before you certain statements in connection with the Aldwych site and their negotiations with Lord Grey, which they consider should be brought to your knowledge, and I enclose the statutory declaration they have forwarded for this purpose.(1)

In May, 1914, Earl Grey - the first ex-Governor General to do so - returned to Canada on a cross-country tour from Victoria. He stopped at Ottawa to confer with the Government as to his Dominions' House scheme after

(1) ~~Casta~~ Beckles Willson: The Life of Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal. p.578.

obtaining, personally, the approval of the Australian leaders to his great plan of an Empire Building on the Aldwych site in London for which he held an option of lease at $250,000 a year for 99 years - for buildings which he estimated would cost $6,000,000 to erect.(1) But the War broke out later in the summer, and from then on the plan seems to have been dropped for good.

Although apparently not directly germane to the subject of Canada's conduct of its external affairs, attention has been given to this proposal for several reasons. First, it reveals the zealous interest of the Governor General, Earl Grey, in the relationship of the Colonial Office with the self-governing Dominions; secondly, it shows the relationship of the Governor General and the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and the manner of their intimate collaboration in external affairs; thirdly, it reveals Sir Wilfrid's reluctance to presume in initiating steps concerning the administrative organization of the British Colonial Office; and, fourthly, it introduces Lord Grey's predilection for the British Prime Minister to take charge of Dominion affairs - (which found its parallel in Joseph Pope's thinking) - and Grey's conception of an Imperial headquarters in which the Dominions Office and all the Dominion agents and high-commissioners would be housed together. Later developments fulfilled Grey's proposal for a separate Dominions Office; but did not fulfil his dream of a single headquarters for all the Dominion representatives in London.

(1) Castell Hopkins. The Canadian Annual Review. 1914.p.780.

There remains one unexplained fact. Earl Grey in his correspondence distinctly attributed to Sir Wilfrid Laurier the notion of a separated Dominions Office, quoting almost verbatim his alleged words in favour of such a reorganization. In fact, in reading Grey's correspondence, it would appear that Laurier was the chief proponent of this proposal, which Grey enthusiastically seconded. Yet Laurier took no positive steps to advocate it at the Colonial Conference in London in 1907 or the Imperial Conference in 1911, indeed backed away from the scheme, and asserted his entire satisfaction with the existing arrangements, the standing Imperial Secretariat and after 1907 the Dominions "department" of the Colonial Office. The most he did in 1911 was to have an "open mind" and to express willingness to go along with whatever seemed best to the majority of the other Dominions. "Though I and my colleagues are satisfied with what exists we would not offer any objection if the other members of the Conference are disposed to press the point." It is difficult to understand whether Earl Grey was mistaken and entirely misrepresenting Sir Wilfrid Laurier's views, or whether Laurier had in private conversation with the Governor General expressed one view, as Grey attributed to him, but in public action took the opposite and more negative view, to Grey's embarrassment, mystification, and disappointment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Notes on Bibliography

The materials for this study have come from many scattered sources, and in most cases these have been indicated in footnote references.

For a period of many years, various members of the Department of External Affairs, interested in historical research or working in the Division of Historical Records (later Historical Division) and Research, have collected notes and documents, and have investigated public archives and departmental files, providing assorted material for future compilation into a history. The present study has benefitted from this previously collected material.

A considerable amount of this former material, and a considerable amount of new material, has been extracted from departmental files covering the period under review. Many of these files, being dormant or obsolescent, have lately been relegated to the Departmental Records space at Tunney's pasture, Ottawa West.

Other material has been extracted from such collections as the Laurier Papers, the Borden Papers, the Meighen Papers, the Pope Semi-Official Papers, and the Collection of Earl Grey of Howith, all in the Public Archives.

The public records of Canada, including the contemporary Debates of the House of Commons and Senate, various Sessional Papers, the annual reports of the Department of Secretary of State of Canada and the Department of External Affairs, the Auditor General's Reports, and other government "bluebooks" have been examined. The 1908 Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service provided

useful information. The unofficial Canadian Annual Review, edited and published by Mr. Castwell Hopkins, has provided supplementary material for the period concerned.

Of the non-official sources, the literature examined is extensive. On the British Colonial Office and Foreign Office there are a number of standard works; on Canada's external relations, besides the classic work, A History of Canadian External Relations by Professor George de T. Glazebrook, there are studies by Soward, Keenleyside, Corbett, Dawson, Brebner, Dewey, and others, and collections of lectures by Borden, Rowell, Shotwell, Skelton, Massey, and others. The memoirs and biographies of Macdonald, Laurier, Borden and King are numerous and invaluable.

Certain lacunae may be mentioned. Public access to the main collection of papers of Prime Minister Arthur Meighen is still restricted while Mr. Roger Graham, formerly of Regina College, is writing an official biography. A collection of miscellaneous papers and correspondence of Meighen, however, is in the Public Archives. Some of the personal papers of O.D. Skelton are still in private possession. The major part of the Mackenzie King Papers are still under examination and editorship, and are held in the Public Archives or at Laurier House, and are not yet open to general inspection.

The semi-official papers of Sir Joseph Pope are in the Public Archives; many of them are carefully sorted and arranged by Pope himself in his last years. His biography, written by his son, Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope, is to be published by the Oxford University Press probably in the autumn of 1959; Sir Joseph's

personal diaries have recently been deposited in the Public Archives but under seal; it is not expected that they will be opened for inspection at least until the publication of the biography, and possibly later. Consequently the notes referring to Sir Joseph Pope in this survey have been taken mainly from departmental files, the Semi-Official Papers, and occasional newspaper sources.

On the Colonial Office and Governor General, the following standard books have been consulted:

The Colonial Office - Henry L. Hall
The Colonial Empire and Its Civil Service - Sir Charles Jeffries
The Colonial Office - Sir Charles Jeffries
The Dominions and Colonial Offices - Sir George Fiddes
Studies in the Evolution of Dominion Status - Gwen Neuendorff
The Colonial Office and Canada 1867-1887 - David M.L. Farr
The Foreign Office - Lord Strang
"The Foreign Office (Algernon Cecil); Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.III.

The 'Grey of Howith Collection" of Earl Grey Papers in the Public Archives and the Laurier and Borden Papers have been examined with much reward. Prof. W.M. Whitelaw Reid's study "The Responsible Government and the Irresponsible Government", in the Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 13, 1932, is useful regarding the earlier days of colonial governors in Canada.

The role and function of the Privy Council have been dealt with in various excellent and scholarly books on the subject, both British and Canadian. Mr. A.D.P. Heeney has made a useful contribution in the Journal of Political Science and Economics, and Dr. MacGregor Dawson's The Government of Canada is also a good summary. As to the

role of the Privy Council and Cabinet in the "conduct" of external affairs, Sir Joseph Pope's article "The Federal Government of Canada" in the Canada and its Provinces series; various remarks in the House of Commons, and occasional papers in the various collections of correspondence, cited in the text of this study, have all afforded useful information.

The same may largely be said in respect to the role of the Secretary of State's Department, the role of the Prime Minister, and of Parliament, and of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, in the governmental machinery of external business of Canada. Personal sketches of the Prime Ministers and Secretaries of State concerned have been made from miscellaneous sources, including memoirs, biographies, and private correspondence found in the Public Archives.