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
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# *United Nations General Assembly*

TWENTIETH SESSION, THIRD MONTH

**D**URING the third month of its twentieth session, from November 15 to December 15, the General Assembly in plenary adopted a number of resolutions submitted by its main committees, noted the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Item 14), and debated the report of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four on Colonialism for 1964 and 1965 (Item 23).

Several elections were held. Dr. Fouad Ammoun of Lebanon was elected to the International Court of Justice (Item 97) and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was elected UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). At a pledging conference on December 8, 36 governments pledged \$1,800,000 (U.S.) in contributions for the 1966 programme of assistance to refugees; Canada's pledge was \$350,000, an increase of \$60,000 over that for 1965.

In the elections to fill the non-permanent seats on the newly-enlarged Security Council of 15 members, Argentina, Bulgaria and Mali were elected to replace the three retiring members. Nigeria, Japan, Uganda and New Zealand were elected to the four new seats on the expanded Council. Of the four new members, Nigeria and Japan will serve for two years, while Uganda and New Zealand will serve one-year terms expiring December 31, 1966. Jordan retained its seat for 1966 under the split-term arrangement agreed on in 1964.

## **First Committee**

The First Committee (Political and Security) completed discussion of the disarmament items on its agenda during the first week of December. It adopted a resolution sponsored by 43 non-aligned countries approving in principle the convening of a world disarmament conference. The General Assembly approved this recommendation a week later by a vote of 112 (Canada) in favour to none against, with one abstention. Consultations between governments are to be held for the purpose of establishing a committee to make preparatory arrangements for the conference.

The Assembly also adopted resolutions calling for the suspension of all nuclear tests, for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Africa, and for the early reconvening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) to consider questions of general and complete disarmament under international control. It approved without objection another recommendation by the First Committee that the question of a conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons be referred to the Disarmament Committee for study. The U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., as Co-Chairmen, announced that the ENDC would reconvene in Geneva on January 27, 1966. A resolution

introduced by Malta which would require publicity for arms transfers was defeated, and Item 29 (Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons) was withdrawn by the Ethiopian Delegation.

Turning to the other items on its agenda, the First Committee began discussion of Item 107 (The Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States) and considered several draft resolutions on this question. It also discussed Item 93 (The Question of Cyprus).

### **Special Political Committee**

Following discussion of the report of the Commissioner-General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by the Special Political Committee, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 91 in favour (Canada) to one against, with seven abstentions, a resolution calling for renewal of the Agency's mandate for a further period of three years. The resolution also urged members to consider increasing financial contributions to the Agency.

Two resolutions on *apartheid* were adopted. By the terms of the first, adopted in a vote of 80 in favour to two against with 16 abstentions (Canada), the Assembly drew the attention of the Security Council to "the fact that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security, that action under Chapter VII of the Charter is essential in order to solve the problem of *apartheid*, and that universally-applied economic sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution". The Canadian Delegate, in explanation of vote, said that, while agreeing with the welcome objective of the resolution, namely the elimination of *apartheid*, and agreeing with many of its provisions, Canada was unable to endorse a few of them which Canada considered unsuitable. He said that Canada unequivocally opposed South Africa's *apartheid* policy, which was "offensive to human dignity". Canada had made known this position to the South African Government in various ways. Canada had also complied with the Security Council's resolution of August 1963 calling for an arms embargo against South Africa. A second resolution, calling for establishment of a UN trust fund to aid victims of *apartheid*, was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 95 in favour (Canada) to one against, with one abstention.

After a long debate on Item 101 (Comprehensive Review of Peace-keeping Operations in All Their Aspects), the General Assembly adopted a Canadian resolution by a vote of 87 in favour (Canada) to one opposed (Albania), with five abstentions. Sponsored in the Special Political Committee by Canada and 18 other nations, the resolution invited the Special Committee of 33 on Peace-keeping Operations to continue its work and called on all member states to make voluntary contributions "so that the future may be faced with renewed hope and confidence".

Another draft resolution on peace keeping, submitted by Ireland and eight other members, was not put to the vote but was referred to the Committee of 33 for "careful consideration". It proposed an interim system to finance peace-keeping operations, under which, for operations not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements, developing countries would pay 5 per cent of peace-keeping costs, industrialized countries 25 per cent, and those permanent members of the Security Council who voted in favour of an operation would pay 70 per cent.

During this period the Special Political Committee also began discussion of Item 99 (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes).

### **Second Committee**

Discussion in the Second Committee (Economic and Social) ranged over a wide field, and resolutions were adopted on a number of items on the Committee's crowded agenda, including Items 12 (Science and Technology), 41 (Role of the UN in Training National Technical Personnel for Accelerated Industrialization of Developing Countries), 42 (Role of Patents in Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries), 38 (Technical Assistance), 12 (UN Development Decade), 40 (Industrial Development), 44 (Conversion to Peaceful Needs of Resources Released by Disarmament), and 52 (World Food Programme). Also considered was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The General Assembly adopted resolutions on Items 39 (Establishment of a UN Capital Development Fund), 47 (World Campaign for Universal Literacy) and 48 (UN Institute for Training and Research).

In an important step, the Assembly, on November 22, approved a resolution consolidating the UN Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance into a new United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Canada has announced its intention to contribute \$9,500,000 to the combined programme for 1966, an increase of almost one-third over the 1965 contribution. The Secretary-General has hailed the merger as opening the way for a fuller mobilization of international resources and improved co-ordination of international efforts to create a better world. The new Development Programme will come into force on January 1, 1966. It will be administered by a Governing Council of 37 members, which will approve projects, allocate funds and provide general policy guidance.

### **Third Committee**

The Third Committee spent most of its third month dealing with the implementation and final articles of the Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Basically, the debate was between those delegations that considered that strong measures of implementation could encroach upon the sovereignty of member states and those, including Canada, that considered that, if the Convention was to be effective, meaningful implementation of articles was necessary. In the end, the Third Committee agreed that states parties should report periodically to the Secretary-General on the steps they had taken to give effect to

the Convention, that a conciliation committee should be established to deal with claims from a state that another state party was not abiding by the provisions of the Convention, and that, provided their governments agreed, organizations or individuals should be allowed to complain to the Committee if they considered that they were victims of a violation of the Convention.

The Third Committee adopted several resolutions with respect to the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and thanked Mr. Felix Schnyder, the retiring High Commissioner, for his distinguished service. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the former Deputy High Commissioner, was elected as his successor. The Committee also called for increased efforts to promote human rights in 1968 as an International Year for Human Rights, including the holding of an international conference to review past progress and consider further United Nations measures in this area.

During this period, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions recommended by the Third Committee, including those dealing with measures to encourage respect for human rights, a declaration regarding youth and the promotion of understanding between peoples, assistance in cases of natural disaster, a long-range social programme for the United Nations, the world housing shortage, and the programmes of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees referred to earlier. These were introduced in plenary by Professor R. St. John Macdonald of Canada as rapporteur of the Third Committee.

#### **Fourth Committee**

During the third month of the Assembly's twentieth session, the Fourth Committee (Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories) adopted resolutions on the Falkland Islands, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, the Cook Islands and Gibraltar. The Committee also approved recommendations on 26 small island territories, and resolutions dealing with British Guiana, Ifni and Spanish Sahara, and the mandated territory of South West Africa.

The principal draft resolution on South West Africa, adopted in committee by 83 in favour to two against, with 15 abstentions (Canada), stated that a "serious threat" to peace existed in South West Africa, declared that any attempt to annex any part of the territory would constitute an act of aggression, called on South Africa to remove all military bases and installations in South West Africa, denounced the activities of foreign companies operating in the territory and requested all states to implement the arms and oil embargoes recommended in the Assembly's resolution of November 13, 1963. The Fourth Committee adopted without objection two other resolutions relating to South West Africa, one on petitioners and the other on special educational and training programmes for South West Africa.

On December 14, the Committee adopted a resolution recommending that the question of Oman be sent for examination to the Special Committee of Twenty-Four on Colonialism. It then continued its consideration of the question of territories under Portuguese administration.

### **Fifth Committee**

A French proposal for a detailed study of the financial situation of the UN and its Specialized Agencies emerged as one of the most significant items before the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. As a result, the General Assembly decided, on December 14, to establish a 14-member *ad hoc* committee of experts to examine the finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. At the same time, the Secretariat was asked to prepare a balance-sheet of the organization's financial situation as of September 30, 1965, by making a detailed analysis of expenses for each type of activity. The committee of experts is to submit recommendations to the next session of the Assembly on ways to improve the use of available funds and to ensure that any expansion of activities takes account of both needs and costs.

During this period, the Fifth Committee recommended appointments to the Administrative Tribunal, held elections to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and approved a number of recommendations of this advisory body. It also adopted a new scale of assessments for contributions to UN expenses, based on the report of the Committee on Contributions. The new scales of assessment, which will be used in calculating each member state's contribution to the UN regular budget for the years 1965-67, range from 0.04 per cent for 51 members, to 31.91 per cent for the U.S.A. Canada's assessment rate is 3.17 per cent.

### **Sixth Committee**

On the recommendation of its Sixth (Legal) Committee, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution recommending that the International Law Commission continue its work on the codification and progressive development of the law of treaties and of special missions (Item 87). It also adopted a number of amendments to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure consequent upon the entry into force of the Charter amendments enlarging the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27.

During much of this period, the Sixth Committee continued its discussion of Item 90 (Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States) and debated various draft resolutions on this subject. It considered Item 92 (Progressive Development of Private International Law) and approved a resolution asking the Secretary-General to submit to the next session of the Assembly a survey of work in the field of unification of the law of international trade. The Committee also recommended that the Assembly resume work at its 1966 session on the Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum, with a view to completing the text as a whole.



# *NATO Ministerial Meeting*

*The North Atlantic Council, of which the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, is honorary president for the year 1965-1966, met in ministerial session in Paris from December 14 to 16. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Martin released the following statement to the press in London:*

This was a valuable meeting of the NATO ministers. Decisions will be required in the months ahead on many difficult problems facing the alliance and it is gratifying that there has been a frank exposition of the various national points of view and of the differences which exist among them. There was a universal desire to avoid aggravating these differences but as a result of this meeting each of us knows better what our partners think.

## **East-West Relations**

This meeting clearly established that NATO governments have an interest that goes beyond defending the NATO area. They are looking to the eventual resolution of the outstanding issues which have divided Europe for so long. Recognizing that recent indications of Soviet attitudes are not encouraging, the members of NATO nevertheless reaffirmed their determination to find common understanding with the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe. This meeting advanced that purpose.

## **Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**

It was particularly significant that an organization created for defensive purposes should have demonstrated such an active interest in progress towards disarmament. In particular, there was a full awareness of the danger of nuclear proliferation in all parts of the world.

## **Non-NATO Areas**

It has for some time been evident that NATO could not limit itself to a discussion of problems within the treaty area. As on previous occasions, there was general discussion of the areas of conflict and tension outside the area of the alliance. Vietnam, Rhodesia and Cyprus all received attention. These situations are naturally of grave concern to the alliance as a whole, even though they do not involve the reciprocal obligations of the members of NATO. It is undoubtedly helpful to those directly involved in the situation to know the views of their partners.

## **Cyprus**

As one of the main contributors to the UN Force in Cyprus, Canada, as on past occasions, took the opportunity at this meeting to explore the prospects of a set-

tlement. Conversations were held with both the Greek and Turk representatives to this end. To them and in statements in the NATO Council it was emphasized that there should be as broad as possible financial and other support for the UN peace-keeping effort in Cyprus.

### **Nuclear Problems**

NATO will soon have to give particular attention to nuclear problems. There was a useful discussion of studies to be undertaken on some of the practical aspects of nuclear arrangements. There was a valuable opportunity for Canada to have discussion on these and other problems with ministers from the United States, France, Britain and Germany.

### **Franco-Canadian Relations**

The Minister's presence in Paris enabled him to have discussions with the French Foreign Minister not only on international problems but also on the important range of subjects of bilateral interest. These discussions formed part of the regular exchange of views which have been taking place between France and Canada.

### **Vietnam**

In London and Paris, Mr. Martin explored with the British Foreign Secretary and the U.S. Secretary of State the possibilities of progress towards peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

### **Rhodesia**

On Rhodesia, the Minister, in London and at the NATO meeting, gave support to policies designed to restore a legal regime without resort to force.

Canada remains convinced of the value of the NATO alliance, not only as an assurance of security and as an avenue to peace but as an essential instrument of partnership among the Atlantic nations.

## **Communiqué**

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in Paris on 14, 15 and 16 December, 1965.

In a comprehensive survey of international affairs, ministers reviewed the whole field of East-West relations.

In pursuit of their common objective of ensuring peace and security, the members of NATO have promoted and extended their contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. They will continue to seek an improvement in their relations with these countries. Ministers noted with satisfaction that these efforts had met with some degree of response, mainly in the sphere of bilateral relations.

Although no major crises had arisen in Europe, the Soviet Union continues to oppose a settlement of the cardinal issues between East and West. Such a settlement, which must safeguard the legitimate interests of all concerned, remains one of the essential objectives of the alliance. At the same time, ministers also noted that the Soviet Union continues to devote an increasing share of its economic and technical resources to military purposes.

In this situation, ministers emphasized their determination to maintain the unity of the alliance and to ensure its collective defence.

The Council noted with regret that no progress had been made towards overcoming the division of Germany. The accusations levelled against the Federal Republic of Germany do not make a solution any easier. Rejecting these accusations, the Council reaffirmed that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany can be reached only on the basis of the right of self-determination. They also reaffirmed that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. With regard to Berlin, the alliance stands by the terms of its Declaration of December 16, 1958.

Turning to problems outside the Atlantic area, ministers noted that tension had diminished in some parts of the world. But in Southeast Asia conflicts continued. With regard to Vietnam, the United States Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States, while determined to fulfil its commitments, remained ready to enter without preconditions into negotiations to end the war. He recapitulated the views of his Government as to the bases for a peaceful settlement. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence outlined British policy on the subject of Rhodesia and expressed appreciation for the support received from allied governments. He stressed the need for further concerted action by members of the alliance. Consultations will continue not only on these problems but also on those to which several ministers drew attention, arising out of the policies pursued by the People's Republic of China.

Ministers reaffirmed the concern of their governments for the social and economic welfare and continuing progress of the developing countries.

Ministers reaffirmed that the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remained one of the principal objectives of their governments. They expressed their regret that so little progress had been made towards this end. They viewed with concern the potential danger of the spread of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. They agreed that this problem should be kept under constant review and that the search should be continued for ways of averting the danger. Ministers welcomed the recent decision to convene periodical meetings in NATO in order to intensify the examination of detailed technical aspects of arms control and for the exploration of new possibilities for progress in disarmament.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress made in studies of the inter-

related questions of strategy, force requirements and resources, which had been initiated by ministers at their session in Ottawa in May 1963. Force goals for the period 1966 through 1970 are being worked out, as the first of a series of steps designed to secure a closer alignment between NATO military requirements and national force plans within the agreed strategic concept of a forward defence posture. They accepted in principle the introduction of new procedures designed to improve the annual process of reviewing the defence efforts of member countries and agreeing upon their force contributions. These procedures, by projecting alliance force goals and country plans five years ahead each year, are designed to enhance the capacity of the alliance to adapt its defence plans to changes both in military technology and in the international situation.

Ministers instructed the Council in Permanent Session to review the organizational and financial basis of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force.

The Secretary-General, as Chairman of a Special Committee of Defence Ministers, made a progress report to the Council. The ministers had a discussion on this report.

The Ministers approved a resolution inviting the Council in Permanent Session to set up a programme for defence assistance to Greece and Turkey for 1965 with the participation of the greatest possible number of member countries, and to ensure that the commitments taken in this respect are implemented with the least possible delay. At the ministerial meeting in the spring of 1966, the Council in Permanent Session will report on the implementation of this programme, and submit proposals for a programme for 1966 in the light of relevant defence planning studies.

Ministers heard a report from the Secretary-General on his activities under the "Watching Brief" in regard to Greek-Turkish relations entrusted to his predecessor by the Council at their meeting in The Hague in May 1964. They confirmed their support for the activities of the Secretary-General under his "Watching Brief" mission and agreed that they should continue. They also reiterated their support for the efforts of the United Nations to reduce tension in Cyprus and reaffirmed their determination to contribute to bringing about a peaceful, agreed and equitable solution of the problem in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General's plea for an early resumption of constructive discussions between Greece and Turkey. Ministers expressed their confidence that the parties concerned would refrain from any action prejudicial to such a solution. Against this background, the Council stressed the importance of a speedy solution to the financial and other problems involved in the continuation of the United Nations peace-keeping operation.

Ministers approved a report on civil emergency planning. They noted that a reappraisal of civil emergency planning is being conducted and reaffirmed the importance of such planning for the protection of the civil population.

The next meeting of the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level will be held, on the invitation of the Belgian Government, in Brussels at the end of May or beginning of June, 1966.

# *International Claims*

It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. (*Permanent Court of International Justice, Mavrommatis Concessions Case, 1924.*)

In recent months, the Department of External Affairs has issued a number of public announcements concerning negotiations with Eastern European countries towards a settlement of nationalization claims of Canadian citizens. In response to these announcements, over 3,000 Canadians have to date submitted to the Department details of the losses they have incurred as a result of nationalization and land-reform measures taken by Eastern European countries in the post-war period. These losses are estimated to run into millions of dollars. The Canadian Government has embarked upon negotiations with three of the countries concerned — Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland — and further efforts are being made to achieve some progress towards an equitable settlement of Canadian claims outstanding against Roumania and Czechoslovakia. In light of these developments, it may be useful to outline in general terms the practice of the Department of External Affairs in its role of assisting in the protection of Canadian property and interests abroad. What can the Canadian Government do on behalf of the Canadian who has lost property abroad and what should the aggrieved Canadian do to bring his claim to the attention of the Canadian Government?

## **Conditions of Government Intervention**

The difficulties and losses which a Canadian might experience under a foreign jurisdiction are, of course, legion. He might have his property nationalized in Bulgaria, intervened in Indonesia, blocked in Egypt, sequestered in Cuba, or taxed in Venezuela. Canadian property abroad might be subject to an infinite variety of governmental measures, many of which could not be considered objectionable by international standards. The Canadian Government cannot be of assistance in all circumstances where the Canadian believes that his property or interests have not been accorded the respect which he considers due to them. Under international law certain pre-conditions, which flow from the dictum of the World Court cited above, must be established before the Canadian Government can properly intervene on behalf of Canadian citizens. These prerequisites to the exercise of diplomatic protection may be described in the following terms. It must normally be established that:

- (a) the claimant is and has been a Canadian citizen at the relevant times (normally from the time of loss continuously through to the time of presentation of the claim);

- (b) he has suffered a denial of justice — an injury, damage or loss that may be attributed to an act or omission of the foreign state in violation of international standards of justice;
- (c) he has exhausted all local remedies which might be available to him under the foreign jurisdiction, without obtaining satisfaction.

In the face of difficulties involving his property abroad, the Canadian owner must first attempt to extricate himself or obtain satisfaction by pursuing the legal remedies and appeal procedures which may be available to him under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. The mere fact that a tardy debtor has removed himself from Canada and taken up residence in Ruritania would not provide grounds for intervention by the Canadian Government or by the Canadian Embassy in Ruritania. The Canadian creditor must seek advice from a lawyer practicing in the foreign locality as to how he may assert and establish his rights. The names and addresses of foreign lawyers practising in various parts of the world are available in international legal directories to be found in the libraries of most lawyers in Canada. Sometimes, however, it is difficult to obtain the names of lawyers in countries such as, for example, Poland, where the legal profession is organized by the state into legal co-operatives. The Department of External Affairs will try to supply, upon request, names and addresses of lawyers in such countries (subject to the understanding that the Canadian Government can assume no responsibility for the competence or reliability of the services of any lawyers who might be named).

### **How to Make a Claim**

If, after exhausting local recourses, the Canadian concerned considers that the has been subject to a denial of justice and wishes to turn to his Government for assistance, the first step is to present to the Claims Section of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa a statement of the particulars of the claim. The request for assistance, with accompanying statement of particulars, should in general be addressed to this Department in Ottawa, rather than to the Canadian diplomatic mission in the foreign country, which will normally look to the Department in Ottawa for instructions as to whether or how the question should be taken up with the government to which it is accredited. Such statements should set out as clearly as possible all the relevant circumstances of the complaint, together with all relevant documentation — for example, copies of correspondence with lawyers or government officials in the foreign country. Ill-prepared statements and lack of supporting documentation can result in delays arising out of the need for further correspondence between the Department and the claimant. The Department makes available, upon request, a standard questionnaire, entitled "Registration of Claims of Canadian Citizens Against Foreign Countries", outlining the basic information which the Department would wish to consider in determining whether or how it could be of any effective assistance.

In cases where the Canadian Government is launched on negotiations with a

particular government towards an overall settlement of general categories of Canadian claims, as in the case of Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland, the Department issues for the guidance of claimants special notices and questionnaires designed to meet the particular requirements of the pending negotiations. These notices invite Canadians to submit details of their claims to the Department by a given deadline, preparatory to negotiations. After the period of registration, the claims are examined and classified by legally-trained staff in the Claims Section and, where necessary, individual claimants are asked to provide further information and documentation which the Canadian negotiators would require to advance the claims effectively during negotiations. As an example, the text of the Department's notice in respect of Poland dated September 1, 1965, is set out below.

### **Types of Assistance Available**

Assuming that the prerequisites have been met and that the claimant has established that he has a grievance or a claim which may be taken up by the Canadian Government, what kind of assistance might be contemplated by the Canadian Government? Assistance by the Canadian Government might be considered under one of the four following headings:

- (a) Presentation of individual claims for settlement through diplomatic channels.
- (b) Presentation of individual claims for adjudication by an international tribunal.
- (c) Negotiation of a lump-sum settlement of a number of claims.
- (d) Assistance by way of informal good offices.

The presentation of claims on an individual basis through diplomatic channels may lead to a settlement or may eventually lead to third-party adjudication or negotiations towards a lump-sum settlement, which would include other similar claims that remain unsatisfied. Thus (a) may suffice to settle the matter, or it may merely be a preliminary to (b), particularly where the claim at issue poses difficult questions of fact or of law which require judicial determination, or (c), where numerous claims are involved.

### **Settlement by International Court or Tribunal**

The classical mode of settlement of international claims, if no agreement can be reached by direct diplomatic negotiations, is by reference to an international court or arbitral tribunal for adjudication. The matter may be referred to the International Court of Justice in The Hague by agreement of the parties, or as a result of their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Alternatively, the claim may be adjudicated by a special court or tribunal having jurisdiction conferred upon it by agreement of the parties. An example of this mode of settlement was the celebrated "I'm alone" case of 1929, where Canada and the United States agreed to refer to a mixed arbitral commission the question

of United States liability for the sinking of a Canadian vessel by the United States Coastguard on the high seas outside United States territorial jurisdiction. In this case, an award of some \$50,000 was rendered by the commissioners and duly paid by the United States Government to the Canadian Government and for the benefit of the captain and crew of the Canadian vessel. A more recent example of this mode of settlement was the agreement of March 25, 1965, concluded between Canada and the United States providing for an international arbitral tribunal to adjudicate the claims of United States citizens against Canada arising out of damage caused by flooding in the Great Lakes alleged to have been caused by the construction of a Canadian dam on the St. Lawrence River known as "Gut Dam".

### **Lump-Sum Settlement**

Canada and the United States share a common tradition of law and have been able to find the common ground essential for such agreements to submit international disputes to the judicial process. The experience of the post-war years has shown that such common ground can be reached only with great difficulty in the case of disputes between countries of different ideologies and different traditions of law. Where numerous claims are involved, the technique of third-party adjudication has in the practice of states been supplanted by the technique of negotiations leading to a lump-sum settlement. This is the pattern of the negotiations recently announced between Canada and Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. Under this mode of settlement, the claimant government seeks payment through negotiations of a global amount in final settlement of all claims of its citizens<sup>1</sup>.

Any lump-sum negotiated is then distributed to eligible claimants by means of an agency or commission set up under the domestic laws of the claimant government. The British and United States Governments have concluded a number of such settlements with Eastern European countries and have established claims agencies or commissions on a semi-permanent basis to distribute the proceeds of the settlements to their nationals. Canadians who had nationalization claims against Yugoslavia were able to benefit under a 1948 agreement between Britain and Yugoslavia providing compensation for British and Canadian citizens. Canadian claims were submitted to the Foreign Compensation Commission in London, which was responsible for the adjudication of these claims and the distribution of the lump-sum of four and one-half million pounds sterling which had been obtained from Yugoslavia. No such commission has as yet been set up by the Canadian Government to adjudicate post-war nationalization claims. Depending on the outcome of current negotiations with Eastern European countries, an appropriate claims agency or commission may be established by the Canadian Government for this purpose, perhaps along the lines of the Canadian War Claims Commission set up by the Government in 1952 to adjudicate war claims.

<sup>1</sup>Concerning settlements of this sort, see text of speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, *External Affairs*, December 1964, Page 586.



### **Informal Assistance**

Short of formal espousal of a claim, the Canadian Government is prepared, depending on the circumstances, to authorize Canadian missions abroad to lend their informal good offices to assist Canadians in a wide variety of situations. The exercise of good offices may take many forms, including, for example, an enquiry by the Canadian consulate in the locality as to the present status of a dispute, a request for a review of an administrative decision, or a request for information as to the regulations or procedures which a Canadian should follow in order to press his own claim under local laws.

In each case any services rendered by the Department or by the Canadian mission abroad will be closely tailored to respond to the problem at hand. In each case the decision of the Canadian Government as to whether it could or should intervene under one or more of the four headings outlined above, either formally or informally, can only be taken on the basis of a full understanding of all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the complaint. It is, accordingly, important that any requests to the Department for assistance should be accompanied by statements of claim which leave the Department in no doubt as to the nature of the problem and of the efforts already made by the claimant on his own behalf to overcome that problem. Officials on the staff of the Claims Section, currently consisting of eight lawyers, are glad to discuss with claimants or their representatives any aspect of the preparation of statements of claim or the possibilities of effective assistance by the Canadian Government. It is often in the claimant's interest to consult the staff of the Claims Section on an informal basis at an early stage in order to obtain advice as to his position under the relevant rules of international law and practice. It should be noted that there is no rule of international law which obliges states to protect their nationals. The Canadian Government retains full discretion as to whether or how in a given situation it will seek to assist in the protection of Canadian interests abroad.

As an example of detailed guidance issued to Canadian claimants by the Department, preparatory to negotiations with a particular country, the text follows of the notice on Polish claims dated September 1, 1965:

### **Notice Concerning Claims of Canadian Citizens against Poland**

The Canadian Government and the Polish Government have agreed to begin negotiations at an early date with a view to a settlement of claims of Canadian citizens outstanding against Poland. The Department of External Affairs is currently engaged in examining the information available on such claims, preparatory to negotiations.

2. Canadians who qualify in accordance with paragraph 7 below and who have property and financial claims against Poland should therefore submit the details

of their claims to the Department of External Affairs without delay, and in any event before *January 1, 1966*,<sup>1</sup> in order that they may be considered with a view to the forthcoming negotiations. Statements of claim must be prepared and submitted in duplicate on the attached questionnaires in the manner prescribed below, together with all available documents in support of the claim. Further copies of the claims questionnaire in English or in French may be obtained by writing to the Claims Section, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

3. Claimants who have already submitted some details or documents on their claims to the Canadian Government are also requested to complete the attached questionnaires. This is to ensure that the Department has the detailed, accurate and up-to-date information about each claim which will be required for the forthcoming negotiations. It is important that each question on the questionnaire be answered as completely and as accurately as possible in order to assist the Canadian Government in its efforts to reach an equitable settlement in an expeditious manner. Before completing this questionnaire, claimants should read carefully the explanatory notes set out below.

#### **Scope of Negotiations**

4. During recent discussions in Warsaw, the Polish Government assured the Canadian Government that they are prepared to enter into early negotiations towards a lump-sum settlement of Canadian claims in dollars or freely convertible currency on the basis of principles similar to those applied in other claims settlements concluded by Poland.

5. The forthcoming negotiations will take into account all claims of Canadian citizens in respect of property, rights, interests and debts which have been nationalized, taken or otherwise affected by the Polish authorities. War damage claims will not be included in the negotiations. (Claims of Canadian citizens for war damages and maltreatment were adjudicated by the Canadian War Claims Commission which was in operation in Ottawa for a number of years after the war and which has since been disbanded, after due notice, and is no longer receiving claims. The War Claims Commission dealt only with claims of persons who were Canadian citizens at the time of loss or maltreatment.) Claims in respect of property nationalized by governments other than Poland (for example, property in former Polish territory ceded to the Soviet Union) will not be included in the negotiations.

6. It should be noted that even though an individual claim may appear to fall within this general description, there is no assurance that any particular claim or category of claims which might be submitted to the Department of External Affairs can or will be espoused by the Canadian Government or that compensation will be obtained for such claim or category of claims. Claimants are requested

<sup>1</sup>This deadline was subsequently extended to May 1, 1966, in response to numerous requests from interested persons (Department of External Affairs Press Release No. 80 of December 14, 1965).

to submit completed claims questionnaires to the Department solely for the purpose of assisting the Canadian Government in its negotiations with the Polish Government and in order to facilitate any settlement that may be found possible. The submission of a completed questionnaire does not constitute the submission of a formal claim for compensation. However, failure to register a claim in this way may prejudice a right to possible compensation in the future. If an agreement is in due course made with Poland in the nature of a lump-sum settlement which provides funds for distribution to Canadian claimants, claimants will be notified at the appropriate time of the procedure for the formal filing of their claims.

### **Nationality Requirements**

7. It is important to note that only the claims of persons or companies who meet the following nationality requirements may be considered by the Department of External Affairs for the purposes of the forthcoming negotiations with Poland:

- (1) companies incorporated under the laws of Canada or of any of the provinces of Canada and which were incorporated in Canada on the date on which their property, rights, interests or debts were nationalized, taken or otherwise affected by Poland.
- (2) individuals who are Canadian citizens at the present time *and* who were Canadian citizens on the date on which their property, rights, interests or debts were nationalized, taken or otherwise affected by Poland.

8. This requirement of continuous Canadian nationality from the time of loss to the present is based on well-established rules of international law and practice. The Canadian Government is accordingly precluded from espousing the claim of a person who was not a Canadian citizen at the time of his loss, even though he might subsequently have acquired Canadian citizenship.

### **Period for Submitting Claims**

9. Canadian claims against Poland which fall within the general description given above and which qualify under the nationality requirements should be submitted on the attached questionnaires to the Claims Section of the Department of External Affairs before January 1, 1966. Claimants who are not able to support a claim completely by documentary evidence before the period for submission of claims expires should submit their claim on the questionnaires with available evidence before January 1, 1966, and submit the additional evidence as soon as it is obtained.

### **Claims Questionnaires**

10. Claimants are required to complete and submit to the Department two signed copies of the questionnaire together with two copies of supporting documentation. A third copy should be retained by the claimant for his own records.

11. One copy of the completed claims questionnaire together with one copy of supporting documentation will subsequently be forwarded by the Department to

the Polish authorities in all cases where it appears to the Department that the claim is sufficiently well established and well founded so as to be taken into account in the course of the forthcoming negotiations. Such completed questionnaires with supporting documentation may be subject to joint examination by Polish and Canadian authorities during the course of the negotiations. It is therefore important that all supporting documents of which the original language is Polish should be submitted to the Department both in the original Polish and in English or French translations.

12. The questionnaires should be completed in block capitals or by typewriter. Claimants should supply information under each item on the questionnaire or state why it is not possible to do so. If any item on the questionnaire is not applicable, "Not Applicable" should be entered in the appropriate place. Attach additional sheets as needed for any items where space on the form is insufficient. If two or more persons (e.g. husband and wife or brothers and sisters) have joint interests in the property which gives rise to the claim, it is preferable that they submit a single joint statement of claim. Each of the joint claimants should sign the completed questionnaires.

13. Failure to complete the questionnaires, to clarify all aspects of the claim or to supply necessary supporting documentation will result in delays in advancing claims towards a settlement, since the Department may be obliged to engage in further correspondence with claimants in order to obtain clarification of any aspects of their claims which are not clear or in order to elicit further information or documentation which the Canadian negotiators will require in order to advance the claims effectively during the negotiations.

#### **Valuation of Claims**

14. For purposes of discussion of claims with the Polish Government, claimants are asked to indicate a valuation of their losses both in local currency (zloties, reichsmarks, etc.) and in Canadian dollars. Under established principles of international law, property claims should normally be based upon the reasonable or fair market value of the property concerned at the time of the loss, nationalization or confiscation. However where market values of the properties concerned at the time of loss are unknown or considered to be unrealistic in the absence of normal market conditions, the claimant should submit to the Department information and evidence as to the reasonable market value of the properties during the last period of relative economic stability, normally before the outbreak of war in September, 1939.

15. Values of properties from earlier pre-war periods should also be submitted if known. For example, if the claimant has a record of a pre-war purchase price as set out in a deed, an insurance appraisal or a tax assessment, such evidence together with supporting documentation (photocopies of pre-war deeds, etc.) should be submitted in duplicate. Such values should be converted into Canadian currency at the pre-war rate of exchange prevailing at the time of the valuation.

In all cases the claimant should indicate on what basis and according to what calculations he has arrived at the value of the claim which he is presently asserting. When indicating equivalent value in Canadian dollars, he should also indicate clearly what rate of exchange he is using.

16. Attached as a general guide is a table showing Polish currency fluctuations in terms of Canadian dollars over the years 1920-1965. The rates shown, compiled from banking sources, represent only average annual rates and there may be some variations in exchange rates within the years covered.

### **Evidence Required in Support of Claim**

17. Claimants are urged, in their own interests, to submit all available documents and information which would support their claims. For example, completed questionnaires should be accompanied by duplicate photostatic copies of birth certificates or certificates of Canadian citizenship (in support of nationality particulars), title deeds, wills, extracts from Polish cadastral records (in support of ownership), and Polish court orders or decrees (as evidence of loss or nationalization).

18. Each document in a foreign language must be accompanied by a translation into English or French certified by the person making the translation.

19. Claimants who lack information or documentation on essential aspects of their claims should consider writing directly in the Polish language (registered mail) to any friends or acquaintances in the locality of the property concerned. Claimants may wish to seek documents, appraisals or information through Polish lawyers. The Department can supply, upon request, addresses of lawyers practising in legal cooperatives in Poland although no responsibility can be assumed for the competence or ability of any lawyers named. These persons may be asked to obtain for the claimant extracts of cadastral records from the local Polish land registry office. The Polish authorities have assured the Canadian Government that all land records and registry offices in Poland are open to the public and that Canadians have free access to these public records. In addition, friends or agents in Poland might be asked to provide further information, however informally, on other aspects of the claim, such as the date and circumstances of the nationalization, which might require clarification. Even though such information obtained by informal enquiries might not be considered as conclusive evidence in a Canadian court of law, it might nevertheless be of assistance to the Department in substantiating a claim during the course of forthcoming negotiations with the Polish Government.

20. If it has not been possible to secure a certain document requested in the questionnaire (for example an extract from cadastral records as evidence of ownership), the claimant should explain in the questionnaire the efforts which were made to obtain such document and the reasons why it was not possible to obtain it, and should attach any other evidence, such as sworn affidavits of disinterested persons, insurance policies, tax receipts, etc., which would directly or indirectly support his claim.

21. Persons who have previously submitted documents on their claims to the Canadian Government need not send additional copies but they should refer to and identify these documents in the questionnaire and state when and to which Department in Ottawa they were submitted. Reference should also be made to the number of the relevant file of the Department concerned, if known.

22. Persons completing these questionnaires may subsequently be required to make statutory declarations or swear affidavits to substantiate all or any of the statements contained in their questionnaires and may be asked to supply additional or supplementary evidence as may be considered necessary by the Canadian Government.

#### **Correspondence Concerning Claims**

23. The Department of External Affairs will acknowledge receipt of each claim and notify the claimant or his representative of the claim number assigned to it, which number should be used on all further correspondence concerning the claim.

# *Disarmament at the Twentieth UN General Assembly*

**T**HE First (Political) Committee was originally scheduled to discuss six disarmament topics during the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; a world disarmament conference; the suspension of nuclear tests; the denuclearization of Africa; the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons, and progress towards general and complete disarmament. As the debate proceeded, however, it became evident that not all of the items could be dealt with in the time available, and the Ethiopian representative volunteered to defer until next year the consideration of his government's proposal for a world conference to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons.

## **Non-Proliferation**

Of the five subjects actually discussed at the twentieth session, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons received the greatest attention. For some time there has been a growing recognition by many countries, including Canada, that the most urgent problem in the disarmament field is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. During the summer session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the United States Delegation tabled a draft non-dissemination treaty. This was followed on September 24 in the General Assembly by the submission of a draft by the Government of the Soviet Union. Both draft treaties are designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five existing nuclear powers, but each takes a slightly different approach.

Toward the end of the debate in the First Committee, the U.S. Delegation tabled a purely procedural resolution that would have referred both draft treaties to ENDC for negotiation. This move led the Soviet Delegation to table a resolution proposing that the Committee endorse the Soviet draft treaty as a basis for further negotiations in the ENDC. However, this one-sided approach was not acceptable to the majority and, after some discussion, a number of non-aligned countries submitted a compromise resolution calling for a reconvening of the ENDC at the earliest possible date to resume negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty and suggesting certain principles to serve as guide-lines. This resolution was approved by the First Committee and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 93 (Canada), to none against, with five abstentions.

## **World Disarmament Conference**

Another disarmament topic that attracted a good deal of attention was the proposal to convene a World Disarmament Conference, designed primarily as a means to bring Communist China into discussions about disarmament. The idea had been strongly endorsed earlier in the year by the United Nations Disarmament

Commission<sup>1)</sup>, and it was clear from the beginning of the debate that an overwhelming majority of the members supported the idea. The main problem was to obtain the support of as many as possible of the major powers, whose participation in such a meeting would be essential to ensure its success.

During the general debate on September 24, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, referred to a statement by the Secretary-General to the effect that progress on disarmament, whether general or nuclear, would hardly be possible so long as one of the major military powers, which had recently developed some military nuclear capacity in its own right, did not participate, and added that "Canada hopes that the People's Republic of China will be invited to take part in these discussions". From the beginning, Canada had supported in principle the idea of a world conference and indicated its willingness to participate if satisfactory answers could be found to a variety of practical issues such as membership, organization, location, financing and guide-lines for the discussions, such as the "agreed principles" adopted by the Assembly in 1962.

After some initial reservations had been resolved satisfactorily, the United States was able to vote in favour of a 43-power draft resolution, which endorsed the idea of a world conference and urged that a preparatory commission be established to consult with governments and to deal with the various complicated issues involved in convening such a meeting. When the draft resolution approved by the First Committee was presented to the General Assembly, it received overwhelming support, being adopted by a vote of 112 (Canada), none against, with one abstention.

### **Nuclear-Weapon Tests**

The partial nature of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water has continued to be a source of dissatisfaction to many countries, particularly those near-nuclear powers who have the capacity to develop their own nuclear weapons. Some of these countries consider that signature of a non-proliferation treaty entailing forfeiture of the right to develop their own nuclear weapons should be balanced by concessions by the nuclear powers through signature of an agreement to ban all nuclear tests, including those underground. The original draft resolution on this subject, which was introduced in the First Committee by the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC, was unacceptable to the United States and the Soviet Union, but for different reasons. The U.S. could not accept what amounted to a proposal for an immediate unverified moratorium on underground tests, while the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning underground tests might be advanced by international co-operation in the field of detection. The Canadian position, as outlined by General Burns during the debate, was that the early conclusion of an agreement banning all tests was highly

<sup>1</sup>For an outline of this discussion, see *External Affairs*, August 1965, Pp. 338-339.



desirable but that the absence of any satisfactory means of verifying that commitments were being honoured could only lead to difficulties and mistrust. In extensive negotiations, which went on behind the scenes, the non-aligned sponsors of the draft resolution eventually agreed to amend the paragraph dealing with the immediate suspension of underground tests in a manner which made it acceptable to the Western countries. However, they were unable to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and, when the amended text was finally put to a vote in the First Committee, the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, together with a small number of other countries, voted against it. The final vote on this item in the General Assembly was 92 (Canada), to one against, with 14 abstentions.

### **Nuclear-Free Zones**

The regional approach to the control of nuclear weapons has been gaining increasing support and, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the First Committee considered a proposal for the denuclearization of Africa submitted by a large number of African states. A majority of the Committee, which included Canada, took the position that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Africa was desirable in principle but that the details of how this should be achieved should be left largely to the countries of the region to settle. There were a number of differing points of view on the details of the problem amongst the African countries themselves, but after prolonged negotiations they were able to reach agreement on a draft resolution which, among other things, called on all countries to refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into Africa or assisting in their production there. It also proposed that the Organization of African Unity should consider what detailed arrangements might be made for the eventual conclusion of a formal agreement on the denuclearization of the continent. This approach to the problem received overwhelming support and the draft resolution approved by the First Committee was adopted in the General Assembly by a vote of 105 (Canada), none against, with two abstentions.

### **General and Complete Disarmament**

The final disarmament topic dealt with by the First Committee was the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and more particularly the problem of general and complete disarmament. Most delegations appreciated that the achievement of general and complete disarmament would be a complicated process, which would not be completed quickly, and were satisfied to endorse the ultimate goal and refer the matter back to the ENDC for further negotiations. A procedural resolution to achieve this purpose, which was submitted by the Delegation of Cyprus, was approved by the First Committee by a large majority and eventually adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 102 (Canada), none against, with six abstentions. Under this same heading, the Delegation of Malta tabled a draft resolution calling for a study of the idea of

publicizing the transfer of arms between states. Although certain delegations saw merit in this idea, the consensus was that it was too complicated an issue to be examined in the time available to the Committee and, when the Maltese resolution was put to a vote, it was defeated 18-19-39 (Canada).

Probably the most noteworthy aspect of the disarmament debate at the twentieth session was the return to the consensus approach, as evidenced by the overwhelming support received by all of the resolutions adopted. There was only one negative vote cast (Albania) in the General Assembly against the five disarmament resolutions approved. Another helpful feature was the fact that the polemics and propaganda which had often played a prominent part in the Soviet approach to UN disarmament debates were largely absent at the twentieth session, even though the war in Vietnam continued to place a serious strain on relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Finally, the valuable contribution of the non-aligned countries in the field of disarmament, already demonstrated in the UNDC, enabled them to play an increasingly important role in the debate at a time when the strain on East-West relations complicated the process of obtaining agreement between the two super-powers.

# *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development*

MINISTERIAL MEETING, 1965

**T**HE ANNUAL meeting of the Council of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, at ministerial level, was held at the Organization's headquarters in Paris on November 25 and 26, 1965. Canada was represented by the Minister of Industry, the Honourable C. M. Drury, who was accompanied by officials of the Departments of Trade and Commerce, Finance, Industry and External Affairs.

As in past years, the Council undertook a detailed review of the economic situation in member countries and their economic relations with the rest of the world. Particular attention was devoted to the trade relations between developed and developing countries, and the ministers agreed that the OECD should undertake a comprehensive examination of the problems in this field during the coming months.



*Present at the recent ministerial meeting of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: left, C. J. Small, Canada's Permanent Representative to the OECD; right, the Honourable C. M. Drury, Canada's Minister of Industry and head of the Canadian delegation.*

## Communiqué

The Council of the OECD met at ministerial level in Paris on November 25 and 26, 1965, under the chairmanship of Dr. Hans Schaffner, Vice-President of the Swiss Federal Council, Head of the Federal Economic Department, and reviewed the economic situation of its member countries and their economic relations with the rest of the world.

During the period 1960-65, the gross national product for the OECD countries taken together has increased at a somewhat higher rate than that needed to meet the target of 50 per cent for the decade 1960-70 set by ministers in 1961. The prospects for satisfactory growth in 1966 seem relatively good. Since, however, inflationary tendencies exist in many countries and insufficient growth in some others, there is still much to be done in order to combine, under conditions of full employment, satisfactory growth with price stability. This calls for an appropriate mixture of fiscal and monetary measures, incomes and prices policies, and structural reforms. The Organization will continue its work on this problem in all its aspects.

### Combating External Deficits

The efforts to reduce the external deficits of the United Kingdom and the United States are now showing appreciable results. Large swings have appeared in the foreign payments of a few other member countries. The need to reduce such swings should be taken into account in selecting measures designed to adjust demand to productive resources. Another source of disequilibrium has been the considerable capital outflow from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from the United Kingdom. Measures have already been taken by various countries to reduce this capital flow. Nevertheless, some of the considerable differences in interest rates between member countries will have to be reduced, and a number of member countries will have to improve their arrangements to mobilize savings for investment at home and abroad.

The Organization is studying these capital market problems together with other balance-of-payments problems.

Ministers agreed that, in order to help less-developed member countries to solve their special problems of growth and to reduce the gap between them and the other countries, the industrialized members of the OECD should promote a more active flow of productive investments into these countries and take into consideration their export problems.

### Consortia for Greece and Turkey

Concerning Greece and Turkey in particular, the ministers expressed their concern over the difficult and interrelated problems of development and stability these countries are facing and the desire that they should be supported in solving these problems. To that end, the existing difficulties facing the Consortium for

Greece should be eliminated and the Consortium reactivated in order to provide appropriate aid. In the Consortium for Turkey, appropriate aid should be provided taking into account the aim of Turkey to reach external viability towards the end of her second Five-Year Plan.

Ministers discussed the continuing difficulties of developing member and non-member countries in general and stressed the need for an increase in volume and an improvement in terms and conditions of aid. They also agreed that the effectiveness of aid programmes should be further improved through increasing co-operation between donor countries and by other appropriate measures.

In the long run, it will be even more important to increase the export proceeds of developing countries. The ministers instructed the Organization to undertake an examination of the problems regarding trade between developed and developing countries with a view to formulating constructive and concerted policies.

## *Second Special Inter-American Conference*

**N**INETEEN member countries of the Organization of American States met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from November 17 to 30, 1965, to consider various measures to strengthen the inter-American system, including several items from the agenda of the Eleventh Inter-American Conference, which has been postponed since 1959. Venezuela, which has not had diplomatic relations with Brazil since the ouster of the Goulart Government in Brazil in April 1964, indicated shortly before the Conference opened that it would not attend the meeting in Rio de Janeiro.

Canada was represented at the Conference by an observer delegation, as were Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The Canadian delegation comprised Mr. A. D. Ross, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of the Canadian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Mr. G. C. Langille, Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, and Mr. C. M. Forsyth-Smith, Counsellor (Commercial) of the Canadian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. This marked the first time Canada had been represented at an Inter-American Conference of the OAS. The presence of the three observer delegations was noted, and the hope that their countries would become members of the OAS was expressed by H. E. Miguel A. Zavala Ortiz, Minister of External Relations of Argentina, in his address in reply to President Castelo Branco's welcoming speech, and by H. E. Vasco Leitao da Cunha, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as President of the Conference, who said in his closing statement:

I should also like to express the hope that we might shortly be able to see our sister nations in this hemisphere — Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica — among the members of our Organization. Naturally, these nations possess elements of other kinds of culture, race and religion, which would thus become a regular part of the American world. In voicing our hope that they will decide to permanently share in our work, I would quote the words of Paul Valéry, which would appear to be very apt: "Enrichissons-nous de nos mutuelles différences."

### **Act of Rio de Janeiro**

The chief outcome of the Conference was a series of recommendations embodied in a document called the Act of Rio de Janeiro, which comprises guide-lines for the revision of the OAS charter, to be considered at a third special Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires in July 1966. A special committee of representatives of each of the member states of the OAS will meet in Panama early in 1966 to prepare preliminary draft amendments. The recommendations provide for annual Inter-American Conferences to approve the Organization's policy and budget, to determine financial quotas, and to co-ordinate the activities of the various organs and agencies. Three councils directly responsible to the Inter-American Conference are to be established: (i) a Political Council, to be

the executive body for decisions of the Inter-American Conference or Meeting of Consultation unless these decisions are specifically directed to another organ; (ii) an Economic and Social Council, to meet annually and to have the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) as its executive committee as long as the Alliance for Progress continues; and (iii) an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Council. The meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers is to be retained, and the Pan-American Union will continue to act as the central and permanent organ of the OAS and as its General Secretariat. The terms of office of the Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General are to be reduced from ten to five years. The Act of Washington, regulating the admission of new members to the OAS, is to be included in the charter. The special committee to meet in Panama will examine in detail the question of locating the Councils and the other OAS organs and agencies in one city, or of having them dispersed, and will prepare a study of the factors involved.

### **Standards for Co-operation**

The Act of Rio de Janeiro also directs that the special committee's draft amendments shall include recommendations for additional standards for inter-American co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields. The guide-lines for the drafting of these standards include an acceptance by all member states of the obligation "to help one another and to provide assistance, in the order of need to the less-developed countries of the system. . . ." Members are exhorted to co-operate in accelerating Latin American economic integration and in solving problems which arise when a member state's economic development or stability is affected by economic or trade measures adopted by another country. The guide-lines recommend that action, both joint and individual, be taken to facilitate Latin American exports and access to world markets, to arrange international agreements on basic products in order to assure fair prices and to increase returns from these exports, and to have importing member countries reduce and eventually abolish restrictions on importations and consumption of primary products. It is recommended, too, that efforts be made to lessen the variations in earnings abroad of countries which depend primarily on export of primary products and to eliminate measures that limit world consumption of Latin American products in their access to international markets.

In drafting Charter amendments, the special committee is requested to strengthen the capacity of the OAS "to give the member states effective aid in the peaceful settlement of their disputes, assigning the necessary powers to the Council of the Organization of American States". The Conference also resolved to convoke a specialized conference to study matters related to the use of international rivers and lakes for agricultural, industrial and commercial purposes.

Resolution IV of the Conference instructs the OAS Council to study the bases for co-ordination of the activities of the various inter-American agencies, and their co-operation with other organizations, specifically agencies of the United

Nations. An Emergency Aid Fund has been set up on a voluntary basis, to assist countries suffering natural disasters or other emergencies. It will function under the authority of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

### **Final Act**

The OAS has thus laid the groundwork for its institutional and functional reorganization, and reaffirmed commitment to the ideals of the Alliance for Progress and to its goals of rapid development and higher living standards in Latin America. The Conference's Final Act says, in the guide-lines for additional economic and social standards:

The principles of solidarity that inspire the activities of inter-American co-operation in the political field and in that of mutual security must, of necessity, be applicable also to the economic and social field, inasmuch as the American republics have resolved to unite in a common effort to enable their peoples to attain the greater social justice and more rapid and balanced economic progress essential to the security of the hemisphere.

The Final Act of the Conference remains open to signature by the member states that were unable to attend Conference.



# *Canada's Educational Aid Programme*

## A NATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT

**M**ANY of Canada's best external-aid activities have been accomplished through co-operation between the External Aid Office, other levels of government in Canada and Canadian universities and institutions.

An outstanding example is the Technical Teachers Training College in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In the classrooms and workshops of the school, Canada, Malaysia and Manitoba combined in a venture that is having a marked effect on technical education.

Malaysia supplied the buildings, and the government of Manitoba made available the services of personnel who organized the project and served as instructors and principals on a rotational basis. Canada paid the bill and brought Malaysians to study at Canadian institutions in preparation for their return to the staff of the College. The graduating classes of 1964 and 1965 went out to Malaysian cities and towns where new schools had been built — 54 of them equipped with \$3-million worth of Canadian instructional equipment.

### **Involvement of Education Boards**

In another project, the External Aid Office had the help of the Board of Education of London, Ontario. In 1963, the Board gave leave of absence to a staff member who became temporary principal of the Singapore Vocational Institute, which had received \$200,000-worth of Canadian machine-tools and instructional equipment.

The school developed to the point where it could be taken over by the Singapore counterpart principal. Meanwhile, six Singapore teachers had been trained at the H. B. Beal Secondary School in London.

With the help of the Toronto School Board, the External Aid Office was able to send a project leader and 14 technical instructors to the Dar-es-Salaam Technical College, the only institute of its kind in Tanzania. Once again, Canada provided equipment and trained local personnel to take over from Canadians at the conclusion of the project. The province of Manitoba provided the services of three instructors to Ceylon for a technical institute and paid their salaries for the duration of their assignments.

In Ghana, Canada is providing nearly \$1 million for architectural and engineering services, equipment and furnishings for the Ghana Trades Training Centre in Accra. Mr. J. A. Doyle, Saskatchewan's Director of Vocational Education, undertook the initial feasibility study of the project, and has maintained a continuing interest and co-ordinating role in the project. A number of Ghanaians have been trained in Saskatchewan and will return to positions as instruc-

tors in the Training Centre. The province will also supply a staff of Canadian instructors during the Centre's initial years.

Alberta is expected to play a similar role in the Canadian programme to design, construct, equip and staff a technical high school in Benin City, Nigeria.

There are many advantages to this kind of co-operation. Recruitment is facilitated and the Canadian adviser has the invaluable support services of his provincial administration. In much the same way, agreements between the External Aid Office and various Canadian universities have simplified the problem of handling complex educational development activities in a number of countries.

#### **Arrangements with Universities**

Since May 1961, when the University of British Columbia provided five professors from its Faculty of Commerce to set up courses in accounting and business administration at the Universities of Singapore and Malaya, the External Aid Office has arranged a number of smoothly-working partnerships.

The University of Toronto has sent members of its staff to help establish a regional engineering college in the Indian state of Mangalore. In 1963, courses of study in civil, electrical and mechanical engineering were set up in co-operation with the Indian authorities. Four professors from the University's faculty of medicine have advised the University of Lagos medical school on the creation of a department of anaesthesia — now regarded as one of the leading schools of its kind in the whole of Africa.

The University of Manitoba has supplied professors to set up faculties of engineering and agriculture at the University of the North East in Kohn Kaen, Thailand.

French-speaking professors went from Canada to join the National University of Rwanda at Butare, an institution which plans to fill a great need for higher education in East and Central Africa.

One of the more interesting team projects has been the establishment of an adult-education system in Rajasthan, which was launched by two professors from the University of British Columbia.

This working relation between the official aid agency and other authorities has done much more than merely facilitate the procedures under which international assistance may be extended. It has given the citizens of many provinces and cities personal involvement in a challenging aspect of Canada's external relations.

## *Message from the International Commission in Laos*

**M**ESSAGE No. 35 of September 16, 1965, from the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos to the Co-Chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference, which had just been released by the British Co-Chairman, was made available on December 6 in Ottawa by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin. In issuing the message and the accompanying report of the investigation on which it was based, Mr. Martin made the following statement:

"The message establishes that regular units of the armed forces of North Vietnam, numbering up to 650 men, entered Laos during 1964 with arms and munitions, and that they engaged in hostilities with Laotian Government forces on Laotian soil. These acts of aggression against Laos represent gross violations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol, both of which were signed by the Government of North Vietnam and 13 other governments in July 1962.

"Canada participated in the 1961-62 Geneva Conference in the hope that a solemn agreement guaranteeing the neutrality and integrity of Laos would remove that country from the arena of world conflict and enable it to pursue its development in an atmosphere of peace and stability. To contribute to that goal, Canada also agreed to serve, along with India and Poland, on the International Commission which, under the terms of the agreements, was given the responsibility of supervising the implementation of the undertakings of the signatories.

### **North Vietnam Inculpated**

"It was hoped that, with the reaching of agreement after more than a year of strenuous negotiations, conditions had been created for the achievement of peace in Laos. This investigation by the International Commission was carried out by the Indian and Canadian delegations, since the Polish delegation declined to participate. Their report makes it clear, however, that North Vietnam has violated important provisions of the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, as well as Articles 4 and 6 of its Protocol.

"This is the first report of the Laos Commission which establishes that major violations of the 1962 Agreements on Laos have been committed by a signatory power. The Commission is now investigating a number of cases of North Vietnamese prisoners captured in Laos and also is investigating an allegation by the Communist Neo Lao Haksat that United States aircraft based in South Vietnam have bombed and otherwise attacked Laotian territory.

"In the light of these findings, the Canadian Government is gravely concerned about this course of developments in a country whose neutrality and integrity have

been solemnly guaranteed by an international agreement freely entered into by all the parties concerned."

The message is based on the results of an investigation carried out by the Commission at the request of the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, following the capture by Laotian Government forces, in September 1964, of three North Vietnamese soldiers.

### **Aim of Geneva Conference**

The Geneva Conference of 1961-62 was summoned in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Laotian question, which threatened to bring about the large-scale involvement of major powers in the hostilities between the various parties in Laos. It was recognized that the escalation of hostilities that was taking place in Laos represented a threat to the peace of the world, and it was accepted by members of the conference that peace in Laos could be ensured only by an agreement which confirmed the respect of the members of the conference for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs. After more than a year of negotiations, all members of the conference agreed to and signed the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which spelled out undertakings designed to guarantee the neutrality of that country; they also signed a Protocol to the Declaration, which set out in greater detail the specific undertakings of the signatories and the machinery for supervising the implementation of those undertakings.

The 1962 Declaration included undertakings by the signatories that they would not commit or participate in any way in any act that might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos (Article 2 (a)); that they would not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos (Article 2 (b)); that they would refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos (Article (c)); that they would not introduce into Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever (Article 2 (g)); and that they would not use the territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of Laos (Article 2 (j)). The Protocol to the Declaration (which had the same binding force as the Declaration) specifically prohibited the introduction of foreign regular or irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel into Laos (Article 4), and also prohibited the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos might consider necessary for the defence of Laos (Article 6).

### **Evidence Gathered in Laos**

It is against this background that the developments set out in the Commission's Message No. 35 must be set. The message is based on the report of an in-

investigation carried out by a Commission team which, between November 12 and December 21, 1964, interviewed the three North Vietnamese prisoners and ten other witnesses. The prisoners, who, according to the Commission's report, "appeared to give their evidence freely and without hesitation" and "did not seem to be under duress", claimed that they entered Laos between February 1964 and September 1964 as regulars of the North Vietnamese armed forces and as members of complete North Vietnamese army units varying in size from 50 to about 650 soldiers, that they brought their personal weapons and ammunition with them, and that they, together with other soldiers of their groups, fought on Laotian territory against the Royal Laotian armed forces until their capture. The Commission points out that, although, for reasons beyond its team's control (i.e. the refusal of the Communist forces to permit the team to pursue its investigations in the areas of Laos under Communist military control)

... a complete verification or authentication of the evidence given by the prisoners has not been possible, the Commission is satisfied in regard to the veracity of the evidence presented to it. Basing itself entirely on this evidence, the Commission believes that it would not be wrong to consider that violations of Articles 4 and 6 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos signed at Geneva on July 23, 1962, have occurred.

A perusal of the evidence presented to the Commission by the North Vietnamese prisoners themselves and by other witnesses makes it clear not only that violations of Articles 4 and 6 of the 1962 Protocol have occurred but that North Vietnam has also violated clauses (a), (b), (c), (g) and (j) of Article 2 of the Declaration; the Commission, however, relates its findings only to the provisions of the Protocol to the Declaration.

### **Verification Obstructed**

Paragraph 17 of the Commission's message indicates that:

... for reasons beyond the team's control, neither the team nor the Commission was permitted to verify and authenticate in a legalistic manner the evidence provided by the three prisoners and by the other witnesses.

It goes on in this connection to remind the Co-Chairmen that in a previous message of January 21, 1965 (concerning a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the 1962 Protocol by the Communist Neo Lao Haksat Forces), the Commission has commented that:

... because the Neo Lao Haksat (the Communist faction in Laos) refuses to extend the appropriate facilities to the Commission under the Protocol, the Commission finds it difficult to avoid the inference that the Neo Lao Haksat is unwilling to permit investigations because any such investigation might bring to light evidence that the Protocol has indeed been violated.

Shortly after the Commission was informed by the Laotian Government of the capture of the North Vietnamese prisoners, it received a letter from the Communist Neo Lao Haksat authorities alleging that United States aircraft based in South Vietnam had bombed and otherwise attacked Laotian territory and that, from time to time, these aircraft had parachuted South Vietnamese military personnel with arms and equipment into Laos. Although the Neo Lao Haksat authorities did not request an investigation, the Commission appointed a team to ascertain the facts, and the Laotian Government has agreed to co-

operate. The Commission has indicated, in its message, its intention of proceeding with this investigation. Its ability to do so, however, will depend on the cooperation of the Neo Lao Haksat authorities, who, in the past, have not permitted Commission teams to enter the territory under their control in pursuance of the Commission's responsibilities under the 1962 Protocol.

This is the first report of the Laos Commission which establishes conclusively major violations of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the North Vietnamese authorities. Other North Vietnamese troops have been captured since, some in an attack on a military training school of the Laotian Government and others in a major offensive a few days ago against Laotian forces at Thakhek. The Commission will provide the Co-Chairmen with reports on these incidents in due course.

# *Canada-France Economic Committee*

*After an interval of several years, the Canada-France Economic Committee established in 1949 met again on November 18 and 19, 1965, to review and discuss bilateral trade and economic problems of interest to the two sides. The meeting also focused on the preparations for an important Canadian economic and financial mission to France early in the new year. The meeting was another manifestation of the desire of the Canadian and French Governments to develop and strengthen relations between the two countries.*

*The following account of the meeting was subsequently issued to the press:*

## **Communiqué**

Ottawa, November 19, 1965 — Representatives of the French and Canadian Governments met in Ottawa on November 18 and 19, 1965, within the framework of the Franco-Canadian Economic Committee created in 1949 to examine the principal aspects of economic, financial and commercial relations between the two countries. The two delegations studied the possibilities for further developing these relations and also considered certain international problems of common interest.

The French and Canadian delegations were led respectively by Messrs Tanguy de Courson, Minister Plenipotentiary and Head of the Service of Bilateral Agreements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and J. H. Warren, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, and included on both sides representatives of the various departments concerned.


These consultations reflect the desire of both Governments to intensify and broaden relations and co-operation between the two countries, notably in the economic, financial and commercial fields.

The two delegations envisage further consultations at a further meeting of the Committee in Paris next year.

## Canada Launches a Second Satellite

The Canadian Defence Research Board's Alouette I, launched from the Western Test Range in California on September 29, 1962, was the first satellite designed and built in Canada. It was launched as a joint project of the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration and DRB. Shortly afterwards, the new NASA-DRB co-operative programme, International Satellites for Ionospheric Studies (ISIS), was arranged. Canada assumed responsibility for the design and construction of four more ionospheric satellites to be launched by NASA at intervals between 1965 and 1969, near the minimum and maximum of the present solar cycle. The new Canadian space-craft is similar in design and purpose to Alouette I, but has been substantially modified and carries improved experiments. On November 28, the Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence, issued the following statement on the occasion of the placing in orbit of Alouette II:

The successful launching of the Defence Research Board's second topside-sounder satellite, named *Alouette II*, from the Western Test Range in California:



Technicians on the staff of two Canadian firms — RCA Victor Company Limited of Montreal and de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Limited, Toronto — that support the DRB-NASA programme for the orbiting of international satellites for ionospheric studies adjust the telemetry antennae on the Alouette II flight model.



at 11:48 p.m., EST, Sunday, November 28, marks another long step in Canada's space programme.

*Alouette II* will extend the four experiments carried out in its illustrious predecessor *Alouette I*, and an additional fifth experiment at the request of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

While *Alouette I* was placed in a circular polar orbit about 625 statute miles above the earth, *Alouette II* will be in an elliptical polar orbit, varying from 270 to 1,620 statute miles. This increased range has necessitated a substantial change in the interior components from those designed for *Alouette I*.

The outstanding success of *Alouette I*, which has now entered its fourth year of operation, has demonstrated the expertise available in the Defence Research Board, and particularly in its Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment, in this aspect of space science and exploration. This is the most significant fact behind the present Canadian-United States International Satellites for Ionospheric Studies programme. Of these achievements all Canadians can be justly proud. I extend my congratulations to all members of the ISIS-X team — U.S. and Canadian — and express the hope that the present endeavour will equal or surpass our first venture atop the ionosphere. Also I want to express appreciation and gratitude to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the provision of the rockets and facilities for launching *Alouette II*. Without this co-operation, these experiments by Canadian scientists would be impossible.

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### FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

OECD Ministerial Meeting on Science: Paris, January 12-13

UN Economic and Social Council, fortieth session: New York, February 23 - March 4

GATT Contracting Parties: Geneva, mid-March

International Joint Commission semi-annual meeting: Washington, April 5-8

World Health Organization, nineteenth assembly: Geneva, May 3-20

Commonwealth Trade Ministers' Conference: London, May 16-20

Universal Postal Union, Executive Board: Berne, May 17-28

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee: Geneva, May 16-24

UNICEF, Executive Board: Addis Ababa, May 19-28

## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. P. M. Roberts posted from the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, to Washington, effective September 5, 1965.
- Miss M. Buckley-Jones appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 13, 1965.
- Mr. P. E. Heinbecker appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 13, 1965.
- Mr. L. A. K. James appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 13, 1965.
- Mr. M. B. Phillips appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 13, 1965.
- Mr. P. Asselin appointed Canadian Consul General in San Francisco, effective September 26, 1965.
- Mr. P. F. Walker posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, effective September 26, 1965.
- Mr. N. A. Robertson retired from Department of External Affairs, effective September 29, 1965.
- Mr. P. de W. Wilson appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective October 4, 1965.
- Mr. J. B. Erichsen-Brown retired from the Department of External Affairs, effective October 13, 1965.
- Mr. L. E. Vail appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 6, effective November 4, 1965.
- Mr. C. V. Cole posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, to Ottawa, effective November 5, 1965.
- Mr. J. C. G. Brown appointed Ambassador to the Congo (Leopoldville), effective November 10, 1965.
- Mr. N. H. Berlis appointed Ambassador to Poland, effective November 19, 1965.
- Mr. A. R. Menzies appointed High Commissioner to Australia, effective November 22, 1965.
- Mr. J. B. Seaborn posted from the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, to Ottawa, effective November 23, 1965.
- Mr. J. H. Landriault appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Personnel Administrator 5, effective November 25, 1965.
- Mr. L. V. J. Roy retired from the Department of External Affairs, effective November 26, 1965.
- Mr. G. Périard posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to the National School of Administration, Paris, December 15, 1965.
- Mr. J. F. Tanguay posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective December 19, 1965.
- Mr. D. G. Bishop posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, effective December 23, 1965.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# United Nations General Assembly

## CONCLUSION OF TWENTIETH SESSION

WHEN THE twentieth session concluded three months of work on December 21, 1965, the United Nations General Assembly had completed action on a record agenda of 108 items and adopted more than 120 resolutions in what was widely regarded as a useful and constructive session.<sup>1</sup>

During the last week the Assembly, besides considering numerous resolutions submitted by its main committees, took action on certain items assigned to plenary. It approved the 1965 and 1966 budget estimates. It noted interim reports of the Committee for the International Co-operation Year (ICY) submitted by the Committee's Chairman, Mr. Paul Tremblay of Canada, as well as the report of the Credentials Committee.

The Assembly paid tribute to the memory of General Thimayya, the Commander of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and heard addresses by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Wilson of Britain.

Several elections were held, including the re-election of Liberia to the Trusteeship Council and elections to fill 15 seats on the enlarged Economic and Social Council (Canada holds one of the continuing seats). The President announced appointments to certain committees; among them was the *ad hoc* committee of 14 financial experts to examine the finances of the UN and its Specialized Agencies, to which Canada was appointed.

On December 18, the Assembly renewed its call for the cessation of all practices depriving the Tibetan people of human rights and fundamental freedom. The resolution on Tibet was approved by a vote of 43 in favour (Canada) to 26 against, with 22 abstentions.

The Assembly concluded its session by hearing statements of congratulations to President Fanfani by representatives of the various regional groups and the President's summary of the activities of the twentieth session.

### First Committee

During the final week of the session, the First Committee (Political) dealt with the remaining items on its agenda. Discussion of Item 107 (Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States), introduced by the U.S.S.R., was dominated in committee by representatives of a number of Latin American and Afro-Asian countries. A compromise draft declaration, sponsored by 57 countries, was finally agreed on. It condemned in one form or another every possible type of intervention, whether by armed attack from without or by subversion

<sup>1</sup>*External Affairs* has followed developments in the General Assembly in its three preceding issues.

and infiltration from within. This declaration, which Canada regarded as "an expression of the political will" of the Assembly, was adopted in plenary by a vote of 109 in favour (Canada) to none against, with one abstention.

Both Turkey and Cyprus had requested inclusion on the agenda of Item 93 (Question of Cyprus). The First Committee, after debating several draft resolutions on this item, submitted to the General Assembly a 31-nation resolution which supported the right of Cyprus to full sovereignty and complete independence without foreign intervention. The resolution was adopted by 47 votes in favour to five against, with 54 abstentions. Canada abstained, as did all other members contributing contingents to UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus) and all Communist countries except Albania. In an explanation of vote, the Canadian representative made it clear that Canada, as a participant in UNFICYP, had abstained through a desire to remain impartial in the eyes of all parties.

On the recommendation of the First Committee, the General Assembly also adopted resolutions during its last week on Items 31 (Peaceful Uses of Outer Space), 32 (Korean Question), and 33 (Encouragement of Good Neighbourly Relations among European States Having Different Social and Political Systems).

#### **Special Political Committee**

The Special Political Committee completed its work on December 17. The Canadian Delegation promoted a resolution under Item 34 (Effects of Atomic Radiation) commending the work of UNSCEAR (UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) and urging continued research on the effects and levels of atomic radiation. After a short, non-partisan debate, the resolution was unanimously adopted by the Special Political Committee and the Assembly.

A draft resolution on Item 99 (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes), was introduced by Britain and co-sponsored by 16 other countries, including Canada. The debate was not completed because several Delegations said they wished more time to study the matter and therefore moved successfully that discussion be adjourned until the twenty-first session.

#### **Second Committee**

The Second Committee (Economic and Financial) adopted two resolutions under Item 52 (Continuation and Expansion of the World Food Programme) providing for the continuation of the Programme and requesting the Secretary-General to study the feasibility of long-term international food aid of a multilateral character. Canada announced its willingness, in principle, to contribute up to \$27.5 million (U.S.) in commodities and cash for the next three years.

After considerable informal negotiation on its precise terms, the Committee also adopted and forwarded to the General Assembly a resolution on Item 37 (Report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development). In unanimously adopting this resolution, the Assembly confirmed a recommendation to establish the headquarters of the Secretariat of UNCTAD in Geneva and expressed satis-

faction with the organization of the UNCTAD subsidiary bodies and with the methods of work adopted by the Board at its first session (1964).

On Item 96 (Review and Reappraisal of ECOSOC), the Assembly unanimously adopted an essentially procedural resolution drafted by Canada that requested the Council to continue its review and to consider detailed suggestions to be made by the Secretary-General on improved methods of operation. A related resolution on Item 100 (General Review of United Nations Programmes) postponed consideration of this item to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

On December 20, the Assembly approved by unanimous vote a resolution calling for the establishment of a new UN Organization for Industrial Development as an autonomous body within the UN system to promote industrial development in the developing countries.

On the recommendation of the Second Committee, the Assembly also adopted resolutions dealing with science and technology (Item 12), development and utilization of human resources (Item 12), transit trade of land-locked countries (Item 37), financing of economic development (Item 38), the UN Development Decade (Item 12), accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to developing countries (Item 38) and the transfer of technology to developing countries (Item 42). The Committee decided that consideration of items concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources, population growth, economic development and decentralization of the UN economic and social activities should be postponed until next year.

### **Third Committee**

A major achievement of the Third Committee was the unanimous approval by the General Assembly on December 22, 1965, of the Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Item 58). The President of the Assembly, Mr. Fanfani, declared that the Convention was an event of particularly far-reaching political, juridical and moral importance. Two resolutions were adopted regarding the Convention. One concerned the means by which action on petitions from colonial territories regarding racial discrimination would be reported annually to the General Assembly; the other called for widespread publication of the text of the Convention and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly on ratifications of the Convention by member states.

The Assembly returned to the Commission on Human Rights for further study the question of establishing the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and remitted to the twenty-first session further consideration of the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information.

### **Fourth Committee**

The Fourth Committee (Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories) concluded its work on December 21, having been able to complete action on all items as-

signed to it. A resolution on the Portuguese territories in Africa (Item 23) condemned Portuguese colonial policies and urged member states to adopt a series of punitive measures against Portugal, including the rupture of diplomatic relations, a trade boycott and the refusal of facilities to Portuguese ships and aircraft. The various paragraphs of the resolution were not put to a separate vote. The Canadian Delegation voted against this resolution as a whole, while emphasizing that Canada strongly supported the aspirations of the African people in these territories for self-determination. The resolution was adopted in the Assembly by a vote of 66 in favour to 26 against (Canada), with 15 abstentions.

Resolutions were also adopted on the trust territories of Nauru and New Guinea. These called on Australia to grant independence to Nauru not later than January 31, 1968, and to fix an early date for the independence of Papua and New Guinea. Canada abstained in the voting on both resolutions because they gave a distorted picture of the situation in these territories.

#### **Fifth Committee**

The financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East was one of the major problems considered during the final debates of the Fifth Committee (Administration and Budgetary). The Canadian Delegation introduced a resolution on UNEF financing for 1965 and 1966. This resolution was drafted taking cognizance of the fact that assessments for UNEF costs could not be enforced as a result of the consensus that Article 19 (loss of vote in the Assembly) would not be raised in respect to UNEF arrears. The resolution provided for apportionment of the bulk of the costs of UNEF amongst the United Nations membership as a whole, thus preserving as far as possible the principle of collective responsibility. The Assembly adopted this resolution by a vote of 44 in favour (Canada) to 14 opposed, with 45 abstentions.

The Assembly adopted budgets for 1965 and 1966. The 1966 budget was \$121,567,420, more than \$13 million higher than the budget just approved for 1965. The two major reasons for the increase were higher staff costs and the expansion of the staff of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

#### **Sixth Committee**

Debate in the Sixth Committee (Legal) was dominated by discussion of Item 90 (Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States). Item 94 (Observance by Member States of Principles Relating to Sovereignty of States), proposed by Madagascar, was discussed concurrently. Finally, it was decided to reconstitute the Special Committee on Friendly Relations and to ask it to continue its work on the seven principles of international law set forth in Resolution 1815 (XVII) with a view to their incorporation in a declaration. The Special Committee was enlarged by the addition of Algeria, Chile, Kenya, and Syria (Canada was an original member of the Special Com-

mittee). The resolution containing these recommendations was unanimously adopted by both the Sixth Committee and the General Assembly, as were resolutions amending Article 109 of the Charter and the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly to take account of recent increases in the membership of both the Security Council and Economic and Social Council.

On the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, the Assembly also adopted resolutions dealing with technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law (Item 89), a declaration on the right of asylum (Item 63), a study of methods of fact-finding (Item 90) and steps to be taken for progressive development in the field of private international law, with a particular view to promoting international trade (Item 92).



# *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association*

ELEVENTH GENERAL CONFERENCE, 1965

THE ELEVENTH annual conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, held in Wellington, New Zealand, from November 30 to December 8, 1965, was preceded by an extensive 12-day tour of New Zealand, which was greatly enjoyed by the various delegates. One hundred and twenty-three parliamentarians attended as delegates from 68 branches of the Association. There were also a number of official observers and 24 secretaries in attendance.

As had been the practice for some years, a delegation from the United States was invited to participate in the international affairs debate on the final day of the conference. This delegation was led by Senator J. William Fullbright.

The conference dealt with the subjects of Rhodesia, economic growth in the Commonwealth (which was considered under four headings), parliamentary government in the Commonwealth, the CPA — its future role and development — and international affairs.

## **Aims and Organization**

The primary aim of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association is to foster contact and understanding between parliamentarians in Commonwealth countries. It facilitates the exchange of visits and information between its branches in each country, and delegates from each of the branches meet in plenary conference once a year. The conferences are non-deliberative assemblies, where each parliamentarian may express his personal views. The Association has over 90 branches in Commonwealth legislatures. These include main branches, which are formed in the national parliaments of the independent members of the Commonwealth, state or provincial branches, composed of members of provincial legislatures in the independent countries, and auxiliary and affiliated branches in dependent territories of Commonwealth countries. Since 1948 the Association's conferences have been held in a different country each year. This was the second time the New Zealand branch of the Association had been host.

The Canadian delegation was the largest attending the conference; it consisted of two Senators, five Members of Parliament, and a Secretary from the Federal Branch, with Ron Basford, M.P., as leader. Mr. Basford is also the representative of the Federal Branch on the General Council of the Association. The provincial group consisted of one delegate from each of the provincial branches, and included five speakers, led by the Honourable G. W. Clarke, Speaker of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland. A Secretary also accompanied this group. Speaker Clarke is a member of the General Council.

The vice-chairman of the conference was the Honourable Senator John J.

Connolly, Minister without Portfolio and Leader of the Government in the Canadian Senate. He was elected chairman of the General Council of the Association for 1965-66.

### **Problem of Rhodesia**

Events in Rhodesia received first attention from the Commonwealth parliamentarians. Before the opening of the conference, the General Council of the Association unanimously agreed that the Rhodesian branch of the Association should be expelled "in view of the fact that the Rhodesian Parliament has condoned the act of rebellion by the illegal Smith regime and actively supported the actions



*Canadian delegation to the meeting in Wellington of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association:*

*Front row (left to right): Senator the Honourable John J. Connolly, Chairman of the General Council, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; the Honourable George W. Clarke, Speaker, Legislative Assembly of Newfoundland and leader of the provincial delegation; Mr. R. Basford, M.P., leader of the federal delegation.*

*Second row (left to right): the Honourable Guy Lechasseur, Speaker of the Quebec Legislative Assembly; the Honourable Donald Morrow, Speaker of the Ontario Legislative Assembly; the Honourable J. Angus MacLean, M.P.; Senator the Honourable Sydney J. Smith.*

*Third row (left to right): Mr. C. S. Menzies, M.L.A., New Brunswick; Mr. H. J. Spence, M.L.A., Nova Scotia; Mr. T. R. Montgomery, secretary, federal delegation; Senator the Honourable Frank Welch; the Honourable Marcel Lambert, M.P.*

*Fourth row (left to right): the Honourable J. E. Snedker, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan; the Honourable W. H. Murray, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia; the Honourable J. B. Carroll, Minister of Welfare, Manitoba; Mr. Max Saltsman, M.P.; Mr. Patrick Asselin, M.P.*

*Fifth row (left to right): the Honourable Alfred J. Hooke, Minister of Municipal Affairs, Alberta; Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable A. D. Stewart, M.L.A., Prince Edward Island; Mr. Charland Prud'homme, secretary, provincial delegation.*

of the regime". An application for re-admission to the Association will be considered when a legal and constitutional government has been restored to Rhodesia, the General Council decided. In the midst of a tense debate over the restoration of constitutional rule in Rhodesia, in which the position taken by African parliamentarians was criticized by some delegates, the leader of the Canadian delegation, Mr. Basford, remarked on the restraint exercised in the debate by African parliamentarians at a time when they were deeply concerned with the fate of African Rhodesians, reaffirmed Canadian support for the principle of racial equality in the Commonwealth, detailed the effectiveness of the steps taken by Canada to establish economic sanctions, and expressed his support for the United Nations action which had been taken against the illegal Rhodesian regime.

One of the subjects that attracted most speakers was the question of economic growth in the Commonwealth. Delegates discussed the effective use of technical and financial resources for economic development, problems of commodity stabilization and agricultural co-operation, and the growth of population in relation to resources. Max Saltsman, MP, a member of the Canadian delegation, spoke of the widening gap in wealth between the developed and under-developed countries, and contrasted the concern of representatives of the developed countries for higher living standards with the concern of the other representatives for basic necessities such as food and shelter. He said that Canada must, as a matter of self-interest, use its technical and financial resources for the benefit of the less-developed nations.

### Views on Party Systems

The next major item of discussion was parliamentary government in the Commonwealth. There was very lively dispute about different party systems, during which Jamaican, Nigerian, Indian and other representatives attacked the one-party idea. While it was generally agreed that Commonwealth countries must be free to adopt whatever political systems they wished, there was a reluctance by most delegates to think that one-party systems were democratic. There was also discussion of party politics in federal states, in which Mr. Guy Lechasseur, the Speaker of the Quebec Legislative Assembly, gave an account of political developments in his province and stressed the fact that minorities could be protected within a federal state. Attention was also given to the office of *ombudsman*, particularly in New Zealand, the first Commonwealth country to adopt the institution, as a means of redressing grievances of private citizens. A variety of personal views was put forward. Generally, but with a number of exceptions, delegates from small countries favoured the appointment of an *ombudsman*, while delegates from larger countries expressed doubts. The Honourable M. Lambert, former speaker of the Canadian House of Commons, took the view that providing the right of appeal and recourse to judicial process against administrative actions of governments might be a more useful step towards protecting the freedom of citizens.

The final day and a half of the conference was devoted to international affairs.

This important debate was opened jointly by New Zealand's Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Keith Holyoake, who began with a statement on New Zealand foreign policy, and Senator J. William Fullbright, the leader of the United States Senate delegation, who then addressed the conference on world problems and the U.S. approach to them. Many of the speakers made general statements of the foreign policies of their countries, while others addressed themselves to specific international questions, including Chinese membership in the United Nations, Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, the problem of Kashmir, the conflict in Vietnam, and non-alignment in international affairs. Mr. Basford was asked to close the international affairs debate and in a well-received speech called for practical support from the small nations of the world for the United Nations in its twin role of peace keeping and socio-economic development.

### **Future of the Association**

A discussion of the future role and development of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association revealed an urgent concern to strengthen the organization of the Association and its impact on governments. Most speakers talked of its value in providing an opportunity for contact and understanding between the law-makers of the Commonwealth countries; but a number referred to the racial problems that divided the Commonwealth and suggested that the future of the Association would depend on resolving these problems. The leader of the Canadian delegation recognized that the challenge before the Association was to see that, in a world where racial considerations were probably the most important aspect for attention by the Association, the members met together in terms of equality and mutual respect.

The Honourable Blair Tennert, chairman of the General Council of the Association and chairman of the conference, said, in bringing the conference to a close, that he had been told he would be presiding over the last Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference, owing to the threat to the Commonwealth by the divisive issue of Rhodesia. It was apparent, however, that this was not to be so. Delegates reaffirmed their support of the Association as another plank in the bridge of understanding between Commonwealth countries.

The Association has accepted an invitation from the Canadian Prime Minister to hold the twelfth conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Ottawa in 1966 and an invitation from the Prime Minister of Uganda to hold the thirteenth conference in Uganda's capital, Kampala, in 1967.

## *Mr. Pearson Visits Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago*

**P**RIME MINISTER L. B. Pearson visited Jamaica from November 28 to 30, 1965, and Trinidad and Tobago from December 14 to 16. Both of these Commonwealth countries in the West Indies became independent in 1962, shortly after the break-up of the West Indies Federation. Mr. Pearson's visit was particularly significant because it was the first by a Canadian Prime Minister since that time. He was accompanied by Mrs. Pearson and Mr. A. E. Ritchie, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Canada has had close ties with the West Indies ever since the early days of settlement in the Western Hemisphere. Trade has always been an important factor in the relation, and in recent years investment in the West Indies by Canadian firms has assumed significance. Since 1957, Canada has been co-operating in the development of the economies of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries by the provision of Canadian goods and services; \$10 million was allocated for this purpose last year. Both under the aid programme and outside it, students from the West Indies have been coming to Canada in increasing numbers to continue their studies. At the same time, an increasing number of Canadians have been enjoying vacations in the various West Indian islands.

### **Conference Planned**

With the emergence of independent Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, Canada hopes that its traditional ties with the area will become still stronger. To this end, plans are being made for the holding of a Canada-West Indies Conference, to be attended by the prime ministers and premiers of the countries concerned, sometime before the end of 1966. This was one of the matters discussed by Mr. Pearson during his visits to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

In Jamaica, Mr. Pearson had discussions with the Acting Prime Minister, the Honourable D. B. Sangster, and other members of the Jamaican Government. He also met the Governor-General, His Excellency Sir Clifford Campbell, and the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Norman Manley, and visited several points of interest in the Kingston area, including the University of the West Indies campus at Mona, the Hope Botanical Gardens, and the old capital of Jamaica, Spanish Town.

During his visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Pearson was the guest of the Governor-General, His Excellency Sir Solomon Hochoy, at Government House, and had discussions with the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Dr. Eric Williams. He also visited the Trinidad and Tobago House of Representatives and the St. Augustine campus of the University of the West Indies, where he saw

Canada Hall, a student residence built with Canadian assistance under the aid programme.

The following communiqués were issued after Mr. Pearson's visits to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago:

### **Jamaica Visit**

The Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester Pearson, and the Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Honourable Donald Sangster, yesterday discussed a wide range of subjects of interest to their two countries. They also discussed the world political situation, paying special attention to the critical situation in Rhodesia.

Assisting Mr. Sangster in the discussion were other members of the Jamaica Cabinet, as well as government officials. Mr. Pearson was assisted by his advisers and the Canadian High Commissioner in Jamaica, Mr. R. Harry Jay.

On Rhodesia, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Sangster shared a deep concern over the situation resulting from the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime. Mr. Pearson described the various trade and financial measures being taken by Canada, following consultations within the Commonwealth and the deliberations of the UN, including the recent ban on all importation into Canada of sugar of Rhodesian origin. Mr. Sangster expressed his concern that economic measures might not prove fully effective. Mr. Pearson and Mr. Sangster agreed on the importance of keeping in close touch over developments in this deplorable and dangerous situation.

The Prime Ministers also discussed various other international questions including issues currently confronting the United Nations and developments in the OAS.

The Prime Minister of Canada expressed the support of his Government for Jamaica's peace-keeping initiative in the United Nations.

On the question of aid, the Acting Prime Minister reaffirmed the gratitude of the Jamaican Government to Canada for the generous terms of Canadian aid. Different aspects of the loans and technical assistance programmes were discussed and a number of proposals examined.

Much of today's discussion related to trade and economic topics. The progress being made in the current tariff negotiations in Geneva was reviewed and arrangements were made to consult closely on aspects of these negotiations of special interest to the two countries. The importance to Jamaica of sugar exports to Canada was stressed and the interest of the two governments in the achievement of an effective international sugar agreement was recognized.

Other specific trade problems were examined, such as the current negotiations regarding codfish purchases and the sale of rum to Canada.



*The Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, and Mrs. Pearson are greeted on their arrival at Kingston, Jamaica, by the Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Honourable Donald B. Sangster.*

Proposals which had been made earlier for a Canada-West Indies Conference were also discussed. Mr. Pearson and Mr. Sangster agreed that further exploratory and preparatory discussions should take place in the very near future between representatives of all governments concerned.

The Prime Ministers examined the question of migration of Jamaican domestic and other labour to Canada as well as the general question of Jamaican immigration to Canada.

They reaffirmed their desire to find solutions to the problems discussed in such a way that the very close relationship between their countries would be maintained and strengthened.

The discussions took place in a most cordial atmosphere, with both Prime Ministers appreciating each other's point of view.

## Trinidad and Tobago Visit

The Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, arrived in Trinidad on December 14 on a two-day official visit.

Today, December 15, the Prime Minister of Canada conferred with the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago on a number of subjects of mutual interest to both countries. The Prime Minister of Canada was accompanied by Mr. A. E. Ritchie, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. Eric Gilmour, High Commissioner for Canada. With the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago were Senator the Honourable W. J. Alexander, Minister without Portfolio and Special Adviser to the Prime Minister; the Honourable G. Montano, Minister of Home Affairs; the Honourable J. O'Halloran, Minister of Petroleum and Mines and Minister of Industry and Commerce; Senator the Honourable Donald Pierre, Minister of Education and Culture. Also present were Mr. William Demas, Head, Economic Planning Division, and Mr. K. F. Sealey, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

The Prime Ministers discussed the international situation and paid special attention to the serious situation which has arisen as a consequence of the illegal seizure of power by the regime in Southern Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago paid tribute to the Government of Canada for their liberal attitude in their policy of grants and loans offered to Trinidad and Tobago and expressed his appreciation of the work now being done in Trinidad and Tobago by technical advisers, and more particularly the work of teachers in the secondary schools and other educational institutions.

The Prime Minister of Canada expressed the willingness of his Government to extend the assistance in the field of education during the coming year.

The discussions also included a reference to some aspects of the terms of economic aid. The Prime Ministers also discussed the tariff negotiations now going on in Geneva and the trade of developing countries. They also discussed especially trade between Canada and Trinidad and Tobago, particularly in respect of sugar and rum.

The Prime Ministers agreed that steps should be taken to prepare for a conference of the Heads of Governments of Canada and Commonwealth Caribbean countries to consider the future relations in economic and other fields. With this in view, it was proposed that a meeting of officials be held early next year to suggest the subjects for discussion.

The Prime Ministers also discussed the activities of international organizations such as the UN and the Organization of American States. The Prime Ministers also agreed that the closest consultation should continue between them and that they should work towards strengthening the close relationship which exists between their two countries.

Following their discussions, the Prime Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago and



Canada signed two development-loan agreements, one for \$650,000 for a rural electrification programme and the other for \$400,000 for lumber for a low-cost housing scheme.




*The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. the Right Honourable Eric Williams, says goodbye to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, at Piarco International Airport at the end of Mr. Pearson's recent three-day visit to Trinidad and Tobago.*

## *Visit of British Prime Minister*

**T**HE RIGHT Honourable Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of Britain, arrived in Ottawa on December 19, 1965, on his way to London from New York and Washington, where he had addressed the United Nations General Assembly and held talks with President Johnson. The Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson paid a visit to Government House before Mr. Wilson joined Prime Minister Pearson and members of the Canadian Cabinet for a working luncheon. During their talks, which continued throughout the afternoon, the two Prime Ministers discussed problems of mutual interest to both countries.

Before his departure for London, Prime Minister Wilson held a press conference. His few hours in Ottawa, he said, had given him the opportunity "to have very intensive discussions with the Prime Minister and his colleagues covering a very wide range of world affairs". "There are very few world problems we have not ranged over," Mr. Wilson declared, "and, while we can't claim to have settled all the world's problems over these four hours, I think we have reached



*During his recent brief visit to Ottawa, the British Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson (left), talks with His Excellency Governor-General Georges P. Vanier (centre) and the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson (right).*

a very high degree of understanding of our respective positions. It was made that much easier in that I had the opportunity of a long discussion with Mr. Paul Martin when he was in London a few days ago before he went to NATO, where, of course, he was in charge of the conference as chairman; and therefore the ground had been well prepared."

### **Problem of Rhodesia**

Included among the topics that Mr. Wilson intimated had been discussed was Rhodesia, about which he said:

"I could not help this afternoon expressing very clearly our appreciation of the action taken by the Canadian Government in the interest of the rule of law, the interest of human rights and in the interest of the perpetuation and strengthening of the Commonwealth. I do not think there is any difference of view at all between our two Governments. We are working together in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations for a solution of this Rhodesian problem."

On the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the British leader said, in part:

"I think it is quite impossible to form a view on the exact time in which what is already a growing economic dislocation will turn itself into a return to constitutional methods. All I would say is that already these sanctions (the economic measures taken by Britain, by Canada, by the U.S., by Australia, by so many countries in the free world) I think one can say they have now reached the point where very serious economic difficulties are developing in Rhodesia, and I would say very very strongly, and with all the urgency at my command, that the sooner there is a quick decision and a return to constitutional rule the easier it will be to restore normal economic working there."

With respect to the possible use of force, Mr. Wilson said:

"Our whole position on this, as we have made clear from the beginning, is that we do not believe that the Rhodesian constitutional problem should be settled by military force; therefore we have not at any time proposed to the Canadian Government the idea of using Canadian — or, for that matter, British — forces for securing a return to constitutional rule. There have been some talks going on about the quarantining of the Kariba Dam, though not necessarily by military forces, and we all of us are awaiting reports of the World Bank about their soundings of this matter before each of us decides how he can help."

### **British Defence Policy**

Mr. Wilson said the British defence review had been discussed in both Washington and Ottawa, and added:

"We have over the past year conducted the most detailed and deepest review of British defence policy in every sense of the word that we probably ever had in our country. We have been able to identify the options, identify the problems, to review the commitments because we have got to ensure that the policy we now lay down, which will be based on the period from now to 1970 and will,

therefore, govern the defence situation for the 1970s and perhaps even the '80s, will ensure that our commitments, our roles, our expenditure fit in with a tolerable economic limit, which so far we have been doing. We have not yet taken any decision . . . but we have felt it right, having identified the options, to put the position as we see it to our United States allies, to our allies and Commonwealth partners here in Canada, and we shall discuss it with other of our allies. Then we shall make a decision. All I can say is we do intend to maintain a useful and helpful constructive world role."

Mr. Wilson indicated that there had been extensive discussions on Vietnam, about which he answered several questions regarding British policies and views. He implied that the future of the NATO alliance had also been reviewed.

### **Trade with Canada**

With respect to trade between Britain and Canada, Mr. Wilson had the following to say:

"I have been on this problem since 1949, . . . when I was President of the Board of Trade, and we have always had these problems of valuation, of anti-dumping legislation, and there has always been, at the end of the day, a substantial imbalance between what we buy from Canada and what Canada buys from us. And it was my aim, when I was a Trade Minister, and it is still my aim today, to see that this imbalance is reduced — not by cutting but by expanding trade. Now there are some problems about this. We very much welcomed, you know, the action taken in the Canadian budget last spring to help begin to solve some of the outstanding problems. There are still some difficulties which need to be ironed out. I think it will be overstating it to say I have seen a great improvement in the last three or four weeks . . . but I hope we are going to see continuing improvement in this. I think there is a genuine desire on the part of both countries to see trade at the maximum level and we will do everything in our power, including trying to sort out the difficulties that are still persisting to get that put right."

# *Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers*

LAGOS, 1966

*The following communiqué was released on January 12, at the conclusion of the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers held on January 11 and 12 in Lagos, Nigeria:*

The Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government under the Chairmanship of Alhaji the Right Hon. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria, ended today in Lagos. Cyprus was represented by its President and Zambia by its Vice-President. In addition to Nigeria, Britain, Canada, The Gambia, Malawi, Malta, Sierra Leone, Singapore and Uganda were represented by their Prime Ministers: Jamaica was represented by its Acting Prime Minister, while Malaysia and Trinidad and Tobago were represented by their Deputy Prime Ministers. Ceylon was represented by its Minister of Justice; India by its Minister of Law and Social Security; Kenya by its Minister of Finance; and New Zealand and Pakistan by High Commissioners. There was an Australian observer.

On the eve of the Meeting news was received of the death of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. The Prime Ministers paid tribute to the work of the late Mr. Shastri and a message of condolence was sent by the Chairman on behalf of the Meeting.

The Prime Ministers welcomed Singapore to their discussions as an independent member of the Commonwealth.

They expressed their especial appreciation of the invitation from the Prime Minister of Nigeria to meet in Lagos. Observing that this was the first meeting to be held in Africa, they agreed that to assemble from time to time in a different Commonwealth capital would underline the essential character of the Commonwealth as a free association of equal nations, spanning all races and continents.

The Prime Ministers noted that this was also the first Meeting to be held after the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat and were glad to welcome the Secretary-General.

## **Single Issue Discussed**

This was the first meeting called to deal with a single political issue and was devoted entirely to the question of Rhodesia. The Prime Ministers discussed in particular the ending of the rebellion; the need for co-operation with and assistance to Zambia; and the future of Rhodesia under constitutional rule. A Working Party of officials discussed in greater detail the nature and efficacy of economic measures against the illegal regime in Rhodesia; ways in which Zambia could be helped in its co-operation in these measures; and the question of Commonwealth assistance in training Africans in Rhodesia. They reported their conclusions to the Meeting.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed that the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rested with Britain, but acknowledged that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world.

The Prime Ministers recalled their statement, first made in 1964, that "for all Commonwealth Governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race, colour or creed. The Commonwealth should be able to exercise constructive leadership in the application of democratic principles in a manner which will enable the people of each country of different racial and cultural groups to exist and develop as free and equal citizens".

They further recalled that in their 1965 communiqué they stated that "the principle of 'one man one vote' was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia".

They expressed their concern at the danger to all multi-racial communities in the Commonwealth, particularly in East and Central Africa, and at the danger to the future of the multi-racial Commonwealth itself if the situation in Rhodesia were to continue.

### **Objectives**

The Prime Ministers declared that any political system based on racial discrimination was intolerable. It diminished the freedom alike of those who imposed it and of those who suffered under it. They considered that the imposition of discriminatory conditions of political, social, economic and educational nature upon the majority by any minority for the benefit of a privileged few was an outrageous violation of the fundamental principles of human rights.

The Meeting agreed that the goal of future progress in Rhodesia should be the establishment of a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment.

To this end several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for purely political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed. The Prime Ministers noted the statement of the British Government that a period of direct rule would be needed, leading to the holding of a Constitutional Conference. This Conference representing all sections of the Rhodesian people would be for the purpose of recommending a Constitution leading to majority rule on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

The Prime Ministers reviewed and noted the measures taken by Commonwealth and other countries against the illegal regime. Some expressed concern that the

steps taken so far had not resulted in its removal. They called on all countries which had not already done so to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council Resolution of 20th November, 1965, making at the same time necessary arrangements to provide for the repercussions of such further measures on the economy of Zambia.

The Prime Ministers discussed the question of the use of military force in Rhodesia and it was accepted that its use could not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order.

In this connection the Prime Ministers noted the statement by the British Prime Minister that on the expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months. While some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard, all expressed the hope that these measures would result in the overthrow of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia within the period mentioned by the British Prime Minister.

The Prime Ministers decided on the following measures of Commonwealth action, starting now:

- (1) To appoint two continuing committees composed of representatives of all Commonwealth countries to meet with the Secretary-General in London. The first will review regularly the effect of sanctions and also the special needs which may from time to time arise in honouring the Commonwealth's undertaking to come to the support of Zambia as required. The second will co-ordinate a special Commonwealth Programme of Assistance in training Rhodesian Africans as set out below.
- (2) The Sanctions Committee will recommend the reconvening of the Prime Ministers' Meeting when they judge that this is necessary. In any case, the Prime Ministers agreed to meet again in July if the rebellion has not been ended before then.
- (3) The Sanctions Committee will advise the Prime Ministers if it considers action by the United Nations is called for.
- (4) Some Prime Ministers indicated that they reserved the right if need arises to propose mandatory United Nations action under Articles 41 or 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. This statement was noted by the other Heads of Government.

#### **Co-operation with Zambia**

The Prime Minister of Britain informed his colleagues of British actions in support of Zambia. The Prime Ministers welcomed the effort made by Commonwealth and other countries in organizing the emergency transport of oil and vital supplies. The Meeting agreed that members of the Commonwealth should give full consideration to concerted assistance to Zambia and that this assistance should be extended to include Malawi if necessary.

### **Assistance in Training Rhodesian Africans**

The Prime Ministers were agreed that planned assistance to a lawfully constituted Government of Rhodesia should begin at once. They therefore approved the establishment of a special Commonwealth Programme to help accelerate the training of Rhodesian Africans and directed the Secretary-General to arrange as soon as possible a meeting of educational and technical assistance experts to consider detailed projects of aid by Commonwealth countries, including the early establishment of an administrative training centre in Rhodesia.

Finally, the Prime Ministers saw the Rhodesian question in the context of the world-wide problem of race relations. They re-affirmed the declaration made in their Communiqué of July 1964 and expressed the hope that a just solution to the Rhodesian question would light a ray of hope for men and women of all races throughout the world for a future giving assurance of greater harmony between nations and recognition of the dignity of man.

### **Statement to House of Commons**

*Prime Minister Pearson made the following references to the Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting and Rhodesia in his speech of January 20, 1966, in the House of Commons:*

. . . As I spent two or three days in Nigeria at the Commonwealth meeting. I was much impressed by the new and potential value of the Commonwealth, though I was also conscious of the difficulties of keeping it together in its present form.

The crisis in Rhodesia is a very good indication of that difficulty. The situation in Rhodesia, a country now ruled by those who represent only a few hundred thousand of its four and a quarter million inhabitants, is a threat not only to government by majority in Rhodesia; it is a threat to race relations in the whole of Africa, besides being, certainly, a threat to the multi-racial character of our association. If this threat cannot be removed, if independence cannot be achieved by the people of Rhodesia on the basis of majority rule, and if the present illegal regime cannot be replaced in a way which will lead to that result, we shall face a very difficult period indeed for the Commonwealth.

Once again, as was done some years ago in London by the right hon. gentleman opposite, the Canadian position was made clear, that we stand for racial equality and the removal of all discrimination inside the Commonwealth association.

. . . After the unilateral declaration of independence, UDI — or "IDI", the illegal declaration of independence, as the Indian delegate termed it — the Government took what we considered to be appropriate economic and financial action in concert with other members of the Commonwealth and with other coun-



tries. I feel strongly (and I hope I am right in this feeling, I hope the results will justify my feeling) that the overthrow of the illegal regime can be achieved by economic and financial measures without the use of military force. I think the Lagos conference did something to clear up the situation in this regard and to remove the immediate pressure for military action, military action which I believe at this time would have been wrong and, indeed, which might not have had the decisive and immediate result which its proponents assumed. For we have learned in the last 25 or 30 years that military action does not always have quick results in achieving a political objective.

. . . The situation in Rhodesia is, as I mentioned, a threat to peace and to orderly development. I hope the recent happenings in Nigeria will not set back that orderly development, though one cannot be very happy about what has happened. . . .

# *The Problem of Rhodesia*

## FURTHER MEASURES BY CANADA

**T**HE CANADIAN Government has taken the following further measures against the illegal regime in Rhodesia, in addition to those announced on November 11, 1965<sup>1</sup>:

- (a) A total ban has been placed on the import of sugar and tobacco of Rhodesian origin as of November 30, 1965, and on ferrochrome, chrome ores and concentrates, asbestos and meats (sterile, canned and cooked) of Rhodesian origin as of December 8, 1965.
- (b) Insurance facilities for exports from Canada to Rhodesia under the Exports Credits Insurance Act have been withdrawn effective November 26, 1965.
- (c) A total embargo has been placed on the export of oil and oil products from Canada to Rhodesia as of December 20, 1965.

### **Security Council Resolution**

These measures were taken pursuant to the resolution of November 20, 1965, of the United Nations Security Council, which recommended, among other things, that "all states refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime, and in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and oil products".

The Prime Minister, in an announcement of December 20, 1965, explained that these steps were "the result of the Canadian Government's strong support for economic measures recommended by the Security Council and designed to bring the illegal situation in Rhodesia to an early end". "In the Canadian Government's view," he said, "the current crisis in Rhodesia is having an adverse effect on the Commonwealth, on race relations and stability in Africa and on Western relations with Africa. It is also thought by the Canadian Government to be in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole that this seriously disturbing situation should be swiftly concluded by economic means."

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<sup>1</sup>The November 11, 1965, statement of the Prime Minister is reproduced in the December 1965 issue of *External Affairs*.

## *Asian Development Bank*

A CANADIAN delegation led by the Honourable J. R. Nicholson, Minister of Labour, attended the Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened in Manila by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) from December 2 to 4, 1965, to adopt and sign the agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank. Canada was among the 22 countries, including 17 from Asia and five from outside the region, which signed the agreement on December 4, 1965.

Membership in the Bank is open to members and associate members of ECAFE and other regional countries and non-regional developed countries which are members of the United Nations or any of its Specialized Agencies.

The agreement provides that the Bank shall have an intitial capitalization of \$1,000 million (U.S.). On signing the agreement, Canada undertook, subject to



*The leader of the Canadian delegation to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Asian Development Bank, held in Manila from December 2 to 4, 1965, the Honourable John R. Nicholson, Minister of Labour, signs the agreement establishing the Bank. Left to right: U Nyun, Executive Secretary, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; Mr. Nicholson; Cornelio Balmaceda, Philippine Secretary of Commerce and Industry and chairman of the Conference.*

ratification, to join the Bank as a charter member and to subscribe \$25 million to its capital stock. By the end of 1965, capital subscriptions pledged by Asian countries had reached \$642 million and, by countries outside the region, \$296 million.

Japan and the United States, with subscriptions of \$200 million each, are the largest contributors to the capital stock of the Bank. Other large subscriptions include the following (in millions of U.S. dollars): Australia 85; Canada 25; Germany 30; India 93; Iran 60; Italy 10; Korea 30; Malaysia 20; Netherlands 11; New Zealand 22.56; Pakistan 31.50; Philippines 35; Republic of China 16; Thailand 20; Britain 10.

### **Background**

The proposal to establish an Asian Development Bank, aimed at accelerating economic growth in the region, has been developed in various ECAFE forums over the past two years. A first version of the charter of the Bank was prepared by a Consultative Committee appointed at the twenty-first session of ECAFE, held in Wellington, New Zealand, in March 1965. In an effort to seek the participation of developed countries outside the region as charter members of the Bank, the Consultative Committee of Asian experts held discussions during the summer of 1965 with the principal Western governments. They visited Ottawa in July 1965.

At a meeting held at Bangkok between October 21 and November 1, 1965, (at which Canada was represented), the Preparatory Committee on the Asian Development Bank examined, amended and finally adopted the draft charter of the Bank. The Preparatory Committee concluded its meeting by recommending the agreement for approval at the Second Ministerial Conference on Asian Economic Co-operation (November 29 - December 1) and for signature at a Conference of Plenipotentiaries (December 2-4, 1965).

Following the Manila Conference, the agreement remained open for signature in Bangkok until January 31, 1966. As soon as it enters into force — following ratification by 15 countries, including at least ten Asian countries, which subscribe a minimum of 65 per cent of the Bank's capital — a Board of Governors is to be appointed, with each member country appointing one Governor. The Board will elect ten Directors and a President. The Bank is expected to commence operations before the end of 1966.

### **Canada's Interest in the Bank**

In his statement at the Manila Conference, Mr. Nicholson expressed Canada's interest in Asian development and in the activities of the Asian Development Bank in the following terms:

“ . . . As many here know, Canada's effort to give concrete form to its interest in Asian development takes many shapes. The continuing growth of our bilateral relations with the countries of Asia has done much to strengthen mutual

understanding of national aspirations and problems. Through the United Nations, Canada has participated in the international effort to develop the economic and technical resources of the region, and has contributed to UN operations designed to maintain the peace and provide the security so essential to development. It has, since 1954, served on the International Commission in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. As a founding member of the Colombo Plan, Canada has expressed its faith in the regional approach to the development process and has contributed well over \$500 million to that end.

“ . . . At an early stage of discussions on the structure and functions of the Bank, a decision was made to seek participation of non-regional countries to provide the Bank with as broad an institutional and financial basis as possible. That decision and the discussions which led to the preparation of the document to which our governments are agreed to give their formal assent can be considered as a unique example of practical international co-operation. The charter of the Asian Development Bank reflects the importance, I should say the necessity, of a regional approach to economic development. At the same time, the charter recognizes the principle that the interests of the developing countries of the region will be served best by an institution in which non-regional members will share the responsibility of protecting, investing and increasing the Bank's financial resources. I feel sure that, if we pursue the objectives embodied in this charter with wisdom, energy and perseverance, the Asian Development Bank will play a significant role in the solution of the wide range of development problems in the Asian region.

“ . . . The size of the announced Canadian contribution is an indication of Canadian interest and support and, in joining as a charter member, Canada will continue to look for ways in which to co-operate effectively with the Bank in channeling its expanding aid resources to Asia.”

## *Karachi Nuclear Power Project*


**A**N IMPORTANT agreement with Pakistan relating to the construction of a Canadian-designed nuclear-power station was signed at Karachi on December 24, 1965, by the Canadian Acting High Commissioner, Mr. J. M. Weld, and S. Osman Ali, Secretary (Economic Affairs) to the Government of Pakistan.

The Pakistan Government, in its general economic plan, has attached the highest priority to the construction of a nuclear-power station because of the impetus it will give to the economic and technological development of the country. This project will thus provide an outstanding example of the growing co-operation between Pakistan and Canada since 1950 in programmes furthering the economic development of Pakistan.

The two Governments reached agreement in principle on the project in February 1965, after which the Canadian General Electric Company negotiated a



*Signing ceremony in Ottawa of the financing agreements between Canada and Pakistan for a nuclear-power plant at Karachi: left to right—I. F. McRae, Chairman of the Board, Canadian General Electric; H. T. Aitken, President, Export Credits Insurance Corporation; His Excellency Sultan Mohammed Khan, High Commissioner of Pakistan; the Honourable Charles M. Drury, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Minister of Trade and Commerce.*



*Model of the nuclear-power plant to be built at Karachi under agreement between Canada and Pakistan.*

“turn-key” contract for the construction of a 137,000-kilowatt nuclear-power station to be located in West Pakistan. The station is to be in operation by 1970 to meet the rapidly increasing power needs of the city of Karachi, which has a population of two and one half million. The nuclear part of the station is to be based on Canadian designs employing a natural uranium reactor moderated and cooled by heavy water.

#### **Financing the Agreements**

Following the conclusion of the inter-governmental agreement in Karachi, supplementary agreements covering the financing arrangements were signed in Ottawa by the Honourable Charles M. Drury, at the time acting in the absence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Trade and Commerce. His Excellency Sultan Mohammed Khan, the Pakistan High Commissioner to Canada, signed the agreements on behalf of his Government. The External Aid Office and the Export Credits Insurance Corporation will finance, in roughly equal amounts, the purchase of Canadian goods and services worth \$48,100,000. The disbursements will be made over five years as part of the Canadian long-term financial-assistance programme for Pakistan. The funds provided by the Export

Credits Insurance Corporation are to be repaid over 15 years after a five-year period of grace and at an interest rate of 6 per cent. The development loan provided by the External Aid Office bears a service charge of three-quarters of 1 per cent and will be repayable over 40 years after a ten-year period of grace.

Both Canada and Pakistan have long been committed to the employment of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and have declared their support for the safeguards system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In order to reassure the international community that the reactor, when it comes into operation, will be so used, the inter-governmental agreement signed in Karachi states the intention of Canada and Pakistan to avail themselves of the safeguards services of the IAEA.



# *The Canada-United States Air Transport Agreement*

*The Canada-United States Air Transport Agreement was signed on January 17, 1966, in the Commonwealth Room of the Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and the Minister of Transport, the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, signed on behalf of Canada, while the United States Ambassador, His Excellency W. Walton Butterworth, signed for the United States. Representing the United States Civil Aeronautics Board were the Chairman, Mr. Charles S. Murphy, and Mr. Richard O'Melia, who came from Washington for the occasion. Signed at the same time as the Agreement were Exchanges of Notes concerning local services, future negotiations, the Detroit-Toronto route and all cargo services.*


*Upon the completion of the signing ceremony, Mr. Martin made the following statement:*

Mr. Ambassador, my colleague Mr. Pickersgill and I are very pleased to join with you today in signing this Air Transport Agreement. In doing so, I recall that it was at a meeting in 1963 that Prime Minister Pearson and the late President Kennedy agreed that a new approach should be taken to the air relations between Canada and the United States. Subsequently, the President asked Professor J. K. Galbraith of Harvard University to make a special study of the matter.

In his report to the President, Professor Galbraith dwelt upon the rapid technological evolution in civil aviation and the great increase in travel which had taken place since the conclusion of the 1949 bilateral Air Agreement. He recommended that the Agreement should be renegotiated because it no longer provided a satisfactory framework for the civil aviation arrangements between our two countries. He outlined certain general principles which he thought should be reflected in the new Agreement. It was desirable to develop a continental approach to air transport which would more adequately meet the needs of the travelling public of both countries, make more rational use of modern jet aircraft, and at the same time provide for an equitable sharing of traffic between Canadian and United States carriers.

These principles were taken into account in the negotiations which opened early in 1964. The resulting Agreement provides for a marked improvement in the air services and a substantial expansion of routes, including access for Canadian carriers beyond the trans-border points to more distant parts of the United States.

Since this Agreement pioneers new ground, we have made provision for periodic review of the route patterns to ensure that the changing and growing requirements of travellers and air-freight shippers are met. The first such review will take place early in 1969.



*The Canada-U.S. Air Transport Agreement is signed by the Ambassador of the United States, His Excellency W. Walton Butterworth (left), and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin (right). The other Canadian signer of the Agreement, not shown in this photograph, was the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, Canadian Minister of Transport.*

It is our view that this Agreement marks the opening of a new era in air relations between Canada and the United States. While the interests of the airline industry have received due attention, our primary concern has been to meet the needs of the public of both countries.


Mr. Ambassador, it has not been a simple matter to arrive at an agreement which represents a significant departure from earlier concepts. During the past two years of negotiations we have had to work hard to reconcile various interests. I am satisfied that we have now achieved a long step forward in the development of our air relations which will be of great general benefit to our two peoples.

# Canada-United States Arbitral Tribunal

ON MARCH 25, 1965, the Governments of Canada and the United States signed an arbitral agreement relating to claims of United States citizens for real property damage that had occurred along the south shore of Lake Ontario in 1951 and 1952. This damage is attributed by the claimants to the presence of a navigation improvement in the international section of the St. Lawrence River known as Gut Dam. The agreement will come into force once ratification by both governments has been completed. Canada has previously participated in similar arbitrations from time to time. The last one was the Trail Smelter arbitration, which took place in the 1930s and also involved the United States.

Under the terms of the present agreement, there will be established a three-man tribunal consisting of two national members, one being appointed by each government, and a chairman appointed jointly by the two governments. This tribunal will hear and finally dispose of all claims for damage involving Gut Dam which are presented to it by the United States Government on behalf of U.S. citizens.

Gut Dam was built by Canada in 1903 and 1904 pursuant to arrangements



concluded between Canada and the United States, this being necessary because the dam was partly located on United States territory. The purpose of the dam was to serve as an aid to navigation in the international section of the St. Lawrence River through the elimination of dangerous cross-currents. Gut Dam existed without any complaints for almost half a century until 1951 and 1952, when extensive water damage along the southern shore of Lake Ontario took place due to high water levels which prevailed in the Great Lakes during that period.

Negotiations between the Governments of Canada and the United States to have these claims settled have continued over a number of years. The position taken by the United States claimants has been that the high water levels which occurred in Lake Ontario in 1951 and 1952 were caused, at least in part, by Gut Dam, which is situated approximately six miles downstream from Prescott, Ontario. The Canadian Government never accepted this position. In the negotiations, the governments focused attention mainly on providing a suitable forum in which these claims could be heard and disposed of on their merits. The need for providing such a forum was emphasized by the fact that actions instituted by the United States claimants against both governments in U.S. courts were dismissed on procedural grounds or otherwise terminated without ever having had the cases dealt with on their merits.

### **IJC Report**

During this period, the two governments requested the International Joint Commission, established under the 1909 treaty relating to boundary waters, to enquire into the causes of high water levels in the Great Lakes. The report submitted by the Commission indicated that Gut Dam had some effect on the level of Lake Ontario. It further showed that several other factors, both natural and artificial, also contributed to high lake levels. This report will undoubtedly be an important document for consideration by the tribunal.

The task given to the tribunal by the 1965 agreement is somewhat different than that which was presented to the Commission. It is being asked to determine whether Gut Dam was the proximate cause of damage to any property which is the subject of a claim. It must determine the nature and extent of any such damage and whether there exists any legal liability to pay compensation. The tribunal must also decide who is responsible for paying this compensation.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Toward a Vietnam Settlement**

*During the debate on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, on January 20, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister, made the following statement:*

. . . I should like to say a few words now, and only a few words, about the situation in Vietnam. Just as the situation in Rhodesia is a threat to peace and orderly development in all of Africa and could bring about an African conflict, so the situation in Vietnam remains a threat to peace and to orderly development not only in Southeast Asia but also in all of Asia. It could ultimately lead to the worst of catastrophes. In recent weeks the United States Government has made offers for a negotiated settlement. I believe, on the information I have received and from the contacts we have been able to make — and these have been close and continuous — among our friends in Washington, in London and in other capitals on this subject, that these offers are genuine and sincere and that they should be supported by all who believe in the necessity of bringing the fighting to an end and beginning a process of negotiation.

In one sense I think it is right to say that these offers have already begun the process of negotiation by throwing out public proposals and by eliciting perhaps not counter-proposals from those to whom the original proposals were made but counter-proposals from one source or another. I hope this process will be continued. Obviously there is a limit beyond which this kind of dialogue cannot be carried but I hope what has been going on will lead to the constructive play of diplomatic negotiation and a chance to explore opportunities for peace, and that those who are more directly concerned than we are and who are bearing the burden of this issue will be able to maintain the patience and wisdom they have been showing in recent weeks since those offers were first made. There is a discouraging side to all this. It is that there has been no response that anyone can detect from Hanoi itself. I think it is wise for the critics of the United States to remember this fact.

At the Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting last June, we tried to take an initiative which would bring the Commonwealth into this issue by way of a Commonwealth mission which would include members who were certainly not unacceptable to the Communists, men who, in two cases, were certainly uncommitted. No success was achieved as a result of that effort. It was spurned by Hanoi and perhaps by some of those who are behind Hanoi; I do not know.

. . . We took the position at that time, and I believe it is the American position now — perhaps it was also at that time, though it was a little unclear to some of us — that, in the negotiations which will have to take place, the

North Vietnamese Government, as the other government of Vietnam, should bring to the negotiations anyone it wished, including the Viet Cong, as part of its delegation. There were some members of the Commonwealth mission who certainly would have gone further than that.

However, there has been no positive response from Hanoi on this present occasion, and there was no positive response on that earlier occasion either. So far as one can gather from any statement of their position, they have made it clear, at least publicly, that there can be no negotiations without the United States withdrawing and without the Viet Cong being considered as the only legitimate representatives of the South Vietnamese people. That is a very difficult position for anyone else to accept.

Nevertheless, the United States has suspended air-bombing and I hope it will be able to maintain that suspension as long as possible. I also hope that, with patience as well as determination, this effort by the Americans for negotiations will have some success.

I should like to read just one sentence from the President's Congressional address, to which I think considerable importance should be attached but to which not very much publicity has been given. I quote from his address as follows:

We will respond if others reduce their use of force; and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.

Perhaps progress would be possible if the North Vietnamese even accepted the idea of negotiations. Once that acceptance has been given by both sides (and it has already been given by the United States) it might be possible, on the acceptance of negotiations, to begin a process of withdrawal. Perhaps that is what the President was hinting at as a possibility in that sentence. I do not know. However . . . in my view it is perfectly clear that military force alone will not settle this problem, will not resolve this issue either by toppling the regime in the North or by permitting the Communists to absorb the South.

Perhaps the result — and it is not one that anyone can get any particular satisfaction out of — perhaps the ultimate solution will have to be, as it has been in other cases since World War II, the acceptance of two Vietnamese communities, neutralized, with other countries staying out. So long as the problem is approached in terms of "puppet regimes" or "national liberation struggles", we run the risk of obscuring the basic fact that there are now two communities in Vietnam and we also run the risk of misjudging the possibility of one community gaining a complete ascendancy over the other by military means or by subversion, or by any other means not based on the clearly expressed choice of the people concerned. In the case of two communities that have developed for more than a decade along different lines, and towards which such massive outside engagements have already been made, it seems difficult to believe that one would now be allowed simply to extinguish the other.

In my view, we should not preclude the possibility of the reunification of Vietnam, which, unquestionably, corresponds with the aspirations of the Viet-

name people, and it would be my hope — and I am sure of all Honourable Members — that, when the fighting has ended and peace is restored, the two communities could proceed quickly towards establishing the basis of confidence which would bring about such reunification.

. . . I cannot help but add that every indication is against Communist China participating in any United Nations intervention. . . . Naturally, I think we would all like to see the United Nations involved in this matter as soon as possible if there were any possibility of progress in that way, just as in the Rhodesian conflict we at Lagos agreed that if economic sanctions, financial sanctions and oil sanctions did not work, and if any member of the Commonwealth thought they were not working, then, having set up the Sanctions Committee, that member of the Commonwealth could appeal to the Sanctions Committee for a reconvening of the Commonwealth Conference or could go to the United Nations and, in the Security Council of the United Nations, introduce a sanctions resolution under Chapter 7 of the Charter which would be obligatory on all members of the United Nations. This could be possible and successful in the case of Rhodesia, but I think it would be quite unrealistic to think UN involvement would be effective in any way in the Vietnamese conflict, unless somehow Communist China could be brought into association with it, and both governments of Vietnam, showed a desire to go to the United Nations.

### **The Crucial Issue of Vietnam**

*On January 25, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, spoke on the same topic as follows:*

. . . I trust . . . that there will be an opportunity soon for the House to undertake a broad review of foreign affairs. Today I thought I should like to confine my statement on behalf of the Government, to the crucial issue of Vietnam. No issue has so much preoccupied public opinion in Canada or the Members of this House in recent months. No issue has aroused greater misgivings or greater uncertainty about where the right course for Canada lies. Probably no issue has cast a darker shadow on the prospects of peaceful accommodation and peaceful co-operation in the world.

The policy of the Government in relation to the Vietnam problem is now a matter of record. It was stated before the External Affairs Committee on Wednesday and Thursday, June 9 and 10. If I restate it today, it is because I regard it as right to do so at the outset of this new Parliament and in the light of recent significant developments in the situation.

In our view, the situation in Vietnam needs to be viewed from three separate perspectives. First, there is what I might call the perspective of internal dissent in South Vietnam. This is something we must expect in any new country where

the people live on the margin of subsistence. It exists because the process of social and economic transformation that is the basis of any significant development is bound to involve dislocation and disruption. It exists in greater degree in a country like South Vietnam because of the intervention from the outside. This, in turn, has made it impossible for successive governments in that country to lay a recognizable basis for political stability.

But let us not on that account equate that outside intervention with the desire for social and economic change. Let us remember that long before the conflict in South Vietnam erupted into open hostilities it was the agents of change — the administrators, the teachers, the public health workers and others like them — who were the prime targets of terror. Let us remember that whatever the change of government in Saigon, and there have been many, the level of that terror did not abate. And let us also remember that, when the government of President Diem was forcibly overthrown in 1963, it was not overthrown by men or groups whose loyalty was pledged to the Viet Cong.

This is not to discount or to downgrade the hold which the Viet Cong has by one means or another been able to establish over sections of South Vietnam and its people; it is merely to suggest that we should be entirely mistaken if we regarded the Viet Cong as embodying a consensus of dissent in Vietnam. So far as we know, none of the major groupings in South Vietnam, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the trade unions, the intellectuals, the students, are significantly represented in the Viet Cong movement. Certainly there is nothing to suggest that there is any basis for the claim of the Viet Cong to be the sole legitimate representative of the people of South Vietnam.

Second, there is the matter of outside intervention. Admittedly this is a difficult situation to disentangle in a divided country. After all, it is often argued: What is the sense in speaking of intervention in a context where Vietnamese are involved on both sides? I suggest to the House that, whatever the circumstances in which these dividing lines were drawn, they have come to reflect political realities which it will take time to alter. They neither justify nor diminish the fact of aggression.

What is happening in Vietnam may not be aggression in the classical sense of the term but it is aggression all the same, and it is aggression carried out in this case under the guise of a war of liberation. The aim of that aggression is to establish in South Vietnam a form of political organization which we have no evidence to suggest that the people of South Vietnam would freely choose for themselves.

We have said that in principle we appreciate and support the purposes and objectives of the policy of the United States. This was affirmed by the Prime Minister when the matter was first discussed in this House. We have said that because, as the Prime Minister put it, we cannot in this nuclear world of ours "afford any permissible kinds of international violence" of the kind by which



the North Vietnamese are trying to achieve their objectives in the South. We have said this because we are of the view that the people of South Vietnam must be left to work out their own future free from outside pressure or intervention. We are not disposed to deny to the people of the South the right of self-determination which we have conceded to others in accordance with the solemn principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Third, there is an even more broad perspective, one from which I think the course of developments in Vietnam has to be viewed. I do not want to urge on the House the "domino" or any other currently fashionable theory. But I do suggest to the House that we cannot look at the situation in Vietnam in isolation. In neighbouring Laos, the country is to all intents and purposes partitioned. The part that is under Pathet Lao control is being freely used for the movement of men and materials from North to South Vietnam. Members of the armed forces of North Vietnam have been engaged in open attacks against the armed forces of the Royal Government of Laos. All this is in clear contravention of the undertakings solemnly given in Geneva in 1962; and Canada was a member of that Conference.

In Northeastern and Southern Thailand, there are the beginnings of the same kind of terror which marked the first phase of insurgency in South Vietnam. As in the case of South Vietnam, this is being aided and abetted from outside but with this difference, that the Thai Patriotic Front, as it is called, is still operating from Peking. It has within the past several weeks been joined by a new clandestine organization, the National Liberation League and Army of Malaysia, which is dedicated to the overthrow by revolutionary means of the Government of Malaysia.

Are we, then, seriously to assume that all these movements are coming into being because the legitimate channels of local dissent in these countries have been closed? Or is this part of the pattern of permanent revolution which is being propagated in some quarters? I suggest to the House, on my responsibility as Secretary of State for External Affairs, that these are questions which we must seriously ponder before we condemn United States policy in Vietnam. . . .

That is our assessment of the forces that are at work in the present conflict. There are those who would have us alter that assessment for the mere sake of giving the appearance of Canadian independence as though independence consisted only in taking positions which are necessarily against those of one's friends. Our policy in this situation represents our own honest assessment of the position and is not a reflection in any way of pressure imposed on us by the United States or by any other country. In this matter we are as independent as is Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I say to the House that, after more than 11 years of active involvement in the situation in Vietnam, we are perfectly capable of arriving at an independent assessment of that situation without having recourse to false credentials. The question we must surely ask ourselves is this: Can we ignore the challenge of the aggression by these Communist liberation fronts in Asia?

Were we able to ignore the situation in Europe 20 years ago? I am not saying that the situation in Europe now is comparable with that existing at present in Asia. Undoubtedly there is a *détente* in effect between the West and the Soviet Union in Europe. I am talking about the situation in Asia, where a different state of affairs prevails but where there are some comparisons to the history of the immediate post-war period in Europe. No one will deny that mistakes have been made in Asia and I think some have been made by the United States. But there is, it seems to me, a parallel between the situation in Asia and that in Europe following the end of the war.

We must ask ourselves what the failure of United States efforts in Asia would mean to us as well as to that country. We must ask ourselves what it would mean to India, to Thailand, to the island countries, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia. We must ask ourselves what it would mean to many countries in Asia and Africa which, although critical of the United States, would be deeply concerned over a Communist victory in Vietnam. I ask what would be the concern of the Soviet Union in these circumstances. I must ask the House whether Canada's real interests would be promoted by a United States defeat. I must ask the House what such a defeat would mean by way of encouragement to an aggressive brand of political action. It is because of these considerations for Canada and other countries that we cannot deny the importance of this conflict in Vietnam to us all. I have given the House my assessment of the conflict. I shall now turn to the policy which we have thought it right for Canada to follow in relation to this conflict.

In the first place, there is our membership on the International Commission. The House is well aware that this has been an increasingly frustrating commitment. The circumstances facing the Commission today bear little resemblance to those envisaged when the Commission was given its mandate. Nevertheless, we have thought it right to maintain a Canadian presence in Vietnam. We have done so because the Commission still has a function to perform in bringing its objective judgment to bear on the facts of the situation, because the Commission continues to maintain, at least in symbolic form, the validity of the Geneva Agreements on which, all the parties seem to agree, any fresh settlement of the Vietnam conflict must be constructed, and because the Commission may still be able to play a part in the context of such a settlement, if not to serve as a channel of contact between the parties themselves.

The charge is sometimes made that Canada has failed to act impartially in discharging its responsibilities on the Commission. This charge, in my judgment and on my examination and on the advice of my officers in whom I have the fullest confidence, men who have served Canada in Indochina for 11 years, has no basis in fact. I reject it without any hesitation. We have acted impartially in relation to all the facts and all the evidence which has come before the Commission. Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, we have been associated with findings against South Vietnam as we have been associated with findings against

the North. We subscribed to the Commission's Special Report of June 1962 because it represented a balanced presentation of events in Vietnam. We also appended a minority report to the Commission's Special Message of February 1965, not because we disputed the findings of the majority but because it was our view that there were other factors which it was legitimate to include on the basis of all the evidence available to us at that time. In all this, I think, we need make no apology to our Commission partners for the way in which we have interpreted our responsibilities on the Commission.

To my knowledge, for example (and I state this not by way of criticism but by way of fact), our Polish colleagues on the Commission have never found occasion to support a finding against North Vietnam and have frequently refused even to participate in an investigation where such a finding was likely to be the outcome. Yet it would be found that Canada, as a member of the Commission, did not hesitate where this was called for to criticize the actions of the Government in the South. The Commission has no authority to criticize any state not a signatory of the Geneva Agreement but the implications are there for everyone to read and there was no reservation made in the Canadian position with regard to the Commission's report of 1962.

Then there is the matter of sending Canadian troops to Vietnam. We have made it as clear as it can be made that we should not regard such a course as being compatible with our responsibilities on the International Commission in Vietnam. This is far from being the frivolous argument some have professed it to be. The Geneva cease-fire agreement, which the Commission is there to administer, prohibits in its very terms the introduction of military forces into either part of Vietnam. It would scarcely be right for one of the powers which has been entrusted with the supervision of the Agreement to abet one of the parties in an infraction of its terms. Any other position on our part would certainly have the gravest consequences to our ability to carry out peace-keeping functions not only in this area but more generally and in other contexts. I believe we can all take pride in Canada's achievements in this field of international activity and I believe it is imperative in the interests of international peace keeping not to jeopardize our ability to contribute significantly to such activities.

Altogether apart from membership on the Commission, however, the Government's policy, as I have stated it twice in this House and as it was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister the other day, is that the Government has no intention to recommend at any time the commitment of our forces to Asia unless pursuant to an obligation under the Charter of the United Nations. . . .

My next point is this. Our policy has been directed toward helping to bring the present conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. This has always been our position and it remains our objective. We have made it clear, and the Prime Minister did so again only the other day, that we do not look upon the present conflict as being amenable to a military solution alone. We have taken every opportunity available to us to probe the possibilities for peace and, indeed,

we are doing that at this very time. We proposed a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam last April, not because we looked to one side only to make concessions but because we hoped that such a pause might provide a climate in which it would prove easier for the other side to respond in a positive way. We have welcomed the current pause, which has now been in effect for an entire month, and the search for a peaceful conclusion of the conflict which has accompanied it. Although the absence of any positive response from the other side has been a matter of deep disappointment to us, we have expressed the hope that the pause might be further extended until all reasonable possibilities have been exhausted. I simply ask: Have all reasonable possibilities been exhausted? I should hope that the pause would continue as long as possible. I should hope that before any final step were taken in this regard the most careful consideration would be given to an examination of any indication that North Vietnam was now seriously engaged in examining the possibility of negotiations. In the final analysis, however, we must recognize that it is not for Canada to take the crucial decisions which lie immediately ahead, since we are not a party to the hostilities. On the other hand, we do think there may well be a contribution which Canada can make to an ultimate settlement because of the long experience we have had of the problems at issue in this whole area.

We have expressed our regret that in a situation which so deeply engages the concern of the international community, the United Nations has been prevented from playing any effective part. We recognize, as the Secretary-General did again in his press conference on Thursday last, that there are reasons why the United Nations has been unable to act in the present circumstances.

. . . It is clear that China would regard the Secretary-General, I regret to say, as *persona non grata*. It is true that China is not a member of the United Nations. It is true that South and North Vietnam are not members. It has not been possible to use the United Nations fully and there has been a failure on the part of some nations to appreciate the great role that the office of the Secretary-General affords in so delicate a situation.

These are obvious reasons why the United Nations has been unable to act and why the Secretary-General himself has not been able to act as fully as he would have liked. But I hope he will continue to explore all the possibilities that may be open to him as Secretary-General to encourage action that will set this conflict on a course of peace. I would also hope with him that there may yet be a role for the United Nations in securing the terms of any settlement of the present conflict. If and when that time comes, I can assure the Secretary-General and the House that the Canadian Government will do whatever it can to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities in this area as it has done in similar circumstances elsewhere.

We have also directed our thinking toward the great task of rehabilitation in that whole area that will have to form a part of any durable settlement of the Vietnam conflict. We have resumed our pledge to participate in the works of

the Mekong Development Committee. We have subscribed to the capital of the Asian Development Bank, which has now been established. We are prepared to devote further substantial resources to regional development in Southeast Asia, in which I hope both communities in Vietnam could play their full part and derive their full benefit. Indeed, I should go further and say that I should look toward this whole field of regional development as providing a framework within which these two communities might be able to establish a basis for mutual acceptance and co-operation.

Over the past month . . . efforts have been made by many countries to explore the opportunities there may be for peace in Vietnam. Canada alone, and Canada in concert with others, has done what it could do to try and bring about negotiations. The House will be aware of the efforts which have recently been made by the United States to reaffirm its readiness to negotiate an honourable conclusion to the present conflict. We are satisfied beyond any doubt that the efforts of the United States during the past month through its Secretary of State, through its Vice-President, through its delegate to the United Nations and through others, have been sincerely directed toward trying to bring about negotiations without any preconditions. It is regrettable that no response has been forthcoming, and I think it is only fair to point out that, whatever some may think of the course of action by our neighbour, the fact is that no one can suggest that the United States has not sincerely sought to achieve negotiations. As I said in the United Nations, those who criticize the United States ought to engage in the same energetic pursuit to persuade North Vietnam and others that the time has come when we should have negotiations to establish peace.

I cannot predict how much longer the present pause in the bombing of North Vietnam will last. I can assure the House that our views in this regard have been made known in a way which we believe, in the circumstances, to be the most effective way of presenting our point of view. What has happened in conjunction with this pause was an effort by the United States to seek peace.

In the short run, there may well be an intensification of the level of military activity in Vietnam. I should hope that even at this hour we could avoid that possibility and that we should have some positive indication from Hanoi, as a result of the efforts that have been made during the course of the last weeks to try and bring about negotiations with the North consistent with the offer to negotiate that has been made.

It is clear . . . that the Geneva Agreement is regarded by the parties as a suitable point of departure for any future settlement. I should not want to suggest to the House that there is formal agreement between the parties on this particular formulation. The Government of North Vietnam holds that its four points contain the essence of the military and political provisions agreed to at Geneva and must be accepted publicly by the United States before any political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be envisaged. What I am concerned to do is to state the minimum common ground on which there appears to be agree-

ment and from which negotiation would necessarily have to proceed.

There would also seem to be agreement between the parties that there should be a withdrawal of foreign military forces and a dismantling of foreign military bases in Vietnam. This is again a minimum formulation. The Government of North Vietnam would regard this as a prior condition to any settlement. For its part, the United States has made it clear that it wants neither a continuing military presence in South Vietnam nor bases in Southeast Asia. But it has also made it clear that this is on condition that there is peace in the area.

So far as the internal affairs of South Vietnam are concerned, there is agreement on the basic proposition that these must be settled by the people of South Vietnam themselves without any foreign interference. . . .

I have said that we are not one of the belligerents in this regrettable conflict. We regret that the United Nations is not capable of serving the function for which its Charter provides. That is not the fault of a country like Canada or the fault of any one member of the United Nations. This is a situation involving grave issues and the Government has had to consider, in its assessment of the problem, the consequences in Asia which in the fullness of time could well provide the same effects as attended the end of the Second World War.

I believe that our relations with the Soviet Union are now on a much firmer foundation. I believe that the threat of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West has very considerably receded. However, we are now faced with a dangerous situation in Asia. Canada, as a member of the International Commission, is doing its utmost to discharge its responsibilities. Canada is ready to do what it can to provide resources to help in bringing about economic improvement in this regrettably unstable region if only there can be peace, and peace is possible only if the parties to a dispute are willing to engage in a fruitful discussion. I can assure the House that this Government has done everything it could to bring about discussions leading to negotiations which we hope could bring peace in Indochina.

### **Canadian-U.S. Financial Relations**

*The Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, made the following statement to the House of Commons on January 27:*

Honourable Members will recall that for more than a decade Canada has been spending more abroad than it has been earning abroad. The deficit has been as high as \$1.5 billion in 1959. In 1963 and 1964 it was down to about half a billion dollars. In 1965 it got up to about \$1 billion, and during the present year it will probably be a little more.

At times of prosperity like the present, when our own resources are almost fully employed, this current-account deficit and the import of capital which ac-

companies it enables us to grow and develop more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case. We are, of course, able to have these continuing substantial deficits only because we are able to finance them.

Where is this capital to come from? Only from the United States can we expect to raise private long-term capital in the quantities that are required to finance this substantial and continuing excess of current international payments over current international receipts. Neither the volume of saving disposed toward foreign investment nor the organization of the capital markets is great enough in Europe or elsewhere to supply more than a modest fraction of our requirements. We are fortunate that, for a variety of reasons, Canada enjoys the confidence of American investors. It is that confidence which enables us to invest and to grow at the high rates that we desire, and indeed expect, while also maintaining a high standard of consumption.

There are differences of view whether it is desirable that we should incur such substantial current-account deficits year after year and import capital on the scale that we do. One point, however, is obvious — namely, that it makes more sense to incur deficits and import such large sums of capital at a time when we are working close to potential and growing rapidly, as is now the case, than it was, say, in 1959, when . . . there was a high rate of unemployment. I have already mentioned the figure for 1959, when Canada was in a bit of a recession. That year we were importing capital at the rate of a billion and a half dollars a year. It is, nonetheless, true that we are heavily dependent upon being able to import the capital we need and we are, therefore, vulnerable to any change in the United States capital markets or any restrictions placed on the United States capital markets of a nature that would interfere with the flow of capital into Canada.

This leads one immediately to consider the position of the United States today. It is hard for us, living as we do just across the border, and perhaps even more difficult for people living at a greater distance from the United States, to realize that a country as powerful and as rich as the United States, one whose currency is in such demand in so many parts of the world, can have a balance-of-payments problem. Yet there is no doubt that it has, although it is very different from ours.

Unlike Canada, the United States normally has a large surplus on its current international account. That is to say its earnings abroad exceed its spendings abroad. The amount of the surplus varies, of course, from year to year, but the general pattern is clear and strong.

The problem of the United States arises from the fact that the American people and the American Government, for one reason or another, have in recent years wished to invest abroad, provide as foreign aid, or utilize for defence purposes much more each year than was available from the surplus in their current-account balance of payments.

The flow of private investment from the United States has been running at

billions of dollars a year for many years. It has contributed in the short run to the overall deficit in the balance of payments which the United States has experienced. These overall deficits show up in the loss of the United States gold reserves and in the accumulation of claims on the United States by central banks and governments of other countries and by other banks. While some of us, such as Canada, are only too glad to hold most of our exchange reserves in the form of United States balances and short-term investments, others have been accumulating more of such reserves in U.S. dollars than they feel they would really like to hold and they wish from time to time to convert substantial amounts of such balances into gold, thereby reducing the ultimate reserves into which the U.S. dollars are convertible. For the past several years the United States Government has been taking measures to deal with the situation. The more important and spectacular of these measures have been those which aim at reducing the flow of U.S. investments to other countries.

From what I have said earlier about Canada's position, it is evident that we are particularly vulnerable to restrictions on the outflow of U.S. capital. At first sight it might look as if we were the country most seriously affected. In fact, however, the United States cannot really improve its own balance-of-payments situation by restricting the flow of capital to Canada. That is the difference between the Canadian position and the position of other countries. In short, we are not a drain on the United States. We provide support to the U.S. balance of payments.

One of the first important measures the United States took to improve its balance of payments was the interest-equalization tax, a tax payable by United States investors on the purchases of foreign securities. This was intended to make foreign investment less attractive to Americans. When this was first announced by President Kennedy in July 1963, there was consternation in the financial markets of Canada because it was quickly realized that this measure as originally proposed would either leave Canada seriously short of foreign exchange and investment capital or would necessitate a substantial increase in interest rates in Canada to levels that would induce Canadian borrowers — provinces, municipalities and corporations — to borrow in the United States in the required volume despite the tax, and I would suggest the order of magnitude is more than a 1 percent increase in interest rates, which, under these circumstances, is very substantial.

Fortunately, we were quickly able to convince Mr. Dillon, then Secretary of the Treasury, and through him President Kennedy, that for the reasons I have described it was not possible for the United States to improve its balance-of-payments position by reducing the exports of capital to Canada below what was required to meet Canada's current-account deficit. Consequently, the United States authorities agreed to exempt new issues of Canadian securities from the interest-equalization tax. In return, the Canadian Government undertook that it was



not its intention to increase its foreign-exchange reserves through the proceeds of borrowing in the United States.

For some months after the announcement of this special interest-equalization tax in the United States, there was uncertainty as to just how it would apply and the need for working out specific aspects of the exemption. During this period there were relatively few issues of Canadian securities in the United States. Once the situation had clarified, however, U.S. lenders and Canadian borrowers anticipated the final enactment of the law and the exemption, both of which were to be retroactive, and a big backlog of Canadian issues held up during the months of uncertainty moved onto the U.S. market in the second, third and fourth quarters of 1964. In keeping with the spirit of our undertaking to the United States, the former Minister of Finance, my predecessor in office, appealed to the provincial authorities in December 1964, to avoid as far as possible adding to the volume of new Canadian issues in the United States at that time.

Early in 1965 President Johnson reinforced the interest-equalization tax with a programme of guidelines — advice, suggestions — for voluntary action on the part of U.S. investors and companies to restrain the flow of their investment outside the United States and bring back to the United States such funds as they reasonably could which had been held abroad by them or their subsidiaries. These guidelines made in February contained some specific provisions for Canada in keeping with the special circumstances which had been recognized in the exemption granted Canadian issues from the interest-equalization tax. Notwithstanding these provisions, however, the guidelines of early 1965 did cause some difficulties in the Canadian market for short-term securities, which did not benefit from the special provisions applicable to long-term investment.

I now come to more recent events in respect of which I think this House is particularly interested. In the latter part of 1965, at a season when the Canadian balance of payments is normally relatively strong, our current account and general balance of payments were suddenly strengthened as a result of the second large wheat sale to Russia. During the autumn, Canadian borrowers were also selling a large volume of Canadian securities in the United States. As a result, Canada's exchange reserves, including our net creditor position in the International Monetary Fund, which is proper to count in this connection, increased well above the level at which we were aiming to hold them in accordance with our understanding with the United States in 1963. We regarded this abnormal rise in our reserves as temporary. I said at the the time, and I say again, we can reasonably expect to see it reverse in the first half of 1966, but it coincided with a period when the United States was quite concerned over its balance of payments.

The Minister of Finance, in November last, requested all major Canadian issuers of securities in the United States to defer delivery of their issues, wherever possible, until after the turn of the year, when our current-account position would be seasonally weaker and the U.S. position could be expected to be stronger. I should like at this time, through the medium of this House, to ex-

press the appreciation of the Government for the co-operation shown by these Canadian borrowers in meeting this request, and also for the co-operation of the dealers and buyers of the securities concerned.

While a considerable improvement in the United States payments position had resulted from the measures taken in 1963 and from the subsequent guidelines programmes instituted by President Johnson last February, the United States overall deficit remained large and the United States Government decided last fall that it must adopt further measures. There were two of these of major concern to Canada.

The first of these was a new guideline, a request by the U.S. authorities to financial institutions other than banks, which includes not only investment companies, insurance companies, etc., but also pension funds and other major buyers of securities, to limit the increase in their holdings of long-term foreign investments to a small fraction of their holdings at an earlier date. This was a most important restriction on the sale of long-term securities in the United States. It is one that for some reason or other has been overlooked in some of the comment which has been made in the press of this country. If applied to Canada, it would have had very serious adverse effects. We sought and obtained an exemption from this important restriction, justified on the same grounds as our original exemption from the interest-equalization tax, and in consideration for an undertaking of the same kind on our part regarding the level of our reserves.

We felt, and when I say "we" I mean the financial authorities in this country (the Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance), that in the present state of the economy it was not desirable to rely too heavily on general monetary and financial measures to control the inflow of capital and a more specific instrument of control might be needed.

I therefore told Mr. Fowler, the Secretary of the Treasury in the United States, when I was Acting Minister of Finance, that the Canadian Government would be prepared, if necessary, to buy outstanding Canadian securities held in the United States to offset any excess flow of U.S. capital to Canada and thus to maintain the net flow of capital at the level required to finance our balance-of-payments deficit. Instead of adding to U.S. assets in our exchange reserves, we should be reducing Canada's liabilities in the United States. Conversely, if the volume of borrowing by other Canadians were not sufficient to meet the balance-of-payments needs, the Government would itself arrange to borrow in the United States. In this way, our reserves could be maintained at around the desired level without interfering either with trade or with the normal use of the U.S. long-term capital markets by Canadian borrowers. I also agreed that, while our reserves must be expected to fluctuate from month to month, we should regard it as appropriate that such fluctuations take place around a level somewhat lower than the mid-1963 figure, say approximately \$2,600 million (U.S.).

Should it be necessary to borrow in the U.S., I should foresee no great difficulty in obtaining moderate amounts as and when we require them. On the other

hand, I believe that there are sufficient Government of Canada securities held in the U.S. market to enable us to do what might be required in buying Canadian securities in the U.S. by using the authority to purchase our own securities that is already granted in the Financial Administration Act.

I should like to tell the House that, since the beginning of 1966, we have purchased about \$40-million worth of our outstanding U.S. bonds that were held in the United States. Our purchase of these securities was consistent with the plan I have outlined but was also intended in considerable part to improve the market for the sale of other Canadian issues in the United States this month, when there appeared likely to be a large volume of such issues scheduled for delivery.

The second important measure adopted by the U.S. in December was a voluntary ceiling on direct investment by United States corporations, of whom about 900 will be asked to report regularly on the progress of their co-operation with the United States Administration. The guideline, and I will not take time now to give details, does not stipulate how any company shall distribute its direct investment among geographic areas. This is a global restriction. It does not apply to Canada particularly; it applies to the world. Where it is applied is a matter for the business organization itself to decide. Canada is not exempted from this ceiling or guideline as it was from the previous guideline applying to direct investment.

As soon as we learned of the new United States guidelines for direct investment, we told them that, while it was very hard for us to assess what its effects on Canada would be because so much depended on the decisions of the businesses, we thought it would cut down some of the flow of such capital to Canada. In so far as it worked in reducing such flow of such capital direct investment, it would simply mean a greater need for new issues of Canadian securities in the United States under the arrangements and exemptions provided for long-term issues. We felt that, from a U.S. point of view, there was no reason why the Canadian balance-of-payments deficit with the United States should not be financed by direct investment just as well as by the sale of new issues of securities. Consequently, it seemed to us there was no certainty that the effort to restrict direct investment in Canada would, in fact, help the U.S. balance of payments at all in the final result.

We also pointed out that the inclusion of retained earnings of subsidiary corporations in the figures used to determine the voluntary quotas for direct investment worked a particular hardship on Canada. U.S.-controlled companies form such a large part of Canadian industry and have been so long established in Canada that they must be regarded as a basic and substantial part of the Canadian economy.

On the basis of these arguments, we suggested that the United States should continue a special exemption for Canada in their guidelines on direct investment or, if they could not see their way clear to do that, they should permit the in-

vestment of retained earnings to be outside the quotas.

My understanding is that the American authorities considered the points we put forward, as they said they would, but came to the conclusion that the guideline on direct investment had to be relatively simple and without special exceptions if it was to be effective in meeting the aims of their general programme. They did assure us, however, that these guidelines would not affect in any way the expansion necessary to achieve the purposes of the Canada-United States Automotive Agreement.

This guideline on direct investment is intended to restrict the outflow of capital from the United States parent companies to branches and subsidiaries in other countries. There is nothing in these guidelines, so far as I can see (and this is an important point), that would prevent Canadian subsidiaries of United States companies from borrowing like other Canadian companies by means of long-term issues in the United States market.

As I said when these guidelines were announced, they have come into effect at a time when capital investment by business in Canada has been increasing very rapidly and cannot be expected to go on increasing at the same rate. In some measure the restraints imposed by the direct-investment guidelines will not conflict with the necessities of our own domestic situation. In particular cases they may, however, result in the delay or cancellation of projects that we might have preferred to see proceed. It is our general economic dependence on imported capital which exposes us to dangers of this kind.

In all the circumstances, we have been fortunate in making arrangements that enable us to finance our balance of payments without restriction on current trade or payments and enable us to secure foreign savings to supplement our own.

I cannot agree with those who say we should have accepted the application of the interest-equalization tax and accepted limitations on our right to raise long-term funds in the United States and should in return have retained our freedom to increase our reserves at will. . . . So far as I can see, the result would have been to increase very substantially the cost to Canadians of borrowing money both in Canada and the United States without increasing the supply of funds available to us and without gaining anything of substance by way of increased freedom to control our own affairs.

These American guidelines limiting direct investment have also raised another issue — that is to say, whether through them the United States Government is interfering in the internal economic affairs of this country. As I have already said, we pointed out to the United States Government that this kind of measure as it applied to Canada was of very doubtful value as a means of relieving the United States balance-of-payments problem. I believe they would have been better advised to continue the exemption to Canada, both on economic and political grounds. It must be recognized, however, that, in attempting to limit the direct investment of its companies abroad, the United States Government is following well-established precedents. Other countries faced with balance-of-payments prob-

tems — I have in mind, for example, the United Kingdom and France — have taken and do take measures to limit direct investments abroad of their international companies, and I have never, never, heard any suggestions that either the United Kingdom or France is thereby interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

I do not like these American guidelines on direct investment and I seriously doubt their wisdom. As a Canadian I find some of the language used by the United States Secretary of the Treasury in appealing to United States companies to co-operate in the programme rather objectionable.

But given the overall arrangements between the Canadian and United States Governments which ensure an access to the United States market for long-term funds and the scale and nature of the temporary guidelines on direct investment, I do not think there will be damage to the Canadian economy at this time; indeed, the results could be advantageous if the emphasis on capital imports is shifted somewhat from direct investment to borrowing as successive Canadian Governments . . . have been attempting to promote in the past decade. Certainly, it is inconsistent for Canada to protest measures which have the effect of limiting the foreign ownership of our industries and resources.

This is a situation that calls for watchfulness on the part of the Government. We want to see the Americans succeed in their efforts to solve their balance-of-payments problems, we are on their side, so that these kinds of defensive measures on their part, the kind of measures I have been talking about, will become unnecessary. This Government will continue its consultations with the United States with the aim of ensuring that both countries deal with their balance-of-payments problems in ways that take into account the interests of the other.

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- UN Economic and Social Council, fortieth session: New York, February 23 — March 4
- Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs: Washington  
March 3-5
- GATT Contracting Parties: Geneva, March 25 — April 6
- International Joint Commission, semi-annual meeting: Washington, April 5-8
- World Health Organization, nineteenth assembly: Geneva, May 3-20
- Commonwealth Trade Ministers' Conference: London, May 16-20
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee: Geneva, May 16-24
- UNICEF, Executive Board: Addis Ababa, May 19-23
- NATO Ministerial Meeting: Paris, June
- International Labour Organization, fiftieth conference: Geneva, June 1-23
- Governing Council of UN Development Programme, second session: Rome, June 8 —
- World Land Reform Conference: Rome, June 20 — July 2
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## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. René C. E. de Chantal appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 6, effective January 1, 1966.
- Miss J. Shaw posted from the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, to the Canadian Embassy, Pretoria, effective January 7, 1966.
- Mr. J. F. Tanguay posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective January 9, 1966.
- Miss Joan Matthews posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombia, to Ottawa, effective January 10, 1966.
- Mr. J. M. Roberts posted from Paris (École nationale d'Administration) to Ottawa, effective January 13, 1966.
- Mr. L. H. J. Legault posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective January 21, 1966.
- Mr. H. F. Clark posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective January 21, 1966.
- Miss M. Gowler posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, effective January 21, 1966.
- Mr. L. Bailey posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé, effective January 25, 1966.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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## Canada and Ceylon

THE ISLAND of Ceylon lies off the southern tip of India, on the opposite side of the world from Canada. Its hot, humid climate and tropical vegetation form a sharp contrast to the Canadian environment. The economy of this agricultural country, with its largely rural population, is "under-developed" in comparison with the industrial economy of Canada. A centre of Buddhism, its roots deep in the ancient civilization of India, Ceylon possesses a culture radically different from that of Canada. It is, indeed, in many ways another world. Yet today the Canadian visitor to Ceylon may well arrive in the island at an airport that is being rebuilt with the help of Canadians, and may travel inland to Ceylon's tea country in a train pulled by a diesel locomotive called *Saskatchewan* or *Montreal*. When visiting Eastern Ceylon to see herds of wild elephants, he may come across the name of Canada on power-transmission lines thrusting up through the thorn jungle. In a fishing harbour of the west coast, he may see trawlers bearing such familiar names as *Maple Leaf* and *North Star*. There are probably few places in Ceylon where the Canadian visitor will find his country unknown or where he will not be among friends. This Canadian presence is the result of Canada's Colombo Plan co-operation with Ceylon and of growing ties between the two countries.

The increased contact of Canada with Ceylon in recent years has resulted from the active role played by Ceylon in international affairs and the importance placed by Canada on building close ties with the Asian members of the Commonwealth and contributing to their economic development. Ceylon, which received its independence from Britain with India and Pakistan and was a founding member of the Colombo Plan, is one of Canada's oldest partners in the new Commonwealth of the post-war years, and has long been a major recipient of Canadian economic assistance under the Colombo Plan.

The development of close relations between Canada and Ceylon has no doubt been aided by the link of a common language (for English is widely used in Ceylon), by the similarity of political and administrative systems, and by a similar approach to problems. Although Ceylon is vigorously independent and its ancient and distinctive culture is undergoing a renaissance, a century and a half of British rule has left political, parliamentary, legal and administrative institutions closely resembling Canada's and a pragmatic, liberal tradition among Ceylon's leaders which Canadians share. In 18 years of independence from Britain, Ceylon has made little change in the political system it inherited from Britain; indeed, although Ceylon intends to become a republic, it remains the only Asian realm of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. While Canada welcomes the common British heritage as giving the two countries an immediate bond on which to build Commonwealth ties, its relations with Ceylon have perhaps been made stronger by



the Canadian respect for the desire of Ceylonese to reassert their Asian character after centuries of European rule, to find the social, political and economic techniques best suited to Ceylon's situation as a developing country, and, having only recently achieved independence from colonial rule, to remain free of commitment to the great powers in international affairs.

### **Ancient History**

Ceylon's active and important role in international affairs in recent years has belied the fact that in size it is no larger than New Brunswick. Its population, however, is nearly 11 million. Roughly three-quarters of Ceylon's people live in the southwest plain and central highlands, which receive the heaviest rainfall. Along the southwest coast are coconut plantations. Inland are rubber estates and in the higher elevations is Ceylon's famous tea country. Tea, rubber and coconut products form 95 per cent of Ceylon's exports. Colombo, the capital and largest city, is situated on the west coast.

Some 70 per cent of Ceylon's people speak Sinhalese, the official language of the country, and most are Buddhists. The Sinhalese are descendants of migrants called Sinhala ("the lion race") who came to Ceylon from northern India in the sixth century B.C. The civilization of Ceylon from the earliest times up to the thirteenth century was centred on the dry area to the north and east of the island, which was converted to rice-production by means of a vast irrigation system. Buddhism was introduced into Ceylon from India in the third century B.C. and continued to flourish there, though it slowly disappeared in India. From the seventh century onward, population pressures and the rise of dynamic Tamil Hindu kingdoms in South India brought a succession of invasions from the north, which largely destroyed this ancient and highly sophisticated Buddhist civilization. The great cities were abandoned to the jungle as the Sinhalese people retreated for safety into the unsettled southwest, leaving the north to the Tamils, whose descendants still live today on the north and east coasts. Today, oddly enough, it is the southwest that is the most densely populated area, while the area of the ancient kingdoms is the least developed.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, during a period of weakness and dissension among the Sinhalese, the Portuguese arrived in Ceylon, to begin four centuries of European domination of the island. They introduced monopolies of cinnamon, pepper and precious stones. They also introduced Christianity, which today has nearly a million adherents in Ceylon. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Dutch became masters of the island, except for the interior Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy. At the close of the eighteenth century the Dutch were in turn supplanted in Ceylon by the British, who in 1815 deposed the King of Kandy — the last of a Sinhalese royal line of 180 rulers in a period of nearly 2,300 years — and brought the whole island under their own control. The history of Ceylon under British rule is largely the story of the establishment and development of the plantation industries that now furnish the country's principal

exports. During the early years of the nineteenth century, cinnamon was the island's most valuable export but, with the construction of roads and railways, the opening up of the interior and the rapid development of plantations by the British, first coffee and, in the last part of the century, tea became the main staple export crop. Today, tea production accounts for one-quarter of Ceylon's national income and over half of its export income.

### **Years of Independence**

Ceylon's constitutional development towards self-government before the Second World War was steady and peaceful and it achieved independence in 1948 without the agitation of a strong national mass movement. It was not until the mid-1950s that Ceylonese political leaders found themselves pressed by popular nationalist movements among the Sinhalese majority demanding the replacement of English by Sinhalese as the official language, the revival of Buddhism and the promotion of Sinhalese culture, the intervention of the state in the economy to lessen the predominant role of foreign capital and to raise the income of the largely rural population, the removal of British bases in Ceylon, and the establishment of a republic following a policy of non-alignment in international affairs. The Freedom Party, led by Solomon Bandaranaike, pledged to restore what it saw as the rights of the Buddhist Sinhalese majority, swept the elections of 1956. The political turbulence created by this movement led to severe communal rioting and, in 1959, to the assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike. The task of implementing his policies and of restoring public order fell to his widow, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who became the world's first woman prime minister.

In the elections of March 1965, Mrs. Bandaranaike was defeated and the United National Party, headed by Mr. Dudley Senanayake, emerged as the largest party. With the support of the Tamil Federal Party and other former opposition groups, Mr. Senanayake formed a "National Government", which, after a period of rapid political and social change, has set as its goals political stability, the promotion of communal harmony and economic development. In external matters, the new Government has reaffirmed its policy of non-alignment but has emphasized its strong support for the Commonwealth. The elections in March 1965, were Ceylon's sixth general elections since independence, and the formation of Mr. Senanayake's Government marked the fourth peaceful, democratic change of government in that time, making Ceylon in practice one of the foremost democracies in Asia.

### **Ceylon's Economic Problems**

While, as a result of Ceylon's well-developed plantation economy, its people are among the best fed, most healthy and best educated in South and Southeast Asia, it is still a poor country by Canadian standards and faces serious economic difficulties. Ceylon's population has nearly doubled since the eradication of malaria at the end of the Second World War and is still growing at one of the

highest rates in the world. The growth of the economy in recent years has barely kept pace with the population increase. As a result of over-dependence in the past on its agricultural export crops, Ceylon must obtain nearly half its food from abroad. It must also look to its export earnings to purchase the capital goods it needs to diversify the economy, provide more employment and ensure future improvement in the standard of living.

In spite of an increase in the volume of tea and other exports, Ceylon's ability to pay for needed imports has remained more or less static since 1956 as a result of a steady decline in export prices. Having expended its reserves, it is now suffering from an acute shortage of foreign exchange and, with its large food-import bill, the import of capital goods required for economic development has had to be increasingly restricted. So far as can be seen, no significant relief of the foreign-exchange shortage through higher export earnings is in prospect, because the trend in prices of Ceylon's exports remains downward. Under the leadership of the World Bank, friendly Western countries are now co-operating in aid efforts aimed at preventing a further decline in Ceylon's foreign-exchange reserves and a consequent deterioration in the economy, and at laying the foundation for a resumption of economic growth. At the same time, the Ceylonese Government is trying to stabilize its fiscal position and to direct more resources to investment, particularly in domestic food production.

### **Canadian Contact with Ceylon**

The first significant contact of Canadians with Ceylon developed during the Second World War, when a Royal Canadian Air Force flying-boat reconnaissance squadron was based in Ceylon. The squadron's most notable exploit was to spot and warn of an approaching Japanese fleet. Discovered, the Japanese withdrew and Ceylon escaped the war with only light bombing. Canadian Government representation in Ceylon dates from the beginning of 1951, when a Canadian trade commissioner's office was established in Colombo. Canada's trade interest in Ceylon is minor, although Canada is Ceylon's sixth best customer. Where Canada usually purchases some \$15-million worth of tea, coconut oil and rubber from Ceylon each year, Ceylon's annual commercial imports from Canada are rarely worth more than \$1 million. The principal Canadian exports to Ceylon are newsprint and asbestos fibre. In August 1953, Mr. James J. Hurley arrived in Colombo as Canada's first High Commissioner. Canada's political relations with Ceylon were extended from the Commonwealth to the United Nations when, in 1955, Canada played a leading role in gaining Ceylon's admission to the world body.

The number of Canadians with direct experience of Ceylon, and of Ceylonese with direct knowledge of Canada, grew more substantial with the establishment of the Colombo Plan. In January 1950, Mr. L. B. Pearson, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. D. S. Senanayake, the Ceylon Prime Minister (and father of the present Prime Minister), and the external affairs

ministers of the other Commonwealth countries met in Colombo to discuss the less-developed areas of the Commonwealth. Their discussion laid the basis for the plan in international co-operation that takes its name from Ceylon's capital city. Canada was one of the earliest donors of Colombo Plan aid to Ceylon when the Canada-Ceylon Colombo Plan Programme got under way in 1952. Canada has maintained this programme continuously ever since and in recent years has been one of the principal donors of grant aid to Ceylon. By the end of the fiscal year 1964-65, Ceylon had received from Canada under the Colombo Plan assistance for economic development purposes to a total value of \$29 million.

### **Canadian Aid Programme**

Canadian aid to Ceylon has included technical assistance, providing for the training of citizens of Ceylon in Canada and sending Canadian experts to act as advisers in Ceylon. By the end of March 1965, 145 Ceylonese had been trained in Canada under the Colombo Plan; many others had also received training in Canada under the Commonwealth Scholarship Scheme or under United Nations auspices. In the same time, 49 Canadian experts had served in Ceylon as advisers and many more had worked there as employees of Canadian companies under contract to the Canadian Government on large capital-aid projects. Still



*Ceylonese students travel in a Canadian station-wagon, provided under the Colombo Plan, to the Hardy Technical Training Institute, situated in a newly-developed region of Eastern Ceylon. The Institute was renamed in honour of the late Professor Evan Hardy of the University of Saskatchewan, who devoted the final years of his life to it.*

other Canadians have served in Ceylon with the United Nations and voluntary agencies. The larger part of the Canadian Colombo Plan aid programme in Ceylon has been capital or project aid, consisting of materials and services supplied from Canada. Assistance to meet the local costs of these projects has also been provided by Canada in the form of over \$10-million worth of wheat flour, which has been sold to Ceylonese consumers by their Government to raise funds to meet local costs of development projects. Canadian capital assistance in Ceylon has been devoted to various projects — resources surveys, hydro-electric power development, transportation, education, fisheries, agriculture, telecommunications, health and others.

One of the early Canadian aid projects was a pioneering effort to establish a deep-sea fishing industry in Ceylon employing large trawlers and a modern fish-processing and freezing plant. Ceylon has recently expanded its ocean-fishing fleet and the original processing plant is now being enlarged with Canadian aid. Canadian assistance is also being given to improve the transportation of frozen fish to the interior, where people's diets tend to be deficient in proteins. The availability of electric power is a prerequisite to economic development, and Canada has made an important contribution to Ceylon's hydro-electric system by doubling the capacity of the only hydro-electric station in Eastern Ceylon and building transmission-lines to take the power to communities and industries in the surrounding area and connect the hydro station with the main power grid of the western part of the island. Canada's most important educational project has been the establishment of an institute of technology near Colombo, which is Ceylon's main centre for the training of technicians.

Canada's largest current Colombo Plan project is the rebuilding of Ceylon's international airport at Katunayake. The former airport was not large enough to receive large jet transport aircraft and Ceylon was in danger of being cut off from international air-routes as all airlines switched to larger aircraft. The first phase of the project, the construction of a new runway over two miles long, was completed by a Canadian contracting company under the supervision of the Canadian Department of Transport at the end of September 1965 — two months ahead of schedule and just in time to receive the large number of aircraft unable to fly over India and Pakistan because of hostilities on the subcontinent. Since the completion of the runway, international air traffic to and from Ceylon has increased by over 400 per cent and many more airlines are expected to include Colombo on their routes. The second phase of the project, the construction of a new terminal building, is about to get under way. With one of the longest and finest runways in Asia, the airport is already proving to be the gateway for a substantially increased number of tourists to Ceylon. With hundreds of miles of palm-fringed beaches, its ancient ruined cities, picturesque mountain country and wild-life parks, Ceylon hopes to make tourism an increasingly important earner of foreign exchange. Canada is also engaged in important construction projects in Ceylon outside the Colombo Plan. Under a Canadian Government

line of credit of \$10.8 million, Canadian firms are providing the engineering services and the turbines and generators and other items of equipment to build, by the end of 1968, what will be Ceylon's largest hydro-electric station, generating 75 megawatts of power.

In response to Ceylon's severe foreign-exchange shortage and World Bank efforts to co-ordinate and increase aid to Ceylon, Canada more than doubled its aid to the country for the year 1965-66. As against earlier annual allocations of roughly \$2 million, the Canadian Government committed \$4.5 million in aid to Ceylon for the fiscal year. This amount included \$1.5 million in grant aid, \$2 million in food aid and \$1 million in an interest-free development loan.

### **Ceylon in Canada**

While numbers of Canadian engineers and technicians have come to know Ceylon through service under the Colombo Plan, and few people in Ceylon are unaware of Canada, there has been little opportunity for large numbers of Canadians at home to become acquainted with Ceylon. That situation will be corrected when, in 1967, Ceylon will be represented at Expo '67 in Montreal with its own pavilion. Although participation in the Exhibition in Canada's centennial year is not easy for Ceylon at a time when it faces other pressing problems, it has been undertaken as an expression of Ceylon's appreciation for Canadian co-operation in Ceylon's development and as a token of the friendship and close ties that have grown between the two countries.

## *Premier of Barbados Visits Ottawa*

**T**HE Honourable Errol Barrow, Premier of Barbados, visited Ottawa on January 25 for talks with the Prime Minister and other members of the Canadian Government. Mr. Barrow was accompanied by Mr. C. B. Williams, Manager of the Barbados Development Board, Mr. Peter G. Morgan, Chairman of the Barbados Tourist Board, Mr. Dennis Vance, General Manager of the Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation, and Mr. Owen Rowe, Acting Commissioner for the Eastern Caribbean, who is resident in Montreal.

During the course of his visit, Premier Barrow had meetings with the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, the Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, the Minister of Transport, the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, and the Minister of Trade and Commerce, the Honourable Robert Winters. Questions of mutual interest were discussed, including plans for the proposed Conference of Commonwealth Caribbean countries and Canada. The Premier also held



*Premier Barrow calls on Mr. Martin in the latter's office. Left to right; Mr. Owen Rowe, Acting Commissioner for the Eastern Caribbean; Mr. C. B. Williams, Manager of the Barbados Development Board; Mr. Barrow; Mr. Martin.*

a press conference and visited the House of Commons, where Mr. Pearson made the following statement:

I wonder if I might be permitted to call the attention of Your Honour and the House to the presence in the gallery of very distinguished visitors, the Prime Minister of Barbados and two of his colleagues, who are here on a visit. As you know, Mr. Speaker, relations between our countries are close and friendly and we hope that they will become even friendlier.

Premier Barrow's visit to Ottawa took place shortly after a resolution had been passed in the Barbados House of Assembly requesting that the British Government convene a constitutional conference to set a date for the independence of Barbados.



# *The Rhodesian Crisis*

## NEW CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS

*New measures by the Canadian Government against the illegal regime in Rhodesia were announced by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on February 3, 1966, and were the subject of the following statement on that date.<sup>(1)</sup>*

The Prime Minister announced today the decision of the Canadian Government to take further economic measures against Rhodesia. A ban is being placed on all imports into Canada of goods of Rhodesian origin and on all exports from Canada to Rhodesia, with certain limited exceptions. These measures are being taken pursuant to the resolution of November 20 of the United Nations Security Council which recommended the severance of economic ties with Rhodesia under the present illegal regime. The limited exceptions occur in the case of food, medical supplies, other goods for humanitarian purposes and goods which are for the essential needs of the Rhodesian railways, the Central African Airways and the Central African Power Corporation, which are operated jointly in Zambia and Rhodesia. Export permit applications will continue to be considered for these goods.

### **All Measures Consolidated**


Among other measures which the Canadian Government has taken since the unilateral declaration of independence on November 11 are an arms embargo, an embargo on the export of oil and oil products from Canada to Rhodesia, the withdrawal of the preferential tariff on Rhodesian imports, an import ban on commodities constituting over 90 per cent of normal Rhodesian imports into Canada, and the withdrawal of export credits and export credit insurance facilities from Canadian exports to Rhodesia. These measures are now consolidated and extended in the total import and export ban.

The crisis in Rhodesia has adverse effects on relations between members of the Commonwealth and on race relations and stability in Africa. The Canadian Government, therefore, strongly supports economic measures which are designed to bring about an early end to the illegal situation. With this aim, Britain has recently implemented new economic measures. The Canadian Government believes that similar measures by Canada and other countries will mean a further and significant contribution to ending the illegal regime in Rhodesia.

<sup>(1)</sup> The measures taken by the Canadian Government before this date appear in the December 1965 and February 1966 issues of *External Affairs*.

## *Prelude to the Founding of the Department of External Affairs*

Editorial Note: *With the passing of time and the maturing of the Department of External Affairs, the history of its establishment evokes increasing interest. One of the earliest documents relative to the Department's founding is reproduced below. While Under-Secretary of State, Joseph Pope (later Sir Joseph)<sup>(1)</sup> produced in May 1907 a memorandum for the Civil Service Commissioners stressing the need to create a department of government for the reception, recording, co-ordination and despatch of all communications concerning the external affairs of Canada. Although, as Pope indicates in an appended comment, the Commissioners failed to grasp all the implications of his memorandum, the Department was established two years later, with Sir Joseph Pope as Canada's first Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.*



*Sir Joseph Pope*

Ottawa, May 25, 1907.

J. M. Courtney, Esq., C.M.G., I.S.O.,  
460 Wilbrod Street,  
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Courtney. — I inclose a memorandum for the consideration of the Commissioners. If you consider it a subject of which they have cognizance, I should be glad if you will kindly lay it before them. I am up to my eyes in business just now arranging for the visit of the Japanese Prince, but I feel I shall be busier later on, and I want to place this matter before the Commissioners, or somebody who will bring about this much needed reform.

In great haste,

Yours sincerely,

Joseph Pope

<sup>(1)</sup>For a brief biographical note, see "Half a Century of Public Service", *External Affairs*, Page 401, November 1931.

**MEMORANDUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE  
COMMISSIONERS**

I desire, with the permission of the Commissioners, to offer a few observations upon a matter akin to the subject of their inquiry in respect of which I had not an opportunity of inviting their attention when recently before them. I refer to the desirableness of establishing a more systematic mode of dealing with what I may term, for want of a better phrase, the *external affairs* of the Dominion.

It is commonly supposed that such matters are now administered by the department of which I am the deputy head, but this is a misapprehension. The Secretary of State is primarily and principally the official mouthpiece of His Excellency the Governor General in respect of *Canadian affairs*; he is the channel of communication between the Dominion Government and those of the Provinces, towards which he occupies somewhat the same relation that the Colonial Secretary does towards the Colonies. All communications which reach the Secretary of State for transmission to England or to a foreign country are forwarded by him to the Governor General with a recommendation that he would be pleased to transmit the same to their destination. All despatches from the Colonial Office are addressed to the Governor General and by His Excellency are sent, for the most part, to the Privy Council, where they are referred to the heads of those departments which they particularly concern. Much of this correspondence relates to domestic matters, and with it I have no concern here. Much, however, bears upon what I have called external affairs, that is to say, questions touching our relations with foreign countries, as the Behring Sea Seal question, the Alaska Boundary, the Atlantic Fisheries, International Boundaries, and other pending controversies which the United States; or, it may be, with questions whose scope and bearing, though within the Empire, extend beyond the bounds of the Dominion; such, for example, as the difference with Newfoundland over the boundary in Labrador. Let us say the Imperial Government have occasion to communicate with the Government of Canada in respect of any one of these subjects. The Colonial Minister addresses a despatch to the Governor General; that despatch is forwarded by command of His Excellency to the Privy Council, which means with us the Cabinet. The Privy Council refers it to the minister at the head of the department to which it relates, who causes to be prepared a reply in the form of a report to the Privy Council thus:

The undersigned to whom was referred a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated ..... on the subject of ..... has the honour to report that .....

That report, when it reaches the Privy Council, is turned into a minute, preserving the sense, and even the phraseology, unchanged. It has, as it were, merely been given a head and tail, thus:

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated the ..... The Minister of ..... to whom the said despatch was referred, reports that (here follows the minister's report verbatim).

The Committee concur in the foregoing observation of the Minister of . . . . ., and advise that a copy of this minute, if approved, be transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the information of His Majesty's Government.

This minute, when approved by the Governor General, is forwarded to England. If it is an important despatch, the policy of the Government in regard to the principle involved is, no doubt, discussed and agreed to in Council; but the terms of the report are almost invariably left to the department to which the despatch was originally referred. Under this mode of dealing with official correspondence there is no uniformity of system or continuity of plan.

The preparation of despatches is a technical acquirement, attained only after special study of the questions involved, and by assiduous practice in drafting. It may happen, it must sometimes happen, that the official to whom these Imperial despatches are referred (for it cannot be expected that a busy minister has time to attend to such matters personally, calling for much study and a large acquaintance with intricate details), while fully competent to deal with the merits of the question in its present aspect, is not familiar with the past history of the controversy or skilled in the framing of state papers. There are, moreover, certain questions which relate partly to one department and partly to another, so that it may not be easy to tell at first sight to whom a new despatch should be referred. The earlier communication may have related to one department, and a later despatch on the same subject to another. Neither department having any knowledge of what has been referred to the other, the consequence is that both departments, *quoad* this particular subject, are working more or less in the dark.

In the early years of Confederation, when these questions were few, the inconvenience of which I speak was not so greatly felt, as the Prime Minister of the day kept them pretty much in his own hands; but, with the growth and development of the Dominion, this is no longer possible.

The practical result of the system in vogue is that there does not exist to-day in any department a complete record of any of the correspondence to which I have alluded. It has been so scattered, and passed through so many hands, that there is no approach to continuity in any of the departmental files. Such knowledge concerning them as is available, is, for the most part, lodged in the memories of a few officials. I fear too that, in Downing street, Canadian despatches are noted for diversity rather than for elegance of style. As the Dominion grows, this state of things must always be getting worse. If some reform is not soon effected, it will be too late. Even now, I am of opinion that it would be an extremely difficult task to construct from our official files anything approaching to a complete record of any of the international questions in which Canada has been concerned during the past 50 years. To give one illustration: Thirty-five years ago, the question of ownership of the island of San Juan, long at issue between Great Britain and the United States, was decided by the Emperor of Germany in favour of the latter. That surely is a matter of important historical concern to the Dominion, yet I should be at a loss to know to-day to what department of the Government

to turn for any information as to this arbitration. Indeed, I am quite confident that it does not exist in any of them.

My suggestion is that all despatches relating to external affairs should be referred by the Privy Council to one department, whose staff should contain men trained in the study of these questions and in the conduct of diplomatic correspondence. These officials should be in close touch with the other departments, from which they could draw all necessary information, the raw material, as it were, of their work; but the digesting of this information and its presentation in diplomatic form should rest with them, through, of course, the same channels as at present, for in this suggestion there is no thought of change in that regard. Every effort should be made to collect from the beginning all papers bearing on the questions I have indicated, from the office of the Governor General, the Privy Council office, the various departments and the Foreign and Colonial Offices. I wish most earnestly to impress upon all concerned that, if this work is not soon systematically begun, it will be too late. The few men throughout the service conversant with these questions are growing old, and must soon disappear. So far as I know, they will leave no successors. Much of the early history of these subjects, so far as Canadian records are concerned, will thus be lost.

I recommend that a small staff of young men, well educated and carefully selected, be attached to the department whose creation I have advocated, and that they be specially trained in the knowledge and treatment of these subjects. In this way we shall acquire an organized method of dealing with international questions which at present we wholly lack.

I have spoken of the creation of another department, but I see no reason why this work should not be done under the supervision of the Secretary of State, whose present department might be divided into two sections, one for Canadian, and one for external, affairs.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

JOSEPH POPE

OTTAWA, May 25, 1907.

### **COMMISSIONERS' REPLY**

Your Commissioners desire to call attention to the memorial submitted by the Under-Secretary of State in connection with the records relating to the external affairs of the Dominion, and submit that the time has come when regulations regarding such records should be promulgated.

### **POPE'S SUBSEQUENT COMMENT**

Could anything serve to show more clearly than this brief comment how absolutely the Commissioners failed to grasp the point of my memorandum?

# Food and Agriculture Organization

## THIRTEENTH SESSION OF CONFERENCE

FROM November 20 to December 9, 1965, representatives from 113 countries met in Rome for the thirteenth session of the FAO Conference. The Canadian delegation was led by the Honourable Maurice Sauvé, Minister of Forestry, who was elected chairman of the Conference. The two alternate delegates were Dr. S. C. Barry, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, and Dr. L. Z. Rousseau, Deputy Minister of Forestry. Other departments represented on the Canadian delegation included Fisheries, Finance, National Health and Welfare, External Affairs and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

The Conference, the governing body of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, comprises the entire membership of the Organization and meets in regular session once every two years. The Conference is the forum where all member nations and associate members meet to approve or define the Organization's policies, to formulate recommendations to governments, to super-



*The Honourable Maurice Sauvé, Canada's Minister of Forestry and chairman of the thirteenth session of the FAO Conference, with Dr. B. Sen, Director-General of the FAO (left).*

wise and control the activities of the FAO, and to adopt the Organization's programme of work and budget.

Before the opening of the thirteenth session, the six technical committees of the Conference began their work of examining activities proposed for 1966-67 in the various technical fields. Their detailed proposals were incorporated in the programme of work and budget presented by Dr. B. R. Sen, the Director-General of the FAO, to the Conference. The 27-member Council met from November 15 to 18.

### **Twentieth Anniversary**

The thirteenth session of the Conference marked the twentieth anniversary of the FAO. The Organization was founded in Quebec City in October 1945; the optimism of that first Conference was reflected in the words of its chairman, Mr. L. B. Pearson, now Prime Minister of Canada:

The first of the new, permanent United Nations agencies is now launched. There are few precedents to follow; it is something new in international history. There have been functional international agencies with more circumscribed objectives and tasks, but FAO is the first which sets out with so bold an aim as that of helping nations to achieve freedom from want. Never before have the nations got together for such a purpose.

FAO will bring the findings of science to the workers in food and agriculture, forestry and fisheries, everywhere, and it will bring the practical problems of these workers everywhere to the attention of the scientists. It will assemble, digest and interpret information to serve as a basis for the formulation of policy, national and international. It can suggest action, but only through the activities of governments themselves can the objectives be finally won.

Membership in the FAO has increased nearly threefold over the years. In 1945, some 40 nations were represented; by 1965, this number had increased to 113 and included many countries which had attained their independence during the previous 15 years.

Despite FAO's achievements during the first 20 years of its existence, the thirteenth session was concerned at the slow progress of world agriculture in meeting the objectives of the Organization. Nearly half the world's population suffer from undernourishment or malnutrition or both.

While the pace of progress has been disappointing, it was noted that the immense task of conquering world hunger and malnutrition had been made still more difficult by the initial need to repair the devastation of war, and by the unprecedented and largely unforeseen population explosion in the developing countries that had occurred in FAO's second decade. Under these circumstances, it was a real achievement that widespread famine had been largely eliminated with the help of surplus food from the more developed countries and that there had been some small improvement in the dietary levels of most developing countries, though mainly as a result of larger food imports or reduced exports.

### **Changing Role of FAO**

The main problems that concerned the first FAO Conference were the need to repair war-time devastation, to increase world food production, to raise levels



of nutrition, to facilitate the international flow of farm products and to raise the levels of income of primary producers.

Over the years the emphasis of FAO's work has changed in response to the evolution of the problems that had to be faced. From being primarily concerned with studies and advisory work, the Organization became increasingly involved in operational activities in agriculture in the developing countries. Technical measures alone were not enough to improve the agriculture of the developing countries but had to be supplemented by the provision of investment funds and credit to facilitate their adoption, and by the establishment of an agrarian structure which would give farmers the will and the incentives as well as the financial means and the knowledge to embark on more productive forms of agriculture. In his address to the thirteenth session, Dr. Barry commented:

We have seen a significant change in the operations of FAO since its inception in 1945. From its original emphasis on advisory and research services, it has moved into more of an action agency. Through the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, the FAO has served as the operating arm which has briefed, guided and provided thousands of technical experts who have worked in and with member governments.

It was generally agreed that, though food aid had proved invaluable in emergencies and would continue to be essential for many years to come, it could not provide a permanent solution to the problems of hunger and malnutrition in the developing countries. The only final solution lay in increasing production in the developing countries themselves. This was both because of the sheer magnitude of the increased supplies needed and because, until agricultural productivity could be increased, their farm populations would be condemned to continued poverty.

The Conference noted that, in some developing countries, the first development plans had put their main emphasis on industrialization, but that most were now seeking a better balance between industry and agriculture, including the production of food for domestic consumption. The experience of the last decade suggested that the poor performance of agriculture stemmed largely from the economic and institutional barriers that in many developing countries tended to segregate the farmer from the growth of demand in other sectors.

In his speech accepting the chairmanship of the thirteenth session of the FAO Conference, Mr. Sauvé asked:

Where do we stand today? No man, not even the most impatient, can deny that, in the last 20 years, FAO has accomplished much — of which we can all be proud. Yet no man, not even the most complacent, can deny that we have not done nearly enough. . . .

Scientifically, technologically, we know we have the answers. We have also identified and isolated the chief remaining barrier that prevents us from achieving our goal. This barrier is the problem of effectively communicating to developing countries the technology and the economic conditions that will permit them to increase agricultural productivity. . . .

We can and we must solve this problem. . . . The key to winning the war on hunger once and for all is to concentrate our knowledge, energies and resources in a comprehensive, co-ordinated unified attack.

### **World Food Programme**

One of the highlights of the Conference was the review of the operations of the

World Food Programme and consideration of its future. The Conference considered that the experimental Programme, launched in 1961, had proved to be a success, and that multilateral food aid should become part of the regular activities of the United Nations family, complementing other types of assistance already provided by established agencies and programmes.

While the World Food Programme had its origin both in the need for food aid and in various initiatives to find constructive uses for agricultural commodity surpluses, it now involved much more than the mere use of surplus foods. While it was possible to discern a trend toward the reduction of world surpluses, the need for food aid was increasing. The Programme had revealed new ways of using food as development capital, and had enabled governments to start undertakings which might not otherwise have been feasible.

It was agreed that food aid was only an interim solution to the food problems of the developing areas; the basic answer to these problems lay in an increase in local food production. The Conference emphasized the particular importance of WFP projects aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, and the fact that, in all projects, of whatever type, due safeguards — as provided by the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal — must be applied to ensure that WFP aid did not discourage local producers in recipient countries or disrupt international trade. The Conference laid stress on the need for adequate attention to the physical arrangements for the handling, storage, transport and distribution of WFP commodities in recipient areas.

Canada actively supported the continuation and expansion of the World Food Programme and indicated that it was ready to contribute up to \$27.5 million (U.S.) in commodities and cash for the forthcoming three-year period.

### **Committee on Commodity Problems**

The Conference reviewed the activities of the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP) and its subsidiary bodies and concluded that the Committee had responded to the changing needs of governments and that, in general, its activities were proceeding on the right lines and in accordance with its role as the Organization's main instrument for consideration of problems and possible solutions in the agricultural commodity field. Canada is a member of the CCP and its subsidiary commodity groups on grains, cocoa and bananas.

Matters relating to food aid and to employment of agricultural surpluses had continued to be kept under review by the CCP and its Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal (of which Canada is also a member). The Sub-Committee had also continued to supervise the observance of the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal and remained the basic inter-governmental forum for multilateral consultations on food aid and surplus problems.

The Conference agreed that the functions and work of the CCP and the various bodies of the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) were complementary and that the CCP and its subsidiary bodies could contribute

effectively to the tasks of UNCTAD and its Committee on Commodities by making available its specialized knowledge and experience on agricultural matters. It was agreed that this co-operation should be continued and strengthened further with a view to avoiding duplication of effort and ensuring the best use of the resources available to the two organizations.

#### **New Programme of Work and Budget**

The Conference approved a budget of nearly \$50 million to carry out the regular work of the FAO during the years 1966 and 1967. The budgetary increases in the programme cover additional expenditures arising out of (1) the expansion of fisheries activities, including the establishment of a committee to deal with fisheries conservation; (2) the preparation of FAO's Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development; (3) expansion of the Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign, the central costs for which would, in future, be paid out of the Organization's regular budget rather than from voluntary trust funds; (4) increased work on commodity policy and trade; and (5) increased activity in the marketing of forest products and logging, improving the productivity of livestock, raising wild-life on marginal land, research in tropical agriculture, integrated pest control, improved seeds and improving facilities for storing and transporting food.

#### **Canada and the FAO**

Canada, as one of the world's leading food-producing nations, has always taken a prominent role in the work of the FAO. At the thirteenth session of the Conference, Canada was again elected to the Council. In turn the Council elected Canada to the Committee on Commodity Problems, the Inter-governmental Committee on the World Food Programme, and to the newly-established Committee on Fisheries.

During the year under review, a number of Canadians joined the FAO Secretariat both at headquarters in Rome and in the field as technical experts. Canada's contribution to the FAO for the year 1966 exceeded \$1 million.

## Galapagos Islands<sup>(1)</sup>

IN JULY, I visited the Galapagos Islands, where we were guests of the Darwin Foundation at Academy Bay. These islands lie some 600 miles off the Ecuadorian coast. Since Darwin made his epochal journey there in 1834, they have been known to scientific scholars, and indeed to all those who have read *The Origin of Species*, as the birthplace of the theory of evolution.

The Galapagos were discovered by a Spanish bishop who was on his way to Lima in the middle of the sixteenth century when his ship was becalmed and carried by the Humboldt Current from the shores of Ecuador to the islands. Though he claimed the islands for the Spanish Crown, no attempt was made during the colonial period to make use of them. Instead, they became a refuge for foraging buccaneers, who sought sanctuary after plundering Spanish galleons and settlements along the Pacific coast. They found water, the huge tortoises for supplies of fresh meat, and a climate equable enough for their "free and easies" while they divided their loot and careened their ships. Dampier and other pirates came here often. Much later, at the end of the eighteenth century and in the early part of the nineteenth, the Galapagos became a port-of-call for the whalers out of New England. It was the whalers who wreaked havoc among the Galapagos tortoises. (Dr. Townsend of the New York Aquarium once estimated from log-books of the whalers that some 200,000 were taken in 30 years.) For the long voyages of the whaling ships the tortoises were ideal. As they could live for months without food and on very little water, they furnished a continuous supply of nutritious, tasty, fresh meat. Fully-grown tortoises have been known to weigh up to 500 pounds, and may live for more than a century. The whalers introduced domestic animals — cows, goats and pigs — to the islands as a means of ensuring supplies of fresh meat of a kind to which they were accustomed.

### First Settlement

Ecuador acquired the islands at the time of its independence by virtue of the fact that they were nearest to Ecuador and, more important, because no one else wanted them. On several occasions the Government sought to sell or lease them to the United States, Britain and France. Not until this century did permanent settlers come to the Galapagos Islands, and most of them were residents of the penal colonies established there. During the Second World War, the United States, concerned about the proximity of the islands to the vital Panama Canal, established an air and naval base on Baltra Island. (It was thought that the Japanese might

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(<sup>1</sup>) This article was written by the Chargé d'Affaires of Canada in Quito, Ecuador, Mr. S. C. H. Nutting.

establish a base there, or that they would be used as a refuge for Japanese, and possibly German, submarines.)

There are more than 50 islands in the archipelago, which range in size from tiny islets no bigger than Percé Rock to Albemarle Island, which is some 75 miles long and about 40 miles across at its widest point. Though the equator passes through the archipelago, it enjoys an agreeable climate because of the cool Humboldt Current which sweeps through the islands.

### **On Baltra Island**

Since there are no regular air or boat services to the Galapagos, we flew to Baltra Island in an Air Force plane. Baltra is a barren, flat-topped slag heap, which merits Herman Melville's description of the islands as "five and twenty heaps of cinders". Its sparse vegetation was already turning grey with the advance of the dry season. Stunted cactus and grey, prickly gorse bushes grow here and there among the broken lava rocks. At the edge of the airfield were the nondescript buildings of the United States wartime base, now crumbling slowly but inexorably into piles of scrap metal. In several of the less tumbledown huts lives a small Ecuadorian garrison.

We were met at Baltra by the *Beagle*, a two-masted, converted fishing schooner, named after the ship on which Darwin sailed, which is maintained by the Darwin Foundation for scientific expeditions and for normal inspection patrols. She is equipped with two diesel engines. The crew is made up of a German skipper, a young Englishman, a Swedish cook, and an egg-shaped Ecuadorian lad as broad as he is tall. We found it an exhilarating experience to go scudding along under full sail, the canvas crackling, the yard-arms creaking, and to watch the dolphins gliding swiftly in and out beneath the bowsprit. If the *Beagle* was seen from a distance as she lay at anchor in a lagoon, it was easy enough to imagine her to be a small pirate sloop of two centuries or more ago.

The *Beagle* took us from island to island for the next six days to see colonies of animals and birds. It is a remarkable experience to walk among several hundred sea-lions, sprawled out on a white sand beach, and realize that they have absolutely no fear of man. The large bull seals can weigh up to 1,000 pounds. Each bull has a harem, which he guards jealously; in fact, he seems to spend much of his time retrieving one or more of his straying wives. Evidently he regards man as untrustworthy and, if you venture too close to one of his wives, he will lunge forward on his flippers, making hoarse, menacing noises. Fortunately, they were clumsy beasts on land and could not run anything like as fast as I.

### **Birds and Beasts**

There are various seabirds, some of which, such as forked-tail and lava gulls, are found only in the Galapagos. Again, it is a remarkable experience to walk within a few feet of gulls, frigate birds and booby birds, some of whom are nesting and others simply carrying on their normal communal affairs. The *Beagle*

tries to maintain itself on food produced in the islands. On several islands we shot goat and pig for our table. Once we rowed the longboat into a salt-water lagoon fringed by mangroves to capture two large sea-turtles. These turtles were about three feet long by a couple of feet broad. They are caught with a sharp hook on the end of a long pole or gaff. As the turtle swims along, the hook is inserted just under his neck and he is hoisted into the boat. The lagoon was alive with these creatures. It appeared to be a breeding ground for a species of shark, and we saw many swimming beneath the boat and among the mangrove roots, but none of them more than four to five feet in length.

Bird life is prolific on the smaller islands. We climbed up the rim of one islet. The interior was taken up by two deep craters, in which the famed booby birds nest. "Nest" is hardly the word, for the booby simply lays a large blue egg on the level floor of the crater and struts about it, making odd crowing noises. Housekeeping is a comparatively simple matter for booby birds.

There is a species of fur seal that lives on the islands, small, dark brown, graceful creatures, with whiskers that give them an oddly human look. They are the most curious of animals. Whenever we landed, they would surround the longboat, swimming along beside it and thrusting their heads up to peer at us.

### **A Strange Reptile**

Two species of iguana inhabit the islands, neither resembling any I have seen on the mainland. The sea iguana is a squat, black, web-footed, ugly creature. It lives on seaweed among the lava rocks along the shore. The land iguana is often more than three feet long. It ranges in colour from a brilliant gold to red-gold. It lives in crudely scraped-out burrows, usually on hills among the scrub brush. One of the crew was singularly adept at catching these reptiles by the tail, yanking them out of their holes, and seizing them firmly under their gills with his other hand. On several occasions he offered to give us one — an invitation we declined. Though the iguana is harmless, he doesn't look so and he can give you a pretty nasty bite or rake you with talon-like claws more than half an inch in length.

The most beautiful of the birds is a species of flamingo unknown outside the islands. They spend their time in lagoons of brackish water that are formed behind the sand dunes on several islands. With their brilliant, cherry-pink plumage and long, sinewy necks, they resemble, as they step daintily along together, a bevy of brilliantly-clad ladies at a cotillion.

### **Background of Conservation Efforts**

At the end of our tour, we returned to the Darwin Station on Santa Cruz. Though the Darwin Foundation was not formed until 1959, it grew out of the increasing concern for the conservation of the unique animal and bird life on the islands. Expeditions were organized by conservation societies. As a result of their findings, the Foundation was set up under the presidency of a Belgian scientist, Dr. Van Straelen, and with the enthusiastic interest and support of Sir Julian Huxley.

The most important of its statutes reads as follows:

The association shall recommend to the qualified authorities any suitable measures to ensure on the Galapagos archipelago and in the surrounding seas the conservation of the soil, flora and fauna, and the preservation of wild life in its natural environment. It shall establish the research programme of the biological station and entrust the same with any scientific studies relating to the above-mentioned objects.

The Foundation receives contributions from scientific societies in Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, the Government of Ecuador, and others that are members of UNESCO. These contributions have built the research station on the island of Santa Cruz. The equipment and the salary of a resident director and his locally-engaged staff are paid by UNESCO.

The Station consists of the Director's bungalow, a dormitory for visiting scientists, a laboratory and an office. The resident Director, Roger Perry, an English biologist as impeccably groomed as James Bond, is preoccupied primarily with the problem of conservation. Several species are now nearly extinct. There seem to be two predators. The more serious of the two are descendants of the domestic animals introduced by the whalers. They are the only wild animals on the islands. So well have they adapted themselves, and so difficult is the terrain, that it is virtually impossible to shoot any number of them. Pigs, dogs, and rats prey on the native species, particularly the giant tortoises, whose eggs they eat. Young tortoises are not safe from them until they reach a pretty good size. Perry is now contemplating the eradication of rats from one of the islands by introducing a virus among them. Before the virus is introduced, considerable research must be done to determine, so far as possible, what its after-effects might be. The other predator is man. When he settles in a locality, he frightens off the animals and destroys the native vegetation. He also kills the tortoises for meat or tries to sell them alive on the mainland. The small staff of the Station, with the aid of the *Beagle*, try to take periodic censuses of various species in the islands. On Santa Cruz a game warden lives at the breeding-ground of the tortoises.

### **An Inhospitable Terrain**

While we were at Academy Bay, we climbed up to the table-land in the centre of the island where the giant tortoise, from which the archipelago takes its name, survives. On the way we passed through different levels of vegetation to a farming community called Bayavista. Though the trail between the two villages is only about four miles, so difficult is the terrain that it took nearly three hours to walk it. Never have I seen so inhospitable a land. Every bush or tree has a thorn or prickle of some kind on it, every weed produces a burr, and strewn across the ground are crumbling lava rocks of every size and shape. The highland vegetation is sub-tropical. There are large trees festooned with lianas, orchids and Spanish moss. The main problem on almost all the islands is the lack of ground water. In season there is abundant rainfall, but the porous lava structure acts as a sieve. There are no springs. During the six-month dry season, if it can be called so, the inhabitants live on the water they have stored in their cisterns, and on

what they collect from a persistent Scotch mist called the "garua", which lasts for several hours a day. Most tropical crops, such as sugar-cane, coffee and fruits of various kinds, thrive in this area. Since there is no way of getting any of their products to market, the inhabitants are subsistence farmers.

The settlement was founded largely because of a book called *Galapagos, World's End*, written by William Beebe in 1924, which described the islands in glowing terms. Because this book had tremendous appeal in Norway, an unscrupulous promoter organized in the twenties a colonization scheme to the Galapagos of some 400 Norwegians, most of whom were under the impression that they were going to some South Sea island paradise. Few of them had any experience of farming, and most returned to the mainland and hence to Norway when they had got enough funds to do so. So much misery and unhappiness was caused by this tragic venture that it precipitated a major scandal in Norway. Today a few survivors still live in steep, shingle-roofed frame houses, which look somewhat incongruous in so tropical a landscape, managing a meagre, frugal existence.

#### **A Former Penal Colony**

We returned to the mainland on the most desolate old scow of a ship I have yet seen. On the way, we spent a day at the most easterly of the islands, San Cristobal, on which the Government of Ecuador has its administrative headquarters and a naval base. This island has a somewhat unsavoury reputation. A penal colony was established there in the early years of this century, where a man named Cobas used the convicts as slaves. After being subjected some years to the most inhuman methods of torture and personal degradation, the convicts revolted, hanged Cobas, and escaped to Colombia. Most of the Ecuadorians in the islands live on San Cristobal, which is one of the few on which there is an adequate supply of fresh water. A mile or two inland we picked oranges growing wild by the roadside. They rot on the ground because there is no regular service to mainland markets.

The islands constitute the greatest natural laboratory in the world. They are of volcanic origin and seem to have been formed over a considerable period. There is still volcanic activity. A volcano erupted on one of the larger islands two years ago, and in living memory several islands have been formed only to disappear into the sea within weeks. There has long been a controversy about whether the islands were once connected to the continent by a land bridge or are simply volcanic islands which rose from the sea. The species of animal life not only differ from those on the mainland but display considerable variation from island to island. The most commonly accepted theory is that the islands once formed a single large island and that the low areas have subsequently sunk into the sea. This would account for the variations in animals from island to island.

Although it has not yet been fully implemented, a conservation policy was adopted recently by the Ecuadorian Government. A possible future for the is-



lands, and one that would seem both sensible and desirable, is their development as a national wildlife park. With comfortable boats, rest houses on the main islands, and regular air services from the mainland, large numbers of tourists might well come to visit the islands. The animal species on the islands could thus be preserved, remaining available for scientific research and as a tourist attraction of great intrinsic interest. It would be a tragedy if the archipelago should lose the many unique species of animal and bird life which dwell there.

## *Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica Visits Ottawa*

**T**HE Honourable Donald Sangster, Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, visited Ottawa for a few hours on February 10, 1966, at the end of a private visit to Montreal. In Ottawa, Mr. Sangster called on the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin. Matters arising out of the recent conference of Commonwealth heads of government in Lagos, Nigeria, and general questions involving Canadian relations with Jamaica were discussed.



*The Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Honourable Donald Sangster (right), in conversation with Canada's Prime Minister Pearson during Mr. Sangster's recent visit to Ottawa.*

# *An Independent Foreign Policy*

*The way in which Canada works out and implements a genuinely independent foreign policy was the subject of an address to the Canadian Club of Toronto on January 31, 1966, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin. Mr. Martin used Canada's commitment in Vietnam as a major illustration of his general thesis.*

*The text of his speech follows:*

Today I wish to speak about the independence of our foreign policy and its relationship to the interests of other nations in the world community.

The word independence has a powerful appeal to most people in the world, and to no people more than the Canadians. It is not so very long ago that we attained the final stages of full sovereignty by taking over complete control of our external relations. With the approach of the centenary, we are thinking of the contribution to that development of some of the great architects of our independence.

Sir Wilfred Laurier was asked at the Jubilee celebration of Queen Victoria in 1897 whether Canada would one day become a nation. He answered: "Canada is a nation. Canada is free and freedom is its nationality." In insisting that the first and indisputable mark of our identity was the independence which Canadians of diverse origins sought and cherished in common, this great Prime Minister proclaimed a confidence in our destiny which has sustained us since then.

Another great Canadian leader, Sir Robert Borden, made the following comment in 1918 at the end of an exhausting war in which the protection of Canadian interests in relation with more powerful allies had been no easy matter: "I am beginning to feel that, in the end, and perhaps sooner than later, Canada must assume full sovereignty. She can give better service to Great Britain and the United States and to the world in that way".

In speaking simultaneously of full sovereignty and of service to the world, Sir Robert Borden pointed to the full meaning of independence which I should like to discuss. I might almost entitle my talk "The Uses and Abuses of Independence".

It is not easy for us in the contemporary world to maintain the cherished independence of thought and decision obtained in the past 100 years. There are two reasons for this.

## **Preserving Independence Not Easy**

In the first place, no nation can enjoy the degree of independence in decision which existed in earlier times. Every major decision has become immensely more complicated by the considerations which new military technology, science, economics and humanitarian obligations present to the governments concerned. The

great powers have more complex considerations to weigh but the lesser powers cannot expect to have much freedom of choice either. Independence in foreign affairs cannot have quite the same meaning as in other fields.

In the second place, Canada has its own unique problems in maintaining independence. We are a nation of relatively limited population in an immense territory, with our only neighbour the most powerful nation in the world. We are a new nation which has strong cultural links with many countries but particularly with the United States, Britain and France. We have had to develop an identity in the midst of these influences in a century in which two world wars and the military and economic pressures leading to collective action have set a high premium on conformity in views.

The problem remains, and I have, therefore, chosen to speak about the fact of our independence and about the means of preserving it. I believe that correct public understanding of the formulation of our foreign policy is of the greatest importance today.

There are two directions from which we must approach this subject. Both are essential to a full understanding.

In the first place, I should like to establish the basic *fact* of our independence in relation to some of the world problems of the moment, because there are people who doubt it.

In the second place, I should like to explain why we can take an independent and useful role in world affairs and what are the *means* chosen by the Government to ensure that we can continue to do this. A nation which does not understand the conditions on which its strength and independence rest will not be able to preserve them effectively.

There are persons who ask whether we have a foreign policy centred on Canadian interests and viewpoints. I do not think they realize the extent and intensity of the work which is done to produce exactly that kind of policy. Every week hundreds of telegrams and despatches arrive from Canadian missions abroad. Every week scores of memoranda are prepared within my Department or in departments in Ottawa recommending courses of action which best seem to meet Canadian external interests.

### **Mature Independence**

When our national interests and our judgment of a particular situation coincide with those of other nations, then we are quite happy to be identified with others in a common policy. Canada is a mature and responsible nation. It sees no value in difference for the sake of difference, for the simple purpose of attracting attention.

Where there are good reasons to take a stand different from that of allies or friends, we do so. This is the point which tends to be overlooked and which I accordingly stress.

The record of such independence of viewpoint is abundantly clear. In a nur-

ber of situations we have taken action or urged viewpoints clearly different from those of nations with which, otherwise, we had a close identity of viewpoint. I should refer, by way of example, to trade relations with Communist nations generally, the Suez crisis of 1956, relations with Cuba, the admission of new members to the United Nations, relations with China, the situation in Indochina, some aspects of peace keeping and the implications of common membership in NATO. Individual Canadians may agree or disagree with the decisions of the Government of the day, but they cannot justifiably deny that the decisions were Canadian ones. Our policies emerge from our own combination of interests, convictions and traditions — they are not borrowed from or imposed by others.

It is impossible for me to describe Canadian policies in all the areas mentioned above. I should like, however, to say something about the situation in Vietnam. This is one problem concerning which there is a good deal of misunderstanding.

It is sometimes alleged that Canadian policies can be independent only where United States interests are not significantly involved. Conversely it is said that, where a major United States interest is engaged, as it undoubtedly is in Vietnam, Canadian policy can operate only within strictly defined limitations.

To put the issue more bluntly: has Canada maintained a mind of its own on the course of developments in Vietnam?

#### **Canada's Impartiality in Vietnam**

For more than 11 years we have maintained a substantial Canadian presence there as observers. Almost one-quarter of our foreign service officers — not to mention an even greater number of members of the Canadian armed services — have done tours of duty there with the International Control Commission. As a result of this continuing and very substantial presence, we have been able to form an accurate assessment of the issues at stake. We have not shut our eyes to violations of the Geneva Agreement which have helped to bring about the present dangerous situation in that country.

We recognize that South Vietnam has violated the Agreement by seeking and receiving military assistance principally from the United States. We also know that, long before this assistance reached its present level and long before the onset of open hostilities, North Vietnam had been deliberately violating the Agreement by organizing, assisting and encouraging activities in the South directed at the overthrow of the Government of South Vietnam.

We have not only recognized this situation; we have a public and official statement about it. In June 1962, Canada and India, in a special report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva conference, concluded that the situation in Vietnam had "shown signs of rapid deterioration". Part of the responsibility for this situation, the report goes on to say, was South Vietnam's for entering into a *de facto* military alliance with the United States and for allowing the entry into its territory of armed personnel and equipment beyond approved levels. These measures of military assistance, the South Vietnamese Government had said, were neces-

sitated by the growing interference by the North in the internal affairs of the South. The report also concluded that there was evidence to show that North Vietnam had sent armed and unarmed personnel, equipment and supplies into the South for aggressive purposes and that the North was allowing its territory to be used for hostile actions against the South.

This, in our view, was a balanced and accurate presentation. In agreeing to it, we and the Indians attempted to place before world opinion our assessment that a difficult situation was developing in Vietnam because of the increasing violations of the cease-fire by both sides.

I think that this report can be characterized not as neutral about truth and falsehood but as impartial and objective with respect to all the facts and evidence we had before us.

### **Dissent from Majority Report**

In February 1965, with the beginning of air strikes against the North, it was decided that the Commission should send another special message to the Co-Chairmen. We made repeated attempts to convince our colleagues that this too should be a balanced and objective report in relation to *all* the facts, and not just a partial selection of them. Nevertheless it was decided, with Canada dissenting, that the message would deal only with the air strikes.

In dissenting, we had no doubt that these strikes had been carried out and that violations of the Agreement had taken place. We were not attempting to cover up these serious developments — the Commission could scarcely hide something which was front-page news all over the world. Our concern, and our decision to submit a minority statement, were dictated not by an attempt to whitewash our friends but by the danger of misleading world opinion about what had been going on in Vietnam. Our minority statement was accordingly cast in terms of violations on the other side of the ledger in an attempt to restore an essential balance to the Commission's judgments.

Does this demonstrate that we have departed from the standards of impartiality in this particular sphere of our foreign policy? I think not. On the contrary, I think it demonstrates just the reverse. As I suggested earlier, the exercise of impartial judgment demands a concern for accuracy and a desire not to mislead or to be misunderstood. It also demands the maintenance of the same — I repeat, the same — critical standards towards both sides.

Unless one were to prejudge the issues at stake in Vietnam and to conclude that the South and the United States are totally wrong and the North wholly in the right, it is senseless to argue that Canada can demonstrate its independence of judgment only in criticism of United States policy — and in criticism of that nation alone.

### **Other Minority Stands**

There have been other instances in which Canada has had to choose a course of

action when there was little unanimity among its allies about what the general Western interest required. It has always been difficult to decide, for example, to what extent trade and other relations should be developed with the Communist nations. We have taken the view, however, that trade in non-strategic goods was desirable. We have tried to develop contacts and exchanges, provided the other side was prepared to deal with us on a basis of genuine reciprocity. Although we have not been prepared to support the entry of Communist China into the United Nations on the terms it has so far set, we have made it clear in our own statements of policy that we recognized the desirability of having that nation in the world organization.

In many ways in the United Nations, in the Commonwealth and in other international organizations, Canada has developed a reputation for independent action. I was told by a departing ambassador in Ottawa a few days ago that he had come to this country expecting to find us very much influenced by our giant neighbour to the south. He is leaving with the conviction that Canada has clearly established its own political identity in world affairs. He was grateful for some things which we had done for his country and he paid tribute to our willingness to help in the solution of disputes. Our representatives abroad report many such tributes to Canadian policies.

The fact of our independence in foreign policy seems to me, therefore, to be well established by the evidence available.

I believe that it is also important to consider *why* we are able to take an active and constructive role in international affairs. Proof of a genuinely independent Canadian role is to be found as much in an examination of the fundamental circumstances of our national existence and of our diplomacy as in an indication of viewpoints on current problems.

In examining these fundamental questions, I should like to comment on the views of those who ask whether the true logic of independence should not be to stay outside alliances and to avoid close economic relations with the United States, lest our independence be jeopardized.

I believe that there are five basic objectives which the Government must seek if we are to remain truly independent:

- (1) We must have military security;
- (2) we must have expanding economic strength;
- (3) we must be able to exert influence on others;
- (4) we must be able and willing to play a creative role in many areas of international affairs; and
- (5) we must maintain a basic unity at home in Canada concerning our national interest in world affairs.

### **Security and Economic Strength**

The Canadian Government believes that NATO defence arrangements, and the continental arrangements which fit logically into them, provide security, which

is the basis of independence. It believes that these defence arrangements offer the partnership into which a sovereign state can enter without loss of national identity or independent viewpoint. For this reason, it has set a high priority on maintaining strength, stability and good political relations among allies.

I know that there are some Canadians who see in such arrangements only the political constraints of an alliance, only the possible dangers of undue political influence by larger members in the affairs of others. I wonder how seriously these critics have considered the overwhelming limitations on our independence and on our fruitful participation in world affairs which isolation, neutrality and military weakness would create.

There is no nation more subject to pressures, more dependent on the views of others or more uncertain of itself, than one with a precarious economy.

I have referred to growing economic strength rather than to current prosperity. We must consider the long-term needs of the country in developing our industry, in making better use of our resources, in increasing the population and in ensuring stable markets. Our experience has been similar to that of all the more economically advanced countries of the free world. A free movement of capital and of business experience and liberal conditions for trade and competition are among the best guarantees of sound economic development.

For Canada, of course, geography and economic facts make it inevitable that a large part of that capital should come from the United States and that a large part of our trade should be with that nation. In entering into agreements with the United States on the Columbia River, on automotive products and on many other matters affecting economic conditions, the Government has considered the long-term economic needs of the country.

The very scale of our involvement with the United States in economic matters naturally brings some problems, along with major benefits. Some argue that, in time, economic involvement on this scale will submerge our independence.

I believe that there are some simple and effective answers to this prediction. I do not accept this type of political or economic fatalism. We shall not lose our independence in this way unless we want to. We are engaged in a process of economic development which should render us basically stronger, not weaker, both in a continental and in a world sense. Where our exposure to the much greater forces of the American economy creates particular problems for some part of our economy, we take remedial action. On the basis of friendship and mutual respect, we bargain with representatives of the United States to obtain the best conditions for our country, as they do for theirs. We have certainly not ignored other possibilities for developing our country and our businessmen contest world markets as vigorously in competition with close friends as with anyone else.

It is important that we should see these basic conditions of an alliance and of close economic relations as being, on balance, means of fortifying our independence in world affairs, not as limitations upon it.



The third basic objective I mentioned is that we must be able to exert influence on others. We should have a wide association with other nations and we should systematically cultivate friendly relations with allies and other nations as a means of developing our capacity to influence the course of events. These may appear to be obvious diplomatic objectives not necessarily related to the specific questions on independence being discussed. It is, however, particularly important for a middle power to make such an effort if it wishes to understand and to exert its own influence upon current events. We are more fortunate than some nations in the range of our relations. We have valuable associations with other Commonwealth and NATO members, with France and French-speaking nations, with the countries involved in our aid programmes, with many nations sharing in special tasks in the United Nations. These associations heighten our status in world affairs and prevent us from becoming unduly influenced by any one nation or group.

### **Creative International Role**

We must make use of our position of military security, economic strength and wide contacts to play a creative role in world affairs, not only in our immediate interests but in the long-term interests of the world community. I believe that the number of fields in which we take a constructive role provides ample evidence not only of an independence of thought or publicly-declared policy in controversial matters but of *action* in taking initiatives or accepting responsibilities which are not always well known. I am thinking of our role in all the major peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, in disarmament discussions, in international development aid and relief and in cultural and educational relations. Canada is accepted and welcomed by nations in many different parts of the world as a participant in important ventures. Those who ask whether we have an independent identity before the world must consider all this evidence of decision, action and participation in international affairs.

We have fulfilled the terms set forth by Sir Robert Borden, full sovereignty and service to the world.

### **Domestic Considerations**

There is, finally, one aspect to this question of maintaining independence which is not really one of foreign policy but rather of the domestic conditions supporting an effective foreign policy. There will never be complete agreement in the country as to the exact course of action which we should follow in any major problem of international affairs. I should hope, however, that we should agree on certain fundamental requirements in the national interest. One is that there can be only one official voice speaking for Canada on foreign policy in matters of national interest when the decisions have been made. The other — and I realize that this is a matter of judgment or degree — is that we might well agree, in view of the weight of evidence available, that Canada does have its own independent

policies and its own role in world affairs and that we should concentrate rather on debating the most effective means in any given case to serve the national interest.

I have attempted to set before you the dimensions of independence in foreign policy — the proof of it in specific international problems, the conditions on which it rests in our existence as a nation. It will be apparent that, in the contemporary world, independence is as many-sided as freedom itself. There is the freedom to agree as well as to disagree; the freedom to consult and not only to go it alone; the freedom to show self-restraint as well as to assert ourselves ostentatiously; the freedom to make our voice heard but also the freedom to remain silent; the freedom to assess the consequences of our acts and utterances and not to behave as though we could be entirely unmindful of the reactions of others; the freedom to recognize the facts of our geography and not to imagine that we are a detached island in space.

The objective of an independent country in the dangerous world in which we live should surely be to make the greatest possible contribution to peace and security and not merely to flaunt a hollow independence for its own sake. In the modern world, independence exists not so much to be displayed as to be used — and to be used responsibly and effectively.

I believe that the statesmen who first charted the course of our independence saw our destiny as a nation in this way and that the people of Canada today would wish its Government to act always in the spirit of civilized patriotism and of enlightened internationalism.

## *Further Development of Franco-Canadian Relations*

**I**N THE framework of the consultations arranged between the Governments of France and Canada, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Couve de Murville, met in Paris on December 13, 1965, on the eve of the NATO ministerial meeting. They had a further exchange of views on international problems and on questions of mutual interest to their two countries.

### **Newspaper Interview**

On December 15, in an interview with the newspaper *Le Monde* on various aspects of Canada's foreign policy, Mr. Martin was asked:

"Following the progress noted in Franco-Canadian relations during the past few years, how can these now be developed?"

Mr. Martin replied as follows:

"As you so rightly say, there has been appreciable progress in Franco-Canadian relations since the visit of the Prime Minister, whom I had the pleasure to ac-



*Mr. Martin (left) in conversation with Mr. Couve de Murville (right) and the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hervé Alphand (centre).*

company, to France in January 1964. We have indeed had most encouraging results, especially in the sphere of cultural relations; these have been given new vigour by the signature in Ottawa on November 17 of a general agreement providing for cultural, educational, scientific and technical exchanges.

"As far as the other aspects of our bilateral relations are concerned, I might say that, up to the present, Ottawa and Paris have aimed at much the same goals. They are beginning to move on to concrete achievements and exchanges. As an example of what we can do, I might mention the France-Canada Parliamentary Association, which was created in September but whose real work will begin early in 1966. Again, only a few days ago, on December 1, the French Minister for the Armed Forces and the Canadian Minister of Industry and of Defence Production jointly announced the establishment of a Franco-Canadian committee to carry out a programme of co-operation, which is now being developed, in defence research, development and production and in the mutual procurement of defence materials. To cite a further example, representatives of the French and Canadian Governments met in Ottawa on November 18 and 19 to study the main aspects of our economic, commercial and financial relations. In this connection, an important Canadian mission of senior representatives of industry, finance and government is preparing to visit France in the spring of 1966. This mission will be particularly important, both because of its novel character and because of its far-reaching goals, which are to develop investments in a tangible way and to establish permanent links between corresponding bodies in the two countries. I am convinced that the result will be an expansion of our economic relations."

## *Immigration for the Sixties<sup>(1)</sup>*

CANADA received 146,758 immigrants during 1965, an increase of 30 per cent over the figure for 1964. Of this total, 67 per cent were in the more highly skilled categories, compared to 59 per cent in the same groups the previous year.

These simple figures tell the story of Canadian immigration today — a build-up of the inflow from the low levels of the early Sixties, in line with the growth of the economy, and great stress on encouraging the immigration of those with skills or sufficient basic education to be readily trained.

The success of the Immigration Branch in meeting these objectives is shown in the 1965 figures. It results directly from a continuing reorganization of the Branch for the purpose of meeting the changing pattern of immigration and competing on a global basis for the skills in short supply in every industrialized nation.

### **A New Type of Immigrant**

The immigrant to Canada is no longer the “stalwart peasant in sheep-skin coat . . . with a stout wife and a half dozen children”, classed as the ideal by Sir Clifford Sifton, the minister responsible for immigration in the early days of the century, when Canada’s economy was still based on agriculture. Today, he is often highly skilled and well educated. The prosperity of Western Europe, the traditional source of Canadian immigration, does not incline him to think about leaving. Much more sophisticated methods must be used to alert him to the opportunities in Canada. The Immigration Branch spent \$500,000 on advertising in the 1965-66 fiscal year. Today’s immigrant must be counselled carefully and accurately and, on his arrival in Canada, he must be welcomed warmly and provided with sufficient advice and social and occupational counselling to enable him to become integrated as quickly as possible into his new community.

The Immigration Branch reorganization to achieve these goals has included extensive decentralization of administration, including appointment of regional directors for major geographical areas — Britain and Ireland, the continent of Europe, and the American, Asian and African areas. Standards for staff both at home and abroad have been increased substantially, and a career service for university graduates as Immigration Affairs Officers is being developed. Scales of pay have been increased, and officers overseas are receiving more privileges, in accord with their standing as representatives of Canada abroad.

The reorganization has stressed the need to interpret and co-ordinate long-range and short-range immigration programmes through a new Directorate of Policy and Planning.

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(1) Prepared by Information Services, the Immigration Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa.

### **Department of Manpower**

The process is being carried a step further with the creation of a Department of Manpower, announced in the Speech from the Throne in January 1966. Under the direction of the present Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Honourable Jean Marchand, this Department, which will unite the Immigration Branch and some functions of the Department of Labour, will co-ordinate Canada's intake of immigrants to a much greater degree with the needs of the labour market.

A further modernization of immigration procedures and policies will result from changes in the Immigration Act, last revised in 1953. A White Paper on immigration policy is now being prepared for presentation to Parliament as the first step toward bringing the Immigration Act into line with present-day thinking. Changes must be made to provide more effective control over visitors who enter and apply for permission to remain, and over criminal and other undesirable elements seeking to enter Canada. Medical prohibitions, especially with respect to certain types of insanity and epilepsy, must be brought into line with current medical ideas. Essential areas of ministerial and departmental discretion must be identified and clarified, adequate safeguards provided, and effective avenues of appeal introduced against possible arbitrary action in the immigration sphere. Refugee policies must be studied to see whether more can be done in this area.

Besides adopting a more dynamic immigration policy, Canada will extend its search for skilled immigrants into regions hitherto almost untouched. Surveys of the immigrant potential of Japan and the Philippines and other areas are now in progress. In the past year, new offices have been opened in Marseilles and Bordeaux, and facilities have been extended in Milan.

It is the belief of Immigration Department planners that, despite automation, technological change, and even some unemployment, Canada will need substantial immigration for years to come. An upgrading of the education and skill standards of the labour force goes hand in hand with an inflow of skilled or trainable new Canadians, as the basis for the country's continued prosperity.

## *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service*

ONE OF the continuing wonders of the world today is that for a grandfather in Prague, a student in Leningrad or a young housewife in Rio de Janeiro, Canada is only as far away as the radio and the voice of Canada can be heard by turning a knob. The grandfather listens to the voice because his son is in Canada and the radio lessens their separation; the student in Leningrad searches for an objective and timely account of the news, and the housewife, perhaps, listens to try to find out what those crazy Canadians are up to now. Each looks for something different and many find it in the right language on the short-wave broadcasts of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

The history of the International Service of the CBC, usually known as the CBC-IS, goes back to a few years before the outbreak of the Second World War, when it was urged that a Canadian short-wave service should be established, roughly on the lines of the familiar Overseas Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation. It was not until the early years of the war, however, that the first positive steps were taken to make such a service a reality. During the dark days of September 1942, the Cabinet approved an Order-in-Council (P.C. 8168 of September 18, 1942), submitted on the recommendation of the Minister of War Services with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to set up a short-wave service that would, according to the Order-in-Council: establish close contacts with the troops abroad; supply Britain and Canada's other allies with accurate information about Canada's war effort; counter the continuous flow of German and Italian propaganda, either positively through the programmes themselves or negatively by jamming; provide a second line of defence if the BBC stations were put out of operation and, finally, strengthen resistance within the occupied countries of Europe.

### **Separate Financing Arrangements**

Under the terms of the Order-in-Council, the Service was to be operated and controlled by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, though the cost of establishing it was to be provided by a special appropriation and the operating expenses were met out of a separate Parliamentary vote. It was considered that the Service was a "national undertaking" and that its costs were not properly a charge against the licence fees and commercial revenues of the National Service. Administratively the CBC-IS is still connected to the Corporation and financially it is still separate, since its budget is voted separately by Parliament. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1966, the CBC-IS appropriation was \$2.4 million.

While the new service was to be operated and controlled by the CBC, at the same time, to quote the Order-in-Council, ". . . in view of the fact that

such short-wave broadcasts would constitute a factor affecting Canada's relations with other countries of the Commonwealth and with foreign countries . . . the work should be carried on in consultation with the Department of External Affairs". As a result, matters such as target areas, the languages in which broadcasts are made and general programme policy have from the start been subject to periodic review with the Department. Over the years, close liaison has been maintained between the Service and the Department by what is now called the Press and Liaison Division, which is responsible for keeping the CBC-IS briefed on departmental policy decisions and the most recent situation reports.

Following the passage of the Order-in-Council, construction of the short-wave transmitting facilities was undertaken at Sackville, New Brunswick, and completed late in 1944, at a capital cost of slightly over \$1 million. Monitoring stations were built near Ottawa and Vancouver and the headquarters was established in Montreal. When the first programme was broadcast in February 1945, there were two 50 KW transmitters; a third was added later. The programme material is carried from Montreal to Sackville by land-line.

### **Broadcasting Languages**

During the early years, broadcasts were made in French, English, German, Spanish, Dutch and Czech. Later, other languages were added and abandoned as the current situation seemed to warrant. At present, the CBC-IS broadcasts in 11 languages: English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Slovak, Polish and Hungarian. Its programmes are beamed, at the appropriate time of day, to Western Europe, Eastern and Central Europe, Africa (south of the Sahara), the Caribbean, Latin America and Australasia. The Sackville facilities are also used to broadcast to Canada's North and to the Canadian armed forces overseas.

The major emphasis of the Service's programming is on news broadcasts which give an accurate and objective account of events around the world, with especial emphasis on events in Canada. The news reports, like all the programmes, are prepared by separate language sections with the particular interests of areas to which they are broadcasting in mind. The news is supplemented by commentaries and interviews explaining Canadian attitudes and policies and by entertainment designed to amuse and to provide a balanced and interesting picture of Canada and Canadians. The range of programme content is extensive and includes everything from the work of popular Canadian jazz musicians to a stamp club of the air. In all, the CBC-IS broadcasts for a total of 90 hours each week.

The CBC-IS, in consultation with the Department of External Affairs, has kept abreast of the changes in the political climate since the end of the Second World War and, more recently, with the easing of the "Cold War", which brought about an end to the jamming of its broadcasts by the countries of Eastern Europe. The main thrust of programme policy today is to present a picture of Canada as a responsible and trustworthy middle power with a foreign policy based on a



sincere desire for lasting peace, a country that is a good trading partner and a source of quality goods, and a good place to visit as a tourist and to settle and raise a family. The CBC-IS tries to present a picture of the wide and interesting variety of Canadian beliefs, customs, tastes and traditions and to provide new Canadians with a link between Canada and the lands of their origins.

### **Other Successful Functions**

Although short-wave broadcasting is the best known and perhaps the most dramatic function of the International Service, its efforts to reach the medium- and long-wave radio audience and the growing television audience have also been successful. This field it shares with the domestic services of the CBC, which are also active in promoting exchanges. Radio programme material is recorded on tapes and discs and sent regularly to more than 1,000 foreign agencies that broadcast the material as part of their local programming. More and more emphasis is being placed on this aspect of the work of the CBC-IS in view of the considerable success demonstrated in recent years. At the same time, the International Service prepares and distributes a television production called "Canada Magazine", as well as other material, which has been well received abroad. Much of this material is distributed through the Canadian missions throughout the world.

The CBC-IS has frequently consulted the Department of External Affairs to ensure that their operations have the maximum effect, bearing in mind the variable nature of Canada's foreign interest and the need to use the relatively weak transmitters to the best advantage. There have been suggestions made recently, notably by the Fowler Committee on Broadcasting, that extra languages and new target areas should be added to the list, and these suggestions are now being carefully studied.

Among the other recommendations of the Fowler Committee was the replacement of the present transmitters, which the Committee described as "relics from the dawn of the electronic age", with more powerful new equipment. Such equipment would not only increase signal strength and allow the CBC-IS to compete more effectively with other short-wave services but would also insure that Canada could retain the broadcasting frequencies assigned to it, which might otherwise be lost by default. Comparing the activity of the CBC-IS with that of the broadcasting services of some other countries, the latest reports indicate that the "Voice of America" broadcasts in 38 languages for more than 800 hours a week, using 96 transmitters; Egypt broadcasts in 25 languages for almost 450 hours a week; Ghana operates two 250 KW and four 100 KW transmitters. The comparable figures for Canada are three 50 KW transmitters broadcasting in 11 languages for 90 hours a week. It is, of course, as already noted, up to Parliament to decide how much more Canada wants to do in this field.

### **Size of Audiences**


Who is listening? That question, say Canadian and other short-wave broadcasters,

is one of the most difficult to answer. Estimates of the size of the domestic audience for national broadcasts are relatively easy to make but it is a very much more difficult problem when audiences in other lands are involved, especially audiences in Eastern Europe. Studies made at the request of CBC-IS have however, indicated that there is a CBC-IS audience of about 170,000 in West Germany and that there are between 300,000 and 450,000 listeners in France. Where it is impossible to conduct surveys of audiences, an indication of their size can be gained from the mail received by the CBC-IS. In 1965, the CBC-IS received a total of 61,604 letters and cards from listeners, a considerable increase over the 37,373 received in 1964 and the 22,066 received in 1963. In 1964, 19,477 pieces of mail were received by the English-language section of the International Service, 2,746 by the French section, 5,688 by the German section, and a total of 3,042 by the Eastern European sections. Among the most remarkable increases in audience mail were those received by the Russian and Czechoslovakian sections. In 1962, the Russian section received eight pieces of mail; it received 35 pieces in 1963, 303 pieces in 1964 and 1,073 in 1965. One of the reasons for the increase was that the U.S.S.R. ceased jamming the Canadian broadcasts in 1963. The Czechoslovakian section received 1,298 letters and cards in 1964 and 5,371 in 1965.

The potential radio audience has been increasing by leaps and bounds, in keeping with the increasing affluence of Europe, Africa and Latin America, and especially since the introduction of inexpensive battery-operated transistor radios. There is no reason to believe that the sale of radios will not continue to increase and with it the potential audience for radio broadcasts. As they increase, the voice of Canada will be available to them.

## Oil for Zambia

**A**FTER the Government of Mr. Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent on November 11, 1965, Britain and many other countries, including Canada, implemented a series of economic sanctions in an effort to bring down the illegal regime they did not recognize. These measures were pursuant to a United Nations Security Council resolution of November 20. Among them was the imposition of an oil embargo on December 17, 1965. In retaliation against the embargo, the Rhodesian authorities forbade the trans-shipment through their territory of oil supplies destined for the land-locked Republic of Zambia, one of the African nations of the Commonwealth. This action seriously threatened the Zambian economy, including the continued operation of essential services and industries, and could, therefore, have been the cause of considerable hardship



*At Lusaka Airport, Mr. J. C. G. Brown, Canadian Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo, presents to representatives of the Zambian Government the first barrel of oil airlifted by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Left to right: Mr. Brown; Mr. Hyden Banda, Zambian Minister of Transport; Mr. Nalumino Mundia, Zambian Minister of Labour and Social Development; Wing Commander Gordon Webb, officer commanding the RCAF detachment.*

for the Zambian people.

Confronted with this situation, the President of Zambia applied to Britain, the United States and Canada for assistance. It was decided that an emergency airlift of oil products should be organized by Britain to help Zambia, and both the United States and Canada quickly agreed to participate in this airlift.

On December 26 an advance party of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel left Canada for Leopoldville, where the base for the Canadian segment of the operation was established with the full co-operation of the Congolese Government. Since the beginning of January, four *Hercules* aircraft of the RCAF have been transporting large quantities of oil from Leopoldville to Zambia, thus helping to sustain that country's economy.

Late in January, the Zambian Government expressed its gratitude for the assistance rendered by Canada, and in particular by the RCAF, and asked if Canada would be prepared to extend the duration of its participation in the airlift until the end of April, should this be required. The Canadian Government recently agreed to do this but, because the air-transport resources of the RCAF will be heavily taxed in meeting other prior commitments, the Canadian contribution to the airlift will be reduced from four to two *Hercules* aircraft at the beginning of March.

# *United Nations Convention on Road Traffic*

## ACCESSION OF CANADA

CANADA deposited its instrument of accession to the United Nations Convention on Road Traffic (1949) with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on December 23, 1965. The Convention, which has already been ratified or acceded to by some 75 countries, entered into force for Canada on January 22, 1966.

In August-September 1949, Canada participated in a United Nations Conference on Road and Motor Transport convened by the Secretary-General in accordance with a decision of the Economic and Social Council. Its object was to conclude a new world-wide convention on road and motor transport superseding earlier conventions on the same subject, which were now obsolete. The resulting agreement, which entered into force in March 1952, covers all aspects of international road transport including basic rules of the road, signs and signals, registration of motor vehicles, drivers' permits and the technical specifications to which roads and vehicles used in international traffic must conform. The two principal objects of the Convention, as envisaged at the time of its drafting, were to establish simplified and uniform world-wide regulations concerning road vehicles in international traffic and to constitute a common basis for the drafting of national laws and regulations on road traffic. Although it is likely that the United Nations Economic and Social Council will sponsor a conference in 1967 to prepare a convention to replace the present one, it was felt to be highly advantageous for Canada to gain experience as a party to the present constitution before that time.

### **Advantages to Canadian Motorists Abroad**

With the increase in the number of Canadians travelling abroad, there has come a growing appreciation of the advantages to Canada of acceding to the Road Traffic Convention. Various automobile clubs across the country have expressed interest in Canada's accession to the Convention. The difficulties experienced abroad by Canadian motorists because they did not have internationally-accepted driving licenses and car-registration plates provided the main impetus for Canadian participation in the Convention. One of the results of such participation is that it will enable Canadian motorists travelling in foreign countries to be issued in Canada with an international driving permit valid in the territory of all contracting states except the state where the permit was issued. Such a permit is based on certain prescribed standards and is intended to facilitate international tourism. Under the provisions of the Convention, apart from the normal registration plates issued by a competent provincial authority, the only other distinguishing sign that must be displayed by Canadian vehicles in international

traffic will be one to three letters in capital Latin characters denoting the home country of the vehicle.

Since many of the provisions of the Road Traffic Convention fall within the sphere of provincial jurisdiction, before the Canadian Government took final steps to accede to the Convention it sought and obtained assurances from each of the provinces that, if required, they would be prepared to implement these provisions. Thus it is expected that the provincial governments will now take whatever steps are necessary to implement the provisions of the Convention, including those relating to the issuance of international road permits.

It was thought particularly fitting that Canada should become a party to this multilateral convention during International Co-operation Year.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Comments on U.S. Economic Guide-lines**

*The following statement was made to the House of Commons on February 2, 1966, by the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance:*

I intend to speak very briefly . . . to make a few points on the application and the implications of United States guide-lines on direct investment in Canada. First of all, I should like to make it quite clear . . . as I did in a speech I gave earlier this session, that I am not defending the United States guide-lines on direct investment. As Minister of Finance, I advised the Government of the United States that I thought they were unwise, both economically and politically, to apply these guide-lines to Canada. Therefore, in what I have to say I am maintaining the position that it would be in the interests of both Canada and the United States if Canada were exempt from these guide-lines.

The first general point I should like to make is that, in discussing the problem of the effect of these United States measures on Canada, we must recognize that the United States has a balance-of-payments problem and that these guide-lines, as well as other measures, are related to that problem alone. Now, some experts disagree as to the nature of the United States international financial problems. However, I believe we have to recognize that the United States must be the judge of its own responsibilities and its own position.

Undoubtedly the United States Government is concerned about its balance-of-payments position. If it were not concerned, it would not be employing the extraordinary measures it is employing. This leads me to the second point, and that is that one should not make the assumption that is sometimes made, I notice, that the United States Government has embarked upon a new and permanent policy of guide-lines on direct investment by international companies based in the United States. If that were so, if in fact we were convinced that the United States had embarked upon a new, permanent policy, there would be very serious cause for concern on the part not only of Canadians but the world at large.

For the time being at least, I think one ought to give the benefit of the doubt to the United States Government and accept the views expressed by members of that administration. If I may, I should like to quote the views expressed by Mr. Connor, Secretary of Commerce, on January 17, as reported in the *New York Times* of that day. He said that the voluntary balance-of-payments programme should be ended by February of next year. The more important part of what he said is the following, as outlined in this article:

In discussing the ending of the program a year from now, Mr. Connor said the Government recognized that restraint on direct investment, in particular, was against the longer-run interest of the nation and of the balance of payments, because it would ultimately reduce both exports and income from investments.

On that point, I think, there is agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada . . . that these measures are not in the interests of the United States in the longer run. I think we must take it for granted that the United States has adopted these policies temporarily and that they are not part of a new orientation of United States thinking.

The third point, and one that I have emphasized before in this House but which I should like to emphasize again, is that it is in Canadian interests and in the interests of the Western alliance that the United States should overcome its difficulties. Our attitude as Canadians should be one of co-operation by all reasonable means. This does not mean we should be reluctant to express our views with frankness and vigour to the United States Government, as we have done. I have no complaint at all about the fact that others in this country have been expressing very vigorous views about the application of these policies to Canada.

It does seem to me, however, that we should not go out of our way to increase the difficulties of the United States, because we do want them to overcome their problems so that they can resume the policies they were following when there were no restraints on the movement of capital in or out of the United States.

Finally, I do wish to make it clear once again, as I did in answer to a question today, that the Canadian Government did not accept the application of United States guide-lines on direct investment to Canada. These guide-lines on direct investment did not form any part of our understanding with the United States Government. In December, I announced the terms of the agreement with the United States Government, which related to access to the United States market for long-term funds and freedom from the United States interest-equalization tax, in return for which we agreed to try to achieve a target on our reserves. This was our agreement.

So far as the guide-lines are concerned, we are free to take whatever action seems to be appropriate to protect Canadian interests, including, if necessary, as I suggested earlier today, guide-lines of our own. For example, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, at my suggestion, is examining the effects of these guide-lines upon the trade of Canada and will no doubt be talking to the heads of Canadian companies that might be affected by the guide-lines applicable to their United States parents.

I intimated also, in answer to a question today, something about our attitude on the financial implications of these guide-lines. I should like to amplify that. The United States balance-of-payments position is basically protected by the agreement on reserves. It would be most undesirable if the effect of the United States guide-lines were to induce strong new pressures of a distorting sort on credit and capital markets in Canada. This would be harmful to Canada and, in view of the overall character of our arrangement with the United States, it would be of no benefit to that country, since it would merely push Canadian borrowers into the new issue market in the United States.

The Governor of the Bank of Canada, on December 10, immediately after



the publication of the American guide-lines, informed the chief executive officers of the five largest Canadian banks that it was his hope and expectation that, if the banks found themselves confronted with new applications for credit resulting from the American guide-lines at a time when they were unable to meet in full the normal demands for business loans for credit-worthy customers, they would continue to look after customers who had relied on them in the past to meet their financial needs. The chief executive officers indicated that they agreed this was the proper course for them to follow. The Governor's views were reiterated at a meeting with the chief executive officers of all the banks held on January 5.

So far as long-term issues of American subsidiaries are concerned, I should hope and expect that there would be no abnormal recourse to the Canadian capital market but, if there were, the Government would have to decide what action to take. As I mentioned in my speech last Thursday, the United States new-issue market is open to American subsidiaries as well as to other Canadian companies. If abnormal borrowing in our capital market developed, this would merely push other Canadian borrowers into the new-issue market in the United States and so provide no benefit whatever to the United States balance of payments.

These are the general comments I wanted to make supplementary to the questions that I answered today. May I just say in conclusion that this is a time, as I said on an earlier occasion, for vigilance and watchfulness on the part of the Canadian Government and, indeed, on the part of Canadians. May I suggest, in the interests of Canada and in the interests of helping the United States overcome its problems, which have repercussions upon us in Canada, that it is also a time for restraint, for forbearance and for understanding.

## **U.S.-Canada Development of Saint John River**

*In the debate on the Estimates for 1965-66, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, stated that the Governments of the United States and Canada were beginning negotiations on the co-operative development of the Saint John River between the State of Maine and the Province of New Brunswick.*

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- UN Economic and Social Council, fortieth session: New York, February 23 — March 4
- Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs: Washington, March 3-5
- GATT Contracting Parties: Geneva, March 25 — April 6
- International Joint Commission, semi-annual meeting: Washington, April 5-8
- World Health Organization, nineteenth assembly: Geneva, May 3-20
- Commonwealth Trade Ministers' Conference: London, May 16-20
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee: Geneva, May 16-24
- UNICEF, Executive Board: Addis Ababa, May 19-28
- NATO Ministerial Meeting: Paris, June
- International Labour Organization, fiftieth conference: Geneva, June 1-23
- Governing Council of UN Development Programme, second session: Rome, June 8 —
- World Land Reform Conference: Rome, June 20 — July 2
- 

## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. H. A. Scott retired from the Department of External Affairs, effective January 28, 1966.
- Mr. J. P. Schioler posted from the Commonwealth Secretariat, London, to Ottawa, effective January 28, 1966.
- Mr. H. R. Morgan appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 3, effective January 28, 1966.
- Mr. D. M. Collacott appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 2, effective February 1, 1966.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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## Canada and NATO

ON MARCH 10, the Government of France delivered an *aide-mémoire* to the Canadian Ambassador in Paris that set out the position of France with regard to that country's future participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The French Government at the same time addressed similar *aides-mémoires* to all other members of NATO, although those addressed to the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada contained additional passages dealing with matters that were the subject of bilateral agreements with France. The *aide-mémoire* stated that France intended to withdraw all its land and air forces still remaining under NATO command; French naval forces had previously been withdrawn. France also required the removal from French territory of all NATO military headquarters, including SHAPE itself. Finally, the withdrawal of foreign forces and installations from France was requested unless such forces were placed under French rather than NATO operational command.

The Canadian Government, like other member governments that received the French *aide-mémoire*, has now publicly reaffirmed its continued support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These governments are considering in consultation the implications and consequences of the French position.

The texts follow of the French *aide-mémoire*, a statement on it to the House of Commons on March 18, the day it was tabled, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and excerpts from an address by Mr. Martin to the Rotary Club of Windsor, Ontario, on March 21, in which he discussed the French message:

### Aide-Mémoire from France to Canada

For some years the French Government has stressed on many occasions, both publicly and in conversations with allied governments, its view that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization no longer meets, as far as the French Government is concerned, the conditions which prevail in the world at the present time and which are basically different from those prevailing in 1949 and the following years.

2. In fact, the threat which weighed upon the Western world, particularly in Europe, and which was the reason for the conclusion of the Treaty, has changed in nature. It no longer presents the immediate and menacing character it once had. At the same time, the European countries have restored their economies and, as a consequence, are recovering their former strength. France, in particular, is developing an atomic armament, which, by its very nature, precludes its integration. In the third place, the nuclear balance between the

Soviet Union and the United States of America, which has replaced the monopoly held by the latter, has transformed the general conditions of Western defence. Finally, it is a fact that Europe is no longer the centre of international crises. This centre has moved elsewhere, notably to Asia, where the Atlantic alliance countries are as a whole not evidently involved.

3. This evolution in no way leads the French Government to question the Treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. In other words, and barring developments which, in the years to come, might basically modify relations between East and West, it does not intend to avail itself in 1969 of the provisions of Article 13 of the Treaty, and it considers that the alliance should remain in being as long as the need appears evident.

4. The above position having been stated unequivocally, the problem of the Organization itself arises — that is to say, all agreements, arrangements and decisions subsequent to the signing of the Treaty, whether they be multilateral or bilateral in form. The French Government considers that this Organization no longer corresponds to what, in its opinion, seems to be required.

5. One could undoubtedly have envisaged that negotiations could have been undertaken to modify by common consent the provisions in force. The French Government would have been happy to propose this had it had reason to believe that such negotiations would have led to the result it has in mind. Unfortunately, everything indicates that such an attempt would be doomed to fail since all of France's partners seem, or profess openly, to favour maintaining the status quo, or reinforcing all that which is henceforth unacceptable from the French point of view.

6. France, accordingly, is led to recognize the consequences for it in this situation and to take the measures which seem required and which in its opinion are not in the least incompatible with its participation in the alliance, or in military operations with its allies should the need arise. Already, in the past, the French Government has taken steps of this nature with regard to its naval forces serving with NATO, whether in the Mediterranean or in the Atlantic. What is now in question is its land and air forces stationed in Germany and assigned to the Allied Command in Europe. France intends to bring their assignment to an end. This decision will entail France's simultaneous withdrawal from the two integrated commands under which its forces are serving and to which it is contributing within the framework of NATO — i.e., the Supreme Allied Command in Europe and the Central Europe Command — and, consequently, the transfer of the headquarters for these two commands outside French territory. The implementation of all these measures raises, of course, a number of problems, which the French Government is now prepared to discuss with its allies. There will be a need to consider the liaison which should be established between the French Command and NATO Command, as well as to determine the conditions under which French forces, particularly in Germany, would participate in wartime, should Article 5 of the Washington Treaty be evoked, in joint military

actions, with reference to command and operations themselves. This implies, in particular, that French land and air forces which are stationed at present in Germany would be maintained in that country under the agreements of October 23, 1954. This, for its part, the French Government is disposed to do.

7. Consideration should be given, on the other hand, to problems which may present themselves to France with regard to the Military Committee and the Standing Group, including the problem of liaison between these bodies and the French Command.

8. Such are the broad outlines of measures contemplated by the French Government which it regards as necessary to adapt to new conditions the modalities of its participation in the Atlantic alliance. It is prepared to enter discussions with regard to the implementation of these measures, and it hopes that appropriate arrangements may be agreed upon by all its allies.

9. Multilateral problems are not, however, the only ones to be considered as far as Canada and France are concerned. Both countries have concluded agreements in the past concerning the construction and the operation of airports on French territory intended for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

10. The French Government considers that these agreements no longer meet present conditions, which lead it to recover the full exercise of its sovereignty on French territory, or, in other words, no longer to accept that foreign units, installations or bases in France should in any way be responsible to authorities other than French. It is ready to examine, and eventually to settle with the Government of Canada, the practical consequences this policy entails.

11. Moreover the French Government is ready to discuss the military facilities which could be placed at the disposal of the Government of Canada on French territory in the event of a conflict to which both countries would participate under the Atlantic alliance. These facilities could be the object of an agreement to be concluded between both Governments.

### **Statement on French Aide-Mémoire**

I rise to make a declaration that is being made by 14 countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at this hour. . .

The Government of France on March 10 delivered a note to the Canadian Ambassador in Paris setting out the position of that Government regarding France's future participation in NATO.

The French note, which I tabled this morning, states that France intends to withdraw all its land and air forces still remaining under NATO command. French naval forces have already been withdrawn. France also requires the removal from French territory of all NATO military headquarters, including SHAPE itself. Finally, France requires the withdrawal of foreign forces and

installations from France, unless the forces are placed under French rather than NATO operational command.

It is the view of the Canadian Government that Canadian forces at the disposition of the alliance in Europe should be under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander. The direct implication for Canada of the French decision, therefore, is that we shall have to relinquish our air-base at Marville and the air division headquarters at Metz and re-locate these forces and facilities elsewhere. Other Canadian forces in Europe outside France are not directly affected.

The French Government also addressed notes to all other members of NATO. These notes are all substantially similar. The notes addressed to the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada deal additionally with matters which are the subject of bilateral agreements with France.

The French intention to withdraw from the integrated military arrangements established under NATO has been the subject of consultation among the other 14 members of the Organization, who have determined to maintain the integrated defence structure of the alliance. The experience of the last two world wars and modern developments in warfare permit no effective alternative to unified command and planning arrangements for allied forces. Recognizing the need for continuing these proven arrangements, Canada has today joined the other members of NATO in making the following declaration:

The following declaration has been agreed on between the heads of government of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the organization established under it are both alike essential to the security of our countries.

The Atlantic alliance has ensured its efficacy as an instrument of defence and deterrence by the maintenance in peace-time of an integrated and interdependent military organization, in which, as in no previous alliance in history, the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the organization are not merely instruments of the common defence. They meet a common political need and reflect the readiness and determination of the member countries of the North Atlantic Community to consult and act together wherever possible in the safeguard of their freedom and security in the furtherance of international peace, progress and prosperity.

I would remind the House before I take my seat that the Government of France, in the note it has sent to Canada, does not, as I said during the question period today, propose to denounce the Treaty.

### **Address in Windsor**

On March 10 the Canadian Ambassador in Paris was called in to receive a note setting out the position of the French Government regarding France's

future participation in NATO. Today I shall summarize the main lines of the French position and give a general indication of the principles which will guide the Canadian Government in the discussions which lie ahead with France and our other allies.

The French note received by Canada states that France intends to withdraw all its remaining land and air forces from NATO commands. Its naval forces had been withdrawn already. France also requires the removal from French territory of all NATO military headquarters, including SHAPE itself. Finally, France requests the withdrawal of foreign forces and installations from France, unless the forces are placed under French operational command, a condition which they themselves recognize is unacceptable.

The implication for Canada is that we shall have to relinquish our air-base at Marville and the Air Division headquarters at Metz and to re-locate these forces and facilities elsewhere. Other Canadian forces in Europe are not directly affected.

I know you will recognize immediately the far-reaching nature of the French decision. I use the word "decision" because the French authorities have made it clear that they are not anticipating counter-proposals. The French Government have, in effect, decided to withdraw from integrated military arrangements within NATO. They are evidently prepared to negotiate only on the modalities and timing for giving effect to the French decision. This will apply to the Canadian bases at Metz and Marville.

We have known from President de Gaulle's press conferences over the last few years and from action which he has already taken to withdraw French naval forces from NATO command that the French Government was dissatisfied with the military arrangements in NATO.

It was for this reason, among others, that the Canadian Government has indicated on numerous occasions that it was ready to consider modifications in the NATO organization which would be acceptable to all members of the alliance. This was our motive in proposing in 1964 that the NATO Council should undertake a study of the future of the alliance. In this way we hoped to start an exchange of views in which France and our other allies could participate and in which plans could be discussed for adapting the alliance to the changed circumstances of the 1960s. Although the proposal was endorsed by the ministerial meeting in December 1964, there was subsequent resistance to the study being developed, because it was thought by many of our allies that it might tend to precipitate a confrontation with France. In these circumstances, we were not able to pursue the proposal.

Now France has chosen to act on her own, so that, as matters stand, we have no alternative but to take account of France's unilateral decision and concentrate on limiting the adverse consequences to NATO.

I am bound to say that the Canadian Government regrets the French decision and is not persuaded by the arguments which the French Government



has used to justify its actions. Our experience in the last two wars has led us to conclude that there is no effective alternative to unified command and planning arrangements for allied forces. That is even more true of modern warfare, with the emphasis on rapid and dependable communications and on quick, but jointly *and carefully* considered, responses. The need for continuing these proven arrangements is accepted as imperative by all other members of the alliance. Last week, these governments agreed on a declaration of their continuing support for the Organization, and you will have read in the press that the text was released in Ottawa on March 18.

As you will have gathered from this declaration, the Canadian Government continues to give its full support to the organizational arrangements which have been established over the years in NATO. This does not mean that we think the military organization cannot be improved. Within the conception of unified command and planning, we believe that the military organization would profit from a re-examination aimed at improving its effectiveness and rationalizing the command structure. The readjustment which is imperative as a consequence of the French decision will afford an opportunity to apply the lessons we have learned. This opportunity must be seized.

In spite of its decision to withdraw from the integrated military arrangements of NATO, the French Government has stated that it does not intend to denounce the North Atlantic Treaty in 1969 — that is, that it will continue to be a party to the Treaty. The implications of this intention, in the light of the announced decision to withdraw from the integrated military arrangements, have yet to be explored with the other members of NATO. But the Canadian Government welcomes this indication of France's desire to continue its formal association with the other parties to the Treaty.

The French Government has also indicated a willingness to develop organizational arrangements with other members of NATO to co-ordinate plans in the event of possible conflict. There are serious doubts as to the real effectiveness of such arrangements under the conditions which would be likely to obtain in modern war. Such arrangements could, however, constitute additional links in France's continuing association with the other members of NATO.

One object of Canadian policy will be to ensure that nothing is done which would make more difficult the resumption by France of full military participation in NATO, should France so decide. No matter how great our regret that the French Government should have taken the decision it has, we shall do all we can not to allow this action to affect the existing warm and friendly relations between Canada and France, which form an important and basic element of our foreign policy. Indeed, if the institutional links between France and NATO must be loosened, it is all the more important to maintain and strengthen if possible the bilateral relation.

In spite of the uncertainties and the problems which the French action

will cause for us and our allies, there are certain essential points about the Canadian position which I should like once more to underline:

- (a) We shall continue to subscribe to the purposes and objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- (b) Canada intends to continue to participate in the integrated military command and planning arrangements, the need for which we discovered at such tragic cost during the last two great wars, and which has become even more important with the increasing complexity and rapidity of military actions and reactions.
- (c) France's decision will require a review of NATO military arrangements. Canada will seize this opportunity for an examination of how we can best contribute to the continuing military effectiveness of the alliance and how the existing arrangements can best be adapted to meet contemporary needs.
- (d) The Canadian Government desires to preserve and strengthen the existing close and friendly relations with France and will do all it can not to allow the French action in NATO to impair our bilateral relations. The Canadian Government also hopes that the French action will not impair France's co-operation with other European and North Atlantic countries in economic, financial, trade, and other matters of great importance to France and to the rest of us.

# *Joint U.S. - Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs*

TENTH MEETING, WASHINGTON, MARCH 1966

*Commenting in the House of Commons on March 7, 1966, on the communiqué issued at the end of its tenth meeting by the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, said that "a document of this kind cannot do full justice to the spirit of understanding and friendship in which the meeting took place, or to the fullness and vigour of the exchange of views we had on a wide range of subjects of common interest..." He drew particular attention to three subjects of major importance that had been discussed in Washington: the United States balance-of-payments programme; the proposed regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission governing "over-the-counter trading in securities"; and the U.S. foreign-assets controls.<sup>(1)</sup>*

## **Communiqué**

The tenth meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held in Washington, D.C., March 4-5, 1966.

As background to the discussions on trade and economic matters, the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed major recent international developments.

The Committee exchanged views on current developments in the closely related economies of the two countries, noting with satisfaction that both had achieved a record of sustained economic expansion unparalleled in their histories and they looked forward to another year of strong growth. They recognized, however, that maintaining price and cost stability will require close and continuing attention.

The Committee discussed the balance of payments of both countries. They recognized that decisive progress had been made toward reducing the United States balance-of-payments deficit and reviewed the measures being taken to bring the United States external accounts into balance. In this connection, the Committee noted the measures that have been taken to maintain access to the United States capital market for an unlimited amount of new Canadian securities free of the Interest Equalization Tax. The United States members reaffirmed that, in buying such issues, U.S. investors were completely free to be guided by market considerations.

(1) For the full text of Mr. Martin's statement to the House of Commons, see Page 176.

Canadian Ministers expressed their concern over the possible implications for Canada of the United States voluntary programme on direct investment and the relation of this programme to the position of Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The United States members made clear that the U.S. Government was not requesting U.S. corporations to induce their Canadian subsidiaries to act in any ways that differed from their normal business practices as regards the repatriation of earnings, purchasing and sales policies, or their other financial and commercial activities. United States members re-emphasized the view that United States subsidiaries abroad should behave as good citizens of the country where they are located. Where U.S. companies were in doubt as to these views, the U.S. Government would ensure that any misunderstandings would be dispelled.

The Canadian Ministers expressed serious concern that proposed Securities and Exchange Commission regulations would subject to United States law Canadian companies not deliberately seeking to sell securities in the United States if their shares had happened to be purchased by United States residents. These regulations, moreover, would discriminate against Canadian companies by imposing more severe requirements relative to other foreign companies. Canadian Ministers referred to plans under way in Canada to improve the disclosure of information regarding Canadian enterprises and the regulation of the issue of securities. They strongly urged that the United States authorities refrain from applying these SEC regulations to Canadian companies which do not seek to sell their securities in the United States. The United States members appreciated the concern of the Government of Canada and assured the Canadian members that the most careful consideration would be given to Canadian views in an effort to work out at an early date mutually satisfactory arrangements.

The Committee discussed United States foreign-assets controls as they may affect the exports of companies in Canada. The United States members reaffirmed their readiness to consult promptly on any transactions of importance to Canada which are affected by United States foreign-assets control. They also stated that regulations over exports of technical data are being revised and that, in light of the Committee's discussions, further consideration will be given to the possibilities of additional modifications of the regulations.

The Committee discussed a number of specific bilateral trade and financial matters on both sides, including Canadian cheddar cheese and Canadian oil exports to the United States, and agreed to keep them under review. The Committee agreed that a joint examination should be made of trade in agricultural implements, tractors, and aircraft for which tariff liberalization would be most important.

They agreed that the removal of unnecessary restrictions on the free flow of goods and services across the border would contribute importantly to the continued prosperity of both countries. The Committee recognized that the Automotive Agreement represents a long stride toward free trade in a basic

industry of major importance to the two countries and had resulted in a substantial increase in two-way trade to the benefit of production and employment both in Canada and the United States. Greater benefits are to be expected as industry in both countries adjust their operations to take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the Agreement.

In the area of international economic relations, the Committee agreed that the "Kennedy round" negotiations in Geneva provided an unparalleled opportunity for the substantial liberalization of world trade, which would benefit all participating countries — developing as well as developed. The Committee, therefore, concluded that the highest priority must be given to the timely completion of these negotiations, which are now entering their critical phase. They agreed that the Canadian and U.S. delegations would continue to work closely together in the interest of a successful conclusion of the "Kennedy round" negotiations, including the negotiation of a world cereals agreement in which the two North American exporting countries have a strong common interest.

The Committee reviewed the trade and development problems of the developing countries, particularly in food and agriculture. They noted the food needs in India and the steps being taken by the Indian Government to deal with the problem. Although both countries were providing assistance to India and other developing countries, they noted that more would be needed during the period ahead from other countries. The Canadian members informed the Committee of Canada's recent decision to make available to India a substantially larger amount of food aid.

The Committee discussed the consultative arrangements between the two Governments in the light of the Heeney-Merchant report and agreed on the importance of close and effective working relations between the two Governments.

The Committee took note of the importance of the work on improving the international monetary system being undertaken by the International Monetary Fund and the Deputies of the Group of Ten. They expressed the hope that the Deputies will be able to reach agreement on a constructive report to the Ministers, which would permit further negotiations on a broader basis.

The Ministers noted with concern the serious problem of pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River, as described in the recent interim report to the Canadian and the United States Governments by the International Joint Commission. They recorded their support for the recommendations in the report and agreed that efforts in both countries should be co-ordinated to deal with this problem as a matter of urgency.

The Canadian delegation was led by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and included the Honourable Robert Winters, Minister of Trade and Commerce; the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance; the Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Industry; the Honourable Jean-Luc Pépin, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys; the

Honourable John J. Greene, Minister of Agriculture; Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of Canada; Sydney D. Pierce, Chief Canadian Trade Negotiator; C. S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, and advisers.

The United States delegation was headed by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and included the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; John A. Carver, Jr., Under-Secretary of the Department of Interior; Thomas C. Mann, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Honorable Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; the Honorable Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Honorable W. Walton Butterworth, American Ambassador to Canada, and advisers.

# United Nations Economic and Social Council

FORTIETH SESSION, NEW YORK, FEBRUARY-MARCH 1966

THE NEWLY-ENLARGED United Nations Economic and Social Council met for the first time as a 27-member body at its fortieth session, held from February 23 to March 8, 1966, at UN headquarters in New York.<sup>(1)</sup>

In contrast to previous spring sessions, this session of the Council was called upon to deal with some 20 items, a number of which were of a very substantive character. It considered a wide range of United Nations activities in the social, economic and human rights fields and adopted a series of resolutions aimed at streamlining the machinery and procedure for such activities and accelerating progress towards the attainment of the objectives of the UN Development Decade.

Action taken by the Council in the area of social and human rights included recommendations on measures for the speedy implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

The Council reviewed the question of the international control of narcotic drugs and, at the suggestion of Canada, initiated action to control barbiturates and similar substances not yet under international control.

In the economic sphere, the Council considered a report by the Secretary-General outlining proposals for a five-year programme of studies relating to the development of non-agricultural resources in developing countries and called for further exploratory action.

Other actions taken by the Council included a recommendation for a survey of resources of the sea beyond the Continental Shelf, approval of a number of studies by the United Nations in the field of water desalination, the designation of 1967 as International Tourist Year, and consideration of the agenda for Council's 1966 summer session in Geneva, together with the proposed work programme of the United Nations in the economic and social field for 1967.

## Control of Narcotic Drugs

The Social Committee of the Council devoted several days of discussion to the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Of special interest to Canada was the Commission's recommendation that a special committee be set up to study the possibility of applying international measures of control to substances such as barbiturates, tranquillizers and amphetamines.

(1) Members of the Council are Algeria, Britain, Cameroun, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Roumania, Sierra Leone, the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States of America and Venezuela.

The Canadian statement pointed to the great increase in the use of these substances, mentioned that Canada had enacted special legislation in 1962 to deal with this problem, and strongly supported the proposal for a special study of international control measures which might be applied to barbiturates and similar substances. At the suggestion of Canada, the Council adopted a resolution calling for the convening of a special committee of the Narcotics Commission to study the question of substances not yet under international control.

In another resolution, the Council took note of the arrangements for the implementation of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It decided to fix March 2, 1968, as the date when the new International Narcotics Control Board, set up under that Convention, should enter upon its functions. A third resolution adopted by the Council on the recommendation of the Narcotics Commission dealt with the question of the coca-leaf, whose use as a narcotic is a serious problem in the highlands of the Andes.

### **Non-Agricultural Resources**

Under this item the Council discussed a report by the Secretary-General outlining a proposed five-year programme of natural-resources development. This would consist of nine world surveys of such resources as iron ore and non-ferrous metals, and such problems as water needs and resources, aimed at promoting the development of these resources as a means of strengthening the economic basis of the developing countries.

The Canadian statement made during the debate offered detailed comments on the various surveys recommended in the report. The Canadian representative suggested that the best way of evaluating the proposed surveys and the priorities that should be assigned to them would be to refer the programme to a committee of experts. This suggestion was eventually incorporated in a resolution adopted by the Council after long discussion. After welcoming the initiative taken by the Secretary-General in submitting a long-range programme of studies of non-agricultural resources, the Council recommended that specially-qualified outside experts should be consulted on the value of the proposed surveys and on the priorities to be assigned to them. The Secretary-General was asked to report to the next session of the Council on the results of these consultations and to provide information on the costs of the surveys and possible methods of financing.

In another resolution, the Council called for a survey of the existing knowledge of mineral and food resources of the sea, beyond the Continental Shelf, and of the techniques which might be employed for exploiting these resources.

In the realm of water desalination, the Council took note of current United Nations activities aimed at studying ways in which the needs of countries suffering water-shortage might be met, and asked the Secretary-General to



take steps to marshal the resources necessary for implementing the United Nations work programme in this field.

### **Human Rights**

The Council adopted two resolutions on measures for the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In one, the Council called on the Commission on Human Rights to recommend any further measures which could be undertaken by the appropriate United Nations bodies to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination.

In a second resolution, the Commission on Human Rights was requested to consider, as a matter of importance and urgency, the question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination, segregation and *apartheid* in all countries. The Commission was asked to give particular attention to racial discrimination in colonial and other dependent territories.

The Council also discussed organizational and procedural arrangements for the implementation of conventions and recommendations in the sphere of human rights. It welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of measures of implementation in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, recommended that future United Nations conventions on the subject of human rights should include similar provisions and invited all eligible states which have thus far not done so to become parties to existing human rights conventions.

The designation of 1967 as International Tourist Year was first suggested by the International Union of Official Travel Organizations. It was strongly supported by Canada and a number of other countries. After some discussion, the Council decided to recommend to the General Assembly that 1967 should be designated International Tourist Year. It also called for a study of the methods and definitions most suitable for the purpose of improving statistics on tourism without increasing tourist formalities.

### **Economic Actions**

After a brief debate on the work programme of the Centre for Industrial Development, the Council adopted a resolution which reaffirmed the need to accord priority to the activities provided for in the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development concerning the establishment of industries with an export potential in the developing countries. A second resolution anticipated the forthcoming meeting of the *ad hoc* committee created to draft the statutes for the new United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID). The resolution asked the Secretariat to prepare for the committee's use an annotated list of problems of procedure, administration and relationship which should be considered in setting up UNOID.

In separate resolutions the Council took note of the reports of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliates.

The Council decided to postpone until its forty-third session in 1967 the question of a further meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Question of a Declaration on International Economic Co-operation.

### **Enlarging Functional Commissions**

One issue which received a good deal of attention, without any final decision being taken, was the question of enlarging the Functional Commissions of ECOSOC and the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning. Canada was closely involved from the start in consultations on this problem. While supporting enlargement, Canada favoured postponing elections to the various Functional Commissions and the Housing Committee to the summer session of ECOSOC, in order to give the Council the opportunity for a full debate on the desirability of enlarging these subsidiary bodies of experts.

In informal consultations with the Afro-Asian members of the Council, it became clear, however, that they wished ECOSOC not only to decide on enlargement at the current session but to proceed with elections immediately thereafter. Eventually Canada joined with Sweden, Chile and the 12 Afro-Asian members in submitting a draft resolution which would have enlarged the Statistical Commission and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to 24 members, while the remaining Functional Commissions (the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women, the Social Commission and the Population Commission) and the Committee on Housing would be increased to 27 members, to be elected on a basis of geographical distribution like that employed in elections to ECOSOC.

In the subsequent debate in the Council, differing views were expressed on the desirability of effecting an immediate enlargement of the Commissions and on the number of seats to be added. The Eastern European members pressed for enlarging the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women, the Social Commission, the Population Commission and the Committee on Housing to 28 members apiece, so as to give them a total of five extra seats. Canada and the other Western members of the Council opposed this suggestion, as it would make these bodies larger than ECOSOC itself, to which they reported and, moreover, would make more difficult the application to them of a system of geographical distribution of seats similar to that now in force for ECOSOC.

It proved impossible to resolve these differences in the time at the Council's disposal. In the end, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, including Canada, proposed that further consideration of the question, as well as the elections concerned, should be adjourned until the forty-first session. This was agreed to, and the Council will therefore take up this matter again during its summer session, which opens in Geneva on July 5.

### **Other Questions**

Other action taken by the Council at its fortieth session included the adoption of a resolution enlarging the Council's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations from 7 to 13 members. The Committee deals with applications by non-governmental organizations for consultative status with ECOSOC.

Action regarding a proposed international institute for documentation on housing, building and planning was postponed pending further consultations with governments by the Secretary-General on the location and method of financing the institute.

Following discussion of a report on the preparation of budgets of the Specialized Agencies, the Council decided to continue consideration of this question at its forty-first session.

The Council also discussed the agenda for its forty-first session and its programme of work for 1967. During the debate, the Canadian representative urged that the work of the Council as governing body of United Nations economic and social programmes, co-ordinator of the economic, social and human rights activities of the whole United Nations family, including the Specialized Agencies, and a forum for debate on broad international issues of economic and social policy should be allocated to separate sessions in keeping with these separate and distinct functions of the Council.

In the course of the session, the Council held elections to the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It also elected members to the newly enlarged Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Special Committee on Co-ordination, and approved the Secretary-General's nomination of members to serve on the Committee on Development Planning.

### **Statement by World Bank President**

Perhaps the most significant statement made before the Economic and Social Council at this year's spring session was the address given by the President of the World Bank, Mr. George D. Woods, on February 25. Mr. Woods gave a wide-ranging survey of some of the key problems of development assistance, focussing on two fields: education and agriculture.

*Assistance for Education:* Education, he said, was the newest branch of development finance. The idea of preparing "bankable" projects in education had not been taken seriously until a few years ago. The World Bank Group was currently involved in a number of education projects. Among its first investments were two credits extended by the International Development Association (IDA) to Pakistan and Ethiopia to finance the construction and equipment of secondary and technical schools. As a result of these projects, the number of students enrolled in technical schools in Pakistan was expected to increase from 1,700 today to 7,000 in 1970. When the IDA project in Ethiopia was completed, Mr. Woods pointed out, enrolment in secondary education in that country would

increase from 33,000 students to about 51,000. Mr. Woods cited these examples to show how the World Bank, in applying the project approach to education, was trying to achieve the same kind of precision in its loans and credits for education that it sought in other kinds of operations.

Mr. Woods added that the Bank was also watching very carefully the new ways in which technology — particularly the media of mass communications — was being applied to teaching. He went on to say:

“Technology is not the toy of the prosperous; it is, potentially, the servant of all societies trying to engineer an escape from their poverty. The application of technology to teaching will get its real justification in the developing countries, where the needs are so great. However, as in all matters of education, progress must come from within, from a clear idea of what should be taught and a firm determination to set high standards of teaching and then stick to them.”

*Assistance for Agriculture:* The President of the World Bank then turned to the question of financing agricultural development. He said that no sector of development had resisted innovation more stubbornly than agriculture. In most under-developed countries, the huge rural population tended to cling to attitudes and practices of the past. Further, many politicians in the under-developed world had a prejudice against agriculture and in favour of industry:

“The latter appears as the wave of the future, while the former suggests stagnation and subjugation associated with the past. However, in most developing countries, agriculture provides employment for the great majority of the people; there must be much greater emphasis on increasing production on the land both to feed growing populations and to feed growing industries.”

Mr. Woods thought it essential that, for the future, much greater emphasis should be placed on the need for increasing fertilizer production in the under-developed world. Because both the ingredients and the principal areas of unsatisfied demand existed in the developing countries themselves, increased fertilizer production and use would bring many benefits to these countries. Apart from increased yields to farmers, it would mean an increase in trade within the under-developed world. To exploit the ingredients available in the developing countries, it would be necessary to bring to those countries the most modern, large-scale technology in order to permit mass production of fertilizers at very low cost.

Mr. Woods assured his hearers that the World Bank Group was ready to give prompt consideration to requests for assistance in this field, and concluded with this observation:

“There is one paralyzing preconception which I think we all should now lay to rest once and for all. That is the notion that agriculture and industry should exist in a perpetual state of divorce. In a concrete way, fertilizer production illustrates that, far from divorce, an enduring marriage between agriculture and industry must be arranged if our hopes for economic progress are to be realized.”

*Development Assistance Problems and Priorities:* In his final remarks, the

President of the World Bank outlined the need for increased international aid and the responsibilities of both the developed and the developing countries in this regard. Because of their interest these comments are reproduced in full below:

"We are all familiar now with the statistics of need which have been gathered in so many quarters to illustrate the great and growing gap between the wealth and welfare of different groups of countries today. These illustrations should alarm the conscience of men everywhere. But when it comes to raising capital for development, I would not be serving member governments well if I were to encourage them to believe that these statistics are in any way a substitute for projects — liberally defined, soundly conceived and daringly planned.

"Our own contribution to calculating the need for external development capital is set out in the annual report before you. We estimate that the developing countries as a group — ignoring wide differences in capacity and performance — could effectively use in each of the next five years some \$3 to \$4 billion more in development finance than they are now receiving. I believe this to be so on the basis of our experience. But that capital will not be forthcoming as a result of our educated guess. Our guess must be fortified by good and visible performance on the part of the developing countries. Substantial sums will only be forthcoming as developing countries express more of their needs in sound projects which promise to raise the productivity of their people.

"The kind of performance I am talking about is evident in an increasing number of countries, I am glad to say. But I can't stress enough the fact that the job of enlisting the needed capital and skills for our work would be much less difficult if more governments would devote more attention — commit more of their prestige, in fact — to the hard business of project preparation. Project preparation involves a lot more than simply drawing up plans and conducting engineering studies. In particular, it involves commitments by responsible authorities... commitments of money, of managerial talent and very often of political leadership. Nothing depresses me quite so much as seeing a carefully researched and evaluated investment opportunity going a-begging because those responsible are in the last analysis unwilling to commit themselves. Today in Central America, for example, the stage is set for building a regional system of telecommunications which would materially speed up the economic integration of the countries in that region. And integration is the direction in which all agree their future progress lies. The United Nations Development Programme provided more than \$600,000 to finance a feasibility study of this project which was carried out under the direction of the World Bank. We have for some time been ready to assist in financing the implementation of the study and we still are. But three of the five governments concerned have yet to decide.

"Maybe we were wrong in this case to undertake the study, for no project proposal is worth anything until those who are supposed to benefit are committed to it. But I don't think we were wrong. What's missing in this, and other cases

like it, is a sense of urgency — a sense of priority, the absence of which seems too often to belie the great needs of which we in this room are all so aware.

“I appreciate the serious problems which most governments in the developing countries face these days in trying to resolve the grave differences which exist among their people. I am not unmindful of the competing and conflicting claims which are made on their meagre resources. But I am also aware of what can be done when governments undertake to resolve internal differences around the common problems of their economic development. I am also aware of what can be done when economic development is given top priority in the allocation of scarce resources.

“The job of enlisting the needed capital and skills for our work would likewise be less difficult if the developed countries would recognize the same kind of top priority in formulating their external aid programmes. I am on record on several occasions as saying that what is now being done is not nearly enough. I am not going to restate my views on this matter today. Just let me appeal once again to these developed countries, preoccupied as they understandably are with their own problems, not to neglect their recognized self-interest in helping others to manage an escape from poverty.

“The present flow of development assistance is not just inadequate in volume; it is also somewhat diluted in quality. There is an extravagance involved in the common practice of tying aid to sources of supply in the donor country. There is still an inadequate portion of development finance offered on long-term and low rates. And there is a persistent anomaly which finds the developed countries urging the developing ones to think about their investment priorities in the context of a long-term plan, while the developed countries themselves are unable or unwilling to provide even target figures of external aid over a comparably long period. Each of these factors dilutes the effectiveness of external aid programmes.

“But what makes it most difficult of all to enlist the money and skills needed for our work is the fact that so much of the real progress being made is hidden under a barrel of political complaint and controversy. We talk a great deal about the importance of international co-operation for social and economic development, but nowhere is it the featured news of the day. Other diversions, more or less hostile to the aim of increasing productivity, continually crowd the stage.

“It need not be this way. We in the World Bank have been able to continue our work in the face of some very noisy diversions of late, and we have every intention of continuing to do so. We can do this partly because we are engaged in works of construction which people can see and whose benefits people can use. More important, we can continue our work because, underneath all the controversy reflected so amply in the press, there is a hard core of men and women from all countries who are dedicated to getting on with the job of development. I just wish these men and women could be heard more in their

own lands and throughout the world. I just wish they were accorded the prestige which politicians and military men in all countries still reserve too often for activities which impede economic development and, at times, make progress virtually impossible.

“When is it that men and governments will come to attach the same priority, the same prestige, to providing jobs and to producing things society wants which is now attached to preparing for war or to waving the flags of nationalism? You know and I know that governments which do not cultivate this kind of prestige are destined to see their people remain mired in poverty.”



#### *GIFT OF CANADIAN BOOKS TO LENIN LIBRARY*

The Ambassador of Canada to the Soviet Union, Mr. R. A. D. Ford, addresses a reception held in Moscow on December 14, 1965, to mark the presentation to the Lenin Library of about 60 books by French-speaking Canadian authors. These volumes will help to balance the Library's holdings of Canadian books, which, before this gift was made, had been mainly in English. Seated beside the Ambassador is the Deputy Director of the Lenin Library.

## *The Rupununi Area of British Guiana<sup>(1)</sup>*

**W**HEN, IN May 1966, British Guiana becomes independent, its name will be Guyana, which means "Land of Many Waters" and is pronounced like "Guy" and "Anna". It contains 83,000 square miles and supports about 600,000 people.

The Rupununi is an administrative district of Guyana the size of the province of New Brunswick, with a population of about 15,000, of whom over 80 per cent are Amerindians. These are the indigenous people of Guyana, comprising nine main tribes, who are sometimes called "Indians". However, usage has given this name to the descendants of the impressed labourers who were brought from India to work in the sugar estates during the last century.

This district, with its prairie-like savannahs and wooded mountain ranges showing icy blue in the distance, with its unique and thinly-scattered population, forms a strong contrast to the Atlantic coastal flats of Guyana. The savannahs are arid in the dry season and covered with ponds in the wet season. The soil is not productive and no way has yet been found to make it so. A dozen ranches, with large grazing rights, find widely scattered pasturage for about 60,000 beef cattle — an average of about ten animals a square mile. Some of the Amerindians work as cowboys on these ranches, but most of them engage in subsistence farming on good soil patches, sometimes on their reservations but often far from their home villages.

### **Rupununi Administration**

The administrative headquarters for the Rupununi are at Lethem on the Brazilian border, where there are a district commissioner and other officials responsible to the appropriate ministries of the central government at Georgetown. Great sections of the district have been reserved for Amerindians, who live in isolated villages. The tribes mainly represented are the Wapisianis and the Macusis, and farther south a few of the Wai-Wais, who, in their primitive simplicity of life, compare with the Papuans of New Guinea.


Since the movement of personnel and freight between Georgetown and Lethem must be by air, only the demands of urgent business or illness bring the ranchers or the Amerindians to the capital. No marked influx into this district has yet begun.

It is impossible to be in Guyana very long without feeling the urge to visit the Rupununi. There were good reasons to let myself yield to the impulse, as I had been asked to look into some of the needs of the Amerindians in relation to our external aid intentions. My opportunity came in May 1964 in the form

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(1) By the Honourable Milton F. Gregg, V.C., Canadian Commissioner to British Guiana.





*In this painting, Aleide Barjona, an Amerindian boy aged 14, has interpreted savannah life, showing the typically abrupt mountains and the heavy banks of cloud in the background, and, in the foreground, the cattle foraging for pasture. In the centre of the picture are to be seen a cowboy and one of the wooden-wheeled ox-carts that are so dependable a mode of transportation when the plains are flooded during the rainy season.*

of an invitation from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is responsible for Amerindian administration for the whole country. The plan was to visit as many villages and reservations as possible in a single week.

We took off from Atkinson Field (28 miles from Georgetown) in a *Dakota* freight and passenger plane, which was filled to capacity with people and provisions of all kinds, including a gift of North American powdered milk, Canadian flour and cases of New Brunswick sardines.

### **A Bauxite Mine**

As we followed the general course of the Demerara River southward, we could see nothing on either side except the solid green roof of the jungle, much denser than that of an Eastern Canada hardwood forest. After about 60 miles, the pilot signalled me to crawl over the mounds of freight and join him to get a better view of the complex of the Demerara Bauxite Company Ltd (DEMBA, a subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of Canada) at the town of Mackenzie.

We could see below the massive digging machine gnawing at a white sand cliff of overburden and carrying it out to be spilled into the jungle a mile away.


Over 100 feet below this operation, the bauxite was being lifted into railway cars by steam shovels and rolled along a light railway to the great plant shrouded in steam. From this one Canadian industry, situated in the heart of the jungle, come 39 per cent of Guyana's exports.

Here we left the course of the Demerara River and crossed over to the Essequibo. This great waterway, which runs for more than 600 miles the whole length of Guyana, would be a valuable river route to the interior but for the many rapids that cannot yet be circumvented.

### **Kaieteur Falls**

The flat jungle floor had given way to hills that grew more rugged as the plane roared through a valley that tapered into a long canyon. We slipped round a bluff and below, just ahead, was the white column of Kaieteur Falls, their iodine-coloured water sliding over the rim and turning to gleaming spray as it took the long plunge to the bottom, a distance "three times the height of Niagara". Visitors travel overland from the coast to see this magnificent sight, but the approach by a plane that circles low overhead as ours did provides a splendid view and is more comfortable.

From the falls, it is not a very long run southwest to the Brazilian border. I mused on the legends of Sir Walter Raleigh's "Eldorado", which has been located near Lake Amuku but has never yet been found. As the plane prepared to land at Orinduik, my interest was caught by the dry clay landing-strip between adobe houses thatched with palm leaves. The little crowd that greeted



*The airstrip at Orinduik, at the northern edge of the Rupununi savannah, usually the first stop for travellers coming by air to the territory from Georgetown.*

us was mostly Amerindian, for this village is at the northern end of the Rupununi district. Observing the appearance of the boys who came to help unload the plane, I thought it would be interesting to drop one of them into a family group on an Eastern Canada reservation to see whether a Maliseet mother could tell him from her own children.

### **Transfer for Lethem**

We were to transfer here to a three-passenger *Piper Cub* missionary plane, which would take us to five Amerindian villages in the northern savannah and put us down at our future base, Lethem, by nightfall. The *Cub* soon appeared and a long-legged American unwound himself from the cockpit. He is employed by a missionary aviation organization in the United States that provides planes and recruits pilots for the use of various evangelical denominations who work in trackless countries. The year before, I had seen this dedicated system at work in Kotabaru, West Irian.

As we took to the air, I could hear a woman's voice sounding in the earphones of the pilot beside me. When I called "Who is that?", he shouted back "My wife!" I shouted: "It's good to be able to have your wife talk to you up here!" and he replied "Yeah, and here I can always cut her off!" Later we met his wife, who acted as the entire land-crew for his plane at its base.

It wasn't long before we landed on a natural air-strip along a smooth ridge where we were greeted by the headmaster and two senior students from the school in Kurukabaru, three miles away across the hills. We walked there hurriedly, for we were late, but we were warmly welcomed by the entire population drawn up in a half-circle — men at the rear, then women with youngsters by the hand, at the breast or in slings. The older children had assembled at the front, as a school half-holiday had been declared. They all looked strong and cheerful. Those over 20 spoke little English, and when the chief (or "captain", as the elected head of the village is called here) told us how pleased they were to see us, and the officials and I responded, a schoolboy translated. In gentle, earnest phrases we were told that the help these villagers wanted was mainly improvements for their communal farms, their water supply and their simple health facilities. They also needed better teaching aids and equipment.

Acting on these recommendations, the Canadian External Aid programme is now providing villages such as this with agricultural extension consultants, mobile well-drilling rigs and some medical equipment.

### **A Native Village**

We were taken on a tour of the village. It might be expected that the heat less than five degrees north of the equator would be oppressive, but it is not, for there is nearly always a strong breeze and the earthen walls and thatched roofs provide insulation. Inside the houses hammocks are slung for the family; the

simple cooking is done outdoors over an open wood fire sheltered by a roof. The food being prepared was cassava bread, cooked like an oversized New Brunswick buckwheat pancake and placed on the thatched roof in the sun to mature before being eaten.

Of equal simplicity was the school, a building of the same type as the others in the village. No partitions separate the four classes of about 100 pupils each; instead, each group faces its teacher in a different direction. The children are crowded together on long benches with no desk in front of them. In the absence of aids, blackboards, textbooks and notebooks, teaching is carried on by recitation and repetition. The teachers are all of Guyanese races other than Amerindian.

### **The Village Priest**


The Catholic Church is responsible for the spiritual welfare of Kurukabaru, as for that of over half the Rupununi villages. We called on the priest in charge, and were impressed by the facilities his parishioners had devised for his work and comfort. The lush garden compound surrounding his house on an otherwise arid knoll took us by surprise. When we asked how he did it, he replied: "Dig your holes, chuck in some cow and/or donkey manure, slosh water in the holes, plant your stuff, keep it watered in the dry season, and there you are!" The result was a good crop of citrus fruits, pawpaws, bananas and vegetables. Fortunately, the single well, the only water supply for a large area, was close by for irrigation purposes.

Though we were becoming very hungry, we could not accept hospitality here since a meal was awaiting us at Paramakatoi, the next village on our itinerary. As we walked back to the plane, accompanied by the headmaster, we speculated whether would-be "do-gooders" should not be content to provide the Amerindians with such fundamental improvements as better food, health and education, and refrain from introducing them too quickly to the pressures of mechanized living. However, we had days ahead of us, at many more villages, during which we should be able to ponder and discuss these matters.

The rest of the day was spent at Paramakatoi, where the minister's wife gave us a good meal, at Karasabai and at Annai. Finally, just as dark was falling, we arrived at Lethem, where we spent the night. From there, during the next few days, we visited half a dozen other villages by *Cub* and *Land Rover*, and came to hold their cheerful folk in high regard.

### **A Second Tour**

Some eight months later I covered part of this route again as one of a group that included the Parliamentary Secretary for Amerindian Affairs, a number of other officials and a Canadian expert on Canadian Indian administration, as well as the wife of the United Nations Resident Representative and my own wife. This second trip had as its sequel a visit to the home of the Wai-Wai at the



very southern tip of Guyana, at the Kanashen mission (Kanashen means "God loves you").

In two small planes chartered from the missionaries, we were flown over the southern jungle, which resembles what we had seen farther north, and settled down among the hills on a short runway the Wai-Wais had cut and levelled at their village.

The missionaries and the whole population of the village turned out. The people are gay, carefree and enthusiastic. In physique they are magnificent and in personality vivacious. While a few of the men wore shorts only, and women, skirts only, the majority of both sexes wore a loin cloth of beads with sundry ornaments on head, arms and legs, while children under 12 were as nature had

made them, completely relaxed and unselfconscious. But it must be recorded that amongst these — perhaps freer from the gadgetry and the worries of civilization than any other people — the male members of the family provide most of the glamour. Their coarse, thick black hair, well greased, is arranged in front in bangs cut square just above the eyebrow; behind, it is allowed to grow long and is braided into pigtails, at the end of which is fastened a great array of multi-coloured feathers. If the back hair is too short, it is tied into a short donkey-tail and a piece of bamboo is attached to it, which hangs down the back as an imitation pigtail, with clusters of feathers at the end. At the neck, upper arms, wrists and waist, and above the calves and ankles, the boys wear improvised ornaments of many colours and shapes, of beads, bones, stones and salvaged hardware. The areas not so adorned, including the face, are gorgeous with painted designs. All this causes the gentlemen to preen themselves and strut like peacocks. The ladies, on the other hand — while many are comely and obviously take pains to add to their charms — use fewer ornaments and body painting than their lords and masters.

The children look vigorous and jovial, and seek to make friends at once. Nowhere among them are there signs of malnutrition. Their elementary education is provided by the four missionaries at the village.

There did not seem to be any work going on in or near the village, but there was evidence of labour performed by hand with primitive tools. The church was a fine circular structure built by the villagers. The weaving of the palm-leaf thatch for the roof, the long, straight pole-rafters, the beams and posts, were all tied solidly with thongs. The wall was made of split saplings likewise tied together, and to the cross-braces, by thongs.

### **A Gift of Wheelbarrows**

The villagers themselves had done the clearing and levelling of their sole link with the outside world, the short air-strip. The visiting officials asked the headman to assemble his counsellors. When that was done, the usual speeches were made and translated. Then there was more detailed talk, during which the members of the council were encouraged to discuss their needs. One got the impression that they could not think of anything to ask for from the world of gadgets, until the very end, when they said they would like a few wheelbarrows. When they were asked what for, they explained that they wanted to extend the landing field to make it safer for planes. (Some time after this, the first of the wheelbarrows, an all-steel structure brightly decorated by my wife, was sent to the village with Canada's compliments.)

The missionaries had arranged a delicious midday meal for us, which included lemonade made from local fruit, bush hog, large yellow plantains and yams, excellent cassava bread, fruit and tea. On one side of building was a large bay overlooking the tables at which we were seated. This soon became full of adult villagers, who stood watching us during the entire meal. Far from

being worried by the sight of so many visitors eating their food, they seemed to be having a fine time, giggling and pointing as though they were exchanging ribald comments on the hungry outlanders.

Our call had to be brief, for the authorities quite properly discourage visitors from coming too often or staying too long. But before we left we were able to examine the village handicrafts and to buy some of them. Many of the handmade baskets, combs, graters, warishes, bows and arrows, pottery bowls, bead aprons, arm-bands, feather crowns and body ornaments of other kinds displayed great originality and a high standard of workmanship.

We knew we must leave well before dark, because, though the little planes could land their five-passenger loads safely, the runway was so short that they could not climb above the trees during take-off. Passengers were therefore flown in relays to a longer landing field (Gunn's Strip), where they were left while the planes returned for the rest. At length all had been picked up and we were on our way back to Lethem.

We came away convinced that, with better education, health and food, and with productive employment outside the reservations, the Amerindians, the primitive Wai-Wai villagers of Kanashen as well as the relatively sophisticated inhabitants of places such as Kurukabaru, would play an important part in the development of Guyana.

## Canadian Teachers Throughout the World

CANADA has more teachers abroad at present under its various aid programmes than ever before. For the academic year 1965-66, there are 534 teachers and university staff assigned to 48 overseas jurisdictions. Six years ago there were only 16 teachers serving abroad, compared to 432 today.

Of these, 173 are teaching mathematics and science, 153 languages, 27 technical subjects and 79 general subjects. More than a third of the total number are teacher-trainers. The largest number comes from Quebec (124); from Ontario there are 116, from British Columbia 49 and from Alberta 43.


There are now 65 Canadian teachers and university staff in Nigeria and 60 in Ghana, out of a total of 223 in the Commonwealth countries of Africa. There are 154 serving in the French-speaking African countries and 11 in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. In the Colombo Plan countries of Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand there are 57 Canadian teachers and university staff. There are 87 in the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean and two in Samoa.



*During a recent visit to Jamaica, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Paul Martin, met a number of Canadian teachers and advisers working in Jamaican schools under Canada's external aid programme. The Minister is shown in this photograph with members of the group: Front row (left to right), Mr. John Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy, Mrs. Gesy, Mrs. Webb, Mrs. Gregory, Mr. R. Harry Jay (Canadian High Commissioner to Jamaica), Mrs. French, Mr. Martin, Mrs. Malcolm, Mrs. Ramsay, Mr. J. E. Webb, Mrs. Stanford; Back row (left to right), Mr. G. J. Fox, Mr. A. Felso, Mr. Ramsay (who is serving with the International YMCA), Mr. P. E. Gregory, Mr. G. C. Gesy, Mr. F. C. French, Mr. A. E. Goranson, Mr. K. E. Malcolm, Mr. J. S. Stanford (Second Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada).*



## CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN VIETNAM



*Mr. Victor C. Moore, the new Canadian Commissioner on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, pays his first call on the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, Air Vice-Marshals Nguyen Cao Ky, in Saigon (January 7, 1966).*



*Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam receives Mr. Chester A. Ronning, Special Representative of the Canadian Government (left), and Mr. Victor C. Moore, the Canadian Commissioner in Vietnam (right), in Hanoi on March 10, 1966. Mr. Moore had paid his initial call on the Prime Minister and other representatives of the Government of North Vietnam during an earlier visit to the North Vietnamese capital.*

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Canada-U.S. Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs**

*The following report was made to the House of Commons on March 7 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin:*

The House will recall that, early in February, the Prime Minister announced plans for the tenth meeting of the Joint Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. This meeting took place last Friday and Saturday in Washington. With the co-operation of the House, it was possible for me and my colleagues the Ministers of Trade and Commerce, Finance, Industry, Mines and Technical Surveys and Agriculture, together with the Governor of the Bank of Canada, to meet with a United States delegation led by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and including Secretaries Fowler, Connor and Freeman . . .

The communiqué records the nature of the discussions and agreement reached on a number of subjects of concern to Canadians and of great significance for Canadian-United States relations. Naturally, a document of this kind cannot do full justice to the spirit of understanding and friendship in which the meetings took place, nor to the fullness and vigour of the exchange of views we had on a wide range of subjects of common interest, both in the meetings and on the various other occasions which provided me and my colleagues with opportunities for private and less formal discussion with our United States counterparts.

May I draw the attention of the House to the references in the communiqué to three of the specific subjects which we raised at the meetings: the United States balance-of-payments programme; the proposed SEC regulations on "over-the-counter trading in securities"; and the United States foreign assets controls which affect trade with countries such as Communist China and Cuba.

We reiterated in some detail our views on the implications for Canada of the United States guide-lines regarding direct investment as they have been commonly understood, and our objections to them. The United States response made it clear that there is no thought that these guide-lines given to their corporations should lead to companies in Canada being requested to operate other than in accordance with their normal commercial objectives.

The United States Secretaries explicitly recognized that companies in Canada should be governed by Canadian national interest as good citizens of this country. As the communiqué states:

The Committee discussed the balance of payments of both countries. They recognized that decisive progress had been made toward reducing the United States balance-of-payments deficit and reviewed measures being taken to bring the U.S. external accounts into balance. In this connection, the Committee noted measures that have been taken to maintain access to the U.S. capital market for an unlimited amount of new Canadian securities free of interest

equalization tax. The United States members reaffirmed that in buying such issues U.S. investors were completely free to be guided by market considerations.

For our part, we expressed our concern over the possible implications for Canada of the United States voluntary programme on direct investment and the relation of this programme to the position of Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The United States members made clear that the U.S. Government was not requesting U.S. corporations to induce their Canadian subsidiaries to act in any way that differed from their normal business practices as regards the repatriation of earnings, purchasing and sales policies, or their other financial and commercial activities. The United States members re-emphasized the view that U.S. subsidiaries abroad should behave as good citizens of the country where they are located.

Secretary Rusk later confirmed to the press that we had tried to resolve, and he thought succeeded in resolving, "any misunderstanding or differences of approach on this problem as between our two countries". The communiqué, moreover, records the agreement reached that the United States Government would ensure that any misunderstandings on the part of United States companies as to the Government's views would be dispelled.

Turning now to the SEC problem, we put forward the strong Canadian views on the proposed regulations as an intrusion into our sovereignty. Responsibility for securities and exchange matters in the United States rests with a quasi-judicial body, but the Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Emmanuel Cohen, was present for this part of the Joint Committee's discussion, and the communiqué records that:

The United States members appreciated the concern of the Government of Canada and assured Canadian members that most careful consideration would be given to Canadian views in an effort to work out at an early date mutually satisfactory arrangements.

There was also a thorough and useful discussion of United States foreign-assets controls, which have on occasion created serious difficulty for Canadian companies trading with such countries as Communist China and Cuba. As the communiqué states:

The United States members reaffirmed their readiness to consult promptly on any transactions of importance to Canada which are affected by United States foreign-assets control. They also stated that regulations over exports of technical data are being revised and that, in the light of the Committee's discussions, further consideration will be given to the possibilities of additional modifications to these regulations.

On all these major subjects I consider that the results achieved are very substantial. The Government is confident that, on the basis of the understandings reached, experience will confirm our judgment that the problems which were threatening have been effectively dealt with.

The Joint Committee also discussed a wide variety of other matters of common interest to our two countries. In particular we reviewed the "Kennedy round" negotiations in Geneva and agreed on the importance of their timely

and successful conclusion; we agreed to continue to work closely together towards this objective.

In addition to dealing with these matters of general concern, the Committee also discussed a number of questions of great practical interest to different sectors of our economy, including the progress which has been achieved under the automotive agreement, Canadian exports of cheese and oil to the United States and trade in agricultural equipment, tractors and aircraft between the two countries, the problem of water pollution in the Great Lakes and the food aid programmes of our two countries, notably in the light of the current Indian food situation.

Finally, I had several opportunities to review a wide range of international problems with Secretary Rusk. One that I might mention here is Vietnam. Secretary Rusk made it amply clear that he recognizes and appreciates the obligations and commitments we have assumed as a member of the International Control Commission and that he hoped we would continue in this capacity to make such contributions as we can towards a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. At no time did Secretary Rusk press for any contribution other than that which the Canadian Government decides in the light of these responsibilities.

This was the tenth meeting of the Joint Committee. I am sure that Honourable Members on the other side who have participated in the past recognize how useful these meetings can be and I would say that this particular session has been the most constructive and fruitful of the three meetings in which I have had the privilege of taking part.

In taking my seat, I want to thank my colleagues for their co-operation on the Canadian delegation.

### **Canadian Participation in Cyprus Force**

*On March 17, to an inquiry whether Canada had been consulted before the decision by the United Nations Security Council to extend by three months the term of the UN Peace Force in Cyprus and whether, if such consultation had not taken place, "the Canadian Government indicated its willingness to continue this vital but expensive operation", Mr. Martin replied as follows: ... Yesterday the Security Council did renew the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a period of three months, from March 27 to June 26, and the Government decided this morning that Canada would continue to participate in that Force.*

The resolution of the Security Council expressed the hope that the parties would make every effort to find a solution to this problem, which has been before the United Nations since March 1964. The Governments of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, in acknowledging with appreciation the decision of the Security Council to renew the mandate, have indicated their determination to do all they can to find a solution.

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- International Joint Commission semi-annual meeting: Washington, April 5-8  
World Health Organization, nineteenth assembly: Geneva, May 3-20  
Commonwealth Trade Ministers' Conference: London, May 16-20  
Universal Postal Union, Executive Board: Berne, May 17-28  
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, Geneva, May 16-24  
UNICEF, Executive Board: Addis Ababa, May 9-28  
Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting: Ottawa, June  
NATO Ministerial Meeting: Paris, June  
International Labour Organization, fiftieth conference: Geneva, June 1-23  
Governing Council of UN Development Programme, second session: New York, June 14-27  
World Land Reform Conference: Rome, June 20 - July 2

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## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. Ross Campbell, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, accredited as Ambassador to Algeria, effective November 12, 1965.
- Mr. A. R. Wright posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Lagos, to Kuala Lumpur, effective February 12, 1966.
- Mr. H. E. Gilmour, High Commissioner for Canada in Trinidad and Tobago, posted to Ottawa, February 14, 1966.
- Mr. S. Cloutier posted from the Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé, to Ottawa, effective February 14, 1966.
- Mr. J. M. Roberts resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective February 18, 1966.
- Mr. P. R. Jennings posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, effective February 25, 1966.
- Mr. J. W. Gilbert posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Georgetown, to Ottawa, effective February 27, 1966.
- Mr. L. M. Berry posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Military Mission, Berlin, effective March 2, 1966.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Action

#### Bilateral

##### Sweden

Supplementary Agreement modifying the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Royal Government of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation and the establishment of rules for fiscal assistance in the matter of income tax.

Done at Ottawa on April 6, 1951.

Signed at Stockholm January 21, 1966.

##### United Nations

Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United Nations concerning certain matters relating to Canadian participation in the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus.

New York, February 21, 1966.

Entered into force February 21, 1966.

Deemed to have been effective from March 10, 1964.

##### United States of America

Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America.

Signed at Ottawa January 17, 1966.

Entered into force January 17, 1966.

### Publication

*Canada Treaty Series 1964 No. 26.* Protocol amending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals. Done at Washington October 8, 1963. Entered into force April 10, 1964.

*Canada Treaty Series 1964 No. 29.* Protocol to amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air. Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered into force for Canada July 17, 1964.

*Canada Treaty Series 1964 No. 30.* Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1953. Done at New York March 30, 1954. Entered into force December 13, 1964.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# Canada and North Vietnam

## AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

*On January 24, 1966, President Ho Chi Minh of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) wrote to Prime Minister Pearson about the situation in Vietnam. This letter was tabled in the House of Commons on February 9. Mr. Pearson's reply, dated February 28, was delivered by Mr. Chester Ronning when he subsequently visited Hanoi as a special representative of the Canadian Government. The text of this reply was tabled by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, at a meeting of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs on April 4.*

*The texts of the two letters follow:*

### **President Ho Chi Minh to Prime Minister Pearson**

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to call your attention to the war of aggression waged by U.S.A. imperialists in our country, Vietnam.

As is known to you, over the past 11 years and more, the U.S.A. has been seriously sabotaging the 1954 Geneva Agreement and preventing the peaceful reunification of Vietnam in an attempt to turn South Vietnam into a U.S.A. new-type colony and military base. It is now waging a war of aggression and barbarously repressing the patriotic struggle of our fellow countrymen in the South. At the same time, it tries to draw experience from this war to repress the national liberation movement in other countries.

In an endeavour to get out of the quagmire in South Vietnam, the U.S.A. imperialists have massively increased the strength of the U.S.A. expeditionary corps and sent in troops from a number of their satellites to wage direct aggression in South Vietnam. They have also launched air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country, and a member of the Socialist camp.

While intensifying and extending the war of aggression in Vietnam, the U.S.A. imperialists are clamouring about their "desire for peace" and their "readiness to engage in unconditional discussions", in the hope of fooling world public opinion and the American people. Recently, the Johnson administration has initiated a so-called "search for peace", and put forward a 14-point proposal. As an excuse for its war of aggression in South Vietnam, it claims that it is "keeping its commitment" to Saigon, a puppet administration; it slanders the patriotic struggle of the people of South Vietnam, calling it "an aggression by



North Vietnam". This deceitful contention can in no way rule out the solemn declaration made by the U.S.A. in Geneva in 1954 that "it will refrain from the threat of the use of force to disturb them, that is the Geneva agreements" (And many other countries which are concerned about the Vietnam situation.)<sup>(1)</sup> Still less can President Johnson's hypocritical allegations conceal U.S.A. crimes in Vietnam.

The U.S.A. talks about respecting the Geneva Agreements. But one of the main provisions of the said agreements bans the introduction of foreign troops into Vietnam. If the U.S.A. really respects the Agreements, it must withdraw all U.S.A. and satellite troops from South Vietnam.

It is crystal clear that the U.S.A. is the aggressor who is trampling under foot the Vietnamese soil. The people of South Vietnam are the victims of aggression and are fighting in self defence. If the U.S.A. really wants peace, it must recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam, and engage in negotiations with it. In accordance with the aspirations of the people of South Vietnam and the spirit of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, the National Front for Liberation is fighting to achieve independence, democracy, peace and neutrality in South Vietnam, and to advance towards the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. If the U.S.A. really respects the right to self-determination of the people of South Vietnam, it cannot but approve this correct programme of the National Liberation Front.

The 14 points of the U.S.A. boil down to this: the U.S.A. is trying hard to cling to South Vietnam, to maintain there the puppet administration rigged up by it, and to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam.

In his January 12 message read before the U.S.A. Congress, President Johnson affirmed that it was the policy of the U.S.A. not to pull out of South Vietnam, and he forced the Vietnamese people to choose between "peace and the ravages of conflict". That is an impudent threat, an attempt to impose on the Vietnamese people the conditions of the so-called U.S.A. "unconditional discussions".

The Vietnamese people will never submit to the U.S.A. imperialists' threats.

At the very moment when the U.S.A. Government puts forward the so-called "peace efforts", it is frantically increasing U.S.A. strength in South Vietnam. It is stepping up the terrorist raids, resorting to the "scorched earth" policy, burning all, destroying all, using napalm bombs, poison gas, and toxic chemicals to burn down villages and massacre the civilian population in vast areas of South Vietnam.

I strongly protest against such extremely barbarous methods of warfare. I earnestly call on all peace-loving governments and peoples the world over to resolutely stay the hand of U.S.A. war criminals.

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(1) Sentence in brackets still unverified

The U.S.A. keeps sending its planes on espionage flights in preparation for new air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On the other hand it continues launching air attacks on many areas in the Kingdom of Laos, and multiplying armed provocation against the Democracy of Cambodia thus posing an even more serious menace to peace in Indochina.

Obviously, the U.S.A. "search for peace" is only designed to conceal its schemes for intensified war of aggression. The Johnson administration's stand remains aggression and expansion of the war. To settle the Vietnam question, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has put forward the four-point stand which is an expression of the essential provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. This is a stand of peace.

Having gone through over 20 years of war, the Vietnamese people desire peace more eagerly than anyone else to build their life. But real peace can by no means be dissociated from genuine independence. So long as the U.S.A. army of aggression still remains on our soil, our people will resolutely fight against it. If the U.S.A. really wants a peaceful settlement, it must accept the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and prove this by actual deeds; it must end unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and open war acts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Only in this way can a political solution to the Vietnam problem be envisaged. Your Excellency, Canada is a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control for the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. In face of the extremely serious situation brought about by the U.S.A. in Vietnam, I hope that your Government will fulfill its obligation under the Geneva Agreements.

### **Prime Minister Pearson to President Ho Chi Minh**

Dear Mr. President,

I have read with interest your letter of January 24, which was addressed to Canada as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

You will not expect me to share the interpretation of the nature of the problem in Vietnam and the origins of the present conflict which is set forth in your letter. I do not believe, however, that it would serve any useful purpose at this time to dwell on our differences, other than to note that they exist.

What concerns me, as it does the people of Canada, is the tragic toll in human suffering and the threat to international peace which the continuation of the conflict in Vietnam involves.

I am convinced that the use of force is not an acceptable means of attaining political objectives in the world as it is constituted today. That is why Canada has urged all parties to the conflict in Vietnam to pursue a course of

negotiation. It is in this direction that we see the prospects of a fair and lasting settlement, which will take account of the freely expressed aspirations of all the people of Vietnam.

For these reasons I have been deeply disappointed by the failure so far of all efforts to promote unconditional discussions on Vietnam. I have carefully studied the positions which have been put forward by the main parties to the conflict. While these positions are still very far apart, I believe that they show some common elements on which a foundation of peace can be built.

It is not for Canada to prescribe to the Vietnamese people how they shall order their political life and institutions. That is for the people of Vietnam themselves to decide freely when the time comes. But the present course of developments in Vietnam is a source of legitimate concern to the international community and it is my firm hope that it can be reversed before all avenues to a peaceful settlement are closed.

In your letter you refer to the obligations which the members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control have in the serious current situation in Vietnam. As a member of that Commission, Canada has at all times endeavoured to carry out its obligations in a spirit of objectivity and impartiality towards the facts as we know them. I can assure you that we will continue to do so to the best of our capacity.

I also hope that the International Commission may be able to play some part in helping to restore peace in Vietnam. It seems to me that, by virtue of its long association with the problem and the advantage of access it has to all the parties to the present conflict, the Commission is in a unique position to play such a part. As far as my Government is concerned, it is prepared to explore all possibilities that may be open to the Commission in present circumstances to exert its efforts in the direction of peace.

Yours sincerely,  
Lester B. Pearson.

## *Recent Developments in Vietnam*

STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ON APRIL 4, 1966, BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN:<sup>(1)</sup>

WHEN I CAME before the Committee on June 10, 1965, I gave a detailed account of the developments which had led up to the situation at that time in Vietnam. I said I thought it was difficult to form a judgment of that situation without examining in its proper historical perspective the problem in Vietnam. I believe the situation is no less true today than it was a little less than a year ago. I know there are interpretations other than that which the Canadian Government has placed on the course of events in Vietnam. Indeed, a great deal of the discussion and dissent which have developed in relation to Vietnam have focused on the history of the conflict itself. I think, however, that no useful purpose would be served by going again over the ground which we covered last year; but, in that context, I wish to make two comments.

First, I should like to remind the Committee that, while there are differences over the antecedents of the present conflict in Vietnam, the assessment which the Government has formed on this subject is an independent assessment resting on a long record of first-hand Canadian experience in Indochina. Secondly, if our foreign policy is to have any impact on the present situation, I believe we must now cast our thinking forward rather than backward. I also believe we are unlikely to achieve anything useful by a policy of denunciation, which is sometimes being urged on the Government by those who take issue with our position.

What we must do is to map out a course which we regard as right and realistic, which takes account of the facts as we know them and which has some prospect of contributing to a peaceful settlement. And this is what we have been trying to do.

There is one matter with which I should like to deal before giving the Committee some indication of recent development in the Vietnam situation. This is the matter of Canadian participation in the International Commission in Vietnam.

Members of the Committee will recall that this was the only issue on which the House divided when the estimates of the Department of External Affairs were considered on February 8. I do not pretend — and I do not suppose anyone would pretend — that the Commission is in a position, in present circumstances, to do justice to the mandate with which it was charged

<sup>(1)</sup> Mr. Martin's statements to the Standing Committee on the same day concerning NATO and Rhodesia will be found in "External Affairs in Parliament", Page 218.

by the Geneva powers in 1954. That is not in any way the fault of the Commission, which was set up to supervise a cease-fire and not to control an armed conflict. Nevertheless, there are — and there will continue to be — a number of good reasons for maintaining the Commission's presence in Vietnam. Some of these reasons I shall be prepared to deal with in interrogation; some of them I shall not be able to discuss.

### **Reasons for Maintaining Commission**

First, none of the interested parties has at any time suggested that the International Commission be withdrawn or its mandate cancelled. Not even the Chinese People's Republic has made this suggestion. On the contrary, it has been confirmed to us within recent weeks both by the Secretary of State of the United States and by senior personalities of the Government of North Vietnam that they attach importance to a continued Commission presence in Vietnam. Indeed, the Committee might be interested to know that, when Victor Moore, our new Commissioner on the Control Commission, made his introductory calls in Hanoi about three and a half weeks ago, it was represented to him that the North Vietnamese Government would like to see the Commission hold more of its meetings in Hanoi than has been the case in recent years. I understand this matter has since been discussed among the Commissioners and that there appears to be general agreement to act on the North Vietnamese suggestion.

I think this would be a good decision, and it would not be establishing a precedent. The Commission at another period has spent more time in Hanoi than it has during the past few years, so there would be no precedent involved in spending a longer period in Hanoi.

Secondly, both North and South Vietnam continue to look to the Commission to consider and adjudicate their charges of violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement. While there can be legitimate argument over the usefulness of such a procedure in circumstances where the prospects of remedial action are limited, the fact is that the parties do attach importance to this function of the Commission and to the public presentation which the Commission is able to make on the basis of its investigations of breaches of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

### **Only Instrument of Geneva Settlement**

Thirdly, if members of the Committee examine the Cease-Fire Agreement which was concluded in Geneva in 1954, they will find that the Commission is, in fact, the only tangible instrument of the Geneva settlement as it affects Vietnam. Even if we were to consider, therefore, that the Commission's presence in Vietnam in present circumstances is of largely symbolic significance, we cannot, I think, discount the importance of the Commission as a reflection of the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in a situation which engages their international responsibilities. . . .

I think it is fair to say that the elimination of the Commission from the

Vietnam scene in present circumstances would only serve to complicate what is already a situation which is fraught with serious risks for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fourthly, we have always thought it right to keep open the possibility that the Commission might be able, in the right circumstances, to make a positive contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue. I think I can say to the Committee, without exaggeration, that this possibility has played an increasing part in our thinking about the Vietnam conflict. I am satisfied that we should be ill-advised at this stage to discard an instrument which may yet have a part to play in bringing this issue from the battlefield to the conference table. I am strengthened in this view by the attitude taken by a number of parties concerned and by the strong position taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

### **Pause in Bombing of the North**

I now shall turn to some recent developments in the Vietnam situation. I should like to say something about the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam which began on Christmas Eve and continued for 37 days until the end of January. The position of the Canadian Government for some time previously had been that such a pause could represent a useful opening for a peaceful solution of the Vietnam issue. It was with this consideration in mind that the Prime Minister had suggested the possibility of a pause in April of last year. The pause which took place in the following months was short-lived and did not produce the result for which we had hoped. When a further pause was initiated by the United States in late December, we welcomed this as a genuine contribution to peace and we did what we could, through diplomatic channels, to reinforce the many efforts that then were being made to turn it to good account.

I do not intend to recapitulate those efforts, except to say it was a matter of disappointment to us that the prospect of some break in the situation, which the pause might have offered, did not materialize. Nevertheless, we took the view throughout the pause that we hoped it might be extended until all reasonable possibilities of eliciting some response from the other side had been exhausted.

Toward the end of the bombing pause, the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam addressed a series of letters to other governments, including the Government of Canada. We have studied President Ho Chi Minh's letter with the greatest care and consideration to see, in particular, if it offered any hope of reversal of the present grave situation in Vietnam. While it did not appear to us that there were, in fact, new elements in that letter, we nevertheless felt it provided a basis on which in time it might be possible to explore the position of the North Vietnamese Government in greater detail.

### **Special Representative to Hanoi**

That is one reason we decided that the time might be opportune to send a special representative of the Canadian Government to Hanoi to present the Canadian reply and, at the same time, to probe the views of the North Vietnamese Government on the prospects for a settlement of the Vietnam issue through other than military means. . . .

Perhaps I should say we did not think it profitable at this stage to enter into a controversy with President Ho Chi Minh over the interpretation of events in Vietnam which was contained in his letter. Rather, we availed ourselves of this opportunity to re-state the Canadian view that there could be no lasting solution of the present conflict other than through negotiations and to suggest, at the same time, that there might be a contribution which the members of the International Control Commission in Vietnam could make to that end.

The Vietnam question was placed before the Security Council at the beginning of February. There has been a good deal of discussion about the wisdom of this step, with particular reference to its timing after the bombing of North Vietnam had been resumed. As far as this Government is concerned our position on this matter has remained unchanged. I said in the General Assembly last fall that the United Nations was the place, or one of the places, where the question of Vietnam should certainly be discussed. We have been aware, of course, that the prospect of the United Nations playing a direct part in relation to the Vietnam issue in present circumstances was very limited. This is not only because three of the principal parties to the Vietnam conflict are not members of the United Nations but also because there has been a reluctance on the part of some countries to have brought before the United Nations an issue such as this which directly engages the interests of the great powers.

### **Security Council Role**

Nevertheless, it would have been entirely inconsistent with Canadian attitudes and policies to deny, as I say, the right of the United Nations to pronounce itself on an issue which involves the maintenance of international peace and security perhaps more than any other issue at the present time. In our view, the provisions of the Charter in this matter are clear. It is regrettable that the Security Council should not have taken the opportunity of at least recommending to the parties that they seek a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict through the machinery for which they themselves have expressed a clear preference — that is to say, the machinery created in Geneva in 1954.

The inability of the Security Council to deal with this issue has reinforced the judgment which we had formed some time ago, and which was in my mind when the debate in the House of Commons took place in February, that we should look to the International Commission in Vietnam to see whether, in the right circumstances, there was not a role which it could play toward bringing about a peaceful settlement of the issue there. This is the direction in which

our thinking has been tending since last December, and it is to this aspect of the Vietnam problem that I want to turn.

### **Role of Commission**

The first question that arises is why it should be thought that the International Commission might be able to make a positive contribution to a solution of the Vietnam conflict. The Commission was brought into being by the Geneva Conference of 1954. We have served on that Commission since that time, along with India and Poland and, as well, we have served on the comparable Commissions in Cambodia and Laos. In a sense, the Commission may be said to represent the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in the Vietnam situation. It is now clear that, when the time comes, any negotiation of the Vietnam conflict is likely to be conducted within the Geneva frame of reference. It is natural, therefore, to think of the Commission as an instrument which might be brought into play in preparing the ground for eventual negotiation.

The question has been raised in our contacts with interested governments: whether there is anything in the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement which confers on the Commission a mandate on the lines we have been considering. I must say that on a strictly legal interpretation of that Agreement the answer must be in the negative. But I do not think anyone who is concerned about the course of developments in Vietnam would feel justified in looking at this issue only in legalistic terms. We have never looked at it that way. We have never thought of the Commission as possessing a role purely on the basis of powers extended to it under the Geneva Agreement of 1954; nor, on the other hand, are we thinking of any fresh mandate being conferred on the Commission, either by the Geneva powers acting collectively or by the Soviet Union and Britain acting jointly in their capacities as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.

### **Good Offices Idea**

We have informed the Soviet Union, we have informed the United Kingdom Government, we have informed other governments of our views as to the role that the Commission might assume, but we have not thought it was necessary to get their authority for making our suggestion. What we have had in mind is something modest and informal; we continue to believe, however, that our proposal has potential merit. Our proposal was really in the nature of a good-offices assignment which would be undertaken not necessarily by the Commission as such but by the three Commission powers, acting as sovereign nations, which have been associated with the Vietnam problem for the past 11 years and which have established a fair record of co-operation between them. It is our view that the knowledge and experience of the Vietnam problem of the three Commission powers and the ready access they command to all the interested parties would make the Commission powers a particularly suitable group to carry forward the search for peace in Vietnam. This is the common objective of the three members of the Commission.



There have been notable attempts made to try and bring about peaceful negotiation in Vietnam: attempts made by the British, by a good-offices body of the Commonwealth, by individual intermediaries, some publicly known and some not, by concerted action on the part of a group of countries including Canada, action by Canada itself, for instance, in the visit that Mr. Blair Seaborn made in June 1965. But for none of these, other than the visit of Mr. Blair Seaborn, did the mediators know in advance that it would have access both to the Government in Saigon and to the Government in Hanoi. It must not be forgotten in appraising the role of the Commission that it has direct access to both capitals in the two belligerent areas in the regrettably divided country of Vietnam. We have, of course, for some time been supporting in general terms the re-convening of the Geneva Conference. In fact, about a year ago we specifically urged that the Geneva Conference be recalled. Britain herself, as one of the Co-Chairmen, has urged the Geneva powers to meet. Recently the British Prime Minister discussed this matter with Mr. Kosygin when he suggested that they might both agree to calling a Geneva Conference.

### **Conference Not First Step**

However, I should like to make clear that we are not now proposing the calling of a Geneva Conference. We hope the time will come when this will be practicable and possible. I want to make as clear as I can that the proposal we have made for a use of the Commission should not be regarded as an effort to call or persuade the two Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to call an immediate Conference. We are not pressing such a move at this time because we are certain that such a call in present circumstances would not produce results. Also, we do not think that this is the right approach for the Commission powers at this stage. A reconvened Geneva Conference is and remains, of course, the end result of the development we hope to be able to set in train, but it is not the first step. Indeed I should be afraid, if we tried to make it the first step, that we are more likely to exhaust than to establish such influence as we may be able to have with the parties principally concerned in the Vietnam conflict. I have made this clear in talks that I have had with particular parties concerned. Certain propositions have now been put forward on both sides with respect to a settlement of the Vietnam conflict. There are the four points of the Government of Hanoi, the 14 points of the Government of the United States, and the four points of the Government of South Vietnam. In a sense, this represents the beginning of a process of negotiation. But such a process can be carried only so far by way of public pronouncements. The gap between the positions, particularly of the United States and of the Government of North Vietnam, is still very wide and something will have to be done to narrow it. There is also a barrier of distrust and suspicion that will somehow have to be overcome.

It has seemed to us that this is something that could be pursued cautiously and discreetly by the Commission powers. We are not thinking at this stage of

anything other than a good-offices exercise. The object of such an exercise would be to try to bring about conditions in which the parties themselves might find it possible to engage in direct discussions as a prelude to formal negotiation. In essence, therefore, what we have in mind is an unblocking of channels which, in the absence of such action, are likely to continue to remain closed.

### **A Canadian Initiative**

I have already indicated, in general terms, that we have had a series of exchanges about a possible Commission initiative along these lines with India and Poland, who are our partners on the Commission. We have put our position to Britain and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. I have also taken the opportunity personally to discuss the matter with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with Secretary of State Rusk and, through others, with the Government of South Vietnam and the Government of North Vietnam.

Our exchanges with India and Poland must necessarily remain confidential. I think I can say that one common point in their initial reaction had to do with the timing and the circumstances in which any Commission initiative might stand a chance of being acceptable to the parties on the ground. That was one of the considerations we had in mind when we decided to ask Mr. Chester Ronning, a distinguished former member of our Foreign Service, to pay special visits to Saigon and Hanoi early last month. I know that the members of the Committee will not expect me to go into details about his mission, or his future participation. It must appear that this is a significant assignment.

On these visits, he had a full opportunity of discussing with senior personalities in both capitals their views of the present Vietnam situation and the possibility of the Commission powers playing some part in opening up avenues which might ultimately lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. You will appreciate that it would not be helpful for me at this stage to disclose the contents of the discussions which Mr. Ronning had on his visits to Saigon and Hanoi or even the possibilities which they may help to open up. All I should like to say is that the results of these visits have in no way seemed to me to foreclose a Commission role in the right circumstances. In the meantime we are continuing our exchanges with India and Poland in response to their own indications that they would like to see these discussions carried forward.

### **Social and Economic Programme**

Turning to another aspect of the Vietnam problem, the significance of the meeting in Honolulu between U.S. and South Vietnam leaders was that it laid the groundwork for a comprehensive programme of social and economic reform in South Vietnam. All of us recognize, I think, the very great problems which the implementation of a programme of this magnitude poses in any developing country. These problems are bound to be even greater in a context of continuing armed conflict and in circumstances where positive results can so easily be

negated. Nevertheless, we believe that the renewed emphasis that is now being placed on the social and economic aspects of the problem in Vietnam is the right emphasis. It is calculated to contribute to a more stable and progressive society, in which the ordinary Vietnamese may be able to feel that his interests are actively engaged.

Recent developments in South Vietnam have underlined once again what I regard as the crucial problem in that country, which is that of achieving a stable political basis. This is not a problem that is confined to that country; it is a problem in many of the new countries, which lack the resources to meet the mounting aspirations of their people for a better life. But it is aggravated in South Vietnam by the disruption that has been caused by subversion and armed conflict.

### **Danger of False Inference**

It is my understanding that the tenor of much of the current protest in South Vietnam is to the effect that only a broadly-based civilian government will provide a basis on which the South Vietnamese can be expected to take the decisions which are certain to face them in the months and years to come. We must be careful, however, not to draw false inferences from what is currently going on in South Vietnam. In particular, I think it would be wrong to conclude that these manifestations of political dissent are based on support for the conception of a government which was composed of representatives of the Viet Cong or which included their participation. There are many strands to the current dissent in South Vietnam but that, according to the best information available to me, is not one of them.

There is a great deal of public concern in Canada, as in other countries, with the situation in Vietnam. As I interpret this concern, it is based on the risks that are inherent in the present situation and on the desire to see a fair and equitable peace established in an area which has been convulsed by conflict for the past 20 years. We share this concern. As a member of this Commission, with special responsibilities, we have felt that our position was not precisely that of other countries and of other governments. We feel very strongly that, if we are going to reach a settlement in this matter, every instrument that is capable of being used to encourage negotiation must be used.

We are strongly of the view — and we are not without considerable encouragement and support for this view — that the Commission has a role and that we, as a member of that Commission at the present time, have a role, and we are seeking to take advantage of this opportunity to the fullest extent possible.

I want to acknowledge that there have been other proposals made by a number of governments. One of them was a proposal made by His Holiness Pope Paul VI. I told his spokesman, on behalf of the Government of Canada, that his proposal for entrusting to the non-aligned powers the responsibility of

arbitration was one that would receive Canadian support. Unhappily, for practical reasons (and I suppose these included the fact that the offer was not accepted by the other side), the proposal was not realized. But I wish now to acknowledge a note that we have had from the Secretary of the Vatican State, indicating their approval of the Canadian initiative.

I want to acknowledge, as well, the efforts being made by other bodies and other agencies, and I wish to say that Canada is prepared to support any effort that will help to bring about the beginning of negotiations.

## Canada and Bolivia



Colonel Julio Sanjinés Goitia (*left*) and Governor-General Georges P. Vanier at Rideau Hall in Ottawa.

ON MARCH 24, 1966, Bolivia's first Ambassador to Canada, Colonel Julio Sanjinés Goitia, presented his credentials to the Governor General in a ceremony at Rideau Hall. The new Ambassador, who will be resident in Washington, is a 41-year-old career army officer, who attended the United States Military Academy at West Point and is a graduate of the University of Iowa.

Bolivia, the fifth largest country in South America, with an area of 424,162 square miles, is a land of towering mountains, rivers and dense forests. Except for Paraguay, it is the only Latin American country without a coast-line. The population is estimated at close to four million, made up

mainly of three groups: native Indians, Mestizos and those of Spanish descent. The city of Sucre, according to an arrangement made in 1898, remains the official capital of the country; however La Paz, the commercial, industrial and transportation centre of the country, is the seat of the executive and legislative branches of the Government. It is also the world's highest capital, at an altitude of 12,400 feet.

### Historical Outline

The Aymara Indians of Bolivia were conquered by the Incas about the beginning of the thirteenth century and remained under Inca domination until the Spaniards arrived in 1538. In 1559, the region represented by the present Republic of Bolivia was made part of the Vice-Royalty of Peru, with its capital at La Plata, now the city of Sucre. Revolutionary movements beginning early in 1661 and continuing for more than 150 years resulted in a formal declaration of independence in 1825. The declaration was issued by the authority of Simon Bolivar, after whom the new republic was named. As a result of the War of the Pacific, which lasted from 1879 to 1884, Bolivia lost its Pacific coast-line and the port of Antofagasta to Chile. Part of the Chaco was lost to Argentina, and the rubber-rich territory of Acre was annexed by Brazil in 1903. The boundary


# BOLIVIA

Capital City.....(★)

Road.....

Railway.....

100 50 0 100 Miles



between Bolivia and Paraguay was fixed in its present state after the Chaco War of 1931-1935.

From late 1964 until early 1966, the country was governed by a military junta led by the co-Presidents General Ovando Caudia and General René Barrientos Ortuno. However, on January 3, 1966, General Barrientos resigned his co-Presidency, and he has recently declared his candidacy in the presidential elections scheduled for July 3, 1966.

Minerals have always been Bolivia's main source of wealth. In colonial times, silver was the chief export, but tin has now replaced it. However, depletion in accessible veins, combined with the fall in world tin prices and management and labour problems, have resulted in lower levels of production over the past ten years and concomitant losses in export earnings.

### **Trade Relations**

Canada's trade with Bolivia has been conducted since 1935 on the basis of an exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment. While trade between the two countries is not extensive, it is growing. Canadian exports to Bolivia in 1965 had a value of \$1.7 million; in 1964 their value was \$1.0 million and, in 1963, only \$600,000. Imports from Bolivia in 1965 were worth \$400,000; their value in 1964 was \$290,000 and, in 1963, \$100,000. Bolivia's imports from Canada consist mainly of manufactured and pharmaceutical products.


There are some Canadian investments in Bolivia, including the Bolivian Power Company and a subsidiary of the Bata Shoe Company (Manaco), which is the largest in the country. Canadian engineering firms have also engaged in consulting work for the tin mines and oil fields. Canadian missionaries have lived and worked in Bolivia for many years. A commercial school for girls, an Oblate seminary, and a Baptist theological seminary are only a few of the projects under Canadian direction. The Oblate mission, in Cochabamba, was founded in 1952. There is also a small Mennonite community of Canadian origin in the country.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been established since 1961, and the present Canadian Ambassador to Bolivia is Mr. François Xavier Houde, who is also Ambassador to Peru and resides in Lima.

## *Commonwealth Secretary-General Visits Ottawa*

**A**FTER A NUMBER of meetings with Government leaders and officials in Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, paid a formal visit to Ottawa from March 26 to 29, 1966. This was the first visit by Mr. Smith, former Canadian Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to his native land since his appointment in July 1965 as the first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.

During his three-day stopover in Ottawa, Mr. Smith conferred with the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and other ministers and officials concerning current Commonwealth problems and forthcoming meetings of Commonwealth representatives.



*During his recent visit to Ottawa, Mr. Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General (left), talks with Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson at the latter's official residence.*



# *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*

**T**HE THIRD SESSION of the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was held from January 25 to February 17 in New York. The Board is the executive body of the new machinery established after the first general UNCTAD Conference in 1964. Four permanent committees, dealing respectively with commodities, manufactures, invisibles and financing, and shipping, are subordinate to the Board and report to it. Of the 55 members of the Board, all except one (Indonesia) were represented at the third session; there were observers from 45 other governments, 19 Specialized Agencies and intergovernmental organizations and eight non-governmental organizations. The Board elected Mr. José Pinera (Chile) as its President for 1966. The Canadian delegation was led by Mr. J. R. McKinney of the Department of External Affairs, and included representatives from the Departments of Trade and Commerce, Finance and External Affairs.

## **Board Responsibility**

The Trade and Development Board is responsible for reviewing and directing UNCTAD's activities and the work of its Secretariat between sessions of the Conference, which meets every two or three years. At this session, the Board dealt with a lengthy list of agenda, embracing a wide range of the organization's activities but with particular emphasis on financial and monetary questions referred to it by the Invisibles and Financing Committee. It also gave preliminary consideration to plans for the second UNCTAD Conference, to be held next year. Other questions discussed at the session included: the preparation by the Secretary-General, Dr. Raoul Prebisch, of an annual report on international trade and economic development; problems arising in trade relations between countries having different economic and social systems; principles to govern international trade relations and trade policies conducive to development progress towards possible international commodity agreements on cocoa and sugar; and commercial policy problems involved in promoting the expansion of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures of developing countries.

A special session of the Committee on Invisibles and Financing was held simultaneously with the earlier part of the session of the Board from January 27 to February 4. This session had been called to consider a report by a Group of Experts entitled "International Monetary Issues and the Developing Countries". In the course of discussion in the Committee and later in the Board, the representatives of emerging countries strongly asserted their interest in current developments with respect to the possible reform of the international monetary system and the possible creation of new forms of international reserve units.

They maintained that the developing as well as the developed nations had an interest in ensuring adequate international liquidity and that an appropriate opportunity should be provided for the developing countries to bring their views to bear on the monetary issues being discussed by the major industrialized countries. They also expressed interest in exploring possible links between the creation of new international reserves and the provision of development aid. The developed countries, for their part, acknowledged that this interest of the developing countries was legitimate and it was therefore agreed that the report of the Group of Experts, with a record of UNCTAD discussions on this subject, should be referred to the international monetary institutions for their due consideration.

### Plans for Next Session

The site of the second Conference and its provisional agenda will be further considered at the fourth session of the Board, to be held in Geneva from August 30 to September 23, 1966. One of the major tasks of the fourth session will be to organize the preparatory work required for the second Conference, which it was generally agreed should concentrate on a limited number of basic problems.

In the words of the Canadian representative:

... If we look back over the record of the past two years, that is to say since the Geneva Conference of 1964, there can be no doubt at all that a great deal is happening in the world today that would not be happening except for UNCTAD. A wide range of issues relevant to development have been opened up for examination in a way that is unprecedented; UNCTAD was established to tackle these problems in depth and that is what it is doing. The main task in the year ahead is to ensure that some of the important work now under way and some of the important studies now being undertaken "ripen" in time for some results to be apparent at the second UNCTAD Conference next year.

The following is a list of other major UNCTAD meetings taking place in 1966:

- Expert Committee on Expansion of Trade Among Developing Countries and on Regional Development: February 16 - March 7, New York
- Committee on Manufactures, resumed first session: February 28 - March 3, Geneva
- Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade, resumed first session: April 13-20, Geneva
- United Nations Cocoa Conference, second session: May 23 - June 22, New York
- Permanent Sub-Committee on Commodities, first session: June 27 - July 15, Geneva
- Group on Preferences: July 26 - August 12, Geneva
- Committee on Shipping, special session: July 18-22, Geneva

Trade and Development Board, fourth session: August 30 - September 23,  
Geneva

Committee on Commodities, second session: October 4-21, Geneva

Committee on Manufactures, second session: November 1-18, Geneva


Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade, second session:  
November 21 - December 2, Geneva

Committee on Shipping, second session: December 5-16, Geneva

## *Diplomatic Relations with Singapore*

ON MARCH 7, 1966, Mr. B. C. Butler presented his Letter of Commission from Her Majesty the Queen, accrediting him as High Commissioner for Canada, to the President of the Republic of Singapore, thus marking the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Singapore. The Canadian Trade Commissioner's Office that has been in Singapore since 1934 will henceforth be known as the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada. It will normally be in charge of an Acting High Commissioner, for Mr. Butler, who is also High Commissioner to Malaysia and Ambassador to Burma and Thailand, resides in Kuala Lumpur. There are no immediate plans for the accreditation of a Singapore representative to Ottawa. Mr. Butler's accreditation as first High Commissioner to Singapore was of special note, for, over 30 years before, he had established Canada's first trade commissioner's office in Singapore and had spent several years there promoting Canadian trade in Southeast Asia.

When a British trading-post was established on the island of Singapore at the tip of the Malayan peninsula in 1819, it was sparsely inhabited by



*Mr. B. C. Butler, first Canadian High Commissioner in Singapore (centre), presents his Letter of Commission to Tun Yusof bin Ishak, President of the Republic of Singapore (left foreground). Behind Mr. Butler (left to right) are: Mr. F. M. Mulhern, Third Secretary (Commercial), Office of the High Commissioner for Canada; Mr. M. D. Copithorne, First Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner; Mr. J. D. Bailey, Counselor (Commercial) and Acting High Commissioner; and Mr. Anwar Ibrahim, Chief of Protocol for Singapore.*

Malays. Today, its 225 square miles support nearly two million people, mainly of Chinese origin. As a free port, Singapore at once began its phenomenal development as a trading centre for the surrounding territories. Between 1921 and 1938, a major British naval base was built at Singapore, which remains the headquarters of Britain's forces in the Far East. In 1946, the island was detached from the British Straits Settlements and established as a separate Crown colony. It remained a free port and continued to handle much of the trade and the processing of raw material such as rubber and tin from Malaya and neighbouring Indonesia. At the same time, local light-manufacturing industries were developed. A new constitution conferring internal self-government was introduced in 1959.

### **Creation of Malaysia**

In 1961 an understanding was reached between the Malayan and Singapore Governments to seek their merger in a new federation which was also to include the British territories in Borneo. The proposal for federation was welcomed in Singapore as a means of bringing the island to independence and of unifying the peoples of Singapore and the mainland, who had close ties, and for the opportunity it held out to Singapore of a common market with the mainland. In September 1962, a referendum was held in Singapore resulting in a decisive majority in favour of accepting merger with Malaya. The federation proposal was also approved by the legislatures in Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and Sarawak. In July 1963, Britain, the Federation of Malaya, and the British territories signed an agreement for the formation of the new federation, to be known as Malaysia, with its capital at Kuala Lumpur, the capital of the former Federation of Malaya. The new federation came into being on September 16, 1963.

### **Withdrawal of Singapore**

Barely two years later, Singapore separated from Malaysia. Not long after the formation of the federation, differences over financial and social policy between the central government in Kuala Lumpur and the state government of Singapore became evident, and relations became increasingly strained. Mounting tension between the two governments culminated in the announcement by the Malaysian and Singapore Governments on August 9, 1965, of the separation of Singapore from the federation and the establishment of Singapore as an independent state.

Given Singapore's close economic integration with the mainland, its political separation has had important economic implications. The Singapore Government, led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, has stated that its objective must be Singapore's reunification with the mainland but that, in the meantime, it must seek to guard Singapore's prosperity as a separate "city state". Singapore's working population at present enjoys a high standard of living by Asian criteria. While Singapore is likely to remain the commercial centre of Southeast Asia, hopes for a better standard of living for Singapore's rapidly

increasing population are based on somewhat uncertain prospects of Singapore's increased industrialization and of its being able to find new markets overseas for its manufactured products.

The Canadian Government had welcomed the formation of Malaysia as the best means of ending the colonial status of Singapore and the British Borneo territories and of contributing to the economic progress of the area and was therefore disappointed when the Malaysian and Singapore Governments felt it necessary to separate Singapore from the federation. The separation agreement was, of course, accepted by Canada, which was among the first countries to recognize Singapore's independence. Canada also supported Singapore's admission to the Commonwealth, which became effective on October 16, 1965. Canada's interest in Singapore has been largely commercial but, given Singapore's new status as a separate Commonwealth country, Canada's relations with it are expected to become closer and more diversified.

# Kenya

ON APRIL 12, 1966, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, announced the decision of the Canadian Government to establish a resident diplomatic mission in Kenya, which is scheduled to be opened early in 1967. Diplomatic relations were first established between Canada and Kenya in 1964 through the dual accreditation of the Canadian High Commissioner in Tanzania. The present Canadian High Commissioner to Kenya, resident in Dar-es-Salaam, is Mr. Alan McGill.


## Land and People

Kenya is bounded on the North by Ethiopia and the Sudan, on the west by Uganda, on the south by Tanzania and on the east by the Somali Republic and the Indian Ocean. Over half of its total area of 224,960 square miles is desert or semi-desert. The most fertile areas are generally in the southern part of the country, which includes the southwest coastal belt and the "Highlands", which are cut by the great Rift Valley. The latter region contains some of the best agricultural land in Africa and, despite its proximity to the equator, has a cool and invigorating climate. Kenya's greatest concentration of population and of economic production is centered in this part of the country.

The total population of Kenya is about nine million, of which some 95 per cent is African. Nairobi, the capital and largest city, has a population of about 250,000. The largest minority groups are Asian (about 200,000), European (about 40,000) and Arab. The African population is made up of numerous tribes, the largest being the Kikuyu, who comprise nearly 20 per cent of Kenya's Africans. Other important tribes are the Luo, Baluhya, Kamba and Meru. Although the tribes speak many different languages, Swahili is the most widely used. English is also understood by many and is the language of instruction in most schools. The Asians are usually traders or artisans in the urban areas, in particular in Nairobi. The Arabs live mainly on the coastal belt, where they are engaged in Indian Ocean coastal trade. Although, when independence came, some of the European population emigrated, many have remained, as farmers and civil servants and in business and the professions. The Minister of Agriculture of Kenya, Mr. Bruce MacKenzie, is a European.

## Early History

Little is known at present about the early history of the interior of Kenya, beyond the fact that successive migrations of African tribes took place. Along the coast, however, Persian and Arab traders were active from about the seventh century on. Arab control of this area continued until about the end of fifteenth century, when Portuguese involvement began. The Portuguese eventually lost all their possessions along the coast to the Sultan of Zanzibar, who had enforced his sovereignty over the area by 1740.





Towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was increasing and competitive European interest in Africa. British involvement in East Africa began with the establishment of trade links, first with the island of Zanzibar and later with the coast. In 1887, the British East Africa Association obtained a concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar over his mainland territories. In 1895, the Association's responsibilities, which by then included much of the area of what are now Kenya and Uganda, were transferred to the British Government, to become the British East Africa Protectorate. The opening by 1901 of the Mombasa Railway through Kenya to Uganda heralded a new era for the territory by providing the foundation for its modern economic development. The railway also brought the beginning of European settlement on agricultural land in the interior, while the influx of Indian labourers, who came to construct the railway, remained to form the nucleus of the present Asian minority in Kenya. European settlement was encouraged by the British Government and certain areas in the "Highlands" were reserved for their settlement.

### **Political Development**

All members of Kenya's first Legislative Council, which was set up in 1906, were European appointees. Elections were introduced for European unofficial members in 1916 and in 1923 provision was made for the election of Asian members. It was not until 1944 that the first African was appointed to the Legislative Council; this number was increased to four over the next four years. Today, the legislative branch, the National Assembly, consists of a House of Representatives composed of 129 members and a Senate of 41 members; both are elected for five-year terms.

Political progress in Kenya was complicated by the special problems of a multi-racial and multi-tribal society. The outbreak of Mau Mau activities in the early 1950s also hindered the country's political evolution. It was not until the end of the state of emergency in January 1960 that a fresh impetus was given to political development that subsequently resulted in Kenya's independence on December 12, 1963. In the advance to independence, the leadership of President Jomo Kenyatta was not only a driving force but also the most important single symbol of national unity for the population of Kenya. His party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), won a sweeping victory in the May 1963 elections, after which internal self-government was granted by the British. The main opposition party at that time, the Kenya Africa Democratic Union (KADU), was subsequently dissolved and its members joined KANU, in effect creating a one-party situation. Kenya is not, however, a constitutional one-party state and the formation of new parties under the present constitution would not be illegal. On its first anniversary of independence, a further stage in Kenya's political evolution was reached when the country was declared a republic, with Jomo Kenyatta as the first President. The next Parliamentary elections in Kenya are scheduled to take place in the spring of 1968.

### **Proposed East Africa Federation**

Shortly after Kenya achieved internal self-government, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda, President Nyerere of Tanzania and President (then Prime Minister) Kenyatta declared their intention to bring their three countries into a single federation before the end of 1963 — in fact, at the same time as Kenya obtained full independence. Although the federation has not materialized, there is a considerable degree of co-operation among the three countries. During British rule common services were developed under the East African High Commission and, since independence, these services, which include railways, an airline, harbour facilities and post and communications, have been continued as the East Africa Common Services Organization (EACSO). The three countries at present share a common currency, but it is expected that, later this year, separate currencies will be introduced. Since 1927, the three countries have also composed the East African Common Market.

### **Economy**

Kenya, like its neighbours Uganda and Tanzania, is primarily an agricultural country. There are few known mineral resources of importance. Its agricultural potential is quite well developed and industrialization has progressed to a point where about 10 per cent of Kenya's gross domestic product comes from manufacturing. Living standards, though low in relation to industrialized countries, compare well with those of other countries in Africa and the *per capita* income, approximately £30 a year, is the highest in East Africa.

In July 1965, a six-year development plan embodied in a white paper entitled *African Socialism and its Applications to Planning in Kenya* was introduced by President Kenyatta. It envisages growth in the domestic product of about 6 per cent every year, to effect which it relies on private (both domestic and foreign) and public investment. According to the plan, nationalization will be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and the Government has pledged prompt payment of full compensation whenever this step is taken. The white paper emphasizes the fact that such controls are essential in order to attract foreign investment and to increase domestic investment.

### **Foreign Policy and Relations**

When introducing the white paper on "African Socialism", the President reiterated the determination of his country to pursue a genuinely non-aligned course. To maintain this non-aligned front, the white paper emphasizes that Communism and *laissez-faire* capitalism are incompatible. The document explains that, "in the phrase 'African Socialism', the word Africa is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted" but rather "it is meant to convey the African rules of a system that is itself African in its characteristics." " 'African Socialism' ", it goes on, "is a term describing an African political and economic system that is positively African, not being imported

from any country or being a blueprint of any foreign ideology, but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source."

President Kenyatta and his Government are also strong supporters of the Organization of Africa Unity. In April of this year, a meeting of 11 heads of state and of government from East and Central Africa was held in Nairobi. This meeting contributed to good relations in that part of Africa and, in so doing, has served to strengthen the OAU. The meeting also discussed the possibility of closer economic co-operation and the Rhodesian problem.

### **Canada-Kenya Relations**

Close friendly relations have been developed between Kenya and Canada through the Commonwealth relation and through Canada's bilateral grant-aid programme (the Special Commonwealth African Aid Plan — SCAAP). At present, under this programme, there are 24 Canadian teachers and technical advisers serving in Kenya, and there are some 29 Kenyan students in training at various institutions throughout Canada. There are also five Kenyan students studying in Canada under Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan. Thus far, under SCAAP, all Canadian aid to Kenya has been in the form of grants; Kenya is, however, qualified to receive soft loans from Canada for development purposes and also food aid. It was also recently announced that Canada would assist Kenya in a five-year, \$350,000 project to increase wheat production. A number of requests for assistance received from Kenyan Government are at present under consideration.

## *Canada Helps Feed the Hungry*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, told the House of Commons on March 23, 1966, of a significant expansion in Canada's food-aid programme. The Government, he said, proposed to provide India during 1966 with approximately one million tons of food, mainly in the form of wheat and flour, worth about \$71 million. In line with the progressive increase in the basic aid programme foreshadowed in the Speech from the Throne, he added, substantial help would also be provided to Pakistan and Ghana. The total food-aid programme for the fiscal year 1966-1967 would be about \$75 million.

To achieve this unprecedented level, the Government intends to seek Parliament's approval for a supplementary estimate of \$45 million, which will be added to the \$30 million set aside for food in the 1966-1967 main estimates of the External Aid Office. The Canadian programme as a whole will include contributions in kind to the World Food Programme, to the UN programme for Palestine refugees and to traditional recipients of Canadian food aid.

From April 1, 1951, to March 31, 1965, Canada made available to countries of the Colombo Plan area, on a bilateral basis, food worth \$139,752,000, mainly in the form of wheat and flour. In addition, more than \$14 million was provided to the multilateral agencies UNWRA, UNICEF and the World Food Programme.

Food aid was not separated from normal economic and technical assistance until 1964-1965, when a new and expanded programme was introduced. It was announced at the time that the provision of foodstuffs would increase in proportion to the expansion of other forms of aid. Initially, \$15 million was provided. In 1965, the main estimates called for \$20 million, and this year they were increased to \$30 million.

The main estimates were designed to meet anticipated needs under normal conditions, but it was necessary in each of the last two years to seek supplementary estimates to meet emergency situations in India. For this reason, a supplementary appropriation of \$15 million was sought in February, making a total of \$25 million in Canadian food aid to India during 1965-1966.

Subsequently, Prime Minister Pearson informed the House of Commons that the Government planned a substantial increase in food aid to India during 1966-1967. This was consistent with the joint appeal issued in February by U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Dr. B. R. Sen, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, asking the world community "to do everything in its power to avert the threatened mass human suffering".

India has received the largest share of Canada's food aid, increasing from \$7-million worth of wheat in 1960-1961 to \$14 million in 1964-1965 and \$25 million last year. Between 1960 and 1966, Pakistan received food aid from

Canada worth \$16,450,000. The bulk of this assistance was given in the form of wheat, though small quantities of flour, milk powder and dried peas were included on request.

In addition to direct food aid, Canada has contributed to the agricultural development of a number of nations. In the current fiscal year, it undertook the following projects:

Ghana (irrigation and land reclamation)	\$ 650,000
India (fertilizers)	\$3,500,000
Ceylon (fertilizers)	\$ 150,000
Malaysia (resources survey)	\$1,000,000
Pakistan (fertilizers)	\$ 889,000
Ecuador (river-basin development)	\$1,260,000

Indirectly, through associated agricultural benefits, Canada is aiding the West Indies, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia and Thailand.

Canada's food and agricultural aid has taken the form of fishing vessels, farm machinery, pesticides and fertilizers, food-storage warehouses and refrigeration units, crop-spraying equipment and aircraft. Hydro-electric projects with which Canada has been associated have involved irrigation, land reclamation, rural electrification and flood control. Canada has also sent overseas a large number of co-operatives advisers and agricultural and fisheries experts and has trained many students in its agricultural schools and colleges under external aid programmes. In addition, Canadian experts have served with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and similar agencies. Canadian donations to the World Bank and other regional development banks have helped to establish long-range agricultural programmes.

Canada, one of the world's major food producers, is taking part in a collective attempt by the industrialized nations to correct the imbalance in the world's food supply. Apart from the countries, such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand, which have made commodity contributions, nations such as Japan, Norway, Britain, Germany and France provide shipping services and loans that enable the developing countries to buy fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery. They also provide a large number of technical experts.

The loss in capacity to feed itself on the part of the less-developed world has been going on for almost 30 years. Food production has not kept pace with population growth in Asia since 1959, and diet-deficient areas include the whole of Asia except Japan and Israel, all but the southern tip of Africa, and vast areas of Central and South America. The FAO estimates that only about one sixth of the world's population is well fed. Between a third and a half of humanity suffers hunger or malnutrition.

A considerable increase in all programmes will be required to meet the expected population growth. Since demographic trends indicate that the world's population could double by the year 2,000, the limited land supply will have to be cultivated more intensively.

# General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION, GENEVA, 1966

*Though no communiqué was issued after the twenty-third session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, held in Geneva from March 24 to April 6, 1966, the text of the opening statement by the Chairman, Ambassador Lacarte of Uruguay, which was issued as a press release before the session, outlined in some detail the work before the Contracting Parties and anticipated accurately the major issues they would examine. These issues included the accession to the GATT of Switzerland and Yugoslavia, and the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement. The main preoccupation of the Contracting Parties remains, of course, the "Kennedy round" of tariff negotiations. Problems affecting the trade of developing countries were also prominent among the items on the agenda of the twenty-third session.*

## Opening Statement by Chairman

Thanks to the special arrangements we have made for this session, the Contracting Parties will be in a position to concentrate their attention on a small number of important and often difficult issues. This could be a fruitful and significant development in our procedures, particularly if it facilitates the presence at the session — continuously or at the same time — of high-level representatives responsible for policy decisions in their respective governments.

We can draw encouragement as we approach this twenty-third session from the continuing growth in GATT membership and the reaffirmation which this provides of the confidence of the trading community in the General Agreement as the basis for national and international commercial policies. Important countries are seeking full accession to the GATT, and we shall be discussing this later in the session.

Our foremost preoccupation at this time will, of course, be the "Kennedy round" of trade negotiations, which is on the threshold of its final phase and at a decisive stage. We shall be hearing a report on the negotiations from the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, Mr. Wyndham White.

There is no need for me to emphasize again the importance of the "Kennedy round" for world trade or the consequences that its outcome will have for international trading relationships. All this is well known. But it might not be irrelevant to remind Contracting Parties that many governments, simply because of the existence of the "Kennedy round" and in expectation of its

outcome, have been able to resist pressures to take measures which would have been far from positive in character or conducive to an expansion of world trade.

### **End of Preparations**

But we are all aware of how long the work in connection with the negotiations has been going on and of the considerable amount of time, manpower and effort that have already been expended. A great deal of necessary preparatory work has been done, but it is essential that we now emerge from this preparatory stage into that of full and continuing negotiation. It is obvious that, if we do not, there is the risk that impatience and loss of faith may erode our efforts. Time is running out.

We are, of course, conscious of the intricacy and complications of the gamut of questions involved in the negotiations. There are serious outstanding problems and certain important elements are missing. A considerable effort of political will and determination is necessary if we are to achieve a successful outcome to the negotiations in the short time that remains. This is the challenge confronting governments and the Contracting Parties.

A major objective of the "Kennedy round" is to reduce barriers to the exports of developing countries. One of the most serious aspects of the doubts hanging over the "Kennedy round" is, therefore, the possible frustration of this objective and the loss of important benefits by these countries which this could imply. Indeed, a lack of success in the "Kennedy round" could result in a further aggravation of the trade and economic difficulties of the developing countries.

It has never been contended — as is sometimes stated to be the case — that a successful outcome to the "Kennedy round" would solve all the trade and economic development problems of the developing countries. Certain important areas obviously lie outside the ambit of GATT and of the scope of trade negotiations. What is certain is that the "Kennedy round" can make an important contribution to the solution of these problems and that it might, moreover, set in train a continuing process to the benefit of developing countries.

### **Importance to Developing Countries**

It is understandable that developing countries should be irked by the delays in the "Kennedy round". It may be that they feel that the contribution which the "Kennedy round" can make to the solution of their problems is not big enough. There is no doubt, however, that a failure by developing countries to take advantage of the possibilities of the trade negotiations, or a failure by the developed countries to respond constructively to the needs of the developing countries, would represent the loss of a major and, indeed, very nearly unique opportunity.

Therefore, I would urge developing countries which are already participating in the "Kennedy round" to intensify their action, to pinpoint the aspects which

are of principal interest to them, and to make sure their position is unequivocally known to all. To those countries which are not yet taking part, I say that the rules and procedures of these negotiations have been established with great care and contain all the safeguards they may consider are necessary. They may, therefore, feel that this is the moment to provide through their presence an impetus to the "Kennedy round" as it approaches a critical negotiating stage, for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate attention is paid to their specific problems.

The success of the "Kennedy round", as it has been conceived, hinges on reasonable satisfaction being given to all participants. It is an outstanding GATT enterprise and deserves and requires the full support of all Contracting Parties. Its successful conclusion will signify not only a great contribution to world trade but also the avoidance of the pitfalls which would await us, were it not to attain its stated aims.

### **Committee on Trade and Development**

Turning to the vital question of our activities in the field of trade and development generally, the Contracting Parties will have before them the report of the Committee on Trade and Development. It is perhaps too early to expect major results from Part IV of the General Agreement. The Committee's report clearly indicates that it has come to grips with its work and that it has adopted a realistic and practical approach to the matters before it. In many respects and in the case of a number of concrete areas with which the Committee is involved (for example, trade between developing countries themselves), the Committee's report is encouraging. Again, here is a sector in which the General Agreement can make a most worthwhile contribution to the improvement of the present economic situation of many developing countries.

It is to be expected that the Committee will, as time goes by, help through its deliberations and activities to bring about further liberalization of trade in areas of particular interest to developing countries. The Committee can be expected to identify other practical measures that will help developing countries strengthen their export capacity and expand their export earnings, both through their trade with the developed countries and their trade among themselves. One area in which the Committee has already achieved positive results is that of the study of the development plans of less-developed countries — for example, the studies carried out on the Uganda and Nigeria plans have yielded concrete recommendations in regard to measures which would be of assistance to those countries.

No doubt we shall be hearing from delegations their assessment of the progress that has so far been made and their views on the direction which the work of the Committee on Trade and Development should desirably take. It is essential, if Chapter IV is to fulfil the hopes that have been placed upon it, that Contracting Parties — and particularly those with major responsibilities



in international trade — make a positive and imaginative effort to translate its provisions into concrete and constructive action.

### **International Trade Centre**

Progress can be reported in the activities of the GATT International Trade Centre, which is providing practical assistance to developing countries in export promotion. This is a new area of activity which has already proved its value to developing countries. The Contracting Parties have before them the report of the Advisory Group which considered the services already being provided by the Centre and which made recommendations regarding the Centre's future work. Under the financial items of our agenda will have to be considered the question of financial provision for the increases in the Centre's activities recommended by the Group. Certainly, the Trade Centre has evolved rapidly into a practical, efficient and essentially realistic tool for the promotion of trade, which deserves unstinted support.

Another important item with which the Contracting Parties will be dealing at this session — on the basis of the careful examination carried out by the Working Party and the Council — is the request by Australia for a waiver to permit the granting of preferences to developing countries. I need not emphasize the importance and implications of the decision which is to be taken under this point, for they are well known to all those present and their ramifications will spread far.

There are other questions of great significance on our agenda. The number of items relating to the formation of customs unions or free-trade areas is an indication of the strength of the movement in the world towards regional integration. We shall be hearing from the countries concerned of the progress which they are making towards the achievement of their objectives.

Regional integration undoubtedly can bring considerable benefits to those countries which are participating in it and, as the General Agreement clearly recognizes, it can make a positive contribution to the expansion of world trade. At the same time, however, our previous deliberations demonstrate that regional integration can create problems for outside countries, and it should, therefore, be a constant preoccupation of the Contracting Parties to secure the multilateral expansion of world trade, which is their principal objective. Accordingly, these items occupy an important place on our agenda and should occupy an equally important place in the discussions of the Contracting Parties, as we endeavour to maintain a constructive balance between the factors which I have mentioned.

### **Agricultural Trade**

A perennial problem is that of trade in agricultural commodities. As we are unfortunately only too well aware, this is an area fraught with complex difficulties, political as well as economic. In the work undertaken in connection with the "Kennedy round", the intricacy and stubbornness of these difficulties have

been clearly brought out, and they will again be apparent in our discussion of other items relating to agricultural trade which appear on our agenda. Countries which rely on the export of agricultural products cannot be expected to find satisfactory an international trading system where the record of progress in the agricultural sector has in no way been commensurate with that achieved in the industrial sector. These intractable problems are in the forefront of our minds. It is no good blinking at the fact that their solution will not be an easy process. It is to be hoped that those who are framing agricultural policies in the developed countries will not be concerned exclusively with their own problems but will also be aware of the heavy impact that agricultural protectionism has on the economic well-being of the non-industrial countries. Indeed, the terms of the General Agreement itself and of the rules for the "Kennedy round" negotiations establish clear-cut criteria in this field, which should not be lost from sight at any stage.

There are other sectors of world trade which give rise to continuing concern and which call for a tremendous effort on the part of the international trading community if the necessary compromises are to be found. One such sector is trade in cotton textiles.

Towards the end of last year, there was a major review of the operation of the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles and the report of the review will be presented to the Contracting Parties during this session. This is a very difficult and complicated area, which is important in the context of the activities falling within the competence of the Cotton Textiles Committee itself, of the "Kennedy round" and, generally, of our efforts in the field of trade and development.

In this brief survey I have touched upon the problems before us. None of them are easy. Trade issues remain very clearly at the forefront of international economic relations, and peoples and governments alike grasp increasingly their great significance in terms of overall economic progress. In this light, the responsibilities and duties of the Contracting Parties tend to increase steadily. This burden must be borne successfully if we are to feel that the aims of the General Agreement are being fully attained.

I declare the session open.

## *Medical Aid from Canada*

CANADA'S DOCTORS AND NURSES have responded to an increasing number of requests made upon the External Aid Programme for medical development assistance. Medical projects are under way at present in each of the four main areas of Canadian assistance — the Colombo Plan countries, the Commonwealth Africa countries, French-speaking Africa and the Caribbean.

Particular interest has been shown in the establishment of facilities in South Vietnam. A Canadian orthopaedic surgeon is operating and teaching in Saigon, and two doctors are working in the provincial hospital of Quang Ngai, where Canadian aid funds are being used to set up a ward and an outpatient clinic for tuberculosis patients. Discussions have been taking place with a view to establishing a rehabilitation centre for children in Saigon.

To Malawi (the former Nyasaland), where medical services were scarce, Canada has supplied eight nurses and three doctors. In Tunisia, a Canadian doctor has studied the possibility of extending Canadian assistance to a hospital for sick children and of mounting a public-health programme. A team of Canadian mental-health specialists is helping the West Indian island of Trinidad to improve its psychiatric services.

Canada has also responded to requests for equipment. More than 2,000 Canadian-made cobalt beam-therapy units for the treatment of cancer are in use throughout the world and a large number have been supplied under the External Aid Programme.

These efforts are in recognition of the now widely-accepted fact that medical aid is not a luxury but can be as important to the economic development of some nations as large industrial projects.

### **Medical Education**

International agencies such as the World Health Organization have given high priority to medical education. This year, Canada's External Aid Programme is host to more than 200 students from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean who are studying in various branches of medicine and allied fields in Canadian universities and technical institutes.

Under other aid schemes, the University of Toronto continues to assist in the establishment of a Department of Anaesthesia in the University of Lagos Medical School, a lecturer in medicine is serving at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica, a husband and wife team are working in the medical school at Kampala, Uganda, and in Dar-es-Salaam a Montreal paediatrician is advising the Government of Tanzania on child-health problems.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Current Problems in NATO**

*On April 4, 1966, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, made the following statement to the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons:*

Article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty permits signatories to opt out in 1969, the twentieth anniversary of its conclusion. The year 1969, for this good reason, has been regarded as the year for stocktaking. It was with this in mind that, in December 1964, I proposed on behalf of the Canadian Government, at the NATO ministerial meeting, that the North Atlantic Council should undertake a review of the future of the alliance. Although this proposal was approved by the 14 other members of the NATO alliance, nevertheless, the idea was not pursued because the President of France had begun to articulate his nation's dissatisfaction with the NATO organization and no one wanted to precipitate a premature confrontation.

It is now less than a month since the French Government first formally informed their NATO allies of their decision to withdraw from the integrated defence arrangements . . .

My view, and that of the Government of Canada, is that NATO has served a useful purpose. I take it from the reaction the other day to the Canadian position on the French announcement that this view, generally speaking, reflects the opinion of the political parties in Parliament. We have only to cast our minds back to the immediate postwar period; Europe was then unsteadily extricating itself from the morass left by the Second World War and Stalin was pressing in every way to extend his influence through Western Europe to the Atlantic. The picture has now changed, as President de Gaulle has said. It is not unreasonable to ask: "Is the alliance still necessary? Is General de Gaulle right in advocating the end of the integrated military organization of the alliance? Is the strategic concept of the alliance still valid? Is it time to leave the defence of Europe to the Europeans?" These are questions that are being asked at the present time, and they are fair questions. Naturally, by virtue of my own responsibilities, I have been asking myself some of these questions. It may be helpful if I began what I have to say on the situation in NATO resulting from the French action by summarizing the main elements of the position now taken by our NATO ally, France. These comprise:

(1) a decision to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated military structure and French officers from the integrated headquarters, these decisions to take effect on July 1, 1966;

(2) a decision to require the removal from France of the two integrated military headquarters known as SHAPE and the Central European Command. France has proposed that the removal be completed by April 1, 1967;

(3) a decision to require the withdrawal from France of foreign forces and bases. France has proposed that the United States and Canadian bases be withdrawn by April 1, 1967;

(4) France has indicated a wish to retain its forces in Germany, while transferring them from NATO to French command.

(5) France intends to leave its forces in Berlin, where they are established on the basis of occupation rights and where there is a tripartite command.

(6) France has indicated a willingness to negotiate arrangements for establishing, in peacetime, French liaison missions with NATO commands.

(7) France has indicated a readiness to enter into separate conversations with Canada and the United States to determine the military facilities which the respective governments might mutually grant to each other in wartime.

(8) France intends to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and to participate in the activities of the NATO Council. This, as I understand it, is the position taken by the Government of France.

It is only fair to note that these positions have been previously stated, in one form or another, by the President of the French Republic during the last two years.

This last element of the French position is naturally welcomed by the Canadian Government as an indication of France's desire to continue its formal association with the other parties to the Treaty. It will, I need hardly add, be the concern of the Canadian Government to encourage French participation to the greatest extent feasible.

It is evident that some of the French objectives can be attained by unilateral action: for example, the withdrawal of French troops from SACEUR's command and of French officers from the combined headquarters. Some other objectives will require negotiations over modalities and the timing: for example, the withdrawal of NATO headquarters and of foreign bases from French territory. Finally, some proposals depend on working out arrangements with other members of the alliance and will involve negotiations on substance: for example, the presence and role of French troops in Germany and the liaison arrangements which might be established between French and NATO commands.

It must be clear to the members of the Committee that the French proposals raise a host of problems, the range of which has not been fully determined. They raise questions with political, military, financial, and legal implications. We are examining these questions with our allies, informally with the 14 other than France and, where appropriate, with France and the 14. We are, as well, engaged in an examination of the contractual situation, and the documentation in that connection is now being carefully examined by our legal officers.

The first French *aide-mémoire* also sets out briefly the reasons which, in

the view of President de Gaulle, justify the position which he takes. The following arguments are listed:

First, he argues that the threat to Western Europe has changed and no longer has the immediate and menacing character it once had; he says that the countries of Europe have restored their economies and recovered their earlier strength; he argues that France is developing an atomic armament which is not susceptible of being integrated within the NATO forces; that the nuclear stalemate has transformed the conditions of Western defence; and that Europe is no longer the centre of international crises.

These are observations with which I imagine we are all more or less in agreement. But do they, singly or jointly, justify the conclusion drawn by the French Government that integrated defence arrangements are no longer required for the defence of Western Europe?

Let me examine each of the French arguments in turn.

*First*, the threat to Western Europe: Over the years the Soviet Union has steadily strengthened its military forces in Eastern Germany and in the European area in general. These forces are now stronger than at any time since the end of the Second World War. While I recognize that the likelihood of an actual attack has diminished, the effectiveness of NATO's defence arrangements has been, and remains, a factor in this favourable turn of events. Moreover, it is considered prudent to base defence policy on the known capabilities of a possible enemy rather than on his declared intentions, or even his supposed intentions as we may rightly or wrongly assess them. To avoid any possible misinterpretation, I also want to make clear my conviction that NATO countries should avoid provocation of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Canada strongly favours the promotion of better understanding between the Soviet Union and the Western countries. But, as the Cuban experience of 1962 demonstrated, progress towards better relations may be greater when it is clear that there is no alternative to accommodation.

*Secondly*, Europe's recovery: It is, of course, true that the European countries have greatly strengthened their positions in every way. We applaud this development. We know that the generosity of the United States, through the Marshall Plan, greatly contributed to this happy consequence. We have, in fact, been assuming that this would in time enable the Western European states to take on increasing responsibility for European defence, possibly within the framework of new co-operative arrangements among the European members of the alliance. The French action may have set back this prospect, as it has the immediate effect of dividing the countries of Europe over what their defence policies should be.

*Thirdly*, it is a fact that France has developed an independent nuclear force. But, as we see it, this is not an argument against the integration of other forces. The United Kingdom has demonstrated that the acquisition of a strategic nuclear force does not require the withdrawal of other national forces from the

unified command and planning arrangements.

*Fourthly*, it is true that a nuclear stalemate had developed in place of the earlier United States nuclear monopoly. But this is not new. It has been the case for ten years. Moreover, this fact has not diminished the need for unified planning, if the European countries are to make an effective contribution to the defence of Europe.

*Fifthly*, I also acknowledge that Europe is not at present the centre of international crises. But until there is a political settlement in Central Europe, it will remain an area of potential crisis, particularly if the arrangements which have brought stability in the area should be upset.

In my judgment, and in the judgment of the Canadian Government, the arguments presented in the French *aide-mémoire* do not support the conclusion that unified command and planning arrangements are no longer necessary for the defence of Western Europe.

It is striking that all of the other members of NATO have joined in reaffirming their belief in the need for unified command and planning arrangements in a declaration the text of which I communicated to the House of Commons on March 18. I expect members of the External Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee will be interested to know that the strongest support for the integrated military arrangements has come from the smaller members of the alliance, who consider that the only way to assure their defence is by pooling their contributions in a common effort. It seems to me that, if the principle of an alliance is accepted, the experience of the last two world wars and the requirements of modern weapons demonstrate the need for unified command and joint planning. Indeed, one of the most remarkable successes of the postwar world has been the development within NATO of effective peace-time arrangements for military co-operation.

I have explained why we and other members of NATO are not persuaded by the French arguments. I wish now to examine the implications of the actions which have been taken by the French Government.

Providing NATO itself does not disintegrate (and I see no danger of that happening), the immediate military consequences of the French action are thought to be manageable. France has already withdrawn from NATO command, during the last six years, most of its previously integrated forces. The net loss in forces available to NATO from the announced withdrawal, while significant, will not be too serious, particularly if workable arrangements can be devised for maintaining French troops in Germany. But the loss for practical purposes of French land and air space has strategic implications for the defence of Western Europe which will have to be carefully studied.

Even more worrying, to my mind, are the possible political implications. These consequences are, of course, still quite uncertain, so that it is possible to speak only in the most general and cautious terms. But it is obvious that the French actions may weaken the unity of the alliance. This would, in turn,

jeopardize the stability of Central Europe, which has been built on allied unity, and particularly on French, British, and American solidarity in Berlin and in Germany. I do not want to elaborate, but it is possible to anticipate that French bilateral relations with some of the NATO allies, particularly those who carry the larger burdens, will be put under strain. The balance of forces within the alliance will, of necessity, be altered. Finally, France's example could stimulate nationalist tendencies which have been encouragingly absent in Western Europe since the last war.

The Canadian Government is not unsympathetic to many of the considerations which underlie the French wish for change. We know that circumstances in the world have changed since NATO was established. We have long believed that members of the alliance, particularly those, such as France, which have spoken of the need for change, should present concrete proposals to encourage consultation within the alliance.

It is reasonable to look towards a greater acceptance of responsibility by Europeans for the defence of Western Europe. However, any North American move to disengage militarily from Europe will be dangerously premature until the European countries have made the necessary political and institutional arrangements to take over the responsibilities involved. It follows, at this time of uncertainty about NATO's future, that Canada should avoid action which would create unnecessary strain or otherwise impair the solidarity of the alliance. This need not and should not preclude us from making adjustments, in the interest of economy and efficiency, in the manner in which we contribute to European defence. And we should seek to ensure that there is a constructive evolution in the organization of the alliance; and we should take advantage of the actions taken by the Government of France to do exactly what we ourselves proposed in the fall of 1964, which is to engage in serious examination of the state of the alliance.

In so far as the Canadian bases in France are concerned, the Government of France has taken unilateral action. It appears to be a final decision. At any rate, it has stated that it would like to see the Canadian bases withdrawn by April 1, 1967 — although I express the hope, and have no doubt, that the French Government will be prepared to negotiate mutually acceptable arrangements, including compensation and dates for the withdrawal of the bases. Since the objective of sending Canadian troops to Europe was to contribute to the integrated defence arrangements from which France is withdrawing, this Government has accepted the logic that Canadian forces in France cannot outstay their welcome. They will have to be moved elsewhere.

I referred earlier to the determination of other members of NATO to preserve the effective arrangements which have been worked out for joint planning and unified command. This is only prudent and Canada fully shares this determination. This will provide a continuing defence against the Soviet military capacity still directed at Western Europe. It will help preserve the



precarious stability in Central Europe. Moreover, under the present integrated defence arrangements, there being no German general staff, Germany has placed all its troops directly under NATO commanders. The dismantling of the existing structure would lead to the reversion of all European forces to national command.

Inevitably, our attention in the near future will be taken up with handling the immediate consequences of the French action. But we shall not lose sight of the need for NATO to adjust to the changing circumstances since the alliance was concluded. Indeed, the adjustments which the French action will require of the existing military arrangements provide opportunities, as I said earlier, which we intend to take to examine with our allies the possibilities for developing improvements in the NATO structure and to consider how the alliance should develop in the long run, and also to consider what reductions and what savings can be effected without impairing the efficiency of the Organization, or of our contribution to it.

Although I am speaking about NATO, I wish to emphasize that — to the extent this depends on Canada — we will not allow our disappointment to affect Canada's bilateral relations with France. The Canadian Government has been working steadily to improve and intensify our relations with France. For our part, we will not interrupt this process. Differences over defence policy need not impair the development of our bilateral relations in the political, economic, cultural, and technical fields.

For instance, we are sending an economic mission to France within the course of a few weeks, which will be representative both of government and of business, designed to encourage further trade relations between France and Canada. There certainly will be no interruption between these and other contacts that we have established and continue to establish with France. These are matters which can and should be kept separate from defence arrangements within NATO. In all this, we assume that the French Government agrees that this is a desirable approach, and we have no reason to doubt that this is their view.

I want to conclude this part of my statement by referring again to the objectives which the Canadian Government intends to follow in the situation created by the French action.

In NATO, our policy will be, firstly, to seek, in consultation with our allies, including France as far as possible, to limit the damage to the unity and effectiveness of the alliance and to recreate a relationship of mutual confidence among all the members; secondly to help preserve the essential features of NATO's existing system of unified command and joint planning for collective defence; thirdly, to continue to maintain an appropriate contribution to NATO's collective defence system; fourthly, to take every opportunity to examine with our allies possibilities for developing improvements to the NATO structure and to consider the future of the alliance in the long run.

With regard to France, the Government will, firstly, negotiate, either bilaterally or multilaterally as appropriate, fair and reasonable arrangements for those

adjustments which may be required as a result of French withdrawal from NATO's integrated defence arrangements; secondly, leave the door open for the eventual return of France to full participation in the collective activities of the alliance, should France so decide. Finally, we will continue, notwithstanding NATO differences and with the co-operation of the French authorities, to develop our bilateral relations with France.

### **Issue of Sanctions Against Rhodesia**

*The Standing Committee on External Affairs heard the following statement on the Rhodesian situation from Mr. Martin on April 4:*

This declaration of independence has precipitated an African crisis which could have the greatest implications for the Commonwealth. The illegal regime in Rhodesia is attempting to perpetuate a system whereby the white settlers, who are one-sixteenth of the population, maintain effective political domination over the black majority, who are fifteen-sixteenths of the population.

This has naturally placed a severe strain on relations within the multi-racial Commonwealth and between the West and African states.

I should emphasize at the outset that Rhodesia is British territory. The illegal declaration of independence of November 11, 1965, has not been accepted by Britain, or any other state, and the British Government remains responsible for this territory and for the conditions to govern Rhodesian independence. Negotiations between the British and Rhodesian Governments went on for several years before the illegal declaration of independence last November by Mr. Smith. The negotiations were broken off by the Rhodesians. It then fell to the British Government to decide how to restore a legal situation in Rhodesia, and the decision was to employ economic measures rather than force. Throughout, Britain has clearly had the primary responsibility for Rhodesia. It is the colonial power.

At the same time, in view of Rhodesia's importance to race relations in Africa, and, in view of the multi-racial nature of the Commonwealth, Britain has fully recognized that the Rhodesian question is a matter of legitimate and strong Commonwealth concern. At the 1964 prime ministers' conference, there was an extensive discussion of Rhodesia and a lengthy reference to the question in the communiqué, which includes a statement of the view of Commonwealth prime ministers that independence should take place on the basis of majority rule and that a unilateral declaration of independence would not be recognized. The issue was discussed in 1965 and again referred to in the communiqué in which the Commonwealth prime ministers reaffirmed — all of them — that they were "irrevocably opposed" to any UDI.

Up to last November, Canada had normal relations with the Rhodesian Government, and the Canadian Government had already sent a confidential message to the Rhodesian Government some time before the 1965 conference pointing out the grave consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. This warning was repeated again in the succeeding months.

I myself received representatives of the Government of Rhodesia during the last two and a half years prior to UDI and explained our position, as have other governments in and outside the Commonwealth.

After the unilateral declaration of independence, many Commonwealth countries reacted very strongly, as had been generally anticipated. Various African governments argued that Britain should use force in putting down the illegal Smith régime, as Britain had already done in dealing with civil disorders and revolts in other colonies and dependencies. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity passed a resolution early in December calling on all member states to sever relations with Britain if the Smith régime was not "crushed" before mid-December. Following this resolution, various countries, including two Commonwealth members, Ghana and Tanzania, withdrew their missions from London. In an attempt to minimize the damage of this breach, Canada assumed the role of protecting power for Britain in Tanzania and for Tanzania in Britain. Ghana has since restored diplomatic relations. It is a matter of great significance to Commonwealth unity when action of this kind takes place.

It was in these circumstances that the Nigerian Government took the initiative in proposing a special Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia. As in the past, one of the purposes of the conference was to discuss differing opinions on how to deal with the Rhodesian issue so that these differing opinions should not result in a split in the Commonwealth along racial lines.

I would not want to disguise in any way our concern as of last December about what the action of countries in withdrawing missions from a Commonwealth country mean to Commonwealth unity. We are heartened, however, by the fact that President Nyerere did indicate that, in withdrawing his mission from London, there was no intention on the part of Tanzania to withdraw from the Commonwealth. Our concern about this Rhodesian question was not fully but largely based upon our concern for the continued integrity and unity of the Commonwealth, an organism which we believe plays a very vital role at the present time.

At the Lagos conference, Britain welcomed the proposal of Prime Minister Pearson which led to the establishment of two continuing Commonwealth committees. The most important of these, the Sanctions Committee, now chaired by the Canadian High Commissioner in London, is maintaining a review of the sanctions against Rhodesia and considering ways and means of making them more effective. When he was in Ottawa last week, Mr. Chevrier and I had a very useful discussion and reviewed the work of the Committee. It is due to meet again this week. Its tasks include co-ordinating aid to Zambia, which, of

course, is an integral aspect of the Rhodesian situation. A second Commonwealth committee is planning a large-scale programme of training for Rhodesian Africans, which will come into effect when constitutional government is restored. This will help to prepare the ground for a viable independent state under a multi-racial administration by training for their new responsibilities leaders, officials, and technicians from the African majority. These committees are a new type of Commonwealth machinery in that they have been established by the prime ministers for a limited and finite purpose and with some duties which are of a rather wider and less technical nature than those normally carried out by Commonwealth institutions.

The work of these committees was naturally among the subjects discussed with the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Arnold Smith, during his visit to Ottawa last week. This was a valuable opportunity to discuss many aspects of the Rhodesian question, particularly from the point of view of its implications for the Commonwealth. I may not agree with the kind of emphasis that Mr. Arnold Smith gave to this question, but I will agree that the implications of the Rhodesian problem for peace in the world are very great.

Rhodesia is not, of course, of concern only to the Commonwealth and to Africa.

World concern about Rhodesia has been expressed through the United Nations, and the Rhodesia problem has been before the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations a number of times in the past three or four years. The issues involved must be understood in the light of developments in modern Africa with its many new sovereign independent states.

After the unilateral declaration of independence, it was the British Government itself which raised the issue in the Security Council. Britain asked the members of the United Nations to join with its in making effective the economic measures taken against Rhodesia. It was obvious that the co-operation of other nations, particularly the principal trading nations of the world, was necessary if the economic sanctions were to be effective.

The experience of the international community with sanctions is very limited. In fact, I think this is the first instance where a programme of economic sanctions, even though on a non-mandatory basis, has been imposed, unless one were to include the decisions of the Security Council in August 1963 urging member states of the United Nations to take action in regard to the situation in South Africa.

On November 20, the Security Council adopted a resolution by ten votes to none, with one abstention, recommending the severance of all economic relations between member states and Rhodesia, including an oil embargo.

Canada has acted in support of Britain's policy of ending the illegal situation by non-military means; and, as a member of the Commonwealth, has acted in concert with Britain and other members of the Commonwealth and through Commonwealth institutions. Canadian economic measures have been taken

together with other major trading countries, including the U.S.A. and Western European nations, and in compliance with the Security Council resolution of November 20. This is in accordance with the basic Canadian policy of strong support for the UN in grave situations of this kind.

The Canadian belief in multi-racialism and non-discrimination has also been a reason for action over Rhodesia.

I am sure that, if such a stand were not taken by a Commonwealth country or by the Commonwealth as a whole, the integrity and the unity of the Commonwealth would be impaired as it has never been before. Canada opposed the unilateral declaration of independence because it was designed to perpetuate a system of racial inequality and discrimination wholly inconsistent with the basic principle of the new multi-racial Commonwealth. If the Commonwealth is to be maintained, I repeat, Canada cannot give comfort to those who support racial discrimination.

I can very well understand that there may be views of members of the Committee that are not completely consistent with Government policy but that nevertheless appear to give recognition to the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth.

The Canadian Government sincerely believed that Rhodesia should not become independent on the basis of the 1961 constitution unless it was substantially modified. In theory, the 1961 constitution could eventually produce majority rule in the country, when sufficient Africans reached the required property and educational level to obtain the franchise for election to 50 out of the 65 seats in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly. These educational and property qualifications are so high in terms of conditions in Rhodesia that only a very small percentage of the Africans in Rhodesia qualify to vote for these 50 seats. The qualifications of the remaining 15 seats are lower and all but one are now occupied by Africans. However, 14 seats out of 65 is a long way short of a majority. Mr. Smith and his followers have made it plain that they did not expect Africans to become the majority of the electorate in their lifetime. It seems clear that the Smith Government made its illegal declaration because Mr. Smith and his followers were unwilling to accept the basis which would assure the attainment of a fair political voice to the majority of the population within a reasonably short period rather than the very long and indefinite period desired by the illegal Government of Mr. Smith. They knew that the consent of the people of Rhodesia as a whole required by Britain would not be given to independence based on the 1961 constitution as it stood.

Public opinion in Canada and other Commonwealth countries could not contemplate as a fellow member a country which practised discrimination not only through the franchise but in a variety of ways. Rhodesian legislation keeps for the exclusive use of white settlers much of the best agricultural land in Rhodesia. The illegal régime has imposed press and radio censorship of increasing intensity. Hundreds of Africans, and one white Rhodesian, have been interned

or restricted without trial for political reasons.

I should point out that the Rhodesian crisis threatens not only relations within the Commonwealth but also Western relations with Africa in general, good relations between the races all over Africa, and stability within African countries. Economic development is being threatened by this instability and by trade dislocation resulting from the necessary economic sanctions. This is not only damaging to Africa but to Western economic relations with that continent, both in the short and long term.

Another basic reason why Canada is applying economic sanctions to Rhodesia is that such means are much preferable to the use of force, which is always to be avoided if possible.

I can say to the Committee that the possible use of force in certain situations in this matter must be regarded with the gravest concern. It is not merely a question of police action; this is a situation that could have implications and consequences far beyond the mere exercise of police power.

Military operations could have explosive effects on the whole of Africa and grave international repercussions. The British have not precluded the use of force to restore law and order in Rhodesia, but the British Government has declared that it is unwilling to use force in existing circumstances, and this is a matter where the British Government alone is constitutionally responsible.

The sanctions campaign against the illegal régime, which has only been in operation for a relatively short time, as I stated in the House of Commons, has not produced the swift results that some had expected, but there is no doubt that the sanctions are adversely affecting the Rhodesian economy. How long it would take for this campaign to produce the desired result I do not know. It is a field in which predictions are inherently difficult. In this case also, the result may well be obtained at a point well short of economic collapse. When Mr. Smith's followers realize that the growing economic dislocation resulting from the UDI is not a temporary phenomenon but rather that their trade will continue indefinitely and progressively to be damaged by sanctions and that their economic prospects are distinctly bleak, they should realize their mistake in backing his illegal action. It is, therefore, very important to keep up the economic pressure on the illegal régime to make clear to its supporters that there is to be no slackening but rather an increase in the efforts of countries applying the sanctions. We attach importance to the general embargo on exports to Rhodesia by the United States on March 18.

What action will be taken in the United Nations if the sanctions do not give evidence of greater success remains to be seen. Action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter could be confined to oil sanctions, or it could be confined to other sanctions.

Speaking for the Canadian Government and knowing what this means to the Commonwealth as a whole, we cannot in any way relent in our conviction and in our effort, within the limitations that we have prescribed for ourselves,

to see this matter through. Nothing less than the interests of the Commonwealth is involved in this situation.

A major Canadian contribution, apart from the total embargoes on exports and imports that we have authorized, has been the Canadian contribution to the Zambia airlift. This airlift was necessitated by the action of the illegal régime in cutting off the supply of oil products to Zambia in December of last year after the embargo commenced against Rhodesia. Zambia was almost wholly dependent on Rhodesia for oil products from the refinery inside Rhodesia.

Now, far from being ineffective, this airlift has enabled Zambia to maintain and build up its oil stocks to the point where, with increased use of road transportation, the airlift itself may be reduced or become unnecessary in a few weeks time. This has been a useful undertaking and one most effectively carried out by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Our participation was originally intended for a period of one month, starting late in December. We subsequently agreed at the request of the British and Zambian Governments to continue the airlift until the end of April. The position now is being reviewed. I might say that the airlift has cost Canada, up to March 31, \$1,125,000 . . . .

We have to consider the question of Rhodesia alongside other questions that require settlement at this particularly difficult period in our relations with other countries in the Commonwealth, in the United Nations and outside. Our policies in respect of all of these questions is a reflection of the responsibility of any state in the interdependent world in which we live to make its contribution toward removing international sources of friction and to the establishment of peace in the world.


## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- World Health Organization, nineteenth assembly: Geneva, May 3-20
- Commonwealth Trade Ministers' Conference: London, May 16-20
- Universal Postal Union, Executive Board: Berne, May 17-28
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, Geneva, May 16-24
- UNICEF, Executive Board: Addis Ababa, May 9-28
- NATO Ministerial Meeting: Brussels, June 6-8
- International Labour Organization, fiftieth conference: Geneva, June 1-23
- Governing Council of UN Development Programme, second session: New York, June 14-27
- World Land Reform Conference: Rome, June 20 - July 2
- International Labour Organization, eighth American regional meeting: Ottawa, September 21-23
- Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting: Ottawa, October 5-6
- UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session: Paris, October 25 - November 30
- Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians: Huddersfield, England, October 17-29
- Food and Agriculture Organization: Rome, October



## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. R. P. Sterling posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Lagos, effective February 14, 1966.
- Mr. J. A. M. Vennat resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective February 28, 1966.
- Miss E. Edelstein appointed to the Department as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective March 1, 1966.
- Colonel. E. S. Tate retired from the Department of External Affairs, effective March 7, 1966.
- Miss M. Stock posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Lagos, to Ottawa, effective March 15, 1966.
- Miss S. Plouffe posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective March 18, 1966.
- Mr. D. Fraser posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective March 24, 1966.
- Miss L. Smith posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Lagos, effective March 24, 1966.
- Miss P. Cordingley posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, effective March 25, 1966.
- Mr. F. B. Roger posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective March 28, 1966.
- Mr. C. L. Brown-John appointed to the Department as Foreign Service Officer 2, effective April 1, 1966.
- Mr. C. J. Dagg appointed to the Department as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective April 1, 1966.
- Mr. T. J. Pinnacle appointed to the Department as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective April 1, 1966.
- Mr. S. H. Sterling appointed to the Department as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective April 1, 1966.
- Mr. P. Hahn posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, effective April 3, 1966.
- Mrs. A. D. L. Waterman posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Port of Spain, to Ottawa, effective April 4, 1966.
- Mr. D. Peel posted from the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, to the Canadian Embassy, Prague, effective April 4, 1966.
- Mr. M. Gauvin appointed Ambassador to Ethiopia, effective April 12, 1966.



# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# Principles of International Law

## SPECIAL UNITED NATIONS STUDY

THE United Nations Special Committee on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States met at UN headquarters in New York from March 8 to April 25, 1966. As established by General Assembly Resolution 2103A (XX), its membership was composed of Algeria, Chile, Kenya and Syria and the 27 countries, including Canada, that had participated in a similar study in Mexico City during the late summer of 1964.<sup>(1)</sup> Its task, as defined by the Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee, was "to complete the consideration and elaboration of the seven principles set forth in Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII)" and to submit a comprehensive report on the results of this study "with a view to enabling the General Assembly to adopt a declaration containing an enumeration of these principles".<sup>(2)</sup>

### Background

The idea of a study of certain principles of international law by a special committee of the United Nations resulted from discussions in the Sixth Committee at its seventeenth, eighteenth and twentieth sessions. By operative Paragraph 1 of Resolution 1815 (XVII), the General Assembly recognized:

... the paramount importance, in the progressive development of international law and in the promotion of the rule of law among nations, of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States and the duties derived therefrom, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations which is the fundamental statement of those principles, notably:

- (a) The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- (b) The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
- (c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter;
- (d) The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter;
- (e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- (f) The principle of sovereign equality of States;
- (g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.

At the eighteenth session, the Assembly created the first (1964) Special Committee and directed it to study and report on four of these principles.<sup>(3)</sup> After meeting in Mexico for five weeks, the Committee reported that on the scope or content of Principle (a), on the threat or use of force, it has been unable to reach

(1) See *External Affairs*, December 1964, Pp. 610-612.

(2) Resolution 2103A (XX), December 20, 1965.

(3) Resolution 1966 (XVIII), December 16, 1963.

any consensus, although there had been considerable support for a draft text; <sup>(1)</sup> that it had also failed to achieve consensus on Principles (b) and (c) relating to the pacific settlement of disputes and to non-intervention; and that regarding Principle (f), sovereign equality, the Committee had succeeded in unanimously adopting a text setting out the points of consensus and listing various proposals on which a similar degree of agreement proved impossible. <sup>(2)</sup> Its report was subsequently approved by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly at its twentieth session and a reconstituted Special Committee was charged with the responsibility of continuing the study of these four principles and of the three remaining ones in the light of all previous United Nations debates, comments submitted by governments and the practices of the United Nations and of states in the application of the principles. <sup>(3)</sup> To assist the enlarged Special Committee in its work, the Secretariat was requested to complete and circulate selected background documentation drawn from states' practices, as reflected in treaties and agreements, and from academic and legal writings. <sup>(4)</sup>

### **Organization and Work of Special Committee**

Directed by the General Assembly to meet at United Nations headquarters as soon as possible, the 1966 Special Committee convened in March for 52 meetings over a seven-week period. Mr. K. Krishna Rao (India) was elected Chairman, Mr. Vratislav Pechota (Czechoslovakia), First Vice-Chairman, Mr. Amando Molina Landaeta (Venezuela), Second Vice-Chairman, and Mr. W. Riphagen (Netherlands), Rapporteur. To facilitate its work, the Committee decided to discuss the previously-considered four principles first and to confine its debate on them to discussion of the proposals contemplated at Mexico City by the 1964 Special Committee and any new ones. The remaining three principles were then left to be debated fully. At its eleventh meeting, a Drafting Committee of 17 members was appointed, with Mr. Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroun) as its chairman. In practice, therefore, as the Special Committee finished discussing each principle in turn, it was passed to the Drafting Committee with instructions to draft formulations reflecting general agreement. The Drafting Committee itself subsequently split into three informal working groups to prepare suggested drafts on each of the seven principles. The results of the Drafting Committee's labour were then placed before the Special Committee for approval and adoption.

### **Examination of the Principles**

As in Mexico City two years ago, it once again proved difficult in practice to obtain general agreement on enumeration of the principles. Many proposals

(1) Document A/5746, November 16, 1964, Para. 106, Paper No. 1.

(2) *Ibid.*, Para. 339.

(3) For Canadian Government comments, see Document A/5470, August 7, 1963.

(4) Documents A/C 6/L537/Rev. 1, March 23, 1964, and A/C 6/L537/Rev. 1/Add. 1, October 20, 1965.

were made, but few withstood the rigorous test of satisfying each of the main political groupings.

However, the 1964 Special Committee's consensus formulation on sovereign equality was again accepted, with only slight modification, as follows:

1. All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature.
2. In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
  - (a) States are juridically equal.
  - (b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.
  - (c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States.
  - (d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable.
  - (e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems.
  - (f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other States.

No general agreement could be reached on a number of additional proposals involving substantive additions which would have broadened the scope of the accepted formulation. <sup>(1)</sup> These proposals included a state's sovereignty over its national wealth and natural resources, removal of foreign military bases, prohibition of experiments having harmful effects on other states, participation in international organizations and multilateral treaties affecting a state's legitimate interests, forbidding of discrimination among member states of the United Nations and recognition of the supremacy of international law.

A similar degree of general agreement was achieved by the Special Committee on a formulation for the principle on the peaceful settlement of disputes, although here again the need to compromise necessitated the abandonment of several additional proposals. <sup>(2)</sup> The text adopted unanimously was :

1. Every State shall settle its international disputes with other States by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
2. States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their international disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice. In seeking such a settlement the parties shall agree upon such peaceful means as may be appropriate to the circumstances and nature of the dispute;
3. The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the event of failure to reach a solution by any one of the above peaceful means, to continue to seek a settlement of the dispute by other peaceful means agreed upon by them;
4. States parties to an international dispute, as well as other States, shall refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation so as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations;
5. International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure freely agreed to by the parties shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality;

(1) See Document A/AC 125/4, April 11, 1966, Part II.  
(2) See Document A/AC 125/6, April 20, 1966, Part II.

6. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs prejudices or derogates from the applicable provisions of the Charter, in particular those relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes.

A number of delegations stated that they regarded this formulation as incomplete and only as a step towards wider agreement. Among the unagreed proposals submitted were the pre-eminence of negotiation as a means of peaceful settlement, the reference of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice, and that recourse to a regional agency does not preclude or diminish the right to have recourse direct to the United Nations.

No general agreement could be reached on the remaining five principles. Over the objections of most Western countries, including Canada, that General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) of December 21, 1965, which emanated from the First Committee, could be regarded as a universal and definitive legal statement of the non-intervention principle, the Special Committee decided "to abide by" the resolution and consequently to instruct the Drafting Committee to concentrate its efforts on additional proposals with an aim to widening the area of agreement represented by that resolution. <sup>(1)</sup> The Drafting Committee failed to agree, however, on any additions. On the important principle of the threat or use of force, the Special Committee was unable to go as far as in Mexico City. General agreement could be found for only two statements — the first a restatement of the principle and the second that wars of aggression constituted international crimes against peace for which there was responsibility under international law. As these two statements were considered inadequate by themselves, the Drafting Committee simply reported complete failure to reach any agreement.

It is clear from these results of the Special Committee's meeting that, to a large extent, it fell short of its appointed task of drafting a declaration incorporating formulations on all seven principles. What is not obvious from these results is the valuable opportunity the meeting provided to exchange views and clarify difficulties, thereby marking out more clearly the areas on which future efforts by the Special Committee may be concentrated. The report of its discussions, conclusions and recommendations will be presented to the Sixth Committee by the forthcoming twenty-first session of the General Assembly in December. It will then be for the Sixth Committee, in considering the limited progress achieved, to decide whether to recommend a renewal of the Special Committee's mandate so that this United Nations study of the principles of international law may be continued.


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(1) See Document A/AC 125/3, March 18, 1966.

## *Canada-France Interparliamentary Association*

A delegation of ten Canadian Members of Parliament, led by the Honourable Guy Favreau, President of the Privy Council, participated in the first regular meeting of the France-Canada Interparliamentary Association, which took place in Paris, April 21 to 23. In addition to Mr. Favreau, the Canadian delegation included Messrs Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Herbert E. Gray, Deane R. Gundlock, James N. Ormiston, Paul Tardif, Gilles Grégoire, Jean-Paul Matte, Robert W. Prittie and Paul Beaulieu.

The Canadian delegation went to France at the invitation of Mr. Chaban-Delmas, President of the French National Assembly; this invitation followed agreement during the Association's founding meeting in Ottawa in September 1965 that the first regular meeting should take place in France during 1966. The constitution provides for subsequent meetings to alternate annually between the two countries.



*The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Couve de Murville (second from left), recently received the Canadian delegation to the Canada-France Interparliamentary Association meeting in Paris. Shown in this picture with Mr. Couve de Murville are (left to right): Mr. Paul Tardif, M.P.; the Honourable Guy Favreau, President of the Privy Council; and Mr. Jules Léger, Canadian Ambassador to France.*



### **Subjects of Discussion**

In three working sessions, chaired jointly by Mr. Favreau and Mr. Achille Peretti, a Vice-President of the National Assembly, the French and Canadian Parliamentarians discussed Franco-Canadian economic and cultural relations and migration from France to Canada; they also heard Mr. Maurice Schumann, Chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, outline the French position on NATO. The delegates agreed to meet again in Canada during Expo '67.

While in Paris, the Canadian delegates were received by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Pompidou, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Couve de Murville, as well as by Mr. Chaban-Delmas. Before the working sessions, they were taken on a six-day tour of French industrial and cultural centres outside Paris, including Lyon, Saint-Etienne and Aix-en-Provence. They also made a trip through Normandy before leaving France.

# *Growth of the Canadian Foreign Service*

**T**HE Department of External Affairs was established by an Act of Parliament in May of 1909, and for three years the new Department, with its permanent Under-Secretary, was assigned to the Secretary of State. From 1912 to 1946, when the first separate Secretary of State for External Affairs was appointed, the conduct of Canada's relations with other countries formed part of the responsibilities of the successive Prime Ministers.

The creation of the Department in 1909 <sup>(1)</sup> stemmed largely from the need for more orderly methods of handling correspondence on external affairs, and by no means marked the emergence of Canada as a sovereign state. Much more important in the constitutional evolution of Canada was the Boundary Waters Treaty of the same year, which for the first time opened a direct channel of communications, by-passing London, between Canada and the United States, in the form of the International Joint Commission established by the Treaty. The Department began modestly with a total strength of six clerks and the Under-Secretary, a strength augmented a little later by an Assistant Under-Secretary and a Legal Adviser. Today, there are 58 Canadian embassies and offices of high commissioners accredited to 97 countries, staffed at home and abroad by a personnel of over 2,000.

## **Recognition of Sovereign Status**

International recognition of Canada as a sovereign state came only at the end of the 1914-18 War, when Canada signed the treaties of peace, became an independent member of the League of Nations, and was included on the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization. In 1925, a permanent representative was established in Geneva as Canada's delegate to the League, to other international agencies and to conferences. Earlier, in 1921, the Office of the Canadian High Commissioner in Britain came under the direction of the Department, still without diplomatic status.

Following the agreements of the Imperial Conference of 1926, Canada's autonomy in diplomatic and international affairs was recognized, and its first mission abroad was established in Washington in 1927, although it had been agreed to before the 1926 conference. In Paris, the former General Commissioner of Canada in France was appointed Minister in 1928. In 1929, a Canadian Legation was opened in Tokyo. No further missions were opened until 1939, when legations were established in Belgium and the Netherlands.

## **Effects of War**

The Second World War made imperative the extension of Canadian representa-

(1) For an interesting source document on this subject, see "Prelude to the Founding of the Department of External Affairs", *External Affairs*, March 1966, Pp. 104-107.

tion abroad. High commissioners were despatched to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland in 1940 and in 1941 to Newfoundland. Ministers were appointed to the U.S.S.R. and to China; and a minister was accredited to the various allied governments in exile (Belgium, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia). After the war, Canadian representation was expanded throughout Europe as a result of developing trade relations and military alliances.

During the war, missions had also been opened in Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Cuba). The decision to open missions in Latin America was based not only on the development of trade but also on the conviction that closer understanding was necessary for the solution of common problems posed by the war. Canada now has diplomatic relations with all the countries of Latin America.

### **Sudden Maturing**

The rapid growth of the Department and of departmental responsibilities since 1939 has imposed severe burdens on all the administrative services, burdens aggravated by the necessity of reconciling the demands of a rotational system (between Ottawa and the posts) with the increasing complexity and extent of administrative needs both at home and abroad. Staff had to be found and trained to enlarge existing missions and establish new ones, many in unhealthy climates and in areas where Canada had little or no experience. All the complex services of long-established foreign ministries and new services undertaken since the Second World War had to be created or expanded rapidly — in finance, communications, security, consular matters, recruiting and training, properties abroad, permanent delegations to the United Nations and NATO, representation at international conferences, external aid policies and programmes, interdepartmental co-operation at home and abroad. The Department had to mature suddenly, and to create a foreign service commensurate with Canada's importance in the changing and deeply disturbed world of international affairs.

The period of rapid expansion abroad has not yet run its course. As more nations achieve independence, and as Canada assumes an ever larger role in international organizations, Canadian representation abroad increases.

### **New Pattern**

This growth since the war has followed definite patterns. As one of the original members of the Commonwealth, Canada has been among the first to establish diplomatic relations with its new members. After 1947, high commissioners were accredited to India and Pakistan, and subsequently to most of the other new Commonwealth countries — Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda.

A similar growth has taken place in the expansion of Canada's relations with French-speaking countries. As in the case of the Commonwealth countries, common bonds of language, culture and systems of jurisprudence, have led to close ties with the emerging nations of the French Community.

The policy of extending Canada's relations with both the Commonwealth and French-speaking countries is most evident in Africa, where Canadian interests have expanded and created the need to establish or plan new diplomatic missions. Relations with the new African nations have developed also at the United Nations, as they became members of the world organization, which is dedicated to the promotion of international understanding and peace through collective diplomacy. Thus, by 1968, Canada will have 13 missions in Africa; five of these will be in French-speaking nations, five in Commonwealth countries, and three in other countries. These offices will have the usual political, cultural, consular, aid and trade responsibilities.

In the Commonwealth, as in the United Nations and in other international organizations, Canada has established a reputation for independent action. This is illustrated, among other instances, by its presence on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, where almost a quarter of the Department's foreign service officers have done tours of duty.

The swift growth of the Department of External Affairs has resulted from Canada's emergence as an economic power of international importance and the concomitant need for an independent foreign policy, in a broad context marked by the evolution of former British dominions and colonies (stimulated principally by Canada and South Africa) toward independent status. It is due also to Canada's ability and willingness to assume its full share of international responsibilities, a policy that has enjoyed widespread and constant support by the Canadian people.

The purpose of Canada's diplomatic and consular posts is the protection and advancement of the nation's interests throughout the world, an objective that involves the Department of External Affairs in a wide variety of duties. As these interests expand, so must the Department grow in order to discharge its responsibilities effectively.

## *Visit of the Foreign Minister of Zambia*

**T**HE Honourable Simon Kapwepwe, Foreign Minister of Zambia, accompanied by Mr. I. B. Manda of the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Ottawa from April 26 to 29, 1966, to discuss matters of concern to the Canadian and Zambian Governments, including the situation in Rhodesia. During his stay, he called on Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and the Minister of Trade and Commerce, the Honourable Robert Winters. He also attended discussions with the Director-General of the External Aid Office and officials of the Department of External Affairs. Mr. Kapwepwe expressed the gratitude of his Government for Canada's participation in the airlift of oil products to Zambia, which was terminated on April 30. He said that, without this timely assistance from Canada, Britain and the United States, which had come in a critical period for Zambia, his country would have been left in a very difficult position.



*The Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Simon Kapwepwe (centre), and Mr. I. B. Manda of the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conversation outside the Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa with Mr. Thomas Carter, Head of the African and Middle Eastern Division of Canada's Department of External Affairs.*

Zambia, a landlocked state in Central Africa, shares boundaries with seven other states including Tanzania, Congo (Leopoldville) and Rhodesia. It has an area of 290,000 square miles and a population of 3,500,000. Formerly the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, Zambia became independent on October 24, 1964. Northern Rhodesia was a member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which existed from 1953 to 1963. The Chief of State and Head of Government is President Kenneth Kaunda, who is also the leader of the United National Independence Party which holds the majority of the seats in the country's 75-seat National Assembly.

Mr. Kapwepwe who was born in Chinsali, Northern Rhodesia, in 1922, is a member of the Bemba tribe of Northern Zambia. Before entering politics, he was a teacher. During the mid-fifties, he spent some years studying in India and the United States. He was the Minister for African Agriculture in the Northern Rhodesian Government from 1962 to 1964, and has held the Foreign Affairs portfolio since independence.

# *The Problems of Under-development*

*Some of the more pressing problems that face the less-developed countries were outlined by Mr. H. O. Moran, Director-General of the External Aid Office, when he spoke in Toronto recently. Mr. Moran has held his present position since September 1960. The following is a partial text of his address :*

... It has now been generally recognized that all of the developing countries must take account of the "human factor" as an element just as important in economic growth as natural resources or capital. What most of these countries lack is not manpower but skills and training, ranging from the professional classes through technicians and craftsmen to semi-skilled labour.

Around 1960-61, when it was acknowledged that injections of capital alone were not sufficient to ensure adequate development, there was an important shift in emphasis by all donors towards more help in the field of training, both technical and academic. During the past five years, technical and education assistance has been the most rapidly-growing segment of the Canadian programme. During 1960, some 700 students were brought to Canada under the official aid programme, but this figure had more than tripled by 1965, when 2,300 training programmes were arranged in our country for students and trainees from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.

## **Regional Training Promoted**

The number of students coming to Canada from the developing countries will remain large in the years immediately ahead because the needs are so great and the facilities in the developing countries are so few. Nevertheless, Canada is doing all that it can to promote regional training, because it is expensive to send a student abroad for training. It is risky to lift a young man or young woman at an impressionable age out of an evolving society and set him down for long periods in a sophisticated community. It is preferable, in our view, to train these young people in the environment in which they will later live and on the type of equipment that will later be available to them. Consequently, our assistance in recent years has been designed to strengthen the existing facilities or create new ones, where necessary, in the overseas countries. During this past year, for example, we have provided the equipment for scores of secondary schools. We have helped to establish and staff university faculties in Nigeria, Tanzania, Rwanda, Malaysia, Thailand and India, and our assistance to the University of the West Indies continues to grow. We have assisted in the building of three engineering institutes in India and we have helped to set up a teacher-training college in Kuala Lumpur, plus schools of accounting in Pakistan and a trades-training centre in Ghana. Last autumn, four secondary schools, constructed,

equipped and staffed by Canada, were opened in the Little Eight Islands of the West Indies and two more will soon be completed.

Part of this same effort has been the recruitment of Canadian professors, teachers and technical advisers for overseas service, which has grown from 83 at the end of 1960 to a total of 545 last year and will approach 800 in 1966 — representing a tenfold increase in a six-year period.

This type of assistance will continue to be a major part of the Canadian effort, but those persons who advocate the concentration of massive amounts of aid funds on education should be reminded that the number of students receiving degrees and diplomas must not outdistance too rapidly the creation of job opportunities, and therefore the expansion of educational assistance must be related to other forms of development. A few of these countries already have larger numbers of university graduates than they can appropriately absorb at this stage, and it will be no service to them to train more people for unemployment.

In many respects, population growth is the most serious problem of all, because it not only stultifies economic advances but also creates grave social problems. Attention was focused on this subject at the most recent annual Colombo Plan conference, when the Indian delegate described population increase as a major obstacle to his country's development.

In both India and Pakistan, reasonable progress has been made in recent years under their national development plans, but a sizeable portion of these gains has been cancelled out by the increased number of people who must be fed, clothed, educated and employed.

Figures of annual percentage increases become significant only in terms of the population base to which the percentage must be applied. The true situation is revealed more vividly by calculations like these :

Forty-five per cent of Pakistan's population of 110 million is below the age of 15, a group which consumes without producing.

In the past 15 years, two-thirds of the increase in Pakistan's national income has been pre-empted by the growth in population.

The population density in East Pakistan is approximately 1,200 a square mile. In Ontario it is 18, and in Quebec it is 10. Even allowing for our unsettled expanses in the North, this is a striking contrast.

It has been estimated that, on current trends, the population in both India and Pakistan will double by the end of this century, which, in the case of India, will mean one billion people.

On the basis of the present annual increase, India has about 1,400 additional mouths to feed each hour. The current food emergency in that country, which may reach crisis proportions during 1966, has resulted in part from drought conditions, but a major factor has been the alarming increase in the number of food consumers.



### **Food Aid Programme**

From the inception of the Colombo Plan in 1951 until 1964, Canada had contributed \$155 million of foodstuffs to feed hungry people in Southeast Asia. In that year the Government introduced a separate Food Aid Programme, so that the expenditures for food would not be a charge on the monies voted for economic development purposes. The initial allocation for this new programme was \$22 million. The following year it was increased to \$35 million. This year, when severe shortages arose in India and elsewhere, this figure was raised to \$75 million, which will make it possible to ship to India during 1966 a total of one million tons of wheat, thus moving Canada ahead of the U.S.A. as a contributor of wheat to India on a comparative basis either of population or gross national product.

In addition to the gifts of food for immediate consumption, Canada has been furnishing aid designed to increase India's own food-producing capacity. Several weeks ago the *Globe and Mail* published an editorial under the caption "The Arithmetic of Hunger". From my own experience of living and travelling in Southeast Asia during this past decade, I can give personal support to the editor's statement that:

Agriculture must become the first national industry, population control the first national policy.

As to the former, Canada has for a number of years been contributing substantially to the improvement of India's agricultural production. Of the \$300 million of grant funds which Canada has allocated to India since 1951, a large portion has gone to the agricultural sector in the form of fertilizers, pesticides, crop-spraying equipment, land-use studies, agricultural advisers and large irrigation projects. When I was in New Delhi last May, I was authorized to advise both the Finance Minister and the Minister of Food of Canada's willingness to allocate additional amounts of its funds to agricultural production if that was the wish of the Indian Government.

### **Population Control**

As for the editor's other statement, that population control must be the first national policy, I am afraid that, so far, India and Pakistan have received little external help with this urgent problem, although the desire for family planning is stronger in these two countries today than at any other time in their history. Through WHO, UNICEF, various national aid programmes, and through voluntary organizations like the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the developing areas have received the advantages of the latest medical research, modern medicines, support for national health programmes and more effective techniques to lower the death rate but, paradoxically, they have not been given any similar help in family planning.

We all recognize that this is a delicate area for many governments and,

therefore, any assistance in the formulation and execution of a population control programme through the provision of literature, advisory services and needed materials will probably have to come mainly through international and private agencies, at least in the foreseeable future.

### **Debt Repayment**

In addition to the strain imposed on the economies by the population explosion, the needs of the less-developed countries for increased amounts of external aid stem in large measure from what has been termed the "debt explosion". Repayments being made by the less-developed countries on external loans already represent about half the value of the aid they are receiving from outside sources and, if this aid continues at about its present level and on the same terms, it is estimated that, by 1980, the repayment outflows will be as great as the incoming assistance. In other words, the foreign aid available at that time will be sufficient only to balance off the debt repayments. These are sobering statistics.

The situation is due in part to heavy borrowing by the developing countries, but it is mainly because the credit offered by a number of the industrialized nations has not been on sufficiently favourable terms.

Some years ago a special loan was extended by Canada at the prevailing rate of interest to enable India to purchase foodstuffs in a time of serious shortages. Last month the Canadian Government decided, subject to Parliamentary approval, to forgive the remaining payments, amounting to about \$10 million on this loan, as a means of providing additional help to India in its critical balance-of-payments situation. This may be one more Canadian initiative in the field of aid which other donors to India will eventually follow.

### **Outright Canadian Grants**

However, Canadian aid from the outset has been predominantly in the form of outright grants because we concluded that the most effective assistance we could offer would be the transfer of some of our resources to the developing countries without placing any future claim on their scarce foreign exchange. If we had given our aid in commercial-type loans, a country like India, which has now received nearly \$300 million of grant assistance, would have been exposed to an even more serious financial crisis than it faces today. In 1964, the Canadian Government announced a doubling of its aid programme and the provision for the first time of development loans for countries which were in a position to accept this type of financing. These were interest-free loans, with a ten-year period of grace and repayment to be made over the subsequent 40 years. Until last summer, when Britain announced its intention to introduce a similar programme, no other aid-giving nation had offered loans on such highly concessional terms. Even today, the average terms of Canadian assistance to India and Pakistan, which are the major recipients of Western aid, remain "softer" than those of any other donor country.

# *The World Veterans Federation*

A peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem, disarmament, international trade and development, and aid to the bereaved families of servicemen were the chief topics discussed at the Council Meeting of the World Veterans Federation held in Toronto from May 1 to 6, 1966. The Council delegates, who were meeting in Canada for the first time, heard addresses by members of the Government, met the Governor General in Ottawa, and visited Niagara Falls as guests of the Province of Ontario.

Canada was one of the six original members of the Federation, and the Canadian association played a significant role in its founding in 1950. The principal aims of the WVF are "to maintain international peace and security by the application in the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations . . ." and "to defend the spiritual and material interests of war veterans and war victims by all legal and institutional means".

## **Canadian Affiliates**

Since its establishment, the WVF has grown to include over 20 million members in 49 countries, Korea and the Philippines being officially represented for the first time this year. Canadian veterans' associations affiliated with the Federation include the Army, Navy and Air Force, the War Pensioners of Canada, the Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blind, the Canadian National Railways War Veterans Association, the Royal Canadian Air Force Association and the War Amputations of Canada.

The World Veterans Federation strongly endorses the aims and aspirations of the United Nations and the Canadian Government supports its efforts to bring about their attainment. The Federation holds a Category A Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and works in close co-operation with such groups as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund. Close working relations are also maintained with the International Labour Organization and with other agencies working in the Federation's many fields of interest.

The meeting of the Council, which is convened annually to review the implementation of the politics of the WVF General Assembly, was formally opened by the Honourable Roger Teillet, Minister of Veterans Affairs, who welcomed the delegates on behalf of the Department of Veterans Affairs and, in the Prime Minister's absence, read the speech Mr. Pearson was to have delivered to the 300 delegates, representatives of the Canadian group and guests. At the close of their week-long deliberations, the delegates adopted a number of resolutions on issues of universal concern. The resolution on

Vietnam urged members of the Federation to work to achieve "... peace, with freedom, in a manner compatible with the sovereign rights of the people of Vietnam to freedom, independence, and self-determination".

### **Disarmament Conference Urged**

It was resolved that a world conference on disarmament should be held no later than 1967, in conformity with Resolution 2030 of the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Member associations and other national veterans organizations were called on to urge their governments to assist actively in effecting comprehensive preparations for such a conference and to ensure that the conference would produce concrete and essential results.

On May 4, more than 80 delegates and guests were brought to Ottawa by the RCAF to attend a formal banquet tendered by the Canadian Government, at which ministers, ambassadors, trade commissioners and dignitaries from the 49 countries in the World Veterans Federation had been invited.

### **Message of Mr. Martin**

The main speaker on this occasion was the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, who said, in part :

"I have long admired the generous and practical support your organization has given to the idea of a peaceful and orderly society of nations. Moreover, the holding of your first Council meeting in Canada is an event with which the Government is proud to be associated.

"I am more pleased to be here tonight because I am able to announce a decision by the Government of Canada, subject to the approval of Parliament, to make a grant of \$5,000 towards the establishment by the World Veterans Federation of an international peace-keeping information centre. I can think of no organization more appropriately fitted to initiate and manage such a centre, which would have as its purpose to act as clearing-house on peace-keeping research and to stimulate international interest in this vital subject. These are objectives with which Canadians have been and continue to be closely identified . . . .

"Step by step, both through the agencies of the United Nations and through other activities of nations committed to peace, we are advancing towards the goal of international order and security. In these efforts it is of the utmost importance to have public understanding and sympathy in many nations for the work of peace. I know that, among the many organizations which work to achieve this understanding, we can count on the World Veterans Federation to take a significant part in this vital endeavour."

## *Nam Ngum Power Project*

**T**HE agreement establishing the Nam Ngum Development Fund was signed on May 4, 1966, at the headquarters of the World Bank in Washington, D.C., by the representatives of Canada, the United States, Australia, Denmark, Japan, Laos, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand and the World Bank. The Fund will be used to finance the Nam Ngum hydro-electric power project on a tributary of the Mekong River about 48 miles from Vientiane, Laos, and a transmission-link with Thailand.

Seven participating countries have agreed to provide grants totalling the equivalent of \$22,815,000 (U.S.), as follows: United States (\$12,065,000), Japan (\$4 million), the Netherlands (\$3,300,000), Canada (\$2 million), Denmark (\$600,000), Australia (\$500,000), and New Zealand (\$350,000).

### **Thai-Laotian Agreement**

In addition, Thailand and Laos have signed an agreement under which Thailand will make the equivalent of \$1 million available for the purchase of cement from Thailand for use in construction of the Nam Ngum projects and will supply power to Laos during the construction period. Laos will repay the funds and the power consumed by supplying the equivalent amount of power from Nam Ngum when the station is in operation.

The \$23,815,000 will cover the estimated costs of building a dam, a powerhouse with installed generating capacity of up to 30,000 kilowatts and transmission-lines from the dam to Vientiane and onward to Udornthani in Northeast Thailand. The World Bank is to serve as administrator of the Fund and will exercise general supervision over the project.

The Nam Ngum project was given high priority by the Mekong Committee, which was set up in 1957 within the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) by the Governments of Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand to study the development of the lower Mekong basin. Feasibility studies of Nam Ngum were arranged by the Mekong Committee and financed by Japan and the United Nations Special Fund.

A protocol was signed at a recent meeting of the Mekong Committee in New Delhi, registering the satisfaction of the Governments of Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam, as members, with the arrangements made in the Nam Ngum Development Fund agreement.

### **Canadian Survey**

Canada has an earlier association with Mekong development. The original reconnaissance survey of the Mekong River was made for ECAFE more than ten years ago by General Raymond Wheeler, who was chief of the U.S. Corps

of Engineers. Since then, the region has been mapped by Canadian aerial survey teams and Canada and the United States have provided topographical maps. Canada, in co-operation with the Philippines, produced large-scale maps of reaches of the river most suited to power-dams and irrigation projects. Financed by a Canadian contribution of \$1,300,000, mapping started in 1960 and field-work stages were completed by 1962.

The Mekong is one of the world's great rivers, flowing 1,300 miles from the Burma-China boundaries to the South China Sea. It has several times the flow of water of the Yellow River of China but most of the water flows to the sea without aiding the economy of the countries through which it passes. Not a kilowatt of electricity is generated, there are no bridges or any major irrigation works. United Nations' authorities believe it would be possible to use the river to irrigate a million acres of rice-producing land.

## *Canadian Economic Mission to France*

*The following announcement was made by the Office of the Prime Minister on May 20, 1966 :*

The Prime Minister announces that, in keeping with the Government's policy of developing closer economic relations with France, a Canadian Economic Mission has been organized to visit France in June.

The Government of France has warmly welcomed this initiative and has proposed a programme which should assure this Mission a very fruitful visit.

The Mission will visit France from June 4 to June 15 inclusive. It will examine and report on prospects for closer relations between the Canadian and the French business communities. In particular, it will identify industries and other areas of business activity where there are opportunities, on a reciprocal basis, for closer relationships, particularly through exchange of technical information, investment, and links between like-minded organizations in each country.

The Mission will be led by the Minister of Industry, the Honourable C. M. Drury. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Jean-Charles Cantin, M.P., will be a member. The balance of 22 members, all outstanding in their respective fields, is drawn both from the public service and from the business, financial and academic communities . . . .

It is expected that the Mission will lead to private initiatives of a more specialized character and that these in turn will achieve the closer economic relations sought. While these initiatives are to be pursued by non-governmental sectors of the community, the Government will give them every appropriate encouragement, the Prime Minister said.

## *A Canadian Embassy for Addis Ababa*

**D**IPLOMATIC relations were established between Canada and Ethiopia on April 12, 1966, with the presentation by Mr. Michel Gauvin, Canada's first Ambassador to Ethiopia, of his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie at the Jubilee Palace in Addis Ababa. In attendance on His Imperial Majesty were the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Mr. Aklilou Habte-Wolde, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ketema Yifru, the Finance Minister, Mr. Yilma Deressa, and the Minister of National Defence, Lieutenant-General Merid Menguesha. Mr. David N. Coyle, Third Secretary in the Canadian Embassy, accompanied Mr. Gauvin.

Mr. Gauvin conveyed to the Emperor the warm greetings Governor-General and Mme Vanier had asked him to express on their behalf. He said that the high international standing of His Imperial Majesty and of Ethiopia had been major factors in the decision of the Canadian Government to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. The Emperor expressed his satisfaction at the establishment of a Canadian Embassy in Ethiopia and declared his deep



*Mr. Michel Gauvin, Canada's first Ambassador to Ethiopia, presents his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie at the Jubilee Palace in Addis Ababa. Also shown in this photograph is the Palace Chamberlain, Mr. Wolde Giorgis.*



fondness and admiration for the Governor-General and Mme Vanier. He recalled his visits to Canada in 1954 and 1963, and the cordial reception he had received everywhere, particularly at Rideau Hall (Government House).

### **An Age-old Independence**

Ethiopia has been an independent monarchy for several thousand years, with only a brief period of Italian colonial rule. His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie is a direct descendant of the 3,000-year-old line of Solomon. Today, the Emperor has set himself the task of modernizing Ethiopia in such a way as to harmonize deeply-rooted traditionalism with the demands of twentieth-century life. Ethiopia is one of the most important countries in Africa, not only because of its historical independence but also because of the personality of the Emperor, who has consistently been a staunch supporter of African independence and African unity. He has been a peacemaker in a number of inter-African disputes.

The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa have their headquarters in Addis Ababa and this enhances the importance of that capital as an African centre. The importance of Ethiopia is also due to the Emperor's visits to foreign countries, including Canada, the opening of many diplomatic missions in Ethiopia and the impressive list of conferences, both national and international, held in Addis Ababa over the past few years.

Canadian-Ethiopian relations have been marked by friendship for many years, particularly because of the work of hundreds of Canadian educators who have, since 1945, helped to organize the educational system of Ethiopia. Canadian teachers in Ethiopia, both missionary and private, total some 200 at present.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **France, Canada and NATO**

*Asked in the House of Commons on May 20 whether, in view of "the unilateral decision taken by the leader of France, in which he has decreed that all the forces of NATO countries be invited to move out of France", the Canadian Government intended "to remain within the NATO alliance" and whether Canadian forces would remain in Europe, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, replied :*

I have indicated already that Canada joined with the 14 other countries in NATO to reaffirm its belief in the alliance and in the NATO organization. The extent of our participation in Europe is a matter which naturally is being considered by the Government and will be the subject of some negotiation and consultation in the NATO Council. But let there be no misunderstanding : Canada, along with the 14, adheres to NATO and regards the reasons for its existence as being of vital interest to this country as well as to the other members of the alliance.

*To a supplementary inquiry whether the Federal Republic of Germany had offered Canada locations for its NATO bases, Mr. Martin replied :*

The matter of the relocation of Canadian forces now occupying two bases in France, as my honourable friend the Minister of National Defence has indicated, has not yet been settled. This, likewise, will be a matter involving decisions of the Government of Canada and negotiation with the country where Canada proposes to relocate.

## **Canada-West Indies Conference**

*The following statement was made to the House of Commons on April 29 by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson :*

Following my visit to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago late last year, it was decided to hold a meeting of officials to make preparations for the holding of a conference at the level of heads of government. This meeting took place in Kingston, Jamaica, towards the end of January. The representatives of the various Commonwealth Caribbean countries and Canada who attended that meeting agreed to recommend that the conference take place July 6-8. I had indicated our willingness to have this conference in Canada, if it was the wish of the other countries concerned, but I had also made it clear that we would be willing to go to the West Indies if that was preferred. The officials' meeting

in Kingston agreed, however, to recommend that our offer to hold the conference in Canada be accepted.

The officials' meeting also made recommendations concerning the agenda. It was agreed that discussions might be held under the following broad headings : trade, development aid, transport and communications, migration, other economic questions, international questions of mutual interest, and cultural relations.

I am pleased to report that the Prime Ministers of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and British Guiana have expressed concurrence with the recommendations of the preparatory meeting in Kingston, and that informal indications of agreement have been received from the Governments of Antigua, Barbados, British Honduras, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. The conference of heads of government of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and Canada will, therefore, take place in Ottawa, July 6-8.

This conference will, I hope, be only the beginning of a process of even closer and more productive consultation and practical co-operation between the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and Canada. As such, it will mark a new stage in the special relationship which Canada has traditionally had with the West Indies.

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

NATO Ministerial Meeting : Brussels, June 6-8.

International Labour Organization, fiftieth conference : Geneva, June 1-23

Governing Council of UN Development Programme, second session : Milan, June 8-24

World Land Reform Conference : Rome, June 20 - July 2

Canada-West Indies Conference : Ottawa, July 6-8

ECOSOC, forty-first session : Geneva, July 5 - August 5

International Labour Organization, eighth American regional meeting : Ottawa, September 2-23

International Atomic Energy Agency : Vienna, September

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Board of Governors : Washington, September

United Nations General Assembly : New York, September 20

International Monetary Fund, Board of Governors : Washington, September

Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting : Ottawa, October 5-6

UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session : Paris, October 25 - November 30

Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians : Huddersfield, England, October 17-29

Food and Agriculture Organization : Rome, October

## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. R. W. Murray posted from the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to Ottawa, effective April 12, 1966.

Mr. R. G. Hughes resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective April 15, 1966.

Mr. E. J. Bergbusch posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, to Ottawa, effective April 26, 1966.

Mr. J. M. J. Hughes posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, effective April 28, 1966.

Mr. G. L. Morris posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective May 2, 1966.

Mr. E. Gorn appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer 1, effective May 2, 1966.

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## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Action

#### Bilateral

##### India

Financial Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of India.  
Signed at Ottawa March 29, 1966.

Entered into force March 29, 1966.

##### Malaysia

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Malaysia concerning the provision of military transport aircraft.

Signed at Kuala Lumpur April 22, 1966.

Entered into force April 22, 1966.

##### Tanzania

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania concerning the provision of military transport and liaison aircraft.

Signed at Dar-es-Salaam April 30, 1966.

Entered into force April 30, 1966.

## Multilateral

Procès-Verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Done at Geneva December 14, 1965.

Signed by Canada March 25, 1966.

Procès-Verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Done at Geneva December 14, 1965.

Signed by Canada March 25, 1966.

Procès-Verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Done at Geneva December 14, 1965.

Signed by Canada March 25, 1966.

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 21, 1947.

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited March 29, 1966.

Entered into force for Canada March 29, 1966.

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962.

Done at Washington April 4, 1966.

Signed by Canada April 28, 1966.

Nam Ngum Development Fund Agreement, 1966.

Done at Washington, D.C., May 4, 1966.

Signed by Canada May 4, 1966.

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.

Signed by Canada February 5, 1962.

Canadian Instrument of Ratification deposited May 26, 1966.

Entered into force for Canada June 25, 1966.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

MINISTERIAL MEETING, BRUSSELS, 1966

**T**HE first meeting of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization following the decisions by the French Government, announced in March 1966, that France would withdraw from the integrated military structure and would require that NATO military headquarters be removed from French territory was the meeting in Brussels early in June of the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session. Since 14 members of NATO other than France had decided, in the light of the French decision, to maintain the integrated military structure without France, two interrelated problems had to be solved:

- (a) how to reach agreement among the 14 on any necessary or desirable reorganization of the military structure;
- (b) how to work out new relations between France and the 14 so that France, while not participating in the integrated military structure, could continue as a member of the alliance. (A rather tight time-table had been laid down by the French Government for the execution of their decisions.)

The regular ministerial meeting was itself unusual in that, in addition to the regular examination of international relations — which focused, on this occasion, on East-West relations —, considerable time was devoted to working out procedures for conducting negotiations between France and the 14. The foreign ministers of the 14 also met informally at Brussels among themselves to discuss problems related to the continuing military structure and to negotiations with France.

The texts follow of the report on the ministerial meeting to the House of Commons on June 10 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and of the communiqué issued immediately after the meeting:

## **Report to Parliament**

... I wish to report to the House on the NATO ministerial meeting which took place this week in Brussels . . . .

The discussions at this meeting covered a wide range of problems, but our attention was necessarily concentrated on issues directly related to the French decision, while remaining within the alliance, to withdraw from the integrated military structure.

The nature of the main problems that we had to discuss, which were internal to the alliance, made necessary an unprecedented organization of work. The meetings on Monday, June 6, were among the foreign ministers of the 14 countries, to which the Government of France had sent communications. It also proved



necessary in the case of the regular ministerial meetings for the 14 ministers to hold meetings several times separately in order to work out among themselves a common position on issues under negotiation with the French. This, too, was an unprecedented procedural development and one which could have created difficulty. That it worked smoothly I regard as evidence of the goodwill of all members of the alliance. I am also encouraged to think that it reflected their genuine desire to develop forms of relations which would make possible continuing co-operation in the future.

Never, in my experience, has there been a NATO meeting where the exchanges were franker, and perhaps where the problems were more difficult. This was hardly surprising. Ministers found when they reached Brussels that, both among the 14 and as between the 14 and France, they were divided on two important questions: the 14 had differing and strongly-held views as to whether a new site should be chosen for the North Atlantic Council, and previous efforts to find a formula to cover negotiations between France and the 14 over the future role of French forces in Germany had proved abortive.

These two issues of the meetings — the site of the NATO Council and the negotiating procedures for French forces in Germany — involved for us a common concern. At stake in each case was the continued unity of the alliance. We avoided open breaches. Orderly procedures for examining our differences were agreed upon. Time was gained. I do not deny that we have difficult problems ahead of us. The 14 proved to themselves that they could hold to a common position, and France found that its allies were ready to compromise in order to preserve the unity of the alliance.

Now, reporting on these very vital meetings, I do not want to give an exaggerated impression of the achievements of the meeting. In concrete terms, we succeeded in working out a procedure for conducting negotiations on the several problems involving all members of the alliance which are posed by the French decision to withdraw from the integrated military structure. Moreover, the intensive and delicate discussions which led up to this agreement, and which lasted for two days, were marked by efforts on both sides to resist any formula which they considered might prejudice their position in the negotiations which would ensue. This confirmed what we already knew — that it will prove extremely difficult to find a way to reconcile at the same time the requirement of the 14 that French forces remaining in Germany should undertake a militarily significant role with French insistence on the principle that their forces should not be integrated.

The question at issue here is the extent of the military co-operation which the French Government will be prepared to provide as a substitute for participation in the integrated military structure; for it is necessary to have a concerted planning in peace-time if there is to be effective response in emergencies and concerted action in war. The outcome of these complex and crucial negotiations cannot be forecast, but they are at least fairly launched.

The other issue faced at Brussels concerned the future site of the North Atlantic Council. This was the main issue which divided the 14. There were some who felt keenly that a decision had to be taken immediately to move the Council from Paris. With SHAPE, the military headquarters, obliged to leave French territory, they argued the case for the collocation of the military and civil headquarters.

A decision to move the Council from Paris would be an important political action. I argued: would it have been right to have taken such a step before testing French intentions; before discovering whether co-operative military arrangements could be worked out between the French and the 14 who have decided to maintain the integrated military structure — even before President de Gaulle had visited Moscow, even before the French Foreign Minister had reached Brussels and had a chance to show, in consultation with his colleagues, whether satisfactory arrangements could be worked out with France? How could we hope to work out such arrangements with France, the Canadian delegation argued, if our first action as the 14 was to anticipate that our negotiations with the French would fail?

These are the questions I put to my colleagues. No matter how valid some of the arguments for moving the Council might be, we maintained it was too early to take a decision. Eventually, after the fullest discussion, the 14 ministers agreed to defer consideration of the question until October.

The French Foreign Minister later spoke in the ministerial meeting of the position taken by the 14. He said the French Government would be pleased if the 14 decided that the Council should remain in Paris but, if it were decided to move the Council, France would understand the reasons. This statement... helped to clear the atmosphere. When we do approach this problem again in the autumn, President de Gaulle will have visited the Soviet Union and we shall have a clearer idea of the limits of military co-operation between France and the 14. Then, in reaching our decision, facts rather than expectations can guide us.

If two of the principal achievements of the meetings emerged out of conflict, the third important element — the emphasis on improving East-West relations — developed without opposition. Here, I am pleased to report, agreement was complete. All ministers recognized the need to increase bilateral contacts with the countries of Eastern Europe. They saw this as having value in itself and as a necessity for the creation of an atmosphere propitious for the negotiations which must eventually take place on the German settlement. The ministers decided that a report on the possibilities for developing East-West relations should be prepared for their future use.

This unanimity of approach was most encouraging. It demonstrated the extent to which the members of the alliance share a common political outlook, agreeing on the aims of policy and on the prospects for making progress. All members reiterated that a European settlement was our basic objective. But the

road to that settlement will be long. It is the intractability of the problems, rather than any lack of will to pursue solutions, which makes progress inevitably slow.

The proof of the measure of agreement and the motives underlying it are expressed in the final communiqué. By the standards of earlier communiqués, I regard this communiqué as forward-looking . . . .

The Brussels meeting can, I think, be described as fruitful in the sense that, a week before the meeting began, it seemed that we were headed for a confrontation between France and the 14 which threatened to lead to a complete breach. But a confrontation was avoided and a sense of shared interest prevailed. All countries agreed — and this is important — that the maintenance of the Atlantic alliance is as necessary today as ever. They further confirmed that, to this end, its members are pledged, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Our problems are not resolved . . . — indeed, the crucial issues have yet to be faced — but necessary preliminary decisions have been taken. For this we have the alliance and the NATO Council machinery to thank. Once again, this time in new and in many ways more difficult circumstances, the value and the resilience of the alliance were demonstrated. We did our best to avoid unnecessary decisions which could have destroyed the alliance at this stage. We discussed many other problems, including Cyprus, but I have outlined today the essential ones because they involve the unity of the alliance. What the future holds for the 15 has yet to be determined but at any rate, as I have said, we have bought time.

### **Final Communiqué**

The Council met in ministerial session in Brussels, June 7 and 8, 1966.

2. The Council reviewed the state of the alliance. After a frank exchange of views, ministers agreed that the maintenance of the Atlantic alliance is as necessary today as ever, in order to safeguard the freedom and the common heritage of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The first aim of the Atlantic alliance is the common defence of all member countries; to this end its members are pledged, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

3. Ministers agreed to examine, in the light of the principles and obligations of the Treaty, and in a co-operative manner, the problems raised by the French memoranda of last March, in order to reach as soon as possible solutions acceptable to all concerned and which assure continued security. At this meeting the Council:

(a) noted the statement made by Mr. Luns on the discussions which had taken place on June 6 among 14 ministers;

(b) agreed to transfer the military headquarters of NATO from France;

(c) extended a unanimous invitation to the Benelux countries to provide a new site for SHAPE;

(d) agreed that some simplification of the Command Structure should be carried out. This will be achieved in the first instance in the Centre by combining under a single commander and in one headquarters the staffs now divided between the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Central Europe, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Land and Air Forces in Central Europe. This headquarters will be moved to a new location either in Benelux or Germany;

(e) agreed that further studies will be necessary in order to establish the precise requirements and the possibilities of hospitality in the different countries, noted that the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic, the Secretary-General and the NATO Military Authorities had been requested to undertake these studies forthwith; and further noted that, as soon as the required information was available, final decisions would have to be taken as a matter of urgency;

(f) extended a unanimous invitation to Italy to provide a new site for the NATO Defence College;

(g) agreed that the Standing Group will be abolished and replaced by appropriate alternative arrangements, including an integrated international Military Staff;

(h) noted the statement by Mr. Luns in connection with the site of the Council and also the statement of the French Foreign Minister on this subject.

4. With regard to the procedures for negotiation, ministers agreed that:

(a) the questions which need to be settled jointly between the allies as a consequence of French communications will in the first instance be discussed in the Council in permanent session;

(b) prominent among these questions are the tasks and missions of French forces in Germany, including their co-operation with NATO forces and command arrangements;

(c) other questions such as French participation in NADGE and NATO infrastructure projects will be discussed in the same way;

(d) the Council in permanent session may, of course, make any arrangements it wishes for discussion of these questions. It may, for example, decide to set up smaller groups to deal with some or all of the questions. When the political problems have been discussed and sufficient agreement reached on them, the elaboration of the necessary military arrangements will be referred to discussions between the French High Command and SACEUR;

(e) if the Council in permanent session can make no progress, discussion will be resumed at ministerial level.

5. In reviewing the international situation, ministers discussed the relations of their countries with the Soviet Union and the East European countries.

6. In view of the basic aims of the Soviet Union, the level of its armed forces, and its continuing allocation of a high proportion of economic and technological resources for military purposes, the ministers concluded that it is

imperative for the West to maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defence.

7. Ministers had an extended discussion about the main problems affecting European security. They reaffirmed the terms of their declaration of December 16, 1958, with regard to Berlin. They regretted the absence of progress on the important question of German reunification and the continued attempts to discredit the Federal Republic of Germany. Taking note of the positive initiative taken by the German Government in their note of March 25, 1966, ministers reaffirmed that the solution of the German problem is one of the central issues in East-West relations, and they agreed on the necessity of a continued and unremitting search for a peaceful solution that would give satisfaction to the German people's fundamental right to reunification.

8. The defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty is indisputable. It is clearly stated in the undertaking by the signatories to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter by refraining from the use of force to settle international disputes. Furthermore, the defensive character of the alliance has been repeatedly proved by the restraint and moderation shown by its members in the last 17 years, even when confronted by provocation and hostile actions affecting the Treaty area. Owing to the conditions of security created and maintained by an effective common defence of the North Atlantic area, political consultation among partners allows initiatives to be taken which can contribute not only to the stability of East-West relations but also to the general well-being of mankind.

9. If progress is to be made with regard to the complex problems of a European settlement, a determination to resolve the issues must exist on all sides. The peaceful ending of the division of Europe remains a principal purpose of the alliance, the objective being a Europe that will once again be one, and a Germany that will once again be united.

10. Meanwhile, member countries are seeking further to improve relations between the peoples of Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and to diminish mutual suspicions and fears. They are convinced that further tangible results could now be obtained in the cultural, economic, scientific and technical fields.

11. Ministers directed the permanent representatives to continue to examine closely the prospects of healthy developments in East-West relations, and to prepare a full report on these questions for meetings to be attended, as far as is practicable, by the foreign ministers of the various countries. This report, which should deal with all possible initiatives in this field, would cover, *inter alia*, problems connected with European security and German reunification.

12. Ministers expressed their continuing interest in progress towards general, complete and controlled disarmament. They expressed great concern over the problem of nuclear proliferation in its world-wide implications and their determination to continue their efforts to solve this problem. In particular, the governments concerned in the 18-power Geneva Conference reaffirmed their intention to do their utmost to achieve positive results.

13. With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, ministers took note of the Secretary-General's report on the "watching brief" and confirmed their support for the continuation of his activities in this respect. They welcomed the announcement made by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey to the effect that "the Governments of Greece and Turkey, inspired by a sincere desire to facilitate a peaceful and agreed solution of the Cyprus problem and to improve their relations, have decided to proceed to contacts and exchanges of views on the Cyprus question and on Greek-Turkish relations. The procedure to be followed during these contacts will be decided in common". The ministers reiterated their appreciation of the continued presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and expressed their support of the efforts of the United Nations for safeguarding peace and improving the situation in the island.

14. Ministers reaffirmed their desire to promote economic co-operation in the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. They acknowledged the need to join efforts in order to promote research in the scientific, technical and production fields, and achieve a wider co-operation and exchange of information so that, in a world of rapid scientific progress, the gap in technological achievement between Europe and North America can be narrowed.

15. All economically-advanced countries, those of East and West alike, have a common responsibility to co-operate in attacking the fundamental problems confronting the developing countries. Progress towards political settlements and disarmament will contribute to this end by releasing resources and energies which are so badly needed for the advancement of human welfare.

16. The Council, agreeing that efforts should be continued to supply Greece and Turkey with defence assistance within the framework of the alliance, in order to help them maintain an effective contribution to the common defence, adopted a resolution recommending wider participation in this aid programme.

17. Ministers received a progress report on the activities of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers which was created by the Council in 1965. A further report will be submitted to the Council during the ministerial session in December.

18. In view of the importance of science and technology to the military strength of the alliance and the economic vitality of its members, ministers noted with satisfaction the recently agreed improvements in procedures for co-operation among members of the alliance in research, development and production of military equipment. They encouraged member countries to bring suitable projects forward for co-operative action.

19. They noted that a meeting of defence ministers will be convened in July to review and carry forward the institution of force-planning procedures for projecting and adjusting annually a five-year programme.

20. A meeting of the Council at ministerial level will be held in December 1966.

## *British Guiana Becomes Guyana*

**A**FTER ALMOST a century and a half of British rule, British Guiana achieved its independence at midnight on May 25, 1966, when the Union Jack was supplanted by the arrowheaded flag of Guyana. The new nation of 620,000 people became the twenty-third member of the Commonwealth, and has made application for entry into the United Nations.

The Duke and Duchess of Kent were present as personal representatives of Her Majesty the Queen, and participated in nearly all the significant ceremonies arranged for independence week. Of the 76 nations invited, 65 sent representatives, among whom was Canada's Minister of Transport, the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, accompanied by Mrs. Pickersgill. The Honourable Milton F. Gregg, Canada's first High Commissioner to Guyana, and Mr. L. Dyke, the Canadian Trade Commissioner based in Trinidad and Tobago, were also included in the official Canadian delegation. During his five-day stay, Mr. Pickersgill paid a courtesy call on the Prime Minister, the Honourable L. F. S. Burnham, and met with the Governor and other senior officials. On behalf of the Gov-



*The Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, Minister of Transport and Canada's official delegate to the independence ceremonies in Guyana (centre), presents an Eskimo carving to Prime Minister L. F. S. Burnham of Guyana. Canada's first High Commissioner to Guyana, the Honourable Milton F. Gregg, looks on.*

ernment of Canada, Mr. Pickersgill presented Guyana with books to the value of \$10,000 (Canadian). As a personal token, he gave Prime Minister Burnham a piece of Eskimo sculpture.

In a radio broadcast, Mr. Pickersgill conveyed the greetings and good wishes of the Canadian people to the people of Guyana on their attainment of independence. His message, which was paralleled by a statement broadcast the same day over the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, recalled the old ties between the two countries, including their mutual economic and social interests. Mr. Pickersgill also commented on the Canadian programme of development assistance to Guyana, which is providing equipment and personnel at a cost of approximately \$1 million (Canadian) during the present fiscal year. He announced that the programme would include assistance for the construction of a technical institute and a fish-processing centre, and would maintain an estimated 77 Guyanese students in Canada at all times throughout 1966. A contribution to the establishment of the University of Guyana is also included in the programme.

Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, particularly since the 1890s, Canada and this new Commonwealth nation have benefited from a trade pattern that has become traditional. A wide range of Canadian products, including timber, fish, and more recently, manufactured goods and foodstuffs, flow to Guyana in return for bauxite, which has been mined in the area since the 1920s by the Demerara Bauxite Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of Canada.



## *Meeting of Commonwealth Trade Ministers*

*At their last meeting from June 17 to June 25, 1965, the Commonwealth prime ministers agreed that preparations should be made for an early meeting of Commonwealth trade ministers. The trade ministers convened in London from June 13 to 16, 1966. Canada was represented by the Honourable R. H. Winters, Minister of Trade and Commerce. The following is the text of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting:*

The meeting of Commonwealth trade ministers under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, ended today in London. Australia and New Zealand were represented by their Deputy Prime Ministers. Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda were represented by their Ministers of Trade. Singapore was represented by the Minister of Labour. Ghana and Nigeria were represented by the heads of their trade ministries and Zambia by its High Commissioner in London. The Deputy Prime Minister of Bechuanaland and the Minister of Trade of Mauritius also took part. Among the British dependent territories, Barbados, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla and Hong Kong were individually represented at discussions.

Ministers were pleased to welcome the Minister of Trade of Guyana at the first meeting of ministers since Guyana became a member of the Commonwealth.

This meeting followed the decision of Commonwealth prime ministers at their meeting last year. They had agreed that an early meeting of trade ministers should be held to explore means by which Commonwealth trade might be encouraged and expanded and to discuss other matters of importance affecting the trade of all Commonwealth countries. Two meetings of trade officials were held, from 29 November to 3 December, 1965, and from 9 to 13 May, 1966, to prepare for this meeting.

The meeting recognized that intra-Commonwealth trade must be seen in the context of world trade, of which it forms a vital part. The meeting agreed that there was continuing scope for expansion of Commonwealth trade and for initiatives to promote the interests of all Commonwealth countries at all the various stages of development. It was agreed that Commonwealth countries should act in concert wherever possible in wider international organizations concerned with international trade and trade policy. Such action would aim to improve the position of Commonwealth countries in a practical way. Ministers reaffirmed the value of the Commonwealth preference system to all members of the Commonwealth and particularly to its less-developed members.

Ministers held a general discussion on world trade. They expressed their disappointment at the slow progress of the "Kennedy round" of trade negotiations and emphasized the great importance of reaching an early settlement covering

both industrial and agricultural products. The meeting particularly stressed the need to ensure that the "Kennedy round" resulted in increased benefits for all countries, including developing countries, although, in accordance with the decisions of the GATT ministerial meeting of 1963, the developing countries need not be expected to open reciprocal concessions. Ministers drew attention to the part which the developed countries of the Commonwealth could play in helping to bring the developing Commonwealth countries more closely into the negotiations and in representing their views to the other industrialized countries participating in the negotiations. It was agreed there should be consultation as far as is practicable between Commonwealth governments before any concessions are made which would affect the preferential margins enjoyed by Commonwealth partners. The meeting also stressed that, in any tariff concessions or changes which might be made as a result of the "Kennedy round", care would have to be taken that those Commonwealth countries which benefit from preferential arrangements should, so far as possible, gain compensating trade benefits in world markets for any reduction in the value of the preferences they had enjoyed. The meeting agreed that the formation of regional groupings among developed countries, where this resulted in the creation of high protective barriers, gave cause for disquiet and could have serious adverse effects on the prospects for increased international trade and co-operation.

The meeting looked forward to the prospects of the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and urged all governments of developed countries to consider urgently the possibilities of concrete action in this field. The meeting agreed that Commonwealth countries should co-ordinate action wherever possible so as to lead to constructive and concrete results at this conference.

The meeting noted with satisfaction that proposals for supplementary financial measures to compensate developing countries for unforeseen falls in their export earnings were under active consideration in the UNCTAD and agreed that every effort would be made by Commonwealth countries to ensure practical progress in this field as soon as possible. The meeting considered that the adoption of such proposals should not lead to any weakening of efforts to improve the conditions of international commodity trade.

The President of the Board of Trade of Britain informed the meeting of the development of British relations with the EFTA and the EEC and indicated the readiness of the British Government to seek membership of the European Economic Community provided that the essential interests of Britain and Commonwealth countries were safeguarded. He stated that the British Government would make available the maximum information possible to Commonwealth governments on the progress of exploratory discussions with the European Economic Community and would at all stages of any negotiations consult closely with other Commonwealth governments. Other ministers, in welcoming the assurances given by the President of the Board of Trade, stressed the importance

of consultations at all stages of exploratory talks, discussions and negotiations.

Ministers reaffirmed their confidence in the stability of sterling, which intimately affects the trading interests of all Commonwealth countries.

### **Trade in Commodities**

Ministers emphasised the great importance which they continued to attach to securing better access and more stable prices for primary commodities at levels which would be fair to consumers and remunerative to producers. They noted that, notwithstanding the continuing efforts made in international organizations, progress in these directions had, up to now, been disappointing.

Ministers underlined the fact that many Commonwealth countries were dependent for their economic advancement upon returns from the exports of a narrow range of primary products. The meeting expressed concern at the instability or depressed market conditions affecting a number of bulk commodities and considered it important that appropriate remedial action be taken wherever possible. It was agreed that there should be continued Commonwealth support for the United Nations Cocoa Conference.

The meeting expressed deep concern at the continuing depressed price of sugar and agreed unanimously to join in supporting effective arrangements to ensure for this commodity a price-range remunerative to producers and equitable to consumers.

In reviewing the commodity trade situation, ministers, while recognizing that individual countries would wish to place different emphasis on particular points, agreed that the following principles and objectives should guide Commonwealth countries in current and future international negotiations :

- (1) There should be a greater readiness by Commonwealth countries to take part in commodity arrangements, even though they are not major producers or consumers of the commodity in question.
- (2) Each commodity should be considered individually; there should be flexibility in applying general principles to the particular case and in selecting the appropriate techniques of any market regulation. Where appropriate and practicable, it should be the aim to deal comprehensively with the totality of problems affecting a particular commodity.
- (3) It should be an objective of international commodity agreements to afford increasing opportunities for world requirements of primary products to be satisfied by those sources which can meet these demands in an effective and economic manner, taking into account, however, the needs of developing countries generally and bearing in mind the special position of certain developing Commonwealth countries heavily dependent on the marketing of a few products. It should also be an aim, in the interests of promoting the development of Commonwealth developing countries, to secure that international commodity agreements provide for these countries to share adequately in the growth of

consumption in the importing countries, including opportunities for developing countries which are new or potential producers.

- (4) An important objective in international commodity negotiations should be the achievement of stable, equitable and remunerative prices, taking into account the development needs of developing countries.
- (5) International commodity agreements should lay greater emphasis on means of achieving an expansion of consumption.
- (6) In such negotiations for commodity agreements another aim should be to achieve an equitable sharing as between producing and consuming countries of the responsibilities involved in giving effect to the agreements.

It was also agreed that, in respect of particular negotiations, the countries primarily concerned should concert their efforts to identify and seek to remove the obstacles impeding progress.

Ministers agreed that Commonwealth countries should use their influence to ensure that the markets of Commonwealth countries in all bulk commodities were not unduly affected by substantial releases from government stockpiles and non-commercial sales of surplus commodities.

The meeting raised the problem of competition from synthetic products and expressed the hope that the fostering of the production of competing synthetic materials will not be unduly encouraged by developed countries. The meeting also took note of the suggestion to consider the feasibility of co-ordinating investment policies within the Commonwealth as between natural and competing synthetic products, particularly to avoid the disruption of markets by the sale of synthetic products at unduly low prices.

### **Trade in Manufactures**

The meeting recognized the importance of their trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures for all the countries of the Commonwealth. The meeting also recognized the importance of preferences in promoting this trade for the less-developed countries. While expressing appreciation for the practical steps which some developed countries of the Commonwealth had already taken, the hope was expressed that developed members of the Commonwealth would continue to exercise helpful influence in the discussion of the question of general non-discriminatory preferences by developed to developing countries in wider international forums.

The meeting took note of the concern of developing countries at the existence of non-tariff barriers, such as quantitative restrictions and customs valuation procedures in some countries of the Commonwealth.

The meeting concluded that there was considerable scope for expanding the trade in these products and agreed that the practical ways in which intra-Commonwealth trade in manufactures could be expanded should be further studied.

The meeting agreed on the importance of the following points:

- (1) the need of further study of the possibilities for Commonwealth collaboration and co-operation in development plans in industrial investment;
- (2) the need to secure as a matter of priority greater access for the manufactured and semi-manufactured exports of developing countries to the markets of developed countries generally;
- (3) structural readjustment in developed countries, going hand in hand with the development of exporting industries in developing countries;
- (4) the need for the Commonwealth to use all its influence in the "Kennedy round" and in the UNCTAD to secure the maximum benefits on access and the removal of barriers to trade in the products of developing countries;
- (5) the role to be played by the growth of regional co-operation in manufacturing and trade, especially between developing countries.

### **Export Promotion**

The meeting agreed on the importance of training in export promotion and noted that the developed Commonwealth countries, which had already made a significant contribution in such training, had expressed a readiness to extend further assistance in this field. There was room for intensification of such assistance and for co-ordination of this assistance from the developed countries of the Commonwealth. Some ministers suggested the establishment of a Commonwealth market-development fund, with contributions from all Commonwealth countries on the basis of an agreed formula. Out of this fund each of the developing countries in the Commonwealth might benefit in training, marketing techniques, sales promotion, displays, and exhibition facilities. The fund could also be used in conducting regional and country surveys for different products of interest to the developing countries of the Commonwealth. It was agreed that the Commonwealth Secretariat should explore further with Commonwealth governments the feasibility of a scheme on these lines.

### **Public Procurement**

There was a discussion of the public-procurement policies of Commonwealth countries. The British representatives offered to enter into reciprocal agreements, either multilateral or bilateral, with other Commonwealth governments, to give "national treatment" in public procurement to the products of such Commonwealth countries. Ministers agreed to consider the extent to which their governments in their public purchases might place orders in other Commonwealth countries where commercial and other considerations made this practicable.

### **Co-operation in the Field of Shipping**

The view was expressed that high freight charges sometimes make the products of developing countries uncompetitive in overseas markets, and that freight charges were not always fixed entirely on the basis of costs of operations. One

suggestion was to set up a Commonwealth forum, perhaps by renewing the mandate of the former Commonwealth Shipping Committee in some form, so that matters concerning Commonwealth shipping could be discussed. The great complexities of shipping arrangements were recognized and it was agreed that the Commonwealth Secretariat should examine the practicality of reviving the Commonwealth Committee.

### **Tropical Products**

Ministers agreed that fuller and freer access for tropical products should be granted by developed countries in accordance with the conclusions adopted at the GATT ministerial meeting of May 1963.

### **Tourism**

The meeting underlined the importance of tourism as a foreign-exchange earner without any handicap of quotas or tariff barriers and felt that the advantage of a common language and familiarity with each other's history should be utilized for promoting intra-Commonwealth travel. The meeting recommended that the Commonwealth Secretariat should arrange for provision and exchange of information with regard to the development of tourism in Commonwealth countries and the availability of technical assistance through governments. There was need for investments for improving hotel accommodation, equipment, communication and transport facilities. There was also a need for arranging suitable publicity, and Commonwealth co-operation might be useful in this regard. The meeting further agreed that consultations on tourism in a meeting of experts should be organized by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

It was agreed that the Secretary-General should convene a meeting of senior planning officials from Commonwealth countries with a view to exchanging ideas on

- (1) planning techniques;
- (2) regional co-operation in planning and
- (3) trade promotion through exchanges of information or through joint ventures in market analysis, and forecasts of production and demand for products of special interest to Commonwealth countries, and to recommend what further steps could usefully be taken in furtherance of co-operation in planning and Commonwealth trade promotion. (Bilateral discussions among planning bodies in Commonwealth countries were also recommended.)

The meeting agreed that officials of Commonwealth countries should continue to meet from time to time to consider trade problems of mutual concern, particularly those of individual commodities which could benefit from concerted action. Such consultation should, wherever possible, be arranged before discussions in wider international organizations.

The ministers were unanimous in agreeing that this had been a most successful meeting. On the business before them, they had adopted a number of conclusions and recommendations for action by Commonwealth governments. At the same time, they had a useful opportunity to renew personal contacts and to exchange views on common problems. They noted that the extent to which they had been able to reach agreement had been largely due to the fact that the countries of the Commonwealth have so much in common in their approach to international trade problems. They reaffirmed the value of this meeting as being of great practical benefit to Commonwealth countries, and as helping to strengthen the development of international trade and co-operation.

## *Canadian Economic Mission to France*

**T**HE Minister of Industry, the Honourable C. M. Drury, headed a Canadian economic mission to France from June 4 to 15, 1966. Other members were Mr. J. C. Cantin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, senior officials of departments and agencies of the Federal Government and the heads of a number of larger Canadian firms.

The decision to organize this mission, which reciprocated a visit to Canada in 1962 by a French economic mission, resulted from talks between the Canadian Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic in 1964, in which they agreed to increase co-operation between the two countries in economic as well as other areas.

The purpose of the visit was to determine what might be done to encourage further development of technological exchanges between Canadian and French industry and to open up investment opportunities, with a view to expanding trade and economic relations between the two countries. Mr. Drury discussed the mission's objectives with the Prime Minister, Mr. Georges Pompidou, and held talks with the French ministers responsible for finance, foreign affairs, trade, the armed forces, industry and research.

### **Mission Programme**

Included in the mission's programme, which was arranged by the French authorities, were discussions with the financial and banking community, and numerous visits to industrial sites in the Paris area, as well as to the tidal-power plant on the Rance River in Brittany and the nuclear-power station at Avoine-Chinon. Canadian industrial members of the mission met French executives in the following branches of industry: aerospace, avionics, electronics, communications, construction, metal and mining, chemical fertilizers, electric power, transportation, flour-milling, textiles, vegetable oils, pulp and paper, and publishing. Members of the mission discussed matters of scientific, technical and economic interest with appropriate officials and agencies of the French Government including the Commissariat Général au Plan and the Office of Regional Development.

"The mission", Mr. Drury said, "is most gratified by the results of their visit. The many discussions and contacts have provided us with a basis for suggestions for furthering closer economic collaboration between the two countries and their respective business communities. There is scope for intensified interchange between Canada and France in fields where contacts at present exist, but also important opportunities for closer relations in new fields. The mission will return to Canada with an important message for Canadian business and industry. It is that French accomplishments in scientific and technical research



and their industrial applications should be better known in Canada and should find a growing place in our economic future. Canada, on the other hand, has much that is new and promising to offer in the area of research and advanced technology from which you in France may wish to profit. I believe that the intensification of our co-operation through investment and technological exchanges will, together with other measures, soon result in a significant expansion of trade between us."

Amongst the more important conclusions of the mission were the following:

#### **Technological Exchanges**

- (1) Arrangements should be developed to ensure that relevant scientific and technological information available from either country reaches those to whom it can be useful in the other.
- (2) Exchanges and visits of scientists, research technicians, and engineers and students should be further developed. Co-operation between the two countries should be encouraged at the conceptual phase of new technological development.

#### **Investment and Banking Relations**

- (1) Subject to the availability of necessary capital, there is scope for further development of French investment in Canada and Canadian investment in France.
- (2) Mixed ventures in which French and Canadian capital and expertise join together should be encouraged.
- (3) Financial institutions in the two countries have an important role to play in advising on potential investment opportunities that may arise and the manner in which they can be pursued in the two countries.

#### **Development of Trade**

- (1) The level of commercial exchanges between France and Canada is low, less than \$100 million *per annum* in either direction, and represents less than one per cent of the exports of each country.
- (2) There is considerable scope for a higher level of trade, provided that the necessary market-development measures are taken and pursued by the governments and businessmen of the two countries.
- (3) New techniques, whereby distributive services available in one country could be made available to exporters of the other, should be explored.
- (4) Consideration should be given to the further development of institutional links between business organizations of the two countries.

At the closing session of the mission's visit, Mr. Wilfrid Baumgartner, the former Minister of Finance and the leader of the French economic mission to Canada in 1962, noted the development of trade and investment since that time and the mounting interest in France and Canada in seeking closer and more effective ties between the two business communities.

Mr. Drury thanked the French Government and the French people for the warm reception and generous hospitality the mission had received wherever they had gone in France. He said that Canada looked forward to extending an equally warm and friendly greeting to the many businessmen and other visitors who were expected to visit Canada in the years ahead, particularly at the time of the Universal and International Exhibition to be held in Montreal in 1967. He noted with pleasure the decision by His Excellency Robert Bordaz, Commissioner General for France, that a series of special conferences would be held in the French Pavilion at Expo '67, in which French leaders in technical, scientific, industrial and other fields would take part. This would provide an especially useful occasion for French and Canadian businessmen to meet.

#### FRANCE-CANADA RELATIONS



*The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, is shown in conversation with Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, during the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, June 7 and 8, 1966. Following their regular practice, the two ministers met on the eve of the NATO conference to discuss world problems and bilateral questions; both felt that Franco-Canadian bilateral relations were very satisfactory. The two ministers agreed that Mr. Couve de Murville, who had earlier accepted in principle an invitation from Mr. Martin to visit Canada, would come to Ottawa late in September.*

## *U Thant Visits Canada Again*

**D**URING his second visit to Canada, from May 27 to 29, 1966, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, officiated at a flag-raising ceremony marking the beginning of work on the United Nations Pavilion at the Universal and International Exhibition of 1967 (familarly known as Expo '67), received an honorary doctorate from the University of Windsor and had informal talks with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin.

The United Nations Pavilion at Expo '67 is not sponsored directly by the United Nations but by individual supporters of the world organization, through their membership in the World Federation of United Nations Associations and in the United Nations Association of Canada in particular. This fact, the Secretary-General observed, reflected "the desire and determination of ordinary people to see their governments use the United Nations as it is intended to be used, to help bring order, justice, peace and decency into the affairs of mankind". "An international exhibition", he went on, "cannot be complete, at this point in history, unless it contains a tangible reminder of the endeavours of the international community to organize itself more effectively for the sake of the peace and well-being of the world as a whole."

"The theme of Expo '67, 'Man and his World' — man the explorer, man the producer, man the creator, man the provider, and man in his continuity —, could be, moreover, the theme of the United Nations itself," U Thant pointed out. "It suggests the enterprise, industry, inventiveness and goodwill that are the inherent qualities of man and that, coupled unselfishly and co-operatively to the rich natural resources of the world and of the space around it, can produce benefits without limit to all of humanity."

The flag-raising ceremony was followed by a press reception held for the Secretary-General by His Worship Mayor Jean Drapeau of Montreal. The same evening, U Thant accompanied Mr. Martin to Windsor, Ontario, where he spent the weekend at the Minister's home.

### **Address at Windsor University**

On Saturday, in an address to an outdoor convocation of over 3,000 persons — the largest ever assembled at the University of Windsor —, the Secretary-General spoke of the Canadian contribution to the United Nations and the urgent need to solve the organization's current problems. He said in part:

"Canada's contribution (to the United Nations) has ranged from the philosophical to the practical. It includes the considerable influence which successive Canadian Governments have had on the evolution of international standards and attitudes in matters of law, human rights, decolonization, disarmament and relations among states. It includes Canada's active, willing and often crucial support

of both the conception and the practice of international peace-keeping operations.

“Over this whole range of activities, Canada, in my view, has conspicuously shown how large and vital a part in the peaceful regulation of international affairs can be played by a state outside the group of the great powers — if it has the courage to take or to share bold initiatives, and the resources and the will to follow them through.

### **Canada's Peace Role**

“While Canada's active interest in the work of the United Nations has many facets, no part of it has had more immediate, or more urgently needed, impact than this country's support for our peace-keeping operations. This support has been visible and tangible, as well as moral. It can be seen in Canada's consistent advocacy of the principle of collective responsibility for these operations, and in the practical implementation of that policy through the prompt and willing acceptance of your country's share of their costs whenever the principle of collective responsibility has been applied.

“But even when that principle has been set aside or clouded by controversy, Canada has also carried its share — and perhaps more than its fair share — of the cost of international action to keep the peace.

“... Canada has, I know, a very great interest in helping to find the answer to a question which must be of the deepest concern to all who support the United Nations and who wish to see it become a more effective instrument for peaceful and constructive international co-operation. This is the question of the future of the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations — the question, in effect, whether the United Nations will find itself able to afford, both politically and financially, to undertake new operations of this kind when the need for them arises again, as it almost certainly will in our still dangerously unsettled world.

“I find in the present situation a great paradox, and I venture to warn that it runs the risk of proving to be a tragic paradox. On the one hand, there is very wide agreement among the governments as to both the necessity and the effectiveness of the peace-keeping operations of the past and the present . . . . The United Nations has served as a life-saving last resort, called upon in circumstances, sometimes desperate, when the efforts of individual states, or combinations of states, or regional organizations or alliances have all failed. It is well to ponder, too, the likely consequences in many of these situations if the United Nations had not existed or had felt unable to act.

### **Other Aspects of Peace Operations**

“There are other aspects of the peace-keeping operations from which the world, as a whole, ought to have been able to take heart and draw confidence in the potential power for good of organized international action. In varying degree, for example, each such operation has required one or more of the states concerned voluntarily to liberalize its conception of national sovereignty — if not

sometimes, in effect, to yield temporarily a part of that sovereignty — in order to allow an international operation to function on its territory. Another aspect of these operations is the entirely new phenomenon of the development of impartial, disinterested, multi-national teams and forces, and the evolution of a new breed of soldier of peace.

“In all these respects, the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations have constituted, in my view, a great step forward in international co-operation and a great promise of the capacity of men and nations to turn away from violence and towards international action and assistance as the means of resolving their disputes.

“Yet, on the other hand, the chances of the United Nations being able in the future to continue to carry out this kind of operation are being seriously jeopardized by the lack of agreement, so far, in regard to one or another of the constitutional, financial and administrative aspects of the operations . . . .

“I know very well, of course, that, from the viewpoint of some governments, there are, in this matter, issues of national interest, of principle and of legality which they regard as being of the highest importance. I am no less aware that broader considerations of national policy and international relations — indeed, the condition of the international political climate as a whole — tend quite often to override the practical, as distinct from the philosophical, concern of governments for the solution of problems that directly embroil the fate of peoples other than their own.

#### **National Problems Not Isolated**

“I venture to suggest, however, that all of us must take care not to delude ourselves into thinking that these problems can be isolated from the whole course of human development, and that their solution — or lack of solution — has no consequences for those other aspects of this development which may seem of more direct concern to us . . . . If there is one lesson we can learn from history, it is that attempts to maintain a static conception of society, purportedly insulated from changes taking place around it, have always failed . . . .

“It may well be, of course, that the United Nations will never be able to move closer towards the objectives it set for itself 20 years ago until the world it inevitably — and deliberately — mirrors is fundamentally a better and saner world than it is now. In other words, it may well be that, before the United Nations can be relied upon to keep the peace even in places that may seem secondary in the geopolitical order of things, we shall have to see larger progress made by the great powers towards the resolution of the conflicts that still exist between them.

“But can we really afford to wait for a resolution of these conflicts before we try, through the United Nations as it now exists, to provide more effective and dependable help to governments and people which already want and need that help ?

“I do not think so.”

# Disarmament Negotiations

GENEVA, JANUARY 27 TO MAY 10, 1966

WHEN the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) <sup>(1)</sup> recessed in the autumn of 1965, it agreed to resume meetings in Geneva "as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two co-chairmen (the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) after consultation with the members of the Committee". <sup>(2)</sup> Upon resuming on January 27, it had before it the views expressed during the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly and several resolutions adopted by that body. <sup>(3)</sup> It also received messages concerning its work from a number of distinguished personages, including President Johnson, Premier Kosygin, Prime Minister Wilson, the Emperor of Ethiopia, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and His Holiness Pope Paul VI.

As was recommended in the UN resolutions, the ENDC devoted most of its attention at this session to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and the banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests. The Committee also considered various other "collateral" or partial measures and discussed the draft treaties presented by the United States and the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament some years ago.

## Prevention of the Spread of Nuclear Arms

The overwhelming support <sup>(4)</sup> which Resolution 2088 (XX) on non-proliferation received at the twentieth session of the General Assembly made it clear that the importance and urgency of taking early steps to deal with the threat of the spread of nuclear arms was now virtually universally recognized. The General Assembly, *inter alia*, stated its conviction that "the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control", urged "all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons", set out a number of guiding principles, and requested the ENDC to resume negotiations.

The work of the ENDC had been facilitated by the tabling of draft non-proliferation treaties by the U.S. in the ENDC on August 17, 1965, and by the U.S.S.R. in the General Assembly on September 24, 1965. The two drafts have certain similarities. Articles I and II of both drafts deal with the core of the problem, *viz.* obligations to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to be undertaken both by states possessing nuclear weapons and those that do not. Other articles deal with withdrawal, ratification and entry into force. In addition, the United States draft contains potentially important provisions

involving the co-operation of signatories in applying IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities and the possibility of the review of the treaty after a number of years if a majority of signatories so desire.

### **Non-Aligned Views on Draft Treaties**

The discussion brought out the extent to which the treaties would affect the essential interests of the non-aligned countries. The provision for review in the United States draft would enable states not possessing nuclear weapons to consider their situation after a number of years, especially in the light of progress toward nuclear disarmament. Non-aligned countries have insisted that the treaty "should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers", to quote part of UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX), and this principle has been widely supported. There has not, however, been any agreement yet on the treaty obligations by which the nuclear powers should undertake to balance the obligations undertaken by other states to forego producing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

During the session, India reiterated its earlier suggestion that an obligation by the nuclear powers to begin nuclear disarmament should be incorporated in the treaty text. However, most members of the Committee, including representatives of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, contended that to attempt to deal with such matters as nuclear disarmament in the text of a non-proliferation treaty would unnecessarily complicate already difficult negotiations. Negotiations on non-proliferation, they argued, might more profitably be paralleled by discussion of measures to reduce nuclear weapons and their vehicles.

Another important aspect of the non-proliferation discussion concerned the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear countries, whose accession to a treaty might expose them to nuclear intimidation. In his message of January 27 to the Conference, President Johnson reiterated the following proposal, which he had originally made in October 1966 :

So that those who forswear nuclear weapons may forever refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race, let us strive to strengthen United Nations and other international security arrangements. Meanwhile, the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail.

In his message of February 1 to the Conference, Premier Kosygin indicated Soviet willingness to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against those non-nuclear countries party to the treaty that had no nuclear weapons in their territories.

The major difference of view between East and West related to the basic formula of a non-proliferation treaty, i.e. to Articles I and II of the two drafts. UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX) had recommended adoption of the principle that "the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form". The Soviet Union argued that the language of the U.S. draft did not

conform to this principle, since it would allow states not possessing nuclear weapons to gain "access" to them through military alliances. In particular, Soviet spokesmen claimed that nuclear arrangements currently under discussion within NATO would enable the Federal Republic of Germany to move in the direction of acquiring nuclear arms.

### **U.S. Draft Defended**

Western representatives rejected this criticism of the United States draft treaty and the accusations against the Federal Republic. They pointed out that Articles I and II of the United States draft precluded the possibility of the control of nuclear weapons passing to non-nuclear states. They also reminded the U.S.S.R. that in 1954 the Federal Republic had undertaken not to produce atomic, biological or chemical weapons. As for NATO's internal defensive arrangements, none of the various nuclear-sharing proposals under consideration either contemplated or would permit the acquisition of the control of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear members. Moreover, Western spokesmen emphasized, any Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the Western alliance was inadmissible; if the countries of Eastern Europe were concerned about their security, they would find reassurance in the early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. It was unfortunate that the main issues were being obscured by the tendency of the U.S.S.R. and its allies to concentrate on aspects of European security to the neglect of the real issue of the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world.

On March 22, the United States tabled several revisions to its draft treaty designed to refine and improve the language of Articles I and II with a particular view to answering comments made by other members of the ENDC. The Soviet Union and its allies, however, maintained that the changes did not remove the features of the U.S. draft to which they objected.

In view of the impasse which has developed between East and West on the proliferation issue and the absence so far of any sign of a meeting of minds, there is little prospect in the immediate future of progress towards a non-proliferation treaty.

### **Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests**

Resolution 2032(XX) of the General Assembly (December 3, 1965), in recommending that the ENDC "continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban", added to the long-standing reasons for a treaty its "crucial importance . . . in the issue of non-proliferation". In addition, many non-nuclear powers conceive of a comprehensive test ban as a measure by the nuclear powers to balance non-nuclear "sacrifices" in agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Although most members of the ENDC seem to favour the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, discussions at the Conference from February to May did not reduce the area of disagreement between the West and the U.S.S.R. over



the question of "on-site" inspection as a means of verifying a test ban. The Western countries considered that, even with recent significant increase in scientific knowledge, it was not possible to distinguish all underground seismic events, on the basis of their origin, as earthquakes or nuclear tests; the conclusion was that some "on-site" inspections must be incorporated by right in any treaty to deter a potential violator. The Soviet Union, without elaboration, claimed that "national means" of detection were sufficient to ensure compliance with a comprehensive treaty.

Despite continuing differences, a number of suggestions were advanced by Western and non-aligned countries. Mexico proposed that a list of scientists from non-aligned countries be drawn up by the United Nations from which individuals could be called upon to conduct any "on-site" inspections considered necessary. The United Arab Republic reiterated its 1965 proposal for a ban on underground nuclear tests above a threshold of seismic magnitude 4.75, accompanied by a moratorium on tests below that threshold and an exchange of scientific data with a view to making the test ban comprehensive. Sweden put forward a proposal for "verification by challenge", which would interpose a series of steps before the final sanction — denunciation of the treaty — could be taken by a state which suspected that the treaty had been violated. The United States outlined recent technical advances regarding argon gas waste from nuclear explosions, which indicated that inspectors could determine with greater certainty whether a blast had taken place.

Outside the ENDC, but related to the test-ban issue, a meeting of eight non-nuclear countries (including Canada) was called by Sweden during May, to pursue, in accordance with the injunction from the twentieth session of the UNGA, technical questions related to the seismic detection of underground events. Although they recognized that the ultimate purpose of their deliberations lay in the achievement of a test ban, the scientists concentrated on the limited and technical goal of seeing what prospects existed for international exchanges of seismic data so that individual countries would be better able to make judgements about seismic events. The countries participating in the conference are now assessing the results of the meeting.

#### **Other Questions**

The Conference considered a number of other "collateral" <sup>(5)</sup> measures. On several occasions, the U.S. elaborated on its proposals for a "cut-off" of production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons, for the transfer to peaceful purposes under safeguards of 100,000 Kg of such material (60,000 by the U.S. and 40,000 by U.S.S.R.) and for the destruction by both great powers of a large number of nuclear weapons. They also reiterated their proposal to freeze the number and characteristics of nuclear delivery vehicles (including anti-ballistic missiles) and to consider reducing the number of such vehicles. These measures would go a long way toward halting the nuclear arms race and

would, as stated by the Canadian Delegation, be suitable as steps by the nuclear powers to balance the undertakings by other states in a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet Union, however, continued to reject these proposals, repeating its well-known suggestions for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the elimination of foreign bases, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The United States urged consideration of regional agreements to limit acquisition of conventional arms by developing countries.

Finally, the Committee devoted a number of meetings during the session to the question of general and complete disarmament. This remains the ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations, but most delegations recognized that agreement on it is not likely to be reached in the near future. Draft treaties by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. remained on the table for discussion but no discernible progress towards the acceptance of either plan was made and no significant new amendments were put forward during the session.

### Conclusion

The discussion in the ENDC so far in 1966 — particularly on non-proliferation — have been useful, if only in clarifying the issues more precisely. The non-aligned continued to play an important role and have begun to put forward in detail their views as to what measures should complement a non-proliferation treaty. As this article goes to press, the ENDC will be reconvening after a recess of five weeks to allow governments to consider their position on various matters before the Committee in the light of current international developments. The new session, whose duration is not fixed and is dependent, among other things, on the progress to be made in its deliberations and the opening of the twenty-first session of the UNGA, will have before it issues of wide-ranging importance that demand serious and immediate attention.

(1) The countries participating in the ENDC are Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Roumania, Sweden, the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. France, also a member of the Committee, has not participated in its work.

(2) For a report on the ENDC discussions in the summer of 1965, see *External Affairs*, November 1965, Pp. 474-481.

(3) For a report on the discussions in the First Committee at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, see *External Affairs*, January 1966, Pp. 21-24.

(4) The resolution was adopted by a vote of 93 in favour (Canada) to none against, with five abstentions.


(5) "Collateral" measures are initial steps of disarmament or arms control aimed at lessening international tension, building confidence among states and facilitating general and complete disarmament.

## *Mr. Martin Visits Dutch Military Cemetery*

**E**N ROUTE recently from The Hague to Brussels for the NATO ministerial meeting, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, made a brief stop at the Canadian military cemetery at Bergen-op-Zoom to lay wreath on the memorial to the Canadian war dead.

The soldiers who are buried at Bergen-op-Zoom died in the battle to free the port of Antwerp during the Second World War. Since 1945, many of the graves have been adopted by Dutch families and, when next-of-kin of the war dead make pilgrimages to Bergen-op-Zoom, they are entertained as guests in the homes of these families. In his address, Mr. Martin thanked the Dutch people, and the Netherlands War Graves Committee in particular, for their care of the graves and for assisting the next-of-kin in co-operation with the Canadian Legion.

He also spoke briefly of the close ties between Canada and the Netherlands, mentioning the many Dutch emigrants to Canada since the war, Queen Juliana's stay in Ottawa from 1940 to 1945, and his own close association with the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Mr. Joseph Luns.



*Mr. Martin (right), shakes hands with the Burgomaster of Bergen-op-Zoom, Dr. L. van de Laar, in front of the memorial to the Canadian war dead.*

# Canada's National Defence College

**T**HE National Defence College of Canada recently returned from its overseas tour, the purpose of which was an on-the-spot study of political, economic, social and military conditions and problems in various European, Asian and African countries.

This year the tour was conducted in two groups of about 15 persons, including both students and members of the directing staff. One group, led by the Commandant, Major-General C. B. Ware, visited Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, India and Israel. The other, led by Commodore P. F. X. Russell, Royal Canadian Navy, went to Senegal, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Arab Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, West Berlin, Yugoslavia and Sweden. For the last two weeks of the tour, all members of the course visited France and Britain. The full tour lasted seven weeks, from March 14 to April 30, and was a notable success. New countries on this year's itinerary were Sweden, Hong Kong, Japan and Senegal.

## Aims of College

Located at the site of historic Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario, the National Defence College, now in its nineteenth year, was set up to enable senior officers



*Students taking the National Defence College course with members of the staff of SHAPE in Paris during the recent overseas tour of the College.*

and officials of the Canadian Government to study together various aspects of Canadian foreign and defence policies. Each course lasts about 11 months, from September to July, and includes between 25 and 30 members. In addition, two or three students are usually chosen from Canadian industry.

The national security of Canada is the central subject of study at the College. Both the elements and instruments of national policy as they affect security are examined. A considerable part of the course is devoted to the policies and prospects of other countries and of international organizations for collective security.

Knowledge is acquired and opinions formed and tested at the National Defence College through reading, lectures and group discussions, as well as by travel and observation. The College has a carefully-chosen library of some 37,000 books and 180 periodicals, and students are provided with a comprehensive bibliography for each problem studied.

A programme of lectures by outstanding specialists from public and private life in Canada and the United States is an important part of the course. Speakers include Cabinet ministers, university professors, senior military officers and civilian officials, representatives of foreign governments, leading industrialists, trade unionists and journalists.

### **Military and Civilian Membership**

The proportion of military officers to civilian students has been about three to two in recent years. Military students are normally divided evenly among the three services. The non-military student representation has always included at least one member of the Department of External Affairs.

Normally, Britain and the United States have members from their respective military and foreign services on each course. Military members are of the rank of brigadier or colonel or the equivalent, while civilian members are of comparable status and experience. On successful completion of the course members are awarded the letters "n.d.c."

The Commandant of the College is an officer of the rank of major-general or the equivalent, responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff. On many questions affecting the College there is close consultation and co-operation between the departments of government concerned, most notably National Defence and External Affairs. The Commandant is assisted by four senior officers — one from each of the services, and one from External Affairs — all of the equivalent rank of brigadier.

With each successive course, the scope and content of the curriculum and pattern of study at the National Defence College have matured and developed in accord with the changing requirements of national and collective security in the 1960s. Today it stands as one of the most respected institutions of its kind in the world.

## *Commonwealth Law Ministers' Meeting*

THE HONOURABLE L. T. PENNELL, Q.C., Solicitor General, represented Canada at the meeting of law ministers of the Commonwealth held at Marlborough House in London from April 26 to May 3. Twenty independent Commonwealth countries were represented at the meeting, as well as British Guiana and Mauritius, which were about to become independent. Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor of England, chaired the meeting.

The main item on the agenda was a review of the arrangements for extradition of fugitive offenders within the Commonwealth. The meeting considered that Commonwealth arrangements should be based on reciprocity and substantially uniform legislation. After examining existing arrangements in the light of constitutional changes since the passing of the Imperial Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, the ministers formulated a scheme that could serve as the basis of legislation within the Commonwealth.

Reciprocal arrangements for the enforcement of maintenance orders within the Commonwealth were also discussed, and the meeting noted British proposals for revision of present arrangements in order to bring the procedure up to date and clarify certain of its aspects.

The ministers also discussed the possibility of establishing a small Legal Section of the Commonwealth Secretariat to act as legal liaison office among Commonwealth governments and assist in legal matters at Commonwealth conferences and in the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat as a whole.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Canada and Rhodesia**

*The following statement in reply to a number of questions by members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs was made to the Committee on May 5 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin :*

... I should like to say first of all ... that there really are no negotiations under way at the present time between the Government of Britain and the illegal regime of Mr. Smith. When the Prime Minister of Britain announced that there would be talks, he was careful to point out that this did not mean that negotiations were about to begin between the Government of Britain and the Government of Mr. Smith — the illegal Government of Mr. Smith. What was proposed was that there would be undertaken on the official level some conversations to find out whether or not there would be a basis for possible further discussions. These preliminary conversations on the official level have not yet begun; they are supposed to begin and they are supposed to take place in London, but why they have not begun is not clear to us. It could be that there are some internal troubles in Rhodesia about which we are not aware.

... I have explained that the course that we took had to be taken immediately in order to be effective. It was carried out under the Export and Import Permits Act on the basis of advice given to us by our own departmental lawyers and by the law officers of the Crown. It may be argued ... that the Act was never intended for that purpose ... . Of course, I would take issue with that interpretation of the function of a law. Once Parliament has based a law in the specific terms prescribed, what the law-makers may have had in mind has nothing to do with the law itself in that. The legal question, which is elementary in any legal consideration, is whether the law in the terms used permits a particular course of action.

In any event, we did seek advice and we did act under that Act. It would have been preferable for Parliament to have been in session and for the Government to place this before Parliament, of course, but Parliament was not in session and we had to act quickly. I think the course we took was a wise one and I think it will generally commend itself. We were not the only ones who acted quickly but we were the first, and I may say that if Canada had not taken this position, it might have been very difficult to convince certain other Commonwealth countries, and countries outside the Commonwealth, that action had to be taken in order to deal with the situation effectively.

... I will admit that this does represent not a first departure but a new development in Canadian foreign policy. I think it represents, in the light of

the kind of world in which we now live, a desirable departure. It certainly is a long way from the position we took with regard to Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1921; it is a long way from the position that we took later on the proposal made by a Canadian spokesman who acted without authority, though commendably, with regard to the imposition of oil sanctions against Ethiopia. It certainly is a different position from that taken by Canada at the end of the Second World War, when we dealt with the indictment made against South Africa in the United Nations by Mrs. Pandit. At that time, . . . the position of the Canadian Government was that, in view of Article 2, Para. 7, of the UN Charter, perhaps the wisest course would be to refer the matters to the International Court of Justice for an opinion. Article 2, Para. 7, contains a clause providing for recognition of the fact that the United Nations is made up of sovereign organizations, sovereign bodies, and that there must be no interference in their internal affairs. This might seem to be in contradiction with the articles of the Charter which deal with respect for human rights. We have gone a long way since then; that is 20 years ago; the world has become more interdependent, particularly in this nuclear age. The recognition of this interdependence now becomes a matter of practical necessity for all countries.

What was involved in the Rhodesian situation was not interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. There was no violation here of Article 2, Para. 7; Rhodesia was not and is not a sovereign state. No, it is not even a *de facto* sovereign state; Rhodesia is a jurisdiction that is subject to the colonial power in respect of very fundamental aspects of its affairs and, until such time as Rhodesia has been accorded by the Parliament of Britain the right of independence, it could not be regarded as a sovereign entity.

. . . What I want to point out is that, in this situation . . . what was involved was the preservation of the Commonwealth itself. This was my judgment, and the judgment of my colleagues. Long before the Smith Government made known its intentions unilaterally to declare independence, we indicated to the Government of Rhodesia that this would be an unwise course. On two occasions long before the prime ministers' conference of last summer, I had discussion in Ottawa with two different members of the Smith Government. We discussed the Canadian attitude to this matter; we pointed out, as Australia also had in a private way, the dangers involved for the Commonwealth, and we indicated to them that, if they intended to persist in this course, they must not count on Canada because we would join with other Commonwealth countries in repudiating a unilateral declaration of independence. So they were forewarned long before the event, long before the action taken by the prime ministers at the prime ministers' conference. Every effort was made in our discussions here to convince them that the course they were adopting was dangerous not only for the Commonwealth but dangerous for the peace of Africa and perhaps the peace of the world. These views, which we expressed to them pretty strongly, however, were not accepted. Before the prime ministers' conference there were



further exchanges between the two governments as well as exchanges between the Prime Minister of Canada and Mr. Smith himself. At the prime ministers' conference, Canada joined with all of the Commonwealth countries without exception in repudiating the unilateral declaration of independence.

We have to look now at the Commonwealth as it is composed. It is made up not only of the traditional members of the Commonwealth, including India, Pakistan and Ceylon, along with Australia, New Zealand, ourselves and Britain, but is made up now of important countries in the British Commonwealth, in the Caribbean, who have recently got their independence. It is now supported on the periphery by other Commonwealth jurisdictions in the Caribbean that are about to get their independence. It is made up now of a number of independent sovereign body states in Africa — countries like Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia. The Commonwealth would not have been able to maintain its integrity and unity if there had not been a recognition by countries like Canada and by Britain of their opposition to the form of discrimination being practised by some 300,000 whites as compared with some 4 million blacks in Rhodesia.

The world has moved a good deal in the past two decades. There is now the strong recognition that the revolution of the black man has succeeded, and I personally believe it is well that it has succeeded. Any effort, on the part of any administration, to thwart that is bound to create a situation that must bring on it the censure of other countries.

... Why did we not interfere in other situations, for example in Hungary? Well, that is a rhetorical question, but it is not, I believe, a question that is fully relevant. Undoubtedly there was an interference by the Soviet Union in the affairs of that Christian country in a way that aroused the resentment of people all over the world. But there were certainly implications in that situation that are not present in the particular situation that we are discussing. If it had been possible to resist, the only way in which action involving intervention in Hungary could have come would have been by the United States, in particular. I think to raise that question is to raise something that is important, but something that is not fully relevant to this situation.

I do not want my remarks to be interpreted as meaning that we in any way condone what has happened in Hungary. We certainly do not. In self-respecting nations today there are many who honestly feel that country continues to be a satellite; that it continues to be denied what they would consider its sovereign rights . . . .

For a long time at the United Nations we took the position that Article 2 (7) should be interpreted to mean that the UN was made up of sovereign states and that there could be no interference with internal situations. We sought to have the United Nations adequately interpret the implications of that article, particularly in relation, as I said earlier, to the provisions of the human rights clauses of the Charter. But some three years ago we confirmed a change in our

course at the United Nations. We have since condemned *apartheid*, for instance, as practised in South Africa. In earlier years we felt that we could not support any resolution that was directly applied to South Africa. We refused, over a long time... to support any resolution because of Article 2 (7) that condemned *apartheid* in South Africa. But we later decided to vote for a resolution condemning that kind of racial discrimination. Some three years ago a change was confirmed.

Some three years ago, the Government instructed our Delegation to vote specifically to condemn *apartheid* as practised in South Africa. Now, that was a change, and we took that course because of all the development that has taken place, and the consensus that has evolved in the international community. Thus the authority of the United Nations to interpose itself in situations that violate its conception of human dignity, in situations which, unless dealt with, are considered to threaten the peace and, in some cases, do indeed threaten the peace, is now accepted.

I believe that the course we have taken in Rhodesia was the correct and only course. Now, I just want to make one observation. I said that this was a departure in Canadian policy. I want to emphasize it was not the first departure. It is a long way from the course, the somewhat isolationist course, that Canada pursued for a long time, in relation to the Covenant of the League and in some respects in relation to the Charter. But the first real case was in 1963, when the Security Council passed resolutions recommending that all states should cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. Now that was a resolution of the Security Council passed in August of 1963, recommending to all states that they should cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. We accepted that, we observed that. For instance, in 1964, there was an international call by South Africa for tenders for certain military vehicles and because of this resolution, which was a non-mandatory one, we took the position that no Canadian company should respond to this call for tenders even though this meant a possible loss of the sale of almost 10,000 units that might have gone to a Canadian automobile company. We took that position because of this resolution, because we were a member of the United Nations, and felt that we should observe it. We have observed it....

The question of sanctions and their relation to the use of force is something that I think has got to be carefully considered. Undoubtedly, sanctions do involve an element of compulsion, particularly if they are under the mandatory provisions of Chapter 7 of the Charter. But we have a lot to learn yet about the whole question of sanctions. The first time sanctions were imposed by the United Nations was in the case of South Africa in the resolution that I referred to in 1963. The recommendations were that member states were *urged* to take particular courses; they were not *obliged* to do so. This is really the first time that an effort has been made to develop a programme of sanctions against a recal-

citranant country. The first time when sanctions were imposed under Chapter 7 was recently in regard to the request of the Government of Britain to stop the clandestine transfer of oil through Beira in Mozambique. But undoubtedly . . . the development of the rule of law in the international community presupposes the development of sanctions in order to make the law effective. Economic sanctions are one form of sanctions that we are now trying, but I must point out that there are economic considerations that have to be borne in mind in considering the effectiveness of sanctions, particularly if they are to be made more all-embracing than in the situation that faced Britain when ships, of Greek registry in the first instance and later Panamanian registry sought, to get oil into Rhodesia.

We will have to give careful study to whether or not sanctions on a wider front can in any particular instance be applied. I do not say that we should not examine such questions, but we have to give careful consideration to each situation . . . . The course practised in Rhodesia was a course that could not be sanctioned by any Commonwealth country, and the failure of Canada or the other predominantly white portions of the Commonwealth have occasioned the greatest crisis in Commonwealth history.

Last December — on December 16, to be exact —, it will be recalled the Governments of Tanzania and of Ghana decided to withdraw their missions in London. This was a very serious decision on the part of Commonwealth countries. We were all greatly disturbed by this act. It was this act on the part of these governments and the threat of other Commonwealth countries to take a similar course that brought about the Lagos conference. You are quite right in saying that, if there had not been support for the position of the British Government in this matter, the unity and the integrity of the Commonwealth stood in great jeopardy.

*In reply to a suggestion on May 12 by a member of the Standing Committee that Canada's support of British policy respecting Rhodesia recalled the famous "ready, aye ready" declaration by Mr. Meighen at the time of the "Chanak" incident, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, replied:*

Because of the historic inaccuracy, I would like to put the situation in proper perspective. That was a suggestion that Canada should automatically be involved in a war in which Britain was engaged. Now, that is not the situation today. We were not automatically obliged to take action but, because we believed in the strength of the Commonwealth at the present time and because we believed the Smith regime was acting contrary to international interest, we unhesitatingly took the course that we did in supporting the British Government. We were not alone in doing so. We had every other Commonwealth government in agreement in principle.

*The Minister answered as follows an accusation that his statement that Rhodesia's action in unilaterally declaring its independence "would stir up the whole of Africa" had been alarmist :*

Well, no man holding this job wants to be extravagant in his portrayal of the dangers, and I endeavour to be as responsible in these things as I can because of the implications, but I assure you that the situation is precisely as I have stated it, in my judgment and in the judgment of other countries whose interest in this is not less great than Canada's. I would remind you that before the meeting last December there was a meeting of all members of the Organization of African States, some 36 countries, in Addis Ababa, under the chairmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, a man who we all know to be a responsible ruler. We know that 31 African countries recently presented a draft resolution to the Security Council.

In addition to this, through our own diplomatic exchanges, through our conversations with Britain, with Commonwealth countries generally, in Africa and elsewhere, with information from the heads of missions in various parts of the world, we have every reason to believe, and we have every reason to continue to believe, that this particular situation in Rhodesia will require careful attention, and that every effort will have to be made, I hope within the bounds of persuasion and economic action, to bring this situation in Rhodesia to an end. Otherwise, we do run into the danger of great trouble in Africa, which could well be fanned by those whose ideological interests are not our own.

*Asked whether, when he had spoken of "a military threat" inherent in the Rhodesian situation, he had been "talking of the evolution for the future in Africa, not on just an immediate military basis", Mr. Martin replied :*

That is quite right. I was thinking not only in those terms, I was thinking of how a failure to resolve this problem would bring the majority, if not all, of the states in Africa, against not only Britain but against any country that did not sympathize with their objective to see discrimination removed. And, not only would there be such dangers from these countries with admittedly limited military capacity, but there could be contributions from other sources in Africa and outside Africa.

I can assure you, . . . when the Canadian Government agreed to undertake, to the extent that we have, the responsibility of assisting in the military and air training of forces in Tanzania, that was done because we thought that it should be done by a Commonwealth country. I can go no further than that.

In addition to all this, we were concerned that African countries would leave the Commonwealth and not only African countries, I may say — we were also concerned that moderate leaders in Africa might be overthrown. We were concerned that racial conflict would be considerably exaggerated; we were greatly concerned that Communist influence might be significantly facilitated. I think that you will appreciate what I am saying in that regard.

*In reply to an inquiry whether, at an emergency meeting of the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee to be held next day, Canada would support the stand of Britain or that of the majority of African states, Mr. Martin said :*

Well, first of all, regarding the meeting tomorrow, the meeting on May 13, it was suggested this is an emergency one resulting from African pressure. This is not an accurate report. The Sanctions Committee meets regularly. The last meeting was held on May 6. At that time it was considered desirable to have another meeting in about a week's time, and to continue the regular review of sanctions against Rhodesia. There have been discussions at these meetings about the possibility of further Security Council action and I have no doubt that this matter will come up again tomorrow when the Sanctions Committee meets.

... A number of African countries have proposed an early meeting of the Security Council to consider further mandatory sanctions. We, of course, are not a member of the Security Council, and on that account we would not be directly involved. I do think, however, that it would not be desirable to have further and wider mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council under present circumstances. It is by no means certain that such action in these circumstances at the present time is the best means of making sanctions more effective. Up to now some success, I think, has been achieved in this field through diplomatic approaches made by Britain to the principal trading partners of Rhodesia. This may be the best way to close some existing gaps. In any case, the present system of widespread voluntary sanctions and limited mandatory sanctions is taking effect, as I have sought to indicate this morning. I think that the Smith regime's willingness to have these unconditional talks, now taking place in London, shows that the economic pressure is beginning to tell on them. More time will have to be allowed for the present sanctions to work.

For another thing, the further action under Chapter 7 could lead to the extension of the dispute to the whole of Southern Africa and to proposals for sanctions against Rhodesia's neighbours. Such proposals raise very serious issues for Canada and for other countries, particularly Britain. Moreover, some proposals which have been made raise again the question of the use of force. I have indicated a number of times that, in the view of the Canadian Government, in the present situation, the resort to force on the Rhodesian issue could have serious implications for the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth. Therefore, our view at the present time is that the Rhodesian question should be dealt with without the use of force. It would be much better if we could focus attention on economic measures against Rhodesia which are having some effect. Therefore further Security Council action at present seems undesirable. It could adversely affect the exploratory talks between the British and Rhodesian officials and it could simply strengthen the hand of white extremists in Rhodesia who would like to see these talks fail . . . .

*The Minister answered in the following words a question whether "Canada's participation in attempting to settle the Rhodesian question" was "based primarily on whatever obligations we have as a member of the Commonwealth, or . . . more on our commitments to the international community, as regards, eventually, one vote, one man, or one man, one vote" :*

Well, the Canadian action is based first of all on our concept of Commonwealth interests and obligations. It is based likewise on our assumption of duties as a member of the United Nations. It is based on our bilateral relations and on the contemporary view of the international community of mankind — of the place of human rights in society. Whether we would have acted independently in any of these situations is speculative, but, with a combination of all these, I am sure that there was no other course for us to take . . . .

We tend to use the word "Commonwealth" perhaps without fully appreciating the significance, but the Commonwealth does mean something very vital in the current international conflicts. For Canada, it means very close contact with Africa and with Asia, as well as with Britain and Australasia. The Commonwealth, as presently constituted, is a vital factor in the international process and in the movement for eradication of wars as an instrument of national policy. It would have been a matter of the most serious consequence if we had not taken action which would have maintained the unity and the integrity of the Commonwealth. I assure you I did not exaggerate the danger and I do not exaggerate it now when I say that the solution of this problem will go a long way to maintaining unity of the Commonwealth as at present composed, and not only of African countries but of other countries . . . .

*An attempt by one member of the Standing Committee to equate the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence with the recent overthrow of the Nkrumah régime in Ghana and to draw the conclusion that, if the latter event had been legal, so had the former, was answered as follows by Mr. Martin :*

The Government of Rhodesia was not a fully self-governing unit. It was a dependent territory. To appreciate the situation fully you have to recognize our own constitutional evolution in Canada. We have grown from colony to nationhood through a process of negotiation and consensus, and finally, approval, with the Government of Great Britain. The illegal Government of Mr. Smith had gone through that process up to the point of still having authority in foreign policy and in defence finally decided on by Great Britain. And, under the constitutional arrangements, its dependence consisted in not being able to have final authority in these areas until the Government of Great Britain consented; and the Government of Great Britain would not consent. It simply said, we are not going to let you be fully independent, continuing your loyalty to the Crown, continuing as a legal entity of the Commonwealth, until you remove some of the discriminations against the majority of the people in the country. That is the situation; and, because the Smith regime would not do that, Britain

would not accord it its independence. So, one day Mr. Smith said: "Well, I am making a unilateral declaration of independence" — thereby constituting an act of treason, an illegal act.

*Another Committee member having asked whether, by "ganging up on" Rhodesia, the other members of the Commonwealth might not "be compromising any possibility" of the eventual achievement by Rhodesia of "its own independence", the Minister replied:*

The Commonwealth now is made up not only of Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; it is made up of a whole group of new states in Africa, as well as India, Ceylon and Pakistan — it is made up of a whole group of dependent territories and two independent sovereign governments in the Caribbean where the majority of the people are not white. Now, I ask this Committee, is it reasonable to conclude in the face of world opinion about discrimination on the basis of colour, would it have been reasonable to assume, that these countries in the Commonwealth would have stood back if the white members of the Commonwealth had not strongly given evidence of support for the principle of non-discrimination?

That is the issue. That is the issue of the United Nations on a wider front, and we are not going to contribute, it seems to me, to an improvement in international relations unless we recognize this fact which is one of the dominant facts in the world at the present time, even on this continent. Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, have not failed to accept the position of the majority of members of the Commonwealth. Otherwise, it is perfectly obvious what would have happened.

### **Canada-U.S.S.R. Wheat Pact Renewed**

*The following announcement was made in the House of Commons on June 20 by the Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp:*

... Today in Moscow, the Minister of Trade and Commerce has signed on behalf of Canada a protocol extending the Canada-U.S.S.R. trade agreement for a further period of three years. The agreement, which will now expire on April 17, 1969, is subject to renewal by mutual consent.

At the same time the Canadian Wheat Board has entered into a contract with Exportkhleb, the Soviet grain-trading agency, for the sale of 9 million long tons, or about 336 million bushels, of Canadian wheat and flour for shipment during the three crop years commencing August 1, 1966. No intergovernmental credit arrangements are involved.

As part of this overall arrangement, the Wheat Board has concluded a specific contract with Exportkhleb providing for shipment of 3 million long tons, about 112 million bushels, of wheat and flour during the crop year August 1, 1966, to July 31, 1967.

This is the largest three-year commercial contract for a fixed quantity of Canadian wheat and flour ever concluded. Since 1963, the U.S.S.R. has purchased 478 million bushels, valued at approximately \$1 billion. The new three-year contract, worth approximately \$800 million, will bring Soviet purchases to about 814 million bushels since 1963.

The trade agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R. provides for continued exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment between the two countries. Under the protocol agreed to today, the two governments undertake to continue to give sympathetic consideration to any representations which either government may make concerning implementation of the agreement or other matters affecting their commercial relations. The two governments have also renewed their undertaking to facilitate visits for business purposes between Canada and the U.S.S.R.

The Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce and the Minister of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. have also exchanged letters concerning their discussions of trade relations and noted the importance attached by the Government of the U.S.S.R. to expanding its exports to Canada. During the negotiations, the delegations of Canada and the U.S.S.R. carried out a detailed review of trade between the two countries. It has been agreed that the trading framework which has been established should provide increasing opportunities for further development of mutually advantageous trade.

I am sure all members of the House will share the pleasure expressed by the Minister of Trade and Commerce in Moscow that these negotiations have been brought to a successful conclusion. It is most gratifying that the U.S.S.R. has again decided to purchase such substantial quantities of wheat. The impact of this record sale and the assurance it gives for the marketing of Canadian wheat and flour will extend throughout Canada, and will be felt not only by wheat farmers and millers but by grain handlers, longshoremen, elevator companies, railways, shipping companies and the economy generally.



## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- World Land Reform Conference : Rome, June 20 - July 2
- Canada-West Indies Conference : Ottawa, July 6-8
- ECOSOC, forty-first session : Geneva, July 5 - August 5
- International Labour Organization, eighth American regional meeting : Ottawa, September 2-23
- International Atomic Energy Agency : Vienna, September
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Board of Governors : Washington, September
- United Nations General Assembly : New York, September 20
- Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting : Montreal, September 21-22.
- International Monetary Fund, Board of Governors : Washington, September
- Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting : Ottawa, October 5-6
- UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session : Paris, October 25 - November 30
- Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians : Huddersfield, England, October 17-29
- Food and Agriculture Organization : Rome, October

## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Miss L. A. Gauthier resigned from the Department of External Affairs effective April 22, 1966.
- Mr. P. J. M. Asselin posted from the Canadian Embassy, Lima, to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective April 28, 1966.
- Mr. W. G. Graham posted from the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, to Ottawa, effective May 1, 1966.
- Mr. J. W. Gilbert transferred to the Department of Labour, National Employment Service, effective May 2, 1966.
- Mr. M. I. Dolgin posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective May 7, 1966.
- Mr. B. J. Cherkasky appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective May 9, 1966.
- Mr. W. H. Montgomery posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to Ottawa, effective May 9, 1966.
- Mr. D. M. McCue appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective May 9, 1966.

- Mr. K. J. Merklinger posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, effective May 11, 1966.
- Mr. G. K. Grande, High Commissioner for Canada in Ceylon, posted to Ottawa, effective May 11, 1966.
- Mr. T. A. Williams posted from the Canadian Military Mission, Berlin, to Ottawa, effective May 13, 1966.
- Mr. J. D. Puddington posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective May 14, 1966.
- Mr. W. T. Warden posted from the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to Ottawa, effective May 15, 1966.
- Mr. J. A. Millard posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to Ottawa, effective May 16, 1966.
- Miss J. Haworth posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kuala Lumpur, to Ottawa, effective May 21, 1966.
- Mr. F. C. Livingston posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kuala Lumpur, to Ottawa, effective May 22, 1966.
- Mr. P. L. McKellar joined the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective May 24, 1966.
- Mr. G. F. Noble joined the Department of External Affairs as Personnel Administrator 1, effective May 25, 1966.
- Miss N. Walsh posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to Ottawa, effective May 26, 1966.
- Mr. E. B. Wang posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective May 28, 1966.
- Mr. R. D. Lazorka appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective May 30, 1966.
- Mr. D. M. Stockwell appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective May 30, 1966.
- Mr. J. D. L. Rose posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Dar-es-Salaam, effective June 1, 1966.
- Mr. S. F. Carlson appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Miss M. Y. Catley appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. C. H. Cook appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 3, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. W. Currie appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. R. H. Davidson appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. T. Devlin appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. Y. Fortin appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# *Canada and Vietnam*

A STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON JULY 8, 1966,  
BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,  
THE HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN

... **L**ET there be no doubt; we are all concerned about (Vietnam). On a number of occasions the Government has expressed its reservations with regard to the bombing of North Vietnam and about the whole sequence of events which led the United States to the conclusion that it had no option but to adopt this course. I made my views known before the recent bombings took place, and in a manner which I believe was the most effective way to engage in consultations with a country with which Canada has such close ties.

One could be dramatic. One could engage in particular public postures that might bring acclaim, but I want to say that as long as I am Secretary of State for External Affairs, and certainly with regard to this situation, I am going to carry on in the way which I believe will most likely yield favourable results, rather than seek acclaim by some public position that is not capable of yielding a satisfactory solution.

The Prime Minister made clear on June 29 that we should be glad to see the bombing stopped, that we should be glad to see the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam stopped, and that we should be glad to see unconditional negotiations for peace started. This has always been our position. We urged a cease-fire before the President of the United States said he was prepared to enter into peace talks without any preconditions. When we now urge a cease-fire, we must take into account some of the implications which were mentioned yesterday by Mr. Wilson. We could have talks if the parties were so disposed, without waiting for a cease-fire, and these talks in turn might lead to a cease-fire.

## **Implication of Increased Bombing**

I think it important that we understand fully the implications of the action which has now been taken to bomb the oil-storage facilities in North Vietnam. I do not think we can limit our analysis merely to the military aspects of this operation. I propose to go beyond these aspects, to go into other implications which seem to me essential to a full appreciation of the present situation.

So far as the strictly military aspects are concerned, it can be argued that the general pattern of activity has not been significantly altered by the bombing of the oil-storage facilities of North Vietnam. On the understanding that the United States, as I understand them, on the basis of what has been said publicly been communicated to me, it is not the intention of the United States Government

to extend the bombing to targets which are not directly related to the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to buttress the insurgency in the South.

The fact is that the oil-storage facilities which have been the target of recent attacks are located in close proximity to major concentrations of population in North Vietnam. I take it from the preliminary reports that have been made available to the Government of Canada that every care has been taken to spare civilian life in those operations. Nevertheless, I should be less than frank if I did not say there is a risk inherent in these operations in terms of giving this conflict a character, a complexion, which I am sure all of us would be concerned to avoid. . . .

There is a further aspect to these latest operations which is bound to cause concern. That is the possibility . . . of a greater engagement in this conflict by those who have supported and actively encouraged the policies and the efforts of the Government of North Vietnam. It is not possible, I think, beyond a certain point, to estimate what the threshold of that greater engagement may be, but it must be clear that everyone in every country, in all of the continents, is concerned about the dangers flowing from any change in the pattern of the present conflict.

#### **Risk of Miscalculation**

It seems to me exceedingly difficult to guarantee against a miscalculation on the part of one or other of the powers concerned who may consider the course of developments in Vietnam as carrying a direct risk to their national security. All I can say at the moment is that, from all the information that has been made available to us, there appears to be a continuing recognition of the need for restraint on the part of all the governments directly concerned in the conflict.

I wish to deal with a matter which seems to me to be crucial from the point of view of the Canadian Government and of other governments which believe that a negotiated solution is the right way of resolving the Vietnam conflict. The question we must ask ourselves is whether these latest developments, or any future developments tending in the same direction, are likely to help or hinder the prospect of such a solution. This has been the cornerstone of Canada's policy and the guiding consideration in the efforts which we have been making in recent months.

I am bound to say, on balance, that, whatever the rights or wrongs of the situation may be, it is the judgment of the Canadian Government that there is a relation between this whole matter of bombing and the prospects of arriving at even a beginning of a process which might in due course yield an honourable accommodation of the interests of the major parties in the conflict in Vietnam.

#### **Position of North Vietnam**

I should like to take this point a little further by explaining to the House the positions of the Government of North Vietnam and the Government of the

United States, as I understand them, on the basis of what has been said publicly and in private discussions. The Government of North Vietnam has called for a permanent and unconditional cessation of all bombing and other acts of war against their territory. This is one of the elements in a letter which President Ho Chi Minh addressed to the Prime Minister on January 24, and in the absence of which the Government of North Vietnam does not appear prepared to envisage a political solution. The argument behind the formulation is that, by bombing targets in North Vietnam, the United States is encroaching on the sovereignty of that country, and that this is a violation of accepted standards of international law and international relations. The Government of North Vietnam, accordingly, does not think that a willingness to cease this bombing should be qualified by any conditions whatsoever, or that it warrants any countervailing undertakings by the North Vietnamese Government in respect of its own policies.

I think the North Vietnamese point of view is well reflected in a statement issued by the Chinese authorities in Peking on July 3 last. The following extract is relevant to this matter:

U.S. imperialism long ago completely violated the Geneva Agreements and broke the line of demarcation between South and North Vietnam. It has now further broken this line by its bombing of the capital of the heroic Vietnamese people. The United States must be held responsible for all the serious consequences arising therefrom. With the breaking of the line of demarcation by the United States, the Vietnamese people have ceased to be subject to any restrictions.

This is a significant statement. The House will note that it refers twice to the demarcation line which, however temporary it was designed to be, was laid down in the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement of 1954. The statement appears to argue that, so long as this Agreement has not been superseded by a permanent settlement of the whole Vietnam question, that line must to all intents and purposes be regarded as a *de facto* political boundary between North and South Vietnam, and must be respected as such.

This interpretation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement is, I think, one which Canada, as a member of the International Commission in Vietnam, is bound to take seriously. It is also, I think, an interpretation which lies at the root of the whole position of the Government of the United States as regards the matter of support and sustenance which the Government of North Vietnam has afforded to the insurgency in the South. I regret to say, however, that it is only partially accepted in the statement from which I have read to the House. For, having placed due emphasis on the inviolability of the line of demarcation between South and North Vietnam, the Chinese statement goes on to say that "all support and aid rendered by the North Vietnamese people to South Vietnam are within the sacred right of the Vietnamese people". It is this evident inconsistency which is the crux of the problem we are facing in Vietnam and to which we must address ourselves if there is to be any prospect of a peaceful and lasting settlement of the present conflict.

What is the position of the Government of the United States? It is in the

following terms, as they have been given to us. The United States is prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam at any time as part of a mutual reduction of hostilities on both sides. They regard the military activities of North and South Vietnam as forming part of a single problem. If the North Vietnamese were prepared to respect the demarcation line in terms of the assistance they are providing to the insurgency in the South, the United States, for their part, would be prepared to match such a move by halting the bombing of targets in the North which are associated with that assistance.

This, then, is the impasse as I see it. There is a relation between this matter of bombing and whatever moves it may be possible to make towards an eventual settlement. . . .

The North Vietnamese Government believes that the bombing of their territory should be stopped by a unilateral commitment on the part of the United States. The United States Government, on the other hand, argues that it is unrealistic to expect them to give a unilateral commitment of this kind which would leave North Vietnam without any commitment in respect of their infiltration of men and supplies into the South.

### **Canadian Position**

What is to be the position of the Canadian Government in this situation? I believe that there are two choices open to us. We can take strong public positions on any or all of the issues involved in the present conflict. That is the easiest thing we can do. Alternatively, we can continue to do what we have been trying to do. So long as I am in this office that is what I propose to continue to do, because I believe this in the only effective way available of achieving the objectives we have in mind. We shall continue to conduct quietly and through diplomatic channels our efforts to find the basis for an accommodation in Vietnam.

I should seriously suggest to the House that we can follow one or the other course I have mentioned. We cannot effectively follow both at one and the same time. I think we have to admit to ourselves that there are no simple solutions to this conflict. And, because there are no simple solutions, a settlement in Vietnam will not be achieved overnight; it can only emerge from a patient probing of positions.

It will have to go right to the roots and the origins of the conflict in Vietnam and it will have to be such as to hold out an assured prospect of peace and stability, not only in Vietnam but in Southeast Asia as a whole. This is what Lord Avon had in mind when he talked of neutralization — not now, not as a means to bring this conflict to an end, but as the kind of solution that would follow a negotiated settlement. If this is what we are working toward, then I think it will be agreed we must take first steps first.

### **Why New Conference Opposed**

It is being put to me from time to time that Canada, either by itself or in co-operation with other countries, should issue a call to a new Geneva con-

ference. Before we set out to determine the proposed new role for the Commission, we had already done that. Before we sent Mr. Ronning to Hanoi and Saigon and elsewhere, we had already done that. I now resist this course, not because it is unreasonable or because it does not represent a long-term objective of the Government of Canada. We have had discussions with the Government of India — and I mention India because of the speech made yesterday by her distinguished Prime Minister to the effect that there should be a conference called.

This proposal was made over a year ago, and again last November, before we contemplated the proposed role for the Commission, and before we decided on the Ronning missions. I have now resisted this course, in the sense that I have resisted it before, because all the information available to me indicates that a call of this kind will not have the desired results in present circumstances, much as I should like to be able to say that the situation was otherwise. We have been told this without going to Moscow, on the highest authority. It is one thing to call for a conference; it is quite another thing to ensure its being attended by those who must be there.

It seems to me that a conference lies at the end of the road, not at the beginning. If one could be held now, and if the Soviet Union, as Co-Chairman, acquiesced in the suggestion of the Prime Minister of India to join with Britain in calling such a conference, all of us would support this. But I should have to say, as I have already implied, that, knowing what I do, I should be greatly surprised if the representatives that must be at such a conference would be prepared to attend one at this time, whether it would be on Vietnam or indirectly on Laos or Cambodia. . . .

I cannot foresee what intermediate steps may have to intervene before the time for such a conference is ripe. But, on the basis of all the discussion we have had, it is my assessment that it is likely there would have to be some preliminary undertakings (and I emphasize the word "undertakings") about the points of substance which are at issue in this conflict. What this means, in Canadian terms, is that we must do all we can to try to create the conditions in which the processes which will lead to an ultimate settlement can be started. This is precisely the task to which we have addressed ourselves.

I say again that we welcome the proposals made yesterday by the Prime Minister of India. The purposes and objectives behind her proposals are shared by the Canadian Government and they are shared by all of us in this House. If these proposals commend themselves to the parties concerned, and if the parties concerned would attend the conference — I am sure the United States would be among those that would — and if progress on that basis were possible, I can assure the House and the Government of India that Canada is prepared to do whatever may be required of us to see that these proposals are translated into action.

My right hon. friend spoke of Mr. Ronning's two visits to Hanoi. I should



like to underline certain aspects of this initiative which may have been lost sight of in the great volume of publicity . . . which Mr. Ronning's visits have generated.

First, I have said that this was a Canadian initiative and that it was carried out by Mr. Ronning on the instructions of the Canadian Government, and not on the instructions in any way of any other government. I reiterate this today because the impression has been created in some quarters that Mr. Ronning's mandate may have been something other than it was.

Second, I should like the House to understand that the assignment we have taken on is essentially in the nature of a good-offices assignment. It is inherent in such an assignment that we should be concerned to understand the positions and attitudes of all the parties, and that we should do our best to interpret and clarify the positions and attitudes of one side to the other. That, broadly speaking, has been the form which Mr. Ronning's assignment has taken.

Third, I would like to restate the ultimate object of this initiative. It has seemed to us that, if a beginning is to be made in the long and patient process which we hope will lead to ultimate peace in Vietnam, we must find a basis on which both sides would be prepared to see such a beginning made. The mere calling of a conference, desirable as that is, does not meet this essential objective, as we have learned in our discussions with both sides. This is the only potentially useful channel through which there has been contact with both sides in a long time. I will not say it is the only channel, but it is the only channel which has access to both sides. I regard this as a tribute to our country as well as to Mr. Ronning himself.

I do not wish to give the House a misleading impression of our results so far. We have not achieved any spectacular results and I think I can quite frankly say that we have had no illusions as to the pace at which progress was likely to be possible.

#### **Phases of Continuing Effort**

As I have explained previously to the House, we regard the two visits which have now been made to Hanoi — there may be others — as phases of a continuing effort. Over how long a period of time this effort may extend I cannot say. What is significant is that we have had a fair hearing and on both occasions with the top personalities of the North and the South and, of course, with the Government of the United States. I can say that if the channel we have established remains open, and if its potential usefulness is not called into question by any of those concerned, I do not think, in a situation where a failure of communication may be crucial, we can discount the significance of such a channel for the time when the circumstances for the solution of the Vietnam conflict are ripe.

The situation facing us in Vietnam is as serious as any which has faced us since the Korean War. Since that time there has been growing confidence on the part of the international community that it has the means of bringing its influence to bear on situations of this kind, and to put an end to armed conflict,

and to lay the groundwork for political solutions. That is the essence of the conception of peace keeping which Canada and others have tried to develop and strengthen through the United Nations.

We accepted the suggestion of the President of the United States that he would welcome any effort by any country to try to bring about at least preliminary talks that might lead to serious negotiations, which in turn might result in a negotiated settlement. It was in the light of this situation that we thought last December there was a role for the International Commission. Canada, India and Poland, as members of this Commission, have had experience in Indochina now for 11 years. Being the only body that has a continuing link with Hanoi and Saigon, we thought that, quite apart from any authority given to that Commission under the Geneva Agreement, it might undertake the effort to try and bring about a narrowing in the position taken by the various parties.

#### **Role of Indochina Commission**

To that end we have had useful and fruitful exchanges with India and Poland. Our view was that the time had come to use the Commission for this purpose. We did not suggest they were not as sincerely interested in peace as we were. One of the countries took the position that perhaps this was not the particular moment in which to establish a role for the Commission as a mediating instrument. But we continue, all of us, India, Poland and Canada — and this was reaffirmed yesterday by the Prime Minister of India —, to look upon the Commission as having a role in this situation.

The Government of India reaffirmed yesterday that they would be happy to see the Commission used to try and bring the parties together. Because we felt there would be some delay in trying to use the Commission for the purpose I have mentioned, the Government asked Mr. Ronning, a man born in China, who speaks Chinese, who knows many of the personalities involved, to undertake, if this could be arranged with the support of the governments concerned — the United States, North Vietnam and South Vietnam —, a series of discussions to find out if there was a basis for a preliminary discussion between the parties.

We have made a commitment, and we intend to respect it, to the parties concerned that what went on in Hanoi is a matter that must rest with the Government of Canada until such time as we are in a position to report, finally, success or failure. It cannot be any other way. . . .

#### **Further Discussions**

We have had discussions only this week with representatives of the Government of the United States, right here in Ottawa. I have had discussions, as the Prime Minister has, with the Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, who is visiting Canada. We shall continue these discussions next week. Other countries are engaged in similar processes. I want this House and the country to know that there is no item on our agenda that is more important than trying to bring about some

process of discussion between the parties concerned, in order that we can bring an end to the conflict in Vietnam. That is the objective of all of us.

I believe that a military solution of this problem, of course, is not possible by itself. We are all aware of the dangers that flow from the conflict that has raged in that area. We are dealing with the situation as it is now; we are not dealing with its genesis. We have sought not to emphasize the history of this situation but to try to see if we could not make our position as a mediator more effective by taking the most objective position possible. I think thus far we have succeeded in doing this.

I can tell the House that no opportunity will go by without our making every attempt that we can, by ourselves, as a member of the Commission or in concert with other countries, to try to bring about peace talks. When they do take place, whether by a Geneva conference or as a result of the kind of situation that developed in Greece and Malaysia, namely by gradual process, then we shall address ourselves as one country in the international community to those methods by which we hope to bring about an effective neutralization of the whole area.

The objective that Lord Avon spoke of the other day will not be achieved without, of course, the use and support of the international community, through the United Nations or otherwise. I resume my seat after saying that this undoubtedly is one of the most serious situations the world faces. It is not a conflict in which we are engaged. It is not a conflict in which we have any intention of dispatching Canadian armed forces. This, we continue to repeat, would be inconsistent with our role on the International Control Commission just as Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom yesterday said that it would be improper for Britain to send forces to Vietnam because of her role as one of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference powers. . . .

We have done everything we know, with our friends, to put forward our point of view. We have done so as a result of the accommodation extended our representative, Mr. Ronning, in Hanoi. We intend to respect the nature of the conversations that have taken place there and elsewhere, in the hope that we might be able, as a result of this instrument, to bring about the beginnings of peace in Vietnam. If we do not succeed, it will not be because Canada has not tried. We are not wedded to this method alone. If there is some other way by which peace negotiations can be begun, we shall support it. But I want this House to know that we are not weakening in our effort to try to bring peace in Vietnam.


# *Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean*

OTTAWA CONFERENCE, 1966

*The following is the text of the communiqué issued at the close of the Conference that took place in Ottawa from July 6 to 8, 1966, between Canada and the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean, with the texts of the Protocol on the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement and of the Canadian Government Proposal on Sugar as appendices:*

During the past three days, substantial progress has been made on the process of closer consultation and co-operation among the Commonwealth countries of the Western Hemisphere. This development holds great promise for the future and will bring early practical benefits to all the participants. The Heads of Government participating in the present Conference are determined to continue and strengthen the fruitful collaboration among them which has been begun in Ottawa this week.

2. At the Conference, Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago were represented by their Heads of Government



*Delegates from Canada and the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean confer in the Confederation Room of the West Block of the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa.*

and British Honduras by the Minister of Natural Resources and Trade. Britain was represented by an observer and, by special invitation, the University of the West Indies was also represented.

3. The Heads of Government took note that their Conference opened on the forty-first anniversary of the signature of the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement.

4. The Conference welcomed the positive outcome of constitutional discussions for Barbados and the working out of special relationships between Britain and Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St Vincent.

### Trade

5. A review of the special trade and economic relations among the Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada group of countries was a central feature of the Conference. Ministers were unanimous in the great value they attach to maintaining and further strengthening the special trade ties between Canada and the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean. To this end, a special Protocol to the 1925 Trade Agreement has been approved by the Conference and signed by all participating countries. This Protocol provides for continuing close consultation and co-operation within the Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada group of countries. Through the further strengthening of their trade and economic ties, this group of countries can best promote their own trading interests and the contribution they can make to the strengthening of international trade and economic relations throughout the world. <sup>(1)</sup>

6. It was agreed that a study of the question of a free-trade area between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Canada might be made jointly by appropriate institutions to be designated by the Trade and Economic Committee.

### Aid

7. The Heads of Government agreed that they shared an obligation in common to ensure the most effective use of the limited resources available in the Caribbean area and that an increased effort should be made to mobilize additional resources to accelerate the pace of economic development in the Commonwealth Caribbean area. The Canadian Government announced that it was Canada's intention to strengthen its aid efforts in the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean, with which Canada had special links. These countries had demonstrated their ability to use available resources effectively to meet their urgent needs.

8. The Canadian Government indicated that its basic aid programme for the Commonwealth Caribbean countries will be generally made more flexible in its terms, and over each of the next five years will reach at least the level of the

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(1) A Trade Committee, established by the Conference on July 6, held three sessions. Its report, which reviewed a number of trade and commodity problems in the light of the Trade Agreement of 1925 and of developments since then, including the prospects for the "Kennedy round" of tariff negotiations, was unanimously adopted by the Conference.

enlarged programme for the current fiscal year of a total of more than \$65 million for the period. The proposals for special aid for the Universities of the West Indies and Guyana and for a Caribbean Broadcasting Service would raise the minimum figure to \$75 million for the five-year period. With good and practicable projects, the Commonwealth Caribbean part of the expanding Canadian aid programme for all purposes will rise substantially above that figure.

9. Reference was made to the problem of mobilizing in the area adequate financial resources to meet all of the local costs associated with economic development, and Canada indicated its willingness, in appropriate cases, to finance a portion of local costs of development projects.

10. Particular attention was devoted to the need for increased levels of assistance for the non-independent territories. In this connection, it was agreed that the report of the tripartite economic survey of Barbados, and the Leeward and Windward Islands, conducted by Britain, Canada and the United States, should be useful in promoting co-ordinated development efforts in the Caribbean and in mobilizing additional foreign resources to assist in fulfilling the potential for development in the dependent territories. The Conference agreed that further serious study of the report should be undertaken without delay and that meetings of those governments directly concerned might usefully be convened in the fall to consider the implications of the report and of the expected report on British Honduras for longer-range co-ordinated aid efforts.

11. It was also agreed to study the possibility of establishing a financial institution for regional development which might be used as a method of financing projects of particular interest to the smaller areas, as well as projects which would benefit the region as a whole.

12. Special consideration was devoted to programmes of assistance to the University of the West Indies and the University of Guyana. Memoranda of Understanding on these programmes were signed on July 8.<sup>(1)</sup>

### **Transport and Communications**

13. The Heads of Government discussed matters relating to transport and communications both between Canada and the Caribbean and within the Caribbean area. The needs of the area for improved regional air services were reviewed and the technical co-operation of the Canadian authorities in meeting these needs was offered. Many of the governments represented the need for improvement of airport facilities and the Canadian Government agreed that these were matters which would be examined. The need for multilateral discussion with a view to the conclusion of air-services agreements between Canada and

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(1) The programme of assistance for the University of the West Indies provides that Canada will make available to that institution \$5 million in grants over five years for capital construction, scholarships and fellowships and provision of university personnel. For the University of Guyana, Canada will provide \$1 million over three years for the development of a new campus near Georgetown.

the Commonwealth Caribbean countries was discussed and the desirability of consultation and the greatest degree of mutual co-operation in the negotiation of bilateral arrangements with other countries was stressed.

14. The restoration of direct shipping services between Canada and the Caribbean area was urged by several delegations and it was agreed by the Canadian authorities that this matter should be fully investigated in the light of its possible long-term contribution to the promotion of trade. Reference was made to the international telecommunications network in being and in prospect. With regard to the operation of the telecommunication services within the islands, Canada would be pleased to provide technical training and advice within the context of the External Aid Programme. The Canadian Government offered to co-operate in working out and underwriting arrangements for first-class air-mail service at surface rates between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries to be established as soon as technical arrangements could be made.

### **Migration**

15. In the discussion on migration, the Heads of the Caribbean Governments took note of the fact that immigrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean were eligible for entry into Canada on as favourable a basis as immigrants from any other parts of the world and that migration from the area to Canada had increased in recent years. However, they emphasized the need for continued and expanded migration opportunities for their people. The Canadian Government announced that Canada was prepared to keep its door open to qualified immigrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean on a completely non-discriminatory basis. The experimental movement of seasonal farm labour to Canada from Jamaica during the current year was reviewed and Canada indicated that, if the experiment proved successful and there was a continued need for outside labour in future years, consideration would be given to broadening the programme to include other Caribbean countries. Canada also announced a 100 percent increase in the special household-service worker movement from the Caribbean to Canada, and the extension of the Canadian Immigration Assisted Passage Loan Scheme to immigrants from Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean.

16. The Government of Guyana explained that, with accelerated development of Guyana's resources, it would be possible for Guyana to absorb migrants from the Caribbean countries, and announced its willingness to make available immediately for settlement by Guyanese and other West Indians selected areas of known potential. The Heads of Government agreed that the machinery established for the continuation of joint action on matters discussed at the Conference should examine these plans as early as possible.

### **Other Economic Questions**

17. The Heads of Government considered ways of promoting private investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean. They noted that there were no restrictions

on the flow of Canadian private capital to the area, but expressed concern at the effect which the absence of double-taxation agreements could have on that flow. In the context of the relations between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, the Canadian Government indicated its readiness to enter into discussions leading to agreements with interested Commonwealth countries in the area to avoid double taxation.

18. They also discussed possibilities for developing the tourist industry in the Caribbean and, as part of the process, as indicated in the report of the Trade Committee, the Canadian Government undertook to give consideration to the suggestion that enlarged duty-free exemptions be allowed to Canadians entering from Commonwealth Caribbean countries.

#### **International Questions of Common Interest**

19. The Commonwealth countries in the Western Hemisphere emphasized the great value they attach to their relations with the United States and the many countries of Latin America which make up the membership of the Organization of American States. Those participants in the Conference whose countries would be eligible for membership in that Organization indicated their intention either to carry out a joint study of the question or to give one another the benefit of national studies which were being made. They also expect to consult together on this question in the months ahead.

20. There was a thorough discussion of the implications of the continuing situation in Rhodesia. The Heads of Government noted that, unless there was an early solution of this grave issue, the future of the Commonwealth as a multi-racial association would clearly be endangered. They expressed the hope that such an early solution will be announced by the British Government at the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

21. The Conference endorsed the resolution adopted by the Commonwealth Caribbean Heads of Government at their recent meeting in Barbados affirming their fullest support for the self-determination of British Honduras in accordance with the wishes of the people of the country.

#### **Cultural Relations**

22. The Conference recognized the desirability of further strengthening the cultural ties between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean. It was decided to establish appropriate machinery for strengthening such ties with a view to giving the Canadian public the opportunity of seeing in their own country the expression by West Indian artists of indigenous Caribbean art forms such as the dance and the steelband and to making the West Indian public familiar with Canadian artistic achievements, particularly in the field of the performing arts. The Government of Canada also indicated its willingness to assist with the establishment of broadcasting facilities serving the entire region of the Common-



wealth Caribbean, and consultations will now take place among the broadcasting authorities of the participating governments.

#### **Methods of Following up the Canada-Caribbean Talks**

23. In keeping with the intention of Heads of Government that the consultations instituted at this Conference should be continued, it was agreed that a meeting of the governments represented should be held, at a date to be fixed and at an agreed venue in the West Indies, for a general discussion of Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada relationships and to review progress. In the meantime, to ensure that effective follow-up action is taken on the matters discussed at this Conference, it was agreed that, in addition to normal bilateral consultations, the High Commissioners of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries in Ottawa should consult jointly with Canadian officials regarding the timing and location of the first meeting of the Trade and Economic Committee and the form of other consultative arrangements for the future.

### **Protocol on Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement**

*Recognizing* the important changes which have taken place in their trade and commercial relations since the negotiation of the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1925;

*Recognizing* the desirability of close co-operation and collaboration in the development of their respective economies in order to facilitate the most efficient utilization of resources and the maximum development of mutually advantageous trade;

*Taking into account* the urgent economic development needs of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and the key importance of trade to the raising of their standards of living and the progressive development of their economies;

*Taking into account* the common interest of the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean and Canada in ensuring a fair and remunerative return at stable prices for exports of primary products of particular interest to them and the urgent need of these countries to diversify their exports:

Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, British Honduras, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago agree as follows:

1. To examine the 1925 Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement in detail with a view to its further amendment or re-negotiation in the light of the results of the "Kennedy round" of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
2. To continue the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1925 in force, ad interim, subject to the following:

- (i) to the extent that it may be necessary in order to avoid conflict between the provisions of the Agreement and the provisions of the GATT, the obligations of the Agreement, after consultation, may be waived.
  - (ii) Canada will consult with the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean before concluding any agreement in the "Kennedy round" which would have the effect of reducing margins of preference bound under the Agreement and to take such reductions into account in any renegotiation of the Agreement.
  - (iii) The direct shipment requirements of Article VII are waived.
  - (iv) Part II of the Agreement relating to steamship services is recognized as being no longer in effect.
3. To consult upon request with respect to measures to encourage economic development which might substantially affect the trading interests of the other parties, with a view to avoiding possible damage to those trading interests and to achieving the best use of resources, taking into account the scope for regional co-operation.
  4. To consult and co-operate on tourism and in establishing or improving transportation, communications and other facilities designed to promote mutually beneficial trade and other exchanges.
  5. To work together in international commodity discussions and arrangements, and particularly to seek to secure and maintain an appropriate and effective price range under a new International Sugar Agreement which will be remunerative to producers and equitable to consumers.
  6. To endeavour to revive the banana trade and to bring about increased sales of bananas to Canada from the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean.
  7. To seek to secure acceptable conditions of access for wheat in world markets in order to bring about increased trade at prices which will be remunerative to efficient producers and fair to consumers, taking into account world food needs.
  8. The Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean undertake in the development of local flour mills to provide fair and equal opportunities for the Canadian industry to participate in their development and for Canada to have a fair and equal opportunity to supply the wheat requirements of such new mills.
  9. The Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean undertake to ensure that Canadian exporters of salted cod are given a fair and equal opportunity to supply the market requirements at prices which will be remunerative to efficient producers and fair to consumers.
  10. To accord fair and equitable treatment to individuals and enterprises of the other parties.
  11. Canada undertakes to require that the origin and Canadian content of

any rum marketed in Canada be clearly marked and to use its good offices with the provincial authorities to facilitate the marketing of rum from the Commonwealth Caribbean countries.

12. In pursuance of the foregoing to establish a Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Trade and Economic Committee to consult on trade, financial and related matters, which shall meet from time to time at ministerial or senior official level as may be appropriate.

In respect of those territories for which the United Kingdom Government has a responsibility in these matters, this Protocol is being signed with the authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

### **Canadian Government Proposal on Sugar**

The Canadian Government proposal regarding raw sugar imports from the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and territories is to provide on a unilateral basis duty free entry for a quantity of raw sugar equal to the average of such imports for the last five years.

This would mean the abolition for such countries and territories only of the present British Preferential Tariff rate of approximately 29 cents a cwt. Any allocation of this tariff quota would be a matter for the Commonwealth Caribbean Governments.

This tariff quota would, of course, be a new tariff preference and could not therefore be implemented before a waiver was obtained from the no-new-preference provisions of the GATT. Releases would also be required from the Australian, South African and United Kingdom Governments with whom Canada has trade agreements involving obligations concerning the Canadian tariff on raw sugar. The Canadian Government will be prepared to use its best endeavours with the Canadian sugar refiners to ensure that the amount of the tariff free quota is in fact taken up each year and that the full benefit of the additional margin of preference is received by the West Indian producers.

## *Air-Link Between Canada and the U.S.S.R.*

*An agreement was signed in Ottawa on July 11, 1966, by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, Mr. D. S. Polyansky, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and His Excellency Ivan F. Shpedko, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to Canada, establishing a direct air service between Canada and the Soviet Union.*

*After signing the agreement, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Polyansky made the following statements:*

### **Statement by the Prime Minister**

I am very pleased that the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and I are able to mark the conclusion of his highly successful visit to this country by signing together — along with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs — the first air transport agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R.

This agreement, establishing air service between Montreal and Moscow, is a practical expression both of our common interests and of the co-operation between our two countries in serving these interests. So it is particularly fitting that this "signing" ceremony should be linked with Mr. Polyansky's visit, for we regard both the agreement and his visit as milestones in the development of closer relations between Canada and the Soviet Union.

I am sure that Mr. Polyansky and those who have travelled with him through seven of our ten provinces have been impressed by the friendliness shown by Canadians to them — by farmers and industrialists, private citizens and representatives of governments whom they have met.

The extensive coverage given our visitors by press, television and radio has reflected how genuine and widespread Canadian interest is towards the Soviet Union and its peoples.

We also have with us today — and I welcome him to Canada — General Loginov, Soviet Minister of Civil Aviation. Together with our Minister of Transport, the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, General Loginov will sign a memorandum of understanding on the technical aspects of the agreement and will exchange letters providing for future discussions over its extension. The heads of Aeroflot and of Air Canada later will sign the necessary commercial agreement between the two airlines.

Both our countries are confident that this direct air service between Montreal and Moscow, being inaugurated on the basis of these agreements, will be of great practical benefit to the travelling public of Canada and the Soviet Union.

We hope that, based on these agreements, further air service will be developed in due course.

We in Canada are particularly happy that the Moscow-Montreal service will be inaugurated on the eve of our centenary, for it will facilitate travel to Expo '67, where the Soviet Union, as we all know, will be a major participant.

In conclusion, Mr. Polyansky, may I reiterate how much we have valued your presence among us. Both your visit and this agreement demonstrate the mutually beneficial relations which have developed and are expanding between our two countries and peoples. I hope that our new air service will not only encourage reciprocal travel by Canadians and Russians, but, indeed, that it will also facilitate your own early return to our country.

#### **Statement by Mr. Polyansky**

Allow me to express great satisfaction with the signing of the governmental agreement to establish an air-link between the U.S.S.R. and Canada.

Allow me to congratulate all those present here on another important step on the road to the further promotion of Soviet-Canadian relations.



*Prime Minister L.B. Pearson of Canada (right) and Mr. D.S. Polyansky, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., sign the Air Transport Agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union.*

The relations between our countries are developing all along the line — in trade and maritime transport, in science and technology, in farming and culture.

The signing of the agreement to establish a direct air-link between the U.S.S.R. and Canada coincided with the conclusion of our visit.

It may seem, on cursory examination, that it was deliberately arranged by the Soviet Minister of Air Transport Mr. E. F. Loginov, and by the Canadian Minister of Transport, the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill, who are present here. But it is clear to everyone that these are but links in a single chain of good-neighbourly relations.

And I am happy to have the opportunity of performing still another act conclusive to the rapprochement of our countries and peoples.

Recently a direct passenger-ship service was established between the U.S.S.R. and Canada, which has already won recognition.

The Soviet ship *Alexander Pushkin* left on its third cruise from Montreal with its passenger space filled to capacity. Apparently, the air-link will supplement it very well indeed.

Those who were unable to book a passage on the ship can now board a plane. Our northern people say that a reindeer is good and so is a ship, but a plane is faster.

The direct air-link between Moscow and Montreal will result in a considerable increase of Canadians visiting the Soviet Union and Soviet citizens visiting Canada and will place the relations between our countries on a solid basis.

May this link promote good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Canada, between the Soviet and Canadian peoples.

# *International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons*

Men are never so likely to settle  
a question rightly as when they discuss  
it freely. — *Macaulay*.

**T**HE danger to international peace and security that would result from the further spread of nuclear weapons is an issue that is assuming an increasing amount of attention in the world today; governments, the United Nations and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have all expressed their mounting concern about the spectre of nuclear proliferation. In Geneva, the representatives of 17 countries have been discussing the problem for several months, though progress has been limited.

In the face of what, in effect, amounts to an impasse, three private organizations — the American Assembly of Columbia University in the United States, the Institute for Strategic Studies in Britain and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Canada — with the support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, decided to sponsor an assembly on nuclear weapons that would examine the proliferation issue in an ambiance where parliamentarians and government officials could meet academics, scientists, journalists and other interested persons unofficially and off the record. The planning culminated on July 23 in Scarborough, Ontario, where more than 60 “members” from 26 countries gathered to take part in the “International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons”. Nearly all hues of the international political spectrum — East, West and non-aligned — were present, but the emphasis was on expertise in the fields of defence, nuclear technology and arms control. Participants were invited personally, rather than as official representatives of their governments.

## **Programme**

The Assembly's programme was divided between evening public sessions, at which guest speakers delivered formal addresses, and three private sessions, at which the members were able to have a frank exchange of ideas. Several background papers had been prepared for the conference under the editorship of Alistair Buchan, and these will be published as a volume in the American Assembly series by Prentice-Hall in the autumn of this year. Contributors to the book, which will be entitled *A World of Nuclear Powers*, were drawn from seven countries. At the end of three days full of private and informal debate, the conferees met in plenary session on June 26 under the chairmanship of M. Arnold Heeney, President of the CIIA, and Chairman of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission, to consider the text of a final report. The completed document has been made public.

The public speeches were delivered on the first two evenings by Sir Solly

Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Government, and Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Head of the Swedish delegation to the ENDC. Sir Solly Zuckerman dealt with the "technological aspects of proliferation". He acknowledged that the danger to man of the military exploitation of atomic power could not be overestimated, but emphasized that, sooner or later, man would have to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The speaker argued that the existing "passive" restraints of deficiencies in finance, manpower and nuclear fuel, coupled with a system of "active" restraints, such as safeguards on fissile material usage, a ban on underground tests or a "cut-off", could provide the technical means of preventing military proliferation. Political differences, not scientific inadequacies, stood in the way of agreement.

#### **Alternatives to a Treaty**

Mrs. Myrdal stated that, because a non-proliferation treaty "would bind all smaller countries but leave the present five nuclear-weapon nations free to build up their arsenals and the deadliness of their weapons", the non-nuclear powers considered this "classical method" as the least effective way of dealing with the urgent problems of disarmament. The alternative possibilities, which could be considered simultaneously, were a ban on underground tests and a "cut-off". The advances in seismic detection and the possibilities involved in a "verification-by-challenge" procedure were developments which led Mrs. Myrdal to believe that, "from a technical, operative point of view, a comprehensive test ban would be a highly efficient means to forestall proliferation of nuclear weapons to further countries and . . . it would not be too difficult to construct control measures which give reasonable assurances as to the adherence to the treaty obligations". In view of the small gap between the super-powers, the speaker wondered whether both countries were letting the negotiations stall because they wished to test for military reasons. If so, she thought that, judged as a whole, "the cost to the super-powers of acceding to a full test-ban treaty would seem small indeed, while to the world at large the gain would be very great". Mrs. Myrdal thought the "cut-off" a "decisive" non-proliferation measure, since it would "imply a formal undertaking by perhaps hundreds of nations never to start such production, at the same time as it requires from the nations who wield nuclear weapons that they 'freeze' their stockpiles of nuclear war material at the present levels". The Swedish diplomat concluded her remarks with a wide-ranging discussion of the need for denuclearized zones, a new stage of relations among states in Europe, the allaying of suspicions between rich and poor nations and the role of the UN in a disarming world.

The address at the closing evening session was delivered by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson of Canada. Describing the development of the "relatively stable, if uneasy, balance of nuclear strength between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R." and "the tacit understanding of the two super-powers to avoid direct confrontations which would threaten the outbreak of nuclear war," Mr.



Pearson went on to discuss the possible deployment of anti-ballistic-missiles as an unbalancing factor. He expressed the view that, "if the result of a re-assessment were a tacit understanding by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to refrain from the development of ABM systems — and so prevent a new dimension of escalation of the arms race —, the dividends in terms of reduced tension and enhanced international stability would place us all in a much better position to examine the vital political issues which still divide us and which so largely determine our prospects for reducing armaments".

### **Perils of Proliferation**

Mr. Pearson gave serious expression to the dangers arising from proliferation. "These dangers," he said, "are upon us. The further spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risk of nuclear war and so the insecurity of all nations. It could add a new threatening factor to historical, ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations. A decision by one country to acquire nuclear weapons would almost certainly generate strong pressure on others to take similar action. International relations would thereby be made more complicated and more dangerous. Agreements on arms-control measures would become more difficult to achieve and any prospect of progress in this field would recede. Moreover, there would be greater risk of nuclear war breaking out as a result of human error flowing from defective control arrangements or through the action of irresponsible elements into whose hands the weapons might fall."

The Prime Minister declared that the issues were so complex that no single measure was likely to provide a solution. Among the possible measures was the non-proliferation treaty, whose consideration in the ENDC was "dragging on" over the question of nuclear-sharing in NATO. "On this issue," he said, "we in Canada stand on the principle embodied in the Irish resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly in 1961. We are convinced that proliferation would not occur under the terms of a treaty which required that the present nuclear powers must retain full control of their nuclear weapons. Perhaps such a treaty should prohibit, specifically, the transfer of such control to states, groups of states or other entities, requiring that the present nuclear states must at all times maintain the power of veto over deployment and firing of such nuclear weapons."

### **Major Obstacles to a Treaty**

In the final analysis, however, the greatest obstacles to a non-proliferation agreement might well come from technically-advanced countries which would insist on multilateral security assurances and parallel nuclear-power disarmament. The Prime Minister went on to say that "security assurances of this kind raise important issues for the nuclear powers". "They already have commitments to their allies and the acceptance of new commitments might tend to strain their military resources and complicate their political relations with other nuclear

powers as well as with rivals of countries to whom a guarantee was extended," he pointed out. "While the great powers might be prepared to accept responsibilities commensurate with their status, there are, of course, limits to the responsibilities they can be expected to undertake. . . . A United Nations resolution signifying the intention of members to provide or support assistance to non-nuclear states subject to nuclear attack, or threats of attack, might also provide a form of useful collective assurance in no way incompatible with other and more direct arrangements."

Canada was much encouraged, Mr. Pearson said, to see the acceptance of international safeguards steadily gaining ground. It was the Canadian view that, if "safeguards are to be acceptable and effective, they must be acceptable and applicable to all states". "These recognized systems of safeguards which are already applied by many countries to transactions involving transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes should be applied to cover all such international transfers," the Prime Minister declared. "In this way, an important step forward would be taken to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by additional countries."

Like other speakers at the Assembly, Prime Minister Pearson referred to the desirability of a comprehensive test ban with adequate verification machinery, and to the usefulness of nuclear-free zones.

#### **China as a Nuclear Power**

Mr. Pearson then referred to "the emergence of China as a nuclear power and as a new factor in the nuclear equation". "The Chinese leaders appear bent on achieving an effective military nuclear capability, however long it takes and however much it costs," he said. "To those seeking a peaceful world order, this prospect can only be viewed with deep concern. So long as China remains outside existing international councils, isolating herself from the influence of other governments and world opinion, she is more likely to remain a recalcitrant and disturbing factor in the world balance of power. Yet it seems clear that progress towards the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective measures of arms control require that all the principal world powers, including continental China, must be party to international discussions of these questions. Therefore, we should do everything possible to bring China into discussion about disarmament and other great international issues. This may make her more conscious of her responsibility as a member of the international community. In this endeavour, those who already have direct contact with Peking have a special and important role to play."

In conclusion, the Prime Minister spoke of the need to reach agreements in some of the areas described above so as to "reassure a world fearful of nuclear devastation that the world family . . . accepts its collective responsibility for limiting a further spread of these weapons which, left unchecked, threaten to destroy our civilization".

## **Final Report of Assembly**

A short preambular paragraph stated: "The final report of the Assembly reflects conclusions generally acceptable to the participants. However, no one signed it and it should not be assumed that every participant necessarily subscribed to every statement." In some instances, the text of the report does not represent conclusions at all but simply records the fact that certain matters were discussed. On the other hand, given these qualifications, the report reflects a remarkable willingness of the experts to concentrate on the substance of the issues without reflecting mirror-like official national positions.

The principal points emerging from the discussions were identified in the final report. In the view of the Assembly, there was a serious possibility of the "civil nuclear powers" embarking on a weapons programme for reasons of security, prestige or autonomy, though the likelihood of proliferation occurring in any particular country was differently weighted by individual members. At the same time, it was thought that informed opinion in these countries was aware of the political, social, economic and military implications in acquiring military nuclear status, but the Assembly found it difficult to generalize, as a crisis could obscure the arguments against. It was stressed that the technology for a weapons system was often limited in its value for civil purposes. The members widely agreed that the military nuclear powers should acquaint the civil nuclear powers of the economic, scientific and strategic costs, even if this meant relaxing the secrecy that surrounded their planning, and it was suggested that an objective international report on the subject be published.

As far as the likely effects of proliferation were concerned, the members thought that acquisition by one country might well lead to a chain-reaction among civil nuclear powers, that during a country's development programme military dangers would increase and that proliferation in certain troubled areas would indefinitely delay political settlements. In general, the delegates thought that, if nuclear weapons were to spread, the risks of nuclear war would increase and world security would decrease.

## **Ways of Hindering Proliferation**

On the complex question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, the Assembly acknowledged that the basic principles of design were in the public domain but that other ways of inhibiting testing and production were available. A restrictive policy by the nuclear powers in providing materials and technology for separation plants and missile systems might, however, have a limited effect. A better solution would be a non-proliferation treaty to be signed by all the existing military nuclear powers as well as the non-nuclear powers. Some thought that, once East-West differences over nuclear-sharing and related matters were resolved, the wisest course would lie in a simple treaty; left for later negotiation would be control, safeguards, "cut-off" measures, tests for peaceful purposes and a comprehensive test ban.

The report noted that, "if the military nuclear powers ask other powers to sign a non-proliferation/non-acquisition treaty while themselves continuing to test; if they embark on a new phase of their technological competition such as ballistic-missile defence systems; if they cannot agree to halt their arms race and to work more vigorously toward nuclear disarmament; if they are unwilling to contemplate a pledge of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers; if, in short, they seek to impose restrictions on others without accepting any for themselves, some civil nuclear powers might not be willing to adhere to such a treaty". In addition, the civil nuclear powers in Asia had problems of security and would doubt the wisdom of an unlimited treaty of restraint to which Communist China was not a party.

### **Other Initiatives**

Some members observed that, as progress on the proliferation treaty had been slow, responsible countries should consider a number of other important initiatives, including the negotiation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa and possibly Europe and the Middle East. Other possibilities were the "cut-off" and extension of the safeguards and the inspection functions of the IAEA to all countries.

Finally, the report dealt with the high importance that was attached to the prevention of proliferation through an underground test ban: "It was suggested that there should be an agreement by the military nuclear powers to forego all underground testing for a limited trial period, with a system of verification of seismologically ambiguous events by challenge or invitation; it was hoped that such an experimental suspension of underground tests would provide the necessary assurances that could lead to a treaty banning underground tests. Another suggestion was for a 'threshold treaty' banning all tests above a certain seismic magnitude. It was represented that either approach would be greatly assisted by the creation of the proposed 'nuclear detection club', in which nations would co-operate in the collection and exchange of seismological data."

It remains to be seen the extent to which the conclusions of the members will be pursued governmentally. Some specific ideas (a nuclear-test ban for a trial period is an example) received immediate public attention as a possible new initiative. Whatever the impact of specific ideas emerging from the Assembly, however, the meetings showed that, even among representatives of different blocs and areas, there could be found some common meeting ground in the non-governmental atmosphere of a private conference. Finally, the considerable public attention which the conference, its final report and its public speeches engendered in Canada and abroad served to emphasize again the need for progress in the many-sided but vital drive to prevent nuclear proliferation.

## *Visit of Czech Parliamentarians to Canada*

A ten-man delegation from the Czechoslovak National Assembly, led by its Chairman, Mr. Bohuslav Lastovicka, visited Canada from June 13 to 24, 1966, at the invitation of the Honourable Sydney J. Smith, Speaker of the Canadian Senate, and the Honourable Lucien Lamoureux, Speaker of the House of Commons. This visit, the first made to Canada by a Czech parliamentary group, was in return for a visit to Czechoslovakia during the summer of 1965 by a group of Canadian Members of Parliament and Senators.

During their stay in Ottawa, the members of the Czech delegation were received by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson, the Minister of Public Works, the Honourable George McIlraith, the Minister of Agriculture, the Honourable J. J. Greene, the leader of the Opposition, the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, as well as other government and business officials. They were also guests of honour at a dinner held by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin.



*The Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons, the Honourable Sydney J. Smith (centre) and the Honourable Lucien Lamoureux (right), welcome to Canada Mr. Bohuslav Lastovicka, Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly (left).*

### **Other Cities Visited**

Besides Ottawa, the delegation visited Calgary and Banff (Alberta), Vancouver (British Columbia), Niagara Falls, Hamilton, Oakville, Stratford, Kitchener and Toronto (Ontario), and Montreal and Quebec City (Quebec). During this tour they inspected various industrial plants and farms, as well as cultural and health institutions, and saw something of Canadian life as represented by a cross-section of the Canadian people.

A joint communiqué issued at the end of the tour expressed the satisfaction of both countries with the exchange of parliamentary visits and reaffirmed their mutual interest in continuing to develop closer co-operation and better understanding.

# Canada Ratifies Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Canada's ratification on May 26, 1966, of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations brought to 56 the number of countries that had ratified this important international document. <sup>(1)</sup>

The international significance of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention stems from its importance as a further step in the development and codification of international legal norms. The conceptions of diplomatic relations reflected in the Convention are of relatively recent origin, dating largely from the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Before the Congress, the protection of diplomats had been the result of somewhat loose *ad hoc* bilateral arrangements. Similarly, the development of permanent diplomatic relations, as distinguished from temporary diplomatic relations, dates only from the seventeenth century.

## An Early Classification of Diplomats

The 1815 "Regulation of Vienna" (Article 118, No. 17) divided diplomatic envoys into three classes: ambassadors, ministers and envoys, and *chargés d'affaires*. The equivalents of the first two classes among the representatives of the Holy See are *nuncios* and *internuncios*, who are entitled to similar treatment and privileges. (Commonwealth nations accredit high commissioners, with functions and status similar to those of ambassadors, to other members of the Commonwealth.) The success of this classification is indicated by the fact that the definitions have been incorporated, with certain modifications, into the present Convention as Articles 14 to 18. The 1961 Vienna Diplomatic Convention is the summation of, among other things, nineteenth-century agreements, accepted practice, case law, administrative arrangements and bilateral agreements.

The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is frequently confused with its sister document, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The latter document has not yet been signed or ratified by Canada and thus, so far as Canada is concerned, it serves for the time being only as a guide to state practice in the field of consular privileges and immunities. The Diplomatic Convention, which Canada has ratified, applies to the premises of embassies in Ottawa and the capital area and to the persons attached to these embassies, irrespective of where they may be in Canada. The Consular Convention, if adhered to by Canada, will apply to heads of mission, staff and premises of foreign consulates located in major cities across Canada.

The present Vienna Diplomatic Convention was inspired by Resolution No. 685/VII, of December 5, 1952, of the United Nations General Assembly and

(1) See the appended list.

by the drafting by the International Law Commission, at its fifth session in 1953, of articles for a possible convention on diplomatic intercourse and immunities. At its ninth session, in 1957, the ILC adopted a provisional set of draft articles, which were circulated to governments for comment. Twenty-nine countries, including Canada, submitted observations that were taken into consideration when the Commission prepared its final draft at its tenth session in 1958.

On December 7, 1959, the United Nations General Assembly decided, by Resolution 1450 (XIV), that an international conference of plenipotentiaries should be convoked to consider the question of diplomatic relations and to embody the results of its work in an international convention. By the terms of this resolution, all states members of the United Nations, states members of the Specialized Agencies and states parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice were invited to participate. Subsequently, taking advantage of a supplementary survey by the International Law Commission on the topic "*ad hoc* diplomacy", the United Nations General Assembly decided, in Resolution 1504 (XV) of December 12, 1960, to refer the resulting ILC draft articles to the conference. The results of the conference's work are embodied in the present Convention.

#### **Scope of Convention**

The Convention has been in effect, as between parties that have ratified it, since the twenty-second instrument of ratification became effective on April 24, 1964. Although the Convention is a definitive statement of international law on the subject of diplomatic relations, it does not purport to define the limits of diplomatic intercourse for, by Article 47(b), states are permitted "to extend to each other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present Convention". At the same time, scope is provided for the growth of more extensive forms of diplomatic relations through the development of new customary international law.

The general subjects dealt with by the Convention include the establishment, functions and termination of diplomatic missions, the conduct of missions and their members, the inviolability of mission premises, various immunities from judicial, administrative and criminal jurisdictions, immunities from taxation, and freedom of movement. The text of the Convention is accompanied by two optional protocols dealing with matters it was decided to leave out of the main Convention. These are an "Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes" and an "Optional Protocol Concerning Acquisition of Nationality". Neither has been ratified by Canada.

#### **Contents of Convention**

The contents of the Diplomatic Convention correspond generally to the standards and rules that have gained acceptance by judicial decisions and administrative practice in Canada. Articles 1 to 13 define the terms employed, outline the



procedure for establishing diplomatic relations, and describe the process of accreditation functions and the size of missions. Articles 14 to 18 define the various classes of diplomat and the method of determining precedence among diplomats. Articles 17 to 22 outline the procedure for establishing a mission and the rights of the mission premises.

Article 23 exempts the sending state and the head of the mission from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission. This form of exemption, accepted by Canada as a principle of customary international law, was judicially confirmed in the *Reference Re Power of Municipalities to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioners' Residences* (1943) 2 Dominion Law Reports 481. This policy of exemption of foreign embassies from real property taxes and the concomitant policy of making grants to the municipalities in lieu of such taxes has been regularly affirmed to all missions in Ottawa.

Article 24 ensures the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission and Article 25 ensures unhindered performance of the mission's functions.

### **Rights of Travel**

Article 26 confers a right hitherto not clearly existent in international law — that is, the right of diplomats to move and travel freely in the territory of the receiving state except in zones restricted for security reasons. In the past, the movements of diplomats were sometimes limited to a capital area and a distance within a certain radius. Of course, if national security zones are interpreted somewhat extensively, as they are in certain countries, this freedom-of-travel clause will amount to very little in fact.<sup>(1)</sup>

Article 27 of the Convention ensures the free communication of all correspondence, diplomatic bags and diplomatic couriers. Such freedoms are essential to the orderly and effective operation of an embassy as an outpost of its government. Articles 29 and 30 guarantee the inviolability of diplomatic agents and their places of residence. Article 31 ensures that all diplomats are immune from the criminal, administrative and civil jurisdiction of the receiving state, except where a diplomat becomes involved in matters relating to private transactions in property, as an heir, executor or administrator in a matter of succession and not on behalf of his government, or in any action relating to any professional or commercial activity outside his official functions. No diplomat, of course, is immune from the legal jurisdiction of his home state.

### **Waiving of Immunity**

Article 32 permits the sending state to waive any immunity granted to a diplomatic agent. This, combined with the receiving state's ability to declare a

(1) An interesting aside to this article is the interpretation by the Government of Saudi Arabia, which considers that the limitations imposed, on religious grounds, on freedom of travel to the cities of Mecca and Medina should not be construed as limitations to freedom of travel.

diplomat *persona non grata* (Article 9), permits the receiving state to exercise a measure of indirect control over the activities of diplomats in order to ensure that they "respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state" (Article 41). Article 32 also provides a guarantee to the citizens of the receiving state that, if a foreign diplomat brings them into court on a claim, they will have the opportunity to lay a counter-claim. For, once a head of mission waives a diplomat's immunity and a proceeding has begun, immunity from any counter-claim arising as a result of the initial claim is also considered to have been waived. The subsequent enforcement of a court judgment against a diplomat requires, however, a further express waiver of immunity by the head of mission.

Briefly, some other provisions of the Convention include exemption of diplomats from all real, national, regional and municipal taxes and dues except indirect taxes, charges for specific services rendered (e.g. water, hydro, etc.) and private income obtained in the receiving state (Article 34). Exemptions for diplomats from military service and public service within the receiving state are contained in Article 35. Article 36 exempts from customs duties the import of property for the mission and articles for the personal use of the diplomatic agent and members of his family. The various privileges and immunities are also extended to members of the family of a diplomatic agent (Article 37). Article 37 also extends, by categories, restricted privileges and immunities to the administrative and technical staff of a missions; members of the service staff and private servants of members of the mission. Most of the remaining articles cover the general application of the various privileges and immunities, including those accorded diplomats in transit through a third state, obligations in time of war and the termination of diplomatic relations.

The Diplomatic Convention is not designed to bestow privileges and immunities solely for the benefit of diplomats. As the preamble of the Convention points out, privileges and immunities are based upon a clear need for the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as a whole. Diplomats are the instruments of this operation and their immunities are really the lubricant for the machinery of diplomacy.

Similarly, the apparent financial and physical burden of privileges and immunities is not inordinately heavy. Reciprocity is the keynote to any successful international exchange, and a government can expect from all parties to the Convention the same treatment it offers. Thus the amount of money it may cost a government to exempt diplomatic personnel and premises from various taxes and dues is offset by the savings obtained through the receipt of reciprocal exemptions elsewhere.

### **Extraterritorial Theory Discarded**

A final interesting result of the Convention's international adoption is the abandoning, at last, of the "extraterritorial" theory of the diplomatic post. This theory, a popular misconception, envisaged a diplomatic post and its premises

as an overseas manifestation of the sending state's territory and, even though the conception was rejected as far back as 1865 (by the French Cour de Cassation in the *Nikitschentcoff* Case) it had persisted in the minds of many until the 1961 Vienna Convention accepted the "representative character" theory in its place. This latter theory considers a diplomatic mission as an outpost of the sending state's government, a personification of the state, but not as part of the sending state's territory.

For Canada, the internal significance of the ratification of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention lies in its being a further step in the continuing development of Canadian federalism. Canadian fulfilment of many of the obligations set out in the articles of the Convention, especially those relating to tax exemptions, requires the co-operation of the provinces (particularly Ontario and Quebec, within which all foreign diplomatic missions and residences are, in fact, located). Fortunately, as a result of administrative arrangements between the federal and provincial authorities or, in some cases, as a result of provincial initiatives, diplomatic missions and their personnel were in the past frequently exempted in practice from most provincial taxes. Where practice had not hitherto been established, close consultation was undertaken with appropriate provincial authorities to arrange their subsequent co-operation with regard to the Vienna Convention's provisions. Without this mutual acceptance of responsibility, Canada's ratification of this important international document would have been rendered most difficult.

**THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE DEPOSITED AN INSTRUMENT  
OF RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION ARE:**

Afghanistan	Guatemala	Panama
Algeria	Holy See	Philippines
Argentina	Hungary	Malawi
Austria	India	Poland
Brazil	Iran	Rwanda
Byelorussian S.S.R.	Iraq	San Marino
Cambodia	Ivory Coast	Sierra Leone
Canada	Jamaica	Switzerland
Congo (Brazzaville)	Japan	Tanzania
Congo (Kinshasa)	Kenya	Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica	Laos	Uganda
Cuba	Liberia	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Czechoslovakia	Liechtenstein	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Dominican Republic	Malagasy Republic	United Arab Republic
Ecuador	Malaysia	United Kingdom
El Salvador	Mauritania	Venezuela
Federal Republic of Germany	Mexico	Yugoslavia
Gabon	Nepal	
Ghana	Niger	
	Pakistan	

## *Resource Surveys - A Canadian Specialty*

**T**HE surveying of natural resources is an all-important stage in the development of the economics of the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the first tasks of these nations on achieving independence is to take stock of their natural resources in order to make possible the formulation of long-term development plans. They are encouraged by the World Bank and other international agencies co-ordinating aid to undertake pre-investment studies — examinations carried out by experts to determine the most efficient manner of exploiting resources with national or international funds.

Country after country has turned to Canada for help in conducting feasibility studies of power projects, highways and rail-lines. Canadians have won an international reputation as development experts, using methods perfected in Canada's North to chart the rocks, rivers, soils and forests of tropical Asia and Africa.

Canadian exploration equipment has been shipped overseas and Canadian training given to students and trainees from the developing continents.

In India, last year, Canada was deeply involved in a geological survey forming part of the special development-loan programme. Funds were made available for the purchase of Canadian drilling equipment and the training of Indian drillers. During the course of the survey, cores will be drilled in geological formations in many parts of India.

### **Aid to Malaysia**

Canada also launched, in co-operation with the Government of Malaysia, a survey of that country's natural resources that will cover the 52,000 square miles of the Malayan mainland.

Since high priority has been given to mapping in Malaysia's first long-term development plan, Canada decided to make a contribution of \$1.5 million to the survey under the Colombo Plan. This amount paid for one of the two aircraft in use on the survey, for special equipment and materials for the photographic and map-making process, as well as for the salaries of a project manager and six Canadian specialists. The Government of Malaysia will provide the remaining \$2 million for the second aircraft and its crew, fuel for both planes and office and processing facilities.

Aerial photography plays an important role in surveying and planning, and in recent years many Malaysian government departments have realized the need for an up-to-date, large-scale stereoscopic photo-cover for Malaya, as an aid to topographic mapping, land-use surveying, development planning and surveying of natural resources, including minerals, soil, forests and water.

### **Aid to Pakistan**

In Pakistan, experts from Canada spent last year investigating land-use problems in the Chittagong Hills. Only 385,000 persons lived in the 5,000 square miles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Pakistan felt that the region could support a much greater population with the introduction of industry and improved agriculture. A large amount of capital investment and a scientific examination of Chittagong's potential were prerequisites. Under the Colombo Plan, Canada was able to help in both respects.

It contributed Canadian goods and engineering services worth \$5,760,000 to the construction of electrical transmission-lines between Chittagong and Dacca, connecting with the region's Karnafuli hydro-electric scheme. It made a \$625,000 aerial survey of the forests of the region. Then, to prepare for the intensive development sketched on Pakistani drawing boards, one final, intensive survey was needed, and Canada and Pakistan joined in a land survey of the hills of Chittagong.

### **Other Projects**

Under contract to the External Aid Office, Forestal Forestry and Engineering International, Limited, of Vancouver, the firm that had handled the forestry survey, put together a team of specialists and sent them to make studies of agriculture, natural resources, rural development, communications, transport, fisheries, economics and social structure. Their report, which is expected to be completed in September 1966, will be the blueprint for one of the most extensive development plans ever drafted.

Canadians also worked on a highway-feasibility study in Thailand, forest-resources inventories in Kenya and Nigeria, an aerial-photography, mapping and magnetometer survey in Nigeria, aerial photography and mosaics in Trinidad and Tobago and a forest-resources survey in Malawi. In a joint study with Britain, Canada attempted to determine the economics of a projected rail-link from Lusaka in landlocked Zambia to Tanzania's major port of Dar-es-Salaam. In Guinea, Canadian experts examined the feasibility of two power-stations and four bridges across the Niger, Tinkisso and Fatala rivers.

Canada made an effective contribution to the discovery and development of water resources in the Little Eight islands of the Caribbean and facilitated development studies of the Guayas River basin in Ecuador and the interior of Peru under the special development-loan programme for Latin America.

# *Canada's Relations with Bulgaria*

*A delegation from the People's Republic of Bulgaria, led by the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gero Grozev, visited Ottawa June 21 to 30, 1966. As a result of discussions and negotiations during the visit, agreement was reached between Canada and Bulgaria on the establishment of diplomatic relations, on the settlement of a small number of financial claims arising from post-war nationalizations and similar measures, and on matters related to consular protection, the reunification of families and clarification of the status of dual nationals of the two countries. The Honourable Paul Martin, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. Gero Grozev signed on June 30 a series of agreements and notes setting forth the understandings reached during the negotiations.*

*These interrelated documents constitute a practical step in the implementation of the Government's policy of restoring normal relations with Bulgaria and, on a broader plane, between Canada and the countries of Eastern Europe.*

## **Agreement on Settlement of Financial Matters**

The Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in their desire to settle definitively financial questions pending between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

### **ARTICLE I**

The Bulgarian Government shall pay to the Canadian Government the lump-sum of forty thousand Canadian dollars in full and final settlement of the claims of the Government of Canada, Canadian citizens and Canadian juridical persons against the Bulgarian Government in respect of property, rights, interests and debts in Bulgaria which have been affected directly or indirectly by Bulgarian measures of nationalization, expropriation or other similar measures which have taken effect before the date of the present agreement.

### **ARTICLE II**

Payment of the lump-sum mentioned in Article I of the present agreement shall be made by the Bulgarian Government to the Canadian Government within two months from the date of signature of this agreement.

### **ARTICLE III**

For the purpose of the present agreement, claims of Canada citizens and of Canadian juridical persons refer to claims which were owned by Canadian citizens or by Canadian juridical persons on the effective date of nationalization,

expropriation or other similar measure and continuously thereafter until the date of the present agreement.

#### ARTICLE IV

The Canadian Government will consider as settled and discharged as between the Governments of Canada and Bulgaria all claims mentioned in Article I of the present agreement, and the Canadian Government will not pursue, support or present to the Bulgarian Government any such claims whether or not they have already been brought to the attention of the Bulgarian Government. In respect of any measures of the type described in Article I of this Agreement, the Bulgarian Government agrees not to pursue, support or present to the Canadian Government any claims against the Canadian Government held by the Bulgarian Government, by Bulgarian citizens or by Bulgarian juridical persons which may have arisen prior to the date of signature of this agreement.

#### ARTICLE V

(1) The distribution of the amount mentioned in Article I falls within the exclusive competence and responsibility of the Canadian Government.

(2) To facilitate the distribution of this amount the Bulgarian Government shall, at the request of the Canadian Government, furnish as soon as possible such documents and such details of title and of value as are held by the appropriate Bulgarian authorities so as to enable the Canadian Government to determine any claims of Canadian citizens.

#### ARTICLE VI

The Government of Canada will continue to return, in accordance with Canadian law, upon submission to the Canadian Custodian of Enemy Property of such evidence of ownership as the Custodian may require, those assets which were vested in the Custodian in respect of Bulgarian nationals, and which are still held by the Custodian, provided that the requirements of Canadian law shall, in the opinion of the Canadian authorities, be met before April 30, 1970.

#### ARTICLE VII

The present agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in two copies at Ottawa this thirtieth day of June, 1966, in the English, French and Bulgarian languages, each version being equally authentic.

Paul Martin

For the Government of Canada

G. Grozev

For the Government of the People's  
Republic of Bulgaria

Ottawa, June 30, 1966.

### Agreed Minute

The Delegation of Canada and the Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, pursuant to the Agreement between Canada and Bulgaria which was concluded on this day's date by the Governments of the two countries for the settlement of claims of the Canadian Government, of Canadian citizens and of Canadian juridical persons, reached the understanding that nothing in the above Agreement shall be deemed to relate to any external bond obligations issued or guaranteed by the Bulgarian Government.

Paul Martin  
G. Grozev

### Letter on Consular Matters

The Honourable Paul Martin,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.  
Sir,

Referring to the discussions between the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of Canada on consular matters, I have the honour to confirm the agreement reached on the following points:

1. The Bulgarian and Canadian authorities will give benevolent consideration on humanitarian grounds to applications by persons admissible respectively to Canada or Bulgaria who wish to emigrate in order to join members of their families in the other country.
2. The Bulgarian authorities, when considering in accordance with their laws an application for release from Bulgarian citizenship of a person who has acquired Canadian citizenship by naturalization, will take into account as a circumstance worthy of special consideration the fact that the applicant is a dual national normally resident in Canada. The Canadian authorities will accord complete reciprocity in corresponding cases.
3. A dual national (whether by birth or naturalization) of Bulgaria and Canada who visits Bulgaria on a Canadian passport furnished with a Bulgarian visa or who visits Canada on a Bulgarian passport furnished with a Canadian visa will not be denied permission to leave Bulgaria or Canada, respectively, on the ground that he possesses the citizenship of the country visited.
4. The Bulgarian and Canadian authorities will give sympathetic consideration to requests for permission to depart from Bulgaria or Canada respectively received from dual nationals of Bulgaria and Canada (either born in Canada or naturalized in Canada) who have previously been residing permanently in either country and wish to transfer residence to the other.



5. The authorities of Bulgaria and Canada, in accordance with their respective laws, will give sympathetic consideration to any request by the authorized representative of the other for consular access to any citizen of Canada or Bulgaria who is detained or arrested in the other country.

6. The Bulgarian authorities will return to the Canadian authorities all Canadian passports held by or surrendered to the Bulgarian authorities. In like manner the Canadian authorities will return to the Bulgarian authorities all Bulgarian passports held by or surrendered to the Canadian authorities.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Gero Grozev  
Head of the Bulgarian Delegation.

# *Recruitment of University Graduates*

Since its establishment in 1909 and particularly since 1939, the Department of External Affairs has expanded rapidly to meet its growing responsibilities. It now maintains over 80 offices abroad, including 58 embassies and offices of high commissioners which, taking into account dual accreditation, conduct Canada's relations with 97 countries. Because of this continuing growth, the Department has positions open each year to university graduates.

## **Foreign Service Officers**

### **Duties**

The most striking characteristic of the work of a Foreign Service Officer is its diversity. At a post abroad, he establishes, develops and maintains personal and official contacts. If he works in the political or economic section, he regularly meets with officials of the government (particularly in the foreign ministry) and with politicians, businessmen and other groups. He studies and assesses published material to collect, collate and evaluate information that forms the basis of interpretative reports to headquarters. Under guidance, he also consults with officials of the government on matters of interest to the Canadian Government.

An officer working in the information section keeps in touch with journalists, educational institutions, cultural groups, and related government agencies. He sees that Canadian policy and the Canadian way of life become better known, and may occasionally do this by public speaking.

In consular work, an officer deals with government officials and the public. Sometimes he will also deal with immigration matters and with Canadians residing in or visiting the country. Officers may also be given some administrative work.

As part of his representation duties abroad, an officer is expected to attend a variety of functions and to do some entertainment, for which he receives special allowances.

In Ottawa, the Foreign Service Officer works in one of the Department's divisions, some of which deal with political problems in specific areas, while others are concerned with international organizations, economic or consular questions, or matters involving departmental administration. The young officer assists senior officers in his division and is made responsible for part of the work of the division.

### **Essential Qualities**

Although successful foreign service officers come from a wide range of backgrounds and university disciplines, the Department has nevertheless a clear

conception of the qualities which are essential to a successful diplomat, and these form the basis on which candidates are selected. What are these qualities?

Intellectually, an effective officer must be both alert and mature. A high degree of specialization is not required, although a sound knowledge of Canadian and international affairs is necessary. An officer must be able to express himself fluently, whether orally or in writing; much of his effectiveness will depend on his ability to draft clear and concise reports and recommendations. He needs to be an effective administrator, to have the judgment necessary to choose practical solutions to often complex problems, and, of course, the flexibility and adaptability common to all members of the foreign service.

In order to select young officers who possess these basic characteristics, the Civil Service Commission and the Department of External Affairs, in consultation, have developed a selection procedure that consists of two competitions, an annual and a continuing one.

### **Annual Competition**

Most officers are recruited through the annual competition, which is the only avenue to appointment as FSO Grade 1. The basic conditions for eligibility are that candidates be graduates of universities of recognized standing or in their graduating year, Canadian citizens with at least ten years' residence in the country, and less than 31 years of age at the time of writing the qualifying examinations.

This competition, for which the examinations are usually held in October, is widely advertised each year by the Civil Service Commission. Notices are distributed to post offices, Civil Service and National Employment Offices across Canada, and Canadian Government offices abroad. To ensure further that all potential candidates know of the competition, the Commission notifies Canadian universities and major universities abroad where Canadians may be studying. In the past, the Department has also sent officers to a number of Canadian campuses to talk to students and faculty members who may be interested in learning about career opportunities in the foreign service.

The annual competition has two phases — the written examinations and an interview. Examination centres are set up at all Canadian universities and, on request, at offices of the Canadian Government abroad. In order to preserve anonymity until the examinations have been marked, each candidate is given a number. Of the three examinations, one is a multiple-choice "objective" test prepared by the Civil Service Commission to test all university graduates seeking employment in any part of the public service.<sup>(1)</sup> The second is a language paper, designed to show the candidate's knowledge of his second Canadian language. The third is an essay examination prepared for foreign service officer candidates for both the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce and drawn up jointly by the two departments in co-operation with the

(1) A booklet entitled *Civil Service Examinations*, which contains specimen questions from the "objective" examination, may be purchased from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, for 25 cents.

Civil Service Commission. Candidates are asked to write an essay on one of a broad choice of topics.<sup>(1)</sup> From the point of view of the Department of External Affairs, this paper is useful because it allows the candidate to demonstrate both his general knowledge of Canadian and international affairs and his facility in writing. Candidates may, of course, choose to be examined in English or in French.

Those who are successful in the written examinations<sup>(2)</sup> are subsequently invited to an interview with a selection board. The centres at which these boards sit may change from year to year, but they are usually convened in the major cities of Canada and, if the number of candidates should warrant, in some of the larger cities in the United States, Britain and Western Europe. Occasionally, it is found necessary to bring candidates to the examination centre nearest where they are living; in such cases, the Civil Service Commission is prepared to assist those who are required to travel a considerable distance with their return rail or air fares.

Each board is composed of a member of the Civil Service Commission, a senior member of the Department of External Affairs and a senior member of the Trade Commissioner Service. Its function is to judge the suitability of a candidate by assessing his intellectual capacity, initiative, personality and general merit. On the basis of the board's assessment, a mark is assigned for the second phase of the competition.

The Civil Service Commission, by combining this mark and the results from the written examinations, compiles an eligible list of the successful candidates in order of rank. (This list takes into account statutory veterans' preference when applicable). Appointments to the Department are offered to those candidates on the eligible list, beginning at the top. The limiting factor, of course, is the number of vacant positions on the approved Departmental establishment, and these, in any one year, depend on factors such as the Department's expanding its programme at an existing post or its assuming increased responsibility abroad through the establishment of new posts.

Since 1960, about 25 candidates have joined the Department as Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 after each competition, although in 1966 that number more than doubled. Successful candidates usually enter the Department the following spring or summer on the understanding that they will serve wherever the Department may require. They may join earlier if they are free from other obligations.

### **Continuing Competition**

In addition to the annual competition for recruiting Foreign Service Officers 1, the Civil Service Commission recently launched a special continuing competition

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(1) A copy of the 1965 essay paper is appended.

(2) Failing the language examination does not disqualify a candidate, though a degree of fluency in the second Canadian language is an asset.

by which a few exceptionally well qualified men and women can be offered appointment at a higher level. Candidates must be Canadian citizens with at least ten years' residence in the country. Minimum educational requirements are a master's degree (or such equivalent as an LL.B. with admission to the bar) and at least one year's additional study or relevant experience.

Since this is a continuing competition, applications are considered at any time during the year. Qualified candidates are admitted directly to an interview with a selection board. The board, which is usually composed of the Head of the Department's Personnel Division, another officer of the Department, and a representative of the Civil Service Commission, must assess the suitability of the candidate's academic and personal qualities.

### **Relation of the Competitions**

The two competitions are not mutually exclusive. If a candidate in the annual competition had the qualifications to enter the continuing competition and if he were of exceptional merit, his application could be transferred and he could be offered appointment at a level higher than that of Foreign Officer Grade I. On the other hand, the selection board of the continuing competition might suggest to an unsuccessful candidate that he should enter the annual competition, since it requires a lesser degree of specialized knowledge.

## **Junior Executive Officers**

The Department of External Affairs is not only interested in recruiting Foreign Service Officers on the basis of the university graduates competition. It is interested in recruiting Junior Executive Officers as well, who, after a suitable probationary period, will become External Affairs Officers.

### **Functions**

An External Affairs Officer, like a Foreign Service Officer, is a fully integrated member of the foreign service, called upon to rotate between service at posts abroad and the Department's headquarters in Ottawa. The difference is that, while the Foreign Service Officer is mostly concerned with political and economic subjects, the External Affairs Officer specializes in the fields of administration, information and consular affairs. He is responsible for the general administrative, consular and information activities of the Department and for the formulation of policy in these areas. He revises regulations and issues directives in such fields as pay and allowances, personnel establishment, travel and removal, property management, communications, registry and finances at posts abroad. The External Affairs Officer issues passports, visas and other travel documents and performs a variety of other consular services abroad. He also supervises information programmes at home and abroad, and may engage in press relations and cultural activities.

### **Advantages**

The External Affairs Officer enjoys, of course, all the advantages of other civil servants of equivalent categories. Abroad, he enjoys full diplomatic status and privileges and, like Foreign Service Officers, carries diplomatic titles of third, second and first secretary, and counsellor or, if serving at consular offices, vice-consul and consul. External Affairs Officers have been appointed ambassadors and consuls-general. They receive the same living, housing and educational allowances as Foreign Service Officers; their representation allowances may differ when appropriate.

### **Probation**

Both Foreign Service Officers and Junior Executive Officers are appointed on a probationary basis but, after at least 12 months of satisfactory service, they are eligible for reclassification to permanent status. Foreign Service Officers 1 are then eligible for promotion to Foreign Service Officer Grade 2, while Junior Executive Officers may either be promoted right away to External Affairs Officer 2 or reclassified to External Affairs Officer 1. The Department may decide, however, to lengthen the probation period or even to terminate employment.

Officers normally spend from 12 to 24 months at headquarters in Ottawa before their first posting. During this training period, Foreign Service Officers are assigned to at least two divisions, one political and one functional, for about six months each. (An officer might, for example, work in the Latin American or Far Eastern Division and then be transferred to the Economic or Legal Division). Junior Executive Officers, on the other hand, are assigned for periods of about four months to divisions dealing with information, cultural and consular affairs, general administration, personnel management, etc.

In addition to acquiring this practical experience of working in divisions, new officers are given full or part-time language courses that permit them to improve their proficiency in their second Canadian language. They also attend a series of lectures on the organization and the work of the Department, the function of other government departments and the responsibilities of officers at Canadian missions abroad. The lecture programme is supplemented by field trips to government agencies such as the National Film Board and the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Montreal. A number of officers are also sent to the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York for short periods of "on-the-job" training during the annual General Assembly.

Thus, the initial period in Ottawa acquaints the new officer with the work of the Department's headquarters and of closely related government departments, as well as broadening his knowledge of Canada's role in international affairs. He is now ready for his first posting abroad as a working member of Canada's diplomatic corps.

## SPECIMEN ESSAY PAPER

Foreign Service Officer 1, Dept. Trade and Commerce.

Foreign Service Officer 1, Dept. of External Affairs.

1965. TIME: 1½ Hours

NOTE : (a) Candidates may be considered for either Department regardless of the topic they choose.

(b) You are to answer *only one* of the following questions.

(c) The purpose of this examination is to provide you with the opportunity to express your own ideas.

1. Discuss the motives and objectives of aid to less-developed countries. Comment on Canada's present role in this field, mentioning which you think to be the more suitable: grants, loans or technical aid of various kinds, and why.
2. "During the next 20 years the relations between white and non-white peoples may be a source of more serious world tension than the relations between the West and the Soviet Union have been during the past 20 years". Discuss.
3. Should Canada expand trade with members of the Communist Bloc? Support your views.
4. Suggest ways in which Canadian foreign policy might be developed to reflect more fully Canada's bilingual and bicultural character.
5. What would be the implications for Canada if it adopted the metric system?
6. "The fundamental problem we face is to develop techniques which will make rapid social transformations possible, while retaining the pattern of an open society". Discuss with reference to Latin America.
7. Is there a distinctive Canadian culture?
8. What are the main implications of the formation of regional trading blocs for the future of multilateral trade?
9. Should the BNA Act be revised? Support your view.
10. "Let no one think that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied."  
— President L. B. Johnson, April 7, 1965. Discuss.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **International Joint Commission**

*The following is a partial text of a statement on the work of the International Joint Commission made to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on External Affairs on June 2 by Mr. Arnold Heeney, Chairman of the Canadian Section:*

... Members of the Committee will, of course, be aware that the International Joint Commission is an international body which was established by treaty with the United States. The treaty is called the Boundary Waters Treaty, which was signed in 1909. Perhaps it is as well to recall what the purpose of the treaty is and I will therefore quote very briefly from its preamble:

... to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are now pending, between the United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise...

That is the end of the quotation from the preamble, the general statement of the purpose of the treaty.

The Commission has three American members, appointed by the President of the United States, and three Canadian members, appointed by the Governor in Council in Canada. The Commission maintains offices in Ottawa and in Washington.

It is, I think, important to recall that the Commission acts not as a continuing conference of two national delegations — delegations under instruction from their respective governments — but they act as a single body, seeking solutions in the joint interest and in accordance with the principles set out in the treaty.

I emphasize this because this is not always understood. We are a unitary body, although composed of two sections, and decisions taken and recommendations arrived at are not arrived at on the basis of a negotiation between a Canadian and American team but in the way a court would arrive at a decision in a case placed before it, according to the individual opinions of the Commissioners after hearing the evidence and seeing the results of the studies that are made by their technical boards.

The Commission itself does not maintain a large staff either in Canada or in the United States. It pursues its investigations and obtains its advice by means of specially-constituted boards, and this is of some importance.

The members of these boards are selected by the Commission from the departments and agencies of the two governments where the best technical knowledge and competence are to be found. This is an authority and privilege



that we are given by the executive authority of the two governments — that is, to select from the government services in Washington and in Ottawa those who are best suited to investigate the problems which are before us, and we bring these people together in boards, again, jointly formed but a common unitary body, to proceed with these investigations which the governments ask us to undertake.

Over the years, this has proved to be an effective and efficient means of mobilizing the authority and the variety of talent that is required for the Commission's purposes. It has also avoided the necessity of building up a large and expensive establishment of our own, and this is the reason why the estimates asked by the Government for the support of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission are so modest. Frequently people are surprised that the amount of cost directly involved for the Commission, in its Canadian Section and its American Section, is so small. But, the explanation is that we use the officials from the various departments of government where the technical knowledge and competence are to be found.

Since its first meeting in 1912, over 80 questions have come before the Commission, either for final approval under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction which we have under Article 8 of the Treaty, to approve applications, or references — that is, the so-called references under Article 9 — for examination and report to Ottawa and to Washington.

In all but a very few of these investigatory cases, which constitute the bulk of our business, governments have accepted and acted upon the Commission's recommendations.

Now . . . I thought I might select, from the cases that are before us, a number of current ones which seem to be of the most importance and likely to be of the most interest to members of the Committee. If there are questions concerning other ones that I do not mention, I would, of course, be glad to attempt to deal with them.

Selecting then some examples, and moving from the East to the West, beginning with the Atlantic Provinces, we have had an investigation in operation for some time on the St. Croix River, both in regard to regulation and to pollution. Pollution, as they say nowadays is, of course, very big, and, under the Treaty, which is our charter, pollution is prohibited. The two governments agree that pollution shall be prohibited on the one side of the boundaries if it affects property or health on the other. That is to say, each government is under an obligation to prevent, on its side, the pollution of boundary waters or waters going across the boundary, if the result of that pollution is injurious to health or property on the other side.

The St. Croix River reference was given to us in 1955 and four years later, the Commission, after making its technical investigations, made its report. It recommended, as is common in pollution cases, specific water-quality objectives for the St. Croix River and their adoption by the government in both countries,

on the basis of the criteria which were set out in our report. The objectives we recommended in this case — and I cite this as a typical pollution case. — were approved by the governments and then the problem arises of how these are enforced.

The Commission, of course has no penal authority, no executive function to carry out the recommendations which it makes, and which are approved by governments; but here reliance must primarily be placed on local authority, where the jurisdiction rests. In the case of the St. Croix, the primary jurisdiction rested, of course, in the State of Maine and the Province of New Brunswick. The progress made in this case, has, I think, been disappointing, although the Governments of Canada and the United States have communicated with the Province of New Brunswick and the State of Maine respectively, seeking and urging them to move forward along the lines of the International Joint Commission's recommendations.

Within recent months we have had more encouraging response from those local authorities, and it is to be hoped that the municipalities on the two sides, whose sewage is partly responsible for the pollution, and the industrial plant on the United States side, which is very largely responsible for the pollution, will take necessary measures to bring about a gradual clarification of this very important international stream. . . .

The next example I would like to give of a case before the Commission which would be of interest is the Champlain reference. This is the reference made by the two governments to the Commission to examine the economic feasibility of developing and improving the waterway between New York and the St. Lawrence through Lake Champlain, the Hudson and the Richelieu Rivers.

This investigation is now complete. Only a fortnight ago we had our final hearings on the Canadian and United States sides of the boundary at St. Jean, Quebec, and at Burlington, Vermont. This is the customary procedure we follow in such investigations.

Normally, after the references have been made by the government setting out the questions which they wish to have answered, we have preliminary hearings in the areas likely to be principally affected to give opportunity to public bodies, private individuals and others, to express their opinion, and to bring evidence before the Commission. We then set to work the combined board of experts, drawn from the two governments, to make a technical investigation of the economic and engineering features of a possible undertaking like the Champlain waterway. Then, after the board's report is before us, we make this report public and we deposit it in various points where it can be accessible to those who would be affected by the project. We then have a final series of hearings, and we have now arrived at that stage with the Champlain waterway.

The board's report, which, as I say, is now being made public, and the supplementary report which we asked for on this problem, concluded, in essence, that there were no insurmountable engineering problems involved in the construc-

tion of an improved waterway through this area, but that the value of the transportation savings that would be realized is far below the level required to justify its construction. Now at the moment we have all this evidence, both technical and the evidence of witnesses, and we are now struggling with the problem of preparing our recommendations for government.

I will only touch upon the St. Lawrence River power application, which is a case that continues to concern us. It is, of course, a very important one and I would be glad to go into it further if members of the Committee wish. This, of course, concerns our part of the Seaway development where we continue to have an important responsibility in the controlling of the levels and flows of waters at Barnhart and down into the lower river. We do this, also, through a board, which, in this case, is not an advisory board but a board of control. They maintain a constant watch on the levels and flows in order to do the best that can be done for the various interests concerned — not only power being developed on the two sides of the river at the Barnhart Works but also, of course, in regard to navigation, not excluding the very important, tricky, business of the levels of Montreal Harbour. . . .

Let me say something about the Great Lakes reference that was given to us in 1964. I am referring, now, not to the pollution reference but to the reference on regulation and the range of stage. This is certainly the largest, most expensive, hydrological study that has ever been undertaken by the Commission. I was just informed this morning that there are about 100 Canadian technical people engaged on this examination now.

The question put to us by governments here — arising, of course, out of this very severe and difficult low-water situation which existed a year or more ago — was to determine, (and I am quoting now)

Whether measures within the Great Lakes basin can be taken in the public interest to regulate further the levels of the Great Lakes, or any of them, and their connecting waters, so as to reduce the extremes of stage which have been experienced, and for other beneficial effects in these waters.

Here, when the reference had been settled and given to us, we established what we call the International Great Lakes Levels Board, drawing upon the best people we could find in the departments in both Washington and Ottawa. We directed this Board to undertake the required technical investigations, which are of a great complexity and extent and, after their preparation of what they regarded as the best way to go about this, we approved the programme and they are now engaged very intensively in this.

The Committee might be interested to know that the Board's studies have been broken down here into four main areas.

First, the effect of various levels on shore property — and there is some 10,000 miles, I think, of shore-line involved here. Second, the effect of regulation on navigation, which is, of course, important to both countries. Third, the effect on power production, and fourth, the regulation studies in anticipation of the

possibility of bringing some or all of these lakes under a stricter regimen of regulation.

The Canadian costs of these studies for the period 1965-66 right through to 1971 (and not until then do we expect to have the study completed) are tentatively estimated to be about \$1,500,000. The cost of studies of the regulatory works required to effect regulation have not as yet been estimated, but these might run to another \$500,000. The United States costs — new costs are estimated to be about \$800,000 since a great deal of the preliminary work on that side of the line had already been done before the International Joint Commission obtained its reference.

The Board tell us that they expect to have their report in our hands by October 1970. This seems a long time, but I can assure members of the Committee that this is a really vast undertaking. Some engineers have told me that this is the largest hydrological undertaking of which they are aware. Fortunately, of course, the situation is not as critical as it was when the reference was originally given to us.

May I pass on now to perhaps the most urgent and important investigation that is currently under way under the auspices of the International Joint Commission, and that is the investigation into the pollution of Lake Erie, the international section of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario.

Perhaps I might read here the questions that were put to us in this connection by the two governments. The questions were three: First, are the waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the international section of the St. Lawrence River being polluted on either side of the boundary to an extent which is causing, or likely to cause, injury to health or property on the other side of the boundary? This is what, of course, brings it into the international context.

Second, if the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, to what extent, by what causes and in what localities, is such pollution taking place?

Third, if the Commission should find that pollution of the character just referred to is taking place, what remedial measures would, in its judgment, be most practical from the economic, sanitary, and other points of view, and what would be the probable cost thereof?

Again, when this problem was put to us, we assembled the best technical advice we could in advisory boards for the purpose, and the programme of investigation is, of course, well under way now.

In Canada, the members selected for the Canadian section of the advisory boards were drawn from the Departments of National Health and Welfare, Fisheries, Mines and Technical Surveys and, for the Province of Ontario, from the Ontario Water Resources Commission. Here, the Canadian section of our international board is a federal-provincial mechanism. The United States similarly drew their experts from the corps of engineers, and from the Department of Health Education and Welfare, and now from the Department of the Interior,

which, in the United States, has primary responsibility with regard to anti-pollution measures.

Not long after the studies got under way, the Commission, on advice, came to the conclusion that this was an exceedingly urgent matter and we adopted the course of preparing, with the advice of these technical boards, an interim report to governments. This was put before the two governments in December of last year.

In a moment I am going to remind members of the Committee, if I may, of the recommendations that we made at that time. But perhaps I should say something about the scope of this study because I think it is not generally appreciated what an extensive and complicated problem this is.

Financial facts are not necessarily a reflection of magnitude and urgency but they do give some measure of the order of magnitude, and, by looking at the estimates of the International Joint Commission, you would get no real notion of the size of this undertaking, for the reasons that I explained in my introductory remarks. That is to say, by reason of most of the expenses coming through other departments of governments rather than by direct vote attributable to the Commission itself.

The preliminary estimates related to the investigation for the period 1966-1967 — that is, this current year — up to 1970-1971, are as follows: the Fisheries Research Board — and they are playing an important part here — \$5,200,000; Mines and Technical Surveys, \$8,131,000; National Health and Welfare, \$1,491,000; a total of nearly \$15 million, excluding, of course, capital expenditures for the building of ships and the construction of laboratories, and so forth.

The Commission is not, of course, in a position to require — and this is an important item, which I want to draw to the attention of the Committee — the assistance and co-operation of provincial authorities. The Province of Ontario is very conscious of its own responsibilities in regard to pollution in these boundary waters, comprising these two lakes and the international section of the river, and there is only one provincial authority, of course, involved here. On the other side of the line there are, I think, four states involved which somewhat complicates our position.

The Province of Ontario being directly concerned, and conscious of the urgency of this problem, is co-operating directly with the Commission through membership in our Board — the one board on the Canadian side. The Ontario Water Resources Commission, which has been designated by the government of Ontario to play the co-ordinating part at Queen's Park, is directly involved in the programme of investigation and study.

That agency — the OWRC, as it is called — has agreed to schedule its operations so as to assist and complement the investigations which are being carried out by the rest of the Canadian section of this Board drawn from the federal departments. The Ontario Water Resources Commission estimates that

the cost of the work which has been allocated to it will be approximately \$1.5 million by the time they are through.

The Government of Canada have agreed with the Province of Ontario to pay half the costs of that portion of the work that is done by the Province of Ontario through the Ontario Water Resources Commission under a typical cost-sharing arrangement. You will see when you come to look at the details of the vote before you that we are inviting you to recommend that there be provision made for that portion of the work done by the Ontario Water Resources Commission, which is to be paid by the Federal Government. This is a new procedure and this is why there is an item of, I think, \$240,000 in the vote as it stands now.

In December 1965, as I said a moment ago, the International Joint Commission made an interim report to governments on this situation. It seems to me to be important enough to repeat for the record of this Committee — although, I have no doubt that this is known to many members, if not all — the recommendations which we made at that time in this report. They appear on Page 15 of a report which is entitled: "Interim Report of the International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada on the Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River — December 1965."

...I will go on with the quotation of our recommendations made in December of last year:

The Commission recommends that the Governments of the United States and Canada, as soon as possible, and in association with state and provincial governments, take appropriate action to ensure

(a) sufficient purification of all municipal and industrial wastes before discharge into these waters and their tributaries, to achieve the maximum possible removal of phosphates; (b) prohibition of the construction of combined sanitary and storm-sewers and the initiation of a programme of separating existing combined sewers in communities discharging wastes into these waters and their tributaries; and (c) an effective system of regular sampling of effluents discharged into these waters and their tributaries in accordance with programmes approved by the Commission.

#### Paragraph 2 of the recommendations:

...The Commission recommends that the two governments support fully the Commission's programme of investigation and research as outlined in this interim report and as subsequently developed by the provision of the personnel and facilities required from time to time for its effective implementation.

Now, both governments, in Washington and in Ottawa, have taken this interim report seriously. They have expressed themselves as being aware of the importance and urgency of this problem, and, indeed, at a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Washington, reference was made to this in the communiqué after a discussion of this problem.

As yet, there has been no formal acceptance of these recommendations by either government. I presume that the problem, if it be a problem, to which reference was made a few moments ago in another content — namely, the rela-

tionship between federal and local authority on both sides of the line — may have been responsible for any delay or deferring of formal approval. I do not know whether or not the fact that formal approval has not been given has slowed up the remedial action. I am not in a position to say. But that is the fact; that formal approval has not yet been given to those recommendations.

Meanwhile, the Commission, in accordance with its mandate and within its jurisdiction and powers, is pressing forward with the investigation as a matter of fullest urgency. The Canadian side alone — and this, again, is some measure of the importance that we attach to it — has some 200 officials involved in this investigation at present.

There are a number of other cases that I might just touch on more briefly. Again, exemplary rather than for their intrinsic importance. The pollution of the Rainy River and the Lake of the Woods, for instance, in which some members will be particularly interested. Here we had an investigation which was made under a reference from the two governments in 1959. After some years of investigation, the Commission reported to the two governments that the Rainy River was being polluted on each side of the boundary to the disadvantage and injury of property and health on the other side, and recommended that water-quality objectives, as set forth in the report, be adopted by the governments and that the appropriate enforcement agencies require the industries and municipalities concerned to initiate construction of appropriate pollution-treatment facilities necessary to achieve these standards or objectives which we set forth.

We also recommended that the Commission be authorized to establish and maintain supervision over these waters to see how these objectives were being met. Here I can report, with some satisfaction, that the federal governments have accepted these recommendations and are in active contact with the State of Minnesota and the Province of Ontario. I think there is good reason to believe that the situation is going to be improved considerably within a relatively short time.

Moving west again, we have the first reference we ever had on pollution in a water crossing the boundary, namely the Red River. In 1964 we were asked to investigate pollution of the Red River at the International Boundary. Hitherto, all our studies in this field have been concerned with waters that formed the boundary.

The main problem here seems to be the result of industrial activities south of the line, such as potato factories and sugar-beet factories, which have an effluent which is causing difficulty. Conditions are aggravated in the winter because of the ice-cover then. We have had our initial investigation by our Board and the Commissioners are going out to have a look at it in the autumn. We are advised that that is the best time to go. Here, we received excellent cooperation from the state and provincial authorities of Manitoba, North Dakota and Minnesota in the establishment of our Board and I am hopeful that we will

be able to arrive at agreed recommendations to the two governments and that we will be able to improve that situation there.

Another case in Manitoba of some interest, because of the principles involved, has to do with the Pembina River. Here a reference was made to us in 1962 when we were asked to examine the Pembina River. For those members who are not familiar with that stream, it arises in Manitoba, loops into North Dakota and then comes back into the Red River, just below the boundary in Manitoba. We were asked by the two governments to look into the possibility of a co-operative development there, on the two sides of the boundary, to see whether such a co-operative development between the two nations had something to offer which could not be found in separate national developments.

The problem on the United States side was primarily flood control; the problem or the possible benefit on the Canadian side was not so much flood control as the possibility of improved irrigation. Here, our boards have made a careful investigation; we have had preliminary hearings and final hearings. The Board has put up three plans of possible co-operative development and, at the moment, with the assistance of our technical adviser, we are endeavouring to achieve an agreed report which we can recommend to the two governments. If one can jump ahead a little bit, it does look as if there are possibilities of achieving modest, beneficial cost ratios for a joint development here.

To my mind, the importance of this is not so much that the benefits will be dramatic in this particular scheme, but here we are dealing with a kind of laboratory example of the possibility of regional development across the line. We shall see how this works out. I suspect that the conclusions we come to may have some important value from the point of view of precedents in future and perhaps larger cases.

Now those are the cases that I have selected, not at random but because I think they are the most interesting, or the most important, that are before us. We have a great many other cases. We have a number of cases which are before us in a continuing surveillance role. These include, for example, the levels of Lake Superior, the flow of the Souris River, the levels of Rainy Lake, which are causing some anxiety now, from the point of view of their height, the levels of Kootenay Lake, the backwater effects of the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, the control of levels and flows in the St. Croix River, which I mentioned in connection with pollution, and the operation of the Niagara control structure and the Lake Erie ice boom. . .



## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference: London, September 6-15
- International Labour Organization, eight American regional meeting: Ottawa, September 12-23
- International Atomic Energy Agency: Vienna, September
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Board of Governors: Washington, September
- United Nations General Assembly: New York, September 20
- Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting: Montreal, September 21-22
- International Monetary Fund, Board of Governors: Washington, September
- Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting: Ottawa, October 5-6
- UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session: Paris, October 25 - November 30
- Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians: Huddersfield, England, October 17-29
- Food and Agriculture Organization: Rome, October

## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. S. Stanford posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, to Ottawa, effective May 28, 1966.
- Mr. C. E. Garrard appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. C. Gauthier appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. K. J. Harley appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. M. A. L.-H. Leduc appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. F. Moffatt appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. J. Noble appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J.-G. Paquette appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. L. Paynter appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. M. R. Quinn appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. J. Scott appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. A. R. Todd appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J.-C. Tremblay appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. M. Weekes appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 6, 1966.
- Mr. P. A. R. MacMillan posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective June 7, 1966.
- Mr. S. H. Nutting posted from the Canadian Embassy, Quito, to Ottawa, effective June 8, 1966.
- Miss E. Stearn posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Stockholm, effective June 11, 1966.
- Mr. R. G. Blackburn appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 13, 1966.
- Mr. R. V. Gorham posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to Ottawa, effective June 15, 1966.
- Mr. A. C. Lapointe posted from the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, to Ottawa, effective June 15, 1966.

Miss R. C. Rodger posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, effective June 15, 1966.

Mr. A. F. Haggins posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Boston, effective June 16, 1966.

Mr. G. O. J. Neveu appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 1, effective June 16, 1966.

Miss M. L. Reid appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer effective June 20, 1966.

Mr. P. Tremblay appointed Canadian Ambassador to Luxembourg effective June 17, 1966, and to Belgium, effective June 21, 1966.

Mr. T. D. Monaghan posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Georgetown, effective June 21, 1966.

Mr. P. Tremblay appointed Canadian Ambassador to Belgium, effective June 21, 1966.

Mr. J. D. Hughes posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective June 23, 1966.

Mr. H. D. Peel posted from the Canadian Embassy, Prague, to Ottawa, effective June 23, 1966.

Miss E. Weiss posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, effective June 25, 1966.

Mr. R. A. J. Chrétien appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 27, 1966.

Miss L. McIntosh posted from The Canadian Embassy, Stockholm, to Ottawa, effective June 27, 1966.

Mr. J. C. Noiseux posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective June 27, 1966.

Miss M. C. Kelly posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, effective June 30, 1966.

Mr. D. J. Whitelaw posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kuala Lumpur, effective June 30, 1966.

Mr. S. L. Abrahams appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 1, 1966.

Mr. J. K. Bartleman appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 1, 1966.

Miss M. Buckley-Jones posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Lima, effective July 1, 1966.

Mr. J. G. P. Ducharme appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 1, 1966.

Mr. J. R. Hammill appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 1, 1966.

Mr. J. E. G. Hardy posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective July 1, 1966.

Mr. W. J. Jenkins posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Rawalpindi, to Ottawa, effective July 1, 1966.

- Mr. W. C. R. MacKay appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 3, effective July 1, 1966.
- Mr. A. P. Smyth appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 1, 1966.
- Mr. D. W. Campbell posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kingston, effective July 2, 1966.
- Mr. A. R. Boyd posted from the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, to Ottawa, effective July 3, 1966.
- Mr. C. M. Bédard posted from the Canadian Embassy, Port-au-Prince, to Ottawa, effective July 3, 1966.
- Mr. W. M. Jarvis posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective July 4, 1966.
- Mr. K. D. McIlwraith posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 5, 1966.
- Mr. A. T. Chernushenko posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Helsinki, effective July 7, 1966.
- Mr. P. E. A. Romeril posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, effective July 9, 1966.
- Miss G. Buerkle appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. J. J. M. Côté appointed Canadian Ambassador to Senegal, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. A. J. F. Dumas appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. G. Ignatieff, formerly Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, appointed Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. C. R. Jess appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. E. R. Johnston appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. J. R. Y. Parent appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 11, 1966.
- Mr. A. Barrette, Canadian Ambassador to Greece, resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective July 12, 1966.
- Mr. R. W. Davis posted from the Canadian Consulate, Bordeaux, to Ottawa, effective July 13, 1966.
- Mr. R. P. Bower, former Canadian Ambassador to Japan appointed Canadian Ambassador to Germany, effective July 14, 1966.
- Miss H. Currie posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, effective July 15, 1966.
- Mr. M. Godfrey posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, San Jose, effective July 15, 1966.

- Mr. A. M. Leith posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Rawalpindi, effective July 15, 1966.
- Mr. J. G. H. Halstead posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 20, 1966.
- Mr. A. E. Ritchie appointed Canadian Ambassador to Washington, effective July 22, 1966.
- Mr. H. O. Moran, Secretary-General, External Aid Office, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Korea, effective July 25, 1966.
- Mr. J. K. Murray appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 7, effective July 25, 1966.

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## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Action

#### Bilateral

##### Bulgaria

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria relating to the settlement of financial matters.

Signed at Ottawa June 30, 1966.

Entered into force June 30, 1966.

##### New Zealand

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of New Zealand concerning application of the Canada Pension Plan to locally-engaged employees of the Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand in Canada.

Signed at Ottawa June 22, 1966.

Entered into force June 22, 1966.

##### Sweden

Supplementary Agreement modifying the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Royal Government of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation and the establishment of rules for reciprocal fiscal assistance in the matter of income taxes signed at Ottawa on April 6, 1951.

Signed at Stockholm January 21, 1966.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Ottawa July 14, 1966.

Entered into force July 14, 1966.

##### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to further extend the Canadian-Soviet Trade Agreement done at Ottawa on February 29, 1956, and extended by Protocols of April 18, 1960, and September 16, 1963.

Done at Moscow June 20, 1966.

Entered into force provisionally June 20, 1966.

Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Signed at Ottawa July 11, 1966.

Entered into force July 11, 1966.

#### **West Indies**

Protocol to amend the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1925.

Signed at Ottawa July 8, 1966.

Entered into force July 8, 1966.

#### **Multilateral**

Agreement on the privileges and immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Done at Vienna July 1, 1959.

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited June 15, 1966.

Entered into force for Canada June 15, 1966.

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

Done at Washington July 15, 1963.

Signed by Canada July 15, 1963.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited January 23, 1964.

Entered into force April 29, 1966.

International Convention on Load Lines.

Done at London April 5, 1966.

Signed by Canada April 5, 1966.

Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan for the application of agency safeguards in respect of the bilateral agreement between those governments for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Vienna, June 20, 1966.

Entered into force June 20, 1966.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# United Nations General Assembly

## TWENTY-FIRST SESSION — DELEGATION AND AGENDA

THE Canadian Delegation to the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly, which is to open on September 20, 1966, at United Nations headquarters in New York, will consist of ten delegates, advisers from the Departments of External Affairs and Finance, and observers representing all political parties from both Houses of Parliament. The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, will be chairman. Mr. George Ignatieff, Canada's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, who has been appointed vice-chairman, has served for the past three years as Canada's Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and is a former Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. The following are the other members of the Delegation:

Mr. Donald S. Macdonald, a Toronto lawyer, is Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. A former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice, he headed the Canadian delegation to the session of the Economics and Social Council that took place in Geneva during July 1966.

Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister. A well-known critic and commentator on the practices and policies of government, he is one of the founders of *Cité Libre*. For the past five years he has been Associate Professor of Law at the University of Montreal.

Mrs. Edwin N. Fullerton, a teacher and member of the Board of Control, London, Ontario. She was previously an alderman and has been active in a number of service organizations, serving as President of the Addiction Research Foundation and the Western Fair Board.

Professor R. St. John Macdonald, Professor of Law, University of Toronto. Founding editor of the publication *Current Law and Social Problems* and editor of the *University of Toronto Law Journal*, he has undertaken special international legal studies at the request of the Department of External Affairs. He previously taught law at the University of Western Ontario.

Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns, Ambassador and Adviser to the Government on Disarmament. Former Commander of UNEF in the Middle East, he has represented Canada at the Geneva disarmament talks since 1959.

Mr. Max Wershof, Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs and Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. He was previously Canada's Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations.

Mr. Paul Beaulieu, Ambassador to Brazil. A member of the Royal Society



of Canada, he is the author of various books and articles. He is a former Ambassador to Lebanon.

Mrs. Margaret Meagher, High Commissioner designate to Kenya. She has recently served as Chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has been Ambassador to Austria and to Israel.

These Delegates will be responsible for representing Canada in plenary sessions and on the main committees of the General Assembly, which will deal with items in the political, economic, social, colonial and legal spheres.

The provisional agenda contains 90 items, which will be considered in plenary session or in one of the seven main committees. A number of these, such as the question of general and complete disarmament, the development programmes and aid to newly-independent countries, human rights and self-determination for all peoples, are regularly considered by the General Assembly.

The question of peace-keeping operations will be an important subject of discussion, as will the report of the committee on the financing of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. African issues such as the question of the mandated territory of South West Africa, *apartheid*, and the territories under Portuguese administration will also receive a great deal of attention at the twenty-first session. It is expected that additional items will be inscribed on the agenda before the session opens, including the question of Chinese representation.

The preliminary agenda follows:

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the Delegation of Italy.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly:
  - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
  - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the main committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, Paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of nine members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of five members of the International Court of Justice.
18. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
19. Election of the members of the International Law Commission.
20. Admission of new members to the United Nations.

21. United Nations Emergency Force:

(a) Report on the Force;

(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.

22. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2011 (XX) of October 11, 1965, and decision of December 21, 1965].

23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [Resolutions 2012 (XX) of October 12, 1965, 2022 (XX) and 2023 (XX) of November 5, 1965, 2024 (XX) of November 11, 1965, 2063 (XX), 2065 (XX), 2066 (XX), 2067 (XX), 2068 (XX), 2069 (XX), 2070 (XX), 2071 (XX) and 2072 (XX) of December 16, 1965, 2073 (XX), 2074 (XX) and 2075 (XX) of December 17, 1965, 2105 (XX) of December 20, 1965, and 2107 (XX), 2111 (XX) and 2112 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

24. Report of the Committee for the International Co-operation Year [decision of December 16, 1965].

26. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report of the Secretary-General [decision of December 21, 1965].

26. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [Resolution 2028 (XX) of November 19, 1965].

27. Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [Resolution 2031 (XX) of December 3, 1965].

28. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [Resolution 2032 (XX) of December 3, 1965].

29. Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [decision of December 3, 1965].

30. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [Resolution 2130 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

31. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [Resolution 2132 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

32. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [Resolution 2052 (XX) of December 15, 1965].

33. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations [Resolution 2053 (XX) of December 15, 1965].

34. The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Com-

mittee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa [Resolution 2054 (XX) of December 15, 1965].

35. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [Resolution 2078 (XX) of December 18, 1965].

36. Peaceful settlement of disputes [decision of December 18, 1965].

37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board [Resolution 2085 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

38. Establishment of a United Nations capital development fund: report of the Committee on a United Nations Capital Development Fund [Resolution 2042 (XX) of December 8, 1965].

39. United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2084 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

40. Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2088 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

41. Activities in the field of industrial development:

(a) Report of the Committee for Industrial Development [Resolution 2089 (XX) of December 20, 1965];

(b) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development [*idem*];

(c) Confirmation of the appointment of the Executive Director of the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development [*idem*].

42. Regional development [decision of September 24, 1965].

43. Inflation and economic development: report of the Secretary-General [decision of September 24, 1965].

44. Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the United Nations [decision of December 20, 1965].

45. Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2092 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

46. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources [decision of December 20, 1965].

47. Population growth and economic development [decision of December 20, 1965].

48. World Campaign for universal literacy [Resolution 2043 (XX) of December 8, 1965].

49. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director of the Institute [Resolution 2044 (XX) of December 8, 1965].

50. Operational activities for development:

(a) Activities of the United Nations Development Programme [Resolution 2029 (XX) of November 22, 1965];

(b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary-General.

51. Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2096 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

52. Review and reappraisal of the role and functions of the Economic and Social Council: report of the Sec-

retary-General [Resolution 2097 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

53. General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies, the International Atomic Energy, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system [Resolution 2098 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

54. International Tourist Year [Economic and Social Council Resolution 1108 (XL) of March 7, 1966].

55. World social situation [Resolution 2035 (XX) of December 7, 1965].

56. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

57. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [Resolution 1921 (XVIII) of December 5, 1963].

58. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination :

(a) Measures to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [Resolution 2017 (XX) of November 1, 1965];

(b) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2106 A (XX) of December 21, 1965].

59. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance [Resolution 2019 (XX) of November 1, 1965].

60. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance :

(a) Draft Declaration on the Elim-

ination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance [Resolution 2020 (XX) of November 1, 1965];

(b) Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance [*idem*].

61. Freedom of information:

(a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information [Resolution 2061 (XX) of December 16, 1965];

(b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information [*idem*].

62. Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [Resolution 2062 (XX) of December 16, 1965].

63. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights [Resolution 2030 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

64. International Year for Human Rights:

(a) Programme of measures and activities to be undertaken in connection with the International Year for Human Rights [Resolution 1961 (XVIII) of December 12, 1963];

(b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights [Resolution 2081 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

65. Information from non-self-governing territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2109 (XX) of December 21, 1965];

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*idem*].

66. Question of South West Africa:

report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [Resolution 2074 (XX) of December 17, 1965].

67. Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2076 (XX) of December 17, 1965].

68. Question of territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [Resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

69. Special training programme for territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2108 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

70. Question of Fiji: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [Resolution 2068 (XX) of December 16, 1965].

71. Question of Oman:

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [Resolution 2073 (XX) of December 17, 1965];

(b) Report of the Secretary-General [*idem*].

72. Offers by member states of

study and training facilities for inhabitants of non-self-governing territories: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2110 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

73. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended December 31, 1965, and reports of the Board of Auditors:

(a) United Nations;

(b) United Nations Children's Fund;

(c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

(d) voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

74. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1966.

75. Budget estimates for the financial year 1967.

76. Pattern of conferences: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2116 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

77. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;

(b) Committee on Contributions;

(c) Board of Auditors;

(d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

78. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.

79. Audit reports relating to expenditure by Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:

(a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations from the Special Ac-

count of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;

(b) Allocations and allotments from the Special Fund.

80. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:

(a) Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General.

81. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies [Resolution 2049 (XX) of December 13, 1965].

82. Personnel questions:

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Other personnel questions.

83. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.

84. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2123 (XX) of December 21, 1965].

85. Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session.

86. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum [Resolution 2100 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

87. Technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law: report of the Secretary-General [Resolution 2099 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

88. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) Report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States [Resolution 2103 (XX) of December 20, 1965];

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on methods of fact-finding [Resolution 2104 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

89. Progressive development of the law of international trade [Resolution 2102 (XX) of December 20, 1965].

90. Conclusion of an international agreement on legal principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and conquest of the moon and other celestial bodies [item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/6341)].

## *Vietnam – Report on the Dong Hene Incident*

A LETTER dated June 14, 1966, from the Chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos to the Co-Chairmen of the 1961-62 Geneva Conference was made public concurrently in London by the British Co-Chairman on August 22 and in Ottawa by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin. In releasing the letter, which had been transmitted by the British Co-Chairman to the Canadian Government as a participant in the Conference on Laos, Mr. Martin made the following statement :

“The letter conveys to the Co-Chairmen the results of an investigation carried out by the Commission into an attack on a Laotian Government officers’ training-school by North Vietnamese troops. The Commission was requested by the Royal Laotian Government to investigate the attack, which took place in March 1965, and the Commission’s team, in the course of its investigation, interrogated nine North Vietnamese soldiers who had been captured by Laotian forces.

“The prisoners, who, in the opinion of the team, gave their evidence freely and voluntarily, testified that they were nationals of North Vietnam who had been conscripted into the armed forces of North Vietnam; that they had entered Laos with other troops and with arms and ammunition; and that they had attacked the reserve officers’ training-school at Dong Hene in Laos. According to the team, most of the prisoners stated that, before leaving North Vietnam, they had been ordered to proceed with their units to South Vietnam and that, to do this, they had to pass through Laotian territory.

“A Commission message of September 16, 1965, reported to the Co-Chairmen that regular units of the armed forces of North Vietnam entered Laos during 1964 with arms and ammunition, and that they had engaged in hostilities with Laotian Government forces on Laotian soil.<sup>(1)</sup> The Commission’s report on the Dong Hene incident provides a further example of the serious violation of the provisions of the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol. The Canadian Government is concerned not only about these specific violations of Laotian neutrality but also by the evidence provided by the latest report that violations are taking place on a continuing basis.”

### **Guarantee of Laotian Neutrality**

The Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol were signed on July 23, 1962, at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, which had been summoned in April 1961, when the

(1) Message No. 35 from the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. See *External Affairs*, January 1966, Pp. 33-36.

conflict between the parties in Laos threatened to assume international dimensions. Participating in this Conference were representatives of the Governments of Britain, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Communist China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), France, India, Poland, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), Thailand, the U.S.S.R., the United States and Laos. By signing the Declaration, in which undertakings designed to guarantee the neutrality of Laos were set forth, the members of the Conference undertook, *inter alia*, not to commit or participate in any way in any act that might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or integrity of the Kingdom of Laos (Article 2(a)), not to resort to the use or the threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos (Article 2(b)), to refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos (Article 2(c)), not to introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever (Article 2(g)), not to use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries (Article 2(i)), and not to use the territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos (Article 2(j)). These and other undertakings, as well as the means for supervising their implementation, were spelled out in detail in the Protocol to the Declaration. Article 4 of the Protocol prohibited "the introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos". Article 6 prohibited "the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos".

In mid-March 1965, the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, informed the International Commission that the Officers' Training School of the Royal Laotian Army at Dong Hene had been attacked on the night of March 8-9 by a large Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese force. He asked the Commission to undertake a thorough investigation. The International Commission, which operates under the Protocol and relates any findings thereto, decided, by an Indian-Canadian majority vote, that, since the information before it indicated that violations of Articles 4 and 9 (which define the responsibility for executing the cease-fire), and possibly of Article 6, of the Protocol might have occurred, an investigation should take place. A Military Investigation Team was constituted for this purpose.

#### **Hearings on Training-School Attack**

The investigation was launched on March 31, with only the Indian and Canadian members of the Military Investigation Team participating. Even though Article 16 of the Protocol provides that "each member State of the Commission shall ensure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams", the Polish delegation refused to take part in the



investigation on the ground that any request for an investigation required the unanimous support of the three Laotian parties, including the Communist faction, the Neo Lao Haksat (Pathet Lao).

In the course of its investigation, the Team visited the site of the engagement and interrogated at length "all the essential witnesses". These included witnesses produced by the Royal Laotian Government and nine prisoners who had been captured in the vicinity of Dong Hene at the time of the attack. The Team, in submitting its report to the Commission on October 16, 1965, stated that in reaching its findings it had placed "major weight" on the evidence of the nine prisoners; this evidence had been given, in the opinion of the Team, "freely and voluntarily". The nine prisoners testified that they were nationals of North Vietnam and conscripts in the regular armed forces of North Vietnam. At the time of their capture, all wore uniforms and some bore arms and ammunition which, they testified, had been issued to them in North Vietnam. With respect to their presence in Laos, all the prisoners stated that the trip terminating in their capture in Laos had commenced at a point in North Vietnam. Moreover, eight of the nine prisoners testified that they had arrived in the vicinity of Dong Hene as part of an armed, organized force of North Vietnamese troops, and most testified that they had been ordered to proceed to South Vietnam by way of Laos. All the prisoners were captured in the vicinity of the Dong Hene training-school, and all were able to recall events surrounding the battle and to recognize places in the area; some testified that they had been wounded at or near Dong Hene and some categorically stated that the arms and ammunition in their possession at the time of the attack or at the time of their capture had been issued to them in North Vietnam.

#### **Findings of Investigation Team**

The Team, having examined all the evidence, made the following findings:

- (a) all the prisoners are nationals of North Vietnam;
- (b) all the prisoners are conscripts in armed forces of North Vietnam;
- (c) all the prisoners were captured within a radius of approximately 12 kms from Dong Hene in the province of Savannakhet, Laos, the territory of the Royal Laotian Government, during the period March 10-15, 1965;
- (d) some of the prisoners were issued arms and ammunition in North Vietnam and some of the prisoners carried these into the area of Dong Hene;
- (e) the Reserve Officers' training-school at Dong Hene was attacked by the troops of the armed forces of North Vietnam;
- (f) there is a strong possibility of troops of the Pathet Lao having participated in the attack on Dong Hene launched by the troops of the armed forces of North Vietnam on or about March 9, 1965.

A perusal of the evidence shows that North Vietnam has violated Articles 4

and 6 of the 1962 Protocol as well as clauses (a), (b), (c), (g), (i), and (j) of Article 2 of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

A difference of opinion arose within the Commission on whether the Commission was authorized by its terms of reference to submit a non-unanimous report to the Co-Chairmen. The Polish delegation took the position that, while investigations may be initiated and carried out by majority vote, all three members of the Commission must agree on the wording of any report on the investigation that might subsequently be sent to the Co-Chairmen. The Canadian delegation contended that, in the light of the Protocol's terms, the Commission was under an overriding obligation to report immediately to the Co-Chairman any violations or threats of violations of the Protocol and any other important information which might assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The report of the Military Investigation Team was, in the end, conveyed to the Co-Chairmen without this procedural dispute being resolved.

## *Meeting of Development Assistance Committee*

*The annual high-level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development was held this year in Washington, D.C., rather than at the Paris headquarters of the OECD. The change of place was intended to call the attention of the world to the necessity for a powerful concerted attack on the problems of food and agriculture in the less-developed countries. A statement on this subject was made to the meeting by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, leader of the Canadian delegation, who said in part:*

The importance of increasing agricultural productivity in the developing countries cannot be overemphasized. It is obvious that the only satisfactory solution lies in helping these countries to acquire the necessary knowledge, technology, resources and will to feed themselves. However, we must recognize that the most difficult problem may be the human one — how to persuade farmers rooted in tradition to accept new agricultural technologies and motivations. The main burden of these changes must fall on the developing countries themselves. As donor countries, we must seek to help in every way we can. Technical assistance is a vital ingredient. In Canada, we are actively examining additional ways of increasing and improving our contributions of human resources, and we shall give the highest priority to the request from developing countries for such assistance, related to agriculture or fisheries, as we are competent to provide. In addition, we have, over the years, provided significant assistance in other forms, such as fertilizers. In the coming years, we are prepared to supply increased amounts of fertilizers to developing countries. To this effect, programmes are being developed that will, we hope, facilitate forward planning by both Canadian industry and the developing countries concerned.

### **Balance in Agricultural Development**

There is a need of proper balance in the application of agricultural "inputs". As the experience of the Indian subcontinent has made clear, there are dangers in seeking to increase irrigation without paying equal attention to the important problem of drainage. Similarly, there is little point in promoting agricultural productivity through the use of fertilizers unless adequate credit and marketing arrangements are available. In short, there is no magical formula for increasing food production; we must ensure that our approach is balanced and realistic. In addition, the resources of the sea are virtually untapped and I believe that more attention should be devoted to their exploitation. Our own aid programmes have given a high priority to assisting the fishing industry, and we have found

that this can yield encouraging returns. Among the benefits has been the improvement of nutritional standards as a result of the enlarged supply of this high-protein food.

The other main aspect of the problem is the provision of food supplies on an interim basis. Probably only a few DAC members are in a position to make a large-scale contribution in kind. Other donor countries can, however, play their part through increased contributions of cash or shipping services, either through the World Food Programme or under special arrangements such as were recently made to meet the emergency food needs of India. An excellent example of this type of aid was the British Government's cash contribution earlier this year to help meet the cost of shipping foodstuffs to India.

Although Canada makes a cash contribution to the World Food Programme, our main multilateral and bilateral food aid is in the form of foodstuffs, principally wheat, which we supplied in considerable quantities over the years.

### **Canada's Food Aid**

This year, Canada mounted an unprecedented food-aid programme, including the provision of one million tons of foodstuffs, largely wheat, to India to help meet the emergency situation there. Every bushel of wheat we have provided may be considered as a lost commercial sale, so we have made this effort despite the fact that commercial exports of wheat are a vital element in our balance of payments and in the livelihood of Canadians.

Although food aid is, in one sense, humanitarian relief for the hungry, we also regard it as an integral part of our regular development assistance. By responding to the urgent need for food aid, we are freeing, for purposes more directly related to the economic development process, foreign-exchange resources which would otherwise be used for the purchase of foodstuffs.

It is our present intention to continue this food aid on the basis of grants rather than loans, in order to ensure that the debt-servicing positions of the developing countries are not further strained. In our view, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between terms of aid and conditions of aid. While keeping our terms liberal, we are anxious to join with others in efforts to ensure that food aid will be used under conditions which will have the maximum impact in improving levels of agricultural productivity in the developing countries.

### **DAC an Idea Forum**

As Canada expands the size of its bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, more resources will become available for assistance to agriculture, and we look to the DAC for increasing help in administering this assistance. The DAC might well serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques for improvements in the carrying-out of aid programmes in the agricultural sector. Exchanges of views with countries whose experience is greater than our own would be most helpful and would assist us in responding to the aid request of the developing countries

and in suggesting to them how Canadian agricultural assistance might be more effective.

In addition, a co-ordinated approach might be particularly helpful in leading to greater emphasis on self-help in agriculture and the importance of adequate performance by the developing countries. The DAC has done some general work in this field and more may be possible. IBRD consortia and consultative groups can also play a helpful role. We intend to rely increasingly on these groups to evaluate on a country-by-country basis the priority to be given to the various sectors of the economy, the adequacy of the performance of the local governments, and the most appropriate form and terms for external assistance. The DAC might find it useful to look closely at the role of the IBRD groups to see if there are ways to make them even more effective.

### **A Role for Private Groups**

Here we are quite properly concerned with official aid programmes, the channel through which the bulk of assistance will have to flow. However, we should not overlook non-governmental groups, which can play a helpful role in complementing these official activities. For example, private industry can make a real contribution and FAO is already attempting to co-ordinate and encourage these activities. A most significant recent development has been the action of His Holiness the Pope in setting up the special committee, headed by Cardinal Roy of Canada, to mobilize the Church for an active role in the world's war on hunger. Similar work is being done by other churches and by various secular organizations; the agricultural research work of the Rockefeller Foundation, for example, has been outstanding.

*The final communiqué called attention to the passage of a resolution on hunger problems and said the Committee recognized that the basic solution must be found within the developing regions themselves and that a sustained and comprehensive effort from the developing countries would be required. The Committee recognized that this effort would require their support and recommended that its members take the necessary measures. The Committee also recommended that greater emphasis be given to agriculture in aid programmes, and that interim food aid should continue to be provided, under conditions which would encourage the developing countries to increase their own agricultural productivity. The Committee decided to keep under review the food situation in the developing countries and the assistance to agriculture provided by its members through bilateral and multilateral programmes in order to increase the effectiveness and co-ordination of bilateral and international programmes aimed at increasing food production and improving nutritional levels in the developing countries.*

*Earlier, Mr. Martin addressed the DAC on the subject of volume, terms*

and conditions of aid and announced some major decisions in connection with the Canadian programme. He said:

The performance — both individually and collectively — of our group has over the past five years or so provided overwhelming evidence of our determination to play our full role in bridging the gap between rich and poor countries. As the minister responsible in my own country for the conduct of both foreign and aid policies, I am reminded every day that aid not only plays a crucial role in the complex process of economic development but is also a major factor in relations between nations. For this reason, I am today profoundly disturbed by apparent stagnation in our collective efforts to mobilize greater aid resources and put them to effective use. Without a renewal of the upward trend in this effort, there is little chance that we shall succeed in establishing a foundation of lasting peace and stability in the world.

### Disquieting Facts

If we look at the situation now facing us, we cannot but be struck by certain disquieting facts. The 5 percent growth target of the United Nations Development Decade has not been achieved to date, and average growth-rates are, in fact, lower than in the 1950s. In spite of international concern about the growing debt burden, debt-servicing liabilities are now as high as \$35 billion and continue to increase. In spite of our common objectives to raise living standards, there are some 40 developing countries where, because of population growth, *per capita* income has been increasing by only one per cent or less a year. In spite of our desire to build a healthier world, we find that nutritional standards have even been going down in some countries and that many are unable to feed themselves. I should not suggest that aid by itself can hope to provide answers to these problems of continuing under-development. I should say, however, that the volume of our assistance should at all times be measured against the ability of the developing world to use more aid, and that the terms of our assistance should correspond to the economic realities of the developing world.

In short, while our record for 1965 represents no small achievement, it offers no basis for complacency. There are, unfortunately, indications that, while some donor countries are moving rapidly towards higher levels of aid, other member countries, which in earlier days could rightly be considered as pace-setters in foreign aid, seem now to be satisfied with maintaining their aid at current levels. As a result, the total flow of official aid resources has not really left the plateau it has maintained in recent years. Yet it would seem that international circumstances have never been more propitious for a significantly larger and improved aid effort. Developing countries have proved that they are capable of absorbing more aid more rapidly; there are promising new channels, as well as expanded facilities, placed at our disposal by long-established institutions through which additional development assistance can be offered.

Finally, we now have available to us a considerable body of knowledge on the complex ingredients of economic development and also new and comprehensive patterns of co-ordination in the field of development assistance which permit us to offer to our respective parliaments positive evidence that larger aid flows can be effectively used.

The Canadian Government has, for its part, engaged over the past year in an extensive review of its aid policies and the needs of the developing world, in the light of the considerations that I have just outlined in broad terms. As a result, a number of decisions have been taken that will affect significantly the future of our programmes.

### More Aid Needed

One of the major needs of developing countries is more assistance. The total amount available from Canada during the current fiscal year will be about \$300 million. Appropriations for outright grants and long-term, low-interest-rate loans alone stand this year at \$220 million, having increased on the average by \$50 million a year since 1963-1964. Subject to economic and other relevant circumstances, we expect the Canadian programme to continue to expand and we are thus making good progress toward the aid target of 1 per cent of national income established by the first UNCTAD.

In our assessment, the needs of developing countries for aid on appropriately "soft" terms remain one of the essential problems. The Canadian Government has, therefore, decided to make further adjustments in the terms on which Canadian development assistance is to be made available. To "soften" further our long-term, interest-free loans, the Canadian Government has decided to abolish the service charge of  $\frac{3}{4}$  of 1 per cent. This will mean that the bulk of Canadian development lending will be interest-free at 50-year maturities and 10-year grace periods. There are, of course, certain countries that can accept harder terms, and it has been decided to introduce an intermediate lending facility under which we should, in these few cases, be able to lend on 30-year terms, including a 7-year grace period and an interest rate of 3 per cent *per annum*. These intermediate loans would be used only in cases justified by the current and prospective economic and balance-of-payments situation of the recipient.

In mentioning the need for appropriate terms of aid, I should also point to the Canadian view that more is required to achieve harmonization of terms so that donors can pursue similar lending policies in specific cases. There is accumulating evidence that the terms on which aid is being extended to a number of developing countries, including India and Pakistan, are considerably harder than those which their economic circumstances would demand. As an example, the weighted average interest rate in the consortium for India has climbed from 2.8 per cent to 3.1 per cent. The Canadian average rate of interest in the case of India is below 2 per cent. It is our belief that the DAC countries as a group

could make more rapid progress in achieving their stated objective of harmonization, particularly within the framework of consortia and consultative groups.

### **An Element of Flexibility**

As is the case with other DAC countries, we have also found that the need for local cost financing is becoming more important. Certainly we have found that the rigid enforcement of the rule under which Canadian bilateral aid must be tied to procurement in Canada has inhibited in certain cases the effectiveness of our programme. We have found it desirable, therefore, to introduce an element of flexibility. We do have balance-of-payments problems of a long-term nature. Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, we are now prepared to finance a portion of local costs not exceeding 25 per cent of the Canadian aid commitments to specific projects.

In summary, more aid on "softer" terms with better techniques is required. It is, of course, for each member to determine its share of the collective aid effort and the terms on which its share is extended. We have noticed with regret that the volume of aid provided by certain countries has been decreasing and that terms have been hardening. So far as we in Canada are concerned, however, the terms, as well as the volume, of our aid will be determined less by what other DAC countries are doing and more by our assessment of the needs of the developing countries.



## *Two UN Financial Reports*

IT IS COMMON knowledge that the United Nations has been beset, in recent years, by serious financial problems. The organization has been faced by a large deficit caused principally by the refusal of certain countries, for political reasons, to pay their assessed shares of the cost of major peace-keeping operations. Failure to reach agreement on who should pay for peace keeping, it will be recalled, immobilized the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In the sobering aftermath, the General Assembly was able to function normally last autumn at the twentieth session after it was agreed, as part of a consensus, that the financial difficulties of the organization should be solved through voluntary contributions by member states, with highly developed countries making substantial contributions. Appeals for voluntary contributions to liquidate the deficit gave rise, in turn, to queries as to its size; the answer to this question also had political overtones.

Another financial problem which, while not so politically charged, is equally important is the need, after 20 years of evolution, for the United Nations family of organizations to reassess and update its administrative and budgetary procedures. Given the unlimited needs of the developing countries for assistance in the economic and social spheres and the limited resources available to meet these needs, it is essential to ensure that maximum value is received for each dollar spent.

### **Ad Hoc Committee**

In an attempt to provide expert answers to some of these underlying financial problems, the General Assembly approved at the twentieth session, by a practically unanimous vote, Resolution 2049(XX), introduced by France, establishing the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. At the closing plenary session of the twentieth session, the President of the General Assembly announced that Canada would be one of the 14 countries represented on the Committee, with Argentina, Brazil, Britain, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Senegal, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic and the United States. On January 27, 1966, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Mr. J. Douglas Gibson of Toronto, a former banker with wide experience in financial matters, would be the Canadian representative on the Ad Hoc Committee.

The resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare a complete statement of the financial situation of the United Nations (not including the Specialized Agencies) as of September 30, 1965, and to deliver this statement to members of the Ad Hoc Committee and to all other member states of the UN by the end of the twentieth session. As its first task, the Ad Hoc Committee was to

transmit to member states by March 31, 1966, its comments on the Secretary-General's financial statement. As its second task, the Committee was requested to undertake, with the assistance of the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and in liaison with the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a comprehensive review of "the entire range of budgetary problems of the United Nations" and its related organizations and to submit to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, scheduled for autumn 1966, its recommendations "to secure better utilization of the funds available through rationalization and more thorough co-ordination of the activities of the organizations . . . , and to ensure that any expansion of these activities takes into account both the needs they are intended to meet and the costs member states will have to bear as a result".

### **First Committee Report**

In drawing up a balance-sheet of the organization's assets and liabilities and in attempting to reach agreement upon a figure representing the actual deficit as of September 30, 1965, the Ad Hoc Committee was instructed to confine itself to the technical financial questions involved and not to try to devise solutions to the political problems, underlying the financing of major peace-keeping operations, which have been the principal cause of the deficit. After a series of meetings in February and March 1966, at United Nations headquarters in New York, the Ad Hoc Committee was unable to agree on the size of the deficit facing the organization. As a reflection of differing political views on the financing of peace-keeping operations, the Committee's first report gives two estimates of the United Nations deficit as of September 30, 1965 — \$52 million in the French view (supported by the Soviet Union and Hungary) and \$73.4 million in the British-U.S.-Canadian view (supported by several other countries). In calculating the deficit, it was necessary for the members of the Committee to estimate, as an "asset", what proportion of the outstanding assessed contributions totalling \$125.9 million (due mainly to the failure of certain states to pay their peace-keeping assessments) would be collected. The members of the Committee came to the conclusion that only from \$5.3 million to \$7.2 million of the total amount would be collected by the end of 1966.

As part of an initiative involving, as well, Britain and the Scandinavian countries, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced on June 21, 1965, that Canada would donate \$4 million as a voluntary contribution to a special fund to liquidate the United Nations deficit. Only \$20.8 million has so far been paid, or pledged, by 22 countries. Although there has been much speculation as to the timing and amounts of possible French and Soviet voluntary contributions, up to now no contributions have been announced. If one subtracts the \$20.8 million received in voluntary contributions from either of the deficit figures included in the Ad Hoc Committee's report, it is obvious that a con-

siderable deficit still remains. It is to be hoped that, in the near future, the Soviet Union and France will decide to make substantial contributions to reduce this deficit further. Although the difficult questions concerning the financing of peace-keeping operations still remain, the Ad Hoc Committee will have helped to solve the organization's immediate financial problems if its detailing of the financial situation helps to elicit further substantial voluntary contributions.

### **Second Committee Report**

Although the first report of the Ad Hoc Committee, in clarifying the financial position of the organization, may contribute to reducing the deficit, it is the Committee's second report, containing recommendations to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly "to secure better utilization of the funds available", that may prove to be more significant in the long run. In carrying out its extensive mandate to make a comprehensive review of the entire range of budgetary problems of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, the members on the Committee had the benefit of a series of frank exchanges, with officials of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, from April 19 to May 6, 1966, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and from June 6 to July 19 at United Nations headquarters in New York. The report which finally emerged on July 19 after a protracted period of negotiation represents a compromise between the views of the 14 countries represented, whose positions and priorities varied on the different questions under scrutiny. In spite of this give-and-take, however, a definite approach towards future expansion of United Nations activities emerged clearly in the report. The following is quoted from the report's "General Observations" :

A judicious allocation of the limited resources available must be made in order to achieve maximum results... The Committee concentrated its endeavours on the basic measures needed to ensure greater efficiency and real value for money in the vital work of human, social and economic development. As a group of experts, the Committee has paid particular attention to overall efficiency, to the elimination of possible duplication and overlapping, to improved methods of budget preparation and presentation, to inspection and control, to better administration, long-term planning and evaluation and to the best utilization of available resources, both human and material. It is the hope of the Committee that its recommendations, found acceptable to the General Assembly and subsequently implemented, will further strengthen and invigorate the United Nations family of organizations in the performance of their fundamental task.

The emphasis throughout the report, and in specific recommendations, is upon the introduction of administrative and budgetary procedures and techniques (such as long-term planning, improved budgetary presentation, evaluation of programmes, more effective procedures for co-ordination between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, to name just a few) which, when implemented, should provide member states and the secretariats of the different organizations with information to enable them to judge whether maximum value is being obtained from available resources. Certain members of the Committee, who were concerned by what they regarded as the rapid and unplanned expansion

of economic and social activities, advocated initially that the expenditures of the United Nations and the Agencies should be kept within limits defined in advance of an examination of specific programmes proposed by individual organizations. This approach, however, was rejected by most members, who, while realizing that available resources were limited, considered that proposed programmes should be examined on their individual merits rather than in the light of arbitrary limits set in advance.

Obviously, the specific recommendations in the Ad Hoc Committee's second report will not be introduced overnight into the United Nations system. The process of implementation will take time and co-operation between member states and the secretariats of the different organizations in the United Nations family. Some of the conceptions and techniques recommended in the report are already in effect, or partially in effect, in the United Nations or in individual agencies. Other recommendations may meet initial opposition from some agency officials, who may be sensitive to what they regard as infringements on the autonomy of their organizations. Nevertheless, as preparations are being made for the presentation of the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations to the General Assembly of autumn 1966, there is reason to believe that this expert report may lead, in time, to administrative and budgetary changes that will make more effective the crucial work of the United Nations in the economic and social spheres.

# *International Law and International Politics*

EXCERPTS FROM AN ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER,  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE L. B. PEARSON, TO THE CONVENTION OF THE  
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION IN MONTREAL ON AUGUST 9, 1966.

**Y**OUR guest of honour from England that year (Montreal, 1913) was Lord Haldane, the Lord Chancellor. He took as his subject "The Higher Nationality," which was to embrace all humanity. "There is apparent," he said, "a tendency to seek for a higher standard of ideals in international relations. The barbarism which once looked to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main object of statesmanship seems as though it were passing away." He also said this:

The way in which the great powers have worked together to preserve the peace of Europe, as if forming one community, points to the ethical possibilities of the group system.

That was September 1913! I was then a 16-year-old university freshman. If I had been listening to the Lord Chancellor, I should have been inspired by his words and in agreement with his optimism. But before 15 months had passed, with my college friends, I was wearing the King's uniform to prove how wrong he and so many others were. Four terrible years later, after the war to end war, some of us returned home, to see if our generation could do better. We didn't.

The dreary and tragic years of failure and futility followed. We lapsed back into national frustrations and international anarchy. There was no law between us as nations that could save us from the consequences of our political failures as men. Never, indeed, has the interaction between law and politics been more tragically demonstrated than in those years between the wars.

## **Case of South West Africa**

I should like to mention one recent and significant illustration of this interaction. It is found in the judgment — unexpected at least to a layman — on South West Africa by the International Court of Justice. After nearly six years of the most complicated legal arguments, the Court, without giving judgment on the substantive points at issue, ruled that Ethiopia and Liberia, acting as members of the former League of Nations, had not established any legal right or interest in their complaints against South Africa's administration of South West Africa. Yet the Court had already declared in 1962, again by a narrow majority, that it *had* the necessary jurisdiction to hear the case.

The judges who voted not to take cognizance of the merits of the case did so for what seemed to them to have been sound legal reasons without


regard to any other considerations. The judges who dissented were concerned by the political consequences of failure to deal with the case itself, on technical grounds which seemed to them to be insubstantial.

The Court's inability to come to grips with the merits of the South West Africa case may, in the long run, have unhappy consequences from the point of view of the progressive development of the rule of law in the international field, which is so vital for the future well-being of the world community. I hope not, but certainly the Court's decision shows that the international legal system will have to evolve much farther — and man will have to gain much in maturity and wisdom — if the rule of law in international conduct is to become the reliable instrument for regulating relations between states which it has become in governing the conduct of individuals within states.

Nevertheless, progress *has* been made in the last decades in the field of the progressive definition and codification of the rules and principles of international law.

#### **Application and Enforcement**

One can now visualize with a greater degree of confidence the day when it will, at least, no longer be possible for countries confronted with an inter-



*Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, flanked by Mr. Edward W. Kuhn (left), outgoing President of the American Bar Association, and Mr. Orison S. Marden (right), President-elect of the American Bar Association, at the Association's Annual Convention, Montreal, August 9, 1966.*

national problem or dispute to ask in good faith "What is the law?" It will then be more important than ever to have adequate answers to the two closely-related questions "Who is to apply the law?" and "Who is to enforce it?"

In answering the first of these two questions, the extension of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court to more countries and to more subjects will, of course, be all-important. The fact that the decision of the world court in the South West Africa case may have the unfortunate effect of slowing down this progress cannot but be a matter of deep concern.

The second question concerns law *enforcement* in the international field. The international community has found it neither possible nor advisable as yet to make use of the enforcement provisions contained in the Charter of the UN. We can, however, take some encouragement from the fact that a peace-keeping role has, more than once in the last ten years, been entrusted by the UN to international police forces in various regions of the world. Canada has played, and has every intention of continuing to play, a very active part in supporting, organizing and extending these peace-keeping functions of the UN as an essential step toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

While the approach to an international order with law and enforcement behind it has been discouragingly slow, it would be wrong to ignore the significance of the vast and complex system of law which now operates internationally and acts as a bridge between states in their relations with each other, however deep may be their ideological differences. This system must develop. Diplomacy needs the structure and the permanence of law, while law needs the suppleness and the manoeuvrability of diplomacy and politics. Each supplements and buttresses the other.

### **Legal and Political Aims**

There are occasions, of course, when legal and political considerations are opposed, when the exercise of strict legal responsibility may have consequences which could provoke the criticism of political irresponsibility. The decision on South West Africa is an illustration of the dilemma which a judge must face — certainly in an international court — when this happens. The reaction to this decision in a large part of the world already has been one of anger and resentment, of charges that the world court has now shown itself to be a white man's tribunal, dispensing white man's law at the expense of black man's justice.

Therefore, it will be argued, however wrongly, that direct political action, or even force, must now replace reliance on legal processes. This in its turn will lessen the possibility of the Court being able to construct a legal foundation for international progress. In the result, law *and* progress will both suffer.

The reaction to legal decisions which seem to many to be out of harmony with, and to ignore, contemporary social and political developments can, of

course, be equally damaging and dangerous in domestic affairs, even though such domestic decisions have not only traditional respect behind them but the force necessary to ensure their observance.

### **Danger of Widening Gap**

At a period when mass power, mass opinion, mass emotion, and, at times, mass prejudice, tend to dominate democracy, when legal processes and traditions seem to be weakening in the face of these mass pressures which too often are directed to selfish and immediate gain rather than ultimate and general good, any widening of the gap between law and politics in the evolution of society will harm the law even more than politics. In the long run, it can lead to anarchy or tyranny by weakening the rule of law on which responsible freedom and ordered progress can alone securely be based. The demagogue or dictator can undermine peace and order nationally and internationally by exploiting political processes and popular emotions. He can also be unwittingly assisted in his evil purposes by an extreme traditionalist interpretation of the law which makes it seem remote from social, political and technological change.

There is, of course, the danger that law, wrongly influenced by political pressure, could become the plaything of politicians. On the other hand, law too far removed from political and social realities, either in its making or in its interpretation, can become lifeless and even obstructive of progress. As Justice Holmes once put it:

The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.

There must be freedom from the wrong pressures, on the one hand, and from domination by dead procedures and precedents on the other. Reliance on precedent may strengthen legal certainty, but it can also hold back healthy social progress. It was Lord Denning who ventured to point out to the Law Lords in London a few years ago that "the doctrine of precedent does not compel your Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the cliff".

### **Importance of Legal Flexibility**

As a politician, naturally, I stress the desirability of a certain legal flexibility, while I recognize fully the danger of flexibility degenerating into flabbiness. I emphasize flexibility, however, not to weaken but to strengthen respect for the law and legal processes at a time when that respect seems to be diminishing. It is because adaptation to change is often essential to directing and controlling that change, so that it will not explode into violence. Rigidity has often been the handmaiden of subversion and revolution.

So, if we fail to make necessary adjustments in our thinking about politics, economics, law and philosophy at a time when movement and change are



so swift and bewildering, then we are in for serious trouble. But we shall not be able to make these adjustments successfully if we assume that they will be easy, automatic or self-controlling.

Hard, realistic, unselfish thought and effort will be required. These qualities, unhappily, seem to be a diminishing asset in a society which increasingly relies on computers to make its calculations and gadgets to do its work.

The old mores and traditions have weakened, and in some cases disappeared, as the conditions which produced and forward them have changed beyond recognition or recall. The authority of established conventions and institutions is being challenged by a young and impatient generation who often do not know what they want but are sure that they don't want what they have been given.

There is no security in 1966 for any status quo. Changes are made and accepted with a swiftness of upheaval which reflects a nuclear, supersonic, outer-space age where the waltz has given way to the "watusi" and the flowing gown to the "mini-skirt".

Surely, therefore, in this jet and jittery period of history, it is of first importance that we do everything we can to ensure that the law and legal institutions retain, and deserve to retain, deep respect and an honoured position in the public mind. There is depressing evidence, however, I repeat, that this is not happening.

### **Increasing Appeal to Force**

The tendency is growing to place the achievement of a desirable political goal — civil rights, fundamental freedoms, social justice — above the process of law as an essential instrument to its achievement — to insist that, if the law appears to be lagging behind social need, then violence outside the law is justified. This can become itself a form of subversion more dangerous than that spawned by any ideology. It can destroy all hope of ordered progress. Moreover, its demoralizing process is greatly assisted by the fact that today the media of communication and propaganda and incitement can be used by the fanatic and the demagogue with infinitely greater and quicker effect than ever before in history.

The effect of all this extends beyond national boundaries. If we cannot ensure that the law remains a steadying and cohesive force in our own society, how can we possibly expect to bring about a situation between states which will enable us to find that moral and political and economic equivalent for war which is now essential for survival?

### **Respect for National Law**

If we weaken in our respect for law at home, how can we ever hope to substitute law for force as the determinant of peaceful relations between peoples? What possible hope is there for the acceptance of controversial

decisions of a world court or the controversial resolutions of a United Nations if decisions of our own courts, including the highest in the land, are challenged, mocked, and even rejected by sections of public opinion?

The strengthening of the rule of law *within* states is, in short, essential both for the health of society and for the establishment of a rule of law *between* states.

We boast that the rule of law within our democratic societies protects all its citizens — that it is administered by impartial courts and enforced by impartial police. We can show how it has now brought under control the power and the interests of individuals and groups within the state. Even a corporation whose revenue may be greater than that of one-quarter of the sovereign members of the United Nations does not adjudicate all its own disputes, determine exclusively everything related to its own interests, or use its own police force to protect those interests.

National governments must one day accept the same limitations on *their* power and authority as citizens within a state accept them, and for the same reasons — peace and order and progress. They must free themselves “from the disastrous conviction”, as Barbara Ward puts it, “that the hierarchy of responsibility ends at the level of national responsibility... (that) below may be law... all above is force”.

### First Step by UN

A first timid step has been made away from this conviction and toward the acceptance of world law and authority in the work of the United Nations. Its Assemblies have tried by discussion and decision to develop moral force as a basis for international law and as a deterrent to national aggression. They have used international police forces to stop or contain or prevent armed conflict between nations.

These steps are encouraging as far as they go, but they don't go very far. Indeed, the power of the United Nations to act for all people is almost a mockery alongside the power of great states to act for their own people and against others. Yet a beginning has been made.

If it were not for our national prides and prejudices, we should seize on these first hesitant steps of the United Nations in lawmaking and peace keeping as an exciting and challenging point of departure in the achievement of the only security we can possibly get against nuclear annihilation — collective security based on collective action and on collective international policy. Instead of bending every effort to achieve this objective, we concentrate on matters that seem to be more important than mere survival.

I conclude by re-affirming these two goals that we should seek to reach.

The first is an international law for all humanity, based on justice, produced and protected by a world organization, with international force behind international law.

I know that this ideal is hardly a gleam on a distant horizon. But I know also it must become a reality if man is to survive on this planet. If the ideal today seems more remote than when you met here last in 1913, greater realism is being shown today in its pursuit and there is a far greater compulsion for its realization.

The second goal is to make national law stronger through the respect it earns and secures, and through the justice it ensures — stronger by a process of evolution which keeps it in harmony with the requirements of a changing society, stronger by the integrity of its legislative creation, by the wisdom of its administration and by the fearless and impartial character of enforcement.

In his Presidential address to your Association 53 long years ago in this city, the Honourable Frank B. Kellogg closed with these words:

Without the law there is no government, no social order, no home. Its administration is the highest and noblest duty of man to his fellows. Its purity and stability are necessary to the peace, happiness and prosperity of peoples. Its corruption is the destruction of the state and of the nation.

Today those words have a deeper and wider meaning — not only for the nation but for all mankind.

This Association has shown over the years its understanding of that meaning and its resolve to convert that understanding into good and constructive results.

## *The Use of French at the United Nations*

REPRESENTATIVES of predominantly or partially French-speaking member states of the United Nations met recently in New York to examine the status of French within the world organization and to consider what measures might be necessary to ensure that its position was maintained. Under the United Nations' rules of procedure, French has equal status with English and Spanish as one of the "working languages" of the organization and, together with English, Spanish, Russian and Chinese, is one of the five official languages in which delegates may speak and documents may be published. The group, which met in May under the chairmanship of the Permanent Representative of Tunisia, Mr. Taieb Slim, included Algeria, Belgium, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Haiti, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, the Republic of Vietnam, Rwanda, Senegal, Switzerland, Tunisia and Upper Volta — all states whose delegations use French frequently, if not exclusively, as their working language in the United Nations.

### **Alleged Disadvantages**

The meeting agreed that French-speaking delegates at the United Nations suffered certain disadvantages their English counterparts were spared. French translations of the summary records of the meetings of the United Nations and of other essential documents were often issued several days after the original English text had appeared, and sometimes after even longer intervals. Occasionally, the meetings of informal working groups could be held only in English, since no translation facilities were available. Some members of the group wondered if French-speaking members of the Secretariat could compete on equal terms with their English-speaking colleagues, since English appeared to be the Secretariat's *de facto* working language.

The group agreed that there was a patent need that the problem be examined and that, if necessary, representations be made to obtain the rectification of any existing inequities. As a first step, the members appointed a seven-man co-ordination committee, chaired by Tunisia, which was instructed to follow up the questions raised at the first meeting and to call upon the Secretary-General to inform him of the group's existence of and the purpose of its formation. The Secretary-General, for his part, assured the new group that he was keenly aware of the handicap sometimes imposed by circumstances on French-speaking delegates and that he agreed that the question should be explored fully by the representatives of the countries concerned in collaboration with a senior member of his staff.

## *Soviet Parliamentarians Visit Canada*

ON JUNE 26, 1966, a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. arrived in Canada to return the visit paid to the Soviet Union in July 1965 by a Canadian Parliamentary delegation.

This was the most senior Soviet group ever to have visited Canada. Its leader, Mr. Dmitri S. Polyansky, is one of the two First Deputy Chairmen (Deputy Premiers) of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and is a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The ten other members of the delegation, drawn from both chambers of the Supreme Soviet, were Mr. Abdurahman D. Daniyalov, Mr. Alexandr V. Georgiev, Mr. Alexandr T. Gonchar, Mrs. Antonina G. Khripkova, Mr. Vasili G. Komyakhov, Mr. Grigori A. Melnik, Mr. Ivan F. Simitayn, Mr. Vasili N. Uvachan, Mrs. Anele N. Zurbene, Mr. Alexei I. Zverev.

Unfortunately, shortly before the arrival of the delegation in Canada it was learned that the pressure of other business would require its return to the Soviet Union a few days earlier than originally planned. The programme arranged for the delegation had, therefore, to be somewhat curtailed.

### **Capital Schedule**

Nevertheless, it proved possible for the delegation to spend two days in Ottawa at the outset, where they were received by their hosts, the Honourable Sydney J. Smith, Speaker of the Senate, and the Honourable Lucien Lamoureux, Speaker of the House of Commons, and also by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other Ministers, and the Leader of the Opposition. On the eve of their departure from Ottawa for Western Canada, the delegation were received at Government House by Governor-General and Madame Vanier and attended a dinner in their honour given by the Honourable Paul Martin.

During their stay in Ottawa, the Soviet visitors attended a sitting in the House of Commons, at which the simultaneous interpretation system was extended to include Russian for their benefit. They were extensively entertained by their Parliamentary hosts, and also had a good many opportunities for informal contacts with Canadian Parliamentarians. They toured the Central Experimental Farm and the National Gallery, and visited other places of national and historical interest in the capital.

### **Western Tour**

Travelling by air from Ottawa, the Soviet visitors stopped first in Winnipeg. They called on the Board of Grain Commissioners and visited the Grain Exchange and the University of Manitoba. They were entertained by the Honourable Richard Bowles, Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba, the Premier of the province and the Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Wheat Board.

The delegation then travelled to Vancouver, where they were met by the Honourable Arthur Laing, the federal Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, who escorted them throughout their stay in British Columbia.

They visited farms, factories and agricultural and fisheries establishments in Vancouver and on the lower mainland and continued their tour on the following day on Vancouver Island. In the capital, Victoria, they met the Premier of British Columbia and attended a reception and lunch given by the Lieutenant-Governor.

On July 2, the delegation flew to Montreal where, next day, they visited the site of Expo '67 and were received by Mayor Jean Drapeau. They then went on to Niagara Falls and spent July 4 visiting farms in the region and the International Harvester, Stelco and Ford Motor Company plants in Hamilton and Oakville. Returning briefly to Ottawa to hold a reception themselves, after which Mr. Polyansky dined privately with the Prime Minister, the delegation returned to Toronto, where they were received by the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, the Honourable Earl Rowe, and the Premier, the Honourable John Robarts. The delegation departed from Toronto for the U.S.S.R. on July 5.

Mr. Polyansky himself, with Mr. Melnik and officials, remained behind to take part in a detailed tour of the grain-growing areas of Western Canada as guests of the Canadian Government. This tour, which was conducted by the presidents of the Saskatchewan and Alberta Wheat Pools and officials of the Department of Agriculture, took the visitors by air to Regina and by automobile to Swift Current, Medicine Hat, Lethbridge and Calgary. At each of these places and along the way, the party made a close study of Canadian farming methods, with particular reference to the high productivity of labour and machinery. Canadian techniques of dry-land farming were also of special interest to the Soviet group.

Mr. Polyansky returned to Ottawa on July 9 and had further conversations with ministers on July 11, rounding out his stay by giving a dinner in honour of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. He departed for the Soviet Union on July 12.

In the course of the tour, Mr. Polyansky and various Canadian ministers held a number of detailed discussions on international problems and questions of bilateral interest. There was ample opportunity for full exploration by each side of the views of the other and for a thorough examination of ideas for further promoting Canadian-Soviet relations.

A joint communiqué, the text of which is reproduced below, was issued at the conclusion of the Parliamentary visit proper. After his Prairie tour, Mr. Polyansky took part in the signing of the Canadian-Soviet Air Agreement.<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) See *External Affairs*, August 1966, Page 323.

## Joint Soviet-Canadian Communiqué

1. A delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. headed by Dmitri S. Polyansky, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., made an official return visit to Canada from June 26 to July 6, 1966, at the invitation of the Canadian Parliament.

2. The delegation was officially received in Ottawa by the Speaker of the Senate, the Honourable Sydney J. Smith, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Honourable Lucien Lamoureux. While in Ottawa they had discussions with Canadian Parliamentarians and Government leaders and were received by His Excellency, General the Right Honourable Georges P. Vanier, Governor General of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister, and the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs. On its tour across Canada, the delegation was accompanied by the Honourable Arthur Laing, Minister of Northern Affairs, several members of the Canadian Parliament and the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and Mrs. R. A. D. Ford. His Excellency, Ivan F. Shpedko, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to Canada, joined the delegation for the tour of Eastern Canada.

3. The Soviet delegation acquainted themselves with various aspects of Canada's industry and agriculture and the life of its people. The delegation visited industrial establishments, automobile, farm-machinery and food-processing plants, farms, research centres and educational institutions, the Soviet liner *Alexander Pushkin*, and pavilions under construction at Expo '67. The Soviet Parliamentarians spent Canada's National Day, July 1, in British Columbia in company with senior members of the Federal and British Columbia Governments.

4. The delegation met representatives of the Canadian Parliament and Government and leading figures in British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Ontario and Quebec. Frank discussions were held concerning the further development of Soviet-Canadian relations. The parliamentarians of both countries noted the increase in trade between the U.S.S.R. and Canada during the past few years. They recognized the problem of the imbalance in this trade, and favoured further discussion on the subject. They considered that the establishment of a direct passenger-liner service between Leningrad and Montreal and the participation of the U.S.S.R. in Expo '67 will promote the development of commercial and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Canada and will improve mutual understanding.

5. During the course of the talks, the development of contacts and exchanges between the U.S.S.R. and Canada on a reciprocal basis in the fields of science, technology, education and culture was noted with satisfaction. In view of the similarity in the geography and climate of the two countries, the parliamentarians expressed their desire for expanded co-operation in the exchange of information on agricultural research, northern development and other fields.

6. The Soviet and Canadian representatives expressed their respective views on certain urgent international problems, including the serious situation in Vietnam, disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the easing of international tensions.

7. The delegation of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet expressed its gratitude for the warm welcome and hospitality extended to it by Canadian Parliamentarians and all Canadians whom the members of the delegation met during their tour of the country. Since the exchange of delegations between the Canadian Parliament and the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in 1965-66 was successful and useful for the further development of peaceful relations between the two countries, in spite of differences in their social systems, both sides agreed that contacts between the U.S.S.R. and Canada through parliamentary channels should be continued.

8. The delegation of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet extended to the Speakers of the Senate and of the House of Commons an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at a time convenient to them as guests of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. These invitations were warmly received and accepted.

Ottawa, Canada,  
July 5, 1966.




## *The Republic of Senegal*

THE area of Senegal is 76,000 square miles (approximately half that of Newfoundland). Bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the west and separated from Mauritania to the north by the Senegal River, it borders Mali on the east and Guinea and the colony of Portuguese Guinea on the south. The newly-independent state of The Gambia forms an enclave in the southern area of Senegal along the Gambia River. Senegal is mostly a region of plains, with an altitude of less than 650 feet, traversed by four major rivers flowing in almost parallel courses from east to west.

Its population is slightly over three million, the average density being about 30 inhabitants a square mile. Slightly more than three out of four Senegalese live in the rural areas. The distribution of the active population is as follows: 1,100,100 persons in farming and stock raising; 41,400 artisans and skilled workers; 39,000 persons in business, industry and transportation; 40,000 persons (including 7,000 Europeans) engaged in the public services.

### **Economy**

The main economic resources of Senegal are agricultural. The Senegalese economy was developed on conventional lines. Until recently, the peanut



*Mr. J. M. Côté presents his letters of credence to President Senghor.*

crop, which accounts for 80 per cent of exports, has been mainly sold in France at a price about 25 percent above the world market. The crop varies greatly with weather conditions but has ranged between 800,000 and one million tons in recent years. Senegal lost the benefit of the guaranteed price when it became an associate member of the European Economic Community; however, in compensation, it has received assistance from the development fund of the EEC in diversifying its agriculture. Industry, especially mining, is growing markedly.

In the north, under the influence of their Mauritanian and Mali neighbours, the people have adopted the teachings of Islam. Catholics are found in various parts of Senegal. The influence of the Protestant missions extends over a somewhat smaller area, centering round Dakar.

Under Cardinal Richelieu's impetus, the first French settlements on Senegal's shores were established in the seventeenth century. Fort Saint-Louis, named in honour of Louis XIV, was established a bare 50 years after the foundation of Quebec. Lost during the Napoleonic wars, these settlements were returned to France by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The latter part of the nineteenth century was marked by economic expansion, the construction of a railroad from Dakar to Saint-Louis and the gradual growth of the former.

### **Dakar**

Today the Senegalese capital, located in a striking natural setting, is one of the most sophisticated cities of West Africa and a leading seaport. Its university, which offers instruction of the highest quality, is closely linked with a number of French universities.

In 1902, the headquarters of the Governor General of French West Africa were established in Dakar and the history of Senegal became bound up with that of the other parts of the former Federation of French West Africa. French citizenship was extended to all Senegalese by the Constitution of 1946. Deputies and Senators were then elected to the French Parliament. In 1958, 97 per cent of the voters cast their ballots in favour of a continued constitutional association with France and, on November 25, 1958, the members of the Territorial Assembly, who had been elected by direct universal suffrage, met and proclaimed the Republic of Senegal.

### **Breakdown of Federation**

Senegal adopted its first Constitution on January 24, 1959, after joining with the Sudanese Republic on January 17 to form the Federation of Mali. Following General de Gaulle's offer of "international sovereignty" to France's African colonies, the independence of this Federation was proclaimed on June 20, 1960. As a result of disagreement between Senegal and Sudan on the implementation of the Constitution of the Federation, Senegal decided to withdraw, and proclaimed its own independence in August 1960. The National Assembly

of Senegal adopted a new constitution and, on September 5, Mr. Leopold Sédar Senghor was elected President of the Republic of Senegal. Under French sponsorship, the Republic of Senegal was admitted to the United Nations on September 28, 1960.

### **Political Structure**

All the seats in the National Assembly are at present held by the major party, the Progressive Senegalese Union (UPS), which is led by President Senghor. Other parties have, however, contested seats in recent elections.

The Constitution, which is of the presidential type, provides for executive power to be held by the President, who is elected every four years by direct universal suffrage. Legislative power rests with the National Assembly, which consists of 80 deputies, also elected every four years by direct universal suffrage.

The Republic of Senegal is a member of various African bodies, including the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). President Senghor has recently made himself one of the advocates of *la Francophonie*, which would group countries of all continents using French as an official, semi-official or working language.

### **Canada and Senegal**

A major link between Senegal and Canada has been the Canadian missionaries who have worked in Senegal for many years. Until recently, Canada was represented in Senegal on a dual accreditation basis by its High Commissioner in Nigeria. A Canadian Embassy has just been opened in Dakar, where Mr. J. M. Coté is the first resident Canadian Ambassador. Senegal is represented in Canada by an Ambassador, who resides in Washington. Since the inception by the Canadian Government of a special programme of aid for the French-speaking countries of Africa, bilateral relations between Canada and Senegal have increased. There are now 25 Canadian teachers and some increase is likely next year. Other Canadians in Senegal represent international organizations such as UNESCO and, until recently, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Canadian missionaries continue to operate secondary schools and colleges.

In September 1966, President Senghor will pay a state visit to Canada. This will be the first official visit to Canada of one of the presidents of Francophone Africa. President Senghor will be welcomed not only as the representative of Senegal but also as a person who combines in a most unusual degree the characteristics of poet and political philosopher, as well as man of affairs and international statesman.

# The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

A MEMORANDUM BY LORING C. CHRISTIE

Editorial Note : *Readers of External Affairs may recall that the issue for April 1964 contained a memorandum by Loring C. Christie, dated July 1919, on Canada's status as an international person. There was also a brief biographical sketch of Christie, who, as Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs from 1913 to 1923, played a most important part in helping to shape Canada's external policies. Christie resigned in 1923, but rejoined the Department in 1935 and was Canadian Minister to Washington from 1939 until his death early in 1941.*

*The Canadian Historical Review of March 1966 contains an article by Dr. A. R. M. Lower entitled "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922", in which is reprinted a memorandum of February 1, 1921, by Christie on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.*

*We reprint here yet another memorandum by Christie on the same subject under the date of June 1, 1921, barely three weeks prior to the momentous prime ministers' conference of 1921 at which the decision was taken, largely upon the insistence of Prime Minister Arthur Meighen, to seek to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by a broader agreement among the Pacific powers. This memorandum (the third on the subject by Christie) covers much the same ground as the one published by Dr. Lower; but it contains sufficient new material, and is so clearly intent upon meeting objections raised to the first memorandum, that we believe it deserves to be reproduced in full.*

SECRET

June 1, 1921.

## THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

### Recapitulation of Points

*(See previous papers of February 1st and March 3rd, 1921.)*

#### Alternative Courses

1. In approaching the question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance there seem to be three alternative courses between which a choice may be made: (a) Renewal outright, (b) Modification in the shape of abolishing the military obligations, or (c) Termination of the Alliance. An additional alternative dependent upon termination will be noted later. In estimating these alternatives it is, of course,

essential to take into account the radical changes in the position of the world brought about by the events of the past six years; and it will quickly become apparent that if the Alliance is to be renewed it will be as the result of quite different motives from those that ruled in the past and that its repercussions on other countries will be of a quite different order.

#### **Far Eastern Position**

2. The position of the world has changed in almost every respect. Today the German power has disappeared and with it the former menace to Europe. The Russian Empire also has disappeared. Whatever the menace of Bolshevist Russia may be, it is clearly of a different order from that which inspired the original Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Of course the revival of Germany and Russia is possible, and a Russo-Germanic-Japanese combination conceivable; but we have not come to that bridge yet, nor even to anything remotely resembling it. The only other basis that could be suggested on this plane is that of an American menace; but it is inconceivable that we should enter upon that adventure. In these directions there seems nothing to be said for such an Alliance now.

#### **China**

3. Canada and the Empire must always desire to remain on friendly terms with China. China has her difficulties but our inclination and our interest alike must lead us to hope that she shall be enabled to live under stable conditions and develop orderly institutions upon which she may found a prosperous national life. Nor is it possible to believe of this vast community that, given a fair chance, the traditions of their ancient civilization will not reassert themselves or that they can be left out of the reckoning.

4. One of the avowed objects of the Alliance has been the preservation and protection of China. Its success in this respect is open to large doubts. Apparently the argument is that the special relationship with Japan, in spite of the divergence of our interests, enables us to talk more freely to her and to restrain her activities better than we otherwise could. On general grounds this sort of reason seems in itself an extremely dubious and weak basis for an Alliance; while the history of the Alliance shows that this in itself never was the whole reason. Its success in restraining Japanese designs on China has not been impressive. It seems certain that these designs cannot abate; Japanese pressure of population, and, according to the best information, her real ambitions all point toward the Asiatic mainland. The danger is therefore that we may really because of the Alliance find ourselves implicated in a spoliation of China. For the thing cuts both ways; we cannot always be restraining our Ally, and by yielding here and there we may gradually become party to a complete Japanese hegemony in the Far East over which our influence will be of the most illusory sort.

5. Intelligent Chinese do not feel that the Alliance has helped China. Indeed they feel that its effect has been precisely the contrary, and according to all information the Chinese Government would regard its renewal as an unfriendly act. Already the Chinese apprehensions concerning the renewal are said to have caused the Chinese Government to refuse to co-operate in the China Financial Consortium. China's experience at the hands of the Western Powers, moreover, is said to be leading her to ask whether it would not be better for her to do business with Moscow, since the Soviets have so far shown a liberal and considerate attitude toward her. Recent experiences with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan suggest the question whether the renewal of the Alliance would not have the effect of driving China into the arms of Russia. And the renewal would give the United States a far stronger position in China's regard than our own.

6. The Alliance gives to Japan a great prestige; it assures her of British support to a very considerable extent; at least it prevents in a large degree British interference. The danger is therefore that it will result in still greater injury to China and that she and the world will regard it as an endorsement by us of all of Japan's acts in relation to China, both in the past and in the future. In short the effect of the Alliance seems precisely the reverse of its declared object, and we seem likely to lose Chinese friendship.

7. It is submitted that the Western Powers, instead of attempting exclusive arrangements to manage and "protect" China, should endeavour to throw her upon her own resources by enabling her to employ adequate taxing powers and by encouraging her to finance her public undertakings from her own resources. Unless some such policy is adopted it is difficult to see how we can avoid the encouragement of warring factions in China each appealing to this or that Power for support, or how China can ever recover her stability and prosperity. One of the reasons for the existence of the Alliance has been the weakness of China, and it is not a satisfactory reason. Our effort should be to remove it rather than to renew the Alliance.

#### **Alliances Objectionable in Themselves**

8. There is an added objection arising from the nature of Alliances in themselves. The people of the Dominion have an instinctive reluctance to commit themselves to the largely incalculable liabilities and consequences of such a partnership. It is a reluctance that can only be overcome by the practical necessities of a clearly felt crisis, and it is certainly not diminished when the proposed Allies are a people remote, little understood and radically different from our own. An Alliance gives your partner a great deal to play with and may easily become a heavy political burden in your own country. It seems fair to say that this general feeling is true of British peoples everywhere; in any case it would seem to be clearly true of Canada. This, it is submitted, will

appear to anyone if he reflects upon the history of recent times and upon the few occasions on which such arrangements have been made.

9. There is the further question here whether such engagements can be so framed as to be consistent with the letter or spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations to which Canada has given her signature. During the debate in the Canadian House of Commons strong expressions were given to this objection. It was urged that we should refrain from any special or exclusive engagements with other States; that we should stand in the League of Nations as the friend of every State that honourably observes its obligations and seeks to keep the peace; that we should endeavour to promote international co-operation in all matters; and that it was humanly impossible for the League to accomplish its great purposes if important Members of the League form alliances outside the League, since the inevitable result would be to force similar groupings of other States. (See Sir Robert Borden and Mr. Rowell, House of Commons, April 27, 1921.) The unmistakable trend of the whole debate in the House of Commons was indeed against the renewal of this Alliance.

#### **British-American Relations**

10. It has become universally recognized that the question of the Alliance is inextricably involved with the question of securing a policy of co-operation and accord between the British Empire and the United States. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the peace and welfare of the world in the future depend upon such a spirit of co-operation and understanding between these two commonwealths. It has been said so often and it so lends itself to public oratory that it has possibly become a trite phrase. There may be a danger that the mere repetition of the phrase will come to be regarded as enough in itself to secure the result; whereas it is clear that in such matters constant vigilance and care is essential. But no Canadian is likely to regard it as a trite phrase. No part of the world more than Canada can desire that it shall become a reality in every direction. Canada and the United States regard each other as friends, and in spite of occasional minor differences the two countries have an established experience and record of international co-operation and sympathetic understanding extending back now over a century. Canada could therefore be no party to an arrangement in this matter that could by any possibility be said to be directed against United States or that might endanger the good relations existing between the two commonwealths. In this particular question Canada, both as a Pacific Dominion and as the next neighbour of the United States, has an overwhelming interest as compared with that of any other country.

11. From several quarters the formula has been put forward that the Alliance should only be renewed if it can be made "acceptable" or "satisfactory" to the people of the United States. This is perhaps not the most nicely appropriate form in which to frame the question. The Alliance is our affair; the United

States has not been and does not propose itself as a party to the contract. The precise question is whether it is acceptable to us and whether it is in our interest. This, of course, forces it to take into account the effects upon British-American relations as constituting the most important factor in estimating what is in our interest. These two methods of approach come to practically the same thing; but it is perhaps better to employ the more accurate formula. With this understanding then it may be said at once and without any hesitation that it is quite impossible to renew the Alliance in any form that will be "acceptable" or "satisfactory" to the people of the United States — or in other words that a renewal of the Alliance in any form cannot fail to prejudice our relations with the United States in the most harmful manner. It is no more possible to conclude an Alliance or special understanding with Japan that will be agreeable to the United States than it was possible before the war to reach a special understanding with France that was agreeable to Germany, or than it would be possible now to conclude a British-German understanding that would be acceptable to France. Every Canadian who has talked to Americans or who has followed the American press even to a slight extent knows this perfectly well. And the feeling is strongest among Americans who are most sincerely anxious for a comprehensive policy of British-American co-operation in all directions. It is simply playing with words to talk about the possibility of such an understanding being satisfactory to the people of the United States. Whatever is done about the question, this factor must be realized at the outset. If to some this seems a consequence worth incurring well and good; but it should be clearly understood that it cannot be avoided by phrases.

12. Of the concern of the United States in the Far East there is no doubt. She is greatly concerned there and in a special way. It is not merely an economic concern. There is a great body of feeling and opinion in the United States that has made her interest in this part of the world, and especially in China, political in a real sense, however uncertain and ineffective it has been in practice. This is indeed the only sphere outside the Western hemisphere in which she has ever manifested such an interest, and she now regards it as part of her traditional foreign policy. If there is to be a balancing we must admit that her interest there is at least equal to ours. We may be certain that her interest will not abate. And the Alliance, always a stumbling block in the way of British-American concord, will not prove less so now that Armageddon has removed the foundations (that is, the menace of Germany, Russia and the European crisis generally) that made the Alliance in the event sufficiently intelligible to Americans.

13. This aspect of the problem may be approached from a still broader view. Considering the exhaustion of continental Europe it seems in a large sense true that for the coming years the war has left upon the stage three first class vigorous Powers — the British Empire, the United States and Japan. In this light let us ask ourselves what will be the effect upon the third Power



if the other two of us enter into a special confidential relationship concerning a part of the world in which the third Power is equally interested with ourselves — especially when it is also true that the relations between that Power and our prospective Ally are marked by a growing lack of cordiality.

14. It may be said that the danger can be removed by a special stipulation that the Alliance could never be interpreted to involve us in any opposition to the United States. But the real effectiveness of such a stipulation is very doubtful. Our joint policy with the Japanese might well in the course of years land us insensibly in a state of opposition. The Japanese would of course see to that so far as they were able. But in any case, whatever formal stipulation of this sort may be made, it would never in its effect upon public opinion equal the weight of the Alliance itself. The fact of the special relationship would remain; always we should be on the defensive in the arts of explanation even with our well wishers in the United States. In time they might indeed be found saying to us: "Given the choice of friendships in this new state of the world you chose the yellow man rather than us."

15. This point may be considered also in the light of the Japanese attitude, and here such a stipulation seems still less effective. Japan well knows that she cannot expect us to join her in a war against the United States. Nevertheless she wants the Alliance. She wants it, surely, not in the hope of any active intervention of the British Empire in such a war. What she must see in the Alliance is the probability of a sort of benevolent neutrality and, more important still, the support of Britain at the peace table after the war, for the peace table is the vital point of any war. Without the Alliance Japan would never contemplate such a war. With it she is able to regard such an event as being within the realm of the practicable. The proposed stipulation therefore seems a very illusory affair. That this sort of calculation is behind the Japanese attitude seems borne out also from recent discussions in the Japanese Diet. Members of the Diet complained that the Alliance was one sided and unfair to Japan in that it did not bring Britain to join Japan in a war against the United States, which they said was the only power that offered any menace to Japan. It was also said that the nation as a whole believed however that, in the event of war with America, Great Britain would help Japan. Again it is significant that the Japanese Foreign Minister failed to state definitely that Article 4 of the existing Alliance had the effect of absolving Britain from joining Japan in a war against the United States. (See despatch of February 3, 1921, from the British Ambassador at Tokyo to the Foreign Secretary, enclosed in despatch of May<sup>1</sup> 11, 1921 (No. 192), from the Colonial Secretary to the Governor General of Canada.) These indications of what Japan thinks of the Alliance must show on what doubtful ground we should be and how little value is to be attached to the stipulation in question.

16. There is the greatest danger that if the Alliance were renewed in any form it would come to be regarded in the United States as a device to balance

our power against that of the United States. No one has pointed how it could appear otherwise, and as a matter of human nature it is impossible to see how any other result could follow. In other words, whereas at the outset it was the Russian menace that gave the motive for the Alliance, and next the German menace, so now it would be the American menace. The Alliance would be lifted out of its character of a Far Eastern arrangement and would become the pivot of a new world alignment. The Japanese would be brought West. It must be realized at once that this would be not only an utterly new basis for the Japanese Alliance, but that it would involve an utterly new outlook on our relations with the United States. The danger of producing such a result is so great that no benefits arising from the Alliance could possibly offset it.

17. It has already been indicated that the feelings of private Americans and of the American press are overwhelmingly against the Alliance. But there are not wanting public official intimations that should be taken into account. For example, the American Senate have at this moment unanimously adopted an amendment to the Naval Appropriations Bill requesting the President to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to attend a Conference charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding by which the naval programmes of the three powers shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years. The significance of this action taken unanimously and without debate on the eve of the consideration by the Prime Ministers' Conference of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance cannot be ignored. This seems plain enough on the face of it; but in addition there is good reason to believe that this action was deliberately designed and taken in this way and at this stage in contemplation of the Prime Ministers' Conference. Not only has this been learned from private sources, but it will be recalled that on May 28th there appeared in the press a despatch from Washington, evidently inspired, to the effect that the course of President Harding with regard to the disarmament proposals will be largely influenced by the Prime Ministers' Conference in London and by what is done there on disarmament and on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. If the London Conference favours disarmament and opposes the renewal of the Alliance it is said that the disarmament problem of the United States will be greatly simplified. Still more significant is the statement included in the same despatch and issued formally by ex-Senator Jonathan Bourne, President of the Republican Publicity Association, in which he commented on the coming Conference in London, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the importance of the action of the Conference to the United States. He emphasized the fact that the various Dominion Prime Ministers have already signified their opposition to the renewal of the Treaty if it is not acceptable to the United States. (See *Montreal Gazette*, May 31, 1921.) The United States Government have been entirely correct in their attitude; they have said nothing; but it must be clear that this intimation

from the Republican party headquarters could only have been issued with the President's knowledge and must be weighed accordingly.

### **Modification of the Alliance**

18. Between outright renewal of the Alliance on the one hand and termination on the other there is, as already indicated, a conceivable middle way, viz., a modified Alliance. The only modification worthy of the name would be one deleting the clauses entailing an obligation on the parties to go to war. On this there is little to be said. On such a basis it is difficult to see any solid case whatever for an Alliance. It would be open to many if not all of the objections to the full relationship; since it would be an arrangement impliedly excluding others. It would in reality be mere window dressing and disingenuous; the Japanese would surely regard it in that light, and it would seem an illusion to imagine that it could yield us any substantial advantages in the Far East.

### **Pacific Conference**

19. But while outright termination of the Alliance seems in any event to be essential it is proper to consider what policy should be pursued thereafter. What are the main elements of the position? First of all, it is apparent that the Power with whom our interests and feelings in respect of the Far East are most nearly identical is the United States. This is true of the interests of every part of the Empire and it is certainly true of the feelings of the Pacific Dominions, especially with regard to such matters as immigration. Again, it is true that even though the Alliance should be terminated we should still desire good relations with Japan and it would be foolish to imagine that her voice could be ignored in that part of the world in which she is dominant and most at home. We also wish for China's good will, for her independence, her integrity and the "open door". Presumably we want peaceful co-operation with all who have substantial interests in the Far East.

20. But what is the course that is naturally suggested by these considerations? Surely it is not an Alliance between two of these Powers. Rather it is a pooling of the counsel and experience of all the interested Powers for the purpose of adjusting Far Eastern problems. This is not to suggest a wider alliance (for in view of the traditions and feelings of the United States that solution is unattainable even if it were desirable), but simply that we should endeavour to bring about a Conference of the Pacific Powers to discuss Far Eastern and Pacific questions — a Conference, that is to say, between Japan, China, the United States and the Pacific Dominions and Great Britain on behalf of the British Empire. Such a straightforward course would reconcile our position in respect of the United States and China, while the offer of it to Japan would at the same time enable us to terminate the Alliance with good grace. Such a course too would be a practical application of the method and spirit in international intercourse which the nations, by means of the Covenant of the

League, have sought to establish for the adjustment of conflicting interests and views. The agreement to go into conference can be of the loosest kind if need be; there is no vital necessity to secure a formal agreement to hold periodical or future Conferences. If an initial Conference were brought about and went well, it would itself constitute a precedent and might result in a habit, and, in the end, in a real working Pacific Concert. Nothing could be better from the point of view of British-American relations than to bring about such a course of action; it would provide an occasion and a method of co-operation founded on actual common interests and necessities.

21. For such reasons the Canadian Government in February last proposed by telegram to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that representative of the Canadian Government should get in touch with the American President and Secretary of State and discover through informal confidential conversations whether such a policy is feasible. This method was suggested because of Canada's very special concern in the whole question and because Canada through intimate association and intercourse has had special experience in understanding and dealing with the United States. It is submitted that everything that has occurred since that proposal was made makes it still more imperative that the Alliance should be terminated and that an attempt should be made to pursue in some form or other such a policy as that proposed by Canada.

#### **Alternative to Pacific Conference**

22. It is of course possible that for reasons good to them the Americans would find it inexpedient to participate in a Pacific Conference. Or for other reasons such a Conference may appear to be impracticable for the present. But this would not in the least affect the grounds for rejecting the Alliance, whose basis would still remain as unconvincing and whose burdens as a political instrument as embarrassing as before. Our interests are not identical with those of Japan in any solid sense whatever, and this disparity is not relative; it is inherent in the whole situation. If a Pacific Conference is inexpedient for the moment we should endeavour, if only by the establishment of a purely personal, informal relationship and habit between the British Ambassador and the American Secretary of State, to set up a practice whereby Far Eastern problems would be discussed between them before any action by either Power affecting that part of the world was taken. While some features of the American Constitution produce the greatest difficulties in negotiation, yet the peculiar independence of the Secretary of State in the day to day conduct of foreign affairs should always be borne in mind. It is only when a formal treaty is in question that he is really dependent on the Senate; nor is he subject to the necessity of accommodating his views to those of his fellow Cabinet members in anything like the fashion that obtains under our system; while frequently (as may happen under the new Administration at Washington) the President, if he be inexperienced in or indifferent to foreign affairs, will allow his Secretary

of State a very large scope of discretion in the conduct of his Department. In such conditions the simple establishment of a personal working understanding with the Secretary may actually be as valuable and effective for the term of his office as a more formal official understanding. And out of such a practice something more stable may come.

### **Urgency of the Proposal**

23. The suggestion has been made that before a policy of co-operation with the United States can become feasible there are many other questions to be settled. These questions it is suggested are bound up with disarmament, naval shipbuilding, the future of the League of Nations and its disarmament programme.

24. In the first place, it is impossible to imagine that these questions can be settled this year or next year or in any other definite year; if the Prime Ministers' meetings are to wait on the solution of these problems they will wait long indeed.

25. In the next place, it is submitted that, so far from this question of an alternative policy to the Japanese Alliance depending upon the settlement of these other questions of disarmament and naval shipbuilding, the settlement of these questions in reality depends upon our achieving in all directions such a policy of frank and friendly co-operation with the United States as the Canadian Government have proposed. Armaments are the result and instrument of policy, not the creator. By establishing with the United States a basis of co-operation for adjusting common concerns, we may expect to do more for disarmament than a score of conferences for discussion of the subject in the abstract can possibly do. It may perhaps be said that the chances of establishing such co-operation are vague and uncertain, while armaments and alliances are things that are concrete and definite. But it is hard to believe that public opinion in Canada — and elsewhere in the Empire for that matter — will ever be convinced unless every possible effort is made in the former direction.

26. Nothing can be of more importance than the promotion of a policy and habit of co-operation between the British Empire and the United States. The way to begin such a policy is to begin it, or at least to try, and to do so as soon as possible. The United States are — quite naturally — showing their disinclination to participate in European politics; and there seems little likelihood that their relation to any universal association of nations will for a long time be of more than a superficial nature. On the other hand they are actually taking, and will undoubtedly continue to take, an active part in Pacific affairs. This is a region in which the British Empire is naturally deeply concerned; it has indeed often been said that it will be the chief theatre of our action in the future. Practically therefore it offers the only present field of co-operation; while this question of the Japanese Alliance provides an occasion for practical steps in the immediate future. It would seem the part of wisdom to recognize these considerations and make every effort to seize the opportunity. This cannot

prejudice the chances of a wider co-operation in the future, but on the contrary may further them. The proposal is in the direct line of all our dealings and methods so far as Canada and the United States are concerned. The issue raised seems fairly plain, and it seems not too much to say that everything considered no issue of today can be graver. The decision taken will be the first definitely significant step taken on our side along the road of post-war British-American relations; and its full import will consist in the insensible effect that it will have upon our future direction.

27. It may conceivably be objected that the case against the Alliance as indicated above leans too tenderly toward American susceptibilities, that it would mean a subordination of British policy to that of the United States. The attempt has been, however, to consider the question simply from the point of view of the interests of the British Commonwealth, taking into account of course the possible effects upon British-American relations as constituting the most important factor in estimating what is in our interest. The simple question is whether it is in our interest on the whole to renew the Alliance. There seems no possible benefit to be derived from the Alliance that could offset the loss of American good will, to say nothing of the positive disadvantages quite apart from the American aspect. True, if we reject the Alliance on the basis here suggested there may quite possibly be Americans to utter boasts about "dictating British policy", particularly the policy of the Dominions, or about assuming "the moral leadership" of the English-speaking world. Let them. If our policy is sound from our viewpoint such things cannot injure it; nor does one become a "dictator" or a "moral leader" by asserting that he is one. It might also be that such irresponsible assertions would merely provide another bond of sympathy. The peoples of the Empire are sometimes not lacking in humour.

28. These notes have been written on the assumption that the American is a political animal as we believe ourselves to be; that in his instincts and methods he is nearer to us than any other; that in our own and the world's highest interest we should work together; that it is our business to meet and cope with him on the political plane depending upon our skill there as against his; and that to think of him in terms of force means entering upon an incalculable and uncontrollable course. Today policies in foreign affairs must depend for success upon the support of public opinion. American public opinion like our own will always respond in the long run to intelligible and straightforward actions. If we keep that in mind there is every reason to suppose that we need not take too seriously the aspirations of some of their public men for the "moral leadership" of the world. It has not yet been demonstrated that the Americans have rejected our friendship. And if there is to be any rejection of friendship it must never come from our side; if the choice is to be rejection, the choice must be theirs; and we must see to it that it is made quite plain to the world that the choice was theirs. Otherwise we shall have failed in the highest arts of politics.

### **Special Article Respecting Dominions**

29. In the event of some parts of the Empire desiring to renew the Alliance the question arises whether there should be an article providing that the agreement shall not be binding upon the Dominions without the approval of their Parliaments. Such an article was inserted in the abortive Anglo-French Reinsurance Treaty concluded at the Paris Peace Conference. It is difficult to see how this precedent can be ignored, since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is in effect for this purpose practically on all fours with the Anglo-French Treaty. Furthermore the Government stated in the recent debate in the House of Commons that nothing would be done at the Prime Ministers' Conference to bind Canada without the approval of Parliament. The article in the Anglo-French Treaty reads as follows: "The present Treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned."

(signed) L. C. CHRISTIE

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting: Ottawa, October 5-6
- Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians:  
Huddersfield, England, October 17-29
- UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session: Paris, October 25 - November 30
- Food and Agriculture Organization: Rome, October

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## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. L. W. Ford resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective July 12, 1966.
- Mr. T. S. E. Jones posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Sydney, effective July 12, 1966.
- Mr. I. G. Mundell posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective July 17, 1966.
- Mrs. I. J. Lyon posted from the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, effective July 19, 1966.
- Mr. D. A. Moorman posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective July 20, 1966.
- Mr. K. L. Burke posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, effective July 20, 1966.
- Mr. F. W. Scott resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective July 22, 1966.
- Mr. L. H. Amyot posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective July 22, 1966.
- Mrs. R. S. MacLean posted from the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 25, 1966.
- Mr. J. A. R. Millette posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 25, 1966.
- Mr. J. Montpetit posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tehran, to the Canadian Embassy, Beirut, effective July 25, 1966.
- Mr. M. L. M. de Goumois posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective July 26, 1966.
- Mr. J. A. Whittleton posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Dar-es-Salaam, to the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, effective July 26, 1966.
- Mr. P. A. Bissonnette posted from the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, to Ottawa, effective July 28, 1966.
- Mr. C. F. W. Hooper posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Dar-es-Salaam, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective July 28, 1966.



- Mr. J. M. A. Lemieux posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Boston, to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective July 28, 1966.
- Mr. P. D. Courchesne resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective July 29, 1966.
- Mr. L. A. K. James posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kuala Lumpur, to Ottawa, effective July 29, 1966.
- Miss S. Wise posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, effective July 31, 1966.
- Mr. D. M. Collacott posted from Ottawa to the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, effective August 1, 1966.
- Mr. G. K. Grande posted from Ottawa to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective August 1, 1966.
- Mr. T. H. Bennett appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Senior Officer 1, effective August 1, 1966.
- Mr. J. P. Hutchingame posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, effective August 2, 1966.
- Mr. D. Boily appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective August 2, 1966.
- Mr. M. Faguy appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 2, effective August 2, 1966.
- Mr. R. D. J. Tessier appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 2, effective August 2, 1966.
- Mr. E. Hebert posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Kinshasa, effective August 6, 1966.
- Mr. B. M. Mawhinney posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Accra, effective August 6, 1966.
- Mr. P. A. E. Johnston posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Dar-es-Salaam, effective August 7, 1966.
- Mr. M. Beaubien appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective August 8, 1966.
- Mr. G. R. Skinner appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective August 8, 1966.
- Mr. J. M. Cook posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective August 9, 1966.
- Mr. H. W. Richardson posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Kuala Lumpur, to Ottawa, effective August 9, 1966.
- Mr. R. P. Cameron posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective August 11, 1966.
- Mr. A. F. Hart appointed High Commissioner to Ghana, effective August 15, 1966.
- Mr. F. E. K. Chandler posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Marseilles, to the Canadian Embassy, Tunis, effective August 19, 1966.
- Mr. J. C. Legg posted from Ottawa to the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, effective August 22, 1966.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Action

#### Bilateral

##### Poland

Long Term Wheat Agreement between Canada and the Polish People's Republic.  
Signed at Ottawa July 26, 1966.

##### United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America extending the period of the loan of the submarine USS *Burrfish*.  
Washington May 11, 1966.  
Entered into force May 11, 1966.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the use of land at the United States Naval Base, Argentina, for the establishment of a ferry service between North Sydney and Argentina.  
Washington June 6 and 10, 1966.  
Entered into force June 10, 1966.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the continuing use by the United States of land adjacent to Argentina for the operation of a communications site by the United States.  
Ottawa June 15, 1966.  
Entered into force June 15, 1966.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the loan to Canada by the United States of Loran A equipment in addition to that loaned under the Agreement of June 8, 1965.  
Ottawa April 19 and July 28, 1966.  
Entered into force July 28, 1966.

#### Trilateral

Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan for the application of Agency safeguards in respect of the bilateral Agreement between those Governments for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.  
Signed at Vienna June 20, 1966.  
Entered into force June 20, 1966.

#### Multilateral

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962.  
Signed by Canada April 28, 1966.  
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited May 20, 1966.  
Entered into force on July 16, 1966, with respect to Part I and Parts III to VII of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, and on August 1, 1966, with respect to Part II of that Agreement.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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## *Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting September 1966*

*From September 6 to 15, heads of government, or their representatives, of Commonwealth countries met for the second time in 1966. In January, the Commonwealth leaders had held a special meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, to discuss The Rhodesian issue. Meeting this time at Marlborough House, London, they devoted most of their discussion to the Rhodesian problem but, as is customary at prime ministers' meetings, they exchanged views on a number of world problems and on matters of general Commonwealth interest.*

*The prime ministers issued an interim communiqué on September 14 regarding the Rhodesian problem. A final communiqué, released at the close of the meeting on September 15, included the interim communiqué and reviewed the prime ministers' discussions on other issues. The text of the final communiqué follows:*

The meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers which began on 6 September, ended today.

Cyprus, Malawi and Uganda were represented by their Presidents, and Kenya by its Vice-President. Australia, Britain, Canada, The Gambia, Guyana, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Sierra Leone and Singapore were represented by their Prime Ministers, and Jamaica by its Acting Prime Minister. Ghana was represented by the Deputy-Chairman of the National Liberation Council; Trinidad and Tobago by its Deputy Prime Minister, India by its Minister of External Affairs and Pakistan and Zambia by their Foreign Ministers. Ceylon was represented by its Minister of Justice and Nigeria by Brigadier Ogundipe. The Prime Minister of Britain was in the chair.

This was the first meeting at which Guyana was represented as a member of the Commonwealth and the other Heads of Government welcomed its Prime Minister. They agreed that Commonwealth countries would collectively sponsor Guyana's application for United Nations membership.

They noted with pleasure that the Bechuanaland Protectorate would become independent on 30 September as Botswana, Basutoland as Lesotho on 4 October, and Barbados on 30 November; and that all three countries had expressed the wish to become members of the Commonwealth. All member Governments agreed to accept them as members of the Commonwealth, upon completion of the necessary legislative and constitutional processes, and looked forward to welcoming them to the Commonwealth association and to sponsoring their application for membership of the United Nations.

In the course of a comprehensive review, Prime Ministers discussed the major issues arising from the international situation. They considered that it had never been more important that the United Nations should be as strong and

effective a spokesman of the world community as possible and they pledged themselves to continue efforts to place the organization's finances on a sound footing and to strengthen the organization in all its aspects, including its ability to discharge its peace-keeping role. They were unanimous in expressing their deep appreciation of U Thant's efforts on behalf of peace and international co-operation and expressed their hope that he would reconsider his decision not to offer himself for a second term.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Prime Ministers greeted with pleasure the announcement made to the meeting that Pakistan and Malaysia have resumed diplomatic relations.

The Prime Ministers recognized the dangers of a narrowing of horizons and a failure to view the great human problems of racial injustice, poverty and war in the universal terms which alone offer hope of relief to this and succeeding generations. Prime Ministers affirmed their conviction that the greater the international stresses proved to be, the greater the need for bridge-building associations to try to resolve them. They recorded their view of the continuing and vital importance of such broad groupings as the United Nations and the Commonwealth itself, comprising representatives of so many races, continents and cultural traditions.

### **Rhodesia**

The Commonwealth conference devoted a major portion of its discussions to the problem of Rhodesia.

As at Lagos, in January of this year, the members of the conference reaffirmed that the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rested with Britain, but they acknowledged that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world.

They reaffirmed the view expressed in the communiqué issued at the end of the Lagos conference as follows:

The Prime Ministers declared that any political system based on racial discrimination was intolerable. It diminished the freedom alike of those who imposed it and of those who suffered under it. They considered that the imposition of discriminatory conditions of political, social, economic and educational nature upon the majority by any minority for the benefit of a privileged few was an outrageous violation of the fundamental principles of human rights. The goal of future progress in Rhodesia should be the establishment of a just society, based on equality of opportunity, to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment. To this end several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for purely political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed.

They further reaffirmed the statement made in their London communiqué of 1965 and repeated in Lagos that "the principle of one man one vote was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia".

<sup>(1)</sup> The text of a telegram sent by Commonwealth heads of government to the United Nations Secretary-General is annexed.

They remain unanimous on the objective that the rebellion in Rhodesia must be brought to an end speedily. In order to achieve this objective, most of the Heads of Government expressed their firm opinion that force was the only sure means of bringing down the illegal regime in Rhodesia. Others, however, shared the British Government's objections to the use of force to impose a constitutional settlement, while agreeing that it was not ruled out where necessary to restore law and order.

Most Heads of Government urged that Britain should make a categorical declaration that independence would not be granted before majority rule is established on the basis of universal adult franchise and that this declaration should not be conditional on whether the illegal regime agreed to surrender or not. They further urged that Britain should refuse to resume discussions or to negotiate with the illegal regime.

The British Prime Minister stated that the British Government would not recommend to the British Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the six principles; that they attached particular importance to the fifth principle, namely that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; that they regarded it as implicit in this fifth principle that the test of acceptability must enable the people of Rhodesia as a whole to indicate whether or not they were prepared to accept any settlement which provided for the grant of independence before majority rule was achieved; and that there would be no independence before majority rule if the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be opposed to it.

The conference noted the following decisions of the British Government:

(a) After the illegal regime is ended, a legal government will be appointed by the Governor and will constitute a broadly-based representative administration. During this interim period, the armed forces and police will be responsible to the Governor. Those individuals who are detained or restricted on political grounds will be released and normal political activities will be permitted, provided that they are conducted peacefully and democratically without intimidation from any quarter.

(b) The British Government will negotiate, with this interim administration, a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles.

(c) This constitutional settlement will be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means.

(d) The British Parliament and Government must be satisfied that this test of opinion is fair and free and would be acceptable to the general world community.

(e) The British Government will not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be in favour of it.

Most Heads of Government made it clear that, in their view, political

leaders and others detained should be immediately and unconditionally released before an interim representative government was formed, in which they should be adequately represented. They further expressed the view that any ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Rhodesia as a whole should be by a referendum based on universal adult suffrage, i.e. one man one vote.

The Heads of Government also noted that the British Government proposed immediately to communicate its intentions as indicated above through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia and to inform the illegal regime there that if they are not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps whereby the rebellion is brought to an end and executive authority is vested in the Governor, the following related consequences will ensue:

(a) The British Government will withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which have been made; in particular, they will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule.

(b) Given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government will be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of this year a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

The conference had before it an analysis of the working of economic sanctions prepared by the Sanctions Committee set up in Lagos. It was agreed that, though sanctions had undoubtedly depressed the Rhodesian economy, they were unlikely at their present level to achieve the desired political objectives within an acceptable period of time. Accordingly, the Heads of Government were generally agreed on the need for stronger and mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Most were convinced that mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive character should be applied under Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, of the United Nations Charter, and should cover both exports and imports. Others favoured sanctions on selected individual commodities important to the economy of Rhodesia. The Heads of Government recorded their appreciation of the work of the Sanctions Committee and requested it to continue its work.

There was unanimity of view that Commonwealth countries should continue to co-operate to the fullest extent possible in the pursuit of these objectives for Rhodesia notwithstanding some differences of opinion as to the most effective means of achieving them.

It was also agreed unanimously that assistance should be given to Zambia to produce a more complete cut-off of trade with Rhodesia and to assist her to withstand any serious effect on her economy resulting therefrom. To this end they requested that the Zambian Subcommittee of the Sanctions Committee should continue its efforts in co-ordinating further Commonwealth assistance. Continuing consideration should also be given to the problems of Malawi.

The Heads of Government agreed that the problem of Rhodesia should be kept under constant review, and that they would meet again soon if the illegal regime were not brought to an end speedily.

The Heads of Government have had one overriding purpose in their consideration of the Rhodesian situation, a consideration which has now extended over four meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. That purpose is to end the perpetuation of power in the hands of a minority, with only ineffective and inadequate guarantees of the political rights of the majority. Such a situation must be replaced by an arrangement based on a multi-racial society in which human and political rights will be vested in all the people without discrimination and in accordance with the true principles of democracy.

### **Vietnam**

The Prime Ministers discussed the situation in Vietnam. They noted with particular concern that since they had last met the conflict had intensified. They expressed deep anxiety at the tragic and mounting loss of life and devastation in Vietnam, and were conscious of the danger that the conflict might spread and develop into a major international conflict.

They reviewed recent developments, including the many efforts, representing a wide range of international opinion, which had been made since their last meeting to end the conflict and achieve a negotiated settlement. They reaffirmed their continuing belief in the urgent need to establish conditions in which the people of Vietnam might be able to live in peace and be free from outside pressures in order to be able to work out their own destiny within the broad framework of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

They regretted that the mission which they had appointed at their 1965 meeting had not been able to undertake its task. Nonetheless, they believed that the Commonwealth should continue its efforts to promote peace in Vietnam.

### **Disarmament**

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed their support for the aim of general and complete disarmament subject to effective international inspection and control. They expressed regret that, since the conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference had not reached agreement either on general and complete disarmament or on more limited measures; but they expressed the view that this Conference had performed thorough and useful work in defining the areas of disagreement on specific measures. They agreed that this Conference is a useful forum for detailed disarmament negotiations, and they expressed the hope that, when it reconvened after the conclusion of the twenty-first United Nations General Assembly, it would be able to agree on a solution of the most urgent problems.

The Prime Ministers recorded their view that events were throwing into ever sharper relief the need for firm and far-reaching agreements on disarmament.



They were convinced that the persistence of political tensions gave a reason not to relax but to redouble efforts to this end.

They expressed their concern at the growing danger of nuclear proliferation. The meeting deplored recent nuclear weapons tests conducted in the atmosphere by two major powers. Commonwealth Governments recorded their hope that all steps would be taken to bring about a universally binding nuclear test ban treaty and to persuade those nuclear states concerned to participate in discussions on disarmament.

Nevertheless, the Prime Ministers were of the opinion that useful progress could be made in the control of nuclear arms and that such progress would increase the momentum towards world-wide agreements on disarmament. To this end they reaffirmed the principles set out in Resolution 2028 (XX) on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 November 1965.

The Prime Ministers emphasized in particular that while there was still time it was imperative to halt the spread of nuclear weapons by the signature of a non-proliferation treaty. They urged all countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear-weapon powers, to agree to measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Prime Ministers regarded it as no less important to complete the Test Ban Treaty by agreement to stop underground tests. They welcomed the fact that initiatives had been taken by some non-nuclear-weapon countries, both in suggesting procedures for bridging the differences among the major nuclear-weapon powers, as well as in setting in motion arrangements for international seismological co-operation. They trust that these initiatives, along with the rapid developments which are taking place in the field of detection and identification of seismological events, could help to lead towards an early extension of the present Partial Test Ban Treaty to include an agreement to ban underground tests.

The Commonwealth Heads of Government pledged themselves to work for these ends both within and outside the United Nations, and appealed to all governments to do likewise.

### **Africa**

Apart from Rhodesia itself, the meeting also considered other problems in southern Africa. It expressed its concern at the continuing refusal of Portugal to concede the right of self-determination to its territories. The meeting expressed the hope that the remaining dependent territories in Africa would soon be granted the right of self-determination.

The meeting also expressed concern at the denial by South Africa of its international obligations in respect of the mandated territory of South West Africa. There was some discussion of the recent decision on this territory by the International Court of Justice. The Prime Ministers drew attention with regret to the fact that the Court had not pronounced on the merits of the issue.

While the meeting noted that it was still open to the United Nations to raise collectively with the Court the question of South Africa's discharge of its responsibilities under the mandate, most members thought it necessary that the United Nations should now revoke the mandate of South Africa in respect of South West Africa, and take over responsibility for its administration until such time as it achieves independence. They noted that this matter would be considered at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Prime Ministers noted that there was danger of an escalation of conflict arising from territorial claims in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, and they expressed the hope that disputes on changes in international boundaries would be settled by peaceful means and outside powers would refrain from taking steps which could aggravate the situation in that area.

Heads of Government condemned the continued practice of *apartheid* by the Government of South Africa and the adoption of oppressive and discriminatory measures against the non-white population of that country.

### **Cyprus**

The Prime Ministers noted the developments with regard to Cyprus since their last meeting, including the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1965, and reaffirmed their view that the Cyprus problem should be solved within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and in accordance with the principles of democracy and justice and in conformity with the wishes of the people of Cyprus.

### **Dependent Territories**

Britain made a statement to the meeting about the progress of the remaining British dependencies towards self-government or independence.

In the last year there have been nine Constitutional Conferences involving 12 territories and agreement on the final status of 11 has been reached. These included Guyana; the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana); Basutoland (Lesotho); Barbados; Mauritius; and Antigua, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. When all these agreements have been put into effect over the next few months, 22 dependencies will remain, many of them with very small populations. A new constitution is about to be introduced in Fiji. The British Government is engaged in working out new constitutional arrangements with Swaziland and is planning conferences to work out further constitutional arrangements in the near future for a number of other territories, including Bermuda and the Virgin Islands. They are also engaged in discussions about the special positions of British Honduras, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands. The British Government stands ready to give independence to territories that want it and can sustain it. For the others, Britain is willing to work out arrangements appropriate to each territory that will enable them, if they wish, to continue in some form of association with Britain.

The Prime Ministers noted with approval the report of the New Zealand Prime Minister on the progress being made by the independent state of Western Samoa and the fact that the Cook Islands had become a fully self-governing state freely associated with New Zealand.

They noted with approval the progress that had been made and was in train to bring British territories towards independence or some other solution of their choice. They welcomed the assurance of the continuing object of British policy in this regard.

The Prime Ministers were informed about the association arrangements being made with Antigua, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. They noted that, while these include provision for Britain to be responsible for the external affairs and defence of these territories in consultation with their Governments, it had been agreed that a substantial measure of authority in the conduct of their external relations should be delegated to the associated states. The Prime Ministers agreed that consultations should be held about the question of representation of the associated states of the Eastern Caribbean at Commonwealth meetings.

In relation to British Honduras, some concern was expressed about the current mediation between Britain and Guatemala, and the hope was expressed that particular care would be taken to ensure that the people of British Honduras are given the fullest opportunity to express their views freely about any proposed arrangements affecting their future. Britain gave a firm assurance that no settlement would be reached that was not in accordance with the wishes of the people of British Honduras.

### **Economic Affairs**

The Prime Ministers held a general discussion on the world economic situation. They noted that Commonwealth Trade Ministers at their meeting in June 1966 had had extensive and valuable consultations on world trade. It was recognized that, while Commonwealth trade must be seen in the larger context of international trade, of which it was a vital part, there was continuing scope for expansion of Commonwealth trade and need to strengthen to this end the well-established links among Commonwealth members. In this context, the value of the Commonwealth preference system was recognized. Heads of Government endorsed the continuing need for close consultation and co-operation among Commonwealth countries in international forums, particularly with the view to improving conditions for international commodity trade, including questions of better access and more stable prices for primary products remunerative to producers and fair to consumers and to increasing the openings in international markets for exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from developing countries so essential in the development of their economies.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed the hope that the "Kennedy round" of trade negotiations would lead to a substantial growth in international trade and that

failure of the negotiations could lead to the further development of trade blocs and intensified restrictions. Such growth was of vital concern for the economic progress of Commonwealth countries. Despite the slow progress of the negotiations, Heads of Government attached importance to achieving an early settlement covering both industrial and agricultural products and resulting in increased benefits for all concerned, including the developing countries.

They observed that the British Government had indicated at the Trade Ministers' Meeting its readiness to seek membership in the European Economic Community provided that the essential interests of Britain and other Commonwealth countries were safeguarded. The British Government stated that they would make available the maximum information possible to other Commonwealth Governments on the progress of exploratory discussions and would at all stages of any negotiations consult closely with other Commonwealth Governments. The other Heads of Government noted this assurance and stressed the importance of consultations at all stages of exploratory talks, discussions and negotiations. The hope was expressed that the interests of developing countries would receive special attention during these talks.

Heads of Government also noted the statement by the representative of Nigeria that his country had recently signed an agreement of association with the European Economic Community.

They noted with approval that, in accordance with their decision in 1965, which had been carried further by Commonwealth Trade Ministers at their meeting in June 1966, a preliminary conference of officials engaged in economic planning was to be convened to consider the various methods adopted in Commonwealth countries and see whether a mutual exchange of current plans could be used to improve them and thus promote trade and economic progress within the Commonwealth.

Heads of Government recognized the importance of the strength of sterling and the need for additional liquidity for international payments and they expressed the hope that substantial progress in this direction would be made at the forthcoming meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington. They attached particular importance to this matter since they recognized that the maintenance of economic expansion in the fully industrialized countries as well as in less-developed countries was a basic requirement for the steady increase in world trade and development that is so vital to all countries of the Commonwealth. They noted that Commonwealth Finance Ministers proposed to discuss these and allied matters in Montreal later this month.

The Prime Ministers noted with concern the deteriorating position with regard to the world's food supply and stressed the urgent need for a massive increase in food production, particularly in the developing countries, to meet the needs of the world's growing population, and the desirability for continuing assistance towards this end.

In the course of discussion of the problems of aid and development, Prime

Ministers were concerned that the economic progress in the developing countries had fallen short of the minimum average targets of the United Nations Development Decade. They also noted that, notwithstanding the increased efforts of certain countries, the flow of resources from the developed to the developing countries was inadequate. They recognized that the growing economic imbalance between the rich and poor countries called for a continued and concerted effort to provide development assistance. In this connection they noted the growing difficulties arising from maturing debt obligations. They agreed that the Commonwealth, which was a representative group covering all levels of economic development problems, could continue to provide useful initiatives in international co-operation as it had in the establishment of the Colombo Plan for economic and technical co-operation in South and Southeast Asia and the special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan.

The Prime Ministers had before them a number of suggestions submitted to them by the Secretary-General on possible ways to implement their wishes, as set out in the 1964 and 1965 communiqués, that the Commonwealth can make a further distinctive contribution of its own to increase the economic strength and material well-being of Commonwealth countries. They considered that one of the most promising avenues of Commonwealth co-operation lay in the opportunity to play a creative role in the future strategy of economic development.

The Prime Ministers agreed that the suggestions made by the Secretary-General in his paper on Commonwealth assistance programmes should be further examined at a meeting of senior officials of Commonwealth countries concerned with aid administration; and that this meeting might usefully be combined with the meeting of senior planning officials which Trade Ministers had earlier, on the suggestion of the Prime Ministers, asked the Secretary-General to convene on planning techniques, regional co-operation in planning and trade promotion.

#### **Commonwealth Medical Conference**

Heads of Government were happy to accept the invitation of the President of Uganda that the Commonwealth Medical Conference in 1968 be held in Kampala.

#### **Commonwealth Secretariat Matters**

Following the decision at their 1965 meeting, Heads of Government considered the report of the Review Committee on Intra-Commonwealth Organizations concerned with economic and related affairs. They expressed appreciation of the work of the Committee and accepted the major recommendations, including the integration of the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth Economic Committee and the Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit with the Commonwealth Secretariat, noting that this would produce economy in expenditure.

Heads of Government took note of the annual report of the Secretary-General and authorized its publication.

Heads of Government expressed their high appreciation of the work of the Secretary-General and his colleagues in the Commonwealth Secretariat.

**Message to the Secretary-General of the United Nations**

Commonwealth Heads of Government now meeting in London have unanimously asked me, as Chairman, to convey to you our fullest confidence in you as Secretary-General. We earnestly invite you to reconsider your decision not to offer yourself for reappointment and to continue to be available to offer your distinguished services to the United Nations in the future.

Harold WILSON, *Chairman*

## *Canada's Asian Policy*

*The fourth annual Banff Conference on World Affairs, sponsored by the University of Alberta, the University of Calgary, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the United Nations Association of Canada, was held at the Banff School of Fine Arts from August 22 to 27, 1966. Its theme was "Canada and the Pacific". On August 26, the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the conference. The following is the text of his speech:*

... I understand that your discussions have centred chiefly around those Asian nations on the Pacific coast or facing the Pacific. I shall, of course, devote my main attention to that area also. Nevertheless, I should like to define in the broadest terms what correctly should be called Asian policy. It is Asian because it deals with events of this current era, mainly in China and Southeast Asia, which cast their shadow and send their political and economic reverberations across that mighty continent and down to the islands of Australasia.

The extent of Canadian involvement and public interest in Asian affairs, either in the Pacific region or elsewhere, has grown markedly over the years. It is important to remember, however, that official Canadian awareness of the nations over the Pacific, interest in their affairs and involvement in international questions in which the interests of Canada and of Asian and other nations were at issue, has origins early in our history.

I do not need to remind a group with a close interest in Canadian and international affairs of the nature of some of those interests. It is enough to say that Canadian Governments have long been aware of the necessity of formulating some guiding principles for the advancement of Canadian interests in Asia and of following closely the developments there likely to have a significant bearing on our external policies generally.

### **Christie Memorandum**

A short time ago, I read an article by Professor A. R. M. Lower which dealt with the role played by Loring Christie and Arthur Meighen in persuading the British Government to abandon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. In this, one of Canada's first ventures into the waters of the Pacific, the Canadian Government's tightly-reasoned argument prevailed in London and cleared the way for the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. In his memorandum to Mr. Meighen, which Professor Lower has brought to light, Christie recognized that the United States might take credit for this major change in British policy, and boast about "assuming the moral leadership of the English-speaking world". Christie curtly dismissed this possibility in the following terms: "Let them. If our policy is sound from our viewpoint such things cannot injure it. . . . We can

afford to 'take the cash and let the credit go.'<sup>(1)</sup>

The nature of our interest and of our objectives in that part of Asia has changed very considerably in the decades which have elapsed since that time. The search for a sound policy, however, reflecting our conception of our own interests and of world interests and enabling us to bring to bear whatever means we have to influence events there has not been abated, even when our role has not been a major one and our interests have been indirect.

### **Growth of Asian Involvement**

In order to understand the main lines of our current Asian policy, it is important to note the various ways in which our involvement in Asian affairs has grown. Our bilateral relations with most of the leading nations and with a number of the other nations have expanded steadily. The change in the nature of the Commonwealth has brought us into closer contact in most fields of interest with several Asian nations. Trade and economic assistance have opened up channels for political contact. We have committed troops to a war in Korea under the United Nations flag and participated in United Nations peace-keeping operations on the borders of India and Pakistan.

Our membership on the International Control Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia since 1954 has extended our involvement in Asian affairs beyond bilateral relations and beyond participation in the United Nations operations I have mentioned. We did, of course, accept a task in effect on behalf of the world community, but under unique political conditions which made it necessary for us to maintain impartiality in Control Commission affairs in a political and military situation of very great complexity and which steadily involved us to a greater extent in judging the clash of interests in Southeast Asia. It is natural, at present, that definition of an Asian policy for Canada should tend to begin with the Vietnam conflict and the closely-related question of the position of Communist China in the world community, before it goes on to deal with the other considerations which influence our deliberations.

Now that we have a fairly wide involvement in Asian affairs, we can, in order to delineate policy, point to some general characteristics of our relations with nations in that area and to activities and attitudes with respect to the main Asian problems.

### **Old-Style Policy Eschewed**

When I speak of an Asian policy I do not, of course, use the term in the old-fashioned and rather grandiloquent sense in which the rulers of empires or leading powers tried to pursue masterly strategies designed to capture the opponents' pieces one by one and move remorselessly, if indirectly, towards a clear-cut objective. No nation, large or small, should have illusions as to the

(1) See also "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance", *External Affairs*, September 1966, Pp. 402-413.



extent to which it can steer events by force, pressure, influence or guile towards desired but hypothetical international goals.

In a more modest and pragmatic sense, we must relate one specific policy objective to another to ensure that we are not working at cross purposes. Beyond that we can only hope that, in addition to stating what our own specific interests are, we shall be able to set forth principles and objectives which will meet with a response from many other nations and which will help to create a consensus leading to effective action by the world community.

### **Principles and Objectives**

I believe that our relations with Asian nations and our attitudes towards the great problems of the day in that area are guided or determined by these principles and objectives:

(1) We have no reason arising out of geography, previous commitment or military security at present to consider participating in regional security arrangements or regional military action in Asia.

(2) We recognize, however, that war and revolution in Asia, the partitioning of nations and basic changes in the balance of power since 1939, have created fundamental threats to world peace in Asia. We have, therefore, been willing to assign a high priority to our participation in United Nations operations in Korea and in India-Pakistan and to compliance with the request of the Geneva powers so far as service in the International Control Commissions is concerned.

(3) We consider that the isolation of Communist China from a large part of normal international relations is dangerous. We are prepared to accept the reality of the victory in mainland China in 1949. In the trade field, we have significant contacts of a fairly normal nature. We consider, however, that the effective political independence of Taiwan is a political reality too.

(4) So far as the situation in Vietnam is concerned, Canada is more likely to contribute to peaceful settlement by its membership on the International Control Commission and by diplomatic assistance in the stages of preliminary negotiation or final settlement at a conference than by any other means.

(5) In that situation, we believe that ideological conversion by force, either through domestic subversion or foreign infiltration, will lead inexorably to great-power intervention, to the extension of military pacts and to the escalation of risk of a world conflict.

(6) Economic development cannot, by itself, end conflict or guarantee peace, but we find it hard to envisage any steady progress towards political stability and peace which is not accompanied by the increasing satisfaction of material needs by the peoples concerned. Our expanding assistance programmes have been undertaken in recognition of this relationship, as well as in recognition of other considerations.

(7) Although we belong to the NATO, or Western, group of nations for

historic and security purposes, and although our own political beliefs are clear, we do not consider that these facts should inhibit us from seeking friendly and often close relations with nations in other areas. Our membership in a multi-racial Commonwealth, our interest in countries retaining particular connections with French culture, our economic contacts with developing countries and our contacts with Asian countries in the United Nations are all intended to help develop a world community in which there will be no harsh lines of division between regional, racial or economic blocs.

(8) Finally, we believe that the events of the last world war, the initial problems of a change from colonial to independent status, revolutionary turmoil and economic problems, have delayed the assumption by some leading Asian nations of their proper role in regional and world affairs. We have confidence that Japan, India, Pakistan and Indonesia can, along with China, do much to end abnormal situations in Asia and achieve a better balance of power and political influence in the world generally. We can scarcely speak of Canada being able, by itself, to promote such broad developments to any significant degree. To the extent, however, that this approach can have a bearing on specific policy decisions of our own or can be reflected in joint action, this is our viewpoint.

These are considerations which can usefully be listed to indicate general directions of policy. Their application in any given circumstances cannot, however, be predicted by any hard and fast formulas.

It would be appropriate, therefore, to turn now to some of the specific policies pursued at the moment with respect to central issues of Asian affairs. I propose to make these comments under three headings:

- (1) current policy with respect to recognition of Communist China and United Nations membership;
- (2) the Vietnam situation;
- (3) the relevance of other developments in our relations with other Asian nations to the chief problems of peace and stability in Asia.

### **The Chinese Question**

I believe that few subjects cause greater concern at present to Canadians reflecting on foreign affairs than the position of Communist China in the world community. That is one reason why this question is the object of constant review and reappraisal on the part of the Government generally and on my part as Minister of External Affairs.

Canada recognizes the Republic of China, sometimes called Nationalist China. At the United Nations, most recently in November of last year, we voted against a resolution which called for the seating of representatives of the People's Republic of China and for the expulsion of the representatives of the Republic of China. I am aware that there is a substantial body of opinion in this country which disagrees with this policy. I think, however, that those

who urge a radically different position on us sometimes neglect the thornier aspects of the problem of China. Alternative policies are, of course, possible; but those who advocate them should explain clearly how they propose to overcome some of the serious difficulties which the choice of those alternatives inevitably entails.

### **Uncomfortable Facts**

Those, for example, who urge the diplomatic recognition of Communist China must face the uncomfortable fact that the Government of that country demands that it be recognized as something which it patently is not — that is, the Government of the island of Taiwan.

Canada would welcome the opportunity to see Communist China take a seat in the United Nations. I said so last fall. In the General Assembly, I said as well:

... I hope that, as events in Asia unfold, it may prove possible in the interests of this organization, and of mankind, to make progress toward what the Secretary-General in his annual report has described as the imperative need for the United Nations to achieve universality of membership as soon as possible.

But how to achieve this is another problem. Here, too, alternative policies are, of course, possible. But they are accompanied by similarly uncomfortable facts.

Those, for example, who would have us vote for the resolution which has until now been presented on this subject must accept the fact that it calls not only for the seating of Communist Chinese representatives but also for the denial of any status in the United Nations to representatives of over 12 million people on the island of Taiwan. Those who wish to be realistic and would give formal consecration to what they see as a situation of fact, by promoting a so-called "two Chinas" solution to this dilemma, must face the fact that it is no realistic solution at all so long as both governments which lay claim to China reject it indignantly.

### **Problem of Chinese Admission to United Nations**

In view of the dilemmas I have noted, therefore, we have been forced to the conclusion that, until now, no acceptable means of bringing Communist China into the United Nations has been offered or, indeed, has seemed possible. The Canadian Government has long advocated and striven to encourage the establishment of mutually-beneficial contacts between Communist China and Canada, as well as with the rest of the international community. It has not so far seen it possible to establish relations of diplomatic recognition with the government of that country. At this particular juncture, I cannot say what the immediate future holds. The matter is, however, very much on our minds.

The weighing of alternatives on these questions must continue, and informed public debate on them is to be welcomed. But, while such study and discussion goes on, we still continue to take those practical steps which are possible to

reduce the dangers which must inevitably arise from the continued isolation, whether self-imposed or not, of a country of the size and potential power of Communist China. Canada has sought to do its part in promoting the contacts which may in the long run reduce that isolation. We are glad that, in extensive trade transactions, the two countries have found mutual benefit. Canadians welcome signs that the United States in particular is moving also towards greater contact. It is to be hoped that Communist China will recognize the value of engaging in such contacts.

In a question as difficult as that of China's present and eventual place in the world, the modest beginnings involved in discussions of a few routine matters can develop the mutual knowledge and the reciprocal respect on which peace must eventually rest.

### **The Vietnam Situation**

If the position of Communist China in the world community is a source of underlying concern to many Canadians, the conflict in Vietnam creates open anxiety and leads to controversy.

The Canadian involvement in Vietnam arises from our membership in the International Commission for Supervision and Control, which was created by the 1954 Geneva Conference to supervise the Cease-fire Agreement between the French Union Forces and the People's Army of Vietnam. The Commission was given no executive role, and has always worked within the mandate given to it to supervise and report to members of the 1954 Conference on the implementation by the two parties of the provisions of the Agreement. It is sometimes overlooked that it has never had the power to bring about compliance with its recommendations.

It could be argued, and, indeed, it sometimes is, that, in the new and unforeseen situation now existing in Vietnam, the Commission serves no useful purpose and should be disbanded. The Government has examined this possibility on a number of occasions in the past, and has rejected it for what I consider to be sound reasons. None of the parties involved in Vietnam has, at any time, suggested that the Commission should be withdrawn. Both North and South Vietnam continue to look to the Commission to consider and adjudicate their charges, and the Commission is still able to conduct some investigations.

### **Violations of Demilitarized Zone**

I should hope, for example, that the Commission would be able to establish the facts about recent violations of the Demilitarized Zone and take action designed to deter any future violations and to re-establish its demilitarized status. Success in ensuring that both sides respect the zone as a form of *cordon sanitaire* could be a first step, however modest, on the way to de-escalation and might serve as a pilot project for the sort of supervised settlement which must eventually be achieved.

The Commission also exists as the only remaining symbol of the 1954 Geneva settlement. We cannot discount the importance of the Commission as a reflection of the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in a situation which engages their international responsibilities. Finally, I continue to hope and to work for a situation in which the Commission might be able to assist in the achievement of a peaceful settlement. For all these reasons, therefore, we consider that the maintenance of the Commission is both necessary and desirable.

The war in Vietnam began as a symptom of the instability of Asia. As it goes on, however, it can become the cause of instability not only in Asia but in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, all attempts to bring about negotiations have been unsuccessful. We remain convinced, however, that the time for negotiations will come, must come, and that Canada has an obligation to contribute to the search for ways to bring them about.

#### **Access to Hanoi**

Our Commission role has one further and very important advantage, in that it gives us a special opportunity, available to very few others, of access to the capitals most directly concerned in the conflict. We have used this access and will continue to do so. Most of you will be aware of the two visits to Hanoi made by Mr. Chester Ronning as a special representative of the Canadian Government. I scarcely need to tell you, in his home province, of his long and excellent service to Canada in previous years and of the significant contribution he is making now and which the Canadian Government knows he is prepared to continue to make in the field of Asian policy.

We have also explored with our Commission colleagues, India and Poland, the possibility of a useful role for the Commission in bringing the opposing parties closer together. Our efforts have not yet borne full fruit. Despite this, we intend to continue — either alone, or as a member of the Commission, or with other countries — our efforts to bring about peace talks and to find a path which may lead us out of this increasingly dangerous situation. Indeed, I feel that we have an obligation to continue to make every effort possible towards a settlement.

We are often urged to “demand” this or “insist upon” that with respect to some hypothetical solution of the conflict. I think we must recognize that to proceed along these lines is unlikely to be productive. Those who call for dramatic action on Canada’s part in the apparent expectation that we could help bring about some quick solution to the Vietnam conflict either provide little analysis of the main trends in Asian affairs or make assertions about these trends that scarcely fit the facts as we know them.

I think it important, in explaining the policies of the Government in these matters, to give some indication of how we view the developments in Vietnam and in Asia generally.

### **Vietnam Crisis Not Unique**

There is some danger that, faced with the constantly increasing scale of hostilities in Vietnam, and with the complexities of internal affairs in South Vietnam, we might conclude that the situation there is quite unique, that it has been created only by miscalculation or overwhelming ambition on one side or the other in one limited area and that a simple solution could be found regardless of developments elsewhere. We must, however, relate certain aspects of the situation in Vietnam to the problems of Asia as a whole — the lessons to be drawn from the unhappy situation must be placed in a broader perspective.

There are several characteristics of the Vietnamese problem which are common to other parts of Asia and, indeed, in some cases to other parts of the world. It is, for example, a partitioned state, a victim of what has been called "this century's awkward form of compromise". The 17th Parallel in Vietnam is certainly not the only one which has produced international crises. What has happened there provides further confirmation of the risks inherent in any attempt to remove agreed dividing lines by force, whether this force is manifested in open aggression or by subversion and infiltration. We can only work towards some realistic and relatively stable settlement comparable to those which have had to be accepted elsewhere.

The indirect methods of the Vietnamese war are a manifestation of the Communist doctrine of "wars of national liberation" so vividly described by Marshal Lin Piao last September. A future such as that envisaged by Lin Piao, consisting of a series of "liberation wars" supported by China, obviously will not bring about the stability and security which the states of Asia so desperately need. There are disquieting signs of developments elsewhere which point up the continuing danger of eruptions such as we now face in Vietnam.

### **Problems in Thailand and Laos**

Thailand, for example, is experiencing the same kind of terrorist attacks which characterized the early stages of the insurgency in South Vietnam. In Laos the areas under Pathet Lao control are being freely used for the movement of men and material from North to South Vietnam, and, as is shown by the latest report of the International Commission in Laos, made public earlier this week, members of the North Vietnamese armed forces have engaged in attacks against the armed forces of the Royal Government of Laos — all in contravention of the undertakings given in Geneva in 1962. The Pathet Lao have, for their part, protested alleged bombings by United States aircraft of the territory they control. The Commission has indicated its desire to investigate these allegations, but the Pathet Lao have not so far been willing to facilitate such a legitimate exercise of the Commission's functions.

In the context of Asia, therefore, Vietnam is not a special case, either as a partitioned country or as a proving-ground for the doctrine of "liberation wars". In a third role, as a new developing country groping its way towards a sense

of national identity, South Vietnam shares the plight of nearly all the countries of Africa and Asia.

### **Aggression not Justified by Weak Government**

It is sometimes argued that the shortcomings of successive governments in Saigon are somehow at the root of the tragedy that has befallen Vietnam — that the nature of government in the South provides the basis and excuse for Northern intervention. This argument is not adequate as a justification of aggression, since its application throughout the world obviously would soon result in international anarchy.

Furthermore, it is possible to recognize the inadequacy of governments in South Vietnam, and the existence of internal dissent, without concluding that the present war is in any significant measure the product of these. Internal dissent is something we must expect in any new country where the people live on the margin of subsistence. We must never forget, either, that the difficulties experienced by countries like Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan have shown that the achievement of a viable nationhood, as we in the West are sometimes inclined to forget, is never easy or quick, even in a relatively serene and secure international environment. In the atmosphere of war and subversion fomented from without, the difficulties become almost insurmountable.

We should turn for a moment, however, from the difficult problems which Vietnam shares with other nations and which sometimes make solution of the conflict seem almost impossible to some considerations about the general situation in Asia which offer seeds of hope.

First of all, the "war of national liberation" has not proven to be an effective instrument for the extension of Communist power in Asia. It can be a powerful weapon when used against single states groping their way towards social and political stability. In Vietnam, however, countervailing measures have been taken to redress the military balance and to meet the outside support essential to the success of the technique.

One of Peking's most important foreign-policy objectives has been the removal of American influence from Asia; by now, however, it must be becoming apparent to the Chinese that the sort of situation which was fostered in Vietnam has, as in Korea, led once again to the involvement of United States forces in a conflict on the Asian mainland. The clear determination of the South Vietnamese, the United States and others to prevent a forcible takeover by North Vietnam must at some stage be taken into account in Hanoi and Peking. We can hope, therefore, that a realistic appraisal of the efficacy of "national liberation wars" eventually will lead to their abandonment.

### **No Military Role for Canada**

Some would argue that, if development towards a genuine balance of power was one of the hopeful aspects of the current situation in Asia, Canada might

best serve the cause of peace by sending troops to participate in the Vietnam conflict. They would wish to see us take a position comparable to that of some nations in the area or of the great powers. They would be willing to abandon hope that the International Control Commission or any of its members could help towards a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

I think that the reasoning which lies behind such proposals is quite unsound. It is essential that a balance of power be achieved by the nations of the area and by nations already deeply involved in the security and well-being of that part of the world. It is also essential that a balance which is quite possibly in the making within the next year or two should not be prejudiced by a wider and wider involvement of nations likely to make the central problems of Far Eastern affairs even more difficult to solve.

It is because we see some prospects of an eventual settlement which recognizes the realities — military, political, economic — in the Far East that we consider it particularly important to maintain all the efforts which I have already described to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

We have also urged the international community to accept its responsibility to see that situations such as the one which has arisen in Vietnam are brought under control. As the Prime Minister said in March 1965:

If a single power has to undertake this task, there arises the danger of widening the struggle into general war. So the nations of the world must be ready to produce an alternative.

### **Canada's Involvement in Other Asian Developments**

It is evident that military action alone does not provide an adequate answer to the conception of "people's war", and that the long-term stability and security of China's neighbours will depend on their ability to find solutions to the multitude of political, social and economic problems confronting them. In this field, too, there is reason for optimism, and I should like to turn at this point to other trends in Asian affairs and to Canada's interest and involvement in them.

When Indonesia first instituted its "confrontation" of Malaysia, Canada deemed it advisable to come to the aid of its Commonwealth partner with offers of military equipment and training facilities designed to help Malaysia preserve its territorial integrity. We now welcome the end of this wasteful and destructive confrontation, which will enable both Indonesia and Malaysia to exert their influence on behalf of peaceful progress in Asia. Further to the north, the signing of the Normalization of Relations Agreement by Japan and Korea has removed another source of friction.

Many of the smaller countries of Asia have achieved remarkable rates of economic growth. Despite the unsettled conditions in the area, the development of the basin of the lower Mekong is proceeding at an encouraging pace. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank, more than half of whose capital of \$1 billion has been subscribed by the regional members of ECAFE, will provide a solid base for the accelerated development of the region. The



recent establishment of the Asian and Pacific Council joined together nine Pacific countries in an effort to achieve greater co-operation and solidarity in political and economic fields. Although the participants announced their intention to safeguard their national independence and integrity against any Communist aggression or infiltration, they made clear their desire to avoid any further polarization of Asia into Communist and non-Communist groupings.

### **Canada's Contributions to Asian Stability**

Canada, in every appropriate way, is making substantial contributions to the process of building a stable and self-reliant Asia. Canadian contributions under the Colombo Plan alone have totalled more than \$500 million. Canada has just ratified the agreement setting up the Asian Development Bank and, as a charter member, we have subscribed \$25 million. We have participated in the Mekong basin project from its inception, and have only recently pledged \$2 million to the Nam Ngum hydro-electric project in Laos. It was in the light of the importance that we have always attached to regional developmental programmes of this nature for their contribution both to economic progress and to increased stability that we welcomed President Johnson's \$1 billion co-operative regional development programme for Southeast Asia and said we would play our full part.

All these developments, political and economic, contribute to the elimination of the splintering of the countries of the Pacific area which has made them so vulnerable to outside pressures. It is possible to see, in addition to increasing international co-operation in Asia, the emergence of an economically strong and prosperous Japan in an active diplomatic role and the creation of a wholesome balance of power which hitherto has been possible only as the result of United States commitments.

Canada and Japan see eye to eye on many of the problems which the Pacific powers face today. I like to think that the excellent relations which we enjoy are a good example of the concrete results which can be achieved by the pattern of close consultation which has been built up between our two Governments in recent years. Early in October we shall be having talks in Ottawa with five Japanese Cabinet Ministers on the occasion of the fourth meeting of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee. These consultations enable us not only to deal with bilateral problems but to increase our co-operation in Colombo Plan development programmes and to act together in international situations to our mutual benefit.

It is this kind of co-operation which I hope we will see develop amongst the countries of Asia, all of which must eventually assume primary responsibility for the peace and stability of their own area. India, Pakistan and Indonesia will be important factors in this new Asia. It is for this reason that Canada has been so concerned to encourage the peaceful settlement of the disputes which have had such adverse effects on the economic progress these countries

must make to take their rightful position in the Asian scene.

We are confident also that links between Asian and other members of the Commonwealth, the active roles of Australia and New Zealand, the important influence of France in Asia (and we share with France a real interest in nations retaining close associations with French culture), will all contribute to the development of those conditions of stability which the world desires.

### Conclusion

These are some of the highlights of our policies, and of our convictions about Asian affairs. It is impossible to discuss all the aspects of this vital subject, but I have tried to indicate where the Canadian Government stands with respect to some of the greatest issues you have been discussing this week.

I think that most of you would agree that all such discussions tend to come back to one central question: What are the intentions of mainland China and what are the prospects of coming to a realistic, to a mutually beneficial and, I hope, friendly, understanding with that country?

Whether one considers the situation in Vietnam or in its neighbouring states, on the borders of India and Pakistan, or throughout the continent, so far as general stability and peace are concerned, the question of Chinese attitudes arises.

I can envisage interim measures which could serve to reduce tensions in Asia and perhaps to re-introduce an uneasy peace. I firmly believe, however, that central to all the issues you have been discussing in Banff this week is the question of China's position in the international community. I suggest to you that the working out of a *modus vivendi* with China will be the real test of the next decade, perhaps even the next generation, for both the governments and the peoples of the West and Asia. Developments in the past year, particularly amongst our good neighbours to the south, reveal a growing realization of the urgency of this central issue. And it is this issue, I suggest, which governs the formulation of our policy towards Asian problems, even where Canadian actions may seem unrelated, or even inimical, to this long-term aim.

This is why we have to search for some equitable solution in Vietnam; why we must encourage the end of disputes which sap the strength of China's neighbours; why we have lent support to India in that country's efforts to protect its territory against Chinese pressures. But this is also why we urge that China be brought into disarmament talks and that some equitable way be found to seat its representatives in the United Nations, and why we encourage trade and work to increase contacts with the Chinese people.

It will obviously be a most difficult and slow process at best to move towards a real understanding with the Government of the mainland Chinese. But I would borrow a Chinese maxim: "A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step." If both we and the Chinese are willing to embark on this long journey, in spite of its obvious difficulties and hazards, then we can hope for a new era in Asia's history worthy of the greatness of its past.

## *Canada's Relations With Japan*

**F**IVE senior Japanese Cabinet Ministers will visit Ottawa on October 5 and 6, 1966, to take part in the fourth Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting. The purpose of their visit, which is one of a series held annually either in Ottawa or in Tokyo, is to discuss a wide variety of matters of mutual concern with their opposite numbers in the Canadian Cabinet. This meeting provides a useful opportunity for reviewing the development of relations between Canada and Japan since the Second World War.

### **Diplomatic Relations**

Diplomatic relations between Canada and Japan date back to 1929, early in the history of Canada's diplomatic service, when a legation was opened in Tokyo. Canada's first Minister to Japan, Mr. Herbert Marler, served there from 1929 to 1936. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1941. Personnel of the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo were interned and later repatriated to Canada in the summer of 1942.

During the allied occupation which followed the conclusion of the war in the Pacific, Canada was represented in Tokyo by a Liaison Mission accredited



*Residence of the Canadian Ambassador to Japan, Tokyo.*

to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Normal diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level were resumed after the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan in 1952, and Canada's first Ambassador to Japan, Mr. R. W. Mayhew, presented his credentials to the Emperor in January 1953. The present Canadian Ambassador is Mr. Herbert O. Moran, the former Director-General of the External Aid Office, who took up his post in the summer of 1966. The present Japanese Ambassador to Ottawa, Mr. Osamu Itagaki, arrived in Ottawa in September 1966. The mission in Tokyo is not only one of Canada's largest, it is also one of its most active. Fifteen officers from five Government departments are stationed in Tokyo to deal with the various questions of a political, economic, commercial or immigration character which arise in the course of the post's day-to-day responsibilities. Separate offices in Tokyo are also maintained by the Canadian Wheat Board, the Canadian Travel Bureau and the Department of Manpower and Immigration. In Canada, Japan maintains an Embassy in Ottawa and Consulates General or Consulates in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg.

#### **International Co-operation**

Canada and Japan are both members of the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and have established close co-operation in these international organizations, as well as in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Both countries are donor members of the Colombo Plan and participate in the monetary and aid functions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Both are charter members of the recently created Asian Development Bank (ADB). Consultation on the numerous mutual problems which arise in these organizations forms an important part of the discussion at the Canada-Japan Ministerial Conferences. Equally important, however, are the many aspects of Canadian-Japanese bilateral relations which are reviewed when the Ministers meet.

#### **Trade Relations**

Trade serves as one of the strongest links between Canada and Japan. Trade between the two countries is governed by the provisions of the Canada-Japan Trade Agreement of 1954, which established reciprocal MFN (most-favoured-nation) treatment, and by the provisions of the GATT. At the time the trade agreement was concluded the volume of trade between Canada and Japan amounted to about \$114 million a year. In contrast, Japan now ranks as Canada's third-largest single trading partner, with bilateral trade exchanges amounting to well over half a billion dollars annually.

An important reason for this rapid growth in trade is that the economies of the two countries are in many ways complementary. Japan has a population of over 100 million and ranks fifth amongst the industrialized nations of the

world in production. It is, however, very short of industrial raw materials and must import these in large quantities to maintain its industrial production and economic growth. Japan is also a substantial importer of foodstuffs. The Japanese have turned to Canada as an efficient producer of both industrial raw materials and food products, and it is hoped that in the future these products will be increasingly processed in Canada for the Japanese market. Canada for its part is one of the world's largest importers of manufactured products and has found Japan to be a highly competitive source of these products. Japanese investment in Canada has also expanded on a significant scale in recent years.

The rapid increase of Japanese exports to Canada has not been without impact on certain Canadian industries and the Japanese Government has recognized the desirability of expanding exports to Canada on an orderly basis to avoid disruption of Canadian markets. Annually, after consultation with the Canadian authorities, the Japanese Government places restraints on certain Japanese exports. On its side, Canada has often faced problems in gaining access to the Japanese market for some manufactured goods.

The pattern of Canadian-Japanese trade is, however, changing. The former large imbalance of trade in Canada's favour is showing some signs of decreasing. Furthermore, Japanese exports to Canada are becoming increasingly diversified and include a lower percentage of "sensitive" goods.

### **Fisheries**

As Pacific powers, Canada and Japan have a mutual interest in preserving the marine resources of the area. Accordingly Canada, Japan and the United States signed in 1951 an International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific. Fisheries experts of the three countries meet annually to assess scientific data on fish conservation and to discuss related matters. Under the terms of the Convention, Japan has also agreed to restrict its salmon, halibut, and herring operations in the Northeast Pacific; a series of meetings has taken place since 1963 in response to a Japanese request for revision of the Treaty.

Canada and Japan also participate in the Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, signed in 1957 by Canada, Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union. The governments of the four countries recognized that indiscriminate sealing operations in the North Pacific should give way to conservation of existing resources. Under the terms of the agreement, fur seals are now taken, on land only, by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries having control of the islands on which the seals breed, and portions of the annual catch are allotted to Canada and Japan on an accepted basis.

### **Atomic Energy**

Canada and Japan have also established important ties in the scientific field, particularly in regard to the development of atomic energy. In June 1966,

Canada, Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded an agreement in Vienna under which the Agency assumed responsibility for administering the safeguards incorporated in the Canada-Japan Bilateral Atomic Energy Agreement of 1959. As the signing ceremony in Vienna the Canadian representative welcomed this transfer agreement as an important step in the continuing co-operation between Canada and Japan in the peaceful application of atomic energy. This was the first transfer agreement which Canada had concluded pursuant to the established Canadian policy of seeking to transfer responsibility to the IAEA for the safeguards in Canadian bilateral atomic energy agreements with other countries.

### **Immigration**

Japanese emigration to Canada in the early part of this century made an important contribution to the agricultural and industrial development of Western Canada. There are now some 30,000 Japanese-Canadians in this country, the largest groups being centered in Vancouver and Toronto. Although for many years the annual number of immigrants has been small and limited to close relatives of Canadian citizens, the revised Canadian Immigration Regulations have created new opportunities for the entry of Japanese who possess skills or training in demand in Canada to emigrate to this country. In order to facilitate the flow of Japanese immigrants, the Honourable Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, officially opened a Canadian Immigration Office in Tokyo in September 1966.

### **Bilateral Exchanges**

In recent years there has been a major increase in the number of visitors, both official and unofficial, between Canada and Japan. This exchange was facilitated by the conclusion in 1955 of an Air Services Agreement, under which Canadian Pacific Airlines operates four weekly flights between Vancouver and Tokyo. The speed and frequency of jet air travel have thus overcome the ocean barrier between the two countries. Among the Japanese coming to Canada are a number of students. Some 30 Japanese scientists are awarded post-doctoral fellowships for research in Canada each year by the National Research Council. The Japanese Government and universities also offer scholarships for Canadian university students to study in Japan.

There will be further opportunities for Canadians and Japanese to visit across the Pacific in 1967 and again in 1970. Japan will be a major exhibitor at Expo '67 and will hold the next world exposition in Osaka three years later.

# Disarmament Negotiations

GENEVA, JUNE 14 TO AUGUST 25

**A**FTER a short recess to allow for consultations by governments, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee <sup>(1)</sup> resumed its 1966 session on June 14. <sup>(2)</sup> As in earlier sessions, its efforts were devoted mainly to developing a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reaching agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear testing. The Committee also discussed other "collateral" measures designed to curb the arms race and reduce international tension, as well as more comprehensive and long-term proposals for general and complete disarmament.

## Non-Proliferation

It can be said that the discussions on preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons have taken place in two related dialogues. One has been pursued mainly between the two major nuclear powers and their respective allies, while the other has involved the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear (mainly non-aligned) states.

It has been generally acknowledged that the main provisions of both the United States and Soviet draft non-proliferation treaties now under consideration in the ENDC are Articles I and II. These articles would, on the one hand, prohibit the nuclear powers from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states or assisting in the manufacture of such weapons by those states and, on the other hand, prohibit the non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons in any way. As a result of the discussions in the ENDC this year, it has become quite clear that the nuclear powers are agreed, at least in principle, on the necessity of prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states. They are also agreed, to a certain extent, on the question of transfer; neither would be prepared to countenance the simple handing over of nuclear weapons by a nuclear power to a non-nuclear state. A study of the U.S. and Soviet draft treaties also reveals a close correspondence of views on some of the other necessary provisions of a treaty.

With this degree of agreement in mind, the Canadian delegation tabled at this session a working paper in tabular form comparing the two drafts. Canada suggested, as did other delegations, that it should be possible, through a detailed comparative analysis of the two drafts, to produce treaty language for those

(1) The countries participating in the ENDC remain as follows: Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Roumania, Sweden, the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. France, a member of the Committee, has not participated in its work.

(2) For a report on the discussions in the ENDC during the first part of 1966, see *External Affairs*, July 1966, Pp. 284-288.

points on which there seemed to be close accord. It was felt that such an approach, by giving greater momentum to negotiations, would encourage governments to take such further decisions as might be required to overcome the remaining obstacles.

### **Soviet Objection to U.S. Draft**

However, the Soviet Union and its allies were unwilling to accept this approach. According to them, the U.S. draft treaty did not deal adequately with the problem of preventing proliferation. They stated that under the terms of this draft, it would be possible for allies of the United States, notably the Federal Republic of Germany, to acquire possession of any nuclear weapons available to them in the context of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, even though the use of such weapons would be subject to the veto of the supplying nuclear power; to do this, a non-nuclear NATO member would simply have to repudiate the agreement. They argued that, as there was no agreement on what they felt to be the basic issue, it would be misleading to establish any common language and the Canadian approach would, therefore, not be helpful.

In reply, the U.S. delegation stated that no arrangement contemplated within NATO would involve proliferation. They explained in considerable detail the arrangements made to ensure that U.S. nuclear weapons could not be fired by unauthorized persons, American or other. The order to fire U.S. nuclear weapons could only be given by the United States President. The delegation also pointed out that they had already modified their original draft to take into account comments which had been made in the conference, including Soviet comments. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. reiterated its unwillingness to base its security on a U.S. veto, even with such accompanying electronic, mechanical or other physical lock arrangements as the U.S. might have devised. Such arrangements might, they conceded, be reliable at present, but circumstances could be different in the future. The Soviet representative asked why his country should amend its draft treaty when there had been no suggestion that it would not completely bar any kind of proliferation.

### **Problem of Access to Nuclear Arms**

The Western delegation reiterated that the Soviet draft treaty would appear to prohibit, *ex post facto*, certain Western defence arrangements which had been in existence for a number of years. Moreover, the Soviet draft also seemed to bar consultations within an alliance on the use of nuclear weapons for defence against nuclear attack. Such provisions were quite unacceptable to the West. Subsequently, however, the U.S.S.R. concentrated less on the latter features of its treaty. The main focus of its statements was the question of whether or not non-nuclear allies of nuclear states could obtain "access" to nuclear weapons through alliance nuclear-sharing arrangements. In this connection, the British representative pointed out at the final meeting that many of the ideas for nuclear



sharing within NATO which had been discussed in the past were no longer regarded as realistic or feasible.

Although the Soviet delegation concentrated on the matter of nuclear sharing within the European context, they acknowledged on several occasions that it was urgent and important to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world. It has consistently been the position of Western members of the ENDC that the greatest danger of proliferation, defined as an increase in the number of nations having nuclear weapons under their national control, arises among non-aligned states, which might for reasons of national security or prestige decide to acquire such weapons.

Most of the non-aligned delegations continued to take the position that the treaty articles dealing most directly with the question of military alliances would have to be decided by the nuclear powers. They raised no objections to the proposed clauses setting out the obligations of particular significance to themselves, *viz.* the undertaking that they would not manufacture their own nuclear weapons. In other words, they implicitly recognized that such an obligation was an obvious and essential part of a non-proliferation treaty. Some of them, however, went on to argue that, if they were to renounce forever the option of acquiring their own nuclear weapons, they would like some assurance that their security would not subsequently be endangered. It was suggested that such assurance might be provided formally or informally to the non-nuclear states by the nuclear powers, along the lines of specific proposals made by Chairman Kosygin or President Johnson earlier in the year.<sup>(1)</sup> On June 23, the Soviet representative proposed that the following wording be incorporated as an amendment to the Soviet draft treaty:

The parties to the treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the use of such weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and in whose territory, territorial waters and air space there are no foreign nuclear weapons.

It was also suggested that a treaty might be subjected to a time-limit, in order to allow states to review their position at the end of a given period. (The United States draft treaty already provides for the possibility of a conference of all parties to the treaty to review the situation after a specified number of years. Both texts also include a withdrawal clause that would allow a state to denounce the treaty should it decide that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty" make it necessary for it to do so.)

The latest authoritative statement of the views on this subject of the non-aligned countries as a group was provided in a joint memorandum presented to the ENDC on August 22. In this memorandum the eight non-aligned stated, *inter alia* :

The eight delegations reaffirm their conviction, stated in their earlier memorandum, that the treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear

(1) See *External Affairs*, July 1966.

arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

The eight delegations have individually put forward a number of suggestions as to such tangible steps, including a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing, a complete cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, both in themselves effective non-proliferation measures, a freeze and a gradual reduction of the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and assurance of the security of non-nuclear weapon States. Such different steps could be embodied in a treaty as part of its provisions or as declarations of intention.

The question of verification that treaty obligations were being observed by signatories was considered, particularly in the context of Article III of the U.S. draft treaty, which provides for the establishment of a system of International Atomic Energy Association safeguards, or equivalent international safeguards, on the peaceful nuclear activities of signatories. In the conference, on a number of occasions, the Canadian delegation reiterated its support for the incorporation of a strong safeguards article in a non-proliferation treaty. Canada also referred to its established national policy of applying safeguards to all transfers of nuclear materials, as announced by Prime Minister Pearson in the House of Commons in June 1965 and reaffirmed on subsequent occasions. In developing the views of his country on the subject, the U.S. representative in Geneva suggested that the safeguard system should:

... involve an undertaking by the non-nuclear weapon States to accept IAEA safeguards or equivalent international safeguards in all their peaceful activities. It will also involve an undertaking by all States not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material, to any other State for peaceful purposes unless such material and equipment are subject to IAEA or equivalent international safeguards.

While the safeguards principle was supported in the ENDC by a number of other Western and non-aligned delegations, the Soviet position on safeguards as part of a non-proliferation treaty did not emerge clearly, although the Soviet delegation did state that it would be prepared to examine the question at an appropriate time. This was consistent with its position that agreement should first be reached in principle on the basic provisions of a treaty. <sup>(1)</sup>

The United States also raised the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The U.S. representative explained that a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes could easily be adapted as a weapon since the technology of such devices was indistinguishable from that of nuclear weapons. He recognized that the problem was to reconcile the basic principle of a non-proliferation treaty with the need to make the potential beneficial use of peaceful nuclear explosive devices available to all states. He pointed out that, despite extensive United States study of the exploitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, there remained a number of important technical problems to be solved

(1) See above.

before the process would become technically sound and economically feasible. For non-nuclear states the problem was much greater, since only sophisticated thermonuclear devices could be used for earth-moving projects (e.g. canal-building), and fission-type explosions released unacceptable amounts of radioactivity and were too costly. Thus, if only for economic reasons, the development of a peaceful nuclear capability by a non-nuclear state would not appear to the world as being devoted to peaceful purposes alone. He concluded that the obligations and restrictions of a non-proliferation treaty should apply equally to all nuclear explosive devices, whether for military or civil purposes. He suggested, however, that, in return for any undertaking, nuclear states should be prepared, when possible, to make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful application under appropriate safeguards.

At a subsequent meeting, the Canadian representative, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, commented on the United States proposal as follows:

Although Canada has an extensive background in nuclear technology and is in a position to develop independently a device for peaceful nuclear explosions, it has recognized both the difficulty and the undesirability of doing so. In our view, the development by a non-nuclear state of the capacity to conduct a nuclear explosion even though it is designed for peaceful purposes would, in effect, constitute proliferation, and proliferation is a development to which the Canadian Government has repeatedly declared its opposition. In addition, the Canadian authorities are fully aware of the cost in terms of resources and manpower which would be involved in developing a nuclear device to carry out an explosion for peaceful purposes. Our policy, therefore, has been and will continue to be to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, but to exclude from this activity the testing of devices for nuclear explosions . . . .

. . . As a country with large natural resources requiring development, [Canada] would not wish to be deprived of the possible benefits of the use of peaceful nuclear explosions, and therefore we were happy to hear that the United States accept the fact that those benefits should be available to all states irrespective of whether they possess nuclear weapons . . . .

. . . My delegation would hope that that proposal of the United States might provide a starting-point for development of a generally acceptable arrangement to make the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available to all states, while closing the door to possible proliferation.

The British and Swedish representatives also indicated that their Governments favoured the idea put forward by the United States.

Although the majority of members of the ENDC agreed that it would not be feasible to link agreements on other collateral measures directly to a non-proliferation treaty, it was nevertheless generally recognized that certain other proposals had a close relation to such a treaty. If agreed on, they would also in themselves constitute a useful contribution to arms control. A brief discussion of some of these items follows.

### **Nuclear Test Ban**

The basic obstacle to agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests is the difference between the United States and the U.S.S.R. regarding the necessity for "on-site" inspections. The Soviet Union claims that "national

means" of detection are sufficient to monitor such an agreement; they argue that U.S. insistence on "on-site" inspections is merely an excuse to continue underground testing in order to improve existing nuclear weapons and to develop a new generation of such weapons. The United States takes the view that scientific means are not adequate to identify all underground seismic events as either natural or man-made. It has frequently invited the U.S.S.R. to explain the scientific basis for its point of view — an invitation the U.S.S.R. has consistently refused. The U.S. delegate stated during the session that his country did not require inspection for its own sake but in order to assure all parties to the treaty that the agreement was being adhered to; in a security matter of such importance, the United States was not prepared to take unjustified risks.

Under these circumstances, a number of proposals have been made, mainly by non-aligned countries, to bypass the obstacle and reach agreement, if not on the total prohibition of underground tests at least on a partial one. The most recent statement of the views of non-aligned countries, in a memorandum submitted to the ENDC on August 17, read as follows in part:

"The eight delegations view with utmost regret that it has not so far been possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is in the interest of the entire international community.

"The eight delegations are conscious of the fact that differences between the nuclear-weapon powers as to the means of verifying the observance of such a treaty have been an important obstacle to its realization.

"For their part, the eight delegations have made sincere efforts, individually offering various ideas and suggestions with a view to facilitating an agreement on the banning of underground tests.

"Among these suggestions are:

- The idea that underground tests above a certain threshold should be banned by way of a treaty, while, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, all other underground tests should be suspended;
- the improvement, through international co-operation between national institutions, of the seismic data generally available, so as to create a better scientific basis for the evaluation of seismic events;
- the idea of 'verification by challenge', implying a system whereby a party suspected of underground nuclear-weapon testing should find it in its interest to provide all available reassuring information, including, possibly, an invitation for inspection — this system to be related to rules for a possible withdrawal from the treaty if explanations, forthcoming after formal allegations have been made, are not found satisfactory;
- the idea that, in case on-site inspections were agreed upon, a list of impartial inspectors, deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, might constitute a useful instrument;
- the idea that an impartial body of scientists, recruited on a personal basis

from neutral countries, should be asked to give their opinion on the general problem of identification of underground tests.

"The eight delegations believe that the nuclear-weapon powers should explore the possibility of adopting these suggestions so that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is concluded early. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, they reaffirm their strong demand that states responsible for nuclear-weapon tests take immediate steps for their discontinuance."

Another idea that received some attention by the Committee was the suggestion made during a non-governmental conference in Scarborough, near Toronto, last June (sponsored, *inter alia*, by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs):

... that there should be an agreement by the military nuclear powers to forego all underground testing for a limited trial period, with a system of verification of seismologically ambiguous events by challenge or invitation; it was hoped that such an experimental suspension of underground tests would provide the necessary assurances that could lead to a treaty banning underground tests.<sup>(1)</sup>

The United States delegation indicated American readiness to explore this idea in a positive spirit but reiterated its opposition to any unverified moratorium. Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation claimed to find no difference between the idea of "verification by invitation" and the demand for obligatory "on-site" inspections, and declared these verification ideas to be unacceptable.

The Canadian delegation suggested that it might be useful, as a method of negotiation, to try setting down specific language for a treaty to prohibit underground tests, embodying the broad agreement on principles already in evidence and utilizing a number of the suggestions by non-aligned states. In this connection, Canada pointed out that the so-called "nuclear detection club" for the exchange of seismic data might eventually have a useful role to play. Discussion on this Swedish initiative is continuing, as both the United States and the U.S.S.R. spoke of the project in cautiously favourable terms during this session of the ENDC.

#### **Other Collateral Measures**

The most important of the other collateral measures discussed during this session of the ENDC were those which would really do something to halt the nuclear arms race. One of these was the U.S. proposal for the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons and the transfer under safeguards of large quantities of such material to peaceful purposes. The United States also expressed its willingness to destroy stocks of nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation outlined in considerable detail the verification procedures which should accompany implementation of the proposals; such procedures, they suggested, would not be onerous or intrusive, involving only periodic checks of shut-down reactors by experts armed with the most recent scientific tech-

(1) Report of the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, June 23-26, Toronto, Canada, P. 9.

niques. At the close of the session, the Soviet Union had not taken a final position on this proposal.

The "cut-off" proposal received considerable support from other Western and non-aligned ENDC members, who saw in it a measure with a significant bearing on the non-proliferation question. Indeed, Sweden suggested that a "cut-off" and the prohibition of all tests would be at least as effective in preventing proliferation as would a non-proliferation treaty. The Swedish delegation proposed a negotiating schedule for both measures. On the "cut-off", the Swedes set out a possible three-stage programme, as follows: (a) controls on all transfers of source or special fissionable material and principal nuclear facilities between all countries and for all purposes; (b) control extended to all new facilities, including those for weapons-grade material in all countries; and (c) control of existing production facilities.

Another worthwhile measure proposed by the United States was a "freeze" on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, such as missiles and heavy bombers. As emphasized in the conference, this measure could have an important effect on the nuclear arms race. The United States delegation stressed the necessity of including both offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon carriers in such a freeze, since, otherwise, there would be considerable risk of upsetting the present rough balance between the two major nuclear powers.

### **General and Complete Disarmament**

The conference devoted regular meetings to what remains the basic goal of its discussions — a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In this connection, the Canadian delegation pointed out that the main issue was not so much to work out immediately a full treaty on general and complete disarmament as to make a start on disarmament. The measures referred to earlier in this article; if agreed on, would have that effect. Canada has also supported a proposal by the U.A.R. to establish a working group to study the question of the character of the nuclear deterrent to be retained through the disarmament process. This suggestion was accepted by the United States but not, so far, by the Soviet Union.

### **Conclusion**

Although the U.S.S.R. had, from time to time, brought up some of its familiar propaganda topics and interjected a number of references to the situation in Indochina, the atmosphere at the conference this session remained generally very cordial. Indeed, the Soviet delegation made it clear that the Vietnam question should not prevent agreement on disarmament measures. As already indicated, important progress was made on the non-proliferation issue, in which points of agreement were clarified and those issues on which decisions have yet to be taken were isolated. A large number of useful suggestions were

made with a view to overcoming the impasse in the negotiations for the prohibition of underground testing.

On August 25, the Committee recessed in view of the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. It proposed to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two co-chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee. In its final report, the Committee expressed the hope that the useful discussions and exchange of views during this session would facilitate agreement in its further work.

# *United Nations Economic and Social Council*

FORTY-FIRST SESSION, GENEVA

**T**HE forty-first session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council was held in Geneva from July 5 to August 5, 1966. The Canadian delegation was led by Mr. Donald S. Macdonald, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The alternate Canadian representatives were Mr. Jean-Louis Delisle, Canadian Ambassador to Turkey, and Mr. J. O. Parry of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa.

This session was, in many respects, an encouraging one, showing that the Council had adapted well to the increase in membership from 18 to 27. While its membership reflects better the size and strength of the developing as well as the developed world, ECOSOC is still, as Secretary-General U Thant said at the opening of proceedings on July 5, a body compact enough to deal positively and constructively with the problems of economic and social development. It has a role to play that is firmly laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and is now more important than ever. It also has at its disposal, in the Functional Commissions, the Regional Economic Commissions and the new planning committees that it has created, tools that are much superior to those previously available to it, and it is increasingly ready to make use of them. At the forty-first session, the Council took a number of significant decisions to improve its working methods and procedures and, from an organizational viewpoint, is now in a position to function much more effectively than it has in the past. In addition, the Council adopted a wide range of recommendations for action designed to speed up the process of development in the economic, social and human rights fields.

## **A Trend Reversed**

Several years ago considerable doubt existed as to the Economic and Social Council's role and functions and its proper place in the United Nations family of organizations. The forty-first session marked the culmination of efforts to reverse this trend. The President of the Council, Ambassador Bouattoura of Algeria, noted in his closing address that most of the doubt as to the part to be played by the Council had now disappeared. It was no longer viewed as the General Assembly's letter-box but as the sole organ that could supply a global perspective in the field of international co-operation for development. It also had a new mission: that of organizing efforts and measuring results within the framework of the Development Decade.

While it was still too early to make any kind of forecast, Mr. Bouattoura voiced the hope that, with the help of the Advisory Committee on the Application



of Science and Technology to Development and the new Committee for Development Planning, the Council would soon be in a position to draw the broad outlines of an international policy of development. He also expressed the view that, as early as next year, the Economic and Social Council should begin the task of preparing for the 1970s, of drawing up plans and establishing guide-posts for governments, and of orienting the activities of the organizations and agencies of the United Nations. Mr. Bouattoura concluded with this observation:

Among all the problems that have been touched upon in this forum during the present session, the most important, perhaps, is that of the complacency, of the apathy, of world public opinion towards economic and social development. While we are confronted with a truly explosive situation, this complacency, this apathy, persists to an appalling extent. I deeply believe that all the efforts made towards greater international co-operation for development, within and without the United Nations family, will remain inadequate, marginal even, as long as people are not conscious of the true dimensions of the crisis in which we live, of the impending catastrophe. The record of the Development Decade might be less disappointing if systematic and effective action could be undertaken with a view to arousing the interest of public opinion for the problems and prospects of international co-operation for economic and social progress. In my opinion, here is a question worth including among the most worthy of the Council's attention.

### **Economic Questions**

Overlapping the discussions in the Council's three main committees and the plenary debate was the disappointment felt at the pace of development in the majority of the poorer countries of the world and the general failure to realize in these countries the economic and social goals set by the United Nations Development Decade. To a large extent this concern formed the backdrop for the entire session.

In his opening address, U Thant had called attention to the need to give a new impetus to the Development Decade, "which symbolizes the acceptance by both the developed and the developing countries of a mutual responsibility for achieving an adequate rate of growth in the developing world". Referring to the World Bank estimate that the developing countries could make productive use of an additional \$3 to 4 billion annually for development over the next few years, the Secretary-General said that, while much remained to be done by the poorer countries in mobilizing their internal resources, in a significant number of instances the main limitations were not domestic but rather the insufficiency of external resources:

... We are up against the stark fact that, while national income has considerably increased in the developed parts of the world in recent years, financial assistance to developing countries has levelled off, with the result that the transfer of resources from rich to poor nations has decreased in relation to the capacity of high-income countries to provide such assistance. We are getting further from, instead of nearer to, the modest target of 1 per cent. Nor have the developed countries shown themselves willing to modify significantly their trade policies so as to enable the developing countries to expand their foreign-exchange earnings through increased trade.

If this trend continues, it will, to an ever growing extent, act as a brake on the growth of developing countries. Those countries may struggle to narrow further their savings gap but, in present circumstances, no amount of effort will enable them in isolation

to close the foreign-exchange gap — a gap made wider by their growing burden of indebtedness, a gap which can only be closed or narrowed if the developed countries are prepared to act in the spheres of both aid and trade.

### **International Aid Crisis**

Documentation before the Council also served to underline what the Secretary-General described as "the current crisis in international aid". It was this problem that preoccupied the attention of the Council's Economic Committee and led to the adoption, on the last day of the session, of a resolution on the financing of economic development. This was in two parts, one dealing with the flow of external resources to the developing countries and the other with the measurement of the flow of assistance and long-term capital. The resolution noted with deep concern that the transfer of external resources to the developing countries had failed to reach the minimum target of 1 per cent of the individual national income of the developed countries, as well as the fact that some countries were providing aid on more stringent conditions and that "tied" aid has often resulted in an inefficient use of resources. It urged the developing countries to mobilize their domestic resources to the fullest extent possible, and called on the developed countries to reach, and if possible, to surpass the 1 per cent target by 1970, to make external resources available to the developing countries on easier terms and conditions and to review the problem of debt service in the developing countries. In addition, there were a number of controversial provisions on "tied" aid, the re-investment of loan repayments and tied repayment of tied aid, which many countries, including Canada, were unable to support.

In other sections of the resolution, the Secretary-General was asked to undertake a study on economic factors affecting the ability of developed countries to transfer maximum financial resources to the developing countries, to review the progress made by individual developed countries in providing aid on easier terms, and to analyze the reverse flow of capital and invisibles, as well as of interest and dividend repayments, from the developing to the developed countries.

### **Disparity of Views**

The resolution on the financing of economic development was submitted by the 17 developing nations represented on ECOSOC without prior consultations with other member states. In the Economic Committee, which first considered the text, the extreme disparity of views meant that no real dialogue between the developed and the developing countries emerged. The Canadian delegate said that, while agreeing with much of the intent of the resolution, Canada could not accept all of the assertions contained in it, particularly the assumption that the development process was dependent solely upon the quantity and quality of aid provided by the developed or industrialized countries. It was not true, for example, to assume that tied aid was necessarily bad aid. Tying was not the result of mere caprice on the part of donor countries but was related to valid economic concerns on their part, such as balance-of-payments problems. Again,

when tied aid was related to competitively-supplied items and a wide range of choices existed, it could be both positive and useful.

Most of the other developed countries had similar difficulties with the controversial provisions of the resolution. While the resolution was eventually approved as a whole, it is apparent that the debate on this crucial problem will be repeated in other forums.

In other decisions in the economic field, the Council expressed its concern at the growing food shortage in the developing countries, and adopted a resolution appealing for further contributions to the World Food Programme. As regards the Development Decade, the Council, after examining a progress report by the Secretary-General, noted that progress in achieving the goals and objectives of the Decade had been disappointingly slow and reasserted the need for energetic efforts to meet the goals set for the Decade. Looking ahead to the period of the 1970s, the Council asked the Secretariat to report to its forty-third session next summer on the preparations that should be made to facilitate planning for concerted international action in the period following the end of the Development Decade.

#### **Creation of UNOID**

In the field of industrial development, the Council took note of the resolution containing the draft statutes for the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID), which will be considered by the General Assembly later this year. The resolution provides for the creation of a new autonomous organization within the United Nations, with a status similar to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which will have a broad mandate for promoting the industrialization of the developing countries. A number of other resolutions dealing with various aspects of industrial development were adopted unanimously.

At its forty-first session, ECOSOC received the first report of the new Committee for Development Planning. This gives promise of becoming, in time, an important committee of experts whose recommendations will increase the ability of the United Nations to assist the developing countries in the formulation or execution of their national development plans, and to provide a common framework for concerted action.

The Council, in response to earlier proposals for a five-year survey programme for the development of natural resources, called for the establishment of three groups of qualified consultants on minerals, water resources and energy, and asked them to prepare studies on the scope of the proposed surveys, their planning, time-schedules and cost benefits.

In other action, the Council recommended that a conference be held in Vienna, in 1968 to replace the 1949 International Convention on Road Traffic; urged that member states and private organizations undertake preparations for International Tourist Year in 1967; and asked the United Nations, its related

agencies and governments to take a number of measures to further education in those countries where illiteracy was still a problem. UNESCO, in particular, was asked to continue its experimental World Literacy Programme and to evaluate the impact of literacy on economic development and social progress.

### **Enlargement of Subsidiary Organs**

At its spring session earlier this year, the Economic and Social Council had been unable to reach agreement on a formula for increasing the size of its Functional Commissions and the Committee on Housing, as a natural consequence of the increase in membership of the Council itself. At the forty-first session protracted negotiations finally led to a compromise, whereby the Commission on Human Rights, the Social Commission (now renamed the Commission for Social Development) and the Commission on the Status of Women will be enlarged to 32 members, the Population Commission and the Housing Committee will be raised to 27 members each, and the two remaining Commissions (Statistics and Narcotics), which are of a more technical nature, will each be enlarged to 24 members.

### **Co-ordination Questions**

For several years Canada has been attempting to secure support for a reorganization of the procedures and working methods of the Economic and Social Council that would enable it to discharge better its three main functions — those of:

- (a) acting as governing body for the United Nations work programme in the economic, social and human rights fields;
- (b) ensuring the co-ordination of the activities of the whole United Nations system of organizations in these same fields; and
- (c) providing a high-level forum for the discussion of broad issues of international economic and social policy.

At the forty-first session these efforts bore fruit with the adoption of a Canadian resolution that had two main features. First, the Council decided to reorganize its programme of meetings to provide for a spring session devoted primarily to the work programme of the United Nations and its Functional Commissions and committees, and a summer session that would concentrate on its other two main roles — co-ordination, and acting as a forum for the discussion and formulation of major economic and social policy. Secondly, the Council decided that, beginning in 1968, all the Functional Commissions and the Committee on Housing should meet biennially, with the exception of the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on Social Development and the Commission on the Status of Women.

### **Committee for Programme and Co-ordination**

The Council also took a number of other steps closely related to the "Review and Reappraisal" resolution just mentioned. In place of its Special Committee

on Co-ordination, it decided to set up a Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, which will act as a preparatory body in reviewing the United Nations work programme in the economic and social fields, together with its budgetary implications, before the spring session of the Council devoted to that programme. Similarly, the new committee will deal with, and make recommendations for, co-ordination of the activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in these fields before the summer session of ECOSOC, which will consider co-ordination questions. These changes should enable the Council to organize its work in a logical way and so equip it to discharge its responsibilities more effectively.

The Council also approved a resolution initiated by Canada designed to reduce the volume or improve the conciseness of documentation requiring its consideration. For future sessions the Council asked the Secretariat to extend the practice of compiling short analytical summaries of long reports and to submit further suggestions for reducing documentation.

As a first attempt at an evaluation of the full impact and effectiveness of United Nations technical-assistance programmes in selected developing countries, several pilot evaluation projects have been carried out in Chile, Thailand and Tunisia. At its forty-first session, ECOSOC considered the results of these projects and adopted a resolution calling for the setting up of an inter-agency study group to examine the reports of the evaluation teams and to propose practical steps for making technical co-operation programmes more effective. The Council decided that a limited number of other evaluation projects should be undertaken and asked the Secretary-General to report on the development of methods and standards for evaluating the impact of United Nations technical-assistance programmes. In this way, the UN family or organizations may hope to learn from past mistakes, ensure better co-operation in the field and improve the effectiveness of its aid programmes as a whole.

There was considerable discussion of the report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, which called for a "world plan of action" to promote the effective application of modern scientific knowledge and technology in the development of the less-developed countries. The Council adopted a resolution endorsing the objectives of the proposed plan and made a number of recommendations to further the preparation of programmes for the transfer of technology to the developing countries.

In other steps, the Council called for the strengthening of the staff of the inter-agency Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC), adopted a resolution which sought to improve the content of the summary reports prepared by the Specialized Agencies covering their major activities, and asked the ACC to report to the forty-third session on ways to secure better co-ordination of the contribution which the United Nations family of organizations could make to planning, training and research institutes. It also welcomed the results of the first joint meeting between the ACC and the Council's Special Committee

on Co-ordination (now renamed the "Committee for Programme and Co-ordination" to reflect its dual responsibilities) and recommended that such meetings should continue in the future.

### **Social and Human Rights**

As a consequence of its consideration of the report of the Human Rights Commission, the Council recommended action on a wide range of matters relating to human rights. It asked the Commission to do its utmost to complete consideration of the Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance. On the question of the punishment of war criminals, the Council urged all states to take measures to prevent the application of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to continue efforts to ensure the arrest, extradition and punishment of persons responsible for such crimes.

The General Assembly decided last year to designate 1968 as the International Year for Human Rights. A resolution adopted by the Council at its forty-first session calls for intensified efforts on the part of states, organizations and national and regional bodies to prepare for Human Rights Year. Special messages, publications, radio and television programmes have been recommended to mark the Year and governments were asked to make a special effort within the framework of their national legislation.

In a series of other resolutions dealing with human rights and racial discrimination, the Council condemned policies of *apartheid*, racial discrimination and segregation and called on all states to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It asked for a further report on the progress made in implementing the Declaration on Racial Discrimination, and urged the Human Rights Commission to give urgent consideration to improving the United Nations capacity to halt violations of human rights wherever they might occur. A common thread throughout these resolutions is the Council's concern with violations of human rights and discriminatory practices in colonial territories.

Among the decisions taken on the status of women, the Council forwarded to the General Assembly a Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which calls for measures to ensure equal treatment for women as regards voting and election to public office, and equal rights in civil law, education, and in the economic and social spheres. Other resolutions ask the Secretary-General to study the possibility of establishing a fund to finance a unified long-term programme for the advancement of women and urge that this programme should be an important feature of Human Rights Year in 1968.

A number of resolutions resulted from recommendations of the Social Commission. The Council redesignated the Social Commission the "Commission for Social Development" in order to clarify its role as a preparatory body of ECOSOC in the whole range of social development policy. It asked the United

Nations and its related agencies to concentrate more of their technical-assistance activities on social matters and devote more funds to operational activities. The Council also called for consultations with governments and international agencies on the feasibility of initiating research and training projects in the field of regional development.

For 1968 it is proposed to convene an International Conference of Social Welfare Ministers. The Council requested the Secretary-General to proceed with plans for this meeting, which will prepare principles for social-welfare programmes and related aspects of social development activities at the local level, promote the training of social workers and recommend what further action might be taken in this area by the United Nations.

Following consideration of a report by its Special Rapporteur on Slavery, the Council adopted a resolution calling on states that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Slavery Convention of 1926 and its Supplementary Convention of 1956. The Council urged that the question of slavery be placed on the agenda of the International Conference on Human Rights planned for 1968.

The Council also took up the report of the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund and, in a resolution endorsing UNICEF's programmes and objectives, asked governments, groups and individuals to intensify their efforts and contributions on behalf of this organization.

In the realm of housing, the Council approved in principle the establishment of an International Institute for Documentation on Housing Building and Planning and welcomed the offer of India to act as host to the Institute. It asked for a study on the social problem of housing and urban development. Finally, the Council called attention to the need for more funds to finance housing and community-development projects and, in this connection, appealed for concerted action on the part of states, organizations within the United Nations family, and development finance institutes.

## *French Students Visit Canada*

ON June 15, 1964, Canada and France entered into a bilateral agreement under which France undertook to admit a number of Canadian civil servants each year to the National School of Administration. It was provided that, in exchange, and under conditions to be determined by both governments, young civil servants from France would eventually be sent to Canada for training purposes.

The exchange programme began to operate as early as 1964-1965, when the French School of Administration admitted ten Canadians selected from the federal Civil Service and the civil service of the Province of Quebec.

Since Canada has no administration school as yet, the federal and Quebec governments decided in 1965 to invite six young French civil servants, all former students of the French School of Administration, to come to Canada to familiarize themselves with the social and economic facts of public administration in Canada. It was, therefore, with pleasure that, in return for the warm welcome given Canadian civil servants at the French School, Canada in 1966 again organized a training period in which six graduates from the School took part, accompanied this time by one of their lecturers.

### **Programme for Visitors**

As in the past, the programme for the visit of the French trainees was prepared in conjunction with the relevant services of the Government of Canada and the Province of Quebec. The training period took into account the particular interests and educational qualifications of the French graduates, who already occupy important positions in various government departments and agencies, and provided a series of lectures and visits. Special attention was given to problems associated with current economical, social and cultural events in Canada. The graduates also participated in seminars on Canadian political and administrative institutions. During their six-week stay, they were also given the opportunity of seeing the main regions of Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The guests visited a number of cities, including Montreal, Quebec, Toronto, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Yellowknife and Vancouver. They were shown the main points of interest everywhere, and visited many universities and industrial plants.



# *International Civil and Commercial Procedures*

## ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS<sup>(1)</sup>

THE purpose of this article is to set out briefly the role that can be played by the Department of External Affairs in matters of international civil and commercial procedure.

On some occasions at least, most lawyers may find it necessary to serve documents or to take evidence abroad. Such problems confront both Canadian lawyers who wish to deal in foreign jurisdictions and foreign lawyers who have an interest in Canada. The role the Department of External Affairs can play in this area, therefore, extends to both kinds of circumstance, at least in some instances. It is safe to say, however, that, on the whole, it can be and is of greater assistance to Canadian than to foreign lawyers, since much of the work it can perform for Canadian lawyers abroad can be performed in Canada, on behalf of such foreign lawyers, by the local embassy or consulate of the foreign state concerned, either by its dealing with the local judicial authorities direct or by its giving advice to its own nationals on what procedures to follow in Canada. This is true whether there is or is not a civil procedure convention in existence between Canada and the other country involved.

### **Procedures for Latin America and U.S.**

Canada has conventions regulating "legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters" with many countries, notably in Western Europe, but has no such agreements with any Latin American country or with the United States. This does not mean, however, that service cannot be effected or evidence taken in these countries. In fact, the procedures for carrying out both operations are very similar, whether a convention exists or not. Of course, if no convention exists, the foreign country concerned is under no international legal obligation to assist the Canadian authorities or lawyer. However, in practice, the appropriate authorities of the foreign country are consulted, either by the Canadian lawyer's agent there, directly, or by the Canadian authorities, through diplomatic channels, to ascertain if the service or taking of evidence will be permitted and, if so, what method may be used. Normally, countries co-operate with each other in such cases, presumably on the basis of the furtherance of justice in accordance with the comity of nations.

A Canadian lawyer, faced with the problem of having to serve documents or obtain evidence in a foreign country, may engage an agent in that country

(1) Based on an address to the Inter-American Conference on International Judicial Co-operation, held in Montreal, June 3-5, 1966, by A. W. J. Robertson, Legal Division, Department of External Affairs.

to handle the matter through the proper channels in accordance with the laws of the foreign country. In such cases there is, or in any event should be, no need for departmental intervention. However, if the lawyer does not have an agent, he may instead direct a request for assistance to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa, with an undertaking to assume all costs involved. The Under-Secretary will then dispatch the request and instructions for action to the Canadian post in the country concerned. It is desirable to address requests to the USSEA in Ottawa, rather than to the Canadian post concerned, because posts can normally take action in such matters only in accordance with directives from the Department.

Before discussing in greater detail the two principal activities of a civil procedure nature that are likely to take place, that is to say, service of documents, on the one hand, and taking of evidence, on the other, further reference should be made to the civil procedure conventions to which Canada is a party.

### **British Convention**

Practically all the civil procedure conventions to which this country is a party were concluded during the early 1930s by the British Government and they were either made applicable to Canada at the request of the Canadian Government at the time of their conclusion or within the next few years. A typical example, selected more or less at random, is the United Kingdom-Polish Convention, which was signed in Warsaw on August 26, 1931, and which came into force one month after ratifications were exchanged (in London on May 21, 1932). It was extended to Canada by an exchange of notes concluded in Warsaw in July 1935 and it came into effect for this country on August 1, 1935.

It is a simple and fairly straightforward document. After the introductory, preambular, and definition sections, it goes on, in Part II (Articles 2 to 5 inclusive) to deal with service, in Part III (Articles 6-11) to deal with taking of evidence, in Part IV (Article 12) to cover legal aid, and in Part V (Articles 13 onward) it sets out certain general provisions.

Unfortunately, if someone unfamiliar with current practice were to rely on the text of such convention, he would soon find himself in difficulties, because Canadian practice is no longer altogether on a par with what might be inferred from the wording of some sections of these conventions. For instance, Article 4(a)(1), Article 8)a( and Article 9(a) refer to the role of Canadian consular offices in such matters as the taking of evidence abroad, etc. However, in fact, as far as Canada is concerned, the Department of External Affairs is no longer prepared, as a general rule, to make its officers available for performing this kind of work. It is not that the Department is unco-operative; under certain circumstances, it may be prepared to relax its rulings in that regard. But, on the whole, Canadian posts abroad are not equipped

to carry out jobs of a kind that can, in any event, be done in other ways by other people.

### Service of Documents

Now we turn to a discussion of service of documents, in practical rather than theoretical terms. In all cases, including those involving countries with which there is no convention, the Canadian lawyer, if he wants the assistance of the Department of External Affairs, should write to the Under-Secretary giving his undertaking to pay all costs, setting forth the title of the cause, the name of the Canadian court, etc., requesting that service of the document be effected, and giving precise instructions as to how he wishes the service to be made. Naturally, even when various forms of service may be possible in a foreign country, such service must conform to the requirements of the Canadian court which has ordered it.

Normally, then, the procedure is for the USSEA to forward all the relevant documents to the Canadian post in the country concerned, which will, in its turn, forward them to the foreign ministry of that country, for service by local officials in accordance with the rules of the country. This again may involve several steps, including perhaps transmission by the foreign ministry, through channels, to a judge having jurisdiction over the area where the person to be served is resident and the issuance by him of an order that a competent local official serve the document. It might be added that, if the courts are busy, it may take months to serve a document by this procedure. In addition, the foreign state concerned normally insists that the documents and instructions for service be drawn up in the language of the country where they are to be served or, if drawn up in another language, that they be accompanied by an official translation. The Department does not have the facilities, either at the posts or in Ottawa, to provide translations, and solicitors are, therefore, advised that they should have the documents translated by a public translator and certified by him before they are forwarded to the Department for action.

If there is any doubt whether the foreign state requires such translations, it is possible to ask the Department to ascertain this in advance or to make enquiries of the local post of that country in Canada. Nine times out of ten translations (except perhaps of very bulky documents, which need only be identified) are required, and it is probably wiser, safer and faster to provide them anyway.

In all cases, if a Canadian court has ordered service, a copy of the order should be forwarded. Complete information as to the name and address of the person upon whom service is to be effected should be given. Identification of the person to be served is usually considered very important and sufficient provision should be made to ensure that the process-server can make such identification.

It is safest to send three copies of the documents to be served to the

USSEA, as rules regarding the number of copies required vary in different countries.

In taking out an order for service, it is desirable, if possible, to make provision for the proof of service by certificate rather than by affidavit. The practice in most foreign countries is to prove matters of this sort by certificate and no authority may exist in local law for execution of an affidavit. It is, of course, possible that a Canadian court might itself not have authority to issue an order allowing proof of service by certificate. Normally, though, a compromise can be reached and, on a reasonable view of the situation, a certificate could probably be considered equivalent to an affidavit in any case.

Normally, as has already been indicated, Canadian consuls do not undertake to serve documents. However, if the party to be served is willing to attend at the post, the consul may agree, subject to instructions from the Department, to effect service there, provided the authorities of the foreign country permit it. (Under the laws of some countries, however, documents cannot be served by a foreign consul but must be served by the local foreign office.) If the matter is urgent, this method may save time. It must again be emphasized, however, that, under Canadian consular regulations, Canadian consuls are not authorized to act as process-servers under ordinary circumstances.

#### **Taking of Evidence**

Now to turn to the other principal procedural activity, the taking of evidence. There are normally three types of procedure available under the civil procedure conventions to which Canada is a party:

- (1) The taking of evidence by the judicial authorities of the country of execution (i.e. where the evidence is to be taken) pursuant to Letters of Request (Commissions Rogatory);
- (2) the taking of evidence by an examiner appointed and authorized by the court of the country of execution, also pursuant to Letters of Request;
- (3) the taking of evidence by a person appointed and authorized by the courts of the country of origin (usually by commission or by appointment as examiner).

The first and third methods are also usually available in countries with which Canada has not signed civil procedure conventions, while the second is, as a general rule, restricted only to certain countries with which conventions have been concluded.

The first method can, to the best of our knowledge, be used in nearly every country of the world. The authorities in the countries of execution exercise compulsory powers and the testimony given is subject to the local laws of perjury. It is, however, difficult to ensure that the evidence is taken in accordance with procedural rules of a particular Canadian province. Also, this method may involve considerable delay. Thus its use is largely confined to cases in which there may be difficulty in producing a witness voluntarily to give testimony.

The third method is comparatively quick and effective, assuming that there is to be no difficulty in producing a witness to give evidence. However, it may be difficult to find a person who is on the spot and who has had training and experience in taking evidence for use in common law courts. (The Department itself does not normally, as has been said, authorize its diplomatic or consular officers abroad to act as commissioners for the taking of evidence; and anyway, unless they happened to be lawyers, their own knowledge would be limited.) While expenses incurred can be high, this is an effective method for use when it is desired that the witness should be examined and cross-examined by legal representatives of the parties. (This method was used very effectively in Latin America recently, in a successions case, when a provincial judge was made a commissioner and went to a particular country and took evidence there. He sat as a private commissioner, acting as an agent of the embassy.)

The second method (the appointment of an examiner by the foreign court, further to Letters of Request) combines the advantages of the first and third. If it is available and if there is doubt as to the willingness of the witness to testify, it should be adopted, since it enables compulsory attendance to be resorted to if necessary.

#### **Regulations on Letters of Request**

The Letters of Request, in such cases, should be addressed to the competent authorities of the country of execution, rather than to a named court there, and the Department will then transmit them, through the local authorities responsible, to the particular judicial tribunal in the country of execution that is competent to take the evidence. The documents should be sent in duplicate, perhaps even triplicate, with an undertaking to cover all costs. If the parties are represented by agents in the country of execution, their names and addresses should be disclosed. When they are not so represented, the documents should, in all cases, be accompanied by complete interrogatories and cross-interrogatories. Rules for the necessity of translations vary from country to country; however, it is almost certain that the Letters of Request themselves will, in any event, have to be in the language of the country where the evidence is to be taken or accompanied by a translation. There is no marked difference in the procedure to be followed in countries where there is no civil procedure convention in effect and available as regards Canada. It is usually possible to rely on Letters of Request in all countries, with the possible exception of the United States, where procedure by commission or by special examiner should be followed. In some countries, procedure by Letters of Request is the only course available, as the taking of evidence by a consul or by any other person appointed by the court of the country of origin is not permitted by local law. The practice varies from time to time and from country to country, so that a lawyer would be well advised to consult the Department as to the local practice when any problem actually arises.

In some countries it is possible for Letters of Request to be transmitted directly from court to court and even from the agent to the local ministry of justice. This is, however, a more unusual procedure and, while an enquiry can always be made to the Department, to ascertain whether such a course is available, our own experience indicates that both time and expense can often be saved by transmitting the documents through diplomatic channels.

#### **Local Canadian Practice**

Local Canadian practice in these matters need not be discussed here, beyond indicating that there are two approved methods for taking evidence in Canada which it is believed apply throughout the country :

- (1) By addressing a Letter of Request to the attorney-general of the province concerned;
- (2) by retaining a lawyer qualified to present a Letter of Request to the local court by direct application.

In conclusion, it might be useful to add a few general suggestions that might be of assistance to practising Canadian lawyers. The first is that the Department of External Affairs can usually find out about foreign local requirements in respect of procedural matters and, if there is great urgency, it can often do so fairly quickly. It does not guarantee the accuracy of the information obtained and, if it is necessary to consult a local lawyer, the Department would naturally have to be reimbursed for his services.

Secondly, the Department can recommend a local lawyer, in a foreign state, to Canadian lawyers seeking agents abroad. Here again, it cannot and does not offer any guarantees; but its posts, which act with great care in such matters, will draw up a short list of local lawyers known to be well regarded and forward it to the Department, which will pass it on to the Canadian lawyer interested.

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

- Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting: Ottawa, October 5-6
- Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians: Huddersfield, England, October 17-29
- UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session: Paris, October 25 - November 30
- Food and Agriculture Organization: Rome, October
- Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Geneva, October 25
- OECD Ministerial Council: Paris, November 24-25
- International Wheat Council, forty-seventh session: London, December 7-13

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## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. P. Liabotis resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective July 12, 1966.
- Mr. G. L. Morris resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective August 3, 1966.
- Mr. M. Heroux posted from the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, to Ottawa, effective August 10, 1966.
- Mr. L. Sarrazin posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, to the Canadian Embassy, Beirut, effective August 16, 1966.
- Mr. F. M. Bild posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, Vientiane, effective August 19, 1966.
- Miss L. Beattie posted from the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, to Ottawa, effective August 20, 1966.
- Mr. D. W. Munro posted from the National Defence College, Kingston, to Ottawa, effective August 22, 1966.
- Mr. K. S. Ward appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Administrative Officer 1, effective August 22, 1966.
- Mr. P. Dumas posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, effective August 26, 1966.
- Mr. J. George posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective August 26, 1966.

- Mr. R. C. Stansfield posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, effective August 26, 1966.
- Mr. G. Mitchell posted from the Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé, to Ottawa, effective August 29, 1966.
- Mr. G. E. Parent posted from the Canadian Embassy, Beirut, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective August 29, 1966.
- Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie appointed Canadian Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective August 30, 1966.
- Mr. G. E. Hardy posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Helsinki, effective August 30, 1966.
- Mr. J. I. Doig resigned from the Department of External Affairs effective August 31, 1966.
- Mr. A. F. Hart appointed Canadian High Commissioner to Ghana and concurrently Canadian Ambassador to Togo and the Upper Volta, effective August 31, 1966.
- Mr. P. de W. Wilson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, effective August 31, 1966.
- Mr. A. Napier posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, to Ottawa, effective September 1, 1966.
- Mr. A. R. Potvin posted from the Canadian Embassy, Beirut, to the Canadian Embassy, Port-au-Prince, effective September 1, 1966.
- Miss M. Gowler posted from the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, effective September 2, 1966.
- Mr. J.-G. Paquette resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective September 2, 1966.
- Mr. M. J. Bujold posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tunis, effective September 3, 1966.
- Mr. A. B. Roger posted from the Canadian Embassy, Helsinki, to Ottawa, effective September 3, 1966.
- Mr. J. R. Barker posted from Ottawa to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 5, 1966.
- Mr. R. J. Belliveau appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. G. Bergeron appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. G. P. M. Charlebois appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. R. D. Fowell appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. S. E. Gooch appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.



- Miss E. Hesketh appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. T. A. Keenleyside appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. J. K. B. Kinsmen appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Miss M. S. McKay appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. J.-C. Mercier appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. E. A. Willer appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 6, 1966.
- Mr. F. J. Douma appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective September 7, 1966.
- Miss M. H. Francis appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective September 7, 1966.
- Mr. C. J. Gregor appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective September 7, 1966.
- Mr. F. D. Martens appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Junior Executive Officer, effective September 7, 1966.
- Mr. J. R. Sharpe posted from the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, effective September 7, 1966.
- Miss J. A. Booth appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 2, effective September 9, 1966.
- Miss M. Laperrière posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective September 9, 1966.
- Mr. M. B. Phillips posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Addis Ababa, effective September 10, 1966.
- Mr. G. Charpentier posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective September 11, 1966.
- Mr. H. O. Moran, Secretary-General, External Aid Office, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Japan, effective September 14, 1966.
- Mr. P. S. Cooper seconded to the Department of External Affairs August 1966 and appointed Canadian Commissioner to the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, Vientiane, effective September 20, 1966.
- Mr. G. C. Parks appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Solicitor 3, effective September 20, 1966.
- Mr. G. C. Cook posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Quito, effective September 21, 1966.

Miss P. Macoun posted from the Canadian Embassy, Warsaw, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Singapore, effective September 21, 1966.

Mr. J. A. McCordick appointed Canadian Ambassador to Austria, effective September 21, 1966.

Mr. W. M. Wood posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, to the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, effective September 21, 1966.

Mr. K. W. MacLellan, Canadian Commissioner to the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, Vientiane, posted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective September 24, 1966.

Mr. J. R. McKinney appointed High Commissioner for Canada to Trinidad and Tobago, effective September 24, 1966.

Miss H. D. Burwash posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective September 26, 1966.

Mr. A. J. Pick appointed Canadian Ambassador to Tunisia, effective September 29, 1966.

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**CORRIGENDUM, SEPTEMBER 1966 ISSUE :**

Article entitled "Vietnam — Report on the Dong Hene Incident" should read "Laos — Report on the Dong Hene Incident".

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# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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## *Visit of the President of Senegal*

**A**T the invitation of Governor-General Georges P. Vanier, His Excellency Léopold Sédar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, began a ten-day visit to Canada in Ottawa on September 19, 1966. The presidential suite included His Excellency Doudou Thiam, Foreign Minister, His Excellency Habib Thiam, Minister of Planning and Development, and General Jean Alfred Diallo, Chief of the General Staff of the Senegalese Armed Forces. At the Canadian Forces Base, Uplands, where the customary honours were accorded to the President on his arrival, he was greeted by the Governor-General, by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Prime Minister, and by the Dean and members of the Diplomatic Corps.

During the Ottawa visit, cordial discussions were held between President Senghor and Prime Minister L. B. Pearson, Mr. Martin and the Minister of Industry, Mr. C. M. Drury. In addition to touching on current international issues of mutual interest, on which the two sides found themselves in broad agreement, the talks underlined the happy relations existing between the two countries and the bonds between Canada and Senegal, which stemmed in part



*President Senghor of Senegal (left) accompanied by Governor-General Vanier (second from left) during the arrival ceremonies at the Canadian Forces Base, Uplands, Ottawa. Mr. Doudou Thiam, Senegal's Minister of Foreign Affairs, follows Mr. Senghor, accompanied by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin.*

from the importance of the French language and culture in the life of both nations. President Senghor outlined to the Canadian Ministers his views on a proposal envisaging the establishment of closer links between French-speaking countries in a framework yet to be determined.

### **Aid Discussions**

Following further discussions between Senegalese officials and members of the External Aid Office about Canada's contribution to the development of Senegal, representatives of the two countries signed on behalf of their respective governments a memorandum of understanding defining the responsibilities of the Governments of Canada and Senegal with regard to Canadian assistance personnel serving in Senegal under the auspices of the EAO. The Canadian Government also offered up to \$500,000 in Canadian food stuffs to assist Senegal in meeting shortages caused by a recent drought.

The Ottawa visit included a state dinner and reception held by the Governor-General and Mme Vanier at Rideau Hall, where President Senghor stayed during his visit, and a dinner given by the President in honour of his hosts. In addition, the Prime Minister gave a luncheon for the President and his entourage. At the University of Ottawa, where he delivered a lecture inaugurating the public administration course for trainees from the French-speaking countries of Asia and Africa, President Senghor dealt at length with the "problems of development in under-developed countries", emphasizing that these were "problems of structure, of men, and of relationships between nations", which "would be solved only on a world-wide basis".

### **Visit to Quebec City**

On September 21, the Presidential party departed for Quebec City, where they were the guests of the Government of Quebec at a dinner offered by Prime Minister Daniel Johnson. On this occasion, Mr. Johnson assured the Senegalese President of the interest and support that his promotion of closer relations among French-speaking countries was creating in French-speaking Canada. President Senghor also called at the Hôtel de Ville, where toasts were exchanged with His Worship Mayor Lamontagne. A feature of the visit was the ceremony at Laval University, where President Senghor received an honorary doctorate in recognition of his achievements as a poet and political philosopher. The Presidential address on this occasion dealt with the cultural eminence of the French language and the strength and value of the common heritage linking various peoples in "la Francophonie". The conferring of the degree was followed by a lunch at Petit-Cap, where, in the Quebec Seminary's eighteenth century Norman-type farm-house, President Senghor was entertained by His Eminence Cardinal Roy and other dignitaries of the University.

President Senghor spent September 23 to 25 in the Laurentians. During his stay there he attended a session of the conference of the Institut canadien des

affaires publiques held at Mont-Gabriel. The participants honoured him at an informal dinner attended by a number of distinguished Canadian figures, including federal and provincial ministers.

During the President's visit to Montreal, which started on September 25, His Worship Mayor Drapeau gave a dinner on behalf of the City of Montreal for President Senghor. The Senegalese President also made an extensive tour of the site of Expo '67, stopping at Africa Place, where the Republic of Senegal will be represented alongside a number of other African states. The official part of the visit concluded with a public lecture on the idea of "négritude", which President Senghor delivered at the University of Montreal before a large audience of professors and students. The President and his party left Montreal by air on September 28 for the United States.

### **Joint Communiqué**

A joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit to Ottawa expressed the full agreement of the two governments "on the need for vigorous support of the United Nations and for strengthening the capacity of that organization to act effectively for the maintenance of peace and security". Both governments also agreed that "raising the standard of living in developing countries of the world is an urgent and vital problem in which all countries must co-operate" and that, "to this end, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development . . . had an important role to play in promoting the adoption of effective new international economic policies to further the progress of developing countries". The communiqué also noted the agreement of the two governments "on the desirability of developing closer links and more numerous exchanges, particularly in the cultural and professional fields, among those countries for which the French language and culture are in varying degrees an integral part of their national heritage". The Canadian and Senegalese leaders "discussed the need for increasing these links and exchanges through a wide and balanced framework which would take account of the structures and particular problems of all those countries which have a claim to membership in the community of French-speaking peoples". In conclusion, it was stated that "the Governments of Senegal and Canada reaffirmed their sincere friendship for each other, which has been further strengthened by the very welcome state visit to Canada of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Senegal", and that President Senghor had issued an invitation to the Prime Minister of Canada to pay an official visit to Senegal at a date to be fixed later.

## *Economic Development in the Developing Countries*

*To the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly is assigned responsibility for the examination of the many items on the Assembly's agenda dealing with economic matters. The focus of its work is the problem of economic development in the developing countries, and the solutions which the international community can provide, either in the field of external aid or through action designed to promote the capacity of less-industrialized nations to increase their export earnings through expanded participation in world trade. The Canadian representative on the Second Committee, Mr. Donald S. Macdonald, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the Committee on October 7, 1966, during its general debate. The following are excerpts from his statement :*

On the agenda of this twenty-first session of the General Assembly there are no items more important than those concerned with the various facets of the complex problem of economic development. They rank first in importance because they are uppermost among the preoccupations of the majority of United Nations members as they struggle to realize their individual national goals. They also rank first in importance because problems of economic development and measures which are taken in response to them are of such paramount significance for relations between all states today. The collective action which the community of nations takes to meet the challenge of under-development will determine whether we achieve lasting peace, stability and prosperity — in short, the kind of world to which this organization is dedicated.

Over the past year, prolonged, thorough and useful discussions have been held upon major problems of development in a series of important international meetings. Their point of departure has been the growing body of disquieting evidence that we are seriously behind schedule in our efforts to attain the objectives we set for the Development Decade. I should not wish to speak here of shattered illusions, but the only realistic basis for our discussions in this Committee must be the recognition that, if the goals of the Decade are not to elude our reach, the nations of this world (and here I quote from what the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said on this subject in the general debate of this Assembly a fortnight ago) "are going to have to make common cause and sacrifice on a scale that is only beginning to be appreciated and up to now certainly has not generally been accepted".

... To sum up in a phrase what I believe to be the lesson of our efforts to date, I should say that the international community had grasped more clearly than ever before that development is a co-operative endeavour. Translated to the aid field, this means that donor countries must make greater and more

determined efforts to expand the volume and improve the terms of assistance they extend. But it also means that recipient countries must do more to ensure that their limited human and financial resources are used with maximum effectiveness. At the recent fourth session of the Trade and Development Board, considerable attention was devoted to this latter question, especially to problems confronting less-developed economies in seeking to deal with the consequences of the introduction of modern technology. Dr. Prebisch, in a very cogent speech to the Board, underlined the fact that effective assimilation of technological know-how may, in many instances, require quite drastic measures of economic and social reform. The obstacle which obsolete systems of land tenure present for the utilization of modern techniques in increasing agricultural productivity provides one example of an area where action by developing countries may be an essential key to progress.

### **More Initiative Needed**

Similarly, in the trade field (and this again came out very clearly during the last session of the Trade and Development Board), we are struck by the need for concerted efforts by both groups of countries, developed and developing. It is clear that in this field we now realize that there are no quick and easy answers, no short-cuts to rapid and dramatic results. But there is a lot which can and must be done. From industrialized nations there should come initiatives designed to enhance the capacity of developing countries to take full advantage of expanding world trade so as to increase their export earnings. But, as industrial nations seek new ways to assist other countries to sell more abroad, vigorous complementary actions must be taken by the developing countries themselves. I have already touched on the necessity for structural reforms in the agricultural sector. In addition to such domestic reforms in developing countries, there is a very definite need for vigorous action by those countries to provide a wider base for their industrialization through regional and inter-regional co-operation, with the object of increasing trade among themselves.

As a last point before leaving this cursory general review of the current situation and the principles which should guide our future endeavours, I should like to re-emphasize the role of co-ordination. Obviously, effective international machinery is central in synchronizing and stimulating our efforts. Accordingly, we were gratified by the decisions of the last session of ECOSOC to improve its ability to co-ordinate the work of many of the members of the United Nations family. In the aid field, there is scope for even closer co-ordination in programming between donor and recipient countries. In the trade sector, we believe that UNCTAD is maturing as an effective instrument and we look forward to the second conference as an opportunity for concrete progress in a selection of important areas which have engaged the attention of the Trade Board and its Committees since the first Conference. While it is probably too soon to speak with confidence of precise fields where meaningful advances



can be registered at the second Conference, debates in this Committee can help to form the necessary consensus regarding the areas where the greatest chances for positive achievement at the second Conference exist.

### **Canada's Development Aid**

I wish now to return to a few of the specific topics before this Committee in which my Delegation has a very special interest. I have already emphasized the urgent need for an immediate renewal of the upward thrust in flow of development assistance and for action to improve the terms on which donor countries provide this assistance. In the general debate in plenary, the Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed what Canada is now doing to give effect to that conviction. He recalled that, over the last three years, the total aid resources we have made available have increased at an average annual rate of \$50 million and pledged us to do our utmost to continue this expansion in order to achieve the one percent target. Canada's Foreign Minister also mentioned steps which we have taken to provide for the closest consultation with recipient countries in aid planning, to diversify our assistance and to supplement our technical assistance and grant aid with soft loans, and to improve the terms on which these loans are made. In addition to our continuing efforts to expand and make more effective our bilateral aid programmes, Canada firmly supports the expansion of the resources available to soundly-conceived multilateral programmes. It therefore gave me special pleasure to be able to announce yesterday, subject to Parliamentary approval, an increase in our contribution to the United Nations Development Programme to the level of \$10 million (U.S.). The UNDP is playing an increasingly crucial role in the co-ordination and effective implementation of assistance activities in the United Nations family. It is our earnest hope that contributions by other members will permit early achievement of the \$200-million target of the UNDP set at the last session of the General Assembly. If, as we trust, the resources for capital investment through other agencies are to be increased in the near future, the need for more technical and pre-investment assistance through the UNDP is especially pressing.

Canada welcomed as an important step for the promotion of multilateral co-operation on a regional basis the entry into force last month of the agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank. Canada's subscription to this important new institution amounts to \$25 million. Another multilateral instrument to which my country attaches great importance is the International Development Association. I should expect that Canada would be prepared to join with others in responding sympathetically to the current requirement for replenishing IDA resources at a higher level.

The second specific subject on the Committee's agenda which I would like to emphasize is the food problem. Recent studies have cast in stark relief the great gravity of the world food situation and have brought home the need

for imaginative and vigorous efforts on the part of both developed and developing countries in order to avert the calamity of the prospective food gap.

### **Agricultural and Food Aid**

Canada, as a major producer and exporter of food-stuffs, has a vital interest both in the future world demand for and supply of food and in the implications of the food situation for the economic progress and well-being of developing countries. I have already mentioned the burden which developing countries must shoulder in implementing certain fundamental changes in their economies necessary for expanding agricultural productivity. Developed countries must exert new efforts to assist this process both on the bilateral and multilateral planes. Technical assistance is one of the most important ways in which donor countries can help. My country will give the highest priority to requests for assistance which we are competent to provide in the fields of agriculture and fisheries. In addition to increasing and improving our technical assistance, we shall seek to increase what we are doing by way of assistance in other forms, such as the supply of fertilizers, pesticides and farm implements.

But besides technical assistance and development aid to increase productivity through irrigation and drainage projects — to mention only one example — we anticipate a continuing need for the provision of food supplies on an interim basis. Here the World Food Programme — to which, incidentally, Canada's contributions have quadrupled during the past three years — has a central role to play. As far as Canada is concerned, we regard food aid not only as humanitarian relief for the hungry but also as an integral part of our regular development assistance. For example, by responding as we did this year with a million tons of foodstuffs to meet the emergency situation in India, we freed foreign-exchange resources for purposes more directly related to essential economic demands. In this connection, I might mention that it is Canada's intention to continue to extend food aid in the form of grants rather than loans so as not to impose further strains on the debt-servicing capacity of developing countries.

### **Trade in Manufactured Products**

The third and last topic I intend to single out for special mention is our joint endeavours to expand the share of world trade in manufactured and semi-manufactured products of the developing countries. There is no need to belabour in this Committee the importance of the relation between industrialization and economic development. I have already touched on the vital contribution which technical assistance can make in a wide range of fields. At the last session of the Trade and Development Board, it was recognized that in the future increased attention should be given to assistance directed to trade promotion activities. We now have better machinery to enable us to assess what needs to be done and to channel our efforts effectively. I have stressed our belief in the importance of measures of co-operation and integration by developing countries to provide a

wider base for their industrial development. For the available techniques and resources to achieve their maximum impact, much depends on the success of such measures.

We welcome the imminent establishment of a new and important member of the United Nations family, the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development. We have studied the draft statute of UNOID with great care. We agree with those who have emphasized that sustained industrial advance is a crucial ingredient in the world-wide effort to attain those economic and social levels of prosperity and stability to which all are entitled. Canada will, therefore, join with other members of the United Nations in endeavouring to make UNOID a creative and effective force . . . .

## *French Minister of Foreign Affairs Visits Canada*

**I**N response to an invitation from the Canadian Government, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mme Couve de Murville began an official visit to Canada on September 28, 1966. The guests were welcomed at Ottawa's international airport by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, and Mrs. Martin, who gave a state dinner in their honour the same evening.

Next day, the visitors called on the Governor-General and Madame Vanier. M. Couve de Murville also called on the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Honourable Lucien Lamoureux. This visit was followed by a lengthy interview with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, during which the two Ministers made a review of current major international problems and of the relations between France and Canada. At noon, Prime Minister L. B. Pearson was host at a lunch in honour of the French Foreign Minister and, in the evening, a dinner was given at the French Embassy by M. and Mme Couve de Murville in honour of Mr. and Mrs. Martin.

### **Quebec Welcome**

On September 30, the visitors left for Montreal, where they were welcomed at the City Hall by His Worship Mayor Jean Drapeau. Afterwards they travelled to Quebec City, where they were entertained at lunch by the Quebec government. In the afternoon, M. Couve de Murville called on the Prime Minister of Quebec, the Honourable Daniel Johnson. The programme ended with a visit to the City Hall, where M. and Mme Couve de Murville were greeted by His Worship Mayor Gilles Lamontagne, and with attendance at a reception at the Consulate General of France.

### **Speech by Mr. Martin**


At a dinner given by him in honour of the visitors, the Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed the most significant steps taken recently in the sphere of relations between France and Canada. Having stressed the desire of Canadians for a closer and broader relation with France, Mr. Martin went on:

"Our efforts to translate these aspirations into reality have developed at a remarkable rate. Progress has been most rapid, perhaps, in cultural relations. Last year, we concluded a general agreement to develop cultural, scientific and artistic exchanges and to promote education and the use of French in Canada. Visits of students, teachers, technicians, scientists and artistic groups have since multiplied and contributed to creating throughout Canada a richer and more accurate image of France, while promoting, I believe, a better knowledge of Canada in France.

"Progress is less rapid in other fields, but vigorous efforts are being made to accelerate it. Only a few months ago, a Canadian economic mission went to Paris to promote the exchange of goods, investments and technological knowledge between our two countries. The work of this mission will be carried on by more specialized missions and by the France-Canada Economic Committee, which is expected to meet in the near future. We have also started to organize a programme for the exchange of officers and a programme of co-operation in the supply of military equipment.

#### **Aid to Emerging Nations**

"Canada has shown, by a tenfold increase in its economic assistance, its concern for the less-developed countries of the French-speaking world; we have had a chance to consider what sort of co-ordination would be possible in this field between our two countries. At the same time as Canada was opening two new consulates general in France, it was enlarging its diplomatic representation in



*The Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Couve de Murville (left), in conversation during his recent visit to Canada with Mr. Paul Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

other French-speaking countries. The Canadian Government has since had the opportunity, during the recent visit to Ottawa of the President of Senegal, to express the wish that closer ties and more exchanges might be developed, particularly in the cultural and professional spheres, between countries for which the French language and culture constitute, in varying degrees, an integral part of their national heritage.

"Mention should be made here of the successful initiative of Canadian and French parliamentarians who founded, last year, in Ottawa, the Canada-France Inter-Parliamentary Association, which held its first meeting in Paris several months ago. Finally, as you know, Mr. Minister, our diplomats are holding close and continuing consultations on all current major problems. Two weeks ago, your Ambassador to the United Nations and a senior official of Quai d'Orsay visited us here in Ottawa to consider with us the problems that would be examined by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

### **New Development of Co-operation**

"Your presence here gives us an opportunity to express our satisfaction regarding the remarkable progress that has taken place. Nevertheless, as our will to co-operate becomes stronger, the possibilities also increase, each country becoming more aware of the resources of the other. Much remains to be done. I hope, therefore, that your visit will mark the beginning of a new development in our co-operation. If our general relations continue to expand at the same rate, and become intensified in certain areas (which we earnestly desire), our two countries will be more closely associated than they have ever been before in time of peace."

Dealing with the main international issues, Mr. Martin recognized that the respective positions of Canada and France were not always identical on some of these problems; he emphasized, however, that "in essential matters, we are united" and that "our major interests have a common basis".

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that "our conceptions of the world and of its evolution are very close indeed". He recalled the similarity of the basic principles governing the formulation of the foreign policies of both countries. He emphasized the ever closer relations between Canada and French-speaking countries. He concluded: "The existence in Canada of an important community of French language and thought, the awakening of which is a subject of satisfaction to all, is an additional reason for wishing a closer co-operation between our two countries. It is our desire, as it is yours, to reinforce the solid friendship that united us through political co-operation, through the development of trade and investment, and through exchanges in all fields. I am pleased to see that we are progressing toward this objective."

## *Canada's Relations with Denmark*

FROM October 3 to 5, 1966, His Excellency Per Haekkerup, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, was the guest of the Government of Canada. Mr. Haekkerup's visit followed close upon a major policy speech he had made at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, which had once again demonstrated the close similarity of the views on world affairs held by the Canadian and Danish Governments.

On October 4, Mr. Haekkerup visited Governor-General Georges P. Vanier at Government House in Ottawa and called on Prime Minister L. B. Pearson. He also had extensive talks with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, on matters involving the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as other international problems of interest to both countries. Mr. Martin presided at a Government luncheon held in honour of Mr. Haekkerup in the Parliament Buildings, and was himself a guest at a formal dinner given by the Danish Foreign Minister.

Next day Mr. Haekkerup and his party visited the Central Experimental Farm in Ottawa, toured Gatineau Park north of the capital, and motored to Montreal. In the afternoon, he visited the site of Expo '67, where he inspected the impressive pavilion jointly built by the Scandinavian countries. He also paid a brief visit to the Dominion Engineering plant in Lachine before departing for Copenhagen the same evening.

Canada's connections with Scandinavia may be said to date back to the Viking era, notwithstanding the current controversy surrounding the recently discovered "Vinland Map". Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in 1946, and were raised to ambassadorial level in 1956.

### **Danish Immigration to Canada**

The first Danish settlers to arrive in Canada came in 1872 and established a colony at New Denmark, New Brunswick. Since that time, Danes have settled in all parts of Canada, some arriving directly from Denmark, others by way of the United States. Today, the Danish ethnic group in Canada is thought to number about 70,000 persons. In 1951 a visa office was established in Copenhagen and since that time there has been a steady, if small, stream of migrants to Canada. It is interesting to note that during the past ten years Canada has been the main overseas destination for Danes. Approximately 11,000 came to Canada over that period, compared to 10,000 who went to the United States and 4,000 who went to Australia.

### **Economic Relations**

Canada is today Denmark's second largest market outside Europe, surpassed only by the United States. In 1965 Canada spent almost \$20 million importing

goods from Denmark, including machinery, cheese and other dairy products, furniture and a long list of goods produced by Denmark's expanding industry. On the other hand, Denmark purchased \$10-million worth of goods from Canada, mostly copper, asbestos and other metals and minerals. Despite the present deficit in Canadian trade with Denmark, it is encouraging to see that trade both ways has increased considerably over the past three years. Although Denmark has no raw materials, this country of 4.7 million inhabitants has managed to cover its large volume of raw material imports through earnings brought in by agricultural and industrial exports, shipping, tourism and the like, thus ensuring a stable economy. Danish agricultural and industrial goods are of high quality and great international repute. At Expo '67, Canadians will be given the opportunity to see a wide range of Danish products and to form an idea of Danish society from its depiction in the Scandinavian pavilion.

### **Foreign Policy**

Denmark's foreign policy closely parallels Canada's own orientation, in many fields. Students of Danish policy have noted, in particular, four facets of Denmark's outlook on international affairs :

- (a) Support of the United Nations, with a view to preserving world peace;
- (b) commitment to NATO, to safeguard Danish and European security;
- (c) strengthening of Nordic co-operation, through active participation in the Nordic Council;
- (d) development of friendly political relations and closer economic ties with the countries of Western Europe, particularly with the members of EFTA and the EEC.

Denmark is an active member of the UN, to which it has made a valuable contribution. Together with Canada, it is playing an important part in UN peace-keeping activities in the Middle East and Cyprus. Denmark is greatly interested in the question of disarmament and has provided substantial support to the UN relief and aid programmes, in addition to its own bilateral programme of economic aid to developing countries.

In addition to their close relations within the framework of the UN, Denmark and Canada are also linked by their common membership in NATO and their similarity of approach to the main issues facing the alliance.

### **Defence Co-operation**

Canada and Denmark for many years have participated in an air-crew training agreement under which hundreds of Danish pilots and navigators have been trained in Canada. In 1964 this programme was renewed for another four years. Under its terms, Canada provides training facilities for up to 35 pilots and helicopter pilots and two long-range navigators each year. The quality of Danish students sent for training to Canada in the past has been impressive and the ratio of successful candidates to total intake has been remarkably high.



This and other programmes of NATO mutual aid are considered by the Canadian Government as an integral part of its total defence effort. Canada has made substantial contributions to the Danish services in the form of aircraft, electronic equipment and other supplies relating to armaments systems.

#### **Cultural Relations**

Though no attempt has been made to formalize cultural exchanges between Canada and Denmark, there has been increasing interest in both countries in the cultural achievements of the other. Canadians have been welcomed to Denmark to enjoy its rich cultural life. Some of them, thanks to Canada Council grants, have spent time in Denmark studying such subjects as ceramics, ballet and theatre technique. The Royal Danish Ballet has had many admirers in Canada, where it has performed twice. Canada is also much the richer for the contribution which Danish-Canadians have made to Canadian culture. Conversely, a number of Danes have received National Research Council and Canadian Defence Research Fellowships, or have come to Canada as visiting lecturers on Canada Council grants. Aarhus University and State Library were recently presented with 200 works in English and French by Canadian authors dealing with all aspects of Canadian life and culture.

# *Canada - Japan Ministerial Committee*

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE FOURTH MEETING

**T**HE fourth meeting of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee was held in the West Block of the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, on October 5 and 6, 1966. Japan was represented at the meeting by the Honourable Etsusaburo Shiira, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Takeo Fukuda, Minister of Finance, the Honourable Raizo Matsuno, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, the Honourable Takeo Miki, Minister of International Trade and Industry, the Honourable Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency, and Mr. Osamu Itagaki, Japanese Ambassador to Canada.

Canada was represented by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Robert H. Winters, Minister of Trade and Commerce, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance, the Honourable Hédard Robichaud, Minister of Fisheries, the Honourable C. M. Drury, Minister of Industry, the Honourable Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the Honourable John J. Greene, Minister of Agriculture, and Mr. Herbert O. Moran, Canadian Ambassador to Japan.

The Committee discussed a wide range of subjects reflecting the community of interests of the two countries and their expanding trade and other relationships as neighbours across the Pacific and as members of the international community.

### **Review of International Situation**

The Committee had a valuable exchange of views concerning the international situation in general, giving particular attention to recent development in Asia. The Ministers welcomed the steps which are being taken by the countries of Asia to promote the peace and stability of their region on a basis of mutual friendship and reconciliation.

The Ministers discussed the course of developments in Vietnam. They were convinced that the issues at stake in that conflict could be resolved only by recourse to negotiations. They noted the proposals which have been advanced to bring about an accommodation of the interests of the parties to the conflict. They also reviewed the efforts which have been made by Japan and by Canada to see whether the differences between the parties could be narrowed to the point where negotiations become possible. They expressed their determination to pursue these efforts as a reflection of their deep concern about the implications of the conflict for international peace and security and for the future of Asia in particular.

The Ministers agreed that any lasting solution of the Vietnam conflict and of the wider problems of peace and prosperity in Asia will call for a constructive

contribution by Communist China. They expressed the hope that, for her part, Communist China would accept the benefits and assume the responsibilities of international co-operation. They also attached importance to the contribution which contacts and exchanges with the people of China could make to that end.

The Ministers also exchanged views on other areas of mutual concern. In particular, they examined the situation in Rhodesia and the best means of maintaining international co-operation in the application of sanctions against the illegal regime in that country. They also reviewed the recent course of East-West relations and agreed on the continued desirability of exploring all opportunities for widening the area of understanding and contact between the countries concerned.

The Ministers reaffirmed the belief of both countries in the United Nations as an essential instrument for the promotion of world peace. They agreed to maintain close co-operation with each other at the United Nations and, particularly, to exert their efforts to strengthen its peace-keeping capacity.

The Ministers expressed their conviction that the emergence of additional countries with control over nuclear weapons would represent an added threat to international security and world peace. They pledged their continued efforts to achieve international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to put an end to all nuclear weapons tests by extending the partial test ban treaty to prohibit nuclear tests underground. They believed that, to be effective, such agreements should include appropriate arrangements for verification and control. The Ministers also expressed their concern about the continued arms race among the major powers and undertook to explore all possibilities of arresting this trend by means of appropriate and effective measures of arms control.

In the light of their discussion of the international situation, and of the Asian situation in particular, the Committee agreed that broader opportunities now exist for Japan and Canada to co-operate with each other in promoting the stability and assisting in the development of the countries of Asia.

### **Economic Expansion in Both Countries**

In reviewing the current economic situation in Canada, the Committee noted the unprecedented economic expansion which is taking place. The Canadian delegation pointed out that average real income per person has risen by about one-quarter during the past five years and that high levels of trade were both an important cause and consequence of this expansion. It also noted that, despite an unusually large growth in capacity during the past few years, pressure on resources had become evident by the middle of last year and the Canadian authorities had found it necessary to moderate the growth of demand. The Committee noted that the restraint of demand in Canada was intended to assure a sustainable rate of growth and expansion of trade.

Turning to the current economic situation in Japan, the Committee noted

with satisfaction that the economy is now taking a distinct course of recovery from the 1965 stagnation. The Japanese delegation stated that emphasis in the future management of the economy will be placed on commodity price problems, modernization of low-productivity segments, improvement of social overhead capital and strengthening of structural positions of private business. Concrete measures are now being actively studied to meet these problems and to ensure a harmonious development of all segments of the national economy within the context of the new five-year economic plan, which is now being formulated. The Japanese delegation pointed to the maintenance of equilibrium in the balance of international payments as an essential requirement to attain these objectives.

### **International Economic Relations**

The Committee discussed major developments in the field of international economic relations. It recognized the vital significance to both countries of the success of the "Kennedy round" of trade negotiations, which seeks to reduce substantially tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on a non-discriminatory basis. The two delegations agreed that both governments should make every effort, in co-operation with other interested countries, to secure the maximum outcome from the negotiations for trade in industrial and agricultural products, including grains. In this connection, both delegations emphasized the importance of obtaining significant improvements in access to each other's markets. The Japanese delegation expressed their strong desire to see improvements in respect of a wide variety of goods. The Canadian delegation stressed their interest in agricultural products and manufactured and semi-manufactured goods.

The Ministers stressed the urgent need for accelerated economic development in developing areas. They reaffirmed the importance of the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and agreed that every effort should be made to focus its attention on particular issues on which practical results might be achieved. The Ministers also looked to the "Kennedy round" to make a significant contribution to the expansion of trade in products of particular interest to developing countries. They recognized the importance for the developing countries of international commodity arrangements.

The Committee reviewed the expanding programmes of both countries in development assistance and exchanged views on their policies in this field. It reviewed the growing efforts of developing countries to improve the welfare of their peoples and noted the importance of this aspect of the development process.

The Japanese delegation reported on the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia held in Tokyo in April 1966 and, in particular, on the determination shown by participating countries to raise living standards in that area. The Japanese delegation also drew attention to the preparations which are now in progress to convene a Conference on Agricultural Development in Tokyo in early December. The Committee pointed

to the important role to be played by the Asian Development Bank, which will commence operation in December 1966 and in which both countries will participate.

The Ministers discussed trade relations with Communist countries, and agreed that there was scope for further expansion of mutually advantageous trade with these countries.

The Committee noted that progress towards achieving suitable arrangements for the creation of additional international reserve assets had been made in the past year. It welcomed the recent initiatives taken by the Group of Ten and the International Monetary Fund to arrange joint meetings of the Deputies of the Ten with the Executive Board of the IMF, and stressed the need for substantial further progress in the year ahead. The Committee recognized that agreement on suitable arrangements will greatly strengthen world confidence in the international monetary system.

The Committee reviewed the implications for the development of the world economy of the domestic economic policies followed by leading industrial countries, and noted the desirability of ensuring an appropriate balance between monetary and fiscal policy.

#### **Japan-Canada Trade**

The Committee welcomed the continuing growth of trade between the two countries. It noted that, as the economies of the two countries continue to expand, and as economic relations grow closer, there would be opportunities for a substantial further increase in trade. It is expected that this two-way trade will be about \$600 million in 1966.

The Committee discussed the voluntary restraints maintained by Japan on the export of certain products to Canada, and noted the relaxation that had been achieved in recent years and the fact that a number of products had been removed from the list of goods under restraint. The Japanese delegation nevertheless hoped that, in view of the length of time that has elapsed since the introduction of the existing restraints, a critical review should be undertaken as to the necessity of their continuation in their present form. The Canadian delegation said these restraints were sought only in cases where disruption of Canadian markets took place or was threatened. The Committee agreed that restraints should be kept to a minimum and removed from particular products whenever they were no longer necessary.

The Japanese delegation drew attention to certain elements of the Canadian customs valuation system which it regards as restrictive of trade. The Canadian delegation explained the purposes of the Canadian customs law and stressed its non-discriminatory character.

The Canadian delegation expressed concern over the concentration of Canadian exports in unprocessed goods and stressed its interest in expanding exports of all kinds to Japan, including industrial materials in a more advanced

state of processing and manufactured goods. It urged that improved access be provided for these goods. The Japanese delegation indicated that there would be further progress in this direction.

The Committee welcomed the growing association between the two countries through business investment. The Canadian delegation expressed the hope that the remaining restrictions on Canadian investment in Japan would be lifted as soon as possible and that Japanese investors in Canada would take into account the desirability of increasing the degree of processing in their exports from Canada.

#### **Other Matters Discussed**

The Committee reaffirmed the desirability of promoting co-operation between the two countries in the field of fisheries and agreed that both Governments would continue close consultations so as to bring about an early and satisfactory solution to outstanding fisheries problems.

The Committee welcomed the establishment of the Canadian Visa Office in Tokyo this year and the favourable response shown by the Japanese public through the growing number of applications for immigration to Canada. The two delegations agreed that their Governments would continue to foster the development of this programme for the mutual benefit of their countries.

The Japanese delegation outlined the plans for the Japan World Exposition in Osaka in 1970 and expressed its strong hope for active participation by Canada. The Canadian delegation announced the decision of the Canadian Government to participate in this Exposition. The Committee exchanged good wishes for the success of both the World Exhibition in Montreal in 1967 and the Japan World Exposition in Osaka.

The Ministers expressed their belief that the fourth meeting of the Committee had made a valuable contribution to deepening understanding and strengthening relations between their two countries. The Committee accepted the invitation of the Japanese Government to hold its next meeting in Japan.

The Foreign Minister of Japan, on behalf of his Government, extended to the Prime Minister of Canada an invitation to visit Japan. The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the honour of the invitation. The invitation was accepted in principle, the timing to be decided as a result of further consultations between the two Governments.

## *Canada and Germany Exchange Students*

**O**VER the past three years, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has organized working holidays in Germany for groups of Canadian university students. These visits have enabled many young Canadian men and women to spend two or three months of their summer vacation living and working in different parts of the Federal Republic. The students are selected each year in Canada by a committee of Canadian professors of German from Canadian universities that have developed German studies or that offer courses in German language and literature. Those selected are flown to Germany for a three-month visit. They live with German families and earn their living at jobs provided for them by the German Central Labour Office.

The visits have been an unqualified success. In June 1964, when Chancellor Erhard visited Ottawa and met with Prime Minister Pearson, both heads of state noted that about 150 Canadian university students were then spending the summer vacation in Germany and agreed on the desirability of increasing cultural contacts between the two countries.


### **Arranging First Visit**

Shortly after this meeting, a proposal to organize a visit of German university students to Canada in 1965 was put forward to the Canadian and German Governments by the German-Canadian Society of Hanover. The Society required assistance to arrange the trip and, in line with the encouraging sentiment expressed by Mr. Pearson and Mr. Erhard concerning cultural exchanges, the Department of External Affairs and the German Foreign Office agreed to co-sponsor the project. The proposal of the German-Canadian Society of Hanover thus enabled Canada to respond to the initiative of the Federal Republic in organizing earlier visits of Canadian students to Germany.

In making arrangements for the visitors in Canada, the Department sought the co-operation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in administering the tour through its network of field representatives. This involved locating appropriate jobs throughout the country and finding Canadian families with whom the students could be lodged. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration agreed to co-operate and, in the summer of 1965, 26 German university students, from all parts of the Federal Republic, were flown to Canada for a three-month stay.

### **Second Visit Succeeds**

The first visit was a success, and all parties agreed to repeat the exchange in 1966 and to increase the number of German students participating to about 50. This year's group arrived in Montreal on August 1 and returned to their various



*Using a microscope to determine the results of blood tests and analysis, Miss Irmela Wolff, a medical student from the University of Cologne and a native of Bensberg, Germany, carries out one of her many assignments in the laboratory of the York General Hospital, Toronto, during her three-month visit to Canada.*



universities in Germany on October 28. Once again, they were carefully selected by the German-Canadian Society of Hanover from a number of applicants from all across Germany. All the students were bilingual, speaking in addition to German either English or French, and those responsible for organizing the tour made every effort to ensure that the visitors would be distributed in a representative fashion throughout Canada and, in particular, that as many of them as possible would be made acquainted with Canada's bicultural character.

During the first two months of their trip, the students worked in a variety of jobs across the country. The girls were employed as laboratory technicians, nursing assistants, secretaries and sales clerks, while jobs were found for the men in the manufacturing, forestry and mining industries, construction projects and research laboratories. For the final month of the visit, with the funds accumulated from their various jobs, the students spent their time travelling.

### **Benefits of Exchange**

The success of these visits represents an important step in the development of educational and cultural exchanges between Germany and Canada. As to the benefits, perhaps a quotation from a report prepared by the German-Canadian Society of Hanover can be allowed to speak for exchanges in both directions:

Our students... were ambassadors of Germany in that they constituted a selected group of young people with a sense of responsibility, the persons to give a true picture of young German men and women studying at our universities today. But they are also ambassadors of Canada, for the experiences that they have gained in that country enable them to pass on to their friends and colleagues the valuable knowledge they have acquired. Here again interest is awakened — this time the interest of Germans in a country so fascinating and so full of promise.

It is hoped that the fruitful co-operation between the parties concerned will continue and that the student exchange visits during the summer months will become a regular event. Such an outcome would be in line with present Government policy, which is to develop Canadian cultural relations not only with the two "mother" countries but also with those countries, such as Germany, that have provided Canada with a substantial number of new citizens and have clearly made an important contribution to the Canadian mosaic.

# *International Labour Organization*

## EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN MEMBERS

CANADA was host during September 1966 to the Eighth American Regional Conference of the International Labour Organization, which was attended by delegations from 19 nations of the Western Hemisphere. The occasion marked the first time that the conference had been held outside the Latin American countries.

The countries of the Americas represented at the Conference were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Complete tripartite delegations were sent by 16 of these countries.


A total of 151 delegates and technical advisers representing governments, employers and workers took part in the Conference. The delegates included labour ministers from 12 countries. Also represented were 90 observers, including those from seven ILO member states (Britain, the Dominican Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the U.S.S.R.), as well as observers from official international organizations (the Organization of American States, the Organization of Central American States, the Pan-American Organization, the World Health Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank) and several non-governmental international organizations, including international organizations of employers and workers.

The Conference unanimously adopted resolutions drafted and approved by two tripartite committees which were set up to examine two of the three items on the agenda :

- (1) Manpower planning and employment policy in economic development;
- (2) the role of social security and improved living and working standards in social and economic development.

In addition, the Conference held a general debate in plenary sessions on the report of Mr. David A. Morse, Director-General of the International Labour Office, entitled "Social Development in the Americas". The report concentrated on the question of participation by the people in the economic and social development of the American region.

The Conference was opened on September 12 by Mr. Morio Aoki, Permanent Delegate of Japan to the United Nations in Geneva, in his capacity as Chairman of the ILO Governing Body. In addition to a welcoming address by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Prime Minister of Canada, statements were made at the opening session by Mr. Aoki, Mr. José Mora, the Secretary-General of the Organization of



*During the recent ILO meeting in Ottawa, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin (centre), hands to Mr. David A. Morse, Director-General of the Organization (left), the instruments of ratification for two ILO conventions — No. 45, concerning the employment of women on underground work in mines, and No. 122, concerning employment policy. The Canadian provinces, which have jurisdiction over various aspects of these conventions, were consulted, and agreed to implement the relevant provisions. Also shown in this photograph is the Honourable J. R. Nicholson, Canada's Minister of Labour.*

American States, and the Honourable John R. Nicholson, Canadian Minister of Labour, who was elected President of the Conference.

#### **Remarks by Mr. Martin**

In his opening address, Mr. Martin recalled that it was 20 years since Canada had been the site of an International Labour Organization conference, and noted that the ILO had been located in Montreal during the Second World War. He told the Conference that Canada intended "to contribute to the political stability of this part of the world and to its economic welfare (a) by working through any channels open to us towards the lessening of world tensions which threaten all regions; (b) by strengthening the friendly relations already existing between Canada and the other nations of this region; and (c) by participating in economic projects which will assist developing nations in the Caribbean and Latin America".

Mr. Martin continued :

"... The special relationship which links the Commonwealth countries of this Hemisphere, like the Commonwealth relationship itself, is not to be regarded as exclusive or an obstacle to the establishment and maintenance of close relations with other countries. We attach great importance to consultation and co-operation, as exemplified by the Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference, and we anticipate that there will be further valuable meetings of this sort; but it is not our intention that the positions of the various Commonwealth nations with respect to the broad range of Hemisphere matters should necessarily be the same.

"There has, of course, been public debate over whether Canada might enter into the particular political relationship with the United States and with Latin American states which membership in the Organization of American States would entail. This debate has sometimes led people to overlook the extent to which our relations with Latin American states in all fields have steadily developed . . . ."

In his statement to the opening session, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States described the efforts being made by the OAS to accelerate economic and social progress in the countries of the Americas. Dr. Mora emphasized that, in the vast endeavour to achieve change and progress, the OAS viewed with interest and admiration the world-wide accomplishments of the ILO as a pioneer institution in the fields of labour and social security.

#### **Human Resources and Social Security**

In its deliberations on the problems of the economic and social development of the Americas, the Conference unanimously adopted resolutions embodying what came to be called the "Ottawa Plan for Human Resources Development in the Americas" and the "Ottawa Programme for Social Security Reform".

The Ottawa Plan for Human Resources Development emphasized that "effective policies are urgently needed with a view to improving decisively, as a major means of accelerating development, the utilization of the region's human resources by raising the level of productive employment and to developing these resources by improved education, training, health and other services". The Plan invited the ILO to draw up and co-ordinate manpower programmes for the countries of the Americas, with particular attention to the problems of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Conference invited the Governing Body of the ILO to establish a technical commission, or any other appropriate organ for manpower planning for Latin America and the Caribbean, to be associated with the implementation of the programme. This organ should comprise specialists from countries of the region, with participation by workers' and employers' representatives and experts from the ILO and other international organizations.

The Governing Body was also invited to explore, as a matter of urgency,

the financial and administrative implications of these proposals with the international and regional organs concerned, looking towards their early implementation.

### **Greater ILO Activity Urged**

Describing social security as "one of the main instruments for achieving social progress in American countries", the Ottawa Programme calls for an intensification of ILO activity in the American countries and asks that the ILO "take the initiative for co-ordinating the action being taken in this region and in this same field" by other international or regional organizations. The Programme states that technical co-operation activities in particular should be co-ordinated "since there would otherwise be a risk that they might be inspired by different approaches and, finally, instead of complementing one another, they might lead to confusion and dispersion of efforts and might even result in the cancelling out of the results achieved by them". There should also be co-ordination of the activities of certain specialized bodies in the field of economics, such as the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The resolution asks that technical co-operation of the ILO be directed towards all aspects of social security, such as the examination of new legislation or improvement of existing texts, the introduction of new branches, the organization of medical services, actuarial revisions, administrative reorganization, the preparation of bilateral or multilateral agreements, the training of technical and administrative staff, the introduction of the minimum plan of social security statistics, and development of general information programmes.

Social security programmes should be incorporated in the general economic planning of the state, in order to devote to such programmes the maximum financial resources compatible with the economic capacity of the country.

The resolution states that social security, "through the size of the financial resources which it handles", has a definite role in economic development, through its action on the redistribution of the national income, its promotion of savings and national investment, its regulating role on consumption by stabilizing demand and supply, and its stimulation of economic development through specified forms of investment of technical reserves.

At the conclusion of the debate on the Director-General's report, in which 45 speakers took part, the Deputy Director-General of the ILO, Mr. C. W. Jenks, replied on behalf of Mr. Morse.

### **Specifics of Immediate Action**

The most valuable achievement of the Conference, Mr. Jenks said, was the degree of agreement which it reached concerning the specifics of immediate ILO action in the fields of manpower and social security.

Mr. Jenks said that from all quarters in the Conference there had been a general call for bold and specific plans for intensified and accelerated indus-

trialization and rural-development policies, including agrarian reform; for social integration; for economic integration wherever necessary to assist dynamic economic growth; for a fairer distribution of income both within and among nations; for more intimate and continuous co-operation among governments, management and labour in the planning and execution of general and social policy; and for the translation of these plans into resolute and effective action.

## *Canada Opens an Embassy in Tunis*

TUNISIA became an independent state on March 20, 1956, after having been a French protectorate for 75 years. Canada formally recognized the new Republic of Tunisia in June 1956 and diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in 1957 with the accreditation to Ottawa of Mr. Mongi Slim, who was then Tunisian Ambassador to Washington and to the United Nations. In June 1961, Canada's Ambassador to Berne was accredited as Canada's first Ambassador to Tunisia. In July 1966, an advance team arrived in Tunis to open an embassy, and Canada has since appointed Mr. A. J. Pick as the first Canadian resident Ambassador to Tunisia. The present Tunisian Ambassador to Canada is Mr. Taieb Slim, who also represents his country at the United Nations.

### **Land and People**

Tunisia faces the Mediterranean on the north and east and is bordered by Algeria on the west and Libya on the southeast. Its area is about 48,000 square miles (more than twice the size of Nova Scotia). Along the Algerian border, a mountainous hinterland gradually slopes southward to the oases and salt lakes of the Sahara. The cultivated areas stretch across the north and down the eastern coastal plain. The latter is famous for its beaches and tourist facilities.

The 1956 census estimated the total population at 3,800,000. By 1965 this figure had increased to 4.63 million. About 20 per cent of the people are congregated in urban areas. Tunis, the capital, has a population approaching three-quarters of a million. Other important centres are Sfax, with 70,000 inhabitants, Sousse (50,000), Bizerta (46,600), and Kairouan (39,900)<sup>1</sup>.

Arabic is the official language of Tunisia, but French is widely used both in the administration and in the urban communities. While the Constitution recognizes Islam as the state religion, other religions are also represented in Tunisia.

### **Political Development**

The history of Tunisia is ancient, varied and fascinating. As early as the twelfth century B.C., the Phœnicians established trading posts along the coast, which developed into thriving city-states. The most famous of these was Carthage, the great centre of Punic civilization. After the defeat of Hannibal and the reduction of Carthage to a salt-strewn wasteland, there arose the new and magnificent Carthage built by the Romans, who colonized and developed all Tunisia. After the fall of Rome, the area that is Tunisia today was conquered

(1) All figures are estimates.



*The newly-appointed Ambassador of Canada to Tunisia, Mr. Alfred J. Pick (left), in conversation with President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia on the occasion of the presentation by Mr. Pick of his Letters of Credence.*

by successive invaders — Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, Spaniards and Turks. It finally became a protectorate of France under the Treaty of Bardo in 1881. Tunisia remained under this regime until the attainment of complete independence in 1956 under the leadership of Mr. Habib Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour.

The monarchy was abolished by the Constituent Assembly on July 25, 1957, and a National Assembly was elected on November 18, 1959, when all 90 seats were won by the National Front Party. The constitution was promulgated on June 1, 1959. The President and the National Assembly are elected simultaneously by direct and universal suffrage for a period of five years. President Bourguiba was re-elected for the third time in 1964. He is the leader of the Destour Socialist Party, which dominates the political life of the country.

### **Economy**

Tunisia, like its neighbours Algeria and Libya, is primarily an agricultural country. Its agricultural potential is well developed, the main products being wheat, barley, dates, olives, olive oil and wine. Farming and mining are also important in Tunisia. Industrialization has progressed relatively slowly and there is scope for further development. Major modern plants include a sugar refinery in Beja, a cellulose plant in Kasserine, a petroleum refinery in Bizerta and a steel plant at Menzel Bourguiba. Living standards, though low compared to those of



industrialized countries, compare well with those of other countries in Africa. *Per capita* income amounts to 61 dinars (about \$147), according to 1965 estimates.

External trade represents another important variable in the Tunisian economy. Exports are mainly of the primary type, while the imports are of the secondary type. In recent years, Tunisia's main trade partners have been, in order of importance, France, Britain, Algeria, the U.S.S.R. and West Germany.

The Tunisian authorities are making impressive efforts to improve the country's economy. In May 1965, the 1965-1968 Development Plan was approved by the National Assembly. It envisages growth in the domestic production of about 6.5 per cent and investments amounting to 455 million dinars, of which two-thirds is to be financed by domestic savings and the remainder by external sources. With the aid of an impressive list of foreign donors, Tunisia has successfully fulfilled most of the goals of its first plan, which covered 1962 to 1964, and is well on the way to implementing its second plan.

In retrospect, Tunisia's post-independence struggle to build a viable nation-state can be summed up as follows: 1956-59, attack on traditionalism; 1959-61, initial investments in the economic infrastructure, and implementation of Destourian socialism and economic planning; 1961 onward, planning of development as such.

### **Foreign Policy and Relations**

Tunisia's foreign policy is a compromise suggested by its status as a newly-independent nation, its situation in North Africa and its involvement in both the Arab and African worlds. Its policy is also conditioned by its reliance on international examples, its desire not to become involved in ideological and military conflicts and its special relations with the former protecting power.

In contrast with many Arab and African countries, Tunisia has not hesitated to express its convictions and, on occasion, to support policies unpopular among the "uncommitted nations". The present regime enjoys good relations with most nations. However, as a result of the Bizerta crisis in 1961 and the expropriation of *colons* lands in 1964, one important problem confronting Tunisian leaders is the re-establishment of full relations with France.

Tunisia, which has been a stalwart supporter of the United Nations, has exercised in that organization an influence far out of proportion to its size and population. It played a particularly constructive role in the Congo crisis, not only on the diplomatic front but also by providing more than 3,000 troops to the United Nations forces.

### **Canada-Tunisia Relations**

Close and friendly relations have existed between Canada and Tunisia since the latter achieved its independence. A high point in the development of these relations was the state visit to Canada in May 1961 of President Bourguiba,

which provided the occasion for a public re-affirmation of the warmth of Canadian-Tunisian relations and of the dedication of both countries to the pursuit of similar objectives in international affairs, particularly at the United Nations. This relation has continued to grow, mainly because of the similarity of outlook on many aspects of world affairs shared by the two countries, and the affinities resulting from the importance to both of the French language and culture.

In order to strengthen further relations between Canada and Tunisia, the Canadian Government is developing a programme of technical and educational co-operation with Tunisia. There are at present 38 Canadian teachers in Tunisia and some 20 Tunisians have come to Canada for further training. These numbers are expected to increase substantially next year. The main assistance project at the present time concerns the pediatric hospital of Tunis, where Canadian doctors, nurses and technicians will assist with the supervision and training of Tunisian personnel. Another project under consideration involves the training of Tunisians on the spot in the repair and maintenance of road and farm equipment.

## Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting

*At the invitation of the Canadian Government, the 1966 meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers (known as the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council) was held in Montreal on September 21 and 22. The Canadian delegation was led by the Honourable Mitchell F. Sharp, Minister of Finance, assisted by officials from the Departments of Finance, External Affairs and Trade and Commerce, and from the Bank of Canada. Following customary practice, Mr. Sharp was named chairman of the meeting.*

*It will be recalled that the Council was established by the Commonwealth conference of trade and finance ministers held in Montreal in 1958 to co-ordinate the then existing arrangements for consultation and co-operation in economic matters among Commonwealth countries. The Council meets periodically both at the ministerial level and at the level of senior economic officials. A detailed account of the discussions at the recent meeting is contained in the following communiqué, issued on September 22:*

1. A meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers was held at Montreal on 21-22 September 1966, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, M.P.
2. Jamaica was represented by the Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Australia by the Treasurer, Britain by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Ceylon, Cyprus, The Gambia, Guyana, India, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago and Uganda by their Ministers of Finance. Malta was represented by the Minister of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and Malaysia by its Ambassador to the United States and Minister without Portfolio. Ghana was represented by a member of the National Liberation Council and Nigeria by the Head of its Federal Ministry of Finance. The Premier and Minister of Finance of Mauritius, the Deputy Prime Minister of Bechuanaland and the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong also took part in the discussions.
3. Ministers reviewed broad developments in the world economic situation. They emphasized that a steady expansion of markets will depend on the achievement and maintenance of satisfactory rates of economic growth in the world. They agreed that there is need to avoid inflationary pressures in the achievement of these objectives but that measures taken to counter these pressures should be so selected as to minimize any consequential damage to other countries' economies. They noted the substantial rate of economic growth maintained in recent years by most industrialized countries and the prospect that economic output in these countries as a group would continue to expand at about the same annual rate of approximately 5 per cent. Concern was expressed at the continuing slow rate of economic growth in the developing

countries, which had fallen short of the targets of the United Nations Development Decade. The share of developing countries in world trade had fallen and net capital flows had levelled off. Export prices of several important primary commodities had continued to decline over the past year. Ministers agreed that it was desirable to work out international arrangements for stabilizing prices at equitable and remunerative levels for commodities that are of special interest to Commonwealth countries. The damage that can be done by unilaterally determined stockpile operations and by subsidized sales of surplus production was noted.

4. The meeting looked forward to the prospects of the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and agreed that Commonwealth countries should co-ordinate action wherever possible so as to lead to constructive and concrete results at this Conference.

5. Ministers reviewed the balance of payments prospects of the sterling area and reached the conclusion that both the United Kingdom, and the sterling area as a whole, are likely to move into balance of payments surplus in 1967. As a result of the economic policies being followed throughout the sterling area, coupled with the recent developments in international co-operation. Ministers confidently look forward to a steady strengthening of sterling. This will be to the mutual benefit of the sterling area as a whole and will assist the maintenance of a high level of world trade.

6. Recent developments in international discussions on the problems of international liquidity and matters related to the improvement of the monetary system were considered. There was agreement on the need for immediate contingency planning to provide additional liquidity, when required, and to reform the international monetary system to make it more responsive to the needs of both industrialized and developing countries. It was noted that measures for improving the international monetary system were receiving increased consideration. Members agreed that progress was urgently needed in the year ahead, so that agreement could be reached on arrangements for the provision of international liquidity which would satisfy the proper requirements of all countries on a uniform basis. Ministers agreed that the International Monetary Fund should play a key role in any new arrangements, and that all of its members should be represented in the discussions leading up to monetary reform.

7. Ministers recognized that the satisfactory working of the international monetary system requires appropriate domestic policies on the part of all countries, and that this obligation rests as firmly on those countries which are in surplus as on those which are in deficit.

8. The Ministers noted with concern the difficulties which developing members of the Commonwealth were facing in obtaining the foreign exchange needed to finance their development plans and programmes, and to maintain adequate levels of imports. The tendency for the export receipts of developing countries

to increase at a relatively slow rate, combined with the rapid rise in debt service charges, had kept foreign-exchange earnings available for development and other essential purposes at a low level.

9. Ministers noted that, while the ability of developing countries to use external financing effectively had continued to increase, the net availability to them of such financing had tended to remain static at the levels reached in 1961 despite the great increase in total production of advanced countries, and despite the increasing assistance provided by some developed countries. They stressed the importance of adjusting the terms on which development financing is made available so as to avoid placing an excessive debt-servicing burden on the balance of payments position of individual capital-importing countries.

10. Ministers welcomed the measures that had been taken to expand the amount and improve the quality of assistance to developing countries, in particular the establishment of regional development banks. Ministers welcomed the initiative of the President of the World Bank for replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association at a high level and expressed the hope that an early and constructive decision would be possible on the level of resources which would be made available to the Association.

11. Ministers welcomed the fact that proposals for Commonwealth initiatives in assisting development through supplementary technical assistance programmes submitted by the Secretary-General to the meeting of Commonwealth heads of government, in response to the desire expressed by them in recent years for a suitable programme, would soon be examined at a meeting of Commonwealth senior officials concerned with aid administration and development planning.

12. A report on the special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan for the year 1965 was reviewed. Ministers noted the progress made in the operation of the plan for the economic development of Commonwealth countries in Africa.

13. Ministers agreed on the need for an internationally concerted approach to avert a serious world food shortage, and that Commonwealth countries should take such action as was possible towards this end.

14. Ministers expressed their appreciation for the generous hospitality of the Government of Canada in providing host facilities for the meeting.

15. Ministers gratefully accepted the invitation of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to hold their next meeting in Port-of-Spain.

## *Educational Role of Canadian Films Abroad*

THE cinema screen is a valuable aid to education in parts of the world where few people can read or write. The educational film has the advantages over more traditional methods of communication that it can appeal to vast audiences speaking a variety of tongues, can convey a simple message clearly and with lasting impact, and can be projected with fairly simple, mobile equipment mounted in specially-designed vans.

UNESCO recognized these assets some years ago when it was drafting its plans for educational development in regions of the world having high rates of illiteracy. The success of the UNESCO experiment was apparent by the time Canada began to develop its programme of assistance to the French-speaking countries of Africa in 1961. Since, at first, Canada was able to make its best contribution in the form of educational and technical assistance, it was felt that cinema vans, supplemented by National Film Board productions, would be the most effective use of limited resources.



*A fleet of cinema vans destined for Senegal and Guinea at the headquarters of the National Film Board in Montreal.*

The films, which are primarily educational, cover such topics as agriculture, art and literature, industry and national resources, health and welfare, science, sociology, transportation and communications. They are also a useful means of telling Africans more about Canada and its people.

The first mobile units, valued at \$7,000 each, were sent abroad in 1963 under the development-assistance programmes of the External Aid Office. Late in 1965, additional equipment was sent to Senegal, Uganda, Chad, Guinea, Rwanda and Gabon. An NFB representative went to Guinea and Gabon in July 1966 to instruct Africans in the use of the equipment. A crew of two Africans is attached to each unit.

In September 1966, four of the vans were presented to the film unit of the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism in Kampala, Uganda, by the Canadian High Commissioner, Mr. Alan McGill. The units were equipped for action, with a petrol electric generator, a projector, an editing unit, film rewinders and a tent with a camp bed. The Minister of Information of Uganda, Mr. Alex Ojera, said that the vans would be able to show educational films to more than 200,000 people.

The vans have been built entirely in Canada, with equipment supplied by International Harvester, Bell and Howell, National Sound Services, Park Photo Supply Company, Anglophoto and Terry Machinery Company. The National Film Board co-ordinates the efforts of the various suppliers.

# *Independence of Botswana*

**O**N September 30, 1966, the Republic of Botswana was born. Formerly the British protectorate of Bechuanaland, this new republic is the thirty-eighth independent state in Africa, the eleventh British dependency in Africa to achieve independence and the tenth African nation to join the Commonwealth. Much of the area of Botswana, which is comparable to France in size (220,000 square miles), is desert (the Kalahari Desert), swamp and scrubland. The population is 550,000.

Botswana's first President is Sir Seretse Khama, whose father was Chief Sekgoma II, of the Bamangwato tribe, which comprises the majority of the population of Botswana. President Khama was five years old when he inherited the chieftainship on the death of his father. Sir Seretse went to Oxford and London to study economics and law. While in England, he married an English girl and subsequently renounced his claim to the chieftainship. He founded the Democratic Party, which forms the Government today.

## **Policy of Moderation**

During the independence celebrations, President Khama stated that moderation would be the keynote of his country's policy. He emphasized that Botswana would be a non-racial, democratic, multi-party state based on universal adult suffrage, in which discrimination of any kind would not be permitted. The President also said that "non-alignment" had special significance for Botswana, which would strive to live on terms of good-neighbourliness with all states.

Canada was represented at the independence celebrations by its Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. C. J. Woodsworth, who presented a letter of congratulations from the Canadian Government and a film-projection kit and films about Canada to the Botswana Government as independence gifts from the Canadian people.

The new constitution establishes a unitary state headed by the President. He can be elected during an election of members to the National Assembly if at least half his supporters are elected to the Assembly. The President of Botswana heads the Cabinet, which he appoints from among the members of the Assembly.

## **Assembly and Upper House**

The National Assembly, the law-making body of Botswana, consists of a Speaker and 31 elected members representing single-member constituencies, as well as four special members elected by the Assembly itself. The Botswana Democratic Party led by Dr. Khama holds 28 seats, while the Botswana People's Party has three seats.

The chiefs of the eight principal tribes in Botswana are members of the House of Chiefs. The remainder of its members are sub-chiefs. Bills dealing



with certain chieftaincy or tribal matters are first discussed in the House of Chiefs, which is essentially a consultative body.

Botswana shares at present a common currency and a customs union with South Africa. South Africa is the largest outside investor in the new republic. One of the main sources of government revenue in Botswana is derived from the 60,000 Botswana workers who earn their livelihood in the South African mining industry. A drought during the last years has caused economic strain, as a large number of Botswana's 1.3 million cattle have been lost owing to lack of feed. Meat exports produce 85 per cent of Botswana's foreign-exchange earnings and are the main support of its economy.

### **Possible Mineral Wealth**

Although Botswana is an arid land, it is possible that rich mineral deposits may lie beneath its soil; some gold, copper, asbestos, manganese, coal and soda have been discovered. Large areas of fertile land might be obtained if swamp areas were drained. A symbol of Botswana's belief in its future is its new capital, Gaborone, built in three years.

Under a Canadian Government external aid programme, there are five Canadian teachers in Botswana, four of whom are teacher-trainers. There is also a Canadian professor attached to a recently-established university, which serves not only Botswana but also Lesotho and Swaziland, with campuses in the three areas.

## *Independence of Lesotho*

LESOTHO became independent on October 4, 1966, and is the eleventh African nation to join the Commonwealth. The Canadian Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. C. J. Woodsworth, represented Canada at the independence celebrations in the capital, Maseru. He presented a letter of congratulations from the Canadian Government and a film-projection kit and films about Canada as independence gifts from the Canadian people.

Lesotho's political system is based on a constitutional monarchy. The Prime Minister is Chief Leabua Johnathan and the Paramount Chief, or King, is Chief Motlotlehi Moshoeshe II. Prime Minister Johnathan's National Party has 31 of the 60 seats in the Assembly. The Congress Party has 25 seats and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party four. Replying to a message of congratulations from Queen Elizabeth, King Moshoeshe II appealed for national unity among Basutos. At a press conference on the occasion of independence, Prime Minister Johnathan said that Lesotho would join the Organization of African Unity and that it intended to try to bridge the differences of opinion in Africa and to work for greater racial harmony.

### **Economy**

Lesotho is a country of mountainous terrain and eroded soil. Its pastoral and agricultural economy (with few known mineral deposits) supports its one million people. The raising of livestock is the major occupation of the Basutos, who own over 1.2 million head of sheep and more than half a million goats. Wool and mohair are exported, and earn a substantial amount of foreign exchange for Lesotho.

The Lesotho economy is closely connected to that of South Africa. The two countries share a common currency and customs union. The main revenue of the Lesotho Government is obtained from the 180,000 Basutos who earn their livelihood in South African mines. Many thousands more Basutos work on South African farms. An important hydro-electric power and irrigation development scheme for joint development by Lesotho and South Africa is under consideration. It would be located at the Oxbow Lake, in the Maluti mountains, where the Orange River has its source.

Under an external aid programme of the Canadian Government, there are two Canadian teachers in Lesotho, one of whom is a teacher-trainer. There are also three Canadian university professors on the faculty of a recently established university, which serves Botswana and Swaziland, as well as Lesotho, with faculties located in each of the three areas.


## *Tax Agreement Between Canada and Trinidad and Tobago*

*A double taxation agreement between Canada and Trinidad and Tobago was signed on September 28, 1966, at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The text follows of a press release issued in Ottawa the same day by the Department of Finance :*

An income tax agreement between Canada and Trinidad and Tobago has been concluded, it was announced today by the office of the Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp.

The agreement was signed today by Mr. Sharp and the Minister of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago, the Honourable A. N. R. Robinson, at a ceremony in the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The agreement follows the general pattern of income tax agreements that Canada has entered into with 13 other countries. Its main purpose is to avoid



*Canada's Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp (left), and his counterpart for Trinidad and Tobago, the Honourable A. N. R. Robinson, during the signing of the double taxation agreement between the two countries.*

double taxation, or to reduce taxation, of income received by individuals and corporations of one of the countries from the other country. Other purposes of the agreement are to prevent fiscal evasion and to encourage international trade and investment.

Taxes included in the scope of the agreement are Canadian federal income taxes, including old-age security tax on income and Trinidad and Tobago corporation tax and income tax.

The agreement provides for the avoidance of double taxation chiefly by a reciprocal system of tax credits whereby one of the states allows against its tax otherwise payable a credit up to certain limits for income tax paid to the other state and by rules providing that in certain instances income may be taxed by only one of the states.

### **Mutual Tax Credits**

In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Trinidad will reduce from 30 to 15 per cent its withholding tax on dividends, interest and royalties (except certain copyright royalties that are exempt) paid to residents of Canada, and make the same reduction in its tax on remitted branch profits. In return, Canada undertakes not to increase its non-resident withholding tax on dividends, interest and royalties, or its special tax on adjusted branch profits, above the present general rate of 15 per cent.

The agreement also provides special rules for taxation of profits of shipping and aircraft companies, business profits not derived through a permanent establishment, and the remuneration of employees of employers in one country who visit the other country to perform services there.

The agreement will have effect for non-resident withholding taxes of both countries on January 1, 1966, for other Canadian taxes for the tax year ending in 1967, and for other Trinidad and Tobago taxes for the tax year beginning in 1966.

In accordance with the usual practice, the agreement will be submitted to Parliament for approval. It will come into force when the last of the two governments have completed their legislative or other necessary procedures.

# United Nations General Assembly

## TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

ON September 20, 1966, representatives of the 119 member states of the United Nations (Botswana and Lesotho were admitted on October 17, raising the total membership to 121) gathered for the opening of the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly. Mr. Fanfani of Italy (the President of last year's session) opened the proceedings and, after a few remarks, asked the members of the Assembly to rise for a minute of silent prayer or meditation. He then proceeded to appoint the Credentials Committee, which examines the credentials of delegations.

By secret ballot, the Assembly elected Abdul Rahman Pazhwak of Afghanistan as the President of the twenty-first session.

The next step was the election of the 17 Vice-Presidents, who include, in addition to representatives of the five Permanent members of the Security Council, seven Vice-Presidents from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, three from Latin America, and two from Western Europe and others. The regional group having the Assembly President loses one of its vice-presidencies so that the total number of Vice-Presidents becomes 17. In addition to the permanent members of the Security Council, the following countries were elected :

Africa and Asia : Iraq, Cyprus, Congo (Kinshasa), Senegal, Gabon, Rwanda

Eastern Europe : Hungary

Latin America : Costa Rica, Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago

Western Europe

and others : Greece, Austria

The Assembly then elected the chairmen of the seven main committees of the whole, through which it functions.

The main committees elected their vice-chairmen and rapporteurs during the last week in September. Towards the beginning of October, the seven main committees meet to elect their vice-chairmen and rapporteurs and to decide their order of business.

The main committees at the twenty-first session, with their officers, are as follows :

First Committee

— Political and security questions,  
including disarmament

Chairman: Dr. Leopoldo Benites (Ecuador)

Vice-Chairman: Ismail Fahrui (U.A.R.)

Rapporteur: G. G. Tchernouchchenko  
(Byelorussia)

Special Political Committee — shares work of the First Committee

Chairman: Mr. Max Jakobson (Finland)

- Vice-Chairman: Privado G. Jimenez  
(Philippines)  
Rapporteur: Carlos Alberta Goni Demarchi  
(Argentina)
- Second Committee — Economic questions  
Chairman: M. M. Tell (Jordan)  
Vice-Chairman: Anatoli A. Boiko (Ukraine)  
Rapporteur: George Reisch (Austria)
- Third Committee — Social, cultural and humanitarian questions  
Chairman: Madame Halema Embarek Wazizi  
(Morocco)  
Vice-Chairman: Ronald St. John Macdonald  
(Canada)  
Rapporteur: Mrs. Clara Ponce de Leon  
(Colombia)
- Fourth Committee — Colonial and trusteeship questions  
Chairman: Fakhreddine Mohamed (Sudan)  
Vice-Chairman: Neville T. D. Kanakarathne  
(Ceylon)  
Rapporteur: Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary (Iran)
- Fifth Committee — Budgetary and administrative matters  
Chairman: Vahpa Asiroglu (Turkey)  
Vice-Chairman: Bogomil Todorov (Bulgaria)  
Rapporteur: David Silveira da Mota (Brazil)
- Sixth Committee — Legal questions  
Chairman: Dr. Viatslay Pechota  
(Czechoslovakia)  
Vice-Chairman: Armando Molina Landaeta  
(Venezuela)  
Rapporteur: Gaetano Arangio Ruz (Italy)

The President, the Vice-Presidents, and the seven committee chairmen form the General Committee, whose function is to make recommendations to the Assembly on the adoption of the provisional agenda and the assignment of agenda items to the main committees, and subsequently to supervise and co-ordinate the work of the Assembly.

In addition to the seven main committees, the Assembly has established two standing committees, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and the Committee on Contributions, as well as a number of other standing subsidiary and special bodies, all of which deal with specific or recurrent problems.

After the Assembly adopted an agenda of 98 items for the session, it held a general debate, which continued until October 19. During this period, heads of delegations delivered important policy statements explaining the attitudes of

their respective governments on the most important matters before the Assembly. At the twenty-first session, a debate on South West Africa was held concurrently with the general debate.

After a committee has concluded its considerations of an agenda item, it recommends a resolution or some other course of action through the medium of the rapporteur's report to a plenary meeting of the Assembly. Plenary meetings are called from time to time to deal with the agenda items assigned exclusively to plenary or to consider the reports of the committee rapporteurs. In practice, very few committee decisions are reversed by plenary. This may happen, however, when the membership is almost equally divided on specific issues, since a resolution in committee needs only a simple majority for adoption, whereas the Charter requires a two-thirds majority in plenary meetings on all matters of importance. <sup>(1)</sup>

Consideration of an agenda item usually begins with a general debate on all facets of the problem, which may last, depending on the item, from a few hours to two or three weeks. During this debate ideas crystallize and draft resolutions, and amendments to these resolutions, are tabled by various delegations and finally voted on. Basically, there are three ways in which a resolution may be adopted: If the presiding officer is convinced that all the member states are in favour of a resolution, he may simply announce that, unless he hears any objection, the resolution will be considered as having been adopted unanimously. If this is not the case, delegations may signify their approval, rejection or abstention by a show-of-hands vote (a procedure under which only the total number of votes in favour, against or abstaining is recorded); or by a roll-call vote, in which each delegation casts its vote orally and has it recorded in the records of proceedings.

## Plenary Items

Twenty-five items will be considered in the plenary session. These range from the adoption of the agenda to the problem of the admission of mainland China to the United Nations.

### Elections to Security Council

The Security Council, which before the twentieth session had 11 members, now has 15. The Council consists of the five permanent members (Britain, China, France, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) and ten non-permanent members. The non-permanent members are elected from four geographical regions, five being elected each year for two-year terms. The following table shows declared candidates for office at the time of writing:

(1) See Article 18 of the Charter.

	Seats of Region	Vacancies	Candidates
Africa-Asia	5	2	Ethiopia Syria India Pakistan
Eastern Europe	1	—	—
Latin America	2	1	Brazil
Western Europe and others (including Canada)	2	2	Denmark Canada

### Elections to Economic and Social Council

Canada is currently a member of ECOSOC. At the twentieth session, nine new seats were added to the original 18, so that ECOSOC now consists of 27 members. The new seats are formally allocated as follows: seven to Africa and Asia, one to Latin America and one to the group comprising Western Europe and others (including Canada).

The following table shows the vacancies for each region, with known or likely candidates (the customary pattern of distribution for the original seats has been combined with the formal regional allocation of new seats) :

	No. of Seats	No. of Vacancies	Candidates
Great powers (Britain, France, U.S.A., U.S.S.R.)	4	1	France
Africa and Asia	12	4	Libya Tunisia Sierra Leone Kuwait Morocco Tanzania
Latin America	5	2	Mexico
Western Europe and others	4	2	Turkey Belgium
Eastern Europe	2	—	—

### Chinese Representation

The substantive issue in the question of Chinese representation is whether the Communist Chinese or the Nationalist Chinese should represent China in the United Nations. Some delegations, including those of the Soviet bloc, have argued that the credentials of the representatives of the People's Republic of China should be accepted and those of the representatives of Nationalist China rejected. Others, including the United States, maintain that the essential issue involved is the question of qualifications for United Nations membership and that Communist China lacks these qualifications. The attitudes of other member



states vary between these two poles. In 1961, the General Assembly decided that the question of Chinese representation was an "important question", which means that any resolution on the substance of the issue requires a two-thirds majority to be adopted. This decision was reaffirmed in 1965. However, since the decision on the "important question" issue is considered to be procedural and procedural matters are settled by a simple majority, it is possible that the decision could be reversed.

In 1961 Canada supported the Assembly resolution making any proposal for change in the representation of China an "important" question requiring for its adoption a two-thirds majority vote. Since then Canada has opposed resolutions calling for the expulsion of Nationalist China and its replacement by mainland China.

### **Report of Special Committee of Twenty-four on Colonialism**

The Special Committee of Twenty-four has the task of supervising the implementation of the Colonial Declaration of December 1960, which proclaimed the necessity of bringing to an end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The Committee meets almost continuously in the interval between Assembly sessions. This year the Assembly will consider recommendations of the Special Committee on a variety of colonial territories, including South West Africa, Rhodesia, Aden, Equatorial Guinea, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands, the Portuguese territories, Oman, and Fiji. These territories differ widely in their political and economic development and each presents special problems. The recommendations of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four are generally dealt with by the Fourth Committee.

### **First Committee**

Although there are no firm rules, agenda items of the First Committee in the past have generally been concerned with specific questions of peace and security, including disarmament and such particular arms control items as the non-proliferation and testing and control of nuclear weapons. In addition, it has been the custom to discuss the reports of the Special Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the First Committee.

#### **Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Draft non-proliferation treaties were tabled by the United States in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in August 1965 and by the Soviet Union in the UNGA in September 1965. The former has the general support of members of the Western alliance. Resolution 2028 of the twentieth session urged all states to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, called upon the ENDC to give urgent consideration to the question and enunciated the main principles on which a treaty might be based.

During two sessions of the Committee between January and August 1966, no significant progress was made, although some issues were perceptibly clarified. The U.S.A. amended its draft treaty, but differences still remain between its position and that of U.S.S.R. on the central formula of a treaty. The twenty-first session of the General Assembly is devoting considerable attention to this question and will seek to agree on a resolution.

### **Suspension of Nuclear Tests**

In 1965, the Assembly adopted Resolution 2032, which urged the suspension of nuclear tests, called on all countries to respect the 1963 partial test-ban treaty and requested the ENDC to continue with a sense of urgency its work on concluding a comprehensive test ban. Progress in the ENDC has, however, been frustrated by disagreement between East and West on the necessity of verification by on-site inspection. While several proposals have been advanced to eliminate or reduce the area of disagreement, no satisfactory solution to the problem of verification has yet been found.

As another avenue to non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban will probably be the subject of intensive examination at the twenty-first session. This approach is strongly supported by those non-aligned countries that are seeking to involve the nuclear powers more directly in arms-control measures.

### **Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons**

An Ethiopian resolution adopted by the Assembly at its eighteenth session requested the ENDC to study urgently the question of convening a conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The Committee subsequently reported that it had discussed the matter without result. Although the Ethiopian Delegation spoke on the idea at the twentieth session, no resolution was presented.

The Ethiopian proposal may be discussed at the current session of the Assembly but, in view of the lukewarm response it has received in the past, countries interested in the proposal may seek to promote it in some other form. The Soviet Union has, in the past, supported the idea as an interim declaratory arms-control measure. Along with other Western countries, Canada has opposed it on the grounds that the only effective way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons is to develop a comprehensive and carefully verified system of arms control and disarmament, which, *inter alia*, would deal with all aspects of the control and reduction of nuclear weapons.

### **General and Complete Disarmament**

At each session since 1951, the General Assembly has discussed the question of general and complete disarmament. Recognizing the growing importance of the question, the United States and the U.S.S.R. agreed in 1961 on a joint statement of principles for disarmament negotiations, which incorporated many of the points of a Commonwealth prime ministers' statement of disarmament

principles issued earlier that year. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. presented a draft treaty and the following year the United States presented an "outline of basic provisions of a treaty". With subsequent amendments, these drafts remain the principal document on which discussions on general and complete disarmament have been based.

Discussion of this issue has occupied considerable attention in the ENDC, although at the moment it is overshadowed by consideration of various preliminary or "collateral" arms-control questions. While committed to the objective of controlled and verified total disarmament, Canada shares the commonly-held Western view that it is a long-term objective on which progress can best be made by steadily enlarging the areas of agreement in "collateral" spheres.

### **Other Measures**

A number of other topics relating to arms control and disarmament, which are not inscribed on the agenda, are likely to be raised in the general debate or under one of the inscribed items.

### **Outer Space**

The task of the 28-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on which Canada has served since its formation in 1959, is to report to the General Assembly on present and potential activities and resources of the United Nations relating to the peaceful uses of outer space; to investigate areas of possible international co-operation under United Nations auspices; and to explore the nature of legal problems which might arise in carrying out programmes to explore outer space. The Committee functions through a Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee and a Legal Sub-Committee (which met in Geneva in August to discuss an international treaty governing human activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies). A working group of the whole met in September to consider the administrative and financial details for an International Outer Space Conference. The reports of the sub-committees and of the working group of the whole were then considered by the full Committee in September. The United States and the Soviet Union have proposed two new agenda items concerning outer space treaties. These will probably be considered along with the report of the Outer Space Committee.

### **Korean Question**

Each year the First Committee debates the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). This year the Soviet bloc has formally proposed that the Commission be dissolved and that all United States and other foreign forces be withdrawn from South Korea.

### **Other Items**

The First Committee will also consider a Soviet-bloc proposal that foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America be eliminated.

## Special Political Committee

The Special Political Committee shares with the First Committee the discussion of political and security questions. It deals with the question of *apartheid* and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The question of peace keeping is generally considered in this Committee.

### **Apartheid**

The *apartheid* policies of the Government of South Africa are deplored and condemned by almost all members of the Assembly. There is, however, a wide divergence of views on the best means of bringing pressure to bear on South Africa to change its policies. Many members from Africa and Asia would like to impose economic and other sanctions against South Africa and expel that country from the United Nations if it continues to disregard resolutions calling upon it to abandon its discriminatory policies. As a result of the recent International Court of Justice ruling on South West Africa, this pressure will undoubtedly increase at the twenty-first session. Other members, including Canada, have argued that sanctions are the prerogative of the Security Council and, in any event, should be examined most carefully before any decision is taken to apply them. In the Canadian view, any move to expel South Africa from the United Nations must be examined in the light of the United Nations' ability to influence South African policies. If South Africa were expelled, or withdrew, the moral influence of the United Nations would be diminished.

### **Peace Keeping**

As the final act of the abortive nineteenth session, the Special Committee on peace-keeping operations (the Committee of 33) was established. The Committee reached a consensus, adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session, that the Assembly could resume its normal work according to its normal procedures, that the applicability of Article 19 in respect of arrears arising from the cost of peace-keeping operations in the Middle East (UNEF) and in the Congo (ONUC) would not be raised, and that all member states should make voluntary contributions to relieve the UN of its financial difficulties. Debate at the twenty-first session will center on the report of the Committee of 33. The Irish Delegation may again put forward proposals designed to confirm the right of the General Assembly to mount a peace-keeping force and to ensure its financing. The Irish envisage the apportionment of expenses for peace-keeping operations according to a specific assessment formula that would be binding on member states.

The most urgent issue to come before the Assembly in this field will be the future financing of UNEF. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1) See item under Fifth Committee.

### **Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

The British proposed last year that the Assembly establish a Committee to study procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Canada was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution submitted under this item, further consideration of which was adjourned until this session.

### **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees**

The Agency was set up in 1950 to provide relief for and facilitate the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees who had lost their homes and means of livelihood during the hostilities that accompanied the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. More than one million refugees still receive rations or full services (including education) from UNRWA at a cost of some \$38 million annually. This work is supported by voluntary donations, both private and national. The principal contributors are the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Australia, and New Zealand, while the balance of UNRWA's revenue is derived from small contributions by some 40 other countries, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and private contributors. Discussion of the work of the Agency will, as in the past, focus on the possibility of progress towards a permanent solution for the refugees.

### **Effects of Atomic Radiation**

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), of which Canada is a member, was established by the General Assembly at its tenth session to collect, study and disseminate information on the effects of atomic radiation on man and his environment. The Committee submits yearly progress reports to the General Assembly. Comprehensive reports were

At its sixteenth session in June 1966, the Committee adopted a report that released in 1958, 1962, and 1964.

will be considered by the General Assembly during the current session. This report reviews environmental radiation, both natural and man-made, and the risks of genetic effects that are caused by the exposure of man to ionizing radiation.

## **Second Committee**

The Second Committee is the apex of the complex institutional structure through which the United Nations deals with the wide range of questions relating to trade, aid and economic development. Among its many items (one-fifth of those now inscribed on the Assembly agenda), the Second Committee considers the reports of the Economic and Social (ECOSOC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This year, the emphasis is

likely to be placed on the aid aspects of financing economic development in the developing countries, the report of the Trade and Development Board, which will underline the unsatisfactory growth rates of the majority of developing countries and their diminishing share of international trade, and the draft statutes for the proposed United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID).

The 27-member Economic and Social Council, on which Canada is at present serving, acts not only as an executive body for the economic, social and human rights activities of the United Nations system of organizations but also as a forum for debate on broad issues of international economic and social policy, and is, in a sense, a preparatory body for the deliberations of the General Assembly in these fields. At its most recent session, the Council approved, after protracted discussion, a resolution on the financing of economic development, which expressed acute concern at the deterioration of the economic situation in many developing countries and called for changes in some of the aid-giving practices of the developed or "donor" governments.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, a semi-autonomous organ of the General Assembly, still in its formative stages, represents a major attempt to come to grips with the trade problems of developing countries. A recent report to the Board indicates that the trading position of the developing countries has continued to decline, with a significant drop in their share of world trade and a disappointing growth rate largely offset by population increases.

A somewhat similar organization is likely to be created when the Assembly turns to the proposed statutes for the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID), drafted earlier this year by a Preparatory Committee set up by the twentieth session of the General Assembly. The Assembly decided that an organization of this kind should be established within the United Nations after previous proposals for a separate Specialized Agency to deal with industrialization in developing countries had been resisted by the developed countries. It is unlikely that delegations to the twenty-first session will dispute the conclusions of the Preparatory Committee, which has provided in the draft statutes for a 45-member Industrial Development Board and a greatly strengthened secretariat. As in the case of UNCTAD, the administrative costs of UNOID will be met from the regular budget of the United Nations. Unlike UNCTAD, however, UNOID is expected to undertake a wide range of operational activities to assist developing countries in the industrial field, financed both from the United Nations Development Programme and from voluntary contributions earmarked specifically for industrial development.

Other significant items on the Second Committee agenda include the preliminary report on a forthcoming study of the scope for multilateral food aid and items on population growth and economic development and permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

## **Third Committee**

The Third Committee considers human rights and social questions. Much of its work is generated by four of the seven Functional Commissions of ECOSOC — the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Resolutions and recommendations from these Commissions must first have the approval of the Economic and Social Council, to which they report. Once having obtained ECOSOC endorsement, the resolutions are passed on to the Assembly, where they are considered in the Third Committee. The Committee also deals with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNESCO and some aspects of the work of ECOSOC.

### **International Declarations and Conventions**

In past years, the Committee has considered and approved a number of international conventions. Among these is the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages, which was opened for signature in 1962, the Convention on the Status of Refugees, completed in 1951, and the Supplementary Convention for the Abolition of Slavery, which was completed in 1956.

At this session the Committee will pursue consideration of a draft declaration and a draft convention on freedom of information. It will also consider a draft declaration on the right of asylum, which is likely to give rise to much the same difficulties as in previous years. The declaration provides for the right of an individual who is being politically persecuted in his country of origin to seek asylum in a country of his choice. This conception has led to a great deal of discussion in the Committee. Soviet-bloc countries tend to support the principle that asylum is the right of an individual to demand, while some Western countries, including Canada, consider asylum the right of a country to grant.

At the eighteenth session, the Committee adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and, at the last session, it approved an international convention on the same subject, which is now open for signature and ratification by member states. In 1962 the Commission on Human Rights was asked to prepare a similar draft declaration and a draft convention on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, but neither document has yet been completed by the Commission and the Third Committee will not, therefore, be able to consider them. The Committee will, however, be asked to approve a draft declaration in the elimination of discrimination against women and, under the item "World Social Situation", it will study the possibility of preparing a declaration on social development.

### **International Covenants on Human Rights**

Many of the items considered by the Third Committee tend to be of a continuing

nature. One of the primary tasks for the Committee in past year has been consideration of the International Covenants on Human Rights. The Covenants, which contain articles on civil and political, economic, social, and cultural rights, have been considered by every session of the Assembly since 1955. The Third Committee has had difficulty in finding a text for each article that would be supported by a majority of states. Each country considers the drafts presented in the light of its philosophy of jurisprudence, its existing laws, its constitutional and practical capabilities, its political problems and objectives, and many other relevant factors. For example, Soviet-bloc countries tend to view human rights as a collective right, while Western countries tend to place the emphasis on the rights of the individual.

As far as Canada is concerned, many of the articles of the Covenants fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces, and no provision has been made in the Covenants to take into account the constitutional difficulties of federal states such as Canada. Canada has also refrained from supporting provisions in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that prescribe "the right to work", "the right of everyone to social security", "an adequate standard of living", "adequate food, clothing and housing", and "the right to take part in cultural life". The ideas expressed in such articles are difficult to implement by legislative means, particularly with the conception of the role of government in society that underlies the governmental system in a parliamentary democracy.

Despite the difficulties encountered by the Committee in relation to the Covenants, agreement has now been reached on the texts of most of the articles. When completed, the Covenants will be considered by the Assembly and, if approved, will become legal documents ready for signature and ratification by United Nations member states.

This session, the Committee will continue consideration of implementing articles. At the eighteenth session it became apparent that the newly-independent states of Africa did not want to become involved at this stage with the subject of implementation, with its inherent limitations on national sovereignty, particularly in the case of the Political Covenant. The Soviet bloc indicated its preference for a single system of implementation for both Covenants based primarily on a reporting procedure, as is at present the case with the draft Social Covenant. These states recommended, however, that the reporting procedure should be made more detailed, so that contracting states could give information about the specific implementation of their commitments. Most Western countries declared themselves ready to support the provisions of the articles set forth in both Covenants, though several delegations, including the Canadian Delegation, questioned the advisability of giving the International Court of Justice the responsibility for appointing the Human Rights Committee, a proposed conciliation commission under the Political Covenant.



### Other Items

The Third Committee will consider the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, portions of the report of ECOSOC, and the report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights, which is to be held in 1968. It will also be asked to approve the formation of a working group to study a proposal for the creation of the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

## Fourth Committee

The Fourth Committee handles colonial questions. In the past few years, the pressure for rapid advance to self-government and independence has been so great that a number of colonial items have been assigned to plenary. Thus it is possible for a debate on, for instance, Rhodesia, to be proceeding in the Fourth Committee while plenary is discussing South West Africa or the report of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four on Colonialism. However, the Fourth Committee remains the focal point of the anti-colonial movement in the United Nations.

Basically the aim behind the work of the Fourth Committee is to encourage the speedy political development of the remaining colonial territories. Three classes of colonial territories come within its field of responsibility:

- (a) *Non-Self-Governing Territories*. There are some 50 of these, ranging from Angola and Mozambique to small island dependencies.
- (b) *Trust Territories*. Only three territories remain under the trusteeship agreements negotiated after the Second World War: Nauru, Australian New Guinea and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the U.S.A.
- (c) *The Mandated Territory of South West Africa*, administered by the Republic of South Africa under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. The international supervisory responsibilities formerly exercised by the League have been taken over by the United Nations.

The hard-core colonial problems before the Fourth Committee at this session can be narrowed to three: Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories in Africa, and South West Africa. In these territories, power is in the hands of a minority of European settlers, and the Africans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, are still deprived of many basic political rights.

### South West Africa

The South African Government will no doubt again be censured for its continued refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in carrying out numerous Assembly resolutions on South West Africa or to permit the establishment of an effective

United Nations presence in the territory. On July 18, 1966, the International Court of Justice rejected the claim of Ethiopia and Liberia that the territory remained under mandate and that South Africa continued to have obligations under the mandate, on the technical grounds that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal right or interest regarding the subject matter of their claim. At the request of a large number of African states, the Assembly decided to accord priority to the South West Africa item and to discuss it in plenary session.

### **Rhodesia**

Since Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence on November 11, 1965, there has been a sustained effort on the part of the UN to put an end to the rebellion. The Security Council has called on all member states to stop supplying Rhodesia with arms and to do their utmost to break off all economic relations with that country, specifically by means of an embargo on oil and petroleum products. With the continued existence of the rebel regime in Rhodesia, there is certain to be a strong demand for the imposition of mandatory sanctions. There will also be pressure on Britain to use force against the illegal regime in Rhodesia.

### **Portuguese Territories**

The Fourth Committee is likely to adopt further recommendations seeking to persuade Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and to co-operate with the United Nations in preparing the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, etc., for eventual self-government and independence. In addition, the African states may try to strengthen these recommendations and to isolate Portugal further by bringing in resolutions calling for various forms of sanctions against it in the economic field, as well as by a ban on military and technical assistance.

The Fourth Committee will also consider the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as it applies to a number of other territories.

## **Fifth Committee**

Among the principal items to be considered by the Fifth Committee, which deals with administrative and budgetary questions, will be the following:

### **Reports of Ad Hoc Committee of Financial Experts**

At the twentieth session, the General Assembly approved a resolution, introduced by France, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Canada was one of the 4

countries appointed to this Committee, which was requested, in its first report, to prepare a balance-sheet showing the financial position of the United Nations (not including the Specialized Agencies) and, in its second report, to make recommendations based on a comprehensive review of the administrative and budgetary procedures of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The two reports will be considered in the Fifth Committee at the twenty-first session.

In its first report, the Committee was unable to agree upon the size of the deficit facing the United Nations. As a reflection of differing political views on the financing of peace-keeping operations, the report gave two estimates of the deficit as of September 30, 1965 — \$52 million in the French view (supported by the Soviet Union) and \$73.4 million in the British-U.S.-Canadian view. Appeals for voluntary contributions to liquidate this deficit have, to date, produced only \$20.8 million, from 22 countries (\$4 million having been contributed by Canada). It is hoped that, once this report has been received by the General Assembly, the rest of the members will make voluntary contributions sufficient in total to eliminate the deficit.

In its second report, which represents a compromise worked out by the Committee after a series of meetings in New York and Geneva with officials of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies, the Committee recommends the introduction of administrative and budgetary procedures (such as long-term planning, improved budgetary presentation, evaluation of programmes, and more effective co-ordination between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies), which, when implemented, should provide member states and the secretariats of the different organizations in the United Nations family with information to enable them to make better judgements as to whether maximum value is being obtained from available resources as regards the work of the United Nations in the economic and social sphere. The Fifth Committee will be called upon to consider the second report and to recommend implementation of its recommendations.

#### **Approval of 1967 Budget Estimates**

After approving the financial accounts of the United Nations for the 1965 financial year and any supplementary estimates required for 1966, the Fifth Committee will be called on to approve the budget estimates for the 1967 financial year, aided by the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The gross expenditures proposed by the Secretary-General in the 1967 estimates are \$128.2 million (U.S.), which is an increase of \$6.7 million (5.5 per cent) over the approved 1966 level. After deducting estimated income, the net expenditures proposed for 1967 amount to \$106.6 million, which is an increase of \$4.8 million over the approved 1966 level. The Advisory Committee has recommended reductions in estimated expenditures totalling \$1.7 million, the smallest proposed cut in several years.

A further \$4 million to \$5 million is expected to be added to estimated expenditures as the result of the financial implications of decisions pending on a number of matters, particularly in the field of industrial development, building and maintenance and the conference programme. Even then, however, the rate of increase should be significantly below the annual average since 1960 of 10-12 per cent.

#### **UNEF Cost Estimates**

The Fifth Committee will be called on to pass a resolution to provide for the financing of UNEF for 1967. In 1965, Canada introduced a resolution, approved by the General Assembly at the twentieth session, which apportioned about 5 per cent of the total 1965-66 cost of UNEF among the 91 developing countries and about 95 per cent among the 26 developed countries (with the developed countries each being apportioned an additional 25 per cent to make up the shortfall caused by the refusal of the Communist countries to pay their share). A similar resolution will probably be proposed this year. In his report on UNEF (Doc. A/6406), the Secretary-General has indicated his intention, within the coming months, given a continuance of existing favourable conditions and relative quiet, to reduce the Force to a basic strength of 3,400 officers and men from the present level of 4,000.

#### **Report of Committee on Contributions**

The scale of assessments, which is reviewed periodically by the Committee on Contributions, assigns a percentage of the total expenses in the regular budget to each member state according to its relative capacity to pay, as determined by such factors as a member's national income, gross national product and population. Under the "ceiling principle" approved by the General Assembly, no member state should pay more than 30 per cent of the total budget and, accordingly, the assessment of the United States is being reduced gradually to 30 per cent. The "*per capita* ceiling principle" stipulates that the *per capita* contribution of any member state should not exceed that of the member paying the highest assessment, namely the U.S.A. According to the present scale, which was approved at the twentieth session (under which Canada's rate is 3.17 per cent), 51 developing countries pay the minimum assessment of .04 per cent.

#### **Distribution of Secretariat Posts**

In its discussion of personnel questions, the Fifth Committee will consider progress achieved towards realizing the objective of "equitable geographical distribution" of professional posts in the United Nations Secretariat. At the seventeenth session, the General Assembly established guide-lines to govern equitable geographical distribution by approving "desirable ranges" or quotas for each member state. The Secretary-General has been making a concerted effort to bring countries in the under-represented areas of Africa and Eastern Europe within their "desirable ranges".

## Sixth Committee

The Sixth Committee is concerned with items which are essentially (although not exclusively) legal in nature. This year its agenda includes:

- (a) The report of the International Law Commission (a body of legal experts, appointed in their personal capacity to codify and further develop international law) on the work of its last session.
- (b) Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. This item was examined by a United Nations Special Committee which met in Mexico City in the summer of 1964 and a further session was held in New York City in May of this year. The Committee's report to the Sixth Committee contains draft formulations of some of the principles involved, as well as suggestions on the future handling of this item.
- (c) Consideration of steps to be taken for progressive development in the field of private international law, with a particular view to promoting international trade.
- (d) Technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law.
- (e) A draft resolution on the right of asylum.

# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Establishment of a French-Speaking Commonwealth**

*In reply to an inquiry in the House of Commons on October 24 as to what measures the Government envisaged "to encourage the establishment of a French-speaking Commonwealth, in accordance with the idea put forward by M. Léopold Senghor, President of the Senegalese Republic", the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, said:*

The concept of "la Francophonie" is still at a formative stage at this time. The recent visits to Canada by President Senghor of Senegal and by the French Foreign Minister have provided the Government with an opportunity for a useful preliminary exchange of views on this subject. While no definite proposals have yet been submitted, the Canadian Government fully supports the idea of developing closer links and more exchanges, particularly in the cultural and related fields, with those countries which, like Canada, share the heritage of the French language and culture.

It is the policy of the Canadian Government to give full expression, in its international relations, to the bilingual and bicultural character of our country. The development of our ties with the Francophone countries, which we have pursued vigorously over the last few years, represents a new and valuable dimension of Canadian diplomacy. We wish to participate actively in any effort to find an effective framework for further co-operation among Francophone states.

Accordingly, I informed our distinguished visitors that Canada would give favourable consideration to any proposal intended to provide a framework for closer contacts and more exchanges among the French-speaking countries. At the same time, account would, of course, have to be taken of the particular structure and needs of all those countries like Canada which are interested in this idea. The Canadian Government is studying this matter and will pursue it actively in consultation with other interested governments.

So far as the form of Canadian participation is concerned, I can assure the House that Canada's eventual participation will be predicated on the two basic principles which have consistently guided our actions in this field in the past: that the Government of Canada represents all of Canada on the international plane and that we are anxious to use our powers in the foreign affairs field to promote and further the interests of all Canadians, including, of course, those relating to our unique French-speaking heritage.

The Canadian Government is, accordingly, anxious to enlist the support and active participation of interested provinces, and the Province of Quebec in particular, in such an endeavour. We are willing and anxious to discuss with the

interested provinces the best way in which provincial participation can be achieved and the exact form it may take within the context of the policy I have just stated.

In this respect, the Canadian Government is, of course, aware of the proposal by the Quebec government to convene a meeting of ministers of education and culture from "states where French is one of the languages used". The suggestion is a recent one and the actual planning for such conference has not, as yet, begun. The Federal Government looks forward to hearing from the government of Quebec concerning this matter. It will be appreciated, of course, that international practice requires that the Canadian Government sponsor any inter-governmental conference that might be held in Canada.

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

UNESCO General Conference, fourteenth session: Paris, October 25 - November 30

Asian Development Bank, inaugural meeting of Governors: Tokyo, November 24-26

OECD Ministerial Council: Paris, November 24-25

International Wheat Council, forty-seventh session: London, December 7-13

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## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. B. Carbonetto resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective September 9, 1966.

Mr. G. S. M. Woolcombe posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé, effective September 9, 1966.

Mr. R. D. Gualtieri resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective September 30, 1966.

Mr. S. H. Nutting, Canadian Embassy, Quito, appointed Commissioner, Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, effective October 2, 1966.

Mr. D. S. McPhail posted from the Delegation of Canada to the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, effective October 3, 1966.

Mr. L. S. Clark posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Accra, to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, effective October 7, 1966.

Mr. E. T. Wiens posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to Ottawa, effective October 7, 1966.

Mr. P. D. Lee posted from the Canadian Delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, to the Canadian Embassy, Tehran, effective October 9, 1966.

Mr. A. J. Hicks appointed Canadian Ambassador to Costa Rica, effective October 13, 1966.

Mr. C. T. MacDonald posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective October 14, 1966.

Mr. W. G. M. Olivier, Canadian Ambassador to Costa Rica, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia, effective October 18, 1966.

Mr. C. E. McGaughey, High Commissioner for Canada to Ghana, appointed High Commissioner for Canada to Pakistan, effective October 24, 1966.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Action

#### Bilateral

##### Israel

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Israel constituting an agreement permitting amateur radio stations of Canada and Israel to exchange messages or other communications from or to third parties.

Jerusalem September 9 and 12, 1966.

Entered into force September 12, 1966.

##### Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago with respect to taxes on income for the avoidance of double taxation, the prevention of fiscal evasion, and the encouragement of international trade and investment.

Signed at Washington September 28, 1966.

##### United States of America

Exchange of Notes bringing into force definitively the Agreement concerning automotive products between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America.

Ottawa September 16, 1966.

Entered into force September 16, 1966.

Convention between Canada and the United States of America further modifying and supplementing the Convention and accompanying Protocol of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income tax as modified by the Supplementary Convention of June 12, 1950, and the Supplementary Convention of August 8, 1956.

Signed at Washington October 25, 1966.

Agreement between Canada and the United States of America concerning the establishment of an international arbitral tribunal to dispose of United States claims relating to Gut Dam.

Signed at Ottawa March 25, 1965.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Washington October 11, 1966.

Entered into force October 11, 1966.

##### Yugoslavia

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the waiver of visa fees for non-immigrant travellers between the two countries.

Belgrade September 19, 1966.

## **Multilateral**

International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.

Done at New York March 7, 1966.

Signed by Canada August 24, 1966.

Protocol for the accession of the Government of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Done at Geneva April 1, 1966.

Signed by Canada September 2, 1966.

Protocol for the accession of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Done at Geneva July 20, 1966.

Signed by Canada September 2, 1966.

Convention (No. 45) concerning the employment of women on underground work in mines of all kinds adopted by the International Labour Conference at its nineteenth session, Geneva, June 21, 1935.

Ratified by Canada September 16, 1966.

Convention (ILO No. 122) concerning employment policy adopted by the International Labour Conference at its forty-eighth session, Geneva, July 9, 1964.

Ratified by Canada September 16, 1966.

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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## *Chinese Representation in the United Nations*

**D**EBATE began in the United Nations General Assembly on November 18, 1966, on the question of Chinese representation. Three resolutions were before the Assembly on this question: a procedural resolution submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, Togo and the United States to the effect that any proposal to change the representation of China in the United Nations was an "important question" within the meaning of Article 18 of the Charter. A second resolution was submitted by Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Roumania and Syria, which would have the effect of seating representatives of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and all its organs and expelling those of the Republic of China. A third resolution was submitted by Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy and Trinidad and Tobago proposing the establishment of a committee of member states to look into all aspects of the question of Chinese representation with a view to submitting its recommendations to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly in 1967.

Voting took place on November 29; the first resolution was approved by 66 votes (Canada) to 48, with seven abstentions; the second was defeated by 57 votes to 46, with 17 abstentions (Canada); the third was defeated by 62 votes to 34 (Canada), with 25 abstentions.

On November 23, the Secretary of State for External Affairs made the following statement to the General Assembly outlining the Canadian position on this question:

"The issue of Chinese representation in the UN is again before us. It has been before us in one form or another for 16 years. In spite of all our best efforts, the UN has not yet been able to discover a way out of the impasse in which it finds itself today.

One reason why better progress has not been made is that the options we have had before us do not reflect the real nature of the problem. The real nature of the problem is that the China of today is not the China of 1945.

### **Unacceptable Alternatives**

"One of the options which has been before us would have us ignore changes that have taken place altogether. It would have us act as if the People's Republic of China did not exist. It would have us continue to exclude from our deliberations and from the whole framework of internal co-operation a government which has the capacity to influence the shape of world affairs for good or for ill.

"The other option also asks us to close our eyes to a part of the reality of the Chinese situation. It would have us do so by extinguishing for all practical

purposes the international personality of a government which controls the destiny of some 12 million people, a greater population than that of three-fifths of the member states of this organization. That is why these options have not carried us forward. They do not take account of fundamental changes which have occurred in China since the UN was established. They do not point to a rational solution of the problem. They do not point to a solution which is in accord with that common interest which should be the basis of a world organization.

"I do not think we shall ever be able to resolve this question on a reasonable basis so long as we proceed from the narrow concept of a contest of votes. If we are to proceed in the spirit of the Charter, any solution should be sought in terms not of contest but of consensus.

"Only by agreement among ourselves on a way out of the dilemma followed by negotiated acceptance of a reasonable solution by the parties concerned can we hope to reach any just and satisfactory outcome. I do not suggest that this can be an easy process or that what we in Canada have been proposing in our consultations is a short-cut to a solution. There are no short-cuts which do not violate both common sense and the spirit of the Charter. What I do suggest is that, unless we are to throw up our hands and turn away from our responsibilities, a start must be made in an effort to find a consensus on this issue.

"What we have to decide at this point in time is this: are we content once more to choose — or refuse to choose — between a set of unsatisfactory options; or should we devote our full efforts and energies to a search for a constructive alternative?

"We cannot afford to shelve this issue for very much longer if the realities of a diverse world are to find effective expression in the UN. I also want to make it clear that the Canadian Government, for its part, is not prepared to stand by and see this situation perpetuated indefinitely without doing our part to solve the representation issue at the UN. My colleagues and I have devoted much time in the last few months in an effort to open the way for a forward move on the question of Chinese representation at the UN.

"I do not propose to linger over the question of importance on which we are being asked once again to pronounce ourselves. It has been the view of my Delegation in previous years that this is an important question and we do not think that the passage of time has in any way detracted from its importance. It is important for the UN. It is important for the maintenance of international peace and security. And it is important, in the final analysis, because the people of China are important. My Delegation, therefore, does not propose to seek a resolution of this issue by denying its importance.

### **Albanian Resolution**

"We also have before us once again the proposal of the Albanian Delegation and other co-sponsors. The intent of this proposal is to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China in the UN. With this we are in full accord,

but the resolution embodying this proposal goes on to stipulate that this be done by expelling the representatives of the Republic of China. The Canadian position on this resolution has been that two wrongs do not make a right. We can see neither sense nor justice in the UNGA denying to the Government of the Republic of China the right and responsibilities of UN membership or in withholding from its people the benefits of international co-operation. If we are to seek a rational and realistic answer to this problem before us, I cannot see that such an answer is to be found in terms of the Albanian resolution.

"I wish now to turn to the third proposal which we have before us. I refer to the proposal tabled by the Delegations of Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy and Trinidad and Tobago. I do not think I am revealing any secret if I say Canada took an active part in initiating consultations which resulted in the tabling of this proposal. The countries with which we consulted are countries whose views of what must now be done appeared to us to be in general harmony with our own. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing to the representatives of these countries our sincere appreciation of the efforts they made to accommodate themselves to our approach to this issue. I should like particularly to pay a tribute to the U.S. Delegation for the spirit in which they endeavoured to meet our position and to say that I fully appreciate the value of the U.S.A. being able to announce its support for this alternative resolution.

"It is a matter of great regret to Canada that the proposal which has emerged as a result of our joint deliberations is not one which in our view goes far enough in charting the course which this UNGA should now take in the interest of the UN and that of the larger world community.

#### **Proposal for Committee Study**

"The proposal before us provides for the establishment of a committee to explore and study the whole situation pertaining to Chinese representation and to make appropriate recommendations to the next session of the UNGA. This proposal represents very little forward movement over a similar proposal which Canada initiated at the fifth general session of the UNGA in 1950. I should have hoped that, with the experience of the intervening years, this twenty-first session of the UNGA might see its way clear to laying down a much more specific mandate, by which the proposed committee would be guided in exploring the elements of an equitable solution of this question. In the absence of such a directive, I fear that much valuable time may be lost by any committee which this Assembly will establish.

"I should like to say that I have been disturbed by some of the statements which have been made concerning the tasks of the proposed committee. I want to make it clear that what is now required, in my view, is not a matter of study or research. What we look to the committee to do is to act on behalf of this Assembly in mapping out a viable solution and paving the way for forward movement on this issue. This surely is the basis on which the committee must

pursue its endeavours if it is to make the sort of recommendations which we have the right to expect it to put before us at our next session.

### **Attitude of Peking**

"It has been suggested that one question which should be put to the Government of the People's Republic of China is whether it is willing to be seated in the UN. I am quite ready to acknowledge that statements which have come from Peking have been such as to implant real doubts in our minds about the general attitude of the Government of the People's Republic of China toward the workings of the UN. On the other hand, countries friendly to the Government of the People's Republic of China have, in successive years, tabled proposals aimed at the seating of that Government in the UN. We must assume, I think, that this would not have been done without Peking's consent.

"It has also been suggested that the Government of the People's Republic of China be asked whether it is willing to adhere to the obligations of the Charter of the UN. Now it is obviously of greatest importance that all member governments respect and observe the obligations of the Charter. The question is properly put in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter to any state which is applying for membership in the UN. But China is a member state of the UN. The issue before us is not one of admitting China to membership. It is rather how China as a member state can be represented in our midst in such a way as to reflect the realities of the present political situation.

"But I can see a further drawback to this whole procedure of asking questions at this stage. I would submit that the real responsibility of any committee we appoint is to devise a basis on which this Assembly would consider it reasonable for the people of China to be represented in our midst. The time for asking questions is after, not before, such a basis has been devised. The real responsibility which is ours is to formulate proposals which can be put to the parties in full confidence that they represent a reasonable approach to this issue. We can commend our proposals to the parties, but we cannot compel their acceptance. At the very least, however, we should have absolved ourselves of the responsibility for perpetuating a situation which lacks the elements of common sense.

"In providing guide-lines to an appropriate solution, the proposal before us refers to "the existing situation and political realities of the area".

### **Two Claimants to Chinese Seat**

"What are these realities? Among the most important are the fundamental changes which have taken place since the founding of the UN. When the Government of the Republic of China signed the UN Charter, the island of Taiwan was under the control of the Government of Japan. By 1949 a revolutionary upheaval on the mainland of China resulted in the removal of the Nationalist Chinese Government to Taipei and the establishment of a Government of the People's Republic of China in Peking. The real situation since then has been, and continues to be,

that we have two governments exercising control over two areas of territory each claiming to be the government entitled to the Chinese seat in the UN.

"One of these is the Government of the Republic of China, with which Canada has long and close diplomatic relations. This Government has been a member in good standing of this Assembly and its subsidiary bodies ever since the founding of the UN. It controls a territory whose economic development can serve as a blueprint for progress in other developing countries. Its representatives have played an important part in the economic and social organs of the UN and in programmes which are designed to raise the standards of living throughout the developing world.

"The other government, the Government of the People's Republic of China, which controls a far greater area and a far greater population, is not represented here and never has been. This is a situation we deplore, both because we firmly believe in the principle of universality and because we believe that lasting solutions to certain important problems facing the world community today cannot be found without the participation of the Government of Peking.

"The Canadian Government, for its part, has consistently, both by its statements and by its actions, done whatever it could to encourage mutually advantageous contacts between Canada and continental China and, for that matter, between it and the rest of the international community. This position should not, of course, be considered by anyone to involve any endorsement of the policies or ideology of the Peking regime.

#### **No UN Right to Arbitrate**

"I do not believe that this Assembly has the right to pronounce judgement on conflicting territorial claims of these two governments. I think that the decisions or actions of this Assembly on the Chinese representation issue should be without prejudice to the eventual settlement of that dispute or to the view strongly held by both governments that China is a single sovereign entity. But, if we have no rights in that regard, we do have a moral obligation under our Charter to see that, pending a final settlement of this dispute, we make the sort of arrangements in this Assembly which will allow maximum participation of the people of China in the work of the UN without depriving those who already belong of the voice to which they have as much a right as anyone else in this Assembly.

"How do we do this in practice? The essence of the position which we have been advocating is that the representatives of both governments should be seated in this Assembly. This could be done as an interim solution pending settlement of the jurisdictional dispute between the two governments. We believe that such an interim solution should be reflected in all organs of the UN and the Specialized Agencies.

"I should also go one step further than this, and suggest that, if the study committee is to make a realistic appraisal of the problem, it should include in its recommendations some reference to the Security Council. I realize full well that



the Assembly cannot impose its views on the Security Council. I do not think, however, that any credible proposal for a solution of this issue can afford to ignore the problem of the disposition of the Chinese seat in the Security Council.

### **Canadian Guide-lines**

"It was with these practical requirements in mind that the Canadian Delegation, in the course of the consultations we have held, suggested the following guide-lines as the basis for a reasonable interim solution: *first*, the participation of the Republic of China in the UN General Assembly as member representing the territory over which it exercises effective jurisdiction; *second*, the participation of the People's Republic of China in the UNGA as member representing the territory over which it exercises effective jurisdiction; *third*, the participation of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council as a permanent member.

"I want to make it clear at this point that the solution we envisage is in no way intended to imply the existence of two Chinas. Both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of China firmly adhere to the concept of one China and it is not for the UN to propound concepts which are at variance with the hopes and aspirations of the people of a member state. This is an internal matter, which is for the Chinese people to resolve and from which the UN, in accordance with clear dispositions of the Charter, is bound to stand aside.

### **Principle of Universality**

"Some 11 years ago, my Delegation was instrumental in helping to break the deadlock which then debarred a substantial number of states from being admitted to membership in the UN. The action we took at that time was prompted by our concern for the principle of universality which was so eloquently commended to us in the memorable address given in this Assembly last year by his Holiness Pope Paul VI. In his words: 'Once more we repeat our wish for you: "Go forward". We shall say more: 'Strive to bring back among you any who may have left you; consider means of calling into your pact of brotherhood in honour and loyalty those who do not yet share in it. Act so that those still outside will desire and deserve the confidence of all; and then be generous in granting it.'

"We are under no illusion that a more genuinely universal organization will necessarily be able to solve all the problems to which solutions have stubbornly eluded us so far. On the contrary, we do not exclude the possibility that the injection of new, and perhaps radically different, points of view may — in the short run at least — retard rather than accelerate the momentum of our work.

"But there are advantages in the concept of universality which we cannot discount. Even if a more broadly based UN is not able to find solution to some of the crucial problems of peace and security which confront us in the world today it will at least have established a much better claim to bringing these problems within the framework of its discussions. Moreover, it seems to me that,

if the UN is to be 'a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations' in the attainment of common ends, as the Charter intended it to be, then it must be concerned to bring into its deliberations at least those nations which are bound to have to assume a major share of responsibility.

"By way of conclusion, let me say this. Canada believes that we must stop marking time on this issue. We must try to end the stalemate which has attended our discussions for a full 16 years. We think the proposal to set up a committee falls short of what is required at this time in the way of specific directives. Nevertheless, the committee does afford us an opportunity of moving forward if we are prepared to seize that opportunity and provided the committee is so constituted as to enable forward movement to be made.

"We think that what is at issue here is the capacity of the UN to live up to the purposes of the Charter to represent the world as it is and to bring the great weight of its influence to bear on the issues of peace and security. Although in the nature of things, we can only move forward on the basis of resolutions, I think I have made it clear that, in our view, this issue is not amenable to solution on that basis alone. It will require the exercise of diplomacy, goodwill and accommodation on all sides, both within our organization and without. If that is the spirit in which the solution of this issue is approached, then I am not unhopeful that we may be able to unblock the road to progress toward making the UN a more effective, a more representative and a more credible forum of international deliberation and action."


# Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference

TWELFTH GENERAL CONFERENCE, OTTAWA, 1966

THE twelfth general conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association was held in Ottawa from September 26 to October 4, 1966. The conference was preceded by a coast-to-coast tour of Canada from September 8 to 25. One hundred and sixty-five parliamentarians attended as delegates from 66 branches of the Association. The Canadian federal delegation was led by the Honourable John N. Turner and consisted of four Senators and ten Members of Parliament, as well as the Secretary-Treasurer of the federal branch. Two delegates were sent by each of the provincial branches except British Columbia, where a provincial election intervened. The United States and Ireland are associate members of the Association and were invited to attend the sessions and to participate in the discussion on international affairs. The United States accepted, but Ireland was unable to send a delegation.

The Chairman of the conference and of the General Council of the Association was Senator John J. Connolly, Minister without Portfolio and Leader of the Government in the Senate.

The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association comprises a membership representing almost 100 legislative chambers in the member nations and their dependencies. The Association is designed to foster understanding between parliamentarians in the Commonwealth countries by means of general and



*Delegates to the twelfth general conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association photographed as a group in front of the Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa.*

regional conferences, visits and the exchange of information between its branches. Delegates from each of the branches meet in plenary conference once a year.

The history of the Association goes back to 1911, when its formation was proposed to cement the cordial relations that developed between parliamentarians from all parts of the then Empire attending the Coronation of King Edward VII. Originally called the Empire Parliamentary Association and administered by the United Kingdom Branch, it assumed its present name in 1948, when management of its affairs was transferred to the General Council, on which all member branches are represented directly or indirectly. Since 1948, the conferences have been held in a different country each year, most recently in Malaysia (1963), Jamaica (1964), and New Zealand (1965). The thirteenth conference will be held next year in Kampala, Uganda.

The Officers of the Association are the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who are elected annually, and there is a permanent Secretariat. The branches, as determined by the General Council, are: main, state and provincial, auxiliary, affiliated, and subsidiary.

As Chairman of the General Conference, Senator Connolly reported on the proceedings to the Senate on October 18. Extracts from his statement follow:

"... Delegates arrived in Montreal on September 8, and they were welcomed extremely well. The welcome they received from the mayor and officials of that city and that province was tremendous. Then they began a visit to all of the provinces of Canada, and, veritably, what we had was a Commonwealth airlift. They were the guests of the provinces and municipalities, as they moved first from Montreal east to the Maritimes and then finally to the West Coast.

"I must express on behalf of the Canadian branch, and, indeed, on behalf of the CPA, appreciation to the provincial authorities in every province who made it possible not only for the delegates to see these provinces and to see Canada, but also to meet so many of the people who live in these provinces....

"Then followed the meetings. They were held in Ottawa — plenary sessions, meetings of the General Council, meetings of the subcommittees, and meetings of the Steering Committee, which committee had a very difficult task to perform.

"In Ottawa there occurred something quite new to the annual meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. We had the privilege of being addressed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Arnold Smith. Mr. Smith, as all Honourable Senators know, is a Canadian. He was trained in our Department of External Affairs. He addressed the delegates in the House of Commons on Friday, September 30, and I should like to express to him the deep appreciation of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association for the way in which he approached that task and for the manner in which he discharged it. I was very proud of him, as I am sure all the delegates were, for what he is doing in the discharge of his heavy responsibilities at a time of great difficulty for the Commonwealth.

"I should like to touch upon some of the events of the meetings, both the plenary sessions and the committee meetings, which took place in Ottawa. They began on September 28 . . . .

"The important debate was that on international affairs, and one can understand the great interest in it in view of the fact that some 27 countries from every continent of the world were represented. This debate was opened by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin. His contribution was both valuable and helpful. The delegates certainly appreciated it, and said so. As soon as the debate began, it was clear, that, within the Commonwealth, and between the countries of the Commonwealth, all is not sweetness and light. The Kashmir situation, for example, was one upon which there was some comment, although I must say that the key of the debate was very low, mainly because of the tentative agreements that were reached at Tashkent, Russia, a little less than a year ago. I regretted, as I think a great many of us did, the fact that the settlement between India and Pakistan reached on that occasion was not an intra-Commonwealth settlement. It is correct to say that there was disappointment expressed in the fact that there is not a Commonwealth agency to deal with intra-Commonwealth disputes.

"Mr. Bhargava of India referred to this, and Mr. Pannel of the British House of Commons also referred to it, as did Mr. Soomro of Pakistan . . . . The debate on this issue was not as hot or difficult as the one that took place in New Zealand a year ago.

"The debate on Rhodesia was another matter, but it was somewhat overshadowed by the fact that the prime ministers had recently come to certain conclusions about the problem there. I think many of the delegates questioned whether Rhodesia is in fact a microcosm of the Commonwealth, and whether there will always be in the Commonwealth antipathies between blacks and whites, between race and race, and between creed and creed. I am bound to say that there was condemnation on the part of some delegates for the way the Rhodesian situation is being handled. The leader of the debate, the Honourable J. S. M. Ochofa from Uganda, made a speech in which he expressed very strongly-held views that force should be used. His criticisms were pungent, and he had the support of speakers from Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean area . . . .

"But there were other views expressed, and I think this was partly due to the influence that emanated from the meeting of the prime ministers which had concluded shortly before the conference began. I was particularly impressed by the moderation of the speeches of the delegates from Malawi.

"I was impressed also, as I think all delegates were, by the responsible way in which the leader of the British delegation, the Right Honourable Arthur Bottomley, the Minister of Overseas Development, discussed this issue. He did it objectively, calmly, and very effectively. Mr. Bottomley brought distinction to both the meeting and the debate. I was delighted that the British Government

had seen fit to send a minister of his rank to this meeting, especially in view of the situation in Rhodesia.

"South Africa was discussed. South West Africa was mentioned, and the conditions there deplored. The situations in Ghana and Nigeria, and the military dictatorships that have been established in those countries, were commented upon, particularly at the Council meeting at Montreal. There being no parliaments in those countries, there were no representatives from them.

"There was a view taken also about the position of Gibraltar, and I commend the reasonable words of the representative from Gibraltar, Mr. Seruya, on the position that Gibraltar occupies in respect of the Spanish development because this affects Gibraltar very much.

"Then of course, Vietnam came up for discussion, and in this we were most indebted to the members of the United States Senate who were present for the contributions they made. Senator Fulbright is well known to almost every member of this Chamber . . . . He spoke of the need for compromise in the situation out there, and of all the dangers that are inherent in it. He spoke from a full mind, and I believe from a heart full of compassion and concern

"Senator Edmund Muskie from Maine, taking a different line, as I thought gave a particularly objective description of the American position in Vietnam, which the President has made so forcefully and so often and is making now in the Pacific — I believe tonight he is in Hawaii.

"It was not only the Americans who spoke of Vietnam. New Zealand has troops there. Mr. Gordon, the leader of the New Zealand delegation, said that they were there to help re-establish peace.

"The Australians talked about Vietnam. Senator Davis of Australia said that the United States has taken a stand in Vietnam 'on the highest level of morality'. One can understand the concern of people in the Far East about the danger, the explosiveness that exists in Vietnam. Senator Davis said that it was a stand against Communism, and Communism has its expansionist philosophy.

"I think there were other delegates too who felt that there might be a great element also of Chinese nationalism that was creating some of the problems out there. Peter Howson, the distinguished young leader of the Australian delegation, strongly supported the United States position.

"Other delegates said that a United Nations force should be sent there and should try to solve the problems. These views were put forward by Mr. Pandya of Kenya, Mr. Cheeks of Guyana, and by others. Dato'Ong, the distinguished member of the Parliament of Malaysia, thought that an Asian solution was perhaps the only one to look for.

"This was the kind of debate that we had on external affairs, and you can see what a wide-ranging thing it was, how varied the points of view were, and how difficult it is to try to put them down into some neat formula that will result in solutions for these complex problems . . . .

"On the problem of Commonwealth self-help, particularly in the field of trade and aid, notable speeches were made. I think one of the best was by the deputy leader of the British delegation, the Whip of the House of Lords, Lord Shepherd . . . . He described the quantum of aid given by the United Kingdom . . . . He also talked about the importance of international liquidity, as well as about some of the British problems connected with this problem of liquidity and the level of aid.

"Mr. Neville Hewitt of Australia said the Australians were second as donor countries in the amount of aid given in the Commonwealth.

"There were also views expressed by donee countries, and this was particularly sought and welcomed, because the giving of aid is one thing but the usefulness of the aid, its value to the country receiving it, and the manner in which it is given are most important.

"Mr. Ahmad of Pakistan made an acknowledgement of the value of this aid. He praised particularly the work of the Colombo Plan.

"Shri Vajpayee of India spoke about the Kennedy idea of freer trade, as also did Mr. Refalo of Malta. They talked, too, about the difficulties some of the developing countries have because of the tariff walls that exclude their products from so many of the developed countries.

"Mr. Tuan Bee of Malaysia . . . talked about the difficulties of marketing products like rubber and tin from his country.

"There was discussion about commodity price stabilization. The plea and the call there was for the abolition of tariffs, for the increase in consumption among developing countries of some of these products that are indigenous to the countries of the Southern Hemisphere — sugar and cocoa.

"The questions arising out of food resources and the population explosion in the world were also debated with knowledge and authority by many of the delegates . . . .

"This year we tried an innovation, a Canadian initiative. Instead of having speeches made only in plenary session, we resorted to the device used in the IPU and the NATO parliamentarians organization, of breaking up into committees. One committee, dealing with parliamentary institutions in the modern world, sat in this chamber under the chairmanship of the Honourable C. A. Thomasos, of Trinidad and Tobago . . . .

"The conclusions of that committee, as given in its report, are to be found at Page 307 of the official report :

A United Kingdom delegate, in closing the debate, remarked that three threads have run through the discussion:

(1) Some modification or reform is needed to bring parliamentary institutions up-to-date.

(2) A pattern suitable for one part of the Commonwealth would not necessarily be suitable for another part; each country must, while maintaining fundamental democratic principles, evolve its own parliamentary methods.

(3) The committee system offers many advantages in meeting present-day demands of legislatures and consideration could be given in many countries to developing it further.

"I am particularly pleased at the reception which the committee received at the hands of delegates and at the enthusiasm with which they praised this Canadian initiative. It gave an opportunity to exchange views immediately upon statements being made. There were questions and answers; and it provided a lively debate and an opportunity of which the parliamentarians took advantage.

"Honourable Senators, the other committee dealt with external aid, primarily the sector concerning education and training. It was an outstanding committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Bernard Braine of the United Kingdom delegation. It is clear from the debates in that committee that modern political, economic and social development can come, provided the educational opportunities are available to the people who are to shape and form those institutions. There were excellent contributions by donor countries; Senator Grosart and Mr. Turner made valuable speeches on that part of the work in which Canada's participation was particularly discussed. Donee countries appraised the programmes and there was criticism in some quarters of the way in which this work is handled . . .

"Honourable Senators, may I refer briefly to the conclusions of that committee, which will be found at page 305 of the official report of the conference :

The consensus of the committee may be summarized as follows :

(1) Developing countries appreciate the educational and technical aid they are receiving, but in most cases this is inadequate to meet real needs, nor is it sufficiently co-ordinated.

(2) While there is a division of views as to whether the multilateral or bilateral method of providing aid is to be preferred, there is general agreement that, under either system, aid should be more closely geared to the needs of developing countries.

(3) To ensure more effective mobilization and use of available resources, expert surveys of the needs of each developing country and the means of meeting them should be made and then co-ordinated through some centralized Commonwealth agency.

(4) Arrangements should be made to ensure that persons sent to developed countries for training as teachers or technicians should return home to utilize their newly-acquired skills in the service of their own people.

(5) To facilitate better understanding and co-operation, there should be many more direct links between educational establishments in Commonwealth countries and more exchanges of teachers and students . . .

"There are challenges within the Commonwealth and there are diverse opportunities for a far-ranging world-wide organization. The parliamentarians of its countries are anxious for solutions based on firm foundations. They believe they can succeed in achieving this through the parliamentary institution. I share that belief, and anyone who followed those proceedings would be moved deeply by the sincerity which delegates showed.

"Honourable Senators, when the conference was opened, His Excellency the Governor General, in a notable speech, said things which are worth recording. He said :

Man has been created a free person, with a free will and the power to choose for himself. If this be so, then democracy is the only political expression in which these rights can be respected. Any dictatorship, by definition, is a denial of freedom.

Later he said that 'democracy is based upon the conviction that there are extraordinary possibilities in ordinary people'. That is what we had at this



conference. Every one of the delegates considered himself to be an ordinary man or woman.

"Finally, the Governor General concluded by quoting from a speech made by Her Majesty at the time of her Coronation, and appropriate it was that he should quote Her Majesty, because she is the head of the Commonwealth. She said this on that occasion:

Parliamentary institutions, with their free speech and respect for the rights of minorities, and the inspiration of a broad tolerance in thought and expression — all this we conceive to be a precious part of our way of life and outlook.

"But there are deeper things involved in understanding and solving Commonwealth problems — things deeper than politics or than economics or than social action. I believe, having been in rather intimate contact with these people now for some time, that there is a great deal to be said for some appreciation of the role which the spirit, which the mind, plays in this work.

"... East may be East and West may be West, and at one time it was thought that the twain never could meet. But the twain can meet if an effort at understanding will persist on the part of East and West. I think Barbara Ward, whom I admire greatly, has perhaps put her finger on this concept in a book which she wrote some years ago, entitled *Faith and Freedom*. I think it expresses better than I can what I would like to leave as my finishing words in connection with this great meeting. At Page 140 of that book, she said this :

This failure of Western culture to communicate itself in depth arose in part from a narrowness of vision among Christians themselves, in part from the decline of religion as a force in Western life. In India and the Far East


(and indeed she might have said, too, 'in Africa', had she been writing this today) the Westerners were brought into contact with civilizations more ancient and continuous than their own and with a religious and social outlook of immense traditional force. To suggest in such a situation that faith in Christ could be achieved only by those who were prepared to renounce totally 5,000 years of Hindu or 2,000 years of Buddhist or Confucian experience was the equivalent of rendering certain the rejection of Christ. In a similar debate, at the origins of the Christian Church, some of Christ's first followers believed that, unless Christianity was presented in the ritual form of Jewish religion with circumcision and all the minutiae of the Law, it would not be the true and saving word of God. But the force of St. Paul's conviction that a Hellenic world would not receive the truth wrapped in a Jewish envelope decided the issue. Paul was free to express the Christian gospel of redemption in terms by which the prophet and the philosopher, Isaiah and Socrates, the worshippers of the Messiah and of the Logos, could give their differing yet complementary witness to the same salvation.

"Honourable Senators, basic to every Commonwealth undertaking is an understanding of this passage and of the will on the part of people of the Commonwealth to recognize it...."

## *Pollution of the Great Lakes*

CO-OPERATION in curbing the pollution of the Great Lakes has become increasingly significant in Canada's relations with the United States during the last few years. The problem was the subject of a meeting in Ottawa on June 23, 1966, between the Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, Mr. Pélissier (now Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources), and the United States Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Udall, during which both stressed the importance of the two governments keeping in touch about development in their respective countries relating to pollution control.

Canada and the United States have a mutual obligation, set out in Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, to see that boundary waters or waters flowing across the boundary are not polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other. The beginning of a concerted attack on pollution of the Great Lakes system began in October 1964, with a request by the two governments that the International Joint Commission undertake a study of pollution in Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the international section of



*The Brandal, a converted stern trawler chartered by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources for the 1966 programme of research into pollution in the Great Lakes, leaves the harbour of Kingston, Ontario, on a regular water-sampling and monitoring cruise of Lake Ontario.*

the St. Lawrence River. In conducting the study, the Commission established international boards of experts drawn from both countries.

### **IJC Recommendations**

The Commission was asked whether these waters were being polluted on either side of the boundary to an extent that was causing or was likely to cause injury to health or property on the other side of the boundary, and, if so, to determine the causes and recommend remedial measures. The Commission, noting a serious and deteriorating situation, particularly in Lake Erie, sent an interim report to the governments on December 28, 1965, recommending that they, in association with state and provincial governments, take action as soon as possible to ensure :

- (a) the maximum possible removal of phosphates from waste water before discharge into the waters under study or their tributaries; <sup>(1)</sup>
- (b) prohibition of construction of combined sanitary and storm sewers and initiation of a programme of separating existing combined sewers;
- (c) regular sampling of effluents.

At the Canada-United States Ministerial Meeting in Washington on March 4 and 5, 1966, it was agreed to support the recommendations of the Commission and to co-ordinate efforts in both countries to deal urgently with the problem. Programmes of pollution control are being put into effect by the Canadian and United States authorities concerned.

### **Responsible U.S. and Canadian Authorities**

In the United States, a campaign against pollution has been started by the Federal Government, which, under the Water Quality Act of 1965, has the power to establish standards on navigable and inter-state waters if the states fail to act before July 1967. In Canada, water resources are largely a provincial responsibility, though the Federal Government has certain specific obligations, including those arising under the Boundary Waters Treaty. In addition, the Federal Government has recognized a responsibility to assist in research, to provide financial incentives to municipalities and industries and to formulate national policies in consultation with the provinces. The most recent example of federal-provincial co-operation in this field was the national conference in Montreal from October 31 to November 4, 1966, on environmental pollution, under the sponsorship of the Canadian Council of Resource Ministers. The new federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources is responsible for co-ordinating the work of federal agencies in relation to water pollution and for liaison with provincial agencies and the Council of Resource Ministers.

The Federal Government will bear, in addition to its own contribution, about half the cost incurred by Ontario in directly supporting the continuing

(1) Particularly in Lake Erie, phosphates have caused a phenomenon known as *eutrophication*, a self-perpetuating process by which nutrients such as phosphates encourage the growth of algae, and so reduce the oxygen supply.

water-pollution study of the Great Lakes by the IJC; furthermore, federal and provincial research programmes will be co-ordinated in co-operation with the United States agencies also engaged in the study by the Commission.

The results of the present programmes will provide guidance for broader investigations of the Great Lakes, in which the Federal Government and the province will continue to participate. Over \$1.5 million will be invested in studies of the lower Lakes this year — 90 per cent of the cost being borne by the Federal Government. It is intended that this investment shall grow from year to year, reaching an estimated level of over \$5 million by 1970.

# *United Nations General Assembly*

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION — THE SECOND MONTH

**D**URING the second month of the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, the general debate, during which the representatives of member states outline their positions on key issues before the current session, was concluded and the seven main committees began detailed examination of the various items on the agenda. The Assembly admitted two newly-independent African states, Botswana and Lesotho, to membership in the United Nations. The admission of these two countries, formerly Bechuanaland and Basutoland, raises total United Nations membership to 121.

## **South West Africa**

One of the most complex and difficult problems to face the United Nations is the question of South West Africa, a territory originally entrusted to South Africa under a League of Nations mandate assigned in 1920. The United Nations Charter set up an international trusteeship system to replace the League mandates, and all the mandatory powers except South Africa agreed to transfer their remaining mandated territories to the new system. In 1947, South Africa informed the General Assembly that it would not place South Africa under trusteeship. It reported to the Assembly in 1947 on conditions in the territory in 1946, but declined in 1949 to submit further reports, despite requests by the Assembly that it do so.

In 1950, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion stating that South West Africa was still a territory under the international mandate and that the United Nations had power to exercise supervisory functions and to receive annual reports and petitions. The Court said that the degree of supervision by the United Nations should not exceed that which applied under the mandates system; that South Africa was not legally obliged to place the territory under the trusteeship system but had no competence to modify the international status of the territory without the consent of the United Nations. The United Nations has never been able to exercise these supervisory functions effectively, although the question has been debated at every Assembly session since 1946. In recent years the United Nations has taken an increasing and determined interest in South West Africa and has repeatedly asserted the right of the indigenous people to self-determination.

On July 18, 1966, the International Court delivered judgement on a case concerning South West Africa which had been before it since 1960, when Ethiopia and Liberia instituted contentious proceedings against South Africa. These two former members of the League of Nations stated that South Africa

had violated its mandate, primarily by its racial policies in South West Africa. The Court was asked to declare that the territory remained under mandate and that South Africa continued to have international obligations to the United Nations under the mandate. In its July judgement, the International Court, by a narrow margin, held that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal right or interest regarding the subject matter of their claims. Accordingly, it rejected their applications without ruling on the merits of the case.

In August, 35 African member states requested that the Assembly accord priority to the South West Africa item. It was subsequently agreed that the question would be considered in plenary, concurrently with the general debate.

The original draft resolution on South West Africa, sponsored by 54 Afro-Asian states, proposed that the mandate be terminated and that responsibility for South West Africa be taken over by the United Nations. The draft resolution sought to establish a United Nations administering authority for South West Africa to administer the territory on behalf of the United Nations with a view to preparing the territory for independence. Long and difficult negotiations took place before a generally accepted text emerged.

Addressing the General Assembly on October 7, the Secretary of State for External Affairs stressed Canada's opposition to *apartheid* and said that the Canadian Delegation fully supported the basic aim of the draft resolution while believing that it should also provide for the establishment of a committee to study all the practical problems involved in asserting United Nations authority over South West Africa and assisting the people of the territory to independence. He concluded by saying:

By any reasonable standards, South Africa's policies under the mandate justify the general opinion that South Africa has proved to be an unacceptable administrator of the territory. In the view of the Canadian Delegation, we are not called upon here in this Assembly to make a juridical judgement as to whether, in one respect or another, the government in charge of the mandate has been delinquent in carrying out the mandate entrusted to it by the League of Nations. We are well aware — and the representative of South Africa, in an able speech, reminded us the other day — that this is a matter which has been argued and contested before the International Court of Justice. What we are called upon to do is to make a decision, in the light of all the relevant factors, and taking into consideration its refusal to accept accountability to the United Nations, as to whether the Government of South Africa should continue to exercise the mandate in the interests of the development and self-government of the people of South West Africa. We believe that the answer is no.

South Africa's long history of failing to pay regard to the rightful interest of the international community and its concern to have detailed reports of this administration has frustrated any meaningful international supervision, even to the degree required by the mandate. In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, therefore, the record of South Africa constitutes clear grounds for stating that, in consideration of the well-being of the inhabitants of South West Africa (and that is and must be our main concern), South Africa has lost the right to continue administering the mandate. For our part, the Canadian Delegation will do what it can in the light of these comments to join with other member states of this organization in trying to work out how best the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations can be fulfilled.

In its final form, the Afro-Asian draft resolution provided for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee, which was asked to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence, and to report to the General Assembly at a special session not later than April 1967. On October 27, it was put to the vote and was adopted by 114 in favour (including Canada) to two against (South Africa, Portugal), with three abstentions (Britain, France and Malawi). The resolution reaffirms that South West Africa is a territory having international status, declares that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the territory, and decides that the mandate is terminated and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The composition of the Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa was announced on November 21. It consists of 14 member states, including Canada.

### **Rhodesia**

The item entitled "Question of Southern Rhodesia" has been before the United Nations since 1962. In November 1965, the General Assembly condemned the Rhodesian Government's unilateral declaration of independence. Later in the same month, the Security Council adopted a resolution which called on all member states to do their utmost to break all economic relations with Rhodesia. The Commonwealth prime ministers have also devoted much attention to Rhodesia and, at two meetings in 1966, held at Lagos and London, most of the time was spent discussing this problem.

Canada has refused to recognize the illegal declaration of independence and the illegal regime in Salisbury. Pursuant to the Security Council recommendations of November 20, 1965, Canada took prompt action to place a complete embargo on trade with Rhodesia (with provisions for very limited exceptions on humanitarian grounds or exports for services operated jointly with Zambia). Canada has also provided economic assistance to help Zambia in the difficulties created by the situation in Rhodesia.

The Fourth Committee decided to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia as the first item on its agenda. A long and difficult debate ensued, with many African and Asian states calling on the British Government to use force to bring down the illegal regime of Premier Ian Smith. Canada and a number of other Western countries expressed serious misgivings about the use of force and instead urged support for selective mandatory sanctions to be imposed by the Security Council. The Canadian representative, Mrs. Edwin Fullerton, addressing the Fourth Committee on October 14, pointed out that the British Government had given a number of important undertakings at the Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting in London. If the illegal regime refused to agree to the restoration of legal government, Britain had announced its

intention to co-sponsor a Security Council resolution providing for selective mandatory sanctions before the end of this year. The British Government would also withdraw all previous constitutional proposals and would not thereafter be prepared to recommend to the British Parliament a settlement which involved independence before majority rule. These undertakings were dependent on full Commonwealth support. Mrs. Fullerton urged all United Nations members to support the economic measures which had been and might be decided upon by the Security Council.

Two resolutions were adopted by the Assembly on the recommendations of the Fourth Committee. The first, a hasty resolution adopted on October 22 by a vote of 86 in favour to two against with 18 abstentions (including Canada), condemned any arrangement reached between the administering power and the illegal regime which did not recognize "the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence". The preamble suggested that the exploratory talks going on between the British Government and Premier Smith's illegal regime did in fact jeopardize the rights of the African people of Rhodesia. Canada abstained because the resolution prejudged the issue and because the British Government had made it clear, on a number of occasions that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

The second resolution on Rhodesia moved by the Afro-Asian states was very strongly worded. Its operative section included paragraphs condemning any arrangement between Britain and the illegal regime which would transfer power to the latter "on any basis", and calling upon the Government of Britain "to take all necessary measures, including, in particular, the use of force" to put an end to the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. In plenary, this resolution was adopted on November 17 by a vote of 89 in favour to two against, with 17 abstentions (including Canada). While generally sympathetic to the objectives of the sponsors of the resolution, sharing their impatience that the economic sanctions applied so far had not resulted in sufficient pressure on the illegal regime in Rhodesia, and agreeing with many parts of the resolution, the Canadian Delegation was unable to support some other paragraphs in the text and had grave reservations about the key operative paragraph calling on Britain to use force to put an end to the illegal minority regime. Consequently, the Canadian Delegation was unable to support the resolution as a whole.

### **Industrial Development**

For some years, the General Assembly has been discussing the need for intensified United Nations action to accelerate the industrial development of the less-developed countries. In 1965, the Assembly decided to establish, within the United Nations, a semi-autonomous organization for the promotion of industrial development. A special *ad hoc* committee was established to make recommendations on the operating procedures and administrative arrangements of the new organization.



The committee's report came up for discussion in the Second Committee which, after a general debate on the structure and functions of the new organization, adopted unanimously a resolution embodying its statutes. In plenary, on November 17, the vote in favour of resolution was also unanimous.

The new organization, which will have a status similar to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), is to be called the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Its principal organ will be a 36-member Industrial Development Board, and the main purpose of the organization will be to assist, promote and accelerate the industrialization of the developing countries, with particular emphasis on the manufacturing sector. UNIDO's administrative costs will be met from the regular budget of the United Nations, while its operational programmes will be financed from voluntary contributions and through participation in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

In participating in the debate on industrial development, the Canadian representative on the Second Committee, Mr. D. S. Macdonald, said that Canada would join with other members of the United Nations in trying to make UNIDO a creative and effective force for sustained industrial advance in the developing world. The work of the new organization would be most fruitful if it concentrated on the definition and solution of specific industrial problems in particular countries and regions, rather than on abstract studies and research. The Canadian statement also stressed the need for intimate co-operation between UNDP and UNIDO, and for co-ordination and close working relations among the staffs of UNIDO, UNCTAD, the World Bank Group and UNDP and, in the case of export-oriented industries, of the GATT International Trade Centre.

#### **United Nations Development Programme**

The annual pledging conference of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) took place on October 6. Canada pledged a total of \$10,750,000 (Canadian), subject to Parliamentary approval, for UNDP operations in 1967. This represents an increase of \$1,250,000 over Canada's 1966 contribution to the UNDP, which is a combination of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. As of November 2, some 101 governments had pledged a total of \$157,320,684 (U.S.) for the 1967 operations of the Development Programme.

#### **Human Rights**

The Third Committee has devoted most of its time at the twenty-first session to debating an item on the violation of human rights and of completing the Covenants on Human Rights. The first was the subject of a lengthy debate, with the Afro-Asian delegations submitting two draft resolutions in which most of the emphasis was placed on the question of *apartheid* in South Africa. Among other things, they urged all states to comply with the relevant General Assembly

resolutions recommending economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, requested the establishment within the Secretariat of a unit to deal exclusively with *apartheid* and appealed to the Security Council to take effective measures towards the eradication of *apartheid*. Canada, with most other Western delegations, abstained on these resolutions because, among other reasons, it had doubts about the practicability of the provisions regarding sanctions and because it considered that questions of coercion ought to be dealt with in other bodies.

The Third Committee spent part of October and all of November on the implementation articles and final clauses of the draft Covenants on Human Rights. Broadly speaking, the rather detailed debate tended to be between those delegations, including Canada, which favour strong and specific measures of implementation as drafted by the Commission on Human Rights and those which prefer to see measures of a more general nature.

In addition to these two major subjects, the Third Committee also took note of reports on the question of racial prejudice and religious intolerance, and once again urged member states to implement fully the declaration against racial discrimination and to sign and ratify the convention on the same subject.

# *International Atomic Energy Agency*

TENTH GENERAL CONFERENCE, 1966

**M**ORE than 350 delegates, from 77 member states, attended the Tenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from September 21 to 28, 1966. The Canadian delegation was headed by Mr. J. A. McCordick, the Canadian Ambassador to Austria, who also serves as the Canadian member of the IAEA Board of Governors. Alternate delegates were Mr. J. L. Gray, President of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Dr. G. C. Laurence, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Control Board, and Mr. K. W. Wardroper, Deputy Head of the Economic Division, Department of External Affairs. The delegation also included, as advisers, other officers of AECL and of the Canadian Embassy in Vienna.

## **General Debate**

Over 50 speakers took part in the general debate. The Agency's achievements over the past decade were commended and there was broad agreement as to the paths it should follow in the immediate future.



*Members of the Canadian delegation to the tenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (left to right, front row): Mr. J. A. McCordick, Mr. W. K. Wardroper, Mr. E. G. Lee. Seated immediately behind Mr. McCordick is Mr. J. L. Gray.*

A considerable part of the general debate was devoted to statements concerning the IAEA safeguards designed to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes. The speeches dealt with the possibility of further simplifying the administration of the safeguards system and broadening its scope and the area of its application.

In his closing statement the Director-General of IAEA, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, declared :

The Agency, as has been repeatedly stated, is ready and willing to play its part when called upon to do so, and the existence of a continually more refined safeguards system and procedures is the best contribution we can make to the general cause of preventing atomic energy being used for destructive purposes.

The work of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste was favourably referred to by many delegates and measures for ensuring its future were discussed. Special tribute was paid to the generosity of the Italian Government in providing accommodation and funds for the Centre. The General Conference decided that the Agency's responsibility for the continued functioning of the Centre would be determined at a later stage by the Board of Governors.

#### **Aid Programme**

A number of delegates were concerned that there should be sufficient funds available for technical assistance to developing areas, and the Board of Governors was asked to consider ways of increasing its assistance to developing countries. The Conference approved the proposed programme for the next year and a budget totalling \$11,899,500, an increase of \$677,500 over that for 1966.

Applications for admission to the IAEA (which now has 96 members) from Sierra Leone, Singapore and Uganda were unanimously approved and will become effective as soon as these countries have deposited instruments of acceptance of the Agency's Statute. The General Conference also completed the composition of the Board of Governors for 1966-67 by electing Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon and Mexico. Some of the other 20 members had already been designated by the outgoing Board of Governors and others continued their terms of office from 1965-66. Canada, which has always played an active role in the activities of the IAEA, has been a member of the Board since the inception of the Agency.

# *Commonwealth Conference on the Education and Training of Technicians*

FROM October 17 to 29, 1966, approximately 120 specialists from 20 Commonwealth countries met at the College of Technical Education in Huddersfield, England, to consider problems related to the education and training of technicians. This conference, held under the auspices of the Commonwealth Education Liaison Committee, stemmed from a recommendation of the Commonwealth Education Conference held in Ottawa in 1964, which invited the Committee to consider planning a conference of specialists from all countries of the Commonwealth on a subject of mutual concern. The education and training of technicians was subsequently chosen as being one of primary concern to developing countries of the Commonwealth as well as the more developed countries.

## **Canadian Delegation**

Canada was represented at the conference by a delegation of five — Dr. C. R. Ford, Chairman, formerly Director of the Technical Vocational Training Branch, Department of Manpower and Immigration; Mr. Paul E. LaRose, Director of Technical and Vocational Education, Department of Education, Quebec; Mr. Eric Palin, Assistant Director, Technological and Trades Training Branch, Department of Education, Ontario; Dr. W. G. Hines, Chairman, National Advisory Committee on Technological Education; and Mr. H. J. Hodder, Director, Education Division, External Aid Office.

The Canadian delegation presented the following supporting papers :

- (1) "The Certification of Technicians in Canada";
- (2) "Curriculum Development in Technician Programmes";
- (3) "Technician Training as an Aspect of Canadian Aid".

## **Work of the Conference**

The primary purpose of the conference was to enable each participating country of the Commonwealth, irrespective of its economic development, to secure the maximum possible improvement in its arrangements for educating and training personnel at levels intermediate between skilled craftsmen or workers, on the one hand, and professionals or technologists, on the other.

In plenary sessions the delegates considered the following topics :

- (1) Manpower background of technician training and the status of technicians.
- (2) Types, content and organization (including extension and correspondence courses) of technician education and training for men and women and its place in education and employment.

- (3) The planning and equipping of institutions, including the provision of libraries, textbooks, audio-visual aids, etc.
- (4) The supply and preparation of teachers and ancillary staff.
- (5) Entrance requirements and selection for technician education and training and the evaluation and recognition of standards of attainment.
- (6) Administration, finance (including assistance for students), control and inspection.
- (7) Assessment of the present and planned provision for the education and training of technicians in Commonwealth countries.
- (8) Aid patterns and Commonwealth co-operation.

Working groups were established to consider problems of technician training in specific industries: mechanical and electrical engineering, agriculture, business and commerce, chemical and other science industries, and civil engineering and construction. An additional group considered the problems of technician education and other forms of training of special interest to women and girls.

An important part of the conference were visits to Bradford Technical College, the Huddersfield College of Technology, the West Riding Institute of Agriculture, Askham Bryan, and the Associated Electrical Industries Ltd. Manchester. A day was devoted to an exhibition of audio-visual aids.

An important contribution to the documentation was made by 12 Canadian institutes of technology, which made available approximately 100 copies of their current calendars; these were enthusiastically received by the delegates as an excellent indication of the scope and nature of technician training available in Canada.

### Results

A number of key themes emerged during the deliberations of the conference. These were as follows:

- (1) Technicians are playing an increasingly significant role in the economies of both the developing and developed countries of the world. All countries agreed that greater efforts were required to increase the supply of adequately trained middle-level personnel.
- (2) Courses for technicians should have their own integrity, if they are to achieve the objectives of developing occupational competence, and should be based on a functional analysis of the industries for which the technicians are being prepared. Such an analysis should be sufficiently detailed to identify each element of the technician's function and the related technological knowledge needed to develop the degree and kind of occupational competence required. These courses involve varying combinations of technical subjects, technological theory, technological skills and general education. They should have a sufficiently broad base to prepare the technician to master new techniques in a world of rapid technological change.

- (3) Careful efforts are required to relate programmes of technician training to the particular needs of countries at different stages of economic development. It was also noted, in this connection, that projects should be planned well in advance to ensure their sound development.
- (4) Full-time residential courses provide the most satisfactory background for training, but part-time and other types of course, involving various combinations of education and practical training, are usefully employed, provided that some period of residential training at an established educational institution is included.
- (5) Industry should be involved at every stage in the planning and preparation of training courses for technicians.
- (6) Although there is a rapidly increasing requirement for technicians in all the areas examined, there is a particular need for training technicians in agriculture because of the critical importance of agriculture to economic development and social well-being. Consequently, a recommendation was put forward that Commonwealth countries give consideration to holding, in the near future, a further specialist Commonwealth conference to study in depth all aspects of agriculture, education, and training.
- (7) Technician training is an important aspect of educational assistance programmes, but it was not considered necessary to establish any new machinery to achieve a desirable increase in such programmes.

The general view of the delegates was that the conference had achieved the objectives which had been established for it. They were unanimous in their praise of the administrative arrangements which contributed in no small measure to its success.

# *Conference on the Status of Teachers*

A SPECIAL Inter-governmental Conference on the Status of Teachers was held under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and with the support of the International Labour Organization, at UNESCO headquarters in Paris from September 21 to October 5, 1966. It was attended by 76 states members of UNESCO, one associate member state and observers from non-member states, inter-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations with an interest in the subject.

## **Canadian Delegation**

Mr. Graham McInnes, Minister and Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO, headed the Canadian delegation. The other Canadian delegates were: Mr. F. T. Atkinson, Deputy Minister of Education for New Brunswick; Mr. Raymond Laliberté, President of the Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices du Québec; Mr. Charles D. Ovans, Secretary-General, British Columbia Teachers' Federation; and Mr. H. T. Pammett, Executive Assistant to the Director, International Labour Affairs Branch, Department of Labour.

## **Work of the Conference**

Mr. Jean Thomas, Inspecteur général de l'instruction publique de la France and former Assistant Director-General of UNESCO, was elected President. The Vice-Presidents were the heads of delegation of Britain, Iran, Morocco, Mexico, Uganda, Roumania and the U.S.S.R. Dr. William G. Carr, Executive Secretary, National Education Association (U.S.A.) was the Rapporteur. Mr. Ovans of the Canadian delegation served on the eight-member Drafting Committee.

The Conference had as its object the approval of an international recommendation to governments on the status of teachers. This recommendation has been drafted by an international meeting of experts convened jointly by UNESCO and the ILO at Geneva in January 1966. It was a very comprehensive document which included references to guiding principles, educational objectives and policies, and established standards for preparation for the profession, the further education of teachers, employment and careers. It also dealt with the rights and responsibilities of teachers and conditions for effective teaching and learning with salaries and with social security. The document concluded with a reference to the teacher shortage that is a marked characteristic of our time and is the concern of both developed and developing countries.

The chief difficulty facing the Conference was that of considering and voting on a very large number of draft resolutions for amendment of the





*The Canadian delegation to the Special Inter-governmental Conference on the Status of Teachers (left to right): Mr. Raymond Laliberté, President of the Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices du Québec; Mr. Charles D. Ovans, Secretary-General, British Columbia Teachers' Federation; Mr. Graham McInnes, Minister and Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO; Mr. F. T. Atkinson, Deputy Minister of Education for the Province of New Brunswick; Mr. H. T. Pammett, Executive Assistant to the Director, International Labour Affairs Branch, Department of Labour.*

document drawn up in Geneva. Not all of these resolutions for amendment were concerned with matters of substance; many contained generalities and qualifications, which, if adopted, would have weakened the original text.

The position taken by the Canadian delegation in the debate and in the voting on resolutions for amendment was that, as Canada was, in general, satisfied with the Geneva text and regarded the document as a recommendation for the future and as an ideal standard at which to aim, it was against amendments seeking merely to weaken or qualify the text, to impose, on a statement of general applicability, particular conditions having relevance to only one country, or to enshrine the actual rather than the desirable.

This position had the effect of putting the Canadian delegation frequently on the negative side. As the debate developed, however, the Canadian view, particularly on the undesirability of watering down the text, largely prevailed, with the result that a number of weakening amendments were withdrawn.

### **Results of the Conference**

The recommendation finally and unanimously adopted is not quite as strong as that presented to the Conference following the meeting of experts in Geneva, but it is still a remarkably comprehensive document, dealing with all aspects of

the teacher's role in education and his relations with his pupils and with the state. It recognizes his rights and defines his responsibilities in various fields, and makes special reference to the continuing and pressing shortage of teachers. Although the recommendation is not binding on member states, it received the concurrence of an impressive number and consequently represents a weight of world opinion that should be helpful to teachers in all countries. The recommendation was coupled with an expression of hope by the Conference that both UNESCO and the ILO would take appropriate measures to ensure its implementation. This the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr. Maheu, and the Deputy Director-General of the ILO, Mr. Blanchard, undertook in their addresses to the closing session of the Conference.

Following the speeches of Mr. Maheu and Mr. Blanchard, the heads of the delegations from Canada, Japan, Lebanon, Nigeria and Yugoslavia gave addresses of thanks on behalf of their UNESCO regions. In response to requests from the delegations of the United States, Mexico and Argentina, the Chairman of the Canadian delegation spoke on behalf of the Hemisphere.

# Canada and Japan

AN ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,  
THE HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN, AT A LUNCHEON SPONSORED BY THE  
CANADA-JAPAN TRADE COUNCIL IN CALGARY, OCTOBER 31, 1966. (1)

It is scarcely necessary for me to emphasize that Canadian relations with Japan are important. The presence here of many representatives of commercial concerns provides abundant evidence of the significance that is being attached in this province, as in other Western provinces, to the contacts and exchanges we have with our Japanese neighbours across the Pacific. For instance, Premier Manning, Mr. Patrick, the Minister of Industry and Development of Alberta, and Mayor Dantzer of Edmonton paid an official visit to Japan last May.

I should like, however, to underline some of the reasons why relations with this major industrial power are important to our national interest.

I think it would also be appropriate for me to take this occasion to review some of the questions discussed at the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee meetings earlier this month.

Our relations with Japan must be considered against the whole background of world affairs past and present. Only in that wider perspective can we appreciate how the course of events since 1945 has brought us, along with many elements of turbulence in international affairs, some welcome developments towards sane, peaceful and prosperous conditions in the world.

The fact that the most economically advanced nations of Western Europe and of North America are now linked to Japan by so many common interests and concepts, both political and economic, is one of the most encouraging developments of recent years.

These nations of three continents base their actions in the world on United Nations principles. They have pledged assistance to the developing nations. They have not relied on any exclusive associations between them; they are separately associated with Commonwealth nations, with the nations preserving special links of French language and culture, with Latin America and with Asia.

They have made clear to Communist nations that no irreconcilable interests or unnegotiable conflicts need prevent the firm establishment of peaceful conditions and mutually profitable contacts.

Japan is a major economic power and the only industrially developed country in Asia. It has a leading role in working with friendly nations to achieve

(1) See also the article entitled "Canada's Relations with Japan", *External Affairs*, October 1966, Pp. 441-444, and the article entitled "Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee", *External Affairs*, November 1966, Pp. 488-492.

a world community in which peace and economic welfare are firmly established in a way they have never been before.

I fully expect our own relations with Japan to assume increasing importance within this international context.

There are several specific reasons on which I base my expectations :

- (1) Our direct contacts with Japan, official and unofficial, are increasing rapidly in volume and variety.
- (2) There are opportunities for further substantial increases in trade between the two countries.
- (3) Both Canada and Japan are major trading nations and have many common interests and preoccupations with respect to trade and economic arrangements in the world as a whole.
- (4) Canada and Japan assign a high priority to economic assistance to developing nations and they are associated in agencies which co-ordinate and concert international efforts in this field.
- (5) We have an identity of interests and attitudes with respect to several of the problems creating the greatest political tension in the world today.

#### **Official Relations and General Contacts**

The recent meeting of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee in Ottawa proved that these arrangements for contacts and discussions, first agreed upon in 1961, are serving a valuable purpose. They deepen our understanding of one another's viewpoints and strengthen relations in a number of fields.

I am glad that, in addition to attending the meetings in Ottawa, our Japanese visitors were able to develop wider impressions of Canada from visits in Eastern Canada and the West Coast. For our part, we appreciated the opportunity, in discussions of international affairs, to arrive at a better appreciation of Asian developments derived from listening to Asian viewpoints.

These meetings reflect the wide range of official contact and common interests between Canada and Japan. In Canada, the Japanese Government is represented by its Embassy and by consulates general or consulates in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg. I understand that Japan intend to open a consulate in Edmonton on January 1, further illustrating the importance Japan assigns to its relations with this province. In Japan, Canada is represented by one of the oldest, largest and most active of our missions overseas.

Fifteen officers from five government departments are stationed in the Embassy in Tokyo to deal with political, economic, defence, trade and immigration questions. Separate offices in Tokyo are also maintained by the Canadian Wheat Board, the Canadian Travel Bureau and the Department of Manpower and Immigration.

These contacts are supplemented by an increasing number of visits, both official and unofficial. The development of rapid and direct air communication by Canadian Pacific Airlines and the awards of fellowships and scholarships

for study in Canada and in Japan have played an important part in stimulating contacts.

Canada has welcomed the fact that Japan will be a major exhibitor at Expo '67 and will itself participate in the next major international exposition in Osaka in 1970.

### **Asian and World Problems**

Both Canada and Japan attribute the highest importance to their membership in the United Nations and to the resulting obligations to support peaceful solutions to conflicts and to promote economic growth through co-operative international action.

The Canadian Government has expressed concern on many occasions about the conflict in Vietnam, in which it has a particular interest because of Canadian membership in the International Control Commission. We have also given particular attention to the question of mainland China's relations with Asian nations and with the rest of the world. In these and related political questions in Asia and in the promotion of economic growth there, we see many of the principal problems affecting world peace and stability.

We have found it particularly helpful, therefore, to review these questions with Japanese representatives. They too are convinced that the issues at stake in the Vietnam conflict can be resolved only by recourse to negotiation. The Japanese Government considers that the central issue involved is the right of a country, in this case South Vietnam, to conduct its own affairs free from outside interference.

I am pleased that, during the recent ministerial meeting, the Japanese delegation expressed satisfaction with Canada's efforts to promote a settlement in Vietnam. They indicated that they were equally determined to find ways, appropriate to their own international role, to help resolve the conflict.

The Japanese delegation thought, as we do, that China must be encouraged to follow a more constructive course. We agreed that contacts and exchanges with that nation could play an important role in leading to international co-operation on a wider scale.

Japan has manifested its interest in peaceful progress in a number of ways. The normalization of relations with the Republic of Korea achieved recently, in spite of long-standing and deeply rooted problems existing between the two nations, has been an important step forward towards stability in the Pacific. Japan has given encouragement to the Government of Indonesia in its new course of seeking peaceful relations with its neighbours and of resuming international co-operation through the United Nations. On the initiative of the Japanese Government, a multi-nation conference was held in Tokyo recently to consider ways of solving Indonesia's problems of external debt.

Japan has played a leading role in the formation of the Asian Development Bank, has held a conference earlier this year on economic development, in South-

east Asia and will hold a conference in Tokyo later this year on agricultural development in the same area. In this way Japan is doing its part to work together with Asian nations for common stability and well-being, regardless of past differences.

It is important to note the contribution which Japan can make from its experience to the efforts of less-developed Asian nations. It provides a leading example of successful economic modernization. Japan has limited area and natural resources and a large population. In spite of these conditions Japan has, during the past 100 years, transformed itself from an isolated feudal state to one of the world's most advanced economic powers.

In the post-war period, it has combined the consolidation of a democratic society with the highly successful pursuit of economic development which may already have brought it to the rank of the world's third largest industrial nation. Japanese have shown a remarkable capacity to master industrial and commercial techniques, to adapt them to their specific needs and, increasingly, to develop, improve and extend technology from which others can benefit. In a cultural and social sense, too, they wish a synthesis of modern and traditional, of Oriental and Western, in order to develop the society best suited to their own circumstances.

With their creative vitality and working diligence, the Japanese have shown that rapid economic development, drawing eclectically on the experience of others, need not mean any weakening of their independent development of a unique way of life but rather a reinforcement of that independence. Surely, in essence, this is what we hope will happen in the whole process of economic development through international co-operation.

### **Aid and UNCTAD**

The Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee reviewed the expanding programmes of both countries in the field of development assistance. The ministers of both governments stressed the urgent need for accelerated economic development in the developing areas.

I reported an increase in the Canadian programme, which will reach a level of about \$300 million this year. Subject to economic and other relevant circumstances, our programme will continue to expand. We are making good progress towards the aid target of 1 per cent of national income. In April of this year, Japan formally pledged itself to do the same.

We paid special attention to plans for the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to be held next fall. We agreed that it was vital to ensure the success of that conference. It is clear that special efforts to promote a more rapid expansion of trade and industrial growth of the developing countries are also essential ingredients in the development process. It will be very important to focus attention on particular issues, on which practical results might be achieved.

It has been the Japanese experience, as it has been our own, that international discussions, notably in UNCTAD, are leading to an improved understanding of the magnitude and complexity of these development problems and of the directions in which more vigorous national and international efforts might proceed.

It is our hope that discussions in the "Kennedy round" of tariff negotiations will make an important contribution to the expansion of trade in products of special interest to developing countries.

Canadian and Japanese ministers were particularly interested in prospects for the newly-created Asian Development Bank. This is likely to be an institution of major importance. Japan has taken a primary part in planning the operations of the Bank and has contributed \$200 million, a sum equal to that of the U.S.A. Canada has also made a substantial subscription of \$25 million to this new institution. This is over and above the significant Canadian aid programme, under the Colombo Plan, for countries in this area.

### **International Trade and Economic Relations**

Canada and Japan have common interest also in fields affecting their own well-being as major world traders. They have a vital interest, for example, in reducing international trade barriers.

The "Kennedy round" provides the first real opportunity for broad tariff and trade negotiations between Canada and Japan within a multilateral context. It could thus constitute a major step in further strengthening the trade relations between Canada and Japan and increasing and diversifying trade in both directions.

Both delegations at the ministerial meeting emphasized the importance of obtaining significant improvements in access to each other's markets in the tariff negotiations. There will be difficulties, of course, in achieving agreement but we nevertheless hope that there may be sufficient flexibility in the Japanese position to permit successful negotiation.

Canada and Japan also participate in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, along with the United States and the countries of Western Europe. They support its objective of expanding world trade on a non-discriminatory basis, of achieving the highest sustainable rate of economic growth and of contributing the sound economic expansion in developing countries.

I believe that our views on another subject of current interest to the chief trading nations — that of trade with Communist nations — are close to those held by the Japanese. We believe, of course, that there are good economic and political reasons for engaging in this trade provided that respective interests are reasonably balanced.

### **Canadian Trade with Japan**

Trade between Canada and Japan is, of course, at the centre of many of our discussions with Japanese representatives. It is very satisfying that this trade

is already extensive and that there are reasonable prospects for its continuing to increase fairly quickly. Exports and imports will total about \$600 million this year.

In large measure, of course, the two economies are complementary. There has been an impressive increase in trade between the two countries during the period 1954-1965. Canadian exports to Japan increased more than three times and imports from Japan increased 12 times. Japan has become our third largest single export market and our fourth largest supplier. We would hope that, in addition to other factors stimulating trade, Expo '67 and the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970 will make their contribution to expansion.

### **Possibilities of Improvement**

It is natural that, with trade being conducted at very high levels by nations with as strong a desire for commercial expansion as Canada and Japan, there should be areas requiring discussion, some difficulties and various promising possibilities of improvement.

I believe that there are four points with respect to which we might look for improvement or solution to some problems:

- (1) rate of growth;
- (2) make-up of our trade;
- (3) barriers to trade;
- (4) capital investment.

### **Rate of Growth**

In spite of the impressive increase in our trade with Japan during the last 10 years, it has recently been growing at a slower rate than our trade with the United States and some of our other major trading partners.

This may be owing primarily to a period of stagnation in Japan's domestic growth during 1965, and we are looking forward to a resumption of a higher rate of growth in our trade with the currently more favourable conditions in Japan.

### **Make-up of our Trade**

We are concerned that our exports to Japan are largely composed of raw materials with little if any processing, whereas our imports from Japan are made up of highly manufactured goods.

Canada values its traditional exports to Japan, such as wheat, primary foodstuffs and industrial materials, and we are glad to provide a continuing and dependable source of supply for many of the essential requirements of the Japanese economy. However, we are also interested in more rapidly developing our trade in manufactured goods and we have found it particularly difficult to increase our manufactured exports to Japan, despite the fact that we have made striking progress in doing so in other highly competitive markets, such as the United States.



I think it natural that we should not want to see this situation continue indefinitely. Canadian representatives have expressed the view that both countries have a large potential for increased trade. They have also expressed the wish that this trade should increasingly take the form of exchanges of processed goods.

In some instances, of course, the reason for Canadian difficulties in selling manufactured goods lies in highly competitive production in Japan. In other instances, high tariffs or quantitative import restrictions have adversely affected exports. It is in this latter field that we should hope progress could be made.

### **Trade and Capital Investment**

The ministerial meeting gave a good deal of attention to what representatives of the two countries considered to be the main barriers or restrictions to trade moving in either direction. It is some indication of the friendly spirit of the meeting that we could discuss frankly, and in very specific terms, the views of the two sides on these problems.

Canadian representatives described tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions and a variety of technical and administrative obstacles encountered by Canadian exporters. We naturally laid stress on our hope that ways will be found to overcome these obstacles both in the multilateral context of the "Kennedy round" and in our bilateral discussions with Japan.

On the Japanese side, emphasis was placed on the difficulties which they have encountered in exporting to Canada, in particular the effects of the voluntary export-restraint system.

We recognize that there are difficulties for the Japanese in applying export restraints of this kind, but have pointed out in our conversations with them that this system has unquestionably allowed a greater volume of sensitive imports into Canada than would have been feasible if Canada had had to set up import quotas. We have also pointed out that, in practice, Canada accords more liberal terms of access of imports of sensitive goods from Japan than does any other industrialized country.

Furthermore, the percentage of Japanese exports to Canada affected by these measures has rapidly decreased and now amounts to only 10 to 15 per cent of Japanese sales here. We are prepared to agree to the lifting of the remaining restraints as soon as they are no longer necessary to prevent disruption of Canadian markets (for example in 1966 Canada agreed to the removal of transistor radios and certain textile items from the list of restraints).

I should add that there has been no question of restraints at all on an important range of exports from Japan developed during the last few years, where sales have increased very rapidly, including such sophisticated products as cars, motor-cycles and cameras. I believe the recent ministerial meeting was useful in clarifying the facts and our point of view on this whole problem.

The Canadian representatives pointed out that we very much welcome Japanese investment which has been particularly evident on the West coast. There have,

however, been some disadvantageous features about the flow of funds between the two countries.

One of our concerns is that Japan's controls have encouraged the flow of borrowed funds rather than equity capital into Japan and that investment authorizations are too often subject to lengthy delays. Thus Canadian companies investing in Japan have all too often been unable to secure what we would regard as an appropriate voice in the control over their investments in Japan. This is in striking contrast to the position of Japanese investors in Canada, who are free to invest here in any form they wish.

The Canadian delegation expressed the hope that the remaining restrictions on Canadian investment in Japan would be lifted as soon as possible and also that Japanese investors in Canada would take into account the desirability of increasing the degree of processing in their exports from Canada. The Japanese are now fully aware of our views on this matter and we are confident that they will be giving thought to these problems.

### **Conclusion**

I have pointed only to the highlights of the discussions on trade matters at the ministerial committee meeting. I cannot hope to suggest in this speech the detailed answers to many questions which may arise in the minds of some of those here today. I wanted, rather, to emphasize the wide range of commercial questions which, along with other economic and with political matters, are a normal part of Canada-Japan consultations.

One point which is particularly noteworthy is the obvious determination of our two countries to tackle trade problems in a spirit of goodwill and to adapt and improve the patterns of our trade, which are so important to both of us. This determination is based on friendship between our two nations and a confidence in each other as trading partners.

I believe that this friendship and confidence provide evidence of the distance we have travelled from some of the unhappy periods in international relations in the past. On mutual confidence and on continuing efforts towards the effective solution of trading and development problems involving many countries, we can build the political trust which is the essential ingredient of world peace.

This is the path to which Japan and Canada are now committed.

# Canadian Statement on Disarmament

A STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 26, 1966, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  
E. L. M. BURNS, ADVISER TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT  
ON DISARMAMENT (1)

A YEAR ago, the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out that to halt spread of nuclear weapons was the most urgent problem confronting this organization. The same view has been expressed by many world leaders in speeches before the United Nations and elsewhere. Spokesmen of my own Government have repeatedly called attention to the grave dangers to peace which could be caused if more countries acquired nuclear weapons.

If this problem was urgent a year ago, it is much more urgent today. In the 12 months that have elapsed since last we debated disarmament in this Committee, several countries have carried out further tests of nuclear weapons. The U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and France have each conducted several nuclear tests and China, already an important military power, has given further evidence of her determination to develop her military nuclear capability. This makes it plain how important it is to bring all the present nuclear powers into active participation in international disarmament deliberations. With every month that passes, nuclear technology is becoming more widespread, and with every reactor constructed to generate electric power, more fissile material adaptable for the manufacture of bombs is becoming available. The Canadian Delegation has long urged that action be taken immediately to curb the further spread of nuclear weapons, and to diminish the threat of nuclear war by ensuring that these weapons are restricted to nations now possessing them. Among possible measures, priority should be given to a non-proliferation treaty and to an agreement prohibiting all nuclear tests, whether in the atmosphere or underground.

To the Canadian Delegation, and, I think, to all of us, it must appear that the prospects for achieving agreement on non-proliferation are more favourable today than they were a year ago. At our meeting on October 20, we heard Mr. Federenko say: "There are no insurmountable difficulties for the solution of this problem". And later: "The Soviet Union is working consistently for the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without delay". Mr. Goldberg quoted what Mr. Gromyko, the

(1) See also the article entitled "Disarmament Negotiations", *External Affairs*, October 1966, Pp. 445-453.

Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., said after his recent meetings with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk: "Both countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, are striving to reach agreement to facilitate conclusion of an international agreement on this question". And Mr. Goldberg also quoted what President Johnson said on October 13: "We have hopes that we can find some language that will protect the national interests of both countries and permit us to enter into the thing that I think we need most to do, that is, a non-proliferation agreement". I make no apology for repeating these statements, for they show, the Canadian Delegation believes, the increased determination of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to solve this problem, to come together on suitable terms for the provisions of a non-proliferation treaty. They show — and we have other indications — that there is a new spirit in the negotiations, a realization that the importance of achieving agreement on this sector of the disarmament problem greatly outweighs some of the considerations which have delayed progress heretofore. The Canadian Delegation applauds that determination. We are heartened to learn that a new series of talks have been initiated to work out terms mutually acceptable to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. We welcome the prospect of further meetings between the two major powers which, assisted by the discussions in this Committee and in the ENDC, may result in an agreed text acceptable to all states concerned — the nuclear powers and the states which do not have nuclear weapons alike.

#### **Non-Proliferation Treaty**

While this year's meetings of the ENDC recorded no spectacular achievements, it is generally conceded that the discussions have been most useful in clarifying the issues that lie before the Committee. This was particularly true of the non-proliferation deliberations. Mr. Goldberg, in his address on October 20, outlined the areas where progress had been made: (1) progress towards understanding that collective nuclear defence arrangements do not and need not lead to proliferation; (2) progress in accepting the need for safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities; (3) progress in understanding the special problems of peaceful nuclear explosions; (4) progress in exploring ways to halt, and indeed to reverse, the build-up of nuclear weapons stockpiles and delivery systems. We were encouraged by the generally high level of debate in the ENDC this year, and by the frankness of the exchange and by the helpful and constructive contribution of the non-aligned members of the Committee. In their joint memo on non-proliferation, they expressed their concern that an eventual treaty should reflect a balance of obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries and should lead to wider measures of arms control and general and complete disarmament. I think it fair to say that their point of view has been accepted by the other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. While the Canadian Delegation attaches the utmost importance to the early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty,

we regard it as only the first of many measures designed to stem the nuclear arms race and bring us closer to our objective of general and complete disarmament. We welcome what Mr. Federenko said: "As it works for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government does not in any way strive to consolidate and perpetuate the so-called nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers. Such an agreement cannot and must not be regarded as an end in itself; it should be regarded only as a step towards the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons". And Mr. Goldberg said essentially the same thing . . . .

### **Canada's Position**

The Canadian Government stands firmly committed to its long-established policy not to produce nuclear weapons, which has been well within our technical ability for many years. We are also committed to the conclusion of a universal non-proliferation treaty as the most urgent arms-control measure before the international community. There is considerable common ground between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. draft treaties now on the table. We believe they are close enough in object and scope that we can reasonably expect conclusive negotiations on the substance of a treaty. As far as the substance is concerned, we wish to see a formula which would ensure that the nations possessing nuclear weapons — or nuclear powers — be limited to the existing five, and that the control of nuclear weapons not be allowed to pass to other countries. We are satisfied that this can be done without interfering with legitimate defensive arrangements of alliances.

We think it important that a treaty include an effective provision for verifying that obligations undertaken are observed. Article III of the present U.S.A. draft treaty, which would call upon all signatories "to co-operate in facilitating the application of the IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities", would contribute both to the effective working of a non-proliferation treaty and the strengthening of the international safeguards system. If provision were also made for the application of international safeguards on a mandatory basis to all foreign transfers of fissile materials, as is, indeed, already the policy of the Canadian Government, a safeguards article would itself become an effective obstacle to further proliferation.

Since it is impossible to distinguish between the technology required for nuclear explosions for military and for peaceful purposes, we consider that the countries not possessing nuclear weapons should give up the right to conduct nuclear explosions for any purpose whatsoever. Such action on their part would, of course, have to be subject to an undertaking to establish a service under international supervision which would make available, at a fair cost, nuclear explosive services for legitimate civil projects whenever such explosions become technically and economically feasible, and provided they are consistent with test-ban treaty obligations. This would ensure that the benefits of controlled

nuclear explosions would be generally available at minimum cost without incurring the drastic political and military consequences of the further national development of nuclear bombs.

We feel that it may be necessary to give security assurances to non-aligned countries, over and above the general terms of the UN Charter. In this way, perhaps, any disadvantages of their accession to a non-proliferation treaty could be offset. Whether these assurances are to be provided within the context of a non-proliferation treaty, or in some other way, will mostly depend on the views of the countries concerned. We should therefore be most interested to hear the views of non-aligned members on the merits of the various alternatives which have been proposed, as well as any other ideas which they themselves may advance.

We believe that, as now revised, draft Resolution A/C.I/L.368 on the renunciation of actions hampering the conclusion of the agreement on non-proliferation should contribute to establishing a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations which will be taking place here, in Geneva and elsewhere and help expedite them. It was for this reason we decided to associate ourselves with the resolution as a co-sponsor.

While Canada is committed to a universal non-proliferation treaty, we by no means rule out the regional approach to non-proliferation. We therefore support and should like to encourage countries attempting to create nuclear free zones in areas relatively free from grave international tensions. The efforts of the Latin American and Caribbean countries in this regard deserve particular praise and we would also wish African countries success in their aspirations to make their continent a de-nuclearized zone.

### **Underground Tests**

Most countries, including the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., advocate an end to nuclear testing underground to complete the agreement which was reached in Moscow to prohibit nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. The difficulty, of course, is over verifying that all parties to the treaty shall respect obligations not to carry out underground tests. The position of the U.S.S.R. is that all underground tests anywhere can be detected by national means within national territories. The position of the U.S.A. and its Western allies is that, although considerable improvements have been made in detecting underground tests by seismological and other scientific means, yet a certain number of underground events still cannot be identified as either earthquakes or nuclear explosions. That is to say that, if verification of a treaty were limited to seismological means alone, there would still be a possibility of a nation evading its obligations by carrying out clandestine underground tests. The U.S. position is that a small number of inspections at sites of unidentified events is necessary in order to be sure that obligations would be adhered to.

As I have indicated, there has been continuing effort to improve techniques

for detecting and identifying of underground events. Possibilities of supplementing them are being explored. Canada supports the proposal put forward for this purpose by Sweden, which is that interested countries, primarily those not nuclear powers, should exchange seismic information. The proposed exchanges would take place principally among those countries with a sufficiently advanced seismological science and data-gathering or processing equipment, but results would be available to all. With information coming from many sources, individual countries would be in a better position to assess whether any suspicious underground event was natural or nuclear in origin. We attach importance to the participation of the nuclear powers in the suggested exchange and welcome their expressed interest. If the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., for example, could provide information from sites close to indeterminate events to supplement information now available from distant monitoring, many more nuclear events could be identified.

It has also been suggested recently that the idea of so-called "black boxes" — that is, sealed seismographic installations — could supplement distant means and would make it almost certain that no clandestine testing could be carried out. We should hope that the U.S.S.R. will also agree to co-operate in examining such procedures, which, in combination with others, might make it possible to break the deadlock in the underground test prohibition problem, and permit the successful culmination of the efforts which have been under way since the Moscow Treaty was signed. We have also studied, with much interest, other proposals made by Sweden, Mexico, Brazil and the U.A.R. in an effort to bridge the gap between the positions of the two major powers on this issue. We hope these suggestions will be carefully considered by those principally concerned.

Another proposal which, though not new, commends itself to Canada is to halt the production of fissile material for military purposes, popularly known as the "cut-off". Several nations besides the U.S.A. (which has elaborated proposals in this regard) appreciate that a verified halt in the production of fissile material for use in weapons would reverse the dangerous continual increase in the nuclear potential of nuclear powers. It would be, therefore, an anti-proliferatory measure mainly affecting nuclear powers, and would constitute a "balancing obligation" to the obligations nations without nuclear weapons would incur by signing a non-proliferation treaty. In our view, the cessation of fissile material production should be seriously studied. It combines the quality of not endangering existing national security with the positive values to which I have just referred.

### **Goal of Total Disarmament**

This brings me to the question of general and complete disarmament which has not occupied very much of the time of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in this year's discussions, although it was not neglected entirely in the ENDC. We have

always recognized that a disarmed and peaceful world is our final goal. But the same difficulties have always faced us when discussions of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. draft treaties have been undertaken. I think most of those in this Committee who have studied the matter at all know the positions of the two sides. It has been clear for a long time that the crux of the problem lies in the opposed conceptions of how nuclear armaments are to be reduced and then eliminated. It is also clear that little progress can be expected on this central problem until greater mutual confidence exists, so that the nations concerned can feel any nuclear weapons reduction would not imperil the balance of our present security arrangements. It seems to the Canadian Delegation that we must look for some new, more hopeful means of initiating a process which will lead eventually, through increasing confidence on both sides, to general and complete disarmament. We favour the step-by-step approach because it seems illusory to think that significant disarmament advances will be made in any other way. The Canadian Delegation feels that a non-proliferation treaty, an underground test ban, the cut-off of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and the reconversion of existing nuclear weapons and explosive material for peaceful uses would be important initial steps which could be followed by others and lead us towards the general disarmament which we have all declared as our goal. These ideas are some of the important, but by no means the only, measures which should be given serious study here and elsewhere, in order that the impetus of the hopeful agreements of 1963 can be regained, so that we may move forward to more far-reaching stages of general and complete disarmament itself . . . .



# *External Affairs in Parliament*

## **Statement on Canadian Policy**

*The following statement was made to the House of Commons on November 24 by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable L. B. Pearson :*

I think China is the subject that I should deal with first, because it is one that has been touched upon . . . by those speakers representing the various parties who have preceded me . . . . I think that, if the statement made yesterday by the Secretary of State for External Affairs is examined in detail by those who are interested, they will find that what has been said in the House of Commons is not in contradiction to what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in New York yesterday. The Canadian position in respect of this very important matter of the representation of China at the United Nations, I believe, was very clearly outlined in the statement made yesterday. The Secretary of State for External Affairs . . . outlined the essentials which we would consider would constitute a reasonable solution to this problem. I know it is difficult to formulate an important matter in a word but, in a word, the proposal was that the Governments of both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should be represented in the General Assembly in respect of the territories under their effective jurisdictions and that the Government of the People's Republic of China should be the permanent member on the Security Council, representing the territory over which it effectively has had jurisdiction for 15 or more years now and which includes 700 million people.

The position embodied in the Minister's statement was framed specifically to avoid interference in what must be considered as internal Chinese affairs and, in particular, to avoid prejudging the question of China's being a single sovereign entity, as both Chinese Governments claim at the present time. Of course, we know this. Therefore, this proposal or suggestion is not an attempt to create two Chinas; it is an attempt to outline what might be a reasonable interim solution to the problem of Chinese representation, strictly limited to the United Nations context, with no implications in respect of the questions of sovereignty or territorial rights which one day will have to be settled by the Chinese themselves, including those who live on Taiwan. That was the purpose of the statement. The policy embodied in that statement has been given to this House by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and, indeed, by myself, on more than one occasion. It is a policy based on the desirability of universality in a world organization. In that statement of yesterday, we have not abandoned the belief that the policy of universality should be implemented in such a way that it would not expel a present member government from the United Nations.

In making that statement and in outlining this policy, the objective was to begin, and we hoped it would begin, a process of breaking the log jam which has faced the United Nations Assembly for many years. We hoped it might produce some ideas which might result in some progress being made in dealing with the matter of representation of China, which is on the agenda of the United Nations, as it has been now year after year for more than 15 years. I believe the statement which has been made will have a helpful effect in that direction. I hope that it will result in other motions being made at the United Nations General Assembly, in the form of new and positive approaches to at least an examination of this problem with a view to finding a solution.

Before the United Nations Assembly at present there are three resolutions which deal with the question of Chinese representation. There is the resolution which comes up every year (and this is the one which I hope will be decided first), to decide whether or not this question is an important one within the meaning of the rules of procedure of the United Nations. If it is considered to be a question of great substance (and I cannot imagine a question of much greater importance), it then would require a two-thirds majority. That is important. This is one resolution. Then there is the perennial Albanian resolution, which provides for the admission of the Government of Peking, and at the same time for the expulsion from the United Nations of the Government of Taiwan.

When the Secretary of State for External Affairs issued his statement on Chinese representation in November 1965, he was dealing with the Albanian resolution and explaining why we would not support it at that time. We do not propose to support it this year either, because we cannot vote for a resolution which, in its terms, would expel the Government of Taiwan from the United Nations. Presumably this resolution will come up early next week for decision. There will be the same reluctance (and, indeed, impossibility), on our part, to support a resolution in those terms.

Then there is a third resolution put forward by the Italian, Belgian, Chilean and, I think, one or two other Delegations which provides for an examination of the matter by a committee which would report back to the United Nations Assembly a year from now. In its terms, it is almost the same kind of resolution which the Canadian Delegation put forward in 1950 without very much success.

We appreciate the desire of the sponsors of this resolution to join us and others in making a step forward and in making some progress in this matter. We feel it is a satisfactory resolution so far as it goes, but we do not feel that it goes far enough to ensure that, at the end of the year's examination, we shall be faced at the next meeting of the Assembly with a realistic and helpful report on this matter which could lead to further desirable action. That is the reason the Secretary of State for External Affairs made a statement yesterday and proposed an examination of the question, not in the form of a resolution.

but rather in the form of a suggestion put forward for consideration and discussion. In this form it goes somewhat further than the Italian resolution, because it lays down certain guide-lines — if I may use that word — which would influence the examination which is about to be made. It suggested that that examination should not be carried on by a committee of the Assembly, because it would be difficult indeed to get a satisfactory committee. The suggestion was that this be carried out by the President of the Assembly himself, with all the help he can get from the many sources available to him, and particularly from the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

This proposal, which was put forward yesterday, embodied a policy which goes a long way back before this session of the General Assembly. I believe it will continue after this Assembly rises. It is not embodied in a resolution. Had we made this suggestion in the form of a resolution (and we had been considering that right up until the last few days) it might have been, and indeed I think it would have been, defeated by a large majority as going too far for some and not far enough for others. With the Italian resolution which is on the order paper providing for an examination, such a proposal by Canada might have received an inadequate number of votes and, that particular kind of a proposal having been defeated in the form of a resolution, it might have been more difficult to resurrect later. However, in the form of the proposal as made in a statement by the Canadian Delegation, it is now open for discussion and consideration.

More than one speaker this afternoon has asked how the Government of Peking and its policies have changed so as to warrant the Canadian Delegation putting forward a proposal of this kind at this time. There is no one who can be optimistic, in the light of events, that it would be possible to find any resolution which would be acceptable to the Peking Government, except one in the terms of the Albanian resolution, which we could not support because of its expulsion clause. We have no illusions about that and we have no illusions that Peking's policy has suddenly changed or that the Government of Peking by any change would suddenly become eligible for participation in the United Nations as a peace-loving nation within the terms of its Charter. If one applied that standard literally to all the members of the United Nations today, or to the nations who may apply in future, I do not know how many members of the United Nations would be able to subscribe to such terms without some qualification.

The question is not whether the policies of the Government of Peking have suddenly changed in a way that makes it an acceptable representative at the United Nations which has no revolutionary or aggressive instincts, or that it has suddenly abandoned certain policies which could hardly be called peace-loving. That is not the question which faces the United Nations at this time. The question is whether or not the United Nations is going to take its responsibility in doing its best to see that a suitable basis can be found in that world

assembly so that a government which represents effectively 700 million people in this world can be represented in that organization. We will discharge our responsibility as a member of the United Nations if we try to find a basis of negotiation with Peking. Having done that, it will be up to Peking to make a decision. It may well be that the Government of Peking will spurn—as indeed it has already given some indication it will—this kind of offer to find a basis on which membership could be granted. The United Nations and its members will have discharged this responsibility if an effort is made to find such a basis for membership. That is the purpose of the examination that has been proposed by the Italian and other delegates, and it is the purpose of the proposals that have been put forward by our Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Let me now move from China and its representation at the United Nations to the second subject which has been referred to this afternoon. I should like to deal with the question of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There is no more important matter on the international scene at this time, nor one more fraught with immediate danger to general peace in that area.

It is very discouraging, but realistic, to note that, since the House last discussed foreign affairs, there has been no movement in Vietnam which brings us any closer to a peaceful settlement. Despite repeated attempts to find a basis for peace talks, the problem in Vietnam is still being tackled today as a military problem. We have made clear our belief, (and I know this House shares this belief because Hon. Members have made that clear this afternoon,) that the removal of this source of serious instability in Southeast Asia (that is putting it mildly) will not be achieved by military means alone . . . .

It is precisely because we are convinced of the need for a political solution that we have made every effort within our power to see whether we could help in finding a basis for a political solution. That is also the reason we have welcomed the repeated expressions of the United States' willingness to enter into negotiations leading to a lasting settlement. That is also why we are discouraged and disappointed that there has been no expression of such intention, desire or willingness on the part of the Government of North Vietnam, which is certainly a party to this conflict.

While I can understand the difficulty of the Government of North Vietnam relating any kind of movement toward peace to the bombing of its territory or, as long as the bombing of its territory is going on, to talk about a peace movement, I find it very difficult to understand why that Government has refused to accept missions, including the mission of Commonwealth prime ministers, which desire to discuss with that Government the basis upon which some kind of peaceful negotiation could be brought about. The mission I mention consisted of prime ministers of countries not unfriendly to the North Vietnamese side of this case, and none committed to the United States side. That has been very discouraging indeed . . . .

We have always held the view that the bombing of North Vietnam was, and indeed remains, the key element in this dangerous military and diplomatic impasse. We have made that view known more than once in Washington and at least once in public in the United States. We have also made clear our belief that the bombing is unlikely to stop merely as a result of denunciatory declarations or appeals. Nor is any practical impact going to be made by an oversimplified and unrealistic prescription for peace which places on only one side the full burden of responsibility for making essential concessions.

I should like to hear a statement from Washington to the effect that bombing will stop, and I should like to hear a statement from Hanoi that, if the bombing stops, the infiltration of troops into South Vietnam will stop. There are indications that this is the direction of United States policy statements. If there is any fear on the part of North Vietnam, Communists in North Vietnam, in Peking, in Moscow or anywhere else that the United States will not withdraw from South Vietnam after peace negotiations have begun, or perhaps brought to an end, I should like it made crystal clear that the United States has no intention of remaining in South Vietnam. I believe that to be the case . . . .

. . . What I am trying to point out . . . is that, if the suspicion that the United States is going to stay indefinitely in Vietnam can be removed, and if these powers can be convinced that the United States is there for one purpose — to support a government which it considers to be the victim of aggression, the situation might improve. If these people can be convinced that, once this aggression (as the United States and South Vietnam see it) has stopped, and once peace talks have started, the process of withdrawal will begin, that South Vietnam is not going to be a base for the United States, as I believe the United States does not wish it to be, and that the people, as a result of peace talks, will have the opportunity of deciding their destiny for themselves as a neutral power, if they so wish, I am sure the results will be beneficial.

I think it is important to remove any fear. We have discovered this fear in all the talks and discussions we have had with Communist representatives. They say that the United States have not moved into the area with the forces they have, with the facilities they have brought in, with the work that has been done there—the building of harbours, and all that sort of thing—unless the United States are going to stay. If that fear could be removed, it would be a great step forward. There must be the removal of this fear if there is to be peace. The people of the area must also have the chance to vote freely as to what they want to do, and under what regime they want to live. If we could remove these fears, I think we would progress a long way on the road to peace. But that is a very big “if” indeed.

I do not think there is anything more I can usefully add at this time, except perhaps to repeat what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said the other day. In the talks we have had recently, and through his visit to Moscow and Poland, we have found little for encouragement in so far as

the prospect for immediate improvement in the situation is concerned. There are very great differences of view, for instance, between ourselves and other Western countries and the Soviet Union, though I believe the Soviet Union is as anxious to bring this war to an end as we are. But they feel that this cannot be done unless the United States stops its bombing and fighting and begins to remove its troops. They say that at that time there will be the right kind of reaction from the North. The United States feels it should not be asked to take those steps unless there is some assurance that they will result in negotiation and peace. So there does not seem to be much likelihood of a quick settlement.

The question of Rhodesia was discussed by previous speakers. I will try to deal with some of the points that have been raised. I think the prime ministers' conference of a year ago was correct in discussing this question . . . . It seems to me that if the Government immediately concerned with the problem of Rhodesia, which is the United Kingdom because it has still the immediate responsibility, brought the question before the prime ministers' conference, and the other members of the conference were anxious to discuss it—certainly the Africans were, and insisted on a discussion—we would have been defaulting on our responsibility had we said: No, this is not a matter we should discuss. This is especially so in view of the fact that the prime ministers' conference, quite rightly, discussed the question of South Africa on a previous occasion. Anyway, the question of Rhodesia was discussed. The United Kingdom, which admitted its immediate responsibility, asked for the views of other members of the Commonwealth as to how the question could best be settled in a way which would protect the interests of the majority of the people.

There were those at the meeting last January who were demanding military intervention at once, that force be used to put down the illegal regime. It was argued that, if the illegal regime had been black and the majority had been white, there would not have been any delay by the United Kingdom or anybody else concerned in using force. There was a great deal of suspicion that there was no sincerity on the part of certain members of the Commonwealth in their desire to see that the rights of the majority—who number about 4 million to 200,000—were protected and respected.

Before that time, the United Kingdom Government had laid down six points which governed its policy in Rhodesia. These have been the basis of its policy. Our Government has supported those points. We made them clear to the House of Commons last spring. We continue to support those points. They provide for unimpeded progress toward the establishment in Rhodesia of a government which will represent the majority of the people on non-racial lines.

It was felt by the United Kingdom that the application of voluntary sanctions might be effective. We were told that they were likely to be effective. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was optimistic at the conference in Lagos.

These sanctions, as I said the other day in the House, have not been effective. We learned this morning that, if progress is not made in the next few days in the discussions between Salisbury and London (and I can see very little likelihood at the present time of any progress on that front—the Secretary of State at the request of the Governor, before the final break occurs in the sense that for Commonwealth Relations is going to Salisbury today to see the Governor, discussions are cut off), there will then be recourse to the United Nations.

Progress may be made in these discussions, but I have not very much optimism in this respect. We will see whether Mr. Bowden, when he returns to London, brings with him some information which will make unnecessary recourse to the United Nations. But I think . . . that it is likely the matter will be brought before the United Nations Security Council in the first instance by the United Kingdom Government. The United Kingdom Government has been discussing with other members of the Commonwealth procedures that should be adopted with regard to the resolutions which may be brought forward. The United Kingdom is committed to this course because of the meeting we had in London last September. At that meeting we agreed that, if progress had not been made by (I think it was) the end of November, and if the Commonwealth members supported the United Kingdom in the steps that would be taken, sanctions and resolutions would be brought forward under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

Chapter 7, Part 1, under which the United Kingdom would presumably be operating, provides for obligatory economic sanctions. Under that section of the United Nations Charter, this action could be taken. There is, of course, a very great difference between the kind of sanctions put into effect last year and the sanctions which would be put into effect if the Security Council agreed to make them obligatory on all United Nations members . . . . This course could not be effective unless those sanctions were extended to South Africa. I know this is a very great difficulty, and I suppose the United Kingdom knows even better that it is a very great difficulty.

I would only point out that, if the United Nations and all its members were sincere in their desire to put into effect selective obligatory sanctions and took the necessary steps to carry them out, it would be possible, by selecting certain key exports from Rhodesia, to do very great and perhaps crippling damage to the economy of that country, because it would be possible to police these sanctions in a way that was not possible in respect of the present sanctions. There are only five or six commodities which are of critical importance to Rhodesian exports. It would not be easy to export those commodities through South Africa, to members of the United Nations who were putting sanctions into effect, without the importing countries knowing that they came originally from Rhodesia, because in most cases they would know the commodities were not South African at all in their origin.

It is a question of whether the United Nations wishes to take this step

and whether the members of the United Nations fall behind it and do their best to make it work. If they do not do this, these sanctions will not work either, if they are put into effect. We are committed to the policy of co-operating in regard to selective obligatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter when they are brought before the United Nations, because we feel they will—and we hope they will—have the effect in Rhodesia of bringing about a state of mind which would result in negotiations on the basis that the rights of the majority in that country are respected as to the form of government under which they wish to live. This is the only basis on which these negotiations would ever succeed.

We also made it clear that we do not think that objective will be accomplished by the use of military force, which might have results far beyond those which are visualized by pressing for that kind of military sanction. Therefore, we believe we should confine our efforts in this regard to economic sanctions and the financial and economic isolation of this *de facto* illegal government . . . .

I wish I had more time to discuss NATO but I have not. I know that the committee is anxious to get on with other business. But while we have been considering China, Southeast Asia and Rhodesia we should not overlook the fact that a key area of the world remains Eastern and Western Europe, and that NATO remains a vital agency for peace and progress in that area through its provision of machinery for collective defence and for building up the Atlantic Community.

Important changes are taking place in NATO. We who have believed in NATO from the beginning, as I know all members of this House have, should remember that what was exactly the right form of organization for 1949 is not necessarily the right form of organization for 1966. I think these changes will have to be reflected in the form and structure of NATO.

For one thing, . . . the European countries should be given or should take a greater share in the control and functioning of the collective defence organization. But, if they are to do this, they will also have to take a greater share in responsibility too. I think that, if we are to keep NATO going as an effective organization (and I hope we can) we will have to move toward a form of partnership between the North American side of NATO and the European side of NATO, both sides working together. We in NATO will also have to move away from the immediate military defensive side toward (and I hope this turns out to be the case) political discussion with Eastern Europe and the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

We in NATO have been talking about this for the last ten years but have shied away from it. Some of its members have thought that this would be a sign of weakness or would be too defensive, but it is pretty well agreed now that a very important function of NATO is to establish contact with the other collective security organization in Eastern Europe. If this is to be done, then all members of NATO will have to work together—and this includes France.

I am sure no one regrets more than the members of this House the abandon-



ment by France of its position in NATO so far as an integrated military organization is concerned. But France still remains a member of the Organization, withdrawing from the political side of NATO. In the future, I hope that France may come back even into the military side of NATO. To be a member of a defence organization like NATO and to take part in collective defence but to say that you will not organize for collective defence until the emergency occurs flies in the face of all history, especially modern history. So I hope that perhaps even in that respect there may be developments which will strengthen NATO in the years ahead.

### **Reported U.A.R.-Israel Conflict**

*On November 29, in reply to a request that he say "something regarding the ominous situation in the Middle East and the report today that various areas in the Middle East are on the brink of an explosion the like of which has not been seen since 1956", Mr. Pearson said:*

I can only express the hope that the report. . . that we are on the brink of an explosion in that area involving greater danger than that of 1956 will turn out to be greatly exaggerated. It is true that a dangerous situation has developed as a result of Israel's reaction against what it considered to be serious border provocation. This is the matter which was dealt with by the United Nations Security Council when a resolution was passed criticizing Israel's reaction.

It is also true that there was a report about an air engagement that took place this morning. According to the information so far available, and naturally we are making further inquiries, a small number of Israel and United Arab Republic aircraft were engaged in an action near the mid-point between the Israel and Arab borders. Early reports indicate that two U.A.R. aircraft were shot down in this encounter.

As Hon. Members are aware, the United Nations has a peace-keeping force stationed in this area. I think we can take some satisfaction from the knowledge that this force is there. We expect to have more precise information shortly, and when that information arrives I will report to the House at once.

### **Rhodesia—Support of Mandatory Sanctions**

*A little later the same day, asked whether, in view of the visit to Washington and Ottawa by Sir Saville Garner, British Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, he could inform the House if he had "had consultation with our representative in London serving as chairman of the Sanctions Committee on*

*Rhodesia, or with the British Government with regard to the reply they have received from the Rhodesian Government", the Prime Minister said:*

Yes, we have been in continuous consultation through our High Commissioner at Canada House, the United Kingdom High Commissioner here and the British Government direct on this matter. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations was in Salisbury visiting the Governor for a few days. He has returned to London with certain suggestions made by the *de facto* Government in Salisbury, apparently, through the Governor. I understand that the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, will be visiting Washington and Ottawa. I expect to see him when he arrives Friday morning, when he will be bringing the views of the United Kingdom Government on the question, presumably, of selective mandatory sanctions which might be put forward by the British Government to the United Nations in case the talks with the Rhodesian Government in Salisbury finally break down. That is all I think I can say at the moment.

## APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RESIGNATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. H. Landriault separated from the Department of External Affairs effective September 30, 1966.
- Mr. C. S. Gadd posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Port-of-Spain, to Ottawa, effective October 9, 1966.
- Mr. T. N. Ulch posted from the Canadian Embassy, Quito, to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective October 26, 1966.
- Mr. R. B. Edmonds posted from the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, Vientiane, to the Canadian Embassy, Stockholm, effective October 31, 1966.
- Mr. W. M. Weynerowski appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 2, effective November 1, 1966.
- Mr. L. J. Wilder posted from the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective November 1, 1966.
- Mr. J. G. McEntyre appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Canadian Consul General in Los Angeles, effective November 1, 1966.
- Mr. A. W. Sullivan posted from the Delegation of Canada to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Saigon, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Port-of-Spain, effective November 3, 1966.
- Mr. M. R. Pelletier posted from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva to Ottawa, effective November 3, 1966.
- Mr. O. A. Chistoff posted from the Canadian Embassy, Stockholm, to Ottawa, effective November 4, 1966.
- Mr. C. Laverdure posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective November 4, 1966.
- Mr. P. E. Heinbecker posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, effective November 5, 1966.
- Mr. F. M. Filleul posted from the Canadian Embassy, Ankara, to the Canadian Embassy, Dakar, effective November 15, 1966.
- Mr. C. D. Fogerty posted from the Canadian Embassy, Prague, to Ottawa, effective November 18, 1966.

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