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Roundtable on Reporting by States
Parties to the NPT (2003 : Ottawa,
Ont.)
Transparency with accountability
reporting by States parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

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Introduction

This report is an overview of the discussions at the Roundtable on Reporting by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) hosted by the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa on 19-20 June 2003.

The purpose of the Roundtable was to examine how States parties to the NPT have responded to the reporting requirements agreed at the 2002 NPT Review Conference and to consider how such reporting might be improved in the future. The Roundtable examined the reporting experiences at the 2002 and 2003 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings, considered the content of reporting by both nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), and discussed the use of the report.

Transparency with accountability: Reporting by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Roundtable built on the work of a earlier roundtable on NPT reporting, also organized by the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which was supported by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. This report is a summary of the discussions and the conclusions reached. It is very useful in helping to develop a better understanding of the current state of reporting.

Report on the Roundtable on Reporting by States parties to the NPT Ottawa, 19-20 June 2003

Participants in the 2003 roundtable included representatives of NWS from Canada, Europe, and the United States, Canadian government officials, and a number of individuals with special expertise in the UN system and other areas relevant to NPT reporting (see Appendix I for the full list of participants).

Hosted by the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada

Questions or differences remained. The Roundtable was held under the Chatham House Rule, no comments or views are attributed to specific individuals or organizations.

Funding support for the Roundtable was provided by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. This support does not, of course, imply endorsement of the contents of this report by either the Centre or the Government of Canada.

Background of NPT reporting

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Introduction

This report is an overview of the discussions at the Roundtable on Reporting by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), hosted by the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa on 19-20 June 2003.

The purpose of the Roundtable was to examine how States party to the NPT have responded to the reporting requirement agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and to consider how such reporting might be improved in the future. The Roundtable examined the reporting experience at the 2002 and 2003 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings, considered the content of reporting by both nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), discussed use of the reports by states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and attempted to identify strategies through which states and NGOs could increase momentum towards a "culture of reporting" prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

The Roundtable built on the work of an earlier roundtable on NPT reporting, also organized by the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons with funding support from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, which took place 8-9 January 2002.¹ That roundtable was considered very useful in helping to develop NGO and Canadian government approaches to NPT reporting.

Participants in the 2003 roundtable included representatives of NGOs from Canada, Europe, and the United States, Canadian government officials, and a number of individuals with special expertise in the UN system and other areas relevant to NPT reporting (see Appendix I for the full list of participants).

Participants were not asked to formally agree on any specific conclusions or recommendations, but a number of areas of common opinion became apparent during the event, along with many areas where questions or differences remained.² As the Roundtable was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, no comments or views are attributed to specific individuals or organizations.³

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Background of NPT reporting

¹ *Reporting by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Report on the NPT Reporting Roundtable, Ottawa, 8-9 January 2002, Bill Robinson, Rapporteur, February 2002.

² Every attempt has been made to report fairly the range of opinions expressed during the Roundtable. It must be emphasized that the views recorded in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of CNANW member organizations, the individuals who participated in the event, or the organizations that they represented.

³ For further information on the Chatham House Rule, see <http://www.riia.org/>

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Background of NPT reporting

¹ Reporting by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Report on the 2002 Reporting Roundtable, Ottawa, 8-9 January 2002. See also the 2002 Reporting Roundtable Report, 12-20 June 2002. ² Every attempt has been made to report fairly the range of opinions expressed during the Roundtable. It must be emphasized that the views recorded in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of DFAIT or other organizations. For individuals who participated in the event, or the organizations they represent, the final authority on the Chatham House Rule remains with the individual.

NPT Review Conferences have always had implicit in their function a requirement for information on the status of the Treaty's implementation. Background documents of varying degrees of detail have been submitted to Review Conferences by NWS States parties since 1985. Review conferences also have benefited from reports on the implementation of Article IV submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But there has never been any form of standardized reporting to Review Conferences by the nuclear-weapon States, or any other States parties, on implementation of the Treaty.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995 NPTREC) agreed not only to extend the Treaty indefinitely, but also to strengthen the NPT review process, establishing a regular schedule of Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in each of the three years preceding the quinquennial Review Conferences and mandating those meetings "to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference."⁴

The decision to strengthen the review process was an integral part of the "Permanence with Accountability" equation that was the basis of the Treaty's permanent extension, and it implied a further requirement for information on the status of implementation of the Treaty. Beginning in 1997, the nuclear-weapon States began volunteering information on their Article VI compliance at PrepCom sessions as well as Review Conferences. As with their submissions to Review Conferences, however, each State party determined the form and content of these submissions on its own.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference (2000 NPTRC) broadened the mandate of the PrepComs to include consideration of "specific matters of substance" relating to implementation of the NPT, implying a still greater requirement for information at PrepCom sessions. The 2000 NPTRC also addressed, in a preliminary way, the absence of systematic reporting of such information. The States parties agreed in the *Final Document* of the 2000 NPTRC on thirteen "practical steps" to be taken in pursuit of implementation of the Treaty, of which practical step 12 called for the provision of

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.⁵

But no explicit procedure for reporting was spelled out, and thus there remains no agreement on which States parties should report, no agreement on the scope and format of reporting, no agreement on the frequency of reporting, no agreement on the level of detail required, and no agreement even on whether such information should be provided in the form of a formal report.

Two PrepCom meetings (2002 and 2003) have taken place since the 2000 NPTRC. These meetings

⁴ NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, para. 4.

⁵ Subparagraph 12 of paragraph 15, subsection on "Article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs," 2000 *Final Document* (NPT/CONF.2000/28, Volume I, Part I, p. 15).

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PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, 2000
Final Document, NPT/CONF/2000/28, Volume I, Part I, p. 17.
"Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Dismantment,'" 2000

have seen the first attempts by States parties to develop a response to the 2000 NPTRC reporting requirement.

Roundtable discussions

The Roundtable discussions were divided into five sessions, each of which addressed one major topic:

- The record of reporting to date;
- Desirable content of reports;
- Use of reports;
- Building momentum for reporting; and
- Expectations for the 2005 Review Conference.

I: What has reporting yielded to date?

The first topic of discussion was the record of reporting to date.

A background document reviewing the record of reporting at the 2002 and 2003 PrepComs⁶ was circulated to the Roundtable participants before the meeting. The purpose of the document was to review how States parties responded to the reporting obligation at the 2002 and 2003 PrepComs and to consider whether this experience offers guidance for the future elaboration and clarification of the Article VI reporting requirement. The document was composed of three sections: a brief description of the background of and the continuing debate related to the reporting requirement; an analysis of the number, format, and content of reports submitted to the PrepComs; and a set of general conclusions and recommendations. The document also included two appendices: a table listing the type and content of reporting by each of the States parties (Appendix 1) and a detailed description of the content of reporting by the NWS States parties (Appendix 2).

The session opened with a discussion of the background document's main findings.

Three categories of "report" were considered: documents formally submitted by States parties in direct response to the reporting requirement; documents provided by the NWS containing information about their programs and activities but not submitted as formal reports; and documents, statements, remarks, etc by States parties containing elements of reporting but not submitted as formal reports. All told, 52 States parties reported at the 2002 PrepCom, 11 providing formal reports, and 60 States parties reported at the 2003 PrepCom, 28 providing

⁶ *Reporting by States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the Implementation of Article VI: A Review of Reports to the First and Second NPT PrepComs*, Report submitted by Project Ploughshares, 19 June 2003. Project Ploughshares (<http://www.ploughshares.ca>) is an ecumenical peace centre of the Canadian Council of Churches.

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Roundtable discussion

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- The record of reporting to date;
- Possible content of reports;
- Use of reports;
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 ² Ibid., p. 1.

formal reports. In each case, all five NWS reported, but none of the documents provided by the NWS was submitted as a formal report.

Formal reports tended to address some or all of the following categories of information:

- 1) General assessments of developments and trends;
- 2) Information on national nuclear holdings and doctrines;
- 3) Descriptions of disarmament policies, initiatives, and programs;
- 4) Identification of advocacy and diplomatic priorities;
- 5) Information on agreements reached and commitments undertaken; and
- 6) Regular declarations of compliance.⁷

According to one participant's breakdown, of the 28 States parties that submitted formal reports in 2003, 10 focused exclusively on Article-VI-related issues (7 of these focused on the 13 Steps), 8 addressed the Treaty as a whole, and 10 addressed a variety of topics, generally highlighting specific areas of national concern or action and in some cases using the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament⁸ as the template for reporting.

The Roundtable background document identified the following major topics addressed by States parties in their 2002 and 2003 reporting:

- Status of the NPT regime
- Work of the Conference on Disarmament
- Strategic nuclear weapons reductions
- Tactical nuclear weapons reductions
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and testing moratorium
- Fissile Material Control Treaty
- IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocols
- Export controls
- Reporting
- Nuclear weapons free zones
- Security assurances
- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Verification
- Irreversibility
- Transparency

⁷ See pages 13-14 of the background document for explanations of these categories. These categories also were identified in Canada's 2003 working paper on reporting (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.2: Reporting by States parties).

⁸ Decision 2 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference: *Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*. The major categories within the Principles and Objectives are: Universality, Non-proliferation, Nuclear disarmament, Nuclear-weapon-free zones, Security assurances, Safeguards, and Peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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Journal reports tended to address some or all of the following categories of information:

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- 3) Descriptions of disarmament policies, initiatives, and programs;
- 4) Identification of advocacy and diplomatic priorities;
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- Security assurances
- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
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² Decision 2 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The major categories within the Principles and Objectives are: disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- International co-operation on disarmament and non-proliferation⁹

The documents submitted by the NWS, although not formal reports, tended to provide information on a broad range of Treaty-related issues. With the exception of China, all provided hard information on at least some elements of their nuclear holdings, nuclear doctrine, and operational status of their weapons. The most detailed information was submitted by the United Kingdom, but in all cases there was room for substantial elaboration.

See the background document for further information concerning the nature and content of the reporting at the two PrepComs.

Roundtable participants considered the background document extremely useful, praising it highly and promising to distribute it at the United Nations, to States parties, and to NGOs. The document will be made available for circulation after Project Ploughshares has incorporated a number of minor suggestions made by participants for corrections and additions.¹⁰

Participants tended to view the record of reporting to date as mixed.

In 2002, 139 of the then-187 States parties attended the PrepCom and 52 reported, representing 28% of States parties and 37% of attendees. Formal reports were submitted by 6% of States parties (8% of attendees). In 2003, 106 of the then-188 States parties attended the PrepCom and 60 reported, representing 32% of States parties and 57% of attendees. Formal reports were submitted by 15% of States parties (26% of attendees). In other words, although only a small number of States parties reported at the 2002 PrepCom, this number showed a promising increase at the 2003 PrepCom. Nonetheless, even in 2003, more than two-thirds of States parties did not report in any way. It was suggested that understaffing in foreign ministries and delegations may be one major reason for this relatively low rate of participation.

Participants asked how many of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (the states that possessed nuclear research and/or nuclear power reactors as of the mid-1990s)¹¹ reported. These states, which include the NWS and most states with nuclear-proliferation-related capabilities, might be considered the states most likely to have important information to report.

⁹ See pages 18-19 of the background document for explanations of these topics.

¹⁰ It was suggested, for example, that mention be made of the working paper submitted by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway at the 2003 PrepCom (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.17: Working Paper submitted by Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway for consideration at the second Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference).

¹¹ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo).

The documents submitted by the NWS, although not formal reports, tended to provide information on a broad range of Treaty-related issues. With the exception of China, all provided hard information on at least some elements of their nuclear holdings, nuclear doctrine, and operational status of their weapons. The most detailed information was submitted by the United Kingdom, but in all cases there was room for substantial elaboration.

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Participants tended to view the record of reporting to date as mixed.

In 2002, 139 of the then-187 States parties attended the PrepCom and 52 reported, representing 58% of States parties and 37% of attendees. Formal reports were submitted by 65 of States parties (47% of attendees). In 2003, 106 of the then-188 States parties attended the PrepCom and 60 reported, representing 32% of States parties and 27% of attendees. Formal reports were submitted by 12% of States parties (20% of attendees). In other words, although only a small number of States parties reported at the 2003 PrepCom, this number showed a promising increase at the 2003 PrepCom. Nonetheless, even in 2002, more than two-thirds of States parties did not report in any way. It was suggested that understating in foreign ministers and delegations may be one major reason for this relatively low rate of participation.

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¹² Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, and Yugo-Slavia (now Democratic Republic of the Congo).

A breakdown of how the Annex 2 states reported was not available during the Roundtable. Post-Roundtable analysis of this question produced a number of interesting results, however. Forty-one of the 44 Annex 2 states are parties to the NPT (Israel, India, and Pakistan are the non-parties). Of these 41 states, 37 (i.e., 90%) reported in one form or another in 2002 and/or 2003; twenty (49%) provided formal reports. Only North Korea (whose membership in the Treaty is currently in dispute), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Spain, and Turkey did not report in any way. By contrast, of the 147 NPT States parties that are not part of the Annex 2 list, only 31 (21%) reported in 2002 and/or 2003; eight (5%) provided formal reports. Thus, 116 (97%) of the 120 States parties that did not report in either year were states that were not on the Annex 2 list. This suggests that a perceived lack of information to report may be another major reason for the current low level of reporting participation by NPT States parties (even though a wide range of NPT-related activities and initiatives could be reported by non-Annex 2 states, as evidenced by the 31 such states that did report in one form or another).

Participants also asked how many members of the NATO alliance reported. It was suggested that Canada might be able to use its alliance ties to encourage reporting by fellow members of the alliance. Canada might also remind these countries that NATO members had affirmed their support of the 13 Steps, including the reporting requirement, as part of NATO policy in December 2000.¹² Analysis of Appendix 1 of the Roundtable background document indicated that 12 of the 19 NATO members reported in 2002 and/or 2003, and 7 provided formal reports. Non-reporting NATO members included two of the four non-reporting Annex 2 states: Spain and Turkey.

Culture of Accountability

Participants assessed that some progress had been made on promoting a “culture of accountability” at the 2003 PrepCom, despite resistance from the NWS and some other States parties. Such a culture involves more than just reporting, incorporating also NGO access to the review process and greater interactivity in discussions among States parties. It was noted that greater interactivity would help States parties to deal with questions of compliance. It had been useful, for example, to prod Iran to report at the last PrepCom.

A number of participants commented that the NWS continue to resist this culture, maintaining that they are not accountable to anyone. This, participants said, remains a fundamental problem. Nonetheless, some progress has been made with the NWS as well. The informal report submitted by the United Kingdom, for example, commented favourably on reporting and transparency, acknowledging that “States party have rightly expressed interest in reporting on disarmament measures by all states, as well as reporting on other measures linked to the Treaty.”¹³ Also, although the United States and France

¹² North Atlantic Council, *Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament* (public version released as *Press Communiqué M-NAC-2(2000)121*, 14 December 2000.

¹³ *Statement by Ambassador David Broucher, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Cluster 1: Disarmament, 30 April 2003.*

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¹² See the 2000 Report on Disarmament and Arms Control, Working Paper No. 1 (2000), at 13.
¹³ See the 2000 Report on Disarmament and Arms Control, Working Paper No. 1 (2000), at 13.
¹⁴ See the 2000 Report on Disarmament and Arms Control, Working Paper No. 1 (2000), at 13.
¹⁵ See the 2000 Report on Disarmament and Arms Control, Working Paper No. 1 (2000), at 13.

successfully opposed inclusion of items using the term “reporting” on the agenda of the last PrepCom, reporting did play an important *de facto* role in the proceedings.

NWS resistance was attributed in part to reluctance to admit to an obligation to report and thus to be seen to be accountable to the other States parties. Indeed, all States parties may fear to some extent being held to account as a result of reporting. States parties, and in particular the NWS, may also be afraid that such an obligation could turn into an obligation to report on specific things and in specific ways.

Progress also was reflected in the addition of comments on transparency and accountability in the Chairman’s Factual Summary produced at the end of the 2003 PrepCom.¹⁴ Participants commented that paragraphs 10 and 21, in particular, represented significant additions compared to the 2002 summary. Paragraph 21, which specifically addressed reporting, repeated in part the equivalent paragraph in the 2002 summary, but added a number of important points (new sentences are highlighted in italics):

Many States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime through transparency. *It was also expressed that such transparency provided valuable means to address and respond to compliance concerns. States parties recognized the value of reports and used them in substantive deliberation, in line with their wish for enhanced interaction.*

II: What reporting content would be most useful?

The Canadian Government’s initial approach has been that it doesn’t care how States parties report as long as they do it. This has led to somewhat greater support and participation and has allowed other States parties to experiment with scope, format, and content, minimizing any sense that this is just a Canadian initiative. Over the long run, however, participants felt that a greater standardization of scope, format, and content is desirable to maximize the usefulness and viability of reporting.

Participants suggested that it is still too early to expect to achieve completely standardized reporting. But it would only be sensible to seek fairly standardized kinds of information content. The immediate priority should continue to be to encourage more widespread participation in reporting. It would be important not to discourage participation by seeking an excessively demanding standard of reporting. Nonetheless, it is also important that reporting elicit useful information. When States undertook to report, it reflected a certain seriousness of purpose, and the result tended to be a little less rhetorical. This should be encouraged. Production of concrete, detailed reports would not only enhance the usefulness of reporting in monitoring Treaty implementation. It would also contribute to the further development of a culture of reporting and accountability among NPT States parties.

¹⁴ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/50, Annex II: Chairman’s factual summary, 13 May 2003.

successfully opposed inclusion of items using the term "reporting" on the agenda of the last PrepCom, reporting did play an important role in the proceedings.

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Many States parties noted that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 12, subparagraph 12, of the 2000 Final Document. It was noted that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall Non-Proliferation Treaty regime through transparency. It was also expressed that such transparency provided a vehicle to address and respond to competition's concern as States parties recognized the value of reports and would them in substantive contribution, in line with their wish for enhanced interaction.

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Scope

Three broad approaches to the scope of reporting were suggested, all of which have advantages and disadvantages:

1) Focus on the 13 Steps. Advantages: Defining the content of reporting would be straightforward. Attention would be focused on the actions of the NWS, reducing pressure on the NNWS. Disadvantages: The NNWS might feel that they have little need to report. Limiting the scope to the 13 Steps might prevent or discourage reporting on other topics of importance. And the fate of reporting would be tied to the fate of the 13 Steps, which might eventually be superseded by other priorities.

2) Report more generally on implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Advantages: This is the agreed mandate for reporting. It would be more flexible in content than a focus on just the 13 Steps. Disadvantages: Many of the States parties that have reported to date want to report more broadly, addressing topics such as negative security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones or the Treaty as a whole.

3) Report on the Treaty more broadly. This approach might involve systematic article-by-article or topic-by-topic reporting on the entire Treaty, or it might be restricted to a more limited set of specific topics drawn from across the Treaty, such as the subjects of the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

Advantages: This approach would address the entire Treaty, emphasizing the interrelatedness of its commitments and eliciting information on all aspects of its implementation. It would increase the range of uses for the reports, and it would clearly implicate all States parties in reporting. Disadvantages: The scope of reporting would exceed the range described in the agreed mandate. Several participants argued that this need not be a problem. Implementation of Article VI requires implementation of the entire Treaty (with the possible exception, it was suggested, of Article IV), so all developments with respect to Treaty implementation could and should be considered relevant to the reporting mandate. Another possible disadvantage is that some States parties may feel that comprehensive reporting would remove the focus from nuclear disarmament, letting the NWS "off the hook" to some extent.

It was noted that a broad reporting mandate might appeal to the NWS by adding topics on which they might have more positive news to report and by leading to the production of reports by other States parties that were useful for pursuing implementation of all aspects of the Treaty. This might encourage the NWS to buy into the process. It was also argued that broadening the mandate would not really have the effect of letting the NWS off the hook on nuclear disarmament. The existing process sets aside Special Time for the issue, but the NWS consider their statements to be purely voluntary, with the contents entirely determined by themselves. Acceptance of an obligation to produce formal reports, even ones containing information on both disarmament and non-proliferation, would still be a step forward. Also, why let the NWS (and other States parties) off the hook for their performance with respect to the Treaty's other articles?

Each of the three approaches outlined above was used by at least some States parties during the 2002

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and 2003 reporting; no approach has yet become the *de facto* standard. According to one participant's breakdown, however, 18 of the 28 formal reports submitted in 2003 used the third approach, addressing a broad range of Treaty-related topics.

All Roundtable participants who expressed an opinion were in favour of the broad approach to reporting. The 13 Steps represent the agenda of most States parties at present, but priorities will change as new items come up; it would not be wise to restrict reporting to the 13 Steps. It also would not make sense to be constantly tinkering with the mandate. It was suggested that States parties probably should not attempt to change the 2000 mandate at the 2005 NPTRC. It might be reasonable, however, to seek agreement that the existing reporting mandate should be understood in its broadest context to include all aspects of the Treaty. In any case, States parties should be encouraged to interpret the reporting requirement in that light. Whether such reporting proceeded theme by theme or Article by Article was considered a less important question.

Information categories

Participants also discussed the general categories of information that States parties might be encouraged to report, working from the six categories outlined in the background document (reproduced on page 6*** above). It was suggested that the most useful and sought after information was in the middle four categories: information on national nuclear holdings and doctrines; descriptions of disarmament policies, initiatives, and programs; identification of advocacy and diplomatic priorities; and information on agreements reached and commitments undertaken. The other categories were considered less important. General assessments of developments and trends (category 1) were characterized as mainly rhetorical comments that had a legitimate place in national statements during the review process but might be less useful in formal reports on Treaty implementation, where it would be better to press for concrete content. Some participants argued that declarations of compliance with the Treaty or aspects of it (category 6) were also largely rhetorical, and fairly meaningless in the absence of concrete information. Others argued that such declarations can be useful. There is no agreement among States parties on the actions that might constitute compliance with Article VI, short of complete nuclear disarmament, but compliance with other Treaty articles is a little more straightforward, and declarations in this respect could be tantamount to reporting that certain actions had or had not been taken.

Participants argued that States parties should be encouraged to provide specific, concrete information and to focus on recent actions and developments. Reports are not the place for rhetoric or statements of general intentions. Instead of declaring support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, for example, a State party should declare its specific intent to ratify the Treaty within a certain time period or "in due course" (which might be as specific as states were willing to be on future activities). Or a State party might report that "last year our country urged the NWS to do X, Y, and Z on this and that occasion", i.e., focusing on what the state did, rather than using the report itself to advocate specific actions. It was suggested that such reports also could include accounts of informal discussions or initiatives being explored by States parties. Such efforts have the potential to lead to formal processes, and their inclusion would give States parties new things to report.

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Nuclear-weapon States

Participants discussed the desired content of NWS reporting. Although it is too early to seek any kind of standardized format of NWS reporting, States parties could make suggestions as to desirable content, perhaps outlining intermediate categories of information that would be useful. Such categories might be the “middle four” outlined above, with the “nuclear holdings and doctrine” category including comprehensive information on the following topics:

- The transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials;
- Holdings of fissile materials;
- Nuclear facilities of all kinds;
- Holdings and production of nuclear weapons (including the numbers, types, and yields of warheads, as well as numbers and types of delivery vehicles);
- The operational status of all weapons held; and
- Nuclear weapons doctrines and policies.¹⁵

It was noted that the Belgian/Dutch/Norwegian working paper at the 2003 PrepCom had made similar suggestions with respect to NWS reporting:

In addition to the transparency measures already agreed to in the 2000 Final Document, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to provide periodically the aggregated number of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes in their possession. The nuclear-weapon States should provide this information in the form of regular reports under step 12 (Article VI, paragraph 15) of the 2000 Final Document.¹⁶

Both of these suggested approaches include information on delivery vehicles. Review Conferences have not focused on delivery vehicle developments, but most of the information papers submitted by the NWS have noted such developments, and the preamble of the Treaty makes it clear that the Treaty’s purpose includes “elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons *and the means of their delivery*” [emphasis added]. It might be desirable, therefore, to include delivery vehicles as a separate category.

It was also suggested that detailed information on warhead types and variants would be useful. It was noted that the United States already provides some such information. Other NWS, especially those with less sophisticated arsenals, probably would be more reluctant to reveal technical details, however. Doubt was also expressed as to how far even the United States was prepared to go at present in this regard.

One way to proceed would be to compile the kinds of information currently being provided and then suggest how these could be built upon. The document provided by the United Kingdom might be held

¹⁵ Background document, p. 15.

¹⁶ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.17.

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¹⁰ Background document, p. 12.
¹¹ NPTCONF.2002/MC.D/WP.17.

up as a good minimal example, covering most of the range of issues sought, although not yet with the level of detail desirable. The UK document was cited by several participants as the best provided by the NWS, although it was also noted that the UK's 2003 document was almost identical to its 2002 document, containing virtually no new information. The data on planned reductions provided in US documents was also noted as valuable and a good model to be followed by the other NWS.

Participants stated that there was no sign of co-ordination or even of extensive interaction among the papers submitted by the NWS. Nonetheless, a certain amount of informal interaction was noted. The Russian statement had challenged the United States on the subject of tactical nuclear weapons, for example, while the Chinese statement had challenged the US and other NWS on a number of points. The UK document also could be seen as something of a challenge to the other NWS to increase the amount of detail provided in their statements.

Non-nuclear-weapon States

Participants noted that a number of the NNWS States parties that had reported in 2002 did not report in 2003. Germany, for example, was one of the non-reporters in 2003, arguing that it did not question the principle of continuing reporting, but stating that none of the information in its 2002 report had changed. Participants discussed whether it was better to submit no report or to send a duplicate of a previous one. Most argued that it is important to be seen to be reporting, and that the greater the number of States parties reporting, the more other States parties would be encouraged to follow suit. It was also suggested that most States parties would have new items to report if their all significant initiatives and advocacy efforts were reported. (Germany, for example, had been involved in a number of nuclear-disarmament-related activities worthy of being reported in the period between its 2002 report and the 2003 PrepCom.)

As with the NWS, the "middle four" categories of information were suggested as the most useful categories of information on which to seek reports.

As one participant pointed out, in many cases the delegations of States parties are small, and the same diplomats work on both NPT issues and the small arms and light weapons issue. This would likely to lead to less focus on the NPT and a correspondingly greater need for education on the issue. It might be useful to encourage the understanding that nuclear weapons issues are linked to other weapons issues through the general and complete disarmament provisions of Article VI. The Treaty does not make the achievement of nuclear disarmament dependent on the achievement of general and complete disarmament. But it does oblige States parties to pursue such disarmament, so it would be legitimate for States parties to report what they are doing in this regard. It would also be useful for States parties to report what they are doing to advance non-proliferation.

In addition to these issues, it was noted, NNWS often express concerns or views about universality, security assurances, and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

These factors suggested that many NNWS would also prefer reporting on a broad range of Treaty-

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Other issues

One participant asked how the reporting process could address the issue of states that are not party to the NPT (i.e., India, Israel, and Pakistan). Such states, as non-parties, would not submit reports. States that are States parties might address the issue of non-parties through discussions on universality, however. Also, it was suggested that the UN or the IAEA might be able to report whatever information is known about the nuclear programs of the three non-parties.

The question was also raised of how to account for collective reports, such as those submitted in the name of the Non-Aligned Movement. Such reports may provide useful information. In most cases, however, they would not contain country-by-country information; thus, they could not be seen as a substitute for individual reporting by States parties.

III: How can reports best be used by States parties and NGOs?

Next, the Roundtable discussed how to increase and improve the use of reports by States parties and NGOs.

In part, this would depend on the purpose that reporting is intended to serve. Several participants commented on this topic. Reporting is not the solution to all of the NPT's problems nor is it proposed as such: it should be seen as a useful tool among others. By contributing to transparency and accountability, it, along with the other elements of the enhanced review process, could help to strengthen the Treaty and slow its erosion. Other participants commented that reporting also could contribute to implementation: the very process of reporting would force States parties to consider what they are doing or not doing to implement the treaty. It should not be seen as an alternative to disarmament action or a measure of despair, to be pursued in the absence of real progress toward disarmament. Instead, reporting should be understood as a secondary activity that reflects what is happening – a means of promoting, supporting, and keeping track of material progress. Disarmament progress might appear to be in short supply at present, but the quickest way to kill the NPT would be to give up on making progress within the Treaty.

Discussion then turned to the characteristics of reports that States Parties would find most useful. These were summarized as follows:

- Submitted as formal reports, archived, and accessible in all UN languages;
- Available early (preferably well before the PrepCom), so they can be translated, read, and commented on in a timely manner;

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- Available early (preferably well before the PrepCom), so they can be translated, read, and commented on in a timely manner;

- Based on the 2000 NPTRC mandate, but interpreting this mandate broadly to address the entire Treaty;
- Utilizing a flexible, open format, and built around categories of information rather than a fixed matrix;
- Emphasizing hard information rather than advocacy and opinion;
- Forward-looking as well as backward-looking;
- Organized in such a way as to be comparable State Party-to-State Party, including NWS to NNWS;
- Comparable year-to-year; and
- Not burdensome to produce.

Participants noted that the issue of early availability raised a difficult question: Since there is no permanent NPT Secretariat, to whom should States parties submit early reports? (And when could they be translated?) It was noted that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention also lacks a permanent secretariat, but an unofficial, virtual secretariat, a website hosted by the University of Bradford (<http://www.opbw.org>), works well as a place to post reports and analyses. Participants commented that a similar site, while not resolving all questions related to early availability, might prove very useful for the NPT review process.

Interactivity

Participants discussed the prospects for increasing the use of reports during actual PrepCom and Review Conference sessions. The prospects for interactivity are linked to the content of the reports: the more relevant the content, the more likely that reports will be used. There are also practical issues of timing. When would reports become available? How quickly could delegations respond to them, both in asking questions and in providing credible responses?

A number of participants suggested that it might be possible to stagger the PrepCom/Review Conference agenda over the two weeks of the event in order to allow time for reports to be digested, questions to be asked, and approved responses to be provided. It was emphasized that delegations would need sufficient time to check with their foreign ministries if they were to provide credible responses to questions of substance. It would not be realistic to expect delegates to answer potentially loaded questions on the spot, nor would they necessarily have the detailed, technical knowledge of their own country's programs that would be needed to provide useful answers. By providing time for such exchanges, staggering the agenda might increase the likelihood of active use of the reports, especially with respect to the NWS and States parties facing compliance questions. It was considered unlikely, however, that the agenda of the next PrepCom could be modified in this way. Such a change probably would be made only if the Chair of the PrepCom determined it to be uncontroversial (which is not likely to be the case).

Another possible approach discussed would be to submit lists of questions for the NWS or other States parties two to three weeks in advance of the conference to allow these states time

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- Comparable year-to-year, and
- Not burdensome to produce.

Participants noted that the issue of early availability raised a difficult question: Since there is no permanent IWT Secretariat, to whom should States parties submit early reports? (And when could they be translated?) It was noted that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention also lacks a permanent secretariat, but an unofficial, virtual secretariat, a website hosted by the University of Bradford (<http://www.opaw.org>), works well as a place to post reports and analyses. Participants commented that a similar site, while not resolving all questions related to early availability, might prove very useful for the NPTRC review process.

Interactivity

Participants discussed the prospects for increasing the use of reports during actual PrepCom and Review Conference sessions. The prospects for interactivity are linked to the content of the report; the more relevant the content, the more likely that reports will be used. There are also practical issues of timing. When would reports become available? How quickly could delegations respond to them, both in asking questions and in providing credible responses?

A number of participants suggested that it might be possible to stagger the PrepCom/Review Conference agenda over the two weeks of the event in order to allow time for reports to be digested, questions to be asked, and approved responses to be provided. It was emphasized that delegations would need sufficient time to check with their foreign ministries if they were to provide credible responses to questions of substance. It would not be realistic to expect delegates to answer potentially loaded questions on the spot, nor would they necessarily have the detailed technical knowledge of their own country's programs that would be needed to provide useful answers. By providing time for such exchanges, however, the agenda might increase the likelihood of active use of the reports, especially with respect to the NWS and States parties facing compliance questions. It was considered unlikely, however, that the agenda of the next PrepCom could be modified in this way. Such a change probably would be made only if the Chair of the PrepCom determined it to be uncontroversial (which is not likely to be the case).

Another possible approach discussed would be to submit lists of questions for the NWS or other States parties two to three weeks in advance of the conference to allow these States time

to prepare responses for submission at the conference. This procedure would work best, of course, if the reports of these States parties were themselves available well before the conference.

It was noted that States parties have already begun to use reports in an interactive way to a limited extent during PrepComs. No comments were made on the reports submitted in 2002, but in 2003, a number of States parties asked questions based on the reports (or other documents) submitted. Sweden, for example, posed a series of significant questions on the US and Russian statement on the Moscow Treaty, such as how was the 2012 date for reductions decided? Why is the date not earlier? And is the possibility of making the planned reductions irreversible under consideration?. It remains to be seen where, when, and to what extent responses to such questions will be provided. Two of the NWS had told the last PrepCom that they were not able to answer all the questions that had been asked of them, stating that they would consider these questions and respond later, possibly in another forum. Participants wondered what it would mean for the review process if questions asked multilaterally were answered bilaterally. How would answers be reported back to the other States parties?

Another issue discussed was whether States parties are using the reports in any way outside the review process framework. The answer to this question is not yet clear. The Canadian government has begun looking at how reports could be addressed in the course of its other diplomatic activities, but participants did not know whether other States parties were also doing this.

Encouraging participation

Participants noted that it was important to encourage more NNWS to submit formal reports that could become part of the record. Thailand, for example, had stated its support for efforts to promote a culture of accountability, submitted a formal report in 2002, and promised to report in 2003, but in the end it did not submit a 2003 report. It would be useful to encourage States parties that made oral statements at the PrepCom to distribute those statements (or at least the sections relevant as reporting) in writing as formal documents. Canada had already encouraged some States parties to do this at the last PrepCom, with some success. It also was noted that timeliness is important: some reports had been submitted so late that the PrepCom was over by the time they were translated and distributed. In other cases, States parties were supportive of reporting, but were reluctant to take on an onerous job. Bangladesh (which did not submit a formal report) was one such example. This highlighted the importance of keeping the reporting task manageable.

Making reports available

Participants commented that it was important to make all reports and other documents from the PrepComs and Review Conferences widely available, posting them on an official website and maintaining an official archive.

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The lack of a permanent NPT Secretariat makes this difficult at present. Records from past conferences are scattered over a number of places at the United Nations. The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) has a small library of documents, but it is incomplete and difficult to use. The DDA website¹⁷ does have a pretty good collection of working papers and other official documents from the 2000 NPTRC, summary records (summaries of the oral proceedings) from the main sessions of the NPTRC, and official documents from recent PrepComs. Documents from earlier conferences are not available on the website and sometimes cannot even be found. Some of the formal documents of the 1985 NPTRC could not be located at the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, for example. Another problem is financial. Translation and distribution of documents is the most expensive part of the NPT review process. Thus, for example, records of oral proceedings are not even produced for many PrepCom sessions.

The lack of a permanent NPT Secretariat was one of the reasons the NGO Reaching Critical Will (RCW)¹⁸ was created. At present, the RCW website is the best place to find PrepCom and Review Conference documents. Even Canadian officials often use it to find documents. RCW works closely with DDA to try to ensure that RCW gets a copy of everything distributed during the review proceedings. Participants commended RCW for its important contribution in maintaining this collection and making it available to all. It was recognized nonetheless that an official archive is needed.

Reaching Critical Will also prepared a "Shadow Report" for use during the 2003 PrepCom containing detailed model reports for 37 of the 41 Annex 2 NPT States parties.¹⁹ An earlier version was prepared for the 2002 PrepCom. These documents were enthusiastically received and widely used by delegations; a number of delegations also approached RCW to add or correct information.

As noted earlier, it also was suggested that the Roundtable background document (or excerpts from it) also would be useful for NGOs and delegations, and it would be valuable to make the document available more broadly. It might be distributed to delegations at the First Committee, for example, and/or used as the focus of a panel discussion at the UN. It would also be useful to get the report published in an academic journal; *Security Dialogue* was suggested as a good possibility.

A number of participants suggested that anything NGOs could do to make the reports more watched by the wider world would be extremely useful and would help build momentum for

¹⁷ <http://disarmament.un.org/dda.htm>

¹⁸ Reaching Critical Will (<http://reachingcriticalwill.org>) is a project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Focused on nuclear disarmament, its purpose is to provide primary resources and information related to the NPT, the Conference on Disarmament, and the UN First Committee to NGOs and the public.

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reporting. It was noted that RCW already plans to focus greater attention on media work this year and next to take advantage of the fact that the coming PrepCom and Review Conference will both be in New York.

Participants discussed whether it would be useful for NGOs to examine the reports of States parties as they were submitted in order to provide overnight advice for other delegations and for the media. One participant suggested that midsize delegations can do that job for themselves over the course of a few days and that, in any case, a reaction at the next year's meeting would be a pretty good response time. Others commented, however, that NGOs and the public were seeking faster action than that. Immediate responses were needed for media purposes, as well. It was noted that media work should be done carefully, to avoid playing into NWS fears of being dragged before a media/NGO "kangaroo court".

Analysis of reports

Participants noted that there is a need for greater academic and NGO analysis of the reports submitted by States parties. Although the reports and related documents are increasingly available (thanks to Reaching Critical Will and others), an analytic gap persists, both in assessing overall developments and in performing "quality control" assessments of individual reports. The listing of issues addressed by States parties in Appendix 1 of the background document was a highly useful start, for example, but it did not show how States parties addressed the issue or what position they took. This was not to be expected in the background document produced for this Roundtable, but a more in-depth analysis would be useful. Questions were raised as to who might be approached to do such analyses. It might be possible to obtain modest funding for such research from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development or from DFAIT's International Security Research Outreach Programme.

It was also noted that the Liu Centre is planning to publish an annual *World Security Report*; a regular chapter analysing reports by States parties would be a valuable addition to this publication. NGOs might also consider organizing an annual event after each PrepCom/Review Conference to dissect the reports from that year.

Would thorough use of reports by NGOs, academics, and States parties dampen the enthusiasm of States parties for reporting? Participants acknowledged that there is a risk of this happening. But it was argued that thorough and careful pursuit of transparency need not create an "information chill". In any case, analysis and use of the reports was part and parcel of accountability – the very basis of their value. Without accountability, transparency would be of no use.

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IV: How can momentum be built in the run up to 2005?

Next, the Roundtable discussed the need to build and maintain momentum for reporting. Growing participation was considered necessary not only to encourage additional States parties to report, but also to convince many States parties to continue reporting. The increase between 2002 and 2003 in the number of States parties reporting was promising, but states need to see that reporting is producing significant results. Otherwise, the number of States parties reporting may begin to decline.

A variety of explanations for the failure of many States parties to report were discussed. In addition to the reasons already noted (resource issues and a perceived lack of information to report), it was suggested that some States parties may feel that they only need to report to Review Conferences; such states would have to be convinced otherwise. Other States parties, it was suggested, may be waiting for a more formal system to be established, after which they would be willing to participate. Others were likely to report only after it became evident that a large number of States parties were submitting reports. In this regard, even submitting duplicate or near-duplicate reports with minor updates would be worth doing.

Participants asked how the commitment of the NWS to reporting might be increased and how the total number of States parties reporting might be increased.

Would it be realistic, asked one participant, to recommend that Canada and/or other States parties provide modest technical assistance to other States parties to help them in the preparation of reports? Would this be seen by such states as too intrusive? It was noted that sufficient money might not be available for significant efforts in this regard. But it might be possible to organize a workshop on possible content and formats at the First Committee. Such a meeting could be put together at low cost.

In addition, Canada (and/or other States parties) could write to all States parties with suggestions on how to prepare a report – perhaps in the form of a questions-and-answers document. One participant warned against calling such a document a “reporting guide”, however, commenting that there has been great resistance to such a document with respect to the small arms issue. Still, it would be useful to provide suggestions to States parties on what they should say in reports; Canada could prepare a working paper, or a pre-working-paper document, to share ideas on how to proceed. A comprehensive explanation of one possible approach would certainly be welcomed. To be most useful, such a paper should be produced in good time – late this year or early next year.

It was noted that Canada was already looking at options for a third Canadian working paper on reporting, for submission to the 2004 PrepCom (which is supposed to produce recommendations for the 2005 NPTRC). Canada’s previous working papers had laid out a variety of views in a fairly non-committal manner. It was suggested that the next working paper should have a clear Canadian point of view, spelling out Canada’s preferred approach. Many

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States parties would find it useful if one or several States parties were to provide some guidance about the kinds of reporting that would be helpful. This need not be a final, fixed position, but it should at least describe how Canada sees reporting working in general. Preferably, this should be produced quite early, so it could be used to support work at the margins of the First Committee and at regional fora, well before the PrepCom.

It was suggested that there are three routes that Canada could take with respect to recommending approaches to content and format. Canada could say

- we think the following is the best approach, for these reasons, and we recommend that all States parties adopt it;
- we intend to do this, for these reasons, but other ways are possible, and here are some of the arguments for and against these other approaches; or
- we intend to do this, but other States parties may have other preferred approaches.

Many States parties (e.g., the non-Annex 2 states) might think that they have relatively little to report. In many cases, these States parties might also be among those with small delegations and relatively under-resourced foreign ministries. It was suggested that it might be worth producing a sample, "boilerplate" model report that might do most of the work for such States parties, should they choose to use it, leaving them little to do but fill in the blanks and add any special items or comments. This might encourage more NNWS to participate, and it might also have the effect of helping to standardize reporting, not necessarily on a "final format", but at least encouraging movement toward certain desirable general characteristics with respect to scope, choice of categories, and level of detail. Another participant argued that States parties can and should talk about whatever subjects they want, and in particular about what they have done, as long as the information is relevant to assessing progress in implementation of the Treaty. It would not be wise, therefore, to try to impose a limited and inflexible format. Other participants argued, however, that producing a model report that addressed a broad range of Treaty elements while encouraging additional reporting on whatever else the State party considered relevant was worth considering. The Conventional Arms Register received reports from 126 states in 2001, so it is not unprecedented to achieve widespread participation in reporting regimes. Another participant commented that any such model should be applicable to both the NWS and the NNWS. It would have to be both simple enough for microstate reporting and comprehensive enough for NWS reporting.

Several participants suggested that it would be useful for States parties to perceive that other people (NGOs, the media, other States parties) were watching their performance. It would be helpful to highlight those States parties that didn't report and praise those that did. In this respect it is useful to have documents like the Shadow Report and the Roundtable background document, which show which States parties are not yet reporting. Other participants commented, however, that attempts at shaming would likely be counterproductive. In any case, at this point, they argued, there were too many non-reporters. Highlighting them would only

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serve to emphasize that many more States parties do not report than do.²⁰ Participants discussed what might be done to increase the number of States parties reporting without attempting to shame them. Efforts to convince UN members to report military budget information²¹ had used a more positive approach, seeking to convince states that it did not hurt to report.

Participants commented that it might also be useful to reward participants with praise and favourable publicity. In this regard, it was mentioned that Canada had received very little notice for its own efforts to promote reporting. Canada had been one of the most active States parties, if not the most active State party, at the PrepCom on this issue. Another participant noted, however, that Canada had to some extent discouraged attention to its role, apparently in order to minimize the impression that reporting was mainly a Canadian interest.

It was noted that one form of reward might be a meeting of the States parties that had reported. Such a meeting might be held at the margins of the UN First Committee and/or outside the next PrepCom. Canada could invite all 31 States parties that had formally reported in 2002 and/or 2003 to a lunch meeting to talk about how to move reporting forward. Such a meeting might discuss the role and use of reports, the process of reporting, or it might discuss the content of the actual reports. Such a forum might encourage those States parties that have reported to feel greater "ownership" of the process.

Participants discussed whether Canada should engage in further discussions with the other reporting States parties before developing a more definitive "Canadian position" on reporting. It was noted that consultations with other States parties that support reporting but favour different approaches might lead to ways in which these differences could be bridged. Participants commented that Canada had been pursuing a collaborative approach on this issue and undoubtedly would continue to do so. A number of participants felt, however, that it was now time for Canada to declare its preferred approach, even though it should continue to remain open to other solutions.

It would also be useful, it was suggested, to organize a panel or briefing session on reporting to which all States parties could be invited. This too could be held on the margins of the First Committee, and would discuss the role and use of reports, encouraging other States parties to participate in reporting. Would it be better for such a panel/briefing session to be organized by NGOs or the Canadian government? Either approach might work. It might also be possible for both to be involved.

²⁰ It may be worth noting, however, that reporters are already in the majority in the case of the CTBT Annex 2 states. Of the 36 NNWS NPT States parties that are on the Annex 2 list, 20 submitted formal reports in 2002 and/or 2003; only 4 failed to report in any form.

²¹ The Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, established by UN General Assembly resolution 35/142B, 12 December 1980.

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Participants suggested that reporting also might be promoted through diplomatic efforts in other fora, such as the Non-Aligned Movement or the various regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. It might be possible to get the subject of NPT reporting on the agenda of an expected upcoming meeting of all nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Participants also wondered whether there might be a place for a New-Agenda-Coalition-like action on the part of Canada and other like-minded States parties to highlight the importance of reporting. A similar but less high profile action might see Canada working with other core states to push the boundaries of reporting and encourage greater participation.

NGOs might be able to contribute in a number of different ways.

For example, NGOs could organize a panel of academics, diplomats, and NGO representatives at the First Committee and/or the PrepCom to discuss the substance of the reports submitted by States parties. NGOs also could meet with delegations in New York to brief them on the reporting issue.

Another suggestion was that NGOs could organize panel discussions or seminars on broader topics like the value of reporting efforts to treaty compliance in general. It was noted that this approach might elicit more positive NWS participation; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization enjoys very positive co-operation with the United States on technical matters, for example, despite US opposition to that treaty. Participants suggested that VERTIC²² would be a good NGO to organize such a seminar (subject to availability of funding).

NGOs could also take advantage of the period between PrepCom sessions to work with local NGOs to encourage reporting by specific States parties. Most delegations have little latitude to make decisions. Decisions are made at home, and NGOs working in those countries might be able to encourage a greater commitment to reporting. In addition to encouraging reporting by NNWS, NGOs might be able to work with NGOs in the NWS to encourage their governments to submit formal reports and to provide more detailed information in those reports. Such efforts might be especially useful in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where civil society organizations are more highly developed than in the other NWS.

Participants noted that Reaching Critical Will has compiled an extensive database of 400 or so NGOs working on these issues in 75 countries around the world. Contact information for these organizations is on the RCW website. The Abolition 2000 group of NGOs also represent a large number of countries around the world. Information on the appropriate government contacts in many countries is also on the RCW website. RCW or some other group could

²² VERTIC (<http://www.vertic.org>) is a UK-based NGO. Its mission is to promote effective and efficient verification as a means of ensuring confidence in the implementation of international agreements and intra-national agreements with international involvement. VERTIC also concerns itself with the negotiation, monitoring, and implementation of such agreements and the establishment of confidence-building measures to bolster them.

Participants suggested that reporting also might be promoted through diplomatic efforts in other
forums such as the Non-Aligned Movement or the various regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. It
might be possible to get the subject of NPT reporting on the agenda of an expanded upcoming
meeting of all nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Participants also wondered whether there might be a place for a New-Agenda-Corridor-like
action on the part of Canada and other like-minded States parties to highlight the importance of
reporting. A similar but less high profile action might see Canada working with other core states
to push the boundaries of reporting and encourage greater participation.

NGOs might be able to contribute in a number of different ways.

For example, NGOs could organize a panel of academics, diplomats, and NGO
representatives at the First Committee and/or the PrepCom to discuss the substance of the
reports submitted by States parties. NGOs also could meet with delegations in New York to
brief them on the reporting issues.

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topics like the value of reporting efforts to treaty compliance in general. It was noted that this
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further facilitate NGO-to-NGO links by preparing background information or talking points that might make such contacts easier to pursue.

It was suggested that the Canadian government also might be able to facilitate such efforts to some extent. A number of possibilities were suggested in this regard: Canadian officials could participate in brainstorming sessions with NGOs; Canada could provide contacts with other NGOs; and Canada might be able to assist with information flow. Some financial support might also be possible. It was noted that the Canadian government did provide some funding to support development of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and the effort to ban landmines. It also was acknowledged that in some cases it might be helpful for NGO efforts not to be associated with Canada or other specific States parties.

Meetings between NGOs and delegations in New York might also be helpful. The First Committee session in the fall would be one opportunity for such meetings. It was suggested that the Canadian delegation might be able to facilitate NGO meetings with key states.

Another possibility discussed was that an NGO, rather than a State party, could produce a briefing document on reporting for States parties. Such a document might address such factors as why States parties should report and how they might do so. Reaching Critical Will, for example, could put together a package of proposed reporting criteria, the Roundtable background document, and the latest Shadow Report and provide it to States parties. RCW could offer the package as an aid to States parties that chose to report (and possibly offer other assistance as well). States parties that chose not to report would, in effect, have the job done for them by the information in the Shadow Report. This might serve as an incentive for States parties to do their own report. Participants cautioned, however, that tone would be highly important in any such effort. The approach used must not seem presumptuous or threatening. An approach perceived as a genuine offer of assistance might be welcomed, however.

Finally, it was suggested that a special section of the RCW website dedicated to reporting would be highly useful both for NGOs and for States parties. It was noted that the RCW website is currently being overhauled and a section specifically on reporting is planned.

V: What to expect and what to strive for in 2005

In the last session, the Roundtable participants discussed possibilities and priorities for the 2005 Review Conference.

Participants commented once again that it is not realistic to expect States parties to adopt a standardized format for reporting at the 2005 Review Conference. But several more limited developments were considered possible.

It was suggested, for example, that the Review Conference might agree to reaffirm the reporting

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V: What to expect and what to strive for in 2002

In the last session, the Roundtable participants discussed possibilities and priorities for the 2002 Review Conference.

Participants commented again that it is not realistic to expect States parties to adopt a standardized format for reporting at the 2002 Review Conference. But several more limited developments were considered possible.

It was suggested, for example, that the Review Conference might agree to reaffirm the reporting

requirement for all States parties, possibly as a stand-alone requirement independent of the 13 Steps. It might also be possible to clarify the reporting requirement to include a request for the submission of formal reports.

It was also suggested that it might be possible to agree on a sentence or two describing the desired content of reports (e.g., "such reports might include inter alia..."). This might include agreement on an illustrative list of categories to report on. It was noted that a good list of categories would be very useful, and might help to delineate a *de facto* reporting format.

A third possibility identified was a tasking for States parties to come up with specific recommendations on the format of reports for consideration at the 2010 Review Conference.

A number of participants expressed support for pursuing all three of these possibilities.

The Roundtable then discussed the mechanisms for getting such suggestions into the draft recommendations that might go forward at the end of the 2004 PrepCom. The first step would be to put the ideas forward in a well-argued working paper. (This could form a major part of the planned third Canadian working paper, for example.) Very specific language should be proposed. It would then be necessary to generate support among other States parties. Finally, the proposals would be addressed in the course of the extended negotiating sessions that would take place to determine the text of any recommendations to go forward to the 2005 Review Conference. If accepted, the proposals would be passed to the Review Conference as recommendations of the 2004 PrepCom.

A number of participants noted, however, that States parties almost certainly would not agree on substantive recommendations at the end of the PrepCom. The issues involved were too contentious, and concessions normally would be made only during the horse-trading at the end of the process, i.e., at the end of the Review Conference itself. Nevertheless, it would be essential to get the proposals on the table at the PrepCom.

Next steps

In addition to preparing a working paper, Canada might find it useful to circulate the Roundtable report and Roundtable background document, at the First Committee and possibly other venues. It was noted that the two documents should be written so as to complement one another, presenting a coherent message and avoiding too much overlap. One side benefit of circulating the documents, it was suggested, would be to counteract the impression of some delegations that the Canadian NGOs working on this issue are dogmatic on the question of the format and content of reporting.

NGOs could help to advance the reporting issue by working in parallel, through direct efforts as well as through NGO-to-NGO links, to shore up support for reporting among States parties and to bring others on side.

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Evaluation

Participants concluded the Roundtable with a brief evaluation session. Assessments of the meeting were highly positive. Participants appreciated the atmosphere of respect and spirit of give and take that had prevailed between and among government and NGO representatives during the meeting. The mix of participants was praised, although the lack of francophone participation was regretted. And there was general agreement that the Roundtable had been well-organized and productive, that many of the issues surrounding reporting had been clarified, and that a number of useful ideas had been suggested.

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Parties to the NPT (2003 : Ottawa,
Ont.)

Transparency with accountability
reporting by States parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of