




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

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
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
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




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W I T H
Occasional REMARKS on the Fallacy of the
French HISTORICAL MEMORIAL.

The SECOND EDITION.

Hi Manus, ob Patriam pugnando, Vulnera passi?
VIRG.

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M D C C L X I.

miseration of the same august body? Every Englishman capitally tried has his country for his jury; but in the case I now lay before the public, that jury, without the intervention of the legislature, can do little more than recommend the unhappy prisoners, (for so in the present state I must deem our army in Germany,) to the mercy of death.

The reader is not here to imagine that I plead for the rich and opulent part of our army abroad. Too many, alas! in the same circumstances at home, confine their notions of want or misery only to what they themselves feel, or would feel, were they now serving in Westphalia; they never suffer their ideas to stoop to the case of the needy subaltern, or the distressed soldier. This inattention, this confinement of sentiment, has drawn upon the public the present address, in which the author will endeavour to prove the following propositions:

First, That our sending an army to Germany is no other than a secondary measure, subordinate, or which ought to have been subordinate, to the great cause of quarrel between France and Britain.

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Secondly, That when Great Britain had secured the main object she had in view, in making war, her interest led her to have recalled her troops from the continent.

Thirdly, That she might have done that, and yet have adhered strictly to her engagements with her allies in Germany, and have been enabled to have served them more effectually than she has done by the useless residence of her troops in that uncomfortable country for these twenty months past.

Fourthly, That Great-Britain has now no object of sufficient importance to detain her troops in Germany.

In discussing the first of these propositions, it is fair and reasonable to ask my reader, whether, though an angel had come down from heaven to persuade him, he could have believed that the late minister and his friends could have come into posts and power upon the anti-continental principles they adopted, and yet have been able to have carried the continental system to a height never known in this country, not even during its most violent attachments to such connections? I shall readily admit that France did in a

most scandalous manner hook into her quarrel with Great Britain, his majesty's electoral dominions in Germany. But sorry I am to say it, that our ministry, for these three or four years past, has connected together two considerations that in themselves are totally distinct, and ought to have no manner of reference the one to the other; and what is still more aggravating, this unnatural conjunction was first suggested by France herself.

The considerations I speak of are Great-Britain and Hanover, which France from the very beginning of the war, to the publication of her late famous historical memorial, has ever affected to blend, or more properly speaking, to confound together. Had our ministry treated those considerations as quite independent of each other, the public could not have suffered itself to have been led step by step to the ruinous connections it is now involved in, without the smallest emolument to ourselves; and without offering the least relief to our allies. The manifesto published by authority at Paris, in the year 1758, goes entirely upon the plan that France was justified in attacking the electoral dominions of Hanover, because they belonged to the king of Great Britain; and the historical
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memorial published by the same authority, in October 1761, proceeds upon the very same supposition. I shall not say whether it is the happiness or the misfortune of Great-Britain that foreigners, even the ablest and most learned, have a very incompetent knowledge of her constitution. Montesquieu, with all his penetration, and the advantage of a long residence in England, never could divest himself of the Frenchman's habit of thinking; and all the precautions which our ancestors took, by the act of succession, to separate the interests of Hanover from those of Great-Britain, have not to this day been able to impress a single foreigner with an idea that our constitution has rendered them distinct, and in some measure incompatible, interests.

Would to God that this mistake had been confined to foreigners, and that our ministers had not found it too easy to propagate the same at home! The generous concern which the English nation takes in every relation she bears towards other powers, especially to a people who have but one common sovereign with themselves, is extremely favourable to this illusion; and while it had not the fatal consequences that attend it now, there was not

not a man in England (one excepted,) malevolent enough to find fault with the assistance we gave to our friends in Germany, till at last our ideas united their case with our own, without recurring to a single principle of the constitution. When a message was presented by the minister, as many were, to enable his majesty to fulfil his continental engagements, the money granted was always, by the good-natured public, considered as granted for British purposes, and in a British quarrel; and our ministers were too polite to awaken us from that delusive dream. They were favoured by the injustice of France. She wanted to impose a disagreeable neutrality upon his late majesty, as elector of Hanover, which he magnanimously rejected; and England was thereby fired with so strong a resentment of the injury offered to her sovereign, that it seemed to require rather the curb than the spur of the ministry to direct it. The demanding a free passage for the French armies through the Hanoverian dominions; and the possession of Hamelen as a cautionary town, with many other tame compliances required by France, were insults too shocking for Englishmen to endure with patience; and their generous dis-

dain more than answered the minister's purposes; because it in a manner drove him from the principles of anti-continentalism, on which his power was founded.

As if every circumstance had contributed to ruin the anti-continental system, the accidents, for I can call them no other, that preceded the accession of the late minister to power, were the most favourable for his views that we can well imagine; and he improved them to the utmost. The invasion of Minorca; the disgrace of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, under admiral Byng; the loss of Fort St. Philip; the defeat of general Braddock; and all the other distresses and disgraces we underwent in North America, were ascribed to the mismanagement of our ministry at home; and though the clamour had not the least shadow of justice to support it, the government was thereby unhinged. From that time our continental engagements took place. When the French threatened to invade Hanover, no tongue moved, no pen was drawn in England against the duke of Cumberland putting himself at the head of an army of observation, though it was easily foreseen that a great part, to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds of the expence of that army

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my was to be defrayed by Great-Britain. Here however a scene opened, which proved to all Europe, that we were a thousand times more solicitous about the fate of Hanover than the Hanoverians themselves were.

The public perhaps has no occasion to be put in mind, that the battle of Hastenbeck, which was fought by his Royal Highness in July 1757, was chiefly unfortunate, through the untowardly situation the king of Prussia was then in, by losing the battle of Colin in the preceding month; and that his Royal Highness exerted against superior numbers military abilities that would have done honour to the greatest name in war. His army, through the excellent dispositions he made, had been but very little impaired; and the electorate of Hanover itself, at that time, contained within it above one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men. Such was the situation of that electorate, when one of the bravest and most enterprising princes of this age was obliged to conclude the capitulation of Closter-Seven, by which thirty-eight thousand Hanoverians laid down their arms. The public, even at that time, was so just to his Royal Highness, as never once to suspect that this capitulation was rendered necessary by his
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conduct, or that it was adopted by his choice. The people of England were equally just to his majesty; but they lamented his unfortunate situation. As being the common father of Hanoverians as of Britons, he could not withdraw his attention from the interests and safety of the former; and nothing is more certain than that the Hanoverian regency did prefer a safe subjection to France, to the precarious protection of her own elector. This option was a matter which our ministry of both parties did not think proper to touch upon; and it perhaps gave the venerable monarch more concealed pain than any incident of his reign had ever done. But, fortunately for him, the injustice of France relieved him; an injustice so barefaced that it has neither in itself, nor its consequences, a precedent in history.

The regency of Hanover having stipulated for themselves a kind of a feudal neutrality, for I know no other term by which I can call it, would very willingly have pocketed up all the disgraces and affronts offered to themselves for a quiet harmless enjoyment of their estates and properties. Unhappily two difficulties occurred to them. The first was the in-

dignities offered to their sovereign, and the second the gross oppressions inflicted on their fellow subjects, in direct contravention of the capitulation. His majesty, the late king, could not without the most sensible concern, see his Hanoverian subjects rendered hewers of wood and drawers of water, not to mention the unjust terms which France attempted to impose upon the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttle. Those indignities roused his late majesty into a generous resentment and detestation of the perfidy and tyranny of France; and from motives of mere humanity to his subjects, as well as of justice to himself, he ordered his Hanoverian army again to be put in motion; and in so doing he had the concurrence of the British parliament and the British nation.

In the late historical memorial published by the court of France, this affair is most scandalously misrepresented. His Royal Highness, the duke of Cumberland, in the very first memorial that was delivered to the count de Lynar, his Danish majesty's minister, under whose mediation the treaty of Closter-Seven was signed, informed that minister "that his view was to procure by means of that convention a
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suspension of arms on both sides, as the first means of a reconciliation." The baron de Schwegeld, on the tenth of September 1757, the very day on which that convention was signed, expressed the same idea to baron de Bernstorff, the Danish minister of state; and baron de Steinberg, another of his late majesty's ministers, as elector of Hanover, at the court of Vienna, wrote on the twenty-eighth of September to the count de Lynar, the mediating minister. "The promise of the king, (says the Hanoverian minister,) the duke of Brunswick, and the landgrave of Hesse, not to employ their troops during the present troubles, must be founded upon the hopes, that in consideration thereof their states shall be delivered from the oppression under which they at present groan, and that no pretences shall be made to put off this condition till a general peace, which a series of unforeseen events, of which the present year has furnished so great a number, may long prevent."

I have mentioned those letters which were published by authority for two reasons: my first is, to set the conduct of his late majesty and his r—l h—s in a just light, since it is plain that the treaty of Closter-Seven, was on their part no other

than a negotiation *ad interim*, and no formal treaty by which his majesty's electoral dominions were to remain in the hands of the enemy till a future, and perhaps a very distant, reconciliation of the two sovereigns should take place. Had the same been a formal treaty, or had it been understood to be so, either by his majesty or his royal highnesses, a formal ratification by his majesty in person of the same must have followed, which his majesty never thought proper to agree to. My other reason for mentioning those letters is, because I think they are sufficient evidences to prove that the whole of the convention of Closter-Seven was of His Majesty's original, and cooked up by his majesty's electoral ministers, to procure a temporary suspension of hostilities, and to secure their own estates from plunder. The goodness of his majesty's heart, and his being at a great distance from the scenes of action, made him give ear to the applications of the Hanoverian regency and ministry; and the convention of Closter-Seven was concluded. But in that convention there was no stipulation, as the French afterwards wickedly and ridiculously pretended, for the disarming the Hessian and Wolfenbuttle troops; and it was understood that his majesty's electoral

toral dominions were to be free from all military executions; and the convention was to continue only till the courts of Vienna and Versailles had accepted of, or rejected, the proposals for a definitive treaty. His late majesty had soon reason, from the conduct of the court of France, which endeavoured to add to the terms of the convention concluded under the Danish mediation, the most shameful and cruel stipulations, that he had been imposed upon by his H——n ministry. The king of Prussia was certainly of the same opinion, and extremely dissatisfied with the situation of the H——n army after the battle of Hastenbeck. “Had that army, (said the Berlin gazette,) marched directly to the Leine, and then taken post on the other side of Wolfenbüttele, Halberstadt, and Magdebourg, it might have waited securely under the cannon of the latter place, for the junction of the Prussian forces; instead of which, it turned off to the Lower Weser, retiring successively from Hamelen to Nyenburgh, Verden, Rotenburg, Boxtelhude, and lastly to Stade, where, for want of subsistence and elbow-room, the troops were all made *prisoners of war at large*. They made a march of one hundred and fifty miles, to get themselves

cooped up in a nook, instead of taking the other rout, which was only about one hundred miles, and would have led them to a place of safety." I shall make no observation upon this severe remonstrance; because a public writer is not authorised to say that the whole of this march was privately directed by the influence which the H——n ministry had at the c——t of L——n.

The injustice, however, and let me add, the egregious folly of the French ministers, delivered his late majesty from the most disagreeable situation he perhaps ever was in. They even protested against the validity of the convention, and refused to accept of his Danish majesty's guaranty, unless the H——n troops should take a solemn oath not to serve, during the war, against France or her allies; and Riche-lieu, the new hungry French General, insisted upon those conditions in the letter he wrote to Zastrow, the Hanoverian general, who commanded those troops after his r——l h——s's arrival at London that same year. Not contented with that, one of those vultures called French financiers, by name Jean Faigy, obtained from the court of Versailles an actual farm of the territories of his Britannic Majesty which were
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conquered, or to be conquered. And the said Jean, or John, Faidy actually erected a booth under the direction of one Gautier, another financier, his substitute, for that purpose, in the city of Hanover. This was not the only strain of French injustice inflicted on the unhappy electorate. His majesty's subjects there were reduced to a state equally distressed and disgraceful. His troops were confined to a spot of ground, where, had they continued longer, they must have perished for want of the common necessaries of life. His palaces, and those of his ministers, were threatened with immediate destruction, if the new terms imposed by France were not instantly complied with; and a thousand other violations of the convention of Closter-Seven were committed, each of them sufficient to induce his majesty to consider the validity of it as no longer existing. Notwithstanding all those provocations, so delicate was his late majesty in point of good faith, that after prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was appointed to the command of the Hanoverian army, and ordered to put it again into motion, that prince on the twenty-eighth of November gave Richelieu, in a letter from Stade, fair warning of what he was about. His Britannic majesty

jesty, about the same time, ordered a paper to be published in Germany, entitled, "A previous detail of the motives which induced his majesty the king of Great-Britain, in quality of elector of Brunswick Lunebourg, to take up arms against the army of France, which is again in motion." Accordingly on the twenty-third of January 1758, the British parliament granted, *nemine contradicente*, one hundred thousand pounds for a present supply in the then critical exigency, towards enabling his majesty to subsist and keep together the army formed last year in his electoral dominions, and then again put into motion, and actually employed against the common enemy, in concert with the king of Prussia.

From what is said above, the falshood of the fact charged in the French historical memorial, as if the chief pretence made use of on the part of the king of Great Britain for breaking the convention of Closter-Seven, was, "That the army which had capitulated belonged to the elector; and that the same army, which, contrary to the right of nations and all military laws, re-entered into action, was from that time to be considered as a British army:" This allegation, I say, from
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what has been observed, is false in fact. His majesty was justified by the anterior infractions of the capitulation on the part of France; nor had we, at the time that his majesty's German army was put into motion, taken either the Hessians or Hanoverians, Wolfenbuttlers, or Saxe-Gotha troops into our pay. The hundred thousand pounds, already mentioned to have been granted, was not voted, as we have seen, till the 23d of January 1758; and the first vote, relating to the Hessian troops, did not pass till February the 23d thereafter.

Having said thus much, I am sensible of the tenderness with which the Hanoverian ministry ought to be treated; and that it was very natural for them to endeavour, by the best means they could, to mitigate their miseries of war: but the same argument holds as good to Britons as to Hanoverians. The latter seem'd to have been so much convinc'd of the inutility of all their endeavours to save their electorate, that they appear'd chiefly solicitous, that his late majesty should be deprived of the means of making an effectual opposition against the power of France there. For this purpose they persuaded one of our most powerful German allies, I mean the

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duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbittel, to negotiate, even before the convention of Closter-Seven, a convention with France. It is true, this convention was not signed by the Brunswick minister till ten days after the convention of Closter-Seven was signed; but it is equally true, that it was signed at Vienna; and that ten days time was too short to have negotiated from Brunswick to Paris, and from Paris to Vienna. We are likewise to observe, that in the letter, written by the same duke to his brother prince Ferdinand, dated November 27, 1737, he expressly says, that he had accepted of the convention of Closter-Seven on the word of the Hanoverian ministry, and that he had, in CONFORMITY TO THEIR INSTURCTIONS, negotiated at Versailles and Vienna. If this was the case, if the defence of Hanover was given up by that ministry themselves, was the British ministry to undertake it at an expence, the most monstrous that any war we ever were engaged in, cost?

If our good faith, as I think it does, obliges us to assist our allies in Germany, it ought to be by those means that providence has put into our power. Had not his Prussian majesty's unexpected victory at Rosbach favoured his Britannic ma-

jesty's spirit in ordering his German army to re-assemble, it would not have been in our power to have taken the part we have done in the war; and yet all is insufficient; though the sufferings of our troops have been as unparallell'd, as the assistance we have given has been generous. The situation of Francfort, that had been treacherously seized by the French, gave them advantages that all our courage and efforts could not counterballance. It made them masters of the Mayne and the Rhine, secured their communication with the Austrian and Imperial armies; and, at the same time, opened their way for receiving what reinforcements and provisions they pleased. The necessity of dislodging them from that important post was apparent; and as soon as the season permitted, in the year 1758; prince Ferdinand the British general, for so we must now deem him, undertook that arduous task at the head of thirty thousand men. By this time, the vast reputation the British troops had acquired had entitled them to the post of honour, which was most complaisantly allowed to them by that general. Accordingly the hereditary prince of Brunswick put himself at the head of the flower of the British troops, led them through ways

that till then were deemed impassible by an army ; and, after defeating the French wherever he came, he obliged the duke de Broglie to take a strong post at Bergen, between Francfort and Hanau, where prince Ferdinand resolved to attack him. I shall not here enquire, though the enquiry perhaps would not be impertinent, whether his serene highness, had he been at the head of German troops only, would have thought proper to have made that attack, considering the almost impregnable situation of the French. The attack, however, was made by the British troops ; and perhaps none but British troops could have been led on to so desperate a service. Nothing of moment was done but by them ; and all the loss which the Germans suffered, was in the dispositions made by their general for covering his retreat, and thereby saving his army and himself from irretrievable destruction ; even *that* he could not have effected, had it not been by the valour and the farther expence of British blood. This unsuccessful attempt lost to his Britannic majesty's arms all the glorious consequences we had promised to ourselves. The progress of the French became more rapid than ever. Prince Ferdinand could scarcely maintain himself
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upon the defensive ; and the French must have wintered in Hanover, had not the almost miraculous battle of Minden interposed.

The reader will be pleased here to recollect, that we were, at this time, carrying on the whole war at the expence of near eleven millions a year ; of which about three millions went to Hessians and Hanoverians and for his Prussian majesty's subsidy. Besides this immense sum, we were paying above twenty thousand of our own troops ; and many officers of great fortune in our army there, cut deeply into their private estates, in supporting themselves and their fellow officers, whose pay, though greater than that of any troops in the world, was insufficient to relieve them under the inexpressible hardships they suffered. Of all this money, scarce a shilling of it came back to England ; Dutch, Jewish, and German contractors were the only gainers ; and even the miserable inhabitants of the country could not be said to have been benefited by it.

In the middle of the year 1759, the French extended their incursions to the very gates of Hanover, made themselves masters of Ritberg, Lipstadt, and Minden ; and it was with difficulty, that prince Ferdinand

Ferdinand preserved his communication with the Weser. At last, about the 25th of July, they took Munster, and in it four thousand troops. Those were conquests, that, considering the state of the war, and the great interest the Hanoverians had at stake, did not indicate any fierce spirit of aversion in them once more to submit to French government, especially as they had prince Ferdinand's army in the field; which was rendered in a manner inactive, by the rapid successes of the enemy, and the surrender of that electorate's strongest barrier. At last the day arrived that was to deliver his majesty's electoral dominions. But by whom were they delivered? not by German, but by British, valour. A few Hanoverians, indeed, by accident, as it would seem, seconded the irresistible impetuosity of the English infantry; but the rest of the Germans, in the battle which is properly called that of Minden or Thornhausen, acted as unconcerned spectators. Though I am far from vindicating the backwardness of the British general, in not bringing up his cavalry that day, yet it is certain, that, in the admirable defence he made upon his trial, he proved, past all contradiction, that the battle was won, both against the dispositions and the expectations

pectations of the German general; and the account published by the French themselves intimated the same. Another fact is past all doubt; that though the day on which the battle of Minden was fought, was to decide the fate of Hanover and of Hesse-Cassel, yet two thirds of those who were killed and wounded in this decisive action were British soldiers.

Before I proceed in my review of the dreadful consequences of continuing our troops in Germany, I must mention one circumstance of the utmost importance to the welfare and honour of our army serving in Germany; and that is the unfortunate situation they are in, by the British general serving under the command of a foreigner. I call this an unfortunate situation, because, could it have been remedied, it would have been so, by his late or present majesty. Gentlemen of the law are the best judges whether the unfortunate commander, who was tried and censured for his conduct at the battle of Minden, could have regularly refused to be tried for disobedience to the orders of a general, who, by the laws of England, was not duly qualified to command him. I have heard many gentlemen of great knowledge and probity in law, give their opinion in the
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affirmative ; and I never heard the negative advanced by any, but those who think that a royal commission conveys every kind of power, civil as well as military ; men who do not reflect that our martial law itself has no existence, but in the authority of our municipal law. For my own part, I should have been extremely glad if this material point had been tried and decided previous to the trial of the right honourable person ; and that the consciousness of his own innocence had not preposterously made him demand a trial, the event of which probably would have fixed, at the head of British troops, a British commander in chief, who, without being lavish of their blood, would have consulted their glory. But the opportunity is now lost, perhaps never to be retrieved, because of the precedent that has been introduced.

As the people of England are equally affected by the distresses as by the successes of sovereigns, the supplies granted by parliament for the support of the German war during 1759, though immense, were exceeded by those granted for the service of the year 1760. In order to enable us to supply that war with men as well as money, our militia had been embodied. New recruits all over the kingdom, in
Scot-

Scotland especially, were raised. An additional body of Hessians, consisting of nine hundred and twenty horse, and six thousand seventy-two foot, was taken into our pay. The treaty between his majesty and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, was renewed the 9th of November, 1759, (though it had been concluded no farther back than the 19th of January preceding;) and in consequence of the separate articles of that treaty, the sum of sixty thousand pounds was, in a manner, made a present of to his serene highness. On the 17th of January, 1760, no less than half a million of money was granted by parliament upon account, as a present supply towards defraying the charges of forage, bread, bread-waggon, train of artillery, and of provisions, wood, straw, &c. and other extraordinary expences and contingencies, of his majesty's combined army under the command of Prince Ferdinand; a new and a heavy expence, into which our continental connections have brought us. On the 11th of February following, thirty-four thousand three hundred and thirty-three pounds was granted for defraying the charge of an augmentation of one thousand one hundred light cavalry, the troops of Hanover, in the pay of

Great-Britain. That same day, the sum of twenty thousand seven hundred and seventy-six pounds was granted for defraying the charge of an augmentation of four squadrons of hunters and hussars, the troops of the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, in the pay of Great-Britain. The next vote, on the same day, granted the sum of fifty-two thousand nine hundred and two pounds, for defraying the charge of an augmentation of five battalions to the king's army in Germany; each battalion consisting of one troop of one hundred and one men, and four companies of foot of one hundred and twenty-five men in each company, with a corps of artillery. Thus, in one day, was voted the annual additional sum (fractions included) of one hundred eight thousand and twelve pounds, twelve shillings, and seven pence. But this was not all the expence. That of the militia in England and the new raised men in Scotland, was now more than doubled. On the 28th of April, two hundred and sixty thousand one hundred and four thousand pounds was granted for defraying the charge of the embodied militia in England, and of the sensible men of Argyleshire, and lord Sutherland's battalion of Highlanders in North-Britain. That same day, thirty thousand seven hundred

hundred and twenty-two pounds was granted upon account, for defraying the charge of cloathing the embodied militia for 1760.

It may be here objected, that the charge of the militia and the Scotch battalions, ought not to be placed to our German account; but a short answer lies to this objection, viz. that had it not been for our maintaining, at an exorbitant expence, twenty-five thousand of our best troops in Germany, there would have been no occasion to have rendered our militia, to all intents and purposes, regular troops, of embodying them, of harrassing them by marches and counter-marches, of putting their officers to extravagant expences, of bringing both them and their men under military law, and of leaving the lands of England in danger of being both uncultivated and depopulated.

About the time those votes passed, our government as well as our people, were seized with a most ridiculous notion, which the French court had artfully propagated, in order to rouse the generosity and benevolence of their own subjects, that their king and their government were bankrupt. This notion, which effectually answered the purposes of his most christian majesty,

was countenanced by the publication of several authentic pieces in France, by the example of many of her great men, who were not in the secret, and of some who were in it, who sent their plate to the mint, and their money to the treasury ; and the public of Great-Britain was, at this time, impressed with a firm opinion, that the king and queen of France had no more plate for their table, than a single salt-seller and a single spoon, which, like boys in a boarding-school after dinner, they carefully wiped and put into their pockets. The whole doctrine in our court, parliament, city, and country was, that the French was in the last agonies of their credit ; and that a very few more vigorous steps in Germany would infallibly ruin it past recovery.

This doctrine appeared so plausible, that, on the 29th of April, 1760, the sum of sixty-six thousand nine hundred and twenty-six pounds was granted by parliament for defraying the charge of nine hundred and fifty-nine cavalry, and one thousand four hundred and fifty-four infantry, the troops of the reigning duke of Brunswick, in the pay of Great-Britain, pursuant to treaty ; and that same day, the sum of twenty-three thousand eight hundred

dred and forty-three pounds was granted for defraying the charge of an augmentation to the troops of the reigning duke of Brunswick, in the pay of Great-Britain, pursuant to an ulterior convention, concluded and signed at Paderborn, the 5th of March, 1760. The next resolution which passed, was for granting the sum of one hundred one thousand and ninety-six pounds, for defraying the charge of two additional squadrons of hussars, and two companies of chasseurs, together with an augmentation to the horse, dragoons, and foot, the troops of the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, in the pay of Great-Britain, for 1760. Thus, in one day, of the same parliament was granted, in another addition to the expences of the German war, (fractions included) the sum of six hundred eleven thousand nine hundred and eighty-five pounds, thirteen shillings, and one penny halfpenny : so that, exclusive of the additional charge of the militia, of a vote of credit of one million, and many other charges, incurred on account of our German connections, the whole additional sum the German war cost us in 1760, amounted to seven hundred nineteen thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight pounds, five shillings, and eight pence halfpenny.

This

This sum added to our former, what I may call our standing, expences, amounts to above three millions a year. We are now to consider what we reaped after the battle of Minden, to compensate for this treasure and the British blood, which now fertilized the uncomfortable plains of Germany.

The campaign of 1759 had been as unfavourable to his Prussian majesty as it was glorious for us till the 11th of September, when the castle of Marpurg fell into our hands. By this time we had driven the enemy two hundred and fifty miles before us in Germany, without being possessed of a single advantage there which we had not at the opening of the campaign; and which we lost by the ill success of our unaccountable attack at Bergen. In fact, we were in a worse condition; for the Hanoverian general Imhoff did not retake Munster; and our German general did little more than attempt that siege, when he abandoned it. Though the public, from the distresses of the main body of the French, who had lost upwards of twenty thousand men, at and after the battle of Minden, by the valour and intrepidity of the British troops (for by reading the news-papers and gazettes, we can scarcely find that any other

other were employed in actions of enterprise and danger) were in the most sanguine expectations that our German general would have detached part of his army to the assistance of his Prussian majesty; and though it is said the latter expected and requested it in the most earnest manner, he being now in a most dangerous situation from the respective positions of the Austrians, Imperialists, Russians and Swedes, yet no such measure took place; though the junction was far from being impracticable; or even hazardous. This omission could not be owing, as was given out, though most falsely, to any disagreement, either amongst, or with, the British generals in the councils of war. They were, most of them, men of estates or easy fortunes; and those, if any, who were not, were enabled to live in their own country comfortably upon their pay. THEY, therefore, could have no reason for protracting the war. OTHERS, whose *trade* as well as *profession* is war, might have reason for continuing a little longer in *business*; and therefore, so far as the public has been acquainted, such a reinforcement never was sent; though, had it been sent, it is more than probable it would have put an end to the war and to the effusion of British blood;

blood; for little else was shed in that army. The consequence was, that the Russians drew near to the banks of the Oder, and Dohna, though now his Prussian majesty's favourite general, durst not attack them. Wedel, whom his Prussian majesty thought a more enterprising general, took Dohna's command; and though he made a most desperate attack upon the Russians, yet he was repulsed and obliged to repass the Oder; and then the Russians made themselves masters of Francfort upon that river, and of Crossen, and count Daun found means to reinforce the Russians with twelve thousand horse and eight thousand foot under the Austrian general Laudohn, which made their army very near one hundred thousand strong, and enabled them to beat his Prussian majesty at Cunnerdorf, where he lost more men than he had done in any one action during his former campaigns: for his killed, prisoners, and wounded, amounted to twenty thousand men. As it is not my design to enter farther into the history of his Prussian majesty's distresses or successes than as they are connected with those of the British army in Germany, I shall now, to make use of military terms, observe the motions of the latter.

The

The state of the British army, after the glorious things they had done in the year 1759, in Germany, can afford the reader no other than the most disagreeable ideas. The deliverers of Hanover were obliged to take up such winter quarters as the meanest fisherman's boy upon the Thames could not have put up with; and before they could open the campaign of the year 1760, their cavalry was ruined by mere want of food and forage; while the French troops, by commanding the Mayne, the Moselle, and the Rhine, had all provisions in plenty. When both armies took the field, nothing but a misunderstanding between the two French generals, Broglio, and St. Germain, could have saved the British troops from destruction; but this difference being removed, the allied army was obliged to retire towards the Dymel. It was, at this time, that the hereditary prince formed the glorious project of attacking the French at Corbach; and here the valour of our German allies proved more conspicuous than ever. The attack proved unsuccessful; and through the cowardice of the German horse and foot, who fled out of the field, the French bade fair to exterminate our army. Already a great body of their cavalry, assisted by a

numerous train of artillery, had begun the work, when the hereditary prince, in this desperate situation, put himself at the head of Howard's and Bland's dragoons, whose horses, by this time, had been recruited at a vast expence, and not only stopt the pursuit of the enemies cavalry, but drove them back to their posts, and secured the retreat of the fugitives to their main army.

An action so spirited, so fortunate, and so glorious, gave the young active prince a higher opinion of the British fidelity and valour, than he had reason to conceive of the German; and having formed the bold design of relieving Ziegenhagen, he chose Elliot's dragoons as his chief dependence for success. It is true he had with him at the same time six battalions of German troops, two brigades of hunters, and a regiment of hussars. But, by the event, they seem to have been led to the field rather for parade than use. Before they came up to the enemy, which was not till after a march of sixty miles, the Germans could do no more than just break a small party of the French troops; and, in doing that, they pretended to be so fatigued as to be unfit for farther action. By the courage, however, of Elliot's dragoons, who, by the bye, had never been in a field of battle
be-

before, he obtained the most glorious victory the allies could boast of, excepting that of Minden, since the commencement of the war. It may be here asked, how was the German cavalry of hunters and hussars employed during the action? All I can answer to this question is a fact, which is, that no more than eight Germans fell in the whole engagement, while the brave British regiment was almost ruined by their own successes, and by conquering for others.

I can give little or no reason for our German general in chief's inactivity at Saxenhausen, during, and after the glorious expedition of the hereditary prince to Corbach. It is certain that his situation was far from being so desperate as it was when the British infantry gained him the battle of Minden; but it is likely that the credit gained by our countrymen, at that battle, made him cautious of his employing their cavalry in the battle of Warburg, against the chevalier de Muy, which he was in hopes of carrying by his Germans alone. The English cavalry, at that action, was left five miles behind; but their generals and they had too much spirit to remain inactive. Though the former commander of the British troops had, in the

defence he made upon his trial alledged, that riding about half, or at most three quarters of a mile at a full trot, (which seems to have been admitted of by some general officers who sat judges on the trial,) must have blown their horses, and have rendered them unfit for action; yet the new British General, and he who was next in command, advanced with their cavalry, as is said, without orders, to have a share in the glory of this action. They marched the five miles upon somewhat that was more than a full trot, came up without any inconveniency or disorder, to engage their enemies, who upon this charge fell back. The British infantry and artillery made the same noble efforts. Some of them under the hereditary prince had gained considerable advantages over the flank and rear of the French, which had already turned the scale of victory in favour of the Germans, and the rest were so eager to engage, that many of them dropt down dead, in their endeavours to pass morasses and defiles, to come at their enemy, and rendered the victory decisive.

But that was not a glory reserved for British troops. Decision in war is formidable to a general in chief who fights for PAY. The generous efforts of the British
troops

troops came too late ; and they only had the glory, as usual, of losing such a number of men, that the German general was ashamed to publish the number he lost in the engagement. Nothing is more certain than that, if the detachment under the chevalier de Muy had, at that time, been ruined, there must have been an end of the war ; but so far from that, though by the valour of the English, the advantage lay plainly on the side of the allies, yet by our German general keeping his camp at Kalle, he lost all the landgraviate of Hesse, with Gottlosen and Munden, in the electorate of Hanover, and even exposed his majesty's German capital to the same fate.

Those unaccountable events, after what was boasted of as being a victory, created prodigious uneasiness in Great Britain. It was plain, that wherever the British troops had been engaged, they had been victorious ; that not a single advantage, during the whole campaign, had been gained but by the British army ; and yet like the man who died of good symptoms, our affairs in Germany were daily going from one ruin to another. I shall not here advance for certain, what has been more than insinuated, that in all the warlike deliberations there, the British generals were
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always outvoted in every measure but that of having the preference of themselves and their troops being knocked on the head, which, in the terms of the military vulgar, is commonly called the post of honour.

Be this as it will, a great many Englishmen of plain, and therefore strong, sense, began to open their eyes, after the battle of Warburg. They saw that they had been deceived by the sum total, through their inattention to items; that they had, upon plausible pretexts, been led from step to step; and, like the dupes of the alchemist, made to believe that the projection was just at hand, when the whole process was ready to blow into the air. Great numbers of the most sanguine votaries for continental connections began now to be cured of their propensities. They perceived that Mr. Face, the undertaking alchemist, had gulled them of prodigious sums of money, under pretext that the projection every moment was to be expected; but, to speak the most favourably, they were yet very distant from the desired hour. The former professions, however, of their operator, remained so strong upon their minds, that their complaints seldom went farther than doubts, or at most growlings; and next year it was held to be an

undoubted fact, that all matters would be just as we could wish them.

The reader may perceive, that in all I have said, I have confined myself entirely to the dreadful situation of our suffering countrymen in Germany, for whose deliverance this address is intended, without regard to any other object. I have not endeavoured to dispute the very disputable merits of our ministers, as to the conquests we have made in America and other parts of the globe. I readily admit those conquests to be great and important; but I think, at the same time, that their greatness and importance are the strongest arguments to prove, that we ought, before now, to have given up the German war. It is extremely plain, from the original papers published by France in her historical memorial, that during the last negotiation for peace, France offered us both in Europe, Africa, and America, a thousand times more than we could have had the confidence to have asked at the commencement of the war. Were those concessions owing to our German conquests? No, they were owing to conquests in those parts of the globe, and on that element, where, under providence, we were sure we could conquer. Let us suppose that a
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tenth part of the blood and treasure we have expended in Germany, had been employed against the remaining possessions of France in America and the West Indies ; and, (which is no unreasonable supposition) that we had succeeded, can a doubt be entertained that the French would in such a case have enlarged their concessions, by granting all that we ask for, nay more than what the ultimatum of our minister contains?

Let us, on the other hand, suppose we had carried our original point in Germany, which professedly was no other than to protect Hanover, which seems now ready to sink under the French arms, could that have induced France to have ceded to us a single foot of land in any quarter of the globe, more than what she has offered to do by her ultimatum? No: that I may keep to the words of my first proposition, the protection of Hanover was but a secondary measure, incidental to the main cause of quarrel between the two crowns; and whatever success the British arms have had, or could have had there, it never could have influenced France to have given up one single fort or foot of land that lay within the compass of our primary quarrel.

After

After the deviation from the anti-continental system had variously affected the people of this island, conquest and success reconciled the inconsistency, and drew a veil over the serious reflections of the public. But, at the same time, anti-continental maxims and professions were so recent, that some apology seemed to be necessary to certain people who still presumed to judge for themselves, by making use of their own senses. This apology was neither more nor less than, that, by fighting the French in Germany, we, in fact, fought them in America; because the armies they were obliged to send there, would have been employed in America. But unfortunately this was the very reverse of the doctrine with which our minister set out, when he saw the necessity of either parting with his power, or abolishing some part of his anti-continental system. The language then was: Now that the interests of Great-Britain, so far as concerns her American possessions, are secured, let us observe the terms of good faith, by assisting our allies in Germany. But how, in the name of common sense, are we to assist them? By sending twenty-five thousand men to be butchered, or to rot there? But those men kept a French army in Germany, which

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might have been employed in America ; so that the secondary object becomes the same, or at least of as much importance as the primary one.

This way of reasoning, had it been made use of in the beginning of the war, when the anti-continental system was in full bloom, and before its blossoms had fallen off, might have been very unpopular ; but still it might have carried with it some shadow of reason. But it happened, that the more disabled the French were to transport a single battalion to any part of the globe, the more did we multiply our force in Germany. France, at the beginning of the war, had no despicable marine, and it might have been possible, (though not very probable, as appears by what actually happened in the case of the Lys and Alcyde,) that, if she had been in luck, she might have found means to have thrown over two or three regiments to North-America. It will however puzzle the greatest latitudinarian in history and politics, to prove that it was, even at that time, in the power of France to have thrown over into North America a European force numerous enough to have baffled our expeditions against her colonies. During the progress of the war this difficulty

culty increased ; and at last, by the destruction of her marine it became unsurmountable, and has continued so for these two years ; and yet, during that time our connections in Germany have been stronger, and our army more numerous than ever.

Thus the advocates for connecting the continental war with the primary causes of our differences with France, speak the very language of our enemies. “ The hostilities, (say they in their historical memorial) in Westphalia and Lower Saxony, have had and still have the same object as the hostilities in America, Asia, and Africa ; that is to say, the disputes subsisting between the two crowns concerning the limits of Acadia and Canada.” But this is a gross misrepresentation of the fact, and evidently arises from the advocates for a German war, joining so far with the French ministry as to confound the political character of a king of Great Britain with that of the elector of Hanover, though they are separated, by every principle of this constitution, with the greatest care and precision. His late majesty himself was so sensible of this, that in the famous, but now forgotten, paper published by his authority in the year 1757, or the beginning of the year 1758, entitled “The king of Eng-

land's conduct as elector of Hanover," he makes a clear distinction between the two capacities ; for in that paper he says, that " None but such as are unacquainted with the maritime force of England, can believe that, without a diversion on the continent, to employ part of the enemies force, she is not in a condition to hope for success, and maintain her superiority at sea. England had therefore no interest to foment quarrels or wars in Europe." In another passage of the same paper, the same distinction is more clearly expressed. " The king, (says the author,) defrayed the expences of the campaign of 1757, at his own proper charge ; and, except the payment which the Hessian troops received from England, that crown contributed only two hundred thousand pound sterling to that campaign ; a sum which, it is easy to see, was sufficient but for a small part of the necessary expences. Had it been in the power of the king to shun this war, the Hanoverian troops would have stood in no need of subsidies."

The reader is here to observe, that when the above paper was published, the war was above eighteen months old ; and that France herself has been just as inconsistent on this head, as some have been

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nearer home. For when the empress queen began her operations against Prussia, she prevailed upon the court of France, as appears by a paper, published by authority of his most christian majesty, to offer a neutrality for Hanover, during all the time the war should continue between France and Great-Britain. This was a plain separation of the two capacities of king and elector; and as things have since turned out, it had been happy for this nation had that neutrality been accepted of, notwithstanding the disadvantageous terms attending it. France, it is plain, neither had nor could have any motives for attacking Hanover, but on account of our American differences; and thus has she connected the cause of the king with that of the elector. But, by this paper it is evident she waves that plea which, upon the neutrality being rejected, she was, in a manner, obliged to resume. It is true; one of the conditions of this neutrality, viz. the fourth, requires the ELECTOR not to assist either directly or indirectly the king of Prussia or his allies, either with men or money. But this article, if the courts of Vienna and Versailles are not the most egregious blunderers in point of style ever heard of, does not bind up the king of
Eng-

England from supplying his Prussian majesty both with men and money. The sixth article requires the town of Hamelen to be deposited into the hands of the empress queen; but then it was to be restored at the end of the war, in the same condition as it was received; and by the eleventh article, the empress of Russia and the king of Denmark, were to be required to guaranty the convention. This, undoubtedly, was an article hard of digestion; but had it been complied with, it might have saved that electorate from many disagreeable vicissitudes which it has since experienced.

I have been the more full upon the subject of this neutrality, which was proffered so early as the fourth of January, 1757, because it plainly shews, that we were at first no other than volunteers in the service of Hanover. For, on the twenty-first of February thereafter, our parliament voted the two hundred thousand pounds, above mentioned, from the paper called "The king of England's reasons" for assisting his majesty to form an army of observation in Germany, whose operations, as we have already seen, terminated in the convention of Closter-Seven. From this detail, I shall not take the advantage, which I am fairly entitled

entitled to, of attempting to prove, that our connections with Hanover were not originally entitled even to the epithet of *secondary* to our interests in America; because, it is plain, that it was in our power, supposing those conditions to have been laid before our ministry, which I cannot doubt of, to have carried on the American war, independently of all considerations but those of fulfilling our treaty with the king of Prussia, concluded at London in January 1756. But it is to be observed, at the same time, that this treaty was defensive, and that the offensive steps which his Prussian majesty took afterwards, I do not say in consequence of this treaty, were disavowed by his Britannic majesty in his quality of mediator; because they furnished France with a pretext of throwing upon the treaty of London, concluded in January 1756, the odium of kindling the war in Germany.

This leads me, before I finish what I have to advance in support of my first proposition, to a most important consideration, which is, that the members of the Germanic empire, appear evidently to have been of opinion with the court of France; and that the invasion of Saxony was an actual breach of the tranquility of the empire,

empire, by their having furnished his imperial majesty with their contingencies for forming what is called "the army of the empire". This is the more remarkable, as those princes seem very accurately and very wisely to distinguish between the regard that ought to be paid to the Germanic constitution, and the caution they ought to observe for circumscribing the unbounded ambition of the house of Austria. The protestant princes of the empire, the Mecklenburg family in particular, as well as the popish, had the same views in this particular. The successes of Prussia could not intimidate them, and the intrigues of the aulic council could not win them over. The same principle that made them condemn his Prussian majesty for the invasion of Saxony, led them to oppose the annihilating his Prussian majesty, so far as to suffer him to be put to the ban of the empire. They did, indeed, declare him a public enemy, but they did not think a breach of the peace amounted to high treason. The friends of the Hanover family, viz. the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the dukes of Brunswick and Saxe-Gotha, opposed the resolutions taken against him in the diet of Ratisbon; and the reasons why they did so does not require

quire to be pointed out. But that diet could not be brought to go farther lengths against him ; and considering the vast influence, which ever since the peace of Westphalia, the French have had over that body, there is the strongest reason for believing that the court of Versailles was of their opinion, and secretly traversed the intrigues of the court of Vienna.

I call the above a most important consideration, because, had we sufficiently attended to it, it would have rid us from all our engagements, to keep an army of Englishmen in Germany on account of his Prussian majesty's concerns ; and in fact, the conduct of the diet tended to bring the Germanic constitution back to its first principles, which they thought had been violated by the irruption into Saxony. The private evidence his Prussian majesty had, which, by the bye, never was authenticated till he had got possession of Dresden, was no object of the diet's consideration ; and they, perhaps, very properly, judged of the facts which they *did* see, and not of the motives which they *could not* see. It is extremely remarkable, that this resolution of the diet against his Prussian majesty did not take place till the 17th of January, 1757,

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when it was publicly known not only in England but all over Europe, (and I believe even notified to some courts,) that an army of observation was forming in the empire; for the resolution of the British parliament to grant his majesty two hundred thousand pounds, to enable him to form that army, passed on the 21st of February following.

Let us now, upon the whole, see how the affairs of Germany, with regard to Great-Britain, stood at that momentous period; and whether Hanover was in such distress, the king of Prussia in such danger, and the protestant religion under such calamity, as to induce us to plunge, as we did, into the continental system, and to spend twenty millions of money in, or upon, Germany.

That his Britannic majesty did not think Hanover in distress is evident; because, on the fourth of January, before he had rejected the neutrality for that electorate under a most unexceptionable guaranty, supposing he had accepted of that guaranty, what must have been the consequences? Very probably, that the king of Prussia would have abandoned his expeditions against Saxony and Bohemia, which his Britanic majesty seemed to

condemn, and in which it was never pretended Great Britain had, or could have, the least concern or interest. Had that desirable event taken place, the army of the empire never could have been brought to the field.

Trojaque nunc stares, Priamique arx alta maneres.

Prussia never had been lost to the Russians, nor Hanover to the French. The fairest dominions of the house of Brandenburg would not have been in possession of the house of Austria, its declared enemy; and had the empire stood neutral, as in such an event it certainly would have done, the two empresses never durst have pushed their arms against his Prussian majesty. *Sed, quorsum hæc,* to what does all this tend? My answer is, that the crisis, far as we have gone into continental measures, and unfortunate (for so I must think) as we are, is not now irretrievable by the wisdom and steadiness of a British parliament, as I shall prove in the subsequent pages, because it is the principal object of this address.

It is true, had Hanover accepted the proffered neutrality, his Prussian majesty must have been deprived of the harvest of the laurels, and the thorns he has since

reaped; but could that have affected Great-Britain? As to the protestant religion, the guardians of it in Germany did not think it to be in danger; nor do I remember that his late majesty, or the king of Prussia, ever *seriously* declared that it *was*; nor to this day has the public any reason to apprehend that it *is*.

Having thus discussed my first, and by far my most important proposition, the reader may perhaps think that I have proved too much, and that our war in Germany is rather *foreign* than *secondary*, to the quarrel between Great-Britain and France. How far it originally might have been *foreign*, the reader from what has been said, may judge for himself; but I must be of opinion, that *progressively*, it became subordinate. I shall now proceed to my second proposition, which is,

“That when Great-Britain had secured the main object she had in view, in making war, her interest led her to have recalled her troops from the continent.”

The chief question to be discussed under this proposition, is, whether in fact Great-Britain has secured the main object for which she went to war with France? The warmest advocate for continental measures must, I apprehend, allow that *primarily*,

rily, neither the preservation of Hanover, nor the house of Brandenburg, were our main objects, and, at the same time, he must admit, that the retrieving and securing our American possessions, were the professed causes of the war. I know not, however, by what fatality it has happened, that in our late negotiation with France, (if we are to believe the French memorial on that subject) in the very first conference our minister at Paris had with the French ministry, he declared that his master would support his allies with *efficacy* and *good faith*. Tho' I have perhaps a worse opinion than many have of French *good faith*, and not so high an opinion as others may entertain of French *good sense*; yet I cannot help surmizing with them, that this language in so early a period of the negotiation carried with it an air, as if our supporting our allies in Germany had been at *that time our primary* object. That it has become a *primary* object with us, I am sorry to say, after the observations I have already made on the subject.

But as I intend these pages to prevent *future*, rather than blame *past*, miscarriages (for such, I cannot help thinking have mingled with our continental measures) I shall confine myself to the present moment,

ment, and prove, I hope, to the satisfaction of the reader, that it is not even yet too late to retrieve any erring connections, which we have formed during the progress of the war, to divert our attention from what ought to be our *primary* object.

Very little reasoning will suffice for this purpose. *Happily* for us, our connections with his Prussian majesty are only *annual*; but *unhappily* for us, they have been *annually* renewed with an article of mutuality, which ties us up from making peace, but with his consent. This article, which, if I mistake not, is the fourth, in our subsidiary treaty with that monarch, does, I most candidly acknowledge, make the performance of it a *primary* consideration in the present war; and our minister at Paris very properly insisted upon our performing it. I apprehend, however, that at the expiration of the year, from the date of the treaty, it is void. Let us therefore suppose it to be void, what must the effect be? The ruin of the king of Prussia? It is against common sense to think so. Let us *continue* his subsidy, for to that I have no manner of objection; but let us not *continue* to be under his direction, or to receive laws in obtemperance to his conveniency. It is not the interest of Great-Britain, to second
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the ambition of any power upon the continent. To preserve that balance to which ambition is an enemy, is all she ought to aim at.

But how can she do that? Not by continuing her troops in Germany; but by recalling them. Their continuance there serves but to heighten his Prussian majesty's distress, and may in the end accelerate his ruin. I shall not answer for the secret views, or principles, of the court of Vienna; but I think it evident beyond all contradiction, that were our army recalled from Germany, his Prussian majesty must be in a much better situation than he is in at present. My reason is, because the court of Vienna, tho' backed by the resolutions of the Aulic (that is, its own) council, have never yet been able to persuade the diet of Ratisbon, to put him to the ban of the empire. From thence we may fairly infer, that his co-powers in the empire, bear against him neither envy or malice in their hearts, and that all they wish for, is, that he may be a little less turbulent.

Here it may be said, for I shall put all objections against me in the strongest light, Great-Britain has guarantied to his Prussian majesty the possession of Silesia; and if she does not assist him, the Empress
queen,

queen, by far the most considerable power in the empire, will take it from him. I admit this to be a melancholy consideration; but can Great-Britain help it? She herself had the possession of Port Mahon guarantied to her by almost all the powers in Europe. But to what guaranty is she to appeal now that she has lost it? Should the Spaniards besiege Gibraltar to-morrow; is there a power in Europe who guaranties our possession of that important fortress, that would not laugh in our face, should we apply to her for fulfilling the terms of her guaranty? But I am far from thinking, whatever other courts do, that Great-Britain ought to be deficient in *good faith*. Let her fulfil her guaranty by supplying his Prussian majesty even with heaped measure, that is, let us *continue* our subsidy to him, till we see what turn affairs will take. Supposing the most unfavourable turn, and that his Prussian majesty is stript of Silesia; does the fate of Great-Britain depend upon that? No, we had an existence, we had credit, we had power, we had a constitution, before the house of Brandenburg came into possession of that territory. I will take upon me to say, that we once looked upon his Prussian majesty's acquisition of it, to be an over-weakening of the house

house of Austria, and of prejudice to the balance of power in Europe. I shall not even dissemble my apprehensions, that his Prussian majesty may lose Silesia. But can our continuing our troops in their slaughter-houses hinder that event from taking place? I am afraid it will forward it, and that their remaining in Germany has forwarded it too much already; but I must be of opinion, that the instant the Empress queen is reinstated in the possession of Silesia, the former and the natural system of Europe will take place. France will become the protector of Prussia, Great-Britain will be his friend, and the princes of the Empire, perhaps, the house of Austria itself will join in restoring him to all the importance he had in the Empire before he acquired Silesia.

What I have said, with regard to his Prussian majesty, holds in a great measure true, as to Hanover, if we admit that our engagements with that Electorate has rendered it a *primary* object in the present war. It is idle, it is against common sense, to imagine that France, (and no other power is at war with it) were she at this very time possessed of Hanover, could be able to keep it for six months, without expending ten times more than the whole electorate

electorate is worth. Were I to speak my own sentiments, I would say that the great misfortunes of the Hanoverians have proceed from their having had British troops for their defenders ; because it is a defence of such a nature, as spreads either indifference or jealousy through the princes of the empire, whose natural interest leads them to wish his Britannic majesty to be the peaceable possessor of his own electorate.

From what I have said, I must conclude, that either our assisting the king of Prussia, or defending Hanover, were not our *primary* objects in our war with France; or, if they were, that they were mistaken ones, and ought to be considered as such for the future. Having premised this, the reader needs but to throw his eye upon the *ultimatum* of France, to be convinced, that Great-Britain has more than secured the main object she had in view, in making war, which was the retrieving and securing her American possessions. I, therefore, proceed to my third proposition, which is,

“That she might have recalled her troops from Germany, and yet have adhered strictly to her engagements with her allies there, and have been enabled to have served them more effectually than she has done

done by the useleſs reſidence of her troops in that uncomfortable country, for theſe twenty months paſt.”

I am free enough to own, that when I ſketched out the plan of this addreſs, I did not imagine that I ſhould have been obliged to have anticipated, under the heads of my firſt and ſecond propoſitions, ſo much matter as is applicable to this. Somewhat, however, ſtill remains to be obſerved. It is certain, that his late ma- jeſty rejected the neutrality of Hanover, only becauſe of the harſh terms impoſed upon him, by granting Hamelen for a place of arms, and a free paſſage, or what the German Civilians call a *Transitus In- noxiuſ*, through his electoral dominions to the troops of the empreſs-queen, and her allies. If the reader is acquainted with the hiſtory of that time, he muſt be ſen- ſible that had the neutrality been properly modified, his maſteſty would have accept- ed of it ; and I believe the modifications he required are producible. I mention this only to prove, that our agreeing to a *proper* neutrality for Hanover could have been no breach of our engagements with our allies in Germany. But whether ſuch a neutrality ſhall be entered into or not, even ſuppoſing us, againſt all probability,

to be able to obtain it, does by no means affect the present question. We were under no engagements but those of honour and gratitude, to send our troops to that more than inhospitable country. We are under no engagements to continue them, where their abode is only fatal to themselves. Had we been able to deliver that electorate, our assistance must justly have been deemed magnanimous, nay virtuous; but the extreme of every virtue becomes a vice. Magnanimity in a desperate cause is no other than Quixotism; and liberality in reclaiming what is irretrievable, prodigality in the highest degree. Let us, in the name of *good faith*, fulfil our engagements, both with his Prussian majesty and with Hanover; but let us not, in the name of *humanity*, extend them a single moment beyond that which determines them. Are we to imagine, because we do not hear the groans, perhaps the reproaches, of our starving, slaughtered, expiring countrymen, in Westphalia, that none such are vented? Because, perhaps by the rigid rules of war and politics, the complaints of the survivors do not come to our ears; because the military law does not even admit of such complaints being either published in the camp, or transpiring into the public, can we

we imagine they do not exist ? if they are suppressed by authority, they claim our animadversion ; if through modesty, our compassion. That there is foundation for such complaints is undeniable ; nor does it claim the least consideration to answer the suggestions that the French, the Prussians, Hanoverians, Hessians, Russians, and other foreign troops, serving in Germany, undergo the same hardships. Perhaps they do : but the state of a German, a French, or a Russian soldier, in summer or winter, in camp or out of camp, is almost the same ; they have but a little addition of misery. Add to this argument, that they are enduring that misery in their own quarrel. Very different is their situation from that of British subjects under the same circumstances. This country, with her freedom, purchased opulence to all her natives ; and their subjection to the hardships they suffer is embittered by the reflection, which I am afraid is but too common amongst them, that they are suffering in a foreign quarrel. Their present situation is perhaps the first instance in history of so numerous a British army serving in a foreign country, without being able to command the common necessaries of life. In another respect, they are still

still more unfortunate, because, for some time past, they have been dead to fame, to themselves, and to their country.

I am sensible the battle of Fellinghausen may be objected to this assertion; but what was that battle, even according to the German accounts? The French general considered his German opponents as being in a manner below his notice; and our German General had taken care that the British troops should be posted without the line of his encampment. This was more than the French generals, Soubise and Broglio durst have hoped for; and therefore they bent the whole of their force against the British army. Their motions and intentions were known to the meanest soldier in the camp, who saw Lord Granby's advanced posts dislodged without a single German sent to support them; and all the comfort the British troops had, was an order to their general, from the German general, his superior, to maintain his ground to the last extremity. The brave British troops did so: but not a single mention is made (in the German account of the battle) of their amazing intrepidity against such a disparity of numbers between them and their assailants. From the plan of the battle, it appears very plain,
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establish my third proposition, which, in fact, is too self-evident to admit of dispute. I therefore proceed to my fourth :

“ That Great Britain has now no object of sufficient importance to detain her troops in Germany.”

Five and twenty thousand Englishmen were formerly thought sufficient to conquer all France : and that number, excepting those that the sword or sickness have destroyed, is now rotting by piecemeal in the wilds of Germany. I shall admit Hanover to be a proper object for their operations ; but from the course of the campaign, I can by no manner of means see, that the defence of that electorate has directly employed our German general. It appears, on the contrary, that the French at any time were welcome to walk into Hanover, and that the door was open for them ; at least, such was the situation of affairs, when the battle of Fellinghausen was fought. The disagreeable events which, since that time, have happened to his Prussian majesty, render the situation of our brave countrymen in Germany more and more uncomfortable. Against what object can they advance ? The progress of the French in Hanover has rendered their valour useless ; and our German
general

that the marquis of Granby was posted between the rivers Lippe and Aest ; and that for about eight hours, he sustained a most dreadful attack from marshal Broglio at the head of the flower of the French army. Two small detachments at last, one under general Wutgenau on his left, and another under the prince of Anhalt, on his right, were sent to support him ; but not till after the French had been repulsed, through incredible efforts of courage, by the British troops. It will perhaps puzzle the ablest military connoisseur in Europe, to account for the reason, why lieutenant-general Conway, who was at the head of eight battalions and seven squadrons, British troops, was not sent to support his brave countrymen, under the marquis of Granby ; and why he was obliged to lie inactive on the heights of Rinderin, with the Aest on his left, as if our German general had been afraid of making the victory too decisive. Since that day, viz. the 16th of July, 1761, the British troops in Germany have scarcely been heard of ; and matters have been so managed, that the victory they gained at Fellinghausen was but a prelude to the triumph of the French over Hanover. Little more, I think, needs to be said, to establish

general seems to remember the prodigious things they did in the plains of Minden, only to put him upon his guard against giving them another opportunity of displaying the same valour.

I am almost ashamed to insist longer on a proposition so evident in itself, and yet so reproachful to others. Where is the man, (to use the words of a late speech,) who will step forward to *guide*? to *guide* our troops to victory, or, what is almost the same, to battle? Where is the man, who can declare for what purpose they are now detained in Germany? And if the progress of the French should continue so as to make themselves masters of Stade, where is the man who will insure their return to England, as freemen, Britons, and soldiers?

Here I should willingly rest the merit of this memorial, were it not that a great authority in point of fact may be urged against me, and that is, no less than the conduct of a late great minister, who rather than admit even the proposal, or any thing that looked like a proposal, of abandoning our allies on the continent, treated the French minister in a manner that no gentleman would have borne from another, by sending him back the memorial relative to the king of Prussia, as implying an attempt upon the

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honour of Great-Britain. National honour undoubtedly ought to be sacred ; but I can by no means see, as his Prussian majesty, as well as the allies of France, consented that a separate peace should be treated of between France and Great-Britain, that our recalling our troops from the continent could, in any respect, operate to our dishonour, or to his prejudice. It is past all doubt, that if we sent our army to protect Hanover, the end is as unattainable as the measure was mistaken. If we sent them to assist the king of Prussia, their errand was still more absurd, unless we could have locked the French out of Germany. But be this as it will, tho' the *honour* of the nation is concerned in her fulfilling her engagements, after they are formed, yet her *wisdom* calls upon her to be cautious in forming them. I shall admit that while our treaty with Prussia subsisted, by which we obliged ourselves not to make peace but with his consent, it would have been dishonourable to have broken that engagement, or to have failed in fulfilling the other articles of the same treaty. But we are under no manner of obligation, either in honour or justice, to renew that treaty, after the term of it is expired.

Great-Britain has made efforts in favour
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of her allies, that after-ages will scarcely credit. She has even attempted impossibilities to serve and to satisfy them, that nothing in her power should be wanting for their deliverance. She has been so far from succeeding, that her assistance, instead of relieving, has distressed her friends; and in fact, she may be said to have been, all this while, fighting, for fighting sake. France, so far as regards the German war, is in the same absurd situation, but seems to be sensible of it. She, in fact, tells the British court, that the French and the English in Germany are cutting one another's throats in other people's quarrels, and without doing their friends the least service; and that by withdrawing the weight of their respective troops from thence, the state of the war between his Prussian majesty, and the two empresses, can receive no manner of alteration; according to the poet,

Now Europe's balanc'd, neither side prevails,
For nothing's left in either of the scales.

This offer from France, of withdrawing from the war in Germany, is the strongest confirmation of what I have already said, that it is not understood either by France herself, or by the diet of the empire, that she should keep possession of Hanover, or

that it is even worth her while to attempt it. Therefore, without doing any thing to impair the national honour, I own I cannot help wishing, that our great minister had been a little more tractable on this head than he was, and that he would have tried to have got some mitigation of the *means*, as the *end* was so desirable. I have no idea, that France, in earnest, desires or intends, that the king of Prussia should be ruined; on the contrary, it is her apparent interest to prevent his ruin. Might not our minister have felt the pulse of that court, in trying how far she would agree to our continuing a pecuniary assistance to that monarch. It is true, that in the definitive propositions delivered to Mr. Stanley from the court of Great-Britain, the seventh article requires France to make a general evacuation of all her conquests, and the seventh article of the ultimatum of France, in answer to those proposals, agrees, that the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel, the dutchy of Brunswick, and the electorate of Hanover, shall be evacuated of French troops; but the French add to the same article, that they have no power to restore Wesel, or the conquests held by the Empress queen. The state of the question, therefore, is very plain, and very short, as follows:

lows : Whether we ought to consent to his Prussian majesty being deprived, in the mean while, of a country that brings him in about 20,000l. a year, (for the yearly revenues of Wesel and Guelders, which the French took for the Empress queen, are not estimated above 100,000 crowns,) or we should continue to spend yearly about six or seven millions, and throw away 8 or 10,000 lives in a war, that can be of no manner of service either to ourselves or our allies ?

Can such an option admit of one moment's hesitation, especially as the matter was to have undergone a future discussion in the congress of Augsbourg. While I say this, I am far from justifying the demands of the French in behalf of their ally the empress queen ; and it is more than probable, that, in their hearts, they condemn her obstinacy, as much as we, or his Prussian majesty, do. Btt what does that avail, as neither we nor they can better ourselves ? As the common proverb says, *we are to make the best of a bad bargain*, and that we have a *bad bargain* is certain to too melancholy a degree. Can any man doubt, which condition it would be preferable for us to have ? our brave countrymen doing duty in this kingdom,

or in Germany, where, instead of being of any manner of service, either to themselves, or our allies, they only awake the jealousy, and confirm the obstinacy, of other powers. There is not a prince in Europe, our German general excepted, who can be benefited thro' their abode there, nor can any honest man reap the least advantage by it.

It is with great pain I must observe, that the manner of wording the intelligence we have had of our army in Germany, ever since they had the misfortune to go thither, has been generally so perplexed; so dark, and sometimes so enigmatical; that we have all along known little or nothing of their situation or operations. To day we find them encamped near a village, never before known to British ears; to-morrow they are marching through wilds, never before trod by human foot; and, the third day, they emerge upon some bleak uncomfortable height for the benefit of the fresh air. It is true, that while a march or measure is in agitation, it is very proper to conceal the particulars from the public. But I think the people of Great Britain, who have even with romantic magnanimity supported this war, have some right, after the operations are over,

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to be made acquainted with the motives that influenced them. They ought, at least, to be satisfied, that our German general does not expose them to unnecessary fatigues ; that he does not lead them into *wanton* danger ; that he does not render them *food for that powder*, of which, alas ! they have been the voluntary objects. Can any man alive take into his hand the gazettes, that preceded the first of August, 1759, and say, that the victory of Minden was obtained in consequence of our German general's dispositions ? and that his deliverance was not owing to the most amazing exertion of British courage, that her history can produce ? It is true, that after the valour of our countrymen had broken through the toils that the French had spread around them, ten thousand beauties were found in his *manœuvres*, as they are called, and every motion, which really was effected by *chance*, was then cried up as being planned by *judgment*.

But are we to tire out providence, (for the victory of Minden was the most providential one ever known) ? Shall we continue, like Sir Martin Mar-all, to make motions on the flute after the music is ceased ? or what is still worse, are we

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we to be still amused with idle German paragraphs, till we are brought into a situation, worse than that of the *Farca Condinae* of the Romans, by the enemy cutting off the communication of our army with Stade, and with any sea-ports, by which they have a chance of *escaping* to their own country. These considerations are the more important, as the complexion of the war in Germany is, at present, much more unfavourable, both for us and his Prussian majesty, than it was on the fifth of August last. If we are to compare the accounts of our gazette with facts, it will appear that, like the man who died of good symptoms, our army is now languishing, even in a mortal state, after having been victorious through the whole of this year, and never once having received a misfortune. They have not had even the poor comfort of purchasing misery by glory. They have been doomed to the insipid manœuvres, directed by those whose interest it is to protract the war, three times beyond the duration of that of Troy.

Though I am far from impeaching the good intentions of the right honourable gentleman, who recanted his opinion of continental connections, by making it the
sacrifice

sacrifice which *folly and prepossession offered to wisdom and experience* ; yet, though I do not *condemn* his conduct, I must at the same time acknowledge, that I do not *understand* it ; and I think some measures have passed under his administration, that no minister need to boast of having *guided*. When the stake for which his Prussian majesty plays upon the continent, and which he has to lose, is compared to the expence of Great Britain there, it is about a shilling to fifty pounds ; and yet Great Britain, to win that shilling, is at three times the charge he is at, that he may save his fifty pounds. But that is not all ; we furnish him with money to stake on his part. Should he gain, not a shilling of it ever can come back to us ; because he is under no obligation to refund a farthing. If he should even not only save his own, but win from others, by the help of our money, we are not intitled to a farthing of indemnification. It is true, it may be pretended, that the treaty between Great-Britain and Prussia is only defensive ; but it is as true, that his Prussian majesty was enabled, by that treaty, to conquer Saxony, and invade Bohemia. It is likewise certain, that, at the time that treaty was con-

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cluded, his Prussian majesty had a prodigious army on foot, and knew that the empress-queen intended to attack him with eighty-thousand men, and the empress of Russia with a hundred and twenty thousand : and that their design was to have been executed in the spring of the year 1756 ; only it seems the British money, which we had stipulated to pay to the empress of Russia, by the treaty of September preceding, did not arrive time enough to put her troops in motion, though it did very soon after. This, at least, is what his Prussian majesty pretended, while her imperial royal majesty, in a counter-declaration she published, flatly denied that any offensive alliance had been formed against Prussia, between her and the empress of Russia ; neither indeed, as I have hinted before, did the diet of Ratisbon appear satisfied, that the discoveries his Prussian majesty had made in the cabinet of Dresden sufficiently warranted him to invade Saxony and Bohemia ; and even his late majesty, as elector of Hanover, published his disapprobation of that invasion.

So many circumstances of the powerful confederacy formed against his Prussian majesty appearing, we should have naturally

turally thought, that our patriot minister could not have given so effectual a demonstration of his patriotism, after he came again into power, than by reviewing the state of affairs between Great Britain and Prussia, and examining whether any accidental or natural attachment for Hanover had rendered the terms of the treaty concluded between us vastly too burdensome for Great Britain. But this was so far from being the case, that, though the treaty, during his administration was again and again renewed, Great Britain never was eased of the oppressive part of it, I mean that article which binds her up from concluding any separate treaty of peace, but by common advice and consent, each expressly including therein the other. When our connections with Prussia were first formed, the friends of the house of Hanover, little imagining what a dreadful alliance had been concluded against him, did indeed express some apprehensions, lest his Prussian majesty, after getting our money, should have made his own terms ; and therefore they thought this mutual stipulation was very proper. Undoubtedly it was for Hanover and for Great Britain too, if we consider their in-

terests as being the same ; but when enemy upon enemy multiplied upon his Prussian majesty ; when eighty thousand Austrians, and eighty thousand Ruffians, had taken the field against him, when the armies of France, of Sweden, and the Empire, were pouring into his dominions ; when the wonderful efforts he exerted, and the victories he gained, served only to render his fall the more glorious, but without bettering his condition, was it prudent, was it patriotical, was it just, to link Great-Britain to such an ally, and that in such a manner, as to put it in his power to keep such hold of us, as that, if he should sink, we must go to the bottom with him. If the cause of the protestant religion, and even sentiments of humanity, have called upon us, or should further call upon us, to assist his Prussian majesty, let us do it in such a manner, as to be for his advantage, and not to our own ruin, without being even able to serve him, at least, with any efficacy. If we give him money, let him make the best use of it he can ; but let us not trifle with the healths, the liberties, and the lives of five and twenty thousand of our brave countrymen, who can give him no assistance.

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But can they assist Hanover. may, perhaps, be called the great question; and if they can assist it, ought they not to do it? I should be as sanguine as any one, in the cause of Hanover, if I thought it in any manner of danger, but from *our* attempts to defend it. Nothing, to me, seems to be more evident than that, if there was not a single regiment of British troops in Germany, the French army neither would nor durst, winter in that electorate. Whoever has traced the operations of this year, upon the maps of Germany, can see with half an eye, that the French, so far back as the middle of June last, had the possession of Hanover been the real object of their arms, might have marched almost without resistance to that capital. But, in the name of common sense, to what purpose could that have served, unless they had massacred three fourths of the inhabitants, that they might succeed to their victuals; for I believe **there** is no truth more universally acknowledged at present, than that Hanover is now so exhausted as not to be able to subsist its own natives; and that every shilling of the revenues of its government is actually employed for that purpose, and yet all is insufficient for alleviating its miseries?

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The French, therefore, have a much more sensible object in view than the possession of that electorate, where they must absolutely perish for want of the necessaries of life, and that is, their keeping the army and allies of Britain, employed in plans, and upon purposes, at an expence no nation can support, without their being able to bring the least advantage, to, what we affect to call, the common-cause. Supposing our national troops to be instantly recalled by his majesty, could the king of Prussia pretend that to be an infraction of our treaty with him? No, surely, there is not, in that treaty, a single syllable about British troops, nor any stipulation about the matters I have already mentioned, excepting the two following, that his Britannic majesty should pay his Prussian majesty 670,000l. sterling, and that his Prussian majesty should employ the said sum, in keeping up and augmenting his forces, which shall act in the most advantageous manner for the common cause. This I look upon as a fortunate circumstance for us; nay, as the only fortunate one in all our German connections; and I hope our parliament will consider it in the same light.

If we are to believe the accounts that
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come from our own private officers in Germany, not only their own distresses are unspeakable, but the distresses to which they are obliged to put the miserable natives, friends, as well as foes, are so likewise. I know, at the beginning of every new parliament, and every new session of parliament, nothing is more common, than for a party who has a point to carry to propagate rumours, to influence the members to come into their measures, especially if subsidies are to be raised; and I scarcely remember a year of Sir Robert Walpole's long administration, in which the session was not ushered in with some dreadful accounts of an invasion threatened, of troops assembling on the coasts of Brittany, or Galicia, of a rebellion at home, or some other impending calamity. The same game seems now to be going forward; and it is asserted with great confidence, that our German general has obtained a considerable advantage over the French. Perhaps he has, and very probably he might have his reasons, for taking some vigorous steps just before our parliament sat down; but I must be of opinion, that he has obtained no decisive advantage; and that should he beat the French five hundred times, his

successes never can relieve Germany, while our troops continue in it. Success, and even inaction, may defeat, may prolong, the lucrative post he enjoys ; but it is recalling our troops alone, that can be of service to Great-Britain.

F I N I S.

