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THE CANADIAN
MILITARY REVIEW.

A MONTHLY JOURNAL.

DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE INTERESTS OF
THE CANADIAN FORCE.

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PUBLISHER'S NOTICE.

It is needless to say that the success of this enterprise entirely depends upon the support accorded by those in whose interest it appears. An earnest appeal is now made to the members of the Canadian Militia, so that no stone may be left unturned in founding a work of such great importance to them, as the establishment of an independent organ advocating their interests.

The question of Military Organization has been ably handled by both Government and Opposition Organs; yet, however fair or impartial their representations may have been, they are accepted with a certain amount of hesitation, in consequence of their party predilections, which lessens the force of their arguments, and not unfrequently defeats the object in view.

The publication of this purely Military Work, to be placed at the disposal of the Force as an exponent of their rights, is therefore undertaken. The Militia is now composed of some 3,000 Officers and upwards of 40,000 men,—a number sufficiently large for the support of a creditable organ,—and although they are not all directly, it must be admitted they are indirectly, interested in its prosperity.

To enable the publisher to place the matter before every Officer and man in the force, a sample copy of THE CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW, with a Subscription List, is enclosed to every Lieut.-Colonel, Major and Captain, with the hope that they will secure the names of such Officers and men under their commands as may be willing to support a work of this description. To insure its continued publication, it will be necessary to secure at least 2,000 subscribers. It is imperative, therefore, that the friends of this undertaking should exert themselves in securing as lengthy a subscription list as possible, forwarding the same at an early date.

In each copy will be found the Subscription List referred to, with an envelope addressed for return. Officers taking the matter in hand will confer a great favor by returning these Lists before the 15th day of August.

The Publisher, an officer in the active force, of many years standing, can assure his prospective friends and supporters that his desire to serve their interests is most hearty and sincere; and that the completion and perfecting of this Work will receive his best endeavours is sufficiently guaranteed by the heavy outlay made in placing the first number before them. The Subscription Price will be Three dollars per annum,—no portion of which, however, is expected until after the issue of the second number,—when the terms will be finally settled upon. In the meantime address all communications to

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THE
CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW.

No. I.—VOL. I.

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LIFE-RISK ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

(United Service Magazine.)

It is a question whether the chances of death or the risks of life are not pretty equally defined (in the economy of Providence) for all conditions of men, whatever may be their calling. Not to speak of earthquakes—such as that of Lisbon in 1666, when 60,000 human beings perished in five or six minutes—the only part of the city spared being a street inhabited by disreputable women; not to mention floods, such as the recent one in Bengal, carrying off one quarter of a million of the inhabitants; nor even to dwell with emphasis on burning cities, burning theatres and churches, colliding railway trains, and the crush of panic stricken crowds or mobs; daily experience sufficiently corroborates by facts—many of them truly appalling—the declaration of the Apostle, that “in the midst of life we are in death.” Moreover, in spite of all our accurate statistical calculations of life-value, it is quite evident that the battle of life as to duration, is not always in favour of the strong; in fact, that the vigorous lambs of the human family, as well as the old sheep, go equally to the shambles.

Matters are equally surprising on the other hand, if we examine the statistics of the battle-field, where, if anywhere, one would suppose the chances of being killed would be the greatest. The saying is, “that every bullet has its billet,” but assuredly facts do not show that such billet is invariably the unfortunate corpus of some human being. Guilbert, the celebrated artilleryist, calculated that in the battles of old, it required a million of cartridges to kill 2,000 men; that is 500 shots to bring down one combatant. Fiobert, a great authority of the present epoch, calculates that, according to the results of long wars, 3,000 to 10,000 cartridges was the proportion to one man killed or wounded.

Be that as it may, it is generally stated that the proportion of casualties to combatants has gradually diminished since the introduction of the improved weapons of recent years; in other words, that the life-risk in battle is less than it was in former times. At Austerlitz the loss of the French was fourteen per cent. of their army, that of the Russians thirty, that of the Austrians forty-four. At Wagram the French lost thirteen per cent., the Austrians fourteen. At the Muskowa the French loss was thirty-seven per cent., the Russian forty-four. At Bautzen the French lost thirteen per cent., the Russians and Prussians fourteen. Finally, at Waterloo, there fell of the French thirty-six per cent., of the Allies thirty-one.

Now, at Magenta, on the 4th of June, 1859, we find that the French lost only seven per cent., and the Austrians eight per cent. At Solferino, the Franco-Sardinian army lost ten per cent., the Austrian eight per cent. Magenta was a fierce encounter and at Solferino two armies disputed victory during twelve hours with remarkable pertinacity; and the result was, that the losses on both occasions were much less than those of the *least* murderous battles of the First Empire. It cannot be said that the soldiers were inefficient. Never did Emperor of France or Austria lead their equal to battle; in fact, as far as the French were concerned, every French officer who was present will declare that the victories of France on these occasions were nobly won by the French soldier, and the soldier alone. Nor can it be said that the contending armies were widely distant from each other; on the contrary, never was the bayonet more active. "We did it almost all *à la bayonette*," said a French soldier to the writer of this article. And yet never was the loss on either side less or so small, in any previous battle. But the following summary places the fact in a clearer light. It is calculated that at Waterloo, the losses of the victory were one-fourth; at Borodino, one-third; at Talavera, one-eighth; at Marengo, one-fourth; at Inkerman (before rifled guns and breech-loaders were in use) one-third, whereas at Magenta and Solferino the losses were only *one-seventh*, and at the fierce Battle of Sadowa, one *twenty-third*! The battles of the late Franco-German war present the same comparatively small percentages, if we except the terrible contest of Saint-Privat, which was exceptional, as being more in accordance with the hand-to-hand encounters of old, and the closer conflicts with the ancient smoothbores at short ranges. The explanation is that the number of troops brought on the field in former battles was comparatively limited, so that they were all actually engaged in the conflict, perhaps, too, for many hours. Thus, the 24,000 British troops at Waterloo were all exposed to fire, and a large proportion of them were in repeated close combat with the enemy. Hence the large ratio of casualties in that battle, as pointed out by Deputy Inspector-General Longmore, in his admirable "Treatise on the Transport of the Sick" from the field of battle. "At the present day," remarks Dr. Longmore, "the facilities of rapidly concentrating troops and *materiel* are immensely increased. Such armies as were opposed to each other at Solferino and Königgratz, present numbers so enormous—in the former instance 298,358, in the latter 427,100 men under arms being said to have been brought together—that it becomes impossible for all the troops to be engaged in the battle. The firing, of the infantry especially, being restricted to almost directly opposite fronts, large bodies of troops acting as supports or as reserves in such vast armies, are almost necessarily excluded from active interference as combatants, as 'troops actually engaged.'"

Of course there can be little doubt that the statistics we have quoted, and the deductions drawn from them, are, to say the least, very incomplete, and in some respects, from this cause, calculated to mislead; but still, as Dr. Longmore admits, whilst demurring to them, "so far as the ratios go, they serve to show that when all troops—not only those actually brought into action, but also those acting as supports and reserves, or otherwise on the strength of an army, are included—*modern tactics* cause the chance of a casualty of any kind happening to each of the units composing that army, to be considerably less than it was formerly." On the other hand, we entirely agree with this high authority, that "numberless facts concur to prove, as regards particular bodies of troops opposed to each other in actual fighting, that the numbers of *wounds* inflicted within corresponding periods of time, are far greater than they ever were before the introduction of rifles and breechloaders." One thing is certain, however—namely, that the proportion of killed is much less than of wounded in all battles, ancient or modern. Thus, at Salamanca it was one killed to 7·1 wounded; at Waterloo, 1 to 3; at Alma, 1 to 4·6, at Magenta, 1 to 4·9; at Solferino, 1 to 5·2; at Sadowa (Prussians) 1 to 3·6, (Austrians) 1 to 2·9. The proportion of casualties was much higher in the battles of the American Civil War, than in the Italian or German battles; agreeing more nearly in numbers with the supposed losses in the great Continental battles of the early part of the present century; but, as the ratio of killed to wounded (from 1 to 4·5 and 1 to 5·9) was less in the American than it generally was in the latter, the *prima facie* inference is, that the wounds inflicted on the American battle-fields were proportionately less severe.

On the whole, therefore, the life-risks of active service should scarcely present such formidable difficulties as have existed in securing Assurance by officers in command; and we have made the above investigation for the express purpose of bringing this important matter under consideration. The benefit of Life Assurance, and the moral considerations which should induce every friend of his species to promote and extend it, are of course not the particular motives which actuate the founders of such offices—although, no doubt, they have them in the same degree as others; and we shall have done good service if, by presenting the above facts relating to the life-risks of active service, all Insurance Offices be induced to offer "better terms" to officers in that category. As it is, we rejoice to find that the old-established Provident Life Office of Regent Street and Cornhill, has set the good example. Taking into consideration the great disadvantages under which officers of Her Majesty's Army are placed, in reference to the heavy extra rate charged by Assurance Companies, in the event of their being called on active service, the Directors of this Office propose to issue

"Whole World and War Policies," at a uniform rate of £1 per cent. per annum on the sum assured, on certain reasonable conditions.

The great advantages resulting from this most desirable reform in Assurance upon the lives of Military men, will be apparent when we state the fact that officers about to proceed on the Ashantee expedition, were in some cases required to pay as much as £25 down for every £100 assured, or to forfeit their policies. It is not every officer in Her Majesty's service who could afford to pay down £250 upon a policy for £1,000, on his departure for active service, and therefore we are sure that the boon thus offered by the Provident Life Office will be adequately appreciated by the Service. In the case of some new office seeking to "do business"—even apart from the perfectly correct *data* upon which this indulgence is legitimately based—there might be some demur or suspicion; but here is an old-established office with an invested capital of £1,878,819, with an annual income of £244,230, and with existing assurances to the amount of £5,526,706; so that we must conclude that the old rate exacted was exorbitant, and that the new one is as legitimate in the way of business as it is decidedly advantageous to the assured. For this reason we have deemed it proper to give prominence to the matter, with every good wish for the success of the measure in all its applications.

FORTIFICATIONS.

WITHDRAWAL OF IMPERIAL TROOPS FROM CANADA.

It is generally known that before the policy of the Home Government was carried out in the final withdrawal of the Troops, Colonel Jervois, Royal Engineer, in 1863-4, was sent to Canada on a tour of inspection, with a view to the improvement of its defences. The policy of removing the troops had for some years been contemplated by a certain class of politicians, commonly known as the "Manchester school." It is equally known that this policy, from the first, never found any favour or countenance by the people of Canada. Colonel Jarvis in his report to the Secretary of State for War, in January, 1865, has the following paragraph upon its effect in the Western Districts:—

"I should here observe that the prospect of the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from the western districts, in accordance with instructions from this country previous to the confederation movement, has a depressing effect upon the efforts that are being made for the improvement of the organization of the militia of those districts."

And it may with truth be added that the same blighting and unpatriotic policy had an equally depressing effect upon the whole length and breadth of the land.

Of the amount proposed to be expended by Colonel Jervois' estimate, £643,000 sterling was for the defences of Montreal and Quebec, and half a million sterling for Kingston, Toronto and Hamilton—leaving out the armaments, which, at least if effected according to modern scientific improvements—and no doubt Colonel Jervois took that into account—would cost £200,000 more, or nearly one half the cost of the erection of any new forts or lines purely of a defensive character. Of the several works proposed in Colonel Jervois' report, those at Quebec, or more properly Point Levis, were the only ones undertaken by the Imperial Government. Preparatory contour surveys were began by the Royal Engineer corps, and sites of forts No. 1, 2, and 3, selected in 1865-6, the extent of which, from No. 1 to 3, was a little over two miles, in length and within an average radius of about the same distance from the citadel of Quebec. The levels or heights of the *terre-plein* of these positions above the datum line of the river are respectively 396, 392, and 272 feet, while that of the citadel is about 350 feet at the highest point.

The sum of money voted in the Parliamentary estimates for this work was £249,500 sterling. The three forts cost £176,547, or an average of £58,849 each. The balance of the money was expended in building pontoon wharf, hut, barracks, purchasing land &c. The item for land alone was not less than £50,183, while the wharf cost £7,754.

It must not be supposed that the Parliamentary vote of £249,500 covered the whole expense of this work. There were two companies of Royal Engineers employed five years upon these works, and one company for one year. In the Army estimates for these years the sum of £7,492 is voted for each company of that distinguished corps, adding £82,412 more to the expense of the works, without taking other military incidentals into account. So that the total outlay would be much nearer £349,500 than the Parliamentary vote of £249,500. The armaments of about 120 guns of different calibres for the three forts, had they been furnished, would have swelled up the gross amount to nearly half a million sterling. The lands were purchased for the extension of these important works on the right and left flanks, so as to command the water frontage and co-operate in time of emergency with the British naval forces, for the protection and defence of the grand old city of Quebec, as being the first point and key of military communication between Canada and Great Britain, and to which, in case of necessity, the Regular Forces, from whatever cause, would have to retire as a last resource.

The last of the military force withdrawn from Canada, small in number certainly, was the solitary company of Royal Engineers, under that excellent officer, Capt. (now Major) Mitchell, who were employed in the construction of No. 1 fort. This fort was all built of stone, including the casemates, and to the credit of the company be it said, was the most substantially built, the other two having been erected by civil contract. It was much regretted by all, and by none more so than the men themselves, that they were hurried away, in the fall of 1871, to Halifax or Bermuda before the fort had been completed, the Home authorities having been appealed to in vain. The unexpended balance of the appropriation was handed over to the Dominion Government, but the amount was very far short of that necessary for completing the whole work. In the following spring, of 1872, as the fiat had gone forth, not a single soldier of the Regular Service was to be seen. The citadel and time honored ramparts of Quebec no longer resounded to the martial tread of the well trained English sentry.

It is an unpleasant period in the lives of unsuccessful men when they are forced to face the unwelcome truth that they have been failures, and are compelled to bid good bye to the dreams of youth, which time has failed to realize. To have to recall the

past under such circumstances is a sore trial; but it was far more depressing to watch a great nation pausing on its way, growing sadly wise in its maturity, weighing the aspirations of youth in the scale of reality, and reluctantly exchanging a career of supremacy for the comforts and the security of prudent insignificance. The historic plains of Abraham have witnessed two striking scenes, one of which has shown how great men may make their country great, while the other has proved how effectually and easily meddling mediocrity may solve the problem, "how to make a great nation into a very little one." More than a century ago a dying soldier was to be seen there, listening eagerly to the din of the battle field. He had beheld but a few months before the walls of Louisburg levelled to the ground, and heard that in every city of the United Kingdom there were illuminations in honor of the stronghold of our enemy having yielded to the skill of a great General, and to the indomitable valour of British and Colonial troops. Here he was at the gates of the Gibraltar of New France, with his army engaged in a life and death struggle with the garrison. "Thank God, I die happy," were his last words, as he heard the joyous tidings, "they fly! they fly!"

It appears now the immortal Wolfe was sadly mistaken in his views. It seems that he was not justified in dying happy, and that he threw away his life uselessly for a useless prize. More than a century has taught us wisdom. The plains of Abraham have lately listened, not to the measured tread of our troops, not to the cry of victory, and the dying words of a great hero, but to the hammer of the auctioneer, and to the ominous words, "Going! Going! Gone!" "Thank you, Colonel O'Rafferty for your bid. You've a great bargain—almost a new field-piece." "I'll throw in this old gun, it's of no value except for old iron, but it really is a curiosity—one of Wolfe's cannons. It was dragged up the precipice by our sailors. They tell me that there is the blood on it still of some of Wolfe's Highlanders who were killed there. Once upon a time it would have brought almost any price, but heroes' blood is at a discount, and is not a merchantable article. You can cast it into cannonballs when your Irish Republic needs them; we don't require them, they don't pay." (He here indulges in an eloquent wink, which is cordially reciprocated by the Fenian Colonel.)

"Here's the next lot: some old flags, a Union Jack or two, a little the worse for wear, but they are surely worth something. Come, gentlemen, will nobody give us a bid?"

This was not an agreeable episode, either to our countrymen in the New World or to Englishmen at home; but it almost assumed the character of a humorous, playful incident, when compared with

the far more serious measures which the apostles of dismemberment had recently thought fit to adopt.

A few weeks after this auction on the plains of Abraham, the troops are withdrawn. The Fenian and Yankee speculators had carried off their trophies from the dismantled fortifications of a derelict empire, and again the rumours of invasion are heard. You could not walk the streets of New York, Boston, Cincinnati, and other large towns in the United States, without being hustled by companies of the "Army" of the Irish Republic, which are noisily marshalling their forces for a triumphant march on the Britishers. After a suspense of some months, during which the trade of the whole Dominion was paralyzed, the attack is made at last by the Fenian "Army," who considerably sent a General of the United States Army to the Canadian forces to inform them that their foes would recognize the laws of civilized warfare. Nearly a score of our countrymen were shot down at Ridgeway by Spencer rifles, when the chances of a serious battle were so threatening that the Fenians took refuge across the lines behind the ranks of the United States soldiers, and were safe. As a matter of course those who had sold British guns to the Fenians were not likely to be hard upon their customers. Before twenty-four hours had elapsed, the Atlantic cable expressed the gratification of the *spirited* and *patriotic* Cabinet at what had occurred, and conveyed the thanks of the British Government to the Americans for their prompt action in the matter. *Bis dat, qui cito dat.* The ordinary post was too tardy for this outburst of gratitude.

Not long after this event a question arose between the Americans and the Canadians about the Fisheries, which was to have been settled amicably by an arbitration. It was a good chance for a stroke of business. The Alabama story was lugged in. The Fisheries were practically given away, and the navigation of the St. Lawrence was surrendered as a sop to the American Cerberus.

When the flagrant and repeated short comings of the American Government in the matter of the Fenian invasions of Canada were set up as an offset to the alleged neglect of the British Government in allowing Southern cruisers to escape, the Americans declined to consider the matter, and the British Government acquiesced in the propriety of the course pursued by them. But there was no attempt made to conceal the fact. We were told deliberately by a leading journal that the Canadians were sacrificed, but that this was inevitable, as the majority of the Commissioners were Englishmen—of course of a certain unpatriotic school, which, unfortunately for the country, happened then to be in. Such an avowal wound up with an appropriate moral. "We shall of course guarantee a loan of £2,500,000 sterling." It was the only reparation that could

be offered for having thrown overboard the Fenian claims at Washington, though it was believed the proposed guarantee for the projected Pacific Railway was a very doubtful kindness. But the question provoked was, "how long are we (of the unpatriotic Manchester grubs) to go on pretending to defend the interests of Canada, which in truth we have neither the knowledge nor the ability to protect?" or read more correctly, "which in truth we had neither the courage, patriotism, nor the honour to protect." Such was the vacillating and chicken-hearted policy of the Home Government in its relations at the time, between this important outlying portion of the British Empire, and our unscrupulous neighbours.

The last of the Fenian raids, it may be remembered, was on the Missisquoi and Huntingdon frontier, in the spring of 1870. But this did not stop the hurrying of the regular troops out of the country. At this very crisis the auction of the horses of the cavalry, and those of the artillery field batteries, militia stores, &c., were in full operation on the Champ de Mars, Montreal. It is said that even the sentry boxes were offered for sale, but attracted no bidders. That excellent and well trained body of men, the Royal Canadian Rifles—who had been specially organized by volunteers of approved character from the regular service, were unceremoniously disbanded before their full term of service had expired, although it was well understood they were to serve out their time in Canada. They had an offer, indeed, to rejoin the regulars again. The writer heard bitter complaints at this mode of treatment, and such complaints as "breach of faith," "breach of contract," "we came here to serve out our full term in the country, and have been cruelly deceived," were common expressions.

In closing these reflections on the withdrawal of the troops and the action of the military authorities in the last of the so-called Fenian invasions, it may be proper to mention a general order, which was issued at the Headquarters Office, Montreal, on 4th June, 1870, by that excellent officer in command, the late Lieut.-General the Honorable James Lindsay, of which the following is an extract:—

"Canada has been once more invaded by a body of Fenians, who are citizens of the United States, and who have again taken advantage of the institutions of that country, to move without disguise large numbers of men and warlike stores to the Missisquoi and Huntingdon frontiers, for the purpose of levying war upon a peaceful community.

"From both these points the invading forces have been instantly driven with loss and in confusion, throwing away their arms, ammunition and clothing, and seeking shelter within the United States.

"The result of the whole affair is mainly due to the promptitude

with which the militia responded to the call to arms, and to the rapidity with which their movements to the front were carried out, and the self reliance and steadiness shown by this force, as well as by the armed inhabitants on the frontier.

"The regular troops were kept in support, except on the Huntingdon frontier, where one company, the 69th, took part in the skirmish.

"The reproach of invaded British territory, and the dread of insult and robbery have thus been removed by a handful of Canadians, and the Lieutenant-General does not doubt that such services will receive the recognition of the Imperial Government.

"The Lieutenant-General congratulates the militia upon this exhibition of their promptness, discipline, and training, and in dismissing the men to their homes, he bids them carry with them the assurance that their manly spirit is a guarantee for the defence of Canada."

SPECTATOR.

NOTE.—Colonel "Jarvis," on page 7, line 9, is a clerical error, Colonel "Jervois" being the officer to whom reference is made.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

BY VERITAS.

Looking to the question of defences, and being guided by experience, it has been clearly demonstrated that moral suasion, although good in theory, does not always succeed. Every country, therefore, trains a portion of its population to act in concert in the use of weapons of warfare, the extent of this organization depending on local circumstances, and the ability of the country to contribute time and money to the object. In a country such as Canada is, having from England assurance of moral support in time of peace, and material aid in case of war, it is not considered expedient to grant appropriations of money to such an extent as prudent councillors deem necessary. Indeed, public men buoy themselves up with the hope that nothing will occur to mar the harmony of peaceful occupations, and few consequently give serious consideration to military subjects. The very intricacy and extent of the details of organization and administration are sufficient to repel them, and prevent that study of and acquaintance with the subject, necessary to make them intelligent exponents of a suitable system. But it is very apparent, if Canada is to remain a portion of the Empire, that in this respect her population must do their part. Even if assisted in matters of defence, such assistance will doubtless be in the way of supplementing what the country may not be able to furnish.

Economists say the revenue is not sufficient to warrant increased militia expenditure, that it will be time to think of preparation when an enemy threatens us, and that then the population would rush to arms and defend their homes with vigour. Prudence distrusts these comforting theories, and dictates that arguments of this nature are fraught with danger; for experience proves that military success does not reside in popular impulses, but in good arms, a knowledge of their use, discipline and obedience, which can only be attained by a long and patient course of preparation. It is therefore desirable to enquire what Canada is doing in respect of organization for defence, and in the way of providing suitable material, equipment and instruction for her militia.

In 1866, when the Fenians made their first attempt to cross the border, an organized force was placed on service, which, although defective in equipment, had courage and discipline to meet the emergency. Fit representatives of those who defended the country in 1812-15, they turned out with surprising alacrity. Their conduct

on service was excellent; there were very few courts-martial for so large a force, and officers and men secured the good will of the inhabitants in the localities where they were stationed. The rank and file proved themselves loyal and enthusiastic in the defence of their country, were obedient, and exhibited praiseworthy fortitude and cheerfulness in the many discomforts and difficulties of camp life.

The Dominion Militia Law dates from 1868. In 1871, the population numbered about 3,600,000. Of these, 740,000 were liable to serve, and, divided into three classes, consisted of all the male inhabitants of the age of 18 years and upwards to 60, not exempted or disqualified by law, being British subjects by birth or naturalization. The territory was, and is, divided into twelve military districts, subdivided into brigade divisions, and still further into regimental and company divisions. The number of men to be drilled annually was fixed at 40,000, to be raised in the several divisions in proportion to the strength of the enrolled militia constituting the reserve in each. The period of service in time of peace is three years. In case of war, every man is liable to serve or furnish an approved substitute. The law applies to the whole country, and consequently the militia is under Federal instead of the Provincial control which prevailed prior to Confederation. The federal arrangement prevents differences in modes of formation, equipment, rank, pay, discipline, and generally in all that relates to military service, and it permits the whole strength of the Dominion being put forward in defence, without those irritations which must naturally result from different systems being suddenly brought into accord, at a time when the necessities of the country might be most urgent. During the period when Imperial troops were stationed in the country, Canada had the services of properly educated instructors, the several regiments as models, and assistance from the staff in perfecting an organization for defence. Reserves of stores were also maintained for issue, when required, to the militia on payment, thus giving Canada a maximum of benefit at a minimum of expense. Since Confederation other arrangements have been made, and models, instructors and reserves of stores are now maintained by the Dominion.

The present active force consists of cavalry, artillery and infantry, representing a nominal strength of 43,790 officers and men. Of these, owing to diminished appropriations of money, only 29,000 were trained in 1875, and but 23,000 in 1876. Although there are no perceptible exciting causes to stimulate increased exertion, the population is not stationary. There is therefore necessity for an unwearied course of instruction, to keep pace with ordinary development. Each year a new set of militiamen, who perhaps have never seen a regular soldier, attain the age which fits them to serve.

Without models, which an instructed body of men would furnish, and without a suitable number of capable instructors, it will be difficult to make the present force a thoroughly serviceable organization.

Whatever be the actual strength of the force to be maintained, it should be understood that to the extent of those means a foundation has been laid for the education of officers and non-commissioned officers, and for the maintenance of that force in the highest possible state of efficiency. There is naturally a difficulty in obtaining the services of qualified officers, and although there are many able, intelligent, useful ones, they are not enough for present requirement, and as yet sufficient provision has not been made for the education of others to fill the places of those who, through ripening years or insufficient encouragement, leave the service. The population has, however, been familiarized with militia trainings, and a foundation laid for more systematic action and a more thorough organization—an organization having its ground-work in military schools. These schools being at the root of the efficiency of a militia system, their establishment and maintenance have a direct practical object in view, and so far have doubtless been designed solely with reference to the absolute necessities of the force; but as the force expands with the growth and progress of the Dominion, it requires increasing provision for the technical education of its officers and non-commissioned officers, and for keeping up an unfailing supply under constantly changing conditions. Each arm of the service has special duties to perform, and therefore requires technical schools specially adapted to its peculiar requirements: while the several schools combined should impart that instruction upon which the successful working of the mechanism of the whole organization depends. In adopting a recognized plan of organization, it is evident that the perfection of the details will be a difficult and tedious undertaking. The subject itself is complex, and the task is one which would naturally attract only those who feel an interest in the success of the system. In this economical age, where every government has to look sharply after the expenditure, the arrangements for each branch of the public service should be characterized by vigorous administration, with a view to the greatest present good on a permanent basis. Such action, if carried out, will produce indestructible results. What is needed in respect of the militia is, in the first place to stimulate and preserve in activity those motives which constitute the permanent fountain of military enthusiasm—the aspirations of cadets, officers and men, after distinction, which may be gained as honourably, if not as rapidly, in peaceful preparation as in war. Statesmen and political economists require to be technically instructed in this branch of the public service, in order that they may legislate as intelligently on this subject

as they do upon the trade and commerce with which they are so intimately acquainted.

Guided by the experience of nations to whom Canadians trace their origin, a military college of a high class has been established at Kingston, for the education of officers. Having no regular army, and the active force being composed of those who are only removed temporarily from their industrial pursuits for purposes of drill, facilities are afforded for the military education of young men, without reference to class or origin. The vacancies are allotted to districts, and the admissions based on competitive examinations. The course of instruction assimilates as nearly as possible to the English system. The discipline and interior economy are entirely in the hands of a military staff, chosen for special qualifications and ability. In everything the cadet is placed upon his honour, and is in all matters taught habits of precision, exactitude and self control. The length of the college course is four years. The number which may be admitted is 22 at the commencement, 36 for the second, 36 for the third, and 24 for the fourth years—total 118. The cadets will, after the expiration of each period of four years, leave the College in the order admitted, and their places will be supplied each year by the admission of others to the extent of two from each military district. By this method the College will always have a number of older cadets to maintain an *esprit de corps*. The subsistence, lodging, and instruction, is supplied by Government, free of expense, the cadets being required to pay for their uniform, clothing, books, necessaries, &c., the expenditure for which, after the first year, will be so small as to be within easy reach of the most moderate income. Their education will naturally make the cadets capable of duties which require scientific attainments, both in military and in general subjects, of a higher degree than those ordinarily acquired. All who complete the course will carry away with them those habits of discipline, and that high sense of personal honour, which will make them desirable and useful members of society, in whatever position they may be placed. The cadets who go from different districts will return educated, and having a knowledge of the theory of organization will inspire confidence, and enable the Dominion to carry out a system which will accord with the spirit of its institutions, and the social condition of its inhabitants. They will also be qualified to supply military maps of the frontier, which constant changes in the features of the country, caused by clearing the land, draining swamps and improving roads, render necessary.

In addition to the Military College, there are the two Schools of Gunnery which have been in existence since 1870, one at Kingston and the other at Quebec, which provide suitable instruction for officers and non-commissioned officers of artillery. The strength

of these two schools is ten officers and three hundred non-commissioned officers, gunners, and drivers, and provision is made to attach ten officers and ten non-commissioned officers to each school for short courses of instruction of three months each. Similar provision for Infantry, by the establishment of three schools of a smaller aggregate strength, at a cost of about \$37,500 each, per annum, would give the country a solid foundation upon which to build up a military system, the sentiment in favour of which has taken deep root in the minds of the whole people. Schools for Infantry, such as suggested, would afford opportunities for the qualification of officers and non-commissioned officers, without which the most energetic and systematic action, in other respects, will fail to produce a self-reliant and really formidable organization.

There is no provision by law for enrolling a marine militia, except such as applies to the militia generally, but the present time seems favourable for the establishment of a naval training school, which may grow and be strengthened as the Dominion increases in wealth and importance. The Maritime Provinces stand foremost as owners of merchant vessels, Nova Scotia having the greatest tonnage, and the laudable enterprizes which add so much to their prestige as Provinces, which make them nurseries for Canadian seamen, and enable Canada to rank fourth, and perhaps third, amongst the ship-owning countries of the world, deserve to be fostered and encouraged. Our mercantile marine would easily absorb all who could be trained in a naval school, and while the employment of instructed men would conduce to the interests of owners, shippers and passengers, it would ultimately result in the accumulation of a body of available officers and men, accustomed to the use of arms and guns. Such a useful project would no doubt cause England to place at the disposal of Canada a ship and suitable instructors for the purpose.

From all these considerations, it is evident, if the organization of the militia is to be successful, its future maintenance must be considered from a patriotic point of view. In that way only can suitable schools be provided and the work of drill and training be carried on in a satisfactory manner. The retention of a large nominal strength, with provision for the drill of only half that number, cannot conduce to efficiency, for it must be understood that the value of a military body does not consist in numbers only; mere numerical strength forms one of the least important elements in estimating its effective force. Discipline, training, equipment, confidence of the men in their commanders, in each other, in their weapons, and consequently in themselves: these are the most important elements to be considered in the estimate. One force may, on account of its superior discipline, training, equipment, and self-confidence, be fully equal in effective value to another, which, although double its number, is inferior in these particulars. The

public should therefore look forward to the perfection of a sound militia system with that steadiness of purpose which characterized their Canadian ancestors in developing the agricultural and commercial resources of the country.

If it is considered necessary to maintain a militia force, it is manifestly in the interest of all that that force be kept in the highest possible state of efficiency. It is apparent that a properly disciplined force cannot be extemporized at a moment's notice; foresight and forethought must be exercised; reserves of guns, tents, clothing, equipment, ammunition, models of improved appliances, hospital equipment, and all necessary stores must be kept on hand, otherwise the process of organization and maintenance will be so impeded as to entail certain disaster in case of emergency. Information relating to the physical geography of the country, its rivers, roads, bridges and railways, their condition and the facilities they offer for transport, must also be accumulated from year to year, so that the staff may always be in a condition to know not only the effective strength, but how to apply that strength to the best advantage.

Whether the organization be on an extensive or limited basis, it should be held in this practical age, where usefulness is valued according to results, that to the extent of the means employed, the groundwork is being laid for future development on short notice, to any extent the necessity of the times may require. The action should be energetic, systematical, formidable through efficiency; and the arrangements economical, pervaded by a strong and definite purpose, perfect in details and in keeping with the growing requirements of the country.

While the active force is being drilled and trained, the different organizations might also be made a means for mutual instruction of officers and men, by social gatherings in cities and towns, for readings or lectures, and by the encouragement of athletic sports, and by temperance in all things. Both officers and men are engaged in civil pursuits, and could in this way obtain relaxation, mental and physical. Man is so constituted that he must have relaxation. It should therefore be a first consideration to turn such periods to account, by making our militia an organization, apart from its military character, calculated to attract our more intelligent and useful citizens. The establishment of reading rooms, under the auspices of the force, we regard as a most desirable object, both from a social and military point of view, for they would not only counteract the allurements of the tavern or pot-house, but could not fail to be attended with numerous other beneficial results. Such a place, especially if the books are carefully selected, would become an attractive rendezvous, which would be frequented by the men at all times, and could not fail to contribute immensely to the

intellectual advancement, military education, and moral elevation of the whole force.

In considering the amount of money necessary to meet the annual expenditure for training the militia, and providing them with indispensable requisites while undergoing drill, it should be kept constantly in mind that a force maintained for local police purposes in time of peace, or an army on service, cannot be maintained without a base of supplies, and that other things besides men, discipline and valor, are needed to strengthen any force it may be necessary to place on service. Reserves of arms, equipments, and munitions, especially rifled guns for field and garrison use, should be accumulated, and if experience is worth anything, the country should be able to manufacture powder and cartridges for its small arms, and to repair such of its rifles as may become unserviceable. Establishments of this nature need not be extensive, nor need the annual produce be considerable. What is required is plant, and a few skilled artisans to make a commencement and organize a system, which could be rapidly developed whenever more extensive works become necessary. Buildings are available for such purposes; machinery and appliances are required from England, with which to equip them at the outset; their future can be left to time, the requirements of the country, and the inventive genius of the people.

Economiasts may say, why undertake manufactures of this nature, while what may be required can be procured from England on short notice, and without advances of money. To such it can be truly said, that experience during periods of war, teaches us that dependence on distant markets for supplies vital to the existence of an armed force, and for the successful defence of the country, is liable at times to result in serious embarrassment, from captures or losses at sea, from blockaded ports, and a variety of causes which are apparent to those who give the subject the most cursory consideration.

England has a powerful navy, and would no doubt do all she could to furnish us with necessary supplies in time of war, but the peculiar configuration of this country, its crooked boundary lines, and the possibility of interruption to interior communication in case of war, leave Canadians no alternative, if they have faith in the country, except to take the bull by the horns and place themselves in such a position as will enable them to prove self-reliant when unexpected obstacles prevent supplies being furnished from England. In this way, and in this way only, can the country become a source of strength to the mother land instead of a cause for anxiety in the matter of defence, while the beneficial results to its own people would be of great value in building up the structure of government on a lasting basis, and in giving the representatives of the people a foundation where strength and security can be found.

OUR MILITARY SYSTEM ; ITS DEFECTS AND THEIR REMEDY.

BY CENTURION.

There is perhaps no humiliation so keenly felt by the conscientious as that involved in the consciousness of being over-estimated or over-praised. This truth applies, in the fullest degree, to the thinking portion of the Active Militia Force of Canada, who are fully aware of the defects of the system under which they exist, and equally cognizant of their own short-comings and deficiencies. Yet, from the flattering reports of inspecting officers, the uninformed criticisms of an occasional newspaper paragraphist, and the general tendency to consider all men in uniform as *soldiers*, we have been led to exalt the Active Militia Force into a position to which it is not entitled, from its merits of organization, its constitution, or its efficiency. It is consequently a relief when, as in the *Saturday Review* of the 7th April, we are told somewhat of the plain truth in regard to the force, in a tone of friendly and impartial criticism that lends power to the observations there recorded. We are told that:—

“The recent Report on the military condition of our greatest colony is, however, far from satisfactory, and calls for the careful consideration of all who believe that England extends beyond the four seas, and that her power is not to be measured by her home resources alone. Since the withdrawal of the regular forces from Canada, the numbers and efficiency of the colonial militia have been gradually diminishing. A long array of officers fills the pages of the Army List, but beyond them there is little to represent military power; and after a while the militia of Canada will be solely represented by the showy uniforms and military titles of gentlemen who have no troops to command. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining money—a difficulty due partly to stagnation in trade, partly to the absence of any belief in the necessity for military organization—the number of men annually exercised has steadily diminished, and the periods of training have been shortened until it has become a question whether it is not a waste of money to do more than provide for enrolment, without making any attempt at drill or discipline. During the last year the force exercised numbered only 23,000 men, in place of 29,000 in the previous year, and the period of drill was reduced to twelve days for field batteries of artillery, and eight days for cavalry, garrison

"artillery, and infantry; whilst the method of training the men in
 "brigade camps has given place to the less efficient drill at battalion
 "and company headquarters. The stores are also in an unsatis-
 "factory condition; there is not a sufficiency of clothing for even
 "the small force enrolled as the active militia, whilst the quality is
 "far from good. There is a supply of Snider rifles for about forty
 "thousand men, but only 150 rounds of ammunition per arm—a
 "very inadequate quantity when it is remembered that Canada is
 "entirely dependent on England for every round required. The
 "field batteries have been armed with the latest pattern gun, but
 "the fortifications are almost destitute of artillery. As yet the
 "comparatively newly-raised forts destined to defend Quebec are
 "unarmed; and, far from any steps having been taken to protect
 "Montreal, there is not a gun along the line of the St. Lawrence,
 "except a few seven-inch guns in Quebec citadel, that could in any
 "way cope with an ironclad.

"It must be confessed that, as matters stand, the future of the
 "military organization of Canada is not a bright one. When the
 "regular troops departed, it was supposed that about forty thousand
 "men would receive such annual training as would at least bring
 "them up to the standard of our English militia, and that these
 "forty thousand would have at their back 600,000 able-bodied men
 "who could take the field in the event of war. There were several
 "training schools at the head-quarters of different regiments, and
 "owing to the then recently terminated war in the United States,
 "and the subsequent Fenian raids, a military spirit had been
 "awakened throughout the country. Now, on the other hand,
 "23,000 receive but a very inadequate annual training, and the
 "schools for drill instruction are reduced to the two permanently
 "enrolled and well organized batteries at Quebec and Kingston.
 "The inspecting officers point out in their Report the want of
 "instructors when the regiments are called out, which we can well
 "believe when it is remembered that there exists no permanent
 "staff, regimental or other, below a brigade major. In the Report
 "submitted to the Canadian Parliament, Major-General Selby Smyth
 "states the case with great plainness, putting clearly before the
 "Government the condition of affairs, and pointing out that, if the
 "annual vote is to be kept as low as it was during the past year, a
 "complete change in the organization of the militia would be
 "necessary. A sum of 650,000 dollars, or about £130,000, is voted
 "annually for the militia. Of this amount 26,000 dollars is set
 "apart for the newly-established Military College, leaving only
 "624,000 dollars for the maintenance of the active militia, for arms,
 "clothing, and other warlike *materiel*, and for keeping up the small
 "permanently embodied force included in the Schools of Gunnery
 "at Quebec and Kingston."

No well informed person can dispute the truth of the facts or conclusions above set forth, however much he may regret the necessity for such plain criticism from outside authorities. The "surgeon's knife" so skilfully applied may have a good effect, however, if it leads us to acknowledge our shortcomings, and earnestly set ourselves to remedy them.

The first essential towards improving the condition of the militia force, is to cure the popular apathy regarding its interests. Even those who are friendly towards the organization, stigmatize the efforts to render it an efficient one, as "playing at soldiers," while by far the larger class of the community do not hesitate to say that the annual expenditure for militia purposes is a waste of money and should not be continued. The only reasons that we can advance in defence of the organization are "pooh-pooed," and the unlikelihood of our being required for purposes of war is used as a conclusive argument against the existence of an Active Militia. Yet these self same practical persons would be the first to inveigh against the imprudence of neglecting to insure against fire or accident, while they are content to leave our lives, our properties, and our liberties as a helpless prey to the first body of enterprising American citizens, who, under the name of "Fenians," and in virtue of "Ireland's wrongs," choose to convert our country into a "State," a "Republic," or an "Empire," as their caprice may direct. It is a matter for regret that most of the members of our House of Commons profess, if they do not feel, this indifference to our interests, and that those members who are also officers of the Force, are too strictly bound by political ties to offer their individual opinions. To change this condition of things we must strike at the root, and the only way in which this can be done, is for each member of the Active Militia Force to urge upon his favorite candidate, of whatever party, to pledge himself to give an intelligent and impartial consideration to all matters wherein the interests of the force are involved. It must not be understood for one moment that I counsel the introduction of party politics into militia matters,—but simply that of each candidate it should be demanded that he will in his votes consult the interests of the force.

The proofs of the apathy of which I have spoken are perhaps more strikingly evidenced in the House of Commons than elsewhere. It will not be disputed that the expenditure of so large a sum of money as that which is ostensibly intended for the support of our militia system, is a matter of public importance. Yet one by one the items are passed without question, save where some political store-keeper has been dismissed, or some political friend deprived of a contract. Although many of the members are officers of the force, it is seldom that an intelligent question is propounded, yet they must be aware from their own experience that everything is

not so well managed as it might be. Similarly with the public accounts; no one asks the "why's and wherefore's" of the items of expenditure, although many might fairly be challenged. Taking the items of the public expenditure for militia purposes in 1875 for instance, we find that the maintenance of the militia staff, for a force of 28,845 of all ranks, cost \$73,668.⁷⁷/₁₀₀! Last year produced economy, but in what direction? The number of men to be drilled was reduce to 23,000, the period of drill which they were to perform was shortened by one-half, their drill pay was reduced from \$392,986.¹⁶/₁₀₀ in 1875, to \$123,000 in 1876, and then we had presented to us the anomaly of a staff costing some \$68,000, or more than half the pay of the entire force! Be it understood that in drawing attention to this item, I do not imply that the staff is either useless or unnecessary, or that their pay is too large—but the proportion between the head and body of the force is so like that of the tadpole, that it naturally excites attention.

Again, our legislators are hoodwinked, or they deliberately try to deceive others, in regard to the amount of money expended for militia purposes. It was understood at the time of Confederation, that not less than one million of dollars per annum was to be expended upon the militia; yet in the estimates for 1866-77, we find \$306,356 included for the North West Mounted Police, who are not militia, are not subject to military law, and are not under the charge of the Militia Department! These expensive gentlemen cost an average of over \$1000 per man in 1875, and yet we are compelled to bear the burden of their existence, although their cost (for 300 men) is one third of the whole vote. In plain figures, they are to cost \$306,356; the total vote is \$981,956; leaving for the support and maintenance of 45,000 militiamen 675,600, or little more than double the sum required to keep 300 policemen in the North West Territories.

Space will not permit a more lengthened investigation into the manner in which the money is spent, although much remains to be said. The Militia Force would, however, doubtless like to be informed why the sum of \$651,816.70, which was received from the sale of ordnance lands from 1866 to 1875, is not funded for the benefit of the force, for whose sustenance it was granted by the Imperial Government. Also why the receipts from militia sources, amounting in 1875 to \$45,813.⁷⁷/₁₀₀, is not credited against the expenditure?

The fact of the matter has been, that from the sale of ordnance lands, of militia stores, and the rent of military properties, the Government has derived a revenue of not less than \$100,000 a year, while all charges for care of ordnance properties, purchase of stores, and repairs of military properties, have been included to swell the amount incurred in supporting the militia.

The question naturally suggests itself: What does the Active Militia want? The answer is simple and patriotic. We want to return full value for the annual expenditure upon the force, by the establishment of an effective militia in the place of a body that is only nominal and inefficient. We want the real requirements of the force attended to, so as to enable it to become efficient. We want the militia question dissociated from party politics, so that disinterested counsels may prevail in the management of the force. If popular apathy is removed, and these essentials are granted us, the patriotic spirit which has so far struggled on, despite all discouragements, in the maintenance of the force, will soon work out the rest of the problem.

The existing Militia Law provides for the annual drill and training of 45,000 men (which represents the nominal strength of the Militia Force) for eight days, they being paid 50 cents per man per day and 75 cents per horse per day for such drill, and being furnished with arms, accoutrements, clothing, and ammunition for target practice. This entails an initial expenditure, annually,

For Drill (45,000 men, 2,000 horses).....	\$198,000
“ Clothing (1 suit every three years).....	101,666
“ Ammunition (40 rounds per man).....	28,800
“ Arms and Accoutrements (renewed every 10 years)	60,000
	<hr/>
	\$388,466

This sum morely represents the bare requirements under the Act, but if we add to the amount a fair margin for contingencies, say \$50,000, we reach a basis for calculating what *should* be the annual cost of equipping and drilling the force named under the Act. But this only represents in round numbers \$450,000, while the expenditure in 1875 for militia purposes was over a million of dollars. Let us see how the balance was spent.

Salaries of staff, of brigade-majors, and contingencies \$73,678.67

Respecting this item, nothing need be said, except that the expense of governing and administering the force is extremely disproportionate to its actual numbers. As reduction in this item means abolition of the offices, however, and as that entails *political* difficulties, it is little use to expect any very great retrenchment in this respect.

Military stores..... \$59,953.90

This item represents the amount expended in the purchase of stores not included under the heads of arms, accoutrements, and clothing. In consequence, however, of the insufficient vote for clothing, a considerable part of this sum has been used for, and is properly chargeable to, clothing.

Targets.....	\$569.52
Drill Instruction.....	\$39,999.79

The expenditure under this item is sheer waste of money, as it is paid in most instances to persons who are utterly incompetent to instruct in drill. As, however, reduction in this item means *political* complications, it is hopeless to expect a change.

Aid to Bands.....	\$6,116.00
Aid to Rifle Associations.....	\$22,865.00

It is very doubtful if so large an expenditure under this head is justifiable, when so many more important requisites are neglected.

Care of Arms and Rent of Armories.....	\$51,840.00
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The large proportion of this sum is paid to persons for "care of arms" which they do *not* take care of. In many rural districts the rifles have been so neglected that the rifling is destroyed, and they are of no more use as arms of precision than similar lengths of gas pipe. Yet year after year this sum is paid out, and for *political* considerations must continue to be paid.

Transport of Militia and Stores.....	\$16,833.00
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This expenditure was entailed in assembling the Force at the Camps of Instruction, and will not appear in last year's accounts.

Compensation for injuries at drill, etc.....	\$3,411.06
Drill Sheds and Rifle Ranges.....	8,996.69
Care of Military Properties.....	2,847.02

This should be charged against the receipts from rents of military properties, etc., and not from a charge upon the support of the militia, unless the other item is credited.

Improved Fire-arms.....	\$39,428.39
Ordnance Garrison Artillery.....	19,662.72

These sums were expended in increasing the reserve stock of small arms, and in order to arm our fortifications. At least \$50,000 per annum should be devoted to these purposes, until a sufficient reserve is procured, and our fortifications are properly armed.

Maintenance A and B Batteries.....	\$109,945.00
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These fine batteries are a credit to the Dominion, and are doubtless economically managed. The above amount does not, however, represent their entire cost, as many items in clothing and stores are properly chargeable under this head.

Dominion Forces, Manitoba.....	\$81,916.53
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This force has been from year to year reduced to a skeleton, and is now to be done away with altogether. It is questionable if this is a wise policy, as the presence of a small armed force in a new country is almost an essential towards the establishment of law and order. In this case, also, *political* reasons entailed the retention of a very large number of officers with a very small body of men.

Military Schools and College.....	\$26,339.28
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The expenditure for military schools should be increased by the establishment of schools in Quebec and Ontario. If properly managed they would do more towards raising the standard of efficiency of the force than any other means. It is very questionable, however, if the twenty or thirty young gentlemen who are being educated at the Military College are worth the money that is being expended upon them. The annual cost, as estimated for 1877-78, is to be \$35,000. Taking the five years' course for an average of 30 students (there are only 22 at present) and adding up principal and interest, we shall find that each student will be indebted to his country in the sum of \$6,971.00 for his education. And then will arise the difficult question of disposing of them. As railway engineers? The profession is overstocked. As employés of the Public Works Department? Political reasons would hinder their employment in any but subordinate capacities. In the Militia? Their age and want of rank would render them useless, except as adjutants or instructors, for many years. Unless, therefore, we are to have a standing army, these youths will have no assured career. It cannot be possible that the Government will relinquish its claim upon their services, after having so carefully trained them and at so great a cost; and, therefore, it must provide for them—but where? In the meantime, men who might be immediately useful are debarred from the privileges of which they would gladly avail themselves, were the College, like the Schools of Gunnery, open to Officers of the Active Militia. But for some incomprehensible reason, in the same manner as at the first establishment of the military schools (when Officers of Volunteers were obliged to *resign their commissions* before being allowed to partake of the advantages of the schools) an Officer of the Active Force is debarred from qualifying himself for duty on the staff, by a short course at the Military College, while some twenty lads who have not been, and may not be, of any service to the country, are reaping all the advantages of an expensive and liberal technical education.


The estimate for militia purposes for 1877-78, provides only the sum of \$490,600 for militia purposes, the remainder being for the support of A and B Batteries, Military College, Dominion Forces in Manitoba, and the North West Mounted Police. This sum being inadequate for the support of the Force, it is proposed that only one half of the nominal strength shall be drilled, as was done last year. It would be well if Government would consider the result of this disastrous policy upon the organization. It is impossible to keep men together, to retain *esprit de corps*, or to attain efficiency, unless the men are brought together periodically for drill. In rural districts, where companies never meet, save at annual drill, the same men rarely turn out for two years in succession. At this

present moment, captains of rural companies who are to drill this year are doubtless making every effort to fill up their ranks, and taking every man who applies, fit or unfit, in order to turn out respectably. Once the drill is over, they may never see these men again. Now, is this securing a fair return for our outlay for militia purposes? I maintain it is sheer waste of money. What we want is that each man enrolled in a company shall remain in that company until he is properly trained, and that he shall then be discharged into the reserve, to be available at short notice in case of necessity. If this is impossible in rural districts, let us do away with the sham of calling rural battalions out, and provide instead for the assemblage of the *cadre* of the battalion, consisting of the officers and non-commissioned officers in a camp of instruction, similar to the cadet camp at Laprairie in 1865, where they would be thoroughly instructed in their duties, and rendered capable of imparting instruction to their men. The Force in cities, towns and villages, is more easily accessible, and should be more thoroughly organized and looked after than at present. All non-efficient corps should be struck off the list, and all good and efficient corps liberally encouraged. By these means, instead of having a large paper army, we should have an efficient nucleus, with unlimited powers of expansion.

So many diverse opinions exist as to the *method* in which the re-organization of the Force should be carried out, that I shall refrain from further remark, especially as the reports of the Major-General commanding contain all the suggestions that are necessary for placing the organization upon a proper basis. But if political ties bind the hands of our Government so tightly that they cannot carry out the excellent suggestions that the Major-General has made, let them evade the responsibility and cut the Gordian knot, by adopting the suggestion contained in the article already quoted from the *Saturday Review*, pledging themselves to carry out, within certain limits, the scheme that may be suggested by the Imperial Government. In this way all objections would be silenced, all political complications evaded, and the, at present, disintegrated and discontented Force, consolidated and contented. The suggestion is as follows:—

“The opinion of England is held in high estimation in Canada. Advice offered by her military authorities would be willingly followed, and the criticism that shows appreciation of honest endeavour would be far more readily received than the faint and careless praise which too often conceals contempt. A well-considered scheme for the organization of the Canadian troops, drawn up by the Intelligence Department of our War Office with a due regard to cost, and framed so that it might receive fuller development in time of war, would undoubtedly meet with careful


“consideration in Canada. Such a scheme should include not only
“plans for the defence of the colony, but also the means of utilizing
“its strength for Imperial purposes, or even of finding a place for
“the voluntary aid which Canada would probably proffer in the
“event of any considerable expedition beyond our own seas. In
“fact, the organization of the Canadian army should be almost as
“closely scanned and as carefully watched as that of our own
“militia. Distances are gradually disappearing; the ties that unite
“England with her colonies ought consequently to become closer;
“and for mutual protection every effort should be made to render
“them as binding and as efficient as possible.”



NOTES BY THE WAY.

If it were true, as some "advanced" thinkers of the present day maintain, that the Bible is not an inspired book, but the production of a person or persons whose information on several subjects appears, in the light of the nineteenth century, to be singularly inaccurate, it would still have to be admitted that there were among the writers those who understood very thoroughly and pictured very vividly some of the most besetting weaknesses of the human race. "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree," and "the serpent beguiled me," are two sentences which represent more faithfully and more succinctly than any other two that have ever been written the plea of the unsuccessful and the guilty of all ages. We are all ready enough to take credit to ourselves for our successes; and we are all equally ready to disown responsibility for our failure: there is always a figurative woman or serpent who has to do with what we are pleased to call our misfortunes. As with individuals, so with nations. Their prosperity they regard as the reward of their industry. But they have a happy knack of throwing the blame upon somebody else when the account balances the wrong way. If the people happen to live in a country cursed with freedom and responsible rulers, of course they blame the government, for governments in such countries, and under such circumstances especially, have the reputation of being possessed of very broad shoulders. The shoulders of despots, however, are proverbially narrow. Under the benign sway of a tyrant, therefore, people wisely leave the Government alone, and curse their luck, or providence, as may seem most fit. It is sometimes hard to believe that in this age of enlightenment people are in earnest when they lay at the doors of Cabinets and Parliaments the responsibility for the bad seasons, and the poor crops, and the grasshoppers, and the potato bugs, and the scarcity of money, and the depression of trade which follows as surely upon the heels of reckless speculation and lavish expenditure as moral bankruptcy and social disgrace do upon debauchery and dissipation. But the persistency with which the monstrous proposition is urged leaves no room to doubt. A Geneva correspondent of the *New York Nation*, however, relates one of the best things in this way probably that the pressure of the existing commercial stringency has produced. He says:—"The times are hard, very hard, just now in this part of Europe, yet not so hard but that people generally are expecting them to be worse before they are better. The blame of it is laid by most people partly on the rumours of war, but mainly

on the Americans and the Philadelphia Exhibition." And he goes on to say, in effect, that they think the Exhibition kept the Swiss hotels empty last season, and has since paralyzed the manufacturers of watches with fear of American competition. There is a charming simplicity in this complaint, which is not without its counterpart among ourselves; but it will puzzle a good many people to decide whether this novel way of accounting for "hard times" is the result of patriotic forbearance towards the men who control the political destiny of Switzerland, or the inventive ingenuity of the Swiss watchmakers run mad.



IS WAR AN ANACHRONISM ?

(*Herald G. B.*)

It is worth while to re-examine occasionally the ground of seemingly strong persuasions. When the foundation of a popular or deeply cherished belief is sound, such a scrutiny confirms confidence; if it is insecure, or rests upon an unstable base, the discovery cannot be regarded as a misfortune. It is always well to know the truth. Probably no proposition has been more warmly discussed than the reasonableness of war among civilized nations. The question has been considered from many standpoints and under almost every guise. Is war rational? Is it expedient? Does it really decide any dispute? Or is not the arbitrament of the sword a practical postponement of the issue with the highest probability of its being revived? In these and a multitude of divers forms the question has been repeatedly and exhaustively discussed. We have no intention of reproducing the stock arguments on either side. The effort would not be pleasing; nor would the result prove edifying. Nevertheless there is a shape in which the subject may with advantage once more engage attention and perhaps excite new interest. Is war an anachronism?

The principle of war has not changed since the earliest instance of reasoning by force on record—which is not, as commonly asserted, the strife in which Cain killed Abel, but the exclusion of Adam from Paradise by an angel armed with a flaming sword. The garden of Eden was protected from any attempt on the part of man to recover his lost privilege by force, with force, or, what is the same thing, a demonstration of force. A demonstration is, of course, effective only in so far as it signifies the power, and the will under certain circumstances, to employ the force paraded. The incident in which Cain slew Abel may be taken as the arch-type of jealousy, of treachery, of fratricide, of murder; but it has nothing in common with war, which was a divinely-permitted, if not a divinely-instituted mode of enforcing the decrees of the superior, of maintaining ass med rights and resisting supposed wrongs. No one can read the Jewish history without perceiving this truth underlying the principles of nationality, appropriation and defence; and nothing will be gained by pursuing the peace arguments or the protest of reason against war on the lines of a false presumption. The principle that right, real or imaginary, may and must be enforced by might is one against which no valid reasoning will lie. Whatever may be the case with individuals, nations have no alternative but to maintain their interests and prestige by force. If a display of

the power to act will suffice to compel submission, it may, happily, be needless to proceed further; but practically the influence exerted by any nation in general politics will be commensurate with its ability, if occasion should arise, to make good its words by deeds. It is idle to disguise, and impossible to deny, that the power to enforce obedience is the source of authority all the world over. Upon this fundamental principle international influence and municipal government both rest. The principle of war is coercion. Nothing can change that principle. Meanwhile, if it can be shown that the coercive power has ceased to be what it was in the days when men began to fight with swords and spears, there may be seen to exist a valid and rational ground for the contention that the mode of warfare should be changed, or, in other words, that the new power of coercion should be allowed to choose a more congenial and direct mode of expressing itself than the strife of arms.

In its time war, with the sword and mechanical weapons, has conferred enormous services upon mankind, and done much to aid the progress of civilization. The qualities of courage, patience under suffering, and self-sacrifice, physical strength, with keenness of sight and accuracy of visual judgment, ingenuity, and many allied virtues have been the products of war. It is difficult to see how by any other means these component parts of the civilized character could have been developed. Fanatics sometimes seek to decry war by repudiating the service it has rendered to human nature. This is not the way to advance the interests of peace. The vast successes which have been won by the sword have been not only contributory but essential to the building up of a high and noble nature. Mere predatory wars, carried on by wandering tribes, were useful in the earliest times. They served to develop the faculties of personal prowess and acumen out of which higher and more estimable qualities have grown. In themselves, however, these struggles were incapable of carrying the development beyond a limited area. Wars which made the victorious nation imperial, and necessitated powers of statesmanship to govern the people subjugated have given the greatest impetus to the onward march of intellect. No nation has long flourished in peace without degeneracy. This is the lesson of history. If it seems to tell against the tenets of a creed which glorifies peace at any price, that is an eventuality for which we cannot be held responsible, and which gives us no concern. We will not even beg the question by asserting that the benefits war has conferred upon the world have been collateral or contingent. We believe they have been direct and immediate. War has been, and is, in itself a noble and ennobling enterprise. Nevertheless, if, as we have said, it be the fact that the times and the circumstances have changed since battle in the old sense, whether on a large or small scale, was the appropriate mode of warfare, and the sword a

suitable weapon with which to contend—if this be the fact, and can be proved, it will be possible to make out a strong and clear claim for the recourse to new expedients.

In patriarchal times the right to feed flocks and herds on a particular tract of land or to till the country was maintained by force of arms against all comers. Later on cities were built and held by the right of might. In the same way tribute was enforced and vassalage established and asserted until the feudal age. Communities of men, under the leadership of their fathers and chiefs, grew to be nations with kings and rulers maintaining hereditary authority at the point of the sword against rebels and foreigners. Warlike races subjugated the feeble, and consolidated their conquests to build up empires. In a more complex state of society the legislative faculty came to be separable from the military, with which it was at first commonly associated. The source of authority was, however, the possession of power, whether against the outside world or within the nation. Practically that power has been, and always must be, power to provide the means of making war. A people armed with the largest resources and possessing the highest skill and greatest patriotism—that is, love for the national life and honour—must, in the long run, be triumphant. By surprise, treachery, or superior address, victory may be seized by the least able; but it cannot be held securely except by the most stable. War is, therefore, a forcible claim to the supremacy given by qualities which have been developed through previous successes. After victory, the moral, political, and material gains of the victorious nation need to be cultivated—and the issue of future struggles will, in fact, depend upon the use made of the last. In this way a triumphant power comes to possess extended claims to supremacy apart from the mere spoils of conquest and its prestige—the claim which springs from the wisdom of statesmanship has consolidated and enhanced the greatness achieved by the sword. Now comes the question whether the time has not arrived when the civilized nations of Europe, at least, have attained a point of development at which war may take a more direct form of expressing power than the mere slaughtering of armies. Reduced to its ultimate elements; the struggle has come to be a contest of rapidity in destroying and creating military and naval forces. The strength of fortresses, the range of guns, the skill of generals, are integers in the computation of opposed forces, but they are only parts of the formula, which might as well be worked out in any other fashion.

We are not so Utopian in our conception of human nature and its passions as to suppose nations would ever consent to submit their resources to the judgment of an impartial umpire; but, if this could be done, a settlement on the basis of relative might would approximate more closely to the logic of events than any settlement

by arbitration on the ground of right. Practically right has no more to do with the council of nations than may be expressed by might. If a great power is desirous of annexing a lesser power it will perform the act, unless it be deterred by the fear that some nation, with strength commensurate with its own, is about to take the part of the weak against it. This champions: ip of the little by the great is the best guarantee of peace in Europe. The lesser powers, too small to protect themselves, are the centres of union and of discord. If the powers were more equal they would be more likely to wage ceaseless warfare until, some being subdued and united, the victorious and vanquished together formed a supreme power, and gradually absorbed the others. This is what happened when the Continental nations were more on an equality than they are now. Small states with a good claim to independent existence are the little boys in Dame Europa's school. The big fellows quarrel and fight about them, but not half so often as they would fight among themselves if there were no permanently weak little *protégés* to protect and preserve. If a great power exhibits an intention of absorbing one of these little nationalities, others are sure to oppose it, and thus the rapacity of the more powerful states is held in check. Sometimes a great power uses a *protégé* as a catspaw. In that case the trick is generally detected, and the real aggressor is made to suffer for the sinister offence. It is a simple question of might, test and try it how we may; and, if it were possible to ascertain beforehand which of two nations were the stronger and more effective, taking into account the combinations which may occur in a prolonged war, it would be easy to predict the issue of any contest, and therefore to render the strife unnecessary.

The commercial instinct in a nation ought to be able to form a tolerably precise judgment on the first of the two points just indicated, the measure of force. Science, again, has made great advances, and introduced a new method of forecasting the issues of war. The ceaseless struggle for superiority in armaments is not useless if it enables us to measure our own strength and that of our neighbours with approximate accuracy. Other matters germane to the issue—such as money, health, resources and the like—ought to be well within the scope of the business faculty, and should be adequately appraised. It is necessary to know not only our own position, but that of possible enemies. Such knowledge would save many a contest—and a policy of candour instead of secrecy is therefore the best guarantee for peace; but the short-sighted people that can see no good in spending money on armaments unless we intend to use them, or in maintaining armies unless we intend to place them in the field, must be silenced by the common sense of public opinion—as indeed they have been and will be—or the most effectual and economical means of self-protection, which sheds no blood and does

good service to trade, cannot be carried on. The other question, which resolves itself into an inquiry how other nations will act in certain contingencies, is one which ought to lie well within the ken of statesmanship and diplomacy. It is, however, necessary that public opinion should itself be instructed in the weighing of international interests. To this end history, ancient, modern and contemporary, ought to be studied more generally, and with greater thoroughness. The branch of education which is, in itself, one of the most pacific exercises is unfortunately too much neglected. If public opinion had been better informed, we should not have been regaled with the recent spasmodic oratory and clap-trap lucubrations of men carried away by emotional sympathy in contempt of facts, and Europe might not have been the scene of the present contentions. Popular ignorance is the source of perpetual peril. The mischief should be repaired by better reading and more calm thought. A fair knowledge of our own position and that of our neighbours, with a just judgment of international interests, would have spared the world most modern wars. Aggressors are generally deceived or betrayed; and neither deception nor betrayal is possible when a nation is well informed.

War is not in itself an anachronism, but its practice commonly contravenes the spirit and progress of the times. Most wars could be fought out on paper, with pens and calculating-machines instead of on fields with swords and guns, if the practice were up to date. Wars may never cease; but, as communities become more thoroughly instructed, they will be less frequent. Tyrants with down-trodden people may make war for their own personal aggrandisement, but intelligent nations will not take the field unless they see a fair prospect of success; and, if the opposite party should see with equal clearness that it must be vanquished, the struggle would of course be avoided. The progress of enlightenment is therefore the progress of peace. Enlightenment is the secret cause of peace. Might still dominates, and right is a secondary consideration, but knowledge is power—the power of self-restraint—which is the greatest power of all. Those do nothing to strengthen but much to weaken this power who prate incessantly of peace. It is easy to talk eloquently of the needlessness of arms when an armed man keeps the door and the talkers are protected while they denounce the power that renders them safe. If there were real danger and pressing fear, these pacific philosophers would be the first to cry out for help. Nations with small armies must, on an emergency, raise irregular troops—and by such hirelings honour is sacrificed and independence lost. The only peace possible to nations must be purchased at the price of maintaining armaments ready for war.

OUR MILITIA STRUCTURE.

With a view to meet a want felt in every branch of the Active and Reserve Forces of the Dominion, and amongst a class—who rejoice to think a fast growing class—of loyal, patriotic men, well-wishers of the Force, supporters of that which tends to build the nation on a solid foundation, we have resolved to engage in an enterprise in journalism, the character of which we have more fully explained elsewhere; and, as in soliciting public support, we appeal to a variety of tastes, we shall, in various ways, exert ourselves to meet public requirements. We hope, therefore, as time goes on, and as there are fresh opportunities of extended usefulness, that we may secure extended circulation.

We desire to say a word here with respect to our present Militia structure. Composed of excellent material, it is efficient, too, in many quarters, and our General commanding has plainly shewn the *necessity* for its being efficiently maintained. There is, however, ample scope for development. The value of the Canadian *System* of defence appears to be not sufficiently understood, and not enough appreciated at home or abroad. Handed down to us by one of England's most skilful Generals, than whom we doubt if any military authority alive has given the subject of army organization more deep thought and more careful study. We refer to Major General McDougall. Our force has, in fair proportions, the three distinct component parts that General McDougall so well knew the use of, viz.:—Advance Guard, Support, and Reserve, with the “three arms of the Service” represented in each part—Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry.

(1) In the Advance Guard may be included the Mounted Police, A. & B. Battalions, and the small Infantry force in Manitoba—a Standing Army, if it may be so termed, happily of the minimum numerical strength.

(2) The Support may be considered to consist of the whole Active Militia of the country, drilled annually according to the provisions of section 46 of the Militia Law.

(3) The Reserve Militia, enrolled periodically, with a view to reinforce by voluntary or compulsory means, at short notice, any part of the force requiring to be numerically strengthened, has on its rolls representations of every class and of every arm of the service.

It is the *development* of the whole force, above described, that we desire to advocate, not the development of *one part* at the expense of another. It is useless to point out how undesirable it is

that we should find ourselves with an admirable Military College, but without the force from whence the Cadets are drawn, or with Cavalry and Artillery, but without the real fighting force of the country—Infantry.

In a recent article of the *Saturday Review*, (7th April,) on the "Canadian Militia," wherein scant credit is given for our past efforts to secure efficiency, while there are some valuable suggestions for our future guidance, the "key-note" of the situation is struck in the following words:—"The truth is that the time has come for Canada to consider what sort of force she is ready and willing to maintain; and, having determined upon some general principle, to carry it out systematically, and with all the assistance that England can afford." We have to add that the "general principle" has long since been determined upon, and, oddly enough, it is the well considered scheme of the officer to whom the *Saturday Review* suggests that we should apply, viz:—the officer in charge of the Intelligence Department of the Imperial War Office—Major General McDougall. It only remains, then, systematically to carry it out, and this can best be done, in our opinion, by such an annual system of *effective drill*, however limited in extent we may be at times compelled, for the sake of economy, to make it, as will lead up to triennial tactical Brigade Camps, carried out in a somewhat similar manner to that under which our late Brigade Camps have been assembled, and the results of which have been very satisfactory.

The weak points of the English Militia and Volunteer system have been found, at the recent Easter Monday Review, to be, in brief, as follows:

(1) In having a small number of weak Battalions on parade, which have no reserves behind them, and for the expansion of which to war strength no proper arrangements have been made.

(2) In the endeavour to obtain proficiency in mere barrack-yard drill, and losing sight of the necessity for corps being exercised "in those larger movements upon which actual warfare depends."

In conclusion, having, on our part, on the one hand, an excellent Militia Law, which provides for completing the quota of Active Militia, either by voluntary means, or by ballot; having a tactical brigade camp system at our disposal; and, besides having in the force many officers trained at schools for Artillery and Infantry instruction, with material for non-commissioned officers and men inferior to that of no other nation on earth, let us systematically take advantage of these things, and the Canadian force will yearly become more and more a source of pride to Canadians, and an important part of the auxiliary forces of the Empire.

THE COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

(*Pall Mall Budget.*)

The change which has taken place in the relations between Great Britain and her colonies of late years has been one of the most satisfactory features in the progress of the Empire. It is not very long since matters were by no means so pleasant as they happily are to-day. The removal of the Imperial troops from New Zealand at the most critical period of the struggle with the Maories—a struggle brought about by Imperial mismanagement—was followed by Lord Granville's cold and galling despatches, with the result that a strong feeling grew up in favour of separation from the mother country. In Australia, also, the departure of the troops in spite of the offer from at least one colony to pay the expense of their retention and the forcing upon Victoria an irritating change in the national flag, taken in connection with the contemptuous tone invariably adopted towards the Colonial Governments by the Colonial Office, had gone far to produce a similar discontent. In Canada a succession of petty annoyances, of which the sale of the old sentry boxes and the flagstaff at Quebec formed the climax, had likewise damped down even the loyalty of that noble colony; while the language held by most of the important English journals with regard to our fellow-subjects was little calculated to soften the bitterness aroused by continuous official snubbing. From a superficial point of view it did, indeed, appear at one time not impossible that the strenuous exertions of a few fanatics in favour of the disintegration of the Empire might be crowned with success. But reason and sentiment fortunately combined to neutralize their mischievous influence in England as well as in the Colonies, and if we now refer to past unpleasantnesses, it is only to congratulate ourselves that they cannot recur. All are now ready to admit that we are bound both by honour and by interest to defend our Colonies to the last, and no one of late has even ventured to suggest that in the event of war at our Cape Settlements we should leave the South Africans face to face with the Kaffirs unaided, or that if a difficulty were to arise with America we should give up Canada as defenceless, and abandon the Dominion to its fate.


The very fact, however, that we have risen to a higher conception of our Imperial duties renders it the more essential that we should lose no time in organizing the enormous resources we possess, and that we should call upon our colonists to say how far they desire to

bear a hand in their own defence and are ready to assist in maintaining our posts of vantage all over the world in an adequate state of preparation. This is a matter to which neither the Admiralty, in its present chaotic condition, nor the War Office, cumbered as it is with the details of an incomplete organization at home, is likely to pay immediate attention. It will be for Lord Canarvon, therefore, to take the initiative in promoting a more general understanding with respect to the protection of our colonies and our commerce. We are too much inclined even now to overlook the unity of the Empire; and that a policy which tends to strengthen and benefit any part must in the long run be to the advantage of the whole has scarcely yet met with general acceptance. Moreover, we have to remember that wars sometimes occur, and that we may be involved in them; and it will be no small anxiety removed from our minds if, by the exercise of a little forethought, we are enabled to secure the safety of our outlying possessions, and at the same time contribute to the protection of our vast mercantile marine.

At present we pay far less for protective purposes than any other Power, with the exception of America, in proportion to the wealth, extent, and population of our empire. Strange too as it may appear, this is particularly noticeable in one instance with respect to our navy. France, whose mercantile tonnage is one-sixth that of Great Britain, and whose total of exports and imports is considerably less than half, and who has scarcely any colonies and no India to defend, spends, even in these days of heavy taxation, in the proportion of about £7,000,000 to our £11,000,000 upon her fleet, and the relative strength of the two navies has been computed at about 7 to 10. Thus with six times the shipping of France under our flag at home alone, and infinitely greater interests than she has elsewhere, we are content with a very much more moderate insurance against an enemy's attack. As our navy is our principal offensive as well as defensive weapon, it cannot be urged that in this respect we are in any way over-prepared. But none of our colonies or dependencies, wealthy as they are and valuable as their shipping is becoming—(Canada alone having a greater tonnage than France registered under the British flag at her ports)—contribute a shilling to the Imperial navy, upon which nevertheless they rely, and have a right to rely, for protection. Nor is this all. They do not even pay the cost of the naval stations situated on their own shores, which are kept up for the repair of vessels told off in great part, if not chiefly, for their advantage. No doubt it would be necessary for us, under any circumstances, with our enormous carrying trade to and from our own dependencies, to maintain a fleet in all the waters in which we have a mercantile marine to protect; but this does not relieve our colonists, who derive so great an advantage from the Imperial connection, from some responsi-

bility towards the mother country. If they were to declare themselves independent to-morrow, they would be bound to apply some portion of their funds to the defence of their sea-going vessels; and if they were to join their fortunes to any other country, whether monarchical or republican, they would speedily find themselves called upon to contribute their quota to national purposes. The same is the case with India, which has a very small army, and relies entirely upon the Imperial navy for the security of its seaboard. Englishmen at home have no desire, however, to lay upon their colonies any portion of the burdens which they are able to bear themselves; but at a time like the present, when it is quite conceivable that all classes of our community may be obliged to make great sacrifices in order to maintain unimpaired the dignity and safety of the whole empire, they have a right to ask how far Englishmen in the colonies understand that they owe something to themselves in this matter. Only the other day a distinguished Canadian officer, speaking on the gain to the Dominion of the Imperial connection, instanced the fact that the English flag was everywhere bound to cover the Canadian commerce; and that wherever in foreign countries an English consul was appointed, there the Canadian shipmaster found an official representative ready to espouse his interests and to use the prestige of the Imperial power in the assertion of his rights. What is all-important just now is that in return for such benefits the various colonies should themselves provide for the full defence of such stations as we may require on their shores, and, if necessary, contribute in some measure to the establishment of telegraphic connection between the posts which connect them with the mother country. Where possible also they might assist in their fortification and in keeping them well supplied with coal and other necessaries required for refitting the Imperial vessels of war. There is every reason to believe that the colonists would be perfectly ready to recognize their obligations in this direction. The recent application for the appointment of engineer officers to recommend the best means of fortifying the Australian coast, which has since been complied with by the Colonial Office, shows that the Australian colonies are alive to the danger of neglecting any longer such defences as may be necessary; and although the Canadian militia appears to be falling off somewhat from their standard of efficiency, there is little doubt that the authorities of the Dominion, if the matter were carefully brought before them, would acknowledge that they were at present scarcely doing enough to hold their own coasts against any hostile raid or to provide fortified stores for the Imperial fleet. Fortifications and well-supplied coaling stations cannot be improvised at the critical moment. As was pointed out by Mr. Robert Torrens in a letter to the *Pall Mall Gazette* not long since, King George's Sound,

the important station to the extreme south-west of Australia, is quite undefended, and although it is now to be connected with Adelaide by cable, no steps have yet been taken to secure a most dangerous post in an enemy's hands. Melbourne, Newcastle (New South Wales), the Bay of Islands, and Auckland (New Zealand), the Falkland Islands, Vancouver Island, even Halifax and Hong Kong, also come within the long list of great strategical positions which are either insufficiently defended and supplied or not defended at all. Yet, as has been urged over and over again, a single loss which we may sustain from such neglect might be infinitely greater than the cost of taking ordinary precaution. With ordinary care the absolute control of the water communication of the globe is in our hands. Already the entire southern hemisphere, from the Cape of Good Hope to Australia, from Australia to New Zealand and Fiji, and thence to South America and the Falkland Islands, seems placed at our disposal. We hold the harbours and we own the coal. A similar arrangement to that which the United States have recently concluded with the Sandwich Islands, and—though this is a more delicate question—a rather better foothold in the China seas, would extend our maritime supremacy over the whole Pacific. In the Atlantic and on our great trade routes to the East we are still better off; and there is no need even to name the unbroken chain of posts from Gibraltar to Hong Kong by which we secure our connection with India and China. All that is now contended for is that a comparison of notes with our various colonies and dependencies would place us in a far better position with reference to the points which it is absolutely essential to strengthen than if we were to defer the consideration of these matters to a less convenient season. We should then learn also upon how much assistance we could rely in time of danger, and how far local organization was adapted to ward off a sudden attack.




MILITIA REFORM.

(The following is a summary of the discussion in the House of Commons on the Militia Estimates, published by the "London Advertiser.")

A discussion occurred in Parliament on the motion for concurrence in the Militia estimates, and the reports of the remarks of members who took part in it indicate that the Government aim at a gradual reduction of the active strength of the Militia, and that the drill this year will be for twelve days, in camps, the number of men to be trained being fixed at 20,000. Several members of the House expressed their regrets at the large reductions made in the Militia estimates since the present administration assumed office. Hon. Mr. Mitchell, however, took an opposite view, and urged a still further reduction in the grant. He thought half a million dollars was quite sufficient to expend annually on the Militia. Mr. Wright (Pontiac) believed in reducing the force to a compass that would permit of its being properly drilled, clothed and equipped. He approved of the scheme proposed by the Major-General in his annual report. Mr. Aylmer had a scheme which included the training of the officers and non-commissioned officers and twelve men per company each year, calling out a fresh batch annually, so that each company of forty-eight men would occupy four years in training. This is so much like Capt. Bobadil's method of waging war that it is apt to provoke a smile. Dr. Brouse favored the Swiss plan of drilling the youths while at school, and would like to see it introduced. The propositions and suggestions were varied and numerous, but no definite amendment was offered, and the vote passed without a division. The remarks of the Minister of Militia closing the debate explain the position of the Government on the Militia question. He pointed out that the system followed for the past eight or ten years had been permitted to expand to an improper extent, so that there were really more men on the roll than they could drill, and they were forced to curtail the time. What the Government desired to do was to reduce the force to 20,000 or 25,000 men, and drill it more efficiently, but this could not be done precipitately. They proposed, therefore, to disband companies where little interest was manifested, until the force was finally reduced to the necessary number. Referring to the suggestion of Mr. Aylmer, he said that if they were to drill officers alone he thought they had better establish a school of infantry. They were not in a position to do this at present, and he thought the best thing they could do was to continue the existing system with the amount of money devoted to that purpose, in hope that within a year or

two, with an increased vote for training the Militia, they would be able to bring out the force as usual. He did not think, after spending so much money on the system, it was now advisable to adopt a new one. From this it will be seen that there will be no abrupt change in the Militia system; that there will be a gradual reduction of the force till it reaches about 20,000; and that the drill will be in the main conducted as heretofore, with probably an increased period allowed as the reductions in the force approach the limit aimed at.



THE FRENCH MILITARY SYSTEM.

PARIS CORRESPONDENT OF THE TORONTO "GLOBE."

The Paris correspondent of the *Toronto Globe*, writing under a recent date, has the following interesting notice of the military system of France:

It is admitted on all sides that the French military system is in a very different condition now from what it was in 1870, and that strenuous efforts are being made to increase the efficiency more and more. Immediately after recovering a little from the stunning catastrophe of 1870, and the return from German prisons of the leading French officers, meetings took place at which past errors were confessed and a determination came to no longer to allow themselves to be ruled by false considerations of national self-love. Official enquiries were opened, military journals founded, meetings of officers established, and conferences held at which each manifested an anxiety to contribute his share of experience and good-will to the common work. In 1872 a small volume appeared containing valuable military statistics. This was followed in 1873 by a larger one, and in 1874 by a third, while in 1875 a fourth was issued, condensing the information in the preceding volumes and showing the progress made during the previous years, not only in the French, but also in the armies of foreign nations. Meantime the National Assembly was not indifferent to the subject of army organization, and on 27th July, 1872, passed a law abolishing the system of bounties and substitutes and establishing the principle of personal and obligatory service between the ages of 20 and 40. In this way the annual contingent for the army rose to 150,000 men, divided into two parts, one of which was to remain with the active army for five years, and the other, after a certain amount of service, to be allowed to leave on furlough, but to be at the disposal of the State and to be liable to drill at any time. The ordinary periods of service are at present five years with the active army and four years with the reserve, while voluntary enlistments and the one-year volunteer system are also permitted. In July, 1873, was passed the law for the general organization of the army, having for its leading feature:—"That the army is divided into army corps, complete in staff and material and only needing the addition of men and officers to enable them to take the field; their reserves and stores being close at hand. 2. Decentralisation. Each general is responsible for the mobilisation of his corps and his first supplies. 3. A corps of

General Controllers is established. These report direct to the Minister of War, and act during peace as General Inspectors. 4. The control is separated from the administration. A corps commander is now responsible as much for administration as for drill, discipline, and other purely military matters. 5. Recruiting, remounts, hospitals, &c., are managed—under the corps commander—by the territorial staff, which is distinct from the active staff. When a corps is mobilised and quits the region, the command devolves on a general previously designated by the Minister of War. Subsequent laws and decrees have been issued regarding the inducements to non-commissioned officers to remain in the service, the extension of the period of service of the second portion of the contingent from six months—the time first fixed on—to twelve months, and the formation of an *ecole superieure de la guerre*. Other matters relating to the staffs, the administration, &c., still remain to be settled; but the main points in army reorganization have been already dealt with, and as a whole the new system is in full operation.”

In the ranks of the army a complete revolution has taken place in the mode of cultivating the intelligence of the soldiers and inferior officers. Following the example of the Germans, the instruction of the men is obligatory on the officers, who, instead of lounging in *cafes* as formerly, are kept almost constantly at their various military duties. The army schools are greatly improved, libraries are established in each regiment, programmes for the teaching of topography and geography are prepared, and district schools opened for the practice of shooting, through which all officers must pass. A new regulation for the manœuvring of infantry was put in force in 1876, and it is said to be equal to all the requirements of modern warfare. In drill and tactics the men have made great improvement, and they now keep step like English or German soldiers instead of the slovenly mode of walking they formerly had. A regulation has also been published assimilating the manœuvres of the cavalry to those of the Prussian army, which is so superior in all that treats of that arm. The cavalry is vastly improved in every respect—even the horses are better than they were, and practice is unremitting. The effective force in all the arms has been increased. The infantry, which in 1870 included eight regiments of the Imperial guard, one hundred regiments of the line, twenty-one battalions of chasseurs, and ten regiments *d'elite*, has been nominally augmented by 44 regiments of the line, but really by 36, in consequence of the suppression of eight regiments of the Imperial Guard. The battalions of chasseurs have been increased from 21 to 30; the regiments *d'elite* from 10 to 11 by the return to this corps of the regiment of Zouaves of the Guard. The cavalry, which had been increased from 56 to 63 regiments, now actually

numbers 77. The artillery, which formerly comprised 21 regiments, now includes 38. So that the effective of the French army at the end of 1875 rose to 525,000 men, and in case of war can be carried to 977,500.

The papers have been informing you from time to time of the discussion here on M. Laisant's Bill, the object of which is to abolish the twelve months' volunteering, and to reduce the military service from five to three years. Apart from the political question involved, most military men are opposed to this measure, and I am assured by an influential deputy that there is no probability of its becoming law. M. Thiers had been roused into unusual activity in his opposition to it, ascribing many of the failures of the army in the late war to the abandonment of his favourite law of 1832. At one of the meetings of the Committee on the Laisant Bill, he used the following language, which may be quoted for the benefit of your Canadian military men:—

“There are few new views on the Army question. The principles on which the constitution of true armies reposes are not numerous and are incontestable. I believe that the Committee of '45 of the National Assembly, which made the present law, misunderstood those principles, and did France a great injury by abolishing the law of 1832. I do not thank General Trochu for having raised these questions in the National Assembly, despite the respect I have for his character and his talents. All the experiments that have been made, except the law of 1832, have been fruitless. After every revolution it is believed society requires to be reformed; therefore the army must be reformed. And yet it is men who, like Gouvion St. Cyr, have made the finest campaigns who have made the law of 1832. To have armed nations we must go back to barbarous times. Armed nations in our time run away at the first report of cannon. What are required for war are soldiers. There is no analogy between Prussia and France. In Prussia the population is poor, and has the spirit of submission. There is also there a petty nobility, equally poor, from which are recruited those officers who lead the peasants by blows with the flat side of their swords. Of these elements it is that the Prussian army is made. The condition of our infantry sub-officers is not satisfactory. They cannot be made in a day. Young men must be incorporated in the ranks of men who have made long wars. Soldiers are only made by a long life in the regiment. Nothing is different to-day. War is made in our time just as in the time of Cæsar. Our century is too infatuated; it believes it has discovered everything, and it has only discovered the planet Neptune. The three years' soldier is a disastrous mistake, because not only is education necessary, but also military education. Under the revolution the first shock of the enemy was only borne by the royal


army. I am vexed to see that my country thinks only of chimeras. Field-Marshal Moltke said to our Ambassador, M. de Contaut Biron, at the time of the discussion of the law of 1872, 'I hope to see M. Thiers beaten;' and he was right. Prussia would return to the old system if she could. She has, moreover, her Royal Guard, a chosen corps, without anything corresponding to it in France. The 1832 law enabled the French to make the African, Crimean, and Italian wars. We have many able generals—for instance; General Canrobert. What we want is soldiers, and to have them we must prefer quality to number. 'The army must be a career, not a mere passage for all citizens without distinction.'

You have seen the article in *Blackwood's Magazine* in which a writer discusses the danger that France is supposed to be to Germany, and what the German armies might be expected to meet in case they should make an attempt to invade France. The latter question only bears upon the subject of this letter, and the following will confirm much of what has already been stated in regard to the present condition of the French army:—

"In 1870 'only 250,000 men could be concentrated in a month, while the reserves and garrisons did not at first reach 300,000.' This is all that France had to show against the tremendous array with which Germany took the field, and when this was defeated, dispersed, or shut up in Metz, there was nothing behind but the raw levies hastily raised by the Government of National Defence. As compared with 1870 the present position of France extraordinarily favourable. The writer in *Blackwood* estimates that there are now about 455,000 men with the colours, most of whom have already seen four years' service, while the reserve of the active army amounts to about 920,000. This reserve is, of course, made up of troops of very various degrees of efficiency. The reserve, properly so-called, consists of men who, having served in the active army from 20 to 25, pass into the active reserve at 26, and remain in it till they are 29. Many of these are trained soldiers. Another portion consists of that part of the annual contingent of the active army which is only called up for six months—in future it will be for a year—and is then sent home on leave. The remainder is made up of about 160,000 men who during peace are excused from service with the colours and passed at once into the reserve. Behind all these classes comes the territorial army, which the writer in *Blackwood* sets down at 500,000 men, rather more than half of whom are old soldiers of the active army. Thus, after making a number of necessary deductions, we get at a total force—army reserve and territorial—of 1,800,000, of which 760,000 are really educated soldiers, and about 300,000 have had six months' drilling. The latter, together with the residue, who are soldiers only in name, would be placed in the reserves; 'it is quite possible that they

would have time to learn their business, partially at least, before they were sent out to fight.' With a defensive army of this magnitude, there is no need to have any fears as to the ability of France to hold her own against invasion."

Germany, however, has not the least idea of attacking France at present, and few in France, bitter though their feelings are against that country, impute to it any such intentions. When the hour of conflict comes—and come it will—France will *not* be wanting as she was in 1870.



MILITARY EFFICIENCY.

BY W. A. J.

The question of how best to maintain the efficiency of the Militia Force of the Dominion at the least expense to the country is one which recurs, whenever the Minister of Militia has to make to Parliament his annual explanation of the manner in which he proposes to expend the appropriation he asks to maintain our only constitutional force for defensive purposes. Differences of opinion have existed, do exist, and probably always will continue to exist (until that happy time arrives when swords will be beaten into ploughshares and men will not learn the art of war any more) as to the plan by which this double object can be attained, and if we cannot hope to set at rest these differences, we may, at any rate, induce others to think upon the matter.

We have always regarded the plan of putting untrained men into camp for eight or even twelve days as a simple waste of money, for the reason that when the time required to move into and out of camp (together with the Sundays) is deducted, that left for actual work would not nearly suffice for the most elementary instruction in squad drill. But these camps always terminated their proceedings with a field day, so that it was evidently assumed that instruction in company and even in battalion drill had made considerable progress. Moreover, time was found to expend fifteen rounds of ball cartridge per man, although not one in ten knew anything of the firing exercise, or of aiming or position drill.


The general order of this year we regard as a step in the right direction, and we hope next year to see a further advance, and the drill limited to two companies in country battalions, to one battalion in the smaller cities, and two in the larger ones, with in both town and country a complement of cavalry and field artillery. The latter should be especially cared for. Garrison artillery we have always thought should be reduced to one, or at most two, thoroughly efficient batteries, to be maintained only where facilities for artillery practice exist, and in those places the guns should not only be manned, but the works should be maintained in order by the local artillery militia, who should, if the work required exceeds that which might fairly be demanded during the term of drill, be paid for it.

There is no possible reason why a small, but thoroughly efficient, force should not be maintained at a cost not exceeding the sum now voted, but to do this the reins must be tightened, and the district staff officers must be impressed with the idea that an inspection is a matter of *duty*, and not a sort of annual picnic at which things are to be made pleasant all round. The city battalions should be placed upon an entirely different footing to the country corps. If a militia force is to be of any practical value, it must possess two essential qualifications:—It must be easily mobilized, and it must be so constituted as to be available in case of riot or civil commotion. No argument is needed to prove how much more easily a city battalion can be placed under arms and prepared for active service than a country corps. A city battalion can also be maintained in a much higher state of efficiency, because the men are more easily kept together, and are more frequently assembled for drill, and they can, as a rule, be more thoroughly depended on to do their duty when called upon to aid the civil power; because, being of a mixed character (that is, recruited from many different classes and occupations) they are less likely to be generally identified with any particular class or interest.

As regards the rural corps, it must be obvious that a battalion of which no portion is assembled for drill during a whole year becomes more or less demoralized, if indeed it be not practically disbanded; and for this reason it would seem to be desirable rather to maintain the thorough efficiency of two companies (or even one, if two could not be covered by the appropriation) of each battalion, than to have a certain number of half drilled and a certain number of undrilled battalions. These latter would generally be found to exist merely upon paper. This plan would moreover maintain the efficiency of the regimental staff, since the Lieut.-Colonel, the Adjutant and the Serjeant-Major would superintend the drill of the two companies. The companies would of course be changed each year, and care should be taken to see that the same men do not get transferred from one company to another in that connection. If the Colonel were absent, one of the Majors could take his place. The nucleus of each battalion being thus maintained intact, it would be a very easy matter to increase its strength as occasion might require. Recruits are seldom wanting in times of excitement, and of the men thus trained year by year, a large proportion would always be available.

We are strongly of opinion that the term of drill should in no case be less than sixteen days; twenty-one days would not be too much, but perhaps sixteen is all we can as yet hope for; and this, in the case of city battalions, should be divided into four days or eight drills each quarter, so as to keep the men well in hand.

Target practice, in summer, if conducted in accordance with the regulations, under the superintendence of an officer, might be allowed to count for drill. The inspection should also be of a much more practical character. In the case of city battalions, quarterly inspections should be insisted upon; and as regards country battalions, the time of drill should be so arranged as to enable the D. A. G. to spend at least the last two days of the drill with the battalion, or rather with the two companies.



MILITARY SYSTEM AND MILITARY INSTRUCTION IN SWITZERLAND.

By E. Dwight.

I. OUTLINE OF MILITARY SYSTEM.

In the year 1847 seven of the cantons of the Swiss Republic seceded from the Confederacy. Among them were the three forest cantons, the original nucleus around which the whole Republic had been formed, the birth-place of William Tell and Arnold, of Winkelreid. The seceders held the strongest military position in Europe, but the loyal cantons put on foot an army of 100,000 men, well armed, drilled, and officered. The city of Friburg was taken, and in thirty days from the first proclamation of the commanding general the war was ended and order was restored.

In 1856, a quarrel having arisen with the king of Prussia, Switzerland placed on foot an army of 200,000 men well provided with artillery. Thus the military system of Switzerland has proved itself effective, and as there is no standing army whatever, and the state is a confederacy of cantons under democratic forms of government, we may find something in their system applicable to our own case.

Switzerland covers an area of about 15,000 square miles, of which a large portion is covered by lakes, forests, mountains, ice and snow, leaving only thirty-one per cent of the land fit for agricultural purposes, not including the mountain pastures. Possessing a population of only two millions and a half of people, it is surrounded by military powers of the first class, and must needs be strong to be free. France, Austria, and Prussia are not always as good friends as they are near neighbors, and the little Republic must ever be ready to ward a blow and return it. The constitution of Switzerland declares that every citizen is a soldier. "Tout Suisse est soldat." Military service is required between the ages of twenty and forty-four. The substitution of one man for another is forbidden, but exemption from service is allowed to certain persons, such as officers of the government and of public institutions, clergymen, students of theology, members of the police, pilots and others. In some cases a man is excused from the more active service, but required to pass through the regular course of military instruction and to serve in the reserve of the army when

called upon. Such are the only son, or one of the sons, of a widow; or of a widower, provided the father be over sixty years old, and the son necessary to his support; a widower, the father of children in their minority, who has no resources except the work of his own hands; one of two or more sons when they make common household with their parents, if the family could not be supported by other brothers not subject to service; married men, or widowers having at least two children. These exceptions do not apply to officers.

The Council of State of each canton appoints yearly a "Commission on Furlough and Discharge," consisting of ten members, of whom two are medical men, two officers, one a corporal, one a soldier, and the others members of the council. The commission acts under oath; grants exemption for physical defects or want of height; or passes men from the active service to the reserve. A man who at the age of twenty has not attained the height of five feet and one inch can be furloughed for two years; and if, at the end of the third year, he has not reached this height, discharged from all service. Men who have been convicted of disgraceful crimes, or have suffered penal sentence, are declared unworthy of bearing arms; and if once deprived of their civil rights can not hold a commission.

The militia is divided into the federal contingent and the landwehr. The federal contingent consists—*First*, of the elite, which includes three per cent of the whole population, taken from those between the ages of twenty and thirty-four. The time of service in the elite is eight years. *Second*, the reserve, being one and a half per cent of the population and not above the age of forty. The landwehr includes men up to the age of forty-four. The landsturm, or *levy en masse*, consists of the whole male population, capable of bearing arms, between the ages of twenty and fifty, and not included in the classes before described. The male population of Switzerland is 1,140,000, of which thirty-seven per cent, or 422,000, are between twenty and forty-four years of age. One-fourth of these are exempt or found unfit for service, leaving 316,000 perfectly fit. In 1853 the number of men required for the federal contingent was 104,354,* but according to official statements the number of men in all branches of the service, well armed and instructed, amounted to 125,126. The excess of men supplied, over those required, arose from the public spirit and general desire for military instruction existing among the people. Add to these 125,000 the landwehr, which numbered 150,000, and we have a total of 275,000 effective men, well armed, drilled, and officered.

The federal army is composed of the following arms: engineers, including sappers and pontoniers; artillery, including rocket batter-

* Infantry, including Rifles, 89,366; Artillery, 10,366; Cavalry, 2,869; Engineers, 1,530.

ics; cavalry, riflemen, light infantry, and infantry. There is besides a medical corps for the service of the ambulances and hospitals. But as uninstructed men are of little or no value, the federal law upon military organization provides that the cantons shall see to it that the infantry of their contingent is completely instructed according to the federal rules, and though the application of this principle in its details is left to each canton, yet the following rules are laid down: recruits are not received into the federal elite until they have gone through a complete course of instruction which lasts at least twenty-eight days for infantry, and thirty-five days for light infantry. The confederation charges itself with the instruction of the engineers, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen. This course lasts twenty-eight days for riflemen and forty-two days for the three other arms, but these recruits have previously been drilled in the school of the soldier by their cantons, and the riflemen have received preparatory instruction in firing at a mark.

In the larger cantons—that of Zurich for instance—divisions of recruits in succession are put into barracks and well drilled practically and theoretically for fifty-six days, either consecutively or at two periods of the same year, as may best suit the youths. In the second year after entering the elite and for each year afterwards, the infantry is called out for drill during three days, by half battalions at least, with preparatory drill of three days for the “cadres,”* the commissioned and non-commissioned officers forming skeleton corps. Days of entry into service are not counted as days of drill, and in case of interruption the days of drill are increased by two days. The reserve is called out for drill during two days of each year, with a preparatory drill of one day for the “cadres.”

In the corps of engineers, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen, the elite is called out every alternate year for the engineers and artillery, and every year for the cavalry and rifles. The drill lasts four days for the “cadre of engineers and artillery, and immediately after ten days for the cadres and companies united, or twelve days for both together. For the cavalry the drill lasts seven days for dragoons and four days for “guides;” for riflemen, two days for the cadres, and immediately afterwards four days for cadres and companies united. The reserve is called out for a drill of half the length of that of the elite.

To complete the instruction of the soldier the cantons in their turn send their men yearly to the federal camps where the troops to the number of three or four thousand, are kept under canvas for two weeks. Larger numbers of men, forming bodies of 5,000 and upwards, are also mustered and cantoned in the villages, and during several days exercised in the grand movements and manœuvres of war, chiefly for the instruction of commanders and officers of the staff.

* The officers, non-commissioned officers, and corporals, constitute what is called the “cadre”

To keep up the efficiency of every department of the service the whole is subjected to the yearly inspection of colonels of the federal staff appointed by the central government. The inspection of infantry is confided to ten colonels who serve for three years. There is also an inspector in each of the arms of engineers and artillery, the latter having under his direction an administrator of materiel charged with the inspection and surveillance of all the materiel of the confederation. This administrator directs and superintends the workmen employed in the factories of the confederation for the manufacture of powder and percussion caps, as well as arms, gun-carriages, &c. The colonel of cavalry and the colonel of rifles direct all that relates to their respective arms, and recommend the necessary improvements. If these inspectors detect in the contingent of any canton any want of perfection in drill, they have the power to order such additional drill as may bring the men up to the proper standard.

Great care is taken in the instruction and selection of officers. The officers of infantry, up to the grade of major, are appointed by the cantonal authorities; the higher officers by the federal government. But no officers can be appointed to the special arms of engineers, artillery, and cavalry, except such as have gone through a course of instruction at a military school appropriate to each arm. No one can become a non-commissioned officer who has not served at least one year as a soldier, nor a commissioned officer except after two years' service. Candidates for promotion must pass a public examination, before a commission, both in theoretical and practical knowledge. Promotion is given, according to seniority, up to the grade of first lieutenant. Captains are chosen from among the lieutenants without regard to seniority. To be appointed major, eight years' service as an officer is required, of which, at least, two years as captain. For a lieutenant-colonel, ten years' service as officer, of which, at least four as major of the special arm. For a colonel, twelve years' service as an officer is required, of which, at least, four years as "commandant," or in a higher grade. In the Swiss service there is no higher rank than colonel. When a colonel has been appointed commander-in-chief of the army, he receives for the time being, the title of general, which he afterwards retains by courtesy.

THE CADET SYSTEM.

The Swiss boy learns target shooting and practices gymnastic and military exercises at a very early age. He imbibes with his mother's milk the thought that his first duty is to become a defender of his country.

These boy-soldiers are styled *Cadets*, and are a fruit that can spring up and ripen on democratic soil only. The first armed corps

of the kind we find in Berne near the end of the 16th century. But the general practice of military exercises among them dates back only about eighty years, when the HELVETIC MILITARY ASSOCIATION began to advocate the formation of *Corps de Cadets* in all parts of Switzerland. From that time the most efficient and eminent officers devoted themselves enthusiastically to this cause. The first corps sprang up in Aarau, Sursee and Olten. Aarau possessed for a long time the best drilled, largest and finest corps, and in the canton of Argovia generally the system has struck deeper root than elsewhere; but well drilled corps can be found in any of the larger places, as in Zofingen, Lenzburg, Brugg, Baden, and a dozen other places. It was an old custom for the cadets to parade in the federal cities—Zurich, Berne and Lucerne—in honor of the assembling of the Swiss Diet, (*Tagsatzung*.) As far back as 1770 we find a boy corps of infantry and artillery in Zurich, yet towards the end of the last century the organization was partially broken up, until the political renovation of the canton in 1830 re-organized the corps anew. Besides in the capital, we find corps in Winterthur, Uster, Wald, Stafa, Meilen, Horgen, Wädenswil, and other towns on the lake shores. Berne, Biel, Thun, Burgdorf, and many other Bernese villages, for thirty or forty years, have practiced their school-boys in the exercise of arms. The state takes special care to give the students of the University of Berne and of the two normal schools a thorough military training. The cantons of Lucerne, Solothurn, Basle, Schaffhausen, St. Gall, Appenzell, Glarus, Tessin, Friburg, Neuchâtel, and the countries of Vaud and of the Grisons, possess each of them one or more cadet-corps. Military drill, as well as gymnastic exercises, forms part of the regular school routine of all middle and higher schools of the above-named cantons. Provision is now made to extend this discipline over all schools, making it obligatory on every pupil who is not disabled by bodily defects. Military practice commences at the age of eleven and is continued to the age of eighteen or nineteen. Federal or cantonal officers and instructors drill the youth two afternoons in the week, the more advanced only once a week. The youth thus disciplined, learn not only to obey but also to command. The officers of every corps are promoted from the rank and file, and in this manner are excellently fitted to become officers in the federal army. All cadets when they are enrolled at a later period into the militia, are by law exempted from drill. The arms are furnished by the state or community; the uniform, which the pupil may wear in or out of service, must be procured by himself.

Most of the cadet-corps consist of infantry, (sharpshooters and musketeers;) many have, however, artillery also, as in Zurich, their guns throwing balls of two and four pounds weight. In

Argovia and some other cantons there are even grenadiers and sappers. Cavalry exist in theory only. A gun with bayonet and cartridge-box, here and there also a knapsack and sword form the equipment of the foot-soldier. The uniforms are various and fanciful. The Zurich Cadets distinguish themselves by their simple and tasteful appearance; they wear a dark blue coat with white metal buttons, grey pants, and dark blue cap with the cockade. Every corps has one or more smaller or larger flags. Many cantons have excellent bands of music; others, as Zurich, have only drummers and their indispensable drum-major, and sing martial songs while marching.

It is a universal custom to close the school year in autumn by a festival, the shining point of which is the military parade and field manoeuvre. The Swiss juvenile festivals have gained quite a reputation at home and abroad. In the Argovian communities all the school children, the females as well as males, festively adorned, participate. The corps of the whole canton and even of several cantons are often united in the field manoeuvre; on such an occasion the enthusiasm and emulation of youth reach the highest pitch. Thus the Bernese Cadet Corps in 1821 had a common drill parade in the neighbourhood of the capital, and many others have since come off. In 1816 about 1,000 Argovians went into camp at Lenzburg, and all of them will joyfully remember this merry festival. A still greater notoriety was gained by the hot sham fights at Wettingen, which came off in 1821, and in which the Argovian, Zurich and Winterthur cadets operated together. Two brigades consisting of 1,560 men, all told, with seven cannon, fought there for the position between Wettingen and Baden; the most glorious affair of the day was the heroic defense and final storming of the Wettingen bridge. Yet all other manoeuvres of that sort have been thrown into shadow by the great Swiss cadet feast in September, 1856. It will not be forgotten by the thousands, who participated either as actors or spectators, even if there should be at some future day a re-union of all the corps in Switzerland. Ten cantons participated in that festival. Argovia furnished 974 men; Zurich, 805; St. Gall, 472; Schoffhausen, 186; the Grisons, 166; Ausserrhoden, 155; Lucerne, 148; Thurgovia, 111; Glarus, 60; and Tessin even sent over the St. Gothard a contingent of eighty-four. Thus 2,161 young heroes, in various but generally tasteful uniforms, with bands of music, one hundred and twenty-four drums, numerous banners, and ten cannon, entered the festively-adorned Zurich from all sides. Divided into two little armies drawn up in battle array between Oerlicon and Schwamendingen, they fought over the celebrated battle of June 4th, 1797, in which the French under Massona, were defeated by the Austrians under Archduke Charles.

The youths in Zurich as well as in other cantons, have no

reason to complain that their physical development is neglected in favor of the mental; nay, we might rather fear that the first is at times too much exaggerated, considering the tender age of the majority of the boys. The pupils of the canton Gymnasium and Industrial School, many of whom are foreigners, Germans especially, practice gymnastic exercises throughout the whole year; the military drill is limited to the summer course only. In the month of August, from time immemorial, the boys, all and every one, practice target-shooting. The smaller boys only are allowed to rest the gun on the stand; the older must shoot without any support whatever. The cities and individuals furnish prizes for those who hit the centre of the target. In September the cadets—the infantry as well as artillery—hold their target-shooting; in October they drill in the field, (“Vorkampfi,”) and then comes off the annual School Festival with its gymnastic exercises and the combined manœuvre in field.

At the sham fight on the 1st October, 1860, the enemy as usual existed in fancy only; they fired, however, as if he were flesh and blood. They had the task of pursuing the imaginary foe from Windicon to the Hockler. The division marched over the covered bridge at Aussersihl, detached then a column to the woody heights in order to outflank the enemy, while the principal body marched along the Sihl and drove the enemy from the clearings into the thick wood. Both divisions re-united at the Hockler Bridge and marched to the great “Wollishofer Allmend,” where they practiced firing. This is a beautiful spot for the deployment of troops; the sound of every shot is returned in manifold echoes from the surrounding heights. The Zurich and federal troops also encamp, practice, and shoot on this “Allmend.”

The annual festival of the canton school came off on the day for gymnastic and military exercises. The printed programme distributed among the pupils contains the order of exercises, the plan of the manœuvre, and some useful hints in large type, as “Clear the road”—“Smoking is prohibited to the pupils during the festival”—“Not too fast”—“Do not forget the ramrod”—“Always 120 paces distance.” At 6 o’clock, a.m., the drummers beat the reveille, proceeding from the guard-house in three different directions. If the weather is unfavorable, the reveille is not beaten, the school begins at the usual hour, and the next fair day is chosen for the feast. The beaming sun dispersed, however, on this occasion, the autumnal morning mists, and universal joy beamed from all faces. On the first day the public gymnastic exercises came off, and after supper the decisions of the umpires were proclaimed and prizes distributed.

The second day the whole corps, numbering about five hundred, hastens at 7 o’clock, armed and equipped, to the barracks, and

marches from there to the open space near the railroad station, where from 8 to 10, Colonel Zeigler, the Secretary of War, accompanied by members of the Board of Supervisors, is occupied with the general inspection of "his young comrades." At 12½ the corps assembles again near the barracks, where they receive their ammunition, and at 1 o'clock they turn out to the manoeuvre. The corps is divided into two small armies, each of which consists of a centre, right and left wings, and a reserve. The enemy under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Von Escher, marches over Riesbach and Zollicon into his position. The federal troops under Commandant Nadler, take their way over Hirslanden and the Balgrist. The left wing of the enemy, meanwhile, had taken possession of the heights above the Zollicon, and his main body is marching on the right bank of the lake upon Zurich. The enemy makes a halt, and receives the report of his scouts, that the "Burg'hölzli" and the heights of the Balgrist have been taken possession of by the federal army for the purpose of impeding the further advance of the hostile troops over Hirslanden. The federals at 3 o'clock attack the enemy in his position on the mountain, but they are beaten back, notwithstanding their heroic endeavors, and are compelled to retreat since the enemy changes his defensive position into a charge. The federals retire in good order, and the enemy purchases every inch of ground at a great sacrifice. Though he succeeds in cutting off a side column, his losses must be great until he can silence the murderous fire of the federal battery which has taken a very favorable position on the "Oberrieder Heights," and after having done so he advances to the lowlands.

The fight offers many a picturesque scene. Nowhere such a diversified, broken battle-ground can be found as in the Swiss forelands. Especially in the neighbourhood of Zurich one is at a loss which to choose. There are every where covers and ambuscades for riflemen; the infantry find numerous advantageous positions, and many heights easily accessible which command vales and plains are at the command of the artillery. The leaders have hard work to restrain the ardor of the boy-soldiers, especially of those in the broken chain of the sharpshooters. Finally the signal shot is fired, followed immediately by many others. It is a real feast to observe how the skirmishers, while running from one cover to the other, crouch together as much as possible; how skillfully they take advantage of every little mound, and how they endeavor in their attack to avail themselves of every protection. This or that one seems a perfect little Zouave; some even show the disposition of a Turcos. One loads his rifle lying flat on his back, another springs forward like a tiger. To be commanded to the chain of the skirmishers is considered special good fortune, for there the individual is something by himself, can move at will, and is supplied

with plenty of ammunition. Yet, the main body also of the army, which is obliged to fight in closed lines and strict order, is allowed to vent its fury in firing by single files and by battalions in thundering volleys. At the command to fire a hundred muskets at once, but a single peal as of thunder is heard, and the smoke of the powder fills the air with the sweetest of savors. For a change we turn to the artillery. Though they do not possess any rifled canon, they are nevertheless intent upon aiming their guns accurately, and the little self-possessed gunners who serve the pieces would prove dangerous adversaries to any foe. They mount and dismount a piece as quickly as any trained artillery-man, and where the ground offers great impediments, one can see the stronger boys carrying their own pieces.

The "Father of the Cadets," Colonel Ziegler, is present at the sham fights as an impartial umpire, walking continually on the battle-field, and smiling as one or the other section makes a good hit. As soon as the retreating federal troops have gained a favorable position, they stop short, concentrate their forces, and brave any further advance of the enemy who, after he has made some further unsuccessful attempts, is convinced that the federals are a match for him, and even stronger than himself, makes a halt, and the battle ends. The white cross in the red field (the federal banner) remains, of course always master of the field.

Many a manœuvre has ended without any accident, yet sometimes a hot-blooded cadet forgets the ramrod, and wounds a soldier from the hostile lines or a spectator, for the people mingle without fear among the combatants. Every Swiss is a soldier, and the crack of the guns is a congenial sound to him. The European diplomatists who met in Zurich in the Fall of 1860 for the settlement of the peace of Villafranca, were all present at the manœuvres, and undoubtedly depicted the cadet system to their respective governments in glowing colors, recommending the general adoption of the system. We now ask our governors and our people in general—"Shall we be the last?" A noble ardor may accomplish a good deal, yet *strength* combined with will can accomplish far more—almost everything.

After the parties have fought an hour and a half in the sight of the Alps and the glittering lake, and rested a little while, they march in brotherly union with glowing faces, to the sound of the drum, or singing patriotic songs, from the heights down to the shore road, enter Tiefbrunnen, and stack their arms in pyramids on the green sward of its hospitable pleasure-grounds. Then after the labor and heat of the day, the young soldiers hasten at double-quick step, and with Goliath-like appetite, to the garden of the neighboring inn, which stands on the shore of the beautiful lake, and give fearful battle to a second enemy in the form of loaves, sausages,

etc.; the blood of the grape runs like water, and so indefatigable are they in continually repeated onslaughts, that in a short time the forces of the enemy have wholly disappeared. The state bears the expenses, in order that the poorest boy may be that day as rich as his upper-ten comrade. Shouts and hurrahs spice the good things still more. Meanwhile it has grown dark, the cadets take to their arms again, and by the light of numerous torches, Colonel Ziegler proclaims and distributes the prizes. The name of every victor is received with the beat of the drum and thousands of hurrahs. The results of the target shooting in 1860 were not so satisfactory as in former years. The artillery gained 65 prizes in one hundred shots, the foot 28; while in 1859 the former received 86, and the latter 33, in the average of all distances. The first two prizes were again taken by Glarus boys. This little people, renowned through its marksmen, has for the last seven years monopolized the first prizes.

Finally the warlike band marches home and the officers and instructors meet again at a social supper, which lasts until after midnight. Thus ends the manoeuvre of Swiss boys.

The Swiss militia system may be our model. It will insure our internal peace and national independence. It will unite the citizens of all states into one band of brothers. Every people rears troublesome individuals. Switzerland had to contend with internal difficulties, factions, etc., as we have now, but the majesty of the law was upheld by the masses, and while the rebels were beaten in the field, the people of the different sections met again in friendship. And so, we trust, it will be with us. The day may not be distant when we shall want the strength of our whole beloved Union to maintain our position among the great nations of the earth.


The Swiss are the most peaceable and industrious people, and at the same time the most warlike and ever-ready. In the idea of the Swiss, the citizen is inseparable from the soldier, lest the free man should become the slave of a domestic or foreign tyrant. The first advantage of this idea is, that Switzerland has not a standing army, and yet it can call into the field at any moment 200,000 well-trained men in the flower of their age; a like number could be raised of younger men under twenty-one and above forty-five. 200,000 men is eight per cent of its population, according to which we could have about 2,200,000 citizen soldiers, not on paper only, but real soldiers. If we institute the cadet system the next generation will be a warlike one, and no American will even think of making a law, exempting the citizen from his first duty to appear in person for the defense of his liberties and independence. The whole amount of the Swiss military *Budget** is between four and five millions of francs, equal to ten millions of dollars for our 2,200,000 men—a trifle indeed.

* Federal and cantonal.

From time to time the governors of neighboring states could unite the cadet-corps of different sections and invite the corps from distant states to send a contingent for a grand manoeuvre. Such a proceeding would tend more to cement the band of brotherhood among the states than many artificial means. It would at the same time promote the good morals of the boys, if the governors were to select the best delegates from their states. Every obdurate, mischievous individual should be expelled from the ranks, since the state must not suffer a bad subject to enjoy the honor of serving his country. What a wonderful change will take place in the disposition of our youth; when accustomed to the discipline of a soldier, many a bad habit will disappear entirely. They will become punctual and orderly in the execution of their duties in general, their step elastic, their carriage erect, their bodies strong, their chests large, their cheeks rosy, a joy to their parents and a pride to our people. The lad who leaves his city or his state, if furnished with a regular certificate from his drill-master, can enter a company in the place of his future residence, and be no longer a stranger but a brother-soldier—the member of a mighty association. He enters the circle of well-educated boys at once, and is thus saved from the danger of associating with such as might corrupt his good habits. There are thousands of advantages to him and the country, and not a single disadvantage. Why shall we not seize upon the subject at once? Let our small state have the honor to be the first, as we already have the best system of schools—primary, secondary, and higher institutions. Forward! forward!

In a subsequent article we shall give a description of a "Swiss Shooting Festival." It is an ancient custom with the Alpine people, but since the system of cadet corps has become perfected, these festivals have come off with a splendor that had never before been dreamed of. They unite the men of all sections and have gained quite a fame in Europe.

We implore all statesmen and teachers to take the system of military drill and organization in schools into due consideration; not as a mere experiment, but as something that has proved an excellent success in a sister republic.



LIFE INSURANCE.

SOME IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR THE CANADIAN FORCE.

Elsewhere we publish an article dealing with "Life Risks on Active Service," from the British *United Service Review*, which contains information that will be not a little surprising to a great many, and among others, we doubt not, a considerable portion of the Force in Canada. The facts stated in that article very naturally led to the inquiry—what are the precise effects of active service in the Canadian Militia, and the various contingencies which such service involves, upon the ordinary policies of the different companies doing business in the Dominion? When it is remembered that our Militia Law is so framed as to compel, in certain cases—cases which however undesirable, are by no means impossible—military service from every male subject of Her Majesty in Canada capable of bearing arms, the importance and magnitude of the enquiry may be imagined. We all know how comprehensive is the term "capable of bearing arms," or at least we ought all to know. To any one who is not informed on the subject, the Militia Law will be found interesting reading. Without the actual means at command of proving the statement, it is not unsafe to hazard the assertion that nine out of every ten policy-holders in the Dominion are liable to conscription. To the average citizen who by insurance has endeavoured to protect his family against the consequences of his premature death, the idea of being called upon to defend his country rarely occurs, and he just as rarely takes the trouble to enquire, although, of course, to do so would be to elicit full information, how it would affect the protection upon which he is depending, did the law and duty demand that he should run the risk of having to die in offering that defence.

With a view to answering the enquiry which the article in the *United Service Gazette* suggested, we some time ago addressed a circular to the head office of every insurance company doing business in the country, asking the following series of questions:—

1st. Will the conditions of a Life Policy in the Company you represent permit of a Policy-holder bearing arms in the defence of Canada, without an additional rate of premium? if not, what will that additional rate be placed at?

2nd. Will the said conditions allow a Policy-holder to assist in giving Military aid to the Civil Power without exacting an additional rate?

3rd. Will it be necessary in all cases of bearing arms, either in defence of the Country, in giving aid to the Civil Power, or going on Foreign Service, to previously give notice to the Company; and if such notice is not given, will neglecting so to do invalidate the Policy?

4th. Will Policy-holders be allowed to enlist in the Militia in time of peace without additional charge?

5th. What is the usual rate charged to Policy-holders going on Foreign Service? What regulates the rate? What rate was charged by your Company to Policy-holders serving in the Crimea?

6th. Will the Militia come under the head of Military or Naval Conditions?

Mr. James Croil, Montreal, on behalf of the Scottish Provident Institution, stated in reply that the institution had retired from business in Canada, and was not therefore in a position to avail itself of the opportunity of offering the explanations requested in our circular.

Mr. Arthur Harvey, on behalf of the Toronto Life Assurance and Tontine Company, wrote:—In answer to your enquiries, I beg to send you our form of policy. You will see that it is free from conditions, except that it prohibits entering any Military or Naval services without the license of the Board of Directors. We do not consider serving in the Militia, in time of peace, a Military Service. We have not considered the extra rate chargeable for War Service. We should permit such service, and I think about 3 per cent. on the amount insured would be the charge. We do not consider that giving aid to the Civil Power is such a Military Service as to invalidate the policy. We considered the point when the Queen's Own were called out lately, to hold the Grand Trunk Stations against a mob, and we were prepared to pay had any of our policy-holders' lives been lost. I think this, with the policy, answers all your questions. You will see that, as a Canadian Company, we have a vital interest in the efficient defence of our property, and our regulations must be most liberal."

The provisions of the policy form forwarded by Mr. Harvey, which refer to the subject under consideration are as follows:—

"The person Assured hereby is allowed to reside in any part of North America, *North of 36° 33' North Latitude*, or in any part of Europe, at any time in the year; or to travel or reside in *any part* of the United States, irrespective of Latitude, from the month of November to the month of April, both inclusive, without prejudice to this Assurance.

In case the person or persons whose life or lives is or are hereby assured should go beyond the limits above prescribed, or die on the high seas (unless ir. passing direct, in time of peace, in first class steamers or sailing vessels, between any of the ports in Europe, Canada, or the United States, lying north of the said parallel of latitude), or shall enter any Military or Naval Services without the license of the Board of Directors previously obtained, this policy shall be void, and all moneys paid in respect thereof shall be forfeited to the Company."

Mr. Richard Bull, Montreal, Secretary in this country of the

Life Association of Scotland, stated in reply that the questions submitted in the circular would be referred to the Head Office of the Company in Edinburgh, and promised that their reply would be communicated to us. He added that, during the late Fenian Raids, the Company published an advertisement advising that the policy-holders in the "Life Association of Scotland" could, as volunteers, take up arms in defence of the country, "without prejudice."

The Stadacona Company through Mr. G. J. Pyke, the managing director, gave categorical affirmative replies to the first two questions the circular—that is, the conditions of the Company's policies permit the holder to bear arms in defence of Canada without an additional rate of premium, and will also permit him without extra charge to assist the Civil Power in his capacity as a member of the Militia Force. In reply to the third question, the Company say that if a member of the Force proposes to go beyond the limits of the Dominion, notice must be given, and an extra charge will be made. If notice is not so given, and the extra charge not paid, it invalidates the policy. Policy-holders will be permitted to enlist in the Militia in time of peace without extra charge, and the rate to those going abroad would vary according to climate, the practice of English Companies—the Standard for example—being accepted as the guiding rule. The Company was not in existence at the time of the Crimean War, and therefore no reply could be given to that part of the fifth query. When serving outside of Canada, the Stadacona will rank our Militia under the same conditions as the Imperial Military and Navy. The provisions of the Company's policies which have especial reference to our series of questions are as follows:—

"This policy will also be void, if the party whose life has been assured shall be actually employed in any Military or Naval Service whatever, the Militia or Volunteers, within the limits of the Provinces forming the Dominion of Canada, *excepted*.

All persons whose lives are assured may travel in any part of British North America or of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and may in time of peace travel in any part of North America north of 35° north latitude, and may from 30th November to 1st June travel in any part of the United States of America as organized on 1st January, 1871, and may also in time of peace travel in Europe or sail in first-class vessels to and from Europe, or elsewhere, in the latitudes aforesaid; but if the assured shall go beyond these limits without the previous written consent of the Company, under the hand of the President, Vice-President or General Manager, the policy shall be void."

Mr. A. G. Ramsay, Hamilton, Managing of the Canada Life Assurance Company, writes that "Policy-holders who take part in the defence of the country, either by enlisting at the time, or having previously been connected with a corps, may do so without extra charge, and if they met with their death while giving Military aid

to the Civil Power, their doing so would in no way invalidate their policies, nor would previous notice on their part of such act be necessary." The following are the paragraphs inserted in the ordinary policies issued by the Company with respect to Military Service:—

"Persons shall not enter into any Military or Naval Service without previous license, in writing, from the Directors for the time being; or being or becoming Military or Naval men, shall not enter into actual active service without permission from the Directors; and shall not engage in seafaring occupations, or in navigating the seas, lakes, or rivers, without a previous compliance with the special condition or conditions which the Directors may in each particular case impose. Failing to observe such regulations, the party or parties assured shall forfeit otherwise existing under the policy; excepting in cases where policies have been effected by one party on the life of another, or where they have been assigned to third parties for valuable considerations, when forfeiture shall not take place if satisfactory evidence be given to the Directors that the facts were communicated to the Office so soon as they were known to the parties interested, and payment made of the extra premium required to cover any additional risk incurred.

Enrolment in Militia or Yeomanry corps, under the terms of Provincial or other law, will not be held to come under the Military or Naval conditions set forth in the above last paragraph, and members of such corps are permitted to serve in peace or war in defence of Canada and the Lower Provinces without extra charge."

Mr. Edward Rawlings, Montreal, Manager of the Accident Insurance Company of Canada, answers the first two questions affirmatively. With respect to the third, he states it is not necessary to give notice to the Company in case of bearing arms in defence of Canada or aiding the Civil authority, but an extra charge would be made for going on Foreign Service—at least double the ordinary rate. The nature of the Service and climate will have a good deal to do, however, in regulating the rate.

Mr. G. F. C. Smith, Montreal, Resident Secretary of the Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company, points out that the Company's Policies provide that they will be void, if the party whose life has been assured shall be actually employed in any Military or Naval Service whatever, the Militia or Volunteers, within the limits of the said Provinces, excepted.

The conditions of the Reliance Mutual Life Assurance Society are similar, as are also those of the Scottish Provincial and the Scottish Amicable, the managers of both promising to lay the whole question, opened up by our circular, before the Directors, and to forward their reply in detail.

The Manager of the Standard, whose custom has already been mentioned by the representative of the Stadacona as likely to rule that Company's extra charges for Foreign Service, gives the following answers to the several questions put by the circular:—

1. Our assured are permitted to join Volunteer Corps, and to serve in defence of their Country, without extra Premium.
2. I have no doubt it would, but we have no Rule either admitting or rejecting this.
3. No intimation wanted for engaging in defence of the Country, but for Foreign Service an extra would be charged.
4. Yes.
5. Dependant altogether on climate. From 5 to 10 per cent. was charged Officers serving in the Crimean War, on old policies. New risks were generally refused.
6. Neither.

Messrs. Forbes & Mudge, Montreal, Chief Agents of the Queen Insurance Company, have determined to place the subject fully before their Head Office for consideration and instructions, believing that the risk is in some measure different in this country from that "at home"; and they promise to communicate to us the result of the reference.

Mr. David Burke, Hamilton, Manager of the Mutual Life Association of Canada, sends a copy of the conditions of the Company's policies, which correspond, so far as war risks are concerned, with those of the Canada Life and other Home Companies. In fact, as examination will show, these conditions are pretty nearly alike in all cases.

The following are the provisions of the policies of the Briton Life Association, with respect to residence abroad and Warlike Service—the Manager being unable to state the conditions attaching to Foreign Service:—

"The person whose life is assured by this Policy shall be at liberty to visit and reside in any part of the world (Asia excepted) situate to the north of latitude 35° N, and to the south of latitude 30° S, with full permission, in time of peace, to voyage to and from in first-class steam or sailing vessels; but if he or she shall go out of the above prescribed limits, the person or persons for the time being interested in this policy shall not lose the benefit thereof, provided the fact shall be notified to the Chief Office within seven days from the date of it coming to his, her, or their knowledge, and during the existence of the life assured, and that any required extra premium be forthwith paid.

"If the person whose life is assured now is in or shall enter into the service of the Army or Navy of the United Kingdom, or any other Military or Naval service, and shall be called into actual service, or be or become engaged in any seafaring occupation, the assured shall be charged with such extra Premium, and for such period as the Directors shall think necessary, and if such extra Premium be not paid, then this Policy and all moneys paid in respect thereof shall be forfeited; but the discharge of Military duties in time of peace, or in any casual outbreak or civil disturbance which the Military may be called upon to quell, or the being a member of any Yeomanry, Rifle, or other Volunteer Corps in the United Kingdom or within the State or Country in which such Corps is raised (except in the event of foreign invasion), shall not be deemed actual service within the meaning of this Policy."

THE BRITISH ROUTE TO INDIA.

THE IMPORTANCE TO BRITAIN OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

At the time of writing, the news comes to us by the Atlantic Cable that the British Government have informed Prince Gortchakoff of their unalterable determination not to agree to even a temporary occupation of Constantinople by the Russians. Whether, in view of the policy of inaction maintained by Great Britain so far in regard to the conflict between Turkey and Russia, this peremptory refusal of what seems to have been in some form proposed by the Russian Prince, was wise or unwise, may be a fair subject for discussion. If there are many arguments in favour, there are certainly many against it. Nearly every British journal and periodical which has come to hand for the past month has contributed something to the discussion, and not a little to the mystification, of the probable effects upon British interests in the East of victory for the Russian Army in the deadly struggle. Probably the most sensible, and certainly one of the most able articles on the subject we have seen, is that by Mr. Edward Dicey, in the June number of the *Nineteenth Century*, the newly started magazine of which Mr. James Knowles is editor. Mr. Dicey is no stranger to the public of Canada, having, as is well known in literary circles, been for many years, and still continues to be the London correspondent of the *Toronto Globe*—not the correspondent who dates his communications from Cheapside, but the versatile and brilliant author of those letters which weekly appear under the heading of "British Affairs," and which in all respects equal, if not surpass the best writings of the London representatives of the American papers, Mr. Jennings, of the *New York World*, not even excepted. Mr. Dicey regards the occupation of Constantinople by Russia as a contingency extremely probable in case of the defeat of Turkey; in fact, as will be seen, he deems it to be all but impossible, and ruinously expensive, even if possible, to hold the Bosphorus in defiance of Russia, with the Turkish Empire subjugated and compelled to accept such terms of peace as her enemy might see fit to grant. He therefore discusses—what has hitherto received but too little attention at the hands of students of the Eastern Question,—the best way of compensating ourselves for losing the control of that key to our Eastern possessions. We regret to be unable to quote the article at length, but the following extract will serve to show the position the


writer assumes, and the conclusions which he seems to think inevitable in case the Cross should succeed in trampling upon the Crescent in the contest now in progress:—

“Supposing the war should at its close leave the frontiers of Roumania extended to the Balkan under a Russian Protectorate, Russian territory increased in Asia Minor by the annexation of Armenia, and the free passage of the Bosphorus thrown open to Russian men-of-war, it would be impossible to dispute the fact that Russia had made a long step towards the dismemberment of Turkey and the seizure of Constantinople. And yet, in the event of Turkey being worsted in the coming campaign, such terms of peace as those I have indicated are the least that Russia is likely to demand. Thus, whether we like it or not, we are bound in common prudence to face the contingency that at no distant period Russia may command the head of the Euphrates Valley by land, and the Bosphorus by sea. If once Constantinople passes directly or indirectly into the hands of an active maritime State, the chain of inland seas leading from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Azof must become home waters, so to speak, of the Power holding the Bosphorus. It is only the utter apathy and want of enterprise, especially on sea, characterising Ottoman rule, which has hindered Turkey from becoming the chief maritime Power of the Levant. Given the possession of the Bosphorus, and Russia would soon have an ironclad fleet in the Sea of Marmora, which could sail out at any moment and reach Port Said long before reinforcements could arrive from Malta. It is said that in the case of Russia obtaining the passage of the Bosphorus, we could neutralise the danger by keeping a fleet stationed at Besika Bay, or by seizing the mouth of the Dardanelles and holding it as we do Gibraltar. But the former safeguard could only be temporary in its nature; the latter, even if feasible—which I doubt—would involve a heavy constant outlay and a state of permanent antagonism not only to Russia, but to all Powers interested in the freedom of access between the Euxine and the Mediterranean.

Thus, if I have made my meaning clear, the state of things with which we have to deal is this. A war has begun which, as I deem, may probably, and, as all must admit, may possibly, end in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. That overthrow would weaken if not imperil our hold on India. How then are we to protect ourselves against the peril involved in the possible success of Russia? This is the question. Now, in the first place, I must state my conviction that no precaution, within our power to take, can place us in as strong a position as that we now occupy. Nothing could be as good for us as that the Bosphorus and the provinces west and east of it should remain under the rule of an unaggressive Power, friendly disposed towards us by virtue of the instinct of self-preservation. But even waiving the question whether we should be justified in upholding a vicious system of government in European Turkey in order to promote our own advantage, it is obvious that we are utterly unable to uphold Turkish rule unless we are prepared to fight for Turkey whenever she is assailed, which, wisely or unwisely, we are not. Now the very fact that, according to my view, we should be manifestly weaker, in the sense of being more liable to attack in our Eastern possessions, than we are at present, in the event of Ottoman rule in Europe receiving a death-blow, renders it all the more essential that we should guard against the impending danger by such means as lie within our power. In plainer words, the mere possibility that Russia may obtain the command of the Bosphorus renders it a matter of urgent necessity to us to secure the command of the Isthmus route to India. In order to effect this we must have the power of keeping the Suez Canal open to our ships at all

times and under all circumstances; and, to secure this, we must acquire a recognised footing in the Delta of Egypt of a far more decided character than any we can claim at present.

If the Euphrates Valley route lay open to the Russian armies, while we could only convey troops to and from India by the long sea route around the Cape, the difficulty of defending ourselves against attack, both in Europe and Asia, would be more than doubled. Again, in the contingency to which I allude, it would be a matter of vital necessity to us, not only to have free right of passage for our own ships of war, but to have the power of excluding all others, during war time, from its waters. A hostile ironclad which once made its way as far as Ismailia or into the Bitter Lakes would prevent the passage of our ships by the mere fact of its presence. Then, too, it should be borne in mind that the canal, owing to the peculiarity of its structure, could very easily be rendered useless. Given four and twenty hours' time, and a company of sappers and miners in undisturbed possession of any portion of its sandbanks; and an amount of damage might be inflicted which would not only render the canal impassable for the moment, but which could not be repaired for weeks or months. In order, therefore, to secure our freedom of uninterrupted access to India across the Isthmus, it is essential that we should not only have an unrestricted right of employing its waters for war purposes, but that its course from sea to sea, as well as its ports of ingress and egress, should be under our protection.



A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH AND COLONIAL, IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

[On the 28th May last, Colonel H. C. Fletcher, formerly Militia Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General, delivered a Lecture on the Volunteer Force. We have been favoured with a copy of the Lecture, which has been printed for private circulation, and extract so much of it as refers to the Forces in Canada, and their employment to act with the regular army.]

To turn to the second portion of the subject, namely, the employment of a Colonial force to act with our regular Army.

The facilities of communication, and the increased intercourse between portions of the globe separated from each other by what were formerly considered as vast distances, have tended to bring our great colonies into far closer union with the mother country than in past days. Time, has, in fact, been completely annihilated, and the instantaneous transmission of intelligence augments the interest that those who look on, have for those who are engaged in war; whilst rapidity of communication affords means of giving practical expression to their feelings of sympathy. The connection between England and Canada has become very close, every event is telegraphed, and if the occurrence of a fog in London affords a paragraph in an Ottawa evening paper of the same day, much more will any circumstance that touches on the interests of England find an immediate echo throughout the Colony. A war in which England were engaged, would stir to the depths the feeling of loyalty and the love of home that are such marked characteristics of Canadians, and there would be a universal desire to do more than merely look on as spectators of any struggle in which we might be involved. A few days ago a telegram from Canada announced that a field battery at Toronto had volunteered for service in the event of England going to war, and it is probable that many other portions of the Canadian Militia would, under such circumstances, be eager to cast in their lot with the British Army.

Owing partly to a general belief that in consequence of the good feeling existing between England and the United States, and the peaceful aspect of affairs throughout the great Republic, no need exists of military preparation, the Canadian Militia has gradually been reduced in number, and I must say in efficiency. The last report shows that they consist of not more than 23,000 actually exercised during the preceding year, and the period of training extends only to twelve days for artillery and eight days for the

other branches of the service. When I add that there is no permanent and paid staff of any description below a brigade major, a notion may be arrived at, of the general condition of the force if measured by a European standard. "At the same time" (to quote General Selby Smyth's report) "it must be borne in mind that the active militia is but the advanced guard of the Army of Canada in case a general call to arms should ever occur. The real force of the country would then be represented by the reserve militia, amounting by law to some 600,000 men." From this larger basis of supply, the troops who might enrol themselves for foreign service could be drawn, and it must be remembered, that although no portion of the force might be highly trained, the Canadians possess, in a marked degree, qualities calculated to make excellent soldiers. They are hardy, industrious, accustomed to rough work, and handy in dealing with the many exigencies of colonial life. They are also easily subjected to discipline, and willing to submit to the authority which they recognise as necessary for military efficiency. The various descriptions of labour in which they are engaged, and their habit of adapting themselves to different conditions of life, make them peculiarly fitted for many of the requirements of soldiers on service. In the Red River Expedition, under a leader whom they respected and admired, they performed excellent service, and the manner in which they overcame the many difficulties that beset their path through the wilderness, showed that in a very high degree they possessed the qualifications of excellent troops. During the Fenian raid, I have been assured on the authority of the Officer who so ably commanded the Red River Expedition, that their Cavalry, under Colonel Denison, of Toronto (well known as a writer of a treatise on that arm) performed most valuable service in watching a wide extent of country, whilst the manner in which their field batteries work and manœuvre, gives a proof that the habits of driving so universal in Canada and the States, can be turned to good account for military purposes. In fact, there is no better material for making soldiers than is to be found in Canada, and I may add—if the maritime population of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the semi-maritime navigators of the inland seas be taken into consideration—there would be found ample materials for adding to our seamen. That there is a warlike spirit in the country is shown by the popularity of the militia and the willingness with which they turn out on the prospect of anything like service. But peace tends to rust their arms, and the absence of any regular troops to furnish a standard of excellence, leads to a gradual diminution of efficiency. If, however, England should be engaged in war, and if the services of a few regiments of Canadians were asked for, I feel sure that the call would be warmly answered, and that a body of troops, which, in a short time would

reach a high state of efficiency, would be ready to embark for service wherever they might be required. In accepting their services, Canada should be treated as an equal, the force ought to be taken with its own Officers, and if sufficiently advanced, the New Military School at Kingston should be utilised, to furnish a portion at least of the necessary staff. Possibly some regular Officer, known in Canada, might be appointed to the command, but the Colony should be encouraged to organise, equip, and officer its own troops. When once on board ship they would come under the Mutiny Act, and be paid by England, possibly, also, it would be well that a portion of their equipment and arms should be furnished to them by the mother country, but the political as well as the material benefit accruing from such a force, would, in a great measure, depend on its organization being Colonial, *i.e.*, that it should not consist merely of soldiers recruited and paid for by the mother country, but that it should be a force placed at her disposal by a great colony, anxious to show that it recognised among the duties that a grown up child owes to its parent—the noble one of contributing to its defence.

It is, of course, impossible to estimate what numbers could and would be sent, as they would partly depend on the popularity of the war, partly on the condition of affairs in the colony. It is also difficult to indicate the class of men who would volunteer for the service. The Canadian Militia have an affinity to our volunteers as well as to our militia, and the regiments vary greatly in their composition. Some are induced to enlist into the active militia by the pay—a somewhat higher rate than is afforded directly to our troops—whilst others engage from the love of the service and from the incentives of duty. There is also a great difference between regiments raised in the several provinces of the Dominion, and in regard to present efficiency much depends on the opportunities that the propinquity of the villages from which the companies are enrolled, gives for drill. Probably a force for foreign service would comprise regiments representing the various elements from which the present militia is raised; and if, at the first start, two regiments of infantry could be equipped in Ontario, one in Quebec, and one in the maritime provinces, with perhaps a couple of batteries of artillery and three squadrons of cavalry mounted on Canadian horses, an excellent commencement might be made for future organization. If this force distinguished itself before the enemy, which it would be well nigh sure to do, the prestige that it would afford to the Canadian Army would be very great, whilst the additional and noble tie that community of danger and suffering would furnish, would do more to bind the colony to the mother country than years of negotiations and of mutual arrangements. I can imagine no finer troops than could be raised from the backwoodsmen and lumberers, who seek a


livelihood in the Canadian forests during the winter months, and who, when the freshet or spring liberates the waters, are engaged in navigating the rafts down the rapids of the great tributaries of the St. Lawrence. Their life in the shanties accustoms them to discipline and to an organized system of working. Their gang leaders have much of the training of non-commissioned Officers, whilst the various descriptions of labour on which men are employed, call forth the energy, the intelligence, and the resource which are invaluable in soldiers. To build huts, to make roads, to bridge streams, to construct rafts, and to navigate them under difficulties, form their yearly work (which by the way they do entirely on tea); whilst the necessity of depending on each other for mutual support and assistance, gives a species of *camaraderie* much resembling that of men serving together in a regiment or a company.

I feel, however, that I am going into details which are beyond the scope of this paper. What I desire to impress on you is, the mutual benefit that would result from a Colonial or Canadian force; for the great Australian colonists appear as yet to be too far removed by time and distance to enable them directly to subsidize our army for European war. They might possibly be able to furnish assistance in other ways, and an Australian fleet in the Pacific, or Australian troops in some of our important garrisons, would relieve our ships and soldiers from a distant duty and permit of their utilization nearer home. But to revert to my subject. England would benefit directly by the addition of an excellent body of troops to her army, and Canada would derive an advantage similar to that which Sardinia gained by sending her small but well-equipped army to the Crimea, whilst both would profit by the mutual respect and affection which community of danger engenders. From what I know of Canada, and from what I hear from those who are well-informed as to the feelings of the colony, I do not think these views are Utopian, or that their realization would be impossible. That difficulties might arise, and that considerations of expense might have to be duly weighed, I have little doubt, but the end in view would justify some departure from ordinary usages, and would encourage those who might undertake the carrying out of the scheme to more than common exertion. The choice of proper agents is of the utmost importance, and would require some caution, as there are always to be found plenty of men, especially perhaps in the colonies, who are ready to propose and willing to promise anything, whilst the real thorough workers, and people of standing and influence keep in the background. But these are mere incidents common to any new and important enterprise. I have ventured merely to propound the scheme, and leaving it to abler men to criticise it, to alter it, and, in fact, to lick it into shape. My

object is to direct attention to the desirability of encouraging our almost grown-up children to assist the mother State, and to the necessity of taking the broader views of the Imperial power of England, that our empire, vastly enlarged since the last great war, justifies us in adopting.

It may be objected that in this paper I have mixed up two subjects, and that the employment of a brigade of English volunteers is quite apart from the utilization of a Colonial force; but I would submit that the two schemes have their origin in a similar principle. . A European war in which Great Britain might be engaged would probably not be on a small scale. It would be waged with powerful nations, organized so that every able-bodied man might be brought under arms. It would be fought under unknown conditions, as the weapons which science has introduced, especially in regard to naval warfare, make us appreciate David's remark when he gazed on the armour that Saul offered him. It would necessitate the strain of every nerve, the employment of every resource, and the utilization of every advantage.

It has consequently been my endeavour in this paper to indicate two latent forces that have hitherto been allowed to lie dormant. The first, a means of utilizing our middle classes, and of imbuing with an increased element of vitality the Army (for I can term it nothing else) that gives an outlet to their military enthusiasm; the second an idea of bringing into closer union for mutual protection and for mutual support, the great colonies and the mother country. I know that both these schemes have been but roughly sketched, and perhaps ignorantly dealt with, but if the paper I have just read will lead to thought and criticism, it will not be worthless, neither will the time you have so kindly accorded me have been thrown away. The subject is one of great importance, and in testing the value of the schemes put forward, no mere professional difficulties, or desire of preserving intact old bottles at the expense of new wine should be allowed to cloud the broad views of imperial defence that alone can lead to a proper appreciation of all the resources that England possesses for a serious war.



BIOGRAPHY.

A RECORD OF FORTY-THREE YEARS' SERVICE.

Lt.-Col. Wily, of the Militia Department, having recently left on a visit to England,—a holiday which he has well earned—his name has suggested itself to us as one which would appropriately take a place in the series of biographical sketches, which we hope, with the assistance of our friends, to make a more or less prominent feature of the "CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW." We trust in all cases to be able to connect the subjects of such notices with some event which would in a similar, or even more pointed way, direct to them that public attention which would of itself be a justification for the prominence we propose to give them, and thus leave no room for the suspicion of either favouritism or flunkeyism.

Lt. Col. Wily came to Halifax in 1834 with the 83rd Regiment, in the Grenadier Company, of which he was then serving as Colour and Pay-Sergeant. In 1837, in view of the threatening aspect of affairs in Canada, the 83rd was suddenly ordered to Quebec, and in November of that year, Col. Wily was appointed Ensign and Lieutenant, to drill and organize the Quebec Light Infantry, one of the newly raised volunteer regiments. In 1838 he was created Brigade-Major to the whole volunteer force of Quebec, then numbering between 2,000 and 3,000 men, under the command of Lieut.-Col. the Hon. James Hope, of the Coldstream Guards. In 1839 he was appointed Lieutenant and Adjutant to the 1st Provincial Regiment, organized and paid by the Imperial Government for frontier service, for which he raised one hundred recruits within twenty-four hours, in the City of Quebec. For three years he served with this regiment, until it was disbanded in 1842, when he was appointed Captain and Adjutant to the 4th Battalion, which also was disbanded a year later. From that period until after the burning of the Parliament Buildings in 1849, he was Chief of Police in Montreal, when he was nominated Assistant Quarter Master General to Colonel the Hon. James Moffatt, in command of the District of Montreal. In 1855 he was appointed to the command of the 1st Volunteer Regiment of Canada, afterwards the Prince of Wales' Regiment, in which position he remained until 1861. In 1859 he was sent to Ottawa to remove a large quantity of ammunition, then improperly stored there by the

Ottawa Field Battery, and which it was considered dangerous to allow to remain during the strike of the labourers engaged on the new Parliament Buildings. In 1860 he was appointed by the Government to superintend the arrangements for the expected visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada, his duties being to provide accommodation, transport, &c. This was an onerous task, and for the manner in which it was discharged, he received the thanks of His Royal Highness, and a handsome present as a memorial of his visit. In 1861 Col. Wily was appointed Secretary to the Grand Trunk Railway Commission, and also subsequently to the Militia Commission, and in 1862 his present position in the Militia Department was conferred upon him. Immediately after he was directed by His Excellency, Lord Monck, to inspect the whole of the Volunteer Militia in Upper and Lower Canada, on which duty he was employed four months, and received the thanks of His Excellency for the manner in which it was performed. In 1865 he was sent to settle some disputed claims of the inhabitants of Chateau Richer, below Quebec, consequent on the billeting of troops, called out in aid of the Civil Power. In December, 1864, and March, 1865, he was directed to provide quarters and other accommodation for the Militia called out to guard the frontier, and repress threatened incursions of Southerners into the United States. This he did in the west at Niagara, Windsor, Sandwich, Amherstburg, Chatham, and Sarnia; and in the east, at Huntingdon, Hemmingford, Lacolle, Philipsburg, and Frelighsburg. In the same year he was again sent on a confidential mission by Lord Monck, to search for some piratical craft, said to be preparing in the harbours of Lake Erie, for the purpose of making descents on the American shore. The case was urgent, as the report came from our Ambassador at Washington. After making a thorough search of the Canada shore of Lake Erie, Col. Wily failed in making any discovery, except it were, indeed, as Lord Monck put it, a "mare's nest."

In 1866, during the Fenian troubles, Col. Wily was appointed Commandant of Ottawa, drilled and organised two battalions, which were called out on two separate occasions. During the same year he was appointed the command of the Civil Service Rifle Regiment, which position he retained until it was disbanded in 1868. In 1870 he was directed to procure all the supplies required for the Red River Expedition, then being organised, and in 1872-73, he organised and sent off at Collingwood the drafts required for the Red River Force, doing the same thing from Sarnia in 1875.

From 1870 to 1872, Col. Wily was employed taking over the whole of the Imperial property—forts, armaments, and lands,—then transferred to the Dominion Government, on the withdrawal of the troops from Canada. Speaking of this matter himself, he says:—"It struck me as a singular coincidence, that I should receive

over, then a Lt.-Colonel and Director of Stores of Canada, the Citadel of Quebec, with all its guns and stores, into whose gates I had marched a sergeant with my regiment in 1837, and to which I was sent in hot haste from Halifax, to hold it against all comers. Who could have predicted such a thing, without being laughed at for his pains?"

In 1874 he performed the last and most unpleasant of his many duties, having been sent down by the Government to obtain possession of the Crystal Palace at Montreal. He performed the duty successfully, and was subsequently tried for it before the Court of Queen's Bench at Montreal, on the charge of forcible entry and detainer. After a trial which lasted a week, he and three others, members of the Water Police, also implicated, were acquitted by the jury. He declares it is not a pleasant thing to be tried on a criminal charge, even if you know that you have a Government at your back. After such a long and faithful service of the country in so many capacities, it need hardly be added that Col. Wily well deserves the brief respite from duty which his trip across the Atlantic affords him.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD SELBY SMYTH.

[The following we have compiled from official sources.]

Major-General Sir Edward Selby Smyth, K.C.M.G., entered the army in 1841, and has served 36 years, during which time he has served abroad nineteen years, in peace as well as in war, in various remote portions of the British Empire. Proceeding first to join his regiment, the 2nd Queen's Royals, in Central India, he was employed both regimentally and on the staff for four years, including the campaign in the Southern Mahratta country and in the Conkass.

Returning with his regiment to England in 1846, he was Adjutant of the Battalion for nearly five years, and on the breaking out of the war in South Africa in 1850, his regiment was sent to the Cape in H.M.S. *Birkenhead*, early in 1851. Having previously obtained his company, Sir Edward served regimentally to the end of the war in 1853, partaking in every action in which the regiment was engaged. On one occasion, being attacked in the intricate fastnesses of the Great Fish River, his party lost one third of its number in a desperate encounter with some thousand Kaffirs and Hottentots, and upon the senior officer being killed during the action, the command devolved upon Sir Edward, who subsequently formed a junction with the column under Lt.-Colonel (now General) Sir John Michel.

For his conduct upon this occasion, Sir Edward was promoted a Brevet-Major and referred to in high terms in a General Order, by the Commander-in-Chief, for his "cool and intrepid" conduct.

Peace having been proclaimed after the Battle of Berea, in the Orange River Territory, General Sir George Cathcart appointed Sir Edward, first Deputy Assistant-Quarter-Master General of the 2nd Division under General Sir George Buller, and, afterwards, Adjutant and Quarter-Master General at the Head Quarters of the Army in South Africa, which important office he filled for almost seven years, having for some time a force of nearly 12,000 men.

The restless character of the powerful Kaffir Chiefs, induced them in 1856 to attempt the most dangerous organization ever before conceived by them—to drive the whole white population out of the country—but by a well concerted system of secret service, such certain and accurate information regarding their movements and intentions was obtained, as to enable the General Officer in Command to apply for reinforcements to counteract this designed outbreak. Troops were poured in from Mauritius and from England, including two Infantry Battalions of the German Legion; the Kaffirs were checkmated, and some 30,000 died from starvation, while many thousands fled from Kaffirland and took service among the Colonial farmers. Many of the chiefs were made prisoners, and confined upon Robben Island in Table Bay. The tribal system was completely broken—peace and quiet, which for many years had been unknown on the exposed frontiers of the Colony, were established—and, almost without exception, have since allowed the inhabitants to increase in prosperity for upwards of twenty years.

In 1858, Sir Edward became a full Colonel in the Army, though still holding a Captain's Commission in his regiment. For the greater part of this year, he acted as Secretary to the Government in the Eastern Provinces, in addition to his staff duties. In 1860, his term of office having expired, and his regiment having previously proceeded to China,—Colonel Selby Smyth returned to England after nine years' uninterrupted absence abroad. He did not long remain idle, for in 1861, upon the appointment of General Sir Hastings Doyle to the command in Nova Scotia, Colonel Selby Smyth succeeded him as Inspector General of Militia in Ireland, a post which he held for six years. In the year 1867, he was selected by General Lord Strathnairn to act as Adjutant General of the Army in Ireland, during the time the flying columns were employed in stamping out the Fenian movement in the South. He was at this time appointed by the Duke of Aborncorn a special magistrate for the County and City of Dublin, to use the troops independently in case of outbreak.

At the conclusion of this service he was unemployed, and spent his winters in Algeria, until April, 1870, when he was sent as General Officer in Command of the Forces in Mauritius. During his service in that tropical island, he twice acted as Governor for


nearly twelve months, including the period of the Franco-German war, when he was obliged to detain a British frigate to carry out the neutrality laws between French and Germans, whose ships were in considerable number in the Harbour of Port Louis, and watched by a French squadron from the Island of Bourbon, only 120 miles distant.

After his return to England, round the Cape of Good Hope for the eleventh time, in the Indian Troopship *Euphrates*, Sir Edward spent his time in continental travel, until selected by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, to proceed to Canada to take the position he has now filled for three years.

In the year 1875, Sir Edward, after having made himself thoroughly acquainted with the Provinces eastward of the great lakes, proceeded to Manitoba, and from thence made a journey through the North-west Territory, across the Rocky Mountains and the Forests of British Columbia, to Vancouver Island, about 2,500 miles of the distance having been performed on horseback, thus accomplishing what the *Army and Navy Gazette* justly termed the longest continuous tour of inspection ever performed by a General Officer of the British Army, from the Atlantic Ocean on the east, to the distant shores of the Pacific on the west.

Sir Edward has been frequently referred to in high terms for judgment and discretion, as well as gallant conduct, by various General Officers under whom he has served in the Field and on the Staff.

Upon the occasion of the celebration of Her Majesty's Birthday in this year, 1877, the Queen was pleased to confer upon him the distinction of Knight Commander of the most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, in recognition of his long and valuable services in so many remote dependencies of the Crown—a distinction which was not only well earned, but we venture to say has been a source of pride and satisfaction to the Force in Canada and the whole Canadian people.



THE WIMBLEDON TEAM.

A lively debate took place in the House of Commons during the passage of the Militia Estimates as to whether or not the Government should give a sum of money to enable a Canadian Rifle Team to visit Wimbledon Common this year. Mr. Mackenzie spoke in terms of praise of the various teams which have gone to England, and admitted that a Canadian camp on the rifle ranges, where Canadian hospitality was lavishly dispensed, and the clever shooting of the riflemen, had no doubt drawn considerable attention to this country; but he believed the sum of from \$7,000 to \$10,000 annually voted by Parliament for the purpose of assisting the Dominion Rifle Association, to be represented by a few officers and men in England, could be spent to much better advantage by being distributed *pro rata* as prize money for the encouragement of good shooting in Canadian battalions. This was well received by the House, but there was evidently a very general desire that Canada should be represented at Wimbledon; seeing she was the first colony to go there, it was thought it would be discredit to her as a country to be the first to back out. The Premier felt that it was a mistake to spend so much money on a few men who got all the plums, while the great body of the volunteers received nothing. He said the matter would be considered, and in all probability a vote would be made, but, as he assured the House, it would be on a reduced scale, as the finances of the country could not afford a large one.

In this connection we may take the opportunity of correcting a misapprehension which appears to be generally prevalent, as to the way in which the subsidy usually granted by the Government to the Dominion Rifle Association is given. The nature of this apprehension, and the extent to which it may be presumed to prevail, may be gathered from a letter which the President of the New Brunswick Provincial Rifle Association addressed to the *St. John Telegraph*, on the 4th of May last, in which an Ottawa correspondent is represented as having sent the following message:—"Government grants six thousand dollars for Wimbledon team this year." It is quite true the Government granted a sum of six thousand dollars—not, however, to the Wimbledon team, but to the Dominion Rifle Association, to be appropriated as the President and Council might think best. It has no doubt been quite well understood that the President and Council of the Association look to Parliament for this grant with a view to expending it in sending a team to represent Canada at Wimbledon—that, indeed, the absence of that item

from the appropriations of public money made by the Legislature would, in all probability, mean the abandonment of the Wimbledon team. But, although Parliament may be supposed to know, and does know as a matter of fact, in what way the greater proportion of the appropriation is to be expended, it must be remembered that the grant is accompanied by no condition to that effect, and it is therefore quite incorrect to state that the Government grants any sum whatever for the Wimbledon team. Apart, however, from the actual accountability of the Association for the expenditure of the money, there is no denying the moral responsibility to which the Government and Parliament are held by the country on the subject; and when we find the Premier expressing himself so strongly and so sensibly upon the desirability of encouraging good shooting at home, no matter if we should be, temporarily at least, unrepresented on Wimbledon Common, we are tempted in some measure to regret that there should be any division of responsibility at all in this matter. When the President of the New Brunswick Rifle Association, in commenting on the telegram just quoted, declares that the information it conveys "will no doubt prove to be very satisfactory to the marksmen of Canada," he is clearly not speaking for them all. There are some marksmen in Canada who are not mere enthusiasts, and who discern, in the present state of the country and the extent of the Parliamentary grant, some very powerful reasons why the conclusions of the Prime Minister should commend themselves to the Executive of the Dominion Rifle Association. When we consider that last year it required \$5,923.69 to defray the expenses of the Wimbledon team, it would not be reasonable to expect a very large balance to the credit of the Association after the expenses of this year have been deducted from the \$6,000 voted; and it is quite clear that it will depend entirely upon the amount of extraneous assistance which the Association may be able to command whether an amount can be raised sufficient to make the Dominion matches of the coming season sufficiently attractive to prevent the selection of next year's Wimbledon team from being made out of a very few. We do not wish to be understood as opposing the principle of representation at the great rifle tournament in the Mother Country, nor to under-rate the loss of dignity, not to say discredit, involved in backing out of the custom after being the first colony to establish it. But to be deterred from taking that step from considerations of the nature indicated, if the funds at the disposal of the Association do not enable them to fill an attractive and satisfactory programme at their annual matches, would be an unpardonable weakness—an indication of that desire to be thought something other, if not better, than we are, which we call snobbery in the common walks of life. In fact, to persist in sending a team to Wimbledon, while we can't afford to get together at a Dominion

match the very best material from which to pick that team, and while little or no encouragement is offered in the way of prizes to the great body of our riflemen, is irresistibly suggestive of the pomp and family plate and two liveried and powdered servants (fortunately for themselves living on board wages) all of which Thackery, with such brilliant satire, represents as being thought necessary to the proper serving of three mutton chops, at seven o'clock exactly, in a certain family residence, while the misses spent their very limited pocket money on buns and cakes for their famished stomachs.



OUR MISSION.

In bowing ourselves upon the stage of public existence, it is, of course, both customary and proper that we should briefly explain "our mission." To many of our friends but little is required to be said as to the necessity of some such publication as the *CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW* proposes to be—an organ, not of any party or of any clique, but for the dispassionate discussion of all questions affecting the Force in the Dominion. It is no undue disparagement of the journals which have so far attempted to fulfil this important function to say that their attempts have practically resulted in failure. "No man can serve two masters" is an axiom as true as it is old; and it is equally impossible for a Military journal to honestly earn a Government subsidy, and at the same time open its columns to independent criticism of the Government's Military policy. The resolution to abandon the system of subsidizing a Military paper was a wise one. It left to independent effort a free field and no favour. We can readily understand why no one has been anxious to step forward and fill the vacancy. The past few years have been "hard" years to many—in fact, more or less, to all—sections of the community. To publishers, they have been years of almost universal disaster. Periodical literature seems to be regarded in these times as one of the luxuries which may very properly be dispensed with, and even the daily newspapers, which are popularly supposed to be as necessary to man's existence as his daily bread, would appear to have been placed in the same category, if we may judge from the straitened circumstances in which many of them find themselves placed. That the moral of this gloomy tale should extend its depressing influence to the literary friends of the Military Force in Canada is by no means surprising. Indeed, it would be surprising were it otherwise. The recompense for literary labour is at best but meagre and precarious—scarcely equal to the keeping of body and soul together: The contemptuous parting kick is too frequently the reward of noble but unsuccessful effort. Men whose hearts are in their profession,

however, would be content to earn if but a scanty living by it. It is the dread of the parting kick, the contempt and ridicule which would certainly follow failure, that daunts their sensitive souls and makes them fear to venture. We know that some such feeling as this has hitherto prevented the friends of military organization in Canada from establishing a journal which would be a fearless and faithful exponent of their views. There is abundant literary material in the Force and among its supporters. We are well assured there is no lack of the necessary enthusiasm. What is needed is the courage to incur the risks, the responsibilities, and the labour connected with its inauguration. It is from no sense of any peculiar fitness for the task that the publishers of the REVIEW have taken upon themselves these risks, responsibilities and labours. Much encouragement has been offered them, by officers and men in all parts of the Dominion, to make the venture, and they expect the co-operation of the whole Force to make the magazine as free as possible from the many faults and failings which will doubtless be apparent in this initial number. The work to which we have set ourselves we acknowledge to be one of no small magnitude. Without the active assistance and practical sympathy of the *whole* Force we cannot hope to be successful. Upon that sympathy and assistance, however, we confidently rely. Every officer and man in the Dominion is interested in the attainment of our ends.

“Deeds, not words,” is the soldier’s motto. By what we are able to do, we hope to be judged; but we also hope to be afforded an opportunity to prove our claims to a favourable verdict. The contents of the present number will give some idea of the course which is intended to be pursued; but new features will be added, and improvements in existing features adopted, as experience may direct and the encouragement offered may justify. We trust, for one thing, with the help of friends in different parts of the country, to furnish a brief *resumé* of the military “events” of each month, which will give to the REVIEW an interest for its various readers altogether apart from its discussion of questions affecting the Force generally. It is hoped, of course, to maintain a fair standard of literary merit in the contributions to which publicity will be given. But the leading feature of the magazine will be its bold and fearless advocacy of the interests of the Force. With the advocates of what

is commonly called the "peace-policy" we have no quarrel. That their motives are of the very best we have not the slightest doubt. That the doctrine they preach is sound in principle, we are quite ready to admit. But that this is the time—when the leading nations of the earth are armed to the teeth, when some of them are engaged in deadly combat, and when each day threatens to bring about some complication which will necessitate the active participation in the struggle of the Empire of which we form a part—to put that doctrine into practice, we utterly deny. "Peace at any price" is the refuge of the coward, and Canadians have ere now given proof that cowardice is not one of their national weaknesses. Nobody knows better or would more willingly avert than the true soldier the horrors of war. But there are times when even that dreadful alternative cannot be refused, except at the expense of honour; and no true Canadian was ever known to regard honour as second to any consideration, or its maintenance to be unworthy of any sacrifice, no matter how great. We are no advocates of huge standing armies, for experience teaches that they are but too apt to find for themselves employment. But we do believe that Canada, as a part of the British Empire, is bound at least to be in a position to defend her own borders, and to render the Mother Country assistance in other quarters of the globe as well, if that were necessary. No statesman, no patriot, no man of common sense can pretend to believe that we are capable of doing either at the present time. The position in which we are thus placed is a mean one, and degrading not only to our own sense of honour, but to our reputation as a people. It is a practical admission that, while we are ready to take the benefits of self-government, we are too niggardly to accept its responsibilities; that while we are framing laws for the regulation of our trade and commerce to suit ourselves, and in direct opposition to the interests of the Mother Country, we are nevertheless wholly dependent, or almost so, for the protection of that trade and commerce upon the Imperial Army; that while we are claiming exemption for our extensive mercantile marine from some of the provisions of the Imperial Shipping Law—demanding certain immunities, not as British subjects, but as Canadians—we are building those ships and sending them to sea with that feeling of security which is bred of absolute supremacy—the supremacy of the British

Navy, to the maintenance of which we contribute not a single cent. We are actually in a position, in all military and naval respects, of utter and abject dependence upon the Mother Country. And what is still worse, there is no sign of a forward movement. Rather, indeed, are we going backward. To be the means, through our friends and supporters, of counteracting this downward tendency, of turning the current in the opposite direction, and of helping to bring about that feeling of self-respect in the country which would make the continuance of our helpless condition impossible, will be the great aim and object of the **CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW**.

There are some people to whom the policy of this magazine will be a disappointment. Chief among these will be the politicians, who are ever ready to turn unfavorable criticism to personal and party advantage when opportunity offers. If they hope to be assisted in their schemes of personal aggrandisement through these pages, they will find themselves miserably mistaken. The Force has true friends on both sides of politics, who may always count on our hearty co-operation in their efforts to have Militia matters placed upon a more satisfactory footing. Our business is to rouse the great body of the public—if we can succeed by any means in reaching them—from the apathy, if not absolute antagonism, to the maintainence of an effective force for the defence of the country, into which they have of late years fallen. Happily that question is one which has, so far, been removed above the noise and dust of party wrangling, and what we can do shall be done to keep it so. If we have the people with us, we have no fear of parties, or of governments. Self-interest, if no higher motive, will induce them very quickly to respond to the popular will, just as their present policy indicates they are prepared to do, even when the popular will is at fault.

Independent alike of Government and Opposition, friendly alike to members of both parties who are favorable to the Military interests of the country, we propose to do our best, fearlessly and independently, to cultivate that spirit of patriotism which is the source of all justifiable military organization; and if, in the discharge of that duty, which we hope to perform without giving unnecessary annoyance to any, we may be compelled to criticise some rather unfavorably, it will be from a sense of duty alone. There will be much in the articles of our contributors, of course, with which it may be impossible for us to agree. But since there are two sides to every

question, it is quite natural to suppose that both will be heard. So far as we are able to accomplish that object, both sides will be. It is by healthy discussion that healthy public opinion is formed, and the fullest opportunity consistent with dignity and the importance of the controversy will be offered for such discussions through our pages.

As to the commercial aspects of our enterprise, it need only be said that we depend entirely and solely upon the amount of favour with which the effort may be met. It will not only be the desire but the interest of the publishers to merit the consideration and support of the Force, and upon that they rely until they have had an opportunity of showing whether they are deserving of continued confidence. If they get but a fair trial, they have no fear of the result.

We may add that we neither hope nor desire to supplant in any measure the "Military Column" which some of the daily newspapers—notably the *Montreal Gazette*—have recently introduced. The field we hope to occupy is an entirely different one. The "Military Column" of the *Gazette* is evidently in very good hands, and the Messrs. White deserve great credit for giving so much attention and such prominence to Militia matters.

Under the provisions of the general order for the drill of the active militia during the financial year 1877-78, the total number to be drilled is 20,000. Field batteries of artillery are to be for twelve consecutive days in camp; other corps for the same time, but on different days, as may be most convenient. The field batteries will receive an issue of tent equipment and an allowance of 25 cents per man and 35 cents per horse per diem, to cover the value of rations and forage. All other corps will be subsisted at their own homes during the period of drill, without expense to the public. The corps for drill will be drawn by lot under special conditions, field batteries being first included; then corps which did not drill in 1876-77; then other corps to complete. As transport will not be provided by the public, the drill of company corps will naturally be by companies; but in cities, where no charge for transport need be incurred, the drill will probably be by regiments, although such is not compulsory. Field batteries will have 100 rounds blank and 85 rounds of service ammunition; garrison artillery, 20 rounds blank and 40 rounds of service; other corps 20 rounds blank and 20 rounds of ball for practice during the training. It is to be regretted that, owing to the small amount of money voted, a greater number cannot be trained, or that the country corps cannot be brought together in camps of instruction. It is, however, to be expected that the momentary stringency under which the country is

now suffering, may only temporarily affect the appropriation for militia purposes, and that in another year effective measures may be adopted for training the whole force. The public interests would doubtless be best secured by reducing the strength of the force to such proportions as the money voted would provide suitable drill and equipment for. The curtailment of the appropriation to its present proportions, while the nominal strength remains so large, is only justifiable as a temporary measure, and it is to be hoped that regulations similar to those of the current and preceding year may not be necessary hereafter. There is, we believe, practically no limit to the sacrifices in time and money, which both officers and men are prepared to make; but then patriotic self sacrifice should be directed towards uniformity of system in drill and training, which is quite impossible under the recently published regulations, except indeed, as we have said, to some extent in the cities. The supply of ammunition is also too small to admit of rifle practice being made in a satisfactory manner. There is a danger, especially with country corps, which are but very imperfectly provided with ranges, of the ammunition being expended by the more skilled marksmen at matches, to the great injury of the efficiency of the rank and file. In these days of rapid firing from breech-loading guns, much depends upon the skill with which the weapons are handled and the thorough acquaintance with their shooting capacities, possessed by the men in whose hands they are placed. Great care should therefore be taken to get as many of the men as possible to expend their own practice ammunition.

We have received at a late hour, a programme of the Ninth Annual Prize Meeting of the Ontario Rifle Association, to be held at the Association Ranges, Garrison Common, Toronto, Tuesday, 28th August, 1877.

The prize list is an attractive one, and if, as has been intimated, the Council of the Dominion Rifle Association are compelled to abandon their annual match for want of funds, many of our marksmen will, no doubt, avail themselves of the opportunity offered to compete at Toronto.

By special arrangement with the Northern, Grand Trunk, Great Western, Toronto and Nipissing, and the Brockville and Ottawa Railways, competitors will be carried to and from the Match at single fare; on the St. Lawrence and Ottawa, and Toronto, Grey and Bruce Railways, at one and a third fare, on being furnished by the Secretary of the O.R.A. with certificates before leaving home; and by the Richelieu and Ontario Navigation Company, at rates which will be furnished on application to the Secretary of the Association.



MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS.

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.

HEAD QUARTERS,

Ottawa, 1st June, 1877.

GENERAL ORDERS (13.)

No. 1.

ACTIVE MILITIA.

REGULATIONS FOR THE ANNUAL DRILL OF 1877-78.

DOMINION OF CANADA.

Adverting to No. 1 of General Orders (11) 11th May last, the three paragraphs under the heading "*Drill and Practice*," for Field Batteries of Artillery, and the paragraph under the heading "Garrison Artillery," are hereby cancelled, and the following substituted:

ARTILLERY PRACTICE.

Field Batteries, 9 pr. R. M. L.
16 competitors, 5 rounds each, viz.,
3 Common Shell with time fuses 48
2 Shrapnel do do .. 32
Trial Shots and instruction, common shell plugged or fired with bursting charge and percussion fuse, if range permits 5

85

Field Batteries, 9-pr. S. B.
16 competitors, 5 rounds each, viz:
2 Solid shot 9-pr. 32
2 Shrapnel, Shell with time fuses 9-pr. 32

1 Common do do 24-pr 16
Trial Shots and instruction,
solid shot 9-pr. 5

85

Garrison Batteries.

8 competitors, 5 rounds each, viz :

3 Solid Shot 24
1 Common Shell with time fuse 8
1 Shrapnel do do 8
Trial Shots and instruction,
solid shot. 5

45

Each Field Battery of Artillery will be allowed 100 rounds, and each Garrison Battery, 20 rounds of Blank Ammunition, for Exercise and Practice."

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

Kingston Field Battery of Artillery

Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander S. Kirkpatrick, G. S., is hereby permitted, as a special case, to retire retaining his Brevet Rank.

Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick's rank as Brevet Lieutenant Colonel dates from 1st February, 1877.

Wellington Field Battery of Artillery.

To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally: Corporal John Crow, vice McDonald, resigned.

15th Battalion or the "Argyle Light
Infantry."

To be Lieutenant Colonel:
Major and Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel Samuel Shaw Lazier,
V.B., vice Alfred A. Campbell
who is hereby permitted to re-
tire retaining rank.
Lieutenant Colonel Lazier takes
rank as Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel from 15th June, 1876.

33d "Huron" Battalion of Infantry,
No. 9 Company, Dunganon.

To be Lieutenant:
John Stanley Varcoe, Gentleman,
M.S., vice Jacob Crozier who is
hereby permitted to retire re-
taining rank.

38th "Brant" Battalion or "Duf-
ferin Rifles."

No. 1 Company, Paris.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally:
Robert Grinton Clarke, Gentle-
man, vice Pettit, appointed
Quarter-Master.

To be Ensign, provisionally:
Alfred Adolphus Allworth, Gen-
tleman, vice John M. Robertson,
left limits.

No. 2 Company, Brantford.

Adverting to No. 3 of G.O., (14)
21st July 1876, Captain John Kerr,
Lieutenant Thomas Burnley and
Ensign James Page should have
been "transferred" with their re-
spective ranks, "from 3rd Battalion
Rifles, Grand Trunk Railway
Brigade," instead of as "late" of
that corps.

44th "Welland Battalion of In-
fantry.

No. 5 Company, Welland.

To be Captain, provisionally:
Richard Harcourt, Esquire, vice
Thomas B. Brown, left limits.

M

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

9th Battalion of Rifles, or "Voldi-
geurs de Quebec."

No. 5 Company.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally:
Frank Pennée, Gentleman, vice
Gingras, retired.

61st "Montmagny and L'Isle" Bat-
talion of Infantry.

No. 4 Company, St. Jean Port Joli.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally:
Charles François Leclerc, Gentle-
man, vice Burke, promoted.

Quebec Provisional Battalion of In-
fantry.

The Head Quarters of this Provi-
sional Battalion are hereby trans-
ferred from St. Ambroise to
L'Ancienne Lorette.

CONFIRMATION OF RANK.

Lieutenant John Fortune Nott,
V.B., 1st Battalion; from 22nd
May, 1877.

Ensign Kenneth Cameron Pat-
terson, V.B., 1st Battalion from
22nd May, 1877.

Ensign Stanley Kinnear, V.B.,
1st Battalion; from 22nd May, 1877.

Ensign John Ogden Wilgress,
V.B., 1st Battalion; from 22nd
May, 1877.

BREVET.

To be Lieutenant Colonel:
Major John Henry Taylor, V.C.C.,
Cookshire Troop of Cavalry;
from 23rd May, 1877.

PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

67th Battalion, "The Carleton Light
Infantry."

No. 6 Company, Grand Falls.

To be Captain:
Lieutenant Charles Edward Beck-
with, M.S., vice Bossé, resigned

No. 2.

CERTIFICATES GRANTED.

SCHOOLS OF GUNNERY.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

FIRST CLASS "SHOT COURSE" CERTIFICATES.

Sergeant F. Smith, Ottawa Brigade Garrison Artillery.

Bombardier Henry Linall, Toronto Field Battery.

SCHOOLS OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION.

PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

SECOND CLASS CERTIFICATES.

St. John.—Gunner William McKunkin, N.B. Brigade Garrison Artillery.*Victoria.*—Lieutenant Charles E. Beckwith, 67th Battalion.*Westmoreland.*—Captain Samuel C. Alward, 74th Battalion.*York.*—Private Edward McGrath, 71st Battalion; Private James W.

Hoyt, 71st Battalion; Private Hewlett S. Carman, 71st Battalion

BOARD OF EXAMINERS.

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

FIRST CLASS CERTIFICATES.

Captain Alexander Robertson, 1st or "Prince of Wales' Regiment."

Captain Robert Garnett Patlow, 1st or "Prince of Wales' Regiment."

SECOND CLASS CERTIFICATES.

Lieutenant John Fortune Nott, 1st or "Prince of Wales' Regiment."

Ensign Kenneth C. Patterson, 1st or "Prince of Wales' Regiment."

Ensign Stanley Kinnear, 1st or Prince of Wales' Regiment."

Ensign John Ogden Wilgress, 1st or "Prince of Wales' Regiment."

By Command,

WALKER POWELL,

Colonel.

Adjutant-General of Militia, Canada

HEAD QUARTERS,

Ottawa, 22nd June, 1877.

GENERAL ORDERS (14.)

No. 1.

ACTIVE MILITIA.

REGULATIONS FOR THE ANNUAL

DRILL OF 1877-78.

DOMINION OF CANADA.

Advertising to No. 1 of General Orders (13) 1st June instant, under the heading "*Artillery Practice*" the word "percussion" is substituted for "time," as connected with "fuzes," in the detail of ammunition for "Field Batteries, 9—pr. R. M. L." guns.

ARTILLERY PRACTICE REPORTS

Officers commanding Batteries of Artillery are requested to forward their "Practice Reports" to their respective Inspectors of Artillery, immediately after the completion of practice,

The Report of the Winnipeg Field Battery is to be forwarded to the Inspector of Artillery at Kingston, and the report of Batteries in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island to the Inspector of Artillery at Quebec.

PARTY DEMONSTRATIONS.

The attention of Officers commanding Military Districts, Battalions, and all concerned, is called to the Queen's Regulations for the army, sec. 6, par. 44, viz:

"Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers are forbidden to institute, or take part in, any meetings, demonstrations, or processions for party or political purposes, in barracks, quarters, camp, or elsewhere.

FIRING PARTIES FOR FUNERALS.

Firing parties for funerals will, without special authority, only be detailed for funerals which are strictly military.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

Kingston Field Battery of Artillery.

To be Captain provisionally and specially, from 1st June 1877:

1st Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Henry Wilmott, vice Kirkpatrick, retired.

Toronto Field Battery of Artillery.

To be 1st Lieutenant, provisionally: Lieutenant Joseph Hooper Mead, from 10th Batt., vice Stephen Staughton, whose resignation is hereby accepted.

7th Battalion "The London Light Infantry."

To be Lieutenant-Colonel: Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John Walker, V. B., vice John MacBeth, who is hereby permitted to retire retaining rank.

The resignation of Captain George S. Birrell, is hereby accepted.

10th Battalion or "Royal Regiment of Toronto."

To be Ensign, provisionally: Quarter-Master-Sergeant George Maurice Furnival, vice G. B. Gordon, whose resignation is hereby accepted.

The resignation of Ensign W. G. Andrews is hereby accepted.

14th Battalion "The Princess of Wales" Own Rifles, Kingston.

To be Lieutenant provisionally: Private Henry Gordon Hubbell, vice John Donley Shelleck, left limits.

24th "Kent" Battalion of Infantry. No 5 Company, Bothwell.

The resignation of Lieutenant Michael Dixon is hereby accepted.

26th "Middlesex" Battalion of Infantry.

No 5 Company, Lucan.

To be Captain: John S. Thom, Esquire, M. S., vice William Gunning McMillen, who is hereby permitted to retire retaining rank.

The resignation of Lieutenant Charles Clutterham is hereby accepted.

34th "Ontario" Battalion of Infantry.

To be Assistant Surgeon: David Peterson Bogart, Esquire, vice Jonathan Robinson, left limits.

No 2 Company, Oshawa.

To be Lieutenant: Private John E. Bryant, V. B., vice Reginald Larrard, deceased.

No. 3 Company, Oshawa.

To be Lieutenant: George St. John Hallem, Gentleman vice Slade, resigned.

37th "Haldimand" Battalion of Rifles.

No 1 Company, York.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally, from 18th June, 1877.

Quarter-Master-Sergeant Robert Archibald Weir, vice Cranston, resigned.

No. 4 Company, Hagarville.

The resignation of Lieutenant Henry Almas is hereby accepted.

No. 5 Company, Hullsville.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally, from 16th June, 1877:

Sergeant James McFarlan, vice Albert R. Pyne, who is hereby permitted to retire retaining rank. Ensign William Brock having left limits, his name is hereby removed from the list of officers of Active Militia.

No. 7 Company, Caledonia.

To be Captain, provisionally, from 18th June, 1877:

William Treggerthen Sawle, Esquire, vice Geoffrey John Whiddon, who is hereby permitted to retire retaining rank.

42nd "Brockville" Battalion of Infantry.

No. 1 Company, Almonte.

To be Ensign, provisionally:

Sergeant Francis Coulter, vice
McEwan, resigned.

*77th "Wentworth" Battalion of
Infantry.*

No. 2 Company, Waterdown.

To be Ensign, provisionally:

James C. Ryan, Gentleman, vice
Nathaniel Pettit Bell, left limits.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

Lieutenant Frederic E. A. Gautier
1st Battalion Governor General's
Foot Guards, for a further period of
six months from 9th proximo.

Lieutenant Gautier, to have the
local rank of Captain in the Pro-
vince of Quebec, whilst absent on
leave from his corps.

BREVET.

To be Lieutenant-Colonel:

Captain and Brevet Major Henry
Cassidy Rogers, V. B., No 3
Troop, 3rd Provisional Regi-
ment of Cavalry: from 3rd May,
1877.

Major George Lee Garden, M. S.,
12th Battalion; from 10th May,
1877.

Major Herbert Charles Gwyn, V.
B., 77th Battalion; from 23rd
May, 1877.

Captain and Brevet Major Wil-
liam Henry Cotton, G. S., "A"
Battery, School of Gunnery;
from 1st June, 1877.

To be Major:

Captain Joseph White, V. P., No.
6. Company, 34th Battalion;
from 7th June, 1877.

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Quebec Field Battery of Artillery.

To be Veterinary Surgeon:

William B. Hall, Gentleman.

Montreal Field Battery of Artillery.

To be Veterinary Surgeon:

Duncan McEachran, Gentleman.

*1st Battalion "Prince of Wales"
Regiment" Montreal.*

To be Lieutenant:

Ensign Kenneth Cameron
Patterson, V. B., vice Tatlow,
promoted.

Ensign Stanley Kinnear, V. B.,
vice Wright, promoted.

Ensign John Ogden Wilgress, V.
B., vice Sidney Caldecott
Chubb, whose resignation is
hereby accepted.

*53rd "Sherbrooke" Battalion of
Infantry,*

No. 1 Company, Sherbrooke.

To be Lieutenant provisionally:

Sergeant Ernest W. Beckett, vice
James F. Morkill, whose resig-
nation is hereby accepted.

To be Ensign, provisionally:

Corporal William A. Brooks, vice
Ibbotson, transferred to No. 3
Company.

No. 3 Company, Lennoxville.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally:

Private John A. McNicol, vice
John Shuter, whose resignation
is hereby accepted.

To be Ensign, provisionally:

Private Stephen Twose, vice
George Wood, whose resigna-
tion is hereby accepted.

65th Battalion "Mount Royal Rifles."

No. 3 Company, Montreal.

To be Captain:

P. O. Joseph Hebert, Esquire,
M. S., vice J. Clement Danse-
reau, whose resignation is here-
by accepted.

No. 5 Company, Montreal.

To be Captain:

Lieutenant George S. Malepart,
M.S., from No. 2 Company,
vice Louis Alphonse P. Barthe,
whose resignation is hereby
accepted.

No. 6 Company, Montreal.

To be Ensign, provisionally:

Charles E. Rouillard, Gentleman,
vice Prosper H. Handfield,
whose resignation is hereby
accepted.

79th "Shefford" Battalion of Infantry, or "Highlanders."

No. 1 Company, Granby.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally:
Joseph T. Seale, Gentleman, vice
Michael H. Cox, whose resignation
is hereby accepted.

80th "Nicolet" Battalion of Infantry.

To be Lieutenant-Colonel:

Major Edouard de Foy, V. B.

To be Major:

Captain Charles Hercule Giroux,
M.S., from No. 2 Company, vice
de Foy, promoted.

To be Quarter-Master:

Ensign William Courtchêne, from
No. 2 Company.

To be Assistant-Surgeon:

Adolphe Lanouette, Esq., M.D.

No. 2 Company, Nicolet.

To be Captain:

Lieutenant and Adjutant Jean
Baptiste Rousseau, V. B., vice
Giroux, promoted.

BREVET.

To be Major:

Captain George William Hatton,
V. B., Adjutant 1st Battalion;
from 7th June, 1877.

PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

New Brunswick Engineers Company

The resignation of 2nd Lieutenant George Black Hegan is hereby accepted.

CONFIRMATION OF RANK.

Captain Samuel Chauncey Alward,
M.S., No. 2 Company, 74th Battalion;
from 16th May, 1877.

PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA.

2nd "Halifax" Brigade of Garrison Artillery.

No. 2 Battery, Dartmouth.

To be 1st Lieutenant:

2nd Lieutenant Henry Pineo Clay,
M.S., vice William Lithgow,
left limits.

66th "Halifax" Battalion of Infantry.

Captain and Paymaster George Mclean, to have the honorary rank of Major.

PROVINCE OF MANITOBA.

Winnipeg Field Battery of Artillery

1st Lieutenant William Morris having left limits, his name is hereby removed from the list of officers of the Active Militia.

BREVET.

To be Lieutenant-Colonel:

Captain and Brevet Major Wm. N. Kennedy, M.S., Winnipeg Field Battery; from 3rd May, 1877.

No. 2.

CERTIFICATES GRANTED.

SCHOOLS OF GUNNERY.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

FIRST CLASS "SHORT COURSE" CERTIFICATE.

Gunner A. Brown, Toronto Field Battery.

SECOND CLASS "SHORT COURSE" CERTIFICATES.

Gunner William Adair, Kingston Field Battery.

Gunner C. W. Nedham, Ottawa Field Battery.

BOARD OF EXAMINERS.

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

FIRST CLASS CERTIFICATES.

Major Edouard de Foy, 80th Bat.
Capt. Joseph Boudreau, 76th do
do François Lapointe, 65th do
Paymaster J. Beauchamp, do do
P. O. Joseph Hébert, Gentleman

No. 3.

RESERVE MILITIA.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

REGIMENTAL DIVISION OF THE NORTH
RIDING OF SIMCOE.*No. 1 Company Division.*

To be Captain:

Lieutenant John Powell, vice J.
Morrow, deceased.

To be Lieutenant:

Ensign James Thompson, vice
Powell, promoted.

To be Ensign:

Daniel Fraser MacWatt, Gentle-
man, vice Thompson promoted.*No. 2 Company Division.*

To be Lieutenant:

Ensign George Leach, vice G. C.
McManus, deceased.

To be Ensign:

Warren Pringle, Gentleman, vice
Leach, promoted.*No. 4 Company Division.*

To be Ensign:

Daniel Switzer, Gentleman, vice
Peter Campbell, left limits.*No. 6 Company Division.*

To be Lieutenant:

Ensign Wm. Drury, vice Allan
Lloyd, left limits.

To be Ensign:

Donald McCuaig, Gentleman,
vice Drury, promoted.*No. 9 Company Division.*

To be Lieutenant:

Ensign James H. Ryan, vice
Joseph Kean, deceased.

To be Ensign:

James Kean, Gentleman, vice
Ryan, promoted.*No. 11 Company Division.*

To be Lieutenant:

Ensign James R. Carmichael, vice
C. Popplewell, left limits.

To be Ensign:

Domiuick Loftus, Gentleman,
vice Carmichael, promoted.

PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

REGIMENTAL DIVISION OF SUNBURY.

To be Lieutenant-Colonel:

Major Robert Duncan Wilmot,
junior, vice R. Hoben, deceased.

To be Majors:

Captain James King Hazen,
from No. 1 Company Division,
vice Wilmot, promoted.Captain Hanford Brown, from
No. 4 Company Division, vice
John S. Brown, deceased.*No. 1 Company Division.*

To be Captain:

Lieutenant John Fredk. Hoben,
vice Hazen, promoted.

To be Lieutenant:


Ensign Isaac William Stephen-
son, vice Hoben, promoted.

By Command,

WALKER POWELL, Colonel,

Adjutant-General of Militia,

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
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
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Montreal, 1877

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