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VACATION AND TERM.—THEIR ORIGIN.

TIME:

Orl.—"*Who stays it still withal?*"

Ros.—"*With lawyers in the vacation for they sleep between term and term and they perceive not how time moves.*"

AS YOU LIKE IT.

PERHAPS the earnest law student is the last man in the world who has time to unravel the myriads of little mysteries constantly encountered in the study of the law. Nor is it absolutely necessary, provided he occupy his time in training his mind to grasp the great principles of law and their application that he should exhaust his nerve centres in mastering all the trifling incidentals. He may submit to being befogged by incomprehensible snatches of Norman French—often snipped from the preambles of musty old statutes—with impunity. Many a time when perusing the involved sentences of some old text writer he would fain come *de profundis* into the light, but his confusion is sure to be worse confounded by a free libation of Church Latin poured from the pages of some old ecclesiastic whose justice would have been tempered with mercy had subsequent text writers clothed it in the less fashionable garb of unpretending English. Often in such cases would the impulse be to slam the book together, cry aloud *obscurum per obscurius!* and dash Tom I. or Tom

II. into the middle of next week, Hades, or—to provide against the possibility of a second encounter—into some less committal place, say Valhalla, the resting place of the Scandinavian warriors. [It will be noticed that the words used above are "perhaps the earnest law student is the last *man*," and it may be as well to say that the italicized word has been used advisedly, for has it not been decided that an attorney's clerk should not be described as a "gentleman?" *Tuton* v. *Sanover, 3 H. & N. 280; Beales* v. *Tennant, L. J. 29, Q. B. 188; Brodrick* v. *Seale, L. R. 6 Q. B. 98.*]

One of his first difficulties will be to obtain a clear idea of the succession of the various terms and vacations; this is sure to seem awkward at first, but before long the beginning of a vacation will loom up like a workman's dinner hour, and he will predict the very moment when it is bound to arrive. Not only will he know that Christmas vacation comes between Christmas and Hilary terms, Easter between Hilary and Easter, etc., but he will be able to tell glibly when every one of the terms begins and the exact day of its ending. Having accomplished this, one is sure to feel considerably relieved, but not wholly satisfied. There is a churchy sound about the names of the terms, that seems unaccountable. The first impulse is to exclaim what "in the name of the evil spirits of the Hartz Mountains" had St. Michael, St, Hilary and the boiled-egg-season to do with motion papers and rules nisi? How came we by term and vacation, and what led to the present arrangement by which Christmas vacation is sandwiched in between St. Michael and St. Hilary, etc.?

In 1873 a good deal was said about a proposed shortening of the long vacation in England, and soon after the adoption of the Judicature Act in Ontario the judges of that Province recommended that the midsummer vacation be extended to the first of September. One would be inclined to think that having ascertained the reasons given now-a-days for varying the vacations some clue would have been obtained to their origin and first arrangement, but

what do we find?—that the shortening of the English vacation was strenuously opposed because a number of noble and distinguished lawyers and judges (*Can. L. J., vol. 10, p. 330*) had died of overwork, and that the lengthening of the Ontario midsummer vacation was called for (*Can. L. T. vol. II. p. 97*), "because two months is not a very long time for a partial rest" for—the lawyers. Let the curious read as they will and the main consideration will be found to be "the lawyers"—the lawyers must "sleep between term and term"—but what ideas can be more opposed than "the lawyers" and *saints* (*Mrs. Grundy, Passim*); even St. Michael and St. Hilary, they (the curious) will be further than ever from the object of their search.

It seems to be an accepted matter of history (*Holly's Blackstone*) that for the origin of our term and vacation it is necessary to go back to the *dies fasti* and *nefasti* (business days and holidays) into which the whole Roman year was divided (*Ovid; Fast, vv. 145, Wharton's L. Lex. p. 301*); an arrangement of the year said to have been instituted by Numa Pompilius. On the *dies fasti* the praetor was allowed to administer justice in the public courts, but *dies nefasti* were holidays, when the court doors remained closed, and litigation was at a stand still. For a long time this custom of the Romans, like many others of the same origin in our early law and observances, held sway, but with the rise of Christianity and a consequent antipathy to Roman superstitions and fasts, this artificial partition of the year was disregarded and the twelve months were given up indiscriminately to litigation.

The Christians themselves having cleared away the older fabric were not long in erecting a new one in its place. The Church interjected a few holy seasons during which litigation was strictly prohibited. Advent and Christmas among these corresponded to the winter vacation, Lent and Easter to the spring vacation, and Pentecost to the third, while—perhaps from having a heavy interest in tithes and other fractional parts of the crop—a separate Church edict

required that hay time and harvest be not interfered with, and for this purpose the long vacation between midsummer and Michaelmas was first instituted. (*Blackstone quoting Spelman of the Terms, and Rymer's Feodera.*) This arrangement was "established by a canon of the Church A. D. 517, and was fortified by an imperial edict of the younger Theodosius," and these prohibitions seems to have been kept in view in all subsequent statutes; e. g., in the time of Edward the Confessor, "no secular plea could be held and no man sworn on the Evangelists during Advent, Lent, Pentecost, harvest and vintage," but later (*Stat. West. I., 3 Edw. I. c. 51*) under special circumstances certain business was allowed to be gone on with in Advent, Septuagesima and Lent, "by the assent of all the prelates," and that "at the special request of the King to the bishops." In this way arose the four vacations or periods of no work for the lawyers, at that time imposed upon the profession from without and no doubt whether they liked it or not; it is a curious change in circumstances to contemplate—the vacations at one time *imposed* in the interests of the Church, harvest and vintage, are now regarded by the profession as a right, a time for recreation, a time *far niente*, when the voice of the court crier is dumb and the twelve "honest men and true" are devoting their entire attention to the cultivation of their tubers, and "toiling in the grain." The influence which agriculture—at that early time almost the one absorbing employment, had in determining the allotment of the parts of the year may be gathered from the following quaint words taken from Coke on Littleton ("The First Part of the Institutes of the Law of England or a Commentary upon Littleton, not the name of the author only but of the law itself,") (*page 185, ch. 11*)—"As to Trinity tearme it sometimes had seven days of return and was as long as Michaelmasse tearme is now; but for avoyding of infection in that hot time of the yeare and that men might not be letted to gather in harvest three returnes * * * become dies non juridice." Corresponding to the four vacations were the four terms, Hilary, Easter, Trinity and Michaelmas, the

first called after a festival immediately preceding it and held in honor of a French bishop, the second named from the well-known feast of the Passover, and the remaining two also after festivals immediately preceding them. In this way term and vacation seem to have arisen. Many changes as to time and procedure mark the statute books, and numbers of old observances may have grown obsolete, but these are impertinent to the present subject. It has often been said that the strict observance of the first day of the week, which was instituted by the Sabbatarian sect at the close of the sixteenth century, (*Hallam Con. Hy. of Eng. p. 282, and foot note,*) will be kept up for sanitary and other reasons even should the old reasons cease to have weight, and it seems safe to predict that whatever may have been the origin of the long vacation it will continue, if for no other purpose, in order that lawyers may "sleep between term and term,"

F. C. W.

MARRIED WOMEN.

IF women desire the franchise and other privileges they must be content to accept corresponding obligations and among the rest the duty of paying their creditors, with the alternative of executions in the sheriff's hands. They may, perhaps, complain that they are getting the burdens faster than the benefits, and the recent decision in *Wishart* v. *McManus*, *1 Man. L. R.*, does seem to supply them with something more rocky than the fish they were asking for. It will, however, furnish them with another argument, and, it seems to us, a very good one, for their enfranchisement.

In Ontario the judges have been for years struggling with the question of the liability of married women, and after many doubtings and debatings they seem finally to have reached a very illogical conclusion. A married woman is not liable upon her contracts and cannot make

herself liable if she tries; she is a married woman, and is supposed to be so much under the domination of her husband that she cannot, in her own interest, be permitted the right to contract. If she had the power to do so she would be speedily ruined and despoiled. At the same time she can do as she likes with her separate property, and that with the greatest facility. Her powers are far larger in this respect than those with which the law has thought proper to entrust her husband. He, poor soul, is hedged all round from frauds and perjuries with the Statute of Frauds. No one shall say that his property is mortgaged unless the assertion can be proved by his signature or at least by production from deposit of his title deeds. A married woman, on the contrary, can effectually charge her whole estate by signing a promissory note or ordering a new dress. The property, then, which is already subject to the husband's debts, obligations and control, which is not separate estate, cannot be made liable for a married woman's contracts; but her separate estate, that which is free from her husband's control, which should be protected if there is to be any protection, can be mortgaged by word of mouth and without her knowing what she is doing.

Learning, and not common sense, must supply the justification of this conclusion. It may be that a married woman, having been unable to bind herself at law, must have been held to have intended to charge her separate estate when she signed a note, and that the contract having been partially executed by the loan of the money equity enforced the charge. Payment of money, however, never was such a part performance as removed a contract relating to land out of the Statute of Frauds, and, if it were, why should a married woman have been permitted to divest herself so easily of her property while the law assumed her to be so specially weak and imprudent.

The solution is, as usual, historical, and the history being as yet, in Ontario, incomplete, the position there is unsatisfactory and illogical. At law a married woman was a part of her husband and her property became to a large extent

his. Equity, however, deeming this unjust, was accustomed to declare that certain property of a married woman was her separate estate and with regard to it treated her as a *feme sole*. Down to the commencement of the Married Woman's Acts the doctrine of separate estate was unknown to courts of law. After much difference of opinion it was (in Ontario) determined that the effect of those Acts was to introduce into courts of law the equity doctrine of separate estate; and that although the statutes declare that a married woman is to be liable as a *feme sole*, they only mean that she is to be liable as a married woman used to be in a court of equity.

In passing we would like to suggest that, in any case, the form of judgment in use in Ontario in actions against a married woman is unfair to the plaintiffs. The form gives execution against all the separate estate which the defendant had at the time the debt or liability was incurred and which is yet undisposed of. We submit, with all the deference due to that superior Province, from which we must expect for all time to import our judicial ability, that the plaintiff is entitled as against the defendant to a charge upon all the separate property which she had at the time when the debt or liability was incurred whether it has subsequently been disposed of or not; and that the plaintiff is then at liberty to contest priorities, upon the ground of notice of his charge or otherwise, with the persons who have acquired interests subsequent in point of time to his.

Wishart v. *McManus*, for Manitoba, relieves the law of all incongruities and inconsistencies. If a married woman contracts she is liable as if she were a *feme sole*—that is, judgment may be obtained, and execution issued, against her personally. This is extremely satisfactory, and we are not sure that we are not much indebted for the result to the able arguments of the members of the bar who were engaged in the case, one of whom received special compliment from the court. The Ontario bar should really look into these questions a little more thoroughly. Judges will go wrong unless assisted by debate.

REVIEWS.

WE have received from the author "A Law Treatise on The Constitutional Powers of Parliament and of The Local Legislatures under The British North America Act, 1867," with the requests: "Please review and forward me a copy," and "Please name that the work will be sold at $1.50 per copy; with discount to the trade."

The author is J. Travis, Esquire, LL. B.; and the title page informs us that he is of the New Brunswick Bar; that he is the annotator of Parsons on Partnership; that he was the First Prize Law Essayist of Harvard University, of 1866; and that he has written leading law editorials in the *American Law Register* (of which the Hon. Chief Justice Redfield, who is the author of "Law of Wills," "Law of Railways," &c., is editor,) on Origin and History of the Common Law; Jurisdiction of the United States Federal Courts; Common Law Jurisdiction of the State Courts, &c., &c.

Now we submit that this is altogether unfair. We are barely six months old, and how can we be expected to review a man with a history like that? A man who wrote an essay when he was at college, and spends his later life in writing editorials in a law journal, of which a Chief Justice is editor; a man who is an Esquire and an LL. B., and who can fill 184 pages with abuse of all the judges he knows (except two, one of whom he worships,) interlarded with sufficiently long quotations from their judgments to make themselves the witnesses of their own unmitigated stupidity. Surely, a man who has knocked the Privy Council out of all law and reason into bad grammar and absurdity, is beyond review, and can only be humbly and devoutly canonized.

We always desire, however, to comply with polite requests, but we are going in with Dr. Faust—for love of fame we resign ourselves to perdition—we will have a Guiteau immortality.

At the very outset, however, we must admit our ignorance and confess that we have never seen "a legal analyst," (122); and that, therefore, when we undertake to dissect one we assume a task wholly beyond our ability.

A "legal analyst," we should think, must be one authorized by law to analyse; just as an illegal analyst would be one not by law permitted to practise. We feel sure, however, that this cannot be the true explanation. Try analogy! There are milk analysts? Yes, but no milky ones that we know of! Well, there are chemical analysts? Yes, they use chemicals in their work; but surely law would be of no service in a laboratory! Are there medical analysts? No. Then there are mineral analysts, or assayers rather—iron analysts? Yes, and perhaps irony analysts—or ironical analysts! This may be the right track—we will inquire.

And first of all, "a legal analyst," in his methods, treats "the arguments of those with whom we (he) comes in contact . . . . as though we (he) were fairly criticizing a book without the remotest conception in the world as to who might be its author" (98); at least the specimen in hand says that that is the way he endeavors to proceed—"removing all of error about those opposing claims, as far as we are able to do so, no matter by whom made; set forth, honestly and faithfully THE TRUTH" (93).

Then, a "legal analyst" is not a politician. but a patriot and a philanthropic teacher. "In continuance, recollect, of the same line of argument, which we—not as a politician, but simply as a legal analyst—have fairly placed before our readers, in our honest, and, say patriotic, effort to remove the ignorance and uncertainty in which many of the statesmen, politicians, judges and lawyers of this Dominion have been so apparently hopelessly involved. . . ." (111).

Correct grammar is not a necessary qualification of "a legal analyst," but emphasis is wholly indispensable. A schoolmaster who learned the rules of grammar after he acquired habits of incorrect expression might be "a legal analyst;" one who could seize upon a doubtful sentence

penned by a privy councillor, but who would refer to a principle "which *lays* at the bottom of the rule of construction," (152), and experiment on the plural of subject-matter, trying first *subjects-matter* (6), then *subjects-matters* (10). (An ordinary mortal would have tried the third alternative, if it were only to see how it would look.)

Italics and capitals, spacing and display headings are distinguishing characteristics of "a legal analyst." We had been accustomed to think that too free a use of such adventitious props to language were a sign of poverty of expression; but when the point is worked out it becomes quite clear that when one undertakes to make "THE TRUTH" apparent, the best way is to use capitals and large type—the dimmest eye will thus be accommodated. An example or two will show the beauty and benefit of the system: "the fate of the Scott Act now before them on appeal, is, TO SAY THE LEAST OF IT, *rendered somewhat doubtful*" (116); "but I think an Act, which in effect *authorizes the inhabitants of each town or parish to regulate the sale of liquor and to direct for whom, for what purposes, and under what conditions spirituous liquors may be sold therein*, DEALS WITH MATTERS OF A MERELY LOCAL NATURE, *which*, by the terms of the *16th sub-section of sec. 92 of the British North America Act*, ARE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATURE" (171).

Another peculiarity of "a legal analyst" is, that under certain circumstances he will translate an easy English word into Italian, but when he uses Latin words in a novel manner he leaves the reader to do the best he can. For example, he tells us that traffic is "from the *Italian* "*tratta*," to trade," (151), but he frequently speaks of Parliament legislating "*bona fide*" (129, 137, 179, &c.), and yet leaves us to grope around for a new meaning to the words.

"A legal analyst," in his religious aspect, has some of the characteristics of a christian. He is no respecter of persons. He will not speak evil of dignitaries; he will treat of arguments and not of their authors (98). But,

nevertheless, if dignitaries insist upon provoking and teasing him he will call them a whited wall, or anything else that comes handy (37, 165, 168, 169, &c.).

Learning to be "a legal analyst" evidently incapacitates the devotee for every day life. Constant criticism produces a crabbed, carping impatience with the mediocrities, who obtruding their perverse stupidities upon finely adjusted sensitiveness, render a legal analyst's life a continuous struggle with his temper. He takes on a Carlylean coarseness and crossness, and editors and barristers, judges and privy councillors alike come under the lash of his correction. It is well, however, that society in this way gets rid of these philosophers—well for society, because it gets along less roughly; and well for the sages, for they can without distraction elucidate and disentangle with all necessary elaboration. No one in active practice could write 184 pages on two clauses of the B. N. A. Act and merely deal with the decisions upon them. Or if he did he would not have time to ruin the reputation of the judges as he ought to do it. In this busy world it is quite evident that there must be a further heterogeneity of occupation, and that no community will hereafter be complete without "a legal analyst." Jndges have been far too free from criticism, and the result is that "I ARRAIGN INCOMPETENCE FOR OFFICE AS ONE OF THE GREAT CRIMES OF THIS DAY IN PUBLIC PLACES" (183).

The Government should at once employ the services of Mr. Travis to analyse the judgments of all the judges in the Dominion, and should at once expel for incompetency all those he condemns as unworthy. The whole of the New Brunswick bench will go first and without further analysis. This is their measure; "As is to be expected with reference to a court, in connection with which Truth and Candor compel the admission, without doing them a particle of injustice, that, since Ritchie, C. J., left it, it has not contained, nor does it now contain, among its judges, a single lawyer possessing anything like thorough scientific knowledge;

its decisions, now still further to be examined, in this connection show anything else than sound legal knowledge; but in some respects, Truth compels the statement, are supremely ridiculous" (37). The Ontario judges are no better: "Considering that holding in the Ontario Court of Queen's Bench, and the equally absurd *semble* from another Ontario case we have named (*Regina* v. *Taylor*), ... we are almost forced to the conclusion that there are other Courts in the Dominion of not much higher authority than that extremely weak Court, the Supreme Court of New Brunswick" (125). The Thrasher case is enough to condemn the British Columbia judges. Out of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice may remain, and Mr. Justice Gwynne, if he brushes up a little, but the others will surely be plucked. The Privy Council are by long odds the worst. They are "as utterly ignorant as children" (169). "Their ignorance (to be perfectly candid and strictly just); actual, stupid, stolid, ignorance of the matter they are examining, when we consider that *that* is our highest, authoritative appellate Court, is positively painful" (168); their judgment "on the validity of the Canada Temperance Act was even worse than the judgment which we had previously thought was the worst judgment we had ever examined (and we have critically analysed many thousands of judgments—over three thousand in one treatise alone, we once wrote)" (165). After this damaging *exposé* of crass stupidity what can be the use of continuing appeals to England? Why not merely mail copies of judgments complained of to St. John, N. B., for critical analysis? It should not cost very much more than the present system of appeals, and then the result being attained scientifically would be necessarily apparently correct to both sides, and all parties would thus be satisfied, if not pleased.

Three reasons for continuing the present practice occur to us. First, the oracle might die, and it would then be be better for us that we had never known anything better than the Privy Council. Second, legal analysis does not show that any of the decisions of the Privy Council are wrong. The judgments are illogical, ungrammatical, and

stolidly stupid, but the decision, someway or other, always turns out to be correct. Perhaps the Board may have similar luck in the future. While fortune stands to them we may safely remain. Third—we take a long breath—third, the critical analysis spends itself largely on sentences detached from their connection, on opinions imputed to, but not held by, the Privy Councillors. The Privy Council has laid down some rules which are useful in helping one to ascertain whether the statute is *intra* or *ultra vires*. One of these rules is that if the legislation does not fall within any of the classes of subjects assigned to the Legislatures, then the Legislatures have no jurisdiction and the matter falls within the competency of Parliament. This seems not only simple, but necessarily correct, and yet Mr. Travis with the most perverse ingenuity first misunderstands the rule and then spends page after page demolishing his misunderstanding. It is hard to see how so simple a statement could be misinterpreted. It would take "a legal analyst" to do it. But it is quite easy when you know how. This is the way:—The rule may be expressed in other language—"the new doctrine is thus established by the Privy Council, and by the fair and plain application of their tests, that Parliament can pass *the identical Act* that is held *ultra vires* of a Legislature" (144). It will be observed with what facility "a legal analyst," by merely restating a proposition, can show its absurdity. An Act may contain something *ultra vires* of Parliament, and something else *ultra vires* of the Legislatures, and yet the Privy Council are such fools that they never thought of that, but hold that if the Act cannot be passed by a Legislature it must necessarily be within the competence of Parliament. The Judicial Board may possibly believe that to be law, but they have never said so, and (now that Mr. Travis has put them on their guard) probably never will say so. In *Russell* v. *The Queen*, 7 *App. Ca. at p. 836*, the Judicial Board did say that "if the *Act* does not fall within any of the classes of subjects in section 92, no further question will remain, for it cannot be contended" that unless it falls within one of these classes Parliament had not ful

legislative authority to pass it. In that case there was one point in controversy: Had Parliament power to pass a general temperance law? and the Judicial Board says that it cannot be contended that if the Legislatures could not pass a temperance Act, Parliament must be able to do so. There must be jurisdiction over the temperance question somewhere—if not in the Legislature, then in Parliament. That is quite simple and quite true, and the Privy Council did not add to that proposition, a statement that every Act, however multifarious or peculiar, must be soley in one jurisdiction or the other; nor did they say that if the Legislature of Ontario could not pass an Act to have operation in Quebec; that therefore Parliament could pass that identical Act.

The pure gold is shewn by the analyst at page 60. He claims to have established several propositions. This is the first:—"That the Dominion Parliament and the Local Legislatures, have not, as has been claimed, concurrent powers, but that Parliament has the dominant, and the Local Legislatures, the subordinate power." This is about as far wrong as he could go. It is worse than wrong, for it shews that the true statement of the case had never occurred to the writer. He decides between concurrent power and a dominant and subordinate relationship. Neither is correct. We do not think that the existence of concurrent power has ever been suggested even by a Privy Councillor; and Mr. Justice Loranger, (whose letters upon the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, have been analysed into pure stupidity,) is much more nearly accurate than his critic, when he says:—"In the reciprocal sphere of their authority thus recognized, there exists no superiority in favor of Parliament over the Provinces, but, subject to Imperial sovereignty, these Provinces are quasi-sovereign within their respective spheres, and there is absolute equality between them." This statement is also defective, for there is not, and can be no equality, An orange may be divided equally, but it is impossible to separate legislative power into moieties. No common denominator can be applied. If "Insolvency"

counts as six, at how much should "Municipal Institutions" be rated?

But it is not necessary, nor do we think it possible, to express in any one word, the relative position of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies. Of the total sum of legislative power, a portion was assigned to Parliament and a portion to the Provincial Legislatures, and the fact that in exercise of its powers, Parliament necessarily interferes with "Civil Rights," does not make its power in any sense dominant, it only shews that under a heading of jurisdiction—Insolvency for instance—a portion of the civil rights of men are included. There is no difficulty in agreeing upon a set of words to express this meaning, and we are quite willing to adopt those used by Chief Justice Ritchie in *The Citizens' Insurance Co.* v. *Parsons*, *4 Sup. Ct. R.*, *215*, and quoted by Mr. Travis as containing a true exposition of the matter:—"No one can dispute the general power of Parliament to legislate as to trade and commerce, and that when, over matters which Local Legislatures have power to deal, local legislation conflicts with an Act passed by the Dominion Parliament, *in the exercise of any of the general powers confided to it*, the legislation of the local must yield to the supremacy of the Dominion Parliament; in other words, that the Provincial legislation, in such a case, must be subject to such regulations, for instance, as to trade and commerce of a commercial character, as the Dominion Parliament may prescribe. I adhere to what I said in *Valin* v. *Langlois*, *3 Sup. Ct. R. 15*, that the property and civil rights referred to, were not all property and civil rights, but that the terms property and civil rights must necessarily be read in a restricted and limited sense, because many matters involving property and civil rights are expressly reserved to the Dominion Parliament, and that the power of the Local Legislatures was to be subject to the general and special legislative power of the Dominion Parliament, and to what I there added. But while the legislative rights of the Local Legislatures are, *in this sense*, subordinate to the rights of the Dominion Parliament, I think such right must be exercised, so far as may be

consistently, with the rights of the Local Legislatures; and therefore, the Dominion Parliament would only have the right to interfere with property and civil rights in so far as such interference may be necessary for the purpose of legislating generally and effectually, in relation to matters confided to the Parliament of Canada." We have taken the liberty of using italics, for the purpose of drawing attention to the wide difference in statement between the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Travis. When the latter says that the Local Legislatures have the subordinate power, let him add "in the sense explained by Chief Justice Ritchie in *Valin* v. *Langlois*," and he will be right. If he stop short of these words, he will be, as he now is, utterly wrong.

We have also received a "Manual of the Acts respecting Marriage Licenses and the Solemnization of Marriage." The control of the marriage license branch of the public service being about to pass from the Treasury Department to the Department of Agriculture, Mr. Acton Burrows commences his duties by arranging the numerous statutes so that their effect may be readily understood. If some one would kindly take the statutes of last session alone and consolidate the original acts and their amendments which may be found in that single volume, he would be a benefactor to the profession. Every one is presumed to know the law, but if when trying to find it out, he misses a second amendment to a statute of the same session, he really ought to be excused.
