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
**SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM
Symposium Report**


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Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group

June 5-6, 2000
Calgary, Ottawa

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SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM
CALGARY - OTTAWA, CANADA
JUNE 5-6, 2000

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Symposium Report**

Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group

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SYMPOSIUM REPORT

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Sudan Civil Society Symposium

Canada, June 2000

SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM

Introduction

CALGARY - OTTAWA, CANADA

JUNE 5-9, 2000

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SYMPOSIUM REPORT

Sudan Civil Society Symposium

Canada, June 2000

1 Introduction

The **Sudan Civil Society Symposium** was held in **Calgary** on **June 5** and in **Ottawa** on **June 7-9, 2000**. It was organized by the **Sudan Inter Agency Reference Group (SIARG)**, a network of Canadian NGOs working on Sudan. **Freedom Quest International** and **Partnership Africa Canada** played major co-ordination roles in **Calgary** and **Ottawa** respectively. The organizers gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the **Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)**, the **Centre for Foreign Policy Development** of the **Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)** and the member organizations of **SIARG** in making this Symposium possible.

The **Sudan Civil Society Symposium** provided an opportunity for views and opinions of Sudanese people to be heard with regard to Canadian involvement in Sudan, and an opportunity to discuss the effectiveness of existing activities and ideas for peace and development among invited non-combatant representatives from Sudanese civil society. The Symposium also aimed to explore and highlight appropriate responses among the Canadian public and private sectors with respect to their conduct and activities in enhancing the peace process in Sudan. In addition, the Symposium provided an opportunity to explore the role of Sudanese civil society and the international community in the promotion of peace within Sudan.

The first part of the **Sudan Civil Society Symposium**, **Forum I**, was held in **Calgary** on **June 6** with more than 160 people attending. The participation of the Sudanese community in western Canada was acknowledged and welcomed. A pre-Forum meeting of the Sudanese community was very important to building relations and sharing information among its members; it was also effective in enhancing the dialogue between participants and the speakers at the Forum.

The second part of the **Sudan Civil Society Symposium**, **Forum II**, was held in **Ottawa** on **June 7-9** and brought together Sudanese civil society representatives to air views on the many issues concerning the conflict in Sudan and to discuss the possibilities of strengthening the peace process. Representatives from Canadian NGOs, Sudanese community groups in Canada, the Government of Canada and the diplomatic community participated in the Forum. The Forum deepened the commitment of the participants and organizations to assisting the situation in Sudan and articulated ways to work on concrete issues together. The Forum also offered recommendations to the Government of Canada and other bodies concerning issues and policies that require urgent attention and renewed efforts to further the efforts for peace. Several additional meetings also took place in **Ottawa** and **Toronto** between the Sudanese participants and the Sudanese community in these cities.

2 Summary of Recommendations of the Sudan Civil Society Symposium

2.1 Enhancing the Role of Civil Society in the Sudan Peace Process

1. Participants endorsed the People to People Peace Process and the use of traditional methods of peace building. It is further recommended that the New Sudan Council of Churches extend its peacebuilding initiatives from south to north, engaging grassroots communities in its process with emphasis on work in the south until that work is comprehensive, but with some initiatives between north and south. Given the extent of north-south mistrust in Sudan, it is recommended that efforts be made to open lines of communication and dialogue between civil society groups in both parts of the country.
2. Interested parties should contemplate ways to put the necessary civil administration into place in the south as part of the peacebuilding and rehabilitation effort. The barriers that exist to accessing funds for such activities in SLPA-held territory must be overcome in creative and innovative ways to help maintain the gains of the People to People Peace Process.
3. Given the absence of development assistance for Sudan, all agencies should seek ways to go beyond the provision of emergency assistance and provide inputs that contribute to long term development.
4. There is a need for NGOs from IPF (IGAD Partners Forum) countries and other countries to monitor and track the IPF process. This can be done through the establishment of a shadow NGO body to the IPF with the objective of feeding NGO and civil society views into the IPF. Care should be taken within the international NGO network to encourage all NGOs involved to refrain from taking away ownership of issues and processes in Sudan from Sudanese groups.
5. Given the successes of the People to People Peace Process, clear and firm steps should be taken to disseminate information on this initiative within the north and south of Sudan. Furthermore, SIARG and other interested parties elsewhere should endeavour to find resources to support the current peace initiatives of civil society groups and NGOs.
6. Given the size of the Sudan problem and also the limited prospects for peace, action should be taken to form an international network of external groups working in Sudan. Furthermore, a particular task of this network might be to conduct international monitoring of and action on the human rights crisis in Sudan.
7. Given the limited flow of information between Canadian NGOs and Sudanese groups in Canada, and recognizing the participation of Sudanese groups in Canada, ways should be found to improve the flow of information and the contact between Canadian NGOs and the Sudanese community groups in Canada. Furthermore, Sudanese groups in Canada should be invited to engage in the peace building process going on in Sudan and to undertake training or other activities within their own community related to the peace process underway within Sudan. Efforts should be made to support better co-ordination and communication among Sudanese groups in Canada.
8. Given the Canadian Government's response to the recommendations of the Harker Mission report, Canadians should press for support for enabling the voices of Sudan to speak to the peace process and tap into the international network.

2.2 Mechanisms for Canada to Support Human Rights and Civil Society in Sudan

1. The severity of human rights abuses in Sudan, in all regions, requires more vigorous action by the international community. Systematic monitoring and consistent follow-up means that Canada should balance its office in Khartoum with equal presence to effectively monitor human rights abuses in the South. The consensus is that the Government of Sudan (GOS) only responds to strong and persistent international pressure; correcting the Government of Sudan's attempts to polish its image (dubbed the "charm offensive") with the truth about the scope and severity of human rights abuses is essential to support the Sudanese people who are fighting for their basic human rights. Identified areas requiring more international attention include:

- forced removals and inhumane conditions for displaced persons;
- bombardment of civilian centres, e.g. hospitals and schools, and denied access to humanitarian assistance;
- slavery and the inadequacy of the work by the committee appointed to eradicate abductions as a response;
- systemic violations of women's rights;
- discrimination and inadequacy in meeting the right to basic education;
- inequitable access to health care - none in many areas of the south;
- the GOS's Public Order Law as a violation of basic human rights;
- violations of the security and rights of children, which requires immediate attention;
- torture and denial of the most basic rights for people in prisons;
- systemic violations of the right to religious freedom;
- denial of civil rights, such as democratic rights, freedom of association, failure to implement rights recognized in the constitution which the GOS uses as a cover for its abuses.

2. The Government of Canada (GOC) is urged to convince the Government of Sudan (GOS) to allow international and national NGOs to help internally displaced persons (IDPs) and that planning of the IDP camps and provision of goods and services to the camps be greatly improved. The Government of Canada should do all it can to secure the right and freedom of Sudanese NGOs to help displaced people throughout the country. Of particular concern is the flow of assistance to the Nuba people and people in the Southern Blue Nile region.

3. Action is urgently required to enable Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) to resolve with the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) all outstanding issues between these two parties with regard to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) so that the flow of assistance to people in southern Sudan by OLS can recommence immediately. The GOC is urged to seek, through multilateral channels, the earliest possible resolution of issues regarding the MOU and ensure the renewed flow of assistance to southern Sudan.

4. The GOC and Canadian NGOs are urged to work closely together as a matter of urgency to develop a protocol for the extension of international (including Canadian) assistance to Sudan so that support can be provided to Sudanese civil society organizations and Sudanese NGOs. Due to problematic aspects of the OLS structure and methods, particular effort should be made to ensure that assistance flows to NGOs that are autonomous of the GOS.

5. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) should convene as soon as possible a full-day consultation with NGOs which work in Sudan on all aspects related to the control and access to assistance within both south and north Sudan, including the impact of the OLS system itself, in order to ensure consistency in CIDA's policy and implementation in Sudan.

6. CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) division should expand its terms of reference for aid to Sudan. Other donors should be encouraged to deliver a broader range of programs to Sudan as well. Specific concern is expressed for people in prisons, for women and children, and for internally displaced people in GOS's so-called 'peace camps'.

7. The Government of Canada should vigorously pursue ways to hold Talisman directly accountable for the specific human rights violations identified in the Harker Mission report as directly linked to their operations, such as the forced displacement of people from the oilfields and violations of basic human rights committed by Talisman's security guards, who are also members of the GOS army. The unacceptably narrow terms of reference for Talisman's own human rights monitoring program should be challenged by the GOC and support given to genuinely independent and systematic monitoring of human rights abuses in the area of the oilfields.

8. The Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) members should consider the results of a recent survey of NGOs in Sudan completed by Alternatives and consider ways to match interested Canadian NGOs with Sudanese NGOs for collaboration on program design, delivery and evaluation.

9. The rights of children in the war situation in Sudan and the effects of war on children are of grave concern. SIARG and multilateral bodies should raise the profile of Sudanese war-affected children on the agenda of the Winnipeg Conference on War-Affected Children and at other international conferences, wherever possible.

10. Given the discussions inside Sudan and within the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) on cessation of hostilities followed by an interim period (during which time a referendum would be held to determine the future of Sudan), Canadian NGOs should prepare for that interim period. CIDA is encouraged to provide financial support for that effort. The New Sudan Council of Churches is active on this issue and agrees to share its work with Canadian NGOs.

11. As the Government of Canada is establishing a monitoring office in Khartoum, the mandate for that office should include the collection of information from sources other than the GOS and from sources outside of Khartoum. Furthermore, the mandate, strategies and processes of that office should focus primarily on human rights monitoring. It is strongly recommended that the office not become a Program Support Unit (PSU) of CIDA, nor a Consular Office or a Trade Office.

12. The IGAD Monitoring Committee should deal with Human Rights issues directly and explicitly. Also, the Geneva Convention must be adhered to by the GOS, with the International Red Cross or Red Crescent Society monitoring compliance, such that all POWs are identified and remain safe.

13. The GOC should encourage the GOS to ratify the Land Mines Treaty. Similarly the SPLA should be engaged in effective dialogue in de-mining activities. The GOC should also encourage the GOS to sign UN conventions, treaties and protocols, such as those on Women's Rights.

2.3 Impact of Canada's Support for Sudan's Oil Development on the Peace Process

Symposium participants drafted recommendations related to Sudan's oil development projects, and specifically, the impact of Canada's support for those projects on the peace process.

There was consensus among participants to support the continued implementation of complementary strategies aimed at forcing Talisman's disinvestment from Sudan until there is peace, including cross-sectoral awareness-raising and mobilization, a media campaign and a call to investors to divest to demonstrate their support for the people of Sudan.

For further information, please contact SIARG.

3 Forum I - Calgary

The first part of the Sudan Civil Society Symposium, Forum I, was held in Calgary on June 5. It brought together members of the Sudanese community from across western Canada with people who are actively involved in the Sudan peace process - civil society representatives from Sudan, Canadian, US and European NGOs, representatives of Talisman Energy, interested Canadian citizens and representatives of the media. It was the first exchange of such dimensions on Sudan in Calgary.

The impact of the discussion was to galvanize those interested in long term peace in Sudan on key issues, including those described below.

3.1 The International Mediation Process

The current mediation process for Sudan involving the parties to the conflict and the international community has been extremely difficult and is seen by the Forum resource persons as being in deep trouble. The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Mediation Committee member countries, chaired by Kenya, are currently unable to play their role due to the internal problems of the respective countries. There is a second peace initiative underway involving Egypt and Libya but the format and modalities of that process are less clear. The international community that comes together in the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) includes Canada. However, as the IPF relies on the IGAD process, its strategy is now also experiencing difficulties.

The list of several significant issues to be resolved that have been agreed by the parties is well known. Several of the issues are discussed in this report. However these issues have yet to be resolved by the parties to the conflict.

3.2 The Escalation of the War

There is an ongoing war in Sudan being waged throughout the country, with its main effects felt by the people in the south of Sudan. The war has been ongoing for more than seventeen years. It is a war that is escalating with the recent purchase by the Government of Sudan of significant new military equipment and ammunitions manufacturing capacity. The war contrasts with the so-called 'charm offensive' also being waged by the Government of Sudan to improve its international image. Most participants and speakers understood the 'liberalization' measures being undertaken by the GOS as being strictly for appearances only.

3.3 Civil Society Voices Speak for Peace

The voices of civil society in Sudan are many and diverse. They exist in exile, and also within the country. The internal voices exist under duress due to the massive impoverishment and displacement of Sudanese citizens during the 17 year since the war commenced in 1983. Especially notable are the voices of the women of Sudan who are making a special appeal for peace and an end to war, together with special efforts to resolve differences. Also of great importance is the People to People Peace Process currently underway in southern Sudan. This process deserves additional resources and support, given its success to date.

Participants and speakers stressed their interest in peace in Sudan and a resolution to the problems causing conflict, noting that too many people have died and too many people have been displaced to unacceptable temporary locations. The participants urged action such that the

significant suffering of the people of Sudan can end, urging all parties to act in a way that will ensure significant development in the direction of peace.

3.4 The Role of Oil

The Sudanese participants felt strongly that the exploitation and flow of oil is exacerbating the war and has raised the stakes, with the clear prospects that war atrocities will increase. Speakers underlined that they had seen and felt the negative effects of oil on the people of the south. They expressed how deeply disturbed they were at the atrocities carried out by the military units of the Sudanese Army to protect the oil fields and installations, including the pipeline to Port Sudan, and the international investments that have been made. The Sudanese participants are particularly concerned by the role of the Canadian company, Talisman Energy, in oil development in Sudan. Civil society organizations in Sudan and Canadian NGOs have called for Talisman to acknowledge that its activities are exacerbating the war and enabling the war atrocities to continue, if not expand. They have called upon Talisman Energy to acknowledge the atrocities committed by its partner in the project, the Government of Sudan (GOS), and to withdraw from Sudan.

The participants felt strongly that Talisman is not dealing with the realities of the situation on the ground, or with the evidence of ongoing atrocities committed by the GOS. The participants endorsed the view that considerable pressure must continue to be applied on Talisman so that it acts appropriately and stops its support to one side in the conflict.

Talisman defended its investment and its operational involvement in Sudan and claimed that it is party to a development process for the economic good of all Sudanese. Talisman representatives admitted that Talisman "eats from the same cake as the GOS" and benefits financially from its Sudan operations. They explained Talisman's recent decisions to adopt a new approach to 'corporate responsibility'. While there were signs of dialogue and 'learning moments' between Talisman representatives and other conference participants in Calgary, a lack of trust in Talisman was expressed by many of the assembled participants. As well, the view was expressed that if Talisman were to fully adopt the current International Code of Conduct for Corporations, it would logically conclude that it must withdraw from Sudan. Many participants felt that Talisman Energy was not committed to full social and corporate accountability involving real transparency.

3.5 The Conclusions of the Harker Mission Report

The Forum heard from a member of the Harker Mission about the conclusions of the Harker Mission Report. Many participants felt that the statements of the Mission on the issue of atrocities and violations of human rights represent a clear indictment of the GOS and its partners in the oil production.

Participants were referred to the Report's reference to abductions, forced displacement and slavery in Sudan by military forces of the GOS, and those sponsored by the GOS to engage in such activities. The Mission corroborated findings of the UN Special Rapporteur. These findings conclude that all forced abductions into slavery and confined work without compensation are illegal. In today's context of the Sudan conflict, there is no difference between slavery and abductions, and all practices that result in wrongful treatment of one human being by another are illegal under international law. Specific mention was made of continuing reports of slavery among Sudanese women and the continuation of repressive laws that condone or encourage excessive brutality.

Forum participants endorsed the Recommendations of the Harker Mission Report. Hope was expressed that its Recommendations would be accepted and implemented by the Government of Canada. In particular, participants mentioned frequently that Canadians must be encouraged to demand more significant action by the Government of Canada. This action should stem the flow of oil revenue to the GOS. Canada must also play a more enlightened and pro-active role, particularly as it is also a member of the IPF.

4 Forum II - Ottawa

Forum II, held in Ottawa on June 7-9, brought together civil society voices from Sudan, Canada, the US and Europe for nearly three days to air views on the many issues concerning the conflict in Sudan and to discuss the possibilities of strengthening the peace process. Representatives of the Government of Canada and the diplomatic community were welcomed to the Forum.

4.1 Review of the Context

Participants heard of the tradition of and experience with national democratic institutions in Sudan and gained a particular appreciation of the democratic history and successes throughout the country, noting that twice in Sudan's history since independence, civil society forces have brought about periods of democratic government. Specific reference was made to the role of women in the life of the nation, their role in the history and the structures of civil society and the new role of women in search of peace - pushing the peace process from within civil society. It was also noted that undemocratic regimes and war plagued the country and the results of war have dealt Sudan a severe legacy of destruction, dislocation, uneven development and indeed underdevelopment.

In order to bring about significant and positive change in Sudan, elements of Sudanese society have attempted to bring about peace. There must be an acknowledgement of the long history of negotiation and dialogue towards peaceful settlement of issues, accompanied by great frustration and protraction of the armed conflict.

The participants heard of the recognition that should be given to the tremendous size of the problems and issues facing the people and the parties in the Sudan conflict. The details on the death and displacement of people in the Sudanese conflict are staggering and underline the call for urgent international attention to the requirements of the peace process.

There was great concern among the participants at the Forum that the Mediation Committee of IGAD is not making adequate progress. Many details of the IGAD process were described, as were ideas that can be considered by the IPF members as they discuss their next moves in the IGAD process. The parties heard a strong rationale for the IGAD process to be used as the main initiative for mediation of the conflict. Participants heard many views on the Egyptian-Libyan process and there was a view that there should be only one process at the diplomatic, international level.

There was concern by the Sudanese civil society representatives that the principle of self determination must not be abrogated, that it is of primary concern. Participants heard that the Interim Period after cessation of hostilities and the Referendum on Unity or Separation are key steps in securing an enduring peace, and that these should be taken in a context within which democratic norms must be practised vigorously.

Concerns were raised about the role of Canada in the IPF and the recent proposal that Canada establish a monitoring mission in Khartoum. Great concern was raised as to whether that office can be effective under the gaze of the GOS, and uncertainties were raised as to the procedures, operations and mandate of that office. Participants hoped that it would be effective and have integrity. Furthermore, there is disappointment that Canada has done little with the conclusions and recommendations of the Harker Mission Report. Participants called on Canada to be more proactive on the critical issues related to oil extraction and the role of the Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy, in Sudan.

The role of Talisman Energy of Calgary in exploration, extraction and financing of oil operations in Sudan is large and of great concern. There were few participants who expressed confidence that Talisman was accomplishing anything other than assisting the GOS, inadvertently or otherwise, in its efforts to maintain and extend the war in Sudan.

The participants felt strongly that the revenues from oil should not benefit the current regime and its war effort. Nor should oil revenues go only to one region of Sudan. Rather, corporations involved in oil operations in Sudan must cease operations until an agreement is made for the equitable distribution of the revenues from oil. This agreement can only be achieved in the context of, or following, a peace settlement for the whole of the Sudan.

Participants did not express support for the Government of Sudan and its policies and practices. The regime is seen as undemocratic, hostile to the interests of the vast majority of the people of Sudan in all parts of the country and serving only the interests of a few who use the mechanisms of government to do business for themselves. Participants agreed, however, that there are many severely aggrieved and disempowered persons and communities throughout the country. Participants expressed support for the dialogue on peace and the Declaration of Principles of the IGAD mediation process.

4.2 Human Rights and Civil Society in Sudan

A strong gender analysis of the human rights situation and a detailed description of the role of women within civil society came through from many speakers at the Forum. Historical notes on civil society that were presented described the structure, role and difficult operating circumstances of civil society today. The presentations were gripping and real. Women are among the most negatively affected, though women are also 'refreshing' the peace process now by speaking out.

Women are speaking out not only about the war but also about their general role in society. There are hopes for important changes towards equality. There is, however, a particular concern about the impact of the war on women and children, especially those displaced by the war, those in so-called 'peace camps' and those in prisons. Women in Sudan are among the poorest of the poor and suffer the highest illiteracy rates. The war had made the situation for women in Sudan much worse than the impact of colonialism. Few health facilities are available in the country for women and children; access to food is skewed against women and children; and land mines severely affected women and children. In this adverse context women are struggling to be heard. Women want to ensure that in any negotiations and resolution of the conflict that women are full party to the outcomes and find a way to ensure significant moves towards gender equity in any new dispensation. Women are demanding the reinstatement of human rights and the rule of law and demand an end to the recruitment of children into the war.

With the incarceration of members of civil society by the military and police throughout the country,

the concern for people in prison was raised and is of grave concern. The difficulty for groups that attempt to work in prisons was described in detail. It is complicated work and frustrating, and there is little observable effect on conditions of prisoners, especially women and children. It was noted that the vast majority of people in jails in the north are people from the south.

The situations facing a variety of specific groups within Sudan was raised. Chief among them was that of the Nuba people, particularly the military activity being carried out by the Government of Sudan in the Nuba Mountains, the lack of relief and emergency support there and the severe displacement that has resulted from both military attacks and the lack of external assistance. This issue was examined in detail with reference to the activities of the Sudan military around the oil fields and the oil pipeline.

Great concern was expressed about the expansion of military operations into Block 5 to the south-west of the Unity and Heglig oil fields. This is understood as an expansion of the war for purposes of depopulating new oil territory for the expansion of oil drilling and potential new exploitation of further oil reserves.

The aid and relief situation is of great importance in southern Sudan due to the ongoing lack of civilian administration and provision of services in the areas of health, education, agriculture (e.g. seeds) and water.

The participants and speakers dealt with the dilemma of dependency on external assistance. Concern was expressed about the way in which aid affects, often skews, the situation in the country, especially with the cessation or slowdown of aid, and the unequal distribution of aid. As well, in comparison, there is an open mind to aid and external assistance, indeed a need to collaborate with external groups in many areas of work and provision of basic services. It is hoped that more areas of Sudan can be opened up for needed relief and development assistance.

The speakers also exposed many sensitive issues and experiences of how people understood the situation from their own perspective, which, if not handled properly, will remain in effect and affect relationships in the future. The participants grappled with the need for truth about the pain and suffering, healing and reconciliation, trust building between people, and hope for a way forward.

The People to People Peace Process being carried on in southern Sudan by the New Sudan Council of Churches is showing great promise, progress and vitality. In particular, the 1999 Wunlit Conference has brought reconciliation between several groups in the south. This process not only builds peace 'from below' but it fosters collaboration among groups as the overall situation in Sudan evolves.

The south-south dialogue, preparation for the cessation of hostilities and the Interim Period that would follow are important developments in the overall movement towards peace. The links between the People to People Peace Process, the south-south dialogue and the IGAD process, with its accompanying IPF process, were described by the speakers and were viewed as complementary processes.

The operations of the current regime in Khartoum, pose a continuing affront to the human rights of the people of Sudan. The great difficulties in daily life being faced by so many Sudanese are very real and deeply disturbing. The violations of human rights and abuses by the current regime are sufficiently documented to be of grave international concern. Yet the violations continue. The combined ability of Sudanese civil society and the international community must be raised to

effectively challenge the Government of Sudan and bring pressure for a cessation to oppression, military atrocities and human rights abuses.

4.3 Civil Society and the Peace Process in Sudan

The participants heard details of the role of women in Sudan as instruments of peace. Recommendations were voiced for the further involvement of women in the peace process, especially in the north of Sudan. Within the ideas presented the participants heard of ways to further mobilize women, analysis of pressure points of the GOS, training needs for women and the potential for international linkages.

The participants also heard in more detail of the People to People Peace Process that has been going on in the south of the country. In particular the Forum heard of the events that led to the Wunlit Conference in 1999 and of the positive development since that Conference. The People to People Peace Process holds particular potential if carried out further to involve more groups and communities. Reports are that more groups are indeed becoming involved and that there are tremendous results from all the work to date. The 'bottom-up' approach is bringing civil society into the peace process despite the conflicts between military and political leaders.

The view was strongly expressed that unless south-south conflicts - the so-called tribal or ethnic conflicts - are resolved, civil society in the south will not be able to influence the peace process at the formal level involving the recognized parties to the conflict.

Details were presented to the Forum participants on the involvement of other civil society actors in the peace promotion work in the south. Participants heard of the particular role of women in the People to People Peace Process especially after the Wunlit Conference. While there was early scepticism among women, there is now a sense of change, and women have participated in the peace process and want the world to hear about it. In the north, there is an active role among youth, women and professional groups, unions, peace researchers and activists, Muslim and Christian leaders and representatives of internally displaced peoples.

There is currently an important gap in civil society cohesion, especially recognizing that in both parts of the country people are working against a common force of oppression. The mutual mistrust between north and south cannot be ignored and must be resolved.

Issues concerning the People to People Peace Process include the following:

- How far and how fast can the process be extended and can it effectively go beyond the south?
- How can the word be spread that there is reconciliation at the community level, particularly to inform groups and people in the Diaspora?
- How can civil society from the north and the south be engaged in a common process or to share information?

Key building blocks for peace and a negotiated settlement include agreements reached already in the IGAD mediation process. These included a Statement of Principles. The main issues being debated are:

- Separation of religion and the state, and the issue of the 1998 Constitution.
- Borders between North and South, and the issue of oil in Unity State.

- Self-determination for unity or succession, and the referendum.
- Equitable sharing of power and wealth.
- Cessation of the conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army and separation of forces.
- Repatriation of exiles and displaced persons.
- Humanitarian relief.
- Role of northern opposition groups in talks, and specific issues of specific groups of southern Sudanese.

Internationally, groups can be involved in several ways. These include:

- Pressure by NGOs to secure support within the IPF for the role of NGOs in the Peace Process.
- The hosting of more conferences, meetings and fora to talk strategically about the Peace Process in Sudan, keeping the Peace Process as high on the international agenda as possible.
- Pressure by NGOs and multilateral agencies on the GOS and SPLA to allow more relief goods into the country to all peoples in all parts of the country - to help sustain the life of all individuals at this critical juncture.
- Pressure on the GOS to significantly enhance resettlement and rehabilitation work among internally displaced peoples, including the provision of education for all and medical services.

There was a strong call by speakers and participants of the Ottawa Forum to pressure the GOS and the SPLM as well as IGAD to involve civil society in the peace process. It was strongly voiced that the IPF must help bring the Sudanese NGOs and civil society groups into the peace process.

International support was requested to facilitate and encourage north-south communication between civil society organizations, including funds for meetings and information exchange. This would enable and empower Sudanese to take ownership of their problems, to organize and correct mistakes, to agree on objectives and methods of action and strategies, and to gain mutual understanding and trust.

4.4 Forum Workshops

The Forum included workshops on three areas:

- Supporting Human Rights and civil society in Sudan - Mechanisms for Canadian Assistance.
- Impact of Canada's economic role in Sudan - Oil Development and Support for the Peace Process.
- Enhancing the role of civil society in the peace process.

The Reports of these workshops brought the Civil Society Forum on Sudan to a conclusion. The recommendations reported from these workshops are included in the main set of recommendations enclosed in this report.

5. Note on consultations among Sudanese, Canadian, American and European NGOs during the Ottawa Forum

During the Ottawa Forum, NGO participants from Sudan, Canada, Europe and the United States met to explore options to improve the communication flow among regions, to develop common advocacy objectives and to better facilitate joint advocacy campaigns. Agreements were reached to redouble efforts in each of these areas.

Discussion also focused on ways in which NGOs might stay better apprised of the work of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), how best to link with the IPF and how to interject international NGO perspectives for consideration by the IPF.

Canadians present pledged to provide the necessary follow up on these questions during the coming months (September-November 2000).

▲ NSOC People-to-People Peace Process, Stephen Ter Nyoun Yier

▲ Oil Extraction in Sudan, Bonar Malwal

▲ Sudan - an overview

▲ SIARG - Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group

SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM

Annexes

Canada, June 2000

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- ▲ NSCC People-to People Peace Process, *Stephen Ter Nyoun Yier*
- ▲ Oil Extraction in Sudan, *Bonar Malwal*
- ▲ Sudan - an overview
- ▲ SIARG - Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group

SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM

Canada, June 2000

1 INTRODUCTION

The civil war in Sudan continues with little sign of any imminent peaceful settlement. A state of emergency was recently declared as political tensions run high in the Sudanese Government.

Now that the oil pipeline has been completed, there is little or no incentive for the warring parties to come to a comprehensive peace agreement. The Government is accused of stalling on the IGAD peace process because it believes that, with oil revenues flowing, it is only a matter of time before enough weapons and resources can be acquired to either win the war, or convince southern leaders to join their "peace from within" strategy through the provision of material incentives.

The opposition parties, on the other hand, (particularly the SPLA), have no incentive to lay down their weapons, now that they see their resources being taken from them and handed to their adversary. There is a striking lack of confidence in the "peace from within" initiative of the government, which has yet to demonstrate that it is acting in good faith and has clearly failed those southern groups which have signed the agreement.

Sudan government officials, opposition leaders and faction heads have all been given opportunity to express their visions for peace. But for some of these, peace is less of a priority than ensuring that their own power and influence is maintained. Thus the current "peace process" is muddied with voices which are not necessarily interested in a just and comprehensive peace. The voices of the victims - the women, the children, and the innocent civilians caught in the civil war - have no voice in any peace forum.

The recent conference on civil society in Sudan, held in Milan, Italy, and which was sponsored by a group of Italian NGOs, demonstrated clearly the value of hearing the voice of Sudanese civil society groups on issues of justice, peace, human rights and development. The Milan conference was notable in two ways:

- It brought to the public attention the competent, articulate and reasonable voices of people from a wide variety of racial, ethnic and sectoral backgrounds on issues of peace and human rights in Sudan.
- It was able to separate propaganda from fact in a credible manner.

There is an urgent need for the Canadian Government and general public to gain a better understanding of the situation in Sudan and to come up with viable channels for supporting the peace process. Canada's involvement and influence in the Sudan is significant (especially with the oil company activity), yet the needs and issues related to Sudan have seldom received the attention and focus which they deserve.

A symposium on the Sudan peace process will be held in two locations in Canada (Calgary and Ottawa), with a focus on Canadian - Sudanese issues which are directly connected to the economic and political influence of Canada in Sudan in the context of the peace process.

2 GOALS OF THE SYMPOSIUM

2.1 To explore and highlight appropriate responses for the Canadian public and private sectors with respect to their conduct and activities in enhancing the peace process in Sudan by:

- Providing forums where the views and opinions of the Sudanese people can be heard with regard to Canadian involvement in Sudan, and;
- Discuss the effectiveness of existing activities and ideas for peace and development with invited non combatant representatives from Sudanese civil society.

2.2 To outline the role which civil society (both within Sudan and in the international community) can play in promoting peace in Sudan, including the integration of civil society counterparts into the IGAD process in conjunction with the IPF.

3 ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

Through a series of plenary presentations and discussion, followed by workshops, the Symposium will address issues related to the following three broad themes:

- The Peace Process
- Human Rights
- Civil Society Capacity Building

It is important to stress the interconnectedness of these themes and of the issues which will be discussed by panellists and participants at the Forum. For example, the question

of the *role of civil society*, the question of the *oil economy* or the question of the *role of women* will all find expression throughout the Forum. Panellists and participants will be encouraged to direct their analysis at current and future initiatives, rather than dwell unnecessarily on past events.

4 EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- a) Canadians will come away with a better understanding of the role that we are playing in the peace process in Sudan.
- b) Canadian NGOs, the Government and general public will be given concrete ideas for action in contributing significantly to establishing a lasting peace in the Sudan.
- c) The provision of forums where civil society voices can be heard by the international community will encourage and strengthen Sudanese civil society itself, by demonstrating to the warring parties, IGAD, the IPF and international community that the voices of the victims are an essential component of the peace process.
- d) Ideas and concrete recommendations for implementing the new CIDA policy on support to civil society are likely to emerge.
- e) It is hoped that the symposium will lead to the development of an international civil society movement which will provide complementary support to the IPF/IGAD forum, encouraging and enhancing the peace process through the input of grass roots ideas.
- f) The Symposium will provide insights into the need for (and ultimate profitability of) the incorporation of ethical codes of conduct by transnational companies involved in zones of civil conflict.
- g) The Canadian business sector will understand better the importance of including a comprehensive analysis of the political, social and human rights situation in a country, (and the likely impact of the company's activities on those areas), as an integral component in its "due diligence" process prior to involvement.
- h) A written report will be produced (in English and French) immediately following the symposium and will be given wide distribution.

5 PARTICIPANTS

The following sectors and groups will be invited to attend and participate:

a) Sudanese representatives will be invited to present a diversity of views from a cross-section of Sudanese civil society. They will come from among the following groups:

Sudanese women's groups
NGOs
Religious organizations
Human rights organizations
Community associations
Research organizations
Labour/Trade Union

b) Researchers from Canada, the US and Europe, who will be requested to present their findings, e.g. the Harker mission.

c) Representatives from the Canadian Government.

d) An invitation will be extended to the Sudanese Embassy.

e) Representatives of Canadian oil companies and investment analysts. The Calgary Forum will allow direct dialogue with leading Sudanese civil society representatives.

f) Representatives intimately connected with the IGAD peace process.

g) Members of the Sudan Inter Agency Reference Group (SIARG) and other NGOs, churches, the media and the general public.

6 TIME FRAME

The Symposium will take place in late June. Provisional dates are:

Calgary Public Forum	Monday	June 5, 2000
Ottawa Public Meeting	Wednesday	June 7, 2000
Ottawa Symposium	Wednesday-Friday	June 7-9, 2000

The visitors from Sudan will have many follow up activities during subsequent days with the media, church groups, DFAIT and CIDA.

Statement

NOTES FOR REMARKS

BY

ANDREW MCALISTER
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

AT

THE SUDAN INTER-AGENCY REFERENCE GROUP
CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM ON THE
SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

Ottawa, Ontario
June 7, 2000



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

Canada

Thank you for the kind introduction.

On behalf of the Honourable Maria Minna, Minister for International Cooperation, who unfortunately could not attend today, I would like to thank the organizers of this event, the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group, for their work ... and, on a personal note, their hospitality.

It's a pleasure for me to speak to you on such an important issue, and affirm Canada's support for those who are fighting for their survival, for peace and development in Sudan.

We would like to extend an especially warm welcome to those guests who are visiting from Sudan and the region.

It is extremely important that we Canadians — in civil society and government — have such opportunities to listen to you in order to better develop our understanding and better ways to support your work.

You are no doubt aware that the Canadian International Development Agency — CIDA for short — has provided assistance to Sudan in various forms.

Since 1990, we have provided over \$100 million in food, basic medicines and other health and emergency assistance.

This has been delivered — mainly in the South, but also in the North — through the UN system as well as through Canadian NGOs and their local partners, some of whom are represented here today.

About one year ago, CIDA reviewed its policy on Sudan and came to the conclusion that, in addition to emergency assistance we should become more active in supporting the search for peace.

Of course, CIDA works very closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs here in Ottawa and in the region as well as with Canada's Special Envoy for the Sudan Peace Process, Senator Lois Wilson.

CIDA provides resources to support the peace process because we believe that — whatever we do, however many resources we channel — the people of Sudan will not enjoy their basic rights for development and human security until there is a lasting peace.

A *lasting* peace is a goal I know all of us in this room are seeking. But achieving that goal will not be easy.

When one dares to think about the schools and clinics that could have been constructed, of the business enterprises that could have flourished, of the roads and fields that could have been built and tended rather than mined, and of the cultural vibrancy that could have been more freely celebrated -- the tragedy of Sudan becomes even more deeply etched in our minds.

That is why it is important to develop an alternative future for Sudan, and for all Sudanese -- but, most of all, perhaps, for the children.

This vision would be based on a culture of peace rather than a culture of war.

In the past year or so CIDA has provided over \$1.2 million in financial support for a number of initiatives related to the Sudan Peace Process.

These include:

- the Sudan Women's Peace Initiative, which held an international conference in Maastricht in April, supported by CIDA and Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade;
- a Track II project managed by Project Ploughshares in partnership with the Nairobi-based Inter-Africa Resource Group;
- the "IGAD Resource Group" project managed by the Addis Ababa-based InterAfrica Group;
- of course, we also support and work closely with the IGAD Peace Secretariat, and we are very active in the IGAD Partners Forum where we search for ways to support IGAD, the IGAD Declaration of Principles and the Peace Secretariat itself;
- we are also very happy to be one of the funders for this Symposium.

I think it important to point out that, in this list of CIDA-funded projects, civil society features prominently.

Civil society organizations and their membership have been among the victims of the Sudan conflict.

Civil society has a basic right to be heard, and to influence the peace process that will be so central in determining Sudan's future.

Peace-making and peace-building are about more than well-crafted documents, as important as these are.

Civil society leaders and organizations can bring flexibility, inspiration, creativity and, sometimes, sources of expertise or legitimacy that are so often lacking in a prolonged, deep-rooted conflict.

If well-organized and well-supported, civil society actors who are truly representative can play a key role, not only in providing new ideas for peace but also in building the new relationships and social capital crucial for a lasting peace.

From the Canadian point of view, support to Sudanese civil society can entail:

- well-informed diplomatic, political and moral support;
- support to initiatives that reach the broader Sudanese public and grassroots rural populations;
- support for groups and processes that can help build bridges between the grassroots and the more established civil society actors who are better placed to directly influence the parties to the negotiations;
- support to religious and other indigenous leaders who may not traditionally engage in such politically-charged processes but who play a unique role in the societies and cultures of Sudan and may want to play some role in the peace process -- in particular to help build bridges across the cleavages in society that have been exacerbated by the conflict; the Sudan conflict, in particular, calls for special attention to issues related to the role of religion in society and politics, and cross-faith relations generally;
- we also continue to work with those who are closer to the situation, to carefully identify and channel resources to locally-organized initiatives -- as we have done with the New Sudan Council of Churches.

We must also ensure that in all our initiatives we are well-informed of not only the complex "macro-level" dimensions of this conflict, but also the best practices, methodologies and processes for conflict resolution from around the world *and* in the traditions of Sudanese cultures.

And we must do our best to ensure that civil society processes and viewpoints are brought to the centre of discussions by the international community and the principal actors in the conflict.

We are listening to our own stakeholders, including the Sudanese diaspora living in Canada — many of whom already are in regular contact with CIDA officials.

None of this is to suggest that the "civil society approach" is either a panacea or is not fraught with its own particular difficulties, especially when it comes to supporting the right actors through the right means.

There will be no shortage of challenges in the resolution of the Sudan conflict. But this is why we at CIDA are also increasing our own capacity to monitor and more deeply understand the Sudan conflict and the plethora of stakeholders.

The fact is that, no matter how much we seek to understand Sudan, its problems and opportunities — the key to our success, in playing our own small but we hope effective role, will be the relationships we Canadians develop and foster with Sudanese.

The situation is far too fluid and too complex to believe that formulas or blueprints can be applied to any of the kinds of initiatives I have mentioned.

We need creative, flexible and highly effective approaches.

We look forward to watching this particular process, as we at CIDA continue to be engaged with the people committed to, central to and truly capable of realizing a durable peace for Sudan.

I wish you the best of luck in these very important endeavours. Thank you.

RECORD OF THE

LILIIR

**PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
PEACE CONFERENCE**

EAST BANK CONFERENCE

FOR

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

BETWEEN THE

ANYUAK, DINKA, JIE, KACHIPO, MURLE AND NUER

**LILIIR, UPPER NILE, SUDAN
9TH TO THE 15TH OF MAY**

Introduction & Background

The Liliir Conference marked an important step in the progressive people-to-peoples' movement for peace and reconciliation among southern Sudanese ethnic groups. Its achievements must be understood in the context of earlier peace initiatives conducted between various local groups, the most significant being the Wunlit conference in March 1999 between the Dinka and the Nuer, who reside on the west bank of the river Nile. Since then, other notable achievements of the growing peace process have occurred at the local level.

Under the facilitation of the New Sudan Council of Churches, the peace process is characterised by being people-led and people-focused, i.e. an encounter between the traditional and civil representatives of the participating ethnic groups independent from the political and military domain. This is perceived to be a critical element to the process: that it remains as free as possible from the interference of opportunistic political forces which, if unchecked, is capable of manipulating proceedings for self-seeking gains.

Encouraged by the significance and powerful spirit generated at Wunlit (which concentrated on the dominant Nilotic groups west of the Nile), the peace process advanced to other areas and a momentum grew among people east of the river to convene a second major conference to address their particular concerns.

The challenges facing the Liliir conference were complex given the diversity of the ethnic groups that reside in the region; the arrangement of its divided political landscape; and the intense mistrust and conflict that has arisen as a result. Throughout Sudan's civil war, the traditional hostilities between many of these groups have often been appropriated by warring parties for their political and military ends, sometimes with devastating effects for the ethnic groups concerned.


While the Liliir conference was attended by a large number of ethnic groups, it was unable to assemble a full representation from the region. This was partly because of the distance and logistics involved and partly because some participating delegates were obstructed from attending (by their military commanders). The delegates deeply regretted that 10 Gawaar chiefs, and 6 Lou chiefs (both Nuer), while transiting to the conference, were detained in Lankien and were unable to attend. Finally, the conference didn't have adequate time (and resources) to conduct the number and range of more localised encounters and reconciliations necessary to bring about a comprehensive, region-wide settlement. Once the rain season intensifies in Sudan (from the month of May), transport and logistics become prohibitive for over 4 months.

However, at the bequest of the people themselves, a significant and sufficient number of groups declared their interest to meet in the spirit of the (now 1 year old) Wunlit conference, and capture the desire of the people to talk of peace and reconciliation. These groups were the Anyuak from Akobo and Pochalla; the Bor and the Padang Dinka; the Jie and Kachipo groups from the Boma area; the Lou and some Gawaar Nuer from Ayod, Waat and Akobo; and finally the Murle from Boma.

The box below gives a simple representation of the participating groups and their approximate boundaries of interaction. In varying degrees, conflict exists *between* ethnic groups and *within* ethnic groups, and not all the members of one group are necessarily perceived to be hostile to another.

Thus, for example, the conference distinguished between the Murle from Boma and the Murle from Pibor, the latter residing in areas under northern government control and seen as hostile to almost all neighbouring groups. Similarly, the Gawaar and the Lou Nuer were distinguished, as there is currently discord between members of both sub-groups.

Box depicting proximity of participating ethnic groups, to each other.



It was also acknowledged that prior to the conference, dialogue and smaller localised agreements were either in process or actually brokered - principally among the Bor Dinka and the Gawaar and Lou Nuer, and also among the Padang Dinka and the Gawaar Nuer - reflecting the changing trends taking place at the grassroots towards peace in southern Sudan among civilian groups.

In order to consolidate these positive trends, NSCC deployed a team of mobilisers and an elaborate network of consultations were set up. Although Wunlit recommended that the next major conference be in the land of the Nuer, the organisers failed to obtain agreement on a suitable site where security would be sufficiently guaranteed. This regrettable situation was a disappointment to all, and finally, Liliir was agreed as an alternative.

Organisation of the Conference

The host community prepared the conference facilities and NSCC provided facilitation and technical support. An additional water point was secured with assistance from the NGO community. Security was provided by the SPLA. Because of the relative distances between the groups, airlifts had to be conducted for the visiting delegates. A number of observers also attended, including elders from the diaspora (and other parts of Sudan), church leaders, international representatives and the media.

The occasion commenced with the traditional sacrifice of a white bull and the conference followed a now proven procedure. Firstly, beginning with the hosts, the delegates faced each other and told their story of transgressions, hostility and violence against their people. A period was then offered for rebuttal, comments and observations. This dialogue continued for three days and produced a catalogue of sensitive but key issues upon which a peace agreement would be fashioned. In response, 9 working groups were established to address the topics in more detail:

1. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR: I) THE IDENTIFICATION OF MISSING PERSONS; II) THE RETURN OF ABDUCTEES; AND III) THE RECOGNITION OF MARRLAGES
2. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO ENSURE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE & THEIR ANIMALS, AND THE PROVISION OF ACCESS TO ANIMAL WATER POINTS AND GRAZING AREAS
3. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR: THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON BORDERS & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER CHIEFS, POLICE, COURTS AND PATROLS
4. PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR: MONITORING THE PEACE AGREEMENT GENERALLY
5. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO ENCOURAGE THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL NUER CONFLICTS IN THE FUTURE
6. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP THE RECONCILIATIONS BETWEEN THE (GAWAAR) NUER AND PADANG & BOR DINKA
7. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO RESOLVE THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE LOU NUER AND THE ANYUAK IN AKOBO
8. PROPOSED MEASURES: TO BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE WITH THE PIBOR MURLE
9. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE PROCESS FROM POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REMAINING UPPER NILE GROUPS, TO JOIN THE PROCESS

The working groups reported back to the conference their proposed resolutions and recommendations. After discussion, and a number of amendments, they were finally approved by the delegates.


Reflecting the substantive issues discussed, and in the spirit of reconciliation generated by the process, a covenant was signed by 129 representatives. This formal act publicly sealed the participants desire for peace and outlined the areas where they will take responsibility for its implementation. The ceremony was concluded with the sacrifice of a white ox. The Christian community, both those attending the conference and those scattered throughout the world who are in solidarity with the peace process, offered prayer for its success and the advancement of peace and reconciliation throughout southern Sudan. The conference also expressed appreciation to the many supporting governmental and non-governmental organisations that have provided financial assistance to the peace process.


The conference recognised and regretted that not all ethnic groups, or important sub-groups, were represented on the day. It was the wish of the delegates that, with the assistance of NSCC, the process move forward to encompass these groups as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the Liliir conference stands as a remarkable accomplishment. The conference was successful in fortifying the voice of the southern Sudanese people in their compelling demand for peace. The delegates were unambiguous in appealing to their leaders (military, civil and the educated class in general): that there must be unity and peace amongst all the southern people, and more accountable administration and governance of their interests and affairs. However, the determination of the people to persevere with the achievement of peace, regardless of what obstacles are encountered, was apparent.


The following attached documents testify to the achievements secured at Liliir, namely;


- Liliir Covenant Document
- Conference Recommendations and Resolutions
- Press Statement Released by NSCC
- Delegate Signatures to the Covenant Agreement

This document therefore represents the official publication of the Liliir agreement and has been approved by members of the NSCC conference facilitation team:



Dr Haruun L. Ruun

Mr Telar Deng

Ms Piana Nadi Albino

Mr Paul Murphy

*A more detailed record of the conference will be made available by NSCC in the future.

LILIIR COVENANT
between the
ANYUAK, DINKA, JIE, KACHIPO, MURLE AND NUER
who attended the
EAST BANK PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PEACE & RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE
in
LILIIR, BOR COUNTY, UPPER NILE, SUDAN
(May 9th to the 15th, 2000)

A gathering of traditional and civil leaders was convened in Liliir (Bor, county), to reconcile the differences and conflicts between the Anyuak, Dinka (Bor & Padang), Jie, Kachipo, Murle (Boma) and Nuer (Gawaar & Lou), and to establish harmony and peace amongst themselves. The spirit of the conference was reflected at the opening by the ceremonial sacrifice of a 'White Bull', and concluded with the declaration of a joint covenant between the represented ethnic groups. The covenant was sealed with the sacrifice of a 'White Ox', the offering of Christian worship, and the signatures of each of the participating delegates and observers, publicly recorded. The following outlines their covenant:

"Under the facilitation of the NSCC, and witnessed by many church leaders and other citizens of Sudan, we, the delegates of the Liliir conference have established a covenant of peace and reconciliation between us. We declare our intention today to cease from hostile acts, and commit ourselves to the practical measures necessary to ensure the integrity and sustainability of our agreement. Recalling the spirit and wisdom handed down from our ancestors, and the memory of our daughters and sons who have unnecessarily died over the past 10 years, we pledge ourselves to observe and implement this covenant and its accompanying resolutions.

We have unanimously agreed that:

- ✓ all traditional hostilities will cease among us, and that all military (and militia) groups are to respect the civilian population and abide by, and protect, this covenant;
- ✓ the conditions necessary to foster local peace and development are brought about by our communities and leaders, and the provision of basic essential services for the people are made available and improved;
- ✓ an amnesty will be upheld for all offences against our people and their property prior to the conference, in the spirit of reconciliation and unity. The amnesty takes effect from this date;
- ✓ all abducted women and children are freely returned to their places of origin, and where necessary, marriage customs are fulfilled;
- ✓ freedom of movement across our common borders is upheld, and trade and communication is encouraged and supported;
- ✓ all cross border agreements are respected and the authority of the border chiefs and police patrols are justly observed;
- ✓ access to common areas for grazing, fishing and water points will be regulated and shared peacefully among us;
- ✓ we will demand good governance from our leaders for the achievement of unity and the observance of human rights;
- ✓ we will advocate on behalf of our sisters and brothers who have been scattered and displaced, especially those from the Bor area, for their return to their homeland with the encouragement and co-operation of their communities, leaders and civil authorities of origin.

In conclusion, we appeal that the people from Upper Nile who were either blocked or did not have an opportunity to participate in the conference be told about our deliberations and be encouraged to meet with us in the near future so that the East Bank peoples' peace process can be widened and deepened. This covenant reflects the will of the people represented at Liliir. It incorporates the resolutions of the conference (attached), and we urge that they be implemented with the full assistance and protection of the civil authorities under all of the southern liberation movements. We hope that the friends of Upper Nile will support our efforts and consolidate our desire for peace."

15.05.00

**MOTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE LILIIR CONFERENCE
9TH TO THE 15TH OF MAY, 2000**

Throughout the proceedings, a number of motions were proposed by delegates of the conference, passed by the assembly, and which are recorded below. In addition, the 9 working groups produced a series of resolutions and recommendations which are intended to accompany the general covenant agreement.

The following motions were unanimously carried at the conference:

1. **MOTION**
THAT THE LILIIR CONFERENCE FULLY ENDORSES THE WUNLIT WEST BANK PEACE AND RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE, MARCH 1999.
2. **MOTION**
THAT THE LILIIR CONFERENCE CALLS FOR A SPECIAL 'CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS' TO OVERSEE THE RESOLUTION OF BORDER IDENTIFICATION AND THE REGULATION OF MOVEMENT
3. **MOTION**
THAT THE LILIIR CONFERENCE CONDEMNS THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UPDF IN DETAINING THE AEROPLANE WITH THE CONFERENCE DELEGATES ON THE 11TH OF MAY.

The following resolutions were approved by the conference:

4. **RESOLUTION**

TO ENSURE I) IDENTIFICATION OF MISSING PERSONS; II) THE RETURN OF ABDUCTEES; AND III) THE RECOGNITION OF (DE FACTO) MARRIAGES

- All abducted women, together with their children (whether born in legitimate wedlock or not), will be handed back to their biological parents and relatives in the presence of the local civil and security authorities.
- For parents who consent to the marriage of previously captive girls/women, that their marriages will be fulfilled according to local norms after the handing over procedure has taken place.
- The local civil and security authorities in the areas cited below are to be charged with the collection of the abductees and to co-ordinate with the identification of the missing persons through the regional Peace Council (see N° 7) and the legitimate owners of the abducted children. The process should be implemented between the relevant chiefs, under the supervision of the Council. 11 areas were identified with one or more chiefs who are to provide lists of the abducted persons.

Contact List:

- i) Lou Nuer, Chief Char Reath Kok (Akobo)
Chief Peter Pok Reath (Gon-Gat Bol)
Chief Dak Nyop

- ii) Gawaar Nuer, *To be identified later.*
- iii) Anyuak, Chief Akug Obang Obuala
Chief Opathi Ghuara Jok
- iv) Murle, Chief Boya Girgir
- v) Bor Gok, Chief Madhoor Alier Jongroor
- vi) Bor Athool, Chief Ajak Mabior Deng
- vii) Twic Ajuong, Chief Ayuel Warabek Ayuel
Chief Maketh Arok Maketh
- viii) Twic Lith, Chief Garang Deng Douth
Chief Kuir Bul Ruaal
Chief Bior Aguer
- ix) Duk Payuel, Chief Majok Chol Jok
- x) Duk Padiet, Chief Deng Mathiang Mabior
- xi) Padang, Chief Majok Mabil Deng

5. RESOLUTION

TO ENSURE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE & THEIR ANIMALS AND THE PROVISION OF ACCESS TO ANIMAL WATER POINTS AND GRAZING AREAS

The conference favoured the setting up of a committee to oversee the issue of access to common or shared resources, especially animal grazing and water points, and how those rights can be protected.

- That the functions of the committee will be given to a special Peace Council (and its various sub-committees), recommended below (N° 7). Representation should include; regional authorities, security, police, local administration, veterinary services, health services, head chiefs, ethnic group representatives.
- That the grazing period be considered from January to June (people & cattle to be dispersed by end of June).
- That people and their cattle will be accompanied to their allocated grazing areas by the border chiefs.
- That the Peace Council will visit sites annually before allocating rights of access to the head chiefs (and copied to the local authorities).
- That a small police force at the grazing areas be established. Security forces shall be responsible for the general security of the people and their cattle. Support for the security force shall come from the chiefs and their people. Security forces shall keep the Peace Committee informed of what the security status is, and what actions they have already taken.

- That the provision of clean water for the settled population and their animals be part of the implementation plan.

6. RESOLUTION

TO ENSURE THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON BORDERS & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER CHIEFS, POLICE, COURTS AND PATROLS

- That border post police will control incursions by cattle rustlers, etc., and report transgressions to their respective chiefs for prosecution.
- That chiefs will meet from the border areas and that courts will be established close to the border posts. Difficult issues or cases will be reported to the higher authorities from the respective areas.
- That the police will be equipped with radios (13) for easy communication with their counterparts in the region.

The conference identified a number of common borders and recommended border stations:

ANYUAK

- Murle: Pochalla & Pibor
Border Station: Abich/Okello
- Murle: Pochalla & Boma
Border Station: contested (Alal/Rad)
- Kachipo: Pochalla & Dima
Border Station: Dima

AKOBO/ ANYUAK

- Murle: Akobo & Pibor
Border Station: Bim
- Nuer: Akobo & Waat
Border Station: Duachen

MURLE

- Nuer: Pibor & Akobo
Border Station: Nyandit
- Nuer: Pibor & Waat
Border Station: Biem
- Dinka: Pibor & Bor
Border Station: Langou (for Bor south)
Manawan (for Bor north)

DINKA BOR

- Nuer: Bor & Waat
Border Station: Ayuai
- Nuer: Bor and Ayod
Border Station: Chueithon

NUER WAAT

- Dinka Bor: Waat & Bor
Border Station: Riek/Panyok

NUER AYOD

- Dinka Duk Padiet: Ayod & Bor (North)

Border Station: Paloich

DINKA PADANG

- Nuer Lankien: Baliel & Waat

Border Station: Kuel (Dinka) & Nyirol (Nuer)

- Nuer Nassir: Baliel & Nassir

Border Station: Nyayin

- Shilluk: Baliel & Sobat

Border Station: Nyinibil

7. RESOLUTION

TO ESTABLISH A REGIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE TO MONITOR AND SUPPORT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Recommended that a Peace Council be established with the sole purpose of overseeing and assisting the implementation and strengthening of the Liliir Covenant and resolutions. Membership, it was suggested, should consist of a chair and vice/chair; secretary; secretary for information and for finance; chief and associate advisors; resource people and other members to be identified. Each county/district will have a sub-committee, and where appropriate, establish them at the village level.

It is also recommended that the chiefs and civil institutions in each area make an explicit commitment to support the peace process and Peace Council, and monitor its implementation.

The following recommendations were agreed by the conference:

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO ENCOURAGE THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL NUER CONFLICTS IN THE FUTURE

Recommended that a meeting be called in the area where the conflict is reputed to be occurring. In particular, a committee should be formed to address the conflict between the Gawaar and the Lou Nuer, and presided over by the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes, i.e. Dinka from Bor, Bahr el Ghazal and western Nuer (to discuss root causes and reach a peaceful solution). Ayod or Yuai were suggested as possible locations.

The conference raised an appeal to the liberation movements of the region to establish secure conditions in the recommended areas, and assist the church in preparing the ground for such a meeting. An appeal was also made to NSCC to assist with facilitation, and to the chiefs to assist with security by mobilising the communities for peace.

Recommended that this meeting take place 'as soon as possible'. The Gawaar and Lou chiefs who attended the Liliir process should be mandated to go and inform their respective communities of the conference's covenant and resolutions. It is viewed as essential that these areas have (supervised and conditional) radio access. A practical but vital recommendation is to address the critical lack of water in the areas of Ayod and Yuai, as part of the process.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP THE RECONCILIATION TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE (GAWAAR) NUER AND PADANG & BOR DINKA

Recommended to form (joint) committees at the local level with four members from each ethnic group (suggesting a chief, a church leader, civil administrator and a member from a woman's association). Groups that have not attended Liliir should be given a record of the conference (e.g. Gawaar Lak, Renk, Pariang, Atar, & Jikeny).

Appeal to NSCC to assist the joint committee with transport for their task and essential commodities for peace meetings. Appeal to the authorities of the region to assist with security in support of such encounters. [Ayod suggested as a location, or Atar if security is a problem.]

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO RESOLVE THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE LOU NUER AND THE ANYUAK IN AKOBO

Recommended that the (to be established) regional Peace Council address this issue in the near future. As part of the problem originates from scarce resources in the Nuer home areas (water/grazing), recommended that these issues become part of the solution. Sharing of administrative duties (between Anyuak and Nuer) was also recommended. [Also noted that hostility between the two groups in Ethiopia was having an impact in Sudan.]

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE WITH THE PIBOR MURLE

Conference urged, that despite the lack of contact with the Murle residing in areas controlled by the Khartoum administration (i.e. in the Pibor area), and the negative profile they have acquired, that all peaceful options should be considered to establish communication with the group, in the hope that some positive response might be achieved.

Recommended that a NSCC send a message to SCC to spread the word of the people-to-people peace among the Murle residing in their areas and inform them of


what has been achieved so far. Similarly, a delegation from the Murle in Boma should send a similar message.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE PROCESS FROM POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF REMAINING UPPER NILE GROUPS TO JOIN THE PROCESS

The delegates distinguished different functions, and how they should be appropriated by the different parties to the process. Firstly, it is a people-to-people event, and thus the agenda and initiative must always remain with the people. Once it has been agreed when and where a peace meeting will be held, then the civil authorities, in the company of the traditional leaders, are both responsible for identifying a suitable location and making preparations for the meeting to take place. Finally, issues of security should remain with the security forces, in support of the people's peace process.

The conference recommended that the achievements of Liliir be widely disseminated throughout the region and documentation be made available in each county/district. The need for continuing smaller, more localised peace initiatives, was stressed before a larger conference is convened.



The New
Sudan Council
of Churches

"Serving All God's People"

PRESS RELEASE

LILIR PEACE CONFERENCE

EAST BANK NILOTIC PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PEACE & RECONCILIATION
CONFERENCE, UPPER NILE, SUDAN, MAY 2000

"ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH IN THE EXPANDING SOUTHERN SUDANESE GRASSROOTS PEACE PROCESS"

The momentum behind the southern Sudanese grassroots peace process continues to quietly, but firmly, progress. Another dramatic breakthrough was achieved in a small village called Liliir, in the Bor area of Upper Nile, between the 9th and the 15th of May.

Under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), over 250 traditional and civil leaders, representing members of the Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle and Nuer ethnic groups from the region, came together to address the deep division and conflict that have arisen between them, especially as a result of the country's 17 year long civil war.

The Liliir assembly was inspired by the success of the previous 'West Bank Dinka Nuer' Conference (in Wunlit, March 1999), and numerous mini 'people-to-people' agreements since then. The Wunlit achievement was unanimously endorsed by the delegates, church leaders, and other observers present (including a letter of support from the SPLM leadership).

The Upper Nile conference was both complex and challenging, given the many ethnic groups that make up the region. While traditional hostilities have prevailed for generations among some of the groups, they have been aggravated (and in many cases manipulated) by the warring parties in recent years. The conference welcomed the public declaration by a number of military officers who, in their capacity as civilian observers, pledged their commitment to the people-to-people peace process.

The conference functioned as a forum for people to face each other, discuss their differences and agree to reconcile and make peace. Given the high attendance, the outcome at Liliir was successful, and practical agreements over issues such as access to animal grazing areas, water points and the return of abducted children and women, were sealed. An amnesty for all prior offences against people and their property was also agreed. The occasion concluded with the making of a public covenant between the ethnic groups, when 129 representatives signed a comprehensive document pledging peace and reconciliation.

The conference regretted however that the wishes of the Gawaar-Nuer to participate in the reconciliation process was denied by an Upper Nile faction. The delegates requested that these, and other groups who did not have opportunity to participate in the conference, be given a chance to meet and reconcile as soon as possible. This, they said, was the wish of the people.

For further information please contact Liz Phillippo at Peacedesk@swiftkenya.com,

**THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PEACE BUILDING IN
SOUTH SUDAN AND OTHER RELATED PEACE EFFORTS
FOR ENDING THE WAR IN THE SUDAN.**

**"BLESSED ARE THE PEACE MAKERS, FOR THEY SHALL BE CALLED
THE CHILDREN OF GOD". (MATT: 5:9)**

**A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM
ENTITLED : "CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SUDAN
PEACE PROCESS" CLAGARY, OTTAWA, CANADA, 5-9 JUNE 2000.**

BY STEPHEN TER NYOUN YIER (NSCC)

INTRODUCTION

First of all I would like to salute all of you and the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference (SIARG) Group which has organized this land- mark historic event. It is an opportunity for us to share and discuss these crucial issues highlighted the slavery, religious persecution, genocide, peace process and suffering of hundreds of thousands of the people, more particularly in the oil fields in South Sudan with increasing escalating of conflicts and massive displacement of civil the population by the Sudan Government, using aerial bombardment on the villages. The People to People Peace Process in South Sudan began in 1994 in Akobo Conference for Lou-Jikany Nuer and later in 1998 in Wunlit Conference for Nuer-Dinka todate. It can not necessarily be assumed that every one is familiar with the background and progress. This intends to explore the process as based on peace building and its successes and difficult balance on its efforts.

The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was formed in 1989 by the Protestant and Catholic churches and also the NSCC represents churches serving outside the Sudan Governments controlled areas and in this particular case movements' administered areas. The NSCC is a member agency of churches in the non-government controlled area separated from the churches by the war. The churches in the Sudan aim at serving all communities irrespective of religious background and the churches are allowed freedom of worship and freedom of advocacy.

In the liberated areas the movements affirm the freedom of worship and free assembly of churches in prayers, meetings and other church activities, free expression and charitable work of the churches in line with biblical duties to serve all members of the church and communities at large.

Peace Process- An overview:

The Sudanese churches are over burdened by the effects of the continuation of the civil war which erupted for the second time in 1983. The escalating of the conflicts and the devastating effects of the war have caused enormous suffering, loss of lives, homes and property since 1955 except in 1972 to 1983 when there was relative peace and costly war is destroying humanity, property and the basic

social services such as health, education and human security, thus destroying the prospect for the future generations. The ethnic violence has increased dramatically among the South Sudanese and the behaviour of struggle for power. Cattle rustling and abuses of human rights have become a nightmare right after the massive return of the Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia in 1991. The Nuer and the Dinka being the largest ethnic groups found themselves in difficult life, situation with no basic necessity of life such as shelters, food, clothing and main business of cattle, agriculture and fishing equipment. The mobility of life has become very common and share of little resources become difficult for them to understand. In no time the war of power, property and poverty began in the South Sudan. The power of the stronger man is used to victimize the weaker people.

In the Nuer areas citizens of the Lou and the Jikany Nuer have been seriously affected by the war in 1991-1994 this is particularly the time when the Nasir Declaration was announced in the Nuer area. In addition to interfactional fight, happened between the following tribes:-

- a) The Lou and the Jikany Nuer
- b) The Lou and the Gawar Nuer and the Dinka of Atar
- c) The Lou and the Gaw waar Nuer and the Dinka of Bor
- d) The Lou and the the Jikany and the Ngok Dinka
- e) Western Upper Nile Nuer and the Dinka of Bhar El Ghazal

Hundreds of thousands of people were killed and wounded, properties were looted and houses were burned down as a result of these inter-tribal fightings.

Therefore, the peace in the South Sudan has become more urgent and priority number one. The calling for peace from the grassroots is genuine, "There are people without homes, children abandoned and are under trees, no food and clothings. Peace can not be delayed. Old diseases are returning, there are no medicines and wounds no longer heal. The healing of peace is missing. Enough of this fierce war; then the calling was honest without hesitation in order to heal the wounds and bring about everlasting peace.

● **The Akobo Jikany and Lou Nuer Reconciliation Peace Conference, September 1994:**

The presbyterian Church of The Sudan has started the peace process since 1994. When the Jikany and the Nuer Lou called for reconciliation peace conference held in September 1994 in Akobo, over three thousand people attended and up to date the two Nuer sections are in peace and harmony and are abiding with the terms of the signed covenant principles.

- The Loki Workshop For Local Chiefs, 1998.

This workshop was organised for a call for peace at the grassroot level. The local chiefs were brought together by the New Sudan Council of Churches in order to relate their testimony of confession and think together for the way forward to peace process. Hence, a genuine call was that, if we are to reveal ideas which express our joy and testimony, we must discuss with respect, what we are thinking in a larger forum inside the South Sudan. Therefore, Wunlit People to People Peace process was a result of that small gathering of the local chiefs.

● **The Dinka - Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference 27 February- 8 March 1999:**

The Dinka and Nuer chiefs, the church and community leaders, elders, women and youth met in a peace and reconciliation meeting in Wunlit, Bahr el Ghazal in Sudan under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). The living testimony of Wunlit created a positive spirit of peace and stability among the tribes in South Sudan. The example set by politicians and military commanders was another respect for the grass root communities calling for peace talks in which the politicians and commanders have taken the back seats and have lent their support in full to the civil society leaders to discuss and negotiate their differences.

The Wunlit peace conference was initiated with the sacrifice of a white Bull (Mabior Thon/Tu-Bor) and have sealed the covenant in Christian worship and traditional sacrifice in which the participants declared the following points:-

- All hostile acts shall cease between the Dinka and the Nuer whether between their respective military forces or armed conflicts. A permanent cease fire is hereby declared between the Dinka and the Nuer people with immediate effect.
- Amnesty is hereby declared for all offenses against people and property committed prior to 1/1/99 involving the Dinka and the Nuer on the West bank of the Nile River.
- Freedom of movement is affirmed and inter-communal commerce, trade, development and services are encouraged.
- Local cross-border agreements and arrangements are encouraged and all shall be respected.
- It is hereby declared that border grazing lands and fishing grounds shall be available immediately as shared resources.
- Displaced communities are encouraged to return to their original homes and rebuild relationships with their neighbours.
- The spirit of peace and reconciliation in this covenant must be extended to all communities in South Sudan.

In reading these seven points of covenant, it reminds to recall the statement of Frederico Major which said:

"On the eve of the new century and millennium, the world is challenged, more than at any time in the past, to transform

human history from its domination by war and violence to a new culture of peace and non-violence. What is so unique about this historical moment that the challenge only arise at this time"? All resolutions adopted by the conference are hereby incorporate into this covenant. An appeal was made for the rebel movements to endorse, embrace and assist in its implementation. From the time of the conference to date a living positive testimony has been carried on to many parts of the South Sudan.

- **The Lou Nuer Peace and Reconciliation Conference 1999 Waat.**

The Lou Nuer chiefs, the church and community leaders, elders, women, youth and other Nuer sectional representatives met in a Peace and Reconciliation meeting in Waat, Upper Nile in South Sudan. The Lou Nuer were fighting among themselves, difference factional groups existing in the Lou Nuer area. The reconciliation was first tried to reconcile the factional groups and for the first time after eight years of inter-factional fight, a number of military leaders from different factions met to discuss how a grass root peace process could continue in the area. Later a mobilization for community was undertaken.

The intention of the New Sudan council of Churches was to first reconcile the grass root communities and a covenant was signed. In the Waat conference the politicians took the front seats and the outcome of peace process was not like that of Wunlit, although Wunlit processes were followed.

- **Liliir Peace Conference, May 2000**

The East Bank Nilotic People to People Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Upper Nile, Sudan is the recent conference which was postponed once for insecurity but later was achieved in a small village at Liliir in the Bor Dinka area of Upper Nile, between the 9th and the 15th May over 250 traditional and civil leaders from the Anyuak, the Dinka, the Jie, the Kachipo, the Murle and the Nuer ethnic groups from the region, came together to address the deep division and conflict that arose between them. The spirit of Wunlit was carried in this conference. The Wunlit achievements were endorsed by the delegates of these communities. Covenant principles were agreed upon and mostly similar of Wunlit covenant, before the conference ended. The delegates requested that these and other groups who did not have opportunity to participate in this conference, be given a chance to meet and reconcile. Indeed the Nilotic people live in a very vast area and are so many that they need a series of conferences to discuss their problems.

4. The Wunlit commitment of signed covenant principles.

It is not surprising that the Wunlit signed covenant principles in all the seven points were quickly implemented and the people live in peace situation.

The Bahr el-Ghazal Dinka and the Nuer of the Western Nile are living in peace and harmony today.

2. The People to People Peace Process.

As we mentioned earlier, the Akobo and Wunlit peace and reconciliation conferences have laid a ground for the grass root peace process. Politicians and military leaders of all the rebel movements have lent their support in taking the back seats in the conferences, providing a tight security, cooperation among themselves and high respect for the mandate of the New Sudan Council of Churches despite of disputes on when and how the peace conferences start and end. With the success of people to people peace process, the Dinka and the Nuer are now sharing the grazing areas, water and fishing grounds. They forgave themselves for the following :

- Cattle which was raided.
- People who were killed
- Houses which were burnt to ashes
- Grain which was looted during the time of conflicts.

It is important to say that the Dinka and the Nuer seemed to have asked themselves "which ever among us were committed no sin may throw the first stone at anyone" (Jn. 2:7). That is the question Jesus asked the people who wanted to throw stones at the woman caught in adultery but later they disappeared without doing anything to the woman. That was a silent confession.

3. The Further Successes:-

The People to People Peace Desk in NSCC is a well organized programme with follow-up, feedback and evaluation system and further share successes. The peace councils are formed to help in monitoring with local authority.

The following points are to be observed by both communities:-

1. Continue evaluation and implementation of signed covenant principles.
2. Border police to control thieves, bandits, trouble makers who may incite troubles.
3. Courts fair trial of offenders

4. Joint court which should be convened at any necessary time when need arises and the chairperson of this court will be selected jointly by both communities.

Capacity building projects e.g. radio communications, education, health etc.

Therefore, there is a need for building bridges of understandings between the communities in South Sudan under auspices of NSCC.

4. "The Peace from Within" (The Khartoum agreement).

The peace from within documentation stated very well the needs and opinion of people of South Sudan. The documents agreed by both parties was signed but a debate over the following matters continued and reached a final disagreement.

1. Security arrangement
 - a) Joint technical committee
 - b) Joint cease fire committee
 - c) Management of peace organisms.
2. Exercise of Democracy by Government
3. Rejection of formation of Southern parliament etc.

It explained that there is no will and commitment on the part of the Sudan government. Later the resignation of the president of the coordinating council of the Southern States stressed the following points:-

- 1) The government has persistently violated the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 21st 1997 (refer to my memo of 25th 1999 to the Joint Ministerial Committee for Evaluation of the implementation of the Agreement). The violations have reached the peak in the recent Republican decrees that dismissed and appointed governors ignoring the 14th Constitutional Decree and the Constitution of the country.
- 2) The government has failed to implement the vital articles in the Agreement that relate to the Public Security, Police, Joint Military Committees, Advisory Council for Southern States (refer to the report of the Joint Ministerial Committee for Evaluation of the Implementation of the Agreement).
- 3) The government, since 17th September 1997 up to now, has declared a vicious war against the South Sudan Defense Forces in Unity State resulting in great losses in lives and property of citizens of the said State. The State entered into a government sponsored anarchy and terrorism resulting in forceful eviction of the elected Governor

from the capital of the State. Murder of two ministers and other ministers and government ministers had to flee in disarray for safety, either to the villages or to Khartoum. Similar incidents are known to have happened in States of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Attempts to stop this war and violent incidences have been frustrated.

- 4) The Government is implementing a policy of division and rule to disperse the political forces that signed the agreement and the South Sudan Defense Forces.
- 5) The Government have many times undermined the Southern Administration, the Coordinating Council of the Southern States, making it irrelevant.
- 6) By the 12th December 1999 decrees declaring the State of Emergency in the country, the President of the Republic abrogated the constitution and undermined the democratisation process.

The Khartoum Peace Agreement has been treated, has failed and the leader Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF) decided to pursue the struggle through armed force. The remaining group might have intended to pursue the principles of self determination through peaceful means with the government of Sudan.

Generally, the Nuer regarded the Khartoum peace agreement has failed totally and the South has no other choice but to come together to pursue the peace through armed struggle. At this time no real sign for the Khartoum peace agreement existence in the areas controlled by movement.

5. Should the Peace negotiations be opened to all political and Military parties?

This question has no answer till today. The entire population in South Sudan raise a question that if peace meetings are going to be convened, the Sudanese churches must invite to participate. Clearly the involvement of all the parties will be a decision of the parties to the conflicts. The negotiations sometimes take a form of close door meetings and no one is allowed even to be an observer. The two parties in negotiation blame each other from time to time. Khartoum government in most cases comes with her set of timetable and agenda. This kind of way led into collapse of the peace negotiations as the mediator may have no power to influence the two parties in conflict.

For sure, the question is very difficult to predict the answer. What may happen in the future, may be in the coming IGAD peace process which may have different nature of approach.

6. The impact of peace process on the Nuer and the Dinka relations:

The two communities of the Dinka and the Nuer have clearly confessed and understood that they have nothing to fight for. For them the war of property, poverty and power is over through these conferences, they have committed themselves to live together, a good example and that when the Nuer of Western Upper were displaced for few months in the oil fields by Sudan government, using gunships and aerial bombardments on the villages, they fled to Bahr el Ghazal areas and lived peaceful with their neighbours, the Dinka communities.

7. The Nuer community

The Nuer community at large accepted and appreciated the peace process under the auspices of NSCC. The Dinka and the Nuer are cousins and many of them are related. During the current war the Nuer and the Dinka have inter married, hence a good family tied relationship. One time a Dinka man came back after 5 years being away from his family because of current inter-tribal fight. Then he asked his Nuer brother in-law to give him his wife and children and he could go back to the Dinka areas. But strange indeed, the Nuer man asked "do you think it's right to claim both your wife and children while the dowry you paid to us and the lady are all from here". But both have a big laughter and the Dinka took his family peacefully. At the movement my uncle's son gave his daughter to a Dinka boy and a dowry will be paid in the future. A good relation between the Dinka and the Nuer was established at Wunlit in 1999.

8. The Response of the Rebel Movements as a result of people to people peace process:

The "success" of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) People to People Peace Process is that it is an indigenous church organization which has led the ongoing process. Although there are short-term fruits, its real impact will be long-term. The political and military leaders, many are positive about the progress- the Former governor of Bahr el-Ghazal has explained clearly that what "is important in the struggle is not the unity of movements and organisations but the unity of objectives and ideas". He added that the struggle is essentially about power not religion nor culture neither ethnicity because all these things flow from power. For sure, if you are a single individual and you have the power, all people can become what you are because you have the power.

One of Senior Commander was quoted as saying that if two leaders of the movements are removed and the people of the South are asked this question, do you have any reason to fight among yourselves. He believes that they all will say no but in such case the people may need another leader. Each group

will bring their leaders and struggle for power will start again and even the two leaders of the movements who were asked to step down will contest again for leadership. Therefore, what the people of the South Sudan could go for at this time is a unity of purpose. The People of South Sudan should learn to live together, to accept diversity and a positive relationship with the other. Therefore, South unity at this stage could only be achieved through the principles of self determination. "For ever is not against us is for us" (Mk. 9:40) Who is against who now, if the Nuer of Bentiu and the Dinka of Bhar el-Ghazal are sharing grazing fields and politicians and military leaders back the principle of self determination on peace process.

9. Human Disaster at the war zone in South Sudan.

The aerial bombardments by the Sudan Air Force are reported in South Sudan to be on daily and weekly activities.

Koch is one of the small areas in Western Upper Nile near the oil field, it has been reported that almost in 53 days aerial bombardments are on weekly and many civilians were killed and many wounded. In general, displacement and killing of civilians were reported in thousands and people moved to nearby regions.

- Rape of young girls and women is unbelievable
- Many elderly men/women and children are affected with eye blindness because of aerial bombardment with chemical weapons.
- Diseases are spread over all areas and people are paralysed and weak a result of chemical weapons.
- Homes in villages are burnt down and properties lost as a result.

Furthermore, some eye-witness reported that Military gunship usually lands at civilians' farms and kills innocent villagers. While other could escape but young girls and young women are always taken by the gunship men to unknown places and no one knows what do they do with such captives in Northern Sudan where they take them.

It has been always said by many who witnessed the disaster in the oil fields that the cleansing of civilian population near the oil fields by the Sudan Government may mean to replace them later with the people from Northern Sudan in the oil areas then the Land could be owned by the citizens from North Sudan, as many Sudanese believe that the Sudan Government is after the land and not the people of South Sudan. Indeed the struggle is at the top level and the common men in the Sudan do not know why the genocides have been committed from time to time.

10. Capacity Building through response of international community.

The developmental projects in South Sudan are essential, the following are needed:-

- Education programme
- Health
- Agricultural production - oxen ploughing
- Communication system
- Empowering women and youth to keep peace
- Peace through development
- Civic education
- People to people peace conferences and supporting other peace initiatives in the region such as IGAD, Arab League Peace etc.

The Sudanese in diápora are active backing the peace process and schools for training future leaders.

Therefore we call upon our international partners and donors to continue to support these programmes to help in peace settlement and everlasting peace.

CONCLUSION.

Finally, in this situation of the war in Sudan. We believe that the church has identified herself with the oppressed and suffering people for which she may be "light and salt". Then let our light shine before men, that they may see our good deeds and praise our father in heaven". (Matt. 5:16).

Therefore, I would conclude my sharing with the following points to remember in peacemaking. Do not forget the family- peaceful families are the basis of peaceful societies.

Do not forget to plan and budget for peace- it costs money; do not forget to put peace into your church liturgy, calendar and catechisms.

Do not demonise your political adversaries; learn to celebrate your differences.

Invent signs and gestures for peace. The world is littered with monuments and heroes of war. We need monuments and heroes of peace. We need to instill a culture of peace in the Sudan. Do not forget to use the year 2000 to multiply efforts for peace. In actual sense, the peace making required hard work, prayer and fasting and Sudanese should never give up to try for peace for their people and the land.

PRESENTATION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY
CONVENED BY THE PARTNERSHIP AFRICA-CANADA
AT CALGARY AND OTTAWA, CANADA; 4-9 JUNE 2000-06-01
By Bona Malwal

First, let me express my personal thanks to the Canadian organisers of the Symposium in Calgary and Ottawa on Sudan Civil Society, taking place from 4 to 9 June, for inviting me to these events. I also wish to express appreciation to the groups of Canadian Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and individuals for conceiving or initiating this symposium. I thank them also for the highly spirited campaign that they have waged since it became clear that the participation of the Canadian company, Talisman Energy Inc., in the exploitation of oil in Sudan is now a major factor in prolonging the civil war and is, therefore, a direct contributor to the suffering of the ordinary people of Southern Sudan, particularly those in the oil-rich areas of Western Upper Nile. The people of Southern Sudan will ever remain grateful to the individual Canadians and the group of Canadian NGOs who have undertaken this campaign. Some of us will make sure, in whatever we do, that the people of Southern Sudan are made aware of this campaign in Canada on their behalf and that they never forget this support.

As they say, there are two sides to any coin. Our own argument as Southern Sudanese has been that the participation of Talisman Energy Inc. in the exploitation of the Sudanese oil in a civil war situation—in the absence of a political agreement between the government in Khartoum and the South—is prolonging both the war and the suffering of the civilian population of Southern Sudan. The participation of Talisman in the extraction of the Southern oil means that the central government in Khartoum has no incentive to negotiate an equitable sharing of this important resource with the people of Southern Sudan, since the government in Khartoum is able to use this resource without any pressure to agree with the South on its use. The participation of Talisman in the Sudanese oil deal is therefore a major disincentive to peace and a major encouragement to the continuation of the war.

Talisman's argument—that its participation in the oil extraction in Southern Sudan is better for the people of the South because this is a Western company with a democratic and human rights-respecting tradition behind it—does not stand up to even weak scrutiny. First, if Talisman respected democratic and human rights traditions, it should not have joined the consortium of oil companies that are currently exploiting the Southern Sudanese oil in the first place. It should have stayed away. When Talisman entered into a contractual agreement with the government of Sudan, it knew full well that the regime was already under international accusations as a violator of human rights. Various United Nations bodies and other human rights organisations around the world had been condemning the regime in Khartoum for its appalling human rights record for years. A company acting in accordance with democratic and human rights traditions should have stayed away from such a project. Besides, there is no indication that Talisman ever made the observance of human rights by the government in Khartoum a condition for its entering into the oil agreement with that government, nor should anyone have expected that. Talisman, whatever its management may say, only saw a business interest in Sudan and took up the opportunity without thinking much about the consequences of entering into what was already a very long and very bloody civil war situation.

That Talisman entered into the Sudanese oil exploitation deal in co-operation with the government of Sudan without regard to the consequences of this action on the war, is further demonstrated by another fact. Not only are Talisman and the other oil companies providing the Khartoum regime with revenue with which to prosecute the war; it has been sufficiently and credibly demonstrated that Talisman and friends also provide the Khartoum regime with facilities—like airports, roads and river barges—to help it ferry its troops to the war front to displace and destroy the lives and homes of Southern Sudanese civilians.

Contrary to Talisman's claim that its presence in Southern Sudan positively contributes to peace in the country, there is much evidence that the regime in Khartoum has almost turned its back on the peace process in recent months because of the oil revenues it receives from Talisman and the other companies. It is unfortunate that the efforts of the Canadian government in the peace process itself do not go far enough, because these efforts do not include pressure by the Canadian government on Talisman to end its participation in the oil exploitation in Sudan. Without the government of Canada exerting credible pressure on Talisman to disengage, it does seem futile to talk of a positive impact by Canada—in any form—on the peace process in Sudan.

We all know what happened to the Canadian-proposed resolution which we were told would be presented at the United Nations. We do not believe, nor does the present government in Khartoum believe, that the oil is being used either as a stick or a carrot to bring peace in Sudan. The regime simply knows that it has achieved an arrangement by which Talisman and the other oil companies exploit the oil and provide it with the revenue from this undertaking which enables it to prosecute the war.

The argument by Talisman—that if it withdraws from the oil business in Sudan then its place would be filled by another company from a less democratic and human rights-respecting background—does not hold much water either. It might have been plausible if Talisman had been working in Sudan long before the current regime embarked on its bad human rights record. But Talisman walked into Sudan when the credentials of this military, authoritarian and fundamentalist regime were being seriously questioned and its human rights record was already the subject of long-term international condemnation. It can be said, therefore, that Talisman did not care about democracy for the people of Sudan nor about the abuses of human rights perpetrated against them by the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime. No, Talisman was prepared to do business with that criminal regime irrespective of its record. If a change has occurred as a result of Talisman's presence, it is not that Talisman has induced the regime to moderate its appalling human rights record—no, the only change is that Talisman is now abetting this horrendous situation and contributing to its escalation.

It can be said, therefore, that without very strong pressure on the NIF regime to move credibly towards peace by negotiating an agreement with the South on all the issues—including the development and distribution of its resources—Talisman's presence in Sudan as an exploiter of the oil on behalf of the government of Sudan alone in a civil war situation is—to say the least—not helpful.

There is at present no system of resource distribution in Sudan and whatever accrues to the government in Khartoum is used on its war programme. Development of such resources as Talisman is currently doing in a civil war situation without a political agreement between the parties to the war is a major disincentive to peace.

In fact, any kind of international development investment in Sudan while the war goes on is a hindrance to peace. That is why the earlier policy of most of the countries of the industrialised democracies of the West, including Canada—to suspend all development aid to Sudan until peace is attained in that country—was a very wise policy; and why the current tendency by these same industrialised democracies of Western Europe and North America, except the United States—to appease the NIF regime—is unfortunate.

The approach of the Western countries, which they call "constructive engagement", of dealing with the regime in Khartoum as if it were a normal government is unlikely to produce any positive results. The impression out there—especially for a regime that was internationally isolated by these same Western countries for years, which now finds these same countries have opened up to it because of the oil—is that Khartoum has had their way. The West has turned around and there is therefore no


need to change the course of NIF policies. This Western position would have been reasonable if it was coming in the aftermath of a seemingly successful peace process in which the regime had responded positively to the political grievances of the people of Southern Sudan. But under current circumstances, "constructive engagement" means that the regime in Khartoum is no longer under any serious pressure to change its bad policies, especially when companies like Talisman are helping it to exploit the very resources of the disadvantaged people and provide the revenues needed to enhance its prosecution of the war.

I believe that the choice for Talisman is not between remaining in the country to safeguard its "democratic" operations so that another country without such a democratic tradition will not take over its share. There is no such choice for the people of Southern Sudan. Talisman is exploiting the South's oil without the consent of its people. You cannot convince these people that although Talisman is helping their oppressors today to exploit their oil and to kill them, at some time in the future the democratic tradition Talisman brings with it will yield some fruits for them. For the people of Southern Sudan, Talisman's operation is simply helping their oppressors to oppress them even more, using their own resources.

The question is truly a moral one for Talisman and for the Canadian government and people: Should their company remain in Sudan exploiting the resources of the people of the South and handing over revenues from this to help the Khartoum regime repress the people of Southern Sudan even more? Or, if neither Talisman nor the Canadian government can deliver an early peace settlement to the conflict in Sudan—which they seemed to promise only a few months back—should Talisman continue its operations in spite of the absence of peace? This is an economic as well as a moral question to both. Clearly, Talisman as an oil company is not in the business of morality, but the Canadian government has up to now occupied very high moral ground internationally on these human rights issues. The government of Canada and Talisman need to work this matter out between them and come up with a credible and consistent stand.

As for the people of Southern Sudan, they appeal both to the government of Canada and to Talisman Energy Inc. not to continue to be accomplices in the crimes against them by the NIF regime in Khartoum on account of their oil resource.

Thank you very much.



Bona Malwal

STATISTICS AND BACKGROUND

Independence: 1 January 1956 (from Egypt and Britain)

Population (1997 estimate): **32.6 million**

Location: Northern Africa, bordering the Red Sea between Egypt (N); Eritrea and Ethiopia (E); Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (S); and Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic (W).

Size: 2,505,810 km² (967,000 square miles)

Major Cities: Capital - Khartoum [Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North]; Juba, Wau, Malakal, Atbara, Kassala, Wad Medani, Nyala, el-Fasher, el-Obeid, Port Sudan.

Languages: Arabic (official), Dinka, Bedawi, Nuer, Fur, Hausa, Zande, English, and various other Nilo-Saharan, and Afro-Asiatic languages.

Major Ethnic/Linguistic Groups: [Afro]-Arab (c.40%), Beja, Dinka (c.12%), Fur, Nuba, Nubian, Nuer, Zande/Azande. The Arab group is ethnically diverse, but bound by language and religion. The Dinka are the largest single ethnic group.

Religion

The media's shorthand simplification of "Muslim-Arab north, Christian-African south" is inaccurate. There are thousands of Muslims in the south of Sudan, and millions of Christians and believers in traditional African religions in the north.

Muslim (Sunni) c.60-70% - Islam is the state religion, but many Sudanese Muslims are more influenced by tolerant Sufi philosophies than by the absolutist attitudes of the National Islamic Front. Degrees of orthodoxy are variable. In Darfur, sorghum beer (*marissa*) is a long-established nutritional resource consumed by otherwise devout Muslims.

Traditional beliefs c.35% - Belief in traditional African religions persists among converts to monotheism.

Christian 5-15% - Growing adherence to Christianity is reported among southerners, Nuba and other marginalised peoples in Sudan, as they have been increasingly subjected to second-class citizenship and discrimination on account of their perceived "backwardness". Many are converting to Christianity to resist the forcible imposition of Islam by northerners who regard believers in traditional African religions as having no culture. However, the south can not be considered Christian by culture, since customary practices such as polygamy have long been an intrinsic part of southern cultures, even though they are contrary to Christian doctrine.

Money

- **Currency:** The Sudanese pound (£Sud) was replaced in mid-1999 by the Sudanese dinar, which is worth £Sud10 and had been in circulation for several years alongside the old currency.
- **Exchange Rate:** US\$1 = 250 dinars (September 1999)
- **Gross Domestic Product** (1997): c\$3.8 billion

- **Real GDP Growth Rate** (1997 estimate): 4.0%
- **Inflation Rate** (1997 estimate): 65.0%
- **Current Account Deficit** (1997): c. -\$807 million
- **Major Trading Partners:** Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Italy, European Union
- **Exports** (1997 estimate): \$634 million
- **Imports** (1997 estimate): \$1,260 million
- **Trade Deficit** (1997): c. -\$626 million
- **Main Exports:** Cotton, livestock, meat, hides, gum arabic, other agricultural products
- **Main Imports:** Arms, food, petroleum products, machinery
- **Total External Debt** (1999): c.\$20 billion
- **Arrears to the IMF:** c.\$1.6bn

Energy Overview

Total Energy Consumption (1996E): 0.0690 quadrillion Btu

Energy Consumption per Capita (1996E): 2.3 million Btu

Energy-related Carbon Emissions (1996E): 1.04 million metric tons (0.017% of world carbon emissions)

Carbon Emissions per Capita (1996E): 0.34 metric tons per person/year (v. 5.5 metric tons in US)

Oil & Gas

- **Oil Reserves:** 262.1 million barrels (proven January 1998). By the year 2015 the total current estimate of recoverable resources of 750 million barrels will have been exhausted unless new fields are found and developed. (Talisman now claims the recoverable reserves may be up to 950 million barrels)
- **Crude Oil Production:** 12,000 barrels per day (1998); 136,000 b/d in September 1999.
- **Oil Consumption:** 30,000 b/d (1998 estimate)
- **Natural Gas Reserves:** 3 trillion cubic feet (1998 estimate)

Electricity

- **Generation Capacity:** 500 megawatts (1996)
- **Generation / Consumption:** c.1.3 billion kwh (1996 estimate)

Sudan OIL & CONFLICT TIMELINE

1955

Beginning of first civil war between north and south.

1956

Independence - end of British-Egyptian condominium rule.

1958

General Abboud's military coup in November overthrows first civilian government.

1960s

Early oil exploration begun by Agip in the Red Sea

1964

October 1964: Abboud regime toppled by popular uprising

Port Sudan refinery comes on-stream, operated by Shell and BP (Sudan) Ltd., a company set up in 1962 between Royal Dutch/Shell and BP. Capacity of 20,000 b/d later expanded to 25,000 b/d in early 1970s. (Shell still owns Port Sudan refinery)

1969

Jaafar Nimeiri becomes president after "May Revolution"; briefly anti-Western.

1970

January 70: Nimeiri nationalises all banks, sequesters many large companies.

March 70: Nimeiri crushes potential Ansar/Umma insurrection - bombs White Nile Aba island base; Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi killed fleeing towards Ethiopia.

November 70: Nimeiri sacks communists from his government

1971

July 71: Failed communist coup d'etat; Nimeiri kicks out Soviet advisors, opens door to China.

1972

Relations resume with US and West

July 72: Addis Ababa Agreement, with autonomy for the South, ends 17 years of civil war

1973

Large-scale Sudanese emigration to the increasingly wealthy Arab oil states.

March 73: US ambassador C.A Noel assassinated in Khartoum.

August 73: Attempted uprising by Muslim Brotherhood and Umma Party

1974

Chevron begins operations in Red Sea, and near Bentiu, Malakal and Muglad in S / SW. Concession is originally granted to Chevron, with Shell subsequently taking a 25% interest.

Over the next 20 years, Chevron and Shell spend an estimated US\$1bn, shoot "extensive seismic", and drill "52 wells, including 34 suspended oil wells capable of re-completion for production."

1975

Sudan is called potential "breadbasket of the Arab world"; large-scale mechanised agriculture expands into southern Kordofan: huge influx of international capital. Loans to Sudan begin accumulating - leading to present day unpayable arrears.

September 75: Attempted anti-Nimeiri coup by "National Front" - an Umma/DUP/Muslim Brotherhood coalition.

1976

Chevron makes Suakin Red Sea gas discovery.

July 76: Failed coup attempt by Ansar (of Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma party) and Muslim Brotherhood

1977

Sadiq al-Mahdi holds "reconciliation" with President Nimeiri (see photo) - but doesn't consult his followers.



1977: "OPEN DOOR" FREE-MARKET POLICIES ADOPTED

1978

1978: First Chevron oil discoveries near Bentiu and Heglig. "More than Saudi Arabia - 15m b/d," claims Lebanese newspaper

Joint Sudanese-Egyptian financing project is launched to construct the Jonglei Canal through Sudd marshes of the South, employing the French CCI company's redundant giant excavator. Economic crisis - international primary commodity prices plummet and imported oil prices soar. IMF intervenes and negotiates "structural adjustment". First devaluation.

1979

February 79: US Secretary of Defense promises to sell jet fighters, tanks and other arms to Sudan. October - US Senate approves \$1.7m in additional military assistance to Sudan (after several previous larger weapons deals).

1980

JONGLEI CANAL construction begins, despite local protests.

Nimeiri embarks on "redivision" of the south from one autonomous unit to three states; a map attached to the Regional Government bill puts the area where oil has been found into northern Sudan. His creation of new "Unity" state around Bentiu to prise it from the south causes political upheaval among southerners, as does presidential decree that oil refinery is to be built at Kosti, in the north, instead of Bentiu.

1981

Chevron discovers commercial oil deposits in the "Unity (South)" field north of Bentiu. With neighbouring Heglig field in S. Kordofan, recoverable reserves are estimated at 236m barrels.

August 81: White Nile Petroleum Corporation is formed by Chevron and Sudan government. There are no southerners on the board.

1982

January 82: Petrol shortages spark serious disturbances. For the first time, Nimeiri's army command voices disapproval of the situation in the country and the corruption of his cronies.

September 82: Kosti refinery project "frozen" in favour of pipeline plan.

1983

Nimeiri completes "redivision" of South; sacks vice-presidents Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu.

April 1983: Civil war re-ignites after mutinies by army commanders Arok Thon Arok, Kerubino Kuanyin, John Garang and others lead to formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

September 1983: Nimeiri introduces "sharia" laws - used by his regime to terrorise and humiliate, with indefinite detention, public floggings, amputations - and death penalty for "heretics".

White Nile Petroleum Company (owned by government, Chevron, Shell and Apicorp) created to build 1,420-km export line from Unity and Heglig via Kost to Red Sea terminal between Port Sudan and Suakin; projected cost US\$1bn.

1984

Nimeiri uses southern ethnic Nuer "Anya Nya Two" militia against SPLA in the oilfields.

March 1984: SPLA attacks oil fields in the south; Chevron suspends operations. Three expatriate Chevron workers are kidnapped from Rub Kona base, near Bentiu, and killed.



July 84: Government signs deal with Trans-African Pipeline Co. of US to build 1,760-km pipeline across Sudan to Central African Republic. (It was never built.)

JONGLEI CANAL WORK IS HALTED BY SPLA

Adnan Khashoggi is offered all-in oil deal by Nimeiri, making implicit threat to Chevron to resume operations.

1985

Fighting in southern Sudan escalates to highest levels yet. Khartoum and other towns fill with people displaced by war in south and famine in west. War spending is double that for education and health.

Anti-Nimeiri alliance of trades unions, professional associations and student bodies co-ordinates opposition, establishes extensive clandestine network of banned political parties, women and youth associations, as well as cells within the army and police.

April 1985: Massive demonstrations precede a general strike that paralyzes the country; Nimeiri is overthrown by army after popular uprising. SPLA rejects peace overtures of transitional military junta headed by his former Defence Minister.

1986

April-May - Parliamentary Elections - Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes Prime Minister of a series of coalitions. No voting in half the 86 southern constituencies on grounds of "insecurity".

November 86 : Government shelve all contracts for \$375m oil pipeline proposal by White Nile Petroleum consortium (Chevron, Royal Dutch/Shell, Arab Petroleum

Investments Corporation, International Finance Corporation and Sudan government), despite complaints from partners.

1987

"Anya-Nya Two" militia breaks up after SPLA's 1986 military successes; senior commanders defect with virtually entire units to SPLA.

1988

Chevron resumes its activities, planning a six-year exploration and drilling program. China buys part of Chevron concession.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Minister of Defence, Gen (ret) Mubarak Osman Rahma, (Nimeiri's last ambassador to Beijing), sign large arms deal with China. Sadiq does not stay in power long enough to take delivery of the weapons.

1989

January-March 89: SPLA "New Kush" Division enters Nuba Mountains led by Yusuf Kuwa, advance close to Kadugli, Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, overrunning police posts. Despite SPLA-government ceasefire, SPLA units infiltrate Tulushi in the western hills.

April 89: Government transfers remnants of the anti-SPLA militia "Anya Nya Two" to Kadugli, where they gain a reputation for ruthlessness. Over 200 Nuba in Kadugli are detained, including many members of the Sudan National Party. Several are summarily executed.

30 June 1989: Lt-Gen al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF) stage military coup

NIF overthrows Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's elected government, aborting peace process and upcoming constitutional conference with SPLA. War escalates in the South; large shipments of arms from China (ordered by Sadiq) are paid for by Iran.

November 89: In Upper Nile, "Anya-Nya Two" forces allied with Army against SPLA disrupt guerrilla supply lines between Bahr al-Ghazal and Ethiopia.

1990

1990: Chevron finally quits and relinquishes all its concessions, after spending more than \$1billion.

January 90: Khartoum reaches deal with Libya for free supply of 600,000 tons of oil (agreement extended twice until May 1991 but supply proves erratic).

April 90: Extrajudicial execution of 28 military officers and unspecified numbers of NCOs and soldiers follows anti-NIF coup attempt.

June 90: Garang announces upcoming SPLA talks with Bashir.

August 90: Gulf War breaks out. Khartoum backs Iraq and is boycotted by Gulf Co-operation Council. Riyadh suspends supplies.

September 90: Iran's president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani declares his support for Sudan and describes the war in the South as a "holy war". More than 60 lawyers and judges, including at least eight from the High Court and the Deputy Chief Justice, are dismissed. Fifteen Nuba NCOs in the Sudanese army are executed for "plotting and collaborating with the SPLA", after 45 officers are arrested.

1991

SPLA peace negotiations with regime sponsored by Kenya.

March 91: Visit to China by Sudan's military chief of logistics: an arms contract worth US\$300m is reportedly signed, to be financed by the NIF with funds from Iran. Two helicopters, one hundred 1,000-pound high altitude bombs and assorted ammunition are later shipped to Port Sudan. China sends team to instruct Sudanese pilots and aircrews in high altitude bombing. Bombardments of civilian targets in the South increase.

May 91: Overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia. Weakened by the subsequent loss of logistical support from Ethiopia, the SPLA, which at this point holds 90% of the rural areas and several towns, loses considerable ground to government forces over the next three years.

August 1991: SPLA Commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol lead unsuccessful "creeping coup" attempt against John Garang; form breakaway "Nasir" faction (later "SPLA-United / Southern Sudan Independence Movement") with allies mainly from Upper Nile's Nuer and Shilluk.

Army seals off the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan) and begins scorched earth operations.

December 91: Iran's Hashemi Rafsanjani heads delegation of 157 officials, 80 from military/intelligence; signs protocols on economic, political and military and intelligence matters. Washington expresses "interest and concern". Iran denies enlisting help in providing new bases for Hezbollah but is willing to train Sudan army personnel: hundreds are being trained in security methods by revolutionary guards. Tehran supplies Sudan with oil and a \$17m loan, and agrees to write off a \$150m loan given to Nimeiri by the late Shah.

1992

Government begins forcible mass relocation of Nuba civilians to "peace villages" - displaced persons' camps.

January 92: Sudan signs Red Sea exploration agreement with Canadian International Petroleum Corporation (now Lundin) to undertake geophysical studies in a 38,400sq.km onshore and offshore concession between Tokar, 180km S of Port Sudan, and Halaib. Minister for Energy and Mines Uthman Abd al-Wahhab says prospecting can start immediately. Initial six-year agreement renewable for 25 years.

February 92: Dispute with Egypt over rights to Halaib area beside Red Sea: Cairo proposes to license a maritime area extending south to latitude 22°N, implying a territorial claim. Visiting Cairo, Sudanese RCC Deputy Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister Brig-Gen Zubeir Muhammad Salih raises the issue; Egyptian Oil and Mineral Resources Minister Hamdi Ali Abd al-Wahhab Banbi says region belongs to Egypt.

UN General Assembly condemns Sudan's NIF regime for gross violations of human rights.

Oil production begins to gather pace after government troops seize large areas in the south from faction-fighting rebels.

February 92: Sudan government seeks support for oil from investors including Canada's IPC (Lundin Group)

5 June 92: SPLA negotiations with regime sponsored by Nigeria in Abuja close down in failure. The NIF, believing it is winning the war, is intransigent. It rules out SPLA options of unity under a secular democratic system, or self-determination for South Sudan and marginal areas through a referendum.

30 June 92: On the third anniversary of its military coup, the NIF says it expects to announce the resumption of crude oil production in southern Kordofan. A Sudanese company will be responsible for refining the petroleum, expected to be produced at 120,000 b/d.

7 June 92: Minister of Energy and Mining Dr Osman Abd al-Wahhab inspects Abu Jabra oilfield at Muglad in SW Sudan. 'Five wells have been drilled, two of them are productive with a capacity of 1500 and 500 b/d respectively,' reports SUNA.

7-8 June 92: SPLA commando forces enter Juba, largest town in the south. They occupy the HQ of the Southern Military Command for three hours, then withdraw to hold six army garrisons on the outskirts of the town. SPLA claims that hundreds of Southern Sudanese soldiers and officers joined them. 9 June 92: Government radio says attack on Juba has been repulsed, and that life in Juba is 'normal'. 11 June 92: Lt-Gen al-Bashir and senior officials fly into Juba for briefing.

June-July 92: Chevron ends 17-year involvement in Sudan

Sale by TransOcean Chevron Co. of upstream holdings - 42m acres - to Sudanese company Concorp, for a token \$25m.

June-July 92: After SPLA invasion of Juba fails, government forces embark on retaliatory massacre. More than 200 are killed in the streets or executed. Another 232 citizens are arrested and taken to the "White House" (Security HQ) and 'disappear'. Catholic bishops say that the army has "turned on civilians", killing and burning homes of suspected SPLA sympathisers. A quarter of a million homeless people are herded into a stadium, hospitals and church buildings after their camps are razed. Five foreign missionaries are forced to leave; civilian bodies are found floating in the Nile. Present in Juba is Fatih Erwa, later head of Sudan Mission to the UN in New York.

mid-1992: The NIF government signs a contract to pay US\$300,000 a year to the Pagolis and Donnelly Group to improve its public image.

28 July 92: Arakis Energy of Canada says London-based Triad International (Pvt) Ltd. is willing to put up \$25m to buy Chevron's Sudan project.

August-September 92: Concorp International - president and owner Mohammed Abdallah Jar al-Nabi - acquires Chevron's Sudan interests.

Concorp begins commercial oil production and refining begin at Abu Jabra, a small topping refinery near Muglad, South Kordofan, with capacity of 2,000 b/d.. Critics say income from initial sales supports NIF's civilian militia.

September 92: Egypt "annexes" the Red Sea enclave of Halaib

October 92: Chevron sells prospecting rights to Concorp.

October 92: Concorp owner, Sudanese businessman M.A Jar al-Nabi, senior NIF financier, sells Chevron concessions to Arakis Energy Corp. and State Petroleum Corp, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arakis, headed by Pakistani national Lutfur Khan. State and Arakis say concessions hold potential 3.5-5 billion barrels of oil. Finance and Economic Planning Minister Hamdi says Iraq will provide technical assistance.

7 December 92: Oil field and refinery in Abu Jabra, south Kordofan, officially opened by Lt-Gen al-Bashir - followed by a thanksgiving at the new Khayrat mosque, where Bashir assures worshippers that the Sudanese people have "now broken free from their bonds and will longer be bothered by condemnations from outside organisations."

7 December 92: Arakis signs memorandum of understanding with Sudan government; Concorp International Ltd Khartoum completes purchase of TransOcean Chevron Co's shares of Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan for undisclosed price.

1993

Egypt and Sudan at loggerheads over territorial rights to Halaib, prompted by Sudan granting oil exploration concession. Each accuses the other of harbouring opposition elements.

1993: Sudan fails to pay arrears to World Bank and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, who suspend loans.

SPLA's John Garang proposes referendum on Southern self-determination.

1993: US State Department adds Sudan to its list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Talks between government representative **Ali al-Haj Muhammad** and SPLA-United's Dr **Lam Akol** in Fashoda, during coronation of the new Shilluk king: Akol is accused of complicity with the NIF.

12 January 93: Arakis engineering and production team in Khartoum to identify cost of bringing Sudan oil into production at rate of 40,000 b/d in 1995. Arakis says its 75% owned concession contains estimated 1.4-bn bbl of oil of which 280m are proven recoverable, and that concession has potential to develop additional 3.5bn bbl.

Iraqi MiG-23 aircraft that fled to **Iran** in the Gulf War have allegedly been refitted by Iran for use by the Sudanese air force against the SPLA in South Sudan. Lt-Gen **Abdel Rahman Said**, former army deputy chief of staff and now leading the Sudanese opposition Armed Forces Legitimate Command, says Baghdad was a party to the deal, and that the MiGs - 'the only type of Iraqi plane that Sudan can maintain' would go back to **Iraq** after an unspecified period. He claims Iran has delivered "between 60 and 90 tanks" to Khartoum, as well as long-range howitzers, ammunition and lorries.

25 January 93: **Lutfur Rahman Khan** of Arakis says State chose it as a partner because of its ability to raise investment capital. Analysts say State and Arakis are exaggerating the recoverable reserves of the Sudanese fields.

February 93: 'Tiny' **Rowland**, chairman of the Lonrho group and long-time backroom operator in African politics, reveals that for the last nine years he has been a member of the SPLM/SPLA. He goes on to say: "The war in Sudan is unwinnable and must come to an end." Shuttle diplomacy: Ugandan President **Yoweri Museveni** visits Khartoum; Rowland makes a trip to Sudan at the same time. **Ali al-Haj** goes to Entebbe, Uganda, to meet Garang. Museveni wants to reunite the SPLA. The leader of the Nasir faction, **Lam Akol**, announces that meetings with such a goal could take place in mid-March in Nairobi. But "Entebbe declaration" does not remove any of the current obstacles to the peace talks.

March 93: Fuel shortages and lack of funds to import petrol and diesel and to operate power stations and bakeries. Envoys to **Iran** asking for help include Dr **Ahmed Awad al-Jaz**, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. Iran, although positive, wants a European country as third-party guarantor; negotiations reach deadlock and Sudan receives nothing.

27 April 93: Peace talks resume in Abuja, **Nigeria**; **Garang** and Machar both absent.

June 93: Arakis Energy Corp (AKSEF) begins trading stock on Nasdaq exchange.

June 93: Government sub-divides Chevron's concessions into smaller exploration blocks; Arakis Energy acquires the portion of Chevron's concession north of the town of Bentiu. Arakis says it has no connections with the Triad company (owned by former arms dealer **Adnan Khashoggi**, who was used as a bargaining chip over oil deals with Chevron by Nimeiri in 1985).

29 August 93: **State Petroleum** enters into exploration and production sharing agreement with Sudan government. State subsequently spends \$125m to explore and develop project, and discovers Toma South and El Toor fields in Unity exploration area.

September 1993: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya establish a committee to resolve the civil war in Sudan, as members of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

1994

Terry Alexander becomes president of Arakis

January 94: Row with Britain: Archbishop of Canterbury, his wife and two officials fly to South Sudan for three days and meet rival SPLA faction leaders.

At New Year Independence anniversary celebrations Lt-Gen al-Bashir says the expulsion of Ambassador Peter Streams - in the row over Dr Carey's visit - will teach the British a lesson. Britain expels Sudan's ambassador to London, **Ali Osman Muhammad Yasin**, who also works for the Attorney-General and is Sudan's ambassador to the UN.

mid-January 94: Representatives of Chinese companies accompany China's Vice-Premier and minister of foreign affairs to Khartoum. Agreements signed on banking, oil exploration and mining, light and heavy industry, agriculture, fisheries and pharmaceuticals.



end January 94: Unprecedented build-up of government forces in Southern Sudan: soldiers and supplies moved by rail and barge to Wau and Juba. Clashes with SPLA-Mainstream are reported on the road parallel to the Aweil-Wau railway; in southern Bahr al-Ghazal; between Yei and Morobo, and between Juba and Kit. The government claims to have taken Nasir, Waat and Ayod from SPLA-United.

January 94: In **France**, ministers **Salah al-Din Karrar** (Energy and Mining), **Ali al-Haj** (Federal Affairs, ex- Investment and Planning) and **Abdullah Hassan Ahmed** (Finance) said to have talked to Iranex (French gum arabic co.), BTP (construction), **Total** and Airbus. Senior intelligence officers from the Nimeiri days who frequently visit Paris include US-trained **Hashim ba'Saeed** and **Fatih Erwa**.

end January 1994: Repeated aerial bombing forces over 1,000 Equatorian refugees daily into Uganda.

end January 94: Fighting on three fronts in Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan. Mass killing, burning and rape reported from Bangili and Tagoma, east of Dilling. In Delami, crops are burned in the fields and wells are poisoned by the NIF's Popular Defence Force. Displaced women and young children are taken by security forces to the Rahmaniyya "Peace Camp", reportedly a "breeding camp" to "Arabise" future generations. Older boys are taken to special camps for religious indoctrination and military training.

February 94: Machine-gun attack on minority Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya mosque in Omdurman - 19 dead. Two men are later shot dead and two wounded and arrested after a shooting incident outside the house of Saudi tycoon **Usama bin Laden** in Khartoum. The regime links the incidents.

February 94: New opposition Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance launched in London by ex-Darfur Governor **Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige** with Nuba spokesman **Suleiman Rahhal**.

10 February 94: Seven security officers and Iranian advisor found dead in al-Hufra, eastern Sudan. Khartoum retaliates by confiscating 360 trucks from the Rashayda people of the area. Subsequent water shortage - some were used to carry water - is blamed for the deaths of seven children.

12 February 94: Sudan accuses Britain's Parliament of supporting "rebellion" after MPs' meetings with the Sudanese opposition are held at Westminster.

12 February 1994: In Nairobi, Riek Machar calls for UN intervention in Sudan and an oil and arms embargo on Khartoum.

March 94: After Washington's directive ordering US banks not to endorse Sudanese letters of credit, Sudan orders its banks to stop dealings with the US.

Lam Akol dismissed from SPLA-United; challenges Riek Machar and claims to command forces in mid-west Upper Nile under the name SPLA-U. SPLA-United commanders Faustino and Kerubino advance into Wunrok, northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Thousands die in faction fighting.

March 94: 14 years after gaining exploration rights over 120,000 sq.km in Bahr al-Ghazal province, **French oil company Total suspends all activities and withdraws because of escalation of civil war.**

March 94: Lundin family buys 8.2 percent of Arakis stock through their holding in Swedish company Sands Petroleum AB.

11 May 94: Arakis acquires State Petroleum, gains control of the Sudan concessions in Unity and Heglig.

(All of the issued and outstanding common stock in exchange for 6,000,000 Arakis shares + finder's fee of 150,000 shares with aggregate deemed value of \$13m, according to Arakis 1996 report)

May 94: Malaysian telecommunications company signs memorandum to take shares in Sudatel, the privatised Sudan Telecommunications Company.

June 94: Liquidation of the General Petroleum Corporation. Energy Minister **Salah ad-Din Karrar** admits that Sud£238m were stolen by a businessman who was given the money to buy dollars from the black market on the corporation's behalf. Recent petrol shortage was due to one client of the GPC diverting a sum of US\$7m to his personal account and failing to deliver the goods. The deficit in the GPC budget is Sud£9bn.

August 94: Hassan al-Turabi makes clandestine visit to Paris, invites French involvement in oil exploration

September 94: Peace negotiations: "Despite reservations", John Garang's Mainstream SPLM/A endorses the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) Declaration of Principles for talks in Nairobi with the Sudan government, **stressing self-determination and separating religion from state.**

September 94: Reconciliation conference in Akobo, Upper Nile, between the **Lou and Jikany** clans of the Nuer, organised by local SPLA splinter groups, local chiefs and Presbyterian church. For two years disputes between the clans had intensified, with over 1000 dead. Soldiers in the area supported their own clans, becoming involved in fighting rather than intervening to stop it.

30 September 94: Riak Machar's breakaway SPLA-United "Nasir" faction announces change of name to Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). Lam Akol, dismissed from the movement earlier this year, had announced separately that he was the chairman of the United faction, and claimed to have deposed Machar.

Arrears with the African Development Bank: Dr **Muhammad Kheir al-Zubair**, Minister of State for Finance, says the near future will see more co-operation with international and regional financial institutions.

September-October 94: **Eritrea accuses Sudan** of training more than 400 'terrorists' with a view to undermining its security. Sudan accuses Eritrea of training 300 Sudanese opposition guerrillas for cross-border raids; Eritrea severs diplomatic relations with Sudan.

October 94: Foreign Ministry delegation visits Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Visiting Iranian delegation sees the Construction Jihad of Iran active in agriculture, hospital building and road building in Sudan.

November 94: Foreign Minister **Hussein Suleiman Abu Salih** visits China; his delegation looks at textile and oil industries.

1995

1995: Government begins strategy of "peace from within", wooing smaller rebel groups and individual dissident SPLA commanders.

6-17 July 95: Arakis' Terry Alexander announces deal to sell 40% of Arakis to Saudi investors for \$345m and a line of credit of \$400m. Under the deal, Arab Group International will buy 23m newly-issued shares in Arakis at \$15 per share in four tranches from July 27 to 15 September. The AGI representatives will also get three board seats, with Prince **Sultan Bin Saud Abdullah al Saud** becoming chairman of Arakis. **Abbas Salih** will be vice chairman, Alexander will remain president and Lutfur Khan will remain president of State Petroleum.

mid-1995: Maj-Gen **Salah Karrar**, Minister of Energy, negotiates with Russia, China, Iraq and Iran over oil development.

August 95: Arakis claims to have completed the pipeline design and says construction equipment and materials are being shipped to Sudan. However, Finance Minister **Abdallah Hassan Ahmed** tells al-Sharq al-Awsat that the agreement between the government and Arakis is due for renewal.

7 August 95: Worries that Arakis' financial agreement with Arab Group International (AGI) are in jeopardy cause the share price to fall 40% in two weeks from a high of \$25.6 in late July to \$16.5.

After announcing a financing deal, Arakis shares reach a record market value of approximately \$1 billion. But the deal vapourises and the company's shares plummet, forcing out chief executive "Terry" Alexander and forcing a major restructuring of Arakis's finances.

15 August 95: Arakis' shares rise to over \$22 amid renewed optimism.

17 August 95: Khartoum government announces Qatari interest in developing two minor former Chevron concessions.

21-22 August 95: Arakis shares drop sharply again to a new low of \$10-\$12. The rapid fall is prompted by Arakis' admission that AGI would put up only \$40m in cash of the anticipated \$345m in equity finance, with the remainder paid in letters of credit, which might include physical assets.

24 August 95 - Arakis delists from Vancouver Stock Exchange and is suspended from trading on Nasdaq for a month.

26 September 95: Bashir in China: his delegation signs agreements on mining, oil, textiles, sugar industry and rehabilitation of Sudan railways. Preferential loan of 150m yuan (US\$20m) is negotiated with Finance Minister **Abdallah Hassan Ahmed**, and a grant of 1m yuan obtained for "projects for poor families".

December 95: Terry Alexander leaves Arakis and is replaced by **John McLeod**, described as former **Amoco Canada** engineer who was in charge of Sudanese project from 1991. Arakis shares rise three cents to \$3.62 after the news of Alexander's departure is announced. They had peaked in July at \$26.62.

1996

January 96 China votes against Sudan in the UN Security Council (it abstains on 26 April).

April 1996: Government's Supreme Council for Peace puts forward its Political Charter, a non-binding general framework for a political solution to the civil conflict.

April 96: President Clinton signs the Anti-Terrorism Act, barring Americans from engaging in financial transactions with governments on the US list of terrorism sponsors, including Sudan.

26 April 1996: United Nations imposes diplomatic sanctions on Khartoum for its involvement in terrorism. In the vote, China abstains.

Arakis begins production from nine wells on the Heglig field. An average of 2,000 b/d is processed and consumed domestically.

Officials from China's CNOEDC meet Arakis Energy executives, including President John McLeod in Vancouver.

Arakis needs around US\$750,000 for the pipeline project. It announces a big new discovery, and pays to take a score of mainly US - but also British - financiers on a junket to Sudan.

June 96: Arakis / State Petroleum starts limited production of 10-20,000 b/d from Heglig, transporting crude by truck and river barge to topping plant refinery near El Obeid.

29 July 96: Government troops attack SPLA positions at Delal Ajak, west of the Nile. Lam Akol's SPLA-United warns Arakis Energy and its British financier, Venture Guarantee Ltd to pull out immediately; says it will not allow Khartoum to 'steal' oil. The government aim is to secure the passage on the White Nile of barges to move crude oil from the Adar-1 field from Melut to Kosti further north. From Kosti, the oil would be sent by train to a refinery at al-Obeid.

31 July 96: Arakis chief executive John McLeod says company is taking the threats seriously.

August 96: US Treasury issues regulations to block deals that would help government-backed terrorism. The "Oxy loophole" (certain business transaction exemptions theoretically enabled Occidental Petroleum to pursue an interest in Sudan).

1 August 96: Arakis statement says its 25-year agreement with the government of Sudan is still valid and that it has spent more than US\$100m developing Sudan concessions.

"Recruited through an agency known as Executive Outcomes, mercenaries will be employed directly by Arakis and will operate independently from the Sudanese authorities," alleges Sudan Democratic Gazette

Two renegade SPLA commanders, **Riek Machar** and **Kerubino Kuanyin Bol**, agree with regime to set up a buffer zone between SPLA forces and the government forces directly protecting the oil fields. Kuanyin moves his forces out of Gogrial town and heads towards Twic county in late August, but is ambushed by the SPLA. Splintered SPLA no longer has large numbers of forces in the Nuer territory of the Bentiu area.

October 96: In Upper Nile's Adar Yale field, private Qatari-Sudanese consortium Gulf Petroleum Company drills and reopens existing wells.

October 1996: Opposition claims Arakis International is planning to employ "white mercenaries" from South Africa as a security force. Arakis' **John McLeod** says the Sudan military provides protection, and the firm employs its own security and safety coordinators who work as go-betweens between company and army. He says he has never talked to Executive Outcomes.

30 October 96: Arakis / State Petroleum estimates its fields have probable and proven reserves of 600m barrels.

November 96: John Garang warns that SPLA forces will attack Adar Yale oil field.

November 96: Khartoum government excludes Occidental from consortium, angered by Clinton government providing aid to 3 neighbouring countries that help the SPLA/NDA forces. (US provided \$20m in surplus military equipment to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda.)

4 November 96: Arakis subsidiary State Petroleum secures framework agreement with Sudan government on developing concession near Bentiu.

Negotiations start on a "modified production sharing agreement", as it searches for other investors for \$1 billion project for field development and pipeline to Port Sudan.

4 November 96: US sources say Khartoum "looking favourably on a proposal by potential investors" for a security operation mounted by **Executive Outcomes**. UK sources say Bashir has approved initiative and that any private force would report to and be paid by Khartoum government, said to be interested in private training for Riek Machar's men following signing of Peace Charter. EO deny any involvement.

4 November 96: Branch Energy said to be interested in Arakis project.

December 1996: Unable to finance exploration, development and pipeline alone, Arakis enters into a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). It consists of Arakis (25% share and field operator), China National Petroleum Corporation (40%), Petronas of Malaysia (30%) and the Sudanese national oil firm Sudapet (5%).

John McLeod says the Chinese partners "incorporated additional benefits to the Sudan government, which essentially got them their participation." Partners will have to make capital expenditures on the project until they equal Arakis' expenditure to date.

28 December 96: Three Arakis board members quit in row over compensation and are replaced.

1997

1997: Sudan government adopts "Islamic" constitution.

Arakis' **Lutfur Khan** appoints former Sudanese finance minister **Abdel Rahim Hamdi** to a committee advising the board of directors of Arakis. (Committee no longer functioning by February 1998). Arakis sells its last remaining US asset, a Kentucky natural gas property.

January 97: Arakis announces third major oil find, El Nar2 (after El Toor and South Toma in 1996).

January 97: *Washington Post* claims US government secretly granted exemption to **Occidental Petroleum** interest in Sudan project, says Sudan has estimated 3.5bn bbl. Abolitionist Leadership Council calls on Congress to block Occidental involvement and says "Khartoum is building a security force... to protect [the oil project] from its rightful owners."

February 97: Riak Machar, ex-SPLA head of the South Sudan Independence Movement, officially switches sides and joins Khartoum government against SPLA.

February 97: Khartoum says Eritrean and Ethiopian troops are fighting alongside the rebel forces.

Sudan faces a 900 million dollar deficit. Oil imports rise to nearly US\$400m/vr, representing more than 25% of the country's total imports, while total exports reach US\$600m/vr.

National Democratic Alliance and SPLA forces open eastern front, seizing patches of territory between the Red Sea and the Blue Nile, threatening the Roseires hydroelectric dam near Damazin.

February 1997: Sweden's IPC / Lundin Oil signs production-sharing agreement for exploration of Block 5A, just south of Arakis' Unity fields. Lundin later brings in Petronas of Malaysia, OMV-AG of Austria and the Sudan government's Sudapet.

27 February 97: Arakis officially enters into Greater Nile pipeline consortium agreement.

February 97: Lundin family buying Arakis stock

March 1997: Bashir inaugurates production from Adar Yale field - 5,000 b/d, under consortium led by Qatar's Gulf Petroleum Corporation.

China National Petroleum Corporation begins exploration and development on the Sharaf, Tabaldi and Abu Jabra fields (Block 6).

March 97: Sands Petroleum AB (Lundin) files with SEC to say it holds 8.4% of Arakis

21 April 1997: Khartoum Peace Agreement signed between government and six splinter rebel groups - but mainstream SPLA is absent.

25 April 97: Arakis board dominated by Khan fires **John McLeod** as CEO over mounting tension with Khan. Two sources of friction are McLeod's negative stance towards creeping takeover by Lundin and fact that Khan was selling shares in 1996 at a time when Arakis was floating large amounts of Reg S shares to fund the Sudan project. Two new members appointed to advisory committee - **Mansoor Ijaz**, founder and chairman of New York hedge fund Crescent Investment Management L.P. and **Abdel Rahim Hamdi**, former Sudanese finance minister and now director of Faisal Islamic Bank of Saudi Arabia. (source: www.vitrade.com)

9 May 97:- Arakis adds **Lukas Lundin** of Sands Petroleum AB to its board. By mid 1997 there had been more "significant discoveries" at Toma South, El Toor and El Nar. The formation of the pipeline consortium resulted in a fourfold expansion of the exploration and development program from the 1996 level, with four drilling rigs in the concession either drilling or being rigged up to drill, and three seismic crews actively acquiring data.

July 97:- Arakis appoints new pipeline manager **David Hunter**, who used to work for Occidental.

17 July 97: Austria's OMV (Mineral and Oil Administration) joins a four-member consortium for oil exploration in Block 5A led by IPC (Lundin), the second consortium to begin oil exploration in Sudan this year.

30 July 97: **James Taylor**, then executive vice-president for international exploration of Occidental Petroleum, joins Arakis board.

July 97: 1,500 km pipeline budgeted at US \$1bn US to build; concession is estimated at 1bn barrels of oil

16 September 97: **Ernie Pratt** resigns from Arakis after operating responsibility in Sudan is transferred to Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co.

18 September 97: Lutfur Rahman Khan says government of Sudan is stable and fully able militarily and politically to hold the oil fields...

26 September 97: **Kenneth C. Rutherford** resigns as finance and chief financial officer to undertake private venture and is replaced by **Tom G. Milne**, formerly of Nova Corp. Calgary.

October 1997: Arakis awards contracts for manufacture of 28" line-pipe to China Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation (1110km) and Mannesmann Handel AG of Germany (500km)

November 97: Canadian Ambassador Gabriel Lessard writes to Arakis asking them to reconsider their presence in Sudan

4 November 97: President **Clinton** signs executive order under the International Emergency Powers Act calling for all Sudanese assets in the US to be blocked, and imposes a ban on bank loans and all US trade with the country. Sudan cuts banking links with US banking establishments in retaliation. US Secretary of State **Madeleine Albright** says sanctions were imposed because of Khartoum's "continued sponsorship of international terror, efforts to destabilise neighbouring countries and abysmal record on human rights." Sudan's ministry of external trade says Sudanese-US trade amounts to only five per cent of Sudan's total exchanges. Future international transfers through American banks will be averted by transacting with other international banks "in foreign currencies other than the US dollar."

Hydroelectric dams on the Nile's second and fourth cataracts are proposed. **China** and Sudan sign initial financial agreement on controversial **Kajbar Dam**, opposed by Nubians.

December 97: Opposition NDA issues official warning to users of the Khartoum-Gedaref-Kassala-Port Sudan highway that it is now a military target.

1998

1998: Arakis plan to build \$750m, 28", 1,610km pipeline still on track.

13 January 1998.: Arakis awards **Argentina's TECHINT International** the contract for construction work on the Port Sudan marine terminal, pumps and SCADA. Supply contracts for the pumps and drivers are awarded to **Weir Pumps Ltd** of Glasgow, **Scotland**, and for generators to **Allan Power Engineering Ltd**, England. **China Petroleum Engineering Construction Corporation** will build the pipeline and field facilities.

February 98: Two pro-government forces - under Gen **Paulino Matiep Nhial** and USDF leader **Riek Machar** - fight each other in the Bentiu area, "close to drilling operations of the China National Oil Company."

February 1998: Wau, capital of Bahr al-Ghazal, surrounded by Kerubino's forces.

Gabriel Lessard, Canada's ambassador to Sudan, warns that Arakis workers are in peril; **Arakis admits "reduced comfort level"**.

February 98: First Vice-President Lt-Gen **al-Zubeir Mohammad Saleh** and ex-SPLA Cdr **Arok Thon Arok** die in plane crash near Ethiopian border.

February 98: Arakis appoints **Raymond P. Cej** as its new president and CEO. Previously chairman and CEO of **Kyrgoil Corp.** of Calgary, and former senior operating officer with **Shell Canada**, he replaces **Lutfur Rahman Khan**, who was acting president and will remain as chairman.

February 98: Arakis pays insurance company \$3.5m to cap its exposure in US securities lawsuits and pays a \$250,000 penalty to Vancouver Stock Exchange over Arab Group International (AGI) financing farrago.

2 March 98: State Petroleum writes to Sudan government assuring them the structure and management of State and Arakis will not change substantially. Sudan government issues 60-day notice of possible termination of Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, citing March 2 letter. The notice is subsequently withdrawn.

May 98: Arakis predicts commercial production of 150,000 b/d to start mid-1999 and completion by same date of 1,500-km pipeline with daily capacity of 250,000b/d

May 98: Arakis says reserves on its Unity, Heglig and Kaikang concessions proven and probable are 428.9m bbl; says proven reserves of 271.3m bbl are sufficient to meet production target of 150,000 b/d subject to additional drilling.

May 98: François Misser in Germany's *Die Tageszeitung* writes that the GNOP consortium wants to hire 3,000 armed fighters from Iran, and an additional 600 from Malaysia. The men would allegedly be under the supervision of a South African company. *"Soldier Of Fortune"* magazine guesses that this could be Executive Outcomes, reported to have worked with Arakis before, although Arakis denies this.

4 May 98: Oil pipeline construction begins at eight separate locations along the route

May 98: A 50,000-b/d refinery at al-Jayli begins construction with assistance from China's CNPC.

June 1998: SPLA captures Mabaan, Blue Nile province (on the road to Melut) and the town of Ulu, about 150 km SW of the strategic eastern town of Damazin and close to the installation at Adar Yale field.

Violence forces aid workers to evacuate parts of Western Upper Nile

Gulf Petroleum Company increases Adar-Yale production to 10,000 b/d. Sudan producing between 18,000 and 20,000 barrels of oil a day.

June 98 - Arakis says its two properties in Sudan may hold about three billion bbl of oil, according to estimates made by Chevron and Shell when they were exploring the property.

June 17: Arakis adds Ian H. Lundin and Fred C. Coles to board of directors

July 1998-December 1998 Fighting in Leer and Mankien districts of Western Upper Nile (Block 5A) keeps WFP aid workers away for five months.

24 July 98: Take-over offer for Arakis by Canadian firm Talisman Energy (formerly BP-Canada). Agreement to the deal comes from Lundin Oil AB (newly-formed in merger between Sands Petroleum AB and IPC), which holds 10.8% of Arakis, and State Street Research (which holds 8%).

17-18 August 98: Talisman agrees to purchase Arakis Energy Corp for stock valued at US\$175.7m - \$200m, committing the company to \$760m of capital spending on Sudan project over next 2 years.

20 August 98: US missile attack on Khartoum's al-Shifa chemical plant - doubts raised about the completion of the Arakis purchase.

21 August 98: Talisman's Jim Buckee, former BP planning manager, "surprised and concerned" by Shifa attack, and seeking more information.

31 August 98: Talisman announces it is advancing \$22 million to Arakis to meet funding obligations.

September 98: SPLA offensive produces no significant gains in the south and is successfully repulsed by government forces.

Attitudes in Khartoum harden. Confident of the efficacy of military action against his enemies, Turabi threatens to put Sadiq al-Mahdi on trial.

October 1998: Sharif al-Tubami, Irrigation Minister, resigns his position. Allegations had appeared in the Arabic press that he helped his son Abdul-Rahman obtain a contract for his construction company Maban in the pipeline project.

7 October 98: Arakis shareholders, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Sudan government and members of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company consortium approve sale to Talisman. Talisman completes purchase of Arakis for Ca\$277m, plus advance of Ca\$46.5m to meet capital requirements

December 98: Talisman estimates proved plus probable reserves in Sudan concession at 150m bbl. It says the company is not prohibited by US sanctions from participating in the project and will fund all Sudan activities from non-US sources.

(Talisman chart shows total yield for five fields 447m bbl, with Talisman share 113m bbl. But company also says it is assuming total of 929m bbl, with its share 232m bbl. Goes on to say mean estimate of undiscovered oil in place is 10 bn bbl, with recovery factor of at least 30%...)

December 98: Talisman says project is 250-500km north of the trouble zones and is well protected.

Pipeline building in South Kordofan, skirting west of Nuba Mountains: SPLA's Ismail Khamis says government used the armed forces to pin down his forces while laying pipe around Lake Keilak.

1999

Pipeline to Port Sudan is 25% complete by mid-January, and more than 110 oil wells have been drilled.

13 January 99: Talisman planning to cut investment in North Sea and Canada to find \$200m needed for Sudan project in 1999, says chief executive Jim Buckee. Total Talisman share of Sudan project costs about \$430m, which Buckee says can be met with undrawn credit lines of \$700m and a "commercial paper program" of about \$350m.

February 1999: "Terry" Alexander, former head of Arakis Energy, fined \$804,000 US, including \$335,000 costs, and banned from trading for 20 years.

Alexander admits secret involvement in deals that profited from Arakis's skyrocketing stock price in 1995 after a reported \$750 million financing agreement for the Sudan pipeline, which later collapsed. Alexander unrepentant, saying he was in over his head. Securities Commission says Alexander controlled Arakis shares held in various offshore companies and trusts and that substantial trading profits were made by "some offshore companies", and that shares were issued without being fully paid for by these companies.

February/March 99: SPLA ambushes Red Cross vehicle near oil fields, seizing 3 local government and security officials (whom it calls "spies") and a Red Crescent officer. All four die; government uses SPLA's refusal to turn over the bodies to delay peace

negotiations and block UN relief assessment in SPLA-held Nuba mountains.

1 March 99: **Lundin Oil 1998 results include write-off of SEK156.2m of original investment in Arakis Energy.**

3 March 99: **Jim Buckee of Talisman says first oil exports from Sudan are "less than eight months away."** He says acquisition of Arakis required Talisman to spend \$140m (excluding capitalised interest) in the last quarter of 1998, in addition to the financing provided to Arakis between the acquisition bid and close of the purchase. Release also says total exploration and development spending in Sudan was \$305 million in 1998 including \$156m incurred by Arakis prior to the acquisition (Talisman release)

March 99: SPLA 13th battalion under Commander Malik Agar, based at Ulu, defeats a government brigade which had been besieging the town of 50,000 since 6 January. The victory brings the Adar Yale oilfield, in Khor Adar, Upper Nile, east of Melut and Malakal, into range of the SPLA's artillery.

April 1999: Completion announced of 1,610 km pipeline linking Heglig oilfield with terminal at Basha'ir Red Sea terminal

Pipeline runs via oil refinery being built at al Jayli, 70 km N of Khartoum, due to become operational at the end of December 1999, which will have an annual capacity of 2.5m tonnes of crude oil.

April 99: Energy and Mining Minister **Dr Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz** visits **China and West Germany.** He discusses with the Chinese ways of completing Khartoum oil refinery, and setting up an electrical power station at the refinery.

30 April 99: **The government is building factories to produce tanks and missiles, "to defend ourselves against conspirators," Turabi tells a rally in Ed Damer, and is quoted by Akhbar al-Yom as saying he will use earnings on oil exports as finance.**

May 99: Ministers say Sudan will be self-sufficient in oil production by mid-1999 and be able "to export crude oil for the first time ever in the second semester of 1999. Initially we hope to export 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day which would be increased to 250,000 b/d in the year 2000" - **Awad al-Jaz**



Turabi, Nimeiri and Bashir turn on the oil May 1999

May 99: "Many villages on the eastern edge of Heglig were attacked and burned to the ground by the Sudanese army, causing the displacement of 1,000 to 2,000 civilians," says UN Rapporteur.

May 99: **Attempt to put government militias in charge of oil installation south of Bentiu leads to open warfare among allies.** Forces of **Riak Machar** are pushed back by Nuer warlord **Paulino Matiep's** government militiamen, who now guard the area. Machar losing ground.

May 99: **Armed forces-spokesman Lt-Gen M.O Yassin tells Radio Omdurman that the SPLA has attacked oil installations in the south and east. One attack in April was at Leer in Unity State (Block 5A, the Lundin/IPC-OMV-Petronas consortium), but Talisman say the \$1.4-bn Greater Nile Oil Project was not a target and the attack was not near the consortium's project area.**

end May 99: **Former SPLA Cdr Tito Biel, based near Bentiu and a government ally since 1997, defects from Riak Machar's group. Clashes continue.**

July 99: **1,200 government forces sweep through Ruweng County, in Western Upper Nile, killing scores of civilians, abducting hundreds and burning over 6,000 homes. In a 10-day offensive on the edge of the Heglig oilfields, Antonov bombers, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery attacked civilians across a 100-km swathe of territory, in violation of a ceasefire signed during last year's famine.**



Pre-1956 map of Dinka, Nuer and other populations in the area that is now Heglig and Unity (top, including Ruweng County) and blocks 5A and 5B (bottom) (Jonglei Investigation Team report)

14 July 99: Sudan Government bans all relief flights to people living around the oil fields.

August 99: **Talisman Energy says that surging crude oil and natural gas prices helped it pump out a tenfold increase in profit in the second quarter.**

September 1999: First shipment of 600,000 barrels leaves Port Sudan. Bargaining ensues over next round of oil deals

September 99: **Kerubino Kuanyin is killed as Peter Gadiet and large numbers of Nuer oil zone militia members defect from government side and seek rapprochement with SPLA.**

September 99: **Film footage of devastation at Gumriak, Ruweng county, is shown on Swedish TV. It prompts outcry against Lundin.**

20 September 99: **Explosion near Atbara, northern Sudan, holes the oil pipeline. Opposition NDA claims responsibility and warns of further attacks if Talisman does not talk to them.**

October 99: **Czechs express concern that proposed second military tank consignment to Yemen may end up in Sudan.**

21 October 88: Peter Gadiet's forces, aligned with SPLA, reported bombarding Bentiu.

November 99: **Japanese oil traders agree deal for crude oil purchase**

November 99: **Talisman hires Hill & Knowlton PR company, previously employed by BCCI.**

November 99: **A trial run on the new 50,000-b/d refinery at Jayli, Khartoum, is postponed until March 2000.**

November 99: **NIF-Umma accord signed in Djibouti.**

SUDAN INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP (SIARG):

Mission Statement and Operational Guidelines

MISSION STATEMENT

The Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) is a NETWORK of Canadian church and non-governmental organizations with Sudan-related programming. It was formed on September 26th, 1998 at a church/NGO-organized roundtable on Sudan. Its purpose is to systematically link member agencies and to provide a mechanism for sharing information, analysis and ideas and for undertaking common initiatives. Members are involved in a wide range of activities including conflict resolution, capacity building, human rights research and advocacy, education, development and relief. On occasion members may speak or act in groups or in unison to fulfill policy and project goals and objectives. Members also will explore options to relate to and support Sudanese organizations in Canada.

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Host Agency

One member of the SIARG will be designated as host agency and will provide minimal administrative support and coordinate meetings, activities and initiatives. The host agency will delegate tasks to other members as the need arises.

Governance

The SIARG will function as a "committee of the whole". Members will occasionally evaluate this means of operating and can form a steering committee if deemed necessary.

Frequency of meetings

Members will normally meet twice a year. Special meetings and teleconferences can be called if necessary. Any member is free to request a meeting should the need arise. Requests should be conveyed to the host agency which in turn will poll other members.

Funding

Funding will be provided through annual membership fees of \$100 and members' special grants. All funds should be remitted to the host agency. Funding may also be sought from official funding bodies for occasional special initiatives. Member agencies are generally expected to cover their own travel and accommodation costs associated with meetings of the SIARG. However, subsidies will be provided for those coming from exceptionally long distances.

Collaborative initiatives

While the SIARG can not issue policy statements or initiate projects in its own name, it will serve as a facilitate forum in which member agencies are encouraged to draft statements and initiate projects either individually or in groups. Any member is welcome to draft a statement and seek endorsement of other members. Draft statements should be sent to the host agency which will coordinate the sign-on process. Members should also keep the host agency informed of any individual or group project initiatives so a central data base can be maintained.

21 October 1998



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
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**SYMPOSIUM SUR LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE AU SOUDAN
Rapport du symposium**

Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group

5-9 juin, 2000
Calgary, Ottawa

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▲ UN/ People-to-People Peace Conference documents

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RAPPORT DU SYMPOSIUM

Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan

Canada, juin 2000

1 Introduction

Le **Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan** a eu lieu à **Calgary** le 5 juin et à **Ottawa** du 7 au 9 juin 2000. L'événement était organisé par le **Sudan Inter Agency Reference Group (SIARG)**, un réseau d'ONG canadiennes œuvrant au Soudan. **Freedom Quest International** et **Partenariat Afrique Canada** ont respectivement pris en charge le travail de coordination à **Calgary** et à **Ottawa**. Les organisateurs ont souligné avec gratitude le soutien financier de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), du Centre canadien pour le développement de la politique étrangère du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI) et des organisations membres du SIARG, qui ont rendu possible la tenue du Symposium.

Le Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan a permis à des Soudanais de faire connaître leurs opinions et leurs points de vue sur les interventions du Canada au Soudan, et a donné lieu à des discussions sur l'efficacité des idées et des activités existantes en matière de paix et de développement avec des représentants non-combattants de la société civile du Soudan. Le symposium a aussi cherché à cerner et à souligner des réactions opportunes de la part des secteurs privé et public canadiens, dans leurs activités et leur comportement, en vue de renforcer le processus de paix au Soudan. De plus, le symposium a permis d'explorer le rôle que jouent la société civile soudanaise et la communauté internationale dans la promotion de la paix au Soudan.

La première partie du Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan, le **Forum I**, s'est tenue à **Calgary** le 6 juin; plus de 160 personnes y ont assisté. On a constaté et salué la participation de la communauté soudanaise de l'Ouest du Canada. Une rencontre pré-forum de la communauté soudanaise s'est avérée importante pour permettre à ses membres d'établir des relations entre eux et de partager des renseignements; elle s'est aussi avérée efficace pour approfondir le dialogue entre les participants au forum et ses orateurs.

La deuxième partie du Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan, le **Forum II**, a eu lieu à **Ottawa** du 7 au 9 juin et a réuni des représentants de la société civile du Soudan afin d'examiner les divers points de vue sur les nombreuses questions relatives au conflit au Soudan et de discuter des possibilités de renforcer le processus de paix. Des représentants d'ONG canadiennes, de groupes communautaires soudanais du Canada, du gouvernement du Canada et de la communauté diplomatique ont participé au forum. Le forum a raffermi la volonté des participants et des organisations d'aider à améliorer la situation au Soudan, et leur a permis de trouver des façons de travailler ensemble à des projets concrets. Le forum a aussi présenté des recommandations au gouvernement du Canada et à d'autres organismes concernant les enjeux et les politiques qui nécessitent une attention urgente et particulière ainsi que des efforts renouvelés afin de poursuivre le travail pour la paix. De nombreuses réunions additionnelles ont aussi eu lieu à **Ottawa** et à **Toronto** entre les participants du Soudan et les communautés soudanaises de ces villes.

2 Résumé des recommandations du Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan

2.1 Renforcer le rôle de la société civile dans le processus de paix au Soudan

1. Les participants se sont dits d'accord avec le processus de paix *People to People* et avec le recours à des méthodes traditionnelles de consolidation de la paix. Il est en outre recommandé que le New Sudan Council of Churches élargisse ses initiatives de consolidation de la paix du sud au nord, engageant les collectivités locales dans le processus en mettant l'accent sur le travail effectué au sud jusqu'à ce que ce travail soit généralisé, tout en réalisant certaines initiatives reliant le nord et le sud. Étant donné l'ampleur de la méfiance entre le nord et le sud au Soudan, il est recommandé de faire des efforts pour ouvrir la voie à la communication et au dialogue entre les groupes de la société civile dans les deux parties du pays.

2. Dans leur effort d'édification de la paix et de réhabilitation, les parties intéressées devraient envisager des manières de mettre en place l'administration civile nécessaire dans le sud. Il faut franchir de façon créative et innovatrice les obstacles à l'accès aux fonds pour de telles activités dans le territoire occupé par le SPLA afin d'aider à préserver les acquis du processus de paix entre les populations.

3. Considérant que le Soudan ne reçoit pas d'aide au développement, tous les organismes devraient chercher des façons d'aller au-delà du financement des secours d'urgence et de contribuer financièrement au développement à long terme.

4. Il est nécessaire que les ONG des pays de l'IPF (le forum des partenaires de l'IGAD) et d'autres pays surveillent l'évolution du processus de l'IPF. Cela pourrait se faire grâce à la mise en place d'un organisme-témoin des ONG de l'IPF ayant pour objectif de faire connaître les points de vue des ONG et de la société civile à l'IPE. Le réseau international des ONG devrait s'efforcer d'encourager les ONG en cause à ne pas retirer aux groupes soudanais la prise en charge des enjeux et des processus au Soudan.

5. Considérant les succès du processus de paix *Peaople to People*, il faudrait prendre des mesures fermes et bien définies pour diffuser, au nord et au sud du Soudan, l'information concernant cette initiative. Qui plus est, le SIARG et les autres parties intéressées, où qu'elles soient, devraient s'efforcer de trouver les ressources nécessaires pour appuyer les initiatives de paix lancées par des groupes de la société civile et des ONG.

6. Considérant l'ampleur du problème et les perspectives de paix limitées au Soudan, il faudrait entamer la formation d'un réseau international de groupes de l'extérieur travaillant au Soudan. Par surcroît, l'une des tâches particulières de ce réseau pourrait consister à assurer une surveillance internationale de la crise des droits de la personne au Soudan et à intervenir pour y mettre un terme.

7. Considérant la circulation limitée de l'information entre les ONG canadiennes et les groupes soudanais au Canada, et en reconnaissance de la participation des groupes soudanais au Canada, il faudrait trouver des moyens d'améliorer le cheminement de l'information et les relations entre les ONG canadiennes et les groupes communautaires soudanais au Canada. De plus, les groupes soudanais au Canada devraient être invités à s'engager dans le processus d'édification de la paix entamé au Soudan, et à entreprendre de la formation ou d'autres activités au sein de leur propre communauté en ce qui concerne le processus de paix en cours au Soudan. Il faudrait s'efforcer d'appuyer une meilleure coordination et une meilleure communication entre les groupes

soudanais au Canada.

8. Considérant la réaction du gouvernement du Canada aux recommandations du rapport de la mission Harker, les Canadiens devraient exercer des pressions pour aider les Soudanais à s'exprimer en faveur du processus de paix et à mettre à profit l'expérience du réseau international.

2.2 Mécanismes permettant au Canada d'appuyer les droits de la personne et la société civile au Soudan

1. La gravité des violations des droits de la personne au Soudan, dans toutes les régions, requiert une action plus vigoureuse de la part de la communauté internationale. Pour effectuer une surveillance systématique et un suivi constant, le Canada devrait créer un équilibre entre son bureau de Khartoum et une présence égale dans le sud du pays afin de surveiller le respect des droits de la personne. On s'entend pour dire que le gouvernement du Soudan (GS) ne répond qu'à des pressions internationales fortes et soutenues; pour appuyer les Soudanais qui luttent pour leurs droits fondamentaux, il est essentiel de contrer les tentatives du gouvernement du Soudan d'embellir son image (faire rater l'« opération charme ») en faisant connaître la vérité sur l'envergure et la gravité des violations des droits de la personne. Parmi les secteurs qui nécessitent une attention internationale plus soutenue, mentionnons :

- les déplacements forcés et les conditions inhumaines vécues par les personnes déplacées;
- le bombardement d'établissements civils, tels que les hôpitaux et les écoles, et l'absence d'accès à l'aide humanitaire;
- l'esclavage et les insuffisances du travail du comité chargé d'empêcher, en réaction, les enlèvements;
- la violation systématique des droits des femmes;
- la discrimination et l'inaptitude à respecter le droit à l'éducation de base;
- l'accès inéquitable aux services de santé - inexistant dans de nombreuses régions du sud;
- la loi sur l'ordre public du GS, qui constitue une violation des droits fondamentaux;
- les violations des droits des enfants et de leur sécurité, qui nécessitent une attention immédiate;
- la torture et la dénégation des droits les plus fondamentaux des personnes emprisonnées;
- les violations systématiques du droit à la liberté de religion;
- le déni des droits civils, tels que les droits à la démocratie et à la liberté d'association, et la non-application des droits reconnus par la constitution, utilisée par le GS comme paravent pour dissimuler ses abus.

2. On presse le gouvernement du Canada (GC) de convaincre le gouvernement du Soudan (GS) de permettre aux ONG nationales et internationales d'aider les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays (PDI), et de faire en sorte que la planification des camps pour les PDI ainsi que leur approvisionnement en biens et services soient grandement améliorés. Le gouvernement du Canada devrait faire tout en son pouvoir pour assurer le droit et la liberté des ONG soudanaises d'aider les personnes déplacées dans le pays. La circulation de l'aide aux Nubiens et aux personnes qui vivent dans la région du Nil Bleu, au sud, est un sujet de préoccupation particulier.

3. Il est urgent d'agir de façon à habiliter l'OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan) à résoudre avec le SPLM (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement) tous les problèmes qui demeurent en suspens entre ces deux parties concernant le Protocole d'entente afin que l'aide de l'OLS destinée aux

personnes qui habitent le sud du Soudan puisse recommencer à circuler immédiatement. Il faut que le GS se presse de résoudre le plus rapidement possible, par l'entremise de voies d'aide multilatérales, les problèmes relatifs au Protocole, et d'assurer la circulation renouvelée de l'aide au sud du Soudan.

4. Il est urgent que le GC et les ONG du Canada collaborent étroitement et rapidement afin d'élaborer un protocole pour élargir la portée de l'aide internationale (dont celle du Canada) au Soudan de manière à fournir un soutien aux organismes de la société civile et aux ONG soudanais. En raison des aspects problématiques de la structure et des méthodes de l'OLS, il faut veiller à s'assurer que l'aide soit dirigée vers des ONG indépendantes du GS.

5. L'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI) devrait organiser le plus rapidement possible une journée entière de consultation auprès des ONG qui œuvrent au Soudan sur tous les aspects liés au contrôle et à la disponibilité de l'aide, à la fois au sud et au nord du Soudan, y compris les répercussions du système même de l'OLS, afin d'assurer la cohérence de la politique de l'ACDI au Soudan et de sa mise en œuvre.

6. Le programme d'Assistance humanitaire internationale (AHI) de l'ACDI devrait élargir son mandat de façon à pouvoir aider le Soudan. Il faudrait aussi encourager d'autres donateurs à offrir un plus large éventail de programmes au Soudan. On devrait se préoccuper particulièrement des personnes emprisonnées, des femmes et des enfants, et des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays dans les « camps de la paix », comme les appelle le GS.

7. Le gouvernement du Canada devrait chercher activement des moyens de tenir la société Talisman directement responsable des violations spécifiques des droits de la personne signalées dans le rapport de la mission Harker, considérant qu'elles sont directement liées à ses opérations, telles que le déplacement forcé de personnes vivant près des champs de pétrole et les violations des droits fondamentaux commises par les gardes de sécurité de la Talisman, qui sont aussi membres de l'armée du GS. Le GC devrait contester l'inacceptable étroitesse du mandat du programme de surveillance des droits de la personne de la Talisman, et fournir un appui à la surveillance systématique et réellement indépendante du respect des droits de la personne dans la région des champs de pétrole.

8. Les membres du Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) devraient prendre en considération les résultats d'une récente enquête effectuée par des ONG au Soudan et achevée par Alternatives, et trouver des manières de jumeler les ONG canadiennes intéressées avec des ONG soudanaises afin qu'elles collaborent à l'élaboration, la mise en œuvre et l'évaluation de programmes.

9. Les droits des enfants qui subissent la guerre au Soudan et les conséquences de cette guerre sur les enfants constituent une grande préoccupation. Le SIARG et les organismes multilatéraux devraient soulever la question des enfants marqués par la guerre au Soudan et l'inscrire à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence de Winnipeg sur les enfants touchés par la guerre et à celui d'autres conférences internationales, dans toute la mesure du possible.

10. Considérant les discussions à l'intérieur du Soudan et au sein de l'Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD) sur l'arrêt des hostilités suivi d'une période intermédiaire (au cours de laquelle il faudrait tenir un référendum pour décider de l'avenir du Soudan), les ONG canadiennes devraient se préparer à cette période intermédiaire. On encourage l'ACDI à fournir des fonds pour appuyer ce travail de préparation. Le New Sudan

Council of Churches travaille activement en ce sens et accepte de partager les résultats de ses travaux avec les ONG du Canada.

11. Puisque le gouvernement du Canada installe actuellement un bureau de surveillance à Khartoum, le mandat de celui-ci devrait comprendre la collecte de renseignements de sources autres que le GS et de sources à l'extérieur de Khartoum. De plus, le mandat, les stratégies et les processus de ce bureau devraient être axés en priorité sur la surveillance des droits de la personne. Nous recommandons fermement que ce bureau ne devienne ni une Unité d'appui aux programmes (UAP) de l'ACDI, ni un bureau consulaire ou un bureau commercial.

12. Le comité de surveillance de l'IGAD devrait traiter directement et explicitement des questions relatives aux droits de la personne. Aussi, le GS doit adhérer à la Convention de Genève, sous la surveillance de la Croix-Rouge internationale ou de la Société du Croissant-rouge, de telle façon que tous les prisonniers de guerre soient identifiés et demeurent en sécurité.

13. Le GC devrait encourager le GS à ratifier la Convention sur les mines antipersonnel. Dans le même ordre d'idées, l'APLS devrait engager un dialogue efficace concernant les activités de déminage. Le GC devrait aussi encourager le GS à signer les conventions, traités et protocoles des Nations Unies, tels que ceux qui concernent les droits des femmes.

2.3 Répercussions sur le processus de paix du soutien accordé par le Canada à l'exploitation pétrolière au Soudan

Les participants au symposium ont ébauché des recommandations relatives aux projets d'exploitation pétrolière au Soudan, et plus particulièrement aux répercussions sur le processus de paix du soutien accordé par le Canada à ces projets.

Les participants ont appuyé unanimement la mise en œuvre continue de stratégies complémentaires destinées à forcer le désinvestissement de la société Talisman au Soudan jusqu'à ce que la paix soit instaurée, y compris la sensibilisation et la mobilisation intersectorielles, une campagne médiatique et un appel aux investisseurs à désinvestir afin de manifester leur appui au peuple du Soudan.

Pour plus de renseignements, veuillez communiquer avec le SIARG.

3 Forum I - Calgary

La première partie du Symposium sur la société civile au Soudan, le Forum I, a eu lieu à Calgary le 5 juin. Le Forum I a réuni des membres de la communauté soudanaise de tout l'Ouest du Canada et des personnes qui sont engagées activement dans le processus de paix au Soudan - des représentants de la société civile du Soudan; des ONG du Canada, des États-Unis et de l'Europe; des représentants de Talisman Energy; des citoyens canadiens intéressés; et des représentants des médias. Il s'agissait des premiers échanges de cette importance sur le Soudan à Calgary.

La discussion a eu pour résultat de diriger les efforts des personnes intéressées par la paix à long terme au Soudan vers des questions clés, dont celles qui suivent.

3.1 Le processus de médiation international

L'actuel processus de médiation pour le Soudan, qui implique les parties au conflit et la communauté internationale, s'est révélé extrêmement difficile et est considéré par les personnes-ressources du Forum comme étant profondément compromis. Les pays membres du comité de médiation de l'Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD), présidé par le Kenya, sont actuellement incapables de jouer leur rôle en raison des problèmes internes dans les pays en question. Une seconde initiative de paix est en voie de réalisation, qui implique l'Égypte et la Libye, mais la forme et les modalités de ce processus sont moins clairs. Le Canada fait partie de la communauté internationale réunie par le forum des partenaires de l'IGAD (IPF). Toutefois, comme l'IPF dépend du processus de l'IGAD, ce forum aussi éprouve maintenant des difficultés.

On connaît bien la liste des nombreux problèmes significatifs à résoudre sur lesquels se sont entendues les parties. Ce rapport traite de plusieurs de ces problèmes. Cependant, les parties au conflit doivent encore les résoudre.

3.2 L'intensification de la guerre

Le Soudan connaît une guerre permanente, qui s'étend partout au pays et dont les principales répercussions se font sentir dans le sud du Soudan. La guerre dure depuis plus de 17 ans. Elle connaît une intensification depuis le récent achat par le gouvernement du Soudan d'importantes nouvelles capacités de fabrication d'équipements militaires et de munitions. La guerre tranche avec la soi-disant « opération charme » également engagée par le gouvernement du Soudan en vue d'améliorer son image sur le plan international. La plupart des participants et des orateurs ont compris que les mesures de « libéralisation » adoptées par le GS ne servent uniquement qu'à sauver les apparences.

3.3 La société civile s'exprime en faveur de la paix

Les voix de la société civile au Soudan sont multiples et diverses. Elles se font entendre de leur lieu d'exil ou de l'intérieur du pays. Les voix de l'intérieur subissent les contraintes de l'appauvrissement et du déplacement généralisés des citoyens du Soudan depuis les 17 années que dure la guerre, commencée en 1983. On remarque particulièrement la voix des femmes du Soudan, qui font un appel spécial en faveur de la paix et de la fin de la guerre ainsi que d'efforts particuliers pour résoudre les problèmes dus aux divergences. Le processus de paix *People to People*, en cours dans le sud du Soudan, occupe aussi une place importante. Étant donné les succès obtenus jusqu'à maintenant, ce processus mérite des ressources et un soutien

additionnels.

Les participants et les orateurs ont souligné leur intérêt pour la paix au Soudan et pour la résolution des problèmes qui causent le conflit, faisant remarquer que de trop nombreuses personnes sont mortes, et que de trop nombreuses autres ont été déplacées et vivent dans des lieux temporaires inacceptables. Les participants ont souligné l'urgence de passer à l'action pour que prennent fin les souffrances considérables de la population du Soudan, implorant toutes les parties d'agir de façon à assurer un développement significatif vers la paix.

3.4 Le rôle du pétrole

Les participants soudanais croyaient fermement que l'exploitation et les mouvements du pétrole exacerbent la guerre et ont fait grimper les enjeux, ce qui donne à croire que les atrocités de la guerre augmenteront. Les orateurs ont souligné avoir vu et ressenti les répercussions néfastes du pétrole sur la population du sud. Ils ont exprimé à quel point ils ont été bouleversés face aux atrocités commises par les unités militaires de l'armée soudanaise pour protéger les champs de pétrole et les installations pétrolières, dont le pipeline vers Port-Soudan, ainsi que les investissements internationaux. Les participants soudanais sont particulièrement préoccupés par le rôle de la société canadienne Talisman Energy dans le développement pétrolier au Soudan. Les organisations de la société civile du Soudan et les ONG du Canada demandent à la Talisman de reconnaître que ses activités exacerbent la guerre et favorisent la poursuite des atrocités, si elles ne les font pas augmenter. Elles enjoignent Talisman Energy de reconnaître les atrocités commises par son partenaire dans ce projet, le gouvernement du Soudan (GS), et de se retirer du Soudan.

Les participants croyaient fermement que la société Talisman ne se sent pas concernée par les réalités de la situation sur le terrain ou par l'évidence des atrocités commises par le GS. Ils étaient d'avis qu'il faut continuer d'exercer une forte pression sur la société Talisman afin qu'elle réagisse de façon appropriée et qu'elle cesse de soutenir l'une des parties au conflit.

La société Talisman s'est portée à la défense de ses investissements et de sa participation aux opérations au Soudan, et a allégué être partie d'un processus de développement pour le bien économique de tous les Soudanais. Les représentants de la Talisman ont admis que la société « mange à la même table que le GS » et bénéficie financièrement de ses opérations au Soudan. Ils ont expliqué les récentes décisions prises par la Talisman dans le but d'adopter une nouvelle approche de « responsabilité corporative ». Bien qu'il y ait eu des signes de dialogue et des « moments éclairants » entre les représentants de la Talisman et les autres participants à la conférence de Calgary, plusieurs participants ont exprimé leur manque de confiance dans la Talisman. De même, on a dit que si la Talisman devait adopter intégralement l'actuel Code de conduite international des compagnies, elle réaliserait normalement qu'elle doit se retirer du Soudan. De nombreux participants croyaient que Talisman Energy n'était pas totalement résolue à faire preuve d'une entière responsabilisation sociale et corporative exigeant une réelle transparence.

3.5 Les conclusions du rapport de la mission Harker

Au cours du Forum, un membre de la mission Harker a parlé des conclusions du rapport de la mission. De nombreux participants ont jugé que les déclarations de la mission sur la question des atrocités et des violations des droits de la personne représentent une accusation manifeste contre le GS et ses partenaires dans la production pétrolière.

Les participants ont pris connaissance des références que fait le rapport aux enlèvements, aux déplacements forcés et à l'esclavage au Soudan, pratiqués par les forces armées du GS et par les personnes encouragées par celui-ci à prendre part à de telles activités. La mission a corroboré les constatations du rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies. Ces constatations confirment que tout enlèvement forcé en vue de l'esclavage et du travail confiné sans rémunération est illégal. Dans le contexte actuel du conflit au Soudan, il n'existe aucune différence entre l'esclavage et les enlèvements, et toutes les pratiques qui résultent en de mauvais traitements d'une personne humaine par une autre sont illégales aux termes des lois internationales. Il a été fait mention de multiples rapports concernant l'esclavage des femmes soudanaises et le maintien de lois répressives qui tolèrent ou encouragent une brutalité excessive.

Les participants au forum ont donné leur aval aux recommandations du rapport de la mission Harker. Ils ont exprimé l'espoir que le gouvernement du Canada acceptera ces recommandations et qu'il y donnera suite. Plus particulièrement, les participants ont fréquemment mentionné que les Canadiens et les Canadiennes doivent être encouragés à exiger des actions plus efficaces de la part du gouvernement du Canada. Ces actions devraient tarir les entrées de revenus du pétrole pour le GS. Le Canada doit également jouer un rôle plus éclairé et plus proactif, notamment parce qu'il est aussi un membre de l'IPF.

4 Forum II - Ottawa

Le Forum II, tenu à Ottawa du 7 au 9 juin, a réuni des représentants de la société civile du Soudan, du Canada, des États-Unis et de l'Europe durant près de trois jours afin d'examiner les points de vue sur les nombreuses questions relatives au conflit au Soudan et pour discuter des possibilités de renforcer le processus de paix. Les représentants du gouvernement du Canada et la communauté diplomatique étaient bienvenus au forum.

4.1 Examen du contexte

On a parlé aux participants de la tradition et de l'expérience des institutions démocratiques nationales au Soudan, et ils ont pu acquérir une meilleure compréhension de l'histoire de la démocratie et de ses succès dans le pays, remarquant qu'au cours de l'histoire du Soudan depuis son indépendance, les forces de la société civile sont parvenues à deux reprises à instaurer des périodes de démocratie gouvernementale. On a insisté sur le rôle des femmes dans la vie de ce pays, de celui qu'elles occupent dans l'histoire et dans les structures de la société civile ainsi que de leur nouveau rôle en tant que femmes en quête de paix - faisant avancer le processus de paix par l'entremise de la société civile. On a aussi souligné que les régimes non démocratiques et la guerre ont empoisonné le pays, et que les conséquences de la guerre ont laissé au Soudan un lourd héritage de destruction, de désarticulation, d'irrégularités relatives au développement et, en fait, de sous-développement.

Pour donner lieu à des changements significatifs et positifs au Soudan, certains éléments de la société soudanaise ont tenté d'instaurer la paix. Il faut reconnaître le long historique de négociation et de dialogue en vue d'un règlement pacifique des problèmes, accompagné d'une profonde frustration et du prolongement du conflit armé.

On a parlé aux participants de l'importance de reconnaître l'énormité des problèmes et des enjeux auxquels doivent faire face la population et les parties au conflit du Soudan. Les détails sur la mort et sur le déplacement de personnes durant le conflit au Soudan dépassent l'imagination et soulignent l'urgence d'agir pour concentrer l'attention internationale sur les exigences du processus de paix.

Les participants au forum se sont dits très préoccupés par le fait que le comité de médiation de l'IGAD ne réalise pas de progrès suffisants. On a mentionné de nombreux détails du processus de l'IGAD ainsi que des idées que les membres de l'IPF devraient prendre en considération au cours de leurs discussions sur les prochaines étapes du processus de l'IGAD. Les participants ont pu entendre un solide exposé en faveur de l'utilisation du processus de l'IGAD à titre d'initiative de médiation principale à l'égard du conflit. Les participants ont entendu de nombreux points de vue sur le processus égypto-libyen et on a émis l'opinion qu'il ne devrait exister qu'un seul processus sur les plans diplomatique et international.

Les représentants de la société civile soudanaise ont exprimé leur volonté de ne pas voir abrogé le principe de l'autodétermination, qui représente une préoccupation de premier plan. Les participants se sont fait dire que la période intérimaire qui suivrait la fin des hostilités ainsi que le référendum sur l'unité ou la séparation constituent des étapes clés pour assurer la paix et son maintien, et qu'il faudrait les considérer comme éléments d'un contexte où les normes de la démocratie doivent être respectées rigoureusement.

On a manifesté des inquiétudes sur le rôle du Canada au sein de l'IPF et sur la récente

proposition du Canada d'établir un bureau de surveillance à Khartoum. On s'est dit très préoccupé quant à l'efficacité de ce bureau sur le terrain du GS, et ses procédures, opérations et mandat ont soulevé des incertitudes. Les participants ont émis le souhait que ce bureau soit efficace et intègre. De plus, on s'est dit désappointé que le Canada ait peu réagi aux conclusions et recommandations du rapport de la mission Harker. Les participants ont demandé au Canada d'être davantage proactif en ce qui concerne les enjeux fondamentaux liés à l'extraction du pétrole et au rôle de la société canadienne Talisman Energy au Soudan.

Le rôle que joue la société Talisman Energy de Calgary dans l'exploration et l'extraction du pétrole ainsi que le financement des opérations pétrolières au Soudan est vaste et préoccupant. Quelques participants ont dit croire que la Talisman ne faisait rien d'autre que d'aider le GS, par inadvertance ou autrement, dans ses efforts pour maintenir et aggraver la guerre au Soudan.

Les participants croyaient fermement que le régime actuel et son effort de guerre ne devraient pas bénéficier des revenus tirés du pétrole. Ces revenus ne devraient pas non plus profiter à une seule région du Soudan. Les sociétés engagées dans des opérations pétrolières au Soudan devraient plutôt cesser leurs activités jusqu'à ce qu'on parvienne à un accord en ce qui concerne la distribution équitable des revenus du pétrole. Un tel accord ne peut être obtenu que dans le contexte d'un règlement de paix dans tout le Soudan, ou à la suite d'un tel règlement.

Les participants n'ont pas manifesté d'appui au gouvernement du Soudan et à ses politiques et pratiques. On perçoit le régime comme non démocratique, hostile aux intérêts de la grande majorité de la population du Soudan partout au pays, et au service des intérêts de quelques personnes seulement, qui utilisent l'appareil d'État pour faire des affaires à leur propre compte. Par contre, les participants se sont entendus pour dire que de nombreuses personnes et collectivités sont des victimes et qu'elles sont tenues à l'écart du pouvoir dans tout le pays. Les participants ont manifesté leur appui au dialogue sur la paix et à la déclaration de principe du processus de médiation de l'IGAD.

4.2 Les droits de la personne et la société civile au Soudan

Une bonne analyse fondée sur le genre de la situation des droits de la personne ainsi qu'une description détaillée du rôle des femmes dans la société civile se sont dégagées des propos de plusieurs des orateurs du forum. Les renseignements historiques sur la société civile qu'on y a présentés ont constitué une description de la structure, du rôle et des difficiles conditions de fonctionnement de la société civile à l'heure actuelle. Les femmes sont parmi les plus gravement touchées, ce qui ne les empêche pas présentement de « rafraîchir » le processus de paix en faisant entendre leur voix.

Les femmes ne parlent pas seulement de la guerre mais aussi de leur rôle en général dans la société. Elles espèrent des changements importants en faveur de l'égalité. On peut néanmoins discerner leurs préoccupations particulières en ce qui concerne les répercussions de la guerre sur les femmes et les enfants, surtout sur ceux qui ont été déplacés par la guerre, qui se retrouvent dans les soi-disant « camps de la paix » ou qui sont emprisonnés. Les femmes du Soudan sont parmi les plus pauvres des pauvres et elles souffrent du plus haut taux d'analphabétisme. La guerre a rendu la situation des femmes au Soudan beaucoup plus difficile que ne l'avait fait l'impact du colonialisme. Il existe peu de services de santé dans le pays pour les femmes et les enfants; l'accès aux aliments est biaisé à l'encontre des femmes et des enfants; et les mines terrestres les ont gravement touchés. Dans ce contexte défavorable, les femmes luttent pour se faire entendre. Elles veulent s'assurer d'être pleinement partie à toute négociation et à toute

résolution du conflit, d'être concernées par les résultats et de trouver des moyens pour que toute nouvelle structure fasse avancer considérablement l'égalité entre les sexes. Les femmes réclament le rétablissement des droits de la personne et de la primauté du droit ainsi que la fin du recrutement des enfants pour la guerre.

En raison de l'emprisonnement de membres de la société civile par les militaires et la police partout au pays, on a exprimé de sérieuses inquiétudes à l'égard de ces prisonniers. On a décrit en détail les difficultés qu'éprouvent les groupes qui tentent d'œuvrer dans les prisons. Le travail est complexe et frustrant, et ses répercussions sur les conditions de vie des prisonniers sont imperceptibles, surtout en ce qui concerne les femmes et les enfants. On a fait remarquer que la grande majorité des personnes emprisonnées dans le nord proviennent du sud du pays.

La situation à laquelle font face une variété de groupes spécifiques au Soudan s'est aggravée. La situation des Nubiens est la plus pitoyable, en vertu surtout des activités militaires que mène le gouvernement du Soudan dans les montagnes nubiennes, du manque de secours et de soutien d'urgence, et des déplacements massifs auxquels ont donné lieu à la fois les attaques par les militaires et le manque d'aide extérieure. On a étudié en détail cette question en rapport avec les activités militaires soudanaises entourant les champs de pétrole et l'oléoduc.

On a exprimé de sérieuses préoccupations concernant l'expansion des opérations militaires dans le « Block 5 », au sud-ouest des champs de pétrole de Unity et Heglig. On estime qu'il s'agit d'une expansion de la guerre dans le but de dépeupler un nouveau territoire pétrolier pour accroître le forage et éventuellement exploiter de nouvelles réserves de pétrole.

L'apport d'assistance et de secours revêt une grande importance dans le sud du Soudan en raison de l'absence d'un gouvernement civil et de services dans les secteurs de la santé, de l'éducation, de l'agriculture (de semences p. ex.) et de l'eau potable.

Les participants et les orateurs ont abordé la question du dilemme que constitue la dépendance à l'égard de l'aide extérieure. On s'est préoccupé de la manière dont l'aide modifie, et souvent fausse, la situation dans le pays, surtout lorsqu'elle cesse ou diminue, et de la distribution inégale de l'aide. Par contre, il existe aussi une ouverture d'esprit en regard de l'aide et de l'assistance extérieure, un réel besoin de collaborer avec des organismes de l'extérieur dans de nombreux secteurs d'activité et pour la prestation de services de base. On dit souhaiter que davantage de régions du Soudan puissent être ouvertes aux secours et à l'aide au développement si nécessaires.

Les orateurs ont aussi fait état de nombreuses questions délicates et d'expériences concernant la façon dont les gens comprennent la situation dans leur propre optique; si on n'agit pas avec circonspection, cette situation perdurera et influera sur les relations à l'avenir. Les participants se sont penchés sur le besoin de dire la vérité sur la souffrance et la douleur, la guérison et la réconciliation, le rétablissement de la confiance entre les gens et l'espoir face à l'avenir.

Le processus de paix *People to People* soutenu par le New Soudan Council of Churches dans le sud du Soudan est très prometteur et est marqué par le progrès et le dynamisme. Plus particulièrement, la conférence de Wunlit de 1999 a mené à une réconciliation entre plusieurs groupes dans le sud du pays. Non seulement ce processus consolide-il la paix « par la base » mais il favorise la collaboration entre les groupes à mesure qu'évolue la situation au Soudan.

Le dialogue sud-sud et la préparation en vue de la fin des hostilités et de la période intermédiaire

qui s'ensuivrait constituent des étapes importantes dans le mouvement général en faveur de la paix. Les orateurs ont décrit les liens établis entre le processus de paix entre les populations, le dialogue sud-sud et le processus de l'IGAD, dont le processus connexe de l'IPF, qui ont été perçus comme des processus complémentaires.

Les opérations de l'actuel régime à Khartoum représentent un perpétuel affront aux droits de la personne au Soudan. Un grand nombre de Soudanais sont aux prises avec de sérieuses difficultés dans leur vie quotidienne, qui sont très concrètes et profondément perturbantes. Les violations des droits de la personne et les abus par le régime en place sont suffisamment documentés pour constituer une importante préoccupation internationale. Pourtant, les violations perdurent. La société civile soudanaise et la communauté internationale doivent conjuguer leurs efforts pour contester le gouvernement du Soudan et exercer des pressions afin que cessent l'oppression, les atrocités militaires et les violations des droits de la personne.

4.3 La société civile et le processus de paix au Soudan

Les participants ont pu acquérir une connaissance plus détaillée du rôle des femmes au Soudan en tant qu'instruments de paix. On a recommandé que les femmes soient davantage engagées dans le processus de paix, surtout dans le nord du Soudan. Les idées présentées aux participants leur ont permis d'en apprendre davantage sur les façons de mobiliser encore plus les femmes, sur les points de pression du GS, sur les besoins de formation des femmes et sur la possibilité d'établir des liens internationaux.

Les participants ont aussi été mieux informés sur le processus de paix entre les populations en cours dans le sud du pays. Plus particulièrement, le forum a permis de parler des événements qui ont mené à la conférence de Wunlit, en 1999, et de l'évolution favorable depuis la conférence. Le processus de paix entre les populations offre des perspectives intéressantes si on l'élargit afin d'y intégrer davantage de groupes et de collectivités. Selon les rapports, de plus en plus de groupes s'impliquent effectivement et les résultats de tout le travail effectué à ce jour sont considérables. L'approche « par la base » engage la société civile dans le processus de paix malgré les conflits entre les dirigeants militaires et politiques.

On a largement exprimé le point de vue selon lequel si les conflits sud-sud - aussi appelés conflits tribaux ou ethniques - ne se résolvent pas, la société civile du sud ne sera pas en mesure d'exercer une influence sur le processus de paix officiel, auquel participent les parties reconnues au conflit.

Les participants au forum ont pris connaissance des détails au sujet du rôle d'autres intervenants de la société civile dans la promotion de la paix dans le sud. On leur a parlé du rôle particulier des femmes dans le processus de paix entre les populations, en particulier depuis la conférence de Wunlit. Malgré le scepticisme manifesté au départ par les femmes, elles ont maintenant la volonté de changer les choses; elles ont participé au processus de paix et elles veulent que le monde le sache. Au nord, les groupes de jeunes, de femmes et de professionnels, les syndicats, les chercheurs et les activistes en faveur de la paix, les dirigeants musulmans et chrétiens ainsi que les représentants des personnes déplacées dans le pays jouent un rôle actif.

Il existe actuellement un important manque de cohésion au sein de la société civile, surtout si l'on considère que dans les deux parties du pays, les gens travaillent contre une force d'oppression commune. On ne peut ignorer le manque de confiance mutuelle entre le nord et le sud, et l'on doit résoudre ce problème.

Parmi les problèmes auxquels doit faire face le processus de paix entre les populations, mentionnons :

- Jusqu'où et avec quelle rapidité peut-on élargir le processus, et celui-ci peut-il effectivement déborder du sud?
- Comment faire savoir qu'il existe une réconciliation au niveau communautaire, en particulier pour informer les groupes et les personnes de la diaspora?
- Comment engager la société civile du nord et celle du sud dans un processus commun ou dans un partage de l'information?

Les composantes clés de la paix et un règlement négocié incluent les ententes déjà conclues dans le cadre du processus de médiation de l'IGAD, notamment une déclaration de principe. Les principaux sujets de controverse sont les suivants :

- La séparation entre la religion et l'État, et la question de la constitution de 1998.
- Les frontières entre le nord et le sud, et la question du pétrole dans un État unifié.
- L'autodétermination en ce qui concerne l'unité ou la succession, et le référendum.
- Le partage équitable du pouvoir et des richesses.
- La fin du conflit entre le gouvernement du Soudan et l'Armée populaire de libération du Soudan, et le partage des pouvoirs.
- Le rapatriement des personnes exilées ou déplacées dans le pays.
- Les secours humanitaires.
- Le rôle des groupes d'opposition du nord dans les pourparlers, et les enjeux spécifiques des groupes spécifiques du sud du Soudan.

Sur le plan international, les organismes peuvent intervenir de plusieurs façons, dont voici quelques-unes :

- Les ONG peuvent exercer des pressions pour s'assurer du soutien au sein de l'IPF quant à leur rôle dans le processus de paix.
- Les organismes peuvent organiser davantage de conférences, réunions et forums afin de discuter de la stratégie du processus de paix au Soudan, conservant au processus de paix la plus grande priorité possible à l'ordre du jour international.
- Les ONG et les organismes multilatéraux peuvent exercer des pressions sur le GS et la SPLA afin de permettre l'accès à davantage de secours en nature dans le pays, destinés à toutes les personnes, dans toutes les régions du pays - pour aider à assurer la subsistance des personnes dans cette situation critique.
- Les ONG peuvent exercer des pressions sur le GS afin d'accroître considérablement le travail de réinstallation et de réhabilitation des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays, y compris l'éducation pour tous et les services de santé.

Les orateurs et les participants du forum d'Ottawa ont fermement réclamé qu'on exerce des pressions sur le GS et le SPLM ainsi que sur l'IGAD afin que la société civile soit impliquée dans le processus de paix. On a exprimé la ferme volonté que l'IPF agisse de façon à aider les ONG et les organismes de la société civile soudanaise à faire partie du processus de paix.

On a demandé un appui international pour encourager et faciliter la communication nord-sud entre les organisations de la société civile, y compris des fonds destinés à des rencontres et à l'échange de renseignements. Cela permettrait aux Soudanais de prendre en charge leurs propres problèmes, de s'organiser et de corriger les erreurs, de s'entendre sur les objectifs, les modes de

fonctionnement et les stratégies, et d'apprendre à se comprendre et à se faire confiance mutuellement.

4.4 Ateliers du forum

Le forum comportait des ateliers portant sur trois thèmes :

- Appuyer les droits de la personne et la société civile au Soudan - Mécanismes pour l'assistance canadienne.
- Les répercussions du rôle économique du Canada au Soudan - L'exploitation pétrolière et l'appui au processus de paix.
- Élargir le rôle de la société civile dans le processus de paix.

Les rapports tirés de ces ateliers ont conclu le Forum sur la société civile au Soudan. Les recommandations tirées de ces ateliers ont été intégrées dans la série de recommandations comprise dans ce document.

5. Remarque concernant les consultations entre les ONG du Soudan, du Canada, des États-Unis et de l'Europe qui ont eu lieu au cours du Forum d'Ottawa.

Durant le Forum d'Ottawa, les ONG participantes en provenance du Soudan, du Canada, de l'Europe et des États-Unis se sont rencontrées afin d'explorer des moyens d'améliorer la communication entre les régions, de s'entendre sur des objectifs communs en matière de revendication et de faciliter davantage les campagnes conjointes de revendication. On a convenu de redoubler d'effort dans chacun de ces domaines.

Les discussions ont aussi porté sur les moyens par lesquels les ONG pourraient mieux se tenir au courant du travail effectué par le forum des partenaires de l'IGAD (IPF); sur la meilleure façon d'établir des liens avec l'IPF; et sur la façon d'interpeller l'IPF de manière à ce qu'il prenne en considération le point de vue des ONG internationales.

Les Canadiennes et Canadiens présents se sont engagés à effectuer le suivi nécessaire sur ces questions au cours des mois suivants (septembre à novembre 2000).

SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM

Annexes

Cartoon, June 2000

1 INTRODUCTION

The civil war in Sudan continues with little sign of any imminent peaceful settlement. A state of emergency was recently declared as political tensions run high in the Sudanese Government.

- ▲ Sudan Civil Society Symposium background document
- ▲ CIDA Statement
- ▲ Liliir People-to-People Peace Conference documents
- ▲ NSCC People-to-People Peace Process, *Stephen Ter Nyoun Yier*
- ▲ Oil extraction in Sudan, *Bonar Malwal*
- ▲ Sudan - an overview
- ▲ SIARG - Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group

Sudan government officials, opposition leaders and faction heads have all been given opportunity to express their visions for peace. But for some of these, peace is less of a priority than ensuring that their own power and influence is maintained. Thus the current "peace process" is muddled with voices which are not necessarily committed in a just and complete way to peace. The voices of the victims - the women, the children, and the innocent civilians caught in the civil war - have no voice in any peace forum.

The recent emergence of civil society in Sudan, led in 1991 by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and which was sponsored by a group of Sudanese NGOs, demonstrated clearly the value of hearing the voice of Sudanese civil society groups on issues of justice, peace, human rights and development. This value was made more notable in two ways:

- It brought to the public attention the independent, articulate and reasonable voices of people from a wide variety of racial, ethnic and regional backgrounds on issues of peace and human rights in Sudan.
- It was able to separate propaganda from fact in a credible manner.

SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM

Canada, June 2000

1 INTRODUCTION

The civil war in Sudan continues with little sign of any imminent peaceful settlement. A state of emergency was recently declared as political tensions run high in the Sudanese Government.

Now that the oil pipeline has been completed, there is little or no incentive for the warring parties to come to a comprehensive peace agreement. The Government is accused of stalling on the IGAD peace process because it believes that, with oil revenues flowing, it is only a matter of time before enough weapons and resources can be acquired to either win the war, or convince southern leaders to join their "peace from within" strategy through the provision of material incentives.

The opposition parties, on the other hand, (particularly the SPLA), have no incentive to lay down their weapons, now that they see their resources being taken from them and handed to their adversary. There is a striking lack of confidence in the "peace from within" initiative of the government, which has yet to demonstrate that it is acting in good faith and has clearly failed those southern groups which have signed the agreement.

Sudan government officials, opposition leaders and faction heads have all been given opportunity to express their visions for peace. But for some of these, peace is less of a priority than ensuring that their own power and influence is maintained. Thus the current "peace process" is muddied with voices which are not necessarily interested in a just and comprehensive peace. The voices of the victims - the women, the children, and the innocent civilians caught in the civil war - have no voice in any peace forum.

The recent conference on civil society in Sudan, held in Milan, Italy, and which was sponsored by a group of Italian NGOs, demonstrated clearly the value of hearing the voice of Sudanese civil society groups on issues of justice, peace, human rights and development. The Milan conference was notable in two ways:

- It brought to the public attention the competent, articulate and reasonable voices of people from a wide variety of racial, ethnic and sectoral backgrounds on issues of peace and human rights in Sudan.
- It was able to separate propaganda from fact in a credible manner.

There is an urgent need for the Canadian Government and general public to gain a better understanding of the situation in Sudan and to come up with viable channels for supporting the peace process. Canada's involvement and influence in the Sudan is significant (especially with the oil company activity), yet the needs and issues related to Sudan have seldom received the attention and focus which they deserve.

A symposium on the Sudan peace process will be held in two locations in Canada (Calgary and Ottawa), with a focus on Canadian - Sudanese issues which are directly connected to the economic and political influence of Canada in Sudan in the context of the peace process.

2 GOALS OF THE SYMPOSIUM

2.1 To explore and highlight appropriate responses for the Canadian public and private sectors with respect to their conduct and activities in enhancing the peace process in Sudan by:

- Providing forums where the views and opinions of the Sudanese people can be heard with regard to Canadian involvement in Sudan, and;
- Discuss the effectiveness of existing activities and ideas for peace and development with invited non combatant representatives from Sudanese civil society.

2.2 To outline the role which civil society (both within Sudan and in the international community) can play in promoting peace in Sudan, including the integration of civil society counterparts into the IGAD process in conjunction with the IPF.

3 ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

Through a series of plenary presentations and discussion, followed by workshops, the Symposium will address issues related to the following three broad themes:

- The Peace Process
- Human Rights
- Civil Society Capacity Building

It is important to stress the interconnectedness of these themes and of the issues which will be discussed by panellists and participants at the Forum. For example, the question

of the *role of civil society*, the question of the *oil economy* or the question of the *role of women* will all find expression throughout the Forum. Panellists and participants will be encouraged to direct their analysis at current and future initiatives, rather than dwell unnecessarily on past events.

4 EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- a) Canadians will come away with a better understanding of the role that we are playing in the peace process in Sudan.
- b) Canadian NGOs, the Government and general public will be given concrete ideas for action in contributing significantly to establishing a lasting peace in the Sudan.
- c) The provision of forums where civil society voices can be heard by the international community will encourage and strengthen Sudanese civil society itself, by demonstrating to the warring parties, IGAD, the IPF and international community that the voices of the victims are an essential component of the peace process.
- d) Ideas and concrete recommendations for implementing the new CIDA policy on support to civil society are likely to emerge.
- e) It is hoped that the symposium will lead to the development of an international civil society movement which will provide complementary support to the IPF/IGAD forum, encouraging and enhancing the peace process through the input of grass roots ideas.
- f) The Symposium will provide insights into the need for (and ultimate profitability of) the incorporation of ethical codes of conduct by transnational companies involved in zones of civil conflict.
- g) The Canadian business sector will understand better the importance of including a comprehensive analysis of the political, social and human rights situation in a country, (and the likely impact of the company's activities on those areas), as an integral component in its "due diligence" process prior to involvement.
- h) A written report will be produced (in English and French) immediately following the symposium and will be given wide distribution.

5 PARTICIPANTS

The following sectors and groups will be invited to attend and participate:

a) Sudanese representatives will be invited to present a diversity of views from a cross-section of Sudanese civil society. They will come from among the following groups:

Sudanese women's groups
NGOs
Religious organizations
Human rights organizations
Community associations
Research organizations
Labour/Trade Union

b) Researchers from Canada, the US and Europe, who will be requested to present their findings, e.g. the Harker mission.

c) Representatives from the Canadian Government.

d) An invitation will be extended to the Sudanese Embassy.

e) Representatives of Canadian oil companies and investment analysts. The Calgary Forum will allow direct dialogue with leading Sudanese civil society representatives.

f) Representatives intimately connected with the IGAD peace process.

g) Members of the Sudan Inter Agency Reference Group (SIARG) and other NGOs, churches, the media and the general public.

6 TIME FRAME

The Symposium will take place in late June. Provisional dates are:

Calgary Public Forum	Monday	June 5, 2000
Ottawa Public Meeting	Wednesday	June 7, 2000
Ottawa Symposium	Wednesday-Friday	June 7-9, 2000

The visitors from Sudan will have many follow up activities during subsequent days with the media, church groups, DFAIT and CIDA.

Statement

NOTES FOR REMARKS

BY

**ANDREW MCALISTER
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY**

AT

**THE SUDAN INTER-AGENCY REFERENCE GROUP
CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM ON THE
SUDAN PEACE PROCESS**

**Ottawa, Ontario
June 7, 2000**



Thank you for the kind introduction.

On behalf of the Honourable Maria Minna, Minister for International Cooperation, who unfortunately could not attend today, I would like to thank the organizers of this event, the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group, for their work ... and, on a personal note, their hospitality.

It's a pleasure for me to speak to you on such an important issue, and affirm Canada's support for those who are fighting for their survival, for peace and development in Sudan.

We would like to extend an especially warm welcome to those guests who are visiting from Sudan and the region.

It is extremely important that we Canadians — in civil society and government — have such opportunities to listen to you in order to better develop our understanding and better ways to support your work.

You are no doubt aware that the Canadian International Development Agency — CIDA for short — has provided assistance to Sudan in various forms.

Since 1990, we have provided over \$100 million in food, basic medicines and other health and emergency assistance.

This has been delivered — mainly in the South, but also in the North — through the UN system as well as through Canadian NGOs and their local partners, some of whom are represented here today.

About one year ago, CIDA reviewed its policy on Sudan and came to the conclusion that, in addition to emergency assistance we should become more active in supporting the search for peace.

Of course, CIDA works very closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs here in Ottawa and in the region as well as with Canada's Special Envoy for the Sudan Peace Process, Senator Lois Wilson.

CIDA provides resources to support the peace process because we believe that — whatever we do, however many resources we channel — the people of Sudan will not enjoy their basic rights for development and human security until there is a lasting peace.

A *lasting* peace is a goal I know all of us in this room are seeking. But achieving that goal will not be easy.

When one dares to think about the schools and clinics that could have been constructed, of the business enterprises that could have flourished, of the roads and fields that could have been built and tended rather than mined, and of the cultural vibrancy that could have been more freely celebrated -- the tragedy of Sudan becomes even more deeply etched in our minds.

That is why it is important to develop an alternative future for Sudan, and for all Sudanese -- but, most of all, perhaps, for the children.

This vision would be based on a culture of peace rather than a culture of war.

In the past year or so CIDA has provided over \$1.2 million in financial support for a number of initiatives related to the Sudan Peace Process.

These include:

- the Sudan Women's Peace Initiative, which held an international conference in Maastricht in April, supported by CIDA and Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade;
- a Track II project managed by Project Ploughshares in partnership with the Nairobi-based Inter-Africa Resource Group;
- the "IGAD Resource Group" project managed by the Addis Ababa-based InterAfrica Group;
- of course, we also support and work closely with the IGAD Peace Secretariat, and we are very active in the IGAD Partners Forum where we search for ways to support IGAD, the IGAD Declaration of Principles and the Peace Secretariat itself;
- we are also very happy to be one of the funders for this Symposium.

I think it important to point out that, in this list of CIDA-funded projects, civil society features prominently.

Civil society organizations and their membership have been among the victims of the Sudan conflict.

Civil society has a basic right to be heard, and to influence the peace process that will be so central in determining Sudan's future.

Peace-making and peace-building are about more than well-crafted documents, as important as these are.

Civil society leaders and organizations can bring flexibility, inspiration, creativity and, sometimes, sources of expertise or legitimacy that are so often lacking in a prolonged, deep-rooted conflict.

If well-organized and well-supported, civil society actors who are truly representative can play a key role, not only in providing new ideas for peace but also in building the new relationships and social capital crucial for a lasting peace.

From the Canadian point of view, support to Sudanese civil society can entail:

- well-informed diplomatic, political and moral support;
- support to initiatives that reach the broader Sudanese public and grassroots rural populations;
- support for groups and processes that can help build bridges between the grassroots and the more established civil society actors who are better placed to directly influence the parties to the negotiations;
- support to religious and other indigenous leaders who may not traditionally engage in such politically-charged processes but who play a unique role in the societies and cultures of Sudan and may want to play some role in the peace process -- in particular to help build bridges across the cleavages in society that have been exacerbated by the conflict; the Sudan conflict, in particular, calls for special attention to issues related to the role of religion in society and politics, and cross-faith relations generally;
- we also continue to work with those who are closer to the situation, to carefully identify and channel resources to locally-organized initiatives -- as we have done with the New Sudan Council of Churches.

We must also ensure that in all our initiatives we are well-informed of not only the complex "macro-level" dimensions of this conflict, but also the best practices, methodologies and processes for conflict resolution from around the world *and* in the traditions of Sudanese cultures.

And we must do our best to ensure that civil society processes and viewpoints are brought to the centre of discussions by the international community and the principal actors in the conflict.

We are listening to our own stakeholders, including the Sudanese diaspora living in Canada — many of whom already are in regular contact with CIDA officials.

None of this is to suggest that the "civil society approach" is either a panacea or is not fraught with its own particular difficulties, especially when it comes to supporting the right actors through the right means.

There will be no shortage of challenges in the resolution of the Sudan conflict. But this is why we at CIDA are also increasing our own capacity to monitor and more deeply understand the Sudan conflict and the plethora of stakeholders.

The fact is that, no matter how much we seek to understand Sudan, its problems and opportunities — the key to our success, in playing our own small but we hope effective role, will be the relationships we Canadians develop and foster with Sudanese.

The situation is far too fluid and too complex to believe that formulas or blueprints can be applied to any of the kinds of initiatives I have mentioned.

We need creative, flexible and highly effective approaches.

We look forward to watching this particular process, as we at CIDA continue to be engaged with the people committed to, central to and truly capable of realizing a durable peace for Sudan.

I wish you the best of luck in these very important endeavours. Thank you.

RECORD OF THE

LILIIR

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
PEACE CONFERENCE

EAST BANK CONFERENCE

FOR

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

BETWEEN THE

ANYUAK, DINKA, JIE, KACHIPO, MURLE AND NUER

LILIIR, UPPER NILE, SUDAN
9TH TO THE 15TH OF MAY

The situation is far too fluid and too complex to believe that formulas or procedures developed in other areas can be applied to any of the kinds of initiatives I have mentioned.

We need creative, flexible and highly effective approaches.

We look forward to watching this particular process, as we at CIDA continue to be engaged with the people committed to, central to and truly capable of realizing a durable peace in Sudan.

I wish you the best of luck in these very important endeavours. Thank you.

- 30 -

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PEACE CONFERENCE

EAST BANK CONFERENCE

FOR

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

BETWEEN THE

ANYUAK, DINKA, JIE, KACHIPO, MURLE AND NUER

ELIJAH UPPER Nile SUDAN
25TH TO THE 15TH OF MAY

Introduction & Background

The Liliir Conference marked an important step in the progressive people-to-peoples' movement for peace and reconciliation among southern Sudanese ethnic groups. Its achievements must be understood in the context of earlier peace initiatives conducted between various local groups, the most significant being the Wunlit conference in March 1999 between the Dinka and the Nuer, who reside on the west bank of the river Nile. Since then, other notable achievements of the growing peace process have occurred at the local level.

Under the facilitation of the New Sudan Council of Churches, the peace process is characterised by being people-led and people-focused, i.e. an encounter between the traditional and civil representatives of the participating ethnic groups independent from the political and military domain. This is perceived to be a critical element to the process: that it remains as free as possible from the interference of opportunistic political forces which, if unchecked, is capable of manipulating proceedings for self-seeking gains.

Encouraged by the significance and powerful spirit generated at Wunlit (which concentrated on the dominant Nilotic groups west of the Nile), the peace process advanced to other areas and a momentum grew among people east of the river to convene a second major conference to address their particular concerns.

The challenges facing the Liliir conference were complex given the diversity of the ethnic groups that reside in the region; the arrangement of its divided political landscape; and the intense mistrust and conflict that has arisen as a result. Throughout Sudan's civil war, the traditional hostilities between many of these groups have often been appropriated by warring parties for their political and military ends, sometimes with devastating effects for the ethnic groups concerned.


While the Liliir conference was attended by a large number of ethnic groups, it was unable to assemble a full representation from the region. This was partly because of the distance and logistics involved and partly because some participating delegates were obstructed from attending (by their military commanders). The delegates deeply regretted that 10 Gawaar chiefs, and 6 Lou chiefs (both Nuer), while transiting to the conference, were detained in Lankien and were unable to attend. Finally, the conference didn't have adequate time (and resources) to conduct the number and range of more localised encounters and reconciliations necessary to bring about a comprehensive, region-wide settlement. Once the rain season intensifies in Sudan (from the month of May), transport and logistics become prohibitive for over 4 months.

However, at the bequest of the people themselves, a significant and sufficient number of groups declared their interest to meet in the spirit of the (now 1 year old) Wunlit conference, and capture the desire of the people to talk of peace and reconciliation. These groups were the Anyuak from Akobo and Pochalla; the Bor and the Padang Dinka; the Jie and Kachipo groups from the Boma area; the Lou and some Gawaar Nuer from Ayod, Waat and Akobo; and finally the Murle from Boma.

The box below gives a simple representation of the participating groups and their approximate boundaries of interaction. In varying degrees, conflict exists *between* ethnic groups and *within* ethnic groups, and not all the members of one group are necessarily perceived to be hostile to another.

Thus, for example, the conference distinguished between the Murle from Boma and the Murle from Pibor, the latter residing in areas under northern government control and seen as hostile to almost all neighbouring groups. Similarly, the Gawaar and the Lou Nuer were distinguished, as there is currently discord between members of both sub-groups.

Box depicting proximity of participating ethnic groups, to each other.



It was also acknowledged that prior to the conference, dialogue and smaller localised agreements were either in process or actually brokered - principally among the Bor Dinka and the Gawaar and Lou Nuer, and also among the Padang Dinka and the Gawaar Nuer - reflecting the changing trends taking place at the grassroots towards peace in southern Sudan among civilian groups.

In order to consolidate these positive trends, NSCC deployed a team of mobilisers and an elaborate network of consultations were set up. Although Wunlit recommended that the next major conference be in the land of the Nuer, the organisers failed to obtain agreement on a suitable site where security would be sufficiently guaranteed. This regrettable situation was a disappointment to all, and finally, Liliir was agreed as an alternative.

Organisation of the Conference

The host community prepared the conference facilities and NSCC provided facilitation and technical support. An additional water point was secured with assistance from the NGO community. Security was provided by the SPLA. Because of the relative distances between the groups, airlifts had to be conducted for the visiting delegates. A number of observers also attended, including elders from the diaspora (and other parts of Sudan), church leaders, international representatives and the media.

The occasion commenced with the traditional sacrifice of a white bull and the conference followed a now proven procedure. Firstly, beginning with the hosts, the delegates faced each other and told their story of transgressions, hostility and violence against their people. A period was then offered for rebuttal, comments and observations. This dialogue continued for three days and produced a catalogue of sensitive but key issues upon which a peace agreement would be fashioned. In response, 9 working groups were established to address the topics in more detail:

1. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR: I) THE IDENTIFICATION OF MISSING PERSONS; II) THE RETURN OF ABDUCTEES; AND III) THE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGES
2. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO ENSURE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE & THEIR ANIMALS, AND THE PROVISION OF ACCESS TO ANIMAL WATER POINTS AND GRAZING AREAS
3. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR: THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON BORDERS & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER CHIEFS, POLICE, COURTS AND PATROLS
4. PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR: MONITORING THE PEACE AGREEMENT GENERALLY
5. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO ENCOURAGE THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL NUER CONFLICTS IN THE FUTURE
6. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP THE RECONCILIATIONS BETWEEN THE (GAWAAR) NUER AND PADANG & BOR DINKA
7. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO RESOLVE THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE LOU NUER AND THE ANYUAK IN AKOBO
8. PROPOSED MEASURES: TO BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE WITH THE PIBOR MURLE
9. PROPOSED MECHANISMS: TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE PROCESS FROM POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REMAINING UPPER NILE GROUPS, TO JOIN THE PROCESS

The working groups reported back to the conference their proposed resolutions and recommendations. After discussion, and a number of amendments, they were finally approved by the delegates.


Reflecting the substantive issues discussed, and in the spirit of reconciliation generated by the process, a covenant was signed by 129 representatives. This formal act publicly sealed the participants desire for peace and outlined the areas where they will take responsibility for its implementation. The ceremony was concluded with the sacrifice of a white ox. The Christian community, both those attending the conference and those scattered throughout the world who are in solidarity with the peace process, offered prayer for its success and the advancement of peace and reconciliation throughout southern Sudan. The conference also expressed appreciation to the many supporting governmental and non-governmental organisations that have provided financial assistance to the peace process.

The conference recognised and regretted that not all ethnic groups, or important sub-groups, were represented on the day. It was the wish of the delegates that, with the assistance of NSCC, the process move forward to encompass these groups as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the Liliir conference stands as a remarkable accomplishment. The conference was successful in fortifying the voice of the southern Sudanese people in their compelling demand for peace. The delegates were unambiguous in appealing to their leaders (military, civil and the educated class in general): that there must be unity and peace amongst all the southern people, and more accountable administration and governance of their interests and affairs. However, the determination of the people to persevere with the achievement of peace, regardless of what obstacles are encountered, was apparent.


The following attached documents testify to the achievements secured at Liliir, namely;

- Liliir Covenant Document
- Conference Recommendations and Resolutions
- Press Statement Released by NSCC
- Delegate Signatures to the Covenant Agreement


This document therefore represents the official publication of the Liliir agreement and has been approved by members of the NSCC conference facilitation team:




Dr Haruun L. Ruun



Mr Telar Deng



Ms Iliana Nadi Albino



Mr Paul Murphy

*A more detailed record of the conference will be made available by NSCC in the future.

LILIIR COVENANT

between the
ANYUAK, DINKA, JIE, KACHIPO, MURLE AND NUER

who attended the

EAST BANK PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PEACE & RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE

in

LILIIR, BOR COUNTY, UPPER NILE, SUDAN

(May 9th to the 15th, 2000)

A gathering of traditional and civil leaders was convened in Liliir (Bor, county), to reconcile the differences and conflicts between the Anyuak, Dinka (Bor & Padang), Jie, Kachipo, Murle (Boma) and Nuer (Gawaar & Lou), and to establish harmony and peace amongst themselves. The spirit of the conference was reflected at the opening by the ceremonial sacrifice of a 'White Bull', and concluded with the declaration of a joint covenant between the represented ethnic groups. The covenant was sealed with the sacrifice of a 'White Ox', the offering of Christian worship, and the signatures of each of the participating delegates and observers, publicly recorded. The following outlines their covenant:

"Under the facilitation of the NSCC, and witnessed by many church leaders and other citizens of Sudan, we, the delegates of the Liliir conference have established a covenant of peace and reconciliation between us. We declare our intention today to cease from hostile acts, and commit ourselves to the practical measures necessary to ensure the integrity and sustainability of our agreement. Recalling the spirit and wisdom handed down from our ancestors, and the memory of our daughters and sons who have unnecessarily died over the past 10 years, we pledge ourselves to observe and implement this covenant and its accompanying resolutions.

We have unanimously agreed that:

- ✓ all traditional hostilities will cease among us, and that all military (and militia) groups are to respect the civilian population and abide by, and protect, this covenant;
- ✓ the conditions necessary to foster local peace and development are brought about by our communities and leaders, and the provision of basic essential services for the people are made available and improved;
- ✓ an amnesty will be upheld for all offences against our people and their property prior to the conference, in the spirit of reconciliation and unity. The amnesty takes effect from this date;
- ✓ all abducted women and children are freely returned to their places of origin, and where necessary, marriage customs are fulfilled;
- ✓ freedom of movement across our common borders is upheld, and trade and communication is encouraged and supported;
- ✓ all cross border agreements are respected and the authority of the border chiefs and police patrols are justly observed;
- ✓ access to common areas for grazing, fishing and water points will be regulated and shared peacefully among us;
- ✓ we will demand good governance from our leaders for the achievement of unity and the observance of human rights;
- ✓ we will advocate on behalf of our sisters and brothers who have been scattered and displaced, especially those from the Bor area, for their return to their homeland with the encouragement and co-operation of their communities, leaders and civil authorities of origin.

In conclusion, we appeal that the people from Upper Nile who were either blocked or did not have an opportunity to participate in the conference be told about our deliberations and be encouraged to meet with us in the near future so that the East Bank peoples' peace process can be widened and deepened. This covenant reflects the will of the people represented at Liliir. It incorporates the resolutions of the conference (attached), and we urge that they be implemented with the full assistance and protection of the civil authorities under all of the southern liberation movements. We hope that the friends of Upper Nile will support our efforts and consolidate our desire for peace."

15.05.00

**MOTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE LILIIR CONFERENCE
9TH TO THE 15TH OF MAY, 2000**

Throughout the proceedings, a number of motions were proposed by delegates of the conference, passed by the assembly, and which are recorded below. In addition, the 9 working groups produced a series of resolutions and recommendations which are intended to accompany the general covenant agreement.

The following motions were unanimously carried at the conference:

1. **MOTION**
THAT THE LILIIR CONFERENCE FULLY ENDORSES THE WUNLIT WEST BANK PEACE AND RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE, MARCH 1999.
2. **MOTION**
THAT THE LILIIR CONFERENCE CALLS FOR A SPECIAL 'CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS' TO OVERSEE THE RESOLUTION OF BORDER IDENTIFICATION AND THE REGULATION OF MOVEMENT
3. **MOTION**
THAT THE LILIIR CONFERENCE CONDEMNS THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UPDF IN DETAINING THE AEROPLANE WITH THE CONFERENCE DELEGATES ON THE 11TH OF MAY.

The following resolutions were approved by the conference:

4. **RESOLUTION**

TO ENSURE I) IDENTIFICATION OF MISSING PERSONS; II) THE RETURN OF ABDUCTEES; AND III) THE RECOGNITION OF (DE FACTO) MARRIAGES
 - All abducted women, together with their children (whether born in legitimate wedlock or not), will be handed back to their biological parents and relatives in the presence of the local civil and security authorities.
 - For parents who consent to the marriage of previously captive girls/women, that their marriages will be fulfilled according to local norms after the handing over procedure has taken place.
 - The local civil and security authorities in the areas cited below are to be charged with the collection of the abductees and to co-ordinate with the identification of the missing persons through the regional Peace Council (see N° 7) and the legitimate owners of the abducted children. The process should be implemented between the relevant chiefs, under the supervision of the Council. 11 areas were identified with one or more chiefs who are to provide lists of the abducted persons.

Contact List:

- i) Lou Nuer, Chief Char Reath Kok (Akobo)
Chief Peter Pok Reath (Gon-Gat Bol)
Chief Dak Nyop

- ii) Gawaar Nuer, *To be identified later.*
- iii) Anyuak, Chief Akug Obang Obuala
Chief Opathi Ghuara Jok
- iv) Murle, Chief Boya Girgir
- v) Bor Gok, Chief Madhoor Alier Jongroor
- vi) Bor Athool, Chief Ajak Mabior Deng
- vii) Twic Ajuong, Chief Ayuel Warabek Ayuel
Chief Maketh Arok Maketh
- viii) Twic Lith, Chief Garang Deng Douth
Chief Kuir Bul Ruaal
Chief Bior Aguer
- ix) Duk Payuel, Chief Majok Chol Jok
- x) Duk Padiet, Chief Deng Mathiang Mabior
- xi) Padang, Chief Majok Mabil Deng

5. RESOLUTION

TO ENSURE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE & THEIR ANIMALS AND THE PROVISION OF ACCESS TO ANIMAL WATER POINTS AND GRAZING AREAS

The conference favoured the setting up of a committee to oversee the issue of access to common or shared resources, especially animal grazing and water points, and how those rights can be protected.

- That the functions of the committee will be given to a special Peace Council (and its various sub-committees), recommended below (N° 7). Representation should include; regional authorities, security, police, local administration, veterinary services, health services, head chiefs, ethnic group representatives.
- That the grazing period be considered from January to June (people & cattle to be dispersed by end of June).
- That people and their cattle will be accompanied to their allocated grazing areas by the border chiefs.
- That the Peace Council will visit sites annually before allocating rights of access to the head chiefs (and copied to the local authorities).
- That a small police force at the grazing areas be established. Security forces shall be responsible for the general security of the people and their cattle. Support for the security force shall come from the chiefs and their people. Security forces shall keep the Peace Committee informed of what the security status is, and what actions they have already taken.

- That the provision of clean water for the settled population and their animals be part of the implementation plan.

6. RESOLUTION

TO ENSURE THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON BORDERS & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER CHIEFS, POLICE, COURTS AND PATROLS

- That border post police will control incursions by cattle rustlers, etc., and report transgressions to their respective chiefs for prosecution.
- That chiefs will meet from the border areas and that courts will be established close to the border posts. Difficult issues or cases will be reported to the higher authorities from the respective areas.
- That the police will be equipped with radios (13) for easy communication with their counterparts in the region.

The conference identified a number of common borders and recommended border stations:

ANYUAK

- Murle: Pochalla & Pibor
Border Station: Abich/Okello
- Murle: Pochalla & Boma
Border Station: contested (Alal/Rad)
- Kachipo: Pochalla & Dima
Border Station: Dima

AKOBO/ ANYUAK

- Murle: Akobo & Pibor
Border Station: Bim
- Nuer: Akobo & Waat
Border Station: Duachen

MURLE

- Nuer: Pibor & Akobo
Border Station: Nyandit
- Nuer: Pibor & Waat
Border Station: Biem
- Dinka: Pibor & Bor
Border Station: Langou (for Bor south)
Manawan (for Bor north)

DINKA BOR

- Nuer: Bor & Waat
Border Station: Ayuai
- Nuer: Bor and Ayod
Border Station: Chueithon

NUER WAAT

- Dinka Bor: Waat & Bor
Border Station: Riek/Panyok

NUER AYOD

- Dinka Duk Padiet: Ayod & Bor (North)
Border Station: Paloich

DINKA PADANG

- Nuer Lankien: Baliet & Waat
Border Station: Kuel (Dinka) & Nyirol (Nuer)
- Nuer Nassir: Baliet & Nassir
Border Station: Nyayin
- Shilluk: Baliet & Sobat
Border Station: Nyinibil

7. RESOLUTION

TO ESTABLISH A REGIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE TO MONITOR AND SUPPORT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Recommended that a Peace Council be established with the sole purpose of overseeing and assisting the implementation and strengthening of the Liliir Covenant and resolutions. Membership, it was suggested, should consist of a chair and vice/chair; secretary; secretary for information and for finance; chief and associate advisors; resource people and other members to be identified. Each county/district will have a sub-committee, and where appropriate, establish them at the village level.

It is also recommended that the chiefs and civil institutions in each area make an explicit commitment to support the peace process and Peace Council, and monitor its implementation.

The following recommendations were agreed by the conference:

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO ENCOURAGE THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL NUER CONFLICTS IN THE FUTURE

Recommended that a meeting be called in the area where the conflict is reputed to be occurring. In particular, a committee should be formed to address the conflict between the Gawaar and the Lou Nuer, and presided over by the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes, i.e. Dinka from Bor, Bahr el Ghazal and western Nuer (to discuss root causes and reach a peaceful solution). Ayod or Yuai were suggested as possible locations.

The conference raised an appeal to the liberation movements of the region to establish secure conditions in the recommended areas, and assist the church in preparing the ground for such a meeting. An appeal was also made to NSCC to assist with facilitation, and to the chiefs to assist with security by mobilising the communities for peace.

Recommended that this meeting take place 'as soon as possible'. The Gawaar and Lou chiefs who attended the Liliir process should be mandated to go and inform their respective communities of the conference's covenant and resolutions. It is viewed as essential that these areas have (supervised and conditional) radio access. A practical but vital recommendation is to address the critical lack of water in the areas of Ayod and Yuai, as part of the process.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP THE RECONCILIATION TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE (GAWAAR) NUER AND PADANG & BOR DINKA

Recommended to form (joint) committees at the local level with four members from each ethnic group (suggesting a chief, a church leader, civil administrator and a member from a woman's association). Groups that have not attended Liliir should be given a record of the conference (e.g. Gawaar Lak, Renk, Pariang, Atar, & Jikeny).

Appeal to NSCC to assist the joint committee with transport for their task and essential commodities for peace meetings. Appeal to the authorities of the region to assist with security in support of such encounters. [Ayod suggested as a location, or Atar if security is a problem.]

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO RESOLVE THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE LOU NUER AND THE ANYUAK IN AKOBO

Recommended that the (to be established) regional Peace Council address this issue in the near future. As part of the problem originates from scarce resources in the Nuer home areas (water/grazing), recommended that these issues become part of the solution. Sharing of administrative duties (between Anyuak and Nuer) was also recommended. [Also noted that hostility between the two groups in Ethiopia was having an impact in Sudan.]

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE WITH THE PIBOR MURLE

Conference urged, that despite the lack of contact with the Murle residing in areas controlled by the Khartoum administration (i.e. in the Pibor area), and the negative profile they have acquired, that all peaceful options should be considered to establish communication with the group, in the hope that some positive response might be achieved.

Recommended that a NSCC send a message to SCC to spread the word of the people-to-people peace among the Murle residing in their areas and inform them of

what has been achieved so far. Similarly, a delegation from the Murle in Boma should send a similar message.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE PROCESS FROM POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF REMAINING UPPER NILE GROUPS TO JOIN THE PROCESS

The delegates distinguished different functions, and how they should be appropriated by the different parties to the process. Firstly, it is a people-to-people event, and thus the agenda and initiative must always remain with the people. Once it has been agreed when and where a peace meeting will be held, then the civil authorities, in the company of the traditional leaders, are both responsible for identifying a suitable location and making preparations for the meeting to take place. Finally, issues of security should remain with the security forces, in support of the people's peace process.

The conference recommended that the achievements of Liliir be widely disseminated throughout the region and documentation be made available in each county/district. The need for continuing smaller, more localised peace initiatives, was stressed before a larger conference is convened.



The New
Sudan Council
of Churches

"Serving All God's People"

PRESS RELEASE

LILIIIR PEACE CONFERENCE

EAST BANK NILOTIC PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PEACE & RECONCILIATION
CONFERENCE, UPPER NILE, SUDAN, MAY 2000

"ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH IN THE EXPANDING SOUTHERN SUDANESE GRASSROOTS PEACE PROCESS"

The momentum behind the southern Sudanese grassroots peace process continues to quietly, but firmly, progress. Another dramatic breakthrough was achieved in a small village called Liliir, in the Bor area of Upper Nile, between the 9th and the 15th of May.

Under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), over 250 traditional and civil leaders, representing members of the Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle and Nuer ethnic groups from the region, came together to address the deep division and conflict that have arisen between them, especially as a result of the country's 17 year long civil war.

The Liliir assembly was inspired by the success of the previous 'West Bank Dinka Nuer' Conference (in Wunlit, March 1999), and numerous mini 'people-to-people' agreements since then. The Wunlit achievement was unanimously endorsed by the delegates, church leaders, and other observers present (including a letter of support from the SPLM leadership).

The Upper Nile conference was both complex and challenging, given the many ethnic groups that make up the region. While traditional hostilities have prevailed for generations among some of the groups, they have been aggravated (and in many cases manipulated) by the warring parties in recent years. The conference welcomed the public declaration by a number of military officers who, in their capacity as civilian observers, pledged their commitment to the people-to-people peace process.

The conference functioned as a forum for people to face each other, discuss their differences and agree to reconcile and make peace. Given the high attendance, the outcome at Liliir was successful, and practical agreements over issues such as access to animal grazing areas, water points and the return of abducted children and women, were sealed. An amnesty for all prior offences against people and their property was also agreed. The occasion concluded with the making of a public covenant between the ethnic groups, when 129 representatives signed a comprehensive document pledging peace and reconciliation.

The conference regretted however that the wishes of the Gawaar-Nuer to participate in the reconciliation process was denied by an Upper Nile faction. The delegates requested that these, and other groups who did not have opportunity to participate in the conference, be given a chance to meet and reconcile as soon as possible. This, they said, was the wish of the people.

For further information please contact Liz Phillippo at Peacedesk@swiflkenya.com,

THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PEACE BUILDING IN SOUTH SUDAN AND OTHER RELATED PEACE EFFORTS FOR ENDING THE WAR IN THE SUDAN.

"BLESSED ARE THE PEACE MAKERS, FOR THEY SHALL BE CALLED THE CHILDREN OF GOD". (MATT: 5:9)

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM ENTITLED : "CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS" CLAGARY, OTTAWA, CANADA, 5-9 JUNE 2000.

BY STEPHEN TER NYOUN YIER (NSCC)

INTRODUCTION

First of all I would like to salute all of you and the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference (SIARG) Group which has organized this land-mark historic event. It is an opportunity for us to share and discuss these crucial issues highlighted the slavery, religious persecution, genocide, peace process and suffering of hundreds of thousands of the people, more particularly in the oil fields in South Sudan with increasing escalating of conflicts and massive displacement of civil the population by the Sudan Government, using aerial bombardment on the villages. The People to People Peace Process in South Sudan began in 1994 in Akobo Conference for Lou-Jikany Nuer and later in 1998 in Wunlit Conference for Nuer-Dinka todate. It can not necessarily be assumed that every one is familiar with the background and progress. This intends to explore the process as based on peace building and its successes and difficult balance on its efforts.

The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was formed in 1989 by the Protestant and Catholic churches and also the NSCC represents churches serving outside the Sudan Governments controlled areas and in this particular case movements' administered areas. The NSCC is a member agency of churches in the non-government controlled area separated from the churches by the war. The churches in the Sudan aim at serving all communities irrespective of religious background and the churches are allowed freedom of worship and freedom of advocacy.

In the liberated areas the movements affirm the freedom of worship and free assembly of churches in prayers, meetings and other church activities, free expression and charitable work of the churches in line with biblical duties to serve all members of the church and communities at large.

Peace Process- An overview:

The Sudanese churches are over burdened by the effects of the continuation of the civil war which erupted for the second time in 1983. The escalating of the conflicts and the devastating effects of the war have caused enormous suffering, loss of lives, homes and property since 1955 except in 1972 to 1983 when there was relative peace and costly war is destroying humanity, property and the basic

social services such as health, education and human security, thus destroying the prospect for the future generations. The ethnic violence has increased dramatically among the South Sudanese and the behaviour of struggle for power. Cattle rustling and abuses of human rights have become a nightmare right after the massive return of the Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia in 1991. The Nuer and the Dinka being the largest ethnic groups found themselves in difficult life, situation with no basic necessity of life such as shelters, food, clothing and main business of cattle, agriculture and fishing equipment. The mobility of life has become very common and share of little resources become difficult for them to understand. In no time the war of power, property and poverty began in the South Sudan. The power of the stronger man is used to victimize the weaker people.

In the Nuer areas citizens of the Lou and the Jikany Nuer have been seriously affected by the war in 1991-1994 this is particularly the time when the Nasir Declaration was announced in the Nuer area. In addition to interfactional fight, happened between the following tribes:-

- a) The Lou and the Jikany Nuer
- b) The Lou and the Gawar Nuer and the Dinka of Atar
- c) The Lou and the Gaw waar Nuer and the Dinka of Bor
- d) The Lou and the ~~the~~ Jikany and the Ngok Dinka
- e) Western Upper Nile Nuer and the Dinka of Bhar El Ghazal

Hundreds of thousands of people were killed and wounded, properties were looted and houses were burned down as a result of these inter-tribal fightings.

Therefore, the peace in the South Sudan has become more urgent and priority number one. The calling for peace from the grassroots is genuine, "There are people without homes, children abandoned and are under trees, no food and clothings. Peace can not be delayed. Old diseases are returning, there are no medicines and wounds no longer heal. The healing of peace is missing. Enough of this fierce war; then the calling was honest without hesitation in order to heal the wounds and bring about everlasting peace.

● **The Akobo Jikany and Lou Nuer Reconciliation Peace Conference, September 1994:**

The presbyterian Church of The Sudan has started the peace process since 1994. When the Jikany and the Nuer Lou called for reconciliation peace conference held in September 1994 in Akobo, over three thousand people attended and up to date the two Nuer sections are in peace and harmony and are abiding with the terms of the signed covenant principles.

- The Loki Workshop For Local Chiefs, 1998.

This workshop was organised for a call for peace at the grassroots level. The local chiefs were brought together by the New Sudan Council of Churches in order to relate their testimony of confession and think together for the way forward to peace process. Hence, a genuine call was that, if we are to reveal ideas which express our joy and testimony, we must discuss with respect, what we are thinking in a larger forum inside the South Sudan. Therefore, Wunlit People to People Peace process was a result of that small gathering of the local chiefs.

● **The Dinka - Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference 27 February- 8 March 1999:**

The Dinka and Nuer chiefs, the church and community leaders, elders, women and youth met in a peace and reconciliation meeting in Wunlit, Bahr el Ghazal in Sudan under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). The living testimony of Wunlit created a positive spirit of peace and stability among the tribes in South Sudan. The example set by politicians and military commanders was another respect for the grass root communities calling for peace talks in which the politicians and commanders have taken the back seats and have lent their support in full to the civil society leaders to discuss and negotiate their differences.

The Wunlit peace conference was initiated with the sacrifice of a white Bull (Mabior Thon/Tu-Bor) and have sealed the covenant in Christian worship and traditional sacrifice in which the participants declared the following points:-

- All hostile acts shall cease between the Dinka and the Nuer whether between their respective military forces or armed conflicts. A permanent cease fire is hereby declared between the Dinka and the Nuer people with immediate effect.
- Amnesty is hereby declared for all offenses against people and property committed prior to 1/1/99 involving the Dinka and the Nuer on the West bank of the Nile River.
- Freedom of movement is affirmed and inter-communal commerce, trade, development and services are encouraged.
- Local cross-border agreements and arrangements are encouraged and all shall be respected.
- It is hereby declared that border grazing lands and fishing grounds shall be available immediately as shared resources.
- Displaced communities are encouraged to return to their original homes and rebuild relationships with their neighbours.
- The spirit of peace and reconciliation in this covenant must be extended to all communities in South Sudan.

In reading these seven points of covenant, it reminds to recall the statement of Frederico Major which said:

"On the eve of the new century and millennium, the world is challenged, more than at any time in the past, to transform

human history from its domination by war and violence to a new culture of peace and non-violence. What is so unique about this historical moment that the challenge only arise at this time"? All resolutions adopted by the conference are hereby incorporate into this covenant. An appeal was made for the rebel movements to endorse, embrace and assist in its implementation. From the time of the conference to date a living positive testimony has been carried on to many parts of the South Sudan.

- **The Lou Nuer Peace and Reconciliation Conference 1999 Waat.**

The Lou Nuer chiefs, the church and community leaders, elders, women, youth and other Nuer sectional representatives met in a Peace and Reconciliation meeting in Waat, Upper Nile in South Sudan. The Lou Nuer were fighting among themselves, difference factional groups existing in the Lou Nuer area. The reconciliation was first tried to reconcile the factional groups and for the first time after eight years of inter-factional fight, a number of military leaders from different factions met to discuss how a grass root peace process could continue in the area. Later a mobilization for community was undertaken.

The intention of the New Sudan council of Churches was to first reconcile the grass root communities and a covenant was signed. In the Waat conference the politicians took the front seats and the outcome of peace process was not like that of Wunlit, although Wunlit processes were followed.

- **Liliir Peace Conference, May 2000**

The East Bank Nilotic People to People Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Upper Nile, Sudan is the recent conference which was postponed once for insecurity but later was achieved in a small village at Liliir in the Bor Dinka area of Upper Nile, between the 9th and the 15th May over 250 traditional and civil leaders from the Anyuak, the Dinka, the Jie, the Kachipo, the Murle and the Nuer ethnic groups from the region, came together to address the deep division and conflict that arose between them. The spirit of Wunlit was carried in this conference. The Wunlit achievements were endorsed by the delegates of these communities. Covenant principles were agreed upon and mostly similar of Wunlit covenant, before the conference ended. The delegates requested that these and other groups who did not have opportunity to participate in this conference, be given a chance to meet and reconcile. Indeed the Nilotic people live in a very vast area and are so many that they need a series of conferences to discuss their problems.

4. The Wunlit commitment of signed covenant principles.

It is not surprising that the Wunlit signed covenant principles in all the seven points were quickly implemented and the people live in peace situation.

The Bahr el-Ghazal Dinka and the Nuer of the Western Nile are living in peace and harmony today.

2. The People to People Peace Process.

As we mentioned earlier, the Akobo and Wunlit peace and reconciliation conferences have laid a ground for the grass root peace process. Politicians and military leaders of all the rebel movements have lent their support in taking the back seats in the conferences, providing a tight security, cooperation among themselves and high respect for the mandate of the New Sudan Council of Churches despite of disputes on when and how the peace conferences start and end. With the success of people to people peace process, the Dinka and the Nuer are now sharing the grazing areas, water and fishing grounds. They forgave themselves for the following :

- Cattle which was raided.
- People who were killed
- Houses which were burnt to ashes
- Grain which was looted during the time of conflicts.

It is important to say that the Dinka and the Nuer seemed to have asked themselves "which ever among us were committed no sin may throw the first stone at anyone" (Jn. 2:7). That is the question Jesus asked the people who wanted to throw stones at the woman caught in adultery but later they disappeared without doing anything to the woman. That was a silent confession.

3. The Further Successes:-

The People to People Peace Desk in NSCC is a well organized programme with follow-up, feedback and evaluation system and further share successes. The peace councils are formed to help in monitoring with local authority.

The following points are to be observed by both communities:-

1. Continue evaluation and implementation of signed covenant principles.
2. Border police to control thieves, bandits, trouble makers who may incite troubles.
3. Courts fair trial of offenders

4. Join court which should be convened at any necessary time when need arises and the chairperson of this court will be selected jointly by both communities.

Capacity building projects e.g. radio communications, education, health etc.

Therefore, there is a need for building bridges of understandings between the communities in South Sudan under auspices of NSCC.

4. "The Peace from Within" (The Khartoum agreement).

The peace from within documentation stated very well the needs and opinion of people of South Sudan. The documents agreed by both parties was signed but a debate over the following matters continued and reached a final disagreement.

1. Security arrangement
 - a) Joint technical committee
 - b) Joint cease fire committee
 - c) Management of peace organisms.
2. Exercise of Democracy by Government
3. Rejection of formation of Southern parliament etc.

It explained that there is no will and committment on the part of the Sudan government. Later the resignation of the president of the coordinating council of the Southern States stressed the following points:-

- 1) The government has persistently violated the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 21st 1997 (refer to my memo of 25th 1999 to the Joint Ministerial Committee for Evaluation of the implementation of the Agreement). The violations have reached the peak in the recent Republican decrees that dismissed and appointed governors ignoring the 14th Constitutional Decree and the Constitution of the country.
- 2) The government has failed to implement the vital articles in the Agreement that relate to the Public Security, Police, Joint Military Committees, Advisory Council for Southern States (refer to the report of the Joint Ministerial Committee for Evaluation of the Implementation of the Agreement).
- 3) The government, since 17th September 1997 up to now, has declared a vicious war against the South Sudan Defense Forces in Unity State resulting in great losses in lives and property of citizens of the said State. The State entered into a government sponsored anarchy and terrorism resulting in forceful eviction of the elected Governor

from the capital of the State. Murder of two ministers and other ministers and government ministers had to flee in disarray for safety, either to the villages or to Khartoum. Similar incidents are known to have happened in States of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Attempts to stop this war and violent incidences have been frustrated.

- 4) The Government is implementing a policy of division and rule to disperse the political forces that signed the agreement and the South Sudan Defense Forces.
- 5) The Government have many times undermined the Southern Administration, the Coordinating Council of the Southern States, making it irrelevant.
- 6) By the 12th December 1999 decrees declaring the State of Emergency in the country, the President of the Republic abrogated the constitution and undermined the democratisation process.

The Khartoum Peace Agreement has been treated, has failed and the leader Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF) decided to pursue the struggle through armed force. The remaining group might have intended to pursue the principles of self determination through peaceful means with the government of Sudan.

Generally, the Nuer regarded the Khartoum peace agreement has failed totally and the South has no other choice but to come together to pursue the peace through armed struggle. At this time no real sign for the Khartoum peace agreement existence in the areas controlled by movement.

5. Should the Peace negotiations be opened to all political and Military parties?

This question has no answer till today. The entire population in South Sudan raise a question that if peace meetings are going to be convened, the Sudanese churches must invite to participate. Clearly the involvement of all the parties will be a decision of the parties to the conflicts. The negotiations sometimes take a form of close door meetings and no one is allowed even to be an observer. The two parties in negotiation blame each other from time to time. Khartoum government in most cases comes with her set of timetable and agenda. This kind of way led into collapse of the peace negotiations as the mediator may have no power to influence the two parties in conflict.

For sure, the question is very difficult to predict the answer. What may happen in the future, may be in the coming IGAD peace process which may have different nature of approach.

6. The impact of peace process on the Nuer and the Dinka relations:

The two communities of the Dinka and the Nuer have clearly confessed and understood that they have nothing to fight for. For them the war of property, poverty and power is over through these conferences, they have committed themselves to live together, a good example and that when the Nuer of Western Upper were displaced for few months in the oil fields by Sudan government, using gunships and aerial bombardments on the villages, they fled to Bahr el Ghazal areas and lived peaceful with their neighbours, the Dinka communities.

7. The Nuer community

The Nuer community at large accepted and appreciated the peace process under the auspices of NSCC. The Dinka and the Nuer are cousins and many of them are related. During the current war the Nuer and the Dinka have inter married, hence a good family tied relationship. One time a Dinka man came back after 5 years being away from his family because of current inter-tribal fight. Then he asked his Nuer brother in-law to give him his wife and children and he could go back to the Dinka areas. But strange indeed, the Nuer man asked "do you think it's right to claim both your wife and children while the dowry you paid to us and the lady are all from here". But both have a big laughter and the Dinka took his family peacefully. At the movement my uncle's son gave his daughter to a Dinka boy and a dowry will be paid in the future. A good relation between the Dinka and the Nuer was established at Wunlit in 1999.

8. The Response of the Rebel Movements as a result of people to people peace process:

The "success" of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) People to People Peace Process is that it is an indigenous church organization which has led the ongoing process. Although there are short-term fruits, its real impact will be long-term. The political and military leaders, many are positive about the progress- the Former governor of Bahr el-Ghazal has explained clearly that what "is important in the struggle is not the unity of movements and organisations but the unity of objectives and ideas". He added that the struggle is essentially about power not religion nor culture neither ethnicity because all these things flow from power. For sure, if you are a single individual and you have the power, all people can become what you are because you have the power.

One of Senior Commander was quoted as saying that if two leaders of the movements are removed and the people of the South are asked this question, do you have any reason to fight among yourselves. He believes that they all will say no but in such case the people may need another leader. Each group

will bring their leaders and struggle for power will start again and even the two leaders of the movements who were asked to step down will contest again for leadership. Therefore, what the people of the South Sudan could go for at this time is a unity of purpose. The People of South Sudan should learn to live together, to accept diversity and a positive relationship with the other. Therefore, South unity at this stage could only be achieved through the principles of self determination. "For ever is not against us is for us" (Mk. 9:40) Who is against who now, if the Nuer of Bentiu and the Dinka of Bhar el-Ghazal are sharing grazing fields and politicians and military leaders back the principle of self determination on peace process.

9. Human Disaster at the war zone in South Sudan.

The aerial bombardments by the Sudan Air Force are reported in South Sudan to be on daily and weekly activities.

Koch is one of the small areas in Western Upper Nile near the oil field, it has been reported that almost in 53 days aerial bombardments are on weekly and many civilians were killed and many wounded. In general, displacement and killing of civilians were reported in thousands and people moved to nearby regions.

- Rape of young girls and women is unbelievable
- Many elderly men/women and children are affected with eye blindness because of aerial bombardment with chemical weapons.
- Diseases are spread over all areas and people are paralysed and weak a result of chemical weapons.
- Homes in villages are burnt down and properties lost as a result.

Furthermore, some eye-witness reported that Military gunship usually lands at civilians' farms and kills innocent villagers. While other could escape but young girls and young women are always taken by the gunship men to unknown places and no one knows what do they do with such captives in Northern Sudan where they take them.

It has been always said by many who witnessed the disaster in the oil fields that the cleansing of civilian population near the oil fields by the Sudan Government may mean to replace them later with the people from Northern Sudan in the oil areas then the Land could be owned by the citizens from North Sudan, as many Sudanese believe that the Sudan Government is after the land and not the people of South Sudan. Indeed the struggle is at the top level and the common men in the Sudan do not know why the genocides have been committed from time to time.

10. Capacity Building through response of international community.

The developmental projects in South Sudan are essential, the following are needed:-

- Education programme
- Health
- Agricultural production - oxen ploughing
- Communication system
- Empowering women and youth to keep peace
- Peace through development
- Civic education
- People to people peace conferences and supporting other peace initiatives in the region such as IGAD, Arab League Peace etc.

The Sudanese in di^spora are active backing the peace process and schools for training future leaders.

Therefore we call upon our international partners and donors to continue to support these programmes to help in peace settlement and everlasting peace.

CONCLUSION.

Finally, in this situation of the war in Sudan. We believe that the church has identified herself with the oppressed and suffering people for which she may be "light and salt". Then let our light shine before men, that they may see our good deeds and praise our father in heaven". (Matt. 5:16).

Therefore, I would conclude my sharing with the following points to remember in peacemaking. Do not forget the family- peaceful families are the basis of peaceful societies.

Do not forget to plan and budget for peace- it costs money; do not forget to put peace into your church liturgy, calendar and catechisms.

Do not demonise your political adversaries; learn to celebrate your differences.

Invent signs and gestures for peace. The world is littered with monuments and heroes of war. We need monuments and heroes of peace. We need to instill a culture of peace in the Sudan. Do not forget to use the year 2000 to multiply efforts for peace. In actual sense, the peace making required hard work, prayer and fasting and Sudanese should never give up to try for peace for their people and the land.

PRESENTATION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY
CONVENED BY THE PARTNERSHIP AFRICA-CANADA
AT CALGARY AND OTTAWA, CANADA; 4-9 JUNE 2000-06-01
By Bona Malwal

First, let me express my personal thanks to the Canadian organisers of the Symposium in Calgary and Ottawa on Sudan Civil Society, taking place from 4 to 9 June, for inviting me to these events. I also wish to express appreciation to the groups of Canadian Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and individuals for conceiving or initiating this symposium. I thank them also for the highly spirited campaign that they have waged since it became clear that the participation of the Canadian company, Talisman Energy Inc., in the exploitation of oil in Sudan is now a major factor in prolonging the civil war and is, therefore, a direct contributor to the suffering of the ordinary people of Southern Sudan, particularly those in the oil-rich areas of Western Upper Nile. The people of Southern Sudan will ever remain grateful to the individual Canadians and the group of Canadian NGOs who have undertaken this campaign. Some of us will make sure, in whatever we do, that the people of Southern Sudan are made aware of this campaign in Canada on their behalf and that they never forget this support.

As they say, there are two sides to any coin. Our own argument as Southern Sudanese has been that the participation of Talisman Energy Inc. in the exploitation of the Sudanese oil in a civil war situation—in the absence of a political agreement between the government in Khartoum and the South—is prolonging both the war and the suffering of the civilian population of Southern Sudan. The participation of Talisman in the extraction of the Southern oil means that the central government in Khartoum has no incentive to negotiate an equitable sharing of this important resource with the people of Southern Sudan, since the government in Khartoum is able to use this resource without any pressure to agree with the South on its use. The participation of Talisman in the Sudanese oil deal is therefore a major disincentive to peace and a major encouragement to the continuation of the war.

Talisman's argument—that its participation in the oil extraction in Southern Sudan is better for the people of the South because this is a Western company with a democratic and human rights-respecting tradition behind it—does not stand up to even weak scrutiny. First, if Talisman respected democratic and human rights traditions, it should not have joined the consortium of oil companies that are currently exploiting the Southern Sudanese oil in the first place. It should have stayed away. When Talisman entered into a contractual agreement with the government of Sudan, it knew full well that the regime was already under international accusations as a violator of human rights. Various United Nations bodies and other human rights organisations around the world had been condemning the regime in Khartoum for its appalling human rights record for years. A company acting in accordance with democratic and human rights traditions should have stayed away from such a project. Besides, there is no indication that Talisman ever made the observance of human rights by the government in Khartoum a condition for its entering into the oil agreement with that government, nor should anyone have expected that. Talisman, whatever its management may say, only saw a business interest in Sudan and took up the opportunity without thinking much about the consequences of entering into what was already a very long and very bloody civil war situation.

That Talisman entered into the Sudanese oil exploitation deal in co-operation with the government of Sudan without regard to the consequences of this action on the war, is further demonstrated by another fact. Not only are Talisman and the other oil companies providing the Khartoum regime with revenue with which to prosecute the war; it has been sufficiently and credibly demonstrated that Talisman and friends also provide the Khartoum regime with facilities—like airports, roads and river barges—to help it ferry its troops to the war front to displace and destroy the lives and homes of Southern Sudanese civilians.

Contrary to Talisman's claim that its presence in Southern Sudan positively contributes to peace in the country, there is much evidence that the regime in Khartoum has almost turned its back on the peace process in recent months because of the oil revenues it receives from Talisman and the other companies. It is unfortunate that the efforts of the Canadian government in the peace process itself do not go far enough, because these efforts do not include pressure by the Canadian government on Talisman to end its participation in the oil exploitation in Sudan. Without the government of Canada exerting credible pressure on Talisman to disengage, it does seem futile to talk of a positive impact by Canada—in any form—on the peace process in Sudan.

We all know what happened to the Canadian-proposed resolution which we were told would be presented at the United Nations. We do not believe, nor does the present government in Khartoum believe, that the oil is being used either as a stick or a carrot to bring peace in Sudan. The regime simply knows that it has achieved an arrangement by which Talisman and the other oil companies exploit the oil and provide it with the revenue from this undertaking which enables it to prosecute the war.

The argument by Talisman—that if it withdraws from the oil business in Sudan then its place would be filled by another company from a less democratic and human rights-respecting background—does not hold much water either. It might have been plausible if Talisman had been working in Sudan long before the current regime embarked on its bad human rights record. But Talisman walked into Sudan when the credentials of this military, authoritarian and fundamentalist regime were being seriously questioned and its human rights record was already the subject of long-term international condemnation. It can be said, therefore, that Talisman did not care about democracy for the people of Sudan nor about the abuses of human rights perpetrated against them by the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime. No, Talisman was prepared to do business with that criminal regime irrespective of its record. If a change has occurred as a result of Talisman's presence, it is not that Talisman has induced the regime to moderate its appalling human rights record—no, the only change is that Talisman is now abetting this horrendous situation and contributing to its escalation.

It can be said, therefore, that without very strong pressure on the NIF regime to move credibly towards peace by negotiating an agreement with the South on all the issues—including the development and distribution of its resources—Talisman's presence in Sudan as an exploiter of the oil on behalf of the government of Sudan alone in a civil war situation is—to say the least—not helpful.

There is at present no system of resource distribution in Sudan and whatever accrues to the government in Khartoum is used on its war programme. Development of such resources as Talisman is currently doing in a civil war situation without a political agreement between the parties to the war is a major disincentive to peace.

In fact, any kind of international development investment in Sudan while the war goes on is a hindrance to peace. That is why the earlier policy of most of the countries of the industrialised democracies of the West, including Canada—to suspend all development aid to Sudan until peace is attained in that country—was a very wise policy; and why the current tendency by these same industrialised democracies of Western Europe and North America, except the United States—to appease the NIF regime—is unfortunate.

The approach of the Western countries, which they call "constructive engagement", of dealing with the regime in Khartoum as if it were a normal government is unlikely to produce any positive results. The impression out there—especially for a regime that was internationally isolated by these same Western countries for years, which now finds these same countries have opened up to it because of the oil—is that Khartoum has had their way. The West has turned around and there is therefore no

RAISING THE STAKES: OIL AND CONFLICT IN SUDAN


need to change the course of NIF policies. This Western position would have been reasonable if it was coming in the aftermath of a seemingly successful peace process in which the regime had responded positively to the political grievances of the people of Southern Sudan. But under current circumstances, "constructive engagement" means that the regime in Khartoum is no longer under any serious pressure to change its bad policies, especially when companies like Talisman are helping it to exploit the very resources of the disadvantaged people and provide the revenues needed to enhance its prosecution of the war.

I believe that the choice for Talisman is not between remaining in the country to safeguard its "democratic" operations so that another country without such a democratic tradition will not take over its share. There is no such choice for the people of Southern Sudan. Talisman is exploiting the South's oil without the consent of its people. You cannot convince these people that although Talisman is helping their oppressors today to exploit their oil and to kill them, at some time in the future the democratic tradition Talisman brings with it will yield some fruits for them. For the people of Southern Sudan, Talisman's operation is simply helping their oppressors to oppress them even more, using their own resources.

The question is truly a moral one for Talisman and for the Canadian government and people: Should their company remain in Sudan exploiting the resources of the people of the South and handing over revenues from this to help the Khartoum regime repress the people of Southern Sudan even more? Or, if neither Talisman nor the Canadian government can deliver an early peace settlement to the conflict in Sudan—which they seemed to promise only a few months back—should Talisman continue its operations in spite of the absence of peace? This is an economic as well as a moral question to both. Clearly, Talisman as an oil company is not in the business of morality, but the Canadian government has up to now occupied very high moral ground internationally on these human rights issues. The government of Canada and Talisman need to work this matter out between them and come up with a credible and consistent stand.

As for the people of Southern Sudan, they appeal both to the government of Canada and to Talisman Energy Inc. not to continue to be accomplices in the crimes against them by the NIF regime in Khartoum on account of their oil resource.

Thank you very much.



Bona Malwal

Contrary to Talkal's claim that its presence in Southern Sudan is purely for humanitarian reasons, the fact is that the Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression.

I believe that the choice for Sudan is not between a military dictatorship or a military dictatorship. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression.

As the people of Sudan know, the Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression.

Thank you very much for your interest in the Sudan. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression.

[Handwritten signature]
James M. Stewart
Sudan Mission

In fact, the Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression.

The system of the Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression. The Sudanese government has been using it as a tool of repression.

STATISTICS AND BACKGROUND

Independence: 1 January 1956 (from Egypt and Britain)

Population (1997 estimate): **32.6 million**

Location: Northern Africa, bordering the Red Sea between Egypt (N); Eritrea and Ethiopia (E); Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (S); and Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic (W).

Size: 2,505,810 km² (967,000 square miles)

Major Cities: Capital - Khartoum [Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North]; Juba, Wau, Malakal, Atbara, Kassala, Wad Medani, Nyala, el-Fasher, el-Obeid, Port Sudan.

Languages: Arabic (official), Dinka, Bedawi, Nuer, Fur, Hausa, Zande, English, and various other Nilo-Saharan, and Afro-Asiatic languages.

Major Ethnic/Linguistic Groups: [Afro]-Arab (c.40%), Beja, Dinka (c.12%), Fur, Nuba, Nubian, Nuer, Zande/Azande. The Arab group is ethnically diverse, but bound by language and religion. The Dinka are the largest single ethnic group.

Religion

The media's shorthand simplification of "Muslim-Arab north, Christian-African south" is inaccurate. There are thousands of Muslims in the south of Sudan, and millions of Christians and believers in traditional African religions in the north.

Muslim (Sunni) c.60-70% - Islam is the state religion, but many Sudanese Muslims are more influenced by tolerant Sufi philosophies than by the absolutist attitudes of the National Islamic Front. Degrees of orthodoxy are variable. In Darfur, sorghum beer (*marissa*) is a long-established nutritional resource consumed by otherwise devout Muslims.

Traditional beliefs c.35% - Belief in traditional African religions persists among converts to monotheism.

Christian 5-15% - Growing adherence to Christianity is reported among southerners, Nuba and other marginalised peoples in Sudan, as they have been increasingly subjected to second-class citizenship and discrimination on account of their perceived "backwardness". Many are converting to Christianity to resist the forcible imposition of Islam by northerners who regard believers in traditional African religions as having no culture. However, the south can not be considered Christian by culture, since customary practices such as polygamy have long been an intrinsic part of southern cultures, even though they are contrary to Christian doctrine.

Money

- **Currency:** The Sudanese pound (£Sud) was replaced in mid-1999 by the Sudanese dinar, which is worth £Sud10 and had been in circulation for several years alongside the old currency.
- **Exchange Rate:** US\$1 = 250 dinars (September 1999)
- **Gross Domestic Product** (1997): c.\$3.8 billion

- **Real GDP Growth Rate** (1997 estimate): 4.0%
- **Inflation Rate** (1997 estimate): 65.0%
- **Current Account Deficit** (1997): c. -\$807 million
- **Major Trading Partners:** Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Italy, European Union
- **Exports** (1997 estimate): \$634 million
- **Imports** (1997 estimate): \$1,260 million
- **Trade Deficit** (1997): c. -\$626 million
- **Main Exports:** Cotton, livestock, meat, hides, gum arabic, other agricultural products
- **Main Imports:** Arms, food, petroleum products, machinery
- **Total External Debt** (1999): c.\$20 billion
- **Arrears to the IMF:** c.\$1.6bn

Energy Overview

Total Energy Consumption (1996E): 0.0690 quadrillion Btu

Energy Consumption per Capita (1996E): 2.3 million Btu

Energy-related Carbon Emissions (1996E): 1.04 million metric tons (0.017% of world carbon emissions)

Carbon Emissions per Capita (1996E): 0.34 metric tons per person/year (v. 5.5 metric tons in US)

Oil & Gas

- **Oil Reserves:** 262.1 million barrels (proven January 1998). By the year 2015 the total current estimate of recoverable resources of 750 million barrels will have been exhausted unless new fields are found and developed. (Talisman now claims the recoverable reserves may be up to 950 million barrels)
- **Crude Oil Production:** 12,000 barrels per day (1998); 136,000 b/d in September 1999.
- **Oil Consumption:** 30,000 b/d (1998 estimate)
- **Natural Gas Reserves:** 3 trillion cubic feet (1998 estimate)

Electricity

- **Generation Capacity:** 500 megawatts (1996)
- **Generation / Consumption:** c. 1.3 billion kwh (1996 estimate)

Sudan OIL & CONFLICT TIMELINE

1955

Beginning of first civil war between north and south.

1956

Independence - end of British-Egyptian condominium rule.

1958

General Abboud's military coup in November overthrows first civilian government.

1960s

Early oil exploration begun by Agip in the Red Sea

1964

October 1964: Abboud regime toppled by popular uprising

Port Sudan refinery comes on-stream, operated by Shell and BP (Sudan) Ltd., a company set up in 1962 between Royal Dutch/Shell and BP. Capacity of 20,000 b/d later expanded to 25,000 b/d in early 1970s. (Shell still owns Port Sudan refinery)

1969

Jaafar Nimeiri becomes president after "May Revolution"; briefly anti-Western.

1970

January 70: Nimeiri nationalises all banks, sequesters many large companies.

March 70: Nimeiri crushes potential Ansar/Umma insurrection - bombs White Nile Aba island base; Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi killed fleeing towards Ethiopia.

November 70: Nimeiri sacks communists from his government

1971

July 71: Failed communist coup d'etat; Nimeiri kicks out Soviet advisors, opens door to China.

1972

Relations resume with US and West

July 72: Addis Ababa Agreement, with autonomy for the South, ends 17 years of civil war

1973

Large-scale Sudanese emigration to the increasingly wealthy Arab oil states.

March 73: US ambassador C.A Noel assassinated in Khartoum.

August 73: Attempted uprising by Muslim Brotherhood and Umma Party

1974

Chevron begins operations in Red Sea, and near Bentiu, Malakal and Muglad in S / SW. Concession is originally granted to Chevron, with Shell subsequently taking a 25% interest.

Over the next 20 years, Chevron and Shell spend an estimated US\$1bn, shoot "extensive seismic", and drill "52 wells, including 34 suspended oil wells capable of re-completion for production."

1975

Sudan is called potential "breadbasket of the Arab world"; large-scale mechanised agriculture expands into southern Kordofan; huge influx of international capital. Loans to Sudan begin accumulating - leading to present day unpayable arrears.

September 75: Attempted anti-Nimeiri coup by "National Front" - an Umma/DUP/Muslim Brotherhood coalition.


1976

Chevron makes Suakin Red Sea gas discovery.

July 76: Failed coup attempt by Ansar (of Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma party) and Muslim Brotherhood

1977

Sadiq al-Mahdi holds "reconciliation" with President Nimeiri (see photo) - but doesn't consult his followers.



1977: "OPEN DOOR" FREE-MARKET POLICIES ADOPTED

1978

1978: First Chevron oil discoveries near Bentiu and Heglig. "More than Saudi Arabia - 15m b/d," claims Lebanese newspaper

Joint Sudanese-Egyptian financing project is launched to construct the Jonglei Canal through Sudd marshes of the South, employing the French CCI company's redundant giant excavator. Economic crisis - international primary commodity prices plummet and imported oil prices soar. IMF intervenes and negotiates "structural adjustment". First devaluation.

1979

February 79: US Secretary of Defense promises to sell jet fighters, tanks and other arms to Sudan. October - US Senate approves \$1.7m in additional military assistance to Sudan (after several previous larger weapons deals).

1980

JONGLEI CANAL construction begins, despite local protests.

Nimeiri embarks on "redivision" of the south from one autonomous unit to three states; a map attached to the Regional Government bill puts the area where oil has been found into northern Sudan. His creation of new "Unity" state around Bentiu to prise it from the south causes political upheaval among southerners, as does presidential decree that oil refinery is to be built at Kost, in the north, instead of Bentiu.

1981

Chevron discovers commercial oil deposits in the "Unity (South)" field north of Bentiu. With neighbouring Heglig field in S. Kordofan, recoverable reserves are estimated at 236m barrels.

August 81: White Nile Petroleum Corporation is formed by Chevron and Sudan government. There are no southerners on the board.

1982

January 82: Petrol shortages spark serious disturbances. For the first time, Nimeiri's army command voices disapproval of the situation in the country and the corruption of his cronies.

September 82: Kost refinery project "frozen" in favour of pipeline plan.

1983

Nimeiri completes "redivision" of South; sacks vice-presidents Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu.

April 1983: Civil war re-ignites after mutinies by army commanders Arok Thon Arok, Kerubino Kuanyin, John Garang and others lead to formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

September 1983: Nimeiri introduces "sharia" laws - used by his regime to terrorise and humiliate, with indefinite detention, public floggings, amputations - and death penalty for "heretics".

White Nile Petroleum Company (owned by government, Chevron, Shell and Apicorp) created to build 1,420-km export line from Unity and Heglig via Kosti to Red Sea terminal between Port Sudan and Suakin; projected cost US\$1bn.

1984

Nimeiri uses southern ethnic Nuer "Anya Nya Two" militia against SPLA in the oilfields.

March 1984: SPLA attacks oil fields in the south; Chevron suspends operations. Three expatriate Chevron workers are kidnapped from Rub Kona base, near Bentiu, and killed.



July 84: Government signs deal with Trans-African Pipeline Co. of US to build 1,760-km pipeline across Sudan to Central African Republic. (It was never built.)

JONGLEI CANAL WORK IS HALTED BY SPLA

Adnan Khashoggi is offered all-in oil deal by Nimeiri, making implicit threat to Chevron to resume operations.

1985

Fighting in southern Sudan escalates to highest levels yet. Khartoum and other towns fill with people displaced by war in south and famine in west. War spending is double that for education and health.

Anti-Nimeiri alliance of trades unions, professional associations and student bodies co-ordinates opposition, establishes extensive clandestine network of banned political parties, women and youth associations, as well as cells within the army and police.

April 1985: Massive demonstrations precede a general strike that paralyses the country; Nimeiri is overthrown by army after popular uprising. SPLA rejects peace overtures of transitional military junta headed by his former Defence Minister.

1986

April-May - Parliamentary Elections - Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes Prime Minister of a series of coalitions. No voting in half the 86 southern constituencies on grounds of "insecurity".

November 86: Government shelves all contracts for \$375m oil pipeline proposal by White Nile Petroleum consortium (Chevron, Royal Dutch/Shell, Arab Petroleum

Investments Corporation, International Finance Corporation and Sudan government), despite complaints from partners.

1987

"Anya-Nya Two" militia breaks up after SPLA's 1986 military successes; senior commanders defect with virtually entire units to SPLA.

1988

Chevron resumes its activities, planning a six-year exploration and drilling program. China buys part of Chevron concession.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Minister of Defence, Gen (ret) Mubarak Osman Rahma, (Nimeiri's last ambassador to Beijing), sign large arms deal with China. Sadiq does not stay in power long enough to take delivery of the weapons.

1989

January-March 89: SPLA "New Kush" Division enters Nuba Mountains led by Yusuf Kuwa. advance close to Kadugli, Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, overrunning police posts. Despite SPLA-government ceasefire, SPLA units infiltrate Tulushi in the western hills.

April 89: Government transfers remnants of the anti-SPLA militia "Anya Nya Two" to Kadugli, where they gain a reputation for ruthlessness. Over 200 Nuba in Kadugli are detained, including many members of the Sudan National Party. Several are summarily executed.

30 June 1989: Lt-Gen al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF) stage military coup

NIF overthrows Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's elected government, aborting peace process and upcoming constitutional conference with SPLA. War escalates in the South; large shipments of arms from China (ordered by Sadiq) are paid for by Iran.

November 89: In Upper Nile, "Anya-Nya Two" forces allied with Army against SPLA disrupt guerrilla supply lines between Bahr al-Ghazal and Ethiopia.

1990

1990: Chevron finally quits and relinquishes all its concessions, after spending more than \$1billion.

January 90: Khartoum reaches deal with Libya for free supply of 600,000 tons of oil (agreement extended twice until May 1991 but supply proves erratic).

April 90: Extrajudicial execution of 28 military officers and unspecified numbers of NCOs and soldiers follows anti-NIF coup attempt.

June 90: Garang announces upcoming SPLA talks with Bashir.

August 90: Gulf War breaks out. Khartoum backs Iraq and is boycotted by Gulf Co-operation Council. Riyadh suspends supplies.

September 90: Iran's president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani declares his support for Sudan and describes the war in the South as a "holy war". More than 60 lawyers and judges, including at least eight from the High Court and the Deputy Chief Justice, are dismissed. Fifteen Nuba NCOs in the Sudanese army are executed for "plotting and collaborating with the SPLA", after 45 officers are arrested.

1991

SPLA peace negotiations with regime sponsored by Kenya.

March 91: Visit to China by Sudan's military chief of logistics: an arms contract worth US\$300m is reportedly signed, to be financed by the NIF with funds from Iran. Two helicopters, one hundred 1,000-pound high altitude bombs and assorted ammunition are later shipped to Port Sudan. China sends team to instruct Sudanese pilots and aircrews in high altitude bombing. Bombardments of civilian targets in the South increase.

May 91: Overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia. Weakened by the subsequent loss of logistical support from Ethiopia, the SPLA, which at this point holds 90% of the rural areas and several towns, loses considerable ground to government forces over the next three years.

August 1991: SPLA Commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol lead unsuccessful "creeping coup" attempt against John Garang; form breakaway "Nasir" faction (later "SPLA-United / Southern Sudan Independence Movement") with allies mainly from Upper Nile's Nuer and Shilluk.

Army seals off the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan) and begins scorched earth operations.

December 91: Iran's Hashemi Rafsanjani heads delegation of 157 officials, 80 from military/intelligence; signs protocols on economic, political and military and intelligence matters. Washington expresses "interest and concern". Iran denies enlisting help in providing new bases for Hezbollah but is willing to train Sudan army personnel: hundreds are being trained in security methods by revolutionary guards. Tehran supplies Sudan with oil and a \$17m loan, and agrees to write off a \$150m loan given to Nimeiri by the late Shah.

1992

Government begins forcible mass relocation of Nuba civilians to "peace villages" - displaced persons' camps.

January 92: Sudan signs Red Sea exploration agreement with Canadian International Petroleum Corporation (now Lundin) to undertake geophysical studies in a 38,400sq.km onshore and offshore concession between Tokar, 180km S of Port Sudan, and Halaib. Minister for Energy and Mines Uthman Abd al-Wahhab says prospecting can start immediately. Initial six-year agreement renewable for 25 years.

February 92: Dispute with Egypt over rights to Halaib area beside Red Sea: Cairo proposes to license a maritime area extending south to latitude 22°N, implying a territorial claim. Visiting Cairo, Sudanese RCC Deputy Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister Brig-Gen Zubeir Muhammad Salih raises the issue; Egyptian Oil and Mineral Resources Minister Hamdi Ali Abd al-Wahhab Banbi says region belongs to Egypt.

UN General Assembly condemns Sudan's NIF regime for gross violations of human rights.

Oil production begins to gather pace after government troops seize large areas in the south from faction-fighting rebels.

February 92: Sudan government seeks support for oil from investors including Canada's IPC (Lundin Group)

5 June 92: SPLA negotiations with regime sponsored by Nigeria in Abuja close down in failure. The NIF, believing it is winning the war, is intransigent. It rules out SPLA options of unity under a secular democratic system, or self-determination for South Sudan and marginal areas through a referendum.

30 June 92: On the third anniversary of its military coup, the NIF says it expects to announce the resumption of crude oil production in southern Kordofan. A Sudanese company will be responsible for refining the petroleum, expected to be produced at 120,000 b/d.

7 June 92: Minister of Energy and Mining Dr Osman Abd al-Wahhab inspects Abu Jabra oilfield at Muglad in SW Sudan. 'Five wells have been drilled, two of them are productive with a capacity of 1500 and 500 b/d respectively,' reports SUNA.

7-8 June 92: SPLA commando forces enter Juba, largest town in the south. They occupy the HQ of the Southern Military Command for three hours, then withdraw to hold six army garrisons on the outskirts of the town. SPLA claims that hundreds of Southern Sudanese soldiers and officers joined them. 9 June 92: Government radio says attack on Juba has been repulsed, and that life in Juba is 'normal'. 11 June 92: Lt-Gen al-Bashir and senior officials fly into Juba for briefing.

June-July 92: Chevron ends 17-year involvement in Sudan

Sale by TransOcean Chevron Co. of upstream holdings - 42m acres - to Sudanese company Concorp, for a token \$25m.

June-July 92: After SPLA invasion of Juba fails, government forces embark on retaliatory massacre. More than 200 are killed in the streets or executed. Another 232 citizens are arrested and taken to the "White House" (Security HQ) and 'disappear'. Catholic bishops say that the army has "turned on civilians", killing and burning homes of suspected SPLA sympathisers. A quarter of a million homeless people are herded into a stadium, hospitals and church buildings after their camps are razed. Five foreign missionaries are forced to leave; civilian bodies are found floating in the Nile. Present in Juba is **Fatih Erwa, later head of Sudan Mission to the UN in New York.**

mid-1992: The NIF government signs a contract to pay US\$300,000 a year to the Pagolis and Donnelly Group to improve its public image.

28 July 92: Arakis Energy of Canada says London-based Triad International (Pvt) Ltd. is willing to put up \$25m to buy Chevron's Sudan project.

August-September 92: Concorp International - president and owner Mohammed Abdallah Jar al-Nabi - acquires Chevron's Sudan interests.

Concorp begins commercial oil production and refining begin at Abu Jabra, a small topping refinery near Muglad, South Kordofan, with capacity of 2,000 b/d.. Critics say income from initial sales supports NIF's civilian militia.

September 92: Egypt "annexes" the Red Sea enclave of Halaib

October 92: Chevron sells prospecting rights to Concorp.

October 92: Concorp owner, Sudanese businessman M.A Jar al-Nabi, senior NIF financier, sells Chevron concessions to Arakis Energy Corp. and State Petroleum Corp, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arakis, headed by Pakistani national Lutfur Khan. State and Arakis say concessions hold potential 3.5-5 billion barrels of oil. Finance and Economic Planning Minister Hamdi says Iraq will provide technical assistance.

7 December 92: Oil field and refinery in Abu Jabra, south Kordofan, officially opened by Lt-Gen al-Bashir - followed by a thanksgiving at the new Khayrat mosque, where Bashir assures worshippers that the Sudanese people have "now broken free from their bonds and will longer be bothered by condemnations from outside organisations."

7 December 92: Arakis signs memorandum of understanding with Sudan government; Concorp International Ltd Khartoum completes purchase of TransOcean Chevron Co's shares of Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan for undisclosed price.

1993

Egypt and Sudan at loggerheads over territorial rights to Halaib, prompted by Sudan granting oil exploration concession. Each accuses the other of harbouring opposition elements.

1993: Sudan fails to pay arrears to World Bank and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, who suspend loans.

SPLA's John Garang proposes referendum on Southern self-determination.

1993: US State Department adds Sudan to its list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Talks between government representative **Ali al-Haj Muhammad** and SPLA-United's **Dr Lam Akol** in Fashoda, during coronation of the new Shilluk king: Akol is accused of complicity with the NIF.

12 January 93: Arakis engineering and production team in Khartoum to identify cost of bringing Sudan oil into production at rate of 40,000 b/d in 1995. Arakis says its 75% owned concession contains estimated 1.4-bn bbl of oil of which 280m are proven recoverable, and that concession has potential to develop additional 3.5bn bbl.

Iraqi MiG-23 aircraft that fled to **Iran** in the Gulf War have allegedly been refitted by Iran for use by the Sudanese air force against the SPLA in South Sudan. Lt-Gen **Abdel Rahman Said**, former army deputy chief of staff and now leading the Sudanese opposition Armed Forces Legitimate Command, says Baghdad was a party to the deal, and that the MiGs - 'the only type of Iraqi plane that Sudan can maintain' would go back to Iraq after an unspecified period. He claims Iran has delivered "between 60 and 90 tanks" to Khartoum, as well as long-range howitzers, ammunition and lorries.

25 January 93: **Lutfur Rahman Khan** of Arakis says State chose it as a partner because of its ability to raise investment capital. Analysts say State and Arakis are exaggerating the recoverable reserves of the Sudanese fields.

February 93: **'Tiny' Rowland**, chairman of the Lonrho group and long-time backroom operator in African politics, reveals that for the last nine years he has been a member of the SPLM/SPLA. He goes on to say: "The war in Sudan is unwinnable and must come to an end." Shuttle diplomacy: Ugandan President **Yoweri Museveni** visits Khartoum; Rowland makes a trip to Sudan at the same time. **Ali al-Haj** goes to Entebbe, Uganda, to meet Garang. Museveni wants to reunite the SPLA. The leader of the Nasir faction, **Lam Akol**, announces that meetings with such a goal could take place in mid-March in Nairobi. But "Entebbe declaration" does not remove any of the current obstacles to the peace talks.

March 93: Fuel shortages and lack of funds to import petrol and diesel and to operate power stations and bakeries. Envoys to **Iran** asking for help include **Dr Ahmed Awad al-Jaz**, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. Iran, although positive, wants a European country as third-party guarantor; negotiations reach deadlock and Sudan receives nothing.

27 April 93: Peace talks resume in Abuja, Nigeria; **Garang** and **Machar** both absent.

June 93: Arakis Energy Corp (AKSEF) begins trading stock on Nasdaq exchange.

June 93: Government sub-divides Chevron's concessions into smaller exploration blocks; Arakis Energy acquires the portion of Chevron's concession north of the town of Bentiu. Arakis says it has no connections with the Triad company (owned by former arms dealer **Adnan Khashoggi**, who was used as a bargaining chip over oil deals with Chevron by Nimeiri in 1985).


29 August 93: State Petroleum enters into exploration and production sharing agreement with Sudan government. State subsequently spends \$125m to explore and develop project, and discovers **Toma South** and **El Toor** fields in Unity exploration area.

September 1993: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya establish a committee to resolve the civil war in Sudan, as members of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

January 94: Row with Britain: Archbishop of Canterbury, his wife and two officials fly to South Sudan for three days and meet rival SPLA faction leaders.

At New Year Independence anniversary celebrations Lt-Gen al-Bashir says the expulsion of Ambassador Peter Streams - in the row over Dr Carey's visit - will teach the British a lesson. Britain expels Sudan's ambassador to London, **Ali Osman Muhammad Yasin**, who also works for the Attorney-General and is Sudan's ambassador to the UN.

mid-January 94: Representatives of Chinese companies accompany China's Vice-Premier and minister of foreign affairs to Khartoum. Agreements signed on banking, oil exploration and mining, light and heavy industry, agriculture, fisheries and pharmaceuticals.



end January 94: Unprecedented build-up of government forces in Southern Sudan: soldiers and supplies moved by rail and barge to Wau and Juba. Clashes with SPLA-Mainstream are reported on the road parallel to the Aweil-Wau railway; in southern Bahr al-Ghazal; between Yei and Morobo, and between Juba and Kit. The government claims to have taken Nasir, Waat and Ayod from SPLA-United.

January 94: In **France**, ministers **Salah al-Din Karrar** (Energy and Mining), **Ali al-Haj** (Federal Affairs, ex- Investment and Planning) and **Abdullah Hassan Ahmed** (Finance) said to have talked to Iranex (French gum arabic co.), BTP (construction), Total and Airbus. Senior intelligence officers from the Nimeiri days who frequently visit Paris include US-trained **Hashim ba'Saeed** and **Fatih Erwa**.

end January 1994: Repeated aerial bombing forces over 1,000 Equatorian refugees daily into Uganda.

end January 94: Fighting on three fronts in Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan. Mass killing, burning and rape reported from Bangili and Tagoma, east of Dilling. In Delami, crops are burned in the fields and wells are poisoned by the NIF's Popular Defence Force. Displaced women and young children are taken by security forces to the Rahmaniyya "Peace Camp", reportedly a "breeding camp" to "Arabise" future generations. Older boys are taken to special camps for religious indoctrination and military training.

February 94: Machine-gun attack on minority Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya mosque in Omdurman - 19 dead. Two men are later shot dead and two wounded and arrested after a shooting incident outside the house of Saudi tycoon **Usama bin Laden** in Khartoum. The regime links the incidents.

February 94: New opposition Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance launched in London by ex-Darfur Governor **Ahmed Ibrahim Diraiqe** with Nuba spokesman **Suleiman Rahhal**.

10 February 94: Seven security officers and Iranian advisor found dead in al-Hufra, eastern Sudan. Khartoum retaliates by confiscating 360 trucks from the Rashayda people of the area. Subsequent water shortage - some were used to carry water - is blamed for the deaths of seven children.

12 February 94: Sudan accuses Britain's Parliament of supporting "rebellion" after MPs' meetings with the Sudanese opposition are held at Westminster.

12 February 1994: In Nairobi, Riek Machar calls for UN intervention in Sudan and an oil and arms embargo on Khartoum.

March 94: After Washington's directive ordering US banks not to endorse Sudanese letters of credit, Sudan orders its banks to stop dealings with the US.

Lam Akol dismissed from SPLA-United; challenges Riek Machar and claims to command forces in mid-west Upper Nile under the name SPLA-U. SPLA-United commanders Faustino and Kerubino advance into Wunrok, northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Thousands die in faction fighting.

March 94: 14 years after gaining exploration rights over 120,000 sq.km in Bahr al-Ghazal province, **French oil company Total suspends all activities and withdraws because of escalation of civil war.**

March 94: Lundin family buys 8.2 percent of Arakis stock through their holding in Swedish company Sands Petroleum AB.

11 May 94: Arakis acquires State Petroleum, gains control of the Sudan concessions in Unity and Heglig.

(All of the issued and outstanding common stock in exchange for 6,000,000 Arakis shares + finder's fee of 150,000 shares with aggregate deemed value of \$13m, according to Arakis 1996 report)

May 94: **Malaysian** telecommunications company signs memorandum to take shares in Sudatel, the privatised Sudan Telecommunications Company.

June 94: Liquidation of the General Petroleum Corporation. Energy Minister **Salah ad-Din Karrar** admits that **Sud£238m** were stolen by a businessman who was given the money to buy dollars from the black market on the corporation's behalf. Recent petrol shortage was due to one client of the GPC diverting a sum of **US\$7m** to his personal account and failing to deliver the goods. The deficit in the GPC budget is **Sud£9bn**.

August 94: Hassan al-Turabi makes clandestine visit to Paris, invites French involvement in oil exploration

September 94: **Peace negotiations:** "Despite reservations", John Garang's Mainstream SPLM/A endorses the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) **Declaration of Principles** for talks in Nairobi with the Sudan government, **stressing self-determination and separating religion from state.**

September 94: Reconciliation conference in Akobo, Upper Nile, between the Lou and Jikany clans of the Nuer, organised by local SPLA splinter groups, local chiefs and Presbyterian church. For two years disputes between the clans had intensified, with over 1000 dead. Soldiers in the area supported their own clans, becoming involved in fighting rather than intervening to stop it.

30 September 94: Riak Machar's breakaway SPLA-United "Nasir" faction announces change of name to Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). Lam Akol, dismissed from the movement earlier this year, had announced separately that he was the chairman of the United faction, and claimed to have deposed Machar.

Arrears with the African Development Bank: Dr **Muhammad Kheir al-Zubair**, Minister of State for Finance, says the near future will see more co-operation with international and regional financial institutions.

September-October 94: **Eritrea accuses Sudan** of training more than 400 'terrorists' with a view to undermining its security. Sudan accuses Eritrea of training 300 Sudanese opposition guerrillas for cross-border raids; Eritrea severs diplomatic relations with Sudan.

October 94: **Foreign Ministry delegation visits Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.** Visiting Iranian delegation sees the Construction Jihad of Iran active in agriculture, hospital building and road building in Sudan.

November 94: Foreign Minister **Hussein Suleiman Abu Salih** visits China; his delegation looks at textile and oil industries.

1995

1995: Government begins strategy of "peace from within", wooing smaller rebel groups and individual dissident SPLA commanders.

6-17 July 95: Arakis' Terry Alexander announces deal to sell 40% of Arakis to Saudi investors for \$345m and a line of credit of \$400m. Under the deal, Arab Group International will buy 23m newly-issued shares in Arakis at \$15 per share in four tranches from July 27 to 15 September. The AGI representatives will also get three board seats, with Prince Sultan Bin Saud Abdullah al Saud becoming chairman of Arakis. **Abbas Salih** will be vice chairman, Alexander will remain president and Lutfur Khan will remain president of State Petroleum.

mid-1995: Maj-Gen **Salah Karrar**, Minister of Energy, negotiates with Russia, China, Iraq and Iran over oil development.

August 95: Arakis claims to have completed the pipeline design and says construction equipment and materials are being shipped to Sudan. However, Finance Minister Abdallah Hassan Ahmed tells al-Sharq al-Awsat that the agreement between the government and Arakis is due for renewal.

7 August 95: Worries that Arakis' financial agreement with Arab Group International (AGI) are in jeopardy cause the share price to fall 40% in two weeks from a high of \$25.6 in late July to \$16.5.

After announcing a financing deal, Arakis shares reach a record market value of approximately \$1 billion. But the deal vapourises and the company's shares plummet, forcing out chief executive "Terry" Alexander and forcing a major restructuring of Arakis's finances.

15 August 95: Arakis' shares rise to over \$22 amid renewed optimism.

17 August 95: Khartoum government announces Qatari interest in developing two minor former Chevron concessions.

21-22 August 95: Arakis shares drop sharply again to a new low of \$10-\$12. The rapid fall is prompted by Arakis' admission that AGI would put up only \$40m in cash of the anticipated \$345m in equity finance, with the remainder paid in letters of credit, which might include physical assets.

24 August 95 - Arakis delists from Vancouver Stock Exchange and is suspended from trading on Nasdaq for a month.

26 September 95: Bashir in China: his delegation signs agreements on mining, oil, textiles, sugar industry and rehabilitation of Sudan railways. Preferential loan of 150m yuan (US\$20m) is negotiated with Finance Minister Abdullah Hassan Ahmed, and a grant of 1m yuan obtained for "projects for poor families".

December 95: Terry Alexander leaves Arakis and is replaced by **John McLeod**, described as former **Amoco Canada** engineer who was in charge of Sudanese project from 1991. Arakis shares rise three cents to \$3.62 after the news of Alexander's departure is announced. They had peaked in July at \$26.62.

1996

January 96 **China votes against Sudan** in the UN Security Council (it abstains on 26 April).

April 1996: Government's Supreme Council for Peace puts forward its Political Charter, a non-binding general framework for a political solution to the civil conflict.

April 96: President Clinton signs the Anti-Terrorism Act, barring Americans from engaging in financial transactions with governments on the US list of terrorism sponsors, including Sudan.

26 April 1996: United Nations imposes diplomatic sanctions on Khartoum for its involvement in terrorism. In the vote, China abstains.

Arakis begins production from nine wells on the Heglig field. An average of 2,000 b/d is processed and consumed domestically.

Officials from China's CNOEDC meet Arakis Energy executives, including President John McLeod in Vancouver.

Arakis needs around US\$750,000 for the pipeline project. It announces a big new discovery, and pays to take a score of mainly US - but also British - financiers on a junket to Sudan.

June 96: Arakis / State Petroleum starts limited production of 10-20,000 b/d from Heglig, transporting crude by truck and river barge to topping plant refinery near El Obeid.

29 July 96: Government troops attack SPLA positions at Delal Ajak, west of the Nile. Lam Akol's SPLA-United warns Arakis Energy and its British financier, Venture Guarantee Ltd to pull out immediately; says it will not allow Khartoum to 'steal' oil. The government aim is to secure the passage on the White Nile of barges to move crude oil from the Adar-1 field from Melut to Kosti further north. From Kosti, the oil would be sent by train to a refinery at al-Obeid.

31 July 96: Arakis chief executive John McLeod says company is taking the threats seriously.

August 96: US Treasury issues regulations to block deals that would help government-backed terrorism. The "Oxy loophole" (certain business transaction exemptions theoretically enabled Occidental Petroleum to pursue an interest in Sudan).

1 August 96: Arakis statement says its 25-year agreement with the government of Sudan is still valid and that it has spent more than US\$100m developing Sudan concessions.

"Recruited through an agency known as Executive Outcomes, mercenaries will be employed directly by Arakis and will operate independently from the Sudanese authorities," alleges *Sudan Democratic Gazette*

Two renegade SPLA commanders, Riek Machar and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, agree with regime to set up a buffer zone between SPLA forces and the government forces directly protecting the oil fields. Kuanyin moves his forces out of Gogrial town and heads towards Twic county in late August, but is ambushed by the SPLA. Splintered SPLA no longer has large numbers of forces in the Nuer territory of the Bentiu area.

October 96: In Upper Nile's Adar Yale field, private Qatari-Sudanese consortium Gulf Petroleum Company drills and reopens existing wells.

October 1996: Opposition claims Arakis International is planning to employ "white mercenaries" from South Africa as a security force. Arakis' John McLeod says the Sudan military provides protection, and the firm employs its own security and safety coordinators who work as go-betweens between company and army. He says he has never talked to Executive Outcomes.

30 October 96: Arakis / State Petroleum estimates its fields have probable and proven reserves of 600m barrels.

November 96: John Garang warns that SPLA forces will attack Adar Yale oil field.

November 96: Khartoum government excludes Occidental from consortium, angered by Clinton government providing aid to 3 neighbouring countries that help the SPLA/NDA forces. (US provided \$20m in surplus military equipment to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda.)

4 November 96: Arakis subsidiary State Petroleum secures framework agreement with Sudan government on developing concession near Bentiu.

Negotiations start on a "modified production sharing agreement", as it searches for other investors for \$1 billion project for field development and pipeline to Port Sudan.

4 November 96: US sources say Khartoum "looking favourably on a proposal by potential investors" for a security operation mounted by Executive Outcomes. UK sources say Bashir has approved initiative and that any private force would report to and be paid by Khartoum government, said to be interested in private training for Riek Machar's men following signing of Peace Charter. EO deny any involvement.

4 November 96: Branch Energy said to be interested in Arakis project.

December 1996: Unable to finance exploration, development and pipeline alone, Arakis enters into a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). It consists of Arakis (25% share and field operator), China National Petroleum Corporation (40%), Petronas of Malaysia (30%) and the Sudanese national oil firm Sudapet (5%).

John McLeod says the Chinese partners "incorporated additional benefits to the Sudan government, which essentially got them their participation." Partners will have to make capital expenditures on the project until they equal Arakis' expenditure to date.

28 December 96: Three Arakis board members quit in row over compensation and are replaced.

1997

1997: Sudan government adopts "Islamic" constitution.

Arakis' Lutfur Khan appoints former Sudanese finance minister Abdel Rahim Hamdi to a committee advising the board of directors of Arakis. (Committee no longer functioning by February 1998). Arakis sells its last remaining US asset, a Kentucky natural gas property.

January 97: Arakis announces third major oil find, El Nar2 (after El Toor and South Toma in 1996).

January 97: *Washington Post* claims US government secretly granted exemption to Occidental Petroleum interest in Sudan project, says Sudan has estimated 3.5bn bbl. Abolitionist Leadership Council calls on Congress to block Occidental involvement and says "Khartoum is building a security force... to protect [the oil project] from its rightful owners."

February 97: Riak Machar, ex-SPLA head of the South Sudan Independence Movement, officially switches sides and joins Khartoum government against SPLA.

February 97: Khartoum says Eritrean and Ethiopian troops are fighting alongside the rebel forces.

Sudan faces a 900 million dollar deficit. Oil imports rise to nearly US\$400m/yr, representing more than 25% of the country's total imports, while total exports reach US\$600m/yr.

National Democratic Alliance and SPLA forces open eastern front, seizing patches of territory between the Red Sea and the Blue Nile, threatening the Roseires hydroelectric dam near Damazin.

February 1997: Sweden's IPC / Lundin Oil signs production-sharing agreement for exploration of Block 5A, just south of Arakis' Unity fields. Lundin later brings in Petronas of Malaysia, OMV-AG of Austria and the Sudan government's Sudapet.

27 February 97: Arakis officially enters into Greater Nile pipeline consortium agreement.

February 97: Lundin family buying Arakis stock

March 1997: Bashir inaugurates production from Adar Yale field - 5,000 b/d, under consortium led by Qatar's Gulf Petroleum Corporation.

China National Petroleum Corporation begins exploration and development on the Sharaf, Tabaldi and Abu Jabra fields (Block 6).

March 97: Sands Petroleum AB (Lundin) files with SEC to say it holds 8.4% of Arakis

21 April 1997: Khartoum Peace Agreement signed between government and six splinter rebel groups - but mainstream SPLA is absent.

25 April 97: Arakis board dominated by Khan fires John McLeod as CEO over mounting tension with Khan. Two sources of friction are McLeod's negative stance towards creeping takeover by Lundin and fact that Khan was selling shares in 1996 at a time when Arakis was floating large amounts of Reg S shares to fund the Sudan project. Two new members appointed to advisory committee - Mansoor Ijaz, founder and chairman of New York hedge fund Crescent Investment Management L.P. and Abdel Rahim Hamdi, former Sudanese finance minister and now director of Faisal Islamic Bank of Saudi Arabia. (source: www.vitrade.com)

9 May 97:- Arakis adds Lukas Lundin of Sands Petroleum AB to its board.

By mid 1997 there had been more "significant discoveries" at Toma South, El Toor and El Nar. The formation of the pipeline consortium resulted in a fourfold expansion of the exploration and development program from the 1996 level, with four drilling rigs in the concession either drilling or being rigged up to drill, and three seismic crews actively acquiring data.

July 97:- Arakis appoints new pipeline manager David Hunter, who used to work for Occidental.

17 July 97: Austria's OMV (Mineral and Oil Administration) joins a four-member consortium for oil exploration in Block 5A led by IPC (Lundin), the second consortium to begin oil exploration in Sudan this year.

30 July 97: James Taylor, then executive vice-president for international exploration of Occidental Petroleum, joins Arakis board.

July 97: 1,500 km pipeline budgeted at US \$1bn US to build; concession is estimated at 1bn barrels of oil

16 September 97: Ernie Pratt resigns from Arakis after operating responsibility in Sudan is transferred to Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co.

18 September 97: Lutfur Rahman Khan says government of Sudan is stable and fully able militarily and politically to hold the oil fields...

26 September 97: Kenneth C. Rutherford resigns as finance and chief financial officer to undertake private venture and is replaced by Tom G. Milne, formerly of Nova Corp. Calgary.

October 1997: Arakis awards contracts for manufacture of 28" line-pipe to China Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation (1110km) and Mannesmann Handel AG of Germany (500km)

November 97: Canadian Ambassador Gabriel Lessard writes to Arakis asking them to reconsider their presence in Sudan

4 November 97: President Clinton signs executive order under the International Emergency Powers Act calling for all Sudanese assets in the US to be blocked, and imposes a ban on bank loans and all US trade with the country. Sudan cuts banking links with US banking establishments in retaliation. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says sanctions were imposed because of Khartoum's "continued sponsorship of international terror, efforts to destabilise neighbouring countries and abysmal record on human rights." Sudan's ministry of external trade says Sudanese-US trade amounts to only five per cent of Sudan's total exchanges. Future international transfers through American banks will be averted by transacting with other international banks "in foreign currencies other than the US dollar."

Hydroelectric dams on the Nile's second and fourth cataracts are proposed. China and Sudan sign initial financial agreement on controversial Kajbar Dam, opposed by Nubians.

December 97: Opposition NDA issues official warning to users of the Khartoum-Gedaref-Kassala-Port Sudan highway that it is now a military target.

1998

1998: Arakis plan to build \$750m, 28", 1,610km pipeline still on track.

13 January 1998.: Arakis awards Argentina's TECHINT International the contract for construction work on the Port Sudan marine terminal, pumps and SCADA. Supply contracts for the pumps and drivers are awarded to Weir Pumps Ltd of Glasgow, Scotland, and for generators to Allan Power Engineering Ltd, England. China Petroleum Engineering Construction Corporation will build the pipeline and field facilities.

February 98: Two pro-government forces - under Gen Paulino Matiep Nhial and USDF leader Riek Machar - fight each other in the Bentiu area, "close to drilling operations of the China National Oil Company."

February 1998: Wau, capital of Bahr al-Ghazal, surrounded by Kerubino's forces.

Gabriel Lessard, Canada's ambassador to Sudan, warns that Arakis workers are in peril; Arakis admits "reduced comfort level".

February 98: First Vice-President Lt-Gen al-Zubeir Mohammad Saleh and ex-SPLA Cdr Arok Thon Arok die in plane crash near Ethiopian border.

February 98: Arakis appoints Raymond P. Cej as its new president and CEO. Previously chairman and CEO of Kyrgoil Corp. of Calgary, and former senior operating officer with Shell Canada, he replaces Lutfur Rahman Khan, who was acting president and will remain as chairman.

February 98: Arakis pays insurance company \$3.5m to cap its exposure in US securities lawsuits and pays a \$250,000 penalty to Vancouver Stock Exchange over Arab Group International (AGI) financing farrago.

2 March 98: State Petroleum writes to Sudan government assuring them the structure and management of State and Arakis will not change substantially. Sudan government issues 60-day notice of possible termination of Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, citing March 2 letter. The notice is subsequently withdrawn.

May 98: Arakis predicts commercial production of 150,000 b/d to start mid-1999 and completion by same date of 1,500-km pipeline with daily capacity of 250,000b/d

May 98: Arakis says reserves on its Unity, Heglig and Kaikang concessions proven and probable are 428.9m bbl; says proven reserves of 271.3m bbl are sufficient to meet production target of 150,000 b/d subject to additional drilling.

May 98: François Misser in Germany's *Die Tageszeitung* writes that the GNOP consortium wants to hire 3,000 armed fighters from Iran, and an additional 600 from Malaysia. The men would allegedly be under the supervision of a South African company. *"Soldier Of Fortune"* magazine guesses that this could be Executive Outcomes, reported to have worked with Arakis before, although Arakis denies this.

4 May 98: Oil pipeline construction begins at eight separate locations along the route

May 98: A 50,000-b/d refinery at al-Jayli begins construction with assistance from China's CNPC.

June 1998: SPLA captures Mabaan, Blue Nile province (on the road to Melut) and the town of Ulu, about 150 km SW of the strategic eastern town of Damazin and close to the installation at Adar Yale field.

Violence forces aid workers to evacuate parts of Western Upper Nile

Gulf Petroleum Company increases Adar-Yale production to 10,000 b/d. Sudan producing between 18,000 and 20,000 barrels of oil a day.

June 98 - Arakis says its two properties in Sudan may hold about three billion bbl of oil, according to estimates made by Chevron and Shell when they were exploring the property.

June 17: Arakis adds Ian H. Lundin and Fred C. Coles to board of directors

July 1998-December 1998 Fighting in Leer and Mankien districts of Western Upper Nile (Block 5A) keeps WFP aid workers away for five months.

24 July 98: Take-over offer for Arakis by Canadian firm Talisman Energy (formerly BP-Canada). Agreement to the deal comes from Lundin Oil AB (newly-formed in merger between Sands Petroleum AB and IPC), which holds 10.8% of Arakis, and State Street Research (which holds 8%).

17-18 August 98: Talisman agrees to purchase Arakis Energy Corp for stock valued at US\$175.7m - \$200m, committing the company to \$760m of capital spending on Sudan project over next 2 years.

20 August 98: US missile attack on Khartoum's al-Shifa chemical plant - doubts raised about the completion of the Arakis purchase.

21 August 98: Talisman's Jim Buckee, former BP planning manager, "surprised and concerned" by Shifa attack, and seeking more information.

31 August 98: Talisman announces it is advancing \$22 million to Arakis to meet funding obligations.

September 98: SPLA offensive produces no significant gains in the south and is successfully repulsed by government forces.

Attitudes in Khartoum harden. Confident of the efficacy of military action against his enemies, Turabi threatens to put Sadiq al-Mahdi on trial.

October 1998: Sharif al-Tuhami, Irrigation Minister, resigns his position. Allegations had appeared in the Arabic press that he helped his son Abdul-Rahman obtain a contract for his construction company Maban in the pipeline project.

7 October 98: Arakis shareholders, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Sudan government and members of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company consortium approve sale to Talisman. Talisman completes purchase of Arakis for Ca\$277m, plus advance of Ca\$46.5m to meet capital requirements

December 98: Talisman estimates proved plus probable reserves in Sudan concession at 150m bbl. It says the company is not prohibited by US sanctions from participating in the project and will fund all Sudan activities from non-US sources.

(Talisman chart shows total yield for five fields 447m bbl, with Talisman share 113m bbl. But company also says it is assuming total of 929m bbl, with its share 232m bbl. Goes on to say mean estimate of undiscovered oil in place is 10 bn bbl, with recovery factor of at least 30%...)

December 98: Talisman says project is 250-500km north of the trouble zones and is well protected.

Pipeline building in South Kordofan, skirting west of Nuba Mountains: SPLA's Ismail Khamis says government used the armed forces to pin down his forces while laying pipe around Lake Keilak.

1999

Pipeline to Port Sudan is 25% complete by mid-January, and more than 110 oil wells have been drilled.

13 January 99: Talisman planning to cut investment in North Sea and Canada to find \$200m needed for Sudan project in 1999, says chief executive Jim Buckee. Total Talisman share of Sudan project costs about \$430m, which Buckee says can be met with undrawn credit lines of \$700m and a "commercial paper program" of about \$350m.

February 1999: "Terry" Alexander, former head of Arakis Energy, fined \$804,000 US, including \$335,000 costs, and banned from trading for 20 years.

Alexander admits secret involvement in deals that profited from Arakis's skyrocketing stock price in 1995 after a reported \$750 million financing agreement for the Sudan pipeline, which later collapsed. Alexander unrepentant, saying he was in over his head.

Securities Commission says Alexander controlled Arakis shares held in various offshore companies and trusts and that substantial trading profits were made by "some offshore companies", and that shares were issued without being fully paid for by these companies.

February/March 99: SPLA ambushes Red Cross vehicle near oil fields, seizing 3 local government and security officials (whom it calls "spies") and a Red Crescent officer. All four die; government uses SPLA's refusal to turn over the bodies to delay peace

negotiations and block UN relief assessment in SPLA-held Nuba mountains.

1 March 99: Lundin Oil 1998 results include write-off of SEK156.2m of original investment in Arakis Energy.

3 March 99: Jim Buckee of Talisman says first oil exports from Sudan are "less than eight months away." He says acquisition of Arakis required Talisman to spend \$140m (excluding capitalised interest) in the last quarter of 1998, in addition to the financing provided to Arakis between the acquisition bid and close of the purchase. Release also says total exploration and development spending in Sudan was \$305 million in 1998 including \$156m incurred by Arakis prior to the acquisition (Talisman release)

March 99: SPLA 13th battalion under Commander Malik Agar, based at Ulu, defeats a government brigade which had been besieging the town of 50,000 since 6 January. The victory brings the Adar Yale oilfield, in Khor Adar, Upper Nile, east of Melut and Malakal, into range of the SPLA's artillery.

April 1999: Completion announced of 1,610 km pipeline linking Heglig oilfield with terminal at Basha'ir Red Sea terminal

Pipeline runs via oil refinery being built at al Jayli, 70 km N of Khartoum, due to become operational at the end of December 1999, which will have an annual capacity of 2.5m tonnes of crude oil.

April 99: Energy and Mining Minister Dr Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz visits China and West Germany. He discusses with the Chinese ways of completing Khartoum oil refinery, and setting up an electrical power station at the refinery.

30 April 99: The government is building factories to produce tanks and missiles, "to defend ourselves against conspirators," Turabi tells a rally in Ed Damer, and is quoted by Akhbar al-Yom as saying he will use earnings on oil exports as finance.

May 99: Ministers say Sudan will be self-sufficient in oil production by mid-1999 and be able "to export crude oil for the first time ever in the second semester of 1999. Initially we hope to export 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day which would be increased to 250,000 b/d in the year 2000" - Awad al-Jaz



Turabi, Nimeiri and Bashir turn on the oil May 1999


May 99: "Many villages on the eastern edge of Heglig were attacked and burned to the ground by the Sudanese army, causing the displacement of 1,000 to 2,000 civilians," says UN Rapporteur.

May 99: Attempt to put government militias in charge of oil installation south of Bentiu leads to open warfare among allies. Forces of Riak Machar are pushed back by Nuer warlord Paulino Matiep's government militiamen, who now guard the area. Machar losing ground.

May 99: Armed forces spokesman Lt-Gen M.O Yassin tells *Radio Omdurman* that the SPLA has attacked oil installations in the south and east. One attack in April was at Leer in Unity State (Block 5A, the Lundin/IPC-OMV-Petronas consortium), but Talisman say the \$1.4-bn Greater Nile Oil Project was not a target and the attack was not near the consortium's project area.

end May 99: Former SPLA Cdr Tito Biel, based near Bentiu and a government ally since 1997, defects from Riak Machar's group. Clashes continue.

July 99: 1,200 government forces sweep through Ruweng County, in Western Upper Nile, killing scores of civilians, abducting hundreds and burning over 6,000 homes. In a 10-day offensive on the edge of the Heglig oilfields, Antonov bombers, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery attacked civilians across a 100-km swathe of territory, in violation of a ceasefire signed during last year's famine.



Pre-1956 map of Dinka, Nuer and other populations in the area that is now Heglig and Unity (top, including Ruweng County) and blocks 5A and 5B (bottom) (Jonglei Investigation Team report)

14 July 99: Sudan Government bans all relief flights to people living around the oil fields.

August 99: Talisman Energy says that surging crude oil and natural gas prices helped it pump out a tenfold increase in profit in the second quarter.

September 1999: First shipment of 600,000 barrels leaves Port Sudan. Bargaining ensues over next round of oil deals

September 99: Kerubino Kuanyin is killed as Peter Gadiet and large numbers of Nuer oil zone militia members defect from government side and seek rapprochement with SPLA.

September 99: Film footage of devastation at Gumriak, Ruweng county, is shown on Swedish TV. It prompts outcry against Lundin.

20 September 99: Explosion near Atbara, northern Sudan, holes the oil pipeline. Opposition NDA claims responsibility and warns of further attacks if Talisman does not talk to them.

October 99: Czechs express concern that proposed second military tank consignment to Yemen may end up in Sudan.

21 October 88: Peter Gadiet's forces, aligned with SPLA, reported bombarding Bentiu.

November 99: Japanese oil traders agree deal for crude oil purchase

November 99: Talisman hires Hill & Knowlton PR company, previously employed by BCCI.

November 99: A trial run on the new 50,000-b/d refinery at Jayli, Khartoum, is postponed until March 2000.

November 99: NIF-Umma accord signed in Djibouti.



SUDAN INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP (SIARG):

Mission Statement and Operational Guidelines

MISSION STATEMENT

The Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) is a NETWORK of Canadian church and non-governmental organizations with Sudan-related programming. It was formed on September 26th, 1998 at a church/NGO-organized roundtable on Sudan. Its purpose is to systematically link member agencies and to provide a mechanism for sharing information, analysis and ideas and for undertaking common initiatives. Members are involved in a wide range of activities including conflict resolution, capacity building, human rights research and advocacy, education, development and relief. On occasion members may speak or act in groups or in unison to fulfill policy and project goals and objectives. Members also will explore options to relate to and support Sudanese organizations in Canada.

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Host Agency

One member of the SIARG will be designated as host agency and will provide minimal administrative support and coordinate meetings, activities and initiatives. The host agency will delegate tasks to other members as the need arises.

Governance

The SIARG will function as a "committee of the whole". Members will occasionally evaluate this means of operating and can form a steering committee if deemed necessary.

Frequency of meetings

Members will normally meet twice a year. Special meetings and teleconferences can be called if necessary. Any member is free to request a meeting should the need arise. Requests should be conveyed to the host agency which in turn will poll other members.

Funding

Funding will be provided through annual membership fees of \$100 and members' special grants. All funds should be remitted to the host agency. Funding may also be sought from official funding bodies for occasional special initiatives. Member agencies are generally expected to cover their own travel and accommodation costs associated with meetings of the SIARG. However, subsidies will be provided for those coming from exceptionally long distances.

Collaborative initiatives

While the SIARG can not issue policy statements or initiate projects in its own name, it will serve as a facilitate forum in which member agencies are encouraged to draft statements and initiate projects either individually or in groups. Any member is welcome to draft a statement and seek endorsement of other members. Draft statements should be sent to the host agency which will coordinate the sign-on process. Members should also keep the host agency informed of any individual or group project initiatives so a central data base can be maintained.

21 October 1998



125 promenade Sussex Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

RAPPORT DU CCDPE POUR L'ANNÉE 2000-2001¹

PREVENTION DES CONFLITS ET CONSTRUCTION DE LA PAIX

Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability. Peter Langille, Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives. Fall 2000.

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