



REFERENCE PAPERS

INFORMATION DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 73

CANADA AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM

The information set out below consists of extracts from official publications and is intended to provide a chronological account, although somewhat disjointedly, of Canada's concern with the Korean problem. Most of the extracts are taken from successive volumes in the CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS series which is published annually by the Department of External Affairs. These volumes, since 1947, have carried chapters on Korea which, when read together, provide a well-rounded picture of developments from the time of the Cairo Agreement on Korea in 1943 until the Armistice was signed in 1953. Additional public statements have been added to bring the survey up to March, 1954.

Since a number of the CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS volumes are now out of print and since the Geneva Conference has heightened the need for such information, this material has been brought together in this form for the convenience of those interested.

Excerpt from CANADA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 1947, Department of External Affairs, pages 31 - 35

At the Cairo Conference in December, 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China agreed "that in due course Korea should become free and independent" and the three Powers undertook to ensure the future security, independence and economic well-being of Korea. The Cairo pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, and subscribed to by the Soviet Union when it entered the war against Japan.

At the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued a declaration concerning the establishment of an independent Korea. The Government of China later adhered to this statement. In the declaration on Korea it was agreed to establish a joint United States-Soviet Commission to meet in Korea and, through consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, to decide on methods for establishing a Provisional Korean Government. The Joint Commission was then to consult with the Provisional Government in order to work out measures to assist the political, economic and social development of the Korean people. It was agreed that the proposals of the Joint Commission to achieve these ends should be submitted for consideration to Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and China with a view to the establishment of a four-power trusteeship for Korea for a period of up to five years. It was envisaged that the trusteeship period would precede the granting of absolute independence.

In the ultimate event, it proved impossible for the United States and Soviet representatives to co-operate through the Joint Commission to achieve the objective of the Moscow Agreement. As a result, the temporary division of Korea at the 38th parallel between the United States and Soviet authorities was continued. This arbitrary division, which was introduced for purposes of the occupation at the end of the war, has seriously crippled the Korean economy, since the industrial centres are in the north and the agricultural areas in the south. Normal intercourse between the two zones of occupation has not been possible. The Joint Commission met on a limited number of occasions and failed to agree on any question of importance.

In an effort to achieve some progress towards the establishment of an independent Korean State, the United States proposed the convening of a four-power conference to discuss proposals for implementing the Moscow Agreement. The Soviet Union, however, declined this invitation. The United States then proposed that the agenda of the Second Session of the General Assembly should include an item entitled "The Problem of the Independence of Korea". In his opening speech before the plenary session of the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, the United States representative stated:

"Although we shall be prepared to submit suggestions as to how the early attainment of Korean independence might be effected, we believe that this is a matter which now requires the impartial judgment of the other Members. We do not wish to have the inability of two Powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence".

In the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United States representative introduced a resolution which proposed that elections should be held in North and South Korea, not later than March 31, 1948, under the control of the United Nations, as an initial step towards the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a National Government in Korea. It was proposed to set up a United Nations Temporary Commission, to be present in Korea during the elections and to be available for such consultations as were appropriate in connection with the elections, the subsequent organization of a National Assembly and the formation of a Government.

The Soviet representative responded to the United States initiative on the subject of Korea by himself proposing a resolution which called for the withdrawal of all Soviet and other occupation troops in Korea at the beginning of 1948, in order that the Korean people might establish a National Government without foreign interference. This proposal was not acceptable to a majority of the Members of United Nations.

At this juncture a procedural issue was introduced into the debate by the Soviet representative, who requested the Committee to invite elected Korean representatives to attend the Committee's discussions of the problem and present their views. As no elected Korean representative was available, this proposal obviously was designed merely to delay the consideration of the question in the United Nations. On these grounds, the majority of the Committee, including Canada, objected to the Soviet suggestion, although subscribing to the principle that Korean representatives should eventually be heard.

The United States thereupon introduced an amendment to the Soviet resolution which affirmed the principle of consultation with elected Korean representatives and proposed the setting up of a Temporary United Nations Commission, similar to that proposed in the original United States resolution, to go to Korea to ensure that the representatives elected in Korea, were, in fact, duly elected and not the mere appointees of military authorities. Against Soviet opposition this amendment was finally adopted by a large majority. The Soviet Union and the other eastern European States refused to participate in the voting and thereafter announced that they would take no part in the United Nations Temporary Commission which had been proposed in the resolution.

When the problem of Korean representation in the discussions had been resolved in this way, the United States reintroduced its original resolution, revised to conform with the procedural decision which had established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. This revised resolution embodied Indian and Chinese suggestions which called for the Korean general elections to be held on a national, and not a zonal basis, under the control of the United Nations Commission. It was further proposed that, with the establishment of a Korean National Assembly and of a Korean National Government, the Government of Korea should then constitute its own security forces and should arrange for the withdrawal of all occupation troops in consultation with the United Nations Commission. This amendment was designed to make possible the participation of China in the eventual establishment of Korea's independence. The United States also accepted a Philippine amendment which forbade foreign interference in Korea, except at the request of the United Nations.

The United States proposed that Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine should be represented on the Temporary Commission. These States, with the exception of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, agreed to serve. The Ukraine refused to participate in the work of the Commission.

The United States resolution, as amended, was adopted in Committee by 46 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions, the latter including the Scandinavian countries. Canada voted for the resolution and the U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugoslavia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Czechoslovakia did not participate in the voting.

The two resolutions setting up the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and outlining the plans for Korean independence under the guidance of this Commission were adopted in plenary session by 43 to 0 with 6 Members abstaining. The abstentions included the Scandinavian States and some Arab States. Canada voted in the affirmative, and those States which had not participated in the voting in the First Committee again took no part in the proceedings. The Soviet Union then reintroduced its original resolution, calling for the evacuation of all occupation troops from Korea by January 1, 1948. This resolution was rejected.

The Canadian Attitude

The Canadian representative, in a statement in the First Committee on October 30, said that the failure of bilateral negotiations over the independence of Korea had resulted in this question being placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. He noted the United States and Soviet agreement over the fact that the present occupation forces in Korea must be withdrawn, as well as the important differences over the methods of procedure to be adopted to give effect to this withdrawal. The Canadian representative summed up the Canadian attitude to the United States proposal in the following words:

"The Canadian delegation will support the approach of the United States rather than the proposal of the Soviet Union. It seems to our delegation that a premature withdrawal of occupation forces, which were originally put in that country to enable the Korean people to achieve the degree of unity of purpose and stability necessary to the establishment of a national and independent government, would serve only to precipitate chaos and disunity, especially in view of the political and economic division which has been imposed upon the country during the occupation. Moreover, the reference to 'foreign' interference

hardly seems a valid objection to apply to the United States proposal to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to supervise the freedom of elections in the country, to assist in the organization of a democratic form of government and the withdrawal of the occupying forces. Surely the very purpose of such a commission would be to provide observers to ensure that the Korean people could, in fact, establish their own government by free elections without foreign interference."

Excerpt from CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1948, Department of External Affairs, pages 67 - 71

The last act of the third session of the General Assembly before it adjourned on December 12, 1948, was to pass a resolution on Korea by 48 to 6 with one abstention. This resolution approved the conclusions of the Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and declared that the Government of the Republic of Korea had been properly established under the observation of the Commission in that part of Korea where the Commission had been able to function. In addition to a general interest in the establishment of Korean independence, Canada was especially concerned with the Korean question because of its membership on the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

Dr. Patterson, the Canadian representative, attended the first meeting of the Commission on January 12 at Seoul, Korea, where the Commission first considered the approach to be made to the Soviet authorities in North Korea to secure their co-operation. The United States authorities had already indicated their readiness to co-operate. Letters in identical form were sent to the General Officers Commanding the forces in North and South Korea and the text of these letters was also sent by telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the request that the permanent Soviet representative to the United Nations be asked to transmit it to Moscow. In a reply of January 23 from the Soviet representative, which was relayed to the Commission, Mr. Gromyko reminded the Commission of the negative attitude taken by the Soviet Government towards the establishment of the Korean Commission. It soon became apparent that no response would be forthcoming directly from the Soviet Commander in North Korea.

On February 6, the Commission declared that the negative attitude of the Soviet Government made it impossible for the Commission to exercise for the time being the functions conferred upon it by the General Assembly in the part of Korea occupied by the Soviet armed forces. The Commission thereupon resolved that it should consult the Interim Committee of the General Assembly and adopted a resolution embodying the following questions on which consultation should take place:

- I Is it open to or incumbent upon the Commission under the terms of the General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, and in the light of developments on the situation with respect to Korea since that date, to implement the programme as outlined in Resolution II in that part of Korea which is occupied by the armed forces of the United States of America?

- II If not (a) should the Commission observe the election of Korean representatives to take part in the consideration of the Korean question as outlined in Resolution I of November 14, 1947, provided that it has determined that elections can be held in a free atmosphere and (b) should the Commission consider such other measures as may be possible and advisable with a view to the attainment of its objectives?

On February 19, Mr. Menon, the Chairman and Indian representative on the Commission, made a full report on the work of the Commission to the Interim Committee. The United States representative stated that the first question put to the Interim Committee should be answered in the affirmative, thereby leaving no need for an answer to the second question. He introduced a resolution to this effect.

The Canadian representative, in presenting the view of the Canadian Government, said that of the two resolutions of the Assembly which governed the powers and duties of the Korean Commission, the second in paragraph 4 indicated that the Commission could not operate in South Korea only. The Commission could not violate its terms of reference and the Interim Committee was not competent to change them. Therefore the Commission was not in a position to carry out its mandate in Korea. Although the Canadian Government strongly supported the objective of a free, united and democratic Korea and felt that the policy of the U.S.S.R. in preventing its realization was to be condemned, it nevertheless thought it unwise to ask the Commission to take further action.

On February 26, the Interim Committee by a vote of 31 in favour to 2 against (Canada and Australia) with eleven abstentions, adopted the United States resolution

The General Officer Commanding United States Army Forces in South Korea announced on March 1 that elections would be held in that zone on May 9, a date which was later changed to May 10. After deliberation, the Commission on March 12 by a vote of 4 to 2 with 2 abstentions decided to observe these elections provided that it was ascertained that they would be held in a free atmosphere wherein democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected. Canada and Australia, in conformity with the position they had taken in the Interim Committee, again voted in the negative.

The greater part of the necessary preparatory work relating to the observation of the elections was done by sub-committees and other subsidiary bodies created by the Commission. One sub-committee, on which the Canadian representative served, was charged with devising ways and means to ensure free conditions for the elections and approved a list of recommendations which was subsequently adopted by the Commission and passed to the United States authorities in South Korea. The United States Commanding General, after receiving these recommendations issued on April 5, a "Proclamation on the rights of the Korean People", concerning civil liberties in South Korea.

One of the recommendations of the Commission concerned the pardoning of political prisoners, and on April 8 the United States Commanding General informed the Commission that 3,140 pardons had been issued in ample time for the former prisoners to register as voters or as candidates in the elections.

Another Commission sub-committee examined documents received from Korean sources and secured statements from prominent Korean personalities whose views might be helpful to the Commission in its observation of the elections.

A third sub-committee, of which the Canadian representative was a member, examined the electoral laws and regulations in force in Korea, and prepared draft recommendations for the Commission, for transmission to the authorities. These recommendations were designed to promote as complete and as free an expression of popular will as possible in the elections and the Commission approved them with certain amendments. In a memorandum of March 24, the United States Liaison Officer to the Commission stated that the election regulations had been redrafted on the basis of these suggestions.

To observe the preparations for the elections in the field, the Commission during April divided itself into groups for inspection tours into the various provinces of South Korea. Detailed inquiries were made into the existence of a free atmosphere for elections and when unsatisfactory conditions were encountered the Military Governor was later informed.

As a result of its observations and studies the Commission on April 28 confirmed its decision of March 12 to observe the elections and stated that it had satisfied itself that there existed in South Korea a reasonably free atmosphere. During the debate the Canadian representative indicated his appreciation of the United States efforts to secure free conditions for the elections.

The elections were duly held on May 10 under Commission observation.

In the middle of May the main body of the Commission proceeded to Shanghai to prepare the first part of its report. It returned to Seoul on June 7 after the newly-elected Korean National Assembly had been convened there.

On June 25, the Commission unanimously recorded its opinion that the results of the ballot of May 10 were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in South Korea.

The Commission received formal notification on August 6 that the "Government of the Republic of Korea" had been formed. The letter containing this information requested Commission consultation "particularly with reference to paragraph 4 of Resolution II of November 14, 1947". Some members took the view that the Government could not be regarded as the Government envisaged in the General Assembly resolutions and that the Commission should not prejudice the position of the General Assembly by acceding to the request for consultation. The Commission, however, on August 14 voted, 4 to 2 with one abstention, to comply with the request.

Two days earlier the United States Government had announced its view that the new government "was entitled to be regarded as the Government of Korea envisaged by the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947", and the Chinese and Philippine Governments also accorded provisional recognition. Canada, like most other states, reserved any decision on recognition pending the submission to the General Assembly of the report of the Korean Commission.

On August 15 a special United States representative arrived in Korea to carry on negotiations with the government there concerning the transfer of authority to it from the United States Government. These negotiations had only begun, when the Commission left Korea to complete its report at Lake Success, designating its Main Committee to remain in Seoul to conduct consultations with the new government. It was understood that no serious consultation would be requested before the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris.

When the Temporary Commission on Korea presented its report to the third session of the General Assembly the problem was referred by the Assembly to the Political Committee for consideration and report.

Before the item was reached on the agenda it was proposed by the representative of Czechoslovakia that the Committee, at that time, should consider his draft resolution proposing that a delegation of the Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic should be invited to participate in the discussion on the question. (The Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic was established in North Korea as a result of elections held in North Korea on August 25, in which, it was alleged, the people of South Korea had also participated). The Czechoslovak proposal was rejected by the Committee. Subsequently, when the Committee took up the Korean question, the Czechoslovak draft resolution itself was rejected by 34 votes to 6 with 8 abstentions. In opposing the Czechoslovak resolution, the Canadian representative said that statements had been made in the resolution regarding elections in North Korea and the establishment of a so-called Peoples' Democratic Republic. In default of verification of these statements by the United Nations Temporary Commission, the Canadian representative believed that the Political Committee should not give the elections any support, or the persons supposed to have been chosen by them any endorsement such as would be secured by passing the Czechoslovak resolution. He stated, however, that, once the representatives of the Government elected in South Korea under United Nations supervision had been heard, certain persons from that part of Korea occupied by the U.S.S.R. army, which had refused to admit the United Nations Commission, might, if they were present, be given an opportunity to state to the Committee their views on the problem of Korean unification, and then withdraw.

By 39 votes to 6 with 1 abstention, the Committee adopted a Chinese draft resolution inviting the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Korea to participate in the debate without the right to vote. It was also agreed, without objection, to invite the Rapporteur of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to present its report.

The general debate on the question was held at the 231st to 235th meetings of the Committee during which a draft resolution was proposed by Australia, China and the United States, and a second draft resolution by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The draft resolution proposed by Australia, China and the United States approved the conclusions of the Report of the Temporary Commission; declared that a lawful Government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) had been established, having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult,and that this was the only such Government in Korea; recommended that the occupying Powers should withdraw their occupying forces from Korea as early as practicable; and, resolved that a Commission on Korea should be established to continue the work of the Temporary Commission and to carry out the provisions of the present resolution. The draft resolution of Australia, China and the United States was adopted by 41 to 6 with 2 abstentions.

The draft resolution proposed by the U.S.S.R., resolving that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea should be abolished, was rejected by 42 to 6 with 3 abstentions.

During the lengthy general debate in Committee the Canadian representative offered to forego the privilege of speaking and, in the interest of securing a decision on the question before the Committee adjourned its present session, proposed that the general debate should be closed. The proposal was adopted by 35 to 6 with 2 abstentions.

By a vote of 41 to 0 with 1 abstention, the Committee adopted a proposal by the representative of the United States of America that the Commission on Korea should consist of the same member states which composed the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. The representatives of the Byelo-Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia did not take part in the vote. The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in addition, stated that his Government would not take part in any activities of the Commission provided for in the draft resolution. The Canadian representative, while stating that Canada would not oppose, at that stage, the proposal regarding the composition of the Commission, suggested the desirability of a smaller Commission.

The General Assembly began discussion of Korea at midnight, December 11, and adjourned at 2 a.m. December 12 to meet at 3 p.m. December 12. At the latter session the Canadian representative presented a statement in which he said that the Canadian Government shared the confidence expressed by the Political Committee in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and in the validity of the process by which the Government of the Republic of Korea had been established. He stated Canada's preference for a smaller Commission. Recognition of the Ukraine's refusal to participate in the Commission would reduce the number to eight which would not be a convenient number. He indicated that Canada was prepared to withdraw from the Commission, thus reducing the number to seven. An amendment reducing the number of the Korean Commission to seven as proposed by the Canadian representative was carried 42 to 0 with 3 abstentions. The Soviet bloc did not participate in the voting. The resolution from the Political Committee with this amendment was then passed 48 to 6 with one abstention.

Excerpt from CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1949, Department of External Affairs, pages 73 - 75

In April 1949, the Canadian Representative in the Security Council supported the application of the Republic of Korea for admission to the United Nations. In setting forth the reasons for Canada's action the Canadian Representative stated: "The Republic of Korea has accepted the obligations of the Charter. We are satisfied that it is a peace-loving state able and willing to fulfil its obligations. We are, therefore, in full accord with the recommendations of the (Membership) Committee." Although this application was vetoed by the U.S.S.R., the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a Note dated July 14, informed the Korean Foreign Minister that Canada regarded its favourable vote in the Security Council as constituting full recognition by the Canadian Government of the Republic of Korea as an independent sovereign state with jurisdiction over that part of the Korean peninsula in which elections were held on May 10, 1948.

As the Commission's report to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly showed, most of the objectives assigned to the United Nations Commission on Korea were unattainable. The U.S.S.R. had maintained its refusal to have any dealings with the Commission, and efforts to make contact with the North Korean authorities had failed. The new Republic of Korea was being threatened by the increased incidence of insurgent uprisings and border clashes along the 38th parallel, dividing North from South Korea. Apart from its observation of the withdrawal of United States occupation forces in June 1949, the Commission thus had little to show for its year's work. In submitting its conclusions, the Commission refrained from recommending that its own mandate should be renewed, although it did record the request of the Republic of Korea that "the stay of the Commission in Korea be prolonged for another year". The final conclusion reflects the sense of the whole report in its admission that "the situation in Korea is now no better than it was at the beginning and that (the Commission) has not been able to facilitate the achievement of the objectives set by the General Assembly".

When the General Assembly considered this Report at its Fourth Session, the debates were marked by renewed expression of the long-standing differences between East and West on the Korean question. At the outset of the debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee a representative of the Republic of Korea was invited to participate without vote in the Committee's discussion. A counter-proposal by the U.S.S.R. to extend a similar privilege to a spokesman for the authorities of Northern Korea was decisively rejected by the Committee. A detailed statement followed from the representative of the Korean Government, who outlined the major developments in the Republic since its inauguration, and asked that the Commission be continued with the assistance of military observers to report on border violations along the 38th parallel.

The remainder of the debate centred on two diametrically opposed resolutions dealing with the future of the Korean Commission. A proposal by the U.S.S.R. condemned the past activities of the Commission and urged its abolition. A joint resolution submitted by the United States, Australia, China, and the Philippines, recommended that the Commission should continue in being with authority to appoint at its discretion observers to assist it in reporting on "developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea". The Soviet resolution received support only from the remaining five Communist delegations and was rejected by a heavy majority both in the Committee and in the full Assembly. The joint proposal, on the other hand, won wide support, and having been approved by the Committee, was adopted in the General Assembly by a vote of 48 in favour (including Canada), 6 against, and 3 abstentions.

Thus, although the Commission had been prevented from achieving its objectives, the great majority of the Assembly not only supported its continuation but endowed it with the increased authority to appoint observers. In supporting this decision, member states were undoubtedly prompted by a realization of the growing threat brought about by the border troubles along the frontier between North and South Korea. Furthermore, in a broader sense the Assembly's action would appear to represent an implied recognition of the stabilizing influence which United Nations commissions have exerted in such unsettled areas as the Balkans, Indonesia, and Kashmir.

Finally, the Assembly's decision may be interpreted as a recognition of the need for a stabilizing element in Korea which might, by its presence, exercise a restraining influence on the opposing factions and which could, in the event of an armed outbreak, keep the United Nations fully informed.

Excerpt from CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1950, Department of External Affairs, pages 2 - 10

Because of the unstable situation in the artificially divided peninsula, it had been realized that Korea constituted a potential threat to peace in the area. Nevertheless, the news of the North Korean attack on June 25 came as a profound shock. On the initiative of the United States Government, however, the Security Council was called into session on the same day. The United Nations Commission on Korea having provided authoritative confirmation that aggression had occurred, the Council adopted a resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. The Soviet Delegation, which had been boycotting the Council over the problem of Chinese representation, was not able to veto this resolution. The resolution also urged members to render every assistance to the United Nations, and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. Two days later, as the North Koreans still advanced, President Truman again took the lead and announced that he was ordering United States air and sea forces to give cover and support to the troops of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Later on the same day, June 27, the Security Council, noting that the North Koreans had ignored its previous resolution, approved a second resolution recommending that "members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security within the area". Naval and air support were promptly offered by member governments with units available in the vicinity, and by June 30 authorization had been given General MacArthur to employ ground forces under his command if the situation required. The fifty-three members of the United Nations which approved the Security Council's stand declared their willingness to comply, in accordance with their individual capacities, with the Council's recommendations. On July 7, the Security Council passed a third resolution recommending that all members providing military forces and other assistance should make them available to "a Unified Command under the United States", and authorizing the use of the United Nations flag in operations against the North Korean forces.

In Canada official and public opinion strongly supported the measures taken by the United Nations to meet the crisis. Government approval was recorded in the House of Commons on June 28 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs who stated that the decisions taken by the Security Council represented "collective action through the United Nations for peace". On June 30, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, told the House that "if a Canadian contribution..... under a United Nations Commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace.....then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution". This support soon assumed concrete form. On July 12, Canada made available three destroyers; on July 21 an air transport squadron; and on August 11, in co-operation with the Canadian Pacific Airlines, passenger transport facilities between Vancouver and Tokyo. On August 7, the Government authorized recruitment of a Canadian Army Special Force, which, subject to Parliamentary approval, would be available for service in Korea. To this end the Canadian Forces Act was passed by Parliament and became law on September 9. An advance unit was despatched in October, and by December 19 a battalion had arrived in Korea to complete its advance training.

Despite the ready response of member nations, and particularly of the United States, to the North Korean aggression, and while the Unified Command was building up its strength for the counter-attack, the superior forces of the North Koreans compelled a steady retreat throughout July and August to a beach-head around Pusan. Meanwhile, on August 1, the Soviet Representative returned to the Security Council to take his turn as President and, as expected, to block any further constructive action on Korea. In anticipation of the revival of the veto, the Council passed a last resolution on this question on July 31, dealing with the problem of civilian relief.

By mid-September the first phase of the Korean crisis had ended. The Security Council was inhibited from further action by the return of the U.S.S.R., which purported to view recent events in the inverted perspective of an unsuccessful attack by the Republic of Korea, backed by the United States and condoned by the illegal actions of an improperly constituted organ of the United Nations. Moreover, United Nations forces had gone over to the offensive and after the Inchon landing on September 15, were approaching the 38th parallel. Additional and urgent United Nations decisions, involving the unification and rehabilitation of Korea and, more immediately, the scope of further military operation were clearly required. Discussion of the Korean question was, therefore, transferred to the General Assembly which had, in any case, an item on its agenda entitled "Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea" dealing with the problem of the independence and unification of that country.

When the Fifth Session of the Assembly opened on September 19, the Korean question was given priority on the agenda. The Canadian attitude was outlined in a statement by Mr. Pearson on September 27, during the opening debate. This statement set forth five main principles which might govern the Assembly's decision on Korea:

- (1) "The general objective of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies - a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people itself governs without interference from outside."
- (2) "The United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout its territory as a firm foundation for democratic institutions and of free self government."
- (3) "The Korean people, once peace has been restored, must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage."
- (4) "Nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united free Korea which carries any menace to Korea's neighbours."
- (5) "The free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing those methods of government."

The main debate centred on two draft resolutions: an eight-power resolution sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines and the United Kingdom, and the second, a five-power resolution, sponsored by Byelo-Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R.

The eight-power resolution, presented by the United Kingdom, made the following recommendations:

- (1) that "all appropriate steps should be taken to ensure conditions of stability" throughout Korea;
- (2) that "all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a unified and democratic government";
- (3) That United Nations forces should only remain in any part of Korea so long as necessary for achieving these objectives;
- (4) that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish economic rehabilitation.

The resolution went on, in its operative part, to call for the establishment of a Commission to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

The Cominform bloc opposed the eight-power resolution on the grounds that it sanctioned United States "intervention" in the internal affairs of the Korean people, and tacitly permitted the military occupation of Korea "by imperialist powers". Their counter-resolution consequently recommended that the "belligerents" immediately cease hostilities and that the United States and other foreign troops in Korea be immediately withdrawn, and that a "parity" commission, elected at a joint meeting of the Assemblies of North and South Korea, organize and conduct elections for a national assembly of all Korea.

These resolutions reflected two irreconcilable approaches to the Korean issue. A somewhat different position was taken by the Indian Representative. While agreeing fundamentally with the objectives and assumption of the eight-power resolution, he nevertheless questioned the wisdom of adopting, at that stage, those provisions which gave a tacit authority for the continuation of United Nations military operations north of the 38th parallel, and pointed out that these paragraphs of the resolution might serve merely to increase the tension already existing in that part of the world. However, he did not submit any specific resolution embodying his views. Instead, with the strong support of Israel and Yugoslavia, he proposed the appointment of a sub-committee to formulate a compromise resolution which might command the largest measure of agreement. Many delegations, while sympathetic to the intention behind the Indian proposal, nevertheless came reluctantly to the conclusion that it was unlikely to produce concrete results. As Mr. Pearson pointed out, the Soviet Delegate had already stated that he saw no possible compromise. Moreover, the need for further United Nations guidance was a matter of urgency and a sub-committee might well result in prolonged delay. When brought to a vote the Indian proposal was defeated by 32 to 24, with 3 abstentions. The Assembly was thus faced with a choice between the only substantive resolutions which had been proposed, and there was no doubt where the will of the majority lay. In the final vote on October 7 the General Assembly adopted the eight-power resolution by 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions, including India.

In implementation of this resolution, the new United Nations Commission was immediately appointed, the members being Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. Pending its arrival in Korea an Interim Committee composed of representatives of the same nations was established at Lake Success to consult and advise the Unified Command. In view of the difficulties which were anticipated in connection with the re-establishment of civil administration in North Korea before the holding of elections, the first act of the Interim Committee was to approve a resolution advising the Unified Command to assume provisional responsibility for the government and administration of areas north of the 38th parallel which might come under occupation by the United Nations forces, pending further consideration of the problem by UNCURK. The Economic and Social Council was also preparing the way for a comprehensive programme of economic rehabilitation.

Unfortunately, just as the United Nations was beginning to formulate plans for a unified and democratic Korea in accordance with the new resolution, the situation in Korea itself underwent a drastic change and the Korean crisis entered its third phase, that of Chinese Communist intervention.

Early in October, while the debate at Lake Success was still proceeding, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, had publicly warned that his country would not "stand aside" if United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel. This warning had contributed to the apprehension of a number of delegations lest the continuation of United Nations military operations into North Korean territory might result in an extension of the conflict. On the other hand, while a halt short of the 38th parallel might have been held to be consonant with the immediate objective of stopping the aggression, it would have left unsolved the long-range problem of unification, unless the North Koreans themselves agreed to accept a United Nations settlement for the entire country; and it would have permitted the North Korean forces to regroup once more behind their previous border, remaining as a constant threat to the stability of the area. Within a month after the difficult decision was made, however, it became apparent that the warning from Peking had not been an empty threat. Substantial numbers of Chinese Communist "volunteers" appeared on the Korean side of the Yalu River, throwing back advance units of the United Nations forces. On November 6, the United Nations received official notice of Chinese Communist intervention in a special report from General MacArthur.

The gravity of this new development was recognized by all. It was, however, by no means clear what motives had inspired this intervention, which not only endangered the possibility of any peaceful settlement for Korea, but was also starting a chain of events which might lead to a third world war. If it were motivated by fear of alien forces along the Manchurian border, or by a desire to protect specific Chinese interests in the frontier area, some solution might be found. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Communist action were part of a broader plan, or were designed to throw United Nations forces entirely out of Korea, the United Nations would be faced with a new crisis incomparably more serious than that created by the initial attack on June 25.

Since the question of Chinese Communist motivation was obviously of primary importance, the first action taken by the Security Council on November 8, immediately following receipt of General MacArthur's special report, was to adopt a resolution inviting a representative of the

Chinese Communist Government to be present during the discussion of this question in the Council. It was also hoped that assurances regarding legitimate Chinese interests might ease the tension, and on November 10, a six-power resolution was presented to the Security Council calling on the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea, affirming at the same time that legitimate Chinese interests would be protected, and requesting UNCURK to assist in the settlement of any problems arising along the Chinese-Korean frontier. The Interim Committee on Korea had three days before unanimously resolved to give what assistance it could in this regard, and by the beginning of December the United Nations Commission had begun to consider the problems which it had been assigned.

On November 11, the Chinese Communist Government declined the Security Council's invitation to send representatives to discuss their intervention in Korea, and proposed instead a combined debate on Formosa and Korea. It had, however, announced that it would accept the Security Council's previous invitation of September 29 to the Chinese Communists to be represented during discussion of their own earlier complaint against United States "aggression" in Formosa. The delegation was to be headed by Mr. Wu Hsiu-chuan. It was hoped that the presence of representatives from Peking might at least open the way to private discussions of Korean issues and assist in clarifying the motives behind the Chinese intervention. The delegation arrived in New York on November 24, the day General MacArthur launched the offensive which he hoped would "end the war" and "restore peace and unity in Korea".

By the time Mr. Wu appeared at the Security Council on November 28, Chinese Communist and North Korean forces had already broken through the United Nations front, which had been pushed close to the Korean-Manchurian border. The United Nations had received General MacArthur's communique "that an entirely new war faced United Nations forces". It was therefore in serious terms that the United States delegate, Mr. Austin, addressed the Security Council. "It now appears doubtful", Mr. Austin said, "that war in Korea can be quickly concluded. It also appears clear beyond any doubt that what all the free world hoped was an intervention for limited purpose is, in fact, aggression - open and notorious. I use the word "aggression" here in this Council and before the world by direction of my government. The consequences of these facts must be faced squarely by the people of the world, and more particularly by this Council". Mr. Austin then asked the Chinese Communist delegate a score of questions concerning Peking's intervention in Korea.

In reply Mr. Wu pointed out that he had come to discuss the question of United States aggression against Formosa and not the special report of the Unified Command. After presenting the Chinese Communist case in uncompromising fashion and accusing the United States of aggression in Korea, he concluded with the proposal that the Security Council adopt measures calling for the withdrawal of United States forces from both Formosa and Korea.

On November 30, the six-power resolution calling on the Chinese Communists to withdraw their troops from Korea was voted on in the Security Council, and, as expected, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Nine votes were cast in favour, but India did not participate in the vote. The sponsors of the six-power resolution then submitted the question of Communist Chinese intervention to the General Assembly, which assigned it to its Political Committee. Another six-power resolution, almost identical with that vetoed in the Security Council, was at the same time placed on the agenda.

While these preparations were going forward to have the question of Chinese Communist intervention debated in the Political Committee, Mr. Pearson made the following statement from Lake Success on December 5. "In this dangerous situation it remains our view that, if and when the military position is stabilized, we should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Communists by every means possible. I am aware of the difficulties, I assure you, but I believe that nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. If, for example, providing the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations - possibly covering more subjects than Korea - in which the Chinese Communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement".

One week later, a group of Asian and Middle Eastern countries submitted two resolutions to the Political Committee proposing a course of action along the lines suggested by Mr. Pearson. The first, known as the thirteen-power resolution, recommended that a special group of three, including the President of the Assembly, Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, be established to "determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire could be arranged". The second, sponsored by twelve powers (the Philippines did not join in the sponsorship), recommended the appointment of a committee to draft plans for a "peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations". The Political Committee agreed to give priority to the cease-fire resolution, which was approved on December 14, by a vote of 52 to 5 (Cominform bloc) with one abstention (China). Mr. Pearson and Sir Benegal Rau of India were named as the two other members of the Cease-Fire Group.

The initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reaction to the cease-fire proposal offered little hope for its success. Both Mr. Malik and Mr. Wu made it clear that the proposal was not acceptable, demanding instead the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea in accordance with a Soviet draft resolution of December 9. This resolution had not specified whether "foreign troops" included the Chinese Communists. The impression left by Mr. Malik's remarks was that they did not, although he implied that the removal of United Nations forces would make it easier to arrange for the departure of Chinese "volunteers". At his press conference on December 16, Mr. Wu flatly rejected the cease-fire proposal as a trap to permit the building up of United States strength in Korea. He also stipulated the withdrawal of United States protection from Formosa and the seating of Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations as conditions precedent to any negotiated settlement in Korea.

Despite these discouragements, the Cease-Fire Group proceeded with its task. As a first step, it consulted representatives of the Unified Command regarding a reasonable basis for future discussion. From this there emerged, among other proposals, suggestions for the establishment of a demilitarized area approximately twenty miles deep above the 38th parallel and for the supervision of the cease-fire by a United Nations Commission. On December 16, the Group sent Mr. Wu a message, repeated by cable to Peking, offering to discuss cease-fire arrangements with the Chinese Communist Government or its representatives in New York or any other "mutually convenient" place. On the same day, Mr. Entezam transmitted to Peking through the Swedish Government a request that the Chinese Communist delegation be instructed to remain in New York for discussions with the Cease-Fire Group. Finally on December 19, the Group assured the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister that it was the clear understanding of the

Group and of the sponsors of the twelve-power resolution still before the Political Committee, that "once a cease-fire arrangement had been achieved, the negotiations visualized in the second resolution" for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in the Far East "should be proceeded with at once", and that the Chinese Communist Government "should be included in the Negotiating Committee referred to in that resolution".

The Chinese Communist response was, however, negative. Mr. Wu was instructed to leave New York, and the Chinese Communist Government notified Mr. Entezam that it regarded "as illegal, and null and void" all major resolutions, especially those on Asia, which had been adopted in the United Nations without the participation of the Chinese Communist Delegation. Finally, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Government, refusing to recognize the Group, sent Mr. Entezam as President of the Assembly the text of a public statement he had made on December 22, attacking the "so-called proposal for a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards", and reiterating the conditions for negotiating a possible settlement which had previously been laid down by Mr. Wu.

As the year ended, the Cease-Fire Group was preparing to submit to the Political Committee of the General Assembly a report on its efforts to bring the fighting in Korea to an end. At the same time, the Communist forces resumed in strength their offensive south of the 38th parallel.

Excerpt from CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1951-1952,
pages 1 - 7

On January 3, 1951, the Cease-Fire Group reported failure but, at the request of the Political Committee of the General Assembly, prepared a statement of principles on which a cease-fire in Korea could be based. This statement of principles was approved by the Political Committee on January 13 in the following terms:

The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the programme outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a free and united Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.

1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property, and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.
2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.
3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign State with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.
4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.
5. As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations.

This statement of principles was transmitted to the Central People's Government of China which was asked whether the principles would be acceptable "as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems". On January 17 the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government replied in terms which some states interpreted as an outright rejection and which others interpreted as a partial

acceptance or counter-proposal. The United States particularly took the view that the reply of the Central People's Government could not be accepted as a basis for continued negotiation and on January 20 introduced a resolution naming the Central People's Government of China as an aggressor in Korea, requesting consideration of additional measures to meet the aggression and providing for the appointment of a Good Offices Committee.

Meanwhile steps were taken to try to clarify the meaning of the Central People's Government's reply of January 17. On the basis of this clarification, 12 Asian and Arab countries, including India, presented a resolution of January 25 recommending "that representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt and India, and of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, meet as soon as possible for the purpose of securing all necessary elucidations and amplifications of the above mentioned reply and of making any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems".

The Political Committee of the General Assembly rejected the Asian-Arab resolution of January 30 (Canada abstaining) and adopted the United States resolution with amendments accepted during the course of the debate. Canada reluctantly voted in favour of this resolution for reasons which the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated before the Political Committee on January 26:

We think the putting of such a resolution at this stage and in this form when the possibilities of negotiation with the People's Government of China are not in our opinion completely exhausted to be premature and unwise . . .

The main purport of this resolution as we understand it and certainly as the public in our own country will understand it, is to condemn the Chinese People's Government for the assistance they have given the aggressor in Korea. We think that there is no shadow of doubt about this continuing participation in aggression and we believe that the action of the Chinese People's Government in this matter has been morally wrong, and that the United Nations cannot ignore such a defiance of the principles upon which it is founded.

The resolution as passed on February 1, 1951, included the following paragraph:

The General Assembly . . .
Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea.

Canada was represented on the Additional Measures Committee set up by this resolution but not on the Good Offices Committee.

The Good Offices Committee was not able to make any progress or to secure recognition by the Central People's Government of China. During the debate on Chinese aggression at the beginning of the year the communist forces launched a heavy ground attack which was halted during January. In April and May another heavy communist offensive was launched. This, combined with the failure of the enemy to agree to negotiate with the Good Offices Committee, led the Additional Measures Committee to approve on May 11 a resolution calling for an embargo on shipments of arms and strategic materials to China and North Korea. This resolution was approved by the General Assembly on May 18. It is worth noting that Canada, like many other members of the United Nations, had already put into effect regulations of its own which were similar in purpose to the restrictions called for by the resolution of May 18. For this reason, and because its regulations were, if anything, more severe than those required by the resolution, Canada felt able to vote for the resolution.

On April 11 General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Douglas MacArthur as the Commander of the United Nations Command. The dismissal of General MacArthur precipitated a political controversy in the United States which resulted in hearings before a committee of the Senate during which the following exchange took place:

Senator Smith: You think that if we stopped them at the Thirty-eight and pushed them back to where they began, and if we restored peace and security in South Korea, that is all we are expected to do in order to assert the prestige of the United Nations?

Mr. Acheson: That is the military objective of the United Nations, as laid down by the United Nations itself. There is also the political objective of the United Nations, which is creating a free, independent, and democratic Korea, and the United Nations will continue to do that, and I hope it will be able to do that.

Mr. Acheson's remarks were evidently interpreted by the communists as meaning that a negotiated truce along the 38th parallel would be acceptable to the United Nations as the fulfilment of their military obligations in Korea.

On June 23 the Soviet Representative to the United Nations in New York made a radio address at the end of which he suggested that discussions be started "between the belligerents for a ceasefire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel". After clarifying Mr. Malik's remarks in Moscow, the United States announced that General Ridgway had been authorized to seek to negotiate a cease-fire with the enemy commander in Korea and, following an exchange of messages between General Ridgway and enemy headquarters, official representatives of the opposing commanders met for the first time on July 10, 1951.

Negotiations proceeded slowly. On July 26 an agenda for the discussions was agreed upon in the following terms:

- (1) Adoption of agenda;
- (2) Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides, so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea;
- (3) Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising

organization for carrying out the terms of the cease-fire and armistice;

- (4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war;
- (5) Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

The negotiators then approached the first substantive question - the question of where the truce-line should be drawn. By this time the United Nations forces, in attacking the communists to recover ground lost during the two enemy offensives mentioned earlier, had reached a line which was just south of the 38th parallel on the west and north of it on the east. The enemy were reluctant to accept this actual battle line as the military demarcation line and the United Nations negotiators were unwilling to give up their militarily defensible line (which was in the general area of the 38th parallel) for a purely arbitrary and artificial line which had proved impossible to defend in 1950. It was therefore not until November 27 and after the communists had suspended negotiations from August 23 to October 24, that agreement was reached on the military demarcation line in the following terms:

1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed Armistice Agreement both sides will withdraw two kilometers from the line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.
2. If the Military Armistice Agreement is signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, determined by the sub-delegations on the basis of the above stated principle and in accordance with the present line of contact as indicated in the attached map and explanatory notes, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.
3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the Armistice Agreement, if the Military Armistice Agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in paragraph two above, the sub-delegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the Military Armistice Agreement, the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the Military Armistice Agreement and will constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice.

The two delegations proceeded immediately to a discussion of Item 3 of their agenda, concerning arrangements for carrying out the terms of the armistice. A difference of view at once developed over the question of supervision, as the communist negotiators were unwilling to accept any thorough supervision of activities behind the demilitarized zone, while the United Nations negotiators were anxious that supervision should be as thorough as possible. The communists were unwilling to allow a supervisory commission made up of representatives of neutral states to roam at will behind the lines on both sides looking for clandestine military activity, or to permit the commission to fly over territory behind the lines to check on activities which could be seen from the air. The communists later, after accepting the principle of a commission of neutrals, nominated the Soviet Union as one of the three states to be named by the communist side. The nomination of so biased a state for a neutral commission obviously could not be accepted by the negotiators for the United Nations Command.

In order to speed up the negotiations, discussion was opened on Item 4 (prisoners of war) on December 11 before discussion of Item 3 was concluded. Negotiations on this item too were deadlocked when it became apparent that the United Nations negotiators would not accept an obligation to compel communist prisoners in their hands to accept repatriation, while the communist negotiators refused to agree that prisoners were free to refuse to return to their own countries if they so wished. The problem of prisoners who might prefer not to be returned to their own side for political reasons was a very difficult one. Current international custom is designed to protect the rights of prisoners of war against their captors, but there is no long-standing custom which covers the case of prisoners who want, for political reasons, protection against the states from whose armies they were captured. To carry out the humanitarian intent of international practice, therefore, the negotiators for the United Nations Command took the stand that any prisoner, who so feared repatriation for political reasons that he was ready to resist repatriation by force, should not be repatriated. For this, precedents existed, among which were the offers made by the Russians to German armies which were besieged in Stalingrad and Budapest during the Second World War.

Again with the object of hastening the discussion, conversations began on Item 5 on February 6 while Items 3 and 4 were deadlocked. This item was relatively easily settled and the two armistice teams agreed on the following wording on February 16:

In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

In accepting this wording, the United Nations negotiators made it plain that "foreign forces" meant "non-Korean forces" and that the word "etc." was not to be construed to relate to matters outside of Korea.

Meanwhile, the sixth session of the General Assembly which had met in Paris decided to defer consideration of its two items on Korea in view of the continuation of the armistice negotiations in Korea. On January 3, the Soviet Delegate attempted to secure approval for a resolution which would have required the Security Council to hold one of the periodic meetings provided for in the Charter and "to examine at the periodic meeting in the first place the measures which the Security Council should take to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations taking place in Korea for the cessation of hostilities". This was voted down as being likely to interfere with the negotiations rather than to bring them to a successful conclusion, because it would have involved the infusion of political questions into what had hitherto been a purely military negotiation. This could only have resulted in a delay in achieving an armistice. The procedural resolution deferring consideration of the two agenda items on Korea - "The Problem of the Independence of Korea" and "Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea" - was adopted by the Assembly on February 5, 1952 by a vote of 51 in favour (including Canada), 5 against (the Soviet bloc) and 2 abstentions (Chile and Yemen).

Excerpt from CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1952-1953, pages

1 - 7:

The cease-fire negotiations had by the summer of 1952 resulted in the drawing up of a draft armistice agreement complete except for the provisions relating to the disposition of prisoners of war. On this issue there was deadlock. The United Nations negotiators held fast to the basic position that they would not accept an obligation to force North Korean and Chinese prisoners in their hands to accept repatriation against their will, while the communist negotiators would not agree that prisoners were free to refuse to return to their own countries if they so wished. Finally, on September 28, General Harrison, on behalf of the United Nations Command (UNC), offered three new alternative proposals each of which, although designed to break the deadlock on the question, preserved the principle that there should be no forcible repatriation. The first was that all prisoners from both sides would be delivered to a demilitarized zone and there given the choice of ^{either} going home or returning to the side on which they were detained. The second and third alternatives both provided that all prisoners willing to go home would be exchanged at once, the remainder would be taken in small groups to the demilitarized zone and there freed from military control. Under the second alternative they would then be interviewed by neutral representatives agreed upon by both sides and thereafter be free to go to the side of their choice. Under the third alternative they would be permitted to go to the side of their choice without interviewing or screening. Any one of these procedures could, if desired, be supervised by the International Red Cross, by joint Red Cross teams, or by military observers from both sides.

On October 8, 1952, the communist negotiators rejected these proposals and introduced counter-proposals which reflected no change in their position that, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949 as they interpreted it, all prisoners of war should be repatriated and that no prisoner might renounce his right to be repatriated. Thereupon General Harrison informed them that the United Nations Command did not wish any further meetings until they were ready to

accept the UNC proposals, or until they made in writing constructive proposals of their own. Thus the armistice negotiations were in recess when the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly convened on October 14.

Very early in the session it was agreed that the Korean question should be given priority in discussion. On October 23 debate on the problem began in the First Political Committee of the Assembly, which in spite of Soviet objections invited the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to send a representative who would participate as an observer in the Committee's consideration of the question. The Committee also rejected a Soviet proposal that the North Korean regime be invited to send an observer. Canada voted with the majority in both cases.

Four resolutions came before the Committee for consideration. The first, co-sponsored by twenty-one delegations, including the Canadian, commended the efforts already made by the negotiators and called upon the Peking and North Korean authorities to agree to an armistice which would recognize the right of all prisoners of war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and would avoid the use of force in their repatriation. Two resolutions submitted respectively by the Mexican and Peruvian Delegations, which dealt with special aspects of the issue, were also based on the principle of voluntary repatriation. The Soviet Delegation, after rejecting the twenty-one power resolution on the grounds that it would lead to an extension of the war, and that "no forcible repatriation" amounted to "forcible detention", introduced a resolution providing for the establishment of a commission "for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question". As finally revised, it called for an immediate cease-fire and referred "the question of the complete repatriation of prisoners of war" to the proposed commission, to be composed of eleven states, four of them communist. Decisions in the Commission were to be by a two-thirds majority; thus the communist group would have been able to block any action if it so wished.

It became apparent during debate that none of these four resolutions was likely to receive a large majority, and on November 19 Mr. Krishna Menon of the Indian Delegation introduced a new resolution, explaining that its object was to bridge the two conflicting points of view which had appeared in the course of discussion. Thus it proposed that the repatriation of prisoners should be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and that force should not be used either to prevent or to carry out the return of prisoners to their homelands.

This resolution, which the Canadian Delegation supported from the beginning, was clarified by amendment during a long debate and attracted growing support. The Soviet Representative, however, declared it unacceptable and later tabled amendments which would have made it virtually the same as the Soviet proposal. The Committee rejected these amendments, adopted the Indian resolution as otherwise amended and rejected the Soviet resolution. The other resolutions submitted by non-communist states were not formally withdrawn, but consideration of them was suspended by agreement. On December 3, 1952 the Assembly adopted the Indian resolution, as further clarified by the sponsor, by a vote of 54 in favour (including Canada) 5 against (the Soviet bloc) and one abstention (Nationalist China), rejecting the Soviet amendment and the Soviet

resolution which had both been re-introduced, the latter by a vote of 40 against (including Canada), 5 in favour (the Soviet bloc), and 11 abstentions, four delegations being absent.

The text of the resolution adopted by the Assembly appears as Appendix III. It provided that after both sides had agreed to repatriation based on the principles of the resolution, a Repatriation Commission should be set up to which all prisoners of war would be released. The Commission would arrange for their repatriation in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The question of the disposition of those who did not wish to return home was to be referred to the political conference which the draft armistice agreement drawn up by the negotiators at Panmunjom recommended should be called, and if after 30 days the conference was unable to agree, the responsibility for the care, maintenance and final disposition of the remaining prisoners was to be transferred to the United Nations.

When transmitting the text of this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime, the President of the General Assembly in his covering message emphasized the wide agreement reached by the General Assembly and appealed to both Ministers to accept these proposals of the United Nations as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement which would serve to bring about a constructive and durable peace in Korea. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Peking Government, Chou En-lai, and later the Foreign Minister of North Korea, rejected the resolution as a basis for negotiations. Both replies called for the realization of a complete armistice as the first step and asked that the question of the "total repatriation of prisoners of war" be then referred to the commission proposed in the Soviet resolution which had been rejected.

The Assembly's consideration of the prisoner of war problem at the pre-Christmas part of its session thus did not bring about an immediate settlement of the principal question which was blocking the conclusion of an armistice in Korea. It did, however, afford an impressive demonstration of the solidarity of the non-communist members of the United Nations on the issue and played its part in the later developments in the armistice negotiations.

One further question relating to Korea was discussed by the Assembly before Christmas. Riots had occurred on December 14 among prisoners in United Nations hands on the Island of Pongam and in their suppression prisoners had been killed. On December 21, one day before the intended adjournment, the Soviet Delegation claimed that this incident amounted to "the mass murder of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war" and asked for an urgent meeting to discuss it. The request having been granted, the Soviet Delegate introduced a resolution which condemned the "inhuman butchery" committed by the United States military authorities. The Assembly rejected this resolution by a vote of 45 to 5 (the Soviet bloc) with 10 abstentions (African and Asian states).

Discussion of the Korean problem at the resumed session which began on February 24, 1953, at first led to no progress. The large majority of the Assembly continued to support the proposals contained in the Indian resolution. The

Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation expressed the hope that if the Soviet Representative had anything to propose that was not contrary to the principles of the Assembly resolution, he would do so, but the only response was a reiteration of the Soviet proposal which had been rejected before Christmas. Debate was resumed later with more encouraging results, but in the meantime the centre of interest shifted to Korea.

The Geneva Convention of 1949 provides that, independent of any question of general exchange, prisoners of war who have been wounded or are seriously sick may be exchanged even during the continuance of hostilities. The United Nations negotiators had repeatedly proposed at the armistice talks that action be taken to implement the humanitarian clauses of the Convention, but the communist representatives had not favoured the suggestion. On February 22, 1953, General Mark Clark, the United Nations Commander, informed the Chinese and North Korean Commanders by letter that his Command remained ready "immediately to repatriate those seriously sick and seriously wounded captured personnel who are fit to travel in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention". Article 109 provided inter alia that no sick or injured prisoner of war eligible for repatriation might be repatriated against his will during hostilities.

On March 28, 1953, the Communist Commanders informed General Clark that they agreed with his proposals and suggested that, since the settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides should be made to lead to the settlement of the entire problem of prisoners of war, the armistice negotiations ought to be resumed immediately. General Clark replied that the United Nations Command would be willing to proceed at once with arrangements for the repatriation of the sick and wounded and that, if agreement were reached on this matter, would also be prepared to take up, as the second order of business, the question of resuming full armistice discussions.

On March 30, Chou En-lai made an important statement on the prisoner of war question the heart of which was his proposal "that both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation". His statement also provided that while prisoners were in the custody of the neutral state, representatives of the countries of their origin should be given the opportunity to make "explanations" to them. The President of the Assembly, when he distributed this statement to representatives of member governments, expressed his hope that it might provide a basis for peace in Korea.

The agreement for the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners was signed at Panmunjom on April 11 and the exchange of these prisoners took place between April 20 and May 3. On April 16, the United Nations Command agreed to resume full armistice negotiations.

In New York a new development occurred at the General Assembly. A resolution was introduced by Brazil on April 14 expressing the hope that further negotiations in Panmunjom "will result in achieving an early armistice in Korea consistent with United Nations principles and objectives" and requesting "the President of the General Assembly to re-

convene the present Session to resume consideration of the Korean question (a) upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the signing of an armistice agreement in Korea; or (b) when, in the view of a majority of Members, other developments in Korea require consideration of this question." The states of the Soviet bloc voted in favour of this resolution both in the Committee and in plenary session, and it was accordingly adopted unanimously - the first time for many years that this has happened on a major political issue at the United Nations. Five days later the Assembly recessed.

The resumed armistice negotiations at Panmunjom continued with new hope of success. Two main points of disagreement emerged - the question of what country should be the "neutral state" referred to in Chou En-Lai's proposal, and the procedure to be followed in disposing of those prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. After over a month of negotiation the United Nations Command on May 25 presented further proposals. These proposals, which the Canadian Government fully supported as a basis for negotiations, led, after further consideration, to the initialling of an agreement on the repatriation of prisoners by the two sides at a meeting on June 7 (June 8 Korean time).

In essence the agreement reached on June 7 closely followed the main provisions of the General Assembly's resolution of December 3, 1952. Within two months after the armistice agreement became effective both sides would hand over in groups all those prisoners in their custody, who insisted on repatriation, to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Both sides also agreed to hand over within 60 days of an armistice those prisoners who had not exercised their right of repatriation, to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and India were to be asked to serve on this Commission (and later agreed to do so). India would be chairman of the Commission with casting vote and, as its executive agent, would provide "exclusively" the armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Commission to carry out its duties. While in the custody of the Commission any prisoner might apply for repatriation and have his request granted. Ninety days after the prisoners had been transferred to the Commission, the question of the disposition of those who had not been repatriated would be submitted to the political conference provided for in the draft armistice agreement which would endeavour to settle the question within 30 days, during which time the Commission would continue to retain custody of such prisoners. Those who after 90 days had not elected repatriation and for whom, after a further 30 days, no other disposition had been agreed upon by the political conference, would be released by the Commission "from prisoner of war status to civilian status". After release, according to the application of each individual, those who elected to go to neutral nations would be assisted by the Commission and by the Red Cross Society of India. This operation was to be completed within 30 days and the Commission then dissolved. After such dissolution, whenever and wherever any of these civilians who had been released from their prisoner of war status desired to be returned to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they then were would be responsible for assisting them. The understanding regarding prisoners of war which was thus reached, was duly incorporated in the existing draft armistice agreement.

While the negotiators at Panmunjom were reaching agreement on the prisoner of war problem the government of the Republic of Korea expressed with increasing violence its opposition to the conclusion of an armistice which would leave the peninsula still divided. In a statement released in Washington on June 5, President Syngman Rhee termed unacceptable the United Nations Command proposals of May 25 which later became the basis for the agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war. In spite of a letter to him from President Eisenhower stating that the acceptance of an armistice was required of the United Nations and of Korea, President Rhee did not retreat from his position and indeed supplemented his words with action when he connived at the release by South Korean army guards, between midnight and dawn June 18, of approximately 25,000 North Korean prisoners who had refused to be repatriated. He did this on his own responsibility even though the armed forces of his Government had on July 15, 1950, been placed by his voluntary act under the "command authority" of the United Nations Commander, and even though he had given General Clark assurances that he would take no unilateral action relating to an armistice without consultation.

The United Nations negotiators immediately informed the other side of what had occurred. At the meeting of June 20, the communist negotiators delivered a letter of protest. This letter posed three questions. Was the United Nations able to control the South Korean Government and army? If not, did the armistice in Korea include the Government of South Korea? If that Government were not included, what assurance was there for implementation of the provisions of the armistice by South Korea? The letter stated that the United Nations Command must be responsible for the immediate recovery of the escaped prisoners and must give assurances that similar incidents would not occur in future.

On June 23, the President of the General Assembly cabled President Rhee expressing his shock at the latter's unilateral action, which had violated both the repatriation agreement and President Rhee's undertaking to place the Korean armed forces under the "command authority" of the UNC. The President of the Assembly pointed out the gravity of the situation and expressed his hope that President Rhee would cooperate with the United Nations Command "in its continuing determined efforts to obtain an early and honourable armistice."

General Clark replied on June 29 to the communist negotiators, pointing out that the proposed armistice was a military agreement between the military commanders, and that the UNC did not exercise authority over the Republic of Korea, though it did command the Korean army. He assured them that the UNC would make every effort to secure the co-operation of the Government of Korea and would continue its attempts to recover the escaped prisoners of war, though it would be unrealistic to imply that any large number could be recaptured.

Meanwhile, Walter S. Robertson, United States Assistant Secretary of State, was conferring with President Rhee as the personal representative of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles in the hope of persuading him to adopt a more favourable attitude towards the armistice proposals. As a result of the meetings the UNC was able to inform the communists that the Government of Korea had given the necessary assurances not to obstruct the implementation of the armistice agreement. On July 19 at Panmunjom the communists

accepted these assurances. The commanders then agreed to the designation of areas in the proposed demilitarized zone where prisoners not directly repatriated would be turned over to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27 (Korean time) and the cease-fire took effect 12 hours later.

Under the Agreement, a military demarcation line was fixed from which both sides would withdraw two kilometers to prevent the occurrence of incidents. It generally followed the line of battle and was near the 38th parallel. Neither side might reinforce its establishment in Korea, but provision was made for the maintenance of existing manpower and matériel.

The Agreement established a Military Armistice Commission of five senior officers from each side and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission composed of two senior officers appointed by Sweden and Switzerland and two by Poland and Czechoslovakia. "Neutral nations" were defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. The Military Armistice Commission, which was to be assisted by ten Joint Observer Teams, had the general mission of supervising the implementation of the Agreement and negotiating settlement of any violations. The functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (which was provided with twenty Neutral Nations inspection teams under its sole control) included inspection and supervision of the permitted replacements of men and matériel and the investigation at the request of the Military Armistice Commission of reported truce violations outside the demilitarized zone.

Machinery was established to co-ordinate the plans for repatriating prisoners of war, Joint Red Cross teams were provided for to oversee the welfare of prisoners, and displaced civilians who wished to return to their pre-war homes across the demarcation line were to be assisted to do so.

Finally the commanders agreed to recommend to the governments concerned on both sides "that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."

The President of the General Assembly, in a statement delivered when the armistice was signed, termed it the first step toward a peaceful settlement in Korea. He said the next step was "to call the United Nations General Assembly back into session to prepare the way for calling the political conference recommended in the armistice terms" and announced that the Assembly would reconvene in New York on August 17.

Excerpt from a Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs
in the House of Commons, January 29, 1954. House of Commons
Debates, pages 1588 - 1590:

I should now like to move across the world to the Far East and to say a few words about developments in Korea. Since I last spoke in the house on this subject an armistice agreement has been signed there which ended on acceptable terms more than three years of fighting by the United Nations in resisting the unprovoked aggression launched against the Republic of Korea. With that aggression repelled, the military purpose of this great collective resort to armed force has been accomplished but, of course, only at a cost to our own forces, and great cost to those of the United States and those of Korea which bore the brunt of the struggle. We remember that cost as we talk about Korea today.

This armistice marked the end of the first step toward a peaceful settlement in Korea. The next step has been to try to convert that armistice into a peace settlement through the convening of a conference. The United Nations Assembly, last summer and last autumn, long and carefully, considered how that conference could be brought about. As a result, as most hon. members know, when the General Assembly last summer closed at the end of August it had, by formal resolution, made provision for the United Nations side of the Korean political conference. These decisions did not meet in full our own wishes but they were those of the United Nations and we accepted them and respected them as much. Moreover, we thought that those decisions, even though they were not perfect from our point of view, were good enough to provide a basis for a Korean political conference if the other side wanted such a conference.

Then, as hon. members will recall, last autumn discussions began at Panmunjom with the Communist side in an effort to work out the details for this conference. Those discussions are theoretically still going on, although they have been suspended for the time being. As these discussions were taking place in December last they removed some of the pressure at the Assembly, which was meeting then from continuing its deliberation into January. As hon. members will recall, at that time a resolution was passed making provision for recall of the Assembly if a majority of the members so desired if the President of the Assembly, Madame Pandit, --who has been acting in that position with such skill and distinction--should decide that the time had come or should be asked by any member to recall the Assembly. Such a request has now been made by the Government of India. Our reply to that request has just been sent today to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the President. This reply was made after a great deal of consideration and exchange of views between ourselves and the Indian Government, the British Government, the United States Government and other governments. Possibly I might put this reply on the record, Mr. Speaker. It is as follows:

Please inform the Secretary-General as soon as possible that the Canadian Government has given very sympathetic consideration to the request of the President of the General Assembly that the present session be reconvened on February 9. The Canadian Government appreciates the desire of the Government of India to report to the United Nations General Assembly on the discharge of its responsibilities as chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in respect of the prisoners-of-war placed in its custody under the provisions of sub-paragraph 51 (b) of the Korean armistice agreement, but considers that in present circumstances it would be inadvisable to reconvene the General Assembly for discussion of the general

Korean question of which the Assembly is seized. In the view of the Canadian Government a session on this subject--

That is on the general Korea question.

--might more usefully be reconvened at a later date in March or April.

We took that position because of developments in Panmunjom where steps are now being taken to bring about a resumption of the talks, and we hope that these steps will be successful within the next few days; because of developments in Berlin where Far Eastern questions have been put on the agenda; and because we came to the conclusion, after the inquiries we made, that it would not be possible, if the session opened on February 9, to restrict its deliberations merely to the action of India and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

It should have been possible before now at Panmunjom to work out a satisfactory plan for the Korean political conference. Differences of viewpoint occurred at once, of course, as one would expect, between the negotiators from the two sides on this question. But on their face, none of those differences were impossible or even difficult of reconciliation. Indeed I think a solution might have been found if the communist representatives had not turned from negotiation to abuse, thus indicating that if their principals wanted a conference at all, they did not want one at that time. Hence the negotiations were suspended. As I have said, steps are being taken--which we hope will be successful--to bring about their resumption. The present situation in Korea is simply that there is no fighting, but there is no peace. Our servicemen in that area, while they remain at the alert, have for more than five months, however, been spared the tragic consequences of actual conflict. That is a blessing which we would all do well to remember.

One other issue out there has now been disposed of in the prisoners-of-war question. I do not need to go into details of that matter inasmuch as they will be familiar to most hon. members. We have taken the position as a government that the action of the United States commander in releasing and returning to civilian status the prisoners-of-war under his jurisdiction when they were returned to him by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was not only legally correct but morally sound and quite consistent with the terms of the armistice agreement itself. It seems to us that no other course was open to the United Nations commander at that time. Our own position in regard to this matter has been, I think, quite clear and consistent from the beginning. We have not believed nor do we now believe that any prisoner should be compelled by force to return to what was once his homeland. The provisions of the commission's terms of reference were drafted to prohibit enforced repatriation, and those of us who took part in the long, complicated and difficult negotiations to that end will recall this very clearly. But that prohibition would have little meaning if the only alternative facing a prisoner was indefinite captivity. Therefore the terms of reference in the armistice agreement made clear provision for the final release of prisoners to civilian status 120 days after their being placed in the custody of the commission. In the words of General Hull--

The plain intent of paragraph 11 of the terms of reference is to prevent either party to the agreement from frustrating the basic purpose of avoiding indefinite captivity for the prisoners.

We subscribe to that position.

Of course if there had been a different attitude taken by the Communist representatives on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and by the Communist side in Korea it would have been, I think, quite possible, almost easy, to have arranged for the examination of these prisoners in the time allotted for it, ninety days. It was understood by those who took part in these negotiations that the ninety days meant ninety consecutive days. However, after the first examinations took place, and when it was clear to the world that the great majority of the prisoners would rather go back to captivity than to go home under Communist rule, this was such a terrific blow to the prestige of communism in the Far East that the Communists themselves from that time forward did everything they could to prevent further examination. That seems to me to be a simple and pretty obvious explanation of why the examination of prisoners broke down before the end of the ninety-day period.

Excerpt from a Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons, March 25, 1954. House of Commons Debates, pages 3326 - 3327:

The other item on the Berlin agenda which was dealt with has resulted, as the house knows, in the calling of the Geneva conference. I believe this conference can be welcomed. But again, we should have no exaggerated hopes of success. We must, of course, do our best to bring about that success. We must refuse to give up the struggle if we seem to be having difficulty in the first week or two. But it is not going to be an easy conference, and indeed it is not going to be a conference from which we can be sure of constructive results. For one thing, we shall have new membership at that conference in the personnel of the delegation from Communist China.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom we were happy to welcome in Ottawa only a few weeks ago, had this to say in London at a dinner on March 18:

"Now, we are facing a new chapter in the Korean story. Next month in Geneva the nations who fought under the United Nations flag in Korea return to the conference table to seek peace. At this table the communist countries will be fully represented for the first time. The negotiations that will be undertaken in Geneva will be of extreme difficulty, yet it would be a serious mistake to allow them to lapse again should it prove impossible quickly to conclude that peace treaty."

He concluded this part of his remarks in these words:

"It is inherent in the United Nations' approach that the western world and the communist world meet regularly around the conference table."

I was asked on Tuesday by the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) what would be our instructions as a Canadian delegation at this conference. Mr. Speaker, that can be stated in very general terms. We shall do our best to assist in the process of converting the Korean armistice, a somewhat uneasy Korean armistice, into a durable and satisfactory peace within the United Nations frame of reference which has been set down for this conference and by which we, as a government, indeed as a parliament, are bound.

The United Nations' resolution on this subject reads - at least the important sentence of it - that the objectives we are to seek are:

"Achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area."

These are the goals of the Canadian delegation to the conference, and indeed they should be the goals of each delegation whose right to participate at the conference stems from its military contribution to the United Nations' cause in Korea. I can see no obstacle that could not be overcome in the way of the realization of that resolution if there is good faith and good will on both sides; but that "if", Mr. Speaker, as we know from unhappy experience, is big enough to restrain undue optimism as to the results of the conference. Nevertheless, we shall do our part as Canadian representatives, I hope, to achieve a satisfactory result which may bring peace to Korea.

At the Geneva conference there will also be discussed the question of Indo-China. It was agreed on by the four foreign ministers at Berlin that this question should be discussed by representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states. As hon. members know, the problem of Indo-China, where bitter fighting has been going on for eight years and is going on today, has never been submitted to the United Nations for consideration and for that reason Canada has not been as directly concerned with this matter as we were with the aggression in Korea. Nevertheless, I am sure we are all conscious of the critical significance of the struggle in Indo-China as it affects the aspirations of the people of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in achieving and maintaining the independence accorded them by France, as it affects the security of the neighboring countries in southeast Asia and as it affects the ability of France to make the maximum contribution to European and North Atlantic security and co-operative arrangements. And so, while we do not expect at Geneva to take any active part in discussion of Indo-China, we shall of course follow these talks with close interest and take advantage of any opportunity that may be afforded to us to help in bringing some satisfactory conclusion out of this particular matter.

Excerpt from a Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons, March 31, 1954. House of Commons Debates, pages 3545 - 3546:

So far as Canada is concerned, Mr. Speaker, we will not act at Geneva, I hope, in a way which would betray national honour, national interests, or our hopes for peace. We are going there, so far as Korea is concerned, to convert an armistice into a peace. We have a United Nations resolution for that purpose which, as I suggested the other day, will be our instructions on this matter.

It has been said by more than one hon. member of the opposition that we have adopted a different attitude in respect of Indo-China. We were asked why we did not show more active interest in the Indo-Chinese problem, which is possibly as important to the peace of the world as the Korean problem. I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that there

is a very real difference between the two positions in so far as Canadian participation, if not Canadian interests, is concerned. We have been invited to Geneva, as a member of the United Nations with forces participating in Korea, to help bring about a peace settlement. The text of the invitation makes that quite clear, and I shall read it:

In accordance with the proposal agreed upon at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, February 18, 1954, and announced in the enclosed communique of the same date the government of the United States has the honour to extend to the government of Canada an invitation to participate, if it so desires, in the Korean political conference to be convened at Geneva on April 26.

In so far as the Indo-Chinese aspect of this conference is concerned, the communique of the foreign ministers in Berlin has this to say. They are agreeable that the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited. Our position here is, however, entirely different. We have not been invited to take part in the Indo-Chinese discussions. There was a basis for our invitation to the Korean Peace conference because we are a participating power in the Korean operation. It might be a quite different situation in so far as Indo-China is concerned.

It may well be that those most immediately concerned will want to keep that conference restricted to those who are actually concerned with Indo-Chinese operations.

(MR. FULTON): Would the minister be kind enough to read that communique again, because it does not seem to be capable of the interpretation he is putting upon it.

(MR. PEARSON): It says they are agreed that the problem of Indo-China will also be discussed at the conference - that is the Korea conference - to which representatives - that is to the Indo-Chinese discussion - to which representatives of the United States, France, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

(MR. FULTON): That surely refers to the Korean conference.

(MR. PEARSON): It has been made quite clear to us that "the interested parties" refers to those who may be invited to the Indo-Chinese talks. If we are invited, we shall play as active a part as we can. However, if it appears to be in the best interests of settling the problem that the discussion be restricted to the four or five countries immediately concerned, I do not think it would serve the best interests of peace to press for an invitation.

In the process of negotiations at Geneva, concessions of some kind may be necessary on both sides to reach any solution. For instance, if some concessions had not been made and some compromise had not been reached at Panmunjom - a compromise upon which the United Nations did not desert its principles - we would have had no armistice at all and no peace negotiations could even be attempted in Geneva. No

one I assume opposes or opposed at the time the armistice, and no one in this house opposes the invitation to the Geneva conference. It may be that the hon. member for Prince Albert has some mental reservation about the wisdom of this conference. He is quoted as having said in Toronto, according to the Toronto GLOBE AND MAIL of March 9, that the Red Chinese attendance at the conference in Geneva is a victory for Russia. I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that that is not the case; because China will not be in Geneva as one of the five great powers, or after recognition, or even as an invited power. Indeed, it is hard to imagine Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden or Mr. Bidault agreeing to a proposal for a conference at Geneva, if it were a victory for Russia.

Red China will be at that conference in Geneva because we cannot negotiate a peace in Korea without her attendance. Whether we can do it with her attendance remains to be seen.

On February 2, 1951, I said in the house referring to the Chinese Communists:

They should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition of the United Nations.

I still feel that way, and also feel that Peking should not be granted diplomatic recognition merely because they signed an armistice in Korea or have agreed to go to a conference in Geneva. But that does not mean that we will not negotiate with this government now in authority in China, when we should do so, or with any other communist government when it is necessary to do so.

We have accepted this invitation, and I hope the Canadian delegation will not follow any course at Geneva or take any action there which would justify the gloomy forebodings expressed last Friday by the Leader of the Opposition, based upon impressions - and as I see it erroneous impressions - that he had received from press quotations. We are not carrying any umbrella to Geneva, nor are we brandishing a bomb either.