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# The Volunteer Review

## AND MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

A Journal Devoted to the Interests of the Military and Naval Forces of the Dominion of Canada

OL. VIII.

OTTAWA, (CANADA,) TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1874.

No. 2.

### NEWS OF THE WEEK.

The Ontario Legislature was opened by Lieut. Governor Crawford, on the 7th inst. The Hon. T. G. Currie having resigned the Speakership, on motion of the Premier, the Hon. Mr. Robert Meares Wells, the member for South Bruce, was unanimously elected in his stead.

His Excellency the Governor General has been pleased to make the following appointments, viz:—

The Honorable David Christie, of Paris, in the Province of Ontario, Senator, a Member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, to be Speaker of the Senate *vice* the Honorable Pierre-Joseph Oliver Chauveau.

The Honorable Richard William Scott, of the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, a Member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, to be Secretary of State of Canada *vice* The Honorable David Christie, resigned.

A very important step has been taken by the Bavarian Government. The decision of King Maximilian II., according to which the Bavarian Constitution had always to give way to the Concordat with the Papal See whenever their respective provisions happen to clash, has been abrogated.

A special despatch from Berlin to the *Times* says the imprisonment of Archbishop Lodochowski is threatened. All his furniture has been distrained, and he still refuses to pay the fines imposed by the Courts.

During the investigation into the *Ville du Havre* disaster, Mr. Waile, of New York, who was a passenger of the steamship, deposed that he was rescued by a French boat. The same boat afterwards rescued Captain Surmont, who was in the sea clinging to some wreckage. Waile further stated that the crew of the *Loch Earn* confounded the pilot of the *Ville du Havre* with Surmont, and it was this that gave rise to the statement that the latter's clothing was dry when he came on board the *Loch Earn*. The court accepted this explanation of Waile's, and thanked him for having made it.

Captain Robertson of the *Loch Earn*, was examined before the Court of Investigation yesterday. The Court unanimously decided that he was not to blame for the collision with the *Ville du Havre*.

The French Admiralty Court has decided that the *Ville du Havre* was blameless for the collision, eulogises Captain Surmont, and gives the bad management of the *Loch Earn* as the cause of the disaster.

The Metropolitan Railway Carriage Works at Birmingham, were destroyed by fire on the 6th. Loss estimated at \$50,000 and 400 hands thrown out of employment.

Reports from Fort McIntosh, Texas, bring news of destructive raids by the Comanche Indians.

There is a financial crisis in Havana, and the necessities of life are going up enormously in price.

The United States' Public Debt has increased nearly eight and a half million dollars during the past month.

A Madrid despatch to the *Standard* reports that 200 persons were killed and wounded before disturbances in Zaragosa and Valladolid were suppressed.

The new Government intends soon to add 100,000 men to the reserve.

The Madrid Municipality has been reorganized, with Senor Caraval at his head.

Yesterday the Spanish ironclad *Arapiles*, was taken out of dry dock, and while being towed to the ordnance dock, ran aground at high water.

Thirteen of the conductors on the Hudson River Railway have been discharged for refusing to submit to the general orders reducing the salaries.

The *Virginus* correspondence has been transmitted to the Senate. It is said to be very voluminous.

The President of the United States forwarded Caleb Cushing's nomination as Minister to Spain to the Senate yesterday.

There are sixteen American war vessels at Key West.

Another appropriation of sixteen million odd has been made by the American Government for Navy expenses, apart from the \$4,000,000 already appropriated.

On motion of the District Attorney in the Supreme Court, orders have been issued on Twed, Ingersoll, and Genet, to show cause why they should not be struck off the Rolls of Attorneys.

The confidential diplomatic despatches were not included in the *Virginus* correspondence transmitted to the Senate, as it was feared they might complicate matters and render future relations with the new Spanish Ministry unpleasant.

On Monday night the Metropolitan Railway Carriage Works at Birmingham, England, were destroyed by fire. The loss is estimated at only \$50,000, 400 hands are thrown out of employment.

President Castelar's Government was defeated on two votes in the Cortes on Saturday, whereupon General Pavia, a friend of the President, occupied the palace of the Cortes and all the public buildings with a force of some 14,000 troops and dissolved the Cortes. There was a great excitement and the streets were filled with people, but no blood was shed. A new Ministry has been formed with Marañon as President.

A thousand men were discharged from the Brooklyn Navy Yard on Thursday.

A decree was promulgated on the 5th suspending constitutional guarantees and putting in force throughout Spain the laws of 1870. Decrees are also published appointing Senor Martinez Minister of Justice, Senor Mosquera Minister of Public Works, and Senor Albarba Civil Governor of Madrid.

The Minister of the Interior of Intergo, Garcia Buez, has ordered the publication of all Carlist and Intransigent newspapers to be stopped.

An armed rising of volunteers of liberty took place in Saragossa on Sunday. It was incited by the municipality. After eight hours fighting the troops took 200 of the insurgents prisoners and captured eight cannon and a large quantity of rifles and ammunition. The municipality has been disallowed.

The besiegers of Carthagena have captured by assault and burned the outlying fort of Calvarie.

The Home Government have granted without restriction the extraordinary powers by Captain-General Jovellier.

The sensitive party here is highly delighted with the change of Government at Madrid.

It is rumored that the insurgents have taken the Spanish Colonel, Montaner, prisoner.

It is reported that the Government remove the Captain Generals of the Philippines, Cuba, and port Rico. It is probable that General Jose De la Gorchá will be appointed Captain General of Cuba.

The disarmament of the disaffected volunteers is going on quietly everywhere. The malcontents in Valladoif and Malaga dispersed before the troops arrived.

Overthrow of Castelar's Ministry has been favorably received in Havana. The volunteers are evidently in favor of a monarchy. Crowds on the stern of Spanish vessels in harbor, which were painted over when republic was in favor, are now being repainted. The Imperial Spanish coat of arms has again been placed in the palace of Captain General.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE MILITIA SYSTEM OF CANADA.

(Continued from Page 12)

There is another argument in favor of the plan proposed, which would appear likely to occur to those who believe in a future for the Dominion. Can a country aspire to greatness which neglects its own means of self-defence; and would the people of Canada be satisfied to provide men sufficiently trained, and to rely for officers from the regular Imperial Army? Does not the proper organization of a defensive force including training for its officers, devolve on a country as much as the formation of the means for administering justice, or of a Department to preside over its maritime interests? In all that concerns self-government, the Dominion has made rapid strides; its civil service is well organized, its public departments carefully managed. Would it not therefore follow that steps should be taken to provide for the efficiency of the military establishment by supplying the want which the withdrawal of the regular troops has created? This want is only beginning to be felt; as yet, officers who have received instructions in the volunteer schools formed in connection with the regular regiments, which were first established in Canada, and afterwards introduced into England, hold commands in the militia; and non-commissioned officers, formerly soldiers of the Imperial army, are still available to instruct the recruits in the rudiments of drill. These conditions will, however, soon change; and even supposing the schools formerly established continue to maintain their efficiency when deprived of the assistance the regular regiments afforded, there is no body of men with professional training to insure the advance of military science, and to profit by the experience which the Continental nations of Europe have earned at the cost of blood and treasure. Without a professionally trained force, the standard of efficiency will gradually become lower, and the form of military service will be maintained, whilst the spirit will be dead. There will be plenty of officers in gay uniforms too closely resembling those of the Imperial army, and at grades there will be some showy manoeuvres; but the true instruction of the modern soldier, to the necessity of which, all who think seriously of war are awakening, will be neglected, and even ignored. A revolution is even now passing over the organization and training of European armies, and if Canada wishes to profit by the changes which will follow, she must have men whose business it is to study the art of war as professionals, and not as amateurs.

Having thus stated briefly the want which it is believed exists, and the reason, which have led to this belief, it remains to be seen whether, at but little expense, this want can be supplied. It is presumed, as has been already stated, that some small permanently embodied force is necessary; and that without it there is a danger lest the whole defensive organization of the Dominion should in a few years deteriorate. By merely improving on what already exists, the nucleus of an army could be obtained, and the expense involved would be more than compensated for by the benefits that would accrue. It must however, always be remembered that the true defensive strength of the country will remain with its militia; the active force, as is the case at present, being in readiness to be called out at a short notice, the reserve forming the second line and serving as a feeder to the active force.

With regard to the organization of the active militia, it will be seen on reference to the report of the commission above alluded to, to whose labours the organization of the present system is in great measure due, that a head-quarters, divisional and regimental staff are recommended. But only the two first of these recommendations have been as yet carried out. The third has been omitted, and there is no permanent regimental staff of any description. It is proposed to remedy this defect and at the same time to avoid the evil of keeping on pay for long periods of each year men for whom no work, except during the season of training, can be found, by a plan of which the outline only can be furnished, to be filled up by those who have practical experience of the needs of the Canadian militia.

It is suggested to establish in the Dominion three training schools, using those already in existence in Quebec and Kingston and adding another for the maritime provinces, probably at Halifax, where the presence of the regular troops might be of advantage. These training schools should consist of a small force of the three arms, viz., cavalry, artillery and infantry, which should correspond with the active militia of the four provinces. The troop, or even half troop, of cavalry would contain the permanent regimental staff of the cavalry of the district; the battery of artillery, in the same way, of the field and garrison artillery; and the companies of infantry of the militia infantry. Supposing about 31,000 men (i.e. rank and file) to be the numbers of the active militia, divided in equal proportions between three districts; that is, three regiments of cavalry equal to 1,800; twelve batteries of artillery 3,000; and thirty-six regiments of infantry 28,800, with possibly a small force of engineers numbering 200, and of a military train 200. (a) These troops, as in the case at the present time, to be called out for yearly training and inspection. The duration of the drill to be fixed by statute, due regard being had to real efficiency. To correspond with this force, at each of the three training schools would be one half troop of cavalry numbering about 40 non-commissioned officers and men and 30 horses; one battery of artillery numbering about 250 men, of which two guns only would be fully horsed, requiring seventy-eight horses; (b) three companies of infantry, each section of each company corresponding with a regiment of infantry, in all 240 men, and a few non-commissioned officers to be instructed in the duties of engineers and train; the whole force at each of the three schools would not be more than 530 non-commissioned officers and men. With regard to officers it would probably be necessary at the present time to obtain commandants of these schools from the regular army, as is now done at the artillery schools of Quebec and Kingston. These should be selected either from officers who have been educated at the staff college, due regard of course being had to other qualifications; or from those who, known to be good regimental officers, have passed

(a) NOTE.—These numbers are approximately, regard being had to, the establishment of the cavalry, artillery and infantry in the Imperial service.

(b) NOTE.—The number of horses for the two guns might possibly be reduced, or some of the horses used for other purposes when not required for service or instruction. The proportion of artillery permanently embodied is high in comparison with the infantry, partly because the battery is the lowest tactical unit of that arm, partly on account of the additional training required by artillerymen, and the consequent necessity of a larger number of instructed men, and partly from the fact that infantry drill forming a part of the instruction of garrison batteries, a portion of the men would be available as a means of teaching the infantry officers battalion drill.

through one or more of the various schools at Shoeburyness, Chatham or Hythe. If Canadians can be found who, having entered the Imperial army, were in all respects well qualified, preference might be given to them; but high proficiency should be required, qualities for command being combined with power of imparting instruction. The appointment should be for five years, with possibly power of renewal for an additional term, and conditional on the officer's visiting Europe and keeping himself acquainted with the changes and improvements in the art of war. It would be a question whether the command of the school could not be united with the Deputy Adjutant Generalship of the district, (a) the brigade majors acting as second in command. A second in command (if the brigade majors were not utilized), an adjutant a doctor and a quartermaster would form the staff of the school, whilst a due proportion of officers, say two for the battery of artillery, one for the cavalry, and three for the three companies of infantry, selected from militia officers who, having evinced good capacity, are willing to embrace the military profession as a career, would receive commissions to act as instructors in the training schools and as staff during the drill season of the active militia. To these schools all gentlemen recommended for commissions in the active militia would be required to come for a period of six months on first appointment, when their commissions would depend on the ability they displayed during the course of instruction. In the event of regimental promotion, (b) and no other promotion, except in the permanent staff of the militia, should in peace time be possible, officers should be required to attend for three months at one of the schools, passing through a severe training, both bodily and mental; and being required to obtain a qualifying certificate before their promotion could be confirmed. A judicious transference from the active to the reserve lists, of officers who either from age or other causes appeared unlikely to be fit for service, would keep the senior ranks of the active militia sufficiently young, and would facilitate promotion. Any promising young officer who might evince a desire to remain longer at the schools of instruction either with the object of qualifying in the event of a vacancy occurring in the permanent force, or with the view of obtaining a deeper insight into their professional duties, should be encouraged to do so; and it might be a question whether some opening could not

(a) NOTE.—The appointment of the Deputy Adjutant General of the district to the command of the school would save expense, but would render difficult the selection of an officer to fill the important post. It would have the advantage of consolidating into one place the military duties of the district, and of keeping the officer in command in constant intercourse with military life; whilst during the time of the yearly drill he would be free for purposes of inspection, as the schools would in great measure be broken up by the employment of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men with the reserve for months. It might be a question whether the brigade majors could be spared from their several localities, and whether it would not be desirable, in the event of the Deputy Adjutant General being an infantry officer, of the second in command being an artilleryman, combining, as is at present the case, the inspectorship of artillery and warlike stores of the district with the work of instruction. If the Deputy Adjutant General were an artillery officer, the second in command should be taken from the infantry.

(b) NOTE.—The present system of promotion, viz., that of giving a step in rank after five years' service in the Active Militia (containing probably not more than eighty days' actual duty) without regard to the command attaching to rank, will go far to reduce to a minimum the value of military titles, to injure discipline, and to render impossible the proper working together in time of war of the Imperial and colonial forces. It is a most serious mistake, and one that requires immediate remedy.

be found for them in one or other of the public departments or public works after their period of training: military education, both in regard to knowing how to command and how to obey being no bad qualification for young men commencing life. Should these officers elect to remain in the school for a longer period than six months, they should be required to receive instruction in the other arms of the service than in that to which they might first have been appointed, and to pass a second and more severe examination, care being taken that the time passed at the schools should be utilized to the utmost. It may be objected that there would be risk lest young men, having received a military education, might decline to give the country the benefit of their instruction, by refusing to serve in the militia. Safe guards might possibly be provided against this eventuality, but the best guarantee would be a good selection of cadets for first appointments. Again, there may be a difficulty in inducing young men to come forward; should this be so, inducements must be offered, but if a check be placed on the assumption of rank and uniform by those who are not really qualified and ready to serve in the active militia, much will be done to exalt the position of the officer. At present, the Dominion swarms with officers of high rank who have received little instruction and have seldom or ever held proportionate commands; consequently, as is the case in the United States, military titles are held in little esteem. There will unquestionably be a difficulty in procuring trained officers of local standing for some of the country corps, but if the system proposed be adopted gradually, i.e., instruction previous to first appointment being insisted on, and a proportion of qualified non-commissioned officers being also provided, the officers at present holding commissions as field officers and captains will feel themselves morally obliged to learn their professional duties.

With regard to the non-commissioned officers and to the rank and file of the schools, men should be enlisted for one year, if possible from the localities to which the regiments of active militia of the district belong, with power, in the event of their showing efficiency, to re-engage for five or more years. From these latter, non-commissioned officers will be selected, first for the school itself, both as staff sergeants and as pay-sergeants of the companies, and then for service in the active militia when embodied or called out for training. These latter would learn the duties of non-commissioned officers, but with the exception of the few who would be required for duty would serve, when at the schools, as private soldiers, being excused the more irksome work which would fall on those who did not aspire to rise above that grade.

During the training or embodiment of the active militia, these embryo non-commissioned officers would act as sergeants and corporals to the companies of the regiment to which each section of the infantry company would correspond, and in a similar way, to the regiment of cavalry and batteries of artillery; those who evince the greatest aptitude being selected as sergeant-majors and staff sergeants. It would be well that even in respect to these men, long periods of service should not be exacted or permitted; as, in such case, there would be a difficulty in providing for them after their term of service had expired; whereas, if discharged in the prime of life, they could return to civil occupations, probably remaining in the active or reserve militia, and would easily

obtain situations in the railways or in the police force, where men of good character, with a knowledge of discipline, are constantly in demand.

By the plan proposed, there would always be a force of nearly 1,600 men at hand, in case of sudden emergency, a standard of efficiency would be supplied (which ought to be fully as high as that of any Imperial regiment) to which standard the militia might endeavour to conform, and there would be the means of training officers and non-commissioned officers for service in the active militia. The plan would be elastic, as if a more numerous permanent force were required, the schools could be enlarged without change of system, half companies, or companies corresponding to the regiments, in place of sections, whilst in the event of danger being apprehended the efficiency of the active militia might be increased, by lengthening their period of drill, or if numbers were required by calling in more men from the reserves. The plan is, however, only sketched, and its details require to be filled in. There are doubtless many difficulties attending it and also many defects, but it appears to provide for a want, which is now felt, and which will declare itself more and more, year by year, at what (is conceived to be) the least possible expenditure of men and money.

It may not be out of place if I allude, very briefly, to other minor points connected with the instruction to be given at these schools. Their object must be clearly kept in view, viz: That besides maintaining a body of regular troops, ready to be used as such, if required, they are above all schools of instruction. The work and discipline must, therefore, fulfil both objects, and as it is very necessary that the time spent there should be fully occupied, and habits of discipline inculcated in the shortest possible time, variety of instruction to prevent tedium becomes necessary. The officers aspiring to first commissions, should be treated as cadets, and should learn the duties of the private soldier equal with those of the officers. They should be taught to impart instruction, and the examination at the end of the six months should be severe as well as practical. The simpler principles of field engineering, almost necessary for all officers campaigning in a country like Canada and the United States, should be inculcated theoretically and practically, whilst to those who might elect to remain for an additional period, the principles of the other two arms might be taught in the same way as I believe is done at West Point.\* Above all the instruction should be practical, nothing should be sacrificed to mere show; order, cleanliness, steadiness under arms are all essentials to discipline, whilst individual activity, mental and bodily, skill in the use of weapons and an intelligent appreciation of the principles of fighting in open order are equally necessary to the modern infantry soldier. The cavalry should be carefully taught the principles of patrolling and vidette duty, whilst instruction in the duties of field and garrison artillery would probably necessitate for the officers of that arm a longer period than six months training. When officers of the active militia join the schools previous to promotion, opportunity would offer to ascertain whether in body and mind they are fit for command. The instruction given would correspond with their

\*NOTE.—This principle is strongly advocated by recent German writers, in order to insure the three arms working well and intelligently together.

higher rank, but should be severe with the double object of attaining efficiency, and of weeding out men whom age might have rendered more suitable for corresponding rank in the reserve militia. All details connected with the military districts would probably be kept at these schools, and information would thus be collected, which would prove of invaluable assistance in the event of war. Encouragement would be given to qualified officers to attend the manoeuvres of the English army, and to avail themselves of the instruction afforded at the various military schools. Arrangements might probably be made with the Imperial authorities to admit a certain number of officers to the Staff College, to the Artillery School Shoeburyness, the Engineering School at Chatham, and the School of Musketry at Hythe. In the event of young Canadians entering the Imperial service, and showing themselves able officers, their services should not be lost to the Dominion. Every effort should, in fact, be made to provide officers and non-commissioned officers for the militia, both active and reserve.

The scarcity of labor, the scattered settlements, the short summer, all render it most difficult in ordinary time, except at a great sacrifice of money, to assemble together any large body of troops for the annual drill. Frequently the best men are not found in the ranks of the active militia during the yearly training, although more than one instance has proved that they are ready to come forward at the least threat of war. Owing to these causes the militia will (at all events for the present) for its efficiency on possessing ready at hand a proper staff with each of the regiments. By the method proposed, some at least of the officers will have received the rudiments of military training, whilst a permanent staff of non-commissioned officers will, if occasion so require, be in readiness to join the regiments and companies of the respective localities to which they belong.

There is much in the life of the Canadian that qualifies him for military service. As a result of the scarcity of labor and of the comparative isolation of the scattered farms, owing also to the great changes of climate from an almost arctic winter to an Italian summer, men have to adapt themselves to various conditions of life and to accommodate themselves to circumstances not met with in England. The aptitude, the skill, the energy and the patience derived from such training form no slight foundations for the highest discipline and for the most perfect military efficiency. In one especial branch of industry common to all four provinces, qualities that should characterize the officer and the soldier are called forth in an ordinary degree. The organization of the gangs of lumberers, their provisioning, their discipline, and in fact the care taken of their general well being, demand many of the characteristics which should belong to those high in command of a military force. The foreman of the several gangs have duties to do not dissimilar to those expected from officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of companies of soldiers, whilst the actual work performed by the men is such as would serve, mentally and physically, to train them for much that would be required of troops in actual war. Their skill in road making, in hitting themselves, and in the rougher engineering works, might prove invaluable to soldiers campaigning in a forest country, their practice in driving teams over roads which an English carter would con-

sider impassable, might go far to qualify them for artillery drivers, whilst the excitement and even danger attending a portion of their labors would tend to bring out qualities not dissimilar to those called forth by active service. Then again, the very mixture of races in Canada ought to furnish the essentials for a good army, the intermingling of English, Scotch, Irish and last but not least of French, should combine the military qualities of each nation, and should tend to that wholesome rivalry which adds stimulus to war like enthusiasm. What Canada ought to strive for is a good organization, and a sufficient force to resist any sudden raid arising from turmoils on the frontier, until help could arrive from the opposite side of the Atlantic. She must remember that her neighbour although friendly, and with but a very small army, yet possesses a vast element of strength and experience which has been gathered in the great civil war, and which now lies dormant. In the event of hostilities there would be no lack of experienced officers and of men able quickly to organize troops, and peaceful as the aspect of affairs now is, and improbable as any disturbance of friendly relations appears, yet it behooves Canada to counterbalance these advantages by a careful training of a small force, which, while providing for defence could not be mistaken for a menace to her powerful neighbour. It is as difficult to keep the necessity for military preparation before the eyes of a free and peaceful population bent on energetically developing the vast resources which surround them, as it is to preserve from rust and from the deterioration of prolonged peace, the military institutions themselves.

The excitement of danger, consequent on the Fenian raids produced excellent results in the Dominion, especially on the menaced frontier, in inducing military preparations. The volunteer system and the responsibility thrown upon the officers and men for their efficiency appear to suit the English race. In New Brunswick, in the Townships, and in Ontario, the militia system has shown excellent results. In Quebec it has not worked so well, not from the want of military qualities inherent in a French population; but from the fact that the greater part of the Province being removed from the danger of invasion, a feeling has arisen among the population that they will willingly obey an order for enrollment, but that to volunteer for service is not among the duties of a citizen. In conclusion, I would urge that the scheme proposed is merely put forward to invite the opinions of those who are well acquainted with the feelings of the people and the interior economy of the militia force. One great difficulty lies in the scattered condition of the country regiments which renders their drill and inspection difficult, another lies in the necessity for taking officers from the influential men of the districts without reference to their military qualities, as unless well known men are chosen, the companies and battalions cannot be raised or kept together. Of course such men will frequently make the best officers, but being almost always engaged in business operations they cannot spare much time for military training. These are difficulties, but six months or a year's training at the commencement of life is not long, and may even be counted as education, whilst three months on promotion to the rank of field officer, is not a great sacrifice with so honorable a position in prospect. Officers would doubtless require to be paid during these periods, but the money spent would be well laid out. The same applies to the non-com-

missioned officers and privates of the embodied force, their career should be sufficiently promising to induce men of respectability from the various localities to come forward, whilst as there would be two classes, viz: the first class or non-commissioned officer when called out for training, and the second or simple private soldier, two rates of pay would probably be considered fair. Above all, the appointments should be kept clear from political influence; at present officers of the militia are recommended for commissions by their several colonels, and it is believed the system works well. To allow them to be nominees of the House of Commons would lead to the introduction into the force of a political element very prejudicial to military discipline.

There are still two important subjects which have not been touched on, one the best method of conducting the yearly training of the militia; the other, the condition (taken generally) of the defences of the Dominion, as handed over by the Imperial authorities on the departure of the troops. In regard to the first, the amount of money to be expended will, to a certain extent, fix the duration of the training, but given a specified sum, it may be a question whether it is better to expend the whole with the object of extending the period as long as possible, or to pay a portion for the assembly of the companies into battalions, the battalions into regiments and brigades. If the companies be drilled separately the men will, as a rule, live at home, their pay will be less, and the money can be spared over a longer period; but there is a risk of the drill being slurred over, and at all events, of their being little opportunity of inculcating discipline as well as drill during the instruction. The advantage of comparison with other companies and of the wholesome rivalry thereby engendered is wanting, together with the military feeling created by the mere assembly of considerable bodies of soldiers. The formation of battalion camps appears preferable to drill performed by individual companies, as the officers acquire practice in providing for the maintenance, comfort and health of the men; and habits of order are learnt by the discipline of a camp. The larger camps are doubtless the best means of training soldiers, including in that term the higher officers, but the cost of transport is great, and political considerations may sometimes weigh in determining the desirability of forming large camps on or near the frontier. Their advantage lies in the training given to the staff, in the rivalry between battalions, and in the enthusiasm which, both among the soldiers and civilians, is aroused by great military spectacles. The evil of false musters, which recent enquiries have shown to be too prevalent, is checked and should be, with care, entirely prevented. No doubt if the troops are assembled for any length of time, the practice of manœuvres, and the working together of the three arms would be a means of imparting valuable instruction; but where the period of drill is limited to but, at most, a few days, the ground-work of military education can alone be attempted. Careful instruction by companies is the foundation of all infantry tactics, and under the present conditions of warfare this instruction should be pushed even further than has hitherto been done.

The solution of the question appears to be, to allow of an elastic scheme, and not to draw hard and fast rules for all the provinces or for all the regiments. In some scattered districts where labour is scarce,

and where men must per force combine some daily work with drills, training by companies may be the better method of meeting a difficulty which, if a strain were put on the men, might break down the organization in that locality.\*

When possible the battalion training will be better, and near towns, the system tried with some success in England by the volunteers of pitching the camp in the vicinity of the ordinary places of labour of the men, and morning and evening drills might be pursued with advantage. The brigade and division camps should not be neglected. If they cannot be organized yearly in every military district on the score of expense, they might be triennial, so that every man in the militia might once in the course of his service receive the benefit of the instruction thereby afforded. The formation of a cadet camp which met with so great success when organized by General McDougall, might again be tried. The young officers and non-commissioned officers who would have passed through the training schools being called on to volunteer for the extra education that would thereby be offered. Whatever plan be pursued, care must be taken that the training period be perfectly utilized, and full value obtained for the money expended.

The second subject which remains to be noticed is the condition of the defences as handed over to the Dominion by the Imperial authorities. The completion of the system of fortification recommended by Colonel Jervis and partially commenced in consequence of his report, will probably not be effected until an alarm of war should occur; but fortresses of great value have been confined to the care of the Dominion, and costly property, such as barracks, storehouses, &c., are awaiting decision as to their disposal. Many of the buildings are in the heart of thriving cities, and could be sold at a considerable gain. The time appears to have arrived for some decision to be taken in respect to the most fitting mode of dealing with this property, and it seems at first sight consistent with proper administration, that the money obtained should be reinvested for military purposes. Supposing, for instance, that some of the older fortifications of Kingston should be useless for the purpose of defense in consequence of changes in the art of war, and at the same time, the decision by competent officers should point to the importance of Kingston as a position to be defended, might not the older buildings be disposed of and the money obtained be applied to the purchase of land on which fortifications suitable to modern requirements might be raised, when political considerations should point to the necessity of doing so? The rent in the meantime being appropriated for military purposes, the sale of old barracks would furnish drill sheds and storehouses for the militia, and the property would thus be used for the purposes for which it was designed.\*

These are merely crude suggestions; indeed, the whole scheme for militia improvement, as given in this paper, is traced out more with the object of provoking thought and criticism than of dogmatically urging any particular plan; and I can only venture

(a) NOTE.—This may apply to some of the villages in the outlying districts of the maritime provinces and on the shores of the lakes, where batteries of artillery suitable for coast defence might go through their yearly drill in their own localities.

(b) NOTE.—In fact, militia property should be so administered that its proceeds would be expended for the purposes for which it was intended. The maintenance of the necessary forts, drill sheds, &c., would thus cease to be included in the yearly estimates, but would be provided for out of a consolidated fund.

to express a hope that those who are cognizant of the subject will criticize it freely, adopting or rejecting the whole or portions of it as they may consider most applicable for the good of the militia, and for the well being of the Dominion.

H. C. FLETCHER.

Lieut. Col. Scots Fusilier Guards.  
Military Secretary.

Ottawa, November, 1873.

ESTIMATES OF PAY AND SUBSISTENCE OF ONE TRAINING SCHOOL, for Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, for One Year, of the strength of 45 Cavalry, 250 Artillery, and 240 Infantry.

NO.	DESCRIPTION.	PER DIEM.	TOTAL.
1	Com'dt the B.A.C. of the District.....		1,700 00
1	Assistant do.,—Artil- lery Instructor.....	3 00	1,235 50
5	Captains.—1 Cavalry, 1 Artillery, and 3 Infantry, to act as Instructors.....	2 50	5,125 00
1	Adjutant.....	2 44	862 60
1	Quartermaster.....	1 91	745 19
10—	Surgeon.....	3 65	1,382 25
1	Sergeant-Majors.....	1 00	1,000 00
1	Laboratory Fore- man.....	1 00	365 00
1	Ordnance Armorer.....	1 00	365 00
1	Small-Arms Ar- morer.....	1 50	547 50
1	Master Gunner.....	1 00	365 00
20	Sergeants.....	0 50	5,810 00
20	Corporals.....	0 70	5,120 00
8	Bombardiers.....	0 60	219 00
1	Trumpet Major.....	1 00	365 00
6	Trumpeters.....	0 50	1,950 00
250	Troopers, Gun's, and Privates.....	0 60	85,151 00
10—530	Total for Pay.....		\$112,718 45
500	Rations of Bread and Meat.....	0 12	23,672 00
73	Horses—Forage.....	0 30	8,541 00
	Wheat, say 1000 Cords.....		7,000 00
	Light.....		500 00
	Clothing, Winter equipment, Medi- cal supplies, Regi- mental necessar- ies, Attestation, Transport, Barric- ade works, equip- ment, at the most moderate computa- tion.....		49,000 00
	Contingencies abt.....		7,588 55
			\$200,000 00

MEMORANDUM NO. 2.

ESTIMATE for maintaining 3 training schools.....	\$60,000
ALLOWANCE TO CADETS dur- ing Training.....	95,800
	\$695,000
ESTIMATES for TRAINING 35 000 officers and men in camp for sixteen days, being the probable number out of the 34,000 that could be placed in camp.....	\$100,000
ORDINARY CONTINGENT MILITIA SERVICES for the year, after deducting the pay of 3 Deputy Adjt. Gen's who would receive pay as Com'dts of the Schools; and the fees for Drill Sheds, Rifle Ranges, & care of Militia Properties, to be provided for out of funds obtained by the rent or sale of Mil- itia property (.....)	\$489,900
Total.....	\$1,584,900

(\*) NOTE.—A further deduction of \$10,000 could fairly be made, as the expense of maintaining the Gun Boat might in peace time be very properly transferred to the Marine and Fisheries Department.

A CANADIAN ON RIFLE SHOOTING

From Forest and Stream.

We take great pleasure in producing a most interesting letter, which will be fully appreciated by our riflemen. Its author is a distinguished member of a leading Canadian Rifle Club—

HAMILTON, Ont., Dec 12, 1873.

EDITOR FOREST AND STRAAM:—

Having attended the first meeting of your National Rifle Association, I take a very great interest in reading your reports of Creedmoor and of the different matches held there, and I am pleased to notice the great improvement your marksmen have made in a short time in the use of the rifle. I have attended since I have lived in Canada numerous opening matches of Rifle Associa- tions, but I must say that the matches at Creedmoor, N. Y., were better conducted, and the shooting at least equal to any I have seen in the Dominion. Great Credit is certainly due to the several gentlemen who had the organization of the Association, and who have carried out their arrangements so well, I do not mean to say that all was perfection, for that is not to be attained at a first rifle meeting, but it was all that could be expect- ed. There were a few mistakes made which you will no doubt obviate on acquiring expe- rience. I will mention one or two. I no- ticed on several occasions men firing at tar- gets when markers were painting the ad- joining ones with danger flags up, which is very dangerous, for the bullet after striking the target fly in pieces on each side, and it was a wonder that the matches terminated without an accident. Another mistake I think was made in the small bore matches, (or, as you term them sporting rifles) and that error was in shooting them from the shoulder. We did the same thing at the opening matches of our Dominion Rifle Asso- ciation, and have now given it up. Long range rifles are not made for shoulder shoot- ing, and although in England and Scotland they have matches at the short distance of 200 yards with them, they, on all occasions, shoot in any position. In Canada we sel- dom have matches with small bores at any range under 500 yards. In your paper of November 5th, in your comments on the match of the Amateur Rifle Club, you make some mistakes which you will pardon me for correcting. You say, "Mr. Omand having been a member of the Victoria Rifles of Mon- treal, and one of the winners in the match for the Raja of Kolapore Cup in 1870," and so forth. Now, Mr. Omand was never a member of the Victoria Rifles of Montreal, but was a member of the Victoria Rifle Club of Hamilton, and the Kolapore Cup was first competed for by Canadians at Wimble- don in 1871, twenty men on each side, at 200, 500 and 600 yards. On that occasion we were beaten by somewhere about fifty points, but, in 1872, we picked our eight men and shot eight men a side and beat the united team of England, Ireland and Scot- land by eight points. You also make a comparison of the shooting in your matches and the shooting for the Kolapore Cup, but you must recollect that they shot with the Snider Military Rifle, with open sights where- as the Amateur Club shot with sporting rifles, finely sighted with aperture front and back sights. Now, that makes a great dif- ference indeed. From what I saw I feel per- fectly satisfied that the Remington Sporting Rifle is at least equal to the Rigby or Metford Small Bore Rifles, which are the best long range rifles that we know of. I think it is a mistake to exclude muzzle loading rifles

from shooting in your badge matches, or any other. It is the best way to test the merits of both kinds of rifles by shooting them along side each other. You must not think by my above remarks that I have any inten- tion of trying to diminish the credit due to your marksmen. Far from it; they certainly have improved in a most wonderful way in the short time they have been practising, and deserve credit. I see by some remarks in your paper that you do not approve of giving money prizes at your competitions, for the purpose of keeping out a spirit of gambling, which is perfectly correct, if it would have that tendency; but experience proves, both in England and Canada, that such is not the case; for where there is no chance of cheating there is no danger of gamblers' competing. If you do not offer money prizes your competitions will be con- fined to men who have the means and time at their disposal. Now, I presume the gentle- men who have so magnanimously worked and organized the National Rifle Association had some nobler object in view than getting it up for a mere pastime. I have no doubt their intentions are that it shall be an insti- tution for teaching young men, whom you would expect to fight your battles, the prac- tical use of the rifle. It is necessary for me to tell you that there are thousands of such men, who, for want of means, would not be able to give the necessary time for practice, and consequently would not attend your competitions at all; whereas, if there were any chance of their being able to pay their expenses by what they might win in money they would be far more likely to take an in- terest in rifle practice, and in a military point of view, your country would be all the stronger. I also see some remarks about spirit levels, plumb balls, &c., &c. for the very necessary purpose of keeping the rifle perpendicular when shooting. In Canada we have gotten over experimenting on those things. I see by your columns that one gentleman suggests a pendulum hanging loosely from the back sight with an aperture in it, which is a good idea, but for the one objection of its being impracticable on a windy day, it would keep shaking back and forward and would disturb the eye of the marksman. We have tried a great many plans to keep the rifle plumb, but all meth- ods have failed, save by using the spirit level, which suits the purpose better than any thing we have tried. So far as the dan- ger of the spirit levels getting broken is con- cerned, that depends very much on the way they are fitted on. I have made mine to slip on the foresight and move along with it, when I shift for wind, so that it is always in a direct line with the sight, and does not disturb the eye when sighting. It can be taken off and put on in a moment without any trouble. I have used it for over five years, and it is not broken yet. The same amount of care which is necessary to protect the sight will also protect the level.

Yours, very truly,

SHOOTER.

Great Britain has forty-six colonial gov- ernments scattered over the four continents, the West India and Pacific Island, under twenty eight Governors, eleven Lieutenant- Governors, one Inspector, two Administra- tors, and four Captain-Generals.

In the week of the great fog the mortality of London rose to 27 per 1000, an average not known before for many years.

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The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

Under God, unbought, our swords we draw,  
 For God and the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, JAN. 13, 1874.

To CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be pre-paid. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words "Printer's copy" written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

The article following from *Broad Arrow* of 13th Dec., on "The Conviction of Marshal Bazaine," will place before our readers the particulars of the shameless and infamous proceedings against that gallant old soldier who has been sacrificed in order that the treason of such scoundrels as GAMBETTA, the treachery and imbecility of TROCHU, and the villainy of the ruffians that overthrew the Empire may be kept hidden from the scrutiny of the victims of their rascality and cowardice.

*Broad Arrow* puts the case in its true light, as one of unjustifiable political murder, and the Duc d'AUMALE has made as great a mistake as his grandfather the infamous EGALATA did, when he voted for the murder of LOUIS XVI.

THE CONVICTION OF MARSHAL BAZAINE.

The great trial which has been in progress at Versailles since the beginning of October, and which is destined to fill one of the

most important and all-engrossing pages of modern history, has been concluded by a verdict which will divide opinion for many generations to come, like that on Admiral Byng or Marshal Ney. "Our glorious Bazaine," as Gambetta once flatteringly styled him, is condemned to be stripped of all his hardly won honors, as being no longer worthy of bearing the name of a French soldier; and being thus degraded to the level of the meanest citizen of Franco, the comparatively trivial doom of death follows. Its commutation to any lesser sentence is only of interest in a humanitarian or purely personal point of view. For the historian, Bazaine is degraded and shot as a traitor to his country, the military charges being transparently formal, and by no means placed beyond doubt by the evidence tendered in proof.

The Council of War deliberated upon the following questions:—1. "Is Marshal Bazaine, late Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine, guilty of having, on the 28th of October, 1870, capitulated to the enemy, and surrendered the fortress of Metz, of which he held the supreme command, without having exhausted all means of defence, and without having done all that duty and honor prescribed?"

2. "Is Marshal Bazaine, the late Commander of the Army of the Rhine, guilty of having capitulated on the same day in the open field?"

3. "Did this capitulation result in the Army having to lay down its arms?"

4. "Did Marshal Bazaine, before treating verbally or in writing with the enemy, fail to do all that duty and honor prescribed?"

The Council unanimously replied in the affirmative to all these four questions, and the sentence followed as a matter of course. Before the judges withdrew to consider their verdict the marshal was asked if he had anything to add to his defence. Then rising from his seat, he replied, in a louder tone of voice than he had before used during the trial, but with perfect calmness, "I wear on my breast the words 'Honor and Country' [alluding to the inscription on his Star of the Legion of Honour]. I have never been unfaithful to that legend, neither at Metz, nor during my whole service of forty two years. That [lifting up his right hand] I swear before Christ!"

In whatever else Bazaine may have failed, he has not failed in the dignity suitable to the occasion, and the interesting question for all is, whether his words were a solemn mockery, proceeding from the lips of a man who was conscious of the black drop of treason in his heart which the sentence presupposes had destroyed his moral sense and corrupted the soldierly virtue which his very enemies concede that he once possessed. To answer this question we must not consider probabilities alone, but make a careful study of the facts; nor must our judgment be influenced by the character of the tribunal at Versailles. In estimating this latter point, account must be taken of the political circumstances of France, and the first thing to note—considering these circumstances—is, that the President of the Tribunal should be the Duc d'Aumale, who is indebted for this title of General to a royal ordinance signed by the King, his father, who was afterwards dethroned and his house banished by a revolution; and who has himself only been restored to any position at all in France by the Revolution of 1870. Length of service could certainly not entitle this young officer to preside over a tribunal composed of men growing grey in

hardness, and accordingly it was thought necessary to remark in the Commission, that he commanded in chief in actual warfare. That was in 1844—just upon thirty years ago—in the campaign against Abd-el-Kader. To be strictly just we must recall the fact that when he received intelligence of the Revolution of February, 1848, the Duc d'Aumale exhorted the colony to await peaceably the orders of the metropolis, and when the time came, quietly resigned his powers into the hands of General Cavaignac. If the seeming parallel has had any influence on the appointment of the Prince to the office of President of the Court, or on the trial and judgment passed on Bazaine, the fact is much to be regretted. The circumstances of the Revolution of September 4th were wholly different from the Revolution of February and the position of Bazaine at Metz, with France invaded, the Emperor a prisoner of war, and Paris itself invested, was entirely unlike that of the Duc d'Aumale in Algiers when the Citizen King was dethroned.

The other judges were the Generals Da la Motterouge, Chaubaud Latour and Tripier, who have commanded in presence of the enemy, and Generals Princeteau, Martineau Deschenez, and Rossayre, selected locally from the First Military Division. Of all these the first alone is known to fame as having commanded the first Army of the Loire until, threatened with a court martial by Gambetta, he resigned his powers to General d'Aurelle de Paladines. Rossayre replaced General Martimprey, impeached. So far as we can judge from this composition of the court, Bazaine has not been tried by his equals, or by men whose responsibility in the face of the world was sufficient for the occasion. If an exception be claimed in favour of the Duc d'Aumale, his fairness and ability may be conceded without affecting the views we take of his sufficiency in a military point of view.

Again, we are impressed by the fact that Bazaine alone among the generals of Franco who equally failed of success in the late war, has been impeached, and that it was precisely his impeachment and conviction that were alone needful to vindicate the notion of Gambetta as delegated Minister of War under the Government of Defence. The inquiry this reflection suggests is one that the future historian will pursue with the most jealous care. Trochu capitulated at Paris, and surrendered a much larger force than Bazaine ever commanded, and for awhile there was a howl of execration heard against him. How is it that this cry died out, and the cry against Bazaine increased in intensity? A complete answer to this question would lead us over much historical ground, and suggest a large amount of military criticism; but without summoning up the details, one impressive consideration presents itself. The conviction of Trochu, either for incapacity or treason, would not have served to vindicate the policy of Gambetta, as the relieving armies all round were defeated before Paris surrendered. But the conviction of Bazaine, on the other hand, exactly serves this purpose. If he was a traitor, and purposely let loose the army of Prince Frederick Charles against the Army of the Loire in the very crisis of its fate, and when the King and his whole staff were ready to retreat at a moment's notice from the walls of Paris, then obviously there is no need to seek

\* \* \* President. M. le Duc d'Aumale, general de division, ayant commande en chef devant l'ennemi."

further for the causes which ruined the defensive operations of the Delegate Minister of War, and henceforth his amateur strategy and his dictatorial treatment of Aurelio de Paladinos and Chanzy may pass unquestioned. The more those facts are considered, the more they will be thought worthy of the historian's attention. If Metz could not hold out any longer, plainly the Minister who continued the war under hopeless circumstances was to blame; but if the maiden fortress could hold out, and if Bazaine had failed in doing "all that duty and honour prescribed," the Minister was exonerated. The temptation was great, and Gambetta, on this theory, was not superior to it. He proclaimed Bazaine a traitor by placards all over France. He decreed him a traitor as he decreed the *teece en masse*, and the abolition of the General Councils. As M. Jules Richard has said: "La France n'éait pas encore vaincue, elle était toujours trahie. r gu'est-ce que peut la trahison et surtout la trahison d'un maréchal de l'Empire contre la légende révolutionnaire? N'avait-on pas les capottes en futaine, les souliers en carton, les canons Naquet, les fusils et les cartouches de la commission d'armement. N'avait-on pas la légion des jeunes chefs qu'invaient jadis servi, de jeunes chefs vierges de défaites et de victoires, vierges surtout de talents militaires? Cela ne suffisait-il pas amplement pour sauver désormais la France? Mais pour faire verser aux Français le sabre hyperbolique de César Gambetta, il fallait de tout nécessité que Bazaine fût un traître—tout l'ancienne armée l'était avec lui—et tous les absents de la veille pouvaient aspirer librement à la gloire de restaurer la vieille réputation militaire de la France."

Then again the consideration presses itself upon us that Trochu submitted to the Revolutionists and allowed himself to be proclaimed chief of the improvised government at the Hotel de Ville, while, on the other hand, Bazaine so far resisted the Revolution that he refused to know anything of it by hearsay, and being without official warrant for any other line of action, remained true to the Empire. Whether or not he was equally loyal to the person of the Emperor may be an open question, but it is hard to believe that for the ghost of a chance of five or six years' power, at most, in the position of regent or constable during the minority of the Prince Imperial, he would have risked the glory and the gains of a lifetime. We say nothing more on such an issue as this, but leave it for the courts at present, and for the lucky historian in the future who may be able to clear up the doubt by reference to unanswerable documents. That Trochu headed the Revolution, and Bazaine opposed it; that Trochu's impeachment would fail to serve Gambetta, and that Bazaine's conviction is Gambetta's triumph, are obvious facts. When the train which brought the news from Versailles arrived in Paris the mob was hardly kept back by a picket of *sergens de ville*. "What is the news?" cried one of them to the first man out of the train. "Condemned to death unanimously!" Then the words "A mort!" rent the air, and the whole multitude cheered a *la Française* by clapping their hands in wild savage delight along the streets. On the Boulevards the news spread like wildfire, and cries of "Mort a Bazaine!" where everything mingled with shouts and cheers of exultation.

After all it will be said, the loyalty of Bazaine must be judged by the evidence, and guilty by that evidence, his judges

have found him guilty. It is not possible in these columns to discuss so large a subject, but it is permitted to doubt if a tribunal, such as that assembled at Versailles, and in the present political circumstances of France, has been influenced by the evidence alone. We may say this without impeaching the honor of any officer at the table; for, to say nothing of "unconscious cerebration," it is only necessary to refer to the exact terms in which the four points were submitted to the court to see that much of the evidence might be considered, conscientiously, as irrelevant to the issue. Virtually, only one question was submitted to the court, "Did Marshal Bazaine, or did he not, do all that duty and honor proscribed?" This, it will be seen, is a very wide question, and it admits of being answered in the negative, even if, in the opinion of the judges, the most important witnesses had failed in establishing their statements. Very much, for example, rested on the question of the despatch sent to MacMahon on the 23rd, and the prosecution laid great stress on the evidence they were able to bring that it actually reached the marshal. Nevertheless, this testimony was rebutted, and the fair conclusion is that the despatch did not reach him. The judges may have admitted the fact in their own minds, and yet may have conscientiously declared that all was not done that honour and duty dictated. We quote this single item in the evidence to show that the points submitted to the tribunal were so worded, as to invite a conviction on general grounds, whatever might be the conclusion of the court on particular issues. We are justified in this view of the case by the unanimity with which the judges recommended Bazaine to mercy. If he were guilty the death of a dog would be too good for so great a crime as his, and we do not believe that any jury of patriotic Frenchmen could be found to extenuate a crime at once so base, and so disastrous in its consequences. For this reason we remain of the opinion that the prosecution of Marshal Bazaine has been a purely political one, thinly veiled under the disguise of a technical investigation by a military court. That he committed faults as the Commander in Chief of an army so circumstanced as to demand that prompt and masterly handling, which in every age constitutes great generalship, is possibly true enough: it is for impartial history to judge. That he committed the treason for which he has been condemned, we refuse to believe in the interest of France herself, whose shame it would be that one capable of the baseness he is charged with could rise to so great an eminence—and sink so low.

The following article from the United States Army and Navy Journal of the 27th December, is a fair exposition of the value of the Monitor System. We are satisfied that a wooden frigate, such as the *Shah*, properly handled in a sea way would make short work of any iron clad in existence. The *deck scrapers* are like the *torpedoes* a novelty of no practical utility.

"The insufficiency of laminated armor to resist heavy rifled ordnance having been pointed out by prominent British officers, we made the following explanation in our issue of October 13, 1866. "We advise our maritime friends not to calculate on finding laminated armor only to practices against, should unhappily a conflict ever occur, The monitor turret is purposely so put together

that its plating may be readily removed and changed. So with regard to the side armor; it forms no part of the hull, and may be detached and replaced at any time. The armor backing and plating of the *Pasadc* class of monitors were in some instances applied in little over a month."

"It will be remembered that Captain Sherard Osborn, in his memorable letter to the London Times of September 22, 1866, said, respecting short ranges in connection with our monitors: "When it comes to that distance, having a steam engine under foot, there will be a much closer hug, be assured, and the boarders and riflemen with needleguns will settle the question whether English sailors have lost their cunning." Our reply was: "We can assure the gallant Captain that neither cunning boarders nor needle guns will avail against monitors, for however irritating their low docks may appear, when the sea is not high enough to wash intruders overboard, our deck scrapers will infallibly be at work—a 'cunning' contrivance consisting of elongated shells which suddenly rise above the deck and instantly explode. Experiments on wooden representations of an enterprising enemy have shown, that by this inhospitable mode of receiving visitors, a whole ship's crew may be swept off the monitor's deck in an instant."

"Now that unhappily a conflict may occur, have our monitors been provided with *deck scrapers*?—has the laminated plating been replaced by *solid armor*? If not, are we in a position to challenge maritime nations provided with iron clad ships and rifled ordnance of heavy calibre? Our naval authorities cannot plead ignorance regarding the resisting power of armor of different kinds, since the widest possible publicity has been given to the result of English and continental rifle practice against armor plates of all sorts. Accordingly, every naval officer here and elsewhere, knows that the eleven one inch plates composing our monitor turrets may be easily penetrated by chilled shot projected by rifle guns of scarcely eight inch calibre. The Swedes, who copied our monitors before the advent of heavy rifled ordnance, have since abolished the laminated armor; the turrets of their last monitors and turreted gun-boats, are built of solid plates. The Norwegians are also now engaged in reconstructing their monitors, applying solid armor. The published result of target practice at Finspong, near Stockholm, is conclusive as to the utter inability of the laminated armor, which necessity compelled us to employ during the war, to resist chilled cast-iron rifle shot. The rifled guns employed by the Swedes in the target practice referred to, are made of cast-iron hooped with steel bands, on the French system, the bore being twenty-four centimetres or nine and one third inches. The targets, twelve inches in thickness, were built-up of plates two inches thick, composed of the best Swedish iron, bolted together on the same plan as the plates of the monitor turrets. The range was two hundred yards, yet each shot passed through the target and two feet of wood backing, entering the bank of earth behind the target to get a depth of eight feet. Apart from this destructive effect, bolts and splinters of the broken armor plates, weighing from 300 to 500 pounds, were detached to each shot.

"With reference to Captain Osborn's objection, that the slow monitors may be boarded by the crews of swift iron-clads, it may be urged that monitors being intended for harbour defence only, and drawing very



little water, may lie in shoal water along the ship channels, thus rendering an approach of the deep draught iron-clads impossible. But, we now propose to go into the deep water with our light draught, low vessels. It needs no demonstration to show that a bold, enterprising commander of a heavily armored ship, with his superior number of men, may board and capture these low decked vessels unless protected by the deck scrapers, the elongated shells which may be instantly exploded whenever required. It is quite true that the deck scrapers are of little utility in monitors with *lamina tel armor*; since these vessels might be disposed of by their antagonists, by a few well directed rifle shot at convenient range, as demonstrated by the rifle practice at Kin, spong.

Our readers who are familiar with the subject are aware that Captain Ericsson's defence of the monitor system, published in this and leading European journals, has been based on the assumption that the turret plating, as well as the side armor, is composed of *solid plates*. We are not aware that any successful demonstration has yet been published disproving his proposition that, for light draught, no other form of iron clad can compete with the monitor. We need scarcely remind our readers that several northern European powers early adopted the monitor system; but the significant fact demands special attention, that the German Empire, with the light of experience and in the face of all objections raised, is now building monitors for its coast defence. In view of the foregoing facts the country, no doubt, expects to be informed of the causes which have operated to induce the Navy Department to abandon the monitor system so far as to deem it unnecessary to substitute solid plating for the inefficient laminated armor. We have no reason to suppose that Congress would have refused to grant an appropriation necessary to procure solid armor, if informed that without it we are unable to make any defence against even a weak enemy possessing iron clad ships and modern rifled ordnance. Unfortunately our opponents understand the matter perfectly well; they know that the heavy ten inch Armstrong rifles of the *Arctics*, at short range, can send their pointed projectiles in at one side, and nearly out at the other of our laminated turrets. At long range, the penetration will be sufficiently deep to strew the turret flooring with fragments of broken bolts and plates, as shown by employing moderate charges during the Swedish target practice before referred to.

We strongly recommend the Secretary of the Navy to ask Congress again for an appropriation to put our best monitors in order, stating specifically that it is for the purpose of covering them with solid armor. That Congress is willing to perfect these vessels we infer from a recent grant of \$50,000 merely for a patented plan (Wilmart's) of raising the turrets by hydraulic pressure—more particularly as the plan, was of questionable utility, it having been demonstrated by competent judges to be not only imperfect, but dangerous, on the ground that any defect, the smallest leak, for instance, of the hydraulic apparatus, would render it impossible to turn the turret. \$500,000 would probably supply deck scrapers for this whole fleet of monitors,

A writer in the current number of *Naval Science* mentions as one of the principal means of harbour defence in this country "batteries of guns manned by the Royal

Artillery." Now the fact is, that as matters stand at present we should, in the event of war and a threatened invasion, have comparatively few Royal Artillery available to man our coast batteries, and it is undeniable that we should have to trust mainly to the Militia and Volunteer corps for what may be called the garrison artillery defence of the country. For it must be remembered that in the event of a European war, a large extra force of Royal Garrison Artillery would probably be required for Malta and Gibraltar, and possibly for some other foreign stations. Then the Field and Horse Artillery at home would have to be put on a war establishment, which would be done by filling up the horse from the field, and the field from the garrison batteries. Moreover, it is by no means improbable that one or more new field artillery brigades would be raised, and this would occasion a further drain on the garrison branch of the regiment. According to a recent return, the garrison artillery force in the United Kingdom consists of 8350 Royal Artillery, 13,050 Militia Artillery, and 31,000 Volunteer Artillery. From these figures and from what has previously been stated, it is easy to see, that in the event of war, we should have very few coast batteries manned by the Royal Artillery; and it is therefore obvious that the burden of the work would fall upon the Militia and Volunteer Artillery. This circumstance greatly enhances the importance of our auxiliary artillery—that is to say, relatively to the regulars, the auxiliary artillery occupies a more important place in our military system than the auxiliary infantry, because in the event of war, the former will have to act more independently of the regulars than the latter. Such a consideration should prompt the authorities to encourage volunteer artillery corps in every possible manner, and it should also stimulate the members themselves to attain a high standard of efficiency, when they reflect that if their services are ever required for the defence of the country, they will not—like the rifles—be brigaded with regulars, but they will probably be called upon to man some fort entirely by themselves. And it need hardly be said, that there is no branch of the Service in which Volunteers can become so thoroughly efficient as in the garrison artillery, for its various duties involve on the whole the individual exercise of a larger amount of intelligence than infantry work requires. As regards this qualification, Volunteers, being taken from a higher social class are undeniably superior as a body to the regulars; and, moreover, as artillery exercises do not demand the "wooden wall" rigidity and absolute silence enforced at company or battalion drill they are less irksome to civilians, and, therefore, often more cheerfully and satisfactorily acquired. In view of the very important part which it thus appears, the Volunteer artillery must play in the defence of the country, it might be well for them to be contented with the sphere of duty above indicated, and not aim at distinguishing themselves in field battery work—a branch which, upon the whole, it seems better to leave entirely to the Royal Artillery. As we pointed out in our remarks on the Volunteer's list week, there is a great probability of these valuable troops (the volunteer artillery) being greatly augmented, or very long by the conversion of the militia volunteers of our maritime districts into artillery. The sooner a movement of this sort takes place spontaneously the more effective will the artillery be when the bombing change takes place.

The foregoing from *Broad Arrow* shows that the opinion with respects to the auxiliary force is undergoing a rapid change in England. It is not over two years since Sir HORS GRANT recommended that *volunteer artillery* should be suppressed, and, gave what was then called good military reasons which were endorsed by military organs for the measure. We have always entertained great contempt for opinions advanced in favour of mere specialities, and can only say that at the time we thought the gallant General was altogether awayed by the narrowest of professional idiosyncrasies inasmuch as the training of an efficient artillery man demanded in the recruit more than the ordinary intelligence to be found in the rank and file of an army, and that the volunteer force supplied what was wanting in that particular abundantly. From the time taken by our contemporary it is evident that this fact has been at last recognized, and that the difficult problem of providing sufficient *gunners* for home defence is about being solved in a perfectly natural as well as national manner and that the volunteer force of Great Britain will furnish the vast mass of the army of national defence, leaving to the regular forces alone the duty of foreign service. In any future contest it is evident that the services of a much larger body (in proportion to the whole force) of artillery than that hitherto assigned to army corps must be employed, and it would be wisdom to set about training those men in time—moreover actions in the field will be fought with "guns of positions" and not with light field pieces in the manœuvring of which much more cavalry drill is requisite than special artillery knowledge—whereas "guns of position" require all the training and the highest at that of a special arm of the service.

If we do not greatly err the introduction of the "Moncrieff System of Mounting Ordnance" will so far revolutionize field artillery that there will be two batteries, of guns of position to one of *field artillery* so called, and as the manœuvring of heavy guns require training as well as intelligence the Volunteer Organization at home, and abroad is the proper mode by which a force peculiarly adapted for artillery service can be supplied.

We are indebted to Lt. Col. McPHERSON, of the Militia Department, for a copy of the last published "Army List," Dec. 5th, 1873.

A special despatch to the *Daily Telegraph* from St Petersburg says an article in the treaty between Russia and Bokhara, abolishing slavery, is directly due to the exertions of Secretary Schuyler, and all members of the American Legation at St Petersburg.

The financial condition of Havana is becoming still more unsettled. The trades are striking for payment in gold.

REVIEWS

We have received Wood's Household Magazine for January, which has commenced with the present number its fourteenth year, and is steadily increasing in popular favor under its present able management. It has two very good engravings,—one that of a Newfoundland dog, which went to the assistance of a boat's crew, who were in great danger of being wrecked amongst the breakers, boldly swam out to their rescue, took the rope that was thrown to him by one of the sailors in his mouth, and safely towed them to land. The other represents a young child and her brother who had entered their uncle's studio and beholding the portrait of a young lady that the artist had just finished, and after surveying it for some time, the little girl stepped forward and seizing a pallet and brush, she adds a few "finishing touches," to what effect the picture plainly shows, "I think, Josie," says the little lady, gleefully surveying a successful (?) stroke, "she's a getting a miff atash on quo side, ain't she? And now she's agoin' to get one on the other, so she is," and suiting the action to the word, "she got free eyebrows!" All the articles are well written, and a steady improvement is observable, in each succeeding number. Price of Magazine with chromo "Yo Semite" \$1.40. Address Wood's Household Magazine, Newburgh, N. Y.

WHY ENGLISH WORKMEN DON'T LIKE THE UNITED STATES.

London Correspondence of the Continent, Commercial.

The other day I had shown me some letters written by various poor men who had gone out from Yorkshire and settled in a town of Central New York, and they said that though they could earn enough there to make them much more comfortable than they had been in Yorkshire, they were all resolved to come back, and I suppose by this time they have done so. They were very vague in giving their objections, but said that they found life in America void of all interest for workingmen. They found none of those little clubs in which at home (Yorkshire) they were wont to meet and talk over the politics of the day. They found no learned gentleman anxious to lecture to them occasionally. The amusements were of the most miserable description—chiefly, negro minstrelsy. The local newspapers never had an interesting article, and was a tissue of the dullest local items. The preachers preached a dull, humdrum oratory, and were rarely as well educated as their own English parsons. Altogether, life in a New York town they found intolerable, and preferred their crust in Yorkshire, with the old surroundings.

Genl. Jovellar, has telegraphed to Marshal Serrano that he will cooperate with him in everything relating to Cuba.

The *Voz de Cuba* expresses profound satisfaction at the change of Government in Madrid, and condemns the Federal Republic, but praises Estelar.

THE RULING PASSION.

(From the Pall Mall Gazette.)

A well-known sporting character on his deathbed was attended by a friendly divine of somewhat nervous temperament, who, to console him, expressed a conviction that he and his penitents would meet hereafter as winged angels. "Are you sure of that?" inquired the dying man. "Quite sure," replied his adviser. "Then I'll fly you for a sovereign," replied the incorrigible gambler. An enthusiast of this sort seems, according to a local paper, to have greatly distinguished himself on the occasion of a fire which lately broke out at the cotton sampling offices of a firm in Liverpool. While the conflagration was at its height, and the burning cotton was being thrown out of the windows upon the flags below, a number of brokers stood in the street discussing the sum which the waste would realize. One among them offered to bet a guinea that the burnt cotton would fetch £15, and as this was apparently far beyond its value, he found no difficulty in finding persons willing to take the bet. This he did till twenty people had accepted the wager for a guinea each. He afterward went to the sale and bought the cotton for £16, which he then sold for £12, sustaining a loss of £4 upon the purchase, but pocketing sixteen guineas as the balance of his profits on the transaction.

The *Swiss Times* says the cattle plague is extending to an alarming degree in some parts of Switzerland. The latest information shows that it has broken out afresh in several cantons, more particularly Berne, Neuchâtel, and Gribson. In the canton of Friburg, where it had disappeared, it has again attacked several districts at once; and in consequence of its virulence in Naud, a large number of cattle have had to be destroyed. In the latter canton all cattle fairs and markets have been suppressed until further orders.

The Tribunal of Breslau has condemned Dr. Förster, Prince Bishop of that diocese, to a fine of 11,000 thalers, or two years imprisonment, in continuation for appointing a clergyman in violation of the new Ecclesiastical laws.

Dispatches from the vicinity of Cartagena report that the besiegers, inspired by the new order of things, redouble their efforts to reduce the city. At the same time the defenders seem to have taken fresh courage from the belief that the present Government is unpopular and short-lived. They have recently made several desperate sorties, but without effect, and have hoisted the black flag over Fort Gerard.

Telegrams from Cartagena say it is reported on good authority that the burning of the man of war *Tetuan* was intentional, and that the *Nunquies* and *Mendez* were to have been destroyed at the same time, but the plan was discovered and they were saved.

REMITTANCES received on subscription to THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW, up to Saturday the 10th inst.

- Chatham, Ont.—Capt H. G. Reed, to Jan. 1873, \$2.00
Cookshire, Que.—Major J. E. Taylor, to do. 2.00
Kingston, Ont.—Lieut. Wm. Rogers, to do. 1.00
New Hamburg, Ont.—Maj. B. Campbell to 1873, 2.00
Preston, Ont.—Lieut. A. Jones, to July, 1873, 2.00
Stratford, Ont.—Capt McPherson, to June, 73, 2.00
Sarnia, Ont.—Lieut. J. E. Adams, to Jan. 73, 5.00
Wexford, Ont.—Lt. Col. W. F. Norris, to do, 71, 2.00

DOMINION OF CANADA.



MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS

HEAD QUARTERS,

Ottawa, 9th January, 1873.

GENERAL ORDERS (2).

No. 1.

ACTIVE MILITIA.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

35th Battalion of Infantry "The Simcoe Foresters."

To be Major:

Captain and Brevet Major Richard Fyfe White, M. S., from No. 8 Company, v. c. Ferguson, resigned.

43rd "Crested" Battalion of Infantry.

No. 5 Company, Richmond.

No. 5 Company, Richmond, having become non-effective, is hereby removed from the list of Corps of the Active Militia, and the following officers thereof are also hereby removed from the list of officers of the Active Militia: Captain Thomas Ouel, Lieutenant John Kelly and Ensign George McCaffry.

HONORARY RANK.

H. Seymour Hubertus, Esquire, to have the Honorary Rank of Major in the Militia.

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

19th "Shefford" Battalion of Infantry, or "Highlanders."

No. 7 Company, Le Brecheville.

To be Captain, provisionally:

John M. Brown Esquire, vice William De Lawrence, left limits.

To be Lieutenant, provisionally:

Eduard Frégnu, Gentleman, vice Narcisse Hulton, whose resignation is hereby accepted.

The resignation of Ensign Richard Beers is hereby accepted.

By Command of His Excellency the Governor General.

WALKER POWELL, Lieut. Col.

Acting Adj. General of Militia, Canada.

## SELF-RELIANCE.

Aspirest thou Fame's rocky mount to scale,  
Upon its crest to plant thy banner craving?  
Be resolute—bollova thou shalt not fall,  
And high triumphant the white sea it waving.

Let not harsh disappointment cast thee down;  
Still gather strength from every fresh disaster;  
The future for ourselves we may or crown,  
For Resolute, on yet is Fortune's master.

The self-reliant soul all walling scorns,  
And 'neath defeat's cruel blow rings out true metal.

Doubt dares not pluck the rose for fear of thorns,  
While Confidence unhurt will grasp the noxious.

Leave "but" and "if" to vacillating minds,  
Shifting and hovering each succeeding hour;  
Such words bend the soul's inflection blind,  
"Can," "will," and "must," the spirit that would founder.

Let nothing tempt thee from thy chosen track,  
Thy fortune to accomplish all thou praisest;  
Let no misfortune turn thy footsteps back,  
Success is only won by steadfast walking.

Let not thy heart at adverse thunders shrink,  
Nor weak and fearful doubts thy strength enumber;

Nor in Joy a pleasant sunshine idly sink  
Into a slumber state of spirit-slumber.

Rely upon thyself, for ever bear  
Within thy breast a confidence unfiring;  
Preserve that talisman against despair,  
And proudly gain the goal of thy aspiring.

## OFFICERS' LONG COURSE.—GUNNERY SCHOOL QUEBEC.

November 1873.

## "OPERATIONS OF WAR."

*Question 1.*—State the advantages and disadvantages of the initiative in war; the influence of railroads in offensive and defensive operations respectively, and the form of government alone capable of initiating war with success.

*Answer to Question 1.*—A great advantage of the initiative is that having concentrated your forces on a particular point behind your frontier, such point unknown to the enemy, you advance towards the defending army choosing the point you will attack and generally meet him with great odds in your favour as far as numbers are concerned. For an army acting on the defensive is obliged to keep dispersed on the different avenues through which the invader may advance, and up to the last moment cannot attempt to concentrate, fearing the attack directed against a point of its front is only a feint and that the real attack is to be made at a quite different point. This dubious state is still aggravated if a false attack is directed on a point at the same time as the real one. The real attack is then discerned only when it is too late to concentrate to resist it.

One course remains to the defensive army viz., to retreat, abandoning territory to the enemy. This has a demoralizing effect on the army and the nation, but is necessary, as it is the only way the defenders can manage to concentrate—other ways expose them to attack whilst moving by flank march—a very dangerous situation. The retreat of the French army on Chalons would have been attended with much beneficial effect in 1870, but the French generals were prohibited to sink of it, as such a retreat meant revolution in Paris. The result was McMahon's troops was defeated, and then Bazaine's corps d'armee nullified, and the whole army was destroyed before it could concentrate, so that each section would afford support to the other. Another advantage of the initiative is to force the enemy to conform to your movements; force him to act very often quite otherwise than he would. The Confederates forced McClellan to abandon his lines on

the Pamunkey in his advance upon Richmond by threatening to out-flank him. Another advantage of the invaders is that he lives on his enemy's country, which he may strike with heavy contribution and spare his own nation so much of the expense of warfare.

But disadvantages are also attendant on the initiative or offensive mode of warfare; as you must depend as much as possible on a few lines of communication, and as your troops move all in as compact order as possible, the result is that you cannot easily supply your army from the country you move into, consequently, the greater part of your supplies must be taken from your base of operations; consequently great magazines must be established there and great preparations for their transport must be made, increasing thus great expense at the onset. Another disadvantage is that being in great part dependant for supplies on your base of operation, and not being able readily to provide for your army except through your lines of communication, you are more strictly bound to them than if you acted on the defensive in your own country; there you can shift your base adopting a temporary one, thus enabling you to change front, if such change is advantageous.

The Sardinians, when defeated in 1849, might have retreated on Alexandria changing their base of operation from Turin, which up to then had been their base of operation. The Austrians could not have changed their front to such an extent being bound to a line of communication through Lodi and towards the quadrilateral which was their place of refuge in case of retreat. Another disadvantage of offensive is that being able to draw supplies from their own country in all directions, a retreating army may adopt a defensive offensive mode of operation by detaching a corps on the flank of the enemy's communications; it will force him to guard the by roads by which the line of communication could be severed, forcing thus the enemy to fritter his force till ultimately he may be engaged in an action with odds against him; and the position of the two armies reversed. Napoleon's retreat from Russia affords a memorable example of the danger of insufficiently guarded and prolonged lines of communication—his line of retreat was cut at the Beresina by two Russian corps who had manoeuvred on each flank of it, starting one from the north and another from south of Prussia, and his retreat was converted into one of the most disastrous routs on record. An advantage the defensive army has over the adversary is the ease and comparative cheapness with which it can be supplied, the troops being dispersed over a large extent of territory, ready access to magazines can be had, ease of transport, and the districts themselves occupied can nearly supply the army by which they are occupied. Another example of difficulties encountered by invaders as far as supplies are concerned, is to be found in the advance of the Prussians towards Chantilly's armies in the north-west of France in 1870, the invaders would have been obliged to retreat if the capture of Le Mans and Orléans had not replenished their exhausted trains with provisions. Railways seem to be more favorable to the defensive than to the offensive. It is true they help the offensive army to assemble much quicker than if it has to be accomplished by ordinary roads—such was the assembling of the German contingents effected in about a fortnight. It also facilitates collection of supplies, &c., but when the invader is on the enemy's territory conditions are reversed, for if the defender

cannot use his railways to concentrate by lateral movements on account of uncertainty of the point of attack, still as he is retiring if he destroys the railways in his front he lays an impediment in the way of the enemy, gaining thus sufficient time to effectuate concentration in a line in rear of that formerly occupied by him.

Taking the Waterloo campaign as an example, and supposing it had been gone through with the assistance of railways now to be found on that theatre of war, Napoleon would have concentrated his troops from Paris to Fleure by means of the Lille Valenciennes Maboynes railway as unforeseen as he actually was then, and would have found the allies dispersed watching the avenues to Brussels from the sea to the German frontier. But in the action at Ligny the Prussian corps at Ciney and neighbourhood might have been brought up to the battle field by rail in time to take part in the conflict—and supposing Napoleon still victorious the Prussian retreat on Waterloo would have been effected by the Wavre and Gembland railways, bringing the Prussian army or a large part of them on the battle field in time for the battle, instead of their reaching there about three o'clock p.m.—Napoleon's advance on Waterloo would not have been much altered as the railways would have been destroyed as the enemy retired. This is supposing a French force had not been detached to cut them behind the retreating forces—and had succeeded—then things would become much similar to what they actually were, then Wellington's movements would not have differed very much from what they actually were—Grouchy would have pursued the Prussians much as he did. The sum total seems then in favor of the defensive when use of railways comes into question.

The best government to assume the initiative is the despotic. All the questions to be solved by political as well as tactical strategy being left to the discretion of one, the place of campaign can be more readily decided upon, the cost of the initiative being considerable. If left to the discussion of many, delay will be incurred, if left in the power of one to decide no such delays will take place, and promptness is absolutely necessary to secure the initiative. All the resources of the nation are directed towards one end with a unity of purpose and design that can be the attribute of no other government except the despotic. Napoleon is a good example which can be adduced of the influence a form of government has on the securing of the initiative. A more modern example might be found in William of Prussia, though he is sovereign of a nation and apparently governed by constitutional institutions.

The concentration of troops previous to advance in France was effected by the use of railways, the officials of which, even, were under the military control of the commander in chief of the army. These advantages are lost if the despot has bad health or weakened brain.

*Question 2.*—What were the reasons that induced the Confederates to stand on the defensive at the commencement of the Civil War?

*Answer to Question 2.*—The reasons belonged to political strategy. The President of the Confederate States prevented the advance of the Confederate army on Washington after the battle of Bull Run, because it had been stated at the beginning of the war that the object of the South was not to subjugate the other States of the Union, but to secure its independence. This secured the aid

of Virginia and other States which would otherwise not have joined the Confederates if the offensive had been assumed.

**Question 3.**—What reduced Denmark to the defensive in 1864, and France in 1870, after the initiative had been determined upon?

**Answer to Question 3.**—Denmark was reduced to the defence in 1864, because her army was so very inferior in numbers to that of the allied Prussians and Austrians that it could not hope to take a successful offensive. France was reduced to take the defensive because her troop took so long to concentrate that the enemy had time to assemble vastly superior forces and cross the frontier, thus snatching the initiative.

The reasons of the delay in France were her bad recruiting system—men in recruits were posted to corps quite distant from recruiting depots, and soldiers on leave instead of having to go to their line of district to rejoin their regiments, had to travel from one end of the country to the other—bad management of railways and defect in system of control, i.e. centralization of stores—deficiency of unity in the command and the political status of France. Her plan of campaign was the invasion of Southern Germany thus preventing the concentration of the South German contingents. But in fifteen days the Germans had half a million troops on the French frontier, whilst the French had not half that number, consequently had the French taken the initiative they could not have done so except with great odds against them. The Prussian system of military organization was quite different. Each corps was recruited from the same district and stationed in the district it was recruited from, the control intendance (a) was effective, being self-reliant for each corps instead of being centralized as in France, the military training was also more different than in France, consequently much more troops could be brought in the field properly trained. Thus we may say that two reasons would have dictated to France, a defensive war, her inferiority of numbers of trained troops and her tardiness in taking the initiative, also her defect of organization. Apart from that her theatre of war was badly selected, as her army crossing the Rhine would have fallen in an intersected wooded country—the black forest—favorable for an army strong in infantry which was not the case with the French army.

(a) The English are the only people who give so stily a title to the supply department. The General must be the only controller.

(To be continued.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor does not hold himself responsible for individual expressions of opinion in communications addressed to the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

(KINGSTON CORRESPONDENCE.)

It is with feelings of sincere regret for the loss of a kind friend and true hearted gentleman, that I have to inform you of the death of the Militia Storekeeper of this station, in Ottawa on Friday last, the 2nd inst. Colonel CORBETT was so well known here and in this District, that his loss will be missed by many officers of No. 3 Military District, in any future Camp held in the good old limestone city. At one time in Kingston there was no more hospitable man than the

late Colonel CORBETT; and although during the later years of his life he was not so prosperous in circumstances as in his earlier years, yet his heart was ever in the right place. There are many yet living in this city who remember him in the heyday of his prosperity, when his house was open to all, who will think of him with kindly feelings when they follow his body to its resting place; and I venture to say there are none who will have other than a kindly remembrance for his memory. He was ever zealous in his country's cause, and to the last served it as faithfully as his health and abilities would allow. *Requiescat in pace.*

The political world in this Dominion is at present in the throes of a contest produced by the dissolution of Parliament; and this place no less disturbed than others. I fear that before the elections are over feelings will run high on either side. But that is not the business of military men, and so I am dumb on the subject. I trust whichever side wins the service may gain by it. K.

MILITIA STAFF APPOINTMENTS.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

DEAR SIR—I would say a word to my brother officers in the service on the above subject which I think will not be in any way subversive of discipline or contrary to the custom of the country at this particular time, when all questions civil, military and political are usually brought prominently before us as citizens. I write under a *nomme de plume*, because I write as a citizen under military authority; and I write to you as it is a military question with a political aspect.

In former appointments to the militia staff, more particularly the upper grades, wise care was taken to place therein officers of Her Majesty's Regular Army, because the Force was then in its infancy. But, Sir, I think the time has now come when those who have spent time and money on the Force, who have benefited by the instruction received from these officers and who have proved themselves fit to be trusted with official position, should reap the reward of their labors. We have men in the service who, like myself, are old soldiers, and who look forward to the time when such offices as brigade major and D.A.G. shall be the reward of long and faithful service, men, Sir, who have borne the burden of expense and trouble in raising their quota of the Force. Surely our reward should be that we are striving for, and not the disgust of seeing men who have no knowledge of that burden placed in the very position for which we ourselves have been trying to fit ourselves. Let us reap the reward we strive for, and that will be the best encouragement which can be held out to others.

It is but justice to ourselves we ask. There must be, aye, I know there are, men in the service whose aim and object in en-

tering and staying in it is their ambition to fit themselves for such and such like positions as above mentioned. What, Sir, do you suppose must be their feelings after years of trouble, expense and waiting, to see an outsider brought in simply because he happens to have political influence enough (capable and fit as he may be) to place him there.

Our new government is to be congratulated on its first appointment, that of Capt. Matice, at Brockville, as it is a step in the right direction. I trust it will stick to the rule of appointing none but men actually serving in the Force to these and other offices. One never hears of retired officers filling such posts in the regular army. Why should outsiders, or retired officers, expect them in ours?

I must really apologize for the length of this, but its subject matter is, I consider, most important.

Yours truly,

OLD SOLDIER.

We fully endorse the opinion of our esteemed correspondent. We have long been of the opinion that the higher posts in our Army should be filled by our own people, and more especially when they are equally qualified to fill them.—Ed. Vol. Rev.

THE MILITIA ORGANIZATION.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

SIR—The publication of the brochures on this subject emanating from the pen of Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, Scots Fusilier Guards, Military Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General, and Lieutenant Col. Davis, commanding the 37th Haldimand Rifle, afford a curious insight into the widely different manner in which the same subject may be approached and handled by persons who view the matter under discussion from totally different stand points. The former being a regular officer naturally reviews the subject with a professional bias, stating first the propositions under which it is necessary that a military force of some kind should be established in Canada, with an incomplete sketch of the use and progress of the Militia System up to the present time, exhibiting its shortcomings and deficiencies in a very partial manner, and ending by a proposition for the establishment of a small force, permanent as to its cadre, which is to form the model and nucleus for farther organization. It is a matter of regret that so distinguished an officer, and one so eminently qualified to deal with the matter in discussion; did not, before committing his "memorandum" to print, ascertain definitely what were the requirements of the country in regard to its Militia System. As, beyond the suggestion of the Provincial Schools of Military Instruction, based upon the system now adopted for the artillery, there are no ideas broached for the future

re-organization hinted at in the commencement of the pamphlet; I may perhaps be allowed without attempting to criticise the scheme, (which if practicable would be a good one) to ask where the men are to be found, and how the time is to be obtained, for carrying his suggestions as to training into effect. Granted that a staff could be procured who would be willing, after 5 years' service, to retire into private life (their business or professions as civilians being necessarily dropped during that time) how would it be possible for regimental officers, on promotion to leave their occupations for three months at a time to attend a military school. The majority of the best officers in the Force are men actively engaged in the real business of life, and whose patriotism and military ardour leads them to make certain sacrifices in the performance of their military service. If these men, under Col. Fletcher's system, were to leave the force, from the impossibility of complying with its requirements, what class would take their places? None but those whose fortune sufficed them without engaging in labor, or the dillitant, idling, men about town, who would be glad of three months' subsistence from any source; and who, after their training, would be of like service to the country, and no credit to the Force. A few good men, laboring under an acute attack of *scarlet fever*, might be persuaded to join at first; but the decadence of our military schools, as at present constituted, shew little encouragement to the adoption of such a scheme.

The same argument applies to the men of the proposed force. It would be impossible to find the requisite number of men for such service, unless, as in the case of the Dominion Artillery, recourse were had to discharged soldiers, who on leaving the service have found they were fitted for no other occupation; or emigrants who are desirous of looking about them for a year, before entering upon active employment. It is a fallacy to expect that firm laborers or farmers' sons, who constitute a large proportion of rural battalions, or apprentices, journeymen, or clerks, who constitute the city battalions, could leave their employments for a year; or that they would sacrifice wages at the rate of \$1.00 to \$2.50 per day, to serve as soldiers for 50 or 60 cents per day. These men are willing to sacrifice their wages in cases of emergency; and (for a year or two perhaps) for the sake of attending the annual drill, but it will be apparent to all, that such a scheme could not induce the best, or even desirable, men to leave their employments for a whole year; and that, consequently, the ranks would be filled with *near-do-weel's* and scapgraces, with a small sprinkling of enthusiasts.

I will not dwell upon this matter, as I feel sure that Colonel Fletcher has not calculated upon the difficulty in the arrangement of his scheme. If he had advocated the establishment of such a force upon permanent

footing, thereby giving officers and men a future to look forward to; with, perhaps, some provision as to discharges before the expiration of service, the establishment of such schools as he proposes would not be without the bounds of possibility; although his researches upon the Militia System have not led him to the radical errors which now affect its workings. For some of these, I would refer him to Lieutenant Col. Davis' pamphlet. The frightful features there depicted of the disorganization and demoralization of the Volunteer Force, might lead him to suppose that the officer commanding the 37th was of a slightly imaginative turn of mind; but, nevertheless, that grievances do exist, is a fact patent to every officer in the Force. But it is not from such exaggerated or impossible narratives that the Force can expect redress, and no one who had seen the trim and soldierlike appearance of the 37th in 1868, would believe that it could now form the type for such a doleful picture. It is a matter for regret that the zeal of the writer should have led him to colour his sketches so highly, even for the sake of the radness and originality which it undoubtedly possesses. But I am forced to treat his pamphlet in a graver manner. Going forth to the world, under his signature; bearing the weight of his official position as an officer of the highest rank possible in the Militia Force, I do not hesitate to assert that it is highly injurious and detrimental to the interests of the Force, and is calculated to give a wrong impression as to the discipline and morale of the organization. From an intimate acquaintance with the Force for the past eight years, I can say with perfect truth, that never on any one occasion have I realised the absurdities he has depicted, nor have I known of such utter want of discipline or military usage in any battalion. Should Lt. Col. Davis be able to support his case by illustrations, I can only feel that it can be no object to the country to retain such officers and men, and the wisest course to be adopted would be for the Government to dispense with their services.

I do not find fault with the pamphlet, because having a lively sense of the imperfections of constitution and management of the Volunteer Force the writer has put his case in forcible language, and employed overdrawn illustrations; but I do sincerely regret, that, as an officer commanding a Regiment of Canadian Volunteer Militia, he should have published to the world a statement abounding with inaccuracies and exaggerations as depicting "The Canadian Militia, its organization and present condition." As a Canadian Militiaman I deny its applicability to the Force, and deprecate the adoption of individual instances as any criterion of the condition as a whole. I also submit that the publication of wild statements such as abound through the pamphlet, are likely to have an injurious effect, by withdrawing the attention of the Militia authorities from vital defects.

In thus assuming the office of critic, I beg the forbearance of the officers I have referred to, as I enter upon the task with reluctance, and solely in the interests, and for the sake of, the cause I have at heart. With such feelings, it is most gratifying to me, to see that an officer of Colonel Fletcher's rank and experience, should take so great an interest in our militia affairs: and I accept his "memorandum" as a guarantee, that, through his means, the subject will not be lost sight of at Headquarters. To have a friend at court is no small gain to the Militia Force, who have been long apt to be disregarded as an unnecessary encumbrance to the civil power. I feel sure that, on farther investigation, he will be led to the same conclusion that all who have studied the subject are forced to arrive:—that the Volunteer system, as at present constituted, is inadequate for the requirements of the country, and that radical changes are necessary before any satisfactory result can be attained. What these changes are, and how they should be effected, should form a subject of inquiry by the Government, and it would be an act of courtesy which would be appreciated by the Force, if a number of prominent officers of the Force were nominated by Government to take into consideration the present condition of the Force, and to frame such amendments to the act as might be considered necessary for its re-organization upon a proper basis, with such suggestions for its regulation and interior economy as might approve themselves, from their knowledge of its requirements upon such basis. I have no doubt that the Militia Force of the country would again be a subject of pride and credit, and no longer liable to be stigmatized as inefficient and useless. For some such desirable commendation I, & many comrades, are now looking; trusting that with the change of government many of the old traditions of the Department of Militia and Defence may be swept away, and that under the new regime, discipline and efficiency may once more prevail as the characteristics of the Canadian Militia.

CENTURIAN.

BROME VOLUNTEER CAVALRY, P. Q.

A presentation was made a short time since by the Non Commissioned Officers and Troopers of the Brome Troop of Volunteer Cavalry to their Commanding Officer Captain S. N. Boright. The testimonial consisted of an imported Regulation Sabre, Sword Belt—Sabretasche and Slings, as also a regulation Pouch and Belt.

Captain Boright is deservedly very popular amongst his men, and takes great interest in the welfare of his Troops.—*Communicated.*

The Duke of Edinburgh has arrived at St Petersburg.

Famine is reported in Russia.