




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

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
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
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A N

# ENQUIRY, &c.

HOWEVER inconsistent it  
H may be with the Vanity of  
an Author to forbid, rather  
than invite his Reader, the  
Writer of this Enquiry is willing to  
acquaint those whose Curiosity may  
expect

expect a Detection of ministerial Schemes, or whose Malignity may call for Gratification, by the Aspersions of particular Characters, that they will be but ill entertained by a Perusal of his Pamphlet.

He well knows the Genius of his Countrymen; he would more willingly say of Mankind, that it has a secret, or rather an avowed Pleasure, in discovering the Guilt of Individuals. But Truth is not to be wrested to gratify the black Passions of Depravity; and the Enquirer, whether interested or not, ought to be impartial as the Eye of Justice. After this has been said, it will be necessary to observe, that as no private characters will be aspersed, so none will be obliquely defended; that as Envy will not be indulged by conjectural Reproach, so neither shall Impartiality possibly be trans-

transgressed by an unpleasing Defence of any obnoxious name.

The People of *Great-Britain* are astonish'd to see their Arms unsuccessful, their Efforts baffled, their Settlements plundered, and their Enemies triumph: and to a People dreaded for their Courage, fam'd for their Victories, and respected by all the Powers in *Europe*, these, it must be confess'd, are mortifying Circumstances; how these Circumstances came to be ours, is the Subject of the present Enquiry.

Many, unable or unwilling to penetrate into more abstracted Causes, have heard of their Country's Misfortunes with a Kind of philosophic Ease, concerned only as at the Events of common Chance; and have readily acquiesced in the most obvious Excuses; such as, the superiority of Numbers, or the Accidents of War.

These

These may be good Men and peaceful Subjects, but it admits of a Dispute, whether this ought on all Occasions to be the Behaviour of a free People.

If we have not known our Losses so many, our Expeditions so vain, and our Expences so great, it is but natural strictly to enquire why the first have not been prevented? why the second were unsuccessful? and to complain that the last have been ruinously misapplied.

*France*, whose Punic Faith is branded to a Proverb, has, many many Years ago, done enough to inform a discerning People, that she is jealous, ambitious, faithless, and designing.

*Great-*

*Great-Britain* seems to be without Mistrust, very unambitious, conscientiously faithful in her Engagements, and consequently without any Design on the Possessions of others.

When such are the Dispositions of two Kingdoms, Rivals in Interest and in Power, between which there exists a Kind of hereditary Enmity, it will not be wondered that no pacific Treaty, however solemnly ratified, can long continue: those whom no Engagements of Honour can bind, would only wait a favourable Opportunity to gratify their Ambition: the *French*, from the Commencement of the late *glorious* Peace, have only studied how they might renew the War

to an Advantage, and I wish we could now say that their Designs have been unsuccessful.

Our *American Possessions*, the Glory of the *British Crown*, and the Basis of our Commerce, they have long envied us : And for that, among other Reasons, these became the first Object of their Depredations.

In the Year 1753, 1500 regular Forces sent from *France* built three Forts on the *Ohio*, on Lands which, by a Grant from his Majesty, were the Property of several Gentlemen in *London* and *Virginia*. In *October* of the same Year, the Governor of that Province thought proper to send Mr. *Washington* to demand of the *French*  
Com-

Commandant, the Reasons of their settling on the Properties of the *British* Subjects? and to require them in a solemn Manner to withdraw. Mr. *Washington's* painful Journey only procured this Answer, that the Marquis *Duguisne* should be consulted, and his Determinations followed; and that, in the mean time, the *French* were resolved to keep their Station. This Conclusion, however, might have been made from some Hints which the *French* Officers, when Wine \* had taken off Reserve, inadvertently threw out; and their unwarrantable Pre-

\* When Mr *Washington* was with some of the General Officers, in the Freedom of the Bottle, they told him, That their Design was, to prevent the *English* from building Forts on the *Ohio*.

tences † to a Right on the *Ohio*, that they were determined not to quit their Forts, till banished by Superiority of Numbers; which, tho' the *English*, they owned, could easily raise, yet, so well they knew the Tardiness of their Operations, they had no Thoughts of being soon obliged to abandon the Settlements they had usurped.

When an Enemy is so kind as to point out to us our weak Parts, we ought surely to be alarmed, and principally to defend the Object of his Sword.

*Fas est et ab hoste doceri.* . . .

† They pretended a Right to the *Ohio*, by the Discovery of one *La Salle*, made about 60 Years ago.

In

In the Spring, 1754, Orders were sent from *England*, to repel Force by Force, and to drive the Enemy from the Forts they had built, and the Settlements they had established contrary to Treaty. Accordingly a Number of Forces, to the Amount of 2,000, draughted from the several Provinces, were ordered to form a Camp on the *Ohio*. While these military Preparations were making, the *French* cast off all Pretexes, pushed their Encroachments. and committed open Hostilities. But hear the Success of this Campaign. Were the Usurpers banished from their Forts? Was their Plunder recovered? Were their settling Schemes defeated? No——Unless it could have been effected by a trifling

trifling Skirmish ; for that, it must be owned, happened between a few Provincials, under Col. *Washington*, and a Party of the Enemy : And in that ended the Operations of the Season. Can any one observe the Progress of these Affairs, and not be astonished at our Neglect ? While we stupidly suffered our Enemies for whole Seasons to strengthen their Powers, to spread their Insinuations, and to extend their Encroachments ! — However blameable our Colonies were, in that they did not unite with the necessary Vigour and Dispatch to destroy the Enemy, the *British* P———t must have been in a great Degree more so. If, instead of the loose Orders that were dispatched to the Governors of our Colonies, a Number of Transports had been sent over with Ammunition, Money,

ney,

ney, proper Officers, and proper Instructions, we should not now expect Accounts of fresh Depredations, and new Encroachments. But the Pomp and Contests of Electioneering seem to have made our Representatives forget the Cause of their Election.

The *French*, however, not so inactive in assaulting as we in defending our Properties, did not fail to take the Advantage of that Tardiness they foresaw, and that Negligence which they surely found to exceed their Expectations. They were continually reinforcing their Army in *America* with whatever its Necessities required; nor did it make that Use a modern *British*-Army might have made of the Supplies which it received.

In

In the Beginning of the Year 1755, it was concluded, that the Enemy was no longer to be trifled with, and that such a Number of Forces should be sent from *England*, as, with those that might be raised from the several Colonies, would effectually put a Stop to the Proceedings of the *French*, if not totally drive them from the Continent. Accordingly General *Braddock* with *Dunbar's* and *Halket's* Regiments, under Commodore *Keppel*, arrived in *America*.— A general Council was held at *Annapolis* in *Maryland*, and upwards of thirteen thousand Men were found ready for Action. These, in several Parties, had several Destinations; the Troops in *New England* and

and *Nova Scotia* united to repel the Enemy in the last mentioned Provinces, which they effected. Colonel *Johnson* was dispatched with a good Force against *Crown-Point*; Governor *Shirley* marched to attack another Fort at *Niagara*; General *Braddock* was destined to the *Ohio*; and General *Monkton* to drive the *French* from two Forts in the Bay of *Fundy*.

We soon received an Account of *Monkton's* Success: which, indeed, we should have expected from that brave Officer, had he been engaged in a more difficult Enterprize;—and this Event encouraged the Hopes we had before entertained of effectually banishing our Enemies from the

C

Lands

Lands they had seized, and the Forts they had built.

The unhappy *Braddock's* Expedition had a different Event. Nothing should be said to hurt the Memory of that brave Leader, who fell a Sacrifice to his Courage; but it is universally acknowledged, that he was unfit for any Operation in *America*, where so much was to be done by cool Circumspection and affable Behaviour, and where Stratagem and Ambuscade were more to be expected than any regular Battle. A calm Temper, and a discerning Head, were not so much the Characteristics of *Braddock*, as rash Courage, and an impolitic Attachment to the Laws of War.

But

But those who appointed that General to a Command in *America*, wanted either Skill or Honesty, as appeared from several unsuccessful Events during their Administration. An Instance or two will prove the Truth of this Assertion.

*Boscawen* went out with eleven Ships of the Line and one Frigate, to intercept the *French* Fleet, which, when it came out, was found to consist of twenty-five Ships of the Line. Had they then the necessary Intelligence, or was *Boscawen* designed to beat the *French*?

But gross as this Management was, it was made still worse by *Holborne's* Dispatch to reinforce *Boscawen*. This Affair might have been of the most ruinous Consequence, as it might possibly have deprived us of two Fleets, which being attacked separately by the Enemy, would both have been taken or destroyed.

Thus by a Neglect of the necessary Intelligence, to say no worse, was the *French* Power suffered so infinitely to increase in *America*; and by the Choice of an improper Commander to go against them, were those Forts suffered to continue in the Enemy's Hands, which we had been two Years

in-

ineffectually aiming to destroy; and which it was the more shameful to leave undemolished or untaken, as most Part of the Time they were defended but by a Handful of Men.

After this Event, *Virginia* was left naked, exposed to every Incurfion of the Enemy, that Cruelty, Revenge, or the Hopes of Plunder might excite: an almost univerfal Stop was put to Trade, and the Inhabitants were bufied only in hiding their Effects, and confulting for their Safety.

Such were the dreadful Apprehenfions after *Braddock's* Defeat; and happy it was that the expected Confequences did not enfue: For tho' many Families on the Frontiers were either  
mur-

murdered, or ruined in their Circumstances by the Enemy, yet that valuable Province is still ours.

Soon after, however, a more successful Event cleared the Gloom of Despondency, and made the unhappy Provincials once more resume their Courage, and hope for Superiority.

This was the sharp Engagement between Col. *Johnson* and Baron *Dieskau*, in which the latter was taken Prisoner, and a great Number of his Men perished.

This Success might have had a good Effect both on our own People, and the Indians in our Favour, but another discouraging Circumstance at that

that Time, unluckily retarded the Wheel of Prosperity in its Career.

The Supplies voted by the Assembly of *Pensylvania*, and so much wanted and expected at this Time, were stopped by the ill-timed Differences between that Body and the Governor. However justifiable those Disputes might have been at any other Time, they were then of the worst Consequence, and highly blameable.

Though Disputes concerning the Method or Legality of raising Supplies, or the Means to be used for repelling an invading Enemy, are so unnatural and detestable when carried to such a Pitch as to frustrate their End, that one would expect no prudent People

ple would admit them ; yet, as they are found frequent in all Countries, the Method of raising Supplies for Variety of Occasions ought to be fixed and indispensable as every constitutional Law

This Misfortune of the Differences in *Pensylvania* was aggravated by the Remissness of some other Provinces in consulting, at this important Crisis, for the common Good.

The northern Colonies, which had been both more active and unanimous, were also dissatisfied to find that their Mother Country distributed her Favours, and her Care, more liberally among those that had been more inactive, and consequently not so deserving ;

ing ; and if this were true, it was certainly a great Neglect in us, and might unfortunately cool the Ardour, and unnerve the Activity of those who found their most vigorous Efforts neglected, and the Supine and Indolent carry the Palm of Favour.

These Differences, and these Dissatisfactions, we knew ; but did we avail ourselves of the Intelligence ? Were we sufficiently active in inspiring the Indolent, in reconciling Disputes, and exciting a right Emulation by rewarding and encouraging those whose Merits entitled them to Encouragement and Rewards.

Nothing could have so effectually contributed to deter the Enemy, and

D

to

to ascertain the Resources of Provisions, and other Necessaries, as uniting the several Colonies, and by that Means engaging them in a mutual Exertion of their Strength, and an unanimous Defence of the common Liberty. Had this been done, all must have contributed proportionably, and Murmuring and Partiality had not been of any ill Consequence. For want of this Unanimity and general Contribution, was *Johnson*, after his Advantage over the *French*, left without common Necessaries of a Campaign; and though he had a sufficient Force to have taken *Crown-Point*, had he not wanted Provisions, that Fort was left to be the Object of another Spring's Operations.

If

If it should be asked what General *Shirley*, and the 3,000 Men under his Command were doing during the Summer, it can only be answered, that, after having built two small Forts at *Oswego*, he retired into Winter-Quarters.

The Miseries that succeeded this ineffectual Campaign might have been expected, but they were indeed terrible: the unhappy Backsettlers experienced all the Distress that human Nature can suffer, whether in the Loss of Circumstances, or the Loss of Life!

How great ought the Talents of those intrusted with the public Welfare to be ! How extensive their Knowledge ! How indefatigable their Endeavours ! it may also be added, how sensible their Hearts of the Distresses of others, that they may be careful lest any Neglect or Misconduct of theirs should expose the meanest Subject to Ruin or to Pain,

These Considerations seem not at all to have taken Place with our Ministry at a Time when they should have had the greatest Effect. After we had so sensibly seen the unfortunate Consequences of Delay, in both the preceding Summers, the Operations of the

the Year Fifty-six were expected to be managed with the greatest Vigour and Dispatch. But whoever expected it, was surely deceived. The same dilatory Spirit still lulling our Councils, and retarding our Action. Nor will this Complaint appear unjust, when it is considered, that the Supplies sent to *America* were not embarked till the latter End of *April*; that the General appointed to command the Forces, and who, therefore, should have been at their Head as early as possible, did not go forward till a Month after these; and several of the Officers and the Ammunition, not till a Month after him. The discreet Method of shipping the Ammunition is so well known, that it need not be mentioned.

Thus

Thus was the Season for Action lost in the most inexcusable unaccountable Delays ! Delays which, in their Consequence, we could foresee to be dangerous, and which were the more unpardonable, not only as the then Situation of Affairs demanded the greatest Expedition, but as we had very sensibly experienced their bad Effects before.

The frequent Change of our Commanders in *America* was necessarily attended with great Inconveniencies ; the last appointed had the Plan of the Country and the Genius of its Inhabitants to enquire into, and to form his Operations accordingly. No other Arguments need be used to prove the Truth of this Assertion, as unfortunately

nately nothing from Practice can be proved against it.

*Crown-Point*, whose Capture was the Object of general Hope, and for which this Season was particularly designed, was unmolested, unattempted. The *French*, it is true, were now greatly increased in Numbers; but that could be no Obstacle, as we had still a sufficient Force to send against it.

By what strange Fatality then! — by what unaccountable Negligence, or unreasonable Cowardice, did we leave the Design of reducing that Fort unexecuted? The strictest Enquiry, I believe, would produce nothing more than Astonishment; for  
we

we only find, that what was practicable was left unattempted.

But let us suppose, that our Commanders were diverted from their Attention to *Crown-Point*, upon hearing that the Enemy had a Design on *Oswego*. Of this they had timely Notice, as the *French* had formed a large Camp within about thirty Miles of that Fort, the Intent of which could only be to attack it; and of this Notice they industriously availed themselves. They had long before experienced the ruinous Consequences of Delay, and were determined to give one Instance of Vigour and Dispatch: Accordingly General *Webb* was sent with a Reinforcement to *Oswego*, at most two Days after it was taken!

How-

However, let it not be said, that our Forces, during this Summer, eat the Bread of Idleness: Tho' they durst not fight, they could dig with Safety; and the Season was spent in making Entrenchments at *Lake George*, and fortifying Fort *William Henry*.

Let us now turn from the melancholy Prospect of that wretched Year, and see if the present will not afford us a more pleasing one.

The Beginning of this Year was employed in Preparations for an Expedition against *LOUISBOURGH*; a Scheme which, if it had been rightly concerted, might probably have succeeded:

ceeded: But its Success entirely depended on an early Motion in the Spring, before the Enemy could be reinforced by Supplies from *Europe* or *Quebeck*. As this was the Case, there was never any Probability of executing that Design this Year: Admiral *Holborne* could not be expected to arrive sooner than *June*; and whether he would bring a Number of Ships with him superior to the *French* Fleet, was equally uncertain with the Time of his Arrival. When he came to *Halifax*, he found that the Enemy's Fleet consisted of more capital Ships, besides Frigates, than his own; and that they had a much greater Number of Guns. A Council of War was thereupon held, and it was agreed to one Vote, that the Attempt was impracticable at that Time.

This

This Council of War ought not, however, to be look'd upon in the same Light as some of those Councils of Peace which have been held upon our *European* Expeditions. Had *Holborne* inconsiderately risqued a Battle with the Enemy, he might, in all human Probability, have been conquered, and the Consequences of that Defeat would have been terrible indeed: The Transports, with upwards of ten Thousand Land-Forces on board, would have been taken or destroyed, and *New York*, and perhaps *North America*, had been lost in Consequence of that Event. The Courage of the Admiral was never doubted. After the Land-Forces were dismissed, he was determined himself to see the Strength of the

E 2                      Enemy;

Enemy ; and it is well known, he would have hazarded a Battle, though upon a moderate Disadvantage.

That his Fleet has been dispersed and damaged by a Storm, is an unfortunate Accident ; but it is to be hoped, that the Commissioners of the Navy will, without Loss of Time, send him a Reinforcement that shall make him equal, if not superior, to the *French* Fleet.

Before I have done with *American* Affairs, one Particular more is to be considered, which, however, can give the Reader no great Satisfaction at his Dismission. I know not whether it will be expected that I am going to mention the Loss of Fort *William* *Henry*,

*Henry*, as that Event, I cannot tell for what Reason, did not much alarm us. If we should resume the Design of reducing *Crown-Point*, it would be very necessary for the Attempt, as it commands the Lakes; but whatever was its Use, the Circumstances of its Capture were so shameful, that they cannot sure be heard without Indignation.

General *Webb*, the same who was sent to the Relief of *Oswego*, was informed by the unhappy Affair of Colonel *Parker*, which happened about the 21st of *July*, that a large Body of *French* and *Indians* was coming against them, but he could not believe the Report, and so neglected to call in by Expresses the Militia of the Provinces, and to provide every necessary Supply. On the second of *August*  
 their

their Scouts discovered them upon the Lake: that very Night was the prudent General for marching off to Fort *Edward*: in the Morning he went, escorted by a strong Guard; and after his safe Arrival he ventured to write by his Aid de Camp to the commanding Officer at Fort *Henry*. The Contents of his gallant Letter may be thus epitomized.

SIR,

“ The Roads are so invested that  
“ a Letter can scarce get Passage. As  
“ you know my strength, you know  
“ how dangerous it would be for me  
“ to join you. I have sent Expresses  
“ upon Expresses for the Militia. If  
“ neither I nor they should come to  
“ your Assistance, you must make the  
“ best

“ best Terms you can, and I pray God  
 “ give you Success.”

If, as it is urged, the Fort was ill-built, and it was impossible to defend it, why, in the name of common Sense, did not the Garrison quit it before it was invested by the Enemy. They might by that Means have saved the Provisions and every thing else, which, upon a Surrender, were lost. They had not then been exposed to the Plundering and Butchering of the savage *Indians*, nor had they been incapacitated, by the Terms of Capitulation, to take up Arms against the *French*. Besides, had the Garrisons of Fort *William Henry* and Fort *Edward* been joined by the Militia, they might, by the Discretion of a prudent Commander,

der, have cut off the Enemy's Retreat, and instead of our losing a Fort, the *French* might have lost an Army. It was expected indeed, that Lord *Lou-don* would fall upon them in their Return, but those Expectations were founded on bad Intelligence, for they returned victorious, and unmo-  
lestcd.

Thus much of *America* — from a Reflection on the whole it appears, that the Forts on the *Ohio* were suffered to remain in the Enemy's Hand, because of the Indiscretion of the Commander that was sent against them: that General *Johnson* was unable to prosecute his Victory over the *French* in 1755 by Want of Provisions and other Necessaries: that *Crown-Point*  
was



Death of an executed Admiral could appease? When we act thus ineffectually for ourselves, it is no wonder that our Allies should be deceived in us. It is in States as in private Life; He that cannot do well for himself, as certainly proves a helpless Friend; and a Kingdom unsuccessful in its own Wars, must be a hopeless Ally. The brave King of *Prussia* is indeed to be pitied, as he has not only his own Enemies but ours to repel. *Great-Britain*, once the Scourge of *France*, was thought sufficient, not only to defeat that Kingdom in any Attempt, but to assist her Allies, should their Necessities, even then, call for her Relief. Not one of us, I dare say, but is persuaded that the brave Monarch, whom we have so ingloriously deserted, would not have relinquished us in the like Circumstances.

stances. But it is much to be wished that the War be not closed by a Peace as shameful as the Treaty for *H—*—.

As a National Enquiry has been made into the Causes of our Loss of *Minorca*, it would be Arrogance unpardonable in a private Man to assign any other than those which have been pointed out by the wise Council of the Nation. This however, by the Courtesy of *England*, may be said; If *Byng* was capitally guilty for neglecting to do all in his Power to save the Island, those who were then at the Head of Affairs, and neglected, though they had timely Intelligence, to send a Fleet that might prevent the Enemy's Landing—who, when the Fleet was dispatched, sent no more than a Hand-

ful of Land-Forces in Comparison of the Enemy along with it, whose Service, could they have been thrown in, would have been ineffectual, while the *French Fleet* was able to cruise off the Island :—Those, certainly, in some Degree, partook of his Crime, who did not do all he might have done to save the Island.

In the *Corfican Expedition*, indeed, we have not been disappointed ;—because we had no Expectations from it. No Person of common Sagacity could ever suppose that the Malcontents of that Island, who were labouring to throw off one Yoke, would, like the Horse in the Fable, submit to another. If we only meant to have the Privilege of a Watering-Place in Return

turn for assisting the Rebels, could we be so stupid as to think that a People who live on Plunder, would be bound, by any Laws of Gratitude? Or, in Times of Scarcity, be persuaded by any moral Considerations, to spare their Benefactors?

With Respect to the Secret Expedition, this may be said in Favour of the Design, and to the Honour of those that formed it; Had we been successful, and destroyed the Shipping at *Rochelle* or *Rochfort*, the *French* would not have been able to send a new Fleet into *America* in the Spring, because their Artificers must have been employed in repairing the Loss. But why, then, was not this useful Design put in Execution? Was it impossible to land the Men, or to make an Impression

pression on the Works? This will not be avered, even by those who neglected to make the Attempt. Why then the Neglect? The Attempt was dangerous. But why those Delays within Sight of the destined Coast, till it was covered by the Militia of the Country? Was it not a Secret Expedition, and its End to surprize?—

Thus have we by Negligence, Delays, Misconduct, and Cowardice, failed in every Attempt we have made, and been vanquish'd by every Assault of the Enemy.——How the War will end, it cannot now be determined; but if we make not Reprisals by a vigorous Campaign, in the approaching Summer, we may tremble for the Consequence. Should the deserted King of *Prussia* be swallowed up by his numerous Enemies,

mies, what will be the next Object of the *French* Ambition ?

However useless some may think it, to enquire into the Causes of unsuccessful Events, or to shew how the Misfortunes we have suffered might once have been avoided ; there is certainly no Way so effectual to make us attentive to our future Conduct, as to consider the Losses we have sustained, and the Sources from whence they sprung : And it is undoubtedly the Wish of every good Subject, That the Sense of our past Sufferings and Disgrace may animate our Commanders with that noble Indignation, and excite in them those Sentiments of Glory, which must be for ever followed by Victory and Success.

F I N I S.

