


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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1988 SESSION



PV

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

FEBRUARY 1989

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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PREFACE

PV

This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1988 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate the dissemination of research on this issue.

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43.258.715

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 1988 session and the 436th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is with deep regret that we have learnt, during the inter-sessional period, of the loss of our former colleague and good friend, Ambassador Ian Cromartie, who did so much to advance the work of the Conference. He served his country with distinction, being, as he was, an outstanding diplomat. His special personality made him respected and earned him our esteem and admiration as he harmonized so well professional ability with personal integrity. He served as President of the Conference, as well as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I hardly need to recall how effectively he discharged these difficult tasks. In particular, progress towards a convention banning chemical weapons achieved special impetus during his guidance of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. On behalf of the Conference and on behalf of my delegation, I wish to extend heartfelt condolences to the delegation of the United Kingdom and to his family.

I invite you all to join me in a minute of silence as a tribute to the memory of our good friend Ian Cromartie.

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(The President)

- The more favourable conditions which have emerged are an encouragement to the Conference on Disarmament to produce, at last, the concrete results expected of it. What I have in mind, first of all, are the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The Committee, under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus, has made remarkable progress. It should be possible now, in a comparatively short span of time, to cast the agreement that already exists on fundamental issues into additional Convention text and to work out further details.

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

- "The prospects of a ban on chemical weapons are far more promising now than before. The international community certainly expects that everything will be done to accelerate progress on this important measure in order to achieve a convention at the earliest date.

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The PRESIDENT: The 436th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

On behalf of the Conference, it is my privilege to extend a very warm welcome to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Bohuslav Chnoupek, who will be addressing us. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is visiting the Conference for the third time, an indication of the interest with which he follows our work on vital questions relating to disarmament. I gladly take this opportunity to stress the fraternal ties which exist between my country and his, and which encompass close co-operation in the quest for disarmament. Clear evidence is provided by our joint initiatives for the conclusion and implementation of the INF agreement, as well as for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free and chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe. I wish Minister Chnoupek a successful visit to Geneva, and I am sure that members will listen to his statement with particular interest.

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

- The Stockholm Declaration contains a paragraph that seemed to me to be the most appropriate with which to close my statement, since it highlights the concern of its authors about the future of the United Nations organ dealing with disarmament. The paragraph in question reads as follows:

"The Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should be strengthened and made a more effective instrument for achieving nuclear disarmament and for the elimination of all other weapons of mass destruction. A convention for the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons should be urgently concluded. It would also provide an example for future efforts in the multilateral field."

(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

The prospects for the year ahead will be dictated by the determination with which we take our next steps - the vigour with which we pursue the process which has begun.

Above all by the conclusion, at the summit meeting planned to take place this year in Moscow, of a Soviet/United States treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons together with observance of the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time.

By the rapid elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons within the framework of this Conference.

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(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

The Conference's agenda for this year includes issues of major importance to all mankind. As we emphasized at the Prague session, we consider the most urgent issue to be the completion of the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, progress towards a complete nuclear weapon test ban and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Encouraging steps have been taken in these directions. First and foremost through the Washington summit meeting. Through the Six-nation Initiative, which was substantially elaborated upon in the Stockholm Declaration of January this year. And also through the urgency of the calls addressed to the Geneva Conference by the entire international community, as embodied in the relevant resolutions of the forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly. I should now like to dwell briefly on these crucial issues.

The Conference has come within reach of concluding work on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons, including the industrial base for their production. It could be finalized within a very short time - as early as the first phase of the current session. Given, of course, political will and concentrated negotiating efforts focused entirely on completing work on the 10 per cent or so of the text that has yet to be agreed.

However, I wish to say frankly that we have been seriously worried by developments running in just the opposite direction. In particular, the decision to begin production of binary weapons and the intention of deploying them in Europe, as well as arguments attempting to justify an alleged necessity for chemical rearmament. We see in them a dangerous trend towards destabilization of the political and military situation.

It is of the utmost importance that the negotiating process should be expedited rather than slowed down. Already there is agreement in principle on the scope of the future Convention, which must cover binary weapons too. All the essential elements of the Convention are already at hand.

(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

Then let us take an absolutely unequivocal decision: to entrust the committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons with the task of finalizing the Convention this year. This would be fully in keeping with the unanimous recommendation made by the forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly. An essential confirmation of the interest of the member States of the Conference in achieving a complete and effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction.

Secondly, to reach final agreement without delay on an effective mechanism of challenge inspections without the right of refusal; agreement in principle has already been reached concerning the need to incorporate such a mechanism in the Convention.

Thirdly, to build on the encouraging results of last year's negotiations in order to reach final agreement on the overall organization of the implementation of the Convention. Primarily with regard to the activities of its Executive Council.

Fourthly, to complete the development of an economically and financially feasible scheme of routine inspection of chemical industry. To take into account in this regard the requirements connected with the economic and technological development of States parties to the Convention, whatever their socio-economic systems. We are now seriously considering concrete steps to facilitate a solution to those problems.

We most insistently urge the earliest possible final settlement of all the pending issues relating to the Convention. For our part we are determined to do truly everything in our power to that end. As we clearly confirmed in the joint declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Moscow last March. This also includes a readiness for reasonable compromises. As well as the openness that was demonstrated so strikingly by the presentation of Soviet chemical armaments at Shikhany in the autumn of last year.

I wish to mention in this context the proposal made by Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. And in particular to emphasize that we do not regard this as a deflection from efforts to ban these weapons worldwide. Never have we placed global and regional approaches to arms limitation in opposition to one another. On the contrary - our attitude is based on their dialectical unity.

Moreover, this also relates to our similar proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor. The same applies to concrete measures to reduce the level of military confrontation and strengthen confidence, including removal of the most dangerous types of offensive weapons by the States along the line of contact between the two military political alliances in Europe. We advocated the adoption of these measures at the Prague session.

(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

We believe - we are convinced - that the establishment of the proposed chemical-weapon-free zone would be a universal beneficial step of indisputable political importance. Both at present, when it might make a contribution to a global solution, and after the conclusion of the Convention, when it might become the prologue to its implementation in our region.

It is our opinion that while pursuing the priority task of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons, the Conference should focus in a much more purposeful fashion on the entire set of problems of nuclear disarmament. This is where the Conference should demonstrate most clearly its ability to be the centre of, and the generator of, the practical internationalization of disarmament negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear States and the whole international community. Thus playing a decisive role in the process of building a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world, as a fundamental pre-condition for the survival and development of civilization.

We consider that in this year's negotiations, important tasks lie ahead in the field of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. We are ready to work flexibly and constructively towards the solution of problems relating to the establishment and the mandate of the relevant working body of the Conference. The time is truly ripe for starting substantive consideration of the future treaty, whose basic provisions are on the table. Progress in such talks would be facilitated by the setting up of a special group of scientific experts to prepare without delay practical proposals for a system of verification of the non-conduct of nuclear tests. We believe that the drafting of such an overall agreement within the framework of the Conference, and the full-scale Soviet/United States talks that have opened in accordance with the understanding reached in Washington, will be mutually complementary and lead to the same objective.

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The important role of the Conference on Disarmament was underlined by the six, as well as the urgency of concluding a convention banning all chemical weapons.

(continued)

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

- The agreement at the Stockholm Conference in 1986 on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, and progress in negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons, illustrate a dynamic multilateral process. The breakthrough made on important aspects of the verification issue gives hope for new opportunities to conclude disarmament agreements.

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Over the years, major efforts have been made by the members of this Conference to negotiate a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

The early and successful conclusion of these negotiations is now crucially important. Chemical weapons are being developed, produced and used. Failure to reach an agreement soon on a total ban on these frightful weapons would greatly increase the risk of further proliferation, horizontal as well as vertical, with grave consequences for the international community.

Complete and effective international prohibition would, on the other hand, improve the security of nations. Furthermore, such a convention would amount to a breakthrough in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. It would eradicate a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. It would break new ground in the field of international verification. And it would clearly establish the Conference on Disarmament as a capable and viable multilateral negotiating forum for security and disarmament matters.

(continued)

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

My delegation is pleased to note that last year a number of important and constructive steps were taken and agreements reached in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Most problems of political importance have now been solved. Measures were also taken to support and enhance confidence in those negotiations.

Admittedly, intricate technical problems remain. With the draft Convention before us, its conclusion is, however, no longer a distant goal but a close possibility. I urge all negotiating parties to make full use of the extraordinary opportunity we have to conclude a major disarmament agreement at this session.

When speaking in this forum, I have consistently stressed how important it is that States should demonstrate their commitment to the common goal of the Convention by desisting from the production of chemical weapons. Considering the advanced stage of the negotiations I wish, once again, to call upon all parties to refrain from any action that may complicate our negotiations.

Some issues related to the negotiations on the convention have been dealt with in direct contacts between the two major military Powers. I trust that these bilateral talks will prove useful in helping to solve some remaining problems.

It is clear that only a multilateral and comprehensive agreement can safeguard the interests of all States and provide for effective and viable prohibition. Obligations to be assumed and advantages to be gained must be valid for all.

The need for universality has also been the guiding principle in Sweden's consistent cautioning against resorting to partial measures in this field.

In their Washington statement the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union reaffirmed the need to intensify negotiations on a convention. This commitment must be honoured by active promotion of the negotiations in the Conference.

The need for results is urgent. The specific political conditions for chemical disarmament are as good as they are likely ever to be. Now is the opportunity. It must be seized, speedily and with determination.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... This spring we have perhaps a unique opportunity to prove the relevance of the Conference on Disarmament and to demonstrate the potential of multilateral disarmament negotiations. We can do so by achieving concrete results on the items on our agenda. Our achievements can give direction not only to the special session but to multilateral disarmament efforts in years to come.

Two steps would be particularly significant: agreement by the Conference on the outstanding elements of the chemical weapons convention, and a start by the Conference on practical work on all aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

These would be small steps for us, but could be one giant leap for the cause of disarmament.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Allow me to associate myself with the words of welcome expressed to yourself by Ambassador Theorin, and the thanks to your predecessor, as well as with the words of welcome to our new colleagues.

I regret to be starting my intervention by expressing my condolences to the delegation of the United Kingdom on the death of my predecessor as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie. I had the opportunity in early October to visit Ian Cromartie in his apartment in London. During our long conversation Ian Cromartie demonstrated his grasp and insight in the negotiations and his strong belief in our efforts to conclude a complete ban on all chemical weapons.

(continued)

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

On 27 August I had the honour to introduce to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on work done during the regular 1987 session (CD/782). Following the submission of that report, the Conference decided that work on the chemical weapons convention should be resumed under my chairmanship, as follows:

"Firstly, in preparation for the resumed session, private consultations should be undertaken in Geneva by the Chairman during the period 23-27 November 1987 with delegations present;

"Secondly, for that purpose, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee should be held between 30 November and 16 December 1987 ... ;

"Thirdly, the Ad hoc Committee should hold a session of limited duration during the period 12-29 January 1988."

Today, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I wish to present the Committee's report to the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the inter-sessional period, as contained in document CD/795, which has just been circulated to delegates. The report was adopted in its entirety by the Committee on 29 January, and thus has been agreed to by all the members of the Ad hoc Committee.

Although the time period set aside for inter-sessional work by the Committee was fairly short, the work proceeded in an intense and concentrated manner, generating substantive and constructive results. These have been registered in the report by an updated version of the draft Convention, the so-called "rolling text" contained in appendix I to the report. Appendix II contains papers reflecting the results of work, which though not yet ready for inclusion in the "rolling text" of the draft Convention, are made available as a basis for further work. This part too has been updated in the light of work done during the inter-sessional period. Furthermore, the report includes an appendix III, reproducing some papers of a technical nature with the aim of facilitating further work on the issue of toxicity determination.

Thus, the report I am introducing now clearly reflects the results of the negotiations so far and the advanced stage in which we now find the draft Convention.

During the inter-sessional period time was devoted to the issue of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons. Agreements reached enabled us to include a whole new section on this question in the annex to article IV, prompting a reorganization of the entire annex. Furthermore, I was able to continue consultations on another major issue contained in that annex, namely the question of the actual order of destruction of chemical weapons. Some further useful steps were taken, with the consequential updating of the relevant part of appendix II. More work is needed on this politically, militarily and technically intricate question before we can

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

register consensus and include the new text in the draft Convention. I have, however, good reason to believe that this will prove possible before too long. This being done, all the major political questions pertaining to existing chemical weapons will be in place.

Continuing negotiations during the inter-sessional period also covered the various issues pertaining to future non-production of chemical weapons, i.e. in particular, article VI and its annexes. The politically, as well as technically, painstaking search for solutions and compromises continued in good spirit. Further progress was registered, resulting in a revision of considerable parts of the annexes relating to article VI of the draft Convention. Furthermore, in appendix II you will find what I believe to be a useful report on how to define "production capacity", which is the result of consultations between technical experts.

The outstanding issues in the area of future non-production of chemical weapons require that delegations devote more time and effort to the questions involved, while keeping in mind the need for a balance between security concerns and other national and international interests. With most of the directly military elements of the Convention in place, the so-called industrial questions now require particular attention.

The same goes for article VIII, dealing with the international organization to be established for the implementation of the Convention. After having been put on the back burner for some time, this issue re-emerged in focus during the inter-sessional period, with detailed work being done on the powers, functions and interrelationship of the various organs of the international organization. The state of affairs has been registered in a new text of article VIII which is included in the "rolling text". More work is needed on the various aspects involved, but judging from past weeks, it now appears that delegations have developed a much clearer perception of what kind of organization they wish to create. This augurs well for the remaining tasks. In this context I also wish to mention that work continued at the expert level on the elaboration of various models for agreements to be entered into with the international organization, concerning activities at specific facilities. Two new such models have been included in appendix II for further consideration by delegations.

Under article IX work continued on the major outstanding question, challenge inspection. Following the major political advances made during the summer, the consultations during the inter-sessional period were aimed at transforming this progress into concrete practical solutions and translating agreements reached into treaty language. Although well under way, this process requires some further compromises before it can be completed, in particular as regards the procedures to be followed after the completion of an on-site inspection on challenge. The present state of affairs, as I see it, is reflected in appendix II.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

During the inter-sessional period work was initiated on two more articles which had not previously been the subject of negotiations. I am referring to article X, on Assistance, and article XI on Economic and Technological Development. The possible contents of these two important articles were intensively discussed and various approaches were suggested. Appendix II of the report contains material that I believe will be useful in the continued search for common ground in these two areas.

The sum total of the work during the resumed session, as well as previous sessions of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, is embodied in the report I am submitting today. It is a document which the Conference can take pride in. The draft Convention contained therein is no small achievement by this multilateral negotiating body. It speaks for itself and states clearly that the full and complete process of negotiations in which we are involved has reached an advanced stage. We have good reason to approach what remains with confidence and optimism.

In this context I wish to thank all delegations for the efforts they have put into the negotiations, and for the spirit of co-operation in which they have worked. A special tribute is due to the three item co-ordinators, Mr. Philippe Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. With unfailing energy and patience they have conducted the work in their respective areas, bringing us tangible and important results.

I would like to express special gratitude to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, for his commendable work for the Committee during the inter-sessional period and indeed during my whole tenure as Chairman. His work has been characterized by a combination of the highest professional skill and good political judgement.

My thanks go also to Ms. Darby and other members of the secretariat for their indispensable and effective support.

The world community expects us to conclude this work urgently and responsibly. During the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the international community adopted for the first time one single consensus resolution (resolution 42/37 A) on the issue of our negotiations on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

In the resolution the General Assembly expresses its conviction

"of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction".

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Furthermore it

"takes note with satisfaction of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and in particular appreciates the progress in the work of its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report", and

"expresses again none the less its regret and concern that notwithstanding the progress made in 1987, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated."

Finally, the General Assembly

"urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1988 session the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session".

I took the liberty of quoting at length because I think this resolution is an expression of a shared sense of urgency created by concern that the risks of chemical warfare are increasing. The international community expects us to live up to the responsibility assumed and to bring the negotiations conscientiously to a successful conclusion without delay.

The consensus resolution is also an expression of universal support for the draft Convention embodied in the "rolling text" and for our remaining work. The complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons is clearly a matter for all States. The truly multilateral character of the future Convention is at the same time the very prerequisite for the prohibition to become comprehensive, complete and effective. The report which I am submitting to the Conference today, on behalf of the entire Committee, goes a long way in achieving just that.

In handing over the task of carrying the work further to the incoming Chairman of the Committee, I wish to pledge to him my full support and that of my delegation.

(Mr. Nazarkin, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

The Soviet delegation intends to put forward our detailed ideas regarding the current session of the Conference at one of our forthcoming meetings. Today we have asked for the floor in order to introduce two documents which we have submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/789 and CD/790. They both deal with an issue that occupies an extremely important place in the work of the Conference, the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

We consider finalizing the chemical weapons convention as an urgent task for the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union is in favour of stepping up the negotiations to the maximum. At the same time, success in moving towards a convention also depends to a great extent on what is being done outside these negotiations, and above all on creating an atmosphere of trust and openness in the field of chemical weapons.

Today the Soviet delegation is introducing as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament a working paper entitled "Information on the presentation at the Shikhany military facility of standard chemical munitions and of technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile unit", which took place on 3 and 4 October last year. The document contains the information which was provided to those who participated in the visit to Shikhany. This document gives a fairly complete picture of our system of chemical weapons and contains information on all the toxic substances and standard chemical munitions that we have.

The other document (CD/790) is the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, published on 26 December last year in connection with the initiation of the production by the United States of a new generation of chemical weapons - binary weapons. I would like to draw your attention to the important fact that in this statement the Soviet Union, acting in a spirit of good will, was the first of the States which possess chemical weapons to declare the size of its chemical weapons stocks, which do not exceed 50,000 tons of CW agents.

We expect that the United States will also declare the size of its chemical weapons stocks in the near future.

In trying to justify the initiation of binary weapon production before world public opinion, United States representatives usually refer to the alleged chemical threat from the Soviet Union. In so doing, they have cited absolutely fantastic "data" on chemical weapons stocks in the USSR, which allegedly enjoys superiority over the United States in this field several times over. We believe that publishing data on the real size of our chemical weapons stocks has revealed how unfounded such "arguments" are.

(continued)

(Mr. Nazarkin, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Making public the size of our chemical weapons stockpile is also a step towards further confidence-building. I would like to emphasize that we have taken this step in spite of the fact that the United States binary programme is quite incompatible with the emerging process of confidence building in the chemical weapons field. Yet we are not slamming the door in response to the beginning of the practical implementation of the programme, and we shall continue to strive for the earliest possible agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

Our attitude is based on the fact that progress achieved recently at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons has brought this objective so much closer that there can be no going back.

Convincing proof of the fairness of this assessment is the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, introduced today by its Chairman, the Ambassador of Sweden, Mr. Ekéus. In this connection, I should like to point out the great personal contribution Ambassador Ekéus has made to the process of widening areas of agreement on the future Convention. The "rolling text" in its present form represents an excellent basis for the very rapid conclusion of work on the Convention. The Soviet delegation considers that it is essential for the work of the ad hoc committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons to resume as soon as possible to avoid any waste of time or loss of momentum in the negotiations, in order to perform an important task: to prepare as rapidly as possible a convention which would completely prohibit one of the types of weapon of mass destruction - chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

The President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, has conveyed a message to the Conference on Disarmament as it begins its 1988 session. I am pleased to read this message:

- "The Conference on Disarmament has an impressive agenda. Of special importance is your effort on a convention banning chemical weapons. Progress has been made in narrowing differences of principle; you now face the arduous task of working out the details and finding solutions on

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

issues which affect vital security interests of all our countries. General Secretary Gorbachev and I have reaffirmed our commitment to negotiations in the CD which would result in a truly effective, verifiable and global ban on these terrible weapons.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

The joint statement also addressed the issue of the chemical weapons negotiations, an issue that is a direct concern and responsibility of this Conference. This issue, important in its own right, assumes added importance in view of the imminence of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Preparatory Committee for which is even now meeting in New York. As we all recognize, later on in the first part of our 1988 session, the Conference will prepare a report for that special session.

Of all the items on our agenda, clearly the item of most importance for that report, and for our work in the coming weeks and months, is chemical weapons.

Our deliberations this week should be opening on a note of bright promise, enthusiasm and hope, reflecting the energy and dedication of the delegates for achieving progress this session. Instead, a pall of negativism and discouragement exists, in our opinion, which does not bode exceptionally well for prospects here. This atmosphere has been created, most sadly and tragically, by a series of events, agitated by the Soviet Union.

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

On 18 July 1985, shortly after the United States Congress funded the United States' chemical weapons modernization programme, the Soviet Union issued a press release designed to "kill" production of binary chemical weapons (CD/615). Using distortions, the statement accused the United States of stalling on chemical weapons negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The United States at that time was forced to use this Conference's valuable time to set the record straight. Subsequently, of course, the unprecedented progress enjoyed in our negotiations, and the role the United States has played in achieving that progress, has further discredited the 1985 Soviet assertions.

During the ensuing months, it became necessary on more than one occasion to take the floor to call upon the Soviet Union and others to moderate their rhetoric and stop misrepresenting the facts and the intentions of other delegations. We have repeatedly pointed out that this counter-productive approach not only wastes valuable negotiating time, but also sours the negotiating atmosphere. We have made clear that we will set the record straight whenever United States policies are misrepresented, but that the Conference on Disarmament would be better served if such misrepresentations were never made.

We thought that perhaps we had put our point across, because everyone seemed to take a relatively constructive approach to negotiations during 1987, enabling us to make unprecedented progress toward a chemical weapons convention.

We were disappointed, therefore, to see that the Soviet Union has once again launched a propaganda campaign against United States CW modernization. Typical of this effort is yet another Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, released by TASS on 26 December 1987, which has been circulated as CD/790.

Predictably, once again we are here to set the record straight, point out what a time-consuming, counter-productive exercise these exchanges are, and suggest that all delegations concentrate on the task at hand. Let us examine some of these Soviet allegations.

In the latest Soviet statement, the United States' CW modernization programme is described as a step toward a new twist in the chemical arms race. Chemical arms race? With whom has the Soviet Union been racing? Not with the United States, which did not produce a single chemical weapon for 18 years. Nor is there any other chemical weapon threat which would warrant accumulation of the large chemical weapons stockpile the Soviet Union has acquired.

The TASS article states that the United States modernization initiative was unprovoked. As we have pointed out many times, modernization was necessary because the adequacy of the United States' chemical deterrent capability had become a matter of grave concern. During the long period after the United States ceased production of chemical weapons, existing stocks deteriorated. Less than a third of the United States' chemical weapons stockpile is now usable, and most of that small portion has only limited military value.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

The Soviet Union, in the mean time, was amassing a formidable chemical warfare capability. The Soviet Union has by far the largest CW stockpile in the world. Further, the Soviet Union has an even greater edge in the number of military personnel, chemical units, decontamination units and training facilities. This Soviet chemical warfare capability is far greater than would be required for solely defensive purposes. It is this threat that prompted the United States to take action.

Throughout the unilateral Soviet build-up, the Soviet Union reacted to inquiries about its possession of chemical weapons either with silence or with denial. On 29 May 1986, the Soviet Union denied that it possessed chemical weapons, then, a few months later, announced it had ceased production of chemical weapons. The Soviet official who publicly proclaimed that the Soviet Union possessed no chemical weapon stocks subsequently had the contradictory assignment of displaying for the delegates of this Conference 19 different types of Soviet chemical weapons at Shikhany. And now we are told that the Soviet Union has as much as 50,000 tons of these chemical weapons they denied possessing only 19 months earlier. The decision to modernize the United States' chemical weapons stockpile was made long before these recent revelations, and that decision was predicated on the CW threat as the United States assessed it. These Soviet revelations buttress the wisdom of that decision, and contribute to our resolve to continue the rehabilitation of our ability to retaliate against a CW attack.

We know the Soviet Union has a decided advantage over the United States in chemical warfare capability, and even if the most optimistic forecasts for completing a chemical weapons convention are borne out, the Soviet Union would continue to enjoy that advantage, in all probability, for the remainder of this century. The United States also shares the concern of others regarding chemical weapons proliferation. We are unwilling to face a growing CW threat with a diminishing retaliatory capability.

The Soviet Union also knows that the binary programme does not mark the expansion of the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. By the very terms of the legislation authorizing the binary programme, and as certified by the President, every binary chemical weapon produced must be offset by the destruction of a serviceable unitary artillery shell from the existing arsenal. The number of munitions destroyed pursuant to this destruction plan, which, I repeat, is mandated by law, will be several times the number of binary munitions to be produced. Ultimately, all unitary munitions will be destroyed. This destruction plan is ready now to be implemented.

It is also significant that the United States has been completely candid about this modernization programme, and no one who has read the ample public reports and followed the legislative process of this programme could seriously believe that the United States intends to maintain anything more than a small, safe, modernized CW retaliatory capability.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

We believe the binary programme increases the likelihood of a chemical weapons convention. Modernization of the United States deterrent diminishes the value of the Soviet chemical weapons arsenal by making its use less attractive, which, in turn, makes it more likely that the Soviet Union will be willing to give it up. This small United States retaliatory capability provides leverage at the negotiating table. Anyone who questions this should remember that it was only after the Congress funded the binary programme that the Soviet Union began to permit these negotiations to move forward.

Which brings us to another distortion by the Soviet Union: the assertion that the United States is impeding the chemical weapons negotiations, while the Soviet Union is doing all that it can to complete the convention. Negotiators who have participated in these talks over the years know better. Those who have not followed CW negotiations closely need only compare the United States draft convention (CD/500) with the "rolling text", and read our various papers, to see that it is the United States that has made significant contributions to the present text. On the other hand, a review of the Ad hoc Committee's annual reports reveals that the Soviet Union did not produce a single CD document directly contributing to treaty text during the almost four years that have passed since CD/500 was introduced. Indeed, the Soviet Union, individually, has produced only three CW documents at all. One, of course, is the recently submitted information on the Shikhany visit found in CD/789. This is a welcome confidence-building measure, to be sure, but it does not suggest a single word of "rolling text". The other two Soviet documents are the two propagandistic attacks on binaries. That is the extent of Soviet CW documents tabled since the United States presented CD/500 almost four years ago.

Paradoxically, the major contribution of the Soviet Union to the chemical weapons negotiations is that they recently quit saying no to some of the substantive proposals of others. This is a welcome development, and we encourage it. It is more productive than assaults on the integrity and intentions of other delegations.

Such simplistic and inflammatory arguments as we find in CD/790 will neither curtail United States chemical weapons modernization nor lead us closer to our goal of a chemical-weapon-free world. The crux of the matter is that there is no inconsistency in seeking the ultimate elimination of all chemical weapons while, in the interim, insisting upon the preservation of national security. That is what the United States is doing.

Our delegation acknowledges the pace of negotiations has slowed during the past few months. When the Soviet Union accepted the United States proposal for mandatory challenge inspection, many delegations perceived, for the first time, that a chemical weapons convention was indeed possible. In this light, States that formerly played a less active role in the negotiations are now enunciating national positions and expressing reservations and concerns. We do not have more unresolved issues, we are simply discovering what some of the divergencies are. The natural consequence is more discord and less agreed text. But this is a phase of the negotiations that has always been inevitable, and the fact that we have reached that point when we are candidly debating the hard issues is, to our delegation, a sign of progress.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

It is understandable that some become frustrated and impatient for more tangible results. But, as our delegation has cautioned before, and as recent sessions confirm, we have many serious issues yet to be resolved - issues such as whether challenge inspection should involve a right of refusal; how to verify the accuracy of declarations; how to monitor the chemical industry so as to ensure non-production; what to do about old stocks; which chemicals need to go on the various lists; the organizational structure and the mechanics for administering a convention; allocation of costs; economic development and technical assistance; the protection of confidential information; security during the destruction phase; prior multilateral data exchange; and what production will be permitted where. No single State, or even group of States, is blocking progress on any of these issues. The fact is that we cannot expect consensus on these issues until national views are formulated and enunciated, and until differences are resolved through serious debate. This will take considerable time, as anyone determined about these negotiations knows. For this reason, it is not only unrealistic but unproductive to speculate that a convention can be completed before the third special session or by some specified, artificial deadline. Experience shows that such reckless assertions merely engender disappointment and an illusion of failure when the optimistic speculation proves to be wrong.

It is this same consideration that militates against any change in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at this time. A review of the unresolved issues confronting the Committee must lead to the conclusion that we have not reached the stage of final drafting, yet the suggested changes to the mandate would create a different impression. It is better to avoid creating unreasonable expectations. The present mandate in no manner inhibits, obstructs or impedes the work of the Ad hoc Committee, and it can easily be changed when change is appropriate.

The United States delegation will continue to be active in all our deliberations because we remain committed to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons encompassing all chemical-weapons-capable States.

Until we can achieve that goal, however, the United States will maintain a small, modernized CW retaliatory capability as a necessary deterrent against the threat of chemical attack.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

I wish to join others who have paid respect to the late Ambassador Ian Cromatie. As a predecessor of the current Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, Rolf Ekéus, Ian Cromatie had a major influence on the negotiations. His personal qualities - his dedication to the work, his feeling for fair play, his good humour - have been adequately described by others, and I can only echo Ambassador Solesby's words concerning how much we would have liked him to witness the successful outcome of the negotiations.

I welcome colleagues who have recently joined the Conference. We look forward to close co-operation with them.

The reason I have taken the floor at this moment is that I wish to thank Ambassador Ekéus and the Swedish delegation for the excellent way in which, in a crucial period, the work on CW has been conducted and stimulated.

We are extremely grateful to Ambassador Ekéus and his staff for the work they have undertaken, for leading us to the point where we now stand. We often praise one another here in this room, and that makes it more difficult to differentiate in our laudatory comments. But I think we all agree that what Rolf Ekéus and his staff have done has been exemplary. We also wish to thank Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Krutzsch for the good, solid and important work they have done as item co-ordinators in their respective areas.

This morning Ambassador Ekéus has given an interesting overview and evaluation of the situation. It is now up to us members of the Conference to use the building-blocks that have been prepared to continue on the road leading to our common goal, a comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from the Russian): I would not like to begin with polemics on the first day of the work of the session of the Conference on Disarmament this year, and I shall try not to do so. I am obliged to take the floor because the statement by the Ambassador of the United States, Ambassador M. Friedersdorf, contained several inaccuracies, to put it mildly.

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(Mr. Nazarkin, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

He asserted that the Soviet Union until recently denied that it possessed any chemical weapons. That is an incorrect assertion. Until last year official Soviet representatives neither asserted nor denied that we have chemical weapons. This is not a new formula. The United States, for example, uses this formula with regard to the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships. This is the first inaccuracy which the Ambassador of the United States permitted himself.

The Ambassador of the United States also stated that the Soviet Union has the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world. We have declared the size of our stockpile. Certainly, if the United States representative really wished to compare Soviet and United States stockpile, it would be logical to cite data on the size of the United States stockpile. As long as that has not been done, we consider statements that the Soviet Union has the largest stockpile to be unfounded.

I intentionally did not raise the question of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at this meeting because this issue remains the subject of consultations between delegations. But as the representative of the United States has raised the issue, I will also briefly set out our approach to the future mandate of the Ad hoc Committee.

The United States insists on keeping last year's mandate, which contains a restrictive condition - it does not allow for the Ad hoc Committee to complete its work on the Convention. Quite frankly we fail to understand why it is necessary to keep this restrictive provision in the mandate, bearing in mind the progress that has been made in the negotiations.

The United States said merely that in the course of this session, if the need arises, the Conference could amend the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee by removing the restrictive provision. But the point is - why waste time on procedural discussions in the course of the session if this issue can be settled now? Naturally, in deleting this restrictive provision the participants in the negotiations are in no way obligated to embark immediately on the final drafting of the text. When the need arises in the course of the session, the Ad hoc Committee will be free to get down to drafting the text of the draft Convention. In any event there is a need to delete a provision whose sole function is to hinder the completion of work on the Convention this year. The Soviet delegation considers that it would be desirable to delete this restrictive provision from the mandate at the present stage, so as not to waste time on reviewing the mandate.

My last point concerns the initiation of binary weapon production in the United States. At a time when real prospects have emerged for the conclusion of the Convention this step by the United States is in our view nothing other than an attempt to torpedo the process of chemical disarmament, a manifestation of lack of respect for the efforts of States participating in the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of this type of weapon of mass destruction, and for the repeated calls of the General Assembly of the United Nations to step up these negotiations. This was the assessment given by the Foreign Ministry of the USSR in its statement of 26 December 1987.

(Mr. Kusuma-Atmadja, Indonesia)

As testimony to our political will and commitment to ban chemical weapons, which are second only to nuclear weapons in their lethal power, Indonesia acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without reservations as early as 1971. Remnants of old chemical weapons found subsequently in Indonesia were those left behind by the Dutch army during the Second World War, and these were destroyed with the exemplary co-operation of the Government of the Netherlands in 1979.

It is therefore natural that Indonesia, as a country which has never possessed chemical weapons, seeks the early finalization of the ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Such an accord should not only ban these weapons but also provide for a sound verification régime, including provisions for a fact-finding mission to be sent upon request to a site where serious non-compliance is suspected. Furthermore, the Convention must uphold the principle of equality of nations. In this respect it should ensure that all States parties have equal rights and obligations in overseeing its proper implementation. For this purpose we should establish a General Conference or Consultative Committee whose decisions will be upheld by States parties and the organs of the Convention. Finally, while preventing the future production of chemical weapons, we should also ensure that the Convention will not unduly interfere with the activities of States in the field of chemical industries for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, it should in our view promote and foster international co-operation in the advancement of these industries for the benefit of all countries.

I am pleased to observe that the negotiations are moving encouragingly towards these goals. At this juncture, I would like to extend our deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, and his assistants Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium and Mr. Macedo of Mexico, as well as the members of the Committee.

(Mr. Varkonyi, Hungary)

In recent years the question of prohibiting chemical weapons has rightly commanded the attention of the participants in the Conference on Disarmament. To the satisfaction of all of us, the elaboration of the draft agreement has been progressing markedly. Nevertheless, I now feel obliged to voice concern, as the latest round of talks and events outside their framework fail to hold out much promise for early conclusion of the agreement.

Hungary continues to stand for complete prohibition under strict verification and control, and for the complete destruction of stockpiles. It is regrettable that the compromise proposals which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries put forward last year have not yet produced the rightly expected results.

I wish to pay tribute to the Soviet Government for having opened last year the chemical weapons facility at Shikhandy to the delegations participating in the talks and to the international press, as well as having published data on Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons. Such moves make a significant contribution to strengthening mutual confidence and improving the atmosphere of negotiations.

However, the success of talks is by no means promoted by proposals to maintain rather than destroy the existing stockpiles, or even likely to result in their increase. The chances of agreement are impaired by the decision to start the production of binary chemical weapons in the United States. Such unfavourable developments are warnings that the Conference on Disarmament should redouble efforts for the speedy elaboration of the agreement.

Speaking on this point I should like to confirm that the Hungarian People's Republic has no stockpile of chemical weapons or industrial establishments manufacturing such weapons. It does not carry out any sort of research on chemical weapons, nor does it intend to possess such weapons in the future. Furthermore, I can reaffirm that no other country stores any kind of chemical weapons or carries out any kind of related activity in the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic.

We believe that openness regarding the possession or non-possession of stockpiles of different weapons serves to contribute to the strengthening of confidence. It would therefore be welcome if other countries did not keep the international community in a state of uncertainty. In the spirit of the draft agreement being elaborated, I can now inform this Conference that of the key precursors of chemical weapons, the following two are produced for civilian use in Hungary: chemicals containing a P-methyl and/or P-ethyl bond, at one plant, and methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid, at three plants. All of these products are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Italy intends to work for peace and disarmament, at a time which it considers to be important for the future of mankind. We deem that, at this stage, we must specially intensify our efforts where our contribution can be more direct and immediate. I refer to those multilateral negotiations dealing with issues of primary importance for international stability: the negotiations on conventional forces, and on the global elimination of chemical weapons.

We have, therefore, come here to express our hope and to urge that the result attained on 8 December by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on intermediate nuclear missiles can also be achieved in the field of chemical weapons: the global elimination of an entire class of armaments. The Washington Treaty - and it is worth while stressing it once again - is of a significance which goes far beyond the number of weapons destroyed. It marks the reversal of a trend, signalling as it does not the mere cessation of the endless growth of highly destructive weapons - which throughout the last four decades appeared to be almost inevitable - but a significant reduction in the number of offensive systems threatening Europe. For the first time balance has been restored at a lower level and not, according to the easier ways of the past, at a higher one.

This development is of enormous political significance and importance. In fact, from a general viewpoint, new trends seem to be emerging in the context of East-West relations - with possible positive repercussions on the continuation of the disarmament process. From what I would term a more technical viewpoint, the Treaty can serve as a model for ongoing or forthcoming negotiations in other disarmament fields, within a bilateral context as well as a multilateral one.

Allow me, at this juncture, to make a special reference to three concepts which I would consider to be part and parcel of the East-West dialogue on arms reductions, and which may be also extended to the field of chemical weapons:

Asymmetry in reductions, all the more important in the case of chemical weapons, as the initial composition of each party's arsenals - however assessed - seems to us anything but identical,

(continued)

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

The globality of their destruction, as in the case of INFs, shunning the illusion of partial balances, all the more if we consider the possibility for these weapons to be quickly transferred from one location to another,

Lastly, verifiability, which must be all the more rigorous and strict, the more closely related their components are to the industrial production process - as is the case for chemical weapons.

We are all aware - especially as Members of this Organization - of the need to sustain the present fast pace of the negotiating process through rapid and tangible results. The two major Powers have imparted greater speed to their bilateral dialogue, in line with the timetable they have drawn up for themselves, starting with the Moscow summit, which should take place within the first six months of 1988.

The INF Treaty, in fact, constitutes only a first step, which must be followed by others, entailing the drastic reduction of strategic armaments, the elimination of chemical weapons, and the re-establishment of the conventional equilibrium at lower levels. The conclusion of the Washington Treaty, to which the Europeans have made a fundamental contribution, must therefore be considered as a first move - and it is thus considered by Italy and Western Europe - in a long process aimed at achieving a more stable and transparent military balance. We certainly recognize the difficulties of this process, and are aware of the logical connections between its phases, though these should not be seen as the motive for insisting on a rigid time sequence. It should be clear to all, however, that negotiations should aim at establishing enhanced security, which is not merely the other party's insecurity. My presence here today, together with the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, is intended to bear witness to the firm political commitment which Italy strongly feels and wishes to fulfil vis-à-vis the entire international community for the attainment of this goal.

In the conventional field, Italy is participating in Vienna - together with the 22 other countries whose forces have an immediate bearing upon the military balance in Europe - in informal talks aimed at starting a new negotiation on conventional stability, at lower levels, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The disparities and asymmetries existing in the field of conventional forces indeed constitute a traditional source of tension and of serious distress in our continent. It is therefore necessary to redress them, and, as an urgent priority, capabilities to launch surprise attacks and to initiate large-scale military operations should be eliminated, so that we may concretely and effectively promote conditions of increased security, and of improved mutual confidence.

Chemical weapons increase general insecurity. Historically, they were the first arms which Europe's conscience rejected, considering them to be incompatible with the degree of development reached by our societies. This was done at a time when antagonisms were at a peak. Concerns on chemical

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

weapons gave the lead to the first serious thoughts on multilateral arms control, even though in 1932 the impossibility of agreeing upon appropriate verification methods prevented an attempt at banning their production. In the context of East-West relations, these weapons increase existing asymmetries, and render uncertain the nature of the response they might provoke, thus inter alia increasing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.

In the case of regional conflicts, chemical weapons represent a constant temptation to escalate hostilities to levels which would justify the greatest alarm on the part of the international community. Their possession presupposes simple technology, not unlimited resources, and even a superficial training. Their components are internationally tradable, while nuclear arms are subject to extremely severe controls. The possible proliferation of chemical weapons poses a grave threat to mankind.

In recent years, regional conflicts have shown to us some of the devastating effects of chemical weapons. In Italy, we had direct evidence thereof when providing treatment to some victims of the Iran-Iraq conflict. On the basis of the conclusions reached by United Nations experts, the Italian Government has already expressed its strong condemnation of the repeated use of chemical weapons, especially against civilian populations. I personally have had the opportunity, in the past, to express my concern on the matter to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is why I would like to restate once again, in this forum, the importance of safeguarding and strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and to reiterate a strong appeal to all countries to refrain from the use of these means of mass destruction, in whatever context, and above all against unarmed populations.

For many years, Italy has had no chemical weapons, nor does it station them on its territory. It further believes that conditions should be created, as soon as possible, for the generalized and genuine renunciation of such weapons - or, even better, their rejection by all States.

After the traumatic experiences of the First World War, the Geneva Protocol was the first tangible expression of the conscious acknowledgement of the horror caused by chemical weapons. This Protocol, however, has not always proven to be sufficiently effective, hence the need for urgent steps towards the total banning of such weapons.

What I have been saying constitutes the rationale for the Italian Government's special activism in this field, starting with our February 1979 proposal concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the thorough examination of a set of still unresolved problems - such as the purpose of the Convention, the destruction of arsenals, and the formulation of an international system of verification.

Our participation has always been guided by the hope and conviction that, step by step, we would come closer to achieving the final goal - as, indeed, has happened - of a convention envisaging the total prohibition of the production of new chemical weapons, anywhere and forever, as well as the complete destruction of existing arsenals, within well-defined time-limits.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Today, this goal is within our reach. Although it is difficult to foresee any deadline for the conclusion of negotiations dealing with this complex matter, and although it would be inappropriate to sacrifice the goal of arriving at a truly effective and verifiable convention for the sake of saving time, I none the less believe it necessary to impart a decisive impulse to the negotiations. This can be done by availing ourselves of the important conceptual rapprochements which have recently occurred, and of the favourable international circumstances I mentioned earlier.

The remaining obstacles are mainly connected with the problem of verification, since - in this field more than in any other - only an effective system of controls can give all the signatory countries the certainty that the Convention will truly be implemented, with the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring general compliance. With respect to the ban on chemical weapons, we are convinced that this verification system should provide for:

Verification of the accuracy of the initial declarations;

Verification of arsenals, from the moment of the initial declarations to their destruction, and during transportation to the destruction sites;

The means to ascertain the destruction of existing arsenals and production plants;

The means to ensure that banned chemical warfare agents are no longer produced, either at old plants or at new ones, and that other chemical compounds which might constitute a risk according to the Convention are adequately controlled;

All evidence that member States do not obtain chemical warfare agents from external sources;

The prompt detection of any possible suspect activities.

Since verification poses great technical problems, whose solution entails the involvement of scientists, I would suggest that they be asked to contribute - perhaps through a forum open to top specialists from all countries.

This meeting could be held in Rome or in Erice, in the same spirit as the meeting on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy we organized at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the autumn of 1986.

The further obstacles which still hinder the conclusion of the Convention are for the most part of a technical nature, although one cannot neglect their underlying political implications. I will mention only three of them.

In my view, the time has come to take up again a matter which has recently - and perhaps wrongly - been set aside: I refer to the matter of definitions (article 11 of the Convention). This is clearly a central issue

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

whose consequences have a direct impact on the entire subject-matter of the Convention. As of now, we favour the setting up of groups of experts, limited in their composition, for the thorough examination of this issue within a time-limit to be agreed upon.

The destruction of existing arsenals, too, presents problems to be solved in a reasonably short time. The clear political will of all the participants in the negotiation to provide for the global elimination of arsenals in a 10-year time span must now be translated into the establishment of detailed procedures and modalities. We also believe that all production must completely stop upon the conclusion of the Convention. On this point, a greater negotiating flexibility - always taking into account the legitimate security requirements of all - might allow us to overcome the existing obstacles on the basis of solutions envisaging a quicker rate of reduction for the larger arsenals.

In the third place, if we really want to enhance the credibility of the Convention, then we must see to it that - through a mechanism of rigorous verification - no diversion of commercial products towards possible military uses can occur. This question, which pertains to the field of verification, must be addressed and solved comprehensively.

I believe that these measures, of a general and not discriminatory nature, should not raise excessive preoccupations for the industries of the most advanced countries. On the contrary, the higher the level of industrial development of a country, the greater its responsibilities and moral commitment to avoid the incorrect use, domestically or externally, of its industrial capabilities.

I note with satisfaction that on the question of challenge inspections it has recently proved possible to achieve a considerable rapprochement between diverse positions, including those of the United States and the USSR. I therefore suggest that every possible effort be made so that the convergence which has been taking shape is extended and translated in timely fashion into the formulation of a text capable of securing general consensus.

Lastly, as regards the institutional and organizational structures which will be entrusted with the implementation of the Convention, Italy considers that they should first satisfy the criterion of effectiveness, and of adequate and equitable representation of all States.

If we do not wish to waste what we have achieved over the years, the time has now come to make a conclusive effort, which Hans-Dietrich Genscher and I myself, together with other colleagues, have come here to urge, also through a possible acceleration of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. Some have proposed reducing the intervals between sessions, others have suggested a permanent session. I would like to propose reviving the institution of the "Friends of the President", each of whom might be given a specific task. Or we might decide to set up as many working groups as there are articles in the Convention. At this point, a limited group might even be given the task of expeditiously formulating proposals on ways and means of productively

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

accelerating the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee. I do not think there should be any opposition in principle to this proposal, also considering that - it would seem to me - the groundwork exists for reaching a solution to the satisfaction of all.

The Italian Government is firmly convinced that, within the framework of global and stable arms reductions, the elimination of chemical weapons is a priority.

However, we are certainly aware that the task of the Conference on Disarmament is not to deal only with chemical weapons to the exclusion of other problems. It is called upon to thoroughly examine numerous other important issues linked to arms control. We would like to see the negotiating dynamics which we note elsewhere applied to their solution too.

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(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The early conclusion of a convention for the global prohibition of chemical weapons continues to be a matter of high priority, in our view. In reality, they are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature.

(continued)

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

These devices must be destroyed. It is a gruesome coincidence that some of the most terrible nerve gases were discovered by chance during research into insecticides.

Chemical weapons are not regarded as a deterrent in the war prevention strategy of the Western Alliance. As stated in the Federal Defence Ministry's White Paper of 1983, NATO relies mainly on conventional and nuclear forces even as a deterrent against the use of chemical weapons by the Warsaw Pact. Only a limited amount of chemical warfare agents is thus kept ready for retaliation in the event of a chemical attack. Since chemical weapons do not therefore perform any function in the North Atlantic Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, there will be no need to possess them when the stocks of all other countries have been destroyed under a chemical weapons convention.

The Federal Republic of Germany does not possess any chemical weapons, and gave a solemn pledge in 1954 not to produce any. My country also unconditionally recognizes the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Even in peacetime, chemical weapons pose a considerable risk. A chemical weapons convention must curb the alarming proliferation of these weapons. It must counter the danger of chemical weapons becoming "cheap weapons of destruction" in third world trouble-spots. The suffering of the victims of chemical warfare brings home to us the urgent need for action. We followed very closely the remarks by non-aligned representatives at the recent Pugwash Conference to the effect that the third world in particular considers itself exposed to the danger of the use of chemical weapons and is thus interested in a global convention prohibiting such weapons. This bears out our view that regional solutions are not desirable. It also confirms our conviction that most countries will accede to the convention from the start. Our common task will be to urge all States to accede to the convention as soon as it has been concluded.

Chemical weapons must not have a future. This basic consensus of the Geneva Convention on Disarmament must not be called into question. My Government welcomes the fact that the declaration issued at the Washington summit on 10 December 1987 reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards the conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention on chemical weapons. In the summit declaration of 21 November 1985 too, the two sides agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. Now is the time for a practicable consensual solution on the basis of the thorough preparations by this Conference thus far, and not for introducing new concepts.

The Conference has before it a draft convention which, thanks to the energetic efforts of the delegations, already contains formulations on large parts of the subject-matter to be covered by the Convention. On virtually all problems, carefully considered proposals have been presented in the form of working papers drawn up by delegations and by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee and its Working Groups. We knew from the beginning that verification issues would cause the greatest difficulties. This is not a new problem. The right solution to this problem would not be to dispense with a

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

chemical weapons convention, but to seek stringent verification arrangements which effectively preclude the creation and possession of a militarily relevant chemical weapons potential. At no stage over the years have we doubted that effective verification mechanisms can be developed through joint efforts. Moreover, the effectiveness of the agreed verification measures can be examined during the 10-year destruction phase and improved if necessary. In the light of the results achieved at this Conference to date, we are confident that such a verification system can be attained soon. The conditions for this have improved.

On the difficult issues of challenge inspections and the so-called control of non-production, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has made palpable progress in recent months. At this point I should like to thank Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, who in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has greatly helped to advance the negotiations by dint of his excellent direction of them.

The greatest advances have been made in the area of challenge inspections. The Soviet Union's readiness to accept in the context of arms control and disarmament the mandatory on-site inspections proposed by the West has had a positive impact in this respect. An important development was the announcement here by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in August 1987 that the Soviet Union consents to mandatory challenge inspections - in other words, international on-site inspections at short notice, whenever and wherever requested by another participating State. This must now be translated into concrete textual proposals. All countries are now called upon to reach agreement on a suitable section of the Convention, thus filling a sizeable gap in the current draft.

In the field of verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, the verification regulations for the chemical industry have been largely elaborated. As a result of the listing of chemical substances, a satisfactory system for monitoring non-production is available and can be adapted to the latest developments at any time by modifying the lists.

The Federal Republic of Germany has in the past contributed to the development of effective non-production controls and will continue to do so. In our working paper of March 1987, we suggested arrangements for the exchange of data between national authorities and the international organization to be set up under the Convention. In January of this year, our delegation presented ideas concerning the registration of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for civilian purposes and concerning extended controls throughout the chemical industry in the form of ad hoc checks. We feel that with these proposals further gaps in the verification régime can be plugged, and that the fears voiced by numerous countries can be dispelled. My Government has the full support of our domestic chemical industry for these proposals.

Important work has also been done in determining the nature of the international organization to be set up under the Convention. Our aim must be

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

to establish a fully functional organization which can reliably monitor the comprehensive implementation of the ban on chemical weapons. We consider the financial questions arising in this connection to be solvable.

Apart from progress in the subject-matter itself, it is pleasing to note that there have been accompanying confidence-building measures which have had a positive impact on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Following the initial steps by the West, i.e. the United States declaration of details of its chemical weapon stocks in the summer of 1986, the Soviet Union presented to the members of this Conference examples of Soviet chemical weapons at its chemical weapons facility in Shikhan'y in October 1987. A Soviet delegation was able to inspect the chemical weapon destruction facility at Tooele in the United States. As early as 1984, we demonstrated to Soviet experts our facility in Munster for destroying any old stocks of chemical weapons discovered.

It is also encouraging to note that the United States is willing to exchange data on existing quantities with the Soviet Union even before the completion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. In December 1987, the Soviet Union declared that the stocks of chemical weapons on its territory do not exceed 50,000 tons of warfare agents. This step should be welcomed. However, this again gives rise to the need to clarify the large discrepancies between Western estimates and Soviet figures. The verifiable disclosure of data would therefore be another step towards dispelling distrust. It could simultaneously counter the fear expressed with regard to maintaining security on account of the different sizes of the chemical weapons stocks existing at the start of the 10-year destruction phase. In order to take account of the disparities in the chemical weapon arsenals of participating States, those countries with the largest stocks could first destroy some of their chemical weapons until an agreed level is reached. Only then would linear destruction by all countries possessing chemical weapons be commenced. At the same time as the Convention comes into effect, a ban on production that is subject to verification procedures would come into force. Energetic efforts should now be made to advance the negotiations so that a convention on the global, comprehensive and dependably verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is reached as quickly as possible.

The political momentum in the negotiations must be maintained in order that the basic consensus of the Geneva Disarmament Conference is not called into question.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 438th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

••• As announced at our 436th plenary meeting, today I will put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and for decision the questions of the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the appointment of its Chairman. We shall also have to consider a number of requests for participation from non-members. Accordingly, after the list of speakers has been exhausted, we shall hold an informal meeting to examine these questions before decisions on them are taken at the resumed plenary meeting.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

In saying this, I do not wish to downplay the importance of the notable progress achieved in the Conference towards a convention banning chemical weapons. There exist, in our view, all the necessary conditions for the Conference to make appropriate efforts with a view to successful completion of the negotiations in the foreseeable future. The sooner the better. The conclusion of the chemical weapons convention would not only free the world of this barbarous weapon, but could in many respects offer a model for future treaties.

The developments which I have mentioned earlier, resulting in an unprecedented intensification of dialogue both in dimension and in depth, should not obscure the complex reality confronting us. In parallel with the improvement of the political relationship between East and West - in which a comprehensive approach to disarmament holds a prominent place - there are tendencies and attitudes trying to impose old solutions to security problems. The growing awareness of the common dangers has not, unfortunately, brought about substantial change in the system of international relations. This parallelism of positive and negative trends will no doubt last for some time to come. The forthcoming broad international activity is gaining in importance, in order to make this positive development of the relations between East and West irreversible, to extend it to all regions of the world and to bring about solutions of major global problems facing mankind.

(continued)

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is expected to provide a new impetus to the world community to direct international activities towards broadening and expanding the international consensus, strengthening the ties of common interest and promoting comprehensive international co-operation. While not losing from sight the ultimate goal as defined in the Final Document of SSOD-I, SSOD-III should, in our view, be forward-looking and take into account all existing realities of our world. It should chart the course of further action in identifying achievable pragmatic measures in respect of questions where progress is possible and where immediate international action should be successful. Thus SSOD-III would contribute to better understanding of the present stage of development and to the promotion and expansion of existing dialogue. Such an approach would permit success for SSOD-III in searching for the common concepts of disarmament and in mobilizing public opinion.

Therefore, we should all strive to ensure that our Conference, even in this short period ahead of the special session, adequately contributes to successful deliberations at SSOD-III.

The best thing to do would be to complete as far as possible the final draft of the chemical weapons convention. No doubt there is a lot of work to be done towards that end, but negotiations should be intensified and all acts and actions likely to deepen mistrust and jeopardize the achieved level of agreement should be avoided.

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(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

Within the framework of the security policies of the two super-Powers, the communiqué deals with the first three items on nuclear disarmament in the agenda of the Conference, together with the fifth item of the agenda, namely prevention of an arms race in outer space. The joint statement also makes specific reference to the negotiations under way on chemical weapons, thus covering the fourth item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, that is to say the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Finally, the statement includes some ideas on the negotiations on conventional weapons, and in subsequent sections refers to the two leaders' analysis of human rights questions, regional problems and bilateral issues.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Today the Conference on Disarmament is accepting from its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the report of the work carried out in the inter-sessional meetings of the Committee (CD/795). The United States delegation is pleased to join in the adoption of this report, which represents a further step forward in the efforts of this Conference to negotiate a chemical weapons convention.

Our delegation would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Chairman of the chemical weapons Committee for the 1987 session, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, one of the most able and experienced diplomats at this Conference. He and his talented staff have worked diligently to advance the work of the Committee, and we are deeply appreciative of their efforts. Likewise, we extend our thanks to the Cluster Co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Macedo of Mexico, and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, for their notable contributions to the work of the Committee. The latest report of the Committee fairly represents the fruits of their labours, and gives us a good basis to resume our work during the 1988 session of the Conference.

The United States has called several times upon its negotiating partners to declare whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, and for those who have acknowledged possession to provide further information on their chemical weapons capabilities. The United States provided descriptive information on the locations and agents in its chemical weapons stockpile in 1986. If other States also provide such information, this will be helpful in developing realistic verification machinery and cost estimates. Similar information will be necessary for the chemical industry as well.

It is a positive step that others have come to recognize the value of such disclosures. In this regard, I would like to compliment the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Indonesia and Hungary for their explicit statements, made at the plenary session on 4 February that they do not possess chemical weapons. I would compliment Hungary as well for providing additional information on its commercial production of relevant chemicals.

One of the complicated issues needing further work this session is development of an effective monitoring régime for the chemical industry that will provide confidence that chemical activities not prohibited by the Convention are not used for production of chemical weapons. Article VI of the draft Convention contains monitoring régimes for three categories of chemicals that are deemed to pose a special risk to the objectives of the Convention. The three categories of chemicals represent different levels of military significance and therefore different levels of risk. The stringency of the verification régime associated with each category should be proportionate to the risk posed by the chemicals in that category.

Delegations have generally agreed that, below some minimum level, or "threshold", the production, processing or consumption of a chemical will pose no significant risk to the Convention's objectives. Logically, the threshold level will depend on the amount of the chemical that would be militarily significant. Thus, for example, the threshold should be lower for schedule [1] than for schedule [2].

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

While the concept of thresholds is generally accepted, several different approaches have been put forward to define the relevant thresholds of production of chemicals. These include those of the Netherlands, Brazil, and the German Democratic Republic.

In our continuing efforts to promote progress in our negotiations, and assist work on this issue, today I would like to introduce a suggested approach to the establishment of thresholds for monitoring chemical activities not prohibited by a convention. This approach is contained in a working paper, which bears the designation CD/802 and CD/CW/WP.186.

In contrast to the other approaches, in the United States proposal the thresholds do not vary from chemical to chemical within a particular list. Rather, one threshold quantity is suggested for each of these schedules of chemicals.

As the terms of the Convention are worked out, and especially as a need arises to add to or delete chemicals from the lists, the threshold quantities may change to reflect as yet unrecognized factors. Thus our suggested thresholds and monitoring régimes governing the production of the relevant chemicals should be considered illustrative and not absolute at this point.

Our delegation is hopeful that our working paper will serve to help further our work on this important issue, and thus move us closer to our goal of an effective, verifiable chemical weapons ban participated in by all chemical-weapons-capable States.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): I am taking the floor in my capacity as co-ordinator of a group of socialist delegations to make a statement concerning the discussion on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

I wish to express the satisfaction of the group at the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 12-29 January 1988, as contained in document CD/795.

This report, together with its substantive annexes, convincingly demonstrates the usefulness and fruitfulness of the difficult, complex but promising work we have done under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden. His personal values and devotion, patience and diplomatic skill cannot be overestimated in assessing the considerable work done and the results achieved during the entire past year's efforts of the Ad hoc Committee.

May I also extend our gratitude to the Cluster Co-ordinators, Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Philippe Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, for their unflinching efforts which greatly contributed to the results reflected in the report.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

I would also express our thanks to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Secretary of the Committee, to Miss Darby and to the staff of the secretariat, as well as to the interpreters for their untiring work.

The report of the Ad hoc Committee introduced on 2 February 1988 by Ambassador Ekéus duly reflects the advanced stage of negotiations on a CW convention. There are important results in a large number of areas, such as verification of the destruction of stockpiles, the order of destruction, and issues connected with the non-production of chemical weapons, including questions relating to the chemical industry. Some more detailed work is still required to arrive at results which could be incorporated in the appropriate parts of the draft convention.

Substantive and encouraging discussions have been going on concerning the international organization to be established for the implementation of the convention, including the powers, functions and interrelationship of the various organs of the organization. We welcome the fact that the state of affairs in this field has been registered in a new text of the relevant article in the "rolling text". Proposals of major importance have been submitted by the delegation of the USSR during the past year concerning challenge inspection. Active work has been pursued to translate these proposals into treaty language. We welcome the fact that such important issues as articles X and XI have been discussed for the first time, and will hopefully be further negotiated along with other priority issues.

I wish to assure the Conference that the Group I represent will continue to search actively for final solutions to all unresolved questions, and we call upon all States participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to join us in a common and hopefully final effort to achieve the result the international community has so much and so long awaited from all of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any member wish to take the floor? That is not the case.

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I intend to suspend the meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with the question of the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the appointment of its Chairman, as well as requests for participation from non-members.

The meeting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 11.20 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 438th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The Conference now has to deal with the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/795. May I now put that report for adoption by the plenary? If I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As a result of the informal meeting that we have just held, I intend now to put before the Conference for decision a number of working papers which were circulated today by the secretariat.

Let us now turn to document CD/WP.307, entitled "Draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons". If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided. 1/

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, we have just witnessed the fact that, following appropriate consultations, you have succeeded in working out a proposal for the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which enjoys the support of all the delegations in the CD. Speaking on behalf of a group of delegations from socialist countries, I would like to thank you for your prompt action and congratulate you on the efficiency of your efforts.

One may recall, however, that different positions were held as to the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Delegations of the group on behalf of which I am speaking would have preferred an improved mandate for the Committee. We can observe an increasing political commitment to speeding up the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, shared by the great majority of delegations. Our group is reluctant to see anything in the mandate prejudging the outcome of the negotiations or imposing unwarranted limitations when such negotiations take their natural course. The least we should have done is to delete the phrase "except for its final drafting" from the mandate.

At the same time, our group is eager to resume substantive work as quickly as possible and to avoid any delay in the work of the Committee. That is why our group - seeing the resistance of some delegations to any change in the mandate - decided to go along with the mandate you have proposed, on the understanding that the improvement of the mandate will be considered later as appropriate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. Is there any other delegation which wishes to take the floor at this stage? I do not see any.

In connection with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I should like to state that, during informal consultations, consensus has emerged on the appointment of Ambassador Boqumil Sujka of Poland as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. Accordingly, I now put before the Conference the appointment of Ambassador Sujka as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Group of 21, of which I am currently the co-ordinator, I should first of all like to thank Ambassadeur Ekéus for the important work he accomplished as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We should also like to thank the co-ordinators of the working groups working within the Ad hoc Committee for the excellent job they have done.

The work done in 1987 and in the course of the inter-sessional meetings of the Committee on Chemical Weapons has undoubtedly given a vigorous and definitive impetus to the negotiations. Progress has been made on numerous aspects of the draft convention on chemical weapons, a good omen for rapid progress towards the conclusion of negotiations on this item.

We should also like to express our pleasure at the decision just taken to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Group of 21 would have liked the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to be improved so that the Committee could have worked with a clearer and more precise purpose in mind, designed to complete the negotiations and to draw up a definitive text for a draft convention. However, the Group of 21 trusts that within the mandate adopted we shall be able to make rapid progress towards that goal.

On behalf of the Group of 21 I also wish to congratulate the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, and wish him all success in his work. The Group of 21 also wishes on this occasion to reiterate its readiness to continue co-operating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee and to do its utmost to help ensure that the Committee's work is crowned with success as soon as possible. Finally, Mr. President, I should also like to express our gratitude to you for having successfully completed the consultations for the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee in this second week of the Conference's work, which is a good omen for very effective work by the Ad hoc Committee.

Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): I would like, on behalf of the Group of Western States, to congratulate Ambassador Sujka on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the 1988 session. We are confident that under his chairmanship the work aimed at the conclusion of an effective CW convention as soon as possible will be vigorously and efficiently carried forward. He can rely on the full support of all members of the Western Group. We also pledge our active support to the Chairmen of the three working groups.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): I am very glad that under your guidance the plenary meeting has decided today to establish a fourth Ad hoc Committee, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I wish to extend my thanks to the outgoing Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus. Under his able and patient guidance much progress was made in the work of the Committee. The Chinese delegation has always adopted a positive attitude towards the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention.

I wish also to extend my congratulations to the newly appointed Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. The Chinese delegation and myself wish to assure him of our full support in the performance of his duties, in order that, through the joint efforts of all the members of the Committee, the Convention on Chemical Weapons may be concluded at an early date.

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Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): I would like to congratulate Ambassador Sujka of Poland on his election to this very important post of the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at this crucial period. I do so on behalf of a group of socialist delegations. I wish Ambassador Sujka and the members of the bureau to be set up success in their work for the earliest possible finalization of the chemical weapons convention, and I pledge the support of the entire group to its work.

(Mr. Lechuqa Hevia, Cuba)

••• Opportunities will not be lacking. In fact they already exist. Our programme of work contains such items of major importance and urgency as chemical weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests and the militarization of outer space. There is no reason why the treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons should not be completed this year. It is a measure which international public opinion has been clamouring for, and substantial progress has been made in the Ad hoc Committee, though important matters remain pending for satisfactory completion of the negotiations, as set out in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, which we were indeed not able to improve upon, despite the majority opinion of the Conference. This situation is further complicated by the decision of the United States to begin to manufacture binary weapons in the very middle of negotiations, an action which obviously complicates the process further. A happy conclusion of negotiations this year will offer proof of the sincerity of the approach to the question of disarmament, of whether words - propa~~g~~anda - and deeds follow the same path.

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Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy):

••• Today I would like to make some remarks on behalf of the group of Western countries, on the occasion of the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

It remains a matter of high priority to the Western Group that an effective, verifiable and comprehensive convention on a global ban on chemical weapons be concluded as soon as possible. Thus we note with satisfaction the progress which was achieved during the inter-sessional period.

(continued)

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

We thought it would be helpful as we resume our work to address briefly some of the remaining issues. It is the view of the Western Group that our work in the upcoming months should concentrate on many yet unresolved issues in our negotiations. These issues are encompassed within such broad categories as non-production, institutional issues, challenge inspection, and destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Vigorous efforts are needed and we must address these issues, working to take into account national concerns and to resolve differences through serious debate.

For example, progress has been made on non-production over the past months. We believe work should continue to elaborate the régime and schedules [1], [2] and [3] of article VI as well as the procedure for amending them. In doing so we should be guided by the consideration that we need to arrive at solutions which are at the same time practicable and effective. We must also work toward a solution to the question sometimes referred to as schedule [4]. Furthermore, we consider it necessary to review the verification of non-production as a whole. The régime in article VI should, while taking due account of legitimate economic interests, raise to the highest possible level confidence among States parties that there is no production for chemical weapons purposes.

On institutional questions, the work on article VIII dealing with the international organization to be established for the implementation of the Convention has resulted in a new version of article VIII in the "rolling text". This provides a basis for further work on this aspect of the Convention, and more detailed work needs to be done with regard to the powers, functions and interrelationship of the various organs of the international organization, including their composition. We will also need to address the expense of administering the Convention and a formula for allocating those costs.

On challenge inspections, the consultations carried out in this field have been helpful. The paper on this issue prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, which appears as appendix II of document CD/795, provides a basis for developing a challenge inspection régime.

On the destruction of chemical weapons, useful work has been done on article IV. However, one question which will require particular attention in coming weeks is the order of destruction of chemical weapons. A solution to this issue must be consistent with the requirement that the security of all States parties should remain undiminished during the entire destruction period.

Another significant security concern that will have to be addressed is the potential problem of chemical-weapon-capable States remaining outside the Convention.

In addition to these four examples, other important issues also need to be resolved, such as multilateral data exchange. While some work has been done on assistance, economic and technical development during the inter-sessional period, further discussion on these issues should continue with a view to developing realistic formulations which are consistent with the basic thrust of the Convention.

(The President)

I have been asked by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to announce that the first meeting of the Committee will be held tomorrow, Friday 12 February at 11 a.m. in Conference Room III. He also informs me that, in principle, the programme of meetings of the Ad hoc Committee for the coming week will be as follows:

Monday 15 February	3 p.m.	Room III	<u>Ad hoc Committee on CW:</u> <u>Working Group C</u>
Wednesday 17 February	3 p.m.	Room III	<u>Ad hoc Committee on CW:</u> <u>Working Group C</u>
Friday 19 February	10 a.m.	Room III	<u>Ad hoc Committee on CW:</u> <u>Working Group C</u>

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Our agenda item 4 - chemical weapons - represents the most intense area of work in the Conference on Disarmament. There has been remarkable progress in the negotiations in the past several years. I wish to join all my other colleagues in expressing my appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in 1987, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, whose untiring stewardship for the past year has greatly inspired us, and to his collaborators, Mr. Philippe Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, who have made invaluable contributions to the progress of our work.

We have indeed come very far in this marathon of a negotiation. We may in fact be approaching the state of mind of a lone runner for whom the critical decision is approaching of whether to spurt his way through to the goal in a final burst of energy at the risk of running out of breath, or to continue at a steady, measured pace.

I, for one, believe that it is precisely because we are entering this critical phase of the negotiation that we should exercise caution and good judgement lest we stumble into pitfalls or get bogged down in detail.

For so many years now, we have conducted negotiations going into the minutest details, but so often we have been groping about in the darkness. So little is as yet known about the existing chemical weapons and production facilities, as well as chemical industries. Greater openness and transparency on the part of every participant are essential for the successful conclusion of the negotiations.

At this important juncture of the negotiation, I wish to recapitulate what my delegation believes to be the guiding considerations which should see us through to the completion of our work.

The basic consideration is that the ban on chemical weapons has to be global, effective, verifiable and workable. For this to be realized, a proper balance needs to be struck among the highly complex and technical aspects of the Convention. Most importantly, the twin objectives of the Convention, that is, destruction of existing chemical weapons and related production facilities, and non-production, meaning prohibition of the future development or production of chemical weapons, need to occupy balanced places in the convention régime.

We should constantly remind ourselves that the first order of business is to effect the actual destruction of existing chemical weapons and related production facilities. These weapons of mass destruction have to be totally eliminated under strict international control. It is also important that the destruction during the 10-year period should proceed in a manner which does not impair the security of any nation or group of nations.

(continued)

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

To the extent that there are asymmetries in the chemical weapon stocks of different groups of nations, there is a legitimate concern for ensuring a balance of security during the destruction period. However, this should be done without jeopardizing the framework of strict international control and destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities according to an internationally agreed formula.

A weighted approach whereby different rates of destruction are applied in accordance with the amounts of chemical weapon stocks declared by States parties is one way of solving the problem. If there are perceived to be further security concerns during the destruction period, we should guard against the possible risks of dealing with them in a purely tit-for-tat or CW-for-CW approach.

On the non-production side, there remains substantial work to be done in elaborating the appropriate verification and monitoring régimes to be applied to the different schedules under article VI. There are two important points to be considered in this regard. The first point is that the production of schedule [1] chemicals will be prohibited except up to one metric ton per year for research, medical or protective purposes, while it is envisaged that the production of the chemicals on other schedules will continue, subject to appropriate monitoring or verification régimes. The second point is that, unlike destruction, which should end after 10 years, the non-production monitoring and verification régimes will need to be operational in perpetuity, probably requiring great manpower and technical as well as financial resources.

A corollary of the first point is that we should exercise particular care not to impede the legitimate activities and development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, especially with respect to schedule [2], [3] and [4] chemicals. This would involve effective arrangements to protect the confidentiality of commercial information. From the second point it follows that the non-production verification and monitoring régimes need to be realistic and cost-effective both to the inspecting body and to the industries concerned, if they are to remain viable for many years to come. This would especially be the case for schedule [4].

In order to find workable solutions in this regard, I consider it necessary for us to have, at this juncture, some estimate of the number and size of the industrial facilities involved, based on the relevant thresholds to be worked out. My delegation will be ready to join others in providing such information as may facilitate the negotiation.

Article VIII, on the organization, is another area in which we have to build on the very useful work done during the inter-sessional period to resolve a complex set of issues: universality, smooth and efficient operation of the convention régime, the need to strike a balance between very sizeable verification requirements and available resources, to name just a few. In the framework of the commonly emerging perception of the three-tier structure, consisting of the General Conference or Consultative Committee, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, we should strive to strike an appropriate balance between these various factors, bearing in mind the unique characteristics of the Convention, whose primary aim is to ban chemical weapons.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

In this challenging work which will be taken up by Working Group C, and all other work, I pledge the full co-operation of my delegation in assisting the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland.

The late Ambassador, Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, whose passing away we deeply mourn, devoted himself to the cause of a chemical weapon ban. The best tribute we could pay to him is to conclude a successful treaty.

I have stated the views of my delegation on two priority items on the agenda, a nuclear test ban and chemical weapons. I wish to defer extensive comments on other agenda items to later occasions, but let me briefly mention a few of them.

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(Mr. Dolqu, Romania)

... I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize Romania's view that the basic elements of this programme should include cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stocks, with a view to their complete elimination by the year 2000; the definitive banning of all nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction; the prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons; substantial reductions, of at least 50 per cent by the year 2000, in conventional weapons, troops and military expenditure; and the establishment, through agreements between the States of the two military alliances, of progressively lower ceilings for the principal categories of armaments.

At the same time the Comprehensive Programme should contain measures relating to the freezing of military expenditure and subsequent reductions; the creation of nuclear-weapon-free and chemical-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world; the withdrawal of foreign troops within the borders of the countries concerned; a commitment by each State not to deploy troops on the territory of other States; the dismantling of all military bases on the territories of other States; the simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances; the non-holding of military manoeuvres and demonstrations near borders with third countries, especially when these manoeuvres involve participation by several States.

(continued)

(Mr. Dolqu, Romania)

Romania attaches special importance to the total prohibition and definitive elimination of chemical weapons, and, to that end, the elaboration of an appropriate draft convention of universal scope.

At this stage, I would not wish to dwell on the matter, but I would like to emphasize that we favour the conclusion of the convention as soon as possible, perhaps this year. Such a target has been made possible by the remarkable progress made last year, by the spirit of co-operation that has been demonstrated by the participating States.

We are in favour of the continuation and intensification of the negotiations, based on the principles that have underpinned work in this area to date, and we are against any action that could jeopardize efforts to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible. We would therefore like efforts to be made to ensure that, in spirit and in letter, the convention takes due account of the need to guarantee all States broad and unimpeded access to scientific and technological achievements, the promotion of international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this area.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, one contribution to the efforts aimed at the total prohibition and final elimination of chemical weapons could be preventive measures designed to guarantee non-proliferation of chemical weapons in regions where they do not exist at present.

In this connection I would like to call to mind the joint initiative by Romania and Bulgaria dealing with the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans, as contained in a "declaration-appeal" submitted as a document to the Conference on Disarmament in 1986.

(Mr. Dolqu, Romania)

I would like to take this opportunity to state that Romania has no chemical weapons and that there are no stocks of such weapons on its territory. I also recall that my country was one of the first to sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

••• In the multilateral arena other significant agreements have been produced on such subjects as chemical weapons, biological weapons, inhumane weapons, and nuclear weapons.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Another subject of universally accepted importance and on which real negotiations are under way is that of our search for a total ban on chemical weapons.

Last year we made good progress towards a universal chemical weapons convention. There are in fact only a few outstanding issues, although we do not minimize the task involved in resolving those issues.

Major steps towards the objective of a universal convention include: an early and complete declaration of stockpiles by those who have not yet made such declarations; resolution of the problem of verification of non-production; agreement on an effective and credible schedule of destruction of existing stockpiles.

We acknowledge that there are important issues of security involved in this work, whether defined militarily or in terms of industrial or intellectual property.

But we cannot afford to delay in working them out, especially in a world where the threat of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons grows almost daily.

What is needed is a convention open for signature by all States which all States will sign.

(Mr. Sorsa, Finland)

The broader significance of the INF Treaty will, of course, depend decisively on what comes after it, on whether the Soviet Union and the United States can come to an agreement that would strengthen strategic stability at a much lower level of armaments than at present, on whether chemical weapons can be abolished, on whether conventional arms can be reduced. The first step has been taken; other steps must follow.

It is our hope that the momentum visible in the negotiations between the two major Powers will take hold in multilateral talks as well. Multilateral disarmament diplomacy, at least in the global perspective, does not have much to show for its exertions over the past decade. A new momentum is urgently required to achieve definite results on long-standing issues such as the prohibition of chemical weapons and the nuclear test ban, as well as coming to grips with newer issues such as verification. As the single multilateral negotiating body of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament is in a unique position to translate ideas into action.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is a priority item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. This is rightly so. Chemical weapons pose a risk to all of us. They have been used; they could be used again. Chemical weapons are comparatively easy and inexpensive to manufacture. The danger of their proliferation not only exists, it is growing.

Banning chemical weapons is a matter of security. A ban would enhance the security of every State, whether in the North or South, East or West. Finland, for her part, does not possess chemical weapons and will never acquire such weapons. Nor will she help others to acquire them.

In our view, a chemical weapons convention, to be effective, needs to be total in its scope, global in its reach, and verifiable in its implementation.

Considerable progress has been registered in the chemical weapons negotiations over the past year or so. Many problems have been solved, some remain, and some have only recently been discovered. But on balance, it seems clear to us that the negotiations have now advanced to the point where redoubled efforts are needed. The chance to get rid of these heinous weapons of mass destruction once and for all should not be allowed to slip away.

(continued)

(Mr. Sorsa, Finland)

It is imperative that no new chemical weapons emerge once the existing stockpiles have been destroyed. Parts of civilian industry need therefore to be supervised. We believe that such supervision will not be too onerous if carefully tailored to the objective of the Convention. The verification arrangements concerning non-production should make sure that production of chemicals in civilian industry cannot be misused in any military significant way.

One issue which has only recently come under discussion concerns assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons. A consensus seems to be emerging that a State party should be entitled to assistance in the event that chemical weapons are actually used against it. We share that view. We also think that the character of such assistance should be strictly defensive.

As is well known, Finland has for the past 15 years devoted considerable resources to developing technical means for verifying chemical disarmament. The results of our research have been regularly placed at the disposal of the Conference on Disarmament in the form of so-called Finnish Blue Books. Lately, the Finnish research project has concentrated on air monitoring of chemical agents. On the basis of extensive studies and field tests, we have come to the conclusion that air monitoring would constitute an important complementary method of verification which could reliably detect and identify atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.

In view of these research results, one type of assistance which would seem to us well worth considering would involve provision of detection equipment and alarm systems for air monitoring purposes. This type of assistance would be strictly defensive in nature, and would have the additional advantage of being of value even before a possible attack by chemical weapons. Its mere existence might even help to deter the attack in the first place. Moreover, air monitoring facilities could at the same time be used to detect air pollution, thus safeguarding the environment.

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(Mr. Sodré, Brazil)

••• Thus it was in San Francisco, thus it was with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, thus it was with the creation of the great specialized agencies of the United Nations system and also again with the convening of the major international conferences on the environment in Stockholm, on population in Bucharest, on the law of the sea in Jamaica, on science and technology in New York. Thus it will hopefully be in Geneva, in our negotiations to prohibit chemical weapons, to ban nuclear tests, to prevent an arms race in outer space. Thus the growth of military stockpiles and the refinement of systems of mass destruction will be interrupted. Thus a new world of peace and security will be born here.

(Mr. Sodré, Brazil)

••• It is evident that the issue or area of negotiations where most progress has been accomplished, and where the final result can already begin to be perceived, is the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of this type of armament.

As a member of the Group of 21, Brazil, together with the non-aligned countries represented in this Conference, hopes that we may finalize, before the end of 1988, a comprehensive and effective draft convention. We are prepared to support, be it in the substance or procedure, any practical initiatives that might further intensify the rhythm of our work and the pace of our consultations. We are not in a hurry. We simply refuse to waste time.

In this spirit, I wish to state anew the interest of the Brazilian Government in ensuring that the future convention is universal and non-discriminatory in nature and that it safeguards the right of access of all countries to all peaceful uses of chemical industry and technology.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Of the items on the Conference's busy agenda, the one which is most ripe for decision and which opens up real prospects of immediate results, is the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Here the Conference can now make basically the last spurt on the home stretch in order to reaffirm its capacity as an effective negotiating body after a lengthy interval.

The convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production is both a political and a moral imperative. It is designed to become a genuinely palpable measure of disarmament and confidence building.

The need for the speedy conclusion of the convention is dictated by the specific situation in the field of chemical weapons. The participants in the Conference are well aware of the reports on the proliferation of chemical weapons, the recent initiation of production of binary chemical weapons in the United States, the French plan for a chemical arms build-up. These are all dangerous trends.

We are also alarmed by the fact that the United States delegation at the negotiations is in no hurry to take account of the positions of other countries, but has locked itself into its 1984 position. Activity at the negotiations should obviously be measured not by the quantity of paper submitted, but by real efforts aimed at eliminating existing divergencies - exactly what is manifestly lacking on the part of the United States Administration. This lack is more than compensated for by the concrete steps taken by the United States to build up chemical armaments. Hardly had the production of 155-mm binary artillery shells begun when the Administration immediately submitted a request for "Bigeye" aerial bombs. Thus binary weapons are acquiring new parameters, the United States military machine is becoming obsessed with them, and quite naturally this does not increase the pressure on the United States to reach an early agreement.

It may be objected that the United States delegation has stated its desire to work on the elaboration and conclusion of a convention. Moreover, the Soviet-United States summit in Washington confirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards the conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention. Yet a legitimate question comes to mind: how do the United States' words tally with its actual deeds?

Chemical disarmament, like any other undertaking, is a serious and responsible matter. There can be no place here for double standards or double moral values. The initiation of production of binary chemical weapons in the United States most seriously undermines confidence in its declared commitment to the drawing up of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union will resolutely strive to ensure that the future convention provides for an effective ban on all types of chemical weapons and for their destruction. We will not agree to attempts to except binary chemical weapons from the ban and replace a comprehensive convention by partial measures regulating chemical armaments.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In our opinion, the French arguments to the effect that every party to the future convention should have the right to produce chemical weapons pose a serious threat to chemical disarmament. Although such views are founded on the need to ensure security, no strengthening of security actually occurs. On the contrary - in practice, this concept threatens both the proliferation of chemical weapons, and the transfer of the chemical arms race under the protection of the convention, with all the ensuing consequences pernicious for stability, confidence and, in the final analysis, for the security of all, whether parties or non-parties to the convention.

A solution must definitely be sought to the question of the security of States parties to the convention, particularly during the vital first 10 years after its entry into force, but not through the stockpiling and proliferation of chemical weapons - by negotiating a mutually acceptable order of destruction of all chemical weapon stocks and the most stringent verification. As far as chemical weapon stocks and production facilities are concerned, this verification should basically imply international sequestration.

The Soviet Union fully shares the desire of the overwhelming majority of the participants in the negotiations to conclude work as soon as possible, and welcomes the business-like attitude which was quite evident in the statements made in this room by Foreign Ministers B. Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia, P. Várkonyi of Hungary, M. Kusuma-Atmadja of Indonesia, G. Andreotti of Italy and H.-D. Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in the statements we have just heard from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Sorsa, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Mr. Abreu Sodré.

Certainly, really serious major issues are still outstanding in respect of the convention. Joint solutions should be sought to them - daringly, in the spirit of the new political thinking, with each participant correctly assessing and taking into account both his own interests and those of his partners in the negotiations.

One of the most important tasks as we see it is to finalize the negotiation of provisions on verification. The Soviet Union will work to ensure that the convention contains provision for mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal, with the possibility of requesting an inspection of any facility or any site which causes suspicion.

It is also essential to ensure the most effective systematic monitoring of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry.

I should like to assure you that the position of the Soviet Union will not become an obstacle to agreement on the convention's provisions enhancing the effectiveness of international verification of the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons. We note with interest the ideas put forward by Australia regarding "spot checks", and those of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding ad hoc inspections. In our view, requests for inspections could well emanate from the international inspectorate in cases where the need arose, in the context of their systematic verification activities, to clarify some insufficiently clear situations.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union has great respect for other States' views and opinions which are aimed at expediting the preparation of the convention. It is widely held, for example, that at present the factor of openness and mutual awareness of the subject matter of the negotiations is becoming increasingly important for the progress of the negotiations. This was mentioned in particular in the letters from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of various States which we received in response to the message sent to the participants in the negotiations by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR last November.

We agree with this, and we confirm our agreement by practical deeds. The Soviet Union is so far the only State to have officially declared the size of its chemical weapon stockpiles. At Shikhany the Soviet Union presented CW agents contained in its armaments, standard munitions and a chemical weapon destruction technology.

Today the Soviet delegation is introducing for the consideration of the Conference a "Memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons". The purpose of the exchange is to facilitate the earliest possible elaboration, agreement, signature and entry into force of the convention, and in particular to facilitate the practical resolution of the issues of international verification and of creating greater openness in the field of chemical weapons.

The idea is that, as an act of good will, every State participating in the negotiations will, in the first half of 1988, submit information regarding its stocks of chemical weapons (indicating the approximate amount) chemical weapons production facilities, and past transfers or acquisition of chemical weapons and the technology and equipment for their production.

Thereafter it would be desirable for every State participating in the negotiations to submit, at a time to be agreed, information on the number of chemical weapons storage and production facilities, laboratories for their development, commercial facilities for the production of key precursors and dual-purpose chemicals for peaceful purposes, and so on.

At the same time the Soviet Union proposes that the States participating in the negotiations should agree to designate, on a voluntary basis, one facility each where a specially established international group of experts could test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international monitoring of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. In our view, such a measure would not only make it possible to test in practice what we are negotiating now on paper, and to make any necessary adjustments, but would also actually mean a really tangible step towards establishing an international inspectorate.

These are the specific new ideas of the Soviet delegation aimed at the early conclusion of a convention. They are dictated by the Soviet Union's desire to achieve this within the shortest time possible - ideally, in time for the opening of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The prospect of reducing the strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States by half and eliminating chemical weapons creates favourable conditions for a start now, in the Conference, on substantive discussions on specific areas for multilateral efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament.

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(Mr. Morel, France)

••• It is with regard to this latter statement that I would like simply to offer by way of reply one or two remarks on two issues more particularly, which we thought were not presented in the most appropriate way. I refer to security stocks, and also the question of deterrence.

Concerning security stocks, that is, the proposal that was made by my country, we have been directly implicated in this case in a way which, I must say, we consider distorted. What is in fact involved here? A basic point which I think all delegations have accepted and acknowledged and emphasized, namely that there should be undiminished security during the transitional period of the Convention. We think this is an absolutely crucial point, which is tied up with the very existence, the credibility, the viability and the definitive nature of the Convention. It will not be possible to secure a definitive convention unless undiminished security is assured throughout the transitional period. France has been raising this problem for years. We have made various statements on this subject, without the possibility of an appropriate solution having emerged thus far. It is for this reason, and for this reason alone, that we made a specific proposal for establishing a transitional arrangement that we called "security stocks". We have been told today, in particular in the statement by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, that this would lead to proliferation. I am not going to embark on a debate on chemical weapons proliferation today. I will merely emphasize that we did not invent CW proliferation, that we are the first to deplore it and observe that unfortunately the risk exists and is growing. We do not intend to contribute to this proliferation; on the contrary, our wish is for universal accession to the future convention, and the point is that we will not have universal accession to the future convention unless the undiminished security of all States parties is guaranteed during the transitional period. So we do not think at all that we are provoking or heightening or creating this risk. It exists, and what we wanted to do was to face up to the situation in an appropriate way, and not by noting that a certain country will remain outside the convention.

It might appear that our proposal is paradoxical, and I am ready to recognize that. But I would be tempted to say that the paradox could perfectly well lead to disarmament, and may even facilitate it. Today the INF Treaty is welcomed. It is indeed a treaty offering appreciable benefits, which we have emphasized. But there is no doubt that for this to be done a number of preparatory phases were necessary in order to produce this treaty, including the deployment of certain intermediate nuclear forces. Thus there are situations where the well-thought-out and temporary re-establishment of a certain equilibrium can, when it is necessary, lead more easily to the limitation or even the complete elimination of an entire category of weapon.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on item 4 of the agenda, although it must be said that its mandate should have been changed in accordance with General Assembly resolution 42/37 A.

Like many other delegations, my delegation greatly appreciates the contribution made by Ambassador R. Ekéus of Sweden in the success achieved to date in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, and expresses its conviction that, under the guidance of its new Chairman, Ambassador B. Sujka of Poland, the Committee will achieve further decisive progress towards the completion of the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In view of the stage now reached in the negotiations, it is incumbent on the participants to fully mobilize the political will to achieve agreements, and to display openness and trust towards their partners. Such a constructive approach is exemplified by the Soviet Union's declaration of the size of its chemical weapon stocks, and by the proposal recently submitted to the Conference for the multilateral exchange of data on chemical weapons and the approval of procedures for monitoring non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry.

It must be particularly emphasized that these important steps have been taken despite the fact that the United States has decided to begin production of binary chemical weapons. This decision cannot be viewed as other than open disregard for the determination of States and peoples to put an end to the chemical threat.

The Soviet Union made a useful contribution to increasing openness in the field of chemical weapons by presenting to the participants in the chemical weapons talks its standard chemical munitions and the technology for their destruction at the Shikhany military facility.

Mongolia applauds Hungary's recent identification of its plants for the production of the chemicals listed in the convention being drafted, as an exceptionally important and timely step which will serve as an example for others.

(continued)

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

My delegation also wishes to declare that Mongolia has no chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or acquire any. Mongolia long ago signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and has always been and remains a fervent supporter of the speediest possible prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

Wishing, as its modest responsibilities permit, to promote the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons, Mongolia has submitted for consideration in the Ad hoc Committee various working papers on the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks. The importance and the complicated nature of the solution of this problem is accounted for by its indissoluble link with the security of all States throughout the whole period of destruction. We hope that the principle of levelling out which we proposed in document CD/CW/WP.182 - whereby States possessing chemical weapons would be left after the Convention had been in force for an agreed length of time, say by the eighth or ninth year, with approximately equal quantities of chemical weapons, to be destroyed by the tenth year of operation of the convention - will become a good starting-point for solving this problem. Concerning the time frames for destroying the various categories of chemical weapon, it seems to us that weapons in category III (as defined in CD/CW/WP.182) could be destroyed during the first three or four years of the destruction period.

In the view of Mongolia, an important intermediate step towards ridding the whole planet of chemical weapons and preventing a resumption of their production might be the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

In this connection, Mongolia welcomes the initiatives which were put forward by your country, Comrade Chairman, together with Czechoslovakia and also Bulgaria and Romania, on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in central Europe and in the Balkans, and considers that the creation of such zones in various parts of the world, including Asia, would substantially strengthen States' security and would be an important confidence-building measure.

(Mr. Fan, China)

••• It is our view that the United States and the Soviet Union should first of all conclude an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear weapons as soon as possible, and at the same time take steps towards the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, conventional disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 444th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Federal Republic of Germany assumes the presidency for the month of March, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has asked me to extend, on behalf of the Federal Government, their cordial greetings to the representatives of all member States of the Geneva Conference, and has sent a message to the Conference which I will read out. I quote:

••• "Our efforts in the Conference concentrate on the early conclusion of an agreement on a global ban for chemical weapons. In this field the preconditions exist for successfully concluding the untiring and persistent year-long efforts of the Conference. The so-called 'rolling text' and numerous contributions of various delegations constitute a good basis for practically oriented and stringent solutions to the outstanding verification issues. I call upon all member States to advance the ongoing negotiations with determination in order to achieve a comprehensive, global and reliably verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible juncture. There are no new problems today that would justify a more pessimistic attitude towards the conclusion of the agreement than in the past. On the contrary, the rapprochement in principle concerning verification issues has served to surmount existing problems. What is really new is the growing danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons, an aspect that makes a total ban all the more urgent.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

I would now like to inform the Conference of a statement made by Milos Jakes, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on 24 February, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the victory of socialism in Czechoslovakia; that statement contains a proposal for the establishment of a zone of confidence and co-operation between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. I quote:

••• "In the military field this might involve the progressive establishment of a sort of 'diluted' zone with a reduced level of military confrontation, the elimination of the most dangerous types of offensive weapons and the adoption of important confidence-building measures. Such an approach is in full conformity with the proposals which have been submitted in the past for zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and with the plans to resolve various aspects of disarmament and to heighten confidence between the groups of European States, within an all-European or global framework.

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Mr. Marshall (New Zealand):

••• The CD, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, has a unique responsibility in helping to develop a safer world. That is a world in which ultimately no State will need to rely on weapons of mass destruction - whether nuclear, chemical or biological - for its security. A world which

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(Mr. Marshall, New Zealand)

stations no weapons in space. A world where the forces of conflict on Earth are regulated in a fair and politically mature manner. That world must be brought into the focus of this Conference's sights.

(continued)

(Mr. Marshall, New Zealand)

••• But it is not sufficient for other States simply to applaud this achievement from the sidelines. The international community as a whole must support the United States and the Soviet Union in their endeavours, but it must also have an active role itself in the disarmament process. These encouraging developments in the bilateral area must be matched by achievements in the multilateral field, with the two processes working in parallel, buttressing and underpinning each other. Many issues are simply not capable of resolution by the two largest nuclear Powers alone. They require multilateral action. Chemical weapons, nuclear non-proliferation and a nuclear test ban are obvious examples.

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(Mr. Marshall, New Zealand)

••• In positive contrast to this experience, the work in the CD on chemical weapons has been impressive. The draft Convention contains language on most of the provisions necessary for an effective ban. There is consensus that all chemical weapons should be destroyed. But there are continuing reports of the current use and proliferation of chemical weapons. It is imperative that no effort be spared to ensure that the negotiations succeed. New Zealand does not have, and has never had, chemical weapons, and it does not permit chemical weapons to be stationed on its territory. Chemical and biological weapons are, in our view, equally abhorrent. Both categories should be completely eliminated. The benefits of doing so for other disarmament negotiations, both on nuclear and conventional weapons, would, we think, be immense. They could prove decisive. We think, too, that our own security would be enhanced were chemical weapons to be eliminated. We expect that our civilian industry would wish to co-operate fully with the agreed verification arrangements concerning non-production of chemical weapons.

New Zealand is impressed by the scale of the negotiations on chemical weapons and the wealth of ideas that delegations have submitted. These include initiatives that, in recent times, have helped bring the existence of chemical weapons into the open and to reveal the full dimensions of the problem with which the negotiators are grappling. So, too, have there been interesting suggestions to improve the negotiating process which deserve close attention. So much material is available, and so many ideas continue to be submitted, that it cannot be beyond the Conference to resolve the difficult issues ahead. We have been pleased at the commitment to the negotiations expressed by the major participants. With a willingness to compromise, the details of consensus and agreement will surely appear. The goal is too important for it to be otherwise.

Nuclear testing and chemical weapons are essentially global issues. No country, no matter how small or how isolated, is immune to them. In an increasingly multipolar world, where consultation and co-operation are becoming even more complicated, yet even more necessary, New Zealand is in a special position. We have strong and unbreakable Western ties but, because of our geography and the links we have developed with our Pacific and Asian neighbours, we also have a role to play in helping to bridge the gaps that divide us all.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran):

... Unfortunately, however, we do not yet seem to have been able to take good advantage of this momentum. On many issues on the agenda, no real progress is foreseen and, even in the case of the convention on chemical weapons, there is concern that the tremendous efforts and achievements made thus far are giving way to stagnation. It is all so clear that, in most of these cases, it is not problems of technical nature only that impede further progress. Experience has proven, time and again, that a major essential ingredient is political will, which, when present, makes the most difficult and complicated problems look easy. We hope that the situation will evolve as we prepare ourselves for the third special session on disarmament.

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(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... When Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980, it was our expectation, our naïve expectation, that the international community would express its outrage and utilize all means provided in the Charter to "suppress" this aggression. We continued with our naïve perceptions later as Iraq engaged in assaults on commercial shipping and civilian aircraft, and resorted to chemical weapons and attacks on civilian populated centres. The result? Not only did Iraq not face any measures of at least a deterrent nature, but it was even encouraged, and still is, by some countries permanently represented in the Security Council.

... But, for the sake of humanity, and humanity alone, may I be permitted to appeal to the conscience of the members of the Conference to employ all means available to them to bring about an end to the attacks on civilians and ensure respect for the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in armed

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(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

conflicts? At stake is the sanctity of international agreements and commitments. I apologize if I sound a bit pessimistic in my first statement here. It is not my intention at all. The intention is only to note our concern, and hope that the painful experiences we have had to go through will make us all more alert in our efforts to bring about new international agreements and to ensure the highest possible respect for them.

This is particularly true for the convention on prevention of the production, development, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, a major issue of importance in current negotiations. Progress continues on finalizing its provisions, from general definitions to declarations and modes of verification. Yet the key question remains without a definite answer. What should be done, by whom and how against possible violations by States, signatories or not? In the absence of a concrete response to this question, the achievement of universality for the new convention remains doubtful.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The following is the statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Women in Action for Disarmament, Justice and Peace: I quote:

... We regret the lack of complete achievements in multilateral negotiations since the first special session. We are heartened, however, by progress made in the Conference on Disarmament in the formulation of a convention banning chemical weapons. Women, as the keepers of civilian populations, have suffered and watched their children suffer at the hands of the users of chemical weapons. We urge the members of the Conference to exercise their political will and complete the chemical weapons convention by the end of the year.

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

Women welcome the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington last December and the numerous proposals that have been made in recent years for the elimination of other categories of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear- and chemical-weapon-free zones in most parts of the globe. We are urging also that serious negotiations for the reduction of conventional weapons and forces be undertaken in the various fora, including the Conference on Disarmament. Many disarmament proposals have been generated by women at the grass-roots levels of non-governmental organizations and peace movements and the men with whom they work. The ability of these people to contribute to the negotiating process through non-governmental organizations should be kept in mind by the Conference on Disarmament. They seek better communication with the Conference on Disarmament and, we believe, the Conference on Disarmament also seeks better communication with them. We hope that more thought can be given to ways and means. As part of this dialogue, we appreciate the opportunity to deliver our message today. We propose that information links between the Conference on Disarmament and the non-governmental organizations be guaranteed through meetings and written communications.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

... The multilateral negotiating of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has reached a decisive stage. The United Nations General Assembly has come out in favour of the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction by adopting, without a vote, resolution 42/37 A. Moreover, the draft convention has reached an advanced stage of preparation and most of

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(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

the outstanding political problems are in the process of being resolved. Nevertheless, there are at the same time contradictory signs which are troubling. In these paradoxical circumstances, in which the goal seems to be within our grasp and yet to be moving further away as we move forward, it is necessary to generate a convergence in time of political will in order to reach the conclusion of the convention as soon as possible. Otherwise, we run the risk that the debate will become endless, the diligence in negotiation will wane and the opportunity will be lost.

On account of the foregoing, I must point to the support given to the negotiations, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and of Italy, Mr. Giulio Andreotti, who, in the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament of 4 February, urged us to make a final effort. Likewise, we appreciate the contribution of the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, in submitting to the Conference a memorandum on multilateral data exchange and a proposal that each State participating in the negotiations should designate one facility where a group of experts could test the procedures for systematic international monitoring of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. This second proposal is being studied by my Government. In this connection, I would like to say, by way of general comment, that we think it useful to try out, before the entry into force of the convention, the verification measures that are emerging.

The Argentine Republic, as a non-aligned country, is assuming the responsibility incumbent upon it in the negotiations by intensifying its dedication to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In his turn, the President of the nation, Dr. Raúl Alfonsín, has given special attention to this question by affirming in the Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988, along with the heads of State or Government of Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania that "a convention for the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons should be urgently concluded" (document CD/807).

In our previous statement on this subject, on 6 August 1987, we maintained that:

"The chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed [From that point] there will be a single category of States with the same rights and obligations and an identical verification mechanism applicable for all States. ... Thus we have within reach the possibility of drawing up a treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint".

Hence, the future convention should take specially into account the legitimate interests of States so that security is not diminished and the development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes is not impeded.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The future convention should enhance the security of States parties from the very moment it enters into force. In this connection, it is appropriate to recall that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stipulates in paragraph 29 that:

"The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces".

We consider that this general principle is applicable to the case of chemical weapons and has been recognized in the annex to article 4 by the statement to the effect that: "The elaboration of the Order of Destruction shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage". Nevertheless, we consider it appropriate to repeat this in the body of the convention and to extend it to the stage following the period of destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities.

With regard to the development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes, the entry into force of the convention will create a framework for mutual confidence among States parties that we hope will help to increase international co-operation in this field. Because of their community of objectives, the States parties should accord each other in their mutual relations treatment corresponding to their status as "trustworthy partners". Thus the accession of a State to the convention should be recognized as "sufficient guarantee" to help to bring about the greatest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes.

We must avoid the experience with other international instruments of unilaterally or plurilaterally conditioning the commitment entered into multilaterally by establishing additional requirements for co-operation in peaceful uses. The fact that the guarantee of non-production of chemical weapons can be verified will make discriminatory any other condition it may be sought to add to the conditions accepted in the convention.

Consequently, the operation of the convention should not be an impediment to the development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes. This question is of special interest to my country because the chemical industry is becoming an ever more powerful growth factor with regard both to the agricultural sector and to industry and is, therefore, a source of well-being for the Argentine people.

The provisions of the convention should not jeopardize the normal development of this activity, nor affect the right of every State to economic and technological development of the chemical industry in keeping with its interests, needs and priorities.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

In view of the foregoing, the Argentine delegation considers that the objectives of the convention are not confined to those set out in article I but also include both the undiminished security of the States parties and the development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes.

In order to attain these objectives, it has been decided to create an international organization. The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that covers the session from 12 to 29 January 1988 takes account of this decision in the new text for article VIII. Similarly, the powers and functions of the organs have been defined. This progress is the result of intense debate and also of the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21 in accepting the exchange of the notion of "delegated authority" for the idea that the organs' ranking will be determined by their powers and functions as and when the relations between the organs are established. For instance, the character of the General Conference that is the Organization's main or supreme body should be reflected by the powers appropriate to that highest rank.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is the sole multilateral agreement on disarmament concluded thus far to have established - as long ago as 1967 - a body to ensure compliance with its obligations. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known by the acronym OPANAL has a structure similar to that envisaged in article VIII of the "rolling text", comprising three main bodies, namely a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was a forerunner of what are now known as challenge inspections in providing for "special inspections" to be carried out by the Council when requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by a State party which suspects that some activity prohibited by the Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out.

The experience derived from this Treaty shows the necessity of giving the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons a régime of confidentiality of information. The importance of this was underscored by the industrial experts in the meetings held on 6 and 7 July 1987 in Geneva as well as in the Pugwash seminar on chemical warfare that took place, again in Geneva, on 23 and 24 January 1988.

The Argentine delegation considers it particularly necessary to establish a régime of confidentiality of information that will ensure not only that industrial and trade secrets are preserved, but also that no leakage of information can give rise to the use of information for purposes that are prohibited under the convention. Likewise, the information to be collected should actually contribute to the needs of verification and special care must be taken not to demand supplementary information that, while having a certain usefulness, could reveal technological or commercial details.

The entry into force of the convention will not of itself eliminate the possibilities of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons or those of the development or production of such weapons. These possibilities will diminish

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

as the number of States parties and the efficiency of the verification mechanisms increase. But it is possible that chemical-weapon States will not accede to the convention or that States that are not parties to the convention will develop or produce chemical weapons. Nor can the possibility that a State will violate the convention be ruled out.

On the other hand, every State has the right to provide for its own defence and its security cannot be based exclusively on universal accession to a treaty, which might only be attained in the long term; nor can it depend on the accession of all States with chemical-weapon capability, for even a country that is little developed economically and technologically could be in a position to manufacture chemical weapons.

In view of these considerations and of the objective of undiminished security for the States parties, the right of those States to protection against chemical weapons must be explicitly recognized in the future convention.

These are the bases for document CD/809, entitled "Assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons", which the Argentine delegation is submitting today for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament, with a view to helping in the drafting of article X of the draft convention. In that document we list those elements that, with others, would be included in assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons and the criteria that would govern the provision of that assistance.

Our approach to this matter of assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons is based on two criteria of application.

The first is a general criterion, according to which the convention should ensure for States parties permanent and deterrent coverage against chemical weapons through the granting of assistance both for the development and improvement of protective capacity and for cases of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. Pursuant to this criterion, the future convention should recognize the right of every State to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use means of protection against chemical weapons exclusively for defensive purposes. Likewise, all States parties to the convention would undertake to facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the purposes of protection against chemical weapons, and would have the right to participate in that exchange.

In the context of this general approach, the Technical Secretariat would have an advisory and co-ordinating role. At the request of a State party, experts from the Technical Secretariat would be able to assess that State's needs or protection against chemical weapons and to provide advice about which means and measures for protection would be most appropriate and which States parties would be in a position to supply them.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The second criterion refers to specific cases of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. Pursuant to this criterion, there would be established in the convention multilateral machinery for the provision in such cases of assistance complementary to the protection that a State party had itself developed against chemical weapons or to the assistance that it might have received or could receive through other channels.

According to this specific criterion, the future convention should recognize the right of every State party to request assistance from the Executive Council - duly stating the grounds for the request - when it is attacked with chemical weapons or considers itself threatened by such weapons. The Executive Council would consider the request immediately and, if it deemed it valid, would instruct the Technical Secretariat to confirm the complaint, investigate the facts and make an inventory of the requirements by means of an on-site inspection, if necessary and possible.

After the Executive Council had received the report of the Technical Secretariat, it would decide whether the assistance was required and, if it was, would instruct the Technical Secretariat to seek the aid of those countries that were in a position to provide it, according to the needs identified. The Technical Secretariat would co-ordinate the assistance in such a way as to make it available as rapidly as possible and would also give advice on the treatment of the wounded and on the preventive and prophylactic measures necessary.

Viewed in this way, assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons has a humanitarian character and refers to active and passive measures of protection against such weapons catering especially for the need to set up an adequate system for defending the civilian population. Consequently, assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons does not imply the possibility of access to the instructions for use of chemical warfare agents or to the development or strengthening of means of attack. Military experts are not unaware of the fact that possession of an offensive chemical capability means mastering a whole body of operational theory and having specific military training and vectors and systems that are suitable for offensive action and the acquisition of, and ability to operate which cannot come about through assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons.

In conclusion, the Argentine delegation would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, on having resumed his delicate functions, and to wish him every success in his endeavours, which his experience will facilitate. I also extend my congratulations to the chairmen of the Groups, Mr. Macedo of Mexico, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Numata of Japan. I wish to assure them all of the Argentine delegation's willingness to co-operate fully in order to move the work forward including by making our co-operation available for specific and expert tasks, with a view to placing before the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as complete as possible a text of the draft convention.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

We and our allies have a clear arms control agenda. This was reaffirmed at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council attended by heads of State and Government in Brussels on 2 and 3 March. The two communiqués issued by that Council, the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government and their Statement on Conventional Arms Control will, I understand, be circulated this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium, whose country is host to the Organization. These two documents constitute an authoritative statement at the highest level of the policies of the 16 Governments involved.

Our joint agenda includes, and here I would like to quote:

- In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings".

There are, of course, other important areas of discussion and negotiation, including within the Conference on Disarmament. But our priorities go to the heart of the security concerns of Britain and our allies. This is no coincidence. Disarmament and national security are two sides of the same coin. My Government's aim is to establish mutual security at lower levels of armaments. For us that means in particular addressing the impressive array of military might of the Warsaw Pact: the huge nuclear arsenal of the

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Soviet Union, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional and chemical weapons, and the deployment of Soviet forces hundreds of miles west of the Soviet frontier with formidable capabilities for rapid capture of territory.

- We and our allies have steadfastly supported the negotiations for a 50 per cent reduction in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weaponry. In 1986, the Alliance called for conventional stability talks covering the Atlantic to the Urals. For years we have been pressing for a global chemical weapons ban. My Government much welcomes the new Soviet readiness to join in serious negotiations in all these areas.

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(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The most active current area of multilateral negotiations is chemical weapons. The British Government has long been committed to work for a global and comprehensive ban with effective verification. This remains a high priority for us, as was reaffirmed in the recent North Atlantic Council Summit Declaration. Britain gave up its chemical weapons over a quarter of a century ago. We are intent on producing a strong Convention which will remove these weapons from the entire world.

Impressive progress has been made, to which my delegation has fully contributed. We have submitted seven major papers to the negotiations, most recently those on challenge inspection and institutions.

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(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

A large number of issues remain to be solved: the list is well known to those of us round this table. We want to reach the end of our endeavour as quickly as possible. But I do not understand those who suggest that all we need is a final sprint to the finishing line. Would they be content with a second-rate convention? We would certainly not. My Government wants a good convention. That requires a lot more work. And we think we should all be prepared to devote the necessary effort.

Above all, we have to work out together a tight verification system. We must be in a position to know whether States parties are playing fair. This is a highly complicated technical problem. We must face this squarely. We do not help matters by pretending that what is difficult is easy. Proposals for putting together a credible verification régime have been submitted by a number of countries, including my own. But we are still far from a solution. Much more careful thought and ingenuity is required.

My authorities attach particular importance to challenge inspection. I do hope that a consensus on it can be reached during the current session of the Conference.

Data exchange is by this stage in the negotiations a prime necessity. We have to know the size of the problem we are tackling if we are to produce a convention that works. And we have to build up the confidence and trust necessary to attract wide support for the convention. Let us establish a habit of openness. This applies to each and every one of us. Britain gave up its chemical-weapon capability in the 1950s, but we have a large civil chemical industry, and as long ago as 1984 we declared the number of facilities in the United Kingdom producing certain key chemical precursors for legitimate industrial purposes.

The main responsibility rests on those countries which possess chemical weapons, and especially on those with the largest stocks. The United States has already revealed detailed information on its toxic agents and its stockpiles. The Soviet Union made welcome steps in the same direction with a visit to the chemical weapons establishment at Shikhanv, and with the official admission to the possession of 50,000 tonnes of toxic agents. But this is only the beginning. Perhaps inevitably it raises as many questions as it answers. The toxic agents shown at Shikhanv dated from the 1940s and 1950s. Given the Soviet Union's great effort in the chemical weapons field, have they not perhaps produced other agents since then? The figure of 50,000 tonnes of total toxic agents is much lower than many estimates by Western experts. Can the Soviet Union give us more information which might perhaps help to reconcile this wide divergence?

The distinguished Vice-Minister of the Soviet Union has proposed a list of data which might be exchanged on a wide multilateral basis. We are studying the list with interest. A list may well have a useful function. But I must make this clear. What we look for above all is provision of further data by the country with overwhelmingly the largest chemical-weapon capability. That is the urgent need for our negotiating process. We hope that it will soon be met more fully.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

By referring to the history of the involvement of non-governmental organizations in policy formulation and work on disarmament, I had in mind that it is well established that public pressure contributed directly to an end to the First World War. The series of agreements reached in Geneva on chemical weapons, on the rules of war and on inhumane weapons, to mention only a few examples, were also shaped by public pressure.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Extending this idea further, many of us have said that the need to develop complementarity between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations is vital. Indeed, my delegation would argue that a review and possible redefinition of that complementarity will be possibly the fundamental issue to be addressed at the third special session.

What I said earlier about the need for a new agenda, for example, rests on the notion that this complementarity and the need to ensure its continuation in the future, is a critical issue.

There is one field of present activity which is proceeding strongly within our Conference, is being pursued bilaterally and is serving to illustrate in large measure the overall co-operation that can be forged when bilateral work and multilateral work move forward in a mutually supportive way. This is our negotiations on a universal chemical weapons convention. Those negotiations are vital and at present serve as a paradigm case for work on disarmament by the overall world community, both multilaterally and bilaterally.

We have already reached clear measures of agreement in those negotiations, although a good deal still remains to be done. One such measure of agreement is that chemical weapons must never be used. This agreement supplements that of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but goes beyond it and states a prohibition of use, without qualification. Perhaps we should send a signal to the world community by proclaiming that prohibition now, by reporting to the third special session that we are agreed that chemical weapons must never be used and by seeking endorsement of that commitment by the Assembly, by the world community.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

I intend to speak in this intervention on chemical weapons. This is the core of the negotiations in the CD these days. The stakes at issue are high and the negotiations should not lose momentum.

Earlier I already expressed our warm thanks to Ambassador Ekéus and his staff for the work they undertook last year and in January. We congratulate his successor as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and we wish him and his staff, as well as the new item co-ordinators, the success that they deserve; in fact, the cause of the complete ban on chemical weapons deserves it.

We have listened with great attention to what others have said these past weeks and also today on chemical weapons. I mention only the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, and of Italy, Mr. Andreotti, who last month eloquently expressed their views on the urgency of the task of completing a ban on chemical weapons.

Let me first explain why my Government considers the matter to be urgent; why we, in fact, fully endorse the words of the resolution of last year's General Assembly, according to which the negotiations should be accelerated; why, indeed, we welcome the communiqué of the bilateral summit of the United States and the Soviet Union in Washington of 10 December last year, where the leaders of the two countries speak not only of their commitment to an effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons but also of the need for intensified negotiations towards the conclusion of a convention.

Negotiations have been going on now for a very long time. In fact, it was nearly twenty years ago that countries decided for the first time to address the matter. I am aware that global negotiations tend to take a long time and that, perhaps, even this is not a record of longevity. But there still is a time span, which, if exceeded, could affect the credibility and effectiveness of the negotiations.

The day will come when we reach the point where time begins to work against us. There are three reasons in particular why my delegation thinks that these are the months and this the year in which a maximum effort should be deployed.

In the first place, the international community is witness to a horrifying trend towards the proliferation of chemical weapons to countries that up to now did not possess them. In his statement on 23 July last year, Ambassador Friedersdorf said that, according to United States estimates, the number of countries that are actual or potential possessors of chemical weapons is increasing. On that date, approximately 15 countries were believed to possess, or to be seeking to acquire chemical weapons. Perhaps the estimates are even higher to-day.

In the Gulf War, chemical weapons continue to be used. Repeatedly delegates of Iran have informed us here in this room of terrible chemical

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

bombardments killing sometimes hundreds of people. According to some reports, so far 1,000 men have been killed by CW in the Gulf War, whereas 7,000 Iranian civilians have suffered severe health problems following CW attacks.

In the second place, we note a trend not only towards horizontal proliferation, but also towards what could be called vertical proliferation. After a period of comparative obscurity during the 1970s, chemical weapons are now receiving renewed attention. Galloping technical developments lead to an evergrowing potential to destroy and kill. The toxicity of modern chemical weapons exceeds that of those used in the First World War ten to one hundred fold. Those weapons are odourless, they cannot be sensed and their use is hard to detect. Whether released as liquid or gas, toxics make themselves felt in minutes and within an hour's time they kill.

In short, it will become increasingly difficult to put the genie back into the bottle. The situation may arise in which we will, so to speak, be shooting at a moving target. It will become more difficult to hit the target, as effective verification may become increasingly difficult. If, on the other hand, we soon succeed in concluding the convention, the convention itself, as well as the experience we gain with its implementation, would at least provide us with a more reassuring basis on which to consider and contain such new developments.

Finally, the third reason why we think the political climate seems favourable for intensifying our endeavours: the world is witness these days to major achievements in the field of disarmament to which reference has been made by previous speakers today. A Treaty on INF has been concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union and the two countries seek to conclude an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms. We, as others, greatly welcome these developments. They demonstrate that the two countries that possess also the largest chemical weapons arsenals have the political will to do business in disarmament. But in our view they also indicate that this is the moment when the countries represented here in the Conference should show that in disarmament a major multilateral effort can be crowned with success.

My words should not, of course, be interpreted as a plea for setting time-limits at this stage. An early deadline would only work to the advantage of those who believe that the present language of the rolling text is already sufficiently elaborate, and we are not one of them.

On the contrary, important, extremely complicated work lies ahead. In particular, we should elaborate and fine-tune a verification régime strengthening confidence that under all circumstances the convention will indeed be implemented. We must continue to work for a convention that is effectively verifiable and that, at the same time, will inspire confidence that unverified cheating is no realistic option.

We have been told that President Reagan's motto is "Trust and verify". We indeed believe that trust, confidence, should, in the end, cement us together under the convention. Let us not deceive ourselves by *fata morganas*

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

of a 100 - per cent - verifiable convention. If such were our marching orders, we should never have started the course. Even under the most stringent inspection régime - and that is what we are heading for - there remains the risk of cheating, ill-disposed or otherwise.

In the end, security considerations have to be weighed up. The moment should come - not now, but neither, I hope, only in the course of the nineties - when, on the basis of as solid a verification régime as possible, we shall take the plunge. At some point, the security risk of a proliferation-prone situation without a global ban will outweigh the remaining risk, of non-compliance under a global ban. As the French say, le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.

Turning now to verification as the major issue, I shall in particular speak about two themes on which further work needs to be done. One concerns challenge inspection, the other the so-called question of "non-production".

On challenge inspection we made major progress last year. I think that, as Ambassador Solesby has said this morning, we have gone a long way towards accepting that, at the request of a country, a challenge inspection can be initiated and carried out, without permitting so-called filters to affect the mandatory nature of the inspection. In the Netherlands view, the inspection should in fact be carried out in accordance with the request, even in the exceptional case where the requested State, e.g. for particular security reasons, objects to the access of the inspection team to the site and cannot agree on alternative terms with the requesting State. Of course, the inspection team should abide by certain inspection rules to prevent unnecessary intrusiveness, given the need to protect sensitive military and commercial data. But this should not divert us from the obligation of a challenged State to demonstrate compliance by permitting access.

Another problem that still needs to be resolved concerns the role that the Executive Council could or should play in the so-called third stage, i.e. after the phase of initiation of the inspection and after the second phase of actual inspection on the spot has been completed. This, of course, is the decisive phase, in particular if the inspection team has found evidence of the existence of stocks or production of chemical weapons or the inspection team has not been able to collect evidence because the requested State has, contrary to the rules, not permitted access to the site.

The inspection team will then present its report to the Secretariat and, as we see it, the Secretariat should pass its findings on to the requesting State, as well as to the Executive Council.

In this context, I wish to refer to remarks made by those who think that the convention should contain provisions on the way in which a violation of the rules of the convention must be determined. The advantage of specifying that procedure is supposed to be that, on the basis of a decision, there would be no uncertainty about non-compliance. On the other hand, the disadvantage of any multilateral procedure, be it in the framework of the Executive Council

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

or in the General Conference, would be that a legal question would be settled by a body in which political considerations that are not related to the matter of non-compliance might prevail.

It is for the latter reason that we think the inspection report itself could better make clear whether and to what extent evidence on compliance, as requested by the challenging State, has been given. It would be up to the challenging State to judge whether it was convinced by the evidence or lack of evidence on compliance presented by the report and to draw its conclusions from it. Then, the Executive Council may wish to discuss and assess the inspectors' report, and its findings in particular, and if required, act on the basis thereof.

In the intersessional period, intensive negotiations took place on what is perhaps one of the most, if not the most complicated subject of the convention: the monitoring and control of the chemical industry. Progress was slow, but not insignificant. A number of issues have been taken up which had hardly been addressed before. For instance, only recently a group of experts started the discussion on the definition of what is called "production capacity", in itself essential to determine the scope of the verification régime.

There appears to be consensus among delegations that under the future convention a verification régime to prevent misuse by the civil chemical industry must be effective and, at the same time, not unduly intrusive. In practice it proves to be extremely difficult to find a solution that strikes an acceptable balance between those two objectives. What is to be verified and how we can do it in the least intrusive manner are questions that trigger off discussions on details, for instance, on specific chemical substances most liable to pose a risk under a future convention; on the so-called "risk assessment" of the production of certain chemicals and on the specificity of data to be submitted to the Technical Secretariat. The outcome of such discussions will, of course, ultimately determine the frequency and intrusiveness of future inspections.

A workable definition of chemical weapons is, of course, essential for the solution of these problems. Toxicity - a dominant element in the existing unfortunately highly insufficient definition in article II - will certainly remain a central characteristic. Other elements, however such as the stability of chemical substances, their capacity to be weaponized and their volatility, are equally to be taken into account. This is also relevant to other provisions under the convention.

It seems, for example, of little use to establish a separate inspection régime on the chemical industry for production of chemical substances whose only risk to the convention appears to be caused by their toxicity: few of the hundreds of super-toxic lethal chemicals can, in practice, be used for chemical weapons purposes, quite apart from the fact that most of them are not produced at all, or only in very small quantities.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Perhaps it is not so much the toxic substances that we are after, as the facilities producing them: if today a plant produces highly toxic chemicals that do not pose a risk to the convention, it can still be considered capable of producing militarily-relevant chemicals tomorrow. The rapid pace of technological developments justifies paying full attention to this issue in the coming months.

The objective of a balance between effectiveness and non-intrusiveness will partly be achieved by fixing suitable production thresholds. Those thresholds, below which verification is not required, would vary with the risk chemicals or groups of chemicals pose to the objectives of the convention: the higher the risk, the lower the threshold under which production need not be monitored. We welcome the excellent paper on this issue, recently introduced by the United States delegation (CD/802). In our opinion, this paper is a substantial contribution to our current discussion.

Progress in the past two years has made the international chemical industry increasingly aware of the implications of the future convention for the industries concerned. Pugwash and other informal meetings have proved to be useful for a free exchange of ideas and information, also including the chemical industry.

The meeting with experts from industry organized here in Geneva in July last year gave members an opportunity to explain in detail what our intentions are: elaboration of a rigorous verification régime to ensure compliance with the objectives of a future convention banning chemical weapons, at the same time protecting the legitimate interests of the chemical industry. At the meeting and afterwards, many useful observations and suggestions were made. We believe that similar meetings may prove to be useful in the future when more progress has been made, in particular on article VI, concerning verification of non-production.

I suggest that we place the problems of verification of non-production in a proper perspective. They are important, because their solution will provide us with a keystone for an effectively verifiable régime. They present a challenge to experts, who in the first instance should try to find a delicate balance between the objectives I mentioned. But let us also keep in mind that we mainly address the problem of verification of declared facilities. Whilst recognizing the importance of an effective régime for such declared production, the risks of hidden production and hidden stocks are graver, should a country not declare a facility. No verification régime, even the most intrusive one, could provide full assurance that a country, or a producer within that country, will not cheat. An interesting avenue to be explored further and which perhaps covers part of this problem is offered by the Federal Republic of Germany in the excellent working paper CD/791, in which a régime of ad hoc checks is suggested to fill the gap between routine and challenge inspection.

But sometimes we wonder whether we do not run the risk that the régime will, in one area, become so complex that the régime as a whole, as such, becomes less credible. Should we not beware of the risk of overburdening the

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Organization with an extremely intricate verification régime with hundreds of seemingly bureaucratic details, while the real risk area of non-declared facilities is covered by a challenge régime only to be invoked in exceptional circumstances? In my delegation's opinion, the verification régime for non-production should not become a head too big for the body, but should be tailored to the genuine needs of effective verification.

The Washington communiqué of 10 December to which I just referred speaks of negotiations towards a truly global and verifiable convention. Not just global, but truly global. We agree that accession to the convention by as many countries as possible is of great importance. It would not be realistic to suppose that major chemical weapons countries will ratify, as long as many other countries with a similar actual or potential capacity will refrain from joining the convention. On the other hand, we trust there is no reason either for any country to wait with its ultimate decision to join till each and every country with a chemical-weapon potential has given its final accord. No country that is seriously pursuing the objective of a comprehensive ban can make its policies dependent on the reservations, yes, perhaps even the whims, of a hopefully small number of countries - if any - that still have to be convinced.

Here in the Conference, I am sure all members are in principle prepared to join the convention. It is therefore regrettable that so many countries have not yet clearly set out whether or not they possess chemical weapons, or, as the case may be, whether they have traced chemical weapons that are stockpiled on their territory. Various speakers have already called upon countries to follow the example of the United States, later followed by the Soviet Union, and reveal what up to now was kept a secret. A clear "Yes" or "No" would not only help us in the negotiations, but would also serve as a yardstick of genuine interest and involvement in the negotiations.

This should, in our view, be done irrespective of the interpretation to be given to the term "jurisdiction and control" under the convention: the notification of the existence of stocks should not prejudice the outcome of the discussion on countries' responsibilities under the convention.

Since internal procedures may in some cases delay an early declaration, we suggest that all countries which have no chemical weapons within their territory, and my country is one of them, just make a statement to that effect during this spring session. I don't wish to suggest that in this case silence gives consent. But it would bring us closer to realities.

The interest in broad participation in the convention should, in our view, also be reflected in the approach to certain specific subjects. I think, for example, of the problem of assistance in the case of actual use of chemical weapons or threat of use of chemical weapons against a State party, on which the Pakistan delegation has made proposals in the past, and on which Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina made some interesting remarks today.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Attention should also be given to the aspect of stimulating co-operation between industries on matters of technology in the chemical industry. Such co-operation could be encouraged on a voluntary basis. Economic and technological co-operation in general is a matter on which appropriate language can be found, taking into account the well-known limited authority in this field of Governments in countries with market economies.

In short, we should have an open mind to the legitimate wishes of various countries. Let us warm the doorsteps of the convention. But such an open-door policy should, of course, never affect the core of the convention and the obligations to be undertaken. Neither should our interest in broad participation be construed as an argument for permitting proliferation in an initial phase once the convention has entered into force. We fully respect the security concerns of countries that consider themselves more vulnerable than countries that are major chemical-weapon holders. But we think that Ambassador Yamada of Japan was right when he said that the perceived risks should not be dealt with solely in a tit-for-tat or chemical weapons-for-chemical weapons approach.

I think we also have an interest in the participation in the negotiations of countries outside the CD that have important chemical industries or that, perhaps possess chemical weapons or have chemical weapons located on their territory. Those countries can - and some of them already do - participate as observers to the Conference, as well as to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In due time we may have to think about other formulas ensuring that the views of those countries are heard before the convention is finalized.

This brings me to the broader question of multilateral data exchange prior to the signing of the convention. For some time now, growing interest has been expressed by a number of delegations in the exchange of data by countries prior to the signing and entering into force of the convention. This would not only strengthen confidence, but it would also greatly facilitate the elaboration of details of the convention itself. Those data should, in our view, relate not only to chemical weapons proper, but also to relevant chemical industries.

It is clear that such early multilateral data exchange would also increase the sense of participation of Governments concerned. Vice-Minister Petrovsky of the Soviet Union, in his speech of 18 February, introduced a memorandum on the subject. We appreciate this contribution of the Soviet delegation, because it enables us to sharpen our thinking about what it actually is that we wish to achieve and what the limits are of such a pre-convention exercise.

In the same speech, Mr. Petrovsky also proposed that States participating in the negotiations agree each to designate, on a voluntary basis, one facility where an international group of experts could test the procedures being worked out in the negotiations for verification of non-production. Such so-called "trial inspections" to test the verification procedures under consideration would be in line with ideas advanced at the recent Pugwash seminar held in Geneva in January. The workshop organized by my

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

country in 1986 could serve as an example. Delegations may also recall an earlier Netherlands suggestion for a series of so-called "familiarization visits" to the chemical industry by inspectors once the convention is established. This would enable inspectors to acquaint themselves with the intricacies of particularly complex plants.

A limited exchange of data prior to the signing of the convention would undoubtedly strengthen confidence, certainly if some of those data could be verified in a way to be developed. But we wonder whether the system of data-exchange, such as has been proposed by the Soviet Union, is called for at this stage. We should reflect on the type of data on which we could usefully have an exchange of information. Ambassador Solesby has made some interesting remarks on this point this morning. We may also wish to consider holding a number of voluntary national test runs, in order to test procedures for verifying non-production. Wide participation of countries, together with industries concerned, in such tests would seem a good starting point for the further development of a basis for finalizing the verification provisions for non-production.

Finally, I wish to ask attention to a few seemingly innocent words recurring in texts that for years now have been presented to the Conference by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Those words, at the beginning of each report, say that the draft texts contained in the report do not bind any delegation.

In spite of all the work undertaken, we have not reached the stage yet at which at least we could say: "Those lines, those pages are texts on which we reached agreement". We know that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee does not permit us to discuss final legal texts. But even so, it is noteworthy that no letter in the report has received our Governments' agreement in principle.

I wonder, whether it would not be wise at some moment to take stock and conclude that there may be hundreds of square brackets which still separate us from the finalization of our work, but that at least there are elements in the text - of course, without brackets - on which we do agree, pending the outcome of the negotiations on the other points? My delegation would welcome any suggestions on formulas that would more adequately reflect Governments' association with the achievements we have made at the end of any session.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I would now like to deal with a number of specific aspects of the work on a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Just like many other countries, the German Democratic Republic believes that the real opportunity of eliminating, once and for all, chemical means of mass destruction from military arsenals of States should be resolutely used. What we are, in effect, talking about is another zero option of global dimensions. Our aim is that no chemical weapon stocks, modern or not, should be exempt from this ban, neither in Europe nor in any other part of the world. This is precisely the rationale behind our initiatives. My delegation, therefore, regards the completion of the convention to ban chemical weapons as a particularly pressing task facing the Conference. It is for the first time that this forum is concerned with such a comprehensive matter, representing a unique test to be passed by the multilateral disarmament process. This alone compels us to set our sights high when it comes to the achievement of progress in our work. Any delay in drawing up the convention could have far-reaching consequences. Those who caution against moving too quickly on that subject should remember that the banning of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the Conference and its predecessor for some 20 years now. The start of the production of binary chemical weapons has been a grave, negative decision. Can it be interpreted as a mere coincidence that the negotiating pace has since significantly slowed down and that the risk of chemical weapons being spread further in a variety of ways is growing?

My delegation has, therefore, welcomed all the more vividly the statements we heard at this forum from high-ranking government officials from all regions. What they expressed was the resolve to do whatever is necessary to arrive at a successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations. All delegations are called upon to translate into concrete results such political determination.

(continued)

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I assure the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, of my delegation's fullest support in his difficult mission, and I am convinced that, under his guidance, decisive new results can be added to those already achieved under Ambassador Ekéus. Also, I wish the Group Chairmen: Mr. Andrej Sima, of Czechoslovakia; Mr. Pablo Macedo, of Mexico; and Mr. Sadaaki Numata, of Japan, every success in the performance of their important functions. What we now need most is to work single-mindedly, concentrate on the essential and make maximum use of each and every negotiating day.

In my view, the most important subjects to be addressed by us at this stage are unresolved problems in respect to the challenge procedure; determination of the size, composition and decision-making of the Executive Council; agreement on the order of destruction of chemical weapons, with due regard for the security interests of all States parties; and completion of the verification régime relating to article VI, dealing with the activities not prohibited by the convention, or with what is usually labelled as "non-production".

The proposals put forward by a number of delegations are being carefully studied by us. Thus, my country views the Soviet Memorandum of 19 February as a timely initiative aimed at fostering confidence and solving the practical issues associated with the implementation of the convention. The German Democratic Republic, for its part, will shortly respond to the questions posed in the Memorandum.

The Conference's intersessional work at the end of last year and at the beginning of 1988 was marked by, inter alia, efforts to shape the verification machinery. Important provisions, relating to the international organization on chemical disarmament to be set up, have been formulated. And I do hope a number of the divergencies in regard to the functions to be performed by the principal organs have now been removed.

There are, however, topics pertaining to the machinery that have not been addressed so far, such as the numerical size, composition, decision-making and procedures of the Executive Council. Here, too, the time is ripe to move forward from the stage of probing discussions. What we should seek to attain is a political agreement that can serve as a foundation of concrete arrangements.

For obvious reasons, the Executive Council issue is closely related to the important and political problems of challenge inspection, a subject where energetic efforts are required to bring about agreement, on the basis of what has already been accomplished.

If we succeed in getting the problems associated with the functions of the Executive Council closer to a solution, work on the challenge procedure would undoubtedly be facilitated. Our cause would be ill served if we tackled one issue only when the other is resolved. In fact, a parallel approach is needed.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It is precisely because of this consideration that my delegation has set forth its views on the composition, size, decision-making and other procedural matters of the Executive Council in a working paper, which has been circulated as document CD/812. It was our understanding in preparing it that the Executive Council - an organ that would have to be in session almost permanently - will be crucial to the implementation of the convention. Decisions touching upon the security interests of States parties would have to be entrusted to that Council. A principal criterion by which the Council's activities must be gauged is its effectiveness. It requires a relatively small number of members. In our paper, 21 members are suggested. Such a size would enable the body to conduct short and goal-oriented deliberations and arrive at quick decisions.

As for its composition, political and geographical criteria, as well as the level of development of chemical industries, should be taken into account. The political aspect of composition is intimately related to the security interests of the future parties to the convention.

The recognition that the convention must not impair but enhance the security of States will secure broad adherence. For that reason, the composition should correspond to the political balance established at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Yet, the geographical aspect plays an important role as well. The global character of the convention needs to be adequately taken into consideration.

One cannot overlook, though, that countries having developed chemical industries and also those with no chemical industry at all or only a weak chemical sector will be among the future States parties to the convention. Both groups might have certain priority interests that differ from each other. They will have to be taken into account for the sake of constructive co-operation. In my delegation's view, this end would best be served if the two groups were represented in a balanced manner in the Executive Council. In order to ensure that this organ can carry out its functions in the absence of consensus, provisions should be made for a majority decision. Given a balanced composition, a two-thirds majority should represent the common denominator on which to rely in the search for solutions. Such an approach would guarantee that no political group could pursue its interests without proper regard for those of others. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic believes in a close relationship between the Executive Council and all signatories to the convention. Relatively short terms of office of the members of the Council would conduce to achieving that aim. We would suggest a two-year term, without excluding the possibility of re-election.

Furthermore, conditions should be created which would enable the Executive Council to maintain, in its practical work, close co-operative relations with all signatories to the convention. Therefore, it appears essential that the Council should keep States parties informed about its activities and that they should have the right to bring issues to the attention of the Council and to participate in its work.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It would be helpful if such general principles were contained in the convention so as to serve as a basis for future rules of procedure. In addition, they would ensure that generally recognized democratic guidelines are followed in the Executive Council's work as well.

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Mr. EKEUS (Sweden) (speaking as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for chemical weapons): The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on 22 December 1987 its resolution 42/37 A, on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The resolution was adopted without a vote. Thus, all Members of the United Nations have joined the consensus on resolution 42/37 A.

The members of the Group of 21 reiterate today their full commitment to this resolution.

The Group of 21 is thus committed to the negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Thus, the Group does not agree with limited solutions, half measures or interim arrangements. Such steps would delay the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons.

The position of the Group, as based upon General Assembly resolution 42/37 A, is that all chemical weapons, not some, should be destroyed; that all chemical weapons production facilities, not some, should be destroyed, and that all, not some, production or chemical weapons should be prohibited.

Furthermore, the Group of 21 considers that the Conference on Disarmament must intensify, during the present session, the negotiations on the convention and that it must reinforce further its efforts with a view to the final elaboration of the convention at the earliest possible date. Effective organization of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is essential for progress.

The Group of 21 underlines the urgency and the importance of time as stated in the General Assembly resolution. All participants in the negotiations must do their utmost to promote rapid progress. Proposals will be looked upon from the point of view of their intrinsic value, as well as whether they facilitate prompt resolutions of outstanding issues. Procrastination and delays damage the negotiations and endanger the successful outcome, thereby compromising the overriding aim of a multilaterally negotiated total ban.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The Group of 21 welcomes bilateral contacts between States, especially between the two which have declared themselves possessors of chemical weapons, as long as those contacts are carried out with the view to promote the final elaboration of a multilateral convention at the earliest possible date. Half measures, geographically or otherwise limited arrangements, could be counterproductive, seriously harm the negotiations on a truly global and comprehensive convention, give rise to increased security concerns and lead to proliferation of chemical weapons.

In keeping with General Assembly resolution 42/37 A, the negotiations on the convention should be treated by all delegations as a matter of high priority. The negotiating parties must bear this priority in mind and consider all issues in the perspective of the overriding security interest of banning all existing and future chemical weapons.

The Group of 21 will continue to work with resolve towards the early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, comprehensive, verifiable and effective convention banning all chemical weapons.

The Group of 21 strongly appeals to all delegations to honour their commitment of concluding the convention at the earliest possible date.

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(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

With respect to chemical weapons, while we are witnessing new developments in certain countries' positions and new elements of horizontal and vertical proliferation, the prospects for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of such weapons are fading. As regards star wars, preparations continue and nobody can be sure that such warfare will not come about. That is, admittedly, not going to happen tomorrow, but the effort is under way and it is not negligible.

(Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canada)

Our work on a draft convention banning chemical weapons has progressed during the past year and during the intersessional period, thanks to the untiring efforts of the Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus and his assistants, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Krutzsch. This work is now continuing under the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka, to whom I pledge my full co-operation and that of my delegation.

Notwithstanding the progress achieved, it is clear to my Government that, while the end is in sight, we are not quite there yet. As Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky told this body on 18 February, serious major issues are still outstanding. Some of us, conscious of the enormous strides made and impatient to end the race, have suggested that these problems can be speedily resolved. I feel that implicitly, if not explicitly, denies the importance and difficulty of the remaining issues. As our colleague, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, indicated on 16 February, the danger for the marathon runner deciding to make a last desperate spurt towards his goal is that he risks running out of breath or stumbling into pitfalls. While the moment to begin our final sprint is not yet here, it is not forbidden for us to step up our pace as of now. We can and we must do so, but we should make haste carefully.

With regard to the major issues referred to by Deputy Minister Petrovsky, it is evident that several of them concern the central issue of effective verification. As pointed out last month by Mr. Genscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, we knew from the beginning that these issues would cause the greatest difficulties. The Minister noted that:

"The right solution to this problem would not be to dispense with a chemical weapon convention, but to seek stringent verification arrangements which effectively preclude the creation and possession of a militarily relevant chemical weapons potential."

We agree with Mr. Genscher that effective verification mechanisms to achieve this objective can be developed through joint efforts.

First and foremost among the outstanding verification issues is the question of the non-production of chemical weapons, that is, the article VI issue. These issues involve some of the most complex and difficult decisions in the entire treaty negotiation process. Assuming that we agree on the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and CW production facilities (articles III to V), how can we achieve a verification régime for non-production that will both be as reliable as possible and keep to a minimum intrusion in or interruption of the legitimate commercial activities of our chemical industries?

In the view of the Canadian Government, the problems raised here should not be insuperable. Several valuable and illuminating suggestions, such as the one recently submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on ad hoc checks, could help to fill gaps and resolve issues and they warrant our careful consideration. Moreover, as proposed at the Pugwash Conference last January, equipment and procedures that would go a long way towards the

(Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canada)

achievement of our goals exist already or could be designed and developed within a reasonable time. It is encouraging to note that the industry itself is now actively aware of our problems and positively inclined to help us solve them.

Also of direct relevance to verification are article VIII and our efforts to develop an organizational structure to ensure the effective implementation of the convention, as well as its timely adaptation in the light of experience and of new technological and scientific developments. It is the International Inspectorate, with its verification tasks, that will be primarily responsible for ensuring that the convention is, and is seen to be, effectively implemented. With this in mind, my Government intends in the near future to submit working papers dealing with the International Inspectorate's personnel and other resource requirements.

The effectiveness of verification is also a relevant consideration for a third major area of concern, namely the challenge inspection provisions contained in article IX. We seem agreed that a challenge inspection is to be a last resort, for when all other avenues have been exhausted. This underlines the importance of establishing routine inspection procedures that are as complete and as comprehensive as possible. With regard to the conduct of challenge inspections, I suggest the most essential requirements are that the inspectors should have the freest access possible and all the information they need and that their technical competence should be indisputable, so that they can conduct a thorough inspection and issue a definitive report. If these requirements can be met, then many of our concerns about procedures for handling inspection reports might well be allayed or disappear.

A further major issue is the question of exchanges of data prior to the entry into force of the convention. There is no doubt that exchanges of this kind will be essential, not only to build confidence, but also to assist in making realistic assessments of the extent of verification required and the size of the machinery needed to carry it out. The information already provided by some States has been useful in this regard. We particularly welcome the attention that the United States and the USSR have given to this issue. Here I want to note our interest in the proposals submitted by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on 18 February; they contain some useful ideas which we hope will be further clarified and built upon in the weeks to come.

The negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. It would be the first time the international community had negotiated a multilateral agreement banning an entire class of weapons and incorporating detailed verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry and involving the establishment of a new administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses formidable challenges. Our shared sense of the urgency of this work can only be strengthened by the numerous accusations, verified by the United Nations Secretary-General, of the repeated use of chemical weapons and by the disturbing reports of the proliferation of chemical weapons production capabilities. Canada was therefore gratified to note that, in

(Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canada)

their Joint Summit Statement on 10 December 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the need for intensive negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention.

I have noted the interesting points many of you have made at recent plenary meetings on problems to be resolved in the negotiations on chemical weapons. I refer in particular to the statement made by the Netherlands representative, Ambassador van Schaik, at the last plenary meeting on 8 March. I will also be addressing this subject in greater detail in the near future.

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 448th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should also like to recall that exactly 26 years ago yesterday - 14 March 1962 - the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community held its first plenary meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers. Since then, a number of important agreements have been concluded. However, much remains to be done. I do hope that we might be able, in a year's time, to welcome the conclusion of yet another disarmament convention in this forum.

In conformity with our programme of work, the Conference begins consideration of agenda item 4 entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure however, any member who wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

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(Mr. Stoltenberg, Norway)

In view of the danger of renewed use of chemical weapons and further proliferation of these weapons, a world-wide ban on chemical weapons is urgently needed. Therefore, all efforts should be concentrated on accelerating the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention at the earliest possible date.

Such a convention must be global, comprehensive in scope and effectively verifiable. It should lead to the elimination of all existing stocks and production facilities within the agreed 10-year period, thus significantly enhancing international security. Accordingly, it is in the interests of all States to contribute to sustaining the momentum of the negotiations.

(Mr. Stoltenberg, Norway)

Norway has no chemical weapons and has stated unequivocally that such weapons shall not be stationed on Norwegian territory. In addition, my Government is committed to doing its utmost to promote the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

A convention banning chemical weapons should be based on the important principle of asymmetrical arms reduction embodied in the INF Treaty. These negotiations are complex, since the Chemical Weapons Convention will have to contain more comprehensive verification provisions than any existing multilateral arms control convention.

Much detailed work remains to be done in the field of verification, particularly in the areas of non-production and on-site inspection on challenge. I have studied with interest the recent proposal for ad hoc checks on the chemical industry made by my colleague Dr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany. As a safety net, the Convention must also include a system of on-site inspection on challenge within 48 hours and without the right of refusal.

I am pleased that the Canadian-Norwegian proposal of July 1987 concerning the verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons will provide a basis for negotiations on the relevant procedures.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is a priority goal which should be reached at the earliest possible date. The international community expects all the negotiating parties on the Conference on Disarmament to do everything within their power to arrive at a world-wide, comprehensive and verifiable ban. I am confident that all States represented at the CD will intensify their efforts to surmount the remaining obstacles.

(Mr. Stoltenberg, Norway)

The task in this Conference, here in Geneva, is an operational one, that is, to address concrete disarmament issues such as the elimination of chemical weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, negative security assurances and so on. However, in conclusion I would like to remind everyone here that disarmament does not and cannot take place in a political vacuum. Disarmament is, of course, closely related to security. But security depends not only on military factors. A broader concept of security includes political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and ecological aspects.

As you all know, Norway has been endorsed as the Western candidate for membership in the Conference on Disarmament. To illustrate the importance we attach to the work of this Conference, I would like to present the publication "Contributions by Norway to the Conference on Disarmament 1982-1987", which has been distributed as document CD/813 today. I am pleased to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Norwegian research programmes on verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on a Chemical Weapons Convention will continue in the years ahead.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to note the presence at our meeting today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Stoltenberg, to whose statement we listened with great attention and interest. It goes without saying that we will study most carefully all the thoughts and views he put forward.

Before I embark on my main statement, which I intend to devote to the problem of banning chemical weapons, I should like, following your example, Mr. President, to observe that today's meeting is something of a landmark in the multilateral disarmament process. Twenty-six years ago, there was held here the first meeting of the Eighteen-nation Committee on Disarmament, which marked the beginning of the joint participation in arms limitation and disarmament negotiations of socialist, neutral and non-aligned countries and Western States. The expansion of this body and its transformation into the

(continued)

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Conference on Disarmament with the participation of all the nuclear Powers signified the further development of the principle of multilaterality. Looking back over these 26 years, one cannot help thinking that, in the course of such a lengthy period, far more could have been achieved, although what has been achieved is something that we must not leave out of account. With this, I will end my reference to the past and turn to the present.

In his statement on 18 February, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, expressed our assessment of the state of affairs in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons and emphasized the urgent need for early completion of the elaboration of a comprehensive convention. The Soviet Union favours increasing the pace of the negotiations to the maximum and is making a considerable contribution to that in the form of practical action. The slowing of the negotiations cannot fail to worry us.

We share the assessment of this danger made by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, on behalf of the Group of 21, on 8 March: "Procrastination and delays damage the negotiations and endanger the successful outcome, thereby compromising the overriding aim of a multilaterally negotiated total ban". We, like the Group of 21, are seriously worried by the attempts to deviate from the agreed objective of a general and complete ban on chemical weapons to substitute for the elaboration of a comprehensive convention partial measures on the regulation of chemical armaments and agreements that go only part way and permit the continued development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Could not these signs of deviation from a total chemical weapons ban be linked to the production of binary chemical weapons which has begun? Let me emphasize that the Soviet Union's goal at the multilateral and bilateral negotiations is the early conclusion of a convention on the general and complete prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons without any exception and of the very industrial base for their production.

We also note that many Western States support the idea of an early total ban on chemical weapons. However, in the statements by some other Western delegations, ever greater emphasis is, regrettably, being placed on the idea that there is no need to hurry, that there is still a lot more work to be done and that a "final sprint on the home stretch" is out of the question. At the same time, these delegations are totally unwilling to move from the positions which they stated at least several years ago and show no readiness for mutually acceptable compromise solutions.

Naturally, we too are - to use the words of Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom - in favour of drawing up "a strong convention which will remove these weapons from the entire world". We too need a convention that can be reliably verified and blocks all the loopholes for its violation. We realize the complex nature of the verification problem as well as the need to work on numerous technical details. We are, however, against using the complexity of technical issues to justify inactivity as regards the search for solutions to political issues.

In speaking at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 15 July 1986, the United Kingdom Minister of State called on us "to aim to present a complete chemical weapons convention to the United Nations General Assembly in 1987". (CD/PV.370, page 10 of the Russian text, page 9 of

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

the English text). Considerable progress has since been achieved in the negotiations. The contributing factors have been in particular that we have in fact agreed to the British approach to on-site challenge inspections and have unilaterally taken substantial steps as regards openness. Why, then, is the British delegation now pessimistic in its outlook and urging us to abandon the "home stretch" and to refrain from a "final sprint"? It turns out that, when the finishing line was not in sight, it was possible to call for it to be reached in 1987, but that, now the finishing line has become a reality, the British side can no longer (I quote from the statement by Ambassador Solesby on 8 March) "understand those who suggest that all we need is a final sprint to the finishing line".

In the same statement of 15 July 1986, the United Kingdom Minister of State said regarding the preparations in the United States for the production of binary weapons, "We have no wish to see the United States resume production [of chemical weapons] if the better option - a negotiated ban - can be achieved. It would only be with much regret that we would have to envisage such a prospect" (CD/PV.370, pages 8 and 9 of the English text). Maybe the reason for the switch to pessimism is the fact that this "regrettable prospect" has become a reality?

Let me now dwell on the outstanding issues for which the prime requirement is a political decision.

I shall begin with challenge inspections. I think that the resolution of this issue as a whole is being held back by the lack of agreement on paragraph 12 of the "Chairman's paper" contained in appendix II of CD/795. The question is how the applicability of alternative arrangements will be determined - in accordance with the opinion of the requesting State, or by decision of the Executive Council. We believe that the determination should be made by the requesting State itself. Entrusting this function to the Executive Council would, in our view, be inappropriate, first of all because it would lead to delay in conducting challenge inspections.

As we understand it, those States which favour giving the Executive Council the role of a "filter" or assigning these functions to a "fact-finding group" believe that these bodies would be able to prevent the abuse of challenge inspections. I think that the possibility of such abuse worries every State. We too have expressed our apprehensions in this regard. At the same time, having carefully considered this issue, we have come to the conclusion that the danger that exists should not be overestimated.

First of all, there is a very convincing argument that was set forth by the United Kingdom in CD/715, of 15 July 1986, to the effect that "a right in the Convention to request an inspection on challenge might never have to be invoked", since "States parties would be strongly discouraged from considering acts in breach of the Convention because of the likelihood that the breach might be discovered by means of a challenge inspection" (CD/715, paragraph 4 of the explanatory part). One could add to this that the more effective the mode of inspection, the greater the deterrent role of challenge inspections. In our view, any "filter" will inevitably diminish that effectiveness.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

International inspectors will, of course, comply with certain rules during the conduct of inspections. In fact, they have already been drawn up as regards systematic inspections. I think that many of them can be applied to challenge inspections as well.

The Soviet Union calls for constructive work to reach agreement on the inclusion in the convention of provision for mandatory challenge inspections of any location or facility without the right for States to refuse them.

The question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles remains unresolved. I shall not repeat today our assessment of the French proposal on "security stocks" - it is well known. I would just like to remark that allowing production of chemical weapons to continue after the convention enters into force would in itself be contrary to the sense of the convention. As for the references to difference in the sizes of chemical arsenals, the comparative sizes of CW arsenals will, if the convention is not concluded, be determined solely by the vicious process known as the arms race, into which ever more countries will be drawn.

We are ready to search for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem. We propose that certain categories of chemical weapons stocks should be destroyed within a shorter time-limit. Thus, unfilled chemical munitions and devices and equipment specifically designed for chemical weapons use could be destroyed by the end of the fourth year of operation of the convention. From the technical point of view, their destruction will not require so much time as the destruction of filled munitions. We are prepared to include in the agreement on the order of destruction the principle of levelling out the participants' stocks by the penultimate year of the destruction process, subject to compliance with the principle of equal security for the States parties to the convention, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

We are prepared to hold with interested countries - due allowance being made for the need to preserve production secrets, and in the interests of developing co-operation in constructing and operating large-scale chemical weapons destruction facilities - consultations on the technical aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such discussions could be accompanied by an appropriate practical demonstration.

To overcome the difficulties which have emerged in the course of negotiating the provision on past transfers (receipts) of chemical weapons stocks (and of control of such stocks), a compromise proposal has been put forward whereby declarations would be made only in cases where the volume of the transfers (receipts) exceeded one tonne a year and would indicate each calendar year when such a transfer (receipt) took place and the country which transferred or received the chemical weapons. We do not object to the setting of such a threshold. The declarations should cover the period from 1 January 1946 to the date of the convention's entry into force.

Mutual efforts are also needed to solve the problem of ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. A difficult aspect of this problem relates to schedule [1] chemicals. I would like to remind you that the Soviet Union, in a search for a solution to this aspect of the problem, has agreed that for nitrogen mustard, which is produced in a number

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of countries for pharmaceutical purposes, there should be a special exception in the convention allowing its production outside the small-scale facility for the production of schedule [1] super-toxic lethal chemicals, provided that the facilities for its production are made subject to the verification régime envisaged for the small-scale facility. We would like to hope that this step of ours will be of help in solving the problem.

There is, as is known, yet another difficulty connected with schedule [1] chemicals; it relates to the laboratory synthesis of those chemicals. We believe that, in the search for a solution to this issue, there is at least one obligatory condition that cannot be ignored: both the production and the laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals must be carried out under strict international control.

Now, I would like to share with you some considerations aimed at settling the issue of schedule [2] chemicals, that is, of key precursors. The issue of the capacity of the key-precursor production facilities which would be subject to declaration and systematic international verification is as yet unresolved. We propose setting a threshold of 1 tonne a year. In other words, all installations (facilities) with a capacity in excess of 1 tonne a year would be subject to declaration and systematic international verification.

Agreement has already been reached in the negotiations on initial visits to declared installations (facilities) for the purposes of familiarization with them, verification of the correctness of the declared data (capacity, chemicals produced, plant specifications, etc), and determination of the verification procedures for these installations (facilities). The International Inspectorate will, on the basis of the installations' specifications, determine the frequency of inspections within a range of one to five inspections a year.

We believe that this capacity "threshold" combined with the "ceiling" on the number of inspections is optimal in terms of striking a balance between the effectiveness of verification on the one hand, and its non-intrusiveness on the other. We also take into account the views expressed in this connection by other participants in the negotiations.

A similar approach could be employed as regards schedule [4] chemicals (super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical warfare agents). However, in view of the special nature of these chemicals, the threshold for declaration of the relevant installations (facilities) would be 10 kg a year, while the frequency of inspection would range from one to three inspections a year.

It is a matter of satisfaction to us that practical work has begun on articles X and XI, which the Soviet Union considers very important.

Work has at last begun on the concluding articles of the convention. We hope that it will soon lead to a reduction in the number of "blanks" in the text of the draft convention. One of these articles is to determine the depositary or the depositaries of the convention. We are in favour of the depositary's being the United Nations Secretary-General.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

I would also like to say a few words regarding multilateral data exchange prior to the signing of the convention. This question was first raised in 1983, by the delegation of the United Kingdom. Last year the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, also called on all the members of the Conference to declare whether they possessed chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities.

According to our calculations, over 20 States have already stated that they do not possess chemical weapons. Two States, the Soviet Union and the United States have declared that they have chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly been urged to make various declarations regarding its chemical weapons capability. In this context, the reference point has been the information that has been proclaimed by the United States, namely the location of chemical weapons storage facilities and the percentage of various types of chemical armaments. We, for our part, believe that information on the size of chemical weapon stocks is much more important. As is known, we have made that information public. The United States has not as yet provided such data.

Thus, the body of information provided varies between countries. States are motivated by subjective considerations in declaring particular kinds of data.

On 18 February this year, we introduced a Memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons (CD/808). In it we have described what would, in our view, be the optimum body of information to be exchanged.

Of course, the document that we have submitted is now being studied by other participants in the negotiations. We hope to hear their views on this proposal soon.

I should like to explain that we do not consider multilateral data exchange as an obligatory prerequisite for the drawing-up of the convention. None the less, such an exchange would undoubtedly be useful both as a contribution to the resolution of the practical problems connected with the preparation of the convention and as a confidence-building measure. With this in mind, we propose the exchange of the body of information envisaged in our Memorandum. It has been defined primarily on the basis of what is needed to solve practical issues connected with the preparation of the convention. It is a kind of a common denominator for a multilateral data exchange. We believe that it is precisely this criterion, rather than data provided by one side alone, that should be the basis for an exchange. From our point of view, it is important that the preparations for a multilateral data exchange should not delay the negotiations on the chemical weapons ban. We see the purpose of a multilateral exchange as being to facilitate and accelerate the conclusion of the convention.

The Soviet Union has already declared that it possesses chemical weapons and the size of its stockpiles, that it has stopped production of these weapons, that there are no Soviet chemical weapons on the territory of other

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

countries and that it has not transferred chemical weapons to other countries - that is, it has declared a considerable part of the information to be exchanged at the first stage of the multilateral data exchange. In addition to that, I am authorized to provide the following information:

1. There are on our territory no chemical weapons belonging to other States;
2. We have chemical weapons production facilities;
3. The USSR has not transferred to other States technology or equipment for the production of chemical weapons;
4. The USSR has not since 1 January 1946 received from other States chemical weapons or technology or equipment for their production.

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to all participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons to make additional efforts with a view to identifying the possibilities of finding mutually-acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues in order to complete the elaboration of those provisions of the convention which have not yet found expression as formulas in the future convention.

Early completion of the elaboration of the convention on the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons will not merely rid humanity of this type of weapons of mass destruction. It will also demonstrate the possibilities of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament and deprive sceptics of grounds for denying the promising nature of this process.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): The distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union has referred to part of a statement that I have made to this Conference, and I would like, if I may, briefly to respond. He has referred to a comment I made, that I do not understand those who suggest that all we need in our negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons is a final sprint to the finishing line.

With due respect to the distinguished Ambassador, I would suggest that his statement today has amply illustrated precisely why I made that comment. He has described a number of areas where considerable work is still outstanding, and the list is a good deal longer than that. And he has also, I think, well illustrated the complex and complicated nature of those issues. There remain a formidable number of difficult technical problems for us to resolve, and I am therefore uneasy, and my authorities are uneasy, when we are told that a solution is just round the corner, even by May this year has been mentioned. In our opinion, this is simply not feasible. Not if we want a good convention. We, for our part, want a successful end to our negotiations

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

as soon as possible, but we want a thorough job, we want the technical problems squarely faced, and we want effective solutions to them. And I think I may say - I hope, without being immodest - that my country has been active in the search for solutions, and I can assure the distinguished Ambassador from the Soviet Union that we shall continue to be second to none. I hope he will forgive me if I add that we would welcome it if the Soviet Union felt able to put forward rather more specific and elaborated studies and proposals about how solutions might be found to the very complicated problems still in front of us. I can assure you that we, for our part, would always be ready to consider such contributions carefully.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would certainly echo what Ambassador Solesby has just said far better than I can, but I would like to add that I can well understand the anxiety of the USSR for a speedy conclusion of a convention in order to freeze its chemical weapons advantage in place for many years. But we are simply not interested in that type of activity.

The distinguished Soviet Ambassador mentioned, as he usually does in his speeches, production of binary chemical weapons, which has begun. Yes, it has begun, and it shall continue. The Ambassador knows, as well as I do, that the United States has approved a programme to totally destroy all other unitary stocks, and production of binary chemical weapons will leave the United States with a smaller stockpile than it presently possesses, a stockpile which is far below the level of the largest stockpile in the world, possessed by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Ambassador talks about concluding work in a sprint, a last-minute run to the finish-line and so forth, and he also mentions that we should all show readiness for mutually acceptable compromise solutions. Ineffective compromise solutions are not what we are interested in here. We do not believe security is compromisable. We are negotiating a treaty to increase our security, not to reach a compromise for the sake of a convention.

The Soviet Ambassador also talks about the search for solutions to political issues. We are not here to solve political issues; we are here to draft a convention that is verifiable. Political issues will be solved in the capitals, not in Geneva.

And finally, I would say that, like the United Kingdom, we are certainly here as a well-motivated delegation that has introduced as many papers as possible trying to speed these negotiations along. The United States the year before last released more information on its chemical weapons stockpile, including the location of production and storage sites. We have repeatedly called upon the Soviet Union to present this information, and all we have received is a very vague statement about their possessing not more than 50,000 tonnes. That tells us exactly nothing. We think that the Soviet Union would be far more forthcoming if they would present the information in a comprehensive nature, as the United States has done.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The reaction that my statement evoked from the distinguished representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States had led me to the thought that perhaps I was insufficiently clear in setting forth some of the aspects in my main statement and, without in any way entering into a polemic with them, I should like to make a few brief additional remarks.

First of all, I cannot fail to express surprise at what the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, said regarding compromises. As I see it, not to seek compromises means not to seek mutually-acceptable solutions in negotiations, and I cannot imagine negotiations, I cannot conceive of a desire to reach agreement without such a search. Secondly, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, once again called on the Soviet Union to provide additional information on its chemical warfare capacity. In today's statement we gave additional information, and the main idea of the Memorandum that we proposed - and I tried to explain this in my statement - is to find some sort of objective criterion for information exchange, for data exchange: not to put forward as such a criterion the volume of information already provided by one side, but to find a body of information that would truly be consistent with the task of accelerating the drawing-up of the convention. In the statement by the United States representative, Ambassador Friedersdorf, doubt was again expressed about the accuracy of the Soviet Union's declaration of its stockpiles, but I will repeat yet again that the Soviet Union's stockpiles do not exceed 50,000 tonnes in terms of chemical warfare agents, and this can be checked immediately after the entry into force of the convention within a time-limit of 30 days. And finally, I should like to point out that the statement by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, did not explain why, in 1986, the United Kingdom believed in the possibility of concluding the convention in 1987, but now the British side's assessment of the state of affairs in the negotiations has changed and is far more pessimistic even though the number of unresolved problems has, in the meanwhile, been significantly reduced.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I am surprised at the Soviet Ambassador's surprise. What I was referring to when I referred to compromise was to how the United States regards its security as not compromisable. And we are here to negotiate a convention that increases our security and, I repeat, that is not compromisable.

On the second point, data exchange, what I was calling for was for the Soviet Union to provide to this Conference, as the United States has done, information on the location and number of production and storage facilities of its chemical weapons stocks.

(Mr. Morel, France)

With respect to chemical disarmament, I would recall that, in 1978 and again in 1983, the highest authorities of the French Republic made the banning of these weapons one of the conditions for participation by our country in multilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. That is to say that France accords vital importance to the negotiations that currently account for the bulk of the activity of the Conference on Disarmament.

In order to assess the state of the work under way under Ambassador Sujka's authority, it suffices to compare what has been settled with what has not yet been settled. Considerable progress has been made, sometimes spectacularly so, and the convention is therefore gradually taking

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(Mr. Morel, France)

shape. But there is also considerable work still to be done and it is too early to set a date. Rather than thinking a priori that a few political compromises would suffice to settle the real questions that are now at issue, let us try, without preconceived ideas, briefly to identify those questions.

Going through the convention, it is possible to find a dozen or so major subjects for which, after so many years of negotiation, no solution has been found. For each of them, the problem is not, as sometimes happens, just with a particular point or a specific obstacle. No, in each case there is a set of difficulties, a nucleus of problems. These are, to our mind, the main points still outstanding:

First, problems of definition, with respect to which widely differing positions have been voiced, though I will not recall them here;

Second, declarations and data exchange as provided for in the convention, a point I just mention now and to which I will revert later in my statement;

Third, designation of substances, whether it be super-toxic lethal chemicals or more generally future conditions for list management. In this regard, I would recall the role that should, as we see it, be played by the scientific advisory council which is indispensable to the proper functioning of a convention of unlimited duration;

Fourth, the order of destruction of stocks. This point is of particular interest to us, and I need not recall our concern that the convention should assure equal security for all parties during the transitional period. But, contrary to what some might wish, we are not alone in attaching importance to this point; far from it. We are perhaps alone for the time being in raising this problem untiringly, simply because it exists; but I must say that, even if we have not yet found a solution, the reactions that we have seen so far lead us to believe that we are not working in vain. In the context of this inventory, I should just like to make clear a few elements of our position:

The idea of the levelling-out of stocks is an interesting element: As it has been presented so far, it really applies only to the end of the transitional period and only settles a part of the problem: what means does it offer for dealing with the case of recalcitrant countries that choose to remain outside the convention and join it only during the eighth year, in the final phase of destruction?

This example shows that an approach based on an immediate "freeze" of the existing situation is incapable of satisfying the twofold need to ensure the security of all countries during the period of destruction of stocks and to make the convention attractive to all. That is what led us to submit our proposal.

To take only the situation in Europe, it would not be acceptable if, on the entry into force of the convention, a country had a virtual chemical monopoly. It could be argued that the present situation is not very far from that; however, the other European nations now have the possibility of

(Mr. Morel, France)

organizing their chemical defence as they see fit, in keeping with their assessment of the threat. This possibility must be left open to them, if they wish, for as long as the threat persists, but within narrow limits, under international control, until reduction of the present stocks has been virtually completed, that is, the eighth year after the entry into force of the convention.

In that way, the first phase of the convention would indeed be what it should be: a period of transition, not only as regards the destruction of stocks but also as regards the organization of security. A country should not overnight be placed abruptly and irreversibly in a situation where it is unable to organize its chemical defence; it is, on the other hand, fair that it should find itself in a situation of lesser freedom. Whence the idea, which we consider an essential one, of leaving open, under the strict conditions we have proposed, the possibility of having a minimum security stock supplemented by a production unit placed, from the moment of entry into force, under international control.

We have often been criticized for favouring proliferation in this way, whereas we want, on the contrary, to prevent it. We think that a convention that neglected the real difficulties of this especially critical period would offer the best of alibis to those in favour of proliferation, and that a transitional and selective arrangement whereby the security States deemed indispensable would have a very real price, namely the permanent intrusion of international verification, would oblige each country to make a clear declaration and to shoulder its responsibilities, thus depriving the possible recalcitrants of a convenient loophole.

To resume my inventory, I come now to the fifth point, verification. It must still be checked that régimes 2 and 3 defined for civilian industry will be viable. With respect to routine inspections, which should perhaps be described as regular inspections so as to avoid any pejorative connotation that would detract from the importance of a central mechanism, we think it better, rather than to construct an intermediate category of inspection halfway between current practice and challenge, to be prepared to broaden their range. In our opinion, the most recent proposals concerning ad hoc or confirmatory inspections should be integrated appropriately into the regular verification activities.

Sixth, I will turn to institutions. The main lines of the edifice have already been drawn, but what should be the specific weights of the various organs, their respective areas of competence, their modes of operation? With respect more particularly to the composition of the Executive Council, we think that the aim should be a mechanism that is not simply a copy of the usual rules in general political bodies such as the United Nations or this Conference, but is, on the contrary, directly linked to the convention itself and so combines the geographical, the political and the industrial criteria.

Concerning the seventh point, challenge inspection, there is no need to recall the progress already made. However, several important issues are still pending, particularly that of the last phase, which concerns consideration of

(Mr. Morel, France)

the report of the inspectors and the possible consequences thereof. The divergences concerning the respective roles of the requesting State and the Executive Council are manifest. As a preliminary step, to facilitate the discussion and without prejudging the balance that is ultimately agreed on, we propose looking into the following sequence, which, it seems to us, derives from the very nature of the exercise: first, the inspection team would simultaneously submit its report to the requesting State, the requested State and the Executive Council so that consultations can commence among the parties concerned; second, the requesting State - which, let us not forget, would be at the origin of the procedure - would take a formal stand in the light of the report and indicate whether it considered there had been a violation of the convention or not and the consequences it drew from that; third, the Executive Council would adopt its position on the report and its possible consequences. This is, I repeat, a possible working framework which deliberately leaves open several very important substantive issues.

The eighth point is assistance and economic and technological development. This, as numerous delegations have pointed out, is an essential element of the convention for the same reason as those already mentioned. Technical and industrial co-operation will be one of the fields covered by the convention, as will verification machinery. In the light of the various interesting proposals made recently with respect to assistance, it can, furthermore, be seen that there is a direct link between assistance and security during the transitional period.

The ninth point is the entry into force of the convention. Many questions remain open, and the mention simply of a figure for the number of States necessary for implementation will not be enough to resolve them. Thought must also be given to the integration of laggard States in the activities in the transitional period.

Finally, there is the question of linkage between the convention and the Geneva Protocol.

This relatively brief inventory is in no way exhaustive, and other participants in the negotiations could compile it quite differently, with very good reasons. But I hope we are well understood: this cannot be used as an alibi for doing nothing or to win time. The experience of recent years, and particularly of the past few months, has, on the contrary, shown that these very real difficulties can be overcome through patient and methodical endeavour. But it would be futile to imagine that a sudden political inspiration could at one stroke bring about a solution comparable to the gesture of the Emperor Alexander to Gordius of Phrygia. It would at worst be to deceive ourselves and at best to put off the difficulty until later and so undermine the convention in advance. The best way to make progress towards a credible, stable and durable convention is not to set a date - which would necessarily be artificial - but to intensify our work. We are prepared to do that at any moment.

(Mr. Morel, France)

The question of information for the future parties to the convention, which has the Conference's attention today, is an important element, and even an indispensable one in certain instances, even before the text is completed. We have stressed this on several occasions. Signing cannot be a shot in the dark. But it is also clear that the gathering of the data necessary for developing the various mechanisms of the convention is a sensitive exercise which must be subject to the convention itself and must not become an autonomous exercise. An effort must therefore be made to define the modalities for such an exchange precisely by relating it constantly to the negotiations now under way.

The very general two-stage system described in the Memorandum submitted by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union a month ago deserves detailed consideration. We must, however, draw attention as of now to a series of drawbacks. First of all, technical drawbacks: several of the classifications mentioned are not yet the subject of agreed definition. The Soviet Union, having noted this itself, is proposing that everyone should add their own definition; such an exercise would result in the formation of a mass of heterogeneous and not immediately verifiable information and would at the same time tend to crystallize the differences of position on this matter. Next, legal and political drawbacks: no rule of law can compel a State to participate in such an exercise until it has signed the convention. There is, of course, the factor of confidence, but confidence is not something that can be decreed, and the recent experience of the Stockholm Conference has shown that several years were needed to come up with an agreed mechanism for the multilateral transmission of information on military activities. In other words, such a system for generalized exchange of information would rapidly give rise to parallel negotiations culminating in a sort of "shadow convention" that would be fatal for the real convention. Far from speeding up the negotiations, such a procedure would in fact delay it and distort its mechanisms in advance.

Our thinking is therefore oriented towards the definition of a far more specific mechanism.

First of all, rather than confusing them, a clear distinction must be made between the preliminary transmission of information before the completion of the treaty and the normal data exchange that will take place after the entry into force under the agreed rules and with the necessary means of verification. Of course, it is not a distinction that it is easy to make, and we would like it to be discussed in depth. It seems to us at first sight that the "need to know" as it emerges from the negotiation of the essential provisions of the convention would provide a more specific and objective criterion than overly general provisions defined in the light of the inevitably vaguer criterion of confidence. Once the outlines have been clearly determined, it would be advisable to check on the satisfaction at the same time of a certain number of conditions with respect to the internal balance of the convention: the transmission of information will be meaningful and effective only if the draft convention spells out beforehand the definitions of the data in question, the modalities for actual exchange after

(Mr. Morel, France)

the period of 30 days from the entry into force, the relevant verification régime and, finally, the main characteristics of security during the transitional period.

That seems to us to be the means to avoid the confusion of species and a slide towards the parallel negotiation of a "convention bis". Data exchange cannot of itself anticipate the entire convention and establish confidence in one go. It is just a part - an important part, of course - of a whole that is to come. The exchange of information that we suggest would thus confirm the viability of the essential provisions of the convention even before the conclusion of the negotiations. To seek to prove too much before the signing or before the entry into force might, on the other hand, lead to a cheapened convention, which is not our objective.

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(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

Mr. President, I turn now to the more positive aspect of the work of the CD, where considerable progress has been made during the last year. I refer to the negotiations relating to a chemical weapons convention. A comprehensive, universal and effective prohibition on chemical weapons would lead to an enhancement of the security of all nations by removing an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It would also provide an example for negotiations in other areas for multilateral disarmament.

While we are close enough to see the light at the end of the tunnel, it is disturbing to hear voices of scepticism being raised by some. I would urge all countries to refrain from taking any steps that would undermine confidence, so necessary to see us through to our objective. This calls for restraint from actions which could be construed as provocative and complicate the negotiations. It is also necessary to keep our objective clearly in focus - a universal, comprehensive disarmament agreement. Only such an agreement can safeguard the interests of all States, despite the diversity of their perceptions. Let us keep in mind that each sovereign State, before consenting to accede to the convention, must discover for itself a positive balance between obligations, responsibilities and advantages.

If I sound too cautious, it is perhaps because I perceive that what is at stake here is more than one disarmament agreement and the very capacity of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum. On the whole I am cautiously optimistic. I do hope that other delegations also share this cautious optimism about a satisfactory conclusion of the Conference's efforts on a chemical weapons agreement during 1988.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

It is difficult to visualize how any progress can be achieved unless the CD is given the freedom to fulfil its negotiating responsibilities, as spelled out in the Final Document. A negotiating mandate does not forestall or prevent requisite preparations. On the contrary, it obliges delegations to start meaningful discussions because there is a clear objective. I have no doubt that the negotiating mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons since 1984 helped to focus the discussions and intensify the work. What is necessary is a commitment to early realization of the goal of prevention of an arms race in outer space shared by all, and I would strongly urge you to consider a mandate which would suitably reflect such a common objective.

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(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

On the other side, there have been developments that enable us to enhance confidence in compliance with existing and future disarmament agreements. The same satellite technologies can be used to play an important role as a confidence-building measure. The same sensor technologies can also assist in the monitoring of a future chemical weapons convention or an ASAT ban. Technology is neutral; its applications can be stabilizing or de-stabilizing. We have to develop the means to channel these applications into a stabilizing mode. In order to do so, we need continually to assess the implications of these developments for security. We also need to develop appropriate institutional mechanisms which are capable of undertaking this task. The arms race has unfortunately made science and technology the masters of war rather than the servants of peace. At SSOD-III, we must look at this equation and attempt to redress the balance.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia):

It is regrettable that not a single of the three "nuclear" items on our agenda is treated on a working level. We see a certain discrepancy between the substantial progress achieved recently in the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations, as embodied by the INF Treaty, and the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament on the multilateral level. Apparently, the reason for this stagnation emanates from the fact that not all participants in the multilateral fora have, for the time being, accepted the option of nuclear disarmament as, in the final account, the most reliable way towards ensuring international security without directly endangering life on Earth. Supporters of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence are not prepared to observe passively how some building blocks of that doctrine are being removed today and still others may disappear in the destruction facilities tomorrow. In their eyes, what has been lost must be replaced, where possible by the means of nuclear warfare and, where this option is closed, by other types of weapons of mass destruction or at least by a massive build-up of conventional forces. Only in that context can one understand the reluctance in some countries to even start discussion on the elimination of the so-called tactical nuclear weapons and the clear preference for strengthening them in order to compensate for the INF lost. It is once more in the same context that the quite recently rediscovered strategic importance of CW and, hence, the efforts at chemical rearmament, which, unfortunately, has become a political reality, can be, if not justified, at least explained.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Our dealing with the prohibition of chemical weapons represents a special case. After somewhat general exchange of views in 1980-1983, more specific discussion and, indeed, negotiations ensued after 1984. Active work has taken place, especially in the course of the last two years. Important proposals have been submitted, taking into account also the positions of negotiating partners. I am convinced that no one would disagree that in our negotiations on chemical weapons we have witnessed a spirit of compromise unprecedented in the CD. It resulted in the rapprochement of positions on a number of key problems of the CW convention and widely shared optimism as to the possibility of its early conclusion.

It would be only logical to expect that our work would now enter a concluding stage, a final drafting of the convention. As we realized at the beginning of this session, when we discussed the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, some delegations concluded, or rather were instructed to conclude, that the time for final drafting has not come yet. If it were only a matter of the wording of the mandate and if the activities of the Ad hoc Committee on CW continued with the same tempo as in 1987, we could live with the old mandate. However, it now seems to us that it was not just the wording of the mandate that was in question. The real reason behind unwillingness to subscribe to final drafting of the CW convention was apparently the fact that the Governments of some countries officially speaking in favour of chemical disarmament have not yet adopted a final political decision to choose that option.

In that connection, we are observing, to put it mildly, somewhat unusual developments in the approach of some delegations to a number of key provisions of the negotiated convention. Let me take, for instance, the question of challenge inspection. Not so long ago it was loudly heralded that the negative approach of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the acceptance of such inspections without right of refusal was the main obstacle to the achievement of the convention.

In an attempt to advance the elaboration of the convention, we then reconsidered our position and agreed to challenge inspection. But this move did not change the fact that lack of agreement on challenge inspection still seems to be an obstacle, only the reasons are completely different. It appears that those who claimed that challenge inspection should be granted any place, any time now prefer that inspection take place only some place and sometime.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Another example of what I would qualify as backward evolution in positions is the approach towards the laboratories which might synthesize Schedule [1] chemicals. A couple of years ago it was suggested that production and use of these chemicals be prohibited except for production and use of laboratory quantities for research, medical or protective purposes at establishments approved by the State party. Furthermore, it was also proposed that information on the persons authorized to possess such chemicals, the quantity produced and used at each location and the end uses should be reported annually. Let me also recall that this strict verification was suggested for super-toxic lethal chemicals as well as for key precursors and other particularly dangerous chemicals - that means, for a much wider number of chemicals than are today included in Schedule [1]. Now we see even reluctance to declare laboratories handling Schedule [1] chemicals below the proposed threshold of 100 gr. Under no circumstances will I question the right of each delegation to change its positions. But what is striking is the context in which these changes occurred. When there was, on the part of negotiating partners, a certain hesitancy to accept intrusive verification, extremely strict verification measures were readily proposed. Later, when, in the interest of progress, the need for strict verification was recognized, some delegations considerably loosened their verification philosophy.

We are fully aware that certain signs of scepticism are emerging with respect to the prospects for early achievement of the CW convention. We agree that they are not groundless. The current production of binary chemical weapons, political decisions aimed at chemical rearmament and the sometimes overly technical nature of our negotiations on CW, seemingly lacking the final goal of winding up the convention, are hardly reasons for optimism. At the same time, there are developments which I would not hesitate to qualify as encouraging. I am referring to openness with respect to chemical weapons. In the past, some information was offered, falling mainly within the sphere of non-production of chemical weapons and some military aspects of limited scope were demonstrated. Last year, very important new steps in that direction were undertaken. The demonstration in Shikhanj and the visits to Münster in the Federal Republic of Germany and Tooele in the United States represented important measures of openness and confidence-building. In that context, we appreciate the announcement by the Soviet Union in December of last year of the volume of its stockpiles of CW and we consider that this act of openness should be followed by other States possessing chemical weapons. In our perception, the Memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of the convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is aimed at further advancement of openness and confidence and measures proposed in it can contribute to a clearer overview of all dimensions of the problems a CW convention will have to take care of.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): It is ironic that today the agenda item for our work is chemical weapons. I have received instructions from my Government to inform the Conference on Disarmament on the continuation of use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime against civilians, both in Iran and in Iraq.

The magnitude of the use of chemical weapons last week was unprecedented in the whole course of use of these weapons of mass destruction in the war of aggression against Iran. Those of you who have read or heard about the nazi holocaust have some images about Bergen-Belsen concentration camps. Files of dead bodies in thousands, mainly women, more than 40 years ago struck the consciousness of mankind so much that the international community decided to prevent its repetition at any cost. As a result, the United Nations Organization was born. It is sad to see that at our time we are witnessing scenes similar to Bergen-Belsen.

Last week, the Kurdish populated city of Halabja in the Sulaimaniya Province of Iraq was liberated by Iranian troops. This liberation instigated the Iraqi rulers to resort to yet another inhuman act. They poisoned the whole city with chemical weapons, mainly dropped by planes. So far the casualties have been 5,500 dead and 4,500 wounded. This number is, of course, increasing and is more than the whole casualties since the beginning of deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq almost six years ago. Chemical weapons have been used in the past week on both sides of borders against the civilians of both countries.

On 18 March 1988, the Iraqi régime also chemically bombarded on several occasions the Iranian villages of Qaleh, Marag and Sharani in the city of Marivan. As a result, 40 people were killed and more than 100 were injured. The casualties were mainly women and children.

In another inhuman attack on 11 March 1988, the civilians of the village of Garmab in the Iranian western province of Bakhtaran were poisoned. Two civilians were killed and five others were injured.

On Monday, 11 January 1988, the Iraqi régime shelled the city of Sardasht with chemical weapons which left some injured.

We are negotiating here a convention banning chemical weapons. We believe that those who are sincere in their efforts to materialize such a convention must not remain indifferent to such widespread use of chemical weapons, otherwise this will be taken as an acquiescence to such actions and will give carte blanche to the Iraqi régime to even intensify its deployment of chemical weapons in mockery of all internationally recognized norms of law.

We have filed an official request to the United Nations Secretary-General to dispatch an investigation team to the area as soon as possible, before the traces are gone. To check the proliferation of use of chemical weapons needs responsible reaction by the international community as well as by every individual nation.

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

That was a short report on the extensive use of chemical weapons in the past two weeks. The detailed accounts will be provided to the Conference in the near future.

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(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The work of the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with the task of negotiating a treaty banning chemical weapons has entered an extremely crucial stage. On the one hand, the negotiations reached a very advanced stage in 1987, thanks in particular to the inter-sessional consultations. On the other hand the international community is becoming more and more insistent in its demands that this convention should be finalized as soon as possible.

In this situation, marked also by the bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons, our Conference must respond to the General Assembly's appeal to it in resolution 42/37 A. The third paragraph of that resolution urges the Conference, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1988 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, with a view to the elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.

The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee at the very beginning of the session is in itself encouraging, as is the fact that it is led by Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who has already demonstrated his great experience in the Chair of the same Committee in 1982.

We take this opportunity to express our genuine pleasure at the fact that the new Chairman has been able to keep up the pace and maintain the impetus which his predecessor provided throughout the 1987 session. The results

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(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

obtained thanks to the praiseworthy efforts made by Ambassador Ekéus fortify us in particular since they now stimulate the work of the Ad hoc Committee under Ambassador Sujka, who is brilliantly supported by the co-ordinators of the three working groups.

There is no doubt that the task of these groups is difficult, but it is not impossible. Thus, we very much hope that all the members of the Conference will combine their efforts and make sure that the Committee succeeds in its work during this key year.

It would not be without value to recall here that the eyes of the international community are upon us. The international community expects concrete results as an adequate response to the concern expressed for the first time by the General Assembly in the resolution I referred to, at the delay in elaborating the convention. In this context we would very much like this treaty to crown the work of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. However, as this date gets nearer the goal seems impossible to achieve because of the many pending matters which show no signs of being resolved in the immediate future.

The persisting disagreement on such topics as non-production of chemical weapons, the destruction of existing stocks, the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities, all the aspects of the verification régime, the institutional framework which will ensure that the convention is complied with, assistance, and economic and technological development must in no way sap our will or our vigour in completing the negotiations on the convention. Nor should these divergences slow down the pace of work reached during the last session.

This is why we feel that the rapid conclusion of this convention has become imperative. It is all the more necessary as the siren songs of ad hoc partial or regional solutions are becoming more and more pressing. Such solutions can in no way replace our Conference's noble objective which has been and remains the complete and effective prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, together with their destruction.

The principle of universality in disarmament has always governed all negotiations conducted within the Conference, in particular those on chemical weapons. Let us work together to ensure that it is not called into question at a time when the goal has never appeared so close since the joint Soviet-American statement of 10 December 1987, which "reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward the conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention".

Given such a commitment we have every hope that all the members of the Conference will redouble their efforts and overcome the problems in order to conclude this convention by the very latest in 1989. This hope is equalled by our confidence that all countries will be resolved to spare no effort to ensure that these negotiations are successfully concluded.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The Nigerian delegation is highly impressed by the progress made so far in the negotiations on the draft chemical weapons convention. In this regard,

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

I would like to extend our deep appreciation to Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, who so ably chaired the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1987, during which time the Committee moved fast and made appreciable progress towards the conclusion of the draft convention.

As we are approaching the concluding stage of the negotiations on the draft chemical weapons convention, my delegation is of the opinion that those outstanding issues which are of central importance to the convention, and which could to a large extent influence the decision of several countries as to whether or not to join the convention, should now be taken up with all seriousness. I would like to draw attention here to the need to include in the convention measures that would effectively protect parties against chemical weapons intimidation or attack by non-parties. As we are all aware, chemical weapons are second only to nuclear weapons as the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Any decision to renounce chemical weapons could place parties at a serious permanent military disadvantage if non-parties felt free to intimidate or attack them without fear of retaliation.

It is for this reason that my delegation considers it most necessary for article X of the convention to incorporate an undertaking by parties to assist any party, in the exercise of its inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, when threatened or attacked with chemical weapons by a non-party, if requested. Such a provision would be consistent with the provision of article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security ...".

Such a measure in the opinion of Nigeria would commend the convention for greater adherence since it would deter non-parties from attacking parties, thus removing any military advantage in staying outside the convention.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary):

In the first part of my statement today I would like to deal with item 4 of our agenda, i.e. chemical weapons. My delegation notes with satisfaction that intensive negotiations have been going on and substantive progress has been achieved in different parts of the "rolling text" of the chemical weapons convention, mainly during the last two years. We noted with pleasure that during the first two months of the spring session of the CD the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, embarked on the continuation of the work with ambition and expertise. While wishing him every success I would like to assure him and his assistants, Mr. Andrejcima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan, that my delegation will spare no effort to help them in their responsible work.

Registering with satisfaction the substantive progress achieved, my delegation cannot help expressing its concern over the fact that the pace of negotiations has somewhat slowed down during the past few months. This fact is in contrast with the resolute political commitment for the early conclusion

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(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

of the convention repeatedly expressed in this room. We welcome the determination of the high-level government representatives visiting the Conference on Disarmament this spring, and hope that the firm political commitment to move the negotiations forward to an early conclusion will have a positive impact on the everyday practical work.

We are aware that, despite the substantive results achieved so far, much remains to be done. My delegation, however, would like to hear in this context less emphasis on the amount of unresolved problems and difficulties and see more concrete proposals for and expeditiousness in their solution.

From this point of view we consider as positive the initiative taken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee to hold informal consultations on the final clauses of the Convention. A series of questions of different kinds in this area have been only partially explored so far and require a good deal of drafting effort. May I enumerate some of them which my delegation considers particularly important?

Firstly, the relationship between the convention and other international treaties, particularly the 1925 Geneva Protocol, with special emphasis on the reservations made to the latter.

Secondly, the entry into force of the convention and the question of how and by what means to ensure the widest possible adherence to it.

Thirdly, the question of whether there is a need for a simple or a differentiated amendment procedure taking into account the complicated structure of the convention.

We welcome, once again, the serious work which has been started in this field, and we hope that these questions - together with the still unresolved issue of "jurisdiction and control" - will continue to be discussed.

There seems to be a general understanding that openness, political good will and confidence are the prerequisites for successful completion of the work on a global and comprehensive chemical weapons ban. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Péter Várkonyi, emphasized in his statement on 4 February that openness regarding data relevant to the CW convention served to contribute to the strengthening of confidence.

The Government of Hungary, guided by the firm conviction that openness would best serve confidence if transformed into concrete steps, decided to inform the Conference on production in Hungary of certain chemicals relevant to the convention, as well as the number of plants where such chemicals are produced. My delegation was pleased to hear that our contribution has been welcomed by other delegations. We also welcome the proposals recently submitted by the USSR on multilateral data exchange and other confidence-building measures, as contained in the statement made by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky on 18 February 1988 and in the memorandum he introduced then (CD/808).

At the same time we are aware of the fact that it would not be justifiable to expect each and every State to provide all data - especially

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

concerning the production of chemicals for permitted purposes - in the course of a preliminary multilateral exchange. Though we consider such an exercise to be highly desirable, we think it feasible only on a strictly voluntary basis. This multilateral exchange of chemical-weapons-related data might be considered - in our view - as an aggregate of a series of unilaterally provided information.

However, while being flexible and accommodating with regard to difficulties that certain States might face in providing data concerning production for civilian purposes, we can hardly accept that such difficulties should exist with regard to declarations on the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons or chemical weapon production facilities. My delegation would express the sincere hope that the readiness of a hopefully increasing number of States to provide such information would create the constructive climate necessary to further deepen confidence among participants and contribute to the acceleration of work on a chemical weapons ban.

May I remind you that in his statement of 4 February, the Foreign Minister of Hungary, Péter Várkonyi, informed the CD that the following two key precursors of chemical weapons are produced for civilian use in Hungary: chemicals containing a P-methyl and/or P-ethyl bond, at one plant, and methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid, at three plants.

Following that communication, I would like to supply additional information as to the amount of production of those chemicals in 1987:

Domestic production of compounds containing a P-methyl and/or P-ethyl bond was 1,067 tons. Of that amount, 142 tons were used for domestic consumption, while the remaining 925 tons were exported.

Production of methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid amounted to 521 tons, of which 253 tons were used for domestic consumption and 297 tons were exported (the difference in aggregate is due to stocks left over from the previous year).

No chemicals listed in Schedule [3] are produced in Hungary at present. However, we are importing the following three compounds:

Phosphorous trichloride - the planned amount of imports for 1988 is 3,500 tons (originating from the USSR); trimethylphosphite - planned amount of import 600 tons; and dimethylphosphite - planned amount of import 1,200 tons.

The two latter compounds are being purchased from Western countries.

(U Tin Tun, Burma)

The area in which the CD is in the most advanced stage of negotiations is chemical weapons. The CD has covered a good deal of ground in its negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. A future convention on chemical weapons is now in sight. Yet it still eludes our grasp. Continuing efforts to finalize the draft chemical weapons convention have somewhat slowed down recently. Meanwhile, the international community is looking to us for the speedy accomplishment of our mission to successfully conclude our negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons at an early date. It is imperative that we redouble our efforts to accomplish this mission in the shortest possible time.

The Group of 21, through its subject co-ordinator Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, made a statement on chemical weapons at the plenary meeting on 8 March 1988. This statement reflects the concern of members of the Group of 21, including my own delegation. My delegation shares the concern that half-measures and interim arrangements can only serve to delay the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons. We endorse the view that all chemical weapons, not some, should be destroyed; that all chemical weapon production facilities, not some, should be destroyed, and that all, not some, production of chemical weapons should be prohibited. Towards this end, all member States of the CD should spare no effort to achieve at the earliest possible date a non-discriminatory, comprehensive, verifiable and effective convention banning all chemical weapons.

A welcome practice is crystallizing at the CD. I am referring to the practice of declaring possession or non-possession of chemical weapons by a growing number of CD member States. This is a constructive step, befitting member States of the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, actively engaged in the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons. We call upon other member States who have not done so to follow suit.

Burma does not possess, develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons. Nor will she do so in future.

Burma's position on this question is clear and unequivocal. Burma has consistently expressed her opposition to the development, production, stockpiling and use of these horrible weapons of mass destruction in various international forums - be it this august body of the CD, or the United Nations General Assembly, or the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. My country has also supported all the General Assembly resolutions on chemical weapons. My country signed the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We did so in the hope that this would soon lead to the conclusion of a convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. We are therefore among those who ardently wish to see the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible. Burma has consistently supported and will continue to support all endeavours to achieve a global and total ban on chemical weapons at an early date.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan):

Now in my capacity as the monthly co-ordinator for the members of the Western Group, I would like to make a brief statement on their behalf.

As the distinguished Ambassador of Italy stated on behalf of the group of Western countries at the 439th Plenary on 11 February this year, it remains a matter of high priority to the Western Group that an effective, verifiable and comprehensive convention on a global ban on chemical weapons should be concluded as soon as possible.

Thus, the group of countries on whose behalf I am speaking today are appalled at the horrifying reports of the extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war, resulting in tragic and heavy casualties, especially amongst the civilian population.

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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

The Group of Western Countries express their strong and unreserved condemnation of these actions. They strongly urge all parties to abide by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other norms of international law.

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Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): The reports from Halabja bear witness to the large-scale use of chemical weapons against an unprotected civilian population.

Sweden condemns the use of chemical weapons, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.

Investigations by a team of United Nations experts of earlier incidents of use of chemical weapons have proven beyond doubt that Iraq has been repeatedly responsible for chemical warfare contrary to international law.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 embodies the recognized rules of international law prohibiting chemical warfare. The attack on Halabja, a gross violation both of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of customary international law, should be universally condemned.

Furthermore, the use of chemical weapons against Halabja has brought agony and death upon civilians, many of them children and women. The attack is thus a grave violation of general humanitarian rules as laid down in the laws of war.

The violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 constitutes a breach of the fundamental principle that States must honour their undertakings in treaties and other legally binding instruments to which they are parties.

The Conference on Disarmament must now react by intensifying its negotiations on a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, with a view to the final elaboration of the convention at

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

the earliest possible date. Delays in the negotiations can only put off the day when effective international measures can be taken to prevent the further use of chemical weapons and their proliferation.

The tragedy of Halabja must be a signal for the international community to make the existing ban on the use of chemical weapons fully effective by negotiating and bringing into force a complete and global convention banning all chemical weapons for ever.

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Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of a group of socialist countries I should like to state the following:

We resolutely support the strict observance of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons which is set out in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. All actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol - no matter from which side they are instigated - are strongly condemned by us.

We are concerned that the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict could lead to their proliferation, to weakening the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and to undermining efforts for a complete prohibition of these weapons.

We support the appeal made to both sides involved by the United Nations Secretary-General to exercise maximum restraint and to support international efforts for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

We consider it essential to speed up the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and we are determined to undertake, together with the delegations participating in the negotiations, all efforts necessary towards achieving this goal.

These horrible, horrible weapons must be totally banished as speedily as possible.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, on behalf of a group of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, has expressed our assessment of the news of the use of chemical weapons. Further to what has been said by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador H. Rose, concerning the recent case of the use of chemical weapons, I should like to state the following:

In the Soviet Union, we are deeply alarmed at the news of the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran on a massive scale involving a great many casualties among the civilian population. So far we

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have no objective international confirmation of this news. But if it corresponds with the facts, what is involved is a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an action which, in the view of the Soviet Union, deserves resolute condemnation. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, should be observed by all parties to it. Violations are inadmissible and cannot be justified by any considerations whatsoever. This also applies to the parties to the present conflict. The Soviet Union condemns and will continue to condemn any use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, regardless of who may breach the Protocol, and in what circumstances.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would just like to inform this august body that 30 of those injured by chemical weapons from Iraq in the city of Halabja will be arriving today in Geneva. Six of them will be treated here, and the rest will go to the Federal Republic of Germany, England, and also New York. The six civilians who will be treated here will be four children or youngsters, 8, 10, 12 and 13 years old, one man, 20 years old and one woman of 30. We would be glad if the Conference paid visits to these injured people.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In addressing the Conference on Disarmament, I wish I did not have to refer once again, for the fourth consecutive year, to the use of chemical weapons. In the light of the participation of a number of foreign ministers in this Conference, and the blossoming of hopes on the eve of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I would have preferred to touch upon the priorities of the special session, the agenda of this Conference and efforts to reach new international agreements to lower tension and reduce armaments.

Not only was it not possible, but rather a disaster occurred and a crime was committed with far wider dimensions than what I have so far reported to the Conference.

You have undoubtedly seen glimpses of this holocaust, and how the inhabitants of the city of Halabja fell prey to extensive chemical weapon bombardment by Iraq. Frightened women embracing their children, seeking shelter, died on the spot. Fathers who took their beloved ones to the cellars to escape the aerial bombardment did not know that these places would be gas chambers for the whole of their families. Lethal and poisonous gases had superseded the fresh spring weather. Except for those who had left the city earlier, the rest were all poisoned to death by chemical weapons. Chemical weapons kill old and young, men and women indiscriminately. The aim is to kill every living thing in their path.

(continued)

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You have definitely seen the dead bodies of babies aged just a few months. It is with good reason that chemical weapons are called devices for destroying man and nature, weapons which turn cities into gas chambers and public slaughterhouses.

In Auschwitz, men and women were dragged to gas baths, but in Halabja poison and gas were taken to the houses of people. Halabja was not the first city subjected to Iraqi chemical bombardment, but with 5,000 martyrs and 7,000 injured, 75 per cent of them women and children, it was the worst case - the worst single incident of chemical weapon use since the First World War.

The case of Halabja, which was chemically bombarded over 20 times on 17 March 1988 by the Iraqi régime, must be recorded in the history of mankind as a case of genocide and a crime against humanity. Rarely have we recalled any incident which has victimized the residents of a city on this scale since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If there were people who had doubts about it, now it is crystal-clear that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime and the Iraqi ruling clique are war criminals.

The Halabja holocaust is the most vivid manifestation of genocide by a Government, and a gross violation of the important 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

We would like to register our thanks to those international organizations and countries which have provided the victims with humanitarian aid. Yet this only covers one dimension of this crime. The main effort should be directed towards prevention of the continuation and repetition of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. It is unfortunate to say that the efforts have not only not been sufficient, but this kind of acquiescence has given Iraq carte blanche to continue and intensify its use of these weapons of mass destruction.

Under such circumstances watered-down or even strongly worded positions will not be sufficient. Only, and I repeat only, by practical and unified action can we prevent the repetition of such crimes.

The use of chemical weapons by Iraq commenced in January 1981 and expanded throughout 1984. The deployment of these inhuman weapons culminated in 1987 in the poisoning for the first time of a city in the western Iranian province of Kurdistan. In 1984, the United Nations Security Council, based upon reports filed by its investigation team, officially announced and condemned the use of chemical weapons. In 1985 it was substantiated that chemical weapons had been used against Iranian troops; on 21 March 1986 the Security Council officially confirmed the deployment of these abhorrent weapons by Iraq. On 14 May 1987 the Security Council announced that Iraq had used chemical weapons repeatedly and extensively, and that civilians had also been subjected to Iraqi chemical attacks.

Last year, I briefed this very Conference on the Iraqi chemical attacks on the city of Sardasht. At that time I warned that certain members of the

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Security Council, including the United States, in support of Iraq, were urging the Security Council to remain silent and not send an investigation team. It is unfortunate to say that the Council yielded to this irresponsible act and no investigation team was dispatched.

We expressed foreboding that this indifference would provide Iraq with an opportunity to intensify its chemical attacks on cities. Despite all our warnings, no measure was taken by the Council, and as a result Iraq, with open hands and with the hope that there would not be much international reaction, subjected Halabja to its chemical attacks.

The information available to us shows that, this time as well, some Council members, despite the extent of the crime and the existence of innumerable victims, have obstructed the dispatch of an investigation team. In pursuit of their pro-Iraqi policies and exerting pressure upon the Islamic Republic of Iran, they prevent the Security Council from taking any serious position or practical measure to check further deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq. They intend to ignore the fact that efforts to cover up past Iraqi crimes led to the Halabja holocaust. It is beyond any doubt that continuation of such a partial position by some big Powers will drag humanity and the whole world to an abyss far more horrifying than what we witnessed in Halabja. We consider positive the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General, who, despite all pressures, fulfilled his responsibility and acted in accordance with resolution 42/37 C, adopted by consensus last year by the General Assembly, to dispatch an investigation team, although incomplete in composition. In the mean time we strongly believe that this measure is in no way enough, and that only collective international measures can put an end to this heinous crime.

At this juncture the question is more serious than ever: how long should we tolerate witnessing the people of Iran and Iraq fall prey to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, while no serious action has so far been taken to counter the deployment of these weapons?

How many more times should chemical weapons be used by Iraq? Is over 100 times in the past seven years not enough? Should we await still more dastardly crimes? Are the victims who have lost their lives so far not sufficient? Do we need more people to fall prey? Will international commitments have any more credibility and value if they are so shamelessly violated? What incentives will countries have in the future to commit themselves to instruments and arrive at new agreements? Will the result not be that every country will independently seek to acquire the necessary means to make violators abide by their commitments? While after more than 40 years the criminals of the Second World War are still being hunted and punished, why is it that the same criminals with the same crimes are being rewarded?

We have now entered a very sensitive and decisive juncture in history. I would like to reiterate here that safeguarding the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and preventing such crimes is an international obligation, and in addition to the United Nations and other international forums, all countries bear

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responsibility. I hope that all efforts will be directed towards the cessation of chemical attacks by Iraq, regardless of any political considerations.

For further information, a list of cases of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and brochures containing information and photographs of the Halabja holocaust have been put at the disposal of the distinguished members of this Conference. Meanwhile, a number of injured persons are now being treated in the Lausanne and Zurich hospitals. I would like to invite the members of the Conference to visit them to get better information about the destructive consequences of the use of chemical weapons.

Iraq, by extensive and indiscriminate attacks on cities, has also violated the 1949 Geneva Convention on civilians. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained its commitment to all these international instruments, the Iraqi régime is shamelessly and continuously violating them. The official position put forward by Iraq to the effect that it will resort to every means negates and violates all internationally recognized norms of law.

The standing policy pursued by the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been directed at checking the extension of war to civilians. We have so far paid dearly to maintain this policy. The prevention of attacks on civilian quarters will also be possible through concerted international action. The response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to any appeal or initiative in this respect, based on the Geneva Convention of 1949, will be positive and unconditional.

Bitter experience of the repeated and extensive use of chemical weapons by Iraq in past years has presented us with important questions. The disastrous consequences of these crimes have proved to the world once again that all countries must do their utmost, with good will, to eliminate these weapons of mass destruction from the face of the Earth. The convention banning the development, acquisition, stockpiling, transport and use of chemical weapons must be finalized at the earliest possible time. This convention must be comprehensive, global and total.

We all know well that verification is feasible from the technical point of view. But politically it can easily face problems. The failure to dispatch an investigation team to Sardasht last year, and the obstructive methods applied in the case of Halabja, prove to what extent political likes and dislikes can be intrusive. If so many obstacles can be created in the case of use, which constitutes the most critical ingredient of the new convention, we will definitely face more serious and complicated problems in other areas such as production and stockpiling.

We are of the opinion that on the issues of inspection for the new convention, the method applied by the Secretary-General and stipulated in the United Nations resolution 42/37 C provides a good basis. The request should be responded to by the Technical Secretariat automatically and immediately, and the report should be presented to the Executive Council, the

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United Nations Secretary-General and the Security Council. In other cases it should be laid down that a challenge inspection is mandatory without the right of refusal.

With regard to article X, assistance in cases of use should be mandatory and comprehensive. The comprehensiveness and universality of the convention form the most important point. Upon the request of the Executive Council, following actual use of chemical weapons, when there is a need for urgent assistance, the assistance should be mandatory and automatic. In cases of the threat of use, assistance can be voluntary.

Here I would like to register my thanks to Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden for his outstanding work as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in 1987. In the mean time, a lack of political will on the part of certain countries has brought relative stagnation in the progress of negotiations. The issue of undiminished security should be taken into due account, but we believe maintaining security stocks will not be a suitable solution. Other methods, such as halving the duration of the destruction period or commencement of destruction of chemical weapons by the super-Powers before the convention enters into force, merit attention. Economic and technological development (article XI of the convention) should also be taken up with a more constructive and sincere approach.

It is unfortunate to admit that the Conference on Disarmament has not registered noticeable progress in the last 10 years. The Conference is gradually abandoning its negotiating function and has become more and more a body for deliberations and generalities. The progress in the field of nuclear disarmament in the framework of the bilateral talks cannot be directly attributed to this Conference, yet we do not accept the notion that issues pertaining to disarmament should be gradually monopolized by those possessing these destructive weapons. The qualitative and quantitative development of weapons and enhancement of their destructiveness have not only threatened the security of countries but also the very survival of mankind. It is therefore the right and responsibility of all nations to participate actively in the field of disarmament. If we believe in the democratic approach, the views of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world should be respected and form the very basis of agreements and decisions on disarmament. The views of a handful of countries which, due to certain historical accidents, have been able to take hold of the most destructive weapons, should not become a determining factor in the trend of world armament. It is crystal-clear that in this framework we cannot expect to have collective security for all countries; rather, the security and interests of these few countries will be of practical value. We of course welcome any move towards disarmament, but at the same time believe that these moves will lead to decisive and permanent results only when all countries contribute.

In this connection the neutral and non-aligned members of this Conference, working in the framework of the Group of 21, will play a special role, and it is essential that their views - which with a mathematical calculation reflect the views of the great majority of the people of the world - are taken into due consideration. Unfortunately, certain countries

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still do not like to accept the realities, and regard their exclusive views and positions as taking precedence over those of the majority. This constitutes the greatest obstacle to the achievement of disarmament.

In the field of improving the effectiveness of the work of the Conference, proposals such as the work of technical and expert committees throughout the year and continuation of the mandate of ad hoc committees until they arrive at definite conclusions, without any need to renew their mandates, merit due consideration.

Once again I wish for success for this Conference, particularly on the eve of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I sincerely hope that this will be the last time I bring to you a report of the use of chemical weapons. To materialize this hope we expect all countries, especially members of this Conference, along with international organizations, to adopt unambiguous positions, inform world public opinion and use diplomatic channels as well as other deterrent measures to prevent a repetition of the Halabja holocaust.

I pray to the Almighty to bless the souls of the martyrs of the Halabja holocaust.

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(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

A happy contrast which vindicates the CD's role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum is the progress made in negotiating a draft chemical weapons convention.

A special debt of gratitude is due to Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden for all his innovative, patient and sustained efforts during 1987, which succeeded in bringing the draft convention to a point of near-fruit. Our good wishes go now to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who takes the baton from Ambassador Ekéus as the CD enters what we hope is the final sprint on the home stretch. The complexity of the outstanding questions that remain is certainly not being minimized. But Sri Lanka feels that an outcome which falls short of a universal, comprehensive and verifiable ban on all chemical weapons will not succeed in outlawing these weapons. Slackening the pace of negotiations could result in unravelling agreed measures and encouraging the further proliferation of chemical weapons. The speedy conclusion of a convention must be pursued. The momentum must not be lost.

That the CD has succeeded in reaching an advanced stage in this complex question largely because it has had the benefit of about two years of work under a negotiating mandate, must surely have a lesson to teach. That lesson

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

has unfortunately not been learned in respect of item 5 of the CD's agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The Ad hoc Committee on this item has begun its work under the skilful and experienced guidance of Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, but unfortunately on terms which gives it less than a mandate to negotiate. My delegation would have preferred to have seen the Ad hoc Committee invested with an adequate mandate to undertake negotiations towards the eventual conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

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Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese):

Today, the Chinese delegation would like to address the issue of chemical weapons.

The negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons have traversed a long and tortuous road. Owing to the joint efforts of all delegations, important progress has been made, most notably over the recent years. At present, most of the provisions of the future convention have

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(Mr. Fan, China)

already taken shape. This is indeed encouraging. Last year, some long-standing problems were looked into and in-depth consultations conducted among delegations. Though each delegation may have its own assessment of the current state and future prospects of the ongoing negotiations, all delegations seem to agree that these negotiations have reached a critical stage and that it is time to tackle some of those difficult problems whose solution has so far eluded us. The Chinese delegation believes that, given a constructive spirit of co-operation on all sides and intensified consultations and negotiations, it should be possible to solve these problems. Here I would like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee last session, and his able co-ordinators, for their efforts. Meanwhile, I wish to warmly congratulate Ambassador Sujka of Poland on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee for the current session. I wish him and his co-ordinators every success in their endeavours.

Chemical weapons are extremely cruel and abhorrent weapons of mass destruction. I fully share the view expressed by the distinguished Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany in his 4 February statement in the CD that "they are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature". The prohibition and destruction of these weapons have become the general demand and desire of all peoples throughout the world. For many years, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted at each session resolutions on this subject. The Conference on Disarmament has before it a historic mission entrusted to it by the international community of negotiating a convention in this field. Under present circumstances, the early conclusion of the convention has become all the more urgent and necessary.

First, in spite of years of negotiations on chemical weapons, the chemical weapon arsenals of the few major military Powers still remain as large as ever. Their chemical weapons not only exist in huge quantities but have also been updated with new technology. The fact that the world still lives under the constant threat of chemical warfare cannot but arouse general concern.

Secondly, with the spread of the modern chemical industry, countries capable of producing chemical weapons are growing in number. The rapid technological progress in chemistry has made possible and created conditions for large-scale production of the existing types of chemical weapons, as well as the production of new generations of such weapons. As a matter of fact, the chemical weapons possessed by some countries today already far exceed those of earlier generations both in toxicity and lethality. It is conceivable that, unless this process is checked in time, more countries will be producing chemical weapons and new generations of such weapons will also emerge one on the heels of another, leading to an intensified chemical arms race and rendering a ban and verification even more difficult and complex.

Thirdly, although more than half a century has elapsed since the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons, incidents involving their use still occur from time to time and may very well increase in future. The Chinese delegation is shocked by the report on the recent

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large-scale use of chemical weapons in the Gulf region. China is opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any State in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, particularly when they are used against the unprotected civilian population.

In view of the above, I wish to reiterate the proposal made by Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian of China at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"In view of the fact that the arms race in the development of chemical weapons has not been checked, the 40-nation Geneva Conference on Disarmament is called upon to complete its negotiations at an early date and to conclude a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Pending that, all countries capable of manufacturing and producing chemical weapons should stop testing, producing, transferring and deploying chemical weapons and should pledge not to use such weapons."

China, a non-chemical-weapon State and once a victim of the use of chemical weapons, has always advocated the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, and has been working actively to this end. We maintain that the future convention should give priority to the total destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities, ensure that no chemical weapons will ever be produced, and provide for necessary and effective verification measures.

The existing chemical weapon arsenals pose a real and direct threat to international security. To remove such a threat by completely and thoroughly destroying all the existing chemical weapons and their production facilities represents the primary objective of the convention as well as a long-cherished desire of the people of all countries. In the process of destruction of chemical weapons, the principle of undiminished security for all countries should be taken into account. At present, different views still exist on the order of destruction. As we see it, this problem should not be too difficult to solve so long as the States concerned have the genuine political will to achieve the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. The destruction process is currently envisaged to last 10 years. As things now stand, there are gaps between the chemical-weapon States in the size of their arsenals. We feel that the only way to eliminate this imbalance lies in accelerating the destruction process. It is our hope that, building upon the work done last year, the Ad hoc Committee will take a big step forward towards the solution of this problem.

Here I would like to briefly touch upon the question of old chemical weapons, whose destruction is also a problem that needs to be resolved. Due to historical reasons, this question is rather complex. As situations differ greatly, ways of dealing with them should not be the same. As a preliminary thought, we feel that the future convention should lay down the principle of different responsibility for destruction according to different situations. Further consultations among delegations on this issue will be useful.

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Verification is one of the key issues to be resolved in the convention. In order to ensure its effectiveness and increase mutual confidence among States parties, the future convention should provide for effective and appropriate verification measures. It has to be admitted that verification issues have not yet been settled completely and still require further discussion. Over recent years, thanks to the joint efforts of all delegations, negotiations on this issue have made important headway. A continuous international on-site inspection régime has been formulated for the destruction of chemical weapons. With respect to verification of non-production, different schedules of chemicals to be monitored and controlled under the convention and their corresponding verification régimes have been elaborated. Consultations have been conducted and some progress made on challenge inspection as well. The results of these consultations have been incorporated for the first time in appendix II of the report of the Ad hoc Committee. This has provided a basis for future discussions.

The Chinese delegation is of the view that verification forms an integral part of the future convention and should be effective, reasonable, appropriate and workable. "Effective" means that verification measures should adequately ensure the destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities, and prevent the civilian chemical industry from being used for chemical weapon purposes. "Reasonable and appropriate" means that verification measures should not go beyond what is necessary. "Workable" means that verification measures should be acceptable to all States and not consume excessive human and material resources. In working out specific verification régimes, it is necessary to apply the principle of differential treatment. The destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities is one of the main objectives of the convention, for which stringent verification régimes should be established. To ensure non-production of chemical weapons is another major objective. Verification in this respect is to be of unlimited duration. Given the large number of different enterprises involved, we must strike a balance between the cost and effect of verification, and concentrate our efforts on areas most closely related to the purposes of the convention. While stressing the importance of stringency, one must also bear feasibility in mind. Workable verification measures can be further elaborated on this basis in the ongoing negotiations. The verification of non-production is a highly complicated and technical issue which needs to be treated judiciously, so that the purposes of the convention can be achieved without undue intrusiveness.

Challenge inspection is a novelty for all States, and we all lack experience in this regard. It is more difficult than other verification measures and deserves to be carefully examined.

This kind of short-notice on-site inspection is invoked only under exceptional circumstances. Given the special properties of chemical weapons, stringent and timely verification is essential. However, any such verification would entail a high degree of intrusiveness. Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary for the challenged State to accept effective international inspections designed to determine whether there has been any violation of the convention. On the other hand, the challenging State should

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be prevented from abusing such a procedure to carry out activities irrelevant to the convention. It should also be noted that any violation of the convention would not only cause anxieties on the part of the challenging State about its own security interests, but also give rise to concerns among all other States parties as their security is also at stake. Therefore, the organization set up under the convention should play its due role so that issues raised by the States parties concerned will be dealt with in a just and timely manner. Its role will be all the more necessary when a dispute arises in the course of the inspection, and when establishing whether there has been a violation of the convention or an abuse of the right to challenge. Unbiased and qualified experts are needed for challenge inspection, as it involves special techniques and expertise. However, to resort to challenge inspection and to clear up doubts cannot be regarded as merely technical matters. These are but a few aspects of the issue. We have noted that other delegations have also raised a number of issues and made observations on challenge inspection. To arrive at an appropriate solution to this problem of common concern requires further consultations and discussion in various forms.

The future convention should contain provisions on assistance. The working papers submitted by the delegations of Argentina and Pakistan have contributed to our discussions. We consider it necessary to provide international assistance to States parties attacked with chemical weapons. An explicit provision to this effect in the convention would not only represent support to the State party under attack, but also exert political and moral pressure on the potential users of chemical weapons, thus deterring the use of such weapons. While the scope of assistance should be limited to protective purposes, its modalities may vary. The Chinese delegation will work actively with other delegations in the discussions on this issue.

It is the view of many delegations that economic and technical development provisions should be included in the future convention. My delegation understands and shares this position. The complete prohibition of chemical weapons should not adversely affect research, development and production, or hinder international co-operation, in the field of the civilian chemical industry. We hope that appropriate solutions to various practical problems in this field will be found through earnest negotiations between all parties.

The composition of the organization to be set up under the future convention is an outstanding issue that must be solved. My delegation would like to make some preliminary remarks in this connection. In our opinion, the principle of equality of all sovereign States must be respected when considering this issue. Only on this premise should other elements be considered. On the composition of the Executive Council, one body in the organization, a convergence of views seems to have evolved out of several years of deliberation and consultations, i.e., the three elements of geographical distribution, chemical industry capacity and political groupings should be taken into account. The geographical element is important for the universality of the convention. The Executive Council should fully reflect the demands and concerns of the countries in various regions. Nevertheless, in view of the special character of the convention, due consideration should

(Mr. Fan, China)

be given to States possessing chemical weapons and States with a large chemical industry, which bear relatively greater responsibility for the implementation of the relevant provisions of the convention. Their participation in the Executive Council will facilitate the study of problems that may emerge in the implementation of the convention. The element of political representation should also be taken care of, as there do exist different political blocs and States not belonging to any bloc in the world today. We are confident that, so long as we give full consideration to the above three elements and show mutual compromise and understanding, a composition of the organization compatible with the requirements of the convention will be found.

Though the outstanding issues in the negotiations on the convention are few in number, issues to be resolved at a later stage usually have complex causes. Our negotiation stands at a crucial moment. Experience tells us that success usually comes with the last efforts. The Chinese delegation will, as always, work actively towards the early realization of the lofty goal of banning all chemical weapons.

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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

••• However, in the view of my delegation, the interval between the summer and spring sessions, an interval, in fact, of five months, is unnecessarily long. In the negotiations on chemical weapons, we have found a solution for it by extending the work to December and January. What we did on an ad hoc basis only for chemical weapons could be transformed into a more structured approach for all subjects.

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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

••• As I said, we have no fixed ideas on the precise time schedule, and we are, in fact, open to alternative suggestions that would enable delegations to spread work more evenly over the year. Let me add that, in particular circumstances, of course, additional or alternative time schemes could be considered. On chemical weapons, for instance, we believe that, once the final stage of the negotiations on the convention is reached, the CD should determine its programme independently of the New York time schedule.

Mr. de MONTIGNY MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French): In my statement today I wish to submit a working paper on the inspectorate in the context of negotiations on chemical weapons. Thereafter I shall make a few comments on the question of improving the effectiveness of the Conference.

First of all I should like to add a few words to the statement about the use of chemical weapons made by Ambassador Yamada on 29 March, with which my delegation associated itself. In a communiqué issued on 25 March, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Joe Clark, condemned the use of chemical weapons in the north of Iraq. It was with great attention and sympathy that I heard what was said by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, this morning, and it was with

(Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canada)

great satisfaction that we learned that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has already sent experts to inquire into the circumstances of the tragedy.

(continued in English)

Two weeks ago I indicated the importance my Government attached to the work that still needed to be done on various articles of the draft convention on chemical weapons. In particular, I highlighted the critical role the international inspectorate would play in the implementation of the convention, and noted my Government's intention to submit working papers dealing with the personnel and other resource requirements of the inspectorate.

Accordingly, I should like to introduce today a working paper submitted by my Government, and to be circulated under the number CD/823, entitled "Factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements". This working paper is based on a detailed systems study carried out during early 1987 for the Canadian Department of External Affairs by a team of Canadian analysts. That study undertook a systematic examination of the verification requirements explicitly or implicitly discussed in the then current version of the "rolling text" (CD/734), as well as other documents submitted to the Conference. This present working paper draws on the systems study to identify the likely activities of the international inspectorate and the skills consequently required. It then discusses the factors which should have an impact, in a general way, on the size of the inspectorate, the size of the technical support staff and the associated costs as well as addressing some other related issues, such as the question of sources of highly skilled personnel.

I should note that this working paper does not attempt to propose actual numbers for the inspectorate. In my Government's view, our ability to arrive at such a precise quantification will depend to a considerable extent on the amount of data and information which could be exchanged among prospective States parties prior to the convention's coming into force. Pending such an exchange, however, my Government believes it would be useful for the Conference to continue exploring this question, and hopes to make further contributions to this examination.

(Mr. Teja, India)

I would like to make a brief statement this morning on a subject which has been on our agenda for many years.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical weapons, and we fully support the observance of this prohibition. Any violation of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol is a matter of regret and must be condemned.

Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction and not weapons of war. Their use especially against civilian populations cannot be condoned under any circumstances. Such violations of obligations under Geneva Protocol of 1925 undermine respect for international treaties and customary international law. We therefore urge restraint and the non-commission of any action which runs counter to the obligation assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The use of chemical weapons underlines the urgency of accelerating the pace of work on negotiations for a universal, comprehensive and effective chemical weapons convention, so as to put an end to the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing chemical weapon stockpiles. As indicated by my Minister Natwar-Singh in his statement before the CD on 22 March 1988, we urge "a satisfactory conclusion of the Conference's efforts on a chemical weapons agreement during 1988".

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The PRESIDENT: On the final day of my presidency I wish to comment briefly on the work of the Conference during the month of March.

••• Acknowledging these facts would neither detract from the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum - because in spite of the eminent expertise assembled in this Chamber, I think that with the CW negotiations already teaching us how cumbersome treaty-making can be just on one item of our agenda, we can hardly aspire to negotiations on all agenda items, not even with the greatest amount of political will - nor would it prevent us from having a structured exchange of views on the different subject-matter, eventually leading to more formalized working structures when the time is right.

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(The President)

••• We are all dismayed about recent reports on the renewed use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran. We are particularly shocked about the reported unprecedented number of casualties among the civilian population. These reports on the use of CW highlight in a macabre way the importance and topicality of the efforts undertaken in the CD to negotiate a comprehensive world-wide ban on chemical weapons and to conclude it as soon as possible.

(The President)

Subsidiary bodies set up on particular items of our agenda are in the process of accomplishing their tasks. It is of paramount importance that the ad hoc committees on such items as chemical weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and radiological weapons should achieve as much progress as possible in their substantive work and prepare their special reports for the scheduled deadlines.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

These events bear witness that the trend towards improving the political environment for disarmament is continuing. We regret all the more that the generally expected stimulation of our Conference's activities is not yet noticeable. Even mere starting-points for more effective work in priority areas cannot be recognized for the time being. One could possibly quote the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in contrast. However, in the first place this is not the only task we have to address, and in the second place, even on this issue we consider the pace of the negotiations to be too slow. Observations on this matter have already been made by my delegation on 8 March.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

••• A sensible and co-operative division of labour between the multilateral and bilateral approaches is essential. As we see it, the core of the problem involves replacing distinct unilateralism by an increased readiness for international co-operation, and reconciling one's own legitimate interests with those of other States. This includes an evaluation of the relationship between the rights and duties of States in multilateral accords. In the nuclear and space age, and in view of the far-reaching effects of weapons of individual States, this relationship is totally different from that in past ages. Against this background, the obligations undertaken by certain States to reduce and destroy certain types of weapons are balanced in principle, because they are reciprocated by the legally binding pledge of other countries to renounce the acquisition of such weapons. And this is, in our understanding, in the well-understood mutual interest. The negotiations in our Conference on a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons are built indeed on this concept.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

... An understanding on a number of conceptual questions should ensure successful work in SSOD-III. It would, however, be useful, in spite of the late hour, if our Conference could demonstrate in its special report a certain movement with respect to central issues on the agenda. This primarily goes for the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. But equally we see no plausible reason why it should not be possible, as a first step to be taken under agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to agree on subject areas for an intensive exchange of views in parallel with bilateral negotiations.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

A substantial potential for in-depth consideration of confidence-building and verification is provided by the practical experience gathered from bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations, including negotiations on important parts of the "rolling text" of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The contribution of our Conference would, however, be even greater in scope, for example, if the Soviet Union's memorandum on confidence-building measures, in connection with the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, met with a broad positive response; if all aspects of verification set out in the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests were scrutinized by scientific experts in the framework of the Conference; and if the task of setting up an inspectorate for monitoring outer space activities were tackled.

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Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran):

... I am instructed by my Foreign Minister, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, to express his sincere thanks for the warm and cordial hospitality extended to him by the Conference, the President, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany and the secretariat. Our special thanks also go to the distinguished representatives who expressed words of welcome to my Foreign Minister, and particularly those who, in their statements, voiced their condemnation of the recent use of chemical weapons in Halabja.

It is unfortunate that after the Halabja holocaust the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the people of Iran and Iraq has still continued on a large scale. On 22 March 1988 the villages of Namshaar, Taazovaar, Vaalak and Ghalehji near the city of Marivan, as well as several rural areas of Sardasht in the Iranian Kurdish province of Kurdistan, were chemically bombarded on three occasions by 13 Iraqi military aircraft. The initial casualties were 31 dead and 450 injured. Among the victims were a one-year-old baby and an 80 year-old man. From 21 to 26 March 1988 various villages and rural areas in

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Iraqi Kurdistan were subjected to chemical attacks by Iraq. The villages of Susiyan and Doukan were chemically bombed on 21 and 22 March. The rural areas of Bljajar, Jaafairan and Oliyan in Gharedagh region, 27 kilometres south of Sulaimaniya, were subjected to chemical attacks on 23 March 1988. In the meantime, some villages in Zardeh Heights in Sulaimaniya province were also attacked by chemical weapons on 26 March 1988. Mustard and nerve gases were used in these attacks.

In these inhuman actions which are contrary to all internationally recognized norms of law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, some areas of Quaredagh and Sanghab in the north of the country were subjected to heavy chemical bombardment whose repercussions even reached the areas under the control of the Government in Baghdad. Since Iranian forces are not present in these areas, and therefore cannot provide any assistance in sending medical teams and relief, the very urgent aid that is needed can only be provided through other countries and international organizations.

Meanwhile, on 1 April 1988 a captured Iraqi pilot admitted the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Major Ahmad Shaker, whose Sukhoi 22 jet was recently shot down in the Valfajr operational area in north-eastern Iraq, admitted at a press conference that he himself had dropped chemical bombs on Iranian forces in Basra and Hoveyze war theatres. He said chemical bombs normally weigh around 200 kilograms and resemble other bombs in appearance. He further disclosed that these bombs are fitted to Iraqi jets at Balad and Kirkuk air bases by secret agents in plain clothes.

The continuation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in gross violation of international law, and as a threat not only to human values but even to the human race, reconfirms the urgent and vital need for the adoption of concerted and strong positions and for political efforts to bring an end to the use of chemical weapons.

A list has been prepared that includes the cases and locations of use of chemical weapons by Iraq since 1981, and also the number of victims. We would like to request that this document be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to extend to you our congratulations on your assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this important month of April.

The horrible and outrageous reports we have received from the world media, personally delivered to the Conference on Disarmament last week, on the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war, with resultant civilian casualties, should serve as a reminder to all countries of why chemical weapons should be banned.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

We condemn without reservation any use of chemical weapons in violation of international law.

The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war appears to be a grave violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare.

We call upon those guilty to desist from any further use of chemical weapons. The United States continues to urge a negotiated settlement in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 598, which calls for an end to the war in all aspects.

We must seek to prevent further erosion of existing constraints on chemical weapons while we are negotiating here in Geneva, and we call upon all States to comply strictly with their international legal obligations.

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(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

The negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons offer cause for satisfaction, and to a certain extent compensate for the frustration that we might feel at the deadlock in the other items on the agenda of the Conference. Thanks to the tireless efforts of Ambassador Ekéus and Ambassador Sujka as chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, important progress has been made in drafting a convention banning such weapons. It is true that the pace of the negotiations on this question could have been faster, but we continue to hope that our Conference will shoulder all its responsibilities so as to respond to the unanimous appeal addressed to it by the United Nations General Assembly to move as rapidly as possible towards the elaboration of the convention.

As we move closer to completing the draft convention, it is extremely important for all parties involved in the negotiations to focus their efforts on concluding an agreement which genuinely deals with the prohibition and complete destruction of all chemical weapons, and one which will gather universal support.

Over and above its considerable importance for the security of all countries, such an agreement on the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction should serve as an example for multilateral negotiations on other disarmament issues. It will also provide proof that with political will technical problems, no matter how complicated, may be overcome.

Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany):

••• Today I would like to draw attention to a note from the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This note, which has just been distributed, was prompted by recent reports about the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran. In view of this, my Government appeals to all States participating in the Conference to give the highest priority to a global ban on chemical weapons, and calls for intensification of the efforts of the Conference aimed at the conclusion of a global convention on chemical weapons.

We have asked for this note to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

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Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

••• I asked for the floor to read out the following communiqué from the Foreign Ministry of my country dated 6 April last.

"In view of the escalation of warlike acts in the war being fought by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq, which has now entered its eighth year, the Argentine Government has called upon the two countries to put an end to hostilities in accordance with the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 598 (1987), which it helped to draft with the aim of achieving peace.

At the same time, the Argentine Government feels it necessary to express its views categorically on the following aspects of the aforementioned conflict:

1. The extension of hostilities to the major urban centres of both parties, which has come to be called the 'war of the cities', gives a new and tragic dimension to the conflict by involving the innocent and unarmed civilian population on both sides. This calls forth the most energetic condemnation by the Argentine Republic.

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(Mr. Cámpora - Argentina)

2. The use of chemical weapons and asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases in the war between the two countries is a serious violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of customary international law, which is a matter for grave concern on the part of the people and Government of Argentina."

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): First of all I would like to express our thanks for the concern that the distinguished representative of Argentina expressed regarding the escalation of tension in the war between Iran and Iraq. For your information and the information of the Conference, I would like to say a few words. First, we too are concerned about the escalation of what has been known as the "war of the cities". We have given a positive response to the appeals of the Secretary-General since 1984, and we have said repeatedly that we will not attack residential areas and that the cities must be immune from the attacks. That was something our Foreign Minister reiterated two weeks ago here, and our attacks have only a deterrent aspect. Once again, for the correction of the record here, we reiterate that we will never attack cities if the Iraqis do not. We did not start the "war of the cities", we will not continue the "war of the cities", and as you have seen on several occasions, the Secretary-General has appealed and we have given a positive response here. I would like to reiterate again the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that whenever Iraq stops attacks on cities the Islamic Republic of Iran will stop.

On the second point also I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates here to the dangerous trend which is being followed. Iraq has announced, and the Foreign Minister of Iraq has announced, that they will use every means in order to deter what they have called the Iranian aggression, and for that pretext the Iraqi head of the news agency in Cairo also has announced that they will use chemical weapons. They have determined that several big Iranian cities will be attacked with chemical weapons. Blaming both countries and asking both countries in this regard gives Iraq a pretext to escalate. Using such words will only give a pretext for more extensive chemical attacks on bigger cities. As our Foreign Minister reiterated here, we have never used chemical weapons and we will not use chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Mladenov, Bulgaria)

••• We stated in Belgrade our firm conviction that the idea of turning the Balkan peninsula into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and chemical weapons, is still extremely relevant today. In making

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(Mr. Mladenov, Bulgaria)

such an assertion we did not wish to renew the polemics on the usefulness of creating such zones throughout the world. But we know full well that the presence of nuclear weapons near our borders in neighbouring countries, weapons capable of reducing our cities to ashes, does not reassure us, but greatly alarms us. The presence of such weapons is a precondition for mutual suspicion and fear. And fear and suspicion, as we know, are bad advisers. It is easy to imagine where an escalation of fear and suspicion might lead.

(Mr. Mladenov, Bulgaria)

I have been told that so far nine foreign ministers have taken the floor during the spring part of this session of the Conference. We can note that the common element in their statements has been recognition of the need for the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.

On behalf of my Government, I should like to confirm that the People's Republic of Bulgaria is not developing, does not manufacture and does not possess chemical weapons. There are no foreign chemical weapons on our territory. In addition, I can state that the key precursors of chemical weapons listed in schedule 2 in annex VI of the draft convention are not produced in the chemical industry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. I should also like to recall here a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers of my country on 30 December 1986 placing restrictions on exports of certain chemicals which are intended for peaceful purposes but which can also be used for manufacturing chemical weapons.

Objectively speaking, the Conference is on the threshold of concluding a convention banning a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. The threat of the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as the planned production of new, extremely dangerous versions of the "quiet death", make the task of ridding mankind of these barbarous weapons even more pressing. Concluding work on the convention is a first priority for the Conference. Rapid successful completion of this work will have an invaluable political and moral impact on the other areas of disarmament.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

One of the major issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is the global elimination of a particularly inhuman and horrifying weapon. I am speaking of the efforts to conclude a chemical weapons convention.

The activities of the Conference on Disarmament in this field are confronted with a context of the utmost urgency. Hundreds and even thousands of civilians, including women and children, are being killed or wounded in large-scale chemical weapon attacks in the course of an ongoing war. The shattering pictures of poison gas victims have created an awareness of the danger of chemical weapons among the public. Victims of such weapons are being treated in Austrian hospitals. Austria firmly condemns the use of such weapons, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.

In view of the present use of chemical weapons and the danger of their further proliferation, a world-wide ban is of the highest priority. Our endeavours should, therefore, concentrate on stimulating the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in order to conclude the chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date.

This convention should lead to the elimination of all existing stocks and production facilities of chemical weapons, and thereby significantly enhance international security. Agreed verification procedures will, of course, constitute an essential element of a comprehensive and global chemical weapons convention. The issue is complex and much detailed work remains to be done, particularly in the areas of non-production and on-site challenge inspections.

The control mechanism should be devised in a way which ensures the effective and comprehensive implementation of the principle of non-production of chemical weapons. For this purpose, it seems necessary for all States to provide at the earliest possible date detailed information on their actual arsenals, their chemical weapon production facilities and all other chemical industry facilities considered as potentially falling under the future chemical weapons convention.

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(Mr. Mock, Austria)

With a view to contributing to this process of confidence-building, I wish to recall that in accordance with its treaty obligations, none of the chemicals listed in schedule [I] of the annex to article VI of the so-called "rolling-text" (CD/795) are produced in Austria. I further wish to inform the Conference that the Austrian delegation will provide the following specific data on the Austrian chemical industry's production facilities. On the basis of the "matrix version" submitted under CD/CW/WP.193, Austria is ready to give detailed information concerning production facilities and chemicals listed in schedules [2] and [3] of the afore-mentioned article. Comprehensive research on data relating to both schedules is under way so that the filled-in matrix can be presented to the Conference during the first half of this year.

As regards the proposals concerning the contents of schedule [4] which have been submitted to the Conference, there will be readiness on our part for substantive co-operation and participation in an international exchange of views.

Let me add that Austria is at present examining the legislative requirements for establishing transfer and export controls on eight highly toxic chemical substances, five of which belong to the category of the afore-mentioned "key precursors", so that the necessary regulations can come into force as soon as possible.

Regarding recent proposals on various forms of ad hoc checks of the chemical industry, which are based on the principle of on-site challenge inspections, further intensive work still needs to be done. The control of chemical enterprises, particularly private ones, could affect confidential commercial information and also increase the production costs of the companies concerned.

Let me draw your attention to the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which Austria has served as the host country since 1957, practises a communication system which has taken care of some of the above preoccupations. This successful system should be studied with a view to possible lessons to be learned.

For the purposes of studying the requirements of the verification machinery of the future organization and its consequences for the chemical industry, some Austrian chemical enterprises have indicated their readiness for, and interest in, co-operating with the Conference on Disarmament by offering to serve as model facilities. The Austrian enterprises concerned are examining to what extent such a contribution is possible from a technical point of view.

Such an exercise would make it possible to test the specific verification machinery envisaged with respect to the production or non-production of chemical substances listed in the draft convention. International experts would be welcome to examine the functioning of the verification procedures.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

The financial implications for member States of setting up the organization, and those possibly arising for the chemical industry concerned, could also be evaluated. On the basis of such an assessment, conclusions could be drawn with a view to finally determining the framework of the organization. The chemical industry, too, could study the implications and be helped to take the necessary preparatory measures to be ready at the time of the entry into force of the convention.

It is evident from my remarks that my country attaches great importance to the global elimination of chemical weapons. Let me point out in this context that the International Atomic Energy Agency has highly qualified staff who have acquired valuable experience in the field of control and verification. Enabling the new organization which is to be established under the chemical weapons convention to benefit from the experience of those experts might result in the sharing of technological knowledge and possibly in the saving of financial expense. We would hope that the international atmosphere of the Austrian capital and its available infrastructure could help to facilitate the important tasks of new organizations.

Knowing that this question is not of immediate priority, I nevertheless take this opportunity to confirm that Austria would be willing and pleased to be the host to the envisaged organization, should the international community consider such a choice conducive to the most effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention.

You are aware that it is a traditional goal of our foreign policy to increase Austria's role as an international meeting-place.

In concluding my remarks on chemical weapons, I should like to express my firm conviction that the Conference on Disarmament has a historic chance to complete a convention on the global banning of these weapons in the near future. Let no obstacles come in our way during the last stretch of this important disarmament endeavour.

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(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The failure of the Conference to produce concrete disarmament agreements cannot be the sole factor in evaluating the work of this body in recent years. Bearing in mind all the conditions which have been affecting its proceedings, we take a positive view of what the Conference could accomplish. Such a view is based on the following premises:

Firstly, the Conference has made tangible progress in advancing the "rolling text" of a convention on the total elimination of chemical weapons;

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

This thought takes me to the problem of chemical weapons. It is here that the Conference is closest to the fulfilment of its mandate. Really impressive headway has been made towards elaborating a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. There are, of course, some outstanding difficulties which still need to be overcome. New possibilities in this respect emerged last year. The Soviet Union and the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty came out with new proposals, first of all concerning verification. Regrettably, these bold and far-reaching ideas have not always met with due attention on the part of some States concerned. However, chances for a breakthrough still exist, and here they are the most pronounced.

We strongly believe that the early finalization of work on the convention for the total elimination of these weapons should be approached on the highest-priority basis. In its capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on this topic, Poland will spare no effort to reach that end.

In order to further facilitate work towards a convention and contribute to the strengthening of confidence in the process of negotiations, my Government wishes to inform the Conference that none of the key precursors is manufactured in Poland.

Of the chemicals listed in schedule [3], the following are produced exclusively for peaceful purposes, and each of them at one plant: phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus oxychloride, phosphene and hydrogen cyanide.

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(Mr. von Bülow, Federal Republic of Germany)

have the honour to present today. As can be seen from the document, which has been distributed, the data which are required to be provided multilaterally are already called for the needs for working out an effective convention, which will have to function immediately upon entry into force.

In conclusion, I would like once again to urge all delegations to the Conference on Disarmament to participate in this not only desirable but indispensable step prior to the signing of the convention, and to submit to this Conference on a voluntary basis the data to be provided according to our document. I am convinced that the provision of such information will have a positive effect on the course of the negotiations.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany):

In my intervention today I have the honour to speak on behalf of a group of Western countries, and on the subject of chemical weapons.

Transparency is a concept countries of the West have advocated in the field of arms control and disarmament for a long time. This is also true with regard to our negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. A number of contributions have been made by Western delegations towards this end.

In particular I would like to recall the working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 8 March 1983 (CD/353) and its revision of December 1985, which for the first time provided detailed data on the number of companies in the chemical industry producing specific key precursors. Likewise I would like to draw particular attention to the publication submitted by the United States in July 1986, entitled "Chemical stockpile disposal programme", which included detailed information on the location and composition of the American CW stockpile as well as on plans for its destruction. To these very important steps towards increased transparency we might also add the workshops organized by members of the Western Group within the framework of our negotiations. I would only like to mention the workshop in Tooele, Utah in 1983 as well as the verification workshops hosted by the Netherlands in 1986 and by my country in 1984.

We consider the multilateral provision of data prior to the signing of a convention on chemical weapons, so aptly invoked this morning by the Foreign Minister of Austria, not only a confidence-building measure but also a necessary prerequisite for drafting an effective convention, as well as ensuring its early functioning. We welcome the fact that, in submitting its memorandum on multilateral data exchange on 18 February this year, the Soviet Union has also accepted this view.

We thus consider it timely to conduct such an exchange. For this purpose we propose the provision by all States participating in the negotiations of data according to the format which is included in the working document which I

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

have the honour to present today. As can be seen from the document, which has been distributed, the data which are required to be provided multilaterally are clearly tailored to the needs for working out an effective convention, which will have to function immediately upon early entry into force.

In conclusion, I would like once again to urge all delegations to the Conference on Disarmament to participate in this not only desirable but indispensable step prior to the signing of the convention, and to submit to this Conference on a voluntary basis the data to be provided according to our document. I am convinced that the provision of such information will have a positive effect on the course of the negotiations.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, my delegation would like to join you in your kind words of welcome expressed to the distinguished guests who have delivered speeches at today's session, which we have followed with great interest. The presence of His Excellency Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov of Bulgaria, His Excellency Vice-Chancellor Alois Mock of Austria and His Excellency Deputy Foreign Minister Henryk Jaroszek of Poland, just like the visits of their colleagues in February and March this year, underscore the growing importance being accorded by many States to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This is also, in our opinion, a significant contribution to the preparations for SSOD-III. In their statements our honoured guests strongly emphasized the need to continue the work on the convention on a chemical weapons ban in a purposeful and speedy manner. My statement today is also devoted to this subject, but before proceeding I would like to express our deep satisfaction at the signing of the agreement concerning Afghanistan which will take place in a few hours in this building, as this will be an historic event which reaches beyond the region concerned and is also promoting a favourable international environment for disarmament.

At its forty-second session the United Nations General Assembly unanimously urged the Conference on Disarmament to reinforce further its efforts with a view to the final elaboration of a convention on the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The German Democratic Republic declares its unconditional support for the aim of achieving without further delay a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons. No type of chemical weapons may be excluded therefrom. Neither development nor production will be permitted following the entering into force of the convention. Nowhere shall there exist stocks of chemical weapons which remain exempted from verified destruction. Any delay would jeopardize the convention. This is a truth we have been forced to realize again in the past days and weeks. While we are conducting negotiations, chemical weapons are being manufactured, or preparations for production are

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

under way. Chemical weapons are being used and the endeavours aimed at their proliferation are increasing. These are irrefutable facts which must be countered not only by words but also by deeds. The danger of a chemical war will be eliminated effectively only if a binding chemical weapon ban is achieved. To this end, comprehensive efforts are called for both at the negotiating table in Geneva as well as outside these negotiations.

The efforts made in the negotiating process have produced different results. A positive development is in the offing concerning the provisions on verified closure and destruction of chemical weapon production facilities. Thus, it still might be possible at this spring session to fill the gaps contained in the text of article V and in the annex thereto.

As far as article IV is concerned, prospects are emerging for an understanding on the order of destruction pursuant to principles that take into account the security interests of all sides. It has proved possible to delete most of the footnotes and brackets in the present text. It can thus be gathered that practical negotiating efforts have definitely borne fruit.

On the other hand, serious problems have come to the fore on these subjects, to which I will return later on.

Now as before, it turns out to be rather complicated to agree on provisions of article VI, specifying guarantees against the production of chemical weapons in chemical industry.

My delegation has joined in the efforts to speed up the process of finding solutions by advancing concrete proposals. It was only recently that we submitted working paper CD/CW/WP.195, entitled "Article VI: Régime for chemicals in schedule [1]". It incorporates a comprehensive formula which should facilitate an early understanding. We devote great attention to reliably verifying all activities that are connected with schedule [1] chemicals, since these are substances posing the highest risk to the convention. In handling these chemicals no "grey zones" must exist.

Another problem which has been a concern of many delegations is the protection of confidential information and data. An analysis of the latest state of affairs in the negotiations, which was presented by us in working paper CD/CW/WP.194, indicates the scale of the work so far accomplished.

Many provisions relating to protection of the confidentiality of information already have a place in the "rolling text"; others are set out in the addendum and appendix material. Some gaps still need to be filled. Further elaboration of "models of agreements" would be a practicable approach here.

In the field of challenge inspections, a solid basis has been created for working out a convention text. This foundation could be consolidated if we deepened the understanding on how to implement the agreed principles. My delegation endeavoured to make a contribution in this direction by presenting working paper CD/CW/WP.198. It includes proposals for amendments concerning

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

the guidelines on the international inspectorate, proposals which, I am glad to note, met with a positive response from other delegations. The work on this subject can give an even clearer picture of how the principles of challenge procedures, such as "access to the site", "least intrusive manner" and "protection of sensitive equipment or information", materialize in inspection activities. This, together with the provisions governing the designation of inspectors for challenge inspections, as well as the application of specific inspection instruments and methods, would create effective means to avert the danger of abusing challenge inspections.

As regards the verification mechanism of a CW convention, the provisions specifying the composition, size and decision-making powers of the Executive Council and other procedural matters still need to be elaborated. On this topic, my delegation submitted working paper CD/812 of 8 March 1988. The deliberations on this item are proceeding in a constructive manner, and the first outlines of an understanding in principle are beginning to take shape.

The efforts undertaken in the Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, to draw up the final clauses of the convention, resulted in the presentation of a discussion paper setting out concrete proposals for the text, which can serve as a foundation for further elaboration on these articles.

The results and the proposals for solutions give grounds for thinking that the negotiations will be completed before the end of this year, as was demanded by the foreign ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty at their recent Sofia meeting. If a green light was given by all sides involved towards this end, a carefully drawn up accord could come to fruition before then, by virtue of our joint efforts and thanks to the results produced so far, the experience gained in this process and the well-functioning negotiating machinery.

There is, however, no reason for complacency, but rather for serious concern that this objective is moving more and more out of sight. We see ourselves faced with the danger of the pace of negotiations becoming ever slower, and being thereby virtually adapted to the schedule of current and future production programmes for chemical weapons.

Time and again, too long passes before a reply is given to compromise formulae. It is due to inflexibility lasting for too long that many proposals identifying possible solutions have not reached fruition. Moreover, we are very sorry to see new concepts being introduced which question a long-existing consensus on the scope of the prohibition and move away from extensively elaborated formulae on articles IV and V. Diligence and professional expertise at the negotiating table alone cannot remove such obstacles. What is now called for are steps which strengthen the political will to conclude a convention on a CW ban and which serve to build further confidence, parallel to intensive negotiations on specific subjects. Against this background, we consider it to be imperative that political forces should be mobilized on a world-wide scale to counteract the risk of the negotiations' coming to nothing.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It is also necessary to arouse the interest of those States not participating in the negotiations, and to stimulate their readiness to accede to the Convention. In so doing, we see, inter alia, the following possibilities: taking up confidence-building measures with the aim of preparing a convention. The Soviet Union's memorandum of 18 February 1988 on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/808) incorporates a number of valuable proposals relating to confidence-building measures. They have met with a broad positive response. Several delegations are still dealing with single problems involved. Work is being done in the German Democratic Republic with a view to recording data on the production of chemicals now set out in schedules [2] and [3], as well as on their production facilities. In that regard, my delegation suggests intensifying the exchange of views in order to reach an agreement on the details of these confidence-building measures. We support the proposal that all interested States should participate on a voluntary basis in such an exchange of data.

The same goes for the idea of conducting trial inspections. As far as this proposal is concerned, valuable considerations emerged from the Puqwash Workshop which was held in January this year. The German Democratic Republic is very much interested in these steps. At the moment it is examining the possibility of carrying out such trial inspections.

The proposed confidence-building measures could fulfil two tasks: they would enhance the confidence of all sides involved in efforts to bring about a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and at the same time data and experience would be gained which were useful for implementing the provisions of the convention.

The proposals on the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones serve the same objective. Only a few days ago, I was able, together with my colleague, Ambassador Vejvoda, to inform you of a further significant initiative in this field. In a joint declaration of 5 April 1988, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Social Democratic Party of Germany express their concern at the problems which have arisen since autumn 1987 and may delay or even endanger the conclusion of a convention on the general and complete ban on all chemical weapons and their destruction. The parties support the appeal addressed by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the participants of the Conference on Disarmament to proceed with their work in a constructive spirit and to remove all obstacles along the way. The three-party initiative advocates negotiations on ridding their territories of chemical weapons or keeping their territories free of them. This proposal forms part of the overall aim of encouraging agreement on a chemical weapons ban. The elements already finalized on a CW convention should thus be inserted into the text of the regional accord. Just as in the case of confidence-building measures, though with the difference that the agreement on a chemical-weapon-free zone would be an international treaty, the initiative is an enterprise that would provide extremely important experience for the finalization and implementation

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

of the global convention. We hope that this initiative will fall on fertile ground. Its source was the same line of thinking that led to the decision to withdraw the shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on the territories of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia before the INF Treaty enters into force.

The forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be a further occasion for demonstrating the political resolve of all interested parties to bring about a CW convention at the earliest possible date. It will also give an opportunity to elucidate the prospects of multilateral disarmament efforts and to open up new avenues leading towards concrete results. We consider it to be imperative during SSOD-III to focus great attention, inter alia, on the issue of bringing about a CW convention as speedily as possible. It may lend fresh momentum to the question of relieving our negotiations from burdens and insecurities.

The Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, when addressing this body in February this year, spoke of an existing consensus in principle on the issues to be resolved in connection with the CW convention. At SSOD-III there will be the chance to build substance into this consensus in principle, to surmount existing contradictions and to simultaneously extend this consensus to all United Nations Member States. Given the relevance of these issues, we deem it appropriate to make use of the presence of leading representatives at the third special session devoted to disarmament in order to conduct a cordial and constructive dialogue.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

As the spring part of the 1988 session draws to a close, I would like to comment on what has been achieved during the last few months in the chemical weapons negotiations. I plan to take the floor again at the next plenary meeting to present some ideas about the future course of these negotiations.

The work on a chemical weapons ban has continued over the last several months in a business-like and constructive manner. The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has carefully and methodically considered several important issues. New ideas and proposals have been submitted and considered. Undoubtedly, the results of this work have helped to lay the foundation for future accomplishments.

I would like to comment on the activities of each working group, as well as the work supervised by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

Working Group A, under the able chairmanship of Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, has had an extensive and detailed discussion of monitoring of the chemical industry under article VI and on co-operation for economic and technological development under article XI.

To facilitate work on article VI issues, the United States delegation presented proposals for the thresholds that will apply to the monitoring régimes for schedules [1], [2], and [3]. These proposals, which are contained in document CD/802, have generally been well received.

Some delegations, however, have expressed concern that under the United States proposal, synthesis of laboratory quantities of schedule [1] chemicals would not be subject to international monitoring. The concern apparently relates to possible clandestine activities that are aimed at development of chemical weapons. There does seem to be agreement, however, that the small quantities synthesized do not pose a threat to security in themselves.

We, too, are concerned in general with possible clandestine development of chemical weapons. However, proposals by some delegations to monitor synthesis of small quantities of chemicals do not help to enhance security. We do not support such an approach because it would be ineffective. Illegal activities at the early low-level stages of development would be easy to hide. That is a fact of life. The United States delegation remains ready, however, to consider seriously any further proposals to improve verification of the prohibition of development of chemical weapons.

Working Group A has also devoted considerable time and energy to the so-called schedule [4]. Despite very active and constructive discussions, little progress has been achieved in finding a mutually acceptable approach to this issue.

The additional schedule resulted from a widespread concern about the potential risk posed by super-toxic lethal chemicals that are produced in civil facilities and that are not covered under the schedule [1] régime. The concern extends both to the chemicals themselves and to their production

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

facilities. After several years of discussions, we have concluded that this concern seems to be exaggerated, but should not be dismissed entirely. While it is still not clear how many chemicals and facilities in this category pose risks to security, technical discussions have shown that the problem is likely to be very limited.

In our view it is now necessary to consider alternatives to the questionable approach represented by the proposed schedule [4]. Two different problems should be considered. First, how should the convention deal with any extremely toxic civil chemical that in the future might be considered a potential chemical weapon?

One possibility for dealing with commercial chemicals that pose a high risk would be to place them under the schedule [2] régime, as proposed earlier by several western delegations. This régime already provides for strict monitoring for key precursors. It should not be too difficult to adapt it to extremely toxic chemicals.

The second problem is how to identify and monitor facilities that might be suitable for producing schedule [1] chemicals.

The concept of "ad hoc checks" proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/791 is the only alternative approach now before the Conference for dealing with facilities that normally produce innocuous products, but that present a risk of clandestine conversion to chemical weapon production. Obviously, criteria would be needed for identifying such facilities. One possibility would be to focus on types of civil products that require chemical processes common to chemical weapon production.

The United States delegation's initial reaction to the "ad hoc checks" proposal is that it is a constructive one. We are prepared to join with other delegations in exploring this idea and any others that are introduced. Creative approaches are needed if progress is to be achieved.

Additionally, Working Group A has begun to discuss the possible content of article XI, on the issue of economic and technological co-operation. Co-operation is important for many countries, and the United States recognizes this. We are already playing a major role through efforts in international organizations and in the private sector. We believe that the future convention should not impede co-operative efforts. We continue to have doubts that a security agreement like the future chemical weapons convention should contain an obligation to engage in economic and technological co-operation.

I would now like to turn to the discussions in Working Group B, which is capably chaired by Mr. Macedo of Mexico. The principal topics have been provisions for declaration and destruction of chemical weapons under article IV, including the order of destruction, and the provision under article X for assistance in protection against chemical attack.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Provisions regarding the destruction of chemical weapons are among the most sensitive aspects of the convention. They affect directly the existing security arrangements of States. One can expect States to proceed very cautiously in developing such provisions. None the less, over the last year positions have gradually been converging. Thanks in no small part to the skilful work of the 1987 and 1988 Working Group chairmen, understandings have been reached on the categories into which chemical weapons are to be grouped, the period for destruction of each category, and the need for levelling out of stocks before the end of the destruction period.

The United States continues to consider it important that all States possessing chemical weapons begin destruction within a year after the convention enters into force. The elimination of chemical weapons from national arsenals is a global problem. We must avoid approaches that suggest otherwise.

Further work is needed on the technical issue of how to compare binary and unitary weapons, on where the levelling out should be set, and on whether more than one such threshold will be needed, assuming States other than the United States and the Soviet Union will also declare possession of chemical weapons.

Let me now comment on the discussions of article X, which has received a major share of the Working Group's attention.

States correctly attach importance to maintaining a strong capability to protect themselves against chemical attack, even though chemical weapons will be banned. The illegal use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war demonstrates clearly that violations may occur, with horrible consequences.

Differences clearly exist, however, about how to deal with protective programmes in the future convention. Some believe that the emphasis should be on promoting assistance, others on avoiding creation of new obstacles to protective activities. In this regard, we welcome working paper CD/809 presented by the delegation of Argentina. While there are important points on which the United States position is different, we believe that this working paper has made a significant contribution to a realistic and constructive discussion.

In addition to the order of destruction of chemical weapons and article X, Working Group B also has responsibility for provisions on destruction of chemical weapon production facilities and on so-called "old stocks". I would like to touch on these two topics for a moment.

The elimination of chemical weapon production facilities is a fundamental component of a convention. In 1985 extensive consultations were held in the Committee on this complex and difficult subject. However, major differences remained.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

For the past two years, the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union have been working diligently to develop a mutually acceptable approach to this issue and thereby to facilitate the multilateral negotiations in this area. In the most recent round of bilateral discussions, a common approach was reached. This approach is based on a carefully crafted and practical definition of a chemical weapon production facility that takes account of the concerns of both delegations.

During the two years of discussions, alternative ideas were subjected to searching examination. Each side showed a willingness to consider seriously the views of the other. Out of this process emerged a joint view that chemical weapon production facilities should be completely destroyed. This judgement applies both to the buildings and to the equipment of the facilities.

The two delegations have provided material on their common approach to the Chairman of Working Group B, for use in his consultations. It is our hope that these consultations will lead to the elaboration of the relevant provisions of the "rolling text", thus eliminating a major gap in the draft convention.

How to deal with so-called old stocks under the convention is also a complex and delicate topic, which we understand is being discussed in private consultations. While one must not exaggerate the importance of this issue, it is none the less essential that the approach that eventually emerges should not undermine the definition of the term "chemical weapon" nor create a loophole for avoiding the declaration and verification of chemical weapons. We shall look forward to learning the results of the private consultations, so that the Conference may develop appropriate provisions for the future convention.

Let me now present our views on the topics being discussed under Working Group C, which is under the outstanding and very capable chairmanship of Mr. Numata of Japan. These are the functions and interrelationships of the treaty bodies, the composition of the Executive Council, and challenge inspection.

In our view, the combined efforts of the Working Group chairmen for 1987 and 1988, Dr. Krutzsch and Mr. Numata respectively, have resulted in a much-improved text for article VIII. We would like to express our appreciation to both of them. While unresolved points remain, it is our hope that agreement can be reached during the summer. We also would like to express our appreciation to the delegation of Canada for its working paper, CD/823.

For a long time, the composition of the Executive Council was considered a forbidden subject. We welcome the efforts of Mr. Numata to explore this new territory. We appreciate also the contribution of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic in its working paper, CD/812.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

There appears to be a common view that the Executive Council must be small enough for effective work and yet represent the different interests involved in the convention. In our view an appropriate balance must be found among the interests of the international community as a whole, of the States whose existing security arrangements are most directly affected, and of those States that bear the brunt of the verification régime.

While care must be taken to achieve political balance in the Executive Council, we do not see how this goal could be reached directly. It would not be desirable or practical to try to list States according to political groups. Rather, the balance must be accomplished indirectly. In this connection, the interrelationship between the decision-making procedures and political balance must be noted. Political manipulation of decision-making would be more difficult with a requirement for a two-thirds majority than if only a simple majority were required.

Challenge inspection has long been one of the most important and difficult issues in the negotiations. This is only natural. Routine inspection is clearly not sufficient, and it is therefore necessary to develop provisions for access to some of the most sensitive locations and facilities that States have. No one should expect these negotiations to be easy.

At the same time it should be recognized, as pointed out by the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora, on 8 March 1988, that under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, a number of States have already agreed to a mandatory challenge inspection régime.

The Chairman's report on challenge inspection contained in appendix II of CD/795 demonstrates that important steps have been made recently toward a common approach. At the same time it is clear that serious differences remain on each stage of the challenge inspection process: the initiation process, the inspection itself, and the follow-up.

Discussions have shown that the interrelationships of the three stages must be taken into account. Measures to protect against abuse of the right to request an inspection reflect concern that efforts might be made during an inspection to acquire information not related to verification of the convention. This is the concern, for example, behind our own proposal for a fact-finding panel.

The United States supports the August 1987 suggestion of the Soviet Union that procedures be developed for challenge inspections that will provide effective inspections and will minimize the risk of disclosure of sensitive non-chemical-weapons-related information during an inspection. We urge the Soviet delegation to develop this suggestion in a more detailed form. In this context we would note that the effectiveness of the procedures will determine the effectiveness of challenge inspection. We are prepared to consider seriously any detailed ideas that may be presented.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In considering the conduct of challenge inspections, we support the suggestion of the Federal Republic of Germany in CD/CW/WP.191 that further attention should be given to the possible role for a representative of the requesting party. This subject was discussed at length during the Chairman's consultations in the 1987 session. It was not resolved and therefore could not be dealt with in the Chairman's report. This issue is a fundamental aspect of any challenge inspection provision and therefore requires further discussion.

We welcome the increased attention that is now being given to the provisions for follow-up to a challenge inspection. As yet, this important aspect is relatively undeveloped.

The United States believes that after evaluation of the inspection report, the challenging State should notify the Executive Council whether or not it has concluded that a violation has taken place. If the challenging State, or any other State party receiving the inspection report, concludes that a violation has taken place, it should provide the Executive Council with a statement regarding its findings, and, to the extent it deems appropriate, the course of action it plans to take pursuant to its findings. The Executive Council should provide the statement regarding the violation to all States parties and to the United Nations Security Council.

In our view a special meeting of the Executive Council should not be convened automatically each time there is a challenge inspection. Instead, the convention should allow a special meeting to be convened if a specified number of States believe it is necessary.

The question naturally arises of what actions the Executive Council might be empowered to take after an inspection.

The United States believes that the Executive Council has an important role to play after an inspection. It can and should consider and recommend actions for States parties to take to resolve concerns. While such recommendations would not be binding, they would carry behind them the very considerable political weight of the Council.

We do not believe that the Council can or should try to be a court. It cannot realistically be expected to act as an impartial judge of whether a violation has occurred. This judgement must be reserved exclusively for individual States parties.

In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the discussions that were held on the final articles of the convention. The United States delegation welcomes the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, to initiate work on texts for articles XII-XVI of the "rolling text". The Chairman's paper he has prepared will undoubtedly assist efforts during the summer to identify areas of agreement and issues that need to be resolved.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In summary, we have seen in recent months how the combined efforts of all delegations have moved our negotiations forward on a broad front. As I have tried to outline today, the work of the Ad hoc Committee, under its capable Chairman and Working Group Co-ordinators, has helped to clarify areas that heretofore had been ambiguous, establish concrete provisions where before there had been only principles, and set to work on principles where before there had only been headings.

The progress made by this Conference and its Ad hoc Committee may not always be readily discernible. Sometimes the answer to one question brings with it a new question. Sometimes exploration of a subject area reveals to us how much there is still left to do in that area. But we should not fail to recognize the advances that none the less have been achieved through our joint efforts.

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Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

In connection with the fact that on 13 April, the co-ordinator of Group B, the representative of Mexico, Pablo Macedo, submitted to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons a working paper on chemical weapon production facilities, I would like to state the following. The question of chemical weapon production facilities has a long history. Discussions on this issue at the unofficial consultations in the framework of the Ad hoc Committee in 1985 showed that progress in dealing with this problem would be facilitated if a common understanding were reached by the delegations of the USSR and the United States as regards the definition of such facilities. For that reason consideration of the issue of CW production facilities has occupied an important place at the Soviet-American consultations which are being held in accordance with the agreement reached by the leaders of the two countries at their Geneva meeting in November 1985. As a result of that work on a bilateral basis a common approach was agreed which became the basis for the paper submitted by the co-ordinator of Group B, Mr. Pablo Macedo. We hope that the paper that has been submitted will contribute to the early finalization of the provisions of the draft convention on this subject.

Let me now make a few short remarks about the other issues discussed at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The present session has achieved definite progress in elaborating a number of articles of the convention, in particular articles IV, V, VI and VIII. A greater degree of agreement has been reached as regards the provisions of article IV ("Chemical weapons") and its annexes. They have to a considerable extent been "cleansed" of square brackets and footnotes reflecting reservations. Important work has been done to clarify the principles for and order of destruction of chemical weapons. Agreement has been reached on a new, more complete, detailed text of the annex to article VI ("Activities not prohibited by the Convention")

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

relating to production of super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule 1. A useful discussion has been held on the question of ad hoc checks as a form of verification of non-production. More detailed consideration has been given to the issue of defining the concept of the "production capacity" of facilities for the purpose of the convention. A number of provisions of article VIII ("The Organization") have been updated. In particular, a new text has been elaborated on the Technical Secretariat. Rather fruitful, useful discussions have been held on other issues related to the international organization to be established under the convention. Serious work has begun on articles X and XI, devoted to issues related to the provision of assistance and economic and technical development. In working on these articles the Soviet Union proceeds from the concept that the security of the States parties to the convention should be based on collective measures to counter emergence of the threat of the use of chemical weapons, as well as the generally recognized principle of "disarmament for development". We note with satisfaction the active role the delegations of the neutral and non-aligned States are playing in drafting these articles.

Elaboration has begun of the concluding articles of the convention, in particular on such important issues as the signature, ratification and entry into force of the convention, its relationship to other international agreements, amendment, etc. The results of this discussion are included in the document prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Boqumil Sujka of Poland, which reflects the viewpoints of the various delegations.

In the course of discussion of article IX (Challenge inspections) at this session, a number of delegations have expressed concern at the danger of abuse of challenge inspections and have proposed ways to prevent such abuses. This question was also raised in today's statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf. Interesting proposals have been made concerning possible approaches to the solution of this problem (for example, document CD/CW/WP.198 of 5 April this year submitted by the German Democratic Republic). In our view this document contains a number of specific ideas which could be used in drafting the relevant provisions of the convention. In this connection we would like to emphasize that we consider it especially important that measures to prevent abuse of challenge inspections should be elaborated and implemented exclusively in the context of, and not in spite of, the principle of the mandatory nature of inspection. There should be no weakening of that principle or exceptions therefrom. This is a matter of fundamental importance. We continue to believe that the paper on on-site challenge inspection prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and contained in appendix II to document CD/795 provides a good basis for finalizing this part of the convention. The most appropriate solution to the problem of alternative measures (paragraph 12 in the Chairman's document) would in our view be to use the relevant provisions of the working paper from Great Britain (CD/715). We confirm our readiness to engage in practical work to agree on a treaty text on that basis.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Unfortunately, the spring session of the Conference has shown that on some questions not only has there been a lack of progress, but indeed a tendency has emerged of departing from the compromises already outlined as the result of some delegations' having repudiated, abandoned their previous provisions. This, as well as the slow-down of negotiations in general, causes alarm. We fully support the assessment of the status of the negotiations made by the Group of 21 in its statement on 8 March this year. We subscribe to the list of the goals of the negotiations set out by the Group, as was said in a statement issued by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 March this year. The statement also indicates the reasons for the slow progress. As for the Soviet delegation, it is fully determined to do everything within its power to speed up work on finalizing the convention as much as possible.

The Soviet delegation appeals to all participants in the negotiations on a chemical weapon ban to make further efforts to identify scope for mutually acceptable solutions on questions which have not been agreed, so as to complete the work on those provisions which have not yet been the subject of formulations for the future convention. The early conclusion of the convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would not only rid humanity of this type of weapon of mass destruction, but would also demonstrate the potentialities of multilateral efforts in disarmament, and would give impetus to further progress in this and other fields.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to thank Ambassador B. Sujka for his tireless efforts in organizing the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons in an effective way, as well as the co-ordinators of the three working groups, A. Cima, S. Numata and P. Macedo, whose personal contribution to the negotiations has facilitated the search for the necessary compromises at an important stage in the elaboration of the draft convention.

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Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): On Tuesday, 12 April, in the plenary session, the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina read out to us a communiqué issued by the Argentine Foreign Ministry condemning the "war of the cities" and the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran. While the Islamic Republic of Iran fully shares the view expressed by Argentina and welcomes any humanitarian initiative to this end, unfortunately a slip in interpretation, which is an extremely rare event, prompts my delegation to make use of the right of reply to put the record straight. The original text in Spanish referred to the use of chemical weapons en la guerra entre ambos países, which means in the war between the two countries and not by the two, which was the interpretation provided to all delegations today. This case has proved to all of us the valuable and outstanding job the interpreters and translators are doing, without which our work would be

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(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

impossible. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the thanks of my Government for the humanitarian position adopted by the Argentine Foreign Ministry and, at the same time, our apologies to the Ambassador of Argentina for the inconvenience arising from the misinterpretation.

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Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The Western Group is disappointed to see that once again the draft mandate contained in CD/515/Rev.4 is being proposed for decision by the Conference. This has been done without any consultation with this Group. We do not believe that the submission of this draft mandate, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the agenda item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", will facilitate our work on this subject. Thus we are once again unable to associate ourselves with the proposed draft mandate.

The Western Group has stressed the significance it attaches to in-depth consideration of agenda item 3 from the time this item was placed on the agenda of the Conference. Indeed, we consider the prevention of war in any form of paramount importance. This objective is the corner-stone of the security policies of Western countries. The effective prevention of every kind of war, be it nuclear or chemical or conventional, is a matter of global concern. All States are therefore called upon to do everything in their power, as a priority objective of their policies, to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

In considering this item we should not just focus on nuclear weapons. Every day we are made painfully aware of the cruelty and inhumanity of wars fought with conventional and chemical weapons.

Nuclear disarmament must not give rise to the belief that the world has been made safe for conventional, chemical or other types of war. The goal of nuclear disarmament, which we endorse vigorously, must be to increase international security and stability. The Western Group advocates an arms

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control process which encompasses nuclear as well as conventional and chemical weapons, which enhances stability in all its aspects, promotes confidence, and advances by individual steps which are both stabilizing and verifiable.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): We are all under the impression of the gruesome reports on the recent use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq. The pictures we have seen of victims of a chemical attack reconfirm the notion that, as Foreign Minister Genscher put it, chemical weapons are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature.

Indeed, we cannot remain indifferent in the face of this blatant violation of international law. Rather we should view it - as was suggested in my Government's note of 7 April this year addressed to the States participating in the Conference on Disarmament - as an urgent warning to meet our responsibility in the negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. We must intensify our efforts and work towards the conclusion of a convention now. Chemical weapons must not have a future anywhere.

In reconfirming this commitment, to which we attach the highest priority, we can proceed from the basic agreements reached in the course of our negotiations on the main issues relating to an effective and verifiable convention. Substantial progress made in the negotiations during recent years gives rise to optimism and justifies the hope that an early agreement is possible. We have passed the point of no return. There is nothing which should stop mankind from banning chemical weapons once and for all. Therefore we must not jeopardize the important achievements and the basic consensus reached in our negotiations by introducing new concepts or developing old and collectively refused concepts. Rather, we must resolutely follow the road we have taken and try to resolve the remaining issues expeditiously and effectively.

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(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

The spring part of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is now drawing to a close. In the course of it we have continued our intensive negotiations on chemical weapons under the dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. Detailed discussions have been conducted on most of the still outstanding issues relating to the CW convention. Despite the strenuous efforts which have been made, not all our expectations have been fulfilled. Rather, we are somewhat disappointed by the lack of progress in many areas where, on the basis of agreements achieved so far, better results should have been reached.

Let me briefly review some of the major issues on the agenda of our negotiations. First I would like to address matters dealt with in Working Group A of the Ad hoc Committee. The issue of non-production and the monitoring of the chemical industry is of crucial importance for a durable and effective convention. The verification mechanism to be established to this end has to be comprehensive, feasible, manageable, consistent and effective. In order to meet these criteria we have to devise a régime which is stringent and at the same time provides for the necessary flexibility.

We should proceed from the basic question: What is realistically verifiable or detectable? We consider the monitoring régimes for schedules [1], [2] and [3] contained in the annex to article VI to be a sound basis for a viable and effective non-production verification system. However, we consider that coverage should not be limited to those facilities which are declared under schedules [1], [2] and [3]. There should also be a verification instrument available for all other chemical industry facilities. To this end, in CD/791 of 25 January 1988 we proposed ad hoc checks, which could be managed on a routine basis. These checks, which would be initiated by the Technical Secretariat, should serve solely to ascertain whether, at the time of the check, substances listed in the annexes to article VI and not reported for the facility in question are being produced. We are convinced that by this complementary instrument for monitoring the chemical industry an optimal degree of additional transparency, and hence of additional confidence in the reliability of all States parties' compliance with the convention, can be achieved. In the course of the past weeks we have had interesting discussions on our proposal. In light of these talks we intend to further elaborate our concept of ad hoc checks. We are looking forward to further exploration of our concept during the summer part of the session.

There were two other subjects which have been extensively dealt with in Working Group A during the previous weeks: schedule [1] of article VI, and the question of super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule [1].

In document CD/CW/WP.192 of 11 March 1988 we proposed a redraft of the annex to article VI [1]. We did so in the hope of bridging the differences which surfaced on this matter during lengthy discussions in the course of the intersessional work of the Ad hoc Committee. However, as consultations during the previous weeks have shown, regrettably it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on the declaration and verification régime for the substances in schedule [1]. We remain convinced that the approach taken in our working

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paper does provide a basis for a compromise solution, as the régime proposed therein builds on existing points of agreement. Thus we hope that the matter will be taken up again in the summer with a view to arriving at an eventual solution acceptable to all. The degree of agreement in principle existing on this question should make this goal attainable.

On the question of the so-called schedule [4], we expressed strong reservations on the approach proposed at last year's session. We drew particular attention to its inconsistency with the other schedules in the annex to article VI. We also argued that it would be impossible to implement schedule [4] in the form envisaged then. Although a number of questions remain as to the purpose of schedule [4] and its relevance to the objectives of the convention, we are prepared to meet the concerns expressed over this question. Thus in an effort to overcome the obstacle posed by this issue, we proposed in CD/792 of 25 January this year an approach which is at the same time effective, practicable and consistent with the régime contained in article VI as a whole. In doing so we have accepted that the régime could be based on the toxicity criterion alone, and that on this basis a list of relevant super-toxic lethal chemicals could be drawn up. We agree with Ambassador Friedersdorf that the problem should be restored to its real dimensions. We continue to be prepared to seek acceptable solutions. However, as experience in this spring session shows, it is necessary, before continuing to draft texts, to clarify what we are trying to achieve through a schedule [4]. Only when we have identified in an unambiguous manner the objectives of and reasons for a régime for super-toxic lethal chemicals will we be able to shape an effective régime tailored to defined requirements.

One of the main open questions to be resolved in the framework of Working Group B is the order of destruction of chemical weapons. The question of maintaining undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction process is of paramount importance in this regard. The preconditions for this - after the entry into force of the convention - are in the view of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: no research on new chemical weapons; no continued production or modernization of chemical weapons; no exceptions from the general rule of verification of all existing stocks and facilities, i.e. no secret CW stocks; and, lastly, no proliferation.

In an effort to translate principles agreed by the majority of the CD members into reality, and taking account of existing disparities in chemical weapon arsenals, we made a proposal together with Italy in CD/822 of 29 March 1988, which seems to us to present a viable solution. These are the main points of our suggested phased approach to the destruction process:

Proceeding from the basic undertaking that all production of chemical weapons shall cease immediately upon the entry into force of the convention, and that all chemical weapon storage sites as well as production facilities will immediately be subjected to systematic international on-site verification, we suggest that in a first phase the States parties possessing the largest stocks of chemical weapons should proceed with the destruction of their chemical weapon stocks until an agreed level is reached. It is

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

envisaged that, after the large stocks have been levelled out at the end of this phase, which we propose to be the first five years of the destruction process, all States parties possessing chemical weapons, regardless of the size of their chemical weapon stocks, will be required to destroy them. During this second phase, the existing stockpile of each State possessing CW would be subdivided into five equal amounts to be destroyed during the remaining five years of the destruction period.

Our proposal also provides for close monitoring of the destruction process. Thus we suggest that during the first phase States parties should submit regular annual reports on the reduction of their stocks. Furthermore, we envisage a review at the end of the first phase, to take stock of the results achieved so far and the experience gained. It should serve two purposes. First, it should establish that the agreed reductions have in fact been implemented in the first phase. Second, it can be used to examine the verification mechanism in the light of experience and to see whether it is adequate or whether improvements are needed. However, it will not be possible to use this review to change the timing of the overall destruction period, to extend the transitional period or to decide on a course for the execution of the convention other than that laid down in the convention.

Another important subject to be dealt with in Working Group B is the question of "abandoned chemical weapon stocks, discovered chemical weapons and old obsolete chemical weapons". After last year's intensive and sometimes controversial discussion on this topic, my delegation is actively involved in the search for a solution which is acceptable to all concerned and in conformity with the objectives and the nature of a multilateral convention.

We welcome the substantial progress we have made on article VIII of the convention since last year. Our thanks are due especially to last year's item co-ordinator for cluster IV, Dr. Krutzsch, who started to restructure this article. With the elaboration of the chapter on the Technical Secretariat at the very beginning of this year's session, we now have concluded a redraft of article VIII. We consider that article VIII is in far better shape than it was only one year ago. Now we have a better picture of the powers and functions of the organs of the treaty organization, as well as the interrelationship between them. The major issue which remains to be resolved in article VIII is the composition of the Executive Council. Admittedly, this will be one of the most intricate and difficult issues. The preliminary discussions indicate that there may be common ground to build on. I am sure that at the end of the summer session we will have an even better picture of the problems involved, and we sincerely hope that by then a solution acceptable to all will not just appear in outline but will be within reach.

Challenge inspection is of crucial importance for the convention. Only an effective solution to this question will provide the necessary confidence in the verification system as a whole. The work done in this field under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus was very encouraging. The paper included in appendix II of document CD/795 in our view provides a basis for successful completion of an acceptable challenge inspection régime. Part I of the paper

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

especially is in an advanced stage of elaboration. It should be possible to put the finishing touches to it early in the summer session. The process after the submission of the inspection report and part II of Ambassador Ekéus' paper will require further detailed exploration.

In the evaluation of an inspection we believe that two basic considerations have to be taken into account. It would be unrealistic to assume that the Executive Council will be prevented from discussing the results of a challenge inspection and forming its own opinion on whether or not the requested State is in compliance. The Executive Council, a treaty organ consisting of representatives of a limited number of States parties to the convention and taking decisions by a majority, cannot take any decision or adopt specific measures which would affect the national security of one individual State party.

The role of the Executive Council and the requesting and requested States should therefore be seen from that angle. Thus the requesting State will in any event state its position on the report and the conclusion it draws from it. It will certainly adopt those measures it deems necessary to maintain its national security. On the other hand one can assume that the Executive Council, representing the entire membership, will also assess the situation, in particular when a case of non-compliance seems to have been established.

The Executive Council should in our view be permitted to publicly address a violation of the convention. In the event that the violation of the convention is not unambiguously established, it seems necessary that the result of the challenge inspection should be discussed between the requesting State, the requested State and the Executive Council with a view to clarifying the situation. If this cannot be done, another request for challenge inspection should be submitted.

If a violation is unambiguously established, the question of possible sanctions might be addressed. As international law does not provide for sanctions in the form of "convention penalties", it could be examined whether the system of collective security established by the Charter of the United Nations can provide a basis to enforce a chemical weapon ban. Normally the United Nations Security Council is the body which classifies non-compliance with a convention as threatening peace. Consequently the State party which is violating the convention could be subject to sanctions by the community of nations under Chapter VII of the Charter.

At this point I would like to draw attention to working paper CD/CW/WP.191 of 11 March which we have submitted. In it we address a number of further questions on which additional work needs to be done. We hope that the thoughts offered therein on yet unresolved problems may stimulate the negotiations on the challenge inspection régime and contribute to finding acceptable solutions.

Before concluding my remarks on the current state of our negotiations, I would like to mention briefly two subjects on which there have been intensive

(Mr von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

discussions since December of last year: article X (Assistance) and article XI (Economic and technological development). Quite a bit of valuable work has been done on these two articles. On both articles it has been possible to identify some common ground, which will pave the way for satisfactory solutions. My delegation especially welcomes the submission of working paper CD/802 by Argentina, which has in our view provided a good basis for the discussion on assistance. I think it should be possible to arrive at acceptable solutions for both articles if no unrealistic demands are made and if proposed solutions are in conformity and not at variance with the main objectives of the convention.

I have not been able to deal with all the aspects of our negotiations on a CW ban. For example, I did not make any reference to the very useful discussion we had on the final clauses, a discussion we hope to continue in the summer in order to arrive at agreed formulations for articles XII to XVI. I would, however, before ending my statement, like to thank the chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, as well as the working group chairmen Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, for their excellent work and their commitment. We are confident that under their guidance we will be able to make substantive progress in the coming summer session. I would also like to add that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and the chairmen of the working groups can continue to rely on our active support in their endeavours aimed at the early conclusion of an effective CW convention.

CD/PV.458

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): At the plenary meeting on 14 April I presented the assessment of the United States delegation of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the spring part of the 1988 session. Today, I would like to look ahead to the summer part of the session.

In some recent plenary statements concern has been expressed that the negotiations have not moved more rapidly. The United States delegation sometimes shares this frustration. However, important work has been accomplished in a number of substantive areas. We hope and expect that even more will be achieved in the remainder of the 1988 session. We must bear in mind that the key to future progress is not in external developments, or artificial deadlines, but in the efforts of individual delegations and of the Conference as a whole to come to grips with the remaining key issues.

There are, in fact, numerous unresolved issues that require detailed negotiation before a convention can be realized. These issues are difficult ones, and solutions are not readily at hand. The United States delegation will continue to address these issues aggressively because of the strong and continuing United States commitment to the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Some delegations have taken practical steps to tackle key issues by contributing useful working papers. A few others, unfortunately, have emphasized rhetoric rather than concrete proposals. The United States delegation hopes that in the summer there will be more concrete proposals, and much less empty and unhelpful rhetoric.

We also hope that during the summer the trend toward greater openness about chemical weapon capabilities and industrial capabilities will be reinforced and extended. The United States attaches considerable importance to this. We welcome the statements made by a number of delegations since January. We urge those delegations that have not already done so to indicate during the summer whether or not their countries possess chemical weapons. Accurate declarations can make a major contribution toward building the confidence necessary for conclusion of the negotiations and entry into force of the convention. Inaccurate declarations or silence will inevitably have the opposite effect of diminishing confidence and making completion of a convention more difficult.

Given the unhappy experiences of the past, declarations cannot always be accepted at face value. They should be viewed cautiously and critically, and in conjunction with other claims by the same country. In our view, building confidence requires that a country also satisfy any concerns that arise about the declarations that are made. How follow-up queries are answered will play a large role in determining whether confidence decreases or increases.

Today the United States is taking another major step in demonstrating openness about its chemical weapon capabilities. In the past, most recently on 10 July 1986, detailed information was provided on stockpile locations and plans for destruction in our working paper, CD/711. Earlier this year we indicated that our stockpile is smaller than that of the Soviet Union. Today we are providing to each delegation a document that contains considerable additional information, bearing the designation CD/830. This document identifies each toxic chemical in the United States stockpile and provides extensive information on its properties. Detailed diagrams depict each chemical munition in the United States stockpile, including the binary artillery shell. Specific data is provided about the characteristics of each munition.

In addition to the information on toxic chemicals and munitions, the document contains detailed information on the United States programme for destruction of chemical weapons. Since 1974 the United States has destroyed almost 4,000 agent tons of chemical weapons. In the coming years even larger quantities will be destroyed. The document contains detailed material, including numerous pictures and diagrams, on the technology that the United States has developed and is using for this difficult task. The material in the document was presented to representatives of the Soviet Union during their visit to the Tooele army depot between 18 and 21 November 1987. We are now making it available to all delegations represented in this Conference. We will do our best to respond to any questions delegations may have.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The United States delegation welcomed the opportunity recently to participate in the Shikhany workshop, and we consider the information gained from that visit a valuable reduction in the secrecy that has long surrounded the Soviet chemical weapons programme. None the less, the visit has given rise to a number of points that we are seeking to clarify with the Soviet Union.

More recently, the Soviet delegation declared that its chemical weapon stocks do not exceed 50,000 tons, and proposed a so-called multilateral data exchange of certain other chemical-weapons-related information. These most recent steps, unfortunately, do not reflect a balanced approach to data exchange. Nor, in our view, do they build confidence or facilitate the negotiations.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Soleby, raised questions about the Soviet stockpile figure on 8 March. My delegation has similar questions. The Soviet stockpile declaration is vaguely worded and the figure it contains is impossible to assess as an isolated number. We hope that the Soviet delegation will respond positively to Ambassador Soleby's request, and our own, that it provide more information which might clarify the situation. In our view, such information should specify whether the declaration covers bulk agent as well as filled munitions. Details on the number and location of Soviet chemical weapon production facilities and storage sites are also essential.

We cannot agree with the assertion on 15 March by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, that the total size of chemical weapon stocks is the most important statistic. We believe that the number and location of facilities is a much more significant and relevant indicator of chemical weapon capability, and is more critical to our negotiations. We are disappointed, too, that the Soviet delegation continues to advocate an approach to data exchange that in our view is unbalanced. This approach would provide the Soviet Union with much more information about United States capabilities than the United States would receive about Soviet capabilities. Much of the information provided by the United States in CD/711 is presented in terms of percentages of the overall stockpile. If we were now to release the figure for our stockpile size, the Soviet Union would know the quantities of stocks at each of the depots listed in CD/711. They would know what quantities of United States stocks were in bulk and in munitions. And they would know what quantity of usable chemical munitions the United States possesses. And, of course, Soviet officials realized that a single number from us would give them this bonanza. It is little wonder that they emphasize this number. The net result would be that the Soviet Union would know almost everything about the United States chemical weapon stockpile, whereas theirs would continue to be largely shrouded in secrecy. We can hardly agree to such a one-sided approach. Exchanges must be reciprocal. To facilitate greater confidence-building, the Soviet Union could respond constructively to questions about its declarations and present balanced proposals for data exchange.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Two recent proposals for data exchange and confidence-building do represent a constructive approach. I am referring to the 14 April proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for multilateral data exchange and the 18 February proposal by the Soviet Union for testing of verification procedures in the chemical industry.

The Federal Republic of Germany's proposal, for example, is directly connected to the negotiating tasks of the Conference. The data requested could assist negotiators in assessing the number of facilities subject to international verification and identifying which countries would be affected. Assuming that agreement can be reached as to what data should be declared and when these declarations should be made, we must confront the difficult problem of implementing the proposed exchange of data. We also must deal with the fact that the Conference on Disarmament does not include a number of relevant States. Will data elicited from member States - even if reported accurately and comprehensively - be adequate to build confidence or to provide a useful data base? If not, how do we expand this exchange to encompass non-member States? And what are the consequences if participation is less than adequate, or less than truthful? These are issues we must consider in our future deliberations.

We also note with interest the Soviet proposal for a multilateral effort to develop and test inspection methods for commercial facilities. We note that in 1986 the delegations of the Netherlands and Australia reported on trial inspections of commercial facilities in their countries. In 1987 the delegations of the United Kingdom and Finland suggested that countries co-operate in devising verification procedures. The Soviet proposal can be seen as a natural outgrowth of these earlier activities and suggestions.

We believe that a test of verification procedures at commercial facilities would be premature at this stage, since the procedures themselves have not been developed in the CD. The first step must be for each country with facilities subject to inspection to do its homework. United States experts are already actively engaged in developing inspection procedures for commercial facilities. We urge the Soviet Union and other countries to conduct similar work. We would also welcome elaboration from the Soviet delegation of its ideas for the actual implementation of its proposal. How would it actually work?

In looking ahead to the summer part of the 1988 session I have emphasized today attitudes more than specific issues. The attitudes with which delegations approach the work ahead will play a critical role in determining whether significant progress is made. We hope that delegations will return determined to come to grips with the key issues. We hope that they will put aside propaganda and devote their energies to substance. We hope that they will be more open about their military and commercial capabilities, and we hope that they will come with specific proposals, rather than simply reacting to the ideas of others.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

After reviewing the advances made across a broad front during the spring part of the session, I am confident that further advances can and will be made during the summer. The appendices of the draft special report of the Ad hoc Committee prepared in view of the forthcoming third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the plenary statements made this spring and other documents before the Ad hoc Committee, provide a wealth of material that can serve as a foundation for further progress. Our delegation will be returning to Washington soon to consult with its authorities and to assist in preparations for the summer. We shall look forward to resuming the negotiations in early July.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): The distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on 14 April introduced on behalf of a group of Western countries a paper on provision of data relevant to the chemical weapons convention. The United Kingdom is one of those countries on behalf of whom he spoke.

The paper he tabled mainly concerns the provision of data on a multilateral basis. It also envisages exchange of additional and more detailed data between States on a bilateral basis. I would like to elaborate on our own approach to all this. The United Kingdom has long attached importance to the idea of data exchange. In March 1983 we pointed out, in CD/353, that "in order to demonstrate that the inspection of commercial facilities would not be too burdensome, it would be useful to know how many facilities world-wide produce" chemicals of concern to the convention, and we called upon members of the then Committee on Disarmament to furnish such data in relation to their civil chemical industries. In an annex to that paper we gave the relevant information about our own civil industry, which we subsequently updated on two occasions.

The course of the chemical weapons negotiations since then has, I think, confirmed that data exchange would be useful. Indeed there is a growing consensus that in certain regards it is essential. Early data exchange would serve three purposes:

First, the drafting of certain provisions of the convention, in particular those relating to the destruction timetable, verification, organization and costs. For this purpose multilateral data exchange will be essential before the convention is concluded and should be undertaken as soon as possible;

Secondly, the early effective functioning of the convention. As we pointed out in CD/769, the sooner information is available the sooner we can make arrangements for the smooth functioning of the convention, such as training of key personnel in the Technical Secretariat;

And thirdly, as confidence-building measures to create an atmosphere of trust and assurance which in turn would facilitate our negotiations and help encourage wider adherence. This is also a matter of high priority.

We welcome the statements made here by several distinguished delegates on the status of the chemical weapon capabilities of their countries and on the production of certain toxic chemicals for civil purposes. We hope that other delegates will soon follow suit. I have also just listened with great interest to the statement by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, in which he announces further information which his delegation is tabling on their own chemical weapon capabilities.

We have also welcomed the memorandum on the multilateral exchange of data presented by the Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Petrovsky, on 18 February. However, we do wonder whether the data exchanges proposed in that memorandum would be sufficient to permit the drafting of an effective convention.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Indeed, the paper tabled by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a group of countries including the United Kingdom sets out what we regard as the minimum data exchange required for drafting purposes. We consider this exchange should be undertaken as soon as possible. It is essential that those States with the largest stocks of chemical weapons should be amongst the first to provide this data. We do not think the absence of agreed definitions for some of the terms used in the list should hold up the exchange of data. We envisage each State making clear what criteria it has used in compiling its data. Similarly we see no need for negotiations about data exchange. Let each of us provide unilaterally as much data as possible and as soon as possible.

I come now to data exchange for confidence-building measures. In my statement of 8 March I emphasized the high importance my authorities attach to this. We need to give each other as much information as we can about our capabilities in the various areas which the convention will cover. Things should be clearly above board, so that all of us can be reassured that our partners are negotiating in good faith. This calls for considerably more detailed data than that needed for purely drafting purposes. It might be helpful if I gave an idea of the sort of information we consider should be provided for this purpose. An exhaustive list is not feasible as the requirements will differ from country to country. However, the following are examples of the information we think should be included:

First, location and capacity of chemical weapon production, storage and destruction facilities;

Secondly, a detailed quantitative breakdown of chemical weapon stockpiles by site and by agent, as well as by munition and agent stored in bulk;

Thirdly, numbers of civil plants producing, processing or consuming chemicals on each of schedules 1, 2 and 3 above the thresholds to be agreed and the names of the chemicals concerned;

Fourthly, locations of research and development facilities producing chemicals on schedule 1 and the location of the permitted single, small-scale production facility;

Fifthly, plans for the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities.

This more detailed information might be provided bilaterally as a confidence-building measure. Alternatively it might be provided publicly so that it could have the added advantage of facilitating the smooth early functioning of the convention. It is up to each State to choose.

Exchange visits to military and civil chemical facilities can also have a useful confidence-building effect. Visits are not of course an alternative to providing the information I have mentioned, but rather one of the possible vehicles for doing so. Several countries have already conducted such visits - the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Soviet Union for example - and we look forward to the process continuing. The United Kingdom in March 1979 invited members of the Conference on Disarmament to visit our former chemical weapons pilot plant at Nancekuke as well as an organophosphorus chemical facility near Birmingham. We reported this visit together with our experience in destroying the facility at Nancekuke in document CD/15. We have recently arranged an exchange visit with the Soviet Union under which a Soviet team will visit our chemical defence establishment at Porton Down at the end of May and a British team will visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhandy in early July. We are also considering sympathetically the proposal made by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on 18 February for an international verification test on civil chemical facilities.

It is sometimes argued that data exchange can diminish rather than expand confidence and we all know examples where this has happened. It is a fact that some initial disclosures of information will give rise to further questions or may not tally with the assessments of others. In these cases we would expect that the process of data exchange will continue until the necessary confidence has been established. In some instances verification of data exchange on a bilateral basis before conclusion of the convention could greatly help to achieve this.

I have recently returned from a meeting of experts organized by the United Nations Secretariat in Dagomys, where we enjoyed not only a most interesting exchange of views but also the generous hospitality of our Soviet hosts. There seemed there to be a general consensus in favour not only of verification, the specific subject of the meeting, but also more widely in favour of greater openness and transparency on military matters. Data exchange during the negotiating process, when conducted in a positive fashion, can contribute in a tangible way to the search for a common agreement. My delegation hope that the type of information set out in the paper presented by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as in my statement today, will be provided by participants in the chemical weapons negotiations in the very near future. We ourselves will be continuing to play an active part in this exchange.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In his statement today, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, touched upon the important question of the multilateral exchange of data before the convention is signed. The same thing occurred with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Great Britain, Ambassador Solesby. I would like to make some brief comments in connection with these two statements.

To begin with I would like to point out that a multilateral exchange of data before the signing of the convention is, first, an important confidence-building measure, and second, a means which ought to contribute to the elaboration of the convention. At least that is the Soviet Union's approach to the multilateral exchange. Against that background the Soviet Union has declared the size of its chemical weapon stockpile. The representative of the United States devoted a critical part of his statement to this fact. I strongly object to his assertions, which are designed to belittle the importance of this fact.

As an example of why we think that the presentation of such data is important I might refer, for instance, to the recent proposal made by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, which, in a document on the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks put forward jointly with the delegation of Italy, proposed that the process of destruction should be begun by the States with the largest stocks of chemical weapons. I do not intend now to give an assessment of this proposal, but it seems to me that it would be justified for the States with the largest stocks to begin the destruction process. However, in order to solve this problem we obviously have to know in advance which States have the largest stocks of chemical weapons. And if we take this practical aspect, it will be clear that data concerning the volume of stocks are naturally very important in elaborating the convention.

The distinguished representative of the United States also emphasized strongly that the data submitted by the United States constitute what is necessary for the negotiations. Such an approach will certainly not move us forward in solving this matter. That is precisely why we put forward our proposals this year in the form of a memorandum where we set forth our views on which data States must exchange before the convention is signed - a memorandum which did not apply to the data which the Soviet Union had already submitted. We think that the volume of information which should be exchanged by States should take account of certain objective criteria, and should certainly not be based on the data provided by one State or another. We have, of course, given attention to the proposal made by the Federal Republic of Germany and the proposal made by Great Britain today concerning the content of the information which it is proposed should be exchanged. We will examine these considerations attentively.

(continued)

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

I would also like to note with satisfaction the statement which was made today by the distinguished representative of Great Britain, Ambassador Solesby, to the effect that the English side views favourably the proposal made by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on 18 February concerning an experiment in international verification at commercial chemical enterprises. I would also like to take this opportunity to express appreciation to Ambassador Solesby for her kind words to the Soviet side concerning the organization of a recent meeting of experts in Dagomys.

Allow me to return to the statement made by the representative of the United States. In the statement he made today he opposed carrying out an experiment in verification at commercial enterprises at this stage because, he said, the procedures themselves have not yet been elaborated. I would like to explain once again, although the Soviet delegation has already done so, that the point of the experiment which we propose is, as we see it, that its results will help in elaborating the procedures and will help in the negotiations. We already have some basis for such procedures. Carrying out the experiment should show in practice what we might have left out in these procedures, what should be added to them, how they should be developed and clarified. This is where we see the main point of the experiment, and therefore to wait until we finish elaborating our procedures, and then to carry out this experiment, in my opinion, is of no value whatsoever: what is the point of the experiment if the procedures have already been worked out?

I would like to conclude with the same words as those used by the distinguished Ambassador Friedersdorf in his ending statement. He said: "And we hope that they" - meaning delegations - "will come with specific proposals, rather than simply reacting to the ideas of others." I would like to endorse this call, with a small addition: We hope that they will come with specific proposals, rather than simply reacting to the ideas of others in a negative way.

CD/PV.459

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

We welcome the advanced stage reached in the negotiations on the preparation of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction. The progress accomplished is undoubtedly due to the change in the position of many delegations regarding the provisions of this convention, and the flexibility shown in this connection. In this respect, we cannot fail to recognize the prominent role and dedicated efforts of the Swedish delegation, headed by His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus, during his chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee at the last session.

However, in our view, we still have a long way to go before completing the draft convention, especially since some of the remaining differences concern concepts and methodology, and are not confined to drafting details. In our opinion, this convention should be universal in character and acceded to by all States. You may share my opinion that the universality of the

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

convention would be promoted if States felt that their accession to it would not jeopardize their national security, and that they would be secure from the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them, either by States parties or by other States.

Although my delegation is participating very effectively in the negotiations that are taking place in the Conference on Disarmament, in order to achieve the universality of the proposed convention, Egypt considers that the time has come for consultations on the draft articles of the convention with other concerned non-member States that are not participating in the negotiations. This could be achieved through a framework to be agreed upon by the member States, either officially or informally. Such consultations would be a preparatory step to guarantee wide participation and accession and the desired universality. If we all hope for the codification of an effective international régime with the necessary checks and controls, we must start the preparatory stage forthwith, and listen to the viewpoints of the States not participating in the current negotiations.

The Egyptian delegation thus considers that the convention should provide an umbrella for the States parties, in the form of assistance provided by other States parties to limit the effects of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons, and to limit the ability of the other party to continue using or threatening to use chemical weapons. In this context, the idea of a possible Security Council resolution providing positive guarantees for the States parties to the convention could be considered. The same approach was applied in 1968 for the NPT, when the Security Council issued resolution 255 (1968). To eliminate the shortcomings in resolution 255, we propose that these guarantees should be more effective and more credible; this is necessary due to the different nature of the two types of weapons, nuclear and chemical. The reason for this proposal is the need to reactivate the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations.

On the other hand, the accession of States to the convention depends to a large extent on the principle of the equality of States parties in regard to rights and obligations. They would be equal partners in all procedures, recommendations and decisions to strengthen the convention and enhance its credibility.

Egypt views with deep concern the use of chemical weapons anywhere, and considers that reports to that effect should give further impetus to the speedy conclusion by the Conference of a convention in this connection. In this respect I would like to refer to an article which appeared in the Journal de Genève on 14 April 1988, concerning a United Nations medical report confirming the use of gases by Israeli armed forces against Arab Palestinian demonstrators in the occupied Arab territories. Egypt is most concerned at this development, calls upon all parties to respect international treaties and conventions and reaffirms the importance of adherence to the main principles contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In this connection, I wish to emphasize that Egypt does not produce, develop or stockpile such weapons, which it rightly regards as weapons of mass destruction that should be banned.

Mr. TEJA (India): In my statement today, I intend to focus on the chemical weapons negotiations. I should, therefore, like to begin by expressing the congratulations of my delegation to Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman for the current year, and also assure him of my delegation's co-operation. We are confident that under his able guidance, we will be able to carry forward our work which was already considerably advanced under the chairmanship of his predecessor Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden.

(continued)

(Mr. Teja, India)

Our ultimate goal is a convention that will not only prohibit the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons but also lead to the elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. During our spring session, we have listened with attention to the statements made by a number of foreign ministers. The urgency reflected in these statements is a positive sign. On the opening day of our session, Foreign Minister Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia stated:

"... we consider the most urgent issue to be the completion of the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons ...".

He went on to add:

"The Conference has come within reach of concluding work on a convention".

At the very next session, we had the privilege of listening to Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany, who stated:

"The early conclusion of a convention for the global prohibition of chemical weapons continues to be a matter of high priority, in our view. In reality, they are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature."

The position of the Group of 21 is well known. In a statement on 8 March 1988 it was stated on behalf of the Group of 21:

"... the Group of 21 considers that the Conference on Disarmament must intensify, during the present session, the negotiations on the convention and that it must reinforce further its efforts with a view to the final elaboration of the convention at the earliest possible date."

My Government attaches high priority to these negotiations and fully endorses General Assembly resolution 42/37 A, which was adopted by consensus. Our efforts are now close to fruition and, therefore, as stated by Foreign Minister Andreotti of Italy, it is "necessary to impart a decisive impulse to the negotiations". We cannot but note that an undue prolonging of the negotiations could have adverse repercussions on the early conclusion of a CW convention. It is also a fact that chemical weapons are still being produced in some countries and, what is worse, are being used in some regions. The casualties from chemical weapons are also mounting. With new technical developments, there is a resurgence of interest in this field. The new weapons, which are more lethal than the nerve gases of the past, make the task of verification more difficult. We believe that delay in concluding negotiations on a CW convention would increase the risks of proliferation, and this could adversely affect international security.

I would like to reiterate that India does not possess any chemical weapons, nor does it have any intention of producing or acquiring them in the future. We are committed to the objective of a chemical weapons convention that is comprehensive, universal and effective. A limited or a partial

(Mr. Teja, India)

approach, in our view, cannot enhance security. To be effective, the convention must improve the security of all nations and, therefore, must be universal.

Within the convention, verification is one of the most complex areas. A considerable amount of work has been done, though some issues still need to be resolved. The scale of the exercise adds to the complexity. Our approach to the verification issue is based upon certain principles. We believe that these provide an effective set of guidelines for tackling the problems relating to non-production, as also those relating to challenge inspection. The principles of universality and non-discrimination are among the most important for any international agreement. If the chemical weapons convention is to succeed in enhancing global security, then it must be based on a "universal multilateralism".

The verification régime must be appropriate and adequate and should not unduly interfere with legitimate activities. The balance between "appropriate" and "adequate" is a delicate one, especially in the activities covered under article VI. With greater interaction with chemical industry, I believe, we can find the right balance, but there must be understanding on the basic principle that certain parts of the civilian chemical industry will need to be monitored.

In developed countries, considerable importance is attached to the fact that the verification activities should not be unduly intrusive or interfere with normal commercial activities, especially the sensitive areas of R & D, and also that the confidentiality of sensitive information should be maintained. We appreciate this. For the developing countries, the natural correlated concern is that verification measures should not in any way jeopardize the development of a peaceful chemical industry which plays an important role in their national planning. Greater openness and transparency can be an important confidence-building measure and a channel leading to increased peaceful co-operation among the developed and developing countries.

The development of a verification system on the basis of these principles can give us a régime which would be acceptable to all. Quite clearly, the régime under article VI has to be a differentiated régime. It must nevertheless be able to fulfil its basic objective, namely, to prevent the misuse of a facility for prohibited purposes. In doing so, it cannot cover only those chemicals which have been used or stockpiled as weapons in the past, but must also make provision for future developments. In other words, the verification process must be workable and judicious, if it is to serve us well.

A similar approach can also help us in furthering our work on challenge inspection. We agree that such a measure is likely to be invoked as a last resort, when all means, bilateral or otherwise, have been tried and found inadequate. The procedure should, therefore, reinforce this conclusion. A challenging State has a far-reaching right, but one curtailed by the obligation that it is not to be abused. The challenged State is obliged to accept such intrusive inspections, but with a right to demonstrate its

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compliance with the convention. In view of the political nature of the exercise, it will be necessary to balance the rights and obligations of both sides. The results of the efforts by the Chairman for 1987 are reflected in an appendix to last year's report, and provide a good basis for further work. The issue of "alternative measures" has yet to be resolved, and this should be done objectively and in the multilateral context. More work is also needed to amplify the procedures in the post-inspection phase. We believe that the principles elaborated earlier can enable us to develop an effective mechanism that will reflect a truly multilateral character.

During the current session, useful work has been done on article VIII, dealing with the organization of the international body which would implement the convention. While new language has appeared regarding the Technical Secretariat, we will soon have to tackle the political issues relating to the composition of the Executive Council and the distribution of work between the different organs. In our view, the universal character of the chemical weapons convention can be best ensured by maintaining the principle of equality of all sovereign States. There seems to be an emerging consensus that the Executive Council should reflect a political balance and equitable geographical distribution. States with large and developed chemical industries could be appropriately represented under the first criterion so as to assist in effective implementation. As the organ responsible for day-to-day implementation, the Executive Council will play a significant role. Unlike the General Conference, which is likely to meet on an annual basis, the Executive Council could remain in session throughout the year. This feature provides the source for the authority of the Executive Council; its powers, though derived from the General Conference, are extensive. At the same time, the General Conference remains the actual repository by virtue of the complete representation of States in it. The papers submitted by the German Democratic Republic (CD/812) and Canada (CD/823) have helped in our work on this article. We are confident that pending problems can be resolved if the above-mentioned elements are kept in mind.

I should also like to comment on two articles which are of considerable importance - articles X and XI. It is a matter of satisfaction that we have commenced serious work on these provisions. Article X deals with assistance. Under ideal conditions, its provisions may never have to be invoked. Guided by this logic, it is necessary that the provisions of article X be adequate. The invoking of assistance under article X by a State party must be seen in the light of the collective security régime that the chemical weapons convention is intended to provide, and not just as a problem of a particular State party.

Article XI deals with economic and technological co-operation for development, and is of special interest to the developing countries, including our own. Recent discussions on it have revealed varying opinions. We believe that security is a broad-based concept, and there can exist non-military threats to security. Article XI, therefore, needs to be seen as a confidence-building measure. Both negative as well as positive assurances need to be included in it. Appropriate wording to this effect would only improve the security-enhancing function of the chemical weapons convention.

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The growing interest in and submission of proposals for voluntary disclosure of information is a welcome development. Not only does it convey a signal of commitment to and confidence in the early conclusion of our task, but it also assists in the practical work relating to article VIII and the annexes to article VI. The chemical-weapon States bear special responsibility in this regard. The proposals made by the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany are encouraging steps and merit a positive response from the chemical-weapon States.

Touching briefly on the discussions held on the final articles of the convention, I should say that the efforts of the Chairman have contributed to development of text on articles XII to XVI. The Chairman's paper will certainly assist in our future deliberations on this subject.

This year, we came up against the issue of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. We know that the present mandate stops short of the finish line. As our work proceeds, this issue too will be resolved. But we could assist in the process if parallel efforts are undertaken to transform the "resolved" elements of the "rolling text" into treaty language.

In conclusion, let us acknowledge that we are engaged in a new endeavour and a unique enterprise. While we would all like to be able to produce a perfect convention, we also know that in real life the best is the enemy of the good. We will all conclude our work with perhaps some apprehensions, but on the other hand there will be the sense of achievement of a major disarmament measure. The review process will help to straighten out the odd corners that might remain, as long as we leave open the possibility of improving upon our work. The element of finality is in the objective, not in the means of implementation, which can and must be refined as we gain more experience.

I have dwelt on certain basic principles today because often we need to return to these in order to loosen the technical knots. We are looking for a universal and comprehensive disarmament agreement, for only such an agreement can enhance global security and safeguard the interests of all States. The requirements of universality and comprehensiveness impose their own conditions on the convention, and these must be respected if the convention is to be what we all want - the first multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreement which will eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. CLERCKX (Belgium) (translated from French): I should like to follow the example of the previous speaker, the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Teja, and contribute some thoughts concerning the negotiations on chemical weapons. In doing so I shall touch upon a certain problem, certain questions that Ambassador Teja also raised, which clearly shows how vitally important they are in our discussions. But first of all, Mr. President, permit me to congratulate you and to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you chairing our work during this month of April, and during the period when members of the Conference will be dealing, in other

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places, with other problems related to our activities. Bearing in mind your great experience in the field of disarmament, your balanced approach and your knowledge of the background, I would like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation, and here I should also like to thank Ambassadors von Stülpnagel and Rose, who set the Conference on its path with vigour and a deep sense of realism which have been very beneficial to us.

The spring session of the Conference is drawing to an end. We will all readily acknowledge that it has taken place in particularly auspicious circumstances. Everybody here has emphasized the importance of the INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conclusion of this agreement, which some people have described as a revolutionary event has opened up prospects in the field of disarmament and arms control which just a few months ago nobody would have dared to believe in. It has been emphasized that this agreement eliminates a whole category of weapons, so it should be possible for other categories to follow. It includes real verification measures, so such measures can be contemplated in other conventions too. It bears within it the germ of extension to a higher category - a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arms, so it is a link, a first link in a broader and much more diversified process of disarmament.

Rather paradoxically, it is not in the area where this first disarmament breakthrough has been achieved - the nuclear field - that its impact has been felt most strongly in our Conference. In this area we are still at the stage of grand designs, ideas which are generous but which are difficult to tie down in today's political realities, and to which the INF agreement, and even the prospect of a 50 per cent cut in the strategic weapons of two major Powers, cannot, for reasons which I will not go into here, give real impetus. On the other hand, we have seen vigorous progress in the inter-sessional negotiations for the elimination of another category of fearsome weapon - chemical weapons, we have recently recorded particularly welcome and beneficial flexibility in previously frozen positions among various parties, particularly the USSR, a burgeoning of new ideas, concrete contributions to the negotiated texts, which are doubtless the fruit of a thaw between the USSR and the United States that turns on the INF agreement and its consequences and, as a spin-off, offers a basis for real hopes for the reasonably rapid conclusion of a convention for the elimination of chemical weapons.

However, these successes and advances should not lead us into euphoria. The work in which we are engaged here is quite different. The Conference's task is to negotiate a convention of universal scope on chemical weapons. This is something quite different from bilateral negotiations where agreement is reached between two States, however powerful and influential they may be, for which it is much easier to reach a compromise or agree on a quid pro quo because such concessions bind only themselves and their allies. Nor is it a set of negotiations among a number of developed industrial Powers settling chemical issues on the basis of their own political and economic interests. No, there are 40 countries here negotiating a convention which must be applicable to these 40 countries and, above and beyond that, must be universal, in other words, it must be such as to prompt the spontaneous accession of the whole of the world community.

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The result of this is that our objectives are different, as are our negotiating methods. For a convention to become truly universal, it must meet the fundamental concerns of all the potential signatories, and not just some of them, even the most important. Its provisions, too, both as regards prohibitions and as regards verification and monitoring, must be addressed to and designed for all the potential signatories and not just some of them. It is of less interest to know that countries and alliances far away are accepting a ban on chemical weapons than to be assured that your immediate neighbour is offering the same guarantee. So, in order for the convention to be truly universal, the elimination of chemical weapons must be absolute and free of the smallest exception. Merely stating this principle, though it is an obvious one, already poses a major problem. The world contains nations armed with chemical weapons, fortunately in a minority, and a majority of nations with no chemical weapons. Among the chemical-weapon nations, the degree of armament is, moreover, by no means comparable. How can an absolute ban be imposed in such a wide variety of situations without endangering the security of States or bringing about accelerated proliferation?

Belgium has always maintained that only an appropriate adjustment in the order of destruction of existing stocks, spread over the scheduled 9 or 10 years, can provide a solution to this situation for the chemical-weapon States, in the interests of all the States parties and in the context of a total ban on production. Several practical suggestions in this regard are at present being studied. We have no preconceived ideas about them, and will be happy to help to achieve consensus on one or other of the methods suggested. While an absolute ban on chemical weapons for all the signatory States of the convention is certainly the primary necessary element for the universality of the convention, the extent of the area to which it will apply is another. This area of application must also be universal. There cannot be countries where chemical weapons have been abolished and others where they have not.

We are going to have to start thinking about how best in practice to achieve this universality of the area of application. It is not enough for the terms of the convention which is at present being drawn up to satisfy some or suit a limited number of countries particularly concerned; they must be addressed to the world community as a whole, because this is the very objective being pursued by the Conference. Our working methods, therefore, must be appropriate to this end. And first of all, we have to deal with the question of the expansion of the composition of the Conference. This question has been deadlocked for many years. However, the Conference on Disarmament is the subject of very great interest among the community of nations. Indeed, it is enough to note the number of observers who have been following our work here so actively, whose presence my delegation is pleased to welcome. What is at stake is clearly of capital importance, and the more the community of nations participates in and is directly associated with the work of the Conference, the more impact our work will have.

So Belgium speaks out in favour of a rapid expansion in the composition of the Conference, perhaps even beyond the four-seat expansion at present envisaged. Currently there are no less than 13 countries which are candidates. Any opposition to one candidature, however legitimate it may be, should not block the designation of the others. We think that the expansion

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should take place without any linkage being established between the various candidatures before us, and we appeal urgently for initiatives to be taken to break the deadlock and to ensure that the question is not left pending because the CD itself is impotent.

Second consideration relating to our methods of work: the concerns of each of the members of this Conference, however many there may be, and their own perceptions, must be able to be expressed at every stage of the negotiations. On this point I would like to say that my delegation is not in favour of working methods which, although conceived with the best intentions, result in instituting selections, and consequently exclusions, among the delegations which constitute the Conference: here we are thinking not of the various private consultations which chairmen of committees and working groups may quite legitimately and very wisely hold so that progress may be made in our work, but of the occasional establishment of small working groups or groups of a few representatives selected on the basis of political groups when the characteristic of these formulae is that they violate the fundamental provision contained in our rules of procedure, that is that they should be "open to all member States of the Conference unless the Conference decides otherwise", as stipulated by rule 23 of the rules of procedure, confirmed by rule 24 in respect of subsidiary bodies.

We believe that negotiation is not well served by presenting for discussion purposes in our working bodies texts which have already been pre-drafted, and thus in a way pre-agreed, by a limited group of delegations. The delegations which have not been involved in this pre-work are thereby put at a disadvantage from the outset and placed, deliberately or otherwise, under pressure to accept, or in any case to follow, the basic approach which the group of selected delegations, during their pre-work, has already imprinted on the proposals by the time they reach the negotiating table. This is an unjustifiable handicap for the delegations that have been excluded from these pre-consultations and who wish to express different views, because they are obliged to undo what has already been done and has already been publicly approved by a number of delegations. This is certainly not likely to enable the countries that wish to do so to express their own perceptions and their legitimate concerns in a context of equality and equal effectiveness, nor is it likely to promote the universality without which the convention becomes meaningless.

Well, you will ask me, has Belgium a perception of its own to put forward? Indeed it has, and specifically a historical perception. I believe it is not without value to continue to repeat here that it was on the territory of my country that chemical weapons were used for the first time on a large scale, during the First World War, in 1915 - 22 April 1915, to be more precise. This sad anniversary falls tomorrow. In return for the unhappy privilege of being a battlefield for four years during the First World War, we have for 70 years now been digging up, in the west of the province of Western Flanders in Belgium, tons, yes tons of spent unexploded munitions every year. In most cases these munitions are very difficult to identify. It is sometimes impossible to determine whether they are explosive or chemical munitions. The presumed chemical contents are still unknown, because so far as we know none has ever been extracted, since these remnants of munitions are

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generally in such a state of deterioration that it would be very dangerous to handle them - and there have unfortunately already been many victims during removal and sorting operations - recently four people killed in 1986.

At the present time we dig up some 20 tons of such munitions of all types and various origins per year. When you bear in mind that in the First World War, on the western front alone, between 1.5 billion and 2 billion shells of all calibres were "used", about a third of which - 700 million - did not explode and are scattered and buried, it is impossible at present to predict for how much longer our country will have to dig up old munitions, particularly chemical ones. Up to 1952, these old munitions were dropped into holes and destroyed indiscriminately. As this method of getting rid of them created environmental problems, we tried to locate the old chemical munitions, which from then onwards were covered in concrete and dumped in the open sea. New requirements concerning respect for the environment, particularly the Oslo Convention of 1972 and the 1987 North Sea Conference, mean that use of this method is more complicated. Until the Belgian authorities decide upon a final solution, perhaps in the form of a destruction facility, some 135 tons of these old remnants of unusable and dangerous munitions are at present in storage pending elimination.

It is obvious that this particular situation existing in my country falls, we feel, outside the concerns of the convention. The purpose of the convention is to eradicate chemical weapons and their components. Whatever definition we may decide upon, it is obvious that scattered munitions, spent but unexploded, buried in the soil, buried for more than 70 years now, in a state of advanced deterioration, that may be discovered accidentally today or tomorrow, during agricultural or building work, are not, and in our view could never be, chemical weapons in the sense of militarily usable chemical warfare devices covered by the convention. Thus, as far as the Belgian delegation is concerned, none of the provisions of the convention could reasonably be applied to them, either in theory or in practice.

I have illustrated a specific problem which indicates the particular perception that one country, my own in this case, may have during the negotiation of the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and the possible effects it may entail for the objective of universality of this multilateral convention. There are others. I am thinking here of verification. The way in which verification is designed will determine to a large extent the degree of universality which the future convention manages to achieve. This convention will not be purely declaratory, thank God, like so many other conventions and undertakings to disarm in the past, whose fate is well known. It will contain verification measures. Fundamentally, verification is intended to ensure that the application of a convention takes place in conformity with its stipulations. As far as disarmament is concerned, a second concern arises, that of how to detect possible clandestine violations and how to safeguard one's security against the consequences of failure to respect commitments entered into.

The future convention has a twofold objective: on the one hand, to eliminate chemical weapons for ever where they exist, by making it obligatory to undertake the destruction of stockpiles and manufacturing facilities - that is, by laying down a specific action for the signatory States to take: on the

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other hand, to prevent the resurgence of chemical weapons by prohibiting the manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, not only of chemical weapons as such, but also of their components - that is, by laying down that the signatory States must refrain from an action, i.e. by prohibiting that action. That the convention is being applied in conformity with its stipulations may, we feel, be fairly easily checked by the currently planned system of statements, verification by means of on-site inspection, international monitoring and the use of monitoring instruments, as appropriate. On the other hand, this system cannot in our view guarantee to detect clandestine violations of the convention, or offer protection against failure to respect fundamental commitments, even when there is an obligation to do so, because the system for systematic verification of the destruction of stocks and facilities by definition covers only stocks and facilities which have been declared, in other words, which are known; it is powerless to deal with stocks or facilities which have not been declared, in other words, which are unknown.

A fortiori, when it is a question of an undertaking not to do something, to refrain from doing something, a question not only of banning production of chemical weapons, but also of the chemicals which make them up, absolute verification is impossible. It would be futile to submit the entire world chemical industry to an international policing system - clandestine production of illicit products intended for chemical weapons will always remain possible in some part of the world - or of a country. That is why we are not convinced at the outset of the need to submit industry to universal verification measures for the purpose of verifying the absence of production for chemical weapons purposes.

We did not wish to raise obstacles to what other delegations would consider to be progress towards the finalization of the convention, but we remain somewhat sceptical on this subject, except, of course, as I said, regarding plants intended and used for military purposes, which must cease operations as soon as the convention comes into force and be subject to monitoring until they have been totally and radically eliminated. To the extent that the convention fails to submit all present and future plants capable of producing potential chemical warfare agents or their key precursors to effective international verification, the efficacy of the régime for the verification of non-production will, in our view, be limited. In these circumstances is there any justification for trying to increase the present forms of monitoring, to make the convention machinery more cumbersome, to increase the burden it imposes and place it upon the chemical industry, which would ultimately find itself in a veritable strait-jacket?

The example of verification by the inspectors of IAEA in the field of plutonium manufacture shows us that, if the verification of a plutonium plant is to be worth while, the presence of the inspectors is required practically all the time, and for the plant the introduction of this monitoring and verification represents an increase in production costs of something like 15 per cent. This gives us some idea of what would be the burden on private industry if, in order to detect possible abuses in authorized manufacturing of products in schedules 2 and 3, it was necessary to apply an extension or a surrogate of the systematic international on-site verification system applicable to other categories.

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We do not think it is necessary to create a systematic on-site inspection system for schedule 3 products. In fact, assuming it were reasonably feasible, would it be genuinely useful? We must carefully pinpoint the problem. What exactly is involved, or more precisely, what may be involved? In the context of article VI, the only hypothesis to be feared at the inter-State level and in terms of the convention relates to the clandestine manufacture of a militarily significant chemical weapon. Such a decision is not taken by private chemical industry, but by the State. It is the State which is the only user and the only potential customer for chemical weapons. The State alone can decide on that manufacture. Private chemical industry could at most commit the offence of failure to respect the standards for and bans on the manufacture of certain chemical products laid down by the convention. If it does so for reasons which have nothing to do with the interests of the State, it is the State, as the national authority, which must impose punishment, and not some international body, which cannot substitute itself for the State to ensure respect for its laws and regulations within the jurisdiction of the State. Looked at from the point of view of the convention and the ban on the manufacture of chemical weapons, the danger therefore lies not in misconduct by the chemical industry, which can in any case be detected and punished by a State acting in good faith, but in possible misconduct by States, a State acting in bad faith, that is a State which decides to renege on its commitments and embark on the production of chemical weapons.

Now we must start from the conviction that every signatory State subscribes to the convention in good faith. Moreover, the State does so because it is in its own interest to do so. Chemical weapons - and I think that military experts will agree - are not indispensable in the arsenal which serves to guarantee the security of a State, except as a means of reprisals. With the exception of this last case, giving up the possession and use of chemical weapons does not constitute an undue risk for security. That is why we are in a position here today to work multilaterally for their complete disappearance. Otherwise nobody would be here. Consequently, if the possibility of clandestine manufacture of a militarily significant chemical weapon is to be realized, or the possibility of the existence of secret stocks of such weapons is to prove a reality, we necessarily have to suppose a deliberate intention on the part of the leadership of a State party which, reneging on its commitments, intends to acquire chemical weapons for purposes of armed conflict, or at least for serious political destabilization. Otherwise it is impossible to see why any State party would feel the need to acquire chemical weapons or their components, the precaution of reprisals having become superfluous.

For the same reason, it goes without saying that a State party acting in bad faith would not, in view of the existence of the convention, try to create militarily significant chemical weapons openly and publicly, in other words in installations which are subject to verification, whether these are specific installations which produce schedule 1 and 2 products within authorized limits, or private chemical industry more generally, which is freely manufacturing products on schedule 3, if this industry were effectively subjected to verification and monitoring measures extending throughout the industry. It is quite obvious that a State with such intentions would embark on the manufacture of these weapons in a secret place.

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It follows, in our opinion, that the likelihood of a serious, militarily significant violation of the convention is extremely small, as chemical weapons are not vitally necessary, a clandestine resumption of their manufacture in a world where, under the authority of the convention, they have been eliminated and banned could only result from truly warlike intentions which are, after all, it must be hoped, equally unlikely, and their manufacture is impossible except in secret. It also follows that, from the moment when manufacture must necessarily take place secretly, non-production would seem to a certain extent to be unverifiable, or at all events not always usefully verifiable. It is verifiable for the specific products on schedules 1 and 2 because in these cases verification is limited to a restricted number of products and products which are intended solely for chemical weapons; it is not for the products on schedule 3 because, however broad it may be, it cannot cover the whole of the civilian chemical industry, because it would have to place the industry in a strait-jacket which it would find difficult to bear without seriously hampering its operations, and because it would have to subject the industry to outside interference in the form of monitoring personnel - all this without offering a sufficient guarantee against the non-manufacture of chemical weapons.

Consequently, we do not consider that such supervision of private industry is really justified. The enemy is not private chemical industry, the enemy is the State acting in bad faith. Thus it is here that challenge inspection takes on its true significance: it is the last resort, formal notice at the political level, when there is a suspicion of a serious violation, that is a clandestine violation, and therefore a danger for security. My delegation views this procedure as being the most important instrument for the credibility of the convention, because under it the signatory State acting in bad faith can be backed up against the wall. This is why we have always considered that this procedure should be binding, over and above any concept of national sovereignty and reversing the burden of proof. It must not be trivialized by extending its application to cases other than those which are extremely serious. That is why we consider that challenge inspection should be a measure that can be used as a last resort, only in cases where there is a suspicion of a serious violation, that is a violation of article I - manufacture, possession, transfer of chemical weapons and, of course, use - and that this is a course which should be open to all countries, without any distinction, without any conditions without prior conditions and without the right of refusal.

My delegation is not convinced of the validity of the concept of sensitive military or other installations which have to be protected and consequently could be exempt from challenge inspection. This, we think, would pose the risk of depriving challenge inspection of its significance because if there has been a violation there has been, a priori, deliberate bad faith on the part of the challenged State. For the same reason, my delegation does not see any great merit in the possibility of so-called alternative measures, none of which so far are really satisfactory as valid substitutes for on-site visits. If a requesting State wishes to content itself with alternative measures to be agreed with the challenged State, no obstacle should be put in its way, but in our opinion the option of alternative measures should not as such be an acknowledged right for the challenged State, to be inserted in the Convention.

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The whole procedure of challenge inspection, in the last resort, should be in the hands of the requesting State; it is that State which assumes responsibility for it, it is that State to which the inspectors will hand the factual report that they are to prepare, it is that State which will decide whether or not its fears have been allayed, and it is that State which will opt for retaliatory measures or other consequences to be drawn from the situation, particularly in the light of the threat the situation poses for its security.

The true problem, which arises in the challenge inspection procedure is that of improper (or frivolous) requests. Let us note on this subject that the impropriety of a request may be quite clearly apparent simply in the light of the political context at the time. That is one comment. The second is that, since challenge inspection by its very nature should be reserved for extremely serious suspicions falling under article I, it must oblige the requesting country to indicate precisely the nature of its suspicion (manufacture of chemical weapons, stockpiling, manufacture of chemical products for weapons purposes in quantities which could become militarily significant, etc.), and as far as possible to give all the information needed to uncover the alleged violation, specifying place, time, duration, quantity, etc. The reliability of such information will also help to show whether the request is improper or not, because the verification obligation to which the requested State will submit depends directly on the preciseness of the charge. Lastly, it may be thought that it is ultimately better to tolerate a certain risk of improper requests rather than vitiate the binding nature of challenge inspection which is essential if it is to fulfil its role, through exceptions intended to cover confidential or secret data.

Consequently, in this procedure - which is exceptional - the role of the international body should, in our opinion, remain extremely small. It will receive the request, it will have it carried out immediately by its inspectors - of whom there will be a list agreed upon in advance, from which the challenging State will make its choice - and it will inform all the member States of the initiation of the challenge inspection procedure, with all the necessary information. It will forward immediately to the requesting State, and later to the other States parties, the report of the facts which the inspectors are expected to draw up, and it will receive from the requesting State the judgement and the decisions reached by that State.

I have set out a number of thoughts on fundamental principles which guide us in elaborating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are offered to you in a constructive spirit, in the hope that they may contribute to further delimiting areas which require serious decisions. There are many more questions that have to be dealt with as one moves through the articles. My delegation will have occasion to return to them later.

Very recently, on 3 March last, the heads of State and government of the Atlantic Alliance, in their declaration which was published at the end of the summit, reaffirmed once again that the total elimination of chemical weapons formed part of their global concept of arms control and disarmament. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tindemans, said in this very room on 23 July last year, when he addressed the Conference, that for Belgium the early conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

was an urgent priority, and he added that "at present this is the main activity and, I would even say, the main responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament". My delegation will do its best to achieve this objective as soon as possible. My country intends to commit itself fully to that end. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced to you during his statement on 23 July 1987, Belgium has offered a possible headquarters for the international body which is to administer the convention. This offer was repeated by the Minister in his statement at the forty-second session of the General Assembly, and I have the honour to reconfirm it to you today.

We will resume our work after SSOD-III. My delegation believes that the time is close when we will be able to get down to the texts available to us, article by article, to reach final political agreement on them and to prepare them to be cast in the legal language of a convention, on which there should be no further delay.

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Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil):

My delegation would like to address today the issue of chemical weapons.

First of all, let me say that the recent and confirmed reports on the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war remind us once more, if we need reminding, that chemical weapons are not spectres of a bygone era, irrelevant in a period when high technology has thoroughly changed methods of warfare. The reports

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stressed the capacity of these weapons to bring destruction, suffering and death in a cruel and massive way, mainly upon civilian populations. The urgency and priority of this item on our agenda was thus underlined in a most regrettable manner.

During its last regular session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 42/37 A on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the first single consensus resolution on this matter. In it, the General Assembly again urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify negotiations with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.

The Group of 21, in the statement made on its behalf by Ambassador Ekéus on 8 March, reiterated its commitment to this resolution. At the beginning of the 1988 session, most of us cherished well-founded hopes of speedy progress. Unhappily on the eve of the General Assembly's third special session on disarmament, our feeling is one of disappointment. We certainly made progress, but it was neither so fast nor so far-reaching as expected, nor will it be enough to make us particularly proud when presenting our report on this item to this major forthcoming international conference.

We should not, however, be blamed for idleness, for we completed a significant work-load under the very able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and his dedicated group co-ordinators. Nevertheless, those of us who kept attending the formal meetings now and again had the sensation that negotiations might be taking place elsewhere, thus depriving the collective effort of much of its thrust and meaning. Multilateral and bilateral processes can and should reinforce each other, but they cannot, even temporarily, replace one another.

Signs of protractedness multiply in our day-to-day discussions. Brackets and footnotes seem to increase in number rather than diminish. A scholastic exercise of this sort can go on for ever, if there is no political will to reach a conclusion. The views of delegations with respect to the central points of the future convention are already in our view quite well known. Neither the mere reiteration of these positions, nor the sheer course of time, will solve the outstanding problems. Only a spirit of mutual concession, of real and mature compromise, can overcome the last differences and make us take that final sprint to the finish line, if I may borrow half of the very apt metaphor of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby. As stated by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, Dr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, addressing this forum on 18 February last, "we are prepared to support, be it in substance or in procedure, any practical initiatives that might further intensify the rhythm of our work and the pace of our consultations. We are not in a hurry. We simply refuse to waste time".

Our readiness to accept a universal ban on chemical weapons is easy to understand. Brazil does not possess chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or stockpile any. Brazil has unfailingly recognized and supported the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As such, we think that the first priority of a ban on chemical weapons should be the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks and all chemical weapon production facilities, allowing

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no exceptions for any alleged security reasons. We consider that the slower the pace of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks during the 10-year period, assuming this time-frame is retained in the final text, the more discriminatory the transition régime will be towards those countries that have no chemical weapons.

The paramount goal of the future convention - the complete and universal prohibition of chemical methods of warfare - must be secured without jeopardizing other equally legitimate objectives, namely those related to making the basic achievements in the field of chemistry accessible to all mankind, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. The prohibition of chemical weapons should not in any way hamper the economic and technological development of the parties to the convention, or curb international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. Universality and non-discrimination are concepts closely linked. A text which imposes permanently unequal rights and responsibilities on member States will not earn a universal adherence.

We are confronted with the opportunity not only of negotiating one of the most relevant disarmament multilateral agreements ever - one that will free humankind of a fearsome and tragic weapon of mass destruction - we have the occasion to shape a model relationship between the interwoven areas of science, technology, industry, disarmament and development. It has become a truism to say that science and technology are the most wondrous productive factors man ever had to assist him in his struggle for a better life. They help produce more and better, they alleviate physical labour, they inform and teach faster and more precisely. We all know, however, that they can also assist men in killing other men with a speed and range never imagined by our ancestors. Science and technology are, in essence, dual-purpose activities. These two faces of scientific and technological progress are, to some extent, inextricable. We cannot ban or limit science and technology, for we cannot, in the end, ban or limit human intelligence and achievement. We may, however, and ultimately must, ban or limit all types of arms race set in motion by developments in science and technology, and prevent their extension to new areas.

Each welcome regulation of the use of scientific and technological advances for weapons purposes must not result in limitations on the access of developing countries to higher levels of technical capacity and better living conditions for their populations. I think we can strike an acceptable balance between the security concerns we all share and other national interests most of us have, including the free capacity to import and export chemical products not prohibited by the future convention; the right to research, develop, produce and use chemicals for peaceful purposes; and the right to promote and participate in the fullest possible international scientific and technological co-operation in the field of chemistry.

I am confident that the difficulties some delegations have expressed about seeing co-operation-related rights and obligations included in a security agreement will be overcome in the course of our negotiations. Other international disarmament agreements - a denomination we feel is more adequate

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than that of "security agreements" when applied to treaties in this category - have already embodied similar dispositions, most recently the biological weapons Convention.

We welcome, in this context, progress made in the current session on language for article XI. We have put forward our own ideas on this subject in document CD/CW/WP.176. Even if we consider that the wording so far arrived at falls short of what we deem indispensable for the final text of the convention, we feel very encouraged by the exchange of views we have had and consider we have a firm basis for future work. In this context I wish to congratulate Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia for the hard work done in Group A under his chairmanship. May I also thank Ambassador Ekéus, from Sweden, who, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the last session, had already presented to us a very useful paper for discussion on article XI, from which some ideas should still be drawn for our future article on economic and technological development.

Another question of great relevance to Brazil is the matter contained in article X, on assistance, and here again we must welcome the advances made during the present session, under the competent chairmanship of Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, in Group B. Let me only stress again the point made by many delegations from the Group of 21, that it is only natural and logical that States willing to accept the obligation to renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons for ever should strongly insist on having clearly stated in the convention the symmetrical right to assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of such weapons.

Verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century. As with other areas of international relations, as they evolve nowadays, it will bring broad changes to relations between States, between States and international organizations, and to the concept of sovereignty itself. Even if in principle my delegation favours verification mechanisms tailored to each specific treaty, it is arguable that we will be establishing a significant precedent in presenting our convention. We shall therefore be very prudent and careful in dealing with the verification régime and the new ideas that it will introduce.

As a general principle, verification should be efficient, practicable, non-intrusive and cost-effective. Pushed to its logical limits, the verification concept could block progress in any disarmament negotiations, if applied with uncompromising rigidity. Absolute verification being an unattainable goal, we should stress mainly the deterrent effect of the inspection machinery on would-be violators. The cost of future verification procedures in all sectors should stop short of absorbing a large share of the financial resources to be hopefully liberated with the cut in military expenses provided by disarmament agreements and now wasted in the multiple arenas of military competition.

In the case of our convention, Brazil would like to see a verification régime as strict as possible, but with adequate safeguards against excessive intrusiveness and political mis-utilization. We view verification, on the

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other hand, as a two-track process. No one can reasonably equate the threat posed to the convention by chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities with the risk allegedly presented by toxic chemicals produced commercially by the civilian chemical industry. The first and utmost priority of the verification system must be to control the former category of threats. May I quote here my distinguished colleague Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, who, speaking about the risks embodied in supervision of the civilian chemical sector, stressed that "the enemy is not private chemical industry, the enemy is the State acting in bad faith".

Some ideas have been put forward on the need to give the Technical Secretariat the power to decide to carry out ad hoc inspections at short notice, on its own initiative. While sympathizing with the aim of enhancing the verification mechanisms of the convention we consider, in principle, that this proposal would place a very heavy responsibility on the technical skills of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, allowing for the raising of suspicions about its independence and objectivity and thus possibly endangering the inspectorate's role in other crucial areas, and in particular that of challenge inspections.

Coming to this central and essential feature of our future convention, my delegation holds that it should so be structured that it would preclude misuse or abuse of this right not only by depending on the international opprobrium likely to be brought upon the misuser or abuser, but also by giving a strong role to the Executive Council in one or more of the phases of the challenge inspection procedure. The role of the Technical Secretariat will be crucial in that area too. We can quite understand, in principle, the reasons put forward against filters between the request and the conduct of the inspection: the need for speedy action to prevent a cover-up at the site to be inspected obviously requires automaticity. We favour, however, the establishment of very strict conditions for the receivability of the request - details of the site to be inspected, the matters on which assurance is required, the circumstances and the nature of the suspected non-compliance and the exact provisions thought to have been violated. The Technical Secretariat should make sure that each such request meets these requirements as appropriate.

Coming to the stage of consideration of the report by the inspection team, my delegation is of the opinion that the Executive Council should meet immediately after receiving such a report and establish on a factual basis whether a violation of the convention has taken place or not. The same body should also decide on further steps to be taken if a violation has been confirmed. It would be rather awkward to give the requesting State a party to the controversy, the final say on the report on that controversy. If we have a decision-making procedure based on the need for a two-thirds majority, the Executive Council could settle this kind of issue without allowing any one political or geographical group alone to influence unduly the decisions to be made. The role thus given to the Executive Council would be effective to a very large extent in preventing misuses or abuses of the challenge inspection procedure. A State is likely to weigh carefully the pros and cons of resort to this mechanism once the Executive Council's authority and competence are clearly established.

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Some countries have expressed their misgivings about what they have called the "judicial power" of the Executive Council. My delegation thinks that, while we should allow bilateral controversies to be settled outside the framework of our convention, if a dispute persists once the convention procedures have been set in motion it should be treated multilaterally, according to the rules and procedures established in the convention itself. The fact that we want the Executive Council to play an important role in the verification system makes us even more sensitive to the questions of its composition, procedures and decision-making powers. We would like to see a strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30, neither too small to be tempted by visions of oligarchy, nor large enough to be unwieldy and cumbersome.

In the name of efficiency it has been suggested that a few seats should be attributed on a permanent basis. My delegation considers that this would constitute unacceptable discrimination, which would be clearly anachronistic at a moment when we are designing a significant element of the new international order for the next century. Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity. In a more perfect world we would like to see the pre-eminence or even the exclusiveness of the geographical factor, on the model of the United Nations. For the time being, we are prepared to accept the realistic approach of devising imaginative and balanced ways of combining the three criteria. One of the possible formulations would be to take the CD as a model and repeat approximately the same ratios. This decisive aspect of our future Organization has greatly benefited, if I may say so, from the preliminary discussion presided over by Mr. Numata of Japan, Chairman of Group C, during the current session.

Serious and good work was accomplished in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last year under the chairmanship of my distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. Ambassador Sujka has assumed this heavy burden for the present session, and I sincerely congratulate him and wish him further success through the year 1988. Some say, probably with wisdom, but certainly with scepticism, that disarmament measures are only feasible in relation either to weapons on the way to obsolescence or to weapons still in the research and development stage, far from deployment. If this is true, let us strive to have a complete ban on chemical weapons in force before new types of those devices provoke another arms race, bringing unforeseen consequences to all mankind. Let us tackle all unresolved issues with the clear awareness that for every human enterprise there is a right time, and that if procrastination prevails, an historic opportunity can be lost forever.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, has to live up to the expectations of the international community and fulfil the mandate received from the General Assembly. This is a unique chance for multilateralism to prove its effectiveness on disarmament matters, and it is within reach. A positive outcome of our present negotiations on chemical weapons would underwrite our bid for a constructive role in future negotiations on the so-called nuclear items of our agenda, as well as some other significant subjects, like outer space. You can count on the Brazilian delegation, Mr. President, to work in good faith and with diligence towards the attainment of this common goal.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian):

As everybody recognizes, negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons, which have been under way now for a number of years, have reached a decisive stage. This may be seen from the fact that the special report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/CW/WP.200) has practically taken on the look of a treaty. It is now particularly important to intensify our negotiations, particularly by increasing the amount of time devoted to these negotiations during the year, and to put forward practical and constructive proposals, not new concepts which would complicate work on the convention.

In its statement today, my delegation would like once again to dwell briefly on one of the basic unsolved problems, the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons, because animated discussions took place on this point during the preparation of the special report. I have already had an opportunity to say that my country does not possess chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or acquire them. In participating in the negotiations on chemical weapons my delegation has been guided by a desire to contribute, as its capabilities allow, to the rapid finalization of the future convention. The working papers submitted by our delegation have been the result of precisely this kind of activity.

We realize that the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons is not only important from the point of view of military strategy, but also has very obvious political and moral aspects. Careful drafting of the provisions of the convention on this subject and scrupulous implementation by the parties after its entry into force will to a large extent determine the viability of the future convention. It is encouraging that the basic approaches to this question are now moving together, and we hope that it will soon be possible to turn them into agreements, because the solution of this problem will be of substantial importance for the rapid conclusion of the convention. A significant amount of work has already been done on the basis of principles already agreed, such as the principle of undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage, confidence-building in the

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early part of the destruction stage, the gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapon stocks and the applicability of this order of destruction irrespective of the actual composition and size of the stockpiles and the method chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

There is general agreement that all stockpiles should be destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the convention enters into force. We are happy to see that definite progress has been registered at the negotiations on this question in recent months. An example is the agreement reached that the process of destruction of chemical weapons in category 3 must be completed not later than five years after the convention enters into force. Taking into account the positions of the various delegations, the Mongolian delegation put forward in its working paper CD/CW/WP.182 the principle of levelling-out, whereby States possessing chemical weapons would be left, by the end of the eighth year of application of the convention, with approximately equal quantities of such weapons, to be destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the entry into force of the convention. And this principle is now recognized by the participants in the negotiations. As to the level of the remaining stockpiles and the period over which this levelling-out will be possible, these questions await further discussion. Of course, on this question too the socialist countries are prepared to co-operate constructively with all interested delegations.

We are in favour of a simple, practical, effective order of destruction of chemical weapons. As we have repeatedly emphasized, this order of destruction should provide for the complete destruction of all stockpiles, the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and, above all, the immediate cessation of production, the declaration of the precise size and location of all chemical weapon stockpiles by all those possessing them not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force, verification of the trustworthiness of such declarations, and the institution of international monitoring of stockpiles.

Allow me to comment briefly on the working paper submitted by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy (CD/CW/WP.197). We have studied with interest the ideas put forward in this document, and our preliminary comments may be summarized as follows. We do not quite understand why such an early deadline (five years) has been set for levelling-out, as it will almost automatically lead to the establishment of a high threshold of chemical weapon stocks in the hands of the "States parties with large stocks". What we would like - and this will be closely connected with the fundamental aim of the convention - is for all of the States parties to the convention which possess chemical weapons, without any exceptions, and whatever the size of the stocks they possess, to start destroying them simultaneously. Obviously the rates of destruction will vary from one chemical-weapon State to another, and remain to be determined. One can think of various levels to be aimed at by the States parties which possess these weapons, depending on the size of their stocks.

Since the course and process of destruction of chemical weapon stocks is a very important problem for the fate of the convention, we consider that this question should be included in the agenda of each regular session of the

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General Conference of the future Organization. Meanwhile a provision concerning the convening of special sessions, whatever the issues that may be discussed at them, will be set out clearly in article VIII of the convention.

The question of the order of destruction is also broached in document CD/CW/WP.199. We have outlined our attitude to it in previous statements. Our delegation shares the view of many other delegations that the position reflected in this document is in no way conducive to progress in the elaboration of the convention and the rapid destruction of chemical weapons in order that they should never reappear under any pretext. There is no doubt that the early declaration of possession of chemical weapons by States which have not yet made such a declaration, as well as of the level of their stockpiles of these weapons, would effectively promote finalization of work on the order of destruction during the summer part of the 1988 session.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the urgent need to deal with the question of irritants. The use of weapons containing harmful chemicals against developing countries which do not possess a proper level of protection may constitute an extremely serious blow to their security. The principal victims will be the civilian population and peaceful activities in these countries. The use of herbicides for military purposes is another problem which requires solution. The time has now come to incorporate appropriate provisions on this subject in the "rolling text".

Mr. SUJKA (Poland):

The report I am introducing today, contained in document CD/831, was adopted in its entirety by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on 20 April. It reflects the results of the negotiations since SSOD-II, including those achieved during the spring session. In keeping with the requirements for SSOD-III, it reflects the present stage of elaboration of a convention on a chemical weapons ban.

The document now before us follows, in general, the well-established pattern of previous years. It consists of three parts: the so-called technical part, which briefly recalls the history of the negotiations within this body and its subsidiary organ, appendix I and appendix II.

Let me briefly comment on their contents. Appendix I, which contains the current version of the "rolling text" of the draft convention, is a fundamental part of the report. Appendix II contains texts of papers which reflect the result of work undertaken to date on relevant issues. These papers are part of the report, as it has been agreed that they are to serve as a basis for further work. For the time being, they are not developed enough to be included in appendix I.

The report as presented reflects a further step forward in our process of negotiations. It encompasses the results achieved during the spring part of the session. The time we had at our disposal was shorter than usual during the spring session. This time was, however, used very intensively in a business-like manner. Nevertheless, I would share the opinion that the results seem to have fallen short of generally expressed hopes and expectations. However, we have before us the summer part of the session, which could bring us much closer to the common goals.

Briefly taking stock of the present state of affairs as reflected in appendices I and II, I would say that in some areas we were able to develop existing texts towards mutually acceptable solutions. In others we have worked out a common basis for future work. We have also had, however, to register a clearer picture of differences of position on some fundamental issues. I hope this will bring us closer to overcoming these divergences in the future.

I would like to draw the attention of the delegations to a very important aspect of the Committee's work which I consider very helpful for the

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

negotiating process. I have in mind the increased openness and confidence among delegations, demonstrated by numerous declarations made by the participating States on Chemical Weapons and related matters, as well as various visits to military chemical facilities, and the exchange of data both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis.

At the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee it was agreed that the Committee should deal with all the articles of the draft convention while focusing its attention, in the first instance, on articles III, IV, V and X (dealt with in working group B), articles VI and XI (dealt with in group A) and articles VII, VIII and IX (dealt with in group C). Accordingly the Committee concentrated its work on these areas. In addition I have held a number of open-ended consultations on articles XII to XVI of the draft convention - which have not, so far, been subject to full-scale negotiations. We did not succeed, however, in making substantial progress with articles I and II, though they too have been updated so as to reflect the current state of affairs.

To sum up, I would like to say that the present report is a fair and detailed reflection of what has been done and what still remains to be negotiated and agreed upon. It shows that the process of working out a convention has reached a very advanced stage. The existing point of departure for dealing with outstanding issues gives ground for optimism, especially if delegations would use the coming recess to prepare thoroughly for the summer session so that our work can be intensified.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the chairmen of the working groups, namely Mr. Cimr of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, as well as the Secretary of the Committee Mr. Bensmail, and his assistant Miss Darby.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At their meeting in Moscow on 21 and 22 April, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, reviewed among other important issues the status of bilateral and multilateral negotiations in Geneva towards a comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban encompassing all chemical-weapon-capable States. The joint statement by the Ministers says that they "instructed their delegations to undertake further constructive work, including in such areas as confidence-building, openness, verification and the security of States parties, to contribute to the elaboration of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons." The Ministers also recorded their concern over the growing problem of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

Today I would like to touch upon the issues of confidence-building and openness. On 18 February this year the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, submitted for consideration by the Conference a memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The memorandum set out our ideas regarding the purpose of such an exchange and the volume of information which, in our view, it would be appropriate to exchange. On 15 March the Soviet delegation provided some additional clarification concerning the memorandum, and also presented information falling within the scope of the first stage of data exchange that we propose.

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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The statement of 18 February also contained a proposal for the voluntary designation of one facility per country where a specially established international group of experts could test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. These two proposals have, we understand, generated a certain interest. Comments, ideas and requests for clarification have been made. It seems to us appropriate, now that the spring part of the 1988 session is drawing to an end, to sum up the preliminary results of both the data exchange, which has in fact already begun, and the exchange of views which has taken place on our proposals. Let me turn to this issue.

We note with satisfaction that important steps have recently been made towards greater openness in the field of chemical weapons. More than 20 States have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons, and we have heard similar statements at today's meeting. The distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja, has made such a statement, and he was followed by the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart. A number of countries have provided data showing that they produce chemicals covered by the Convention. The practice of visiting chemical-weapons-related facilities is becoming more widespread. We hope that this practice of confidence-building will continue. In particular we consider that those possessing chemical weapons should provide information on the size of their stockpiles. The provision of such information not only dispels suspicions and builds trust, but is also necessary from the point of view of practical requirements for the elaboration of the convention, particularly of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks. As you know, the Soviet Union has already provided such data.

There was, however, particularly in the United States delegation's statement, a shadow of mistrust regarding the figure we declared, although it was not substantiated by any arguments. It seems that on similar grounds, following the "logic of mistrust" and nothing more, we too might question the reliability of the information provided by the United States regarding its chemical arsenal. However, we will not do so, because we do not want data exchange and openness to lead in a direction which would diminish confidence. Furthermore, the statement made on 19 April by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador M. Friedersdorf, contained a reproach that the Soviet Union is allegedly seeking to learn "almost everything" about American chemical weapons, by inviting the United States to declare the overall size of its stockpile, while Soviet stocks would "continue to be largely shrouded in secrecy". The United States delegation asserts that data on the number and location of chemical weapon production and storage facilities are "much more significant". Such data are certainly important. But what for? Obviously, for verification, which will take place after the convention has entered into force. Then, of course, the locations of all storage facilities will have to be declared, including those on foreign territory. Yet I do not know where American chemical weapons are located, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany. Since it is not proposed to conduct checks in respect of the multilateral exchange of data before the signature of the convention, it is not clear what use data on the location of facilities can be at this stage.

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The volume of stocks is another matter, as I have already said earlier. The United States does not want to provide that figure, saying that in combination with the data it has previously declared, including those on the percentage breakdown of the overall stockpile, it will reveal, as Ambassador Friedersdorf put it, "almost everything about the United States chemical weapon stockpile". But one can look at this from the other angle as well. If, in addition to the figure it has declared regarding the size of its stockpile, the Soviet Union provides the data the United States has published, we will find ourselves in the same situation that the United States is trying to avoid. Is there a way out of this situation? We believe one can be found if we take as a starting-point the fact that certain data are needed for the preparation of the convention, rather than asking which data have already been made public at one time or another, for reasons unrelated to the negotiations. This is a matter for each individual State.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, said on 19 April, apparently referring to her statement of 8 March this year, that "some initial disclosures of information will give rise to further questions or may not tally with the assessments of others". On 8 March she had expressed doubts concerning both the figure we had declared for our stockpile and the completeness of the presentation of our arsenal at Shikhany. I have already said earlier that anything can be questioned. The monstrously overstated assessments of our chemical weapon stockpile which are published in the West can only be left to the consciences of their authors. We cannot understand why we should have to prove the truthfulness of our declaration for the sole reason that someone in the West has had wild fantasies regarding the size of our stockpile. Proof of the truthfulness of our declaration will be provided no later than 30 days after the convention enters into force. For the moment I wish to recall our statement that chemical weapon stocks in the Soviet Union do not exceed 50,000 tons of CW agents. Under chemical weapons, we include both chemical munitions and CW agents in containers. As for the presentation at Shikhany, as the command of the Soviet chemical forces stated at the press conference following the presentation, it included all the Soviet Union's CW agents and standard munitions.

I think that on the whole we can state that substantial headway has been made at this part of the session on the issue of the multilateral exchange of data on chemical weapons prior to the signing of the convention. We look forward to further progress on this matter at the summer part of the session.

Now I should like to turn to another issue, which to a certain extent is linked to the first. I refer to the proposal made at the Conference by the delegation of the Soviet Union on 18 February regarding an experiment to test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We are encouraged by the interest that many delegations have shown in this idea. Some initial assessments of our proposal have already been made. Taking into account the discussion that has taken place, we would like today to provide the following additional clarifications as regards our understanding of its organizational aspects.

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First, we believe that the experiment should include the measures envisaged in the draft convention for the types of enterprises from which facilities for the experiment will be selected, including the relevant declarations. Secondly, the experiment may be carried out in stages. In the first stage, a national experiment (conducted by inspectors of that State) would be carried out at the designated enterprise. The Government would submit a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the experiment, containing conclusions and possibly suggestions as regards the international verification procedures being worked out at the negotiations. Thirdly, a specially established group of experts from the States hosting the experiment would analyse the reports and draw general conclusions from them. In the second stage the group would also test the systematic verification procedures at the enterprises designated by the States. Additional procedures which the experts consider desirable might be tested during these international inspections (with the agreement of the host States). The international group of experts will submit its conclusions and recommendations to the Conference on Disarmament. Fourthly, the costs of the experiment, including the costs of inviting the experts, would be borne by the national Government. These are our additional observations. We await with interest the reactions of other delegations.

In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that the forthcoming summer break will be used by all delegations to think over the results of the session now ending, and to study the possibility of further progress in elaborating the draft convention. Allow me also to thank you for your successful and wise guidance of the work of the Conference in the past month, during which it had the important task of preparing the Conference's report to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

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(Mr. Teja, India)

••• SSOD-III is a time for reflection and deliberation. It is an opportunity for setting out a common agenda for multilateral disarmament which will stand us in good stead till the turn of the century. It is a time for building upon the foundations laid down by the Final Document in 1978. It is a time to ensure that existing negotiations, particularly on a chemical weapons convention, are accelerated and concluded at the earliest. It is my conviction that an awareness of our common goals, tempered with a sense of realism, will hold the key to a successful SSOD-III.

Mr. GRANGER (United States of America): The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, has apprised the Conference of the instructions our two delegations have received from their Governments as a result of the recent ministerials in Moscow. The United States delegation will, of course, comply with those instructions, and indeed we have already begun to do so. You will note, if you review the statements of Ambassador Friedersdorf on 14 and 19 April, that the issues mentioned in the joint statement that Ambassador Nazarkin mentioned today, that is, confidence-building, openness, verification and security, are precisely issues my delegation considered important and considered further work is needed on. There are, of course, others that we also discussed in those two statements, and we are prepared for constructive work in all these areas. We will return during the next session when we convene again in the summer and discuss the joint statement further because, of course, it covered many areas other than chemical weapons.

Regarding multilateral data exchange, my delegation has noted with interest the Soviet proposal, and we are considering it carefully, along with other proposals such as the one recently submitted by several Western States. Our preliminary assessment is that the latter proposal offers more prospects for progress in our negotiations, because it seems to call for more useful information to be presented when it would be most valuable. The Soviet proposal appears to us to be unbalanced. We have an open mind, however, as to the approach the CD should take, and we look forward to consideration of all options, as well any others that we may have in addition to those two when we resume in the summer. As for the reservations my delegation and others have expressed regarding some of the recent Soviet revelations, Ambassador Friedersdorf stated last week that, given the unhappy experiences of the past, declarations cannot always be accepted at face value. You all know about these unhappy experiences, and I do not intend to go into them again here today. We have discussed them before in our statements over the past two or three years. I will only say now that these unhappy experiences are not wild fantasies. These past unhappy experiences, however, have not dampened our enthusiasm for multilateral data exchange. Indeed, to the contrary, these experiences make it clear that such an exercise is very important to our efforts.

Regarding the Soviet proposal for multilateral efforts to develop and test inspection methods for commercial facilities, we have welcomed that proposal in the past. We do not think it unreasonable, however, to do our

(continued)

(Mr. Granger, United States)

homework before we begin such an experiment. First, of course, as Ambassador Friedersdorf mentioned last week, we needed to know more precisely what the Soviet Union had in mind, and in that regard we certainly appreciate the clarification that the Soviet Ambassador has given with regard to the Soviet proposal, and particularly his remark that national development of verification procedures must be the first step of development of this experiment. That was the proposal we made last week. As the Soviet proposal itself recognizes, the inspectors would use procedures being worked out here in the CD. Our reservation expressed last week simply recognized that we should better develop those procedures before we take our chemical experts away from their negotiations for the time-consuming, albeit valuable, task of touring these facilities. We look forward to our summer session, where these and other important issues can be addressed again and, hopefully, resolved. My delegation would add its regrets to those expressed by other delegations, that we will soon lose the valuable services of an able diplomat, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria.

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Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the report of the mission despatched by the Secretary-General to investigate the use of chemical weapons, as documented in S/18852 of 8 May 1987, the specialists, while saying chemical weapons had again been used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, also causing injuries to civilians in the Islamic Republic of Iran, concluded:

"We all firmly believe that, at the specialist level, we have done all that we can to identify the types of chemicals and chemical weapons being used in Iran-Iraq conflict ... In our view, only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their obligations".

The specialists warned the international community of their forebodings for the future, saying that indifference "may lead, in the future, to the world facing the spectre of the threat of biological weapons". It is unfortunate that not only has this strongly recommended concerted effort at the political level not materialized, but on the contrary we have been witnesses to a degree of acquiescence to such crimes.

We are now faced with an unprecedented escalation of the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which was highlighted in the Halabja holocaust. Ironically, our request for the dispatch of a team took more than two weeks to meet, and yet the team was incomplete and - worse - the scene of the crime was not visited. What we have to bear in mind is that when the genie is out, nobody will be able to put it back in the bottle. When chemical weapons become a warfare agent in every conflict in the world and the negative effects on the environment come to the threshold of many countries, then it may be too late even to feel sorry for this self-inflicted state. Now the lack of response to the Security Council has made use of chemical weapons by Iraq a fait accompli, which has become normal practice in every operation in a war started by Iraq on 22 September 1980. On 21 April 1988 the township of

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Darkhovein as well as the surroundings of Susangerd in the southern Iranian province of Khugistan were subject to extensive chemical bombardment by Iraqi forces. This deployment, like the previous one in Halabja, was directed against unprotected civilians, leaving a number of casualties. The Islamic Republic of Iran, through its Permanent Mission in New York, immediately submitted a request to the United Nations Secretary-General for the dispatch of an investigation team to the area to once again verify the established facts.

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Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): In my statement today, I propose to address items 4, 7 and 8 of our agenda as well as the question of improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are the most promising area of our work. This is reflected in the intensity of our discussions on this question. These negotiations have now reached an advanced stage where an end is in sight but not yet quite within our grasp. The work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was brought forward considerably during the last session and during the inter-session period under the leadership of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, ably assisted by his team of item co-ordinators. This year we are again fortunate in having as the Chairman of the Committee Ambassador Sujka of Poland who, six years ago, skilfully guided the deliberations of the Working Group on this item of our agenda.

We have been discussing the question of a chemical weapons ban for 20 years in this multilateral negotiating forum. The distance we have covered in the last 6 years is evident from the special report which was submitted to the Conference at our last meeting. For the first time, the report contains either agreed language or suggested formulations on all the articles of the draft convention. The progress made cannot, however, be measured simply by the bulk of our report. There is still a lot of hard work to be done before we reach our goal.

Several delegations have stressed the need for speeding up the pace at which our work is proceeding. We share this view. United Nations General Assembly resolution 42/37 A, adopted last year without a vote, called for the intensification of our negotiations. This call should be heeded.

(The President)

The urgency of concluding a convention to ban chemical weapons can hardly be over-emphasized at a time when reports of their use continue to multiply, when existing stocks are being built up, when these weapons are being produced by more and more nations and when scientific and technological developments threaten to trigger the development of new and more lethal types of chemical weapons. News about the renewed use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war has caused deep anguish to the Government and people of Pakistan. We reiterate our strong condemnation of all actions in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and urge both parties to the conflict to abide by the norms of international humanitarian law, particularly the provisions relating to armed conflict.

The situation in which we find ourselves should impel us to redouble our efforts. Our negotiations are at a crucial stage. If the political will exists, a real breakthrough is possible. The convention we are negotiating would be the first multilateral disarmament agreement providing for the establishment of international machinery to supervise the implementation of its provisions and to monitor an important branch of the civil industry. It would give a significant boost to the Conference on Disarmament and reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process. We must seize this opportunity.

As stated by Ambassador Ekéus on 8 March on behalf of the Group of 21, the non-aligned and neutral countries want the early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, comprehensive, verifiable, effective and truly global convention banning all chemical weapons. They will work resolutely towards this objective and will not agree to partial measures or limited arrangements. My delegation believes that the question of proliferation should be approached in the context of a global convention.

Differences on some of the outstanding issues were reduced during the spring part of the current session. However, a number of difficult problems still await solution, such as the order of destruction, monitoring of the civil industry, the institutional structure and challenge inspection. Evidently, a lot of arduous work lies before us in the summer and beyond. We would urge all delegations to approach these questions with a sense of urgency and in a constructive spirit.

Some further convergence has taken place on the question of the order of destruction, on which considerable common ground was identified last year. We feel that the concerns that have been voiced about security during the period of destruction could be addressed by appropriate adjustments in the order of destruction. Several useful suggestions have been made to provide for a levelling out of stocks. On the other hand, maintenance of secret stocks or continued production during the destruction period would raise more problems than it would solve.

We welcome the understanding reached by the Soviet Union and the United States, the two largest chemical-weapon States, on the definition of a chemical weapon production facility and on the principle that these facilities should be completely destroyed. This understanding should facilitate concrete work on article V in the Ad hoc Committee during the summer.

(The President)

Article VI will be one of the most important parts of the convention. Unlike the provisions concerning destruction, which will apply only to chemical-weapon States and hopefully become obsolete after a transitional period during which stocks and production facilities would be eliminated, the monitoring régime for chemical industry will be of unlimited duration and of direct interest to a considerably larger number of countries. This régime should be as non-intrusive as possible. It should also be cost-effective. At the same time, it must be effective in producing confidence in compliance with the convention.

The proposal made by the Federal Republic of Germany for ad hoc checks (CD/791) has made a useful contribution to our discussions. It has drawn attention to a real problem, that of the risk of clandestine production in facilities normally devoted to peaceful purposes but which could be converted to the production of chemicals posing a risk to the objectives of the convention. Our delegation would, however, be wary of any procedures which smack of a challenge inspection by the Technical Secretariat, as they could compromise its non-political character.

Work on article VIII of the convention has made concrete progress, and the outlines of the institutional structure are becoming more and more clear. The Executive Council has been described as the "most powerful" organ. We do not see the issues in this light. Our aim should be to establish an organization which is democratically constituted and is effective in overseeing implementation of the convention and compliance with its provisions. The General Conference, as the supreme body comprising all States parties on the basis of equality, should delegate to the Executive Council day-to-day functions of a routine character while retaining a supervisory authority over it.

The composition of the Executive Council continues to be a tricky question, and we are glad that it is now being addressed in the appropriate working group of the Committee. My delegation believes that the Executive Council should not be so large in size as to weaken its capacity to take quick decisions, nor should it be so small as to deprive it of a truly representative character. Its precise composition should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of political balance. We are not convinced that a case has been made out for any further criteria to be taken into consideration in this connection.

As several delegations have pointed out, there is an interrelationship between the composition of the Executive Council and its decision-making procedures. Equally, we feel that there is a linkage between these two questions on the one hand and the respective powers and functions of the General Conference and the Executive Council on the other.

The procedures for challenge inspection will have a crucial place in an effective verification régime - to deter violation as well as to create confidence in compliance. There is general recognition that these procedures should be mandatory, without a right of refusal. The consultations carried out by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the 1987 session resulted in

(The President)

tangible progress, as reflected in appendix II of the report. A wide measure of agreement exists on the procedures for the initiation of the inspection, in particular that there should be no political "filter" before this process is set in motion.

As regards the actual conduct of the inspection, procedures still need to be evolved that will reconcile the demands of an effective inspection with the legitimate right of States to protect sensitive information not related to chemical weapons. Moreover, the whole range of issues connected with follow-up to the submission of the inspection report still need in-depth examination. These are questions on which the two political organs to be established under the convention, the Executive Council and the General Conference, would have to be involved in a meaningful way. Once doubts have been raised publicly about compliance with the convention, the matter can no longer be regarded as one of concern only to the requesting and requested States, to be resolved by them bilaterally. Every party to the convention has an interest in seeing to it that the inspection is carried out in an effective manner and that, as far as possible, a clear-cut finding is arrived at on compliance or otherwise. These are matters which could appropriately be decided upon by the Executive Council. In cases of breaches of the convention which are not immediately rectified and of violations of a serious nature the Executive Council should, in our view, refer the matter to the General Conference for further action, including possible measures to restore credibility in the convention.

We have taken a particular interest in articles X and XI of the convention, dealing respectively with assistance and economic and technological development. We fully support the proposal submitted by Argentina on article X (CD/809). Some delegations continue to approach these matters from a rather narrow angle and see them as another North-South issue. Effective provisions on these two articles need to be viewed, however, in a broader perspective as means of promoting the objective of universality of the convention and of strengthening its viability. A State which faces a chemical weapon threat has at present no choice but to acquire a deterrent capability of its own. Such a State will not, therefore, become a party to the convention, or, having become one, will withdraw from it, unless it can count on assurances of assistance from States parties in meeting this threat. These assurances should be given through provisions in the convention for mandatory assistance to the threatened State in protective measures. The existence of such provisions in the convention would by itself serve as a deterrent to anyone contemplating the use of chemical weapons.

In our view, article XI of the convention should contain undertakings for the promotion of international scientific and technological co-operation in the application of chemistry for peaceful purposes. There would be nothing novel in such a commitment, as similar clauses exist in two other multilateral disarmament agreements, namely the non-proliferation Treaty and the biological weapons convention. The case for meaningful provisions on co-operation in article XI is all the greater in view of the generally recognized interrelationship between disarmament and development and the increased confidence that compliance with the convention would generate.

(The President)

Before I turn to other items of the agenda, I would like to express my appreciation to the Soviet delegation for having arranged the visit to the Shikhany military facility last October and for the information on Soviet chemical weapon stocks. We also welcome the various proposals for a multilateral exchange of information on chemical weapon stocks and production facilities and other relevant data. This information would give us a better idea of the magnitude of the task that the inspectorate would be expected to perform, and thus facilitate our work in drafting the relevant parts of the convention.

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(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

As to the convention on chemical weapons, work on which is far advanced in the Conference, we would like the States which possess chemical weapons to show sufficient political will to settle the no less important questions still pending, for example the questions covered by article VI of the draft convention, to enable the Conference to present this draft to the United Nations General Assembly.

The violation of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 through the increasingly intensive use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq is a further argument in favour of concluding the convention on chemical weapons, which will complement the provisions of the Protocol, as soon as possible. Several Ministers for Foreign Affairs who have taken the floor before our Conference have expressed their concern on this subject. The Conference would be taking a great step forward in its work if it succeeded this year in submitting the draft convention on chemical weapons and the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 462nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

...
As announced at our plenary meeting yesterday, the Conference will take up first for adoption the reports of the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I now turn to document CD/831, containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In that connection, I should like to note that on page 104, in the section entitled "Principles and order of the destruction of chemical weapons", in paragraph 1, penultimate line, the words "or size" have been omitted between the words "composition" and "of the stockpiles". The last two lines should read as follows:

"... and applicability irrespective of the actual composition or size of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons."

The secretariat will issue an appropriate corrigendum in the various languages in which this omission occurred. On this understanding and with the addition that I have just read, I suggest that the Conference adopt the report of the Ad hoc Committee, as contained in CD/831.

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(The President)

... Subsidiary bodies set up on particular items of our agenda are in the process of accomplishing their task. It is of paramount importance that the Ad hoc Committees on such items achieve progress in their substantive work. In at least two of these, viz. Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there has been a very clear commitment to bring the

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(The President)

negotiations to an early successful conclusion. I would also like to state that I will continue to make efforts on the priority issues relating to nuclear disarmament. Consultations will also be intensified in order to find an appropriate organizational framework to deal with substantive work relating to nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Let me continue by focusing on those positive developments at the special session which are of immediate importance to the Conference on Disarmament. Thus, it was reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament remains an indispensable forum and recommendations were made that the Conference intensify its work on various substantive items on its agenda. Significantly, in the proposals for a draft text, it was stressed that nuclear disarmament remains a priority objective and represents a central task of the international community. Also, in this context the importance of a cessation of nuclear testing was reaffirmed and the Conference on Disarmament was requested to intensify its consideration of this matter. In the process of consultations a consensus was emerging to the effect that the Conference on Disarmament be invited to continue to work towards solutions to the question

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

of the prohibition of radiological weapons and of the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear facilities. Further, there was a tentative consensus to encourage all efforts on the part of all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, including those efforts aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and other measures to halt and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An agreement was under way regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on urging the Conference on Disarmament to continue its efforts in this area. Furthermore, it was urged at the special session that the Conference on Disarmament as a matter of continuing urgency should pursue its efforts to conclude a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(The President)

negotiations to an early, successful conclusion. I would also like to state that I will continue to exert efforts on the priority issues related to nuclear disarmament. Organisations will also be invited in order to find an appropriate operational framework for dealing with substantive work relating to nuclear disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

While there has been reason for a certain optimism in some fields of disarmament, or at least a sense of growing expectations around ongoing or upcoming negotiations - such as START, chemical weapons and conventional disarmament in Europe - no such optimism or expectations mark the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban today. One of the most crucial tasks of disarmament has reached an impasse. And yet this is the most compelling task for the disarmament work. The need to arrive at a nuclear test ban is as urgent as ever. By the end of last year more than 1,600 nuclear test explosions had been carried out. And the testing continues. Last year all five of the nuclear-weapon States carried out such tests in spite of the long-standing opprobrium of the international community and in defiance of vigorous protests by neighbouring States. A variety of technical reasons and political excuses - reliability, safety, etc. - have been given by the nuclear-weapon States to justify the unjustifiable. But it is clear that nuclear testing is carried out for the main purpose of developing ever more efficient weapon designs. At the same time, the rest of the world - mortally threatened by these weapons - is being told that nuclear weapons are there only to deter, that they are never to be used. Still, they apparently need to be continuously refined, to be given ever more effective war-fighting capabilities. And so the qualitative arms race goes on - to no one's advantage.

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

••• The Conference on Disarmament has devoted a lot of time and made considerable joint effort towards concluding a convention on chemical weapons. We have cause for grave concern. At present chemical weapons are actually being used. Only last week the Secretary-General sent another mission of three experts to investigate the most recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons, a mission including as members, Ambassador Berasategui and Spanish and Swedish experts. The conclusions of the group are not yet known, but results of earlier investigations do not leave room for optimism. Sweden condemns the repeated use of chemical weapons, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. Tragedies like the one in Halabja must never be repeated.

Furthermore, there are indications that these weapons are spreading to additional national arsenals. And, as if this were not enough, it seems that chemical-weapon technology and chemical-warfare agents are being further developed and refined. These alarming indications underscore why we should all be guided by a sense of utmost urgency in our further negotiating

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

efforts. These developments also show, with ample clarity, that a convention is not only urgent but that it needs to be universal and comprehensive in character. Partial or interim measures could seriously delay or hamper the conclusion of an all-encompassing convention. There are firm commitments by both the United States and the Soviet Union, inter alia at the latest summit meeting, to a global ban on chemical weapons. However, I have to state that there is, in these pronouncements at the highest level, an unfortunate absence of any firm wording that would help to speed up these negotiations and conclude them within a specified time. Experience of various multilateral negotiations has shown that such "deadlines" can be useful. They help to avoid diverting attention to detail in a way which could become more obstructive than constructive, and they invigorate the political process necessary for effective decisions.

In this connection, I wish to recall and express agreement with what was said a month ago by the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, who challenged the special session to bring its political weight fully to bear "so that the convention can be concluded before the end of the year". During the special session it transpired that there exists a general will to pursue negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban with urgency and determination. The Conference on Disarmament will have to continue its work in that spirit. My delegation is of course aware that a number of complicated drafting problems remain to be solved, and we have no reason whatever to belittle them. Sweden has, as you know, always paid particular attention to various aspects of verification. Having said this, I do insist that these remaining problems can be resolved if the goodwill persists.

One of these issues, that of the principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons, is unquestionably a serious one. I am, however, convinced that this issue can be solved along the lines already being elaborated in consultations with some of the delegations most directly concerned. Nor do I see any major problems which might prevent agreement on a sufficiently elaborated system to safeguard future non-production, or a mechanism for mandatory challenge inspections, or for that matter on an international organization to monitor the implementation of the convention.

Let us all combine our efforts to conclude this work as soon as possible. It would not just be an important disarmament agreement, which should improve security for all. It would also be a much-needed triumph for multilateral disarmament diplomacy, for this negotiating body and for the delegations participating here.

Time is not on our side, neither in the case of chemical weapons, nor indeed of any other issue I have dwelt upon here. The Conference on Disarmament has to push on with its work. As was remarked by Danilo Dolci: Words don't move mountains. Work, exacting work, moves mountains.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your recognition. I take the floor to voice an objection to and a rejection of the premise of the distinguished Ambassador from Sweden with her criticism of the United States, and her attacks on the United States, regarding the recently completed SSOD-III. I do not believe anyone attending the final days and hours of the session in New York can fault the United States for its dedication to trying to seek consensus on a document. As those of you who are here today and were in New York will recall, the United States had at the highest level during the final hours of the session, Ambassador Hansen from Washington, and our United Nations Ambassador, Vernon Walters, was on hand throughout the night in an effort to try to reach a consensus. And I think you will all recall that the United States agreed, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad, to stop the clock at midnight and continue an overtime session, which we participated in as intensely as possible. As you know, we worked throughout the night. The Swedish Ambassador made no mention whatsoever of the serious problems other delegations had with the final document, including wording that was objectionable to some delegations involving the naming of a certain Middle Eastern country and a South African country. She made no mention whatsoever of the problems other delegations had with the proliferation issue and the conventional arms section. She chose to single out the United States as the provocateur and the reason for all its failure. As General Walters said in the final Committee of the Whole session, there were severe obstacles involving national security and policy that could not be compromised and would not be compromised. But to accuse the United States of blame for failure of SSOD-III, with 159 nations involved with varying perspectives bearing on regional and national interests and concerns, is not only inaccurate, it is highly offensive and deeply insulting to my delegation for the effort my Government made at SSOD-III. The United States record on disarmament is very clear. We have worked very hard these past two years to conclude an INF treaty with the Soviet Union, which has been signed. We are working diligently on a START pact, and also here in Geneva on test-ban verification and chemical weapons, and we simply cannot accept the criticism by the Ambassador from Sweden of the United States record in the area of disarmament.

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(Mr. Morel, France)

Thirdly, priority should not be given to nuclear disarmament in splendid isolation, nor should it rule out other possibilities. A certain amount of diversification in the fields of application of multilateral disarmament is recognized by all as something desirable, without meaning that we have to abandon an overall view. This trend is already reflected in the actual multilateral and regional negotiations which are under way, and it should become more marked in the next few years, whether we are referring to conventional, chemical, biological or space disarmament. We should not be

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(Mr. Morel, France)

setting up a series of watertight compartments, but rather promoting a pragmatic approach combining a variety of fields and different negotiations.

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Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

••• This initiative has been prompted by the example of different delegations that have pressed for unilateral declarations aimed at creating a climate of confidence. It is well known, for example, that various delegations - some of them members of military alliances - have urged States to declare unilaterally whether they possess chemical weapons and to state what stocks of such weapons they possess if they do. In keeping with this idea, many countries, among them the Argentine Republic, have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons.

Of course, these unilateral statements have no value except in so far as people wish to trust them, as they are not subject to any verification procedure until the Convention banning chemical weapons enters into force.

••• It is worth noting that in the field of multilateral disarmament agreements, the principle of the validity of unilateral declarations has been recognized by the international community. Let us take the case of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention

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(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. It welcomed with satisfaction declarations by States to the effect that they do not possess any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. The Conference considered that such declarations increased confidence in the Convention.

••• It is our belief that countries and delegations that advocate unilateral, non-verifiable declarations in different fields, such as chemical weapons, strategic arms both land -and sea-based, and conventional weapons, should also acknowledge the benefits of unilateral declarations by which space Powers would state that they had not deployed weapons in space.

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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

One concerns chemical weapons. The argument has been made that the negotiations on chemical weapons would need a further political impetus in specific terms, leading to an early agreement on the convention on which we have been working already for such a long time. My delegation shares the underlying concern of this reasoning, taking into account the urgency of reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Alarming reports on the continued use of these weapons and increasing concern about their proliferation confirm the necessity of making a maximum intensive effort. The appeal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, on 6 July 1988 has the full support of my Government. However, we feel that still a lot of complex technical work, in particular in the field of verification, must be undertaken.

We are encouraged by the increasing number of useful documents that are now under consideration in this field. My delegation intends to introduce a working paper shortly, as a contribution to the process of multilateral data exchange, in which we will provide data on the number of Dutch producers and consumers of chemical substances, appearing on schedules 1, 2 and 3 of document CD/831. We hope that the informal discussions that at the end of this week will be held with experts from chemical industries will also help us in finding our way through the thorny path towards a comprehensive, effectively verifiable convention.

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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

We remain convinced that, with the political will and patience required, these complex problems can be solved. And, let it be said again, an entirely and perfectly verifiable agreement is not what is needed. We need a convention with the capacity of verification required to inspire confidence in its implementation by all parties.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Thus, not only because of its high place on the agenda, but because of its real significance regrettably emphasized in recent months, we come to the convention on a comprehensive ban on the production, stock-piling and use of chemical weapons. This is a credibility test for the Conference and the ability of other multilateral organs to successfully complete a task promising to open a new phase in multilateral negotiations in general. It is quite clear that the urgent drafting and adoption of a complete, verifiable, non-discriminatory and therefore acceptable convention is of priority to all of us.

We do not ignore the existence of other outstanding complex issues, both technically and politically, but we are sure that the existing measure of agreement points to a successful outcome. As it is generally held that CW are not weapons but means of destruction of man and nature, security problems relating to the order of stock destruction are resolvable. The future convention, to be a genuine multilateral instrument, should be universally acceptable. It should contribute to the consolidation and stability of the régime it is going to inaugurate. It is on these grounds that we believe that convening a United Nations-sponsored Conference for the signing of the Convention, proposed for next year by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister at SSOD-III, would be a timely and powerful incentive for our work and for universal acceptability of the Convention itself. Attempts should be made to adapt its international verification mechanism to the real needs and to rationality and to prevent as far as possible any misuse, particularly against developing countries. The United Nations mechanism should also play its proper role in this field. The issue of international co-operation and technological development should, in our view, find a place in the Convention, in one form or another.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

The constructive, forward-looking exchange of views revealed a considerable degree of convergence on important items of disarmament negotiations, especially in relation to those on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Although different delegations may interpret this convergence in their own way, the main directions in which efforts should be aimed can be seen more or less precisely. Different aspects of the question of nuclear disarmament, including the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, have remained in the centre of attention. The need for measures to further strengthen the non-proliferation régime was recognized. The Conference on Disarmament has been called upon to proceed with the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention expeditiously since the chances of its early conclusion are fairly good.

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(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

Thus it cannot be considered that SSOD III is a total failure and that it will adversely affect multilateral disarmament efforts. It is of course true that the developments in SSOD III have a bearing on the Conference on Disarmament. But then if we look back a few years, its tasks have never been easy. For example, during the course of the negotiations on chemical weapons, we had a breakthrough on one of the toughest issues faced by the Committee, namely, the question of on-site challenge inspection. That breakthrough, unfortunately, did not materialize as an opportunity to speed up the negotiation.

Nevertheless, and regardless of what has happened, when we came here in the first place we made several commitments, among them to conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention as a matter of urgency. We are all obliged to realize that commitment. In this connection it has often been argued that States should contribute to the early conclusion of the Convention by providing information relevant to a future chemical weapon convention. During the third SSOD there was also a paragraph on this point that was accepted by consensus, or at least which was not put aside and does not need to be renegotiated. Having this in mind, our Foreign Minister has informed the Conference that Indonesia does not possess chemical weapons. In the same spirit, I wish to add that at the moment we do not produce "Schedule [1] and [2] chemicals" and that we are in the process of determining how many "Schedule [3] chemicals" are being produced or processed in Indonesia.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

What forms part of the positive record of SSOD III is the unanimous desire to conclude the Convention on the prohibition of all chemical weapons as soon as possible. In this context, the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, in her speech on 7 July 1988, warned of serious dangers which would arise from further delays. We fully share this concern. A situation where chemical weapons are further produced and modernized or their production is prepared, where chemical weapons are employed and the acute danger of their proliferation is growing, such a situation considerably increases the security risk. This should not be acceptable to any State.

Further work has to be accomplished this year concerning different parts of the text, e.g. with regard to the order of destruction of chemical weapons, the conduct of challenge inspections, assistance, economic and technological development and final clauses. We consider clarification of the problems pertaining to the non-production of chemical weapons to be one of the priority tasks. It directly concerns most States. With this in mind, we deem it urgent to advance and complete the work on article VI and the annex thereto.

In so doing, it will be possible to make clear the content of obligations to be undertaken, to arouse the interest of all States and to lay foundations for universal accession to the Convention.

At this juncture, I should like to recall the proposal made by the German Democratic Republic and Poland to the effect that the forthcoming regular session of the United Nations General Assembly should be used for the purpose of information and dialogue with countries outside the Geneva Conference.

An encouraging development, in our view, is the growing amount of information relevant to the future CW Convention which has been provided by various delegations. This, undoubtedly, enhances confidence and directly serves the negotiating process. Just like many other members of the Conference on Disarmament, the German Democratic Republic has already announced in a statement that it does not possess any chemical weapons. The Soviet Union gave details about the amount of its chemical-weapon stocks. We are convinced that during the summer session further States will participate in the endeavours to build confidence.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In view of this, we believe that a sustained multilateral data exchange in the field of non-production of chemical weapons, and also trial inspections, could be conducive to gathering experience and making the verification régimes practicable.

We hold that it is indispensable to considerably increase the intensity of negotiations, and will support the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, in his activities.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Delegations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries issued a memorandum in which our principal positions were introduced. However, during negotiations we were trying to help to achieve a common understanding on all problems, and for the sake of consensus we were extremely flexible. The lack of consensus is definitely not a tragedy - let us not cry over spilt milk - but rather it is the reflection of the situation which, in spite of recent progress in some areas, is still far from satisfactory in results, thinking and approaches to our common goal - disarmament. In that connection I would like to quote the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Yasushi Akashi, who said at the national convention of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and I fully subscribe to this:

"It would be a great pity if short-term calculations of national security interest were to prevail over long-term interests in such vital areas with global dimensions as nuclear non-proliferation, the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, strengthening of the Secretary-General's hand in investigating the use of chemical weapons and preventing the arms race in outer space and constraining it in maritime areas."

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(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

One of the priority tasks of the Conference on Disarmament is to move resolutely forward to arrive at an agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In this connection my delegation noted with satisfaction the proposal put forward by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at the third special session, and repeated last week in the Conference on Disarmament by the distinguished representative of that country, for the convening of a special United Nations conference to approve the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction. To a large extent this approach coincides with the one set out by my delegation on 6 August last year, and is calculated to consolidate the efforts that have been made in this forum over many years.

The doctrine of arms control cannot go on producing advantages for the super-Powers or the major military blocs. The convention being negotiated

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(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons must be symmetrical, non-discriminatory and compensatory. The renunciation of chemical weapons by States that do not have them or possess them cannot be a blank cheque if the States that do possess them reserve certain rights for themselves which later on can legitimize their present situation. Hence the need for all States in the international community to participate on a basis of solidarity in order to guarantee the full implementation of a genuine disarmament agreement.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

At the close of the spring part of the CD session, I devoted two plenary statements to the status of the chemical weapons negotiations. On 14 April, I commented on what had been achieved so far during the 1988 session. My statement on 19 April looked ahead to the summer part of this year's session. Today I would like to return to the important subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons. A lot has happened since I last addressed the Conference on this subject.

On several occasions during the last few months, a ban on chemical weapons has been addressed at a high level bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union. As I have already noted, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have held important and wide-ranging discussions of arms control issues, including the prohibition of chemical weapons. Furthermore, several meetings have been held at the ministerial level.

At the Moscow Summit President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. They noted the progress already achieved in the talks, as well as the difficult problems remaining with regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemicals for chemical weapons purposes. Furthermore, the leaders underlined problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants.

Both sides also agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all States as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close co-ordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable States in the convention.

I believe this is the prevailing view in the international community as well. On the multilateral level, a text expressing the continuing urgency of prohibition of chemical weapons achieved broad support during SSOD-III, including the support of the United States delegation.

All these positions are reflected in the instructions to our delegation. If this commitment is reflected in the instructions to other delegations as well, then I believe that the prospects for further progress are good.

Let me now turn to the substance of the negotiations. Today I intend to address three key issues referred to in the United States-Soviet joint statement: the vital importance of greater openness; the difficult problem of effective monitoring of the chemical industry; and ensuring participation in the convention of all CW-possessing and CW-capable States.

Increasingly, participants in the negotiations have recognized the vital importance of greater openness by all States about their chemical weapons capabilities and their chemical industries. The United States delegation itself has made major contributions in this regard. For example, in CD/711, presented in July 1986, the United States provided detailed information on its chemical weapons stockpile, including storage locations. Furthermore, in document CD/830, tabled last April, we presented further detailed information on the chemical weapons themselves.

Today the United States delegation is taking another major step toward greater openness. We are declaring the location of each of our chemical weapons production facilities. A map showing the locations is contained in the working paper being introduced today, which is entitled "Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities". It is our hope that this paper will contribute both to greater confidence and to the negotiation of related provisions of the convention.

The declaration we are making today is unprecedented. No other member of the Conference has provided information on its chemical weapons production facilities. We urge other countries that possess chemical weapons production facilities to declare the locations of their facilities and to outline how the facilities would be destroyed.

In recent months the Conference has made significant progress in resolving long-standing issues related to chemical weapons production facilities. An agreed definition is within reach. It has been agreed that all such facilities must be destroyed. Corresponding changes are already being made in the draft text of the future convention.

While there is agreement that chemical weapons production facilities must be destroyed, little information is available to the Conference on how this would be done. This issue has already arisen in Working Group B this summer.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

To assist the negotiations, our working paper describes in general terms how the United States would go about the task of destroying its production facilities.

Openness, of course, has not been a monopoly of a few delegations. We are encouraged that the concept of multilateral data exchange has taken firm hold over the last year or two. Many delegations have provided relevant information in plenary statements or working papers. Undoubtedly, additional information will be forthcoming in the remaining weeks of this session.

Our records show that approximately a dozen members of the Conference have not yet indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. We urge them to do so this summer.

Before leaving the subject of openness, I would like to sound a quiet note of caution. Information presented to the Conference can only facilitate the negotiations if it is accurate. On the other hand, inaccurate declarations will decrease confidence and complicate efforts to ban chemical weapons. Unfortunately, we believe statements regarding non-possession of chemical weapons have already been made that are likely to have such an effect. Serious as the effects might be even now, the result of inaccurate declarations after entry into force might well be a series of challenge inspections, with the attendant political consequences. Truthful declarations are essential to the entire process of banning chemical weapons.

The Conference has been wrestling with the difficult problem of effective monitoring of the chemical industry for some time. The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the end of April, document CD/831, clearly shows that substantial progress has been made. The report, however, also makes clear that complicated and thorny issues remain. Resolving these issues will require not only creative approaches, but also a thorough understanding of conditions in the civil chemical industry.

Our delegation believes that representatives of the chemical industry can make an important contribution to the negotiations. This conviction has grown out of the close and long-standing contacts between our negotiators and policy-makers on the one hand, and representatives of the American chemical industry on the other. We have found that industry shares our objective of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. Permit me to cite a recent official statement made by Mr. Robert Roland, President of the American Chemical Manufacturers Association. This industry organization, which is called CMA for short, represents companies comprising more than 95 per cent of the United States chemical production capacity.

In his statement on 28 April 1988, Mr. Roland called for a "strong, effective international treaty" to ban chemical weapons. He said American, Canadian, Japanese and European chemical industry representatives have been working for several months on a set of recommendations that the CMA believes can facilitate agreement on a chemical weapons ban. When the recommendations are agreed to, Mr. Roland said, "they will be sent to our negotiators along with our industries' pledge to do whatever we can to make such a treaty effective".

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I also want to point out that the CMA's Board of Directors recently declared its strong support for a chemical weapons treaty and urged that the chemical industries of all nations work toward consensus on the technical issues.

Our conviction that industry is eager to facilitate the negotiations was reinforced by the informal discussions with industry representatives that were held last week here in Geneva. We are encouraged by the serious and constructive exchanges between negotiators and experts from industry. These exchanges made clear the need to devote greater attention to provisions for protection of confidential business information. They also highlighted the need to specify clearly what types of information should be considered confidential. We express our thanks to the industry representatives who came to Geneva and to those who organized these discussions. Their technical expertise and practical experience are of great value in resolving the many commonly recognized issues taken up in the discussions.

Another positive development is the proposal for a multilateral effort to develop and test procedures for conducting inspections of chemical industry facilities. Initially, my delegation reserved its position on that proposal until it was more fully developed. In light of refinements provided by the Soviet delegation, the United States endorses the concept of such a multilateral experiment and is willing to participate.

For the experiment to be successful, broad participation by States possessing commercial facilities that would be subject to routine inspection under the convention is essential. Participation by others is also highly desirable, in our view, it is important for participants in the negotiations to declare not only whether or not they have chemical weapons, but also to declare soon whether or not they have civil chemical facilities that would be inspected. The United States, of course, does have such facilities.

We agree with the suggestion, made on 26 April, that the experiment should proceed in a multi-step fashion. Before procedures can be developed and tested internationally, individual States need to conduct their own national experiments and provide the results to the CD. The United States Government is already working with the Chemical Manufacturers Association to develop and test inspection procedures. We urge the Soviet Union and others to indicate what actions they are taking.

Much discussion and planning must take place in the CD to make the experiment a reality. The concept is a good one, but it needs to be fleshed out. Many questions remain to be answered about how to proceed. For example, how can sensitive commercial information be protected under circumstances where legally binding rules of confidentiality may be lacking? We look to the Soviet delegation to take the lead in developing answers.

Finally, I want to stress the need for a truly global prohibition of chemical weapons. Much attention has been devoted to security in Europe. But events of the past few years make clear that the greatest risk of the use of chemical weapons lies outside Europe - as demonstrated in the Middle East. We share the view, expressed by the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, at the plenary on 26 April, that the convention should be

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

universal in character. A convention that does not deal effectively with the dreadful reality that chemical weapons capabilities are very widespread cannot be considered successful.

Our objective is a very challenging one - to secure the participation in the convention of all CW-possessing and CW-capable States. Pessimists argue that this is impossible and that therefore States should set their aspirations much lower. We cannot agree. Rather, we support the constructive and creative proposal by the Egyptian delegation that ways be found to consult key States that are not now participating in the negotiations. Similar ideas have been expressed by Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic. We share the view that consultations would help to promote the desired universality. We pledge our co-operation with the delegation of Egypt and other concerned States to bring this proposal to fruition.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Reasoning in these terms the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty agreed on their priorities. They also assessed SSOD-III, and in this context declared themselves in favour of a greater role for the United Nations and more effective mechanisms and processes in disarmament negotiations. These co-ordinated views will serve as guidelines for delegations of member States, including those to the Conference on Disarmament.

Four priority tasks were agreed upon:

- Conclusion of a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles of such weapons;

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The completion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons continues to be one of the most important tasks of our Conference. Unfortunately, the present pace of negotiations in this domain is far from being commensurate with the urgency and imperativeness of the objectives to be attained. A great amount of work remains to be done if we are to find the key to the still unresolved, mainly technical questions. One might add that among them there are some problems which have certain political implications. In short, I wish to emphasize that we have a great deal of work to cope with as expeditiously as possible so as to achieve substantial progress before the current session of the Conference winds up.

The members of the Conference are aware of the fact that my delegation has in the past offered concrete proposals and ideas on the order of destruction of chemical weapons, and perhaps they may recall that at the end of the spring session I dwelt on them at some length. This time I would simply like to put forward the idea of considering the order of destruction of chemical weapons in possible interrelationship with the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities.

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Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

In connection with the statement made today by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, I should like to state the following. We will, of course, carefully study this interesting statement. However, I should like at this stage to welcome the United States agreement to participate in the experiment we propose on testing procedures to verify the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We consider that practical steps are now required to organize this multilateral undertaking. I can inform you that the Soviet delegation will take appropriate steps in this regard, and in particular will conduct consultations with the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland.

The PRESIDENT:

... This month has also seen the coming together of experts from the chemical industry from all over the world, to discuss, appreciate better and contribute to our efforts in the field of verification of non-production. We are all aware of the complexities of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention. These complexities do not exist merely at the stage of negotiations, but will also be present at the stage of implementation. The importance of co-operation from industry for the effective implementation of a CW convention, therefore, cannot be over-emphasized.

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(Mr. Fortune)

The special session has come and gone, and the world of disarmament remains largely unaffected. The recent substantial progress in the bilaterals was noted and warmly endorsed. Like others, we hope it will continue on its present constructive course. But in the multilateral area, nothing has changed. Work continues, to positive end, in negotiations banning chemical weapons. But for the critical nuclear issues, progress remains impeded by two cross-fissures in the international terrain. First, progress in promoting global stability at lower levels of nuclear weaponry remains inhibited by conflicting judgements between the two major Powers over what should constitute the basis of strategic stability in the future. Secondly, in the area of horizontal non-proliferation, progress is stalled by continuing differences of perception over the merits, and role, of the NPT. In the area of disarmament machinery, nothing has changed. The judgement has been made that, notwithstanding the lack of progress recorded over the past decade in multilateral disarmament, the machine is well designed and constructed, and running smoothly enough. New Zealand does not share that view. It is a view which must come as a surprise to an international public concerned with the continuing threat posed to its own survival by nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Fortune)

In the chemical weapons committee work continues toward the conclusion of a global and comprehensive convention banning all chemical weapons. New Zealand recognizes the technical difficulties that lie in the path of a successful convention. We do not believe, however, that the conclusion of a convention before long is beyond our reach. Complex technical obstacles can be overcome with impressive rapidity, as the successful INF negotiations demonstrated. That achievement should serve as an inspiration for the negotiations before us. With due regard to the complexities of multilateral negotiations, the same applies in the area of chemical weapons. In the meantime, and in order to expedite the conclusion of the convention, further measures of transparency will be important. In this regard, as the most recent such measure, we especially welcome the initiative taken last week by the Government of the United States in making a declaration relating to its chemical weapon production facilities.

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(Mr. Fortune)

These are, in my Government's view, the most important issues before the CD at present - nuclear testing, chemical weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. At present, progress is discernible in only one of them. In two others, progress could be expedited towards the common goal if the constructive approach displayed in the bilateral negotiations can only be brought to bear on the multilateral machinery. The same spirit, if transferred from the bilaterals to the multilaterals, would get an NTB committee going. This transference of spirit, of course, was the aspiration of the third special session. It is an aspiration left unfulfilled. But it is not beyond the imagination and capability of the Conference to fulfil it.

Mr. CESKA (Austria):

... In thanking you for having given me the floor I wish to concentrate my intervention on aspects of a possible ban on chemical weapons. This matter having been on the agenda of the CD and the CCD for almost 20 years, the history of negotiations on chemical weapons here in Geneva is a long one, with its ups and downs, with long periods when nobody really believed that an agreement was possible, given the complexity of the matter. And yet those who continued patiently to seek solutions and did not give up before the enormity of the task were right. Today there is a general belief that a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has real chances of coming into being, even though the optimistic assessments made towards the end of 1987, holding that an agreement in the course of 1988 was not impossible, have to be revised.

Among the factors which give us hope that negotiations will culminate in agreement in the not too distant future, I wish to point out the following. Since the beginning of negotiations on a chemical weapon ban, everybody has been aware of the enormous difficulties involved in adequately verifying such an agreement. Now we have reached the stage of thorough examination and negotiation at a very technical level and agreement-oriented work partly in close co-operation with the civil chemical industries in our countries. It is a relatively new phenomenon that hopefully marks the beginning of the final run. At the same time we should not forget that a multilateral convention of similar significance, where effective monitoring posed enormous technical problems, was realized here in Geneva in 1972 - the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. The prospects of biological warfare are as frightening as the use of chemical substances, with their ability to destroy or cripple lives on a massive scale and at low cost. And the fact that biological substances, such as toxins, have effectively been banned, has encouraged those who for decades have tried to achieve a ban on chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

Though there is no need for me to tell this forum of the enormous political and technological difficulties which still have to be surmounted before a comprehensive ban can be achieved, may I nevertheless raise a few points? Politically, answers will have to be found for a number of basic questions. Will all countries which possess chemical weapons admit this fact? Will all countries with the capacity to produce chemical weapons renounce that capacity? Will all the countries which have chemical weapons be ready to destroy their stocks under adequate international verification and renounce future production or acquisition? In other words, will all the countries whose participation is essential for the success and effectiveness of such a ban be ready to accede to the convention banning chemical weapons? In this context we welcome the comprehensive information submitted by Ambassador Friedersdorf in his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 28 July 1988 on the United States chemical weapon production facilities.

The technological difficulties are, of course, related to adequate verification. The planned concepts of verification, including challenge inspection, will hopefully prove adequate to ensure compliance with the convention. To meet this goal, we have, inter alia, to take into account the production of civil industries and the phenomenon of binary weapons. Although we are looking for the strictest monitoring possible, we have to admit that 100 per cent verification is not feasible. As a consequence challenge inspection should be conceived in such a way as to provide a sufficiently high risk for potential violators of the treaty to effectively deter them from doing so.

Of course, many problems remain to be solved. Inter alia, financial arrangements concerning the verification régime will have to be worked out. Given the scope of the task, the question of financing verification procedures will not be a negligible one, and fair solutions will have to be found.

An important prerequisite for a meaningful agreement is the readiness of the chemical industries in all countries to fully co-operate. In this context, my country attaches great importance to the chemical experts meeting we witnessed last week. An Austrian expert took part in its work. As in other countries, it was not not easy at the beginning to persuade the Austrian chemical industry to co-operate. The industry's major concerns relate to confidential information on production techniques and on clients, and should be taken duly into account. With the help of a process of information and explanation, chemical industry representatives have become prepared to make their own contribution to the future convention.

I take this opportunity to add that Austria has decided to establish, and is at present examining the legislative requirements for establishing, transfer and export controls on eight highly toxic chemical substances, five of which belong to the category of "key precursors", so that the necessary regulations can come into force as soon as possible. I further wish to confirm what the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Mr. Mock, indicated at the Conference on Disarmament on 14 April 1988, namely, that on the basis of the "matrix version" submitted under CD/CW/WP.193, comprehensive country-wide research on data concerning production facilities and chemicals listed in schedules 2 and 3 of the annex to article VI of the convention is under way.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

After the horrifying experiences in Europe during the First World War, when poison gas was used on a large scale and caused death and invalidity to thousands of soldiers, chemical weapons have not been used on such a scale for nearly 60 years. The horror of this experience led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This Protocol, though incomplete, since it did not forbid the production or stockpiling of such substances and did not set out any verification procedures, was respected even during the most devastating moments of the Second World War.

Recently, however, chemical weapons have been massively used in the Gulf War. The world has become the horrified witness of those events with the help of modern mass media. Public opinion throughout the world has become more aware of the fact that the use of deadly chemical substances in armed conflicts is, towards the end of the twentieth century, not just a bad dream but a dreadful reality. The repeated use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War is indeed a fact, and I see a certain danger that mankind will get used to the idea of chemical arms being considered as standard weapons and chemical warfare becoming routine. It is therefore imperative to alert the international community in order to avoid a general state of mind which might finally tolerate the routine commission of such violations of international law. If, through a convention banning chemical weapons, we succeed in removing such weapons from the arsenals of all countries, we will not only do away with the threat of their use during a military conflict. It will also mean that such categories of weapons cannot be used as an instrument of political pressure outside a military confrontation.

Chemical warfare, for many years more an item in the history of warfare than a means of combat in actual use, has come back during the last few years as a cruel reality, victimizing both soldiers and the civilian population - old people, women, children, innocents, blind fate striking out against the unaware in a truly inhumane disruption of everyday life. In this regard, having read the two reports issued by the Security Council (S/20060 of 10 July 1988 and S/20063 of 25 July 1988), we cannot but be shocked by the now confirmed use of chemical weapons in the recent past in the Iran/Iraq conflict. We have had occasion in Austria to treat victims of this type of warfare. We have tried to find new means of medical care to treat and rehabilitate victims and develop new protective and first aid material. We consider that this is one specific way in which a permanently neutral country can contribute to stemming the tide of suffering brought about by chemical weapons. But this is not enough.

Austria feels deeply committed to full co-operation in the fight against chemical weapons being waged by the international community, and particularly the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as the trustee of the international community as a whole. Austria does not possess or produce chemical weapons, and has no facilities to produce such weapons. The Austrian Government intends to take the necessary steps to be among the first group of States to sign the convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We sincerely hope that, in spite of many questions still to be solved, such a convention will soon be finalized.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

At present we are facing favourable political parameters we have not witnessed for a very long time. East-West relations in general, and relations between the two major Powers in particular, reflect a will to come to mutually beneficial understandings. Regional conflicts which for many years have put a heavy strain on international relations seem to be on their way to solution. Developments in Afghanistan, in the Gulf War, around Kampuchea and Angola give rise to hope for a future of lessened international tension. These favourable conditions should make it possible to create the political will needed to ban the spectre of chemical warfare. Let this "window of opportunity" not pass by!

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Mr. MARCHAND (Canada):

Last week I offered some observations on the results of SSOD-III and the implications Canada saw for our future work on outer space. This week, I should like to comment briefly on our current negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons, and specifically on the issues we are addressing during this summer session. In focusing on some of the issues that raise particular concerns for Canada, my observations will by no means be exhaustive or categorical.

There is a gratifying degree of consensus, noticeable at SSOD-III, on the importance and urgency of realizing the proposed convention on CW. We should build upon this during the remainder of the 1988 session. Already, even though we are only some four weeks into the summer session, we are pleased to note the serious, business-like approach that negotiators are taking in their examination of the outstanding issues. As I said last spring, my Government favours such a measured pace, without artificial deadlines. But the Canadian Government also recognizes that there are compelling reasons for pressing ahead as hard as we can in our negotiations. Not only is our goal more

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

clearly in sight, but the recent repeated use of chemical weapons raises the increasing danger of chemical weapons appearing to be effective as weapons of war. My Government therefore shares the sense of urgency to suppress or choke off their temptation. My Government is convinced that this is one genie that we can and must put back into the bottle - and quickly.

In offering some observations on the issues currently being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee and its working groups, I should emphasize again that, overall, we are pleased with the workmanlike, unpolemical approach delegations are pursuing. We see several encouraging developments. We also see some that perhaps are not so encouraging. We welcome the promising signs of progress on substantial, even critical, issues in articles VIII and IX and in the final articles. We are hopeful for similar signs in our discussions on articles X and XI, although I am obliged to note that some proposals put forward this week on article X seem to be regressive rather than progressive, in terms of the consensus that appeared to be emerging during our spring discussions.

We are rather more concerned about the article VI discussions, however, where the exchange of views seems rather circular. I refer specially to the recently concluded examination of schedule [1] and schedule [4], where there are few signs of real progress since last January's discussions. We ought to remind ourselves that the issues being discussed under these sections constitute one of the most critical areas remaining to be confronted. We believe a number of our problems here may be traced back to our lack of clearly understood definitions, especially what constitutes a chemical weapon. If this situation continues, and if our discussions in Working Group B do not significantly advance our common understanding of the definitions, perhaps we should consider earmarking article II as the priority issue for more detailed discussions during next winter's inter-sessionals.

Concerning Group B's discussions on article V, I had hoped to comment favourably on its progress in reviewing the proposals of the United States and USSR on chemical weapons production facilities. Like many other delegations, however, my delegation was concerned to learn last week that Mr. Macedo's efforts to introduce elements of these proposals into the text of article V have run into difficulties. We strongly support Mr. Macedo's call for the early resolution of these - hopefully minor - problems, so that we can proceed with the appropriate amendment of the text of article V.

Concerning the rest of Group B's current agenda, I should like to address a specific comment to article IV and the general question of the order of destruction. In developing an agreed régime for the phased destruction of chemical weapons, my Government agrees that one of the primary concerns is to ensure that this process does not cause any diminution of the national security of any State party during the very sensitive 10-year destruction phase. I must again state, however, that my Government cannot support proposals intended to address these legitimate concerns about security that have the net effect of permitting the production and proliferation of chemical weapons during this crucial phase. Given the central purpose of the convention - the complete elimination of chemical weapons for all time - it seems fundamentally illogical to have the convention sanction any production of CW after it has come into effect.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Turning to article VIII, we are impressed with the solid progress achieved by Working Group C under Mr. Numata's able chairmanship. We look forward to that Group realizing substantial further progress on the remaining substantive political issues, particularly on the question of the composition, procedure and decision-making of the Executive Council. I should like to note here that my Government is continuing to focus a major part of its own research efforts in the area of the international inspectorate - and the somewhat related area of the national authority (article VII) - and hopes to submit the results of our research for the Committee's consideration early in next year's session. (In this respect, I might also note for the record that we are distributing the latest addenda to our compendium of chemical weapons documentation.)

Similarly, we have been gratified to note the productive discussions in Group C on challenge inspections (article IX). Like others, we endorse Mr. Numata's view that the differences may be more apparent than real, and we think the open-ended discussions Mr. Numata has been conducting demonstrate the validity of this view. We recognize that a primary purpose of challenge inspection is to resolve the concerns of the requesting State. But we also endorse the argument that such events are of equal concern for the convention as a whole and, thus, for all States party. Our thinking, in this regard, reflects Canada's long-standing belief in and commitment to genuine multilateralism, and our firm view that the convention being negotiated here, if it is to retain its authority and legitimacy for all States party, must be an effective multilateral treaty.

Our delegation has been following with great interest the discussions on the final articles of the convention, and we very much appreciate Ambassador Sujka's skilful tacking through the shoals of these relatively uncharted waters. My Government has considered carefully arguments recently put forward in the exchange of views on article XII concerning the convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We were particularly struck by the arguments of Ambassador von Stülpnagel and the Belgian representative. On reflection, my authorities are of the view that, from a strict, legal point of view, article XII may not in fact be necessary. In the light of the clear prohibitions found in article I (especially paragraphs 1 and 3), and of the provisions of article 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it may be that article XII is redundant and could be eliminated.

More generally, I should like to comment on another legal issue that is relevant to a number of provisions in the convention - the question of the use of the terms "jurisdiction and control". Canada has particular difficulties with one aspect of these commonly used, but not commonly understood, terms: and that concerns the question of the responsibilities of States party for the activities outside their territory of foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of private corporations incorporated under their own laws.

For reasons that I will not detail here, it has been a long-standing policy of Canadian Governments not to accept that one State can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over enterprises incorporated under the laws of another State, even if they are subsidiaries owned or controlled by its nationals. It is our Government's firm view that the State under whose laws

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

the subsidiary is incorporated has exclusive jurisdiction for activities of this separate legal entity within its own territory. This fundamental policy underlies our Government's approach to a wide range of issues arising in the international arena. While we can well understand the concerns of those who advocate extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction under the chemical weapons convention, I must put on record that my Government has not yet heard any compelling arguments that would cause it to alter its fundamental policy on this matter to achieve the purposes of this convention. Moreover, we believe that the purposes of this convention can be achieved without resort to provisions encompassing extraterritorial reach. We are not convinced of the need for any references to jurisdictional issues in the convention.

Ambassador Friedersdorf, in a recent intervention, discussed two other issues, on which I should like to comment briefly. The first concerns the Soviet proposal for a multilateral trial exercise to develop and test procedures for inspections of chemical industry facilities. One major consideration for Canada is that preliminary surveys of our industry indicate that, depending upon the thresholds eventually to be agreed, Canada may not possess commercial facilities that would be subject to routine inspection under the convention. Notwithstanding this possibility, however, we consider that the Soviet proposal merits our support in principle and our close consideration. The results of any such multilateral exercise, providing that it can be properly structured and organized, would be extremely relevant for our further work on article VIII and the organization of the international inspectorate.

The second issue concerns the protection of confidential commercial information. This issue figured large in our consultations with industrial representatives two weeks ago, and is a subject of particular concern to our delegation as well as several others around this table. Clearly, for us negotiators, the primary consideration is to ensure that the information necessary for the effective implementation of the convention is provided by industry. But we must also be prepared to take due account of industry's legitimate concern that commercially sensitive data is adequately protected. Ambassador Friedersdorf emphasized inter alia the need for industry to specify what types of information are truly confidential. I agree that this is an essential requirement. But I would also argue that a priority focus for us here is to examine more closely actual ways in which such information can be protected, perhaps - as others have suggested - by drawing upon precedents available from other international organizations and from our own national procedures. My authorities have been considering approaches to this issue of protecting confidentiality and hope to present our further views in future discussions.

I think it is evident from the number of issues I have raised that our negotiations are addressing substantial concerns in a serious manner. I find this encouraging, and I believe that, if we can maintain the momentum and continue to search for practical solutions to our problems, the 1988 session may well prove to be one of our most productive yet.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The prohibition of chemical weapons is another important issue which I intend to discuss in more detail on some further occasions. My delegation regrets the fact that for a number of years now the Conference on Disarmament has not been making much progress in its substantive work on several items. It seems that the Conference is slowly moving away from discharging its responsibilities as a negotiating body. We feel that this tendency should be halted. The delegation of Bulgaria believes that it is time for the CD to undertake concrete action on all priority items on its agenda, and is determined to make its contribution towards this end.

CD/PV.472

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(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is continuing its work in a seemingly normal manner; but we have the impression that it has slowed down, or, at all events, that the chemical-weapon States which are represented at the Conference so far lack sufficient political will to overcome the differences which still exist in certain crucial areas. As a contribution to confidence-building, and in full accordance with the openness in the area of military activities advocated by Peru, I am pleased to state today before this

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(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

forum that my country does not possess or produce chemical weapons. Consequently, when we say that the future convention must include compensatory machinery, we mean that it must contain clauses for use in the event that it becomes invalid. That is to say that its provisions should in no way give States parties possessing chemical weapons grounds for increasing their arsenals during the destruction period, which is scheduled to cover 10 years. Moreover, they should not develop, produce or test new types of chemical weapons. And if, after the 10-year period, one or more States parties still have chemical weapons in their arsenals, then the Convention will become invalid because it will have lost its *raison d'être*, so that the obligations entered into by all States will lapse.

Last week the distinguished Ambassador of Canada set out his country's position on jurisdiction and control. In this regard my delegation views these comments as very appropriate. In connection with a subsidiary operating on territory belonging to a State party or under its administration or international responsibility, it is obviously for that State to apply its legislation in force. However, this can be supplemented by establishing two channels of co-operation in order to block indirect ways of getting round the convention. We are specifically referring to bilateral co-operation between the State party and the State in which the main company has its headquarters, whether the latter is party to the convention or not, and to multilateral co-operation through the future international organization if the bilateral channel proves impractical or inadequate. What is important is that there should be no excuse for a State party hosting in any way a company involved in the chemical industry to be exempted from its obligations in respect of that company.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Verification is the expression of mutual trust and is called upon to generate greater trust. Verification is not a police type of activity; its main function is deterrence. It does not point to the future intentions of States, it confines itself to detecting non-compliance by commission and by omission. This aside is valid in respect of item 5 of our agenda. Verification in outer space may be carried out using national means of verification and through multilateral action. The 1967 Treaty was essentially based on the former. It is obvious that, if this international instrument is to be amended, priority will have to be given to multilateral verification. From this standpoint the amendments to the 1967 Treaty, in addition to improving the existing verification machinery, should include express provisions relating to review conferences so that States parties are in a position to carry out endogenous reforms to adapt the verification machinery to the imperatives of science and technology. The important experience acquired in 1986 on the occasion of the Second Review Conference of the parties to the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Treaty is a highly stimulating and very instructive example of what can be done when States parties have the necessary political will.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

Another item in the Conference on Disarmament's agenda upon which significant convergences emerged during the third special session on disarmament is that of a global ban on chemical weapons. Already last spring's session of the Conference on Disarmament seems to us to have made further advancement in analysing important matters yet unsolved, thus showing that we now have a concrete opportunity to eliminate once and for all the serious threat to peace and the well-being of mankind represented by this category of particularly hideous armaments.

Recent dramatic regional events indicate the extent of the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons. They further prove that such weapons not only constitute a potential threat, but are easily used with devastating effects on civilian populations as well. We therefore believe that the ongoing efforts must be intensified so as to impart greater momentum to the negotiating process. Only the conclusion of our effort in the shortest possible time required for the co-operative solution of the major negotiating difficulties can offer an adequate response to the preoccupations of so many governments and the anxious questions of the public.

It remains to define some aspects of the ban, mainly those requiring further political and legal work. I would mention, in the first instance, the order of destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the various issues involved in the aspects of jurisdiction and control of the future ban. Other aspects, such as verification of the destruction of arsenals and control of permitted industrial activities subject to the prohibition régime, are widely accepted as to their basic principles. However, a number of technical implications are also involved which still require adequate in-depth consideration and final definition.

In our view, this area allows of innovative and pragmatic solutions as well. Agreement on them will depend in large part upon the concrete and exhaustive nature of the premises on which they are founded. In particular, I refer to the need for a timely and adequate assessment of the impact which technological developments may have on those chemical compounds that are on

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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

the borderline between toxic chemicals and chemicals whose purpose is not prohibited; the proper definition of the characteristics of production facilities which can operate on the margin between legal production and activities banned under the convention; identification of the procedures, techniques and equipment (especially the most innovative ones) which can be used for verification and monitoring of industrial production; and modalities for the protection of industrial patents and any confidential information related to production when a plant is subject to inspection or controls.

The detailed identification of the numerous technical questions inherent in these problems can benefit from wider co-operation in their analysis amongst scientists and experts from all countries concerned. The need to extend such co-operation was recognized by the scientists gathered in a forum held in Rome last May by Centro Ettore Majorana, a well-known Italian scientific association devoted to the promotion of international academic relations.

Because of its short duration, this meeting did not aim at providing exclusive solutions to the numerous problems mentioned above. Its objective was that of singling out some methodological guidelines capable of improving the effectiveness of international co-operation on a number of crucial aspects inherent in the ban of chemical weapons. A report on this work is being published, and we intend to submit it in due course to the Conference. In the meantime, it might be useful to provide some indications of the conclusions reached by the international scientists who participated in the forum. They pointed to the priority need to accelerate the definition of verification and control procedures; the urgency of initiating wider co-operation amongst scientists and experts from all countries concerned with a view to solving the problems cited; within such a framework, the usefulness of concentrating research on the possible standardization of analytical methods, instruments and verification procedures; the advisability of envisaging measures for control of the future research and development of toxic chemical agents to prevent the development of new chemical weapons, as well as to study the formulation of an open list of chemical agents which may potentially pose risks to the stability and effectiveness of the ban being negotiated; and lastly, the usefulness of the contribution which may be rendered by systematically resorting to an experimental method for assessing the procedures under article VI of the present draft convention (in particular as regards the crucial list of key precursors) with the assistance of international experts.

We think that - in view of the authority and independence of the sources from which they derive, which also represent a wide spectrum of opinions - these indications merit close attention and deserve to be considered from a practical and concrete viewpoint. Italy is therefore investigating a possible national contribution in that direction. We invite the member States of the Conference to draw from the above indications an encouragement to continue with increased determination along the path towards the solution of the technical difficulties still preventing us from finalizing the draft treaty for a global ban on chemical weapons. This will really be possible if we agree to be guided by a genuinely co-operative spirit.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved the approach of the Soviet leadership to the problem of eliminating the danger of war through frank, constructive dialogue and disarmament, which opened the way to the conclusion of the INF Treaty and a shift to the practical plane in the negotiations on nuclear, chemical and conventional arms.

Turning to issues related to the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to start with the situation at the negotiations on a chemical weapon ban. During the recession preceding the resumption of the negotiations, important events took place - most importantly, the Soviet-American summit meeting and the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. The issues involved in banning chemical weapons occupied a prominent place at both the meeting of the top leaders of the USSR and the United States and the special session. The joint statement on the Soviet-American meeting in Moscow underlined the continuing urgency of concluding an effective convention on a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons encompassing all chemical-weapons-capable States.

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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

There is no doubt that the participants in the Conference take into account the considerable interest shown towards the negotiations on chemical weapons at the third special session. There was hardly a delegation there that did not address the issue of their prohibition. Thus the negotiations have resumed in very favourable political conditions. What is important now is to achieve results, to translate these conditions into the language of specific agreements on the issues which still remain unresolved. Among such unresolved issues I would mention first of all the problem of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. It is complicated if only because it is necessary to establish a régime that would be effective from the point of view of non-production of chemical weapons and at the same time would not impede the normal development of chemistry for peaceful purposes. One of the aspects of this problem is ensuring the confidentiality of the information on facilities which is to be submitted to the technical secretariat. We share the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Marchand, that it is necessary to consider studying practical ways of protecting such information, naturally without prejudice to the effective implementation of the future convention. A positive contribution to the consideration of this issue was made by the meeting of chemical industry representatives which was held in July.

It is also extremely important that in solving the problem of non-production we have to deal with different forms of ownership, private and public. In other words, differences in the social systems of States are of direct relevance in this issue. Obviously, this element is bound up first and foremost with the complex nature of the search for a mutually acceptable solution regarding schedule [1] chemicals. As you know, we have proposed that all the permitted production of such chemicals should be concentrated at a single specialized small-scale facility for each party.

We proceed from the premise that the convention should not only ensure the destruction of today's chemical weapons, but should also prevent the emergence tomorrow of new and more dangerous types of such weapons, which would in addition be still more difficult to verify. The convention should contain guarantees against a re-emergence of this means of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation intends to continue its active participation in the search for a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

A useful role in finalizing an agreement on the régimes for verification of non-production of chemical weapons can be played by the experiment at chemical plants proposed by the Soviet delegation. We note with satisfaction that interest in such an experiment is growing and that preparations for it are entering a practical phase. The order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities remains unsettled. While developing the order of destruction it is important to observe with care the principle that the security of States should be undiminished. We consider that the next step should be the completion of work on incorporating organically in the appropriate parts of the "rolling text" the Soviet-American document on chemical weapon production facilities presented in April this year.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Regrettably, we have not yet advanced on article X, concerning the provision of assistance to States parties to the convention in the area of protection against chemical weapons. This is an important problem associated with the security of parties to the convention, and deserves serious examination. As our position on the content of article X is flexible, we could support the development of provisions on collective measures by States parties to the convention to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, including the establishment within the framework of the convention of multilateral machinery for mutual assistance among States parties in this area. In our opinion one of the ways to solve this problem could be the conclusion of special agreements between States parties and the technical secretariat specifying the forms, types and order of provision of assistance in conformity with decisions of the Executive Council.

The Soviet delegation is also prepared to agree to inclusion in the convention of provisions on co-operation among States parties to the convention in the area of defence against chemical weapons on the basis of voluntary bilateral and multilateral agreements. Furthermore, we believe that the reaching of agreement on banning military attacks against States parties' chemical weapon storages, destruction facilities and other facilities declared in and covered by the convention would contribute to strengthening the security of the States parties to the convention and to the effective operation of the Convention.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the progress made in developing the provisions of the convention concerning the designation of inspectors for challenge inspections, as well as examination of the reports presented by inspection groups carrying out such inspections. We hope that in the very near future this progress will make it possible to move on to consideration of the key problems in article IX which are still preventing its adoption. I have in mind first and foremost the need to include in the convention provisions that would ensure compulsory challenge inspection without the right of refusal at the request of any State party to the convention at any point and at any facility of another party. We also proceed from the understanding that challenge inspection procedures should be totally without prejudice to the principle of compulsory and effective verification.

To our mind it is time to come to grips with the issues connected with the composition of the Executive Council and other aspects of the establishment and activities of the bodies responsible for the implementation of the future convention, including financial issues. In particular, we consider that the idea of a possible division of the future organization's budget into two parts, administrative and operational expenses, is a useful one. The first part would cover expenses on personnel, current administrative activities, the holding of meetings of various bodies and the like. The second would cover practical activities to ensure systematic international verification of compliance with the convention. States' contributions for administrative expenses would be assessed on the basis of the United Nations funding rules and practices. A given State's contribution to cover operational expenses would be approximately equal to the level of expenses required for systematic international verification on the territory of that State party.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Under the direct guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, work on the final clauses of the convention is moving forward. Thus, in our view, we can count on definite progress in the negotiations by the end of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament. And yet the pace of the negotiations cannot be considered as satisfactory. The Soviet delegation believes that it is also important to put the inter-sessional period to maximum use for negotiating purposes. We consider that for this purpose we could use at least four weeks in November and December this year, after the completion of the First Committee's work in New York, and also practically the whole month of January 1989. If the preparations for the inter-sessional work are to be more purposeful, it is necessary to define in advance the issues to be concentrated on in the inter-sessional period.

Progress towards a convention banning chemical weapons at the negotiating table must, we feel, be complemented and supported by co-ordinated efforts on a broader international scale as well. One of the areas where such efforts could be made is that of measures to ensure confidence-building and openness. To promote the solution of this problem, the Soviet delegation introduced on 18 February 1988 a memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the convention now being negotiated. It provoked considerable interest and wide reaction. Interesting counter-proposals have been put forward, in particular by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/828. We would be prepared to agree to modification of the volume and order of the multilateral data exchange we propose, taking into consideration other existing proposals, in particular within the framework of the scheme set out in the proposal I referred to from the Federal Republic of Germany, which provided for declarations of the presence of chemical weapons on national and foreign territories, the aggregate number of all facilities which are proposed to be covered by the future convention in that State, (CW production* facilities, CW storage facilities, plants for production of schedule [1], [2] and [3], chemicals, etc.), and also the names of chemicals produced for CW purposes, types of munitions and chemical warfare agents, the names of schedule [2] and [3] chemicals produced in commercial industry, and plans and methods for CW destruction. However, it seems to us important as a matter of principle that the multilateral data exchange should include the declaration of volumes of CW stocks, which is particularly important both as a confidence-building measure and as a point of departure for negotiating a number of specific provisions of the convention, including those on the order of destruction of stockpiles.

The information provided within the framework of the multilateral data exchange must certainly be exact and truthful. In this respect we are in complete agreement with the point of view expressed by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, in his statement of 28 July 1988. As regards the information recently presented by the United States on its CW production facilities, we are now examining the American document.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Another important area of efforts outside the negotiations could be described as moral and political preparation for the convention's entry into force. We welcome the statement by the distinguished representative of Austria, made at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 4 August 1988, that his Government "intends to take the necessary steps to be among the first group of States to sign the convention". It would be useful if other States also spelled out their position in this regard.

The proliferation of chemical weapons, which has already led to tragic results, has recently prompted greater and greater concern throughout the world. Concern on this subject has been expressed in particular in the statement by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Hayden, which was distributed today. Many representatives at the Conference on Disarmament have expressed alarm and condemnation in connection with the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation agrees with them. We are deeply convinced that the only correct conclusion to be drawn is that it is necessary to speed up by every possible means the conclusion of a convention on a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons as the most reliable guarantee of their non-proliferation and non-use. We call all the participants in the negotiations to this task. We note with satisfaction that the same conclusion was reached today by the distinguished representative of Italy, Mr. Pugliese.

CD/PV.473

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction which are next to nuclear weapons in their lethality. The use of these dreadful weapons has been prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and a convention has been under negotiation for the past two decades. Although much progress has been achieved in the elaboration of the convention in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and its conclusion is now in sight, the confirmed reports of the continued use of chemical weapons in warfare underlines in a most regrettable manner the urgent need for a faster pace of work to ensure the early conclusion of a convention on this item. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will intensify its efforts to conclude outstanding work on the convention at the earliest possible time. The spirit of mutual concession and more mature compromise is required at this stage to overcome the outstanding differences.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany):

On 14 April 1988 I had the honour to introduce on behalf of a group of Western countries a working paper on the provision of data relevant to the convention banning chemical weapons. In presenting the paper I stressed that the multilateral exchange of data prior to the signing of a convention is not only a confidence-building measure but also a necessary prerequisite for drafting an effective convention and ensuring its early functioning. Since the submission of the paper some welcome steps have been taken. I would like to draw attention in this regard to the Netherlands working paper CD/CW/WP.203 of 19 July 1988, which provided detailed information according to the format proposed in CD/828; the declaration of the location of chemical weapons production facilities in the United States by Ambassador Friedersdorf on 28 July 1988; and the detailed presentation by the United Kingdom on the production of schedule [2] and [3] chemicals in CD/CW/WP.206 of 10 August 1988.

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(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

By taking these steps Western States have once again demonstrated their commitment to more openness and transparency - concepts we consider to be essential in all fields of arms control and disarmament.

Today I would like to present the data for the Federal Republic of Germany according to the proposed format in CD/828. These data are contained in a working paper which has just been distributed. I would first like to reiterate a statement my Government has made on a number of occasions in this forum and elsewhere: the Federal Republic of Germany does not possess chemical weapons. Nor are chemicals contained in schedule [1] of article VI being produced in my country.

According to information provided on a voluntary basis by companies in the chemical industry, four compounds on schedule [2] and, with the exception of chlorpicrin, all compounds on schedule [3] are currently being produced, processed or consumed in the Federal Republic of Germany. On the basis of the thresholds for declaration proposed in working paper CD/802 of 5 February 1988, these 15 compounds are produced, processed or consumed in 52 facilities. The data reflect the situation at the beginning of 1988, and are subject to change depending on market conditions and developments in the state of technology.

I hope that in our negotiations we are only at the beginning of a process, at the end of which all States members of the Conference on Disarmament will have submitted data on their chemical industries and their chemical weapon capabilities. The provision of data is not only a necessary contribution to the negotiation and effective implementation of the provisions of a chemical weapons convention. It will also give all participants the reassurance that the negotiations are being carried out in good faith. In this context, we regret that - despite the noticeable increased recognition of the importance of greater openness - a number of members of the Conference on Disarmament have not yet indicated as a first step whether or not they possess chemical weapons. I would therefore like to reiterate my call to all participants to provide as soon as possible data relevant to the chemical weapons convention.

On the occasion of the presentation of CD/828 I expressed my conviction that a multilateral exchange of data would have a positive effect on the course of our negotiations. Reviewing the current state of our negotiations, I cannot conceal my disappointment over what we have been able to achieve so far this summer. Although pleased by the business-like atmosphere prevailing in our negotiations - and here I fully share the view expressed by Ambassador Marchand in his speech on 4 August 1988 - I continue to be concerned about the lack of progress on a number of issues. Let me briefly review the state of affairs during this summer session and our assessment of it.

The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the working groups, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have made strenuous efforts to move the negotiations forward. We are very grateful to them for their commitment, energy and excellent work.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

In Working Group A under the chairmanship of Mr. Cima a number of important issues concerning the non-production of chemical weapons have been addressed. The discussions on some of the long-standing problems have certainly contributed to clarifying the positions. We deplore, however, the fact that the discussions have not yet resulted in the elaboration of solutions which are not only acceptable to all but would meet the criteria for the establishment of an effective verification mechanism. In this regard I am thinking particularly of the deliberations on the régime for schedule [1] and the so-called STLC problem, where regrettably demands continue to be made which ignore the need to arrive at feasible and effective solutions that take account of the basic question of what is realistically verifiable.

In Working Group A we have also had a very interesting discussion on the concept of ad hoc checks, which was originally proposed by us in working paper CD/791. I do not wish to elaborate here on our thinking on this issue. We have done that on a number of occasions in the past weeks. We will reflect on the interesting comments which have been made, and intend to present more specific ideas on a régime for ad hoc checks in the framework of article VI soon.

On 22 July 1988 we had an interesting meeting with industrial experts. I hope that this meeting was only the start of a more intensive dialogue with representatives of the chemical industry. I am convinced that such a dialogue can contribute to better mutual understanding between negotiators here in Geneva and the chemical industry, which will necessarily be subjected to stringent and effective monitoring to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons. I am likewise convinced that it will be very fruitful for our task to elaborate a comprehensive, effective and at the same time manageable article VI. As the discussion on 22 July 1988 clearly showed, more detailed exchanges with representatives of the chemical industry on such issues as the protection of confidential information are needed. I am gratified to say that the chemical industry of the Federal Republic of Germany, with which we have close and long-standing contacts, shares without reservation our priority objective of achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

Let me make a brief comment also on the question of trial inspections in the chemical industry. We welcomed the proposal made to that effect on 18 February of this year by Mr. Petrovsky, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such inspections, carried out on a multilateral basis, will provide us with information and insights which will certainly turn out to be most helpful and possibly indispensable for working out procedures for conducting inspections in facilities of the chemical industry. We are willing to participate in such a multilateral experiment. At the moment the issue is being closely examined by my Government, and preparations for a possible national experiment are under way. We endorse the emerging consensus on a step-by-step approach to the issue. We would welcome the establishment of an informal group which could prepare for multilateral trial inspections. In such a group experience acquired in the course of efforts undertaken nationally could be exchanged, and as a result a standardized approach for the multilateral experiment could be elaborated.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Let me now briefly turn to the work in groups B and C. We had hoped that during the summer session it would be possible, in an effort to finalize article V, to introduce elements of the joint proposal by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on chemical weapon production facilities into the "rolling text". We understand, however, that efforts made to this end have run into difficulties. We strongly support the Chairman of Working Group B, Mr. Macedo, in his intensive endeavours to resolve the difficulties so that the appropriate amendment to the text of article V can be made in the course of this summer session.

With regard to article X, another subject on the agenda of Working Group B, we note with regret that the negotiations have somewhat retrogressed. The discussion paper on this article now contains a number of brackets and footnotes that point to positions which, it seems, are difficult to reconcile. We urge continuation of the work on that article in a spirit of compromise, and also with a sense of perspective. We should never lose sight of the main goals of the convention we are negotiating, and what can realistically be undertaken to achieve these goals.

With quite some interest we have followed the work undertaken in Group C under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata. We consider the paper which resulted from the discussion on the process after the submission of the report on challenge inspections to be a good basis for solving the issue or coming close to it. We hope that it will be reflected in the report of the Ad hoc Committee to the Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to the sometimes rather protracted and detailed discussions on the guidelines on the international inspectorate, I am convinced that we have to undergo such an exercise, which has proved to be useful and has also brought to the surface some detailed problems we have to come to terms with. I would like to encourage Mr. Numata to pursue the sometimes difficult and very time-consuming consultations on the subject. They will contribute substantially to better understanding of inspection procedures, and will also help to resolve the remaining issues with regard to on-site challenge inspections.

Finally, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, for actively working on the final clauses of the convention. We welcome the revised discussion paper he put forward last week, which, we hope, will provide a basis for making progress on articles XII to XVI. The past discussions on these articles have clearly shown that some very important issues are involved which deserve our particular attention, as a solution of these issues will have a direct bearing on the viability and effectiveness of the convention. In this regard I would only like to mention the question of reservations and amendments, on which a lot of the discussions in the open-ended informal consultations conducted by Ambassador Sujka have focused, bringing out the differences.

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(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

In conclusion I would like to call upon all participants to make the best use of the remaining time available this summer to achieve concrete progress in our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We should make every effort to set the stage and create the best conditions for a promising continuation of our work in any inter-sessionals we may decide to hold starting toward the end of this year.

Ms. SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

I would like this morning to speak about one aspect of that "business in hand", namely the negotiations for a convention banning chemical weapons. The conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention is one of the highest priorities in the arms control and disarmament programme of the British Government as of our NATO allies. We want a convention as soon as practicable. But it must be a good convention, in which we can have confidence. A number of difficult and complex problems remain to be resolved, and this morning I would like to consider two of them: verification and data exchange.

The need for a reliable system of verification lies at the heart of our negotiations. It is the key to a convention. We have made a lot of progress. We can say with some satisfaction that, whatever fine tuning may be required, our "rolling text" provides the basis for a credible procedure for verifying declared activities relating to schedules [1] and [2]. So a good deal is already accomplished.

One reservation has to be made, however, as regards these schedules. The chemical agents so far listed under schedule [1] and indeed schedule [3] are for the main part the traditional chemical agents familiar in the First and Second World Wars and developed further in the 1950s. One or two comparative newcomers such as saxitoxin have also been proposed, but the lists need at

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(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

some stage to be reviewed to make sure they are complete. We also have to provide adequate procedures for modifying the schedules in order to keep pace with technological advances.

Outside schedules [1] and [2] the gaps in verification procedures are also wide. At present for example there is no provision for routine on-site inspection in relation to schedule [3]. Nor so far has provision been made for non-confrontational inspection of undeclared facilities. The valuable proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for ad hoc checks has pointed in the direction of a possible solution. However, the concomitant idea of national registers still leaves us with the problem of facilities wholly undeclared for the purposes of a convention - in other words, facilities which should be declared in accordance with the annexes to article VI or included in any national registers but which are not. Ad hoc checks as conceived at present are clearly not the whole answer. All this calls for further hard thinking. My delegation hopes in due course to table some detailed ideas of our own.

A major achievement in the negotiations has been the convergence of views in support of a system of challenge inspection. The main framework is in place. However, as we have long argued, challenge inspection is the essential safety net for the convention. It cannot by its nature replace the need for a comprehensive and resilient routine régime.

I have so far been speaking about verification mechanisms. There is also the question of conduct of on-site inspections which remains to be tackled in a good deal greater depth than has been done so far. Inspections have to be as intrusive as necessary in order to fulfil their purpose effectively. On the other hand we must recognize legitimate concerns about confidentiality. How can these criteria be reconciled? Here again we have to bear in mind not only the well-known classical chemical weapon agents but any possible newcomers. A lot more innovative thought is required. And private industry has a contribution to make. We are in close and regular contact with our own industry who show a good understanding for the requirements of the convention. Part of the solution may lie in verification instrumentation. Interesting advances are being made through both private and official research. More needs to be done. What is clear, however, is that verification technology in the foreseeable future is not going to replace the need for on-site inspection. We will need a two-legged instrument for a long time.

If what I have said is anywhere near the truth, there are a number of vital questions where we are still groping for answers. Is there anything more we can do that is not yet being done to bring us to the point where we can provide those answers? I think there is. It is my belief - and that of my authorities - that the Conference has reached the phase in its work where our concepts need to be put to the test, as realistically as possible, to see how far they work and to attempt to identify improvements. We need to move from theory to experimentation. We have to test major links in the verification chain, especially those which seem the weakest, in order to establish whether they can take the weight of what we require of them and whether they can be strengthened.

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

My own authorities have for some time been considering the possibilities of practice inspections of relevant facilities. We see the initial phase of these practice inspections as being undertaken at a national level. Procedures will first have to be carefully prepared if the experiments are to be worth while. Inspections may have to be both of a "walk-through" nature with a co-operative facility management, and in a scenario where the management is doing its best to conceal and misguide.

We would hope that national practice inspections in the civil industry would be followed by multilateral inspections, and we have already welcomed the proposal made by the Soviet Union in this regard. This will require close contact and co-operation among the members of this Conference. I am pleased that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is already consulting about suitable machinery for this. My own delegation will be happy to participate fully.

The INF Treaty has established an important precedent for intrusive verification measures. We look for progress in the nuclear area from the joint verification experiment now under preparation by Washington and Moscow. Let us apply that experience to our own efforts to ban chemical weapons.

The second aspect of the negotiations for a convention on which I should like to comment is data exchange. I think it is now widely accepted that provision of accurate data is essential, particularly on the part of those who hold the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. We need additional data to enable us to draft a sensible convention. Equally important, credible data is essential in order to build up the necessary level of confidence in each other's intentions if a convention is to attract widespread support.

For our part we have just conducted what I believe has been an extremely significant experiment. The British Government in 1986 proposed an exchange of visits between Porton Down Chemical Defence Establishment in the United Kingdom and the Shikhany military facility in the Soviet Union. This has just taken place. We were pleased to welcome the Soviet team to Porton Down in May, and a British team was received at Shikhany in early July. Porton Down is engaged solely in research and development for protection against chemical weapons. We aimed at the maximum openness during the visit there. Our visitors were able to go anywhere they chose and they expressed their satisfaction at the end of the visit. At Shikhany we were shown more than during the shorter visit by Conference on Disarmament delegates last October. However, we were made aware of the different attitudes towards the degree of secrecy appropriate in this area. My authorities are still assessing the exchange which was intended as a confidence-building exercise. Much more progress is required towards the sort of openness which our negotiations need. Many questions and concerns remain.

Of course the provision of data does not just depend on visits. We would hope each country, especially the possessors of chemical weapons, would provide the maximum amount of data to its negotiating partners as quickly as possible. The Soviet Union proposed a list of types of data in CD/808 and the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a number of Western countries

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

including the United Kingdom tabled a much more comprehensive list in CD/828. My authorities have already provided this data but we are ready to repeat and update the information.

The following are our responses to the data requested in CD/828. First, as is well known, the United Kingdom abandoned its own offensive chemical weapons capability in the 1950s. Delegates from this Conference were invited to see the destruction of our disused pilot nerve agent facility at Nancekuke in Cornwall in 1979. We described in CD/15 some of the problems that had needed to be overcome then.

Against that background our responses to the questions concerning chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents are as follows. Firstly, the United Kingdom does not possess chemical weapons either within its own territory or within the territory of any other State. There are no chemical weapons possessed by any other State within the territory of the United Kingdom. Secondly, the United Kingdom possesses no facilities for the production or storage of chemical weapons. Thirdly, limited quantities of chemicals itemized in the provisional list of chemical warfare agents in schedule [1] to article VI can be prepared at the United Kingdom's Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down for research and development for protection equipment. The quantity of each such chemical present at CDE Porton Down at any one time is small. Fourthly, old munitions or agent discovered within the United Kingdom are removed to CDE Porton Down for destruction at a small-scale destruction facility there. It has a capacity to destroy about 35 kg of toxic agent at any one time.

CD/828 also requested information on a number of facilities in the civil chemical industry that might be relevant to the convention. Legislation does not exist in the United Kingdom to compel private industry to provide this information to government. However, the United Kingdom Chemical Industries Association has provided information on its member companies which produce schedule [1], [2] and [3] chemicals. This information may be summarized as follows. Firstly, there is one company producing schedule [1] chemicals (small amounts of nitrogen mustard for medical use). Secondly, there are four companies producing schedule [2] chemicals. Thirdly, there are five companies producing schedule [3] chemicals. More detailed information is set out in CD/CW/WP.206, which is being circulated to distinguished delegates.

As a further demonstration of our commitment to openness in this area we have compiled an account of production in the United Kingdom of chemical weapon toxic agents during the Second World War and in the years afterwards up until 1956 when we gave up our chemical weapons capability. This account sets out the type and amounts of agents produced and location of the then production facilities. It also describes our experience in dismantling production facilities. I have pleasure in circulating this information to distinguished delegates as CD/856.

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

Until the convention we are negotiating has come into force and has been, as we hope, universally ratified, the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons remains an instrument of considerable importance. My Government has been dismayed by recent instances in which chemical weapons have been used. The reaction of the international community has, in our view, been quite inadequate. In the last few days media reports have alleged still further grave use of chemical weapons.

My Foreign Secretary during the third special session of the General Assembly made a number of proposals to strengthen the effectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. His first proposal was that any Government not yet a State party of the Geneva Protocol should seriously consider acceding. It is worth my repeating this point here as some members of the Conference on Disarmament have still to become States parties. His second proposal concerned the investigation by the United Nations Secretary-General of allegations by Member States of chemical weapons' use. Sir Geoffrey Howe proposed that the Secretary-General should elaborate without delay "procedures for investigating automatically allegations of chemical weapons' use". He added that such investigations should be "undertaken as a matter of routine and without getting entangled by political considerations". We much hope that the group of experts now meeting in this same building will agree on procedures for an automatic United Nations investigatory procedure. My Government has submitted for the attention of the group a paper setting out our views.

Important as it is to reinforce the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the best way of preventing the use of chemical weapons lies in the efforts of this Conference to negotiate a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I hope that what I have said underlines the determination of my Government to press ahead energetically with these negotiations. Such a ban is a prize for which the world has long striven. It is worth a very considerable effort.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

There was unanimous recognition at SSOD-III of the importance of the early completion of the chemical weapons convention. Backing this recognition was the widely shared concern at the reported use of chemical weapons and the dangerous spread of these heinous weapons. Among the agenda items of our Conference, we have been making steady headway in our negotiations on this item. I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland, for his untiring leadership, and to Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico for their devotion and contributions to the progress of our work. I consider it an honour and a privilege that my deputy is being entrusted with the work of chairing Group C.

I believe that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are now in a final crucial phase. By this I do not mean the process of dotting the Is or crossing the Ts or of going through the whole text of the convention with a legal fine-tooth comb. There will be considerably more work to be done before we reach that stage. We are at a crucial stage where we must make sure that the convention is truly global, effective, verifiable and workable. And we can only do this through working on the nitty-gritty.

(continued)

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Let me, with your indulgence, step back for a moment from the jargon of the negotiators and think about how an uninitiated layman would look at the convention. I say this only because, in the final analysis, the convention will have to be accepted by the public at large, the international as well as the domestic public, to be truly viable. The layman would probably like to be assured that the convention would really ban chemical weapons, that is, in the first instance, get rid of all existing chemical weapons as well as their storage and production facilities within 10 years. It would also be important to him that his security should not be threatened during the destruction period. But he would feel extremely wary if production of chemical weapons were to start or continue in that period for reasons of security.

He would also like to be sure that there would be no more development, production, etc. of chemical weapons undertaken covertly or overtly by industries in the future. He would see the need for certain sacrifices in this regard. But he would hate to forgo the benefits he derives in his daily life from the products of peaceful chemical activities. He would like to see the convention binding everybody, not allowing some to get away with possessing or producing these dangerous weapons. He would, above all, like to have confidence that the convention and its machinery did the job of banning and verifying with dispatch and efficiency, instead of falling of its own dead weight.

At the risk of over-simplification, these seem to be the necessary ingredients for the widest possible public acceptance of the convention. If that is the case, we must make sure that we have these ingredients in the convention. The question is how.

Let me first touch on universality or globality. We should give thought to whom, besides those now negotiating, we may need to involve in the process, and at what stage. This would entail a realistic consideration of what range of participation would ensure confidence that the convention is globally viable. We also need to demonstrate to a great number of States that it serves their interests, and the interest of the international community as a whole, to be "in" rather than "out". One important question to address in this context is how the system of rights and obligations under the convention may be underpinned by its mechanism concerning non-compliance or violations. We will have to answer this question by the end of the negotiations.

Secondly, the confidence which the international community places in the convention will be largely contingent upon how its verification mechanisms actually work. I feel it is important in this context that the burden of verification should be shared equitably among States parties in a manner commensurate with the risks they pose to the objectives of the convention. In the first 10 years, this burden would probably fall heavily on chemical weapons possessors, which would seem only natural because their chemical weapons and production facilities pose the most obvious and direct risk. As from the eleventh year, it would be the civil chemical industries which would have to bear the primary burden, and that would be in perpetuity. The non-production verification régime would have to be cost-effective in order to

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

be durable. I recall in this connection the very pertinent reminder by Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands on 19 July. He said: "an entirely and perfectly verifiable agreement is not what is needed. We need a convention with the capacity of verification required to inspire confidence in its implementation by all parties."

We should first have a firm and clear grasp of what we are up against in terms of exactly what sort of and how many facilities, military and civil, will be subject to verification, and try to work out a proper mix of data reporting, instrumental monitoring, routine and challenge on-site inspections and other possible means. We should seek the optimum balance between verification requirements and available resources. This requires more down-to-earth practical thinking than theorizing. I welcome the recent initiatives by some countries to come to grips with the realities, including those related to non-production, in the process of multilateral data exchange.

My own Government is intensively conducting a survey of our chemical industries to compile the relevant data. This is proving by no means an easy task. But our very preliminary findings seem to indicate that the aggregate number of Japanese producers, consumers and processors of chemical substances on schedules 2 and 3 of article VI, including those under the heading "to be discussed further", could be in the order of approximately 700 - I repeat, 700 - if counted without applying specific thresholds. What is also emerging is that many of these firms or plants, especially consumers and processors, are not powerful corporate giants or oligarchs but disparate small and medium-sized industries. Perhaps the Japanese economic structure is peculiar compared to those of the West and centrally planned States. We have a large sector containing many small and medium-sized cottage industries. But this is the structure you find in much of the developing world. This is the magnitude of the problem we are going to face. We may need to examine whether verification régimes or procedures designed primarily with huge industrial complexes in mind may be effectively applied to those smaller firms or plants.

The protection of confidential commercial information is also an area in which we need to move the discussion from generalities to practicalities. I would hope to see the relevant elements built up on the basis not of a priori assumptions but of an objective assessment of verification requirements and real concerns of industry. A useful focus in this regard may be provided by looking more closely into the question of facility attachments.

As I look to how we may put these various elements together into a viable convention, we recognize the merit of trying to see in practice how the verification provisions may work. My delegation feels that a useful practical approach would be to proceed step by step, that is, first to conduct national experiments and then to pool the experience together to see what can be tried multilaterally.

I have dwelt in some detail on the chemical weapons negotiations precisely because I feel a balanced sense of perspective will in the end provide us with a short cut to the goal we all share, that is, the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. We may not as easily

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

find short cuts to other important items on our agenda, including the nuclear test ban. But I do believe, as you do, Mr. President, that disarmament is a continuing process, and I am confident that we can make it work with determined and persistent efforts.

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The PRESIDENT: As you will recall, immediately following this plenary, we will hold an informal meeting to continue the discussion on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. As there is no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this meeting. Before doing so, I wish to inform you, at the request of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, that an informal meeting of the Ad hoc Committee will be held today at 4.30 p.m. in room III. The meeting will be followed by open-ended consultations on trial inspections in the chemical industry in order to test procedures for systematic verification of the non-production of chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The Governments and peoples of all countries want to see the convention banning chemical weapons, which has been the subject of discussion for several years in the Conference on Disarmament, concluded this year. Our people, which was the first victim of chemical weapons in the world after the Second World War, regards the conclusion of the convention as a problem that is ripe for solution, and impatiently expects from this Conference a legal instrument that will make it possible to put an end once and for all to the horror of chemical warfare on Earth.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Undoubtedly one of the long-standing priority items on our agenda is the ban on chemical weapons. An impressive amount of the time and energy of delegations has gone into discussing and drafting a CW convention which would do away with existing CW and ensure that none are produced in the future. Also this year, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, and the three co-ordinators of the working groups have spared no effort in their striving to further advance the elaboration of the CW convention. I am personally very happy that one of the three co-ordinators is a member of my delegation.

The closure of this year's session is not far away, and one might attempt some evaluation of what has happened in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, right from the beginning it is obvious that this evaluation will not be an easy task. Some positive as well as negative tendencies have emerged during this year's negotiations on the CW convention, and it is difficult to foresee which of them will have a greater effect on the future course of negotiations.

Let me start with what we see as negative, since I would prefer to close this statement on as optimistic a tone as possible. In the more distant as well as the quite recent past, there seemed to be consensus that the convention should quite unambiguously ban all chemical weapons and ensure, in a most effective way, the immediate cessation of their production and their complete destruction. Furthermore, there seemed to be general agreement that effective measures were needed in order to prevent the creation of chemical weapons under the guise of peaceful, civilian chemistry. Do we still have consensus on these basic goals and objectives of the CW convention? We would like to believe so, but some doubts have appeared too.

Firstly, some proposals advanced recently create the impression that we are negotiating a convention which might, in the long run, lead to the elimination of chemical weapons, but that in the mean time States parties could improve their existing chemical weapon stockpiles and continue their production, and that those States which do not possess chemical weapons could, upon their adherence to the convention, decide to start building their own chemical weapon potential. We consider this approach to be contrary to the elementary logic and purpose of the convention we have been negotiating for years, if not decades. There is no place in it for provisions permitting the production, further qualitative improvement and proliferation of CW. There is no guarantee that during the destruction period, before all CW stockpiles are eliminated, States parties that profited from such benevolent provisions might not, for a variety of reasons, decide to withdraw from the convention. Such developments could have adverse effects on international security and on the confidence of States parties in the convention. During the process of gradual destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, security must be assured by agreed measures of an obligatory nature, rather than by individual and unpredictable decisions of States parties to have or not to have chemical weapons, to continue production or to cease it, to modernize chemical weapons or to refrain from doing so.

For years we have heard about the need for stringent verification of the chemical weapons convention. One would therefore presume that when it comes to the elaboration of specific verification measures for specific provisions

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of the convention, there will be general eagerness to look for such measures and to make them as effective as possible. Unfortunately, this eagerness is, to say the least, not general. One of the fundamental obligations under the convention will be the obligation not to develop chemical weapons. For the time being nothing in the present "rolling text" tells us how compliance with this fundamental obligation will be verified. We consider that this represents a loophole which should be remedied. Occasionally arguments are raised that some kinds of activities are not verifiable, and hence no verification can be applied to them. If such reasoning is also used with regard to fundamental obligations, then we consider this a methodological drawback. By verification we understand a comprehensive process starting with data reporting, proceeding to data assessment and finally to the choice of an appropriate inspection régime. If the right balance of monitoring and verification procedures is established, one can expect a certain effect from verification even in facilities where it is unlikely that a flask full of a schedule [1] chemical will be unexpectedly discovered. A realistic view seems to prevail that we cannot expect 100 per cent reliable verification, especially with regard to such a complicated matter as the verification of non-production of chemical weapons. Indeed, in all régimes of monitoring and verification both confidence-building and deterrence are present together with the inspection process itself. We therefore fail to understand the categorical rejection of any monitoring and verification in some cases based on mere assertion that inspections at some facilities cannot always bring immediate results.

To complete the list of negative aspects of our work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, let me mention briefly that in our opinion we are faced with excessively detailed discussion on many questions. Perhaps it would be useful to bear in mind that before the convention enters into force a preparatory organ will be functioning which may settle a number of technical and organizational aspects with a much better overview of likely initial participation in the convention and the conditions of its entry into force than we have now. Besides, the organization to be set up under the chemical weapons convention and its individual bodies, especially the Technical Secretariat, will be continuously solving a number of technical problems which, it seems to us, need not be discussed exhaustively before the final drafting of the convention.

Although the negative tendencies I have mentioned above slow down the progress of our work, we are satisfied that there are also some positive developments contributing to its advancement. The principal of such development is a tendency towards greater openness in military affairs, not least with regard to chemical weapons. A number of seminars and workshops organized in recent years, and international visits to important military facilities in some countries, have given us a better understanding of the problems we are confronted with. Some practical knowledge and experience is of great importance. We therefore welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union for the organization of trial inspections of chemical industry facilities at both the national and the international level. Czechoslovakia is interested in this experiment and intends to participate in it. We followed with attention the first preparatory consultations on the experiment under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. We agree that the drawing up of check-lists as well as a format for reporting might be useful. At the same

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

time we do not think that we shall try to be too ambitious in standardizing the ways in which individual trial inspections take place. Some common features for the upcoming experiments will certainly be necessary so that reports can be compared and general conclusions drawn. But we should not completely disregard the creative approach which, especially during inspections at the national level, can also contribute innovative and unexpected approaches, which may well happen when an unexplored field is dealt with in practical terms for the first time. We had no problems with the time schedule originally proposed by Ambassador Ekéus. If some slight readjustments are considered necessary by some, this could be taken into account. But if a substantial expansion of the time schedule is proposed we would consider it regrettable. A number of questions we are trying to find answers to now will more easily be resolved after the trial inspections have been conducted and evaluated. The sooner we can have these practical contributions at hand the better.

I would also like to mention among the positive aspects of this year's session progress achieved on the definition of chemical weapons production facilities. For quite some time this has been one of the missing bricks in the rising wall of the convention. Now, finally, it is going to be inserted into its place. Deliberations on the conduct of on-site challenge inspections and the role of inspectors therein are also progressing in the right direction. Work on the further development of article XI and the final clauses is also encouraging. It is the hope of my delegation that the positive tendencies I have just mentioned will prevail over the negative ones and that, in accordance with the practice of recent years, the time available between the end of this session and February 1989 will be used for further work on the CW convention.

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(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

In the context of this forum we believe that disarmament should be viewed simultaneously in nuclear, chemical and conventional terms, including horizontal themes such as confidence-building measures, verification, transparency, fact-finding procedures, the development of new technologies and their peaceful applications, as well as the prevention of their uncontrolled dissemination. So disarmament can be perceived as an integrated and continuous process within which States attempt with realism and perseverance, under a multilateral approach, to settle the most serious security issues in the light of the global imperatives of development.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Among the urgent pending problems which were emphasized at the third special session, there is first of all the need to draw up a convention containing a universal and global ban on chemical weapons. Consequently, one of the Conference on Disarmament's priority tasks is to advance resolutely towards an agreement for the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Particularly since alarming reports on the use of chemical weapons and their proliferation have now confirmed the urgent need for maximum possible efforts in this field in order to finalize the draft convention. Hence discussions should be continued on the various parts of the convention text, tackling in turn, for instance, the question of the destruction of chemical weapons, challenge inspections, multilateral assistance, economic and technological development as well as the final clauses. However, clarification of the problem of non-production and the multilateral exchange of data on that subject, along with trial inspections, could make it possible to put in place operational procedures for the verification régimes. In other words, we must agree on a sufficiently well-developed system to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons in future by elaborating mandatory inspection machinery backed up by challenge inspections. If necessary we could even contemplate setting up an international body to monitor the provisions of the convention so as to increase its transparency - but these are all just working hypotheses.

In the mean time chemical weapons continue to be manufactured and, moreover, it appears that techniques and chemical warfare agents are more and more sophisticated, with the risk that they will be used, though as we know their proliferation presents mankind with an ever greater threat. Hence the need to ensure the participation and solidarity of all States in the international community to ensure the full application of a convention on chemical weapons. In this way it will be possible to make the substance of the commitments that are to be entered into more acceptable and to awaken the interest of all States in order to prepare the ground for universal accession to the convention. In this connection my delegation supports the Yugoslav proposal for a special United Nations conference in due course to adopt the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The conclusion of such a convention would assuredly be an undoubted triumph for multilateral diplomacy in the area of disarmament, and specifically for our negotiating body and all the delegations participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Secondly, the participants in the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament also recalled that, in connection with the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, States have made statements that they do not possess any of the toxic agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery listed in their article I of the Convention. Of course, even if as a matter of principle the validity of

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

unilateral declarations is recognized in the field of disarmament as a confidence-building factor, none the less it cannot replace obligations stemming from the binding force of a convention.

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(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

I would add that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons as well as the achievement of balance between the arsenals of conventional weapons of the two major alliances would offer irrefutable proof of good faith vis-à-vis the obligations entered into under the provisions of article VI of the NPT. Undoubtedly, such a development would have great impact on nuclear disarmament on Earth, it being understood that we should prevent the vital interests of the security of all States from being threatened by new military devices deployed in space. Which brings me to my last point, the prevention of an arms race in space. The multilateral dimension of the peaceful use of space requires that all States should actively participate in preventing an

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(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

arms race in this field. It is true that space is already the subject of measures of protection which should be borne in mind in drawing up an appropriate international instrument. Because activities pertaining to the exploration and use of space should be carried out in conformity with the principles of international law, including the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. More specifically, we should consolidate and strengthen the legal régime in force applicable to space and draw useful lessons from the work of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

(Mr. Ruoro, Kenya)

The negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons have demonstrated what this Conference can achieve if political will is manifested by all States on all the issues on the agenda of this Conference. Even though there still remain certain important issues which have to be thoroughly addressed in the draft chemical weapons convention, the pace of negotiations is encouraging as there is a determination on the part of all States involved in these negotiations to solve the remaining problems. The promise exists that the Conference will be able to conclude a chemical weapons ban convention in good time. In view of the reported use of chemical weapons in the hopefully concluded tragic Iran-Iraq war, we appeal to all States to remain committed to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such weapons. The international community must remain committed to eliminating such weapons and to ensuring that they are never again used as weapons of war.

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(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

In order to ensure conditions of stability and security for all States, reduce the danger of war and achieve disarmament, it is necessary to proceed in close relation with practical measures for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of all chemical weapons. We reiterate our position in favour of the intensification of negotiations for the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In this context I should like to make several comments.

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(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

First of all, pending the conclusion and entry into force of the convention, States should reaffirm the validity of the Geneva Protocol and undertake never under any circumstances to resort to these weapons. Secondly, the convention should ensure balance, a necessary balance between rights and duties, notably between countries that possess chemical weapons and those that do not. This involves the peaceful, unimpeded development of the chemical industry in each country, the broadening of international co-operation and exchanges among States in fields related to the application of the convention, the development of the scientific potential of each country and its use exclusively for economic and social progress. Our delegation commends and welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee of the Conference whose task is to finalize the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and wishes to underscore the importance of such an instrument for defining the main avenues to be followed to ensure the dynamism of future disarmament negotiations. We express the hope that under the very skilful chairmanship of our eminent colleague, Ambassador García Robles, and as a result of sustained and unflagging efforts to arrive at generally acceptable solutions, it will be possible to submit the draft comprehensive programme as soon as possible for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Such a programme, with well-defined timetables and phases, would offer clear prospects and contribute to the strengthening and enhancement of the paramount role that the United Nations is called upon to play in the disarmament process.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Mr. President, in my statement today, I would like to deal with item 4 of our agenda, that is, chemical weapons. Mongolia remains a staunch supporter of the early conclusion of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. My country has already declared that it has no chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or acquire any. We have done so proceeding, in particular, from our firm conviction that the convention will be concluded in the very near future, for ever putting an end to the chemical weapons threat. With this same conviction, I wish today to state that the Government of my country intends to be among the first to sign the convention as soon as it is ready for signature.

Since the resumption of negotiations on chemical weapons in July this year, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, as well as the chairmen of the three working groups, have made significant efforts to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding problems. Yet the course of negotiations on the text of a draft convention leaves much to be desired. There is an imperative need for active efforts to resolve a number of key problems relating to the convention, political will and readiness on the part of all participants to come to an agreement. My delegation would like to make a few observations on some provisions of the draft convention which, in our opinion, have special significance.

In the course of this session, Group A has continued intensive work on article VI. In doing so, the participants in the negotiations have concentrated their attention mainly on schedules [1] chemicals and the activities connected with them. This is quite natural, since these chemicals pose the greatest risk for the implementation of the future convention. As is well known, the "rolling text" of the draft convention embodies unanimous agreement with respect to the production of these chemicals exclusively at a single small-scale facility, the capacity of which shall not exceed one metric ton per year. However, it is likely that as a special exception in the convention, the production of nitrogen mustard will be allowed outside the small-scale facility, provided that the production facilities are made subject to the same stringent verification régime as that envisaged for the small-scale facility.

Super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule [1], in other words schedule [4] chemicals, as well as the corresponding production facilities, could also represent a significant danger to the purposes of the convention. All participants share this anxiety. We are of the opinion that the convention should have provisions that would preclude such a danger. We have

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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

no ready recipes to solve this issue. Nevertheless, we are convinced that unless this problem is resolved in one form or another, the convention will not be effective. During the negotiations on schedule [4] the opinion was expressed that it is impossible to verify the chemicals that are to be included in this schedule. We disagree with this, and share the view expressed in document CD/792, presented by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany that "a coherent system of controls could be created for super-toxic lethal chemicals, too, as is largely the case for the substances listed in annexes 1, 2 and 3".

The attention of participants in the negotiations has so far been focused on the question of proper handling of confidential information in the chemical industry. This was dictated by the need to move forward in negotiations to elaborate the régimes for non-production of chemical weapons. In spite of all the inherent difficulties and complexities, we believe that this problem is surmountable. In this context, we found the idea put forward by the representative of the Netherlands at the meeting of industrial experts, for the classification of information which States parties have to provide to the Technical Secretariat in connection with the provisions of the future convention, interesting.

We welcome the consultations begun under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden on an experiment to test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international monitoring of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We are confident that this experiment will make a practical contribution to the solution of concrete problems, as well as to the cause of strengthening confidence and improving the atmosphere at the negotiations as a whole. At the same time, we consider that the preparatory work and the conduct of the experiment itself should be carried out in the shortest possible time span so that the results of the experiment can be used to speed up the ongoing negotiations.

Mongolia considers that the time is now ripe for solving the question of herbicides and pesticides. According to United Nations estimates, pesticide poisoning due solely to improper handling mainly in developing countries, could total as many as 2 million cases a year, with 40,000 deaths. These horrifying figures once again highlight the need to include in the convention provisions prohibiting the use of these chemicals as a method of warfare.

While actively striving for the rapid completion of negotiations on chemical weapons and the conclusion of a convention, Mongolia stands resolutely and consistently for strict compliance with and strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In this regard, I wish to recall that in response to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV), which was initiated by my country, 14 States acceded to the Protocol in 1970 alone. Violation of the purposes and principles of the Protocol is incompatible with efforts aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of the industrial base for their production. We, therefore, support the United Kingdom initiative concerning the devising of procedures for automatically investigating allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Last but not least, my country attaches great importance to the provisions of the convention pertaining to assistance and economic and

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

technological co-operation, under which States parties to the convention will assume an obligation to promote the peaceful development of the chemical industry.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the need to continue negotiations on chemical weapons during the inter-sessional period. Such inter-sessional work, which has been undertaken by the Conference as an almost regular feature during the last few years, has proved to be highly productive.

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(Mr. Burns, United States of America)

Turning the focus to a somewhat broader scale, let me briefly address what I see as a serious problem for international security: the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities, and the proliferation of chemical weapons. The spread of none of these is in our collective interest, nor in the interest of international stability. It can only make more complicated the task of preventing the outbreak of conflict at the local, regional, or even global level. It can only make more complicated the task of resolving such conflicts once they have begun - as the sad events in the Gulf region bear witness.

(Mr. Burns, United States of America)

With regard to the proliferation of chemical weapons, this is a matter of direct relevance to this Conference and to the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. The repeated use of chemical weapons in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare has eroded the force of that instrument, and blurred an international norm that, for over half a century, successfully inhibited States from systematically using chemical weapons as weapons of war. The international norm is further weakened when such repeated violation of the 1925 Protocol fails to evoke immediate, forceful and universal condemnation.

The United States is committed to strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons, and we are convinced that the most effective way to achieve that goal is through the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global chemical weapons ban - a subject to which I will turn momentarily. In your negotiation of that convention, however, I would urge you to remember the lessons learned from the experience of the Gulf war.

Pending completion of a ban, we will also work closely with others to prevent the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons. This should include political pressure brought to bear as appropriate, carefully targeted export controls on certain chemicals, and support for investigation by the United Nations of all cases of alleged use. We urge others to join us to ensure that the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which establishes a binding norm against CW use, is not further eroded.

I would now like to turn from our proliferation concerns to the important matter of negotiating a chemical weapons ban. Ambassador Friedersdorf, in his statement before this Conference on 28 July, presented detailed United States views on current issues in the negotiations. I do not propose to cover the same ground today. Rather, I would like to outline briefly the general United States approach to the negotiations. Simply put, the United States is committed to negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons, thus, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable States. Toward this end the United States submitted to this body in 1984 a draft convention, CD/500, which remains the basis of the United States position.

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(Mr. Burns, United States of America)

At the same time we do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the task. Despite the considerable progress that has been made, difficult problems remain in developing effective means of verification, in providing undiminished security for all States during the transition period, and in ensuring that the ban is truly global. In our view, it is important to address these problems as a matter of continuing urgency.

The kind of convention we are seeking can be achieved only through multilateral negotiations. This Conference must be the focus of efforts to achieve a ban. On specific issues, bilateral discussions can facilitate the resolution of issues in the multilateral negotiations. Therefore, in addition to our continuing active participation in multilateral work we periodically discuss key issues with the Soviet Union, and with others, in an effort to find mutually acceptable solutions. In our view, both multilateral and bilateral efforts are essential. Moreover, evidence of the spread of chemical weapons has led to increased awareness on our part of the need to consult States who are not participating in the work of the Conference.

As you know, the United States has long sought to deter chemical attack through a capability to retaliate in kind. We will continue to maintain this capability until the threat of chemical attack is removed through an effective, verifiable, truly global chemical weapons ban.

As everyone knows, the presidential election campaign in the United States is now in full swing. Alternative policies on many issues are being rigorously debated. But on the prohibition of chemical weapons there is no debate. The United States commitment to a chemical weapons ban is an enduring, bipartisan commitment. For its part, the Reagan Administration will continue earnestly to pursue this goal until the new Administration comes into office in January. We will work hard with all delegations to resolve the difficult questions that remain.

I would add only one or two cautionary notes. As you progress toward the completion of your work on a CW ban, resist the temptation to rush to signature by passing over the details. It is unrealistic to believe that a preparatory committee or some governing body can solve problems that have eluded your experienced experts for the past several years. The time to resolve differences is before a treaty enters into force. The second observation I would make is that practice inspections can be quite useful in uncovering potential areas of controversy while you still have time to resolve them - before a treaty goes into effect.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

Nuclear disarmament is certainly of high importance to this Conference, but it is not the only concern. The international community is facing many other challenges such as the proliferation of chemical weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

We are happy to note that the Conference on Disarmament has made good progress in elaborating a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, although some more work still remains to be done before its conclusion.

The conclusion of a multilateral agreement on chemical weapons is a matter of top priority to the international community, particularly because these are weapons of mass destruction easy to manufacture at low cost. Every avenue should be explored so as to ensure the participation of all States with a capability to produce chemical weapons. Together they should work out effective means of on-site and challenge inspection. We hope that this Conference will come up with an effective and verifiable convention on chemical weapons at an early date. As we all know, giving the final touches to a few outstanding issues will be the most difficult yet important part.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria):

During recent plenary meetings most of the speakers have paid special - I might even say exceptional - attention to the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. That is quite natural. The end of the summer session is at hand; that calls for an assessment of one more annual session of the Conference, whose work has concentrated to a great degree on the negotiations for a chemical weapons ban. That is why my delegation would like to set out its attitude by dwelling upon some major problems of these negotiations.

As a whole the negotiations have proceeded in a favourable political climate. No one questions the need to finalize the convention as soon as possible. This was made explicitly clear in the statements of all foreign ministers who spoke in the Conference during its spring session. The joint Soviet-United States summit statement in Moscow confirmed "the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention". A wide consensus was reached at the third special session that the elaboration of a convention on a chemical weapons ban is a particularly important and urgent task for the Conference on Disarmament. The Warsaw communiqué of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty again pointed out that one of the priority goals in the field of disarmament is to conclude a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The urgent character of the task of eliminating for ever a whole category of weapons of mass destruction which were considered almost extinct after the First World War is being reinforced by their use and the danger of their

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(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

proliferation. The evidence produced by the United Nations on the increased use of poison gas in the latter stages of the Gulf war imparts a new sense of urgency to the matter. This should harden the resolve of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament to do all they can to ensure the earliest possible completion of the years-long negotiations. Maybe those who argue that if the ban is not enforced soon "the chemical cat will be out of the bag" are right.

Has the favourable political atmosphere one may ask, been translated into concrete results in the negotiations? It is hardly possible to give a simple answer to this question, since ups and downs have continued to characterize the pace of the Conference's negotiations. First and foremost, we would like to note that the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has made and is making great efforts to speed up the pace of the negotiations. In this respect he has been energetically supported by the chairmen of the working groups, Comrade Cima (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Macedo (Mexico) and Mr. Numata (Japan). We are very grateful to Ambassador Sujka and the three chairmen of the working groups for their dedication and contributions.

Among the unresolved problems in the negotiations, the issue of the non-production of chemical weapons in civil chemical industry looms large. The goal of the negotiations is clear - to establish a régime which, on the one hand, would guarantee the non-production of chemical weapons in civil chemical industry and, on the other, would not be an obstacle to the development and production of chemical products for peaceful purposes. The achievement of this goal, however, is a complex and difficult task. This is so because there is a need to elaborate and agree upon provisions which take into account different but justified requirements, first, to treat two types of property - State and private - on an equal footing; second, to take into account the special features of production not only in large industrial complexes, but also in medium-sized and small enterprises; third, to establish a verification régime that is both effective and financially reasonable; and fourth, to guarantee the confidentiality of information. The complexity of the task precludes by definition any maximalism and requires a great deal of effort to find a common denominator to achieve a solution which would inspire confidence in both the viability and the effectiveness of the convention.

My delegation supports all steps aimed at accelerating the settlement of problems related to the elaboration of article VI. In our opinion the meetings with representatives of civil chemical industry were a useful initiative. It is in the interest of the negotiations that such meetings should continue during the spring and summer parts of the Conference's session in 1989.

My delegation welcomes the Soviet proposal for holding an international experiment in civil chemical industry. We hope that this experiment will make a useful contribution to the elaboration of the verification régime's provisions for the non-production of chemical weapons in civil chemical industry. We would like to note with satisfaction that the preparations for the experiment have entered a practical phase.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. P. Mladenov, stated on 14 April at the Conference, my country's chemical industry does not produce any of the key precursors for chemical weapons included in schedule [2]. For this reason we will probably not have installations subject to routine international verification. Nevertheless, we are interested in the experiment's results. We hope that the information to be presented after the experiment will help in working out the provisions for ad hoc checks in which the protagonist will be the technical secretariat. In the future an international experiment on this type of verification may also be carried out.

We are encouraged by the progress in the elaboration of the provisions on challenge inspection, namely the procedure for appointing international inspectors and the activities of the Executive Council after receiving the verification report. We think that the implementation of this type of verification must aim at promoting better compliance with the convention. At all events, it should not create conditions for a confrontation that may lead to adverse consequences.

To a certain degree the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities remains an untied knot in the negotiations. All countries are interested in guarantees for their national security. That is why every country ought to be fully confident that the convention will not permit a situation where the security of any country or group of countries might be diminished.

If it is agreed that there is a need to level out chemical weapon stockpiles towards the end of the eighth year after the convention's entry into force, then it would be absolutely logical also that the process of destruction should proceed in compliance with an approved schedule under strict international control.

My delegation shares the view expressed by Ambassador Marchand of Canada that in developing the agreed régime for the phased destruction of chemical weapons "one of the primary concerns is to ensure that this process does not cause any diminution of ... national security ... during the very sensitive 10-year destruction phase". Hence it is not possible to regard as constructive proposals which, to quote my Canadian colleague again, "have the net effect of permitting the production and proliferation of chemical weapons during this crucial phase".

We are pleased that, in an attempt to finalize work on article V, it has been agreed that the joint Soviet-United States proposal on chemical weapon production facilities should be included in the "rolling text" of the convention.

We are concerned about the lack of tangible progress in working out article X. In our view the rendering of assistance to a member State in the event of a chemical weapons threat or the use of chemical weapons against it should be derived from the principle of undiminished security. Besides, it is necessary to think about the universality of the convention. It is logical to expect that the convention will be more attractive, both in political and legal terms, if it contains provisions for rendering assistance to every State party in the event of a chemical weapon threat or the use of such weapons against it.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The proposal of the Soviet delegation made by Ambassador Y. Nazarkin on 11 August of this year, for the working out of collective measures among the States parties to the convention in order to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, is very timely. We consider that it would be advisable to think about the elaboration of measures both of a technical and of a political nature.

In principle everyone shares the view that the convention should not harm the legitimate interests of the States parties in developing their civil chemical industries. We were puzzled at the difficulties which emerged in the process of elaboration of the provisions for widening economic, scientific and technical co-operation in the production and consumption of chemicals for peaceful purposes. Bulgaria is interested in taking part in such co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Therefore, we are encouraged by the progress achieved in Group A.

It is high time for the negotiations to become more intensive and purposeful on certain political and financial aspects of the convention. It is true that the problems related to the composition of the Executive Council and the setting up and functioning of the bodies which will be entrusted with the implementation of the convention are not without analogy in international relations. But it is also true that they are so specific in nature as to preclude borrowing in a mechanical way from past and existing experience.

We note with satisfaction that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, has given impetus to the work on the final provisions of the convention. We think that the revised document presented by him for discussion is a good basis for our future work; it creates preconditions for making progress in the elaboration of articles XII to XVI - provisions which are important for the viability and effectiveness of the convention.

In our view it is desirable for efforts to finalize the convention to be supported by practical steps which would facilitate its signature and entry into force. We welcome with satisfaction the statements made by the delegations of Australia and Austria concerning the placing of controls on production of and trade in a certain category of chemicals. In this connection I would like to remind the Conference of the fact that on 30 December 1986 my Government approved a decree setting out restrictions on the export of dual-purpose chemicals.

In our assessment the summer session will make progress in solving some problems of the negotiations. But should we be satisfied with the pace of the negotiations? We are not inclined to give an affirmative answer to this question. My delegation supports the view that advantage should be taken of the inter-sessional period as much as possible to continue the negotiations. It is advisable for us to use in the most rational manner the time from November, i.e. after the completion of the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly, until the end of January 1989. Obviously this goal will be easier to achieve if we succeed in determining the issues on which the negotiations should concentrate during the inter-sessional period. It is necessary to do everything possible so that in 1989 the Conference will overcome the last obstacles blocking the way to finalizing a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation is ready to take part actively in this process.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

I think that this demonstration, in which we saw with our own eyes the practical implementation of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, will stimulate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In point of fact, we witnessed the birth of an era free of nuclear weapons. I hope the time will come when we will witness steps to implement multilateral disarmament agreements, too, in the area of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons.

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(The President)

It is sad to see that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has been violated with impunity so intensely and indiscriminately. It is a very dangerous trend that weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons are gradually being treated as normal, and that international reaction to reports of their repeated use, substantiated by various United Nations investigating teams, has been rather acquiescent. If the use of such weapons becomes a routine and effective way of pursuing military objectives, then curbing it will be almost impossible in the future. It is an urgent task of this Conference, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, to put the final touches to the instrument being negotiated on a comprehensive, total and globally verifiable convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Achievements so far have been noteworthy, and the international community is keenly awaiting the early conclusion of this convention. In this respect, the reports of the investigating teams, and particularly Security Council resolutions 612 and 620, will facilitate our work in finalizing the convention.

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A comprehensive, global and effective ban on chemical weapons is a priority issue in the Conference on Disarmament. This important objective is now within reach. It is necessary to sustain the current momentum in the negotiations with a view to concluding the chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date. No effort should be spared to eliminate this category of weapons of mass destruction. I should like to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1988, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. He also ably guided this subsidiary body six years ago, at which time he initiated work on a number of important areas of the convention. Significant progress has been made since then. Nevertheless, we have to recognize that there are still a number of sensitive political issues and complicated technical problems to be resolved.

The convention involves verifying the elimination of stockpiles and production facilities over a 10-year period, as well as monitoring the chemical industry on a permanent basis. Never before has a multilateral treaty of such broad scope, which provides for such comprehensive verification systems, been concluded. The chemical weapons convention will therefore have an important bearing on future multilateral disarmament agreements.

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

Non-production is one of the major outstanding issues. The discussions during the meeting of industrial experts in July have, however, clarified certain aspects of this question. Moreover, the Soviet proposal for trial inspections of chemical industry facilities, which is being followed up in the Committee on Chemical Weapons, may facilitate a further convergence of views.

So far, only the United States and the Soviet Union have declared that they possess chemical weapons. The other countries which have stocks of such weapons should follow suit. As the two countries possessing the world's largest stocks of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have, however, a special responsibility for implementing a ban on chemical weapons. I am therefore pleased to note that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed at their meeting in Moscow the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention.

The multilateral negotiating process has already been facilitated by the bilateral talks, most recently in the area of destruction of production facilities for chemical weapons. In this context, I also welcome the declaration made by the United States on 28 July concerning the location of its five chemical weapons production facilities.

All participating States in the Conference on Disarmament should make vigorous efforts towards the conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention. At this stage in the negotiations there is in fact a need for a multilateral exchange of data relevant to the convention.

I can assure you that Norway, which has no chemical weapons, will continue its active role in the work towards a convention banning these insidious weapons. My country strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Recent reports on the use of chemical weapons underline the necessity of ridding the world of these abhorrent weapons once and for all.

In 1981 Norway initiated a research programme on verification of the chemical weapons convention. The programme, which is being carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, is concerned in particular with verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons. The objective of the Norwegian research programme is twofold. First of all, the task has been to develop concrete, practical procedures for verifying the alleged use of chemical weapons which can be applied on a year-round basis and which will cover all the phases of such an investigation. Secondly, field exercises and analytical work have aimed at providing a sound and realistic data base, which will facilitate implementation of the convention once it is in force.

Whereas our previous research has been concentrated on verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons in winter conditions, the exercises in 1987-1988 were undertaken in summer conditions. The main conclusions from this research are contained in document CD/861, which I take pleasure in introducing at this meeting.

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

As stated in document CD/861, it is of interest in the context of the chemical weapons convention that the nerve agents sarin, soman, tabun and VX, as well as the blister agent mustard gas, can be verified in samples from water, grass, sand or soil after two weeks' exposure to summer conditions. The results have also proved that the procedures developed for winter conditions can be directly applied in summer conditions. The tests have further confirmed the validity of the proposed procedures for verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons, which Canada and Norway presented in document CD/766 of 2 July 1987, and to which the existing "rolling text" refers. Finally, the conclusions point to the necessity of improving the technical aspects of analytical methods in the light of rapid technical and scientific developments.

We believe that work of this nature is useful in connection with the ongoing discussions in the Committee on Chemical Weapons on the conduct of challenge inspections and relevant guidelines on the international inspectorate. In addition, several elements of the elaborated procedures can be used in the verification of other parts of the convention, such as destruction of stocks, etc. Therefore, I am pleased to inform you that the Norwegian research programme will continue with a view to contributing to an effective convention.

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(Mr. Pericás, Brazil)

The same resistance and obstruction that have so far prevented the implementation of the Programme of Action adopted in 1978 would not evaporate even if a new consensual concluding document to complement it had been adopted. The important process of change that is under way on the international scene induced us, perhaps, to a certain degree of over-expectancy, as some of us were persuaded that if multilateralism cannot work when the super-Powers disagree, the converse would automatically be true. Unhappily, the logic of political thinking has once more surprised us. Starting from the same facts - the progress in the dialogue between the super-Powers and in their bilateral negotiations - others came to different conclusions; namely that bilateralism was the correct approach to most items on the disarmament agenda and that multilateralism could only operate, under strict control, in some very precise areas - such as chemical weapons - or on the so-called "horizontal themes" - such as confidence-building measures or verification.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

If the topics already mentioned, particularly the ending of nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, benefited from a convergence of political will, the Conference on Disarmament, which is currently working effectively on the drafting of a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, would then be engaged in a series of substantive negotiations on important topics on the disarmament agenda, and would thus bring the content of its work into line with the international situation, which has quite clearly improved. Otherwise, I am very much afraid that it will be difficult for us as responsible delegates here to deny the charge of not having found concrete formulas for disarmament agreements that reflect this favourable international atmosphere, created through the efforts both of the great Powers and of many States that have decided to seek a political solution to their regional conflicts. Disarmament should be, then, an inescapable consequence of this international climate if we intend to take full advantage of it.

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I now turn to item 4 on our agenda. My delegation once again welcomes the advanced stage reached in the negotiations on the preparation of the convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and providing for their destruction. In this respect, my delegation cannot fail to recognize with appreciation the prominent role performed by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland.

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I also wish to welcome the positive step taken by the United States on 28 July in declaring the location of each of its chemical production facilities. Egypt considers this as a contribution to the confidence-building measures needed to enhance our efforts with a view to concluding the convention. We also welcome the step taken last year by the Soviet Union in the military facility of Shikhany, and invite other States to take similar actions in order to strengthen the atmosphere of confidence.

Egypt fully supports the current efforts to conclude a convention to ban chemical weapons. Egypt is a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was also at the forefront of the States that signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction in 1972. Unfortunately, certain circumstances prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. We do hope that such considerations will not arise with respect to future disarmament agreements.

I seize this opportunity to reiterate that Egypt considers that the prohibition of chemical weapons has become a basic norm of international law in our contemporary world, which should be scrupulously observed. Though Egypt recognizes that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved in our work, we do however realize that we still have a long way ahead. Many of the remaining differences concern concepts and methodology, and are not confined to mere drafting details. Like many other States, Egypt considers that the conditio sine qua non for a State to enter into a convention that affects important aspects of national security and undertake a wide range of obligations is that such a convention must be applicable to all States. Certain key countries, including all those in the so-called "hot" regions, should become parties simultaneously. The non-accession of some States could well be the rock upon which the convention would come to grief.

In pursuing the goal of attaining universality, we believe that two basic elements should at this stage be considered: prior consultations and guarantees and sanctions. To realize prior consultations, on the largest scale possible, Egypt does not subscribe to the view that the Conference on Disarmament should submit the convention directly to the General Assembly for adoption. Egypt prefers that an invitation be addressed to all States, members and non-members of the Conference on Disarmament alike, to attend a conference devoted to consideration of the convention. We also believe that some form of preparatory work should be initiated as soon as possible to exchange views on all the dimensions and possible implications of the convention. In this context, I would like to recall the proposal presented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at the SSOD-III for the convening of a special United Nations conference to consider and approve the CW convention. Egypt sees considerable merit in this proposal. We support the convening of an international conference under United Nations auspices, open to all potential signatories of the convention. In our view this procedure would ensure direct participation and would consequently greatly contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive document acceptable to all.

The other element related to the concept of universality is the issue of guarantees and sanctions. In all candour, without guarantees and without sanctions, we fear, the convention may be neither universal nor credible. We

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

would like to see provisions containing specific sanctions should any State (party or non-party) violate the provisions of the convention. We would also like to have guarantees to ensure that sanctions will be applied effectively and without discrimination.

My delegation proposes that the Conference should consider the insertion of a new article dealing with this issue. The context and concept of such an article could be taken up during inter-sessional meetings before our next Conference on Disarmament session in 1989. The gesture of flexibility in the speech made by Ambassador Narzarkin of the Soviet Union on the 11th of last month is highly welcome. We welcome in particular his statement that assistance should be extended to States parties to the convention in the area of protection against chemical weapons provided for in article X. Egypt also supports the development of provisions on collective measures in order to enable States parties to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It is reassuring to note that the Soviet delegation is prepared to agree to the inclusion in the convention of provisions on co-operation among States parties to the convention in the area of defence against chemical weapons on the basis of voluntary bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Another area that should attract special attention is that of verification. We do share the views expressed by many delegations that we need a credible, verifiable convention without any loopholes. It is therefore imperative that the convention include effective verification provisions. Yet this requirement should not be abused. It should never be distorted and stretched to threaten the national security of States parties. We are inclined to consider the non-abuse of this device as important as the concept of verification itself. We therefore support the inclusion of detailed provisions for verification procedures, and in particular challenge inspection.

We believe that the accession to the convention will depend in large part on the extent of the provisions on international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries, while not, however, impeding peaceful chemical activities.

I now turn to the issue of convening inter-sessional meetings. Given the fact that we cannot start until after the First Committee has concluded its work in New York, and that at least three weeks through December and January are usually cut away for holidays, it becomes evident that we have only about six working weeks. In order to make the best use of the time allotted to us, my delegation proposes that we focus on certain specific issues or topics such as guarantees and sanctions and challenge inspection, articles X and XI.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the progress achieved in the work on article VI. However, we realize that more time has yet to be devoted to the super-toxic lethal chemicals listed in schedule [1] and produced on a laboratory scale, and the relevance of this to medical and defence research. We believe that for practical reasons, there should be a procedure to update the schedules annexed to this article whenever necessary. Egypt is of the view that schedules [1] and [3] should be subject to modification whenever new chemical agents are produced.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

My delegation participated in the meeting of industrial experts held on 22 July, and is of the opinion that such meetings are of major importance and have positive effects on the process of drafting of a convention to ban chemical weapons. I seize this opportunity to thank the Swedish delegation for the very able manner in which they moderated the meeting in order to accomplish so much in a very short time. We hope that this meeting will be the first of a series of such meaningful meetings.

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(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

My delegation is not alone in according high priority to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for his efforts and innovative guidance given to the work of the Committee. My delegation is following with great interest the preparatory work for the trial inspection experiment in the informal group led by Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. The successful completion of the trial inspection experiments by the interested States will hopefully contribute a considerable amount of practical experience in the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This in its turn will facilitate the final clarification of the remaining issues in this field.

Our interest in the preparations for the trial inspection experiment also testifies to the fact that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic continues to attach the greatest importance to the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the complete and comprehensive prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons for all States without exception, as has just been wisely pointed out by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, in his statement. With a view to the possibly early conclusion of the convention, our authorities have conducted a thorough review of the position of the Hungarian chemical industry vis-à-vis the convention. As a result of that review, and in order to promote

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openness in the multilateral exchange of relevant data, our Minister for Foreign Affairs in his statement of 4 February 1988 supplied information to the Conference on the production and use for peaceful purposes of relevant chemicals by our chemical industry. My predecessor's statement of 29 March 1988 further elaborated on the data previously supplied.

Among the signals of the forthcoming closure of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament is the fact that the ad hoc committees are introducing their reports to the plenary one after the other. We will hopefully soon receive the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances chaired by my distinguished colleague Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria. I hope that the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and outer space will soon be in a position to submit their reports, enabling the CD to close its 1988 session.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by wishing you well in your important office? I am convinced that you will guide the Conference successfully through the final days of its present session and into the next session in 1989.

For several years, Finland has participated in the work of this important negotiating forum. I have asked for the floor today to introduce to you the second Finnish research report or "blue book" for 1988. This is the thirteenth report in the series on "Methodology and instrumentation for sampling and analysis in the verification of chemical disarmament". The first report of this year (CD/843) was introduced to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the middle of July, and was entitled "Standard operating procedures for the verification of chemical disarmament; D.1 a proposal for procedures supporting the reference data base". The present report (CD/873) is entitled "Computer-aided techniques for the verification of chemical disarmament; E.1 verification data base". Copies of the report will be distributed to delegations together with my statement.

The future chemical weapons convention will demand extensive declarations and detailed plans from the States parties. Verification of the implementation of the convention will require a huge amount of exact and reliable reference data to be readily available to the technical secretariat. The verification process will continue throughout the lifetime of the convention, and will produce mountains of data and an unwieldy number of reports and documents. The management of all this must be such as to ensure reliability and confidentiality. For all these reasons we feel that computer-aided techniques are the only reasonable approach to the task.

In this report we look at the possibility of applying computerized techniques to the storage and handling of verification data. The computerized data base is referred to as the verification data base. The applicability of the different techniques currently available for data management is discussed, and ways of exploiting them are outlined.

We have constructed a prototype data base based on the relational data base technique for the storage of analytical reference data, that is, data which are needed to unambiguously identify chemical compounds using different

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analytical techniques. The data base also includes tentative structures for storage of other than analytical data. These data include "static" data on the verification domain, such as organizations, targets etc., and data on operational procedures, such as inspection reports.

For the purposes of CW verification, the feasible data base techniques needed are: structural data base, text data base, chemical structures data base, picture and image data base, and reference data base. In designing the data architecture we have considered what data are to be stored, the format in which the data are stored, where the data should be physically stored, how these data would be used and by whom, data security, and how long the data should be preserved.

We illustrate how data base techniques could support the various procedures of CW verification. Some of the procedures we describe are preparatory procedures that could be introduced immediately. Others, the actual verification procedures, would be introduced only later, after the future convention enters into force.

For example, the creation of an open international verification data base would ease and speed up the exchange of information on research being done in different countries. The identification procedures for banned chemicals will have to be internationally agreed upon. By way of assistance, the data base could act as an evaluation forum for newly developed procedures. Such a forum would benefit all participants by allowing a review of research being done elsewhere, and instant feedback for one's own research.

If international co-operation between laboratories were to be arranged with a view to creating internationally accepted standard operating procedures for the analyses, the data base could be used for obtaining the preliminary working instructions, and for the storage of the results and comments on the methods. This would allow the status and progress to be continuously monitored, and facilitate statistical evaluations of the results. If the development work were to lead to scientifically sound and reproducible identification methods, the procedures could be used to produce reference data for the future international inspectorate on the compounds listed in the convention. The procedures could then be left to the preparatory commission for approval. This work would considerably diminish the work of the preparatory commission in its duty of developing procedures and instrumentation for verification, and training inspectors to use them. The data base would be an ideal tool to keep track of laboratories, timetables, statistical evaluation of the results, and distribution of the summary of results to each participating laboratory.

The main advantage of the CW verification data base will be achieved after the entry into force of the convention, when the actual verification process begins. The main activities that the data base can support are: storage of documentation, time scheduling, preparations for an inspection, registration of the inspection results, decision-making, reporting, sample tracking and acting as a reference data bank for laboratories.

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A well-organized document storage data base would facilitate the management of all the documents in the form of declarations, reports, facility attachments and so on, and reduce the personnel required for supporting administrative work, and thereby the overall cost of verification.

A time-scheduling system is a tool for work planning to ensure that all activities take place at the proper time and that personnel are available for the job. The future convention will specify a number of time-limits applying to different activities. If all agreed-upon timetables for all activities are entered into the data base, the data base can be used for planning timetables so that, for example, the inspections will not pile up in certain months. Those routine inspections that do not have a predetermined date could be planned so as to fit into slack parts of the timetable.

After entry into force of the convention, facility attachments will be prepared in accordance with model agreements for each declared facility. They will state all necessary points for verification, which instruments are to be used and where they will be installed, and so on. Each facility attachment, or relevant part of it, could be entered into the verification data base to serve as a check-list of all tasks to be performed during the inspection. A facility-specific list of all documents, equipment, spare parts, etc., needed during inspection, could be generated. The inspection report could be written on a text-processing system and stored into a text data base.

Nearly all the data collected during the verification of the implementation of the convention will have to be evaluated. This evaluation will be the most important task of inspectors, and a very laborious one too. The data will have to be checked for consistency with the earlier agreements, declarations and inspection reports. This may necessitate going through a large number of different documents. Here the capabilities of the data base for combination of data could be extensively used. Samples collected during inspection and not analysed on site will be sent to the laboratory at headquarters or to other accredited laboratories for analysis. The data base could aid in choosing the particular laboratory, using the information stored on available facilities.

Using the sample codes, the accredited laboratory could enter the results obtained by different analytical techniques directly into the sample data base. The system could compare the results obtained from control samples with the actual contents of the samples and indicate any inconsistency. The procedure would guarantee impartial analyses and protect proprietary information, since the analytical laboratories would not know the target from which the samples had been collected, nor by whom.

The accredited laboratories analysing the verification samples could use the analytical part of the data base containing the identification data and standard operating procedures. These data could also be made available to the laboratories of the national authorities to allow use of identical reference data needed, for example, to analyse duplicate samples collected during inspections. The sample and reaction data bases would be available to the personnel of the international inspectorate on a "need to know" basis only. However, the accredited laboratories should be able to enter their analytical results in the sample data base on "write only" basis through the sample codes.

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If full advantage is to be taken of computerized techniques, various supporting systems will probably be needed, in addition to the verification data base. The supporting systems could comprise the personal computer system of the inspector, a laboratory information management system for a verification laboratory, instrumental data systems for mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry, data systems of the automatic monitors, and general-purpose international data banks.

A technical description of the prototype data base developed within the Finnish project is given in the report. The system is based on a relational data base (RDB/VMS), and runs on a MicroVax II supermicrocomputer. We have adopted an iterative data-oriented approach that relies on rapid prototyping techniques because verification procedures in the verification are not yet well defined.

The prototype system contains analytical reference data and operational data. We have focused our description on the analytical reference data since our experience lies mostly in analytical techniques and data handling. Reference-type data from organizations and targets etc. are included only to illustrate the possibilities of the data base. As operational procedures have not yet been agreed upon within the CD, or are to be agreed upon later within the preparatory commission, the description of operational data is far from complete.

Data on chemical compounds should be actively updated to be as complete as possible when the convention enters into force. New compounds may be included after the initial declarations. At the moment, our data base contains few identification data on the chemicals listed in the schedules of the convention, for we are now producing fresh data using these standard operating procedures for analyses described in our previous report (CD/843). We consider the use of identical conditions for recording the reference data and the actual verification data of samples to be essential for reliable identification. Our work in this field has been facilitated by the kind donation of listed chemicals by the United Kingdom. We are also very pleased by a detailed offer from Switzerland to provide us with listed chemicals. We also appreciate the interest shown by a number of other countries in providing us with such chemicals.

A user's manual for our prototype system is included in the report. Concurrently with the publication of this report we are offering the prototype system for international experimentation and evaluation, with the purpose of demonstrating the use of this kind of computer system for management of verification data. We encourage users to supply comments and contribute new ideas. User names and passwords will be provided on request to all the States participating in the negotiations. To encourage evaluation and ideas for further development of the system, we hope to be able to arrange a user's training course in the near future.

User names and passwords can be applied for by completing and returning to the delegation of Finland the application form attached to my circulated statement. At the moment, we have no restrictions as to the number of possible users of our prototype system, so that each delegation can decide how many users it would like to have. We would appreciate comments and

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suggestions from laboratories active in this field so as to further develop our prototype system for the day-to-day use of the future technical secretariat.

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Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic):

The negotiations on the CW convention have again been the focus of attention at this year's Conference. We would like to express our gratitude especially to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka from Poland, and also to the co-ordinators of the three working groups, Andrej Cima from Czechoslovakia, Pablo Macedo from Mexico and Sadaaki Numata from Japan, for having accomplished such comprehensive and committed work. They have created the best possible prerequisites for progressing in our negotiations. A number of positive results have been achieved to date, and conditions for solving other complex issues have improved. On the other hand, numerous delegations have justly pointed to the slackened pace in the completion of the convention text. Intensive work pursued in an atmosphere of increasing political resolve and confidence could remedy this situation.

United Nations Security Council resolution 620 (1988) has positive impact on our work. It serves to promote the elaboration of international instruments against the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, this resolution explicitly makes reference to the negotiations in our Conference on a comprehensive and effective CW ban. We have also taken note of the

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statement made to this Conference only recently by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Burns, in which he reaffirmed his country's commitment to earnestly continue to work for a chemical weapons ban in the time to come, irrespective of the outcome of the presidential elections.

Let me now turn to some substantive issues of the draft convention. We welcome the fact that some headway has been made in the further elaboration of article II and the annex to article V. This was due to an agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the definition of production facilities for chemical weapons and the obligations to be undertaken by States in connection with their destruction. These provisions serve to ensure the security of all States in the 10-year phase after the convention enters into force. My delegation would like to reiterate the view that during this period any production of chemical weapons must be prohibited, and any exemption of CW stocks and production facilities from "international arrest" must be ruled out.

Great efforts have been made with a view to solving the outstanding problems in respect of article VI. It would certainly be of crucial importance to reach total agreement on a régime for schedule [1] chemicals. My delegation tried to promote an understanding by submitting working paper CD/CW/WP.195. A compromise solution could provide for the concentration of production of schedule [1] chemicals in a small-scale production facility. Two exceptions to this principle may be contemplated. The first concerns production for special pharmaceutical purposes. Evidence has been furnished in support citing one example, i.e. the production of nitrogen mustard. The production of this chemical in quantities corresponding to actual needs should be facilitated. The verification measures to be applied in this case would have to focus on guaranteeing the complete use of this chemical for pharmaceutical products. This régime would cease to apply once the chemical became an ingredient of the final product, i.e. medicine.

The second exceptional case could be synthesis for fundamental research or medical purposes. In this regard, we consider upper thresholds of 10 or 100 grams per year to be sufficient. Laboratories carrying out such synthesis ought to be specifically licensed by the Government concerned and should be required to submit a declaration to the technical secretariat. Furthermore, their number should be as limited as possible. Consultations on these questions should continue.

An answer also needs to be given to the question regarding the protection of confidential information in connection with article VI. As can be seen from our working paper CD/CW/WP.194, many passages in the draft convention testify to the fact that careful attention has been devoted to this matter for a long time. It has been suggested that information and data should be classified according to their degree of confidentiality. We support this proposal and are prepared to participate in the discussions on this subject. We would like to recall that the duties to be performed in this connection by the Director-General of the technical secretariat have already been set out in article VIII, which provides that a régime should be established governing the handling and protection of confidential data. The preparatory commission could work out a model for such a régime containing also a classification of information in different categories.

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There exists another problem in respect of former category [4]. In our opinion, it cannot be doubted that there are chemicals and facilities outside categories [1] to [3] which pose a risk to the convention. Attempts to identify them and to establish an appropriate régime have been in vain. But nevertheless they must be continued in future.

Considerable efforts have been undertaken to further elaborate on the problem of challenge inspection. This especially applies to the role of the executive council after the presentation of a report on such an inspection. The principles drafted last year under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus from Sweden have been amended. This is a foundation to build on. Intensive work has been accomplished concerning the guidelines on the international inspectorate for the conduct of challenge inspections. My delegation made a contribution to this end by presenting working paper CD/CW/WP.198. It provides for important elements to be added to the existing guidelines contained in the addendum. What needs to be done is to finally agree on some basic issues with a view to formulating the relevant provisions in detail. We hope that our ideas regarding special procedures set forth in our outline of a manual for challenge inspections, which was submitted to the Ad hoc Committee as working paper CD/CW/WP.208, will meet with a positive response. A profound understanding of those practical matters should help resolve the questions of principle.

Regrettably, no progress has been made so far concerning the composition of the executive council, decision-making and other procedural matters. We have proposed a solution in document CD/812. Its underlying aim is to set up an effective organ whose balanced composition and democratic functioning would guarantee that decisions are taken corresponding to the security interests of all contracting parties.

Positive developments are beginning to take shape in terms of activities which are undertaken parallel to the negotiations with the aim of promoting the early conclusion of the convention, its entry into force as soon as possible as well as universal adherence to it. In the first place, mention must be made of exchanges of data and information on the possession and non-possession of chemical weapons and CW production facilities as well as activities covered by article VI. The German Democratic Republic has supported the initiative of the Soviet Union since February 1988. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of our country, Mr. Oskar Fischer, declared in his statement at SSOD-III that the German Democratic Republic does not possess or produce any chemical weapons. Today I am in a position to supplement this declaration by introducing a working paper which will appear as document CD/871.

The compilation of the data provided in our working paper was made on the basis of schedules [1] to [3] of the present draft convention in CD/831, taking into account chemicals on which preliminary agreement has been reached so far. The data have been compiled relying on information gathered with the support of the competent organs and institutions. They reflect the situation in 1988. The compilation is of a preliminary nature and is subject to further refinement following the conclusion of the convention. The ranges for production, processing or consumption mentioned in our working paper have been chosen taking into account the situation in our industry. The number of

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facilities set out in the working paper correspond to the number of locations. The presentation of the above-mentioned working paper is another practical step on the part of the German Democratic Republic to promote progress in the negotiations, increase confidence and contribute to the early conclusion of the convention. We reaffirm our resolve to be among the first to sign and ratify it.

Several countries plan to conduct national trial inspections as a first step in multilateral experiments. The German Democratic Republic also plans to carry out such a national experiment, before the end of this year. Preparations are in full swing. Our thanks are due to Ambassador Ekéus for his readiness to co-ordinate the activities of the countries participating in these activities.

Considerations have been put forward on how to ensure the broadest possible adherence to the convention upon its entry into force. An interesting idea has been aired in this regard, namely the convening of a special conference for this purpose. The forthcoming forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly will offer a first opportunity to take up this question. I would like to make a few observations on how to take advantage of that opportunity.

When dealing with the report of the CD to the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, it would be advisable to inform all United Nations Member States about the state of the negotiations and the tasks to be solved prior to the entry into force of the convention. This we deem all the more important since the "rolling text" is not easy to grasp for those States not involved in the CD negotiations. The Chairman of the CW Committee could give an account of the state of the negotiations, and comments could be added by the item co-ordinators from the various groups. All delegations would thereafter have an opportunity to enter into an exchange of opinions. Informal consultations between delegations would be an additional form of discussion. A concluding statement by the Chairman of the First Committee and/or a draft resolution, if appropriate, would be suitable for recording the results of these activities.

In dealing with activities aimed at fostering the early conclusion of a global convention, I should also like to draw your attention to regional measures to this end. I have especially in mind the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe. We are firmly convinced that the establishment of such a zone in parallel with the preparation of a global CW ban would significantly stimulate the world-wide convention and promote universal adherence to it. The situation in which we find ourselves should impel us to combine all our efforts in the CD to conclude the convention banning all chemical weapons as soon as possible by vigorously pursuing our work on its articles and annexes. This is the only way to fulfil the task our Conference is facing.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

I will now turn to my second subject, chemical weapons. I think we all here around this table share the objective of the establishment of a comprehensive agreement effectively banning the production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons. I hope that all of us also have the same perception of the urgent need to reach agreement on such an effectively verifiable convention. Recent reports on the repeated use of chemical weapons

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speaking for themselves. They underline the urgency of the matter. Chemical weapons not only present a grave potential risk, they actually represent an atrocious reality. We note with deep concern the reports on the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population. We do not know the extent to which these weapons have been used, but such use, if true, is abhorrent.

After the many reports on the issue, there may be a tendency in public opinion to accept the use of chemical weapons almost as a kind of routine matter; not as a man-made disaster, but as a nature-made accident. Let me state emphatically that we consider the continuous violation of the letter and spirit of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 an inadmissible offence against international law and humanity which must be strongly condemned by the world community. Such violations must be stopped for ever. The world community must stand united here and work through appropriate channels, including the Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and elsewhere, to apply the strongest pressure possible to stop this crime.

In the complex negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons we have made progress on a number of issues this year. Many problems remain, some of a more technical character, some of much wider scope, touching on security concerns, inter alia during the 10-year transitional period. These problems need to be fully discussed. But for the Netherlands the basic scope of the treaty on which we have been working for such a long time is clear. Under the convention all production of chemical weapons by parties will be forbidden, and the destruction and complete elimination of stocks and production facilities must take effect within a 10-year period.

Some remarks have been made recently about the amount of detail which has to be worked out before the convention is ready for signature. There is no doubt that the provisions of the convention must be crystal clear before we enter into far-reaching commitments, which, by the way, also have to be translated into national legislation. But every time we dig into the details, we must ask ourselves whether the common sense of the Director-General of the future secretariat, where necessary under the guidance of the executive council or the conference of States parties, would not enable him to cross bridges when these are reached. We cannot foresee all situations that may occur.

Notwithstanding the many points that still have to be worked out, the "rolling text" of the draft treaty is shaping up. There is growing consensus on the main orientations of its provisions. However, this is not yet the case with article VI, on the régime necessary to verify that permitted capabilities are not used for forbidden purposes. We trust that the national trial inspections to be conducted by a number of countries will help to solve some problems, in particular concerning schedule [2] facilities. You may be aware that the Netherlands held such a trial inspection two years ago. We are at present looking into the possibility of additional activities in this field.

Some major conceptual problems remain, however, in the context of article VI. I note the very interesting idea of so-called ad hoc checks, which may present a solution to deter illegal production in facilities capable of producing chemicals relevant to the convention but not falling under

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routine verification procedures. Much work remains to be done to understand all the consequences of the system of ad hoc checks, such as the types of chemical facilities or sites to be listed, the kind of checks inspectors may perform and the selection of the facilities or sites to be checked. In view of the potential importance of ad hoc checks within the overall system of verification of non-production, we consider serious in-depth discussion of this concept essential.

The convention will be a very complex agreement. We have already long since passed the point at which we can explain it to our children. Yet the need for logical consistency remains. In this connection, I would like to raise the issue of the need for schedule [4], or schedule [...] as it is now called, on super-toxic lethal chemicals. For my delegation the three dots are, for the time being, three question marks.

Three major reasons have been given for including schedule [4] in the convention. First, schedule [1] only lists STLCs that have actually been used to fill chemical munitions. According to the proponents, schedule [4] would have to cover other STLCs. It seems to us, however, that most chemicals liable for introduction in schedule [4] are unsuitable for chemical warfare. And if they are, they would be much better put into one of the other three schedules.

Second, it is argued that some of the facilities producing super-toxic materials may at present not be relevant for chemical warfare, but could none the less be used for producing chemical warfare agents. According to the proponents, such CW-capable facilities would be covered if a schedule [4] were introduced. However, this would only be a very partial solution, as most of the facilities with a capability for producing chemicals relevant to the convention would not fall under schedule [4]. In other words, facilities producing STLCs constitute only one amongst various categories with such a potential capability. An adequate system of ad hoc checks would in our view be much better to address these problems, as this would cover all relevant chemical facilities.

Third, proponents of schedule [4] apparently also consider such a scheme appropriate because it could offer the opportunity for verification of the non-development of chemical weapon agents. But in our view non-development is another issue that cannot be covered by a régime which is meant to check the non-production of known chemical weapon agents and their precursors in militarily relevant quantities. Development almost by definition implies that the agent is still unknown and that the quantities produced are irrelevant. If a verification régime for non-development is at all possible, it would be better taken up separately. In that case, we must address the question of what development exactly is - which stages must be passed before development becomes relevant with respect to the purposes of the convention. We may be able to elaborate some confidence-building measures, comparable to those agreed during the last review conference of the biological weapons Convention, which would suit the purpose.

All in all, it will require much time to resolve the complex issues of verifying non-production and related matters, taking also into account the

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discussions with industry that are needed to find optimum solutions. We therefore hope that delegations will focus their attention on these questions, so as to find adequate solutions within a reasonable time span.

Verification may prove to be the most time-consuming and most intricate problem to be solved before the convention can be drafted in its final shape. But the greatest political challenge may well be to ensure maximum participation by countries in the convention. The question is not only that those countries that at present participate in our work - the 40 member countries of the Conference and the 15 or so others that have joined us and make their contribution - should sign and ratify the convention. The question is also how to encourage other countries to take an interest in the enterprise. We think it is too early yet to foresee what procedures are most suitable to ensure that the convention becomes a truly global convention. One element could be the holding of a final conference open to all States once the details of the convention have been worked out.

At this stage we wish to limit ourselves to one observation valid for the short term. In the Netherlands' view, all countries that are interested in joining the work at present are welcome as observers. We fully understand that various countries, perhaps for practical reasons, do not have the opportunity yet to be represented in the daily affairs of the negotiations. But we do hope that representatives of those countries at least find an opportunity to get acquainted with the reports we have produced, and, if they so wish, put questions on an informal and individual basis to those of us here who are more closely associated with the work. This could be of use to us, and it may eventually also facilitate the ratification process once the convention is established.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

I would now like to turn to the question of chemical weapons. Work in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention has continued in 1988 against a backdrop of intensified and escalated use of these weapons of mass destruction. The situation is serious. We are faced with a threat of further proliferation of chemical weapons and further development of chemical warfare agents and methods for their dissemination. Recent United Nations reports on the continued use of these weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, as well as other reports in its aftermath, demonstrate in a tragic way the importance of concluding our work without further delay. A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons would, by its effectiveness and globality, insure us all against the resurgence of chemical warfare, from the very date of its entry into force. This is what is expected by the Conference on Disarmament. Our work must be inspired by a new sense of urgency to address and solve all outstanding issues. For Sweden, the completion of a chemical weapons convention is a major priority of the Conference. That goal is within reach. Our success would also imbue the multilateral disarmament process with new confidence, with a new sense of purpose.

However, and much to our regret, we must note that our work in 1988 has fallen short of the repeated calls for renewed or even continuing urgency. Some important issues have hardly been addressed; solving others has taken unnecessary time and effort. We are conscious that substantive progress has taken place in bilateral work between the two major possessors of chemical weapons. We welcome this progress and are acutely aware of its importance, as an illustration of how bilateral and multilateral efforts can support and reinforce each other. We would however urge the two major possessors of chemical weapons to intensify their efforts and to present their results and agreements in a form which would facilitate their transfer to the multilateral context, i.e. into the "rolling text".

Yet if we feel frustrated by the slow pace of our negotiations, it would not be fair to paint too gloomy a picture. During the present session the Committee, under the steady and patient chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has made some substantive progress. The efforts and the dedication of the three working group chairmen, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have not been in vain. The report which the Conference is presenting to the General Assembly contains valuable new elements.

I will mention some of them, if I may. The Chairman of Group A was able to bring to the report a well-balanced, carefully drafted text on article XI, "Economic and technological development". His success in this endeavour was in part made possible by the flexibility shown by members of the Group of 21, for which this article is of special importance. We regret, however, that the present text of article XI has not been included in appendix I of the report. The arguments that the text is at an early stage of elaboration and that no

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common understanding exists as to the terms and definitions employed in it are hardly convincing. The text of the article has been thoroughly discussed with inputs from delegations of all groups. Its terms and definitions have to a large extent been borrowed from the biological weapons Convention, which has been signed and ratified by most members of the Conference.

The major breakthrough in Working Group B has been the integration into the "rolling text" of a definition of chemical weapons production facilities and of clear language with regard to the undertaking that these facilities should be destroyed, as well as principles and methods for their destruction.

In Working Group C, the Chairman has managed to make considerable progress on the issue of challenge inspections and on procedures following the submission of inspection reports.

As a result of consultations on the final clauses, conducted by the Chairman of the Committee, well-structured elements presented as alternatives are included in appendix II. They form the necessary basis for completion of this important part of the draft convention. Furthermore, the meeting with industrial experts in July highlighted a number of points regarding confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, and also served to illustrate that the chemical industry in major industrialized countries is committed to facilitating the implementation of the convention.

Finally, substantial and results-oriented work has been made in the open-ended consultations on trial inspections. Having chaired those meetings, I will revert to the issue of trial inspections and report to the Conference on the results of our constructive deliberations at the end of my intervention.

Thus, the results which the Conference is able to present this year are tangible even if they are far from sufficient. I will briefly make some observations with regard to the problems that still remain unsolved and indicate areas where, in the view of my delegation, we will have to concentrate our efforts during the inter-sessional work and during the coming session.

Article I remains the very backbone of the draft convention and the basis for all our work. As a result of this summer session it has been further strengthened through the unambiguous undertaking by all States in paragraph 6 to destroy their chemical weapons production facilities. Remaining brackets seem less difficult to deal with. Consultations will have to be undertaken regarding preparation for use, a problem which is also linked to the issue of development of chemical weapons. The question of "jurisdiction or control" could be solved in relation to other articles.

The clarity and comprehensiveness of our scope provisions provide the practical and moral rationale for the whole draft convention and, in the view of Sweden, remaining issues can and must be solved without any major modifications of article I, which has acquired a definitive and timeless character.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The same cannot be said about article II, another basic provision of our draft convention. Certainly, the inclusion of an agreed definition of chemical weapons production facilities this summer is a significant step forward. Other parts of the article, however, have not been addressed in substance for too long a period. The present text reflects an early stage of our negotiations and does not fully correspond to the present stage of chemical weapons technology. Definitions under article II must be basic and applicable to the future. However, the present language in article II has a provisional character; it has, on that basis, served us well up to a point, but it has not been of much help in the latest negotiations on article VI and its various régimes. Progress in those negotiations on activities not prohibited by the convention can bring us closer to a new set of definitions and methods of handling them. As a first step in dealing with the problem of definitions the Committee should, in our view, address article II and the schedules under article VI comprehensively in order to transfer relevant lists of chemicals together with some definitions, criteria and guidelines to a special annex on chemicals. Mechanisms for revision should ensure that this annex could be kept up to date. Article II itself should contain only fundamental and permanent definitions and criteria.

Article III, on declarations, does not seem to require any further work at this stage of the negotiations. The only outstanding issue is to fix a date as of which declarations should be made. In view of the comprehensiveness of the definitions of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, it would seem practical to choose the later date indicated in the text, i.e. 26 March 1975. This would help us to avoid unnecessary ambiguities in implementation, which could lead to irrelevant and potentially harmful challenge situations.

The main task remaining in articles IV and V is to agree on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. These articles and their annexes are of pivotal importance for the implementation of article I so as to ensure the undiminished security of all States, including minor possessors of chemical weapons. This problem has been under consideration for a number of years. Useful material with regard to the principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons is now included in appendix II and reflects a rather advanced stage of elaboration. It is, however, clear that differences on the subject remain.

Most States have never seen the need for chemical weapons in their arsenals and others, like the United Kingdom, have unilaterally decided to destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities, obviously without experiencing profound feelings of diminished security. Still, States evidently have concerns regarding the destruction period. The proposal by France in CD/CW/WP.199 and the difficult discussion on the Committee's report these last few weeks convey the message that there exists a problem which has to be solved. Sweden therefore welcomes the consensus that the issue must be addressed in full. In doing so, however, we maintain that any solution to the problem of undiminished security must be found through a balanced and asymmetrical levelling out of chemical weapons stocks and a balanced phasing out of chemical weapons production facilities.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Sweden, and indeed the whole of the Group of 21, does however reject the possibility of continued production or use of chemical weapons during the destruction period. This would constitute an open invitation to the legalized proliferation of chemical weapons, and would discriminate against all States which have refrained from such production. The draft convention is designed to prohibit the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and not to regulate how to produce, how to stockpile and when to use them.

Activities not prohibited by the convention, covered by article VI and its annex, constitute an area where we have not been able to make any major progress during this session. We hope that the industrial experts' discussion on confidentiality, the convincing demonstration of non-intrusive verification equipment like the "sample now, analyse later" (SNAL) concept introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, and not least the planned process of trial inspections will provide us with fresh material and new insights so that rapid progress can be made. We must provide for effective inspection régimes but at the same time not allow ourselves to get bogged down in technical details which could usefully be left to the preparatory commission and the technical secretariat to solve.

The main goal of article VI must be to provide for measures that would give States parties to the convention confidence that the basic undertaking not to produce chemical weapons is fulfilled by all States parties. The article provides for methods and principles to control relevant production of chemicals in order to verify either that certain chemicals are not produced or that production of toxic chemicals and their precursors is for purposes not prohibited by the convention.

Our choice of approach must take account of several interests. First, we must provide for a high degree of probability that violations of the convention are detected and reported. This means a stringent régime of verification of declared facilities. In addition to the provisions for challenge inspections, there also seems to be a need to extend the possibility for inspections on a politically less visible level to facilities not declared under the respective schedules. Second, the hampering of research, development and production for peaceful purposes must be avoided. Especially at the most sensitive stage, research and development, legitimate concerns regarding commercial and industrial secrets must be respected. Third, the régime must be easily adaptable to future technological developments. To achieve such adaptability the principles and objectives of verification must be clearly and unambiguously stated, while on the other side the technical verification methods and procedures, as well as the lists of relevant chemicals subject to control, could be smoothly changed and updated in consonance with new technical achievements. Fourth, the régime must be designed in such a way that it can be implemented without incurring unacceptable costs and an unmanageable administration. It should thus be not only effective, but also efficient.

If we decide in the negotiations to widen the scope of routine inspections to undeclared facilities, as is proposed with the concept of ad hoc checks, we must be able to establish, first, that such a régime really would increase our confidence in the convention, secondly that it is made sufficiently effective in order not to create ambiguities which might decrease

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

our confidence, and thirdly that the costs are commensurate with the objective. We must establish what the objective of ad hoc checks is supposed to be. Are we looking for undeclared production of listed chemicals? Do we want to control unlisted chemicals that could have military uses? Do we want to check that production capacity is not misused? A purely random, almost accidental, selection for inspection from an enormous number of facilities, most of which could not even be transformed for CW-related production, would be neither efficient nor effective.

Trying to verify what is not verifiable does not create confidence. Verification must be applied to what is relevant and significant. Verification cannot be an aim in itself. A case in point is the area of early research and development of chemical weapons, an issue which has been intensively discussed this summer. My delegation is not convinced that certain proposals advanced during the discussion on this specific issue lead us in the right direction.

The first stages of research and development of chemicals for weapons use in laboratories are undistinguishable from legitimate research for protection purposes. As far as chemicals not included in schedule [1] are concerned, such research is undistinguishable from legitimate research regarding environmental protection, industrial safety, medical or agricultural purposes. We must choose a stage in the development process where verification becomes meaningful, that is a stage where it could conceivably be possible to demonstrate a violation of the convention, or at least a serious inexplicable anomaly. This would hardly be possible before research and development have left the laboratories and entered a pilot plant or weapons testing phase.

A very brief outline of the Swedish position on article VI would be the following. Production of schedule [1] chemicals must be confined to single small-scale production facilities, with the exception of laboratory-scale synthesis and production for medical purposes of up to 10 kg a year. As far as schedule [2] chemicals are concerned, the régime as it now stands seems practicable on paper. The trial inspections will hopefully give us enough experience to finalize that régime. The régime for schedule [3] will need further elaboration. A system of spot checks could usefully be explored. As regards the last, unnumbered schedule, which was also touched upon by Ambassador van Schaik in his speech today, it seems to my delegation that it is the capacity of a given facility that would justify its being subject to control arrangements, rather than the actual chemicals it may be producing. The schedule might even be deleted if we were able to devise another method for identifying and controlling potential (from the technical point of view) facilities for production of chemical warfare agents.

As I have already mentioned, all the lists should be revised and updated and transferred together with relevant criteria and guidelines to a separate annex on chemicals.

In article VII there still remains a heading regarding national technical means without any text. My delegation would consider any language that may be proposed under the heading with great interest. If no such text is forthcoming we would suggest that the heading should simply be dropped next session.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

In article VIII the basic structure of the Organization has acquired almost final form. The core issue that remains to be solved is the composition, procedure and decision-making of the executive council. We maintain a flexible attitude on the relevant provisions. Our main concern is to make the executive council both representative and efficient. This leads us to favour a comparatively small body, certainly not bigger than the Board of Governors of IAEA. The composition of the executive council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution. We fully understand the concerns of some States which, because of their level of industrial development, would carry a higher burden of routine inspections, and their wish for special representation. Those concerns could however be met within the framework of political and geographical criteria.

As to decision-making, rules that would be conducive to consensus should be striven for. Efficient and effective powers of decision-making, however, call for the possibility of voting, and the application of qualified majorities would seem appropriate. With respect to the required majority it is difficult to decide whether it should be two thirds or three quarters, as long as the composition and the full extent and nature of the decisions to be taken by the council are not known. Composition and decision-making must be addressed in parallel. It is also doubtful whether a solution can be found until articles VI, IX, X, XIII and XIV have been fully elaborated. At a later stage it might be useful to consider a differentiated approach to decision-making, implying that different kinds of decisions will be taken with different majorities.

The complex and difficult issue of how to initiate a challenge inspection under article IX, and the principles for the conduct of such inspections within the parameter of no right of refusal, has not yet been finally worked out. The material to be found in appendix II constitutes a sound basis for treaty language that would reflect a balanced approach to the interests of reassurance and security on the one hand and national integrity on the other.

Otherwise, it is the view of my delegation that progress in Working Group C under the skilful and energetic chairmanship of Mr. Numata has been a major achievement this summer. The general rules governing inspections under article IX, now included in the addendum to appendix I, constitute a comprehensive outline. It is our hope that the efforts will continue in such a way that the relevant part of the draft convention can be completed early next session.

Another issue addressed in Working Group C is reflected in a new text in appendix II on the procedure to be followed after the submission of the report. Some problems still remain in that text. Basically the question concerns the extent to which the executive council must, or should, or can express itself on the inspection report and what special importance, if any, should be given to the assessment of the requesting State.

For Sweden it seems obvious that the executive council must be given a high degree of freedom of action. We must therefore rule out a provision which would impose on the council the obligation to determine whether or not a violation of the convention has taken place. Sometimes this would simply not

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

be feasible. On the other hand, we cannot deny the council the right to state that a violation has taken place if this has been substantiated by the inspection.

Article X, on assistance, has been thoroughly debated, especially during the summer session. The result, however, is disappointing. The text that now appears in appendix II is heavily bracketed and contains clearly contradictory elements. It seems necessary to reconsider the whole article. The main assurance against the use of chemical weapons lies in a convention of comprehensive scope, effectively verified and universally adhered to. This is the convention we are elaborating. If we conclude such a convention, the issues addressed in article X acquire a rather academic and theoretical character. Nevertheless, such a provision serves a purpose during the transitional period, and can therefore be viewed as yet another way of tackling the issue of undiminished security. But to serve a purpose it must be realistic in scope and possible to implement. Basically it must contain provisions for assistance in cases of chemical weapons use. Such provisions ought to be easy to elaborate. We have, regrettably, growing experience of extending such assistance to victims of chemical warfare. Furthermore, it can contain provisions for facilitating co-operation in the development by member States of programmes in the field of protection against chemical weapons use. Such co-operation must, however, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For many non-possessors of chemical weapons, undiminished security during the transitional period depends on a high degree of confidentiality regarding their own national programmes and equipment for protection against the use of chemical weapons. That national security interest is incompatible with the concept of model agreements.

I have already at the outset mentioned our progress regarding article XI. Suffice it to repeat briefly that in the view of my delegation the remaining brackets could be removed and the text transferred to appendix I.

As far as the final clauses are concerned, article XII has become a stumbling-block. For Sweden, as for many other delegations, our whole work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were to be transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This convention, as of its entry into force, unambiguously rules out the use of chemical weapons, and that means any use of chemical weapons. This does not mean that those "rights" fully cease. They will have a residual character, but only as a result of withdrawal from the convention. To solve the issue the proposal put forward by Canada that article XII should simply be deleted merits full consideration. It goes without saying that the convention would not limit the obligations under the Geneva Protocol.

The Swedish view on the issue of use leads us to the conclusion that States parties, in exercising their national sovereignty, will have the right to withdraw from the convention if extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the convention have jeopardized their supreme interests. This right should only take effect if scope for remedying the situation under the convention has been exhausted.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Openness and transparency are indeed important for our work. Sweden welcomes the declarations that have been made during this session regarding the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. In this context, I am instructed to declare that Sweden does not possess chemical weapons.

This concludes my intervention in my capacity as the leader of the Swedish delegation. With your permission, however, I wish in my capacity as Chairman of the open-ended informal consultations on trial inspections to present a report on the work undertaken on that subject.

In the draft chemical weapons convention, a number of provisions relate to on-site inspections within the chemical industry. In order to expedite work on the convention, and to assess whether the proposed text has adequate and practical provisions to provide the necessary assurance to States that civil facilities are used only for purposes not prohibited by the convention, it has been suggested that trial inspections could be undertaken.

In a first stage, such trial inspections should be carried out on a national basis. In the second stage, the experience in the national trial inspections should be pooled and evaluated together, in the light of the relevant provisions of the draft convention. This process could be devoted to discussion of what might be involved in, and elaboration of, modalities for the third stage: trial inspections with multilateral participation.

Under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee, and at the request of the Ad hoc Committee Chairman, I held informal, open-ended consultations to prepare the ground for such multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry. As a result of these consultations a paper was elaborated. This paper has now been distributed to you. The paper is primarily intended to assist interested States in their preparations for the national trial inspections. The suggestions contained in the paper are not in any way binding or mandatory, but can be regarded as a list of issues of relevance to the trial inspections. The paper will be issued as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee by the Chairman of the consultations.

As was agreed during the preparations for this round of consultations, delegations are free to add their comments to the paper before the end of this session. The present document, as I said, is issued under the responsibility of the Chairman of the consultations. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part (part A - General approach) could be used for the development of scenarios for the trial inspections. The second part (part B - Detailed approach) provides a kind of check-list for the elaboration of procedures for the conduct of the trial inspections. The third part (part C - Specific aspects) provides a list of issues which might be addressed by the trial inspections. Parts of the paper could also be used by States as a reference in preparing reports of the results of their national trial inspections.

Information available regarding the national trial inspections could be discussed during the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The detailed elaboration of modalities for the multilateral trial inspections could commence in the 1989 spring session with a view to beginning the actual inspections as soon as possible after these modalities have been worked out.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany):

Next Thursday the Conference on Disarmament will be presented with the report of its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the working groups, Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, for the committed efforts and the hard work they have undertaken during the past session to move the negotiations forward.

On 16 August I promised a further contribution on ad hoc checks in the light of comments made since my delegation presented the case for ad hoc checks in working document CD/791 of 25 January this year. The purpose of the proposed ad hoc checks is to come to terms with the existing verification gap and provide an additional and easily manageable possibility for monitoring also those chemical industry facilities which would not be covered by on-site inspections under the provisions so far contained in the "rolling text".

Encouraged by the interest which was shown in our basic idea, we proceeded to elaborate on our concept of ad hoc checks. Today I would like to introduce document CD/869, which, taking account of the interesting discussions we have had on the issue in recent months, tries to develop the concept further, and I hope it will provide a useful basis for future work aimed at strengthening the verification régime for non-production.

In submitting this paper we do not claim to provide all the answers; rather, it is our intention to stimulate further thinking. The following points mark the basic framework from which we propose to proceed. Ad hoc checks are of a complementary nature; they are to be seen solely in the context of article VI, and represent an additional, unintrusive measure for verifying non-production, their main purpose being to verify the absence of substances listed in schedules [1], [2] and [3]; ad hoc checks are of a strictly routine character, with the technical secretariat initiating them on a random basis without any outside interference; and they are to cover the whole chemical industry on the basis of national registers listing all chemical industry facilities in accordance with an agreed definition.

(continued)

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

We hope that our paper will contribute to finalizing expeditiously the provisions on non-production in the "rolling text". In our view it should help to resolve some of the problems which have arisen in the context of article VI, for which we have so far not been able to work out solutions acceptable to all. In this regard I am thinking particularly of the STLC problem which has been debated for a considerable time and on which differences persist. Today's remarks in the Conference seem, in part, to confirm this view. Ad hoc checks could offer a solution to this problem, and thus help to overcome the deadlock on it in the negotiations. Admittedly ad hoc checks, due to their very nature, may not be the answer to all questions which have been raised with regard to the verification requirements of an effective convention. Therefore, I believe that all concerns in this connection warrant our close attention.

In conclusion I would like to express my satisfaction at the prospect of inter-sessional work starting on 29 November this year. We should make the best possible use of the time available during the agreed inter-sessional period. Indeed, I believe that we should not use the inter-sessionals merely to continue our work along the familiar lines. Rather, we might think of focusing our attention on the few specific items we have agreed to deal with during that period. It should be possible as a result of intensive work to make considerable headway on these issues. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, will be able to count on the full and active co-operation and support of my delegation.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Before introducing to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which I have had the honour to chair during this session, let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective way you are performing your duties as President of the Conference in the usually difficult last month of the session. In seeing you, representative of Iran, in the Chair of the President, I cannot but use this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere hope that the talks on stopping the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf, which have started at Geneva, will soon bring the favourable solution awaited by the whole world.

I have the pleasure today to present to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as contained in document CD/874. This report was adopted in its entirety by the Ad hoc Committee at its 21st meeting on 12 September. During this year's session the Committee has worked again on the basis of the same mandate which was given to the Committee for the first time in 1984. This mandate is indicated in paragraph 1 of the report.

As agreed at the beginning of the session, the Committee dealt with all the articles of the draft convention, as indicated in its preliminary structure. The work was carried on in three working groups chaired by Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan. In addition I held a number of open-ended consultations on articles XII to XVI of the draft convention.

Under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee, and at my request, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden held informal, open-ended consultations to prepare the ground for multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry. The results of these consultations are included in working paper CD/CW/WP.213. I wish to express to Ambassador Ekéus my deep gratitude for his efforts and efficiency in performing these duties.

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(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

In July, a meeting of chemical industry experts from many countries was held. Let me again turn to the Swedish delegation and thank Dr. Santesson, who put a lot of effort into chairing this useful meeting.

If we turn to the report we can see that, in general, it maintains the structure and follows the pattern of previous sessions. It consists of several parts on which I would like to comment briefly.

In the so-called technical part I would like to draw your attention to the conclusions and recommendations, especially the recommendations on inter-sessional work to be held in two phases before the beginning of the 1989 session. The session of limited duration in January is to be preceded by open-ended consultations. Both are needed more than ever as we are at a decisive and very specific stage of the negotiations. The inter-sessional work corresponds well with the often reiterated wish of public opinion for the early conclusion of a global, comprehensive draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As I have already touched upon the inter-sessional work, let me take this opportunity to inform the delegations that as a result of my consultations, I propose that during the open-ended consultations in November, December and during the resumed session in January we should concentrate our efforts on the following main issues: confidentiality with regard to verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry; undiminished security during the destruction period; guidelines on the international inspectorate; and article X on assistance.

Turning to the report, may I draw your attention to appendix I, which represents the updated version of the "rolling text" of the draft convention, thus reflecting the present stage of elaboration of the provisions of the draft convention. That is why it can be considered as a fundamental part of the report. As you will see, progress has been made in many important areas. Changes of various kinds, from very substantive improvements to rather editorial corrections, have been introduced in a majority of the articles and annexes. I assume that these changes are well known to the delegations and that there is no need to go into detailed identification and evaluation of them.

Let me, however, point out some of the achievements which I would place among the most important during this session. In article II the term "chemical weapons production facility" has been largely agreed upon. Article V, and especially the annex to this article, have been further developed and rectified. A new part of the guidelines on the international inspectorate concerning general rules governing inspections under article IX has been developed and agreed upon. I wish to stress, however, that despite hard and intensive work by all of us during the whole session, the results achieved, though important, are not - at least in my view - fully satisfactory.

Appendix II represents negotiating material at a less advanced stage. It contains papers reflecting the results of work undertaken so far on issues under the convention. Its content illustrates its transitional character.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

New material has been added; other material has been further developed or moved into appendix I. I have, however, a feeling that in some areas we could have achieved more.

It is therefore necessary to look at appendix I and appendix II as two parts of one entity. Only using this approach can the work of the Committee be seen in the proper perspective. Each delegation will, on its own, and in the light of its own expectations, analyse and evaluate the progress achieved. For my part, I will only say that we have worked hard, with devotion, in a good business-like atmosphere, and credit for that goes to all delegations, item co-ordinators and individual delegates who did not spare their time and good will to help us move forward.

I warmly thank my collaborators Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, whose strenuous efforts have been crucial to what we have achieved in the "rolling text". I am convinced that we will continue our excellent co-operation during the inter-sessional consultations and the resumed session next January. My special thanks go to the Secretary of our Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, and his assistant Ms. Darby, for their constant devotion and tireless hard work. I wish also to express my gratitude to the interpreters and all the technical staff who have helped the work of the Ad hoc Committee to proceed smoothly and effectively.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The prohibition of chemical weapons continued to be the only CD item where real negotiations on an international convention were under way. Some positive results were achieved this year. The Ad hoc Committee has reached

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

agreement on the definition of CW production facilities, and the relevant text has been included in the main body of the future convention. The socialist countries welcome this development as a substantive contribution to the important process of identifying and completely destroying CW production facilities. They also welcome the fact that article XI, on which practical work was initiated only at the end of last year's session, has been substantially developed. In the view of the socialist countries, economic and technological development and co-operation in the field of peaceful chemistry should have its due place in a convention prohibiting CW, taking chemical industry under control and thus objectively imposing certain restrictions on those involved in it. They regret that the present text of article XI could not be included in appendix I of the "rolling text".

More clarity has been achieved with regard to the functions of and interrelationship between the organs to be set up under the future convention, including the enumeration of the specific functions of the technical secretariat. Active consultations on the composition, procedure and decision-making of the executive council have revealed possibilities for convergence of views in some areas. With regard to on-site inspection on challenge, possible building-blocks for the process after the submission of the report have been discussed and are now reflected in appendix II. Further development of article X as well as practical work undertaken on the final clauses also represent positive results of this year's session. Another positive element in the negotiations was furnished by first steps in the process of multilateral data exchange, to which socialist States made their contribution both by presenting relevant data and by putting forward ideas on the scope of the exchange. This process should be continued and further developed. Future negotiations can also be assisted by the carrying out and appropriate evaluation of the multilateral experiment involving trial inspections of chemical industry facilities, as suggested at the beginning of this session by the Soviet Union. The Group of Socialist Countries expresses its hope that the experiment is going to be carried out as expeditiously as possible, at both national and international levels, so that it will influence our work positively at an early stage of the next CD session. It would be helpful if the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons were asked at the beginning of next year's session to start the final drafting of the chemical weapons convention.

Non-production of chemical weapons has emerged as one of the most important unsettled areas. The socialist countries consider that a strict verification régime is required in order to ensure that chemical weapons are not developed and produced in the future under the guise of peaceful chemical activities. Appropriate forms of monitoring and verification should be applied to various kinds of such activities, depending on the risks to the convention. It would be potentially harmful to the convention if verification were applied only to some areas, while some other fields of activity were left without any monitoring and verification. The Group of Socialist Countries hopes that the verification of non-production of chemical weapons will be treated in all its dimensions. There is also a need for a more goal-oriented approach to work on article II, on-site challenge inspection and some other important questions.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

What is needed now is a much more acute sense of urgency in the upcoming inter-sessional work and at next year's session of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We must not forget that while we are "successfully" developing the "rolling text" of the chemical weapons convention, new chemical weapons are being produced and stockpiled and chemical weapons are being used on an unprecedented scale. The overall sophistication of chemical weapons will make it more and more difficult to trace them in the wide network of chemical industry facilities; their further proliferation is contrary to the basic objectives of the convention we are negotiating. In this connection the Group of Socialist Countries considers the continued production, modernization or acquisition of chemical weapons after the chemical weapons convention enters into force to be unacceptable, since that could lead to further proliferation of chemical weapons and would thus be contrary to the objectives of the convention. The security of the States parties can be ensured immediately after its entry into force through the implementation of a number of measures which would freeze chemical weapon stocks at current levels and would lead to their gradual, balanced and complete destruction.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America):

Overall, the results of the negotiations this summer present a mixed picture. Ironically, this does not stem from the lack of a common purpose. The members of the Conference share a common objective - a complete, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the three working groups, Mr. Numata, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Cima, have worked in a serious and dedicated way to bring such a convention into being. We appreciate their commitment and their hard work. Furthermore, we are pleased that, despite some differences, the Ad hoc Committee was finally able to find compromises that allowed it to reach agreement on its report. In particular, the Committee has recommended that a new procedure be established that should end the repeated disputes over listing of documents in its reports, reduce unnecessary duplication, and promote the principle of fiscal responsibility. The United States delegation will continue to seek ways to make economies in the work of the Committee, while not harming the substantive negotiations. I might add that this effort, in line with the overall need to economise, should extend across the board to other areas of the Conference's work.

However, the fact remains that the tempo of progress has slowed down when it should be maintained at a pace reflecting the continuing urgency of our work. An example is the work on the so-called "final clauses", where there has even been backward movement. I would like to offer this morning some constructive suggestions for moving ahead. These suggestions can be grouped into three categories: first, greater participation and openness; second, a focus on the hard problems; and third, an effort to find creative approaches. I would like to outline our own ideas on each of these categories.

With regard to greater participation, the United States is encouraged by the fact that the importance of achieving a truly global ban is increasingly recognized. For example, the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Egypt have made constructive suggestions for consulting countries who are not currently represented in the negotiations. We welcome these ideas.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

Attracting the attention of non-member States is very important. But it should not be forgotten that active participation by members of the Conference is even more important. If a truly global convention is to be achieved, negotiators must hear and take into account the views of a wide variety of States. Toward this end, there needs to be more vigorous discussion at all levels. We would encourage other delegations, particularly those neutral and non-aligned delegations who have not done so recently, to present their views both in the plenary sessions and in the negotiating working groups. Active participation in the negotiations is seen as an important expression of commitment.

Another important form of commitment is support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That agreement provides the foundation for negotiation of a complete ban on chemical weapons. All of us must do everything possible to prevent further erosion of the norm it contains. For States that are parties to the Geneva Protocol that means taking action to stop the continuing violations that have been found. In this connection, I wish to inform the Conference that the United States is gravely concerned over the reports of Iraqi use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population. We have stressed this concern, and the potential impact on United States-Iraqi relations, to the Government of Iraq at a very high level. The United States has been consulting with United Nations officials, Security Council members, and others on the need for an impartial investigation by a team of experts.

States that are not party to the Protocol should accede to it - as suggested by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Sir Geoffrey Howe, during the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. Regrettably, as noted by Ambassador Solesby in her plenary statement on 16 August, some members of the Conference have still to become parties to the Protocol.

Greater openness is also a form of commitment. We welcome the data that have been presented this summer with the aim of facilitating the negotiations. I am referring particularly to the data provided in the statement by Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia on 17 July, and in the working papers from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The United States delegation also presented new data to the Conference. None the less, much more information is needed, particularly from socialist and neutral/non-aligned delegations. For example, nearly one fourth of the members of the Conference have apparently not yet even indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. A number of countries with known significant chemical industries have not yet indicated whether they have industrial facilities subject to the convention's monitoring provisions. We urge countries that have not yet provided these kinds of general information to do so in the near future.

It is probably human nature to want to avoid difficult and sensitive issues. But avoiding the hard issues in the negotiations will only prolong efforts to complete the draft convention. Instead, the Conference needs to identify the real obstacles to an agreement and to deal with them. To stimulate this process, I would like to highlight three issues that the United States delegation believes are central to the success of the negotiations.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

One of the most difficult and sensitive issues is certainly the problem of ensuring undiminished security during the transition period, that is, during the 10-year period in which chemical weapons and their production facilities are being destroyed. As a country that has maintained a deterrent chemical weapons capability as an important aspect of its overall security, the United States considers it essential that, as this capability is phased out, our security, and that of our allies, remain undiminished. We certainly share the concerns expressed by others on this subject. We believe that it is high time to deal directly with these matters, in order to determine the nature and extent of the problem and to exchange views on how the issue may be resolved to the satisfaction of all. We welcome the plan to discuss these concerns, which could affect several articles of the convention, in the inter-sessional discussions.

Another issue that the Committee needs to come to grips with is how to deal with the possible development of new agents. This issue has been raised recently by the delegations of the Soviet Union, Italy, the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia. We share the view that the provisions of the draft convention need to be scrutinized carefully to make sure that they deal as effectively as possible with the potential threat from new agents. Let us look at the real issue, though, not at a shadow of it. Our impression is that the concern expressed by some delegations about laboratory synthesis of small quantities of schedule [1] chemicals is really a concern about development of new agents. The Ad hoc Committee has had months of fruitless debate over proposals for declaration of such laboratories. We share the concerns expressed by the Swedish delegation on 13 September about these proposals. So far the Committee has not tackled the underlying problem, the new agent issue, which has been allowed to block progress on other issues related to schedule [1]. Our delegation believes that those issues should be settled promptly and that the Committee should then focus on the new agent issue separately.

The third key issue I want to raise today is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Intensive consultations held by Ambassador Ekéus during the 1987 session demonstrated clearly that, although there is broad support for a mandatory régime, serious reservations still exist on the part of some delegations. Recognizing that a continued head-on approach would not be productive and that other aspects of the challenge inspection régime have an important role in shaping views of delegations, the Chairman of Working Group C, Mr. Numata, perceptively has focused work this year in these other areas. Under his patient and skilful leadership the discussions have been very productive, and have led to important additions to the "rolling text". We believe that this successful work will facilitate resolution of the central issue of the mandatory nature of challenge inspections when the discussions focus on it again. In this connection, I would also like to express appreciation for the recent working paper on challenge inspection procedures by the German Democratic Republic. This very useful paper is the latest in a series of significant contributions from the German Democratic Republic, and I might add, on a personal note, that our delegation regrets very sincerely the departure of Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic and his important contributions to the Conference will be long remembered.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

Clearly, the issues I have mentioned are not the only difficult ones remaining. Ambassador Ekéus listed other issues in his important statement on Tuesday. Other delegations may want to highlight other issues as well. We urge them to do so in order that everyone may have a clear picture of where the real problems lie. A convention will only be achieved with a better sense of priorities and the scope of the work remaining.

I want to emphasize the need for creative approaches to the unique challenges posed by a chemical weapons ban. This year a number of imaginative ideas have been put forward, for example, suggestions for promoting a truly global convention; for building confidence during the negotiations; for creating a badly needed data base; for testing inspection procedures; and for increasing the effectiveness of the régime for monitoring the chemical industry. Open-ended consultations on trial inspections, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, have produced a valuable compilation of suggestions. In each case the authors of these ideas have each made an important contribution. They have given us new, potentially fruitful approaches to the complex and difficult problems that must be resolved.

In addition, Norway has presented further results of its very useful studies on investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. Finland has also presented additional findings of its uniquely thorough research. We consider these research efforts on verification methods to be important contributions to the progress of the negotiations. These contributions enrich the negotiations and provide the intellectual capital needed to construct a sound agreement. In short, they are part of our common effort to move forward together toward the achievement of a convention that truly meets the security needs of the world community.

Many more new ideas are needed - and from more delegations. Those who wish to see further progress in the negotiations have an obligation to contribute the new ideas that will make this progress a reality. We hope that when the negotiations resume, such additional proposals will be forthcoming and that further progress will be the result.

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Mr. ASIF EZDI (Pakistan):

The importance of a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons is more evident today than it has ever been before. Independent investigations by the United Nations have made repeated findings of the almost routine use of these weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. Among the victims have been not only military personnel but also innocent civilians. The world-wide outrage and distress at this flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol was not, however, sufficient to deter the use of these abhorrent weapons. On the contrary, their use was intensified and became more frequent in later months. We view these developments with grave concern. The Iran-Iraq war has demonstrated the military utility of chemical weapons. These weapons have helped the users in winning successes on the battlefield. The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons seems to have been weakened. These are lessons which will have to be borne in mind in our task of drafting an effective chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

At the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there was general recognition of the importance of the early achievement of a convention banning chemical weapons and of pursuing this matter as one of continuing urgency. We would like to place on record our appreciation for the dynamism and skill with which the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, and the three group chairmen, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have guided our work. However, despite their resourcefulness and hard work, the results achieved this summer have fallen short of expectations. It seems that our negotiations are losing momentum.

We are mindful of the difficult problems which still remain, some of which are essentially of a technical nature, while others are political in character. In tackling these issues, and as we work through the details of the draft convention, we should never lose sight of our goal - a convention which ensures that no significant violation goes undetected and which guarantees undiminished security to all States parties. Only such a convention would be viable and capable of attracting wide adherence.

Our discussions in Working Group A on monitoring non-production in the chemical industry have not been encouraging. The texts of article VI and its annex which were handed down to us at the beginning of the session have not been developed to any significant extent. On some of the issues, we have seen a restatement of old positions rather than a serious effort to find solutions. We do not underestimate the complexity of the task of elaborating an effective verification régime for a vast industry producing all kinds of chemicals for a variety of purposes and posing different levels of risk to the convention. We also acknowledge that no undue impediments should be placed in the way of legitimate industrial activities. However, the paramount consideration should be to evolve mechanisms which create confidence in the observance of the convention and, where such be the case, bring non-compliance to light. If we have to err, we should err on the side of greater, not less, intrusiveness.

Although no concrete progress was registered under article VI, considerable useful work was done nevertheless. Our dialogue with representatives of the chemical industry this summer was a useful experience. The concept of ad hoc checks was given a further airing, and the problem of confidentiality of information was taken up in a focused manner for the first time. Both these questions address legitimate concerns and will need further detailed study. As my delegation stated earlier this year, the problem of clandestine production in facilities not subject to routine inspections is a real one. In trying to solve it, we should be careful not to give the technical secretariat any powers which could compromise its non-political character. We understand the importance which industry attaches to the protection of sensitive information vis-à-vis commercial competitors. These concerns should not, however, be allowed to override the need for effective verification. Considerations of commercial advantage, we feel, should here yield to those of national security.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

We welcome the readiness shown by several countries producing chemicals relevant to the convention to conduct experiments at the national level to test verification procedures under the convention and to pool their experience for evaluation in the Ad hoc Committee. This exercise should be followed by multilateral trial experiments at an early date. We have no doubt that the results of these experiments would be helpful in developing and refining inspection procedures. In this context, I should like to express appreciation for the valuable work done by Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden as Chairman of the open-ended consultations on trial inspections.

My delegation as well as most of the other members of the Group of 21 attach special importance to article XI, concerning economic and technological development. This subject was discussed intensively in Group A, and a text which is very largely free of brackets was evolved. My delegation had expected that, like other texts which have received in-depth consideration and on which a wide measure of agreement has been achieved, the language negotiated on article XI would be placed in appendix I. Regrettably, some delegations have seen fit to oppose its inclusion in the "rolling text" on grounds which we find totally unconvincing.

The agreement reached in Working Group B on a definition of production facilities, on the principle that all such facilities would be destroyed and on the consequent changes in articles II and V of the "rolling text" is one of the major achievements of this year's session. The question of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities remains a major problem area. As we have said in the past, any concerns about security in the destruction period should be addressed by appropriate adjustments in the order of destruction. The maintenance of secret stocks or continued production during this period would however be in conflict with the basic purposes of the convention.

The importance of article X for a viable convention which ensures undiminished security for all participants can hardly be over-emphasized. It would be unrealistic to imagine that the chemical weapons threat would vanish with the signature or entry into force of the convention. Before becoming a party to it, each State would have to satisfy itself that by doing so it did not become more vulnerable to a chemical weapons attack by a potential adversary. These weapons have in the past been used against those who did not possess the ability to retaliate in kind and to protect themselves against these weapons. With a ban on the production and possession of chemical weapons, the importance of possessing a protective capacity would become even more important for parties to the convention. A sizeable number of countries possess this capability, but a larger number do not. It is, therefore, of vital importance that the convention should contain effective and reliable provisions on assistance in protective measures. It is only in this perspective that this question can realistically be addressed. The issues are not academic or theoretical in character, as one delegation suggested at our last meeting. They have a direct bearing on the national security of many countries and cannot be lightly dismissed.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

My delegation made some proposals this summer in Group B to make article X truly meaningful, including a proposal that States parties should conclude agreements with the Organization, on the basis of a model agreement, on the provision of assistance in protective measures. Certain delegations, however, would prefer to keep the provisions of article X nebulous and ill-defined. Such an approach is not likely to enhance the credibility or viability of the convention or to attract wide adherence to it. I should like here to express our appreciation for the statement made by Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union on 11 August 1988, in which he expressed support for provisions on collective measures by States parties under article X and for special agreements between States parties and the technical secretariat on this subject.

In Working Group C tangible progress was made in two specific areas connected with challenge inspection, i.e. the procedure after the submission of the report and guidelines for the conduct of challenge inspections. Many of the key problems in article IX remain, however. These should be resolved on the basis of a multilateral approach which recognizes the interest of each State party in the clarification of doubts which have given rise to a challenge inspection. For this purpose, the executive council should be given the power to resolve contentious issues.

Discussions on the final clauses of the convention under the guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee have served to clarify different aspects of the issues involved. We hope this will be a first step towards a solution of the problems. In our view, the convention should contain explicit provisions to preclude any reservations. Furthermore, any reservations made under the Geneva Protocol with regard to the prohibition of use would clearly be inconsistent with article I, and would therefore stand annulled for States parties to the convention.

We would like to express appreciation to those delegations which have provided information to the Conference on their chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities, as well as on other chemicals of relevance to the convention produced by them. This information will enhance mutual confidence and facilitate the task of developing effective procedures for verification.

Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt in his statement last week drew our attention to an important issue which has so far not been considered fully in our deliberations. I refer to the question of measures to be taken by States parties collectively against another country, whether a party to the convention or not, which uses chemical weapons or otherwise poses a chemical weapons threat to a State party. As recent instances of the use of chemical weapons have shown, a reprimand or condemnation by the international community is not an effective deterrent against their use. It is essential in addition that the international community should have a mechanism at its disposal to make the recalcitrant State desist from its acts, or at least to raise the costs for that State of pursuing such a course. The present "rolling text" already envisages the establishment of a multilateral institutional structure for the implementation of the convention. The question of which one or more

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

of its organs should be entrusted with responsibility for initiating measures to be taken against the offending State should now be taken up. While this organizational question falls essentially under article VIII, we also recognize that it has a bearing on other parts of the convention. It might therefore be worth while to deal with this issue in a separate article and to take it up during the inter-sessional period along with other subjects mentioned by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee a short while ago.

The importance of the universality of the chemical weapons convention has been emphasized by several delegations. We agree with this view. Universality can best be achieved if the provisions of the convention are such that each State finds that its security interests are better served by being a party to it than by staying out. In this context, we would like to underline that effective provisions on assistance and on action to be taken in cases of violation can serve as significant incentives for acceding to the Convention.

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Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Before making my statement today, I would like to invite the attention of the Conference to document CD/872 which I have asked to be circulated today. This provides the text of a statement made on 9 September by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, on the reported use of chemical weapons against Kurdish tribes in northern Iraq.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 483rd plenary meeting on the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with the programme of work, the Conference is to adopt today the reports of two subsidiary bodies, as well as its annual report to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As I announced at our plenary meeting last Thursday, we shall first take up for adoption the report of the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and chemical weapons. We shall now deal with the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/870. That document was circulated at our previous plenary meeting. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is contained in document CD/874, which was also circulated at our last plenary meeting. I put before the Conference for decision the report of the Ad hoc Committee. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

(The President)

It is most unfortunate that we have been victim of the most vicious and barbaric forms of weapons, i.e. chemical weapons. We have seen the extent of genocide by Iraqi forces not only against Iranian military and civilian targets but also against the Kurdish population of Iraq as well. More unfortunate than the crime is the inability of the international community to move against those who are committing these crimes. As my President in his message to the Conference has mentioned, we hope that shortcomings in international regulations governing the use of chemical weapons, genocide and all crimes against humanity and peace will be worked out so as to contribute to our resolve to finalize the convention concerning a ban on the production, storage, transport, transfer and use of chemical weapons.

I hope our shortcomings will not lead us to face other grim realities in the same way as in the case of the use of chemical weapons, where even the recognition and condemnation of the crime, let alone its punishment, is hostage to short-sighted and self-serving petty economic and political concerns. This inaction remained even after special technical teams dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations verified the extensive and frequent use of chemical weapons. To prevent a repetition of such horrors, the Conference as the sole international body responsible for multilateral negotiations on disarmament should be empowered to finalize expeditiously a comprehensive convention. A world free from threats of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and the threat of war in general. May future generations remember us as those who chose and achieved real progress in this area over and above exchanges of diplomatic niceties! Insha-Allah (God willing).

(The President)

As agreed by the Conference today in adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/874, and in accordance with paragraph 11 (d) of that report, the Ad hoc Committee will hold a session of limited duration during the period 17 January to 3 February 1989 and, in preparation for the resumed session, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee will be held between 29 November and 15 December 1988.

This plenary meeting stands adjourned and the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament is closed.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.



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