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
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
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




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REMARKS


ONTHE

LETTER

ADDRESS'D TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING.]



REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESS'D TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

In a LETTER to the


AUTHOR of that PIECE.

Vis confili expers mole ruit sua: Vim temperatam di quoque provehunt In majus: idem odere vires Omne nefas animo moventes.

HOR.

L O N D O N:

Printed for R. and J. DODSLEY, in Pall-Mall.



REMARKS, Sc.

SIR,

Shall not enquire who is the Author of the Piece on which I am going to remark, Your Opinions, and your Arguments are all that I shall confider. Whether you are, or ever have been I penfioned and employed, whether you are merely a private Man, or a Perfon diftinguished in Rank and Fortune, you are to me and to the Publick on this oceafion, only the Author of the Letter to Two Great Men; and you will give me leave to address you in that and in no other Light. It is indeed a Light, in which you cannot be viewed to your difadvantage; your Piece is animated with the Spirit of true Patriotism; it discovers political and historical Knowledge; and it is written throughout with Fire and Energy.

But, Sir, that animation of Language and Sentiment, which is allowed to the Orator in Political Conflicts in Pulvere et in Sole, has no place in a fober Difcuffion. I write not to the Ear or to the Paffions, A 3 I aim

‡ Vid. p. a. of the Letter,

I aim at no Seduction of Judgment; and I ask for no approbation but what a calm Reflection and unprejudiced Reafon may afford me. My End is, rather to examine the justness of your Plan, than to enforce any Plan of my own, and I shall not affect the Flow, nor the Pomp', nor the high colouring of Parliamentary Declamation. If I can deliver a plain Ar-. gument in plain Language, it is all I aim at : for this I shall make no Apology; that Freedom with which you warn the Miniftry against falling into Mistakes in the enfuing Treaty of Peace, will justify me to you, and to the World, if I should attempt to point out some of those Mistakes, into which I imagine you are yourfelf fallen.

You cannot be ignorant in what manner Succefs operates upon the Minds of Men; with what a blind and haughty Confidence it infpires them; and in the infolent Elation of Victory, how little they attend to Reafon, or Juffice, and often to their own most important Interest. People of all Nations imagine, that when they are worsted, Success gives their Enemy very little Right to prescribe fevere Terms; and conceive when they are id

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are themselves fuccessful, that there are no Bounds to their own Pretensions. If. this Difposition should happen at this time to prevail amongst us, it may be attended with very pernicious Confequences. It may raife fuch extravagant Expectations, or excite fuch wrong-placed Defires, as will tender a Negotiation for Peace a Work of infinite Difficulty: A virtuous and able Ministry may in some fort find their Virtue and Ability brought to act against themselves, they may find that their Victories and Succeffes have excited fo much Arrogance in those who had no Share in acquiring them, as to deftroy all their Effects; they may find their Virtue and Moderation overruled by the Madnefs of the People, and be thus difabled from availing themfelves of a fucces ful War, in the Attainment of an advantageous Peace.

I am afraid, Sir, that your Letter tends to increase and inflame this improper Disposition. You are not to be blamed for delivering your Sentiments openly. The Liberty of an Englishman, and your own Abilities, give you a right to do fo. What I blame is your excessive Attachment to certain Objects, fo excessive that if

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they should not be infisted upon by the Ministry, with a Warmth equal to your own, you hefitate not to declare to the People, * that we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace. This, Sir, is furely a most unjustifiable Method of proceeding; it is to fow the Seeds of general Discontent in favour of your particular Opinions; Opinions, which if they are not ill founded, are at least very problematical: I cannot help observing, that your Resentment against the Perfidy of the Enemy, has made you feem much more intent upon affronting France, than providing deliberately for the Interests of Britain.

You fet forth with great Strength of Fact and Reafon, the treachery of *Frances* and her frequent Violations of the most folemn Treaties. You infift particularly on the Cafe of *Dunkirk*: and I admit that you could not have chosen a more proper Inftance. But I am forry to fee that you are even here guided more by old Prejudices than by the true-Nature of Things; and that you have proposed such a *Manner* of acting, that whilst we are in rea-

* Vid. p. 29. of the Letter.

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lity only demanding our honeft and unquestionable Rights, we may have all the Appearance of acting with the most wanton Infolence, with the most hateful Oppression.

You propose to the Two Great Men, that, s " || before they enter upon any new " Treaty, or listen to any plausible Propo-" fal whatever, they ought to infift that " Justice may be done with regard to for-" mer Treaties, shew France the folemn " Engagements she entered into at Utrecht " to demolifh Dunkirk. " Demand," fay. you, " immediate Justice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity " in the enfuing Negotiation. Tell them with the Firmitels of wife Conquerors, " that the Demolition of Dunkirk is what . " you/ are entitled to by Treaties made " long ago and violated, Land that it Shall " not be fo much as mentioned in the en-" fuing Negotiation, but complied with be-" fore that Negotiation shall commence."

Tho' this is a Sort of Language hith erto, I believe, unheard in Europe, why you confine it to Dunkirk I cannot imagine. Why would -you not have Vid. p. 24, 25.

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them in the fame previous Manner renounce all Right to the difputed Parts of America? You will I hope allow, that the French Encroachments there, are as much against the Faith of Treaties, as the Restoration of Dunkirk; and that we have full as good a right to expect every Reparation of Interest and Honour with regard to the one, as to the other. But if all Points wherein the Violation of Treaties is charged, ought not, according to your Doctrine, to be fo much as mentioned in the enfuing Negotiation, but ought to be fettled before that Negotiation shall commence; the Business of the Congress will be fo very short, and fo very eafy, as to require no wonderful Share of that Knowledge, that Adroitnefs, and all that Combination of Talents, and Virtues, which you demand in a Plenipotentiary; but which almost in Despair of finding you are among our Nobility. To speak and to act to the Letter of the Instructions which you give him, instead of all those Qualifications, he need only affume a decifive and dictatorial Tone; to rail abundantly at those employed by the Enemy to treat with him; to remind them of their amazing Perfidy; * to tell them that be owes them

* P. 24.

[11].

them a Difgrace \uparrow ; to tell them that be can bave no Dealings with fuch a People; * and thus to go through the little that is left to be done with as great Airs of Arrogance and Superiority as he can poffibly affume. These are Accomplishments indeed not difficult to be found, and which we need not despair to meet with at Arthur's, or on the Turf. \ddagger

I do not, Sir, @ean to infinuate, that the Demolition of Dunkirk is not an Object worthy of our regard. It is indeed probably not of quite fo much Importance, as you think it, and as formerly it was thought, whilft in the Continental Wars of King William, and Queen Anne, we neglected our Naval Strength, and the due Protection of our Trade. However, as it is still an Object, there is no doubt but in the enfuing Negotiation our Ministry will attend with proper Care to have it demolished, according to the Tenor of former Treaties. This, Sir, we may fay with fome Affurance, will be done. But that this be done before we condefcend to treat, that it is to be a Preliminary to the Preliminaries of Peace, is

† P. 25. P. id.

‡ P. 6.

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rets of 'that' re as s, as at we every with But on of . cordch as ation, t Nefiness fhort. wonthat nation you which nding nd to ctions thofe a deabunmy to f their beorves them

an Idea altogether extravagant, and as little justified by Precedent as by Reason. That those very Matters for which War was declared should not be fo much as mentioned in the Negotiation for Peace, is a Principle entirely your own, and to which all the Writers on Politicks have to this Day been entirely Strangers. You feem indeed aware of this, and therefore affert that fuch Demands as you propofe + " cannot be looked upon as the Info-" lence of a Conqueror, but as the wife " Forefight of a People whom dear-" bought Experience hath taught the " proper Way of doing itself Justice. For you observe some few Lines before, that we ought " § to take every Method in " our Power to fecure the Observance of " those Conceffions they may make; and " to infift upon their giving us fuch " Proofs of their Sincerity before any " Negoiation is entered upon, as may " give us fome Affurance, that they mean " to be more faithful to their future En-" gagements." The way you propofe then of doing ourfelves Juffice, is to infist upon these Demands, as the Compliance with them by the French is fupposed

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+ Vid. p. 9. of the Letter.

§ Ibid.

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to be a Security for their adhering to the Treaty.

I should, Sir, most willingly concur with you in recommending any Method which might fecure their Adherence to fuch Conceffions as they shall make; which might draw from them any real Proof of their Sincerity, or which would give us some Assurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements : but I have confidered your Demand in every Light which I was capable of putting it; and after all Iam utterly unable to difcover, if France should fubmit to the humiliating Step you propose, . what additional Security this will, or can give us, that the will keep the Peace that is to enfue, whenever she shall find it her Interest This Step may indeed be to break it. a mortifying Confession of her present Weakneis, but can be no fort of Security for her future Faith.

So far from having any fuch Operation, there is all the Reafon in the World to expect that it would produce quite the contrary Effect. A Nation which through the Neceffity of its Affairs fubmits to Terms imposed for no other

little That was menis a hich) this feem e afopofe Infoe wife deart the . For that od in ice of ; and fuch any may mean e Enropofe to inompliopofed

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other purpose than to infult-her, seeks the first Opportunity to wipe off the Stain. She will not look upon such Engagements as a Treaty, but as an Oppression; and she will find a fort of Excuse for the Infidelity of her Conduct, in the Infolence of ours. Nations, like Men, often resent an Insult more than an Injury.

Unreasonble as this Demand may be, you however feem fond of it; for you again ask, " Can you have any " Dealings with a Power, who, if he " refuses this, at the very Time that "he is treating, affords you fuch a " manifest Proof that his Word is not " to be relied upon, and that you can-"not truft to the Execution of any " Promifes ever fo folemnly made?" Why not? You may, Sir, undoubtedly have Dealings with fuch a Power, notwithstanding fuch a Refusal; because he only does what is extremely natural, and extremely reafonable, in refufing to deftroy a Place which is of use to him in War, before his Enemy has condescended to treat for Peace. You

* Vid. p. 25. of the Letter.

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that the voluntary Weakening its Hands before a Negotiation for Peace, is not the way to fecure it good Terms in that Negotiation; and that they may well refuse to comply with this ignominious and unfafe Condition, without manifesting any Intention of fwerving from their Engagements. If it could be fupposed for a Moment that our Administration would adopt your Syftem, might not France in her turn afk, and very reasonably too, What Security we propose to give, if the should submit to this extraordinary previons Preliminary, that we shall even then confent on our Side to an equitable Peace? Or that this first unreasonable Demand may not be followed by others still more unreasonable, whilst we have any thing to ask, or she any thing lest to give? To anfwer Væ vičtis would found strangely; to answer otherwise with Confistency is impoffible; and it must be allowed, that so extraordinary a Demand previous to a Treaty, would be a very bad Omen of our Moderation in the framing it. A Compliance with it would indeed mor-

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do not fure imagine, that any Nation is

to ignorant and fottish as not to know,

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mortify the Enemy, but it would add nothing to our real Strength; whilft it would alarm every Nation near us, and affift France in exciting that Jealoufy of the British Naval Power, which she has for a long Time been labouring with great Industry, and fome Success, to infuse into all the Nations of Europe, and particularly into the Maritime States. You have very well observed upon the Terror which was excited by the Power of Lewis XIV. and upon the general Confederacy against him, which was the Consequence of this Power : but you have forgot to add, that the infolent use he made of his Greatness, alarmed as much, and provoked much more, than that enormous Power itfelf: it was indeed the true Caufe of his Fall. Other Nations also may be thought too powerful; and they will be thought fo, whenever they exercise their Power with Haughtiness. Without having recourse to ‡ a Montesquieu, perhaps, Sir, it may be found that the Roman, the Spanish, and

[‡] P. 38. And perhaps it might on Inquiry be worthy of another *Montefquieu* to affign the Caufes of the Rife and Fall of the *French* Monarchy, &c.

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ld add hilft it is, and ealoufy ch fhe bouring Success, Europe, States. oon the Power geneich was but you infolent alarmh more, tfelf: it nis Fall. ight too ught fo, ver with course to may be ish, and

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the French Grandeur have owed their Declention to the fame Caufe; they had attained a greater Power than they had Wifdom fufficient to direct; for the fake of gratifying the paffion of the Day, they loft fight of their lafting Interest.

The utmost rational Aim of our Ambition, ought to be, to posses a just Weight, and Confideration in Europe; and that the Power of the Nation should be rather refpectable than terrible. To effect this, it must not be employed invidioufly; it must operate difcretely and quietly; then it will be Happily felt in its Effects, while it is little feen in violent Exertions. The Genius and Disposition of Nations, as well as Men, is best difcerned by the use they make of And therefore my great Objec-Power. tion to this Part of your Plan, does not arife from the Nature of the thing which you defire; my Objection is to the Time and Manner in which you infift on having it done; which is as I apprehend to ourfelves of no kind of ufe, and therefore arrogant and unreafonable to wards the Enemy.

After the Propofal concerning Dun-B kirk,

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kirk, you lay before the Two Great Men the other Parts of your Plan. And here you recommend it to them to difplay their Moderation by giving up Guadaloupe, Senegal, and Goree; and their Wildom by keeping the Posseffion of every Part of Canada. To keep Canada is the Point you have principally at heart; * " this is " the Point you fay invariably to be ad-" hered to, " this is to be the fine quanon " of the Peace," and unlefs it is, we shall " have a treacherous and delustve Peace."

Before I examine the justness of those Motives that make you to ftrenuously attached to this Object, and so indifferent to every other; I shall be leave ro remark upon the Consequence you deduce from the Possibility that *Canada* will be given up, " that we shall have a treacherous " and delusive Peace."

The Views which every State ought to have at the making of Peace, may be reduced to two.

1st. To attain those Objects for which she went to War. And,

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Vid. p. 34.

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adly. To receive fome reafonable Indemnification for the Charges the has incurred in carrying it on. Without openly avowing fome ‡ Views of Ambition, no Nation can poffibly claim more.

This admitted, Sir, I ask upon the first Head; Whether the Posseficition of *Canada*, properly to called, was ever one of those Objects for which we began the War? Was it ever mentioned as such in any of our Memorials or Declarations, or in any National or Publick Act whatfoever?

The true Caule of the War, our real and indifputable Right, is well known. Our Claims were large enough for Poffeffion and for Security too. And will you fay, Sir, that if, in the beginning of these Troubles, France influenced by a Dread of the Exertion of the Briti/h Power, had acknowledged these Claims, had given up Nova Scotia, or Acadia,

‡ P. 4. of the Letter. As his Majefty entered into the War not from views of Ambition.

P. 33. This Plan is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expressed by his Majesty in his Speech. Ibid. The Possession of Canada is no view of Ambition.

with

with its ancient and true Boundaries, had demolished their Fort in the Province of New York, had removed themfelves from the Obia and renounced all claim to that Territory, and that on those Concessions the Ministry had then ceased from Hostilities, without acquiring or even claiming Canada, will you fay that we should have had a treacherous and . delusive Peace? You will hardly venture to affert that we should. And, is a Peace made after France has felt the Force of Britain, and fubmitted to that Force, to be more treacherous and delusive than if she had made it from an Apprehension only of the Confequences? Is a Peace to be treacherous and delusive, if we do not get on that Peace, what we never claimed as our Right before the War? Is a Peace treacherous and delusive that puts us in posseffion of a Territory larger than feveral flourishing Monarchies? Is a Peace delufive and treacherous only because fomething is left to the Enemy?

[20]

But you do not affert that we have any original Right to *Canada*; nor do you fay that the Conceffion of those Boundaries daries which we have claimed do not give us a vaft Territory and an advantageous Barrier. You go upon another, which is indeed the only Principle which you make use of, but which you are of opinion is fo strong * " as to silence the "French Plenipotentiaries, and to con-" vince all Europe of the justice of your • " demand."

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"Ask the French what Security they can give you if we reftore Canada, however restrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence."

The French Plenipotentiaries, Sir, must be very extraordinary Advocates to be filenced, and Europe as extraordinary a Judge to be convinced by fuch an Argument. France, Sir, might answer, that she can give no such Security. No Nation whilst independent can give it. And therefore no such Security should be defired. To defire the Enemies whole Country upon no other Principle but that otherwise you cannot secure your

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* P. 3. of the Letter.

own,

own, is turning the Idea of mere Defence into the most dangerous of all Principles. It is leaving no Medium between Safety and Conquest. It is never to suppose yourself fafe, whilst your Neighbour enjoys any Security. Indeed fuch a Question, after the Matters difputed in the War have been adjufted, is an Avowal of fuch an unreasonable Ambition, that I truft you will never be feconded in it by any English Man or English Minister. For it is a Question that extends infinitely in its Confequences, extends (for any thing I can fee to the contrary), to the utter Destruction of Mankind. For whilst ever we have France, or any other Nation on our Borders either in Europe or in America, we must in the nature of things have frequent Difputes and Wars with them; and we must suppose, at least, as often as we are fuccessful, that the Enemy is in fault; that is, we must suppose the Enemy had provoked us to take Arms by the Violation of some Treaty, on by the Invation of fome undoubted Right. The Bufiness of a Peace is to adjust and to determine these Disputes; but after the has agreed to our original Demands. Calle P.

mands, if we go on to demand Security for the Prefervation of Peace; what less do we demand, than that they should yield

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themfelves bound Hand and Foot up to our Mercy? Let our Borders be ever fo extended, as long as we have any Nation near us, we must have the fame Disputes, the fame Wars, and we must demand, upon your Principle, the fame Security at the Conclusion of a Peace.

There was a Nation indeed, which I am fure we refemble more in Courage, than in Ambition and Injustice, which frequently used to demand fuch a Caution: and fuch a Caution they actually did require from the Carthaginians, when they intended it as a Preliminary to the utter Destruction of that People, and to the most notorious Breach of Faith upon their own fide. Their Pretence was exactly yours; that the Enemy was a Nation perfidious to a Proverb; a People whom no Treaty could bind. They used the Punica in the fame manner that you do the Gallica Fides. I need not inform you, Sir, what followed : and indeed it was impoffible that fuch Principles and Pretentions could end in any thing **B**₄ but

but the total Destruction of the Vanquished.

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I do not fee why the Arguments you . employ concerning a Security for a peaceable Behaviour in Canada, would not be equally cogent for, calling for the fame Security in Europe. They are our Neighbours and dangerous ones here as well as there; the Low Countries, Lorain, Alface, shew us that the French Monarchy, has been, at least, as intent upon extending its Dominion in Europe, as it can be in *America*; we know that they have tried all the Methods of War, of Treaty, and of Marriages, to enlarge their dangerous Empire. But still, dreaded as they are in Europe (and much more to be dreaded than ever they were in America) if we could be fo happy to fee, what I fear we never shall fee, a Confederacy to reclaim their Ufurpations, what would we fay to the Infolence of those who, on your Principle, should demand all France as a Security that they fhould not make the like Ufurpations for the future.

But, Sir, our real Dependence for keeping ing France, or any other Nation, true to her Engagements, must not he in demanding Securities, which no Nation whilst independent can give, but on our own Strength and our own Vigilance.

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To fay the Truth, we owe our Loffes in America as much to our own, Supinenefs as to the French Perfidy. Our Minifters have heretofore acted in regard to America, as if they expected from a Magic in the Contract, that it would perform itself. They took no Steps to enforce it. But from the Wildom and Vigour of our prefent Administration, I should expect another Conduct. As foon as France is happily reduced to cede us fuch Boundaries as may be thought proper to demand, the fame Spirit that has conducted the War, will maintain the Terms of the Peace. Inflead of Jeaving France at liberty to build Forts at her Difcretion, English Forts will be raifed at fuch Paffes, as may at once make us refpectable to the French, and to the Indian God forbid that we should Nations. depend on the Sincerity of our Enemy. Every wife Nation will rely on its own Watchfulnefs, and on its own Strength, to to maintain the Terms they oblige their Enemy to give them; and whoever expects any other Dependence, will find himfelf the Dupe. LON.IS

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To fupply any Defect that may be in your own Authority to perfuade this Measure, your favourite Measure of retaining Canada, you call in the Aid of our American Colonies; and tell us, " though Care should be taken to keep all " that we have claimed, something more " must be done, or our American Colonies " will tell you, you have done nothing." On what Authority this is fo politively afferted to be the Language of our American Colonies, you have not told us. I hope and believe that you have been milinformed. But if our American Colonies should be fo abfurd and ungrateful to tell us, after all the Blood and Treasure expended in their Cause, that we do nothing, if we do not make Conquests for them, they must be taught a Lesson of greater Moderation. If with a Superiority of at least ten to one, with a vaft and advantageous Barrier, with the proper Precautions to strengthen it, under the Protection of a great Naval Power, they cannot think themthemselves secure, they must blame their own Cowardice or Ignorance, and not the Measures of their Mother Country; who is bound to provide for their Happiness and Security, and not for their vain Ambition, or groundless Fears.

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The Idea of fecuring yourfelf, only by having no other Nation near you, is, I admit, an Idea of American Extraction. It is the genuine Policy of Savages; and it is owing to this Policy, that England and France are able at this Day to dispute the Sovereignty of Deferts in America; to which neither of us would otherwise have had any right.

As we pretend no original Right to Canada, that we can very rationally fecure ourfelves in North America without the Poffeffion of it, will, I apprehend, need very few Arguments to demonstrate. I have already observed upon the vast Superiority of Men that we have there; such a Superiority, that I am always astronished when I think on the unaccountable Conduct that has ever made France an Enemy to be apprehended on that Continent. We are in North America not only

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only a greater Naval, but a far greater Continental Power. Our Superiority in Point of Situation is no lefs vifible. If added to these Advantages, we acquire on a Peace all those important Posts and Communications, by which alone *Canada* became in any Degree dangerous to us, I cannot see why *Canada*, weakened, stripped, confined, and I may say bound down, will not be infinitely in more Danger, in case of any Rupture between the two Nations, from our Colonies, than ours can be from it.

I cannot help observing, that among all your Ideas of Security, and that in particular anxious as you are for the Security of North America, you shew little regard to that of the West Indies. Our Caribbee Islands must be ever infinitely in greater Danger from Guadaloupe, than our North American Colonies can be from Canada circumscribed as it ought, and as it is prefumed it will be. The French have a real Superiority in the West Indies, and they have once made it to be feverely felt.

If, as it has been shewn, we may beyond any rational Fear secure ourfelves without f

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out the intire Poffession of Canada, we can defire it in Preference to our other Conquests only on Account of its superior, Value. Though you have not at all infifted on this, yet left this may be thought one of your Motives to that great Preference, and it is fure the best Motive you could have had, we will confider the Point formewhat at large, and this will bring us to the fecond of those leading Ideas, that ought to guide a Nation in a Treaty of Peace; that is, to acquire a proper Indemnification for the Expences of the War. You are not one of the Number of those who think we ought to give up nothing in a Peace.' You do not claim Canada on a Principle of Right. We have examined it on the Principle of Security; the only Queftion that now remains to be difputed between us is, whether Canada be a better Indemnification for the Expences of the War, than all our other Conquests put together; for you give up all the reft with great Eafe, and infift on this only.

Before we enter into a Comparison between the Value of our Acquisitions in the West Indies and those in Canada, 1 must beg leave to take some notice of your your Reason, your only Reason, for giving up the Island of Guadaloupe*, that we have already fo many Sugar " Iflands of our own." If any Argument could poffibly be drawn from our having Abundance of Territory, furely it holds much more ftrongly with regard to North America, where one of our Provinces alone has more Land than ours, and all the French Sugar Lands put together. If we have in the West Indies Land enough for Sugar, furely we have Land enough in North America for the far lefs valuable Commodities, which are produced on that vast Continent. On what Grounds you are pleafed to think the keeping a great Sugar Island an Acquisition of little Confequence, I am unable to comprehend. You know furely that in one of our Islands, the greatest of them, we labour under a fort of Monopoly, and under other Difadvantages, hard, if not

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P. 33. The Poffeffion of Guadaloupe, an additional Sugar Ifland, when we have fo many of our own, ought not to be infifted upon fo ftrenuoufly as to make it a neceffary Condition of the Peace; and though Senegal and Goree are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own African Settlements have hitherto fupplied us with Slaves fufficient for our American Purpofes.

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impoffible to be remedied. You know that another. Island, I mean Brbadoes, formerly one of our best, is at prefent much exhausted; fo that the Produce, and the Profit made on that Produce, diminishes daily ; and that the rest, except perhaps Antigua, are quite inconfiderable; fo inconfiderable, that the Islands, which as dependents on Guadaloupe are fcarce mentioned, are much more valuable. It was no fooner found that the King of Denmark was intent on fettling the Illand of Santa Cruz, than fome confiderable Planters immediately removed thither, and it is now almost wholly fettled by the English. Many have actually Interests in Martinico; and Guadaloupe was scarce taken when our Planters flocked thither, and immediately made conditional § Purchases, sensible of the Superiority of this Island and the Defects of our own.

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In Confequence of those Wants, and

§ I fay conditional, because the Capitulation has rendered it impossible to make an absolute Purchase; but they have already made Contracts to purchase, if the Island remains to us, and have taken possifision of Plantations by virtue of such Contracts.

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Difadvantages, our Sugar Islands produce little more than what ferves the home Confumption; and that too at a very advanced Price. From the foreign Market we have before this War been almost wholly excluded. France fupplied all the Markets of Europe, and fupplied them in a great measure from the Produce of this very Island, which you efteem to lightly. When we confider Things in a Commercial Light, it is the foreign Market which ought certainly to have the greatest Influence. Those who supply the home Confumption purvey to our Luxury: those who supply the foreign Market administer to our Wealth and to out Power.

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To shew you, Sir, how much the Sugar Trade might contribute to the Wealth and Power of any Nation, by what it formerly did contribute to ours, and what for a long Time pass it has contributed to that of *France*, I will lay before you fome Facts, which are, Sir, of a Nature infinitely more convincing than the warmest Sallies of the most lively Eloquence. About the time of the Treaty of Utrecht we supplied the greatest part of

of the Sugar Confumption throughout Europe. France, far from contending with us in the foreign Market, took from us agreat part of what they used at home. From the year 1715 to 1719 we exported one Year with another 18580 Hogsheads of Sugar; but from 1719 to 1722 we fell to lefs than half, for we fent abroad but 9064 communibus Annis. We continued regularly on the decrease to 1739, in which Year our Sugar Export had fallen to 4078 Hogfheads. Since that time, it has fallen almost to nothing. Now let us turn the other fide, and view the Sugar Trade of France fince the fame Period, the Treaty of Utrecht. At that time the French exported no Sugars. But mark, Sir, the Revolution in 1740, when the British Trade in that Article was in a manner annihilated; France, after ferving her Home Confumption at a very easy Rate, exported no less than 80,000 Hogsheads of Sugar, which, with the Gains of the Commission, &c. was reputed to be worth to France more than a Million Sterling, to employ 40 Ton of Shipping, and 4000 Seamen, folely in bringing from the West Indies to Europe. Thefe, Sir, are Facts that proclaim loudly the Advantage of those Islands to France whilft they were in her Poffession; and declare

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clare no lefs ftrongly the Advantages which must accrue to Britain, if the could attain the Poffeffion of one of the very best of them. Eacts these that ought not to be passed lightly, until you can shew formething like them in favour of the Plan you fo warmly embrace, which cannot I believe be done. I therefore Sir, cannot help thinking that your Reafons for rejecting Guadaloupe, on the Principle of our having Sugar Land enough, are not near fo strong, or the Matter fo well weighed, as the Importance of the Question deferves.

But let us fee what the Value of this Canada is, in Comparison of which you reject all our other Acquisitions.

Unluckily for your Argument, you yourfelf inform * us at your fetting out, that the *French* fet very little Value upon this Poffeffion, and that they have even deliberated, whether it fhould not be entirely abandoned.

If in the Hands of the French, who have no other Northern Colony, from whence to fupply their Islands with

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Lumber, Corn, and Provision, Canada was of so very little Importance, what is it like to prove in ours, who have fuch immense Tracts fo much more conveniently fituated for that Trade, and who can eafily fupply five times the Confumption of ours, theirs, and all the other Weft India Islands put together; and that top at a much easier Rate than they can poffibly have these Things at from Canada. But I do not infift upon this Argument, though it is ftrong against you, because I do not believe that France has fuch a difregard for this their only confiderable Posseffion in North America. It is a great while fince they thought of giving it up; and they are long convinced that it is of fome use to them, independent of their Hopes of encroaching on our Poffeffions. Afk those, Sir, who lately faw Canada, if it had the Face of a Colony which the Mother Country was weary of holding? I believe, Sir, they will tell you that the Cultivation of the Lands, the Number and Neatness of the Houses, the warm Condition of the Inhabitants, by no Means feemed to imply that they were neglected by France; but evinced rather that this Colony was the Object of her very terder Concern.

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There are, independent of the Opinion or Defigns of France, many Reafons why we should not think Canada a valuable Exchange for our Conquest in the West Canada, fituated in a cold Cli-Indies. mate, produces no Commodity, except Furs and Skins, which the can exchange for the Commodities of Europe; and confequently the can have little Returns to make the English Merchant. We know what trifling Returns we have, from fome of our own very flourishing Colonies in The whole Trade of Furs America. and Skins, which Canada carried on with France, fell fhort, in its most flourishing State, of 140,000 a Year. The rest of their Produce, with regard to the Market of Europe, is as nothing. A very great Part of the Value of those Furs was returned from France in the Article of Brandy, without which the Trade with the Indians for their Beaver and Deer Skins could not be carried on. But as an English Plantation, Canada must supply itself as all the other English Plantations do with Rum; elfe they will be obliged intirely to relinquish the Fur and Peltry Trade, which is the only valuable Trade they have. But let it be confidered how they th fro

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they can come to the West India Market from the bottom of the River St. Laurence, with the gross and cheap Article of Lumber and Corn, on a footing with our Colonies, many of which are not three Weeks Sail from the Leeward Hlands. They could neither trade with Europe, nor with the West Indies, with any tolerable Advantage; not with the West Indies, because they must be underfold in that Market; not with Europe, because being so underfold they cannot have the Rum that is necessary for the Indian Trade, which keeps up their Commerce with Europe.

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Indeed whilft Canada is in the Hands of France, the Skin Trade may be kept up fo as to be an Object; because the Return for those Commodities, brings back the Brandy with which they are purchased: and thus the Trade is kept alive by a continual Circulation. The bulkier Articles of Corn and Lumber # may likewife continue a Branch of their Trade, because it is their Interest to fupport by every Method the Vent of these Articles in their West Indies in Preference to Foreigners. But Canada in our Hands can have no fuch Preference, and 3

ion vhy able Velt Clicept inge cons to now ome es in Furs with hing their et of Part irned andy, : In-Skins Enitfelf is do ed in-Peltry Trade l how they and therefore from its Situation cannot be on an Equality in the Weft India Market; and from which Market alone it is that they, as a British Possession, can derive the Spirits, or those Materials for Spirits, without which the Fur and Peltry, their only Trade, must certainly perish. These Principles appear to me fo well grounded, that I think it no Presumption to prophesy, "if that Place should ever "be ours, the Fur Trade of Canada must "inevitably come to little or nothing in "a few Years.

But let us extend our View a little farther; let us suppose that if, instead of aiming at the entire Possefion of North America, we confine ourfelves to those Limits which we have always claimed there; and that Canada is reftored to France, curtailed in such a manner as to fecure the Obio Country, and the Communication of the Lakes. The Country to the Southward of Lake Erie, and near the Obio, is the greatest Indian Hunting Country in North America. If this Territory fhould remain with us on a Peace, it naturally draws to us all that Trade which depends upon the Hunting of Deer and Beaver; and if this Country fhould

fhould be further fecured to us, by the Poffeffion of Niagara, which is a Poft of infinite Importance, and intirely commands the great Lakes of Erie and Ontaria, I cannot fee how it is poffible to keep the far greater Part of the Commerce of North America out of our Hands. The Indians must every where be intercepted before they can arrive at the French Colony, even fuppofing (what can never be) that the French could entice them thither by felling cheaper than our Dealers.

Thus without aiming at the total Poffeffion of *Canada*, by eftablifhing proper Limits, and by fecuring them properly, we may draw to ourfelves a great Part of that Trade which must give *Canada* itfelf any Value, in the Eyes of a commercial Nation.

So that the Question, Sir, is not, whether Canada extended to the Ocean by a Possefilian of the River St. John, and a great Part of Nova Scotia, encroaching upon, and menacing New York and New England, commanding exclusively all the Lakes and Rivers, whether such a Country ought to be kept in Preference to C 4 Gua-

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Guadaloupe, and our other Conquest; but whether Canada, stripped of these Advantages, and confined to its proper Bounds, confined to the Northward of those Lakes, and Rivers, be a better Acquisition than our rich Conquest in the West Indies.

If we compare the Value of the Returns of Canada, even whilft it flourifhed most by its Encroachments upon us, with those of Guadaloupe, we shall find them in no Degree of Competition. The Fur Trade, whofe Value is before mentioned, is its whole Trade to Europe. But Guadaloupe, besides the great Quantities of Sugars, Cotton, Indigo, Coffee, and Ginger, which it fends to Market, carries on a Trade with the Caracca's and other Parts of the Spanish Main, which is a Trade wholly in the Manufactures of Europe, and the Returns for which, are almost wholly in ready Money. Without estimating the Land, the Houses, the Works, and the Goods in the Island, the Slaves, at the lowest Valuation, are worth upwards of one Million two hundred and fifty thousand Pounds sterling. It is a known Fact that they make more Sugar in Guadaloupe, than in any of our Islands, except Jamaica. This Branch alone, befides

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besides the Employment of so much Shipping, and fo many Seamen, will produce clear 300,000 per Annum to our Merchants. For having fufficient from our own Islands, to fupply our Home Confumption, the whole Sugar Produce of Guadaloupe will be exported: and will confequently be fo much clear Money to Great Britain. And, Sir, the whole Produce of Canada, though it were all exported from England, and exported compleatly manufactured, would not amount to the Value of that fingle Article unmanufactured : nor would it employ the one twentieth Part of the Shipping, and the Seamen. But this, though the largest, is not the only Produce of Guadaloupe; Coffee, which in our Islands - is none, or a very inconfiderable Object, is there a very great one. They raife besides, great Quantities of Indigo and Cotton, which fupply Materials for our beft and most valuable Manufactures, and which employ many more Hands than the Increase of the Hat Trade; proposed by the keeping Canada can do. This Island is capable in our Hands, of being improved to double its prefent Value; whereas Canada in our Hands would

would not probably yield half what it did to France.

There is, Sir, one Argument I would use particularly to you, who are so ftrongly fenfible of the Inconvenience Dunkirk is to us from its Situation. Surely there is not a fingle Word you fay, in respect to Dunkirk, that does not hold as ftrongly in regard to Guadaloupe, fituated in the very Heart of our Leeward Islands, and there infefting one of the most advantageous Branches of the British Com-It is not to be denied but that merce. English Coaster and the London Trader has suffered by the Dunkirk Privateers; but their Loffes this War have not been near fo confiderable as that of the West Indies, and above all of the North American Traders, whofe Interest, I believe, you will not difpute to be of some Importance. Ask, Sir, the North American Traders, ask the People of the Leeward Islands, what a vaft Security they thought it to their Trade, that Guadaloupe flould be in our Hands? Our Islands were fo annoyed from thence, that they scarce confidered it in any other Light than as a Neft of Privateers: they were furprised on going there, . there, to find a People richer than in any of our own Islands; and Land fo much better than their own, that many of our rich Planters have already made ‡conditional Rurchales there.

Not to confine our Views folely to a Commercial Point, give me leave to mention one great Advantage, that in a political light may arife from our Poffeffion of *Guadaloupe*. It is very well known that the Hand of Government is heavy on the Protestants of *France*, many of these People are already established in this Island, and they have Connexions of every Kind with those of their own Persuasion at Home; and may we not hope and expect that this may be an Inducement to many others to make this their Retreat, and that the Colony may be enriched by them?

In fhort, Sir, in whatever light you view the Ifland of Guadaloupe, you will

+ I fay conditional, becaufe the Capitulation rendered it impossible for them to make absolute Purchases; but they have possible themselves of Plantations, by Contract to purchase them if the Island remains to Great Britain.

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find it a most valuable and a most defireable Object. Do you ask to deprive your Enemy of an advantageous Post, from whence he might materially moleft your Trade in Time of War? Do you with to extend your Trade in Time of Peace, and to have a new Market for all your Manufactures?. From being scarce able to supply the Home Confumption with Sugar, do you defire to be foremost at the foreign Market? This Island, Sir, of Guadaloupe, that you efteem fo little, will answer all these Ends; Ends so material, that I truft, Sir, that the Stone you have rejected, will be made the Corner Stone in the Temple of Peace.

Therefore, Sir, I must repeat it, that I am not a little furprized that you should pass over in a manner so careless, and with such extreme Superficiality, a Point so very material and interesting as this, to tell us that * " the Possessing as this, to tell us that * " the Possessing as this, to tell us that * " the Possessing as this, to it for many of our own, ought not to be fo for many of our own, ought not to be fo if strenuously insisted upon as to make it a " necessary Condition of the Peace." Had

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you taken the Pains to inform yourfelf of the Facts neceffary for making a Judgment on this Matter, or had you duly attended to them, you could not poffibly have faid that it was not to be infifted upon, and in the fame Breath affert, that without *Canada* we fhould have a treacherous and delufive Peace.

You fay a great deal, and with Reafon, upon the Value of our * North American Colonies, and the great Increase our Trade has had from that Quarter. But you pass by with very little notice, how much both the Trade of England and the Trade of these very North American Colonies owes to the Islands.

You look upon these Islands only as an inferior dependent Part of the British Plantations, which you scarce think worth while to mention; but because I think you are under some mistake in this Point,

* If notwithftanding our having loft feveral Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, we have still more Commerce than ever, a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vast Increase of our Shipping, what can this be owing to but to the Trade of our own American Colonies? Vid. the Letter.

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in addition to those Reasons which have been given to shew the Preference of Guadaloupe in particular to Canada, there are some Facts, which I beg leave to submit to your Observation, concerning Settlements on the Continent of North America and Plantations in the West Indian Islands. Though it may be a new Idea, I shall not hesitate to say, that an Island Colony, is always more advantageous than a Continental one, for the Mother Country.

The Inhabitants of the West Indian Islands never confider themselves as at home there; they fend their Children to the Mother Country for Education ; they themselves make many Trips to the Mother Country to recover their Health or enjoy their Fortunes; if they have Ambition, 'tis hither they come to gratify it. I need not, I suppose, observe to you, how many Gentlemen of the West Indies have Seats in the British House of Commons. I might I believe venture to fay, there are very few who have inherited Plantations in any of our Islands, who have not had an European Education, or at least have not spent some Time in this Kingdom.

dom. Many who have Plantations receive and spend the whole Profits of them here, without ever having even deen the West Indies. If the Commerce with the West Indian Islands had even been in some refpects against us, this Circumstance alone would turn the Ballance in our fayour ; but this in truth is very far from being the Cafe. The Trade we carry on with that Part of the World is as happily circumftanced as Imagination could form it. The West India Islands lie in a Climate different totally from ours. The natural Produce therefore interferes in no respect with that of England. Their Produce is only fuch as the Tafte and Turn of our Manners call for ; but demand fo ftrongly, that if we had them not from our own Colonies, we must purchase from Strangers. The Commerce between the Mother Country and a West Indian Ifland is natural and eafy: it needs in no respect to be forced or managed : they are mutually formed for each other : neither is there any fort of fear that the Iflands in that part of the World shall ever make this Commerce lefs easy or lefs advantageous. The extreme Dearness of Provision will never fuffer them, how much foever

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foever they may be inclined, to fet up any fort of Manufacture which may interfere with our Fabrics. So that these Colonies, by their very Nature, Situation, and Products, by what they have, and by what they want, are kept neceffarily connected with and dependent upon England, and must ever be fo, as long as we are able to protect them. Let us now examine, Sir, whether the greatest part of the Plantations which we poffefs or defire in North America, can come in competition with the Islands, either in the Advantages we derive from them, or in the Certainty of holding those Advantages for the future. With regard to the Eftates in North America fpent in England, I may affirm that from Nova Scotia to Maryland and Virginia there are abfolutely none; yet in this Tract are the four Provinces of New England, the great v Countries of New York, Penlylvania, and the two Jerfeys, Places highly flourishing in Commerce, and abounding with People: even to the Southward of this Line there are few Estates either in Number or Value spent in England.

In North America the Climate is not

in general unfavourable to an European Conflitution, and it is fuch in which Men fond of Rural Diverfions may pafs their time agreeably. The truth is tho' their Eftates fupply them with plenty to live at home, they do not furnifh Money enough to fend them abroad. Excepting Proprietaries, I do not remember that this vaft Continent fupplies our Houfe of Commons with one fingle Member.

To view the Continent of America in a Commercial Light, the Produce of all the Northern Colonies is the fame as that of England, Corn, and Cattle : and therefore, except for a few Naval Stores, there is very little Trade from thence directly to England. Their own Commodities bear a very low Price, Goods carried from Europe bear a very high Price; and thus they are of Necessity driven to fet up Manufactures fimilar to those of England, in which they are favoured by the Plenty and Cheapness of Provisions. In fact, there are Manufactures of many Kinds in thefe Northern Colonies, that promife in a fhort Time to fupply their Home Confumption. From New England they begin even to export fome things Ð

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things manufactured, as Hats, for inftance. In thefe Provinces they have Colleges and Academies for the Education of their Youth; and as they increafe daily in People and in Industry, the Neceffity of a Connection with England, with which they have no natural Intercourse by a Reciprocation of Wants, will continually diminish. But as they recede from the Sea, all these Causes will operate more strongly; they will have nothing to expect, they must blive wholly on their own Labour, and in process of Time will know little, enquire little, and care little about the Mother Country.

If, Sir, the People of our Colonies find no Check from *Canada*, they will extend themfelves, almost, without bounds into the Inland Parts. They are invited to it by the Pleasantness, the Fertility, and the Plenty of that Country; and they will increase infinitely from all Causes. What the Confequence will be, to have a numerous, hardy, independent People, possible of a strong Country, communicating little, or not at all with *England*, I leave to your own Reflections. I hope we have not gone to these immense Expences, 3

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pences, without any Idea of fecuring the Fruits of them to Posterity. If we have, I am fure we have acted with little Frugality or Forefight. This is indeed a Point that must be the constant Object of the Minister's Attention, but is not a fit Subject for a Discuffion. I will therefore expatiate no farther on this Topic; I fhall only obferve, that by eagerly grafping at extensive Territory, we may run the rifque, and that perhaps in no very distant Périod, of losing what we now polfefs. The Poffeffion of Canada, far from being neceffary to our Safety, may in its Consequence be even dangerous. - **A**~ Neighbour that keeps us n fome Awe, is not always the worst of Neighbours. So that far from facrificing Guadaloupe to Canada, perhaps if we might have Canada without any Sacrifice at all, we ought not to defire it. And, befides the Points to be confidered between us and France, there are other Powers who will probably think themfelves interested in the Decision of this Affair. There is a Balance of Power in America as well as in Europe, which will not be forgotten; and this is a Point I should have expected would D 2



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would fornewhat have engaged your atten-

With regard to Senegal and Goree, I concur with you in not making them the principal Object of our Negotiations atthe Congress * for a Peace; but it is upon Principles very different from yours. You defpise the African Trade, and confistently enough, becaufe you feem to lay Inde weight on that of the West Indies, which is fupported by it; but the Reduction of the Price of Slaves, the whole Trade of Gum thrown into our Hands, and the Incrcase of those, of Gold and Ivory, would make even those Places a far better Purchase than Canada, as might I think be fhewn without much difficulty. But I do not infift upon it, becaufe I think we ought to be as moderate in the Terms of Peace, as is confistent with a reafonable Indemnification, and becaufe

* P. 33. Senegal and Goree, though of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own . *African* Settlements have hitherto fupplied us with Slaves fufficient for our *American* Purpofes; and the Gum Trade is not perhaps of Confequence enough to make us amends for the annual Mortality which we already lament of our brave Countrymen to guard our *African* Conquefts.

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too I know in the Nature of Things, that it is, impoffible to retain all. In one word, I will not venture, Sir, to fay, we have a treacherous and delusive Peace, unlefs the Peace is made in Conformity to my Ideas; for there may be Reafons that neither you, or I, Sir, can poffibly be acquainted with, which may make this not proper to be infifted upon; but I will take upon me, Sir, to fay, that if by this War we gain Guadaloupe, we gain as great an Acquisition as ever this Nation gained by any Treaty or any War, and if it is possible to retain this, we need not as for more.

At a Congress, Sir, in the Face of that August Assembly, formed by the Reprefentatives of the Christian World, we there exhibit ourfelves in our fhall real Character, and shew all the Powers of Europe what they are to expect from us, and how far they ought to with the Continuance and Increase of our Great-Therefore any shew of arrogant ness. Superiority, any unmeasurable Claim, any avaricious Grafping, though they may feem immediately to fall upon France, are in effect Menaces to every other Power.

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But if Moderation is necessary Power. there, when the War is ended, and when we act as a Nation, how much more neceffary is it to private Men, whilft the War still continues with that Uncertainty, which must always attend the most profperous Fortune. You cannot forget in this very Year, what an Afpect our Affairs in Germany wore, before the glorious Battle of Minden; and you cannot be ignorant-how much this must have affected in a Negotiation for Peace. Things are not yet decided there; they look indeed favourable, but not favourable enough, either with regard to his Majefty's Army, and ftill lefs with regard to the King of Prussia, to entitle you to prescribe Terms in the Stile of a Roman Dictator, even if any Fortune could entitle you to do it. Let us, Sir, use a little Moderation in our happy Hour, that we may at all Events preferve an Uniformity of Conduct, and not act meanly, if, contrary to our Wishes, any reverse of Fortune should oblige us to be moderate. I should indeed think it the more neceffary in you to have been fo, as you have not, in my humble Opinion, chosen your Objects very properly. France, Sir, though beaten in all Quarters

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v Quarters of the World, worsted both by Sea and Land; though the Credit of her Arms and her Finances are impaired, the is not yet totally ruined: nor, as I conceive, brought to low as the was in the War of Queen Anne. Yet, Sir, you will be pleased to remember, that by the haughty Demeanor, the unreasonable Expectations, the arrogant, I may fay, ridiculous Demands of the Allies, the happy Hour for making Peace on /the most advantageous Concessions was / sufmered to escape; until Faction had Time to raife its Head in England, the Posture of Affairs to change Abroad, and the Fortune of the War to vary in fo many Particulars, that the Refult of all 'our, Success and Arrogance was -> the Treaty The M. de Torcy's Memoirs of Utrecht. are a lively Picture of this Conduct and its Consequences.

> I have, Sir, attentively, and I hope it will be allowed fairly, examined your principal Arguments. You will give me leave now to observe a little upon some Things of lefs Confequence, which lye detached from one another here and there in your Performance.

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I refpect the Zeal which you fhew for the Interest of your Country: but I think that Zeal has transported you much too far in your Reflections on the Conduct and Capacities of our Nobility. If the Eastiness of their Fortunes hurries many of them into a Life of Diffipation and Pleafure, that has always been the Case, because it is the natural Consequence of Youth and Affluence. This, if we may trust our Writers, was the Grievance of other Ages and other Countries as well as ours.

This War is principally, with regard to us at least, it is, an American War. When I confider this, I own my Eyes are involuntarily led, as I believe those of most Persons are, to the few who from their Inclinations, their Studies, their Opportunities, and their Talents, are made perfectly Mafters of the State and Interests of our Colonies. There cannot be many, therefore we cannot eafily be miftaken. Nor can we, when we cast our Eye on the noble Perfon to whom we owe the judicious Settlement of that frontier Colony, whole Capital gratefully bears the Title of its Founder, by any Means

Means defpair of an able Flenipotentiary at a Congress, where for the first Time, our own national Interest will be the principal Object of Negotiation.

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I admire, Sir, with you, the noble Struggle which that great Prince our Ally in this War, has made against fuch a Combination of great Powers as meant to destroy him. I could wish for his Virtues, and profess I almost expect from his Abilities, that he will still extricate himfelf from all the Toils that furround him.

It must, however, be remembered, that it is not to his Connection with us, that he owes his Distress. He has not, like the unhappy Prince of *Heffe* loss his Country twice, by adhering firmly to *Great Britain*, in a Quarrel intirely *Britisconder Britain*, a Quarrel intirely *Britisconder Britain*, and I am fure he has already found in *Great*, *Britain* a most useful Ally, and I believe he always will find in her an Ally faithful to her Engagements. But, Sir, there is a bound to every thing, *t Let us in your own Words learn for the*

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† P. 42.

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future to prefer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the Continent to the immediate Expences of our own Country, and never to assist a New Ally without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what return we have had. We see plainly, Sir, by the Conduct of Great Britain at this Hour, that the Ministry is not inclined to let this Prince fall for want of a due Affistance; but sure while we affist him so materially in Europe, we are not bound to facrifice our Interests in other Parts of the World. It may be a popular Doctrine, but I hope, it is not a Doctrine that will be received.

‡ Enthufiafm, Sir, is a noble Principle of Action, but good Senfe and Knowledge only must direct the fole Business of a Negotiation. The Protestant

† P. 40, 41. I would inculcate a Doctrine which I think will not be unpopular, and which therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Ministers, that whatever Conquest we have made, and whatever Conquest we may still make upon the French, except North America, which must be kept all our own, schoold be looked upon as given back to France for a valuable Confideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforesteen Distrestes.

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Caufe maintained itfelf before the King of *Pruffia* was confidered as its Protector; and I truft it will ftill be able to fupport itfelf independent of him; it will indeed always find a furer Support in the jarring Intereft of the feveral Powers of *Furete*

Interest of the several Powers of Europe, which will certainly never cease, than in the Faith of any Prince, which will be always subject to change.

The Circumstances of that famous * Opposition in our Parliament to which you allude, are indeed but little known. It is, however, a Period about which, no man is uninquifitive. Your Defcription of the Medley which composed that Opposition, is spirited, lively, and I doubt not, just : If you were yourself engaged in that Struggle, when you had driven the common Enemy to the Wall, whether you found it convenient at that Time to guit your Friends, or whether you thought yourfelf deferted by them, Time enough is now elapsed to have forgotten political Friendships, and perhaps too, to have worn

* P. 41. P. 35. vide Note. The true Hiftory of this Transaction here alluded to, may possibly fome time or other appear; though, as yet, we are perfuaded that the World knows very little of it.

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worn out Party Refentments; and in an Age fo fond of Anecdotes, and fo curious in Characters, affuredly nothing will be more acceptable than a true Hiftory of that whole Transaction.

It was indeed no undefirable Time to have lived, when a Field was opened for every Man to display his Abilities, and exert his Talents; if we give the Reins to our Ambition, we should, Sir, regret that where so many skillful Champions used formerly to engage and struggle for Victory,. one Man should at this Day remain single in the Field of Battle. But alas, Sir, however mortifying this may be to us as Men, furely as citizens we must rejoice that the great Man, to whole active Spirit we in a great measure owe all our Glory, our, Succefs, I had almost faid our very Safety, can employ his whole time against the Enemies of his Country, without giving a Moment's Care to provide for his own Safety. If we confider it, in this Light, Sir, fure it must be a most pleasing Contemplation to think, that * "theExtinction of fac-" tious Opposition, the Unanimity of ", every

* P. 2.

" every Party, and the Acquiefcence of " every Connection, in whatever Scheme " is proposed by his Majesty's Servants." fuffer the Speaker without the least Debate or Opposition to take the Chair, only to vote Millions, and levy Thousands; * but these Millions are voted, and these Thousands are levied, for the Destruction of the Enemies of our Country.

Have a little Patience however; we fhall foon, I truft, Sir, have beat all our Enemies, and then we fhall perhaps againhave leifure to quarrel among ourfelves; we may then fee more than one Champion in the Field; we may then lift under that Banner, which our Intereft or our Paffion's may direct us to.

In the mean time, let us thank Providence for the prefent happy Situation of our Affairs. EveryMan fhould, as far ashe can, endeavour to continue that Acquiefcence, to cherifh that Concord and Union, which is indeed fo advantageous to our Country; and every Head of a Partymuft in this have a fhare in our Acknowledgments for their Acquiefcence.

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* Vid. the Letter.

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But the two great Persons you address, at prefent engrofs the public Attention. The noble Lord has great Merit both to his Country and his Prince; his early Zeal cannot be forgotten. His extensive Influence, his perfonal Authority, exerted as they have been, and as I truft they always will be, for the Good of his Country, will always challenge the good Opinion of his Countrymen. Nor will our Country forget to do justice to the active Spirit of that great Man, to whofe unwearied Efforts Great Britain is fo much indebted for her prefent Glory; to whom you and I, Sir, owe it, that in a War with fuch a Power as France we now debate whether our Country fhould use Moderation. I mean not, Sir, to make any Comparison, for it is not now a Time to draw the nice Line between the Merits of great Men, or to ascertain exactly where the Merit of the one ends, and the other begins. Comparisons are always invidious, and might at this Time be hurtful, and tend to weaken the Bonds that unite fo many in the Service of their Country.

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It was no Spirit of Contradiction, Sir, that made me take the pains of anfwering your Letter; therefore as I canvafs with Freedom those Points which appear to me to be mistaken, fo with great Pleafure I join Hands where I think what you fay is just and reasonable. I agree with you intirely in your Judgment of a Place Bill, which would, I believe, be more effectual, if not made too violent in its ffrst Operation like an Oliverian felfdenying Ordinance. Your Judgment on Mediators is furely just and fensible; and we may believe the Ministry think fo, who have not employed any Mediation, though they have offered Terms to their Enemy.

I might now afk yours and the public Indulgence for any Miftakes. I have not willingly perverted or mifreprefented any thing. I do not pretend to the Credit of a Writer, but I have endeavoured to underftand the Queftion I write upon, as I think every Man is bound to do who troubles the Public with his Opinions. If I am miftaken in what I advance, it does not much fignify who the Author of wrong wrong Notions may be. If my Opinions are well grounded, and my Remarks juft, my Country may receive fome Benefit from them; and if the receives a Benefit, it is of little Concern what Hand adminifters it.

I am, SIR,

Yours, &c. &c.

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