


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REPORT ON
DISARMAMENT
DISCUSSIONS

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REPORT ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS, 1957

Disarmament discussions under United Nations auspices, which began not long after the end of the Second World War, have now been in progress for over a decade. For the greater part of this period there were few signs that the Soviet Union had serious intentions of reaching a disarmament agreement. Since May 1955 and particularly in the earlier part of 1957, however, there was some evidence that a first step toward partial disarmament may have become negotiable. Despite their failure to achieve agreement, the meetings between March and September of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission until their final stages were encouraging in this respect. In view of the importance of these negotiations and those at the Twelfth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and because of their length and complexity, this report has been prepared to provide a brief but reasonably comprehensive account of disarmament discussions during 1957.

I. Background

The United Nations Disarmament Commission was established by General Assembly resolution 502(VI) of January 11, 1952 to assume the tasks of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. It is composed of representatives of the members of the Security Council and Canada. With the exception of the months immediately following its establishment, during which twenty-six meetings were held, the Disarmament Commission has met only to review the work of its Sub-Committee, and has not been the major forum for detailed discussion of substantive disarmament questions.

On the initiative of France and India, General Assembly Resolution 715(VIII) of November 28, 1953 contained the suggestion that the Commission "study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the powers principally involved. . . ." On April 19, 1954 the Commission approved the establishment of such a sub-committee, to be composed of representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. From May 13, 1954 until the end of 1956 the Sub-Committee held a total of eighty-six meetings, during which the main developments were discussions of the necessary provisions of a comprehensive disarmament programme and the schedule of their implementation, and later the recognition of the desirability of negotiating a partial agreement which could be implemented without political conditions. Some progress toward agreement was achieved in connection with conventional disarmament and the nature of a control system but there was little advance made on nuclear measures.

II. The Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Shortly after the opening of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union issued, on November 17, 1956, new disarmament proposals calling for: (1) a reduction within two years of the armed forces of the Soviet

Union, the United States and China to 1-1.5 million men and those of France and the United Kingdom to 650,000. The first step toward these ceilings would be force levels of 2.5 million and 750,000 respectively, with a corresponding reduction in armaments; (2) a complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons within the same period, to begin with the abolition of nuclear test explosions; (3) a reduction of one-third during 1957 of the forces of the great powers stationed in Germany; (4) a considerable reduction of the forces of the great powers stationed in Europe in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; (5) the liquidation of foreign military bases within two years; (6) a corresponding reduction in military expenditures; and (7) the establishment of strict international control over the above obligations. In addition to repeating a previous proposal for a system of ground control posts to guard against surprise attack, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to consider the question of employing aerial photography within the area of Europe in which the principal armed forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are stationed, to a depth of 800 kilometres east and west of the demarcation line.

On January 14, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United States representative, Mr. Lodge, outlined a new set of proposals comprising six major points: (1) an agreement under which at an early date and under effective international inspection, all future production of fissionable material would be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision, this event to be followed by progressive transfers from past production to non-weapons uses; (2) on condition that (1) became effective, nuclear test explosions would be limited and ultimately eliminated; in the meantime tests would be made subject to advance notice and registration with limited international observation; (3) conventional armed forces would be reduced progressively and under adequate inspection to 2.5 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union, and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom in the first stage; (4) international control of the development of intercontinental missiles and other objects entering outer space; (5) progressive establishment of an effective inspection system, including aerial reconnaissance and ground control posts, in order to provide protection against surprise attack; (6) an international agency for the reduction of armaments to be installed concurrently with the beginning of the programme.

The Canadian Delegation co-sponsored with Japan and Norway a draft resolution requesting that the Sub-Committee give particular and urgent attention to the possibility of establishing as a first step a system for the registration of nuclear test explosions with the United Nations, and that the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation should co-operate with the states concerned in the operation of such a system "with a view to keeping the total actual and expected radiation in the world under constant observation". Substantial interest in and support for the Canadian-Norwegian-Japanese resolution was expressed.

At the conclusion of the debate it was agreed among the sponsors that the various draft resolutions should not be pressed to a vote, and a purely procedural resolution was unanimously adopted.⁽¹⁾ It requested that the Disarmament Commission reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date, that the Sub-Committee consider certain specified proposals as well as the views which had

⁽¹⁾ Text at Annex I.

been expressed during the debate, and that it submit a progress report by August 1, 1957.

III. Meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: March 18 - September 6, 1957

The most recent session of the Sub-Committee was convened on March 18, and held a total of seventy-one meetings between that date and its adjournment on September 6. Canada's representative from the beginning of the session until mid-August was Mr. D. M. Johnson, Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador to Germany, succeeded Mr. Johnson during the last month of the session. France was represented by M. Jules Moch; the U.S.S.R. by Mr. Valerian Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister; the United Kingdom by Commander the Rt. Hon. Alan Noble, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and for parts of the session by the Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Rt. Hon. W. D. Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; and the United States by the Hon. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President of the United States.

The Sub-Committee discussions began with a preliminary statement by each of the representatives. In his opening speech, the Canadian representative called upon the Sub-Committee to try once again to make some progress in the task assigned to it by the United Nations. "It seems clear" he continued,

that, although there are important differences of policy and approach among us, the gap between the various proposals is not now as great as it once was. I know we are all agreed that we must now eschew propaganda speeches and discuss fully and freely the different proposals advanced, and strive to reach a realistic and acceptable disarmament programme.

I think we all recognize that disarmament discussions are only one sector of the whole front of international effort to achieve a secure and peaceful world; disarmament cannot be treated in isolation from the settlement of other international issues which divide the world today. Nevertheless, large scale armaments, and in particular the incalculable menace of today's nuclear weapons, are themselves an important source of international tension, and a break in the long disarmament deadlock would in itself do much to improve the prospects for a secure agreement among nations.

In their statements at the opening meeting, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France reaffirmed their support for a plan calling for comprehensive conventional and nuclear disarmament in three stages, which they had proposed jointly on March 19, 1956. Both representatives also referred to the desirability of proceeding with negotiations toward at least a partial measure of disarmament, if a more comprehensive plan were thought unattainable. At the second meeting of the Sub-Committee, on March 19, the United States representative reaffirmed the proposals which had been put forward in the First Committee of the General Assembly on January 14.

In his opening speech, the Soviet representative tabled a new plan for comprehensive disarmament, which was in large measure based on earlier proposals, notably those of November 17, 1956. The Soviet programme called for conventional reductions by the Great Powers in two stages, with a world conference to determine the extent of reductions by other states; an immediate undertaking not to use nuclear weapons, to be followed during the second stage by the cessation of their manufacture, and the elimination of stockpiles of previous production; the liquidation in two stages of all foreign bases; a one-third reduction during the first stage of the forces of France, the United

Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union stationed on German territory, to be followed by a further reduction; and a substantial reduction of the forces of the four Great Powers stationed in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. An international control organ to supervise the agreement was also suggested, but its functions were not defined. To safeguard against surprise attack, it was proposed that there should be control posts at ports, railway junctions, main highways and airfields, together with a system of aerial inspection in Europe in a zone extending eight hundred kilometres on either side of the demarcation line. All such inspection would operate from the first stage. Finally, the plan set forth a proposal for a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe covering Germany and adjacent states, in which the armed forces of the Great Powers would be subject to ceilings, and within which it would be forbidden to station nuclear weapons or units trained in their use.

The Sub-Committee then proceeded to a consideration of its seven-item agenda, under which the provisions of a possible disarmament plan were discussed. The Western representatives pressed Mr. Zorin to state his Government's ideas on a partial disarmament agreement, on the grounds that comprehensive and far-reaching measures were not feasible in the present circumstances.

On the question of nuclear weapons tests, Mr. Zorin continued to insist on immediate cessation of tests independently of disarmament and without provision for control, though he added as an alternative a proposal for the temporary suspension of tests. The Western representatives maintained the position that provided there were effective nuclear controls they would limit and ultimately halt such tests. In the meantime they were prepared to adopt measures such as those suggested at the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly by Canada, Japan and Norway. The Soviet representative rejected all such partial schemes and maintained that the cessation of test explosions could be controlled without stationing elements of the control organ within the testing countries.

Mr. Zorin also continued to call for the elimination of atomic weapons and the cessation of further production of such weapons. Mr. Stassen proposed that, provided a disarmament treaty had been negotiated and ratified, the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should cease one month after the establishment of an effective inspection system, and suggested that a technical committee of the five powers should begin work on setting up such an inspection system.

There appeared to be some agreement on levels of forces in the first stage (2.5 million men for the United States and Soviet Union and 750,000 for the United Kingdom and France) with corresponding reductions in armaments. The Soviet position also called for agreement at the same time to further reductions at a later stage to 1-1.5 million men for the United States, the U.S.S.R., and China, and 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. The Western representatives were prepared to agree that there should be further reductions subsequent to the first stage, but only if the system had proved effective and if there was progress towards political settlements.

On the question of control the Western representatives welcomed the apparent advance in the latest Soviet proposals, which had accepted the principle of aerial inspection, but rejected as inadequate the details of the measures proposed in the Soviet plan. Discussion of the agenda item dealing with the

control of missiles and outer space objects showed that there was general agreement on the need for some action to be taken in this field, but no specific conclusions were reached. Discussions of the question of zones of limitation and inspection was not pursued in any detail.

On April 30, at the conclusion of the first round of discussions, the Soviet representative, stating that his Government had taken note of the reluctance of the Western Powers to conclude a comprehensive disarmament agreement, tabled a new plan for partial disarmament.⁽²⁾ The major features of this new presentation were: (1) reduction of the forces of the major powers in two stages down to 1-1.5 million men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom; (2) reduction of conventional armaments by 15 per cent in the first stage; (3) an immediate cessation or temporary suspension of nuclear tests independently of agreement on other aspects of disarmament; (4) a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons to take effect simultaneously with an agreement on conventional disarmament, together with the assumption of an obligation to reach agreement on complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons; (5) progressive liquidation of foreign bases; (6) a one-third reduction of United States, United Kingdom, French and Soviet forces in Germany, and a considerable reduction of their forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas; (7) control posts at ports, railway junctions and highways (but not airfields) in the first stage in a defined area which would include the territories of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, except that in the case of the United States and Soviet Union the areas affected would be limited; control posts at airfields would be installed only at the second stage and would be related to an agreement on measures for the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons; and (8) aerial inspection in a zone in central Europe, and in an Asian-North American zone comprising approximately equal areas in Eastern Siberia and the United States west of the Mississippi.

During the period between the presentation of the Soviet plan and the tabling of the comprehensive Western reply, the Sub-Committee negotiations for the most part took the form of an exposition of the broad principles of the Western position, and the presentation of Four-Power and individually sponsored proposals on questions such as nuclear test explosions and aerial inspection, together with a discussion of the latest Soviet proposals.

On May 6 the United Kingdom representative tabled a memorandum proposing measures for dealing with nuclear tests in three stages: (1) advance registration of tests as proposed by Canada, Japan and Norway at the General Assembly, plus limited international observation; (2) the formation of a group of experts to consider possible methods of limitation and control of tests; and (3) cessation of tests to follow the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes as part of a general disarmament agreement.

On June 14, after it had previously been made public by Messrs. Bulganin and Krushchev during their visit to Finland, the Soviet representative submitted a proposal for the suspension of nuclear tests.⁽³⁾ The Soviet plan called for a two- or three-year moratorium on tests under the supervision of an international commission answerable to the Security Council and the General Assembly,

⁽²⁾ Text at Annex II.

⁽³⁾ Text at Annex III.

with control posts to be established in the territories of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the Pacific Ocean area.

In reply to the Soviet proposal, a Four-Power statement on nuclear tests was tabled in the Sub-Committee on July 2. The Western statement welcomed the acceptance by the Soviet Union "of the requirement of inspection posts with appropriate scientific instruments, equipment, and facilities, to be set up for the purposes of control and detection of nuclear tests." It accepted the Soviet plan in principle, subject to precise agreement on its duration and timing, on the installation of the necessary controls, and on the relationship of this measure to the other provisions of a first stage agreement, including initial reductions in armed forces and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. It further proposed that a group of experts should meet to proceed with the design of the inspection system, while the Sub-Committee itself continued its discussions of the relationship between the suspension of tests and other measures of disarmament.

In further discussions of nuclear disarmament, the Western representatives indicated their support for the United States proposal to cease production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. They also expressed their willingness to agree to a formula involving the conditional renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. In these discussions the representative of the Soviet Union continued to insist on his Government's proposals of April 30.

Discussions of conventional disarmament indicated general agreement with the United States proposal for reductions in armed forces in three stages to 2.5, 2.1 and 1.7 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union. In informing the Sub-Committee of their acceptance of a reduction by stages, the United Kingdom and French representatives stated that their own forces could also be reduced in three stages to 750,000, 700,000 and 650,000 respectively. While the Soviet representative appeared willing to accept the proposed levels in principle, he asked on several occasions for a clarification of the conditions, particularly with regard to political settlements, which it would be necessary to meet before the second and third stages could be undertaken. The Western representatives replied that some progress toward political settlements would be necessary, but said that there should be agreement in principle before further details of such conditions were set forth.

All five powers also appeared willing to accept the United States method of reducing armaments by placing designated armaments in depots under international supervision within the territories of the depositing parties. For the second and third stages the Western powers expressed the view that it would be necessary to find a formula for relating armaments ceilings to reduced manpower levels. Although there was general agreement that there should be some reduction in military budgets, the Soviet Union continued to propose a general 15 per cent cut, while the Western powers indicated a preference for a method related to manpower and armaments reduction.

On the question of control the five powers appeared to be in accord that there should be a system of inspection to assist in safeguarding against surprise attack. Such a system would include both aerial photographic inspection and ground observation posts. The four Western powers stated, however, that the

zones of inspection proposed by the Soviet Union in their April 30 paper were unduly biased in favour of that country. As an alternative, they proposed to open to inspection a zone including either all of North America north of Mexico in exchange for all of the Soviet Union, or a more limited Arctic zone, together with a zone in Europe extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, or a more limited area.

The Western powers envisaged that the system of inspection which would operate in these zones would in all cases include aerial inspection and ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority. It would be understood that ground control posts could be established by agreement at points in territories in the states concerned, without being restricted to the zones of aerial inspection, though the areas open to ground inspection would not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. An agreed Four-Power paper embodying the above proposals on inspection and control was tabled in the Sub-Committee on August 2.

On August 1 the Five Powers agreed to submit a brief progress report to the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with the provisions of the General Assembly resolution of February 14. The progress report cited the number of meetings held, listed the various proposals, working papers, etc., which had been submitted to date by the five delegations, and indicated that the Sub-Committee was continuing its work and would submit a further report. In addition, the report transmitted to the Disarmament Commission memoranda submitted at the invitation of the Sub-Committee by the Governments of Japan, Norway and Yugoslavia, which set forth the views of those states on questions relevant to disarmament and which had been the subject of discussion during previous meetings of the Sub-Committee. In reply to a similar invitation, the Government of India requested that an Indian representative be permitted to address the Sub-Committee, in order to clarify previous Indian proposals. Though the majority of the Sub-Committee agreed that it was not possible to make an exception of one state at that time, the relevant Indian proposals were circulated to the members of the Sub-Committee as a special Sub-Committee document.

On August 29, after detailed consultations which had continued for several weeks among themselves and with their NATO allies, the four Western powers tabled an agreed paper setting forth proposals for a first stage of disarmament.⁽⁴⁾ The plan comprised eleven articles calling for the following measures of disarmament: reductions to force levels of 2.5 million men for the United States and the U.S.S.R. and 750,000 men for the United Kingdom and France, to be followed by further reductions in two stages to levels of 2.1 million and 700,000, and to 1.7 million and 650,000 respectively; a reduction in armaments by depositing agreed lists of designated armaments in internationally supervised depots within the territories of the depositing parties; an obligation not to use nuclear weapons except in defence against armed attack; cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and a beginning of transfers from weapon stockpiles to peaceful uses, both under effective international control; suspension of nuclear test explosions for a period of one year, and for a further period under certain conditions regarding control, including satisfactory progress

⁽⁴⁾ Text at Annex IV.

on an inspection system to verify the cessation of production for weapons purposes; the study of a system of control and inspection over objects entering outer space; aerial and ground inspection and the exchange of "military blueprints" in specified areas; an international control organ; and provision for the study of a system for regulating the international movement of armaments. Articles setting forth the conditions under which the treaty might be suspended, and presenting the paper for negotiation "on the understanding that its parts are inseparable" were also included.

On the occasion of their presentation in the Sub-Committee, Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker emphasized the importance of the new Western proposals, and stated the view of the Canadian Government with respect to them:

Today in London the Western Powers on the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission—France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada—have presented to the Soviet Union proposals which we believe can provide the basis for an agreement on a first stage of disarmament. These proposals are the product of extensive consultations directed towards the design of a plan which could be given effect immediately, without political conditions, and so make a tangible contribution to world peace now by rendering more remote the danger of war.

Progress towards settlement of major political issues is a condition for moving toward the second and third stages since some steps toward solving the problems which can cause international conflicts are necessary before we and our allies can safely make extensive reductions in our defences. Nevertheless, reductions to the levels of 2.5 million for the United States and the Soviet Union and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom, which are proposed for the first stage, would constitute a significant step toward disarmament.

During the first stage it is also proposed that these four powers place certain designated armaments under international supervision in depots within their own territories. We believe that this will be a valuable introduction to more extensive reductions in armaments envisaged in the second and third stages, when the arms retained would be related to the reduced manpower ceilings.

The proposals for nuclear disarmament provide for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against an armed attack. They further provide that the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes should cease, that transfer from weapon stockpiles to peaceful uses should be made and that there should be an effective inspection system to verify compliance with those commitments. The implementation of such proposals would first put a stop to the atomic armaments race and then reverse the trend by reducing the reserves of nuclear weapons.

Provision is also made for a time-table under which nuclear test explosions would, in the first instance, be suspended for a year. If satisfactory progress is being made towards arrangements to cut off production of fissionable materials for weapons, the suspension period would be extended for a further year. Thus the proposals treat suspension of tests as a matter for immediate action while keeping the problem in proper perspective, for the ending of tests cannot end the nuclear armaments race.

In order to ensure that all parties to the agreement are carrying out their obligations, and in order to diminish the dangers of surprise attack, the Western Powers have put forward a number of proposals regarding control and inspection. They would provide for systems to verify compliance with the suspension of nuclear tests and with the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. They would also include provisions for aerial and ground inspection designed to assist in guarding against surprise attack. It is our belief that it is of the greatest importance to have in operation such systems of inspection if we are to ensure that under a disarmament treaty the nations will enjoy no less security than their present defences provide. Because of this belief the Canadian Government has agreed, if the Soviet Union will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection and will do its utmost to ensure that the system works effectively. We consider that a useful start in providing safeguards against surprise attack could be made in the Arctic areas.

The Canadian Government is guided by the desire to find means for preventing war, since any war could provide the spark which would lead to nuclear conflagration. We consider that the proposals offer a realistic and practical basis for a first stage from which we could work with confidence toward more far-reaching measures. In preparing these proposals we have with our allies sought constantly to meet the legitimate interests and policies of the Soviet Union. We have made serious efforts to find terms on which immediate action can be taken because of our conviction that the passage of time makes the disarmament problem ever more intractable but that, if the Soviet Union displays a corresponding willingness to cooperate in the negotiations, significant and rewarding results are within our grasp.

Although the Soviet representative had indicated an apparent willingness to accept some of the Western proposals which had previously been presented separately, his first response to the plan as a whole was extremely negative. Immediately after it had been tabled, Mr. Zorin launched into a condemnation of several parts of it, concluding that "no real value can be attached to the document from the point of view of actual progress towards disarmament". When pressed by the Western representatives in subsequent meetings for a further elaboration of the Soviet position, he offered no detailed comment on the Four-Power plan, but merely reiterated previous demands and continued to accuse the Western powers of placing obstacles in the way of disarmament.

As a result of Mr. Zorin's unwillingness to consider the Four-Power proposals at that time, the Western delegations agreed that no further progress could be achieved by prolonging the Sub-Committee session. Accordingly, they proposed on September 4 that the Sub-Committee adjourn until the end of the General Debate in the General Assembly, and that it then reconvene in New York. When the Soviet representative attacked this procedure as a subterfuge to avoid debate in the General Assembly, it was agreed on September 6 to adjourn *sine die*.

IV. Twelfth Session of the General Assembly

The representatives of many member nations stated in the general debate that disarmament was perhaps the most important issue before the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly. As Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Diefenbaker concluded his statement by underlining the importance of the disarmament question. "Past assemblies" he said, "have earned names descriptive of their major activities. There was the 'Palestine Assembly', the 'Korean Assembly'. Mankind would breathe easier if this Assembly might be known in future years as the 'Disarmament Assembly'." In setting forth the Canadian position on disarmament he again emphasized the urgency of the problem, particularly in view of the continued development of modern weapons, and called upon the Soviet Union to consider the Western proposals carefully:

... The fear of surprise attack is the cause of the major tension of these days. For that reason there is a sombre urgency about the work of this General Assembly. Experience has taught us that no country ever possesses a monopoly of any device. What one country has today, the other nations will have tomorrow, and the day is not far distant, if this continues, when there will be armouries of these rockets. While a few years ago a new era was introduced by the development of nuclear weapons, today an even more frightening and awful time faces mankind. That is why I say that it is a matter of sombre urgency that this Assembly should act, and act effectively, if we are to bring about the control of the use of this dread menace, the ultimate engine of destruction. . . .

I do not intend today to deal in any detail with the terms of the disarmament proposals that were put before the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission by the four Western powers, but I feel it well to refer for but a moment to the question of suspension of tests of nuclear and atomic weapons.

The suspension as provided for in the Western proposals would be for a year, conditional on a convention on disarmament being entered into, and this would be renewable for a second year if satisfactory progress had been made towards a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. But there are well-intentioned people—many people—who believe that a ban on atomic tests is a panacea for all the ills of mankind. In all the clamour there has been over this, some have lost sight of the fact that the suspension of tests is not going to stop the stock-piling of nuclear weapons or the atomic armaments race. The only way to do this is to divert fissionable material from the manufacture of weapons to peaceful uses, and the Western proposals very sensibly linked an agreement to do this with a continuation of the suspension of the tests.

While treating the suspension of nuclear tests as a matter for immediate action, the 11-point Western proposals made such suspension dependent on the establishment of nuclear watching posts in the territories agreed on of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and other countries. . . .

In addition to inspection, the other Western proposals also included in the first stage a limitation on the size of armed forces; a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except in the case of defence; and 'international supervision' to ensure that the production of fissionable materials should be for peaceful uses only.

We believe that these proposals are eminently fair and workable, but for some reason the U.S.S.R. has cavalierly and contemptuously refused to consider them seriously. Surely they must realize that in the climate of distrust and fear which exists paper declarations, however pious their purpose, are not acceptable and that a prerequisite to disarmament must be an adequate system of inspection and control. . . .

The Western nations have gone more than half-way on the subject of disarmament from the beginning of the meetings of the Sub-Committee. For some reason the Soviets have refused to give any ground and insist on its programme. And I say with all the sincerity that I can bring to my words that we in Canada, in the strategic position in which we are, are willing to go to the utmost limit of safety and survival to bring about disarmament. . . .

On September 30, the Disarmament Commission was convened to consider the fourth and fifth reports of its Sub-Committee. Two meetings were held, during which the representatives of each of the powers on the Commission (with the exception of the Philippines representative, who was chairman) spoke briefly on the progress of the recent Sub-Committee session, and on the various proposals which had been submitted to it. The Commission then decided, without objection, to take note of the fourth and fifth reports of its Sub-Committee, and to transmit them, together with relevant documents and the proceedings of the Commission, to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The statements of the majority of representatives again emphasized the very great need for agreement on measures to put a stop to the armaments race, and called upon the powers concerned to renew their efforts in this direction. In discussing the work of the Sub-Committee, the Canadian representative reviewed what he considered had been the most important developments during the preceding few months. In spite of the fact that agreement had not been reached, it was the Canadian view, he said, that the work of the Sub-Committee had not been in vain.

. . . on some important questions the gap between opposing positions has narrowed; and, on the whole, the work of the latest session of the Sub-Committee was conducted in a realistic way appropriate to negotiations which are expected to have early and practical results and are not merely propaganda exchanges. The Canadian Government regards as an unfortunate lapse from this standard of negotiation the hasty and rather scornful rejection by the Soviet representative of the working paper for partial measures of disarmament of August 29, of which Canada was one of the sponsors. We trust that,

as sometimes in the past, the Government of the U.S.S.R. will respond more seriously and more thoughtfully to these proposals so that responsible negotiations may be resumed.

There is in the world today an insistent demand for international agreement to lighten the burden of armaments and to reduce the threat of war, which might carry with it the terrible consequences of the large scale use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. All the governments and peoples of the world have an immense and direct interest in this question, but the few powers which possess these weapons must carry a great share of the responsibility for negotiating a disarmament agreement. I think that we all recognize that a single comprehensive agreement covering all forces and armaments, and their reduction to the levels needed for internal security, is not attainable now. In the past year we have therefore concentrated on the attempt to make a beginning with first steps of disarmament.

If disarmament proposals are meant seriously they must not be one-sided. They must not reduce the relative strength and security of any major power or group. Disarmament plans must be capable of inspection and control, and the necessary controls must be accepted. With some exceptions, which I shall note, it is a mark of progress that most of the plans before us go farther towards satisfying these criteria than ever before.

I think that these requirements are largely met for example in the working paper of August 29 tabled in the Sub-Committee by the delegations of France, United Kingdom, U.S.A. and Canada. . . .

The August 29th proposals are steps which the sponsors are willing to take immediately, in the present world situation, without setting any political conditions. If adopted, they would provide for a substantial reduction in armed forces and armaments, a cessation in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (that is, an end to the arms race in nuclear weapons), a beginning in the reduction of the stock-piles of nuclear weapons, and a suspension of tests of nuclear weapons for two years, which could, in fact, continue and become a permanent cessation of tests of nuclear weapons.

The proposals for mutual aerial inspection, which the U.S.S.R. has sometimes denounced as nothing more than schemes to collect intelligence data, are now put forward in a flexible and accommodating way. The U.S.S.R. is offered a variety of zones in which we might make a beginning with aerial inspection. We believe that these various zones are equitable and fairly balanced. For its part, the Canadian Government has agreed, if the Soviet Government will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection. This was re-affirmed only a day or two ago by the Prime Minister of Canada in his statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

It seems to us that our proposals deserve, at the very least, serious and thoughtful consideration before they are rejected. We cannot see that they would put the U.S.S.R. at a disadvantage compared to other major powers. We believe that with an adequate but not excessive control apparatus, these first steps of disarmament could be carried out without any loss in security to any of the countries party to the agreement. Success in these first steps would generate the confidence which could in turn lead to further disarmament. I do not say that our working paper is necessarily the last word in measures for a beginning of disarmament, and I know that any proposals of the Soviet Government to modify or adjust these suggestions would be very carefully considered. There can be no question of imposing or dictating an agreement. We can make progress only by serious and patient negotiation, and we trust that the Soviet Government will show itself willing to carry on in this spirit.

I now turn briefly to some of the proposals of the Soviet Government. I think that the differences between us on reductions of armed forces and armaments and reduction in military budgets, and perhaps even in the control and inspection of these reductions, are not so great as they once were. Serious and patient negotiations on these points could produce agreement. The U.S.S.R. has admitted in principle the possibility of aerial inspection, together with ground control posts, to safeguard against surprise attack, and we have not given up hope that mutually acceptable zones in which to begin such inspection might be agreed.

We regret very much, however, that the Soviet Government continues to put forward, as if they were serious proposals, two disarmament schemes which are uncontrollable, which do not admit of any effective inspection, and which, therefore, must be

regarded as essentially propaganda. These are, first, the plan for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. While stocks of nuclear weapons remain, an agreement not to use them is significant only until one government changes its mind. If we had the faith in one another which would allow such an agreement, we would also have no arms race and no need for a Disarmament Commission. The second of these uncontrollable, and therefore propagandist, Soviet proposals is for the destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons, and their complete elimination from the armaments of states. As the Soviet Government long ago admitted (in its paper of May 10, 1955) no system of inspection could guarantee the elimination of all stocks of nuclear weapons except with a very wide margin of error. This agreement, too, would therefore rest on trust alone. That at present cannot be mutually accorded.

I have, in conclusion, some few remarks to make on the matter of tests of nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. has recently proposed that the subject of tests should be taken up separately from other elements of the disarmament question. I would ask members of the Commission to consider very carefully the proposals on suspension of tests in our working paper. You will see that the suspension of tests would commence at the very beginning, providing only that we have set up the necessary inspection, which is also provided for in the latest Soviet proposal. No other part of this first stage of disarmament would need to go into effect before the date of the suspension of tests. If the inspection to ensure compliance with the suspension of tests is satisfactory the suspension would run for 24 months. Tests would still be suspended beyond this two year period provided parties to the agreement during these two years have worked out and put into effect the scheme for cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Surely it is important to link in this way the suspension of tests with the fundamentally much more important question of ending the arms race in nuclear weapons; and surely it is also a reasonable and moderate proposal which permits the suspension of tests to take effect up to two years before the actual beginning of the plan for ending the arms race in nuclear weapons. As M. Moch pointed out on August 29 in the Sub-Committee, the Soviet Government and the other four members of the Sub-Committee have proposed a suspension of tests for about the same period, two to three years in the one case, and two years in the other. Is it not better that this suspension of tests which we all propose should be accompanied by efforts to work out the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes? The Canadian Government finds it hard to believe that the world would prefer, as in the Soviet proposal, that the suspension should provide only some illusion of disarmament, while the arms race in nuclear weapons goes on unchecked.

The First (Political and Security) Committee of the General Assembly was convened on October 8. On a proposal of the representative of Brazil, it was agreed without objection that the question of disarmament should be placed first on its agenda. In addition to the report of the Disarmament Commission, three topics were scheduled for discussion under the disarmament item:

(a) *Expansion of the Membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee*

This question was included as a sub-item under the question of disarmament at the request of India. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal reviewed developments in disarmament negotiations, taking the view that

... though the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission has held numerous meetings for the last four years, it must now be admitted that, in its present form, it does not appear to be able to achieve tangible progress or agreement in the field of disarmament. . . .

... the Government of India are of the view that the deliberations and discussions of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament might well be assisted by the presence of such countries as, by virtue of their general approach to problems of world peace, may be in a position to stimulate the processes of understanding and agreement among the Powers more directly involved. The Government of India consider, therefore, that the

General Assembly itself should nominate a few countries to assist the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in its search for tangible solutions to the problems of disarmament.

In a draft resolution dated September 25⁽⁵⁾, India therefore proposed that both the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee should be enlarged. The states to be added were not specified in the case of either body.

A further proposal on the future conduct of disarmament negotiations under United Nations auspices was submitted by the Soviet Union in a letter to the Secretary-General dated October 27⁽⁶⁾. Arguing that the failure to reach agreement in the Sub-Committee had to some extent been caused by its restricted membership and the secrecy surrounding its proceedings, the Soviet Union proposed that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee should be dissolved, and replaced by a "permanent disarmament commission" composed of all members of the United Nations, which would meet publicly to consider "all proposals of disarmament submitted to the United Nations", and to prepare recommendations for the General Assembly.

(b) *Collective Action to Inform and Enlighten the Peoples of the World as to the Dangers of the Armaments Race, and Particularly as to the Destructive Effects of Modern Weapons.*

On August 13 Belgium requested the inclusion of the item in the agenda, and deposited a draft resolution⁽⁷⁾ with the Secretary-General. In his statement in the general debate, Mr. Larock, the Belgian Foreign Minister, gave the following summary of the aims and provisions of the Belgian resolution:

The present session of the General Assembly should decide that a collective information action must be undertaken immediately and that a plan should be submitted to the Assembly for approval during the next regular session. I propose that to this end the Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General on the other, to take up in co-operation the following two tasks: first, the compilation of a body of essential information designed to be disseminated in all countries; secondly, the establishment of programmes and the determination of practical means for such dissemination.

(c) *Discontinuance Under International Control of Tests of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons*

This item was included on the agenda at the request of the Soviet Union⁽⁸⁾ and was made sub-item (d) under the question of disarmament. In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the request, the view was expressed that, due to the increasingly serious danger to mankind resulting from nuclear tests and public concern therewith,

"...the Soviet Government considers it essential to detach the question of discontinuing atomic and hydrogen weapons tests from the disarmament programme as a whole and to settle it forthwith as a separate issue, without linking it to agreement on other aspects of disarmament". When debate began in the First Committee three draft resolutions had already been tabled which dealt, either wholly or mainly, with the question of nuclear tests:

- (i) A draft resolution tabled by Japan⁽⁹⁾, which, in addition to other recommendations concerning disarmament, called upon member states

⁽⁵⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.177

⁽⁶⁾ UN Document A/C.1/797

⁽⁷⁾ UN Document A/3630

⁽⁸⁾ UN Document A/3874/Rev. 1

⁽⁹⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.174

To suspend all nuclear test explosions, from the time an agreement is reached in principle on a supervision and inspection system necessary to verify the suspension of tests until the discussions on the report of the Disarmament Commission at the next regular session of the General Assembly have been concluded.

- (ii) A draft resolution put forward by India ⁽¹⁰⁾, which stated the Indian view on the danger of nuclear tests and the increasing number of such tests, and requests the states concerned . . . to agree forthwith to the nomination of a scientific-technical commission consisting of scientific-technical experts representing the differing views together with other eminent scientific-technical participation to be agreed upon by the aforementioned representatives. . . . requests the aforementioned commission to recommend to the Disarmament Commission an adequate system of inspection arrangements. . . . appeals to the states concerned to agree without delay to suspend tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. . . .

- (iii) A draft resolution tabled by the Soviet Union ⁽¹¹⁾, which took the position that "the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons *would be an important practical first step* ⁽¹²⁾ towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. . . ." The resolution called upon the governments which conduct nuclear tests to conclude an agreement which would provide for their immediate suspension, and upon other states to accede to the agreement, "on the basis of the following provisions":

1. Tests shall be discontinued for a period of two or three years as from 1 January 1958;
2. An international commission, which shall report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, shall be set up to supervise the fulfilment by States of their obligation to discontinue tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons;
3. Under the direction of the aforesaid international commission control posts shall be established, on a basis of reciprocity in territory of the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, the United Kingdom and its possessions, and in the Pacific Ocean area, including Australia.

On September 25 the Soviet Union also tabled a draft resolution⁽¹³⁾ setting forth its views on the related problem of the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet resolution called upon the nuclear powers to assume a temporary obligation not to use such weapons, and proposed "that if at the end of five years no comprehensive international agreement on the disarmament problem has been reached, the question of an obligation by states to renounce the use of nuclear weapons will again be considered by the United Nations".

In connection with more general questions of disarmament, draft resolutions relating to a number of measures were tabled by India, a group of 24 sponsoring powers⁽¹⁴⁾, and Yugoslavia. The Indian draft resolution⁽¹⁵⁾ requested that the powers concerned "agree forthwith" to the appointment by the Disarmament Commission of "representatives of States holding differing views and representatives of other States to be chosen by agreement between the aforementioned representatives". The representatives so appointed would then consider and make recommendations to the Disarmament Commission on the following matters: the date from which future production of fissionable materials would be for peaceful uses only; the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons "with a view to eventual elimination of such weapons"; the dismantling

⁽¹⁰⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.176/Rev. 4

⁽¹¹⁾ UN Document A/3674/Rev. 1.

⁽¹²⁾ Italics contained in Soviet draft resolution.

⁽¹³⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.175/Rev. 1

⁽¹⁴⁾ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Italy, Laos, Liberia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America.

⁽¹⁵⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.178/Rev. 2

of stocks of such weapons and conversion of the fissionable material obtained to peaceful uses; and arrangements for inspection and control required for agreements on conventional armaments. The resolution also requested that the representatives "associate themselves with technical experts who shall be selected by agreement to advise and assist them" with regard to appropriate methods of inspection.

The 24-power draft resolution⁽¹⁶⁾, which was based on the 4-power proposals of August 29, emphasized the urgency of achieving a disarmament agreement, and welcomed the lessening of differences resulting from negotiations in the Sub-Committee. It called for a first-stage disarmament agreement which would provide for the following six measures: the immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tests under appropriate control; the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; transfers of stocks of fissionable materials from weapons to non-weapons purposes; reduction of armed forces and armaments; progressive establishment of ground and aerial inspection to guard against the possibilities of surprise attack; and the study of inspection systems to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

The Yugoslav resolution⁽¹⁷⁾ tabled on October 24 referred in its preamble to the "narrowing of differences" on a number of disarmament questions which was made possible by the work of the Sub-Committee, and emphasized the dangers to mankind resulting from nuclear weapons and the final aim of achieving a disarmament agreement which would include their prohibition and elimination. The resolution went on to state that "there is a consensus of opinion that initial partial agreements constitute in present circumstances the most effective method for achieving progress in the field of disarmament". It then put forward the following specific proposals: reduction of armed forces, armaments and military expenditures; an undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons or fissionable materials for military use to other countries; cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, together with gradual transfers of existing stocks from military to non-weapons uses; measures to ensure that intercontinental ballistic missiles and other "devices for outer space motion" will be used for peaceful and scientific purposes only; and adequate and effective measures of control and inspection.

The disarmament debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly began on October 10 with a general discussion of the problems before the Committee, during which statements by 47 representatives were heard. In his statement, the Canadian representative, Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, again emphasized the necessity of making at least a start towards disarmament. Referring to the Prime Minister's speech before the General Assembly, in which the anxiety of the Canadian Government over the development of increasingly dangerous weapons was made clear, Mr. Smith expressed Canadian determination "to prove, before it is too late, that statecraft has not lagged too far behind science". He continued as follows:

All of us in this room and all our governments must continue to search for sure means to secure the peace of the world. Yet as we survey the antagonisms which rend the

¹⁶ UN Document A/C.1/L. 179

¹⁷ UN Document A/C.1/L. 180

world we find an array of well-nigh overwhelming problems. It would be idle to suppose that at this session of the General Assembly we can bring about a settlement of all these controversies. We may hope, nevertheless, that our endeavours will serve to start a reversal in the trend of world events so that we may, as we are pledged to do under the Charter—"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". When those words were written, despite the appalling devastation which a global war had wrought, those at San Francisco in 1945 could not realize that soon means of destruction would be created which would make us uncertain that the world would ever see those succeeding generations. We have indeed a more fundamental task than that envisaged in the Charter—not merely to save the world from the scourge of war but to save the world from destruction.

As some representatives have rightly said, our debate in this assembly is not merely about disarmament, but about human survival. We have yet to prove that we are capable of the radical adjustment in our thinking which the modern age demands. We are still using, Mr. Chairman, the outworn vocabulary of international rivalry in the age of intercontinental missiles and the beginning of ventures into outer space. Modern science requires us to achieve a solidarity of purpose as human beings in the great venture of exploring these new developments in science for the benefit of mankind.

The Soviet Union makes a simple appeal—ban the use of nuclear weapons altogether, or for five years, and then eliminate them entirely. And, I must confess, in common with many others throughout the world, that this proposition has an immediate attraction and appeal. An end to any possibility of the use of nuclear weapons is certainly our objective. Why then, it is fair to ask, can we not now accept this simple appeal? The answer is that a promise not to use nuclear weapons is good only until one nation decides to break it. There is at present no reliable means of ensuring the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

A disarmament agreement must be based on something more substantial than mere promises. All nations must know (and be able to rely on that knowledge) that other nations will not continue to keep and develop such weapons in spite of their pledged word to get rid of them. We must be convinced that no nation is planning or preparing the destruction or crippling of another and each of the nations must, by its deeds and not by mere declarations, persuade the other nations of the world that its weapons will never be used except for defence. We must have mutual trust and confidence, but it must be based on the cold, hard terms of a binding agreement under which real safeguards have been established. If the nations of the world had the faith in one another on which moral obligations without such safeguards would have to depend, they would not now be caught in the dire armaments race.

Throughout the United Nations disarmament talks the URSS has been notably reluctant to come to grips with the question of inspection. Instead, they have frequently accused other countries of using arguments of inspection as an excuse for avoiding disarmament. We were considerably encouraged by the fact that at least in principle the Soviet attitude on controls in the last year or so had improved considerably, and I believe this was a major factor in the hopes during the past year that at least a partial disarmament agreement might be soon achieved. It was, therefore, with deep dismay that we heard in the latest Soviet pronouncement the same old contemptuous reference to the guarantees of inspection and control which mark the difference between empty declarations and serious disarmament undertakings.

I know that the deep suspicions which divide the great nations today make any agreement on inspection and controls slow and difficult, but countries which are genuinely peaceful in their intentions and whose armed forces and armaments are honestly defensive and not aggressive, should be able to accept this essential condition of disarmament. As my Prime Minister put it, "If you have nothing to hide, why hide it?" Canada, for example, has agreed to open its territory to whatever inspection may be mutually accepted by the parties to a disarmament agreement. We have explicitly agreed to aerial inspection of all or part of our country under a fair and equitable system for warning against surprise attack. Soviet spokesmen have rather sarcastically written off inspection of Canada's arctic regions (included in one of the zones suggested), but this area is of course significant in this context, both as a possible route of surprise attack and as an area for a beginning of such inspection which would be free of some of the complications of more heavily populated regions.

Even if we are agreed in principle on the necessity for controls, there are innumerable questions of technical detail which would need clarification and agreement. The

immense amount of work still to be done in this field was strikingly illustrated by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in his statement in the general debate when he listed many of the vital inspection questions to which we would need to find exact answers.

By the will of the United Nations, Canada has accepted the obligation to serve on the Sub-Committee in the hope of making some contribution to the disarmament problem. While the great powers represented on the Sub-Committee, which have the responsibility and power associated with the production of nuclear weapons, must play a decisive part in reaching an agreement, other countries, which, like Canada, do not produce such weapons, have the right and the duty to express their views on an issue which, as I said earlier, affects all mankind. To some extent Canada, the only smaller country on the Sub-Committee, shares the point of view of the majority of member states which might be classed as middle or smaller powers. During the course of this debate we have already heard from many delegations not represented on the Sub-Committee, thoughtful and important statements on disarmament. To name only a few, Mr. Chairman, the delegations of Japan, Belgium, India and of Mexico in their interventions have called attention to significant aspects of this problem. We have also heard the significant statement of the great powers and particularly the lucid and cogent exposition of M. Moch yesterday morning.

Following the lead of some of these earlier statements, we must come to grips with the real difficulties which now beset disarmament negotiations. Recriminations and reshaping of old controversies, from whichever side put forward, are in our opinion inappropriate. The issue is too grave to furnish material for propaganda points.

In this connection, I am bound to say that our delegation deplures certain statements contained in the speech by the Soviet Representative in this Committee. They are, I suggest, unworthy of this debate. I refer in particular to Mr. Gromyko's implication in his speech in this Committee that the Western democracies were responsible for the second world war. While I do not wish to dwell on the ill-fated German-Soviet Pact which did so much to launch that war I must say again that we consider these communist attempts to falsify history as out of place in discussion of the disarmament issue.

When we begin to examine the essential problems before us, we must face the fact that the world failed in its efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons at a time when the inspection necessary to guarantee such an undertaking presented considerably less difficulty than it does today. The distinguished representative of India has commented on the absence from the twenty-four power draft resolution of reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The explanation, of course, is that this particular draft resolution deals with those limited objectives in disarmament which could be achieved at once or soon. Unfortunately the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, for which there are at present no adequate safeguards, cannot be regarded as immediately attainable. Nevertheless we have not abandoned as a goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If the means of inspection adequate to guarantee such an undertaking can be devised it would certainly be part of my government's recommendation for a comprehensive disarmament agreement. But, I reiterate, it is not helpful to approach this goal by way of unsubstantiated declarations and unenforceable agreements such as a promise never to use nuclear weapons.

Our immediate responsibility now is to do whatever may be possible to decrease stockpiles of such weapons and to ensure the use of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. We do believe that a beginning could be made in this direction. At the same time, and I emphasize this point, constructive efforts must continue through the United Nations to reduce world tension and to solve dangerous problems as they arise and so to make certain that these weapons of terrible destruction are never used. At this point, although I do not for a moment suggest any political conditions for the first stage disarmament plan which we espouse, we are again up against the inevitable link between progress on disarmament and progress on the other difficult international issues which divide the world. Disarmament in any comprehensive sense must go in step with settlement of these other grave international problems. Without any slackening of our efforts to make a beginning in disarmament we must also seize every opportunity for settlement of these other problems. One of the ways in which the United Nations has already made a great contribution to world peace has been the provision of neutral and impartial United Nations observation or inspection forces in tense and troubled areas. The United Nations must be ready whenever appropriate situations arise—and

of course whenever the circumstances are favourable—to consider further action of this kind which at the very least inhibits dangerous movements of forces and may even save the peace of the world and thus give us the time and the atmosphere in which to continue disarmament negotiations. I need hardly add that Canada has always made a full contribution to United Nations undertakings of this sort.

It has been our wish in the Canadian Delegation to participate in a constructive approach to this central question of international security and in our participation, I repeat, we have the role of a middle power. We believe that there are many measures of disarmament which are capable of inspection and control and which could genuinely add to our security because all participating countries could be reasonably sure that other states are living up to their obligations. Among these measures are reductions in forces and conventional armaments and also agreement to provide that henceforth all production of fissionable materials will be solely for peaceful purposes. These are two of the main themes in the draft resolution before the Assembly co-sponsored by four members of the Sub-Committee and a large number of other nations.

Two other measures, included in that resolution, could do a great deal to allay our present anxieties. These are, first, a suspension of testing of nuclear weapons, particularly the largest scale hydrogen weapons, and secondly, some variant of the several proposals which have been made for a system of advance warning against surprise attack by means of reciprocal air and ground inspection. The delegation of India has tabled proposals for scientific commissions to go into some of the detailed problems of inspection and control. These suggestions merit careful examination, particularly with reference to the last two measures.

Canada is one of the sponsors of the twenty-four power resolution I have mentioned. We urge its adoption. Nevertheless we must remain sensitive to every possibility of improving it. Let us not be inflexible. We of Canada certainly do not say that the particular proposals with which we are now associated are the only means by which at least some progress can be made towards disarmament.

The Soviet Delegation has been particularly indifferent—even hostile—to the proposal to use all production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes. We are at a loss to understand this Soviet objection to any cut-off date on the production of weapons from fissionable material. It seems to us strange that despite their many declarations in favour of "banning the bomb" and prohibiting its use, they are not more interested in finding a workable proposal for stopping the manufacture of such weapons, particularly when such a proposal is preceded as it would be under our resolution by the suspension of test explosions.

Speakers in this debate have properly devoted considerable attention to suggestions for suspension of tests of nuclear weapons with suitable control posts and technical equipment in the areas where such tests have been made. The latest proposals in the Sub-Committee which I have mentioned and which Canada co-sponsored, do provide for suspension of tests as the very first thing to be done in our plan for initial steps of disarmament. Under this plan tests could be suspended for two years. The Assembly should note that the sponsors of this proposal have made a real effort to match the proper international concern about the testing of nuclear weapons. As you are all aware, Canada does not produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have not ourselves conducted any of these tests. Thus, we are in this respect in the same position as the great majority of the other nations represented here. Whatever the correct view may be as to the possible harmful effects of radiation and fallout, I think none of us would want to discount the anxiety on this score felt by the peoples of all nations. However, in the present international circumstances of tension and fear, it is inevitable, unless we do something now, that the major powers will seek to augment and improve their weapons, and this involves tests. While we are certainly not opposed to any fair and reciprocal measures to be taken as soon as possible with respect to the tests of nuclear weapons, we are also convinced that some more fundamental action must also be agreed upon and must be taken.

We all have this much in common, that we share an interest in survival. Let us then so order our endeavours that we may ensure that the engines which are capable of putting our survival in hazard are made the servants and not the masters of man. But if the wonderful devices for harnessing the forces of nature which science has contrived are to be used to alleviate and not to increase human misery and destitution, we must organize political machinery which will direct these discoveries into the ways of peace. I cannot believe that this is a simple matter which can be done by the stroke

of a pen or the passage of a resolution. But I am convinced that such an achievement is within our capacity and within our grasp.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I ask seriously this question. What is the alternative? Are we once again to end our discussions in deadlock? We should ask ourselves each of us, have we all really faced up to the meaning of this for the peoples of the world—for all mankind? Prime Minister Diefenbaker, in participating in the general debate, concluded his statement in the general debate with the heartfelt wish that this Assembly might become known in future years as the Disarmament Assembly. My final word is a plea directed primarily to the great powers, which must bear the main responsibilities, for at least a beginning in actual measures of disarmament. Canada has co-sponsored plans for partial disarmament but I repeat we do not regard them as necessarily the last word. Further negotiations in the interests of world peace is the bounden duty of all of us. At the beginning the experience gained and the confidence created by our first steps in disarmament—however limited—could lead us on towards our goal which is the elimination of nuclear weapons. The stake is the very survival of the human race.

Following the general debate, discussion of specific proposals began on October 31. A total of eight meetings was devoted to the consideration of the ten draft resolutions and amendments to them which were before the Committee.

When advocating the Soviet resolution calling for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission composed of all members of the United Nations, the Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, stated that experience had shown that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub Committee "are unable to achieve any progress in the solution of the disarmament problem". The Soviet Union believed, he continued, that the question of disarmament "must be permanently under the supervision of all states of the world", and it was this belief that had motivated the submission of their proposal. Under conditions in which "all attempts to make use of the Disarmament Sub-Committee for productive work have been entirely exhausted", the Soviet Union could see no sense in further participation in its work, and would not take part in the deliberations of either the Commission or its Sub-Committee in their present composition.

Speaking shortly after Mr. Kuznetsov, the Canadian representative, Mr. Wallace Nesbitt, M.P., stated that the Canadian Delegation was "shocked and disappointed by this ultimatum from the USSR, in view of the manifest desire of this Committee to make progress on the great issue of disarmament". In a further intervention on November 6, Mr. Nesbitt elaborated the Canadian position on proposals to change the existing United Nations machinery for disarmament negotiations. The Canadian Delegation, he said, did not believe that

the size or composition of the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee has been a major obstacle in the way of agreement. But, by the same token we do not believe that a matter of some alteration in United Nations disarmament bodies need inevitably be allowed to stand in the way of at least the opportunity for further negotiation.

The attitude of the Canadian Delegation on this matter is not something new. While we have, of course, taken into account all the views expressed in this Committee, our fundamental approach to a possible change in disarmament bodies was defined by Prime Minister Diefenbaker in his statement in the General Debate on September 23. He made it clear at that time that we were certainly not opposed in principle to associating other countries with these disarmament talks if there was any chance that this would improve the prospects of success. If, however, the very possibility of continuing the negotiations at all is now jeopardized, then a willingness to accept some reasonable adjustment is all the more essential.

Our Committee's assessment of the importance of suggested alterations of disarmament bodies cannot be unaffected by the Soviet statement of two days ago announcing refusal to serve on the Commission and Sub-Committee as now constituted. But our

own attitude, as I have said, was indicated long before this statement. Indeed I am confident that many other members of the Committee will share our view that we do not intend to be bludgeoned by the arbitrary Soviet attitude into jettisoning the machinery set up by the United Nations for dealing with disarmament. The unilateral Soviet pronouncement shows very little respect for the organs created by the United Nations General Assembly. No single great power has a right to take it on itself to disrupt United Nations bodies. As I have said earlier we also regard the Soviet proposal for an 82-member disarmament commission as destructive of any serious negotiation.

Nevertheless, I would urge members of this Committee to consider the importance of having further negotiations on disarmament among the major powers. Surely we should not end this Assembly without progress towards agreement between opposing views on the substance of disarmament, and even without any working machinery, acceptable to all the major powers, for carrying on the negotiations. However, if such a situation arose, heavy responsibility would attach to the arbitrary position adopted by the USSR.

Voting on the draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee took place on November 6. The twenty-four power draft resolution referred to above ⁽¹⁸⁾ was voted on first, and was adopted by fifty-seven votes in favour (including Canada), nine against (Soviet bloc), and fifteen abstentions. In its final form, the resolution ⁽¹⁹⁾ included, in addition to the six points noted above, three amendments proposed by India, by a group of Latin American states, and by Norway and Pakistan. The Indian amendment ⁽²⁰⁾ inserted in the preamble a reference to General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) of November 4, 1954; the Latin American amendment ⁽²¹⁾ added an operative paragraph inviting the States concerned to consider the possibility of devoting additional resources to the improvement of living conditions from the funds made available by disarmament; the joint amendment of Norway and Pakistan included additional operative paragraphs according to which the Sub-Committee would establish a group or groups of technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures which may be agreed in principle.

The Belgian resolution ⁽²²⁾ described above was adopted by seventy votes in favour (including Canada), nine against (Soviet bloc) and two abstentions. The Belgian Delegation had previously accepted the inclusion of a Polish amendment ⁽²³⁾ which made a slight alteration to the preamble of the resolution.

Of the remaining draft resolutions, four were not adopted, and four were not pressed to a vote. The Indian draft resolution on nuclear weapons tests ⁽²⁴⁾, the Japanese proposal on the same question ⁽²⁵⁾, the Soviet proposal for a temporary renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons ⁽²⁶⁾, and the Soviet draft resolution calling for the replacement of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee by an 82-member disarmament commission ⁽²⁷⁾ were all rejected. The other four draft resolutions noted above were not pressed to a vote.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Page 15.

⁽¹⁹⁾ UN Document A/C.2/L.179

⁽²⁰⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.182

⁽²¹⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.184

⁽²²⁾ Final text in UN Doc. A/3630/Corr.1

⁽²³⁾ UN Document A/C.1/L.185

⁽²⁴⁾ See above, page 14. The vote on the resolution was 22 in favour, 32 against (including Canada), with 20 abstentions.

⁽²⁵⁾ Ibid, page 13. The vote on the resolution was 18 in favour, 32 against (including Canada), with 31 abstentions.

⁽²⁶⁾ Ibid, page 14. The vote on the resolution was 11 in favour, 45 against (including Canada), with 25 abstentions.

⁽²⁷⁾ Ibid, page 13. The vote on the resolution was 9 in favour (Soviet bloc), 51 against (including Canada), with 21 abstentions.

The General Assembly met on November 14 to begin its consideration of the report of the First Committee on the question of disarmament. Besides the draft resolutions recommended by the Committee, the General Assembly had before it a proposal co-sponsored by Canada and Japan calling for the expansion of the Disarmament Commission by ten members⁽²⁸⁾. India and the Soviet Union, in addition, reintroduced proposals which had been rejected by the Committee.

The first of the draft resolutions recommended to the Assembly—the Belgian proposal for “collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world” of the dangers of the armaments race and the effects of modern weapons⁽²⁹⁾—was passed on November 14 by a vote of seventy-one in favour (including Canada) and nine against (Soviet bloc), with one abstention.

The second, the 24-power draft resolution discussed above⁽³⁰⁾, was also put to a vote on November 14. Speaking shortly before the vote, the Canadian representative expressed his expectation that “the Committee’s recommendation can speedily be adopted”. The Delegation of Canada, he continued,

strongly recommends the overwhelming adoption of the resolution. . . . We co-sponsored this draft resolution in the First Committee and we feel that it represents a realistic and practicable first step towards disarmament. It consists of disarmament proposals which are feasible and acceptable in the present world situation without any political or other considerations. It is not a one-sided document. Although the U.S.S.R. has not supported this draft resolution, we cannot see that it contains anything inconsistent with the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union.

In the ensuing discussion, a number of delegations lent their support to the 24-power draft resolution. The Soviet representative again insisted, to the contrary, that it would “drive the disarmament problem further into an inextricable deadlock” and that it could not “serve as a basis for negotiations”. The resolution was then put to a vote and adopted by fifty-seven votes in favour (including Canada) and nine against (Soviet bloc), with fourteen absences.

The reintroduced Indian proposal on the question of nuclear tests⁽³¹⁾, was rejected on November 19 by twenty-four votes in favour and thirty-four against (including Canada), with twenty absences.

An amendment to the Canadian-Japanese proposal on the expansion of the Disarmament Commission was introduced by India, Sweden and Yugoslavia which called for a further addition of four members to the ten already proposed as additions to the Commission⁽³²⁾. The amendment was accepted by Canada and Japan, which were then joined by its three sponsors and Paraguay as co-sponsors of a revised resolution calling for the expansion of the Commission by fourteen members⁽³³⁾. Speaking as a co-sponsor of the resolution, the Canadian representative, Mr. W. A. Nesbitt, M.P., emphasized the hope of the Canadian Delegation that it would receive wide support. He spoke, in part, as follows:

“We now have before us a draft resolution on the expansion of the Disarmament Commission which Canada is pleased to co-sponsor in association with the delegations of Japan, India, Paraguay, Sweden and Yugoslavia. . . .

⁽²⁸⁾ UN Document A/L.231. The ten additional members proposed for 1953 were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, India, Italy, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

⁽²⁹⁾ See above, pages 13 and 20. Final text, as adopted, (UN Document A/RES/1149(XII) at Annex V.

⁽³⁰⁾ *Ibid*, pages 15 and 20. Final text, as adopted, (UN Document (A/RES/1148(XII) at Annex VI.

⁽³¹⁾ *Ibid*, pages 14 and 20.

⁽³²⁾ UN Document A/L.234. For 1953 the four additional members proposed were Egypt, Mexico, Norway and Poland.

⁽³³⁾ UN Document A/L.231/Rev. 1 and Add. 1.

Our joint resolution now provides for enlarging the Disarmament Commission by the addition of 14 member states, and provides further that for the first year, from January 1958 to January 1959, these 14 states shall be Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The resolution also requires the transmission to the Disarmament Commission of the records of the proceedings of the First Committee at which disarmament was discussed. . . .

In the various discussions which have taken place in recent days, many different ideas for solving this problem have been put forward, and we have always been prepared to consider any reasonable and constructive ideas on their merit. It is my firm conviction that the suggestion contained in the draft resolution now before us in the names of Canada, India, Japan, Paraguay, Sweden and Yugoslavia, represents a very well-balanced and thoroughly reasonable addition to the Disarmament Commission. We do not think that geography, and most certainly not ideology, is the main criterion for choosing these additional members. We feel that ability to make a constructive contribution to the disarmament negotiations should be the main concern. Nevertheless, the proposal which we now offer does give very fair weight to the principle of equitable distribution. It represents all the main geographical areas as well as other interests and groups with which we are concerned in U.N. matters. I feel that if this additional group of 14 members is honestly and fairly assessed, it will be found to be carefully and adequately balanced in its composition.

Our problem is not simply one of adjusting the machinery of U.N. disarmament bodies. If that were the only issue it would not have been necessary to deal with it by introducing at this late date a new proposal in the plenary session. Our problem is how to ensure that serious disarmament negotiations can go on in the future. Surely, the peoples of the world would not understand it if we ended this session of the General Assembly not only without agreement among all the major powers concerned on even a first step of disarmament, but also with a complete breakdown of the machinery for further discussions. This would be a completely backward step and would leave us worse off on this matter than before the Assembly began. Such a situation would be intolerable and would most certainly cause a great increase in fear, apprehension and tension throughout the entire world. I feel certain, Mr. Chairman, that this Assembly will not permit such a situation to arise without making a genuinely conciliatory move to do everything possible to provide a disarmament body acceptable to all of the major powers. It is my sincere and earnest belief that the proposal which Canada has the honour to co-sponsor does constitute just such a conciliatory move. I, therefore, strongly urge that our proposal be unanimously adopted by this Assembly.

I would hope that the broadly representative character of our present group of co-sponsors could be taken as some indication that our proposal will now have the Assembly's full support. The unanimous adoption of this proposal would at least open the door to further serious and constructive negotiations. It is hardly necessary for me to stress that we are still far from agreement on the desperately important matter of the actual substance of disarmament. Nevertheless, our resolution would keep alive the hope of all our peoples for a reduction of the crushing burden of armaments and a lessening of the danger of war, and all the horror and destruction which war would mean in this age of the hydrogen bomb.

I would like to close with an earnest appeal to all members of this Assembly to rally to the support of this resolution so that we can end our discussions on disarmament on a note of hope, however limited, and not give to the world a picture of division and frustration in this Assembly."

Although it had been hoped that it might be possible to obtain unanimous support for the 6-power resolution, the Soviet representative made it known that the Soviet Union would not participate in the Commission if it were expanded in this fashion. He argued in favour of the reintroduced Soviet proposal to replace the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee by a permanent disarmament commission composed of all members of the United Nations⁽³⁴⁾. When put to a vote, this proposal was rejected by nine votes in

⁽³⁴⁾ See above, pages 13 and 20.

favour (Soviet bloc) and forty-six against (including Canada), with twenty-four abstentions.

Shortly before the vote on proposals to expand the Disarmament Commission, the representative of Albania submitted a further amendment calling for the inclusion of another seven states in the list of additions⁽³⁵⁾. Speaking in support of the Albanian amendment, the Soviet representatives again insisted that the 6-power draft resolution was "completely unacceptable" and that the Soviet Union could not support it unless the Albanian amendment was also adopted. The representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland also declared that they could not support the 6-power draft resolution or participate in the work of the expanded Commission unless the states proposed in the Albanian amendment were also added to the Commission.

In the ensuing vote, the Albanian amendment was defeated by a vote of nineteen in favour and thirty-eight against (including Canada), with nineteen abstentions. The six-power draft resolution was then put to a vote and adopted by sixty in favour (including Canada) and nine against (Soviet bloc), with eleven abstentions⁽³⁶⁾.

At the conclusion of the deliberations of the General Assembly the situation thus reflected an impasse with regard to both the nature of disarmament measures and the procedures of negotiation. On the substance of the question, a very large proportion of the membership of the United Nations had endorsed the basis of the proposals submitted on August 29 by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. An even larger number had supported the procedural scheme advanced by Canada, India, Japan, Sweden and Yugoslavia for revising the membership of the Disarmament Commission. However, the Soviet Union has taken the position that it will neither accept the four-power proposals as a basis for negotiation nor participate in the work of the Commission as it is now constituted.

Annex I

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

462(XI) Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of all Armed Forces and all Armaments; conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954,

Recognizing that the achievement of an agreement on the problem of disarmament would contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Welcoming the progress made on certain aspects of the disarmament problem by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee since the tenth session of the General Assembly,

⁽³⁵⁾ UN Document A/L.236. The additional states were to be Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Roumania and Sudan.

⁽³⁶⁾ Final text as adopted, (United Nations Document A/RES/1150(XII)) at Annex VII.

1. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date;

2. *Recommends* that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee give prompt attention to the various proposals that have been submitted to the United Nations including the proposal of Canada, Japan and Norway of 18 January 1957; the comprehensive proposals of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 11 June 1954, 19 March 1956 and 3 May 1956; the proposals of the United States of America made under date of 14 January 1957; the proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made under date of 10 May 1955, 27 March 1956, 12 July 1956, 17 November 1956, 14 January 1957 and 24 January 1957; the proposals of the Government of India made under date of 25 July 1956; and the proposals of Yugoslavia of 10 July 1956; and give continued consideration to the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres;

3. *Recommends further* that the Disarmament Commission request its Sub-Committee to prepare a progress report for consideration by the Commission not later than 1 August 1957;

4. *Transmits* to the Disarmament Commission the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the problem of disarmament was discussed, with the request that the Commission and its Sub-Committee give careful and early consideration to the views expressed in those documents;

5. *Invites* the Disarmament Commission to consider the advisability of recommending that a special session of the General Assembly or a general disarmament conference be convened at the appropriate time.

*653rd plenary meeting
14 February 1957*

Annex II

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: MEMORANDUM

Proposals of the Soviet Government on the implementation of partial disarmament measures

The problem of disarmament is today vitally important. Its solution has significance of the first order for the preservation of peace. The continuation of the armaments race increases mistrust in relations between States, aggravates international tension, and intensifies the danger of the outbreak of a new war.

The most recent developments in science and technology have multiplied many times over the power of means of destruction and of the mass annihilation of human beings. The period succeeding the Second World War has been marked by rapid developments in military equipment and especially in atomic and hydrogen weapons, the explosive power of which is now equivalent to millions of tons of T.N.T. Rocket technology is being developed speedily, and modern weapons have been invented, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles with hydrogen warheads. The introduction of these types of military equipment into

the armaments of States has made vulnerable practically every point on the globe.

There can now be no doubt that the outbreak of a new war in which atomic and hydrogen weapons were used would visit extremely grave consequences on the States taking part in it, and especially on those with a high population density and a high concentration of industry. The existence in the arsenals of States of weapons of this type brings into especial prominence the question of banning atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The Governments of States, and more especially of those which possess atomic and hydrogen weapons and therefore bear special responsibility for the preservation of peace, are bound to heed the peoples' demand to end the armaments race and remove the threat of atomic war.

The continuance of the armaments race has had serious economic consequences. The ever-growing military preparations of States absorb huge resources and lay a heavy burden upon their peoples.

The United Nations Charter imposes an obligation on States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. Consequently the existence of unsettled international problems or disputes cannot be invoked to justify States in maintaining large armed forces and carrying on an armaments race. Propaganda for a new war, accompanied by incitement to enmity and hatred between peoples and pursued in certain States in violation of a General Assembly resolution, is likewise impermissible and in conflict with the United Nations Charter.

The principle of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between States with different social, economic and political systems corresponds to the vital interests of all countries, great and small.

The Soviet Government believes that the great Powers ought to take without delay measures to decrease the existing tension in international relations and the danger due to the existence of huge armed forces and armaments, to the incessant armaments race, particularly in atomic and hydrogen weapons, and to the continuance of propaganda for a new war.

Considering that cessation of the armaments race will not only remove the danger of the outbreak of a new war but will also relieve the peoples of a heavy economic burden and enable the resources thus freed to be used to improve their welfare,

Recognizing the necessity of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme, including the complete and unconditional prohibition of the use and manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of those weapons, which would ensure that all production of atomic materials was used exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Taking into account that the Western Powers are not at present prepared to conclude an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme, and desiring to release the disarmament issue from its present deadlock.

Considering also that the implementation of partial measures as a first step in disarmament could contribute to the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme,

Recognizing that the necessity of taking urgent and effective measures to preserve peace calls for a united effort and for agreement, especially between those States which possess the largest armed forces and produce atomic and hydrogen weapons,

The Soviet Government proposes that the Governments of the States represented in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission should reach an agreement on partial disarmament measures.

Proposals for such partial measures, with necessary explanations and comments, are set out hereinafter.

1. The United States proposes that for the present an agreement on conventional armaments shall be limited to an agreement to reduce armed forces to 2.5 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union and to 750,000 men each for the United Kingdom and France, and to reduce armaments and military budgets by 10 per cent; but the United States declines to agree in advance to make a further major reduction in armed forces to the levels, proposed by itself, of 1-1.5 million men for itself and the Soviet Union and 650,000 men for the United Kingdom and France, or to take measures to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons.

During the last year and a half the Soviet Union has reduced its armed forces by 1,840,000 men, whereas the levels of the armed forces of the Western Powers have remained practically unchanged during that period. The United States proposal to limit reduction of armed forces to 2.5 million men for itself and the Soviet Union, in the absence of an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme and regardless of the unequal situation of the two States, gives an advantage to one side at the expense of the other. It cannot be ignored that the Soviet Union has a territory much larger than, for example, that of the United States, and lengthy frontiers the protection of which requires proportionately numerous armed forces. Most particularly, it cannot be ignored that the security of the Soviet Union is threatened in the west by the North Atlantic bloc, in the south by the Baghdad Pact grouping, and in Asia and the Far East by the Baghdad Pact grouping and the SEATO military bloc.

The position of the United States, whose territory is smaller and whose frontiers are shorter than those of the Soviet Union, is entirely different. The crux of the matter is that the frontiers of the United States are in no danger. To the east and the west the United States is separated from other countries by oceans, extending many thousands of kilometres, and to the north and the south it adjoins States from which, according to its own admission, it does not anticipate any danger. There is no need to prove at length that the United States of America has not been and is not now threatened by the Soviet Union.

It appears from the foregoing that, whereas a reduction of armed forces to 2.5 million men would not only give the United States security, but also enable it to maintain large armed forces outside its frontiers in foreign territories, the reduction of the Soviet armed forces to that level would impair the security of the Soviet Union, whose frontiers, unlike those the United States, are not protected by natural obstacles and are also over a considerable length common with those of countries belonging to the aforesaid military groupings.

The situation would be different if the United States, the Soviet Union and China agreed to reduce their armed forces at the second stage to 1-1.5

million men, and the United Kingdom and France to reduce theirs to 650,000 men. Such a substantial reduction of the armed forces of these Powers, together with prohibition of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, would mean that progress was being made towards effective disarmament and towards peace.

It follows that the United States, in proposing equal levels of 2.5 million men for the armed forces of the Soviet Union and for its own, is not displaying a realistic approach to the solution of the problem of reducing the armed forces of Powers, in particular those of the Soviet Union and the United States, the more so since this measure is proposed without reference to any further reductions of armed forces or to any measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The Soviet Union stands, as before, for the radical solution of the disarmament problem—that is, for the conclusion of an agreement on a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States, and also on prohibition of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Soviet Government has submitted a proposal for that purpose to the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Government has already announced its acceptance of the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men and of the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men each, as a first step towards further reductions in the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and China to 1-1.5 million men and of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 men. It is understood in both cases that the strength of the armed forces is to include personnel employed in the armed forces as civilians but in fact serving military installations and equipment. The Government of the Soviet Union still proposes that an agreement should be concluded to reduce the armed forces of the four Powers to the aforesaid levels in two stages.

2. In connection with the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to 2.5 million men and those of the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men, the United States is proposing that the conventional armaments and military budgets of States reducing their armed forces should be cut by 10 per cent. The Soviet Union would consider it advisable to reduce conventional armaments and military budgets during the first period of the execution of measures for the reduction of armed forces by a greater percentage—by 15 per cent—which would substantially reduce the burden of military expenditure borne by the peoples of all countries.

The size of further reductions in armaments and military budgets could be considered at a later stage.

3. The execution of the measures proposed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above should be placed under appropriate international control. During the first stage, embracing measures for the reduction of the armed forces of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men and those of the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men, the functions of control will include the collection and analysis of information provided by States on their implementation of partial disarmament measures. Those functions should be performed, as agreed by the parties, by a control organ established for the purpose under the Security Council.

Moreover, even during the first stage control posts are to be established on the territory of States, on a basis of reciprocity, at large ports, at railway junctions and on main motor highways, to ensure that there is no dangerous concentration of armed forces and armaments. The list of the points at which control posts are to be established will be settled by later agreement. However, since we are now concerned with the implementation of partial measures only, the solution of the problem of control posts should be modified accordingly. During the first stage, control posts should be established only in the western border regions of the Soviet Union, in the territories of France, the United Kingdom and other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty, and in the eastern part of the United States.

Control posts may also be established, by agreement with other States, in territories belonging to them lying within the aerial photography zone.

The establishment of control posts at aerodromes is proposed during the second stage of the implementation of the partial measures (when the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are reduced to 1-1.5 million men and those of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 men). The establishment of control posts at aerodromes must also be related to an agreement on appropriate measures for the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States.

4. Simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the reduction of armed forces, armaments and military expenditure provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, an agreement is to be reached on atomic and hydrogen weapons, which owing to their enormous destructive power constitute a particular danger. Accordingly States should give, before the peoples of the world, a solemn undertaking to renounce the use for military purposes of atomic and hydrogen weapons of all types, including aerial bombs, rockets carrying atomic or hydrogen warheads, irrespective of range, atomic artillery, etc. This undertaking, given in the form of a declaration (see appendix), would come into force from the beginning of the first stage of the implementation of measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

The States parties to the agreement would give an undertaking to make every effort to conclude an agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, their elimination from the arsenals of States, the cessation of their production and the destruction of their stockpiles.

In view of the particular urgency of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, it is advisable at present to single out this measure from the general atomic and hydrogen weapons problem as one of high priority, and to solve it without delay.

5. One of the causes of tension in relations between States is the presence of military bases in foreign territory. When it is realized that there are dozens, even hundreds, of military bases in foreign territory, it is not difficult to appreciate their detrimental influence upon relations between States.

The presence of military bases in foreign territory has of late greatly intensified suspicion and tension, particularly since atomic military formations are stationed, or it is planned to station such formations, at many of them: a fact which gives grounds for viewing these activities as actual preparation for a war in which atomic and hydrogen weapons would be used. This situation

represents a serious threat to the peace and security of peoples, for even the slightest carelessness may have fatal consequences for the peoples. Apart from this, such activities on the part of the United States cannot but lead, in the natural course of events, to counter-measures by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government therefore proposes that the question of abolishing military bases in foreign territory should be examined and that it should first be agreed which such bases can be abolished within one or two years.

6. In its statement of 17 November 1956 the Soviet Union proposed that the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of Germany should be reduced by one-third as compared with the levels of those armed forces obtaining on 31 December 1956. The Soviet Union believes that such a reduction would do much to ease international tension, and especially to improve the situation in Europe, and thus to facilitate the solution of the problem of disarmament.

7. The Soviet Government considers that an agreement to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of the NATO countries and the armed forces of the Soviet Union stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries would be of great significance in lessening international tension. The size of the reductions in the armed forces of those countries could be determined in the course of subsequent negotiations.

8. In its statement of 17 November 1956, the Soviet Government proposed that consideration should be given to the question of employing aerial photography within the area of Europe in which the principal armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and of the Warsaw Treaty countries are stationed, to a depth of 800 kilometres east and west of the demarcation line between the aforementioned armed forces, provided that the States concerned give their consent. In proposing this area for aerial photographic operations the Soviet Union proceeded on the principle that the line separating the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc from those of the Warsaw Treaty countries follows the demarcation line in Germany and then the western frontiers of Czechoslovakia.

The representative of the United States of America in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission proposed the use of aerial photography in Europe, in a sector bounded to the west by longitude 5° E., to the east by longitude 30° E. and to the south by latitude 45° N. If the area of aerial photography is determined in this way, the median line is moved from the demarcation line in Germany and the western frontiers of Czechoslovakia into Poland—in other words, it is moved arbitrarily to the east. This plan for aerial inspection in Europe covers only a small part of the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, and a substantial proportion of that of the Warsaw Treaty countries. It is true that the northern part of this area includes the territory of Norway but, as is known, the principal NATO forces are not stationed in the territory of that country.

The Soviet Union is, nevertheless, prepared to agree to aerial reconnaissance being carried out within the sector of Europe proposed by the United States, but with the proviso that the line bisecting the aerial photographic sector should run near the demarcation line in Germany, and that in the north the sector proposed by the United States should not extend beyond the parallel passing

through the northernmost point of the demarcation line in Germany, and in the south should be bounded by the parallel passing through the southernmost point of Albania. A sector bounded to the west by the zero meridian, to the east by longitude 25° E., to the north by latitude 54° N., and to the south by latitude 39°38' N. would meet the requirements of this principle.

As to the area of aerial inspection in the Far East, the United States Government proposes a sector extending from longitude 140° W. to 160° E. and bounded to the south by latitude 45° N. The Soviet Government considers that the area of aerial photography could be expanded considerably by including in it: (a) the territory of the Soviet Union east of longitude 108° E., and (b) the territory of the United States west of longitude 90° W. It should be noted that the two areas of aerial photography are approximately equal in extent (the U.S.S.R. area being 7,129,000 sq. km. and the United States area 7,063,000 sq. km.).

As soon as an agreement on partial measures entered into force a limited number of control posts could be set up at railway junctions, on motor highways and at ports in the areas of aerial photography in Europe and the Far East.

9. Propaganda for war and incitement to war, and especially the propaganda carried on in certain countries for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against certain States, are playing no small part in straining relations between States and kindling animosity and hatred between peoples.

The resolution on the prohibition of propaganda for war, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947, is not being observed. Only the Soviet Union and some other States have passed legislation against propaganda for war. The absence of such legislation in other countries creates a favourable soil for fanning militarist passions and war hysteria. To ease international tensions and lessen the danger of war, appropriate measures should be taken to put an end to propaganda for war.

It is also inadmissible that in certain States the ideological struggle is being allowed to enter into relations between States. To end a situation in which ideological disputes and differences are used as a means for straining relations between States, there is urgent need for an agreement under which States would undertake not to allow their ideological differences to enter into relations between States.

* * *

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the proposals set forth in this memorandum will be duly considered by the Governments of the countries represented in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and that a mutually acceptable agreement on the points raised in these proposals will be found.

Appendix to Annex II**DECLARATION**

on measures for strengthening universal peace and the security of the peoples

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATES WHOSE REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SIGNED THIS DECLARATION,

Taking into account the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, which if used for military purposes can cause to humanity untold sufferings and destruction and lead to mass annihilation of the civilian population, the demolition of towns, and the mass destruction of other articles of material and cultural value, created by the labour of the peoples,

Assume, as a first step towards the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, a solemn obligation not to use for military purposes atomic or hydrogen weapons of any type, including atomic and hydrogen aerial bombs, rockets fitted with atomic or hydrogen warheads, irrespective of range, atomic artillery, etc.,

Will continue their efforts to conclude as soon as possible an agreement on the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States, the discontinuance of their manufacture and the destruction of their stockpiles, together with transfer of fissionable materials for use exclusively for peaceful purposes.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS DECLARATION,

Taking into account that, in spite of the General Assembly resolution adopted unanimously in 1947 condemning all forms of propaganda "designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression", a number of States openly continue to conduct propaganda for a new war, and the incitement to war, so far from being halted, is even intensified in the press, in broadcasts and in public statements, with a particular preponderance in recent times of appeals for atomic war,

Taking into account also that there exist in the world States with different social, economic and political systems, in which different ideological outlooks prevail,

Recognizing that close co-operation among States with different social systems and ideologies is possible not only in economic, scientific and cultural but also in political matters, and that especially clear evidence thereof appeared during the Second World War,

Recognizing also that the development of peaceful co-operation among States in all fields accords with the principles of the United Nations and meets the vital interests of all the peoples,

Considering that ideological differences ought not to enter into relations between States,

Assume an obligation to take the necessary measures to put an end to incitement to war and to all forms of war propaganda intended or likely to provoke or encourage a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; and

To found their relations with all the countries of the world on the principle of peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their social systems, and to take in accordance with this principle appropriate measures to prevent ideological conflict from entering into relations between States.

The Parties call upon all the other countries of the world to subscribe to this Declaration.

Annex III

USSR: PROPOSAL ON THE CESSATION OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS PRESENTED AT THE SUB-COMMITTEE'S MEETING OF 14 JUNE 1957

1. The Soviet Government, animated by the desire to achieve the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests without delay in the interests of all countries and peoples, and having regard to the opposition of the Western Powers to the complete cessation of such tests, has declared its readiness to agree to the temporary suspension of such tests.

The Soviet Government proposes that we should now agree upon the immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, if only for a period of two or three years. The suspension of tests for the period we propose would constitute a practical step towards halting the atomic armaments race. Any period shorter than that proposed by us for the suspension of tests would have no practical significance and would do nothing effective to stop the atomic armaments race; for it is common knowledge that preparations for the holding of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests require a considerable time.

2. Considering that the problem of control over the cessation of these tests is now being advanced as the main obstacle to the attainment of an agreement on this matter the Soviet Government, with a view to removing that obstacle, expresses its agreement to the institution of control over the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. For this purpose we propose the establishment of an international commission to supervise the fulfilment by States of their obligation to cease tests of atomic and hydrogen bombs. That commission, as already indicated in the Soviet Government's proposal of 10 May 1955, should report to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union Government proposes the establishment, on a basis of reciprocity, of control posts in the territory of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom and in the Pacific Ocean area for the purpose of supervising the fulfilment by States of their obligation to cease tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Annex IV

CANADA, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA**Working Paper: Proposals for partial measures of disarmament****I. The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments**

A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention, the following States will restrict or reduce their armed forces respectively to the maximum limits indicated below:

France	750,000
United Kingdom	750,000
Soviet Union	2,500,000
United States	2,500,000

The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.

B. During this same period, these States will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an International Control Organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention.

C. The relation of other States to the convention, including the agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.

D. The States listed in paragraph I A will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condition that:

1. Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been verified to their satisfaction.
2. There has been progress toward the solution of political issues.
3. Other essential States have become parties to the convention and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits set out in paragraphs A and B above.

E. Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be undertaken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

F. Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would be 650,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

G. Upon the conditions cited in D above, these States will also be prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calculation of any such armament limitations will be in agreed relation to the armed forces determined in paragraphs E and F above and will be completed prior to the application of

the further limitations in armed forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed the quantities thus allowed in each category.

H. No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments beyond those provided for in paragraphs A and B above will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately expanded and is able to verify such measures.

II. *Military Expenditure*

In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of paragraph I, and looking forward to the reduction of military expenditures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agree to make available to the International Control Organization information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter. The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance and annexed to the convention.

III. *Nuclear Weapons*

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence.

IV. *The Control of Fissionable Material*

A. The parties to the convention further undertake:

1. That all future production of fissionable materials will be used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclusively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning one month after the International Board of Control described in paragraph VIII has certified that the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.
2. That they will co-operate in the prompt installation and in the maintenance of such an inspection system.
3. That for the purpose of accomplishing the above undertakings, the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as possible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a progress report for their approval within the first ten months after the entry into force of the convention.

B. The parties which are producers of fissionable material for weapons purposes at the time of cessation of production for weapons purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for equitable transfers, in successive increments, of fissionable materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad, including stockpiling; and, in this connection

1. To fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
2. To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios following the cut-off date for production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes provided in paragraph IV A 1:

1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III.
2. Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissionable material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapons purposes.

V. *Nuclear Weapons Testing*

A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as may be necessary, with the consent of the Governments concerned.

B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will meet as soon as possible to design the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.

C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspension for a further period under effective international inspection.

D. If the inspection system referred to in paragraph V A is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes agreed to under Paragraph IV A 1 above, all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been put into effect.

E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to announce and register in advance the dates of each series and the range of total energy to be released therein; to provide for limited observation of them; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

VI. *The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space*

All parties to the convention agree that within three months after the entry into effect of the convention they will co-operate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

VII. Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack

A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties concerned will co-operate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.

B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is proposed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee be set up at once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.

C. With regard to inspection in the Western Hemisphere and in the Soviet Union the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose the following:

1. That all the territory of the continental United States, all Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.
2. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe, referred to in paragraph D below, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

D. With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection.

E. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, then, under the same proviso expressed above, a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the understanding that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

F. The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

G. Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the States concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones

described in paragraphs C 1 and 2, but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the agreement with in all cases the concurrence of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.

H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention, the parties will provide to the Board of Control inventories of their fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and within such additional area or areas as may be agreed.

I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger of surprise attack from anywhere.

VIII. *The International Control Organization*

A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.

B. All the control and inspection services described in the convention and those which may be created in the course of its implementation will be within the framework of an International Control Organization established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include, as its executive organ, a Board of Control in which the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.

C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available information freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in categories which will be set forth in an annex to it.

D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures provided for in the convention are progressively applied.

E. Other matters relating to the Organization will be defined in annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which the Organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function, its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working conditions, jurisdiction, immunities, and prerogatives.

IX. *Movement of Armaments*

In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments.

X. *Suspension of the Convention*

A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control Organization, in the

event of an important violation by another party, or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of the violations or prejudicial action.

XI. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable. Failure to fulfil any of the provisions of the convention would create a situation calling for examination at the request of any party.

Annex V

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1149 (XII). Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons

The General Assembly,

Considering that the armaments race, owing to advances of nuclear science and other modern forms of technology, creates means whereby unprecedented devastation might be inflicted upon the entire world, and that peoples of all countries should be made to realize this,

Considering that any agreement, whether partial or general, on the regulation of armaments necessarily implies adequate international control,

Considering consequently that public opinion must be made aware both of the effects of modern weapons of all kinds and of the necessity of reaching a disarmament agreement providing effective measures of control,

Considering that it is therefore desirable to seek ways and means of organizing an effective and continuing publicity campaign on a world-wide scale, under the auspices of the United Nations and disregarding all ideological or political considerations,

1. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to make recommendations on the nature of the information to be disseminated and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Commission on the means available for conducting such an international campaign;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the Disarmament Commission whatever assistance it may request for this purpose;

3. *Invites* Member States to communicate to the Disarmament Commission or to the Secretary-General in good time any views they may see fit to submit as to the scope and content of the proposed campaign.

*716th plenary meeting,
14 November 1957.*

Annex VI

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1148 (XII). Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international Convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954,

Emphasizing the urgency of decreasing the danger of war and improving the prospects of a durable peace through achieving international agreement on reduction, limitation and open inspection of armaments and armed forces,

Welcoming the narrowing of differences which has resulted from the extensive negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,

Believing that immediate, carefully measured steps can be taken for partial measures of disarmament and that such steps will facilitate further measures of disarmament,

1. *Urges* that the States concerned, and particularly those which are members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, give priority to reaching a disarmament agreement which, upon its entry into force, will provide for the following:

(a) The immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with prompt installation of effective international control, including inspection posts equipped with appropriate scientific instruments located within the territories of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in Pacific Ocean areas, and at other points as required;

(b) The cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the complete devotion of future production of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes under effective international control;

(c) The reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under international supervision, of stocks of fissionable material from weapons uses to non-weapons uses;

(d) The reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate, safeguarded arrangements;

(e) The progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack;

(f) The joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee as soon as feasible for this purpose;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to invite its Sub-Committee to establish, as one of its first tasks, a group or groups of technical experts to

study inspection systems for disarmament measures on which the Sub-Committee may reach agreement in principle and to report to it within a fixed period;

4. *Recommends* that any such technical group or groups be composed of one expert from each of the States members of the Sub-Committee and one from each of three other States Members of the United Nations which shall be designated by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Sub-Committee;

5. *Invites* the States concerned, and particularly those which are members of the Sub-Committee, to consider the possibility of devoting, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries;

6. *Requests* the Sub-Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission by 30 April 1958 on the progress achieved.

*716th plenary meeting,
14 November 1957.*

Annex VII

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1150 (XII). Enlargement of the membership of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952 establishing the Disarmament Commission,

1. *Decides* to enlarge the Disarmament Commission by the addition of fourteen Member States which, for the first year, from 1 January 1958 to 1 January 1959, shall be: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia;

2. *Transmits* to the Disarmament Commission the records of the proceedings of the First Committee during the twelfth session of the General Assembly at which disarmament was discussed.

*719th plenary meeting,
19 November 1957.*

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