



House of Commons
Canada

**THE DILEMMAS OF A COMMITTED
PEACEKEEPER:
CANADA AND
THE RENEWAL OF PEACEKEEPING**

**STANDING COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENCE AND
VETERANS AFFAIRS**

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June 1993

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Issue No. 43
Thursday, May 27, 1993
Tuesday, June 1, 1993
Chairperson: Marc Ferland

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Édition 1^{re} 43
Le jeudi 27 mai 1993
Le mardi 1^{er} juin 1993
Président: Marc Ferland

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National Defence
and
Veterans Affairs

Défense nationale et
des affaires des
Anciens combattants

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Issue No. 49

Thursday, May 27, 1993

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Chairperson: Marc Ferland

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 49

Le jeudi 27 mai 1993

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Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on

Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Comité permanent de la

National Defence and Veterans Affairs

Défense nationale et des affaires des Anciens combattants

RESPECTING:

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), consideration of a draft report on Peacekeeping

INCLUDING:

The Fourth Report to the House

CONCERNANT:

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, une étude de l'ébauche de rapport sur le maintien de la paix

Y COMPRIS:

Le quatrième rapport à la Chambre

Third Session of the Thirty-fourth Parliament,
1991-92-93

Troisième session de la trente-quatrième législature,
1991-1992-1993

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VETERANS AFFAIRS

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Roger Préfontaine

Chairman's Foreword

The end of the Cold War has more or less ended the threat of a nuclear world war, but the horrible images we see almost everyday on the television news demonstrate that many regions of the world have still not found peace. Canadians are never indifferent to the suffering caused by war and support the efforts made by the international community favouring the pacific resolution of conflicts, including peacekeeping operations. Indeed, Canadians consider their country's participation in peacekeeping operations as one of the most important elements of Canada's presence on the international scene.

However, peacekeeping operations have multiplied at such a rapid pace since the fall of the Berlin Wall that even a strong supporter of peacekeeping like Canada has had difficulty meeting all requests. Furthermore, operations now require a significant number of UN troops to ensure success and the risks faced by peacekeepers are always increasing. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs therefore decided to study the changing nature of peacekeeping not only to recommend ways to improve Canada's contribution, but also to make Canadians aware of the implications of these operations for the personnel and equipment of the Canadian Forces.

As Chair of the Committee, I feel honoured to have been involved in the work of the Committee on this issue and I would like to thank the other members of the Committee who have worked so diligently to advance the cause of peace. In their name, I thank the Clerk of the Committee and the research staff from the Library of Parliament as well as from the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade for their excellent work. Finally, on behalf of the Committee, I would like to thank all those who testified and who submitted briefs on Canada's contribution to peacekeeping.

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*The Standing Committee on
National Defence and Veterans Affairs*

has the honour to present its

FOURTH REPORT

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), your Committee undertook a study on Peacekeeping. It has heard evidence from a range of expert witnesses, solicited briefs from the general public, heard citizens and reports its findings and recommendations.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommends:

1. That in view of changes in the international scene, the government initiate a public review of Canada's security and defence policy with special emphasis on Canada's contribution to the United Nations and UN peacekeeping.
2. That the federal government prepare a document on its UN commitments and its position on the UN Secretary-General's Report *An Agenda for Peace* and submit it for public discussion.
3. That Canada continue to have a strong commitment to UN peacekeeping operations with the expectation that there ought to be a fair and equitable sharing of peacekeeping costs by UN member countries.
4. That Canada prepare to commit itself to expanded roles in UN peacekeeping and make peacekeeping a high priority role for the Canadian Forces.
5. That Canada encourage other UN member countries to participate more equitably in contributing troops and funding to ensure peacekeeping operations are successful.
6. That Canada persist in its efforts to improve the UN administration's capabilities in communications and logistics with respect to peacekeeping operations.
7. That Canada should stress the urgency of maintaining a 24-hour a day operations centre, capable of dealing with all operations, at UN headquarters in New York.
8. That the Department of National Defence re-examine the structure of the Forces, the value of the Total Force Concept, and the distribution of Regular Force personnel to ensure sufficient peacekeepers are available within budget constraints.
9. That the Auditor General continue his study of the Canadian Forces Reserve on an annual basis in order to monitor the implementation of the Total Force Concept closely.
10. That the proportion of reservists in Canadian contingents deployed in UN operations, such as in the former Yugoslavia, where the situation may rapidly deteriorate into conflict involving UN troops be limited to approximately 10 per cent.

11. That, in general, no more than one-quarter of the members of Canadian contingents deployed in peacekeeping operations be reservists.
12. That the Department of National Defence extend the period of intensive training given to reservists immediately prior to their deployment in a UN operation from 90 days to at least 120 days.
13. That the Department of National Defence encourage reservists who have received intensive training prior to their deployment in a UN operation to remain in the Reserve upon their return to Canada.
14. That the federal government set the example for the private and public sectors by taking immediate measures to ensure that its employees who are members of the Reserve can take special leave from their jobs to train and take part in UN operations.
15. That the federal government study the possibility of passing legislation to protect the employment of reservists taking part in UN operations for six months or more.
16. That the Department of National Defence expedite study of revisions to the *National Defence Act* with respect to the Reserve.
17. That the Department of National Defence conduct a complete evaluation of its peacekeeping training needs and of possible ways of improving training in light of recent operations, and that it make its findings public. This evaluation should be carried out by Department of National Defence personnel in conjunction with outside experts.
18. That the preparation given to military personnel prior to their deployment in a UN operation:
 - a) be provided on a more systematic basis;
 - b) be improved to make personnel more sensitive to the different cultures, customs and practices of local populations;
 - c) be improved to ensure that all military personnel in units which may be deployed in UN operations receive better training in conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation.
19. That the general purpose military training system be maintained and continue to provide military personnel with realistic training in all forms of combat, including those involving tanks.
20. That a permanent peacekeeping training centre be established in Canada.
21. That the Department of National Defence maintain equipment at a level necessary for Canada to contribute on a fair, safe and equitable basis to future UN peacekeeping operations.

22. That Canada should always equip its peacekeeping contingents with the quantity and quality of vehicles and weapons it deems appropriate for the theatre of operations where they are deployed, rather than comply with the instructions of other parties.
23. That the Department of National Defence ensure it meets, as soon as possible, the urgent requests for modifications to equipment from field commanders in UN operations.
24. That the Hercules fleet be modernized in order to ensure that it can continue to support humanitarian assistance operations and Canadian troop contingents in UN operations.
25. That study of the replacement of the operational support ships take into account the usefulness of such ships in supporting Canada's participation in UN operations.
26. That the Department of National Defence maintain and augment services provided to military families and military personnel upon their return to Canada.
27. That a Canadian Volunteer Service Medal for UN peacekeeping be established to recognize the service of Canadian military and non-military personnel who have served on UN peacekeeping missions.

THE DILEMMAS OF A COMMITTED PEACEKEEPER: CANADA AND THE RENEWAL OF PEACEKEEPING

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, Canadian military personnel have left Canada for foreign destinations on a number of occasions. Fortunately, with few exceptions, they left for peacekeeping rather than combat missions.

Over the years, Canadian peacekeepers have done their job so well that Canada's international reputation was greatly enhanced as a result. In most of the missions in which they participated, they were equipped only with jeeps, light weapons and the firm conviction that they were doing something worthwhile.

Today, however, Canadian peacekeepers increasingly require armoured vehicles, high calibre weapons, and additional training to do their work. Never before have so many Canadian soldiers from both the Regular and Reserve Forces been deployed around the world in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping missions have multiplied rapidly in recent years and enjoy the international community's favour as never before. However, the end of the Cold War has brought major upheavals not only in the international situation, but also in expectations placed on peacekeeping operations. While acknowledging the importance of traditional peacekeeping operations, international public opinion also favours a more interventionist policy by the international community in regional and internal conflicts, if only to provide humanitarian assistance to victims.

As an ardent supporter of peacekeeping operations, it was natural for Canada to join the new wave of peacekeeping missions which have marked the international scene in recent months. As a result, in addition to engaging in traditional peacekeeping operations in which the belligerents have more or less agreed to end their fighting, Canadian troops are also involved in UN missions, as in the former Yugoslavia, where the combatants agree most of the time to let convoys of humanitarian assistance pass, but nevertheless continue their hostilities.

The risks facing Canadian peacekeepers in these new operations are on the rise, however. This new wave of peacekeeping missions also comes at a time when Canada's defence policy is being restructured as a result of the end of the Cold War. The fact that some Canadian military resources are in much greater demand than anyone could have imagined scarcely a year ago provides food for thought.

In light of this situation, the Committee undertook this study to examine the characteristics of recent peacekeeping operations, the ability of Canadian peacekeepers to carry out their duties, and the consequences of this activity beyond Canada's borders for Canadian military resources. Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations is such an important element of its commitment to the international community and the UN, that it is important to consider the implications of the new international situation and recent peacekeeping developments.

In its study of the problem, the Committee confined itself to operations undertaken by the UN under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter which deals with the pacific settlement of disputes. When the Charter was drafted in 1945, peacekeeping operations were not mentioned, but Chapter 6 paved the way for the use of such operations to help in the pacific settlement of disputes. There is a tendency today to apply the peacekeeping label to a whole series of missions, including those which, in certain respects, exceed the traditional criteria. What all these missions have in common, however, is an effort to reconcile the belligerents and to reduce the suffering of victims of conflicts.

These characteristics distinguish such operations from others conducted by or under the aegis of the United Nations in which military forces intervene under Chapter 7 of the Charter which deals with actions to counter threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Thus, the questions raised by Canada's participation in UN-sponsored military actions such as those during the Korean War in the early 1950s and in the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 are not addressed directly in this study, if only to facilitate the study of the essential aspects of peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER 1

PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

ORIGINS OF PEACEKEEPING

Like many other inventions, the UN's peacekeeping operations were created in response to a pressing need when other measures, although available, could not be used. From its inception, the UN had seen its ability to undertake military action under Chapter 7 of the Charter to preserve international peace and security severely limited by Cold War tensions.

The Charter grants the Security Council the power to use force against a country engaged in acts of aggression, but it was so difficult to reach a consensus within the Council on what action should be taken that any effort to impose its will on the parties in a regional conflict was out of the question. However, regional conflicts multiplied in the 1950s and 1960s and threatened, if given free rein, to worsen already tense relations between the nuclear superpowers.

While the UN could not decide to use force to stop a conflict, it could at least help the parties implement a ceasefire or a peace agreement and deploy peacekeepers to enforce compliance with such agreements. Thus, although the Charter does not mention peacekeeping, it was felt that such action could be undertaken under Chapter 6 which allowed the Secretary-General to take initiatives to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As Norman Hillmer, professor of history at Carleton University, emphasized, peacekeeping operations "evolved as an alternative strategy, a relatively mild endeavour that could win widespread support and which was predicated on the consent of the affected parties".¹

CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION

Shortly after its founding, the UN embarked on numerous peacekeeping missions in which Canada earned a solid reputation. Canada also played a key diplomatic and military role in establishing the first major operation, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which set up camp between Egyptians and Israelis in the Gaza Strip to put an end to the Suez Crisis in 1956. The success of that mission confirmed that peacekeeping operations were a useful diplomatic tool, while creating a military role which, over the years, became a cornerstone of Canadian defence policy.

It was natural for Canada, an ardent supporter of the UN's work and of the values outlined in the Charter, to give its full support to the UN's use of peacekeeping operations to help resolve regional conflicts. Located in a stable region, possessing a small but professional military force, and enjoying enviable general economic conditions, Canada had what was needed to make a valid contribution to peacekeeping operations.

¹ House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs* (hereinafter "Proceedings"), 30:6.

There was no doubt that Canada was in the Western camp in the Cold War world, but its concern for peace and the professionalism of its peacekeepers made its participation in peacekeeping operations generally acceptable to both sides of any regional conflict. It should not be assumed, however, that Canada took part in UN operations solely for altruistic reasons. Professor Hillmer pointed out that peacekeeping also served the aim of national policy and said that "Canadians benefit from a stable world." He described the image we have of our peacekeeping role as follows:

Peacekeeping is seen as an independent, distinctively Canadian activity, and our internationalism as an antidote to too much continentalism.²

The Canadian public's fascination with this military role, despite the ups and downs of UN operations in the past 40 years, may perhaps be explained by its recognition of the importance of peacekeeping to the national interest and to international peace. There have been periods of disillusionment, particularly after UNEF was expelled from Egypt in 1967, but Canadians have mostly considered peacekeeping as a feather in Canada's defence policy cap, even though, until very recently, fewer than 2,000 Canadian military personnel per year took part in peacekeeping operations.

During the 1980s, when the Regular Force of the Canadian Forces stood at around 80,000 members, it was established policy, as confirmed by the 1987 White Paper on Defence, that as many as 2,000 members of the forces could be posted at any one time to peacekeeping operations. At the height of the Cold War, the majority of Canadian military personnel were assigned either to the defence of North America or that of Western Europe where Canada maintained troops with its NATO allies.

With few exceptions, particularly the UNFICYP operation in Cyprus and UNEF I and II, most peacekeeping operations between 1947 and 1990 required contingents of only 50 to 500 Canadian military personnel. However, using only a small portion of its military resources, Canada has been able to take part in all UN peacekeeping operations and has earned an enviable international reputation along the way.

UPHEAVAL IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Like many other things, peacekeeping operations could not escape the effects of the upheaval caused by the end of the Cold War. The increase in the number of new operations in the late 1980s was a tangible sign of reduced tensions between the Soviet bloc and the West. Conflicts such as those in Namibia and Central America, which had been aggravated by superpower intervention, were peacefully resolved in short order with the help of peacekeeping operations.

However, when the Soviet bloc and the Cold War passed into history, the international community welcomed with open arms the disappearance of superpower tensions which, in many respects, had paralysed the UN, but it still has to deal with conflicts in which peace is difficult to establish. Taking advantage of the new international situation which enhanced its importance and promoted greater cooperation among the members of its Security Council, the UN intervened in a

² Proceedings, 30:9.

number of these conflicts, either to support a peace process already under way, as in Cambodia, or, as in the former Yugoslavia, to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of civil war. However, the rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations inevitably caused problems for the UN.

The sharp rise in the number of operations has complicated the administration of the UN logistics system and revealed some weaknesses in operational command at UN headquarters in New York. Being used to the operations of the past, which took place more or less as planned, UN administrators have had to deal with a new generation of operations in which peacekeepers in the field must often consult headquarters in New York in order to determine what action to take in very delicate situations.

Based on his experience in 1992 as Chief of Staff of the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Major-General Lewis MacKenzie criticized the manner in which the UN administers its operations. In particular, he mentioned the difficulty involved in communicating with UN administrators at headquarters in New York outside regular office hours. Major-General MacKenzie told the Committee that the UN has since made efforts to improve its command system at headquarters, while reaffirming his conviction that the capability to consult and communicate with peacekeepers in the field 24 hours a day is necessary.³

Some of the operations conducted in recent months have also shown that it is becoming increasingly difficult for peacekeepers to carry out their missions safely. Merely wearing a blue beret has never guaranteed UN soldiers immunity from attacks or the dangers of a combat zone such as land mines, as witness the number of UN peacekeepers killed or wounded in peacekeeping operations. Some 154 peacekeepers have died since 1964 in Cyprus alone. Today, however, it appears that belligerents in a conflict are more inclined to attack peacekeepers.

This phenomenon is perhaps more apparent in operations in which the UN intervenes to enforce a ceasefire agreed to after difficult negotiations or to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of a conflict in the absence of any peace accord. The combatants may take a dim view of any UN intervention that may restrict the deployment of their troops in a combat zone or which appears to favour one camp over the other, hence the marked tendency to attack the Blue Berets. It is also clear that the mere presence of UN soldiers in a region where combat is ongoing increases their chances of being killed or wounded.

Given the UN's increasingly interventionist approach, operations in which peacekeepers are not all that well received by the belligerents or in which they find themselves in the line of fire will likely become more numerous. This approach is the result of considerable public impatience with any conflict that persistently victimizes civilians and frustrates diplomatic efforts to make peace.

However, UN intervention restricted to distributing humanitarian assistance or to enforcing local ceasefires does not necessarily guarantee an end to conflict and may expose UN troops to the dangers of a combat zone for several months or years. Consequently, Blue Berets involved in certain operations in which there are varying degrees of peace to be kept may find themselves in situations such as that in the former Yugoslavia where conflict is dragging on, increasing the dangers and frustration they face.

³ Proceedings, p. 33:30.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

Thus, while continuing to involve itself in peacekeeping missions of the traditional kind, the UN has embarked on operations which go somewhat beyond previously established parameters. This situation has inevitably had an impact on UN member countries such as Canada which provide military contingents for those operations. In discussing the 1992-1993 fiscal year, Admiral John Anderson, Chief of Defence Staff, explained this impact as follows:

In the past, less than 2,000 active personnel were involved in our commitments to the UN. That number has more than doubled over the present fiscal year, and the expected additional costs associated with peacekeeping operations are in the order of \$170 million representing more than three times the initial assessment.⁴

In early 1993, more than 4,500 members of the Canadian Forces were deployed around the world in UN operations. However, in addition to increasing the percentage of Canadian military resources assigned to UN operations, the new international context arising from the end of the Cold War era has also changed to some extent the peacekeeping ground rules.

Although part of the Western camp during the Cold War, Canada was able to play a major role in peacekeeping operations because the parties in a conflict, often supporters of other camps, recognized its experience in the field and its commitment to peace, and therefore accepted its participation, despite its links with the West. As a result of the reputation it has built up over the years and its obvious desire to take part in all operations, if only to keep its record intact, Canada became virtually an automatic participant in every new peacekeeping operation.

However, the end of the Cold War raised the prospect of potential new suppliers of peacekeepers. Britain and France, as well as Russia, the Ukraine and even the United States, now freed from numerous military commitments as a result of the end of the Cold War, can more readily contribute troops to UN operations. The consequences of this new situation for Canada were underscored by Jack Granatstein, professor of history at York University, in the following terms:

What this means is that there will be increasing competition among nations for slots on peacekeeping operations. In a uni-polar world, it will inevitably be much harder for us to be seen as one of the few politically acceptable peacekeepers with well-trained, technically skilled troops.⁵

Professor Granatstein nevertheless added that Canada should not fear this new situation, which can benefit Canada if it reviews its policy to ensure it is realistic. While remaining proud of its enormous contribution to peacekeeping operations, Canada should also be concerned about the fact that it perhaps contributes more than its share. With some 4,500 military personnel in UN operations at the start of 1993, Canada is supplying about 10 per cent of UN troops. Some countries provide more soldiers, such as France with 7,000, but when the various levels of military and economic power are compared, Canada is clearly not stinting in this respect.

⁴ Proceedings, 32 :7.

⁵ Proceedings, 30 :9.

However, given current economic realities and the complex nature of some new operations, Canada has not taken on its new commitments with its eyes closed. On the contrary, Canada appears to have had its moments of hesitation in the face of the recent increase in the number of operations. In speaking of the UN, Jocelyn Coulon, journalist with the daily *Le Devoir*, emphasized the following:

It has been noted on many occasions that Canadians were asking more and more questions and were increasingly reluctant to participate in certain missions, to the extent that in the case of the Angola mission, the UN had not explicitly requested Canada's participation. It's Canada that said: We must participate solely to maintain our record of participation.⁶

Thus, while maintaining its commitment to peacekeeping, Canada has had to take a closer look at the parameters of UN operations in which it participates given their sharp increase in number. In the past, when the UN organized an operation occasionally, it was fairly easy for Canada to maintain its record of participation in all operations. With the growing number of operations in the early 1990s, Canada has found itself solicited on all sides at a time when it is trying to reduce military spending.

CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO THE UN

Canada, however, could not abandon the UN, just when peacekeeping operations, one of the feathers in its cap, are multiplying at a remarkable rate. Having supported peacekeeping operations during the ups and downs of the UN's popularity within the international community, it would have been unthinkable for Canada to remain indifferent at a time when the post-Cold War world is unanimously attaching increasing importance to the UN and to peacekeeping.

Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as an important element of their identity and of their country's position on the international stage, even when peacekeeping meant little to much of the international community. Canadians continue to support peacekeeping operations which have won the favour of the international community now coping with the upheavals caused by the end of the Cold War. However, they are increasingly aware of what UN operations entail and are asking questions.

Canada can only be pleased with the importance given UN operations in the current international context and the support they have received from the international community in general, but it is also facing a number of dilemmas. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has enabled it to bring home soldiers previously stationed in Germany as part of its NATO commitments and to cut planned military spending in general, at a time when economic realities have made more prudent economic policy necessary. On the other hand, while its military resources are diminishing, the large number of UN operations has forced Canada to deploy outside its borders virtually the same number of soldiers it had posted in Germany on the central front during the final months of the Cold War.

But Canada is not alone in facing contradictory demands in this respect. The objectives and conditions of peacekeeping operations in the past were not as uniform as might be imagined today, but were conducted in accordance with recognized criteria and normally conformed to an established model.

⁶ Proceedings, p. 41:4.

Peacekeeping operations were undertaken with the consent of the combatants, who were often governments of countries confronting each other along a common border. Today, many of the conflicts in which UN troops are involved occur within a single country in which each of the parties claims to be the legitimate government.

Whereas the international community used to make every effort to avoid interfering in a country's domestic politics, it now finds itself fully involved in a number of situations where various elements within a country agree to allow the UN help them find peace. However, there are also situations in which the UN intervenes in a country that is more or less in a state of civil war. In some situations, it may do so without the parties' consent because anarchy reigns in the country, or with their consent, but only to provide humanitarian assistance to victims as the war rages on.

The UN's greater tendency towards intervention in the domestic affairs of countries in conflict reflects the fact that international public opinion is increasingly opposed to allowing civil wars and human rights abuses to continue without international intervention simply out of respect for a country's sovereignty. International public impatience with domestic conflicts which persist in victimizing civilians is even pushing the international community to consider intervening in countries before conflict breaks out.

It was in this context that, in June 1992, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, published his report entitled, *An Agenda for Peace*, in which he attempted to stimulate debate on the UN's more active and interventionist role. While discussing peacekeeping, he also raised the issues of preventive diplomacy, re-establishing peace and building peace after a conflict.

Aware of the ad hoc and unsystematic manner in which the UN had often established peacekeeping forces in the past, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali raised the possibility of establishing a permanent UN force composed of units of various countries which could intervene quickly to counter open aggression. Intervention by such a standing force or even its mere existence would likely prevent a conflict from persisting for any length of time and would perhaps enable the UN to avoid establishing a peacekeeping operation.

Some witnesses said many problems had to be resolved before a standing UN military force could be established, unless peace mercenaries were used in the meantime. Questions of command must be clarified and it remains to be seen to what extent countries would agree not only to contribute military units, but also to grant the UN all decision-making powers.

Witnesses also emphasized that the distinction between UN action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to counter acts of aggression by one country against another and action under Chapter 6 in the form of a peacekeeping operation to assist countries in implementing a peace accord putting an end to a conflict was gradually becoming blurred. The distinction still exists, but the UN's increasingly obvious tendency toward an interventionist policy, while satisfying the desire of international public opinion to see tangible action taken by the international community to put an end to conflict, also creates concerns.

The briefs submitted to the Committee by the public and interested groups and the presentations made by some authors of these briefs at public hearings generally reflect a concern among the Canadian citizenry about the direction in which the UN is headed and the implications of its policies for Canada. While expressing a wish to see a lasting international peace and an end to continuing conflicts, several members of the public and representatives of interested groups expressed fears that Canada could find itself obliged to enter conflicts under the aegis of the UN.

In light of the increasing number of UN peacekeeping and other operations, Canadians are concerned about commitments that are exacting an increasing cost in soldiers and equipment. While Canada's defence policy is still being restructured on the basis of post-Cold War realities, people are also wondering where we are headed.

The Committee can only be concerned about the doubts expressed in the briefs and during the testimony about what direction should be taken. At a time when more than 4,000 Canadian military personnel are posted outside the country in various UN operations, it is important to ensure that the Canadian populace is prepared to make the sacrifices that active participation in these operations entails. As shown in the previous chapters, the proportion of Canadian military resources dedicated to UN operations is not negligible, and, taking into account other priorities which the government must consider, it is essential that we carefully examine the direction in which we are turning. The Committee therefore recommends:

- 1. That in view of changes in the international scene, the government initiate a public review of Canada's security and defence policy with special emphasis on Canada's contribution to the United Nations and UN peacekeeping.**
- 2. That the federal government prepare a document on its UN commitments and its position on the UN Secretary-General's Report *An Agenda for Peace* and submit it for public discussion.**

As the other chapters will show, Canada's commitment to UN operations is demanding because of the military resources it must assign to them and in human terms given that so many Canadians must be deployed in operations where conditions are most often dangerous. However, given Canada's fervent support of efforts deployed to preserve international peace since the UN Charter was written and, in particular, of the peacekeeping concept itself, it is important for Canada to continue supporting peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN and to help broaden support for peacekeeping within the international community. The Committee therefore recommends:

- 3. That Canada continue to have a strong commitment to UN peacekeeping operations with the expectation that there ought to be a fair and equitable sharing of peacekeeping costs by UN member countries.**
- 4. That Canada prepare to commit itself to expanded roles in UN peacekeeping and make peacekeeping a high priority role for the Canadian Forces.**
- 5. That Canada encourage other UN member countries to participate more equitably in contributing troops and funding to ensure peacekeeping operations are successful.**

Canada must also coordinate its efforts with those of other countries to make the UN administration more effective, particularly with regard to peacekeeping. Admiral John Anderson pointed out to the Committee that Canada was aware of the UN's communications and logistics problems and had already taken measures to assist the organization. In June 1992, Brigadier-General Maurice Baril was appointed military advisory to the UN Secretary-General to assist the UN administration in setting up an information management centre that could monitor events taking place in the various UN operations. Canada has also made available its expertise in the field of logistics.

In view of its contributions of personnel and equipment and the stakes for international peace, it is in Canada's interests to continue assisting the UN in improving its communications with officials in the various operations under way and to make its logistics system more effective. It is therefore recommended:

- 6. That Canada persist in its efforts to improve the UN administration's capabilities in communications and logistics with respect to peacekeeping operations.**
- 7. That Canada should stress the urgency of maintaining a 24-hour a day operations centre, capable of dealing with all operations, at UN headquarters in New York.**

The UN is aware of its administrative problems with regard to peacekeeping and is trying to find solutions. At the same time, however, it is also faced with a radically altered international context and is trying to determine where it fits in, while expectations with regard to peacekeeping are evolving. In any case, other measures which can help pave the way for peacekeeping operations or prevent conflicts from developing should also be considered. For example, the limitation of the international trade in conventional weapons could help in preventing the escalation of conflicts. Canada has taken measures to encourage transparency and consultation in the international trade in conventional weapons and should redouble its efforts to promote additional measures within the international community.

The importance of controlling the international arms trade has been widely recognized in recent years and continued action in this area will improve the prospects for successful peacekeeping and other conflict resolution operations. The Committee supports the position put forward in this area in the fall of 1992 by the Sub-Committee on Arms Export of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. The Committee also recognizes the important role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in reconciling groups involved in conflicts and encourages greater emphasis in this area.

CHAPTER 2

CANADIAN FORCES AND EXPANDED UN OPERATIONS

THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF LAND FORCES

Since the purpose of peacekeeping operations is to encourage, facilitate or supervise the cessation of hostilities in a conflict, it goes without saying that peacekeepers practise their profession on battlefields, indeed on the demarcation line between the belligerents. While members of the Air Force and Navy do take part in peacekeeping operations, it is mainly up to the Land Force to do the essential part of the work.

While the aircraft and ships of the parties in a conflict may return to their respective bases, their armies most often remain face to face along the ceasefire line, hence the need to post contingents of peacekeepers. These contingents may include infantry battalions or observers experienced in land forces tactics. In short, infantry personnel are the most suitable in terms of military knowledge and equipment to perform peacekeeping duties.

When Canada made approximately 2,000 of its military personnel available to the UN, it was able to accommodate these two types of operations without too much difficulty. When Canadian military personnel acted as observers in various UN missions around the world, Canada was also able to contribute larger contingents such as the some 600 soldiers participating in the UNFICYP operation in Cyprus.

INCREASED UN STRENGTH

However, the sharp rise in the number of operations undertaken by the UN in 1991 and 1992, as well as the increasingly complex nature of those operations, have placed a considerably greater burden on the countries providing peacekeepers, including Canada. Whereas a few military observers would have sufficed for most operations in the past, a number of current UN operations require thousands of infantry soldiers.

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) alone needs 16,000 soldiers, in addition to 3,600 police officers and thousands of civilian administrators. The new operation in Mozambique will require the deployment of 7,500 soldiers from various UN countries and the second part of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) which follows operation "Restore Hope" requires some 28,000 troops. It is estimated that between 60,000 and 75,000 troops would be needed to implement the Vance-Owen peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The total number of UN troops deployed around the world reached 60,000 in early 1993, compared to only 11,000 in 1990.

The scope of current operations may be explained in part by the fact that the UN recognizes the problems involved in enforcing the terms of peace accords negotiated by the belligerents amid trying conditions. The fragile nature of these accords is clearly illustrated by the situation in Angola, where

the peace process collapsed after elections, thus restarting the civil war. In countries such as Cambodia, where conflict has raged for many years and any reconciliation between parties remains precarious, the UN relies, among other things, on the massive deployment of peacekeepers to maintain order and to enforce the peace accord provisions.

Even humanitarian operations, such as those in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, undertaken or authorized by the UN, require the deployment of a large number of soldiers. A UN-sponsored military force must have not only an imposing number of soldiers, but also a full range of combat equipment in order to escort convoys of humanitarian assistance in combat zones and to re-establish order in countries torn by clan rivalries and famine, while ensuring its own protection.

In short, whether or not there is a peace to be kept, the tendency in UN operations is to deploy UN contingents consisting of large numbers of well-armed soldiers. The fact that more than 80 Canadian peacekeepers have died since 1945 clearly indicates that peacekeeping operations have never been easy work, but peacekeeping missions today appear to be becoming increasingly dangerous.

The number of UN troops is thus being increased to maximize the chances of an operation's success. However, this is being done while the number of operations is increasing at a breathtaking rate, putting even greater pressure on the military resources of the countries providing troops and creating situations such as that of the Mozambique operation, in which the UN had trouble finding the number of troops it considered necessary.

EFFECTS OF BUDGET CUTS

Thus, barely recovered from the final throes of the Cold War and the tensions of the Persian Gulf conflict, the international scene is once again marked by expanded military activity. For many countries weary of the economic sacrifices which the Cold War imposed, the early 1990s seemed to be an opportune time to reduce military spending. However, rising military commitments as a result of the increased number of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations have come at the very moment the military resources of many countries providing peacekeepers are on the decline.

Like many other Western countries, Canada has already cut its military budget in anticipation of the more peaceful days promised by the end of the Cold War. Among other things, Canada, while maintaining its commitment to NATO, announced in its September 1991 defence policy statement that its two bases in Germany would be closed and its Land Force and Air Force units there brought home. Following the April 1992 federal budget, the closure of the two bases was brought forward to 1993 for CFB Baden-Soellingen and to 1994 for CFB Lahr.

On the one hand, the closing of the bases in Germany, which is already at a very advanced stage, made Canadian infantry personnel available for peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the first Canadian soldiers to arrive in the former Yugoslavia came from Lahr. However, other effects of budget cutbacks have in reality lowered the number of Canadian foot-soldiers, at least from the Regular Force, available for UN operations.

As a result of the September 1991 defence policy statement and the measures arising from the additional budget cuts announced in April 1992, the total number of members of the Regular Force of the Canadian Forces was supposed to fall from approximately 86,000, the average over the final

years of the Cold War, to 75,000 by the end of the 1995-1996 fiscal year. As a result of the April 1993 Budget, an additional 2,000 personnel will be cut, which will leave 73,000 personnel in the Regular Force by April 1995. The number will decline to about 77,975 during 1993-1994.

Of this total, 20,425 will be in the Land Force in Canada. The figure is actually larger if one includes soldiers stationed in Germany or taking part in operations in the former Yugoslavia. There are nevertheless fewer than 25,000 soldiers in the Land Force, and that number will fall again slightly when the total number of members in the Canadian Forces reaches the 73,000 limit. Excluding senior officers and personnel assigned to logistics, artillery, engineering, or signals duties, the number of foot-soldiers who do most of the work in the operations in Yugoslavia and Somalia is relatively small.

Virtually all NATO countries, including Canada, took advantage of the situation in the first months of the post-Cold War period to cut their planned military spending. The number of soldiers in land forces, which appeared headed for a fairly peaceful period in the 1990s, was cut fairly significantly. However, the sharp increase in the number of UN operations caught virtually everyone off guard and without adequate total numbers of available infantrymen.

Canada is not the only country to see its troops committed to missions around the world as the number of soldiers ready to relieve them is constantly declining. In light of the increased number of UN operations, among other things, a recent report by a British Parliamentary Committee asked the government of the United Kingdom to rethink the cuts it was making to its infantry.⁷ In Canada, the small number of soldiers relative to the number of senior officers has often raised questions about the Canadian Forces' ability to meet commitments, such as peacekeeping operations, requiring a large number of infantrymen. Given the rapidly changing events since the start of the post-Cold War period, we recommend:

- 8. That the Department of National Defence re-examine the structure of the Forces, the value of the Total Force Concept, and the distribution of Regular Force personnel to ensure sufficient peacekeepers are available within budget constraints.**

To offset the impact of the Regular Force's reduced strength on Canada's military capability, the Department of National Defence relies to a large degree on greater use of reservists. The implications of this approach for Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations are examined in the next chapter.

⁷ See Ian Kemp, "All-party Report Calls for More Infantry", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 19, No. 8, February 20, 1993, p. 9.

CHAPTER 3

PARTICIPATION OF RESERVISTS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

IMPLEMENTING THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

After being virtually forgotten, the Reserve has now become one of the most important components of Canadian defence policy. The availability of reservists who can quickly cover a shortage of Regular Force personnel in war time or in peacekeeping operations, but who are less of a drain on the public treasury, in that they are only paid when they are on active service or training, is an attractive solution in a period of budget cutbacks.

However, it was during the Cold War that the Total Force Concept was developed to give the Reserves a greater role. The purpose then was to improve Canada's capability to send reinforcements to units on NATO's central front in case of a major war in Europe, while minimizing costs. The 1987 White Paper on Defence Policy confirmed the direction that Canada had adopted in preparing to implement the concept.

However, while the concept was being implemented, altering along the way the infrastructure of the Reserve already in place, the end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical situation. While reducing the concept's importance in terms of reinforcements for the central front, the new international context increased its importance in budgetary terms.

As a result of cuts in planned military spending in the first months of the post-Cold War period, military planners turned to the Reserve in order to maintain roughly the same level of military capability while minimizing costs. Planners had hoped to more or less offset cuts in the Regular Force of the Canadian Forces by relying on a Reserve Force that would have risen from 30,000 to approximately 40,000 members during the Department's 15-year planning period. In the wake of the April 1993 Budget, the total for the Reserve Force has now been set at 38,000 and the increase in number will be done over a longer period of time. The Supplementary Reserve would increase to about 25,000 during the same period.

Approximately 22,134 of the 30,000 members of the Reserve were members of the Militia at the start of 1993, according to the 1993-1994 *Estimates* of the Department of National Defence. When the Reserve reaches 40,000, approximately 29,000 members will belong to the Militia, nearly 5,500 to the Naval Reserve and between 3,000 and 4,000 to the Air Reserve.

In addition to the savings, the Total Force Concept promised greater integration of reservists and Regular Force members within the units. Instead of letting reservists train by themselves, the intention was to train them with the Regular Force units so that reservists would be part of a number of those units.

The concept had to be implemented gradually over a number of years and required a thorough restructuring of the Land Forces in Canada. That effort is ongoing. However, implementation of the concept has not gone off without a hitch.

In Chapter 18 of his 1992 Annual Report, the Auditor General of Canada raised a whole series of questions on the subject of the Reserve's effectiveness and equipment. In paragraph 18.44, he reported that the Department of National Defence believed only one-third of reservists would answer the call if there were a crisis or emergency and that a number of those would not have the required level of training.

Departmental officials assured the Committee that the necessary steps had been taken to correct several of the weaknesses reported by the Auditor General. It was also explained that the Auditor General was reporting on the situation as it existed in 1991 and that the situation had changed considerably since that time. However, the Committee can only be concerned about the questions raised by the Auditor General, particularly since the implementation of this concept has an effect on Canada's ability to meet its peacekeeping commitments. It is therefore recommended:

- 9. That the Auditor General continue his study of the Canadian Forces Reserve on an annual basis in order to monitor the implementation of the Total Force Concept closely.**

The Auditor General also studied the situation when UN operations began to increase in number. Consequently, it would be helpful to know, in the near future, his observations on the situation in the Reserve since that time. The Total Force Concept has been severely tested by the rapid expansion of Canada's commitments to UN operations: no one foresaw the simultaneous deployment of so many reservists to operations outside Canada.

RESERVISTS AND UN OPERATIONS

Colonel J.A. Almstrom, Director General of Reserves and Cadets, testified that on February 15, 1993, approximately 450 reservists were among the some 4,700 Canadian military personnel then deployed in UN operations. On that date, however, it was clear that the number of reservists relative to that of Regular Force members in contingents deployed overseas would increase.

In early 1993, a number of Canadian contingents in UN operations had already been in the field for a number of months, and it was becoming necessary to replace them with fresh troops. In addition to having spent a number of months in operations, several contingents found themselves in highly stressful situations such as those in the former Yugoslavia and had indeed earned a rest.

Thus, while the Committee continued its investigation, the Land Force was preparing replacement contingents. One of the characteristics of these new contingents was the large number of reservists. Having already used a large part of its personnel pool to fulfil all of Canada's commitments, the Land Force had to draw on the Reserve to ensure that the Regular Force units supposed to relieve overseas units had the required number of soldiers.

The Committee finds this situation somewhat perplexing. One passage from the testimony of Professor David Cox, of Queen's University, provides food for thought. In discussing all the other commitments of the Canadian Forces, such as those with NATO and NORAD, he said:

I'm not suggesting here that I can answer those questions, but I do want to leave you with an overall comment, which is to say that, as we look at the force structure of the Canadian Armed Forces and seek to improve our capabilities in peacekeeping, we need to understand the factors that drive a situation in which a budget of \$12 billion or more per annum produces a minimal capability to deploy forces overseas, so that with 4,300 personnel, or something of that order, in peacekeeping missions, the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces seem to be exhausted.⁸

It is true that reservists have already been employed in peacekeeping missions, but sending relief contingents consisting of a large proportion of reservists to the former Yugoslavia raised fears among Committee members about the reservists' ability to perform their duties effectively and safely. The contingent formed of members of the Quebec Area of the Land Forces which trained at CFB Valcartier and elsewhere in the early months of 1993 prior to its deployment in Bosnia contains slightly more than 30 per cent reservists. Reservists will represent 50 per cent of the contingent slated for Croatia consisting of members of the Western Area of the Land Forces.

Departmental officials confirmed that the reservists in the relief contingents would be able to perform their duties properly. They indicated that each reservist's basic combat training had been supplemented by additional intensive training of approximately 90 days. The reservists had also trained with Regular Force members who are also part of the relief contingents.

Others, however, doubt that the training given to reservists is adequate to enable them to perform their role effectively. After mentioning that the Department was relying to a large extent on the Total Force Concept to provide infantry personnel, including reservists, for peacekeeping operations, Professor Granatstein added:

I disagree. I think it's very dangerous to rely on reservists for the most difficult peacekeeping roles. Their training is not up to the high-stress operations as in Yugoslavia, where estimates are that stress casualties are approximately 25 per cent in some contingents.⁹

Major-General MacKenzie, for his part, said he was satisfied with the work of the reservists who were under his command. He explained that, when implementation of the Total Force Concept began, the merging of the units was marked by tensions between Regular Force members and reservists, but that it was impossible in the units in Yugoslavia to distinguish between a reservist and a member of the Regular Force, since the cohesion of the units had achieved such a high level.¹⁰ However, he expressed doubts about the ability of those units to cope with situations beyond peacekeeping:

That will work for peacekeeping. It is working for peacekeeping. They're doing very well. The reports are very positive. But that would require serious reconsideration for any more ambitious tasks, like fighting their way through.¹¹

⁸ Proceedings, p. 34:11.

⁹ Proceedings, p. 30:11.

¹⁰ Proceedings, p. 33:17.

¹¹ Proceedings, p. 33:6.

It should be noted that Major-General MacKenzie was mainly speaking about units in which reservists represented some 10 per cent of the complement. However, they constitute 30 per cent or more of the relief contingents deployed in the former Yugoslavia in the spring of 1993. Even military personnel are wondering whether limits should be placed on the number of reservists assigned to contingents deployed in difficult operations.

Major-General Armand Roy, Commander, Land Forces Quebec Area, noted that it takes several years to train a non-commissioned officer properly and that there are problems in doing so in the context of the Reserve. As for the efforts made to strike the right balance in a unit between the number of reservists and the number of regular military personnel, he added:

Is 30% too much? Is 55% too much? I think in about six months' time we will be able to answer this, but there is no doubt that there are limits to which we can depend and rely on the militia to complement the Regular Force for those taskings, for the reasons I have explained and for other reasons: availability of those militia men, for example.¹²

Jocelyn Coulon also observed that some UN operations appeared more conducive to the use of reservists than others, such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, where conflict situations could more easily arise.¹³ All operations entail risks, but placing reservists in the most stressful situations in all UN operations does not appear prudent.

In light of the doubts expressed by a number of witnesses, including military personnel, the Committee is concerned about the high percentage of reservists in relief units in the former Yugoslavia. While acknowledging the quality of the training which the reservists have received, their desire to do a good job and their courage, the Committee does not believe it is wise to deploy units with high percentages of reservists in UN operations in which the situation may easily deteriorate into conflict. We therefore recommend:

10. That the proportion of reservists in Canadian contingents deployed in UN operations, such as in the former Yugoslavia, where the situation may rapidly deteriorate into conflict involving UN troops be limited to approximately 10 per cent.
11. That, in general, no more than one-quarter of the members of Canadian contingents deployed in peacekeeping operations be reservists.
12. That the Department of National Defence extend the period of intensive training given to reservists immediately prior to their deployment in a UN operation from 90 days to at least 120 days.

SUPPORT FOR RESERVE PERSONNEL

Despite its concern about using reservists in peacekeeping operations, the Committee acknowledges that reservists have an important place in today's armed forces. The Reserve has already proved itself by its contributions to peacekeeping operations to date and by its participation in operations in Canada such as those in natural disaster relief. Furthermore, in a period of budget cutbacks, the savings which the Reserve represents cannot be neglected.

¹² Proceedings, p. 31:16.

¹³ Proceedings, p. 41:18.

It is therefore important to encourage reservists and to foster their ability to serve the country well. In the immediate future, it is important to ensure that reservists who have recently undergone intensive training for their participation in UN operations will continue to serve in the Reserve once their deployment in an overseas operation is completed. It would be unfortunate if some reservists left the Reserve a few months after their return, frustrated by the lack of recognition of their foreign service and with the absence of opportunities for advancement. The difficulties indicated by Major-General Roy concerning the training of non-commissioned officers in the Reserve underscores the importance of keeping militia personnel with peacekeeping experience in the Reserve. We therefore recommend:

13. That the Department of National Defence encourage reservists who have received intensive training prior to their deployment in a UN operation to remain in the Reserve upon their return to Canada.

The idea of having civilians ready to leave their jobs or place of residence as needed to serve their country is not new, but most reservists still face serious problems when required to leave their work in order to take part in regular training sessions or peacekeeping operations. A number of legislative possibilities have been studied over the years to facilitate matters for reservists when they have to be absent from their employment. Furthermore, the Department of National Defence is currently studying possible revisions to the *National Defence Act* with respect to the Reserve. However, the government hesitates to take specific legislative measures regarding training leave for reservists unless it can strike a balance which will produce more advantages than disadvantages.

There is some concern that a statute forcing employers to grant special leave for reservists could make them to avoid hiring the latter. The government is thus trying to secure employers' cooperation on a voluntary basis and is using the Canadian Forces Liaison Council chaired by Mr. John Craig Eaton to promote the benefits of enabling employees who are members of the Reserve to be absent as required to take part in training sessions or operations.

Mr. Eaton indicated that the Council, which consists of eminent business people, has been successful in its efforts to encourage businesses to recognize the need to facilitate matters for reservists. He noted, however, that provincial governments and even the federal government are still reluctant to permit their employees who are members of the Reserve to be absent to take part in training or operations.¹⁴ The Committee was surprised that the federal government was so slow to improve opportunities for special leave for its employees who are members of the Reserve and recommends:

14. That the federal government set the example for the private and public sectors by taking immediate measures to ensure that its employees who are members of the Reserve can take special leave from their jobs to train and take part in UN operations.

The legislative issue becomes more complex with the ever-increasing number of UN operations and the greater participation of reservists. Reservists are required not only to take part in difficult operations overseas, but also to be absent from their jobs for several months at a time. A reservist whose employer finds it difficult to accept an absence of several days for training, might be forced to quit a job in order to take part in a UN operation.

¹⁴ Proceedings, p. 40:13.

Having decided to have reservists play a more important role in peacekeeping operations, the federal government must ensure that they are not penalized for their service to the country and to international peace. A number of Canadians probably hesitate to join the Reserve because there is little protection for their jobs if they are absent for several months in order to serve in an overseas operation.

One possibility is a statute protecting the jobs of reservists who are absent for several months to serve in a UN operation or to answer the country's call in a crisis. Various others have been considered in the past, but the increased importance of reservists in peacekeeping operations suggests a review is in order.

In the United Kingdom, the employment of reservists who must answer the country's call, as was the case during the Persian Gulf War, are protected by a statute, the *1985 Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act*. However, this statute does not protect the job of reservists who are absent in order to train in peace time. It would appear that legislative protection of employment would be useful for Canadian reservists deployed in UN operations for six months or more. This leads us to the following recommendations:

- 15. That the federal government study the possibility of passing legislation to protect the employment of reservists taking part in UN operations for six months or more.**
- 16. That the Department of National Defence expedite study of revisions to the *National Defence Act* with respect to the Reserve.**

CHAPTER 4

TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING

THE MILITARY VIEW

Since peacekeeping encompasses an increasingly broad variety of operations, it is, perhaps not surprisingly, difficult to reach a consensus among officials, experts and other interested parties on the nature of the training that peacekeepers require. This chapter examines the peacekeeping training provided to all soldiers, including reservists. Reservists essentially receive the same basic military training as members of the Regular Force, and, when integrated in a Regular Force unit designated for a UN operation, the same preparation for the mission as the other members of the unit.

According to some experts, traditional operations involving a few military observers require quite another type of training than operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia, which are more or less combat operations. For others, peacekeeping requires that military personnel take an appreciably different approach than the one they learned in their basic training.

However, the military officials who testified before the Committee emphasized that their ability to perform peacekeeping duties efficiently stems to a large degree from their basic military training. In their view, apart from updating their general knowledge of peacekeeping and the specific characteristics of the conflict or region where they are to carry out the mission, leadership, discipline and general practical knowledge in a combat situation developed during basic training and the experience acquired afterward are all that is necessary to carry out a peacekeeping operation effectively and safely.

The Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral John Anderson, summarized this position succinctly when he said, "The best peacekeeper is still a well-trained and well-equipped member of the military." He went on to explain that, even with the end of the Cold War, there is a need for versatile forces that can take part on short notice in the heaviest of combat and the most peaceful of peacekeeping operations:

The need for general purpose, combat-capable forces is more relevant than ever, given the expanding context of peacekeeping I referred to earlier in my presentation and the new roles that will go well beyond the observer activities and the monitoring of ceasefires we have seen in the past.¹⁵

Admiral Anderson's position is consistent with the main thrusts of defence policy as set out in the annual statement that appeared in April 1992 and which reads as follows:

¹⁵ Proceedings, p. 32:8.

Our past successes have not been due to a specialization in the requirements of peacekeeping tasks, but to the general purpose nature of our forces, which are highly trained, adequately equipped, well-commanded, disciplined, professional and prepared for the hardship of conflict.¹⁶

Thus, according to the Department of National Defence, if general purpose forces can properly perform their duties in peacekeeping operations and conventional military operations which may still be required, there is no need to change the forces' orientation and transform them into exclusively peacekeeping specialists. Further, if general purpose military training is enough to enable Canadian military personnel to carry out duties as Blue Berets, specialized peacekeeping training, apart from periodic training in general operations or the next operation in particular, would, in their view, be superfluous.

The Department's position is strengthened by the conviction that the general purpose military training the members of the Canadian Forces receive is of very high quality. Colonel Mike Houghton, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, did not mince his words when he spoke of the basic training given to members of the Canadian military:

There is no doubt in my mind, from what I've seen in the past three years, and in fact throughout my service, that the training system we have in Canada is second to none in the world.¹⁷

Colonel Houghton admitted that the programs preparing Canadian peacekeepers for their deployment in peacekeeping operations could still be improved. However, he explained that, in addition to periodic general purpose training, peacekeepers received information on local customs, the population and other relevant aspects of the region or country where an operation is being conducted. The Colonel explained that the objective of these programs is to ensure that there will be no surprises for the Canadian soldiers when they arrive in a theatre of operations.¹⁸

One example of the additional training given to Canadian peacekeepers before their deployment in a UN operation is the special training provided to contingents of soldiers who, in May 1993, relieved the Canadian contingents already in place in the former Yugoslavia. The contingent training at CFB Valcartier underwent a dress rehearsal in which situations similar to those which the soldiers would encounter in the former Yugoslavia were simulated to give them realistic training and to ensure there would be no surprises. There were discussions with people acting as local authorities, convoys were escorted, and weapons were even fired in order to prepare the soldiers for the conditions characteristic of that operation.

¹⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy*, April 1992, p. 34.

¹⁷ Proceedings, p. 39:14.

¹⁸ Proceedings, p. 39:10.

DIFFERING OPINIONS ON TRAINING

As preparations for the deployments in the former Yugoslavia show, additional training has proved necessary, despite the quality of the basic general purpose training. Even though the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia is being carried out in a combat zone, UN troops are nevertheless not there to fight, but rather to escort humanitarian assistance convoys and to help maintain ceasefires.

In other words, the duties performed by peacekeepers in most UN operations are fairly different from true combat missions, in which all available weapons and tactics are used to take or defend a strategic position. Peacekeepers must conduct their humanitarian actions in the line of fire, returning fire only in exceptional circumstances for self-defence. UN troops rely on their presence, rather than on force, to maintain the peace.

According to the military witnesses, the discipline and techniques instilled in soldiers in basic military training are more than adequate to enable them to carry out their peacekeeping missions. In their view, the deployment of a battalion to escort a humanitarian assistance convoy or to take an enemy position by force requires the same military rigour.

However, while recognizing the value of basic military training, some witnesses pointed out that peacekeeping operations require a fairly different attitude from that present in combat operations, hence the need for special additional training. Whatever the quality of military training, soldiers or even experienced officers do not automatically have the right attitude for peacekeeping missions. This situation has even been recognized within the Department of National Defence.

In his testimony, Peter Langille, a partner in Common Security Consultants, quoted a sentence from a study which was prepared in 1991 by the Peacekeeping Operations Directorate to assess the work done by Canadian peacekeepers:

It is apparent to many who have served with the peacekeeping mission that some Canadian officers arrive for the mission unprepared mentally to accept the methods and idiosyncrasies of other systems/nations.¹⁹

In speaking of Canadian peacekeepers, Mr. Langille added:

They are frequently in situations where one indiscretion by a corporal might prompt serious consequences. For the veterans, these must be stressful and confusing operations. For the rookie reservist, who has recently volunteered and been brought up to standard in his military skills, it is a question of learning on the job site.²⁰

Thus, in the view of these and other witnesses, basic military training should be supplemented by special peacekeeping training which would enhance not only the knowledge soldiers have of the particular characteristics of the theatre of operations, but also the skills they will need to carry the mission through. Witnesses criticized the lack of training in conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation. Retired Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie, President of Stratman Consulting Inc., who spent five years of his military career in Cyprus and in the Middle East on UN missions, underscored the importance of this training as follows:

¹⁹ Proceedings, p. 42:13.

²⁰ Proceedings, p. 42:14.

In a peacekeeping operation, it is important to appreciate that negotiation and mediation often take place at all levels, even at the lowest levels of military representation and at the most isolated outposts. Experience has taught us that incidents that are not resolved effectively at this lowest level, or in soldier terms "at the sharp end", have the potential for rapid escalation and a high probability of resulting in a serious outbreak of hostilities.²¹

Major-General Lewis MacKenzie admitted that, following his experience in the former Yugoslavia, he thought that a little more training was necessary in conflict resolution and the drafting of ceasefire agreements, although he restricted that need to senior officers.²² However, since soldiers, including reservists, are increasingly finding themselves in difficult operations, it would be wise to give all Canadian peacekeepers better training in conflict resolution.

All Canadian peacekeepers should receive better preparation regarding the political and cultural situation of the country or region where they are deployed. Military personnel are normally prepared just prior to their departure for an operation, but this is not done systematically. According to Jeanine Krieger, professor at the Collège militaire royal de St-Jean, some soldiers deployed in Cambodia received a two-hour briefing session on the situation in that country, whereas others were given a one-week course, something that leaves the impression that cultural preparation is done on an ad hoc and uneven basis.²³

Some will say that the degree of information provided before an operation varies with the number of soldiers deployed. A small group of military observers that will likely be very much involved in negotiations with the citizens and officials in the country in question may appear at first glance to need a higher degree of knowledge than units of hundreds of infantrymen with monitoring duties similar to those carried out elsewhere. However, even foot soldiers will inevitably have contact with the local population, and they will have to be very sensitive to their customs and practices. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in a country or a region where a new peacekeeping operation is established can provide soldiers with useful information prior to their departure.

It is therefore very important to give Canadian soldiers proper socio-cultural training before they are deployed. It should not be forgotten that contacts which Canadian soldiers will have with the local population will influence the opinion which the citizenry forms not only of Canada, but also the UN. In addition, at a time when the distinction between a combat operation and a peacekeeping operation is often unclear, it is essential to instill in peacekeepers greater tolerance for customs very different from our own and to provide training on the nature of the mission and on the role of the UN.

At the same time, the importance of general purpose military training which prepares peacekeepers for all kinds of combat situations which they may encounter in an operation cannot be disregarded. The experience of Canadian peacekeepers in Cyprus, who saw tanks for the first time during the Turkish invasion of 1974, should not be repeated.

²¹ Proceedings, p. 42:7.

²² Proceedings, p. 33:13.

²³ Proceedings, p. 34:18.

While acknowledging the high quality of the basic military training given to Canadian soldiers and the usefulness of the preparation they receive before each peacekeeping operation, the Committee makes the following recommendations respecting peacekeeping training:

17. That the Department of National Defence conduct a complete evaluation of its peacekeeping training needs and of possible ways of improving training in light of recent operations, and that it make its findings public. This evaluation should be carried out by Department of National Defence personnel in conjunction with outside experts.

18. That the preparation given to military personnel prior to their deployment in a UN operation :

- a) **be provided on a more systematic basis;**
- b) **be improved to make personnel more sensitive to the different cultures, customs and practices of local populations;**
- c) **be improved to ensure that all military personnel in units which may be deployed in UN operations receive better training in conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation.**

19. That the general purpose military training system be maintained and continue to provide military personnel with realistic training in all forms of combat, including those involving tanks.

It is important to formalize peacekeeping training programs already in place. There is a tradition within the Canadian Forces whereby personnel with peacekeeping experience pass on lessons learned in previous operations by word of mouth. In addressing the training question, Major-General MacKenzie said he is confident this tradition met these needs to a large extent:

We are very good in passing on to the next unit going over the lessons we learned, the mistakes we made in the previous mission, and that's happening as we speak. So there's not a big requirement for it.²⁴

However, this oral tradition, while it has its benefits, does not encourage the creation of a tangible data base which may be consulted by other Canadian soldiers and by foreign military officials. Ms. Krieber emphasized that it was difficult for military personnel from other UN countries willing to improve their peacekeeping skills to see exactly what gives the Canadian system its high degree of quality. Ms. Krieber explained the situation as follows:

²⁴ Proceedings, p. 33:13.

We are not out to impose our own military culture on other countries, we simply want to be able to tell them: these are the things that work. Right now, we do not know what works. We are aware that the whole program works, but within that whole, nothing has been identified.²⁵

Other measures to improve peacekeeping training have been proposed. Some witnesses argued in favour of the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre in Canada which would be used to train foreign as well as Canadian troops. Some existing peacekeeping training programs in the Nordic countries have been cited as examples of the types of training that could be provided at such a centre. Other witnesses, did not consider the establishment of a permanent training centre as being necessary. However, in view of the need to improve peacekeeping training, the establishment of a permanent training centre appears to be a useful measure. It is therefore recommended:

20. That a permanent peacekeeping training centre be established in Canada.

CHAPTER 5

CANADIAN FORCES EQUIPMENT IN UN OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The experiences of UN troops in the former Yugoslavia in recent months has no doubt radically altered the ideas many Canadians had about the equipment the peacekeepers need to carry out their duties. Incessant combat and the disregard shown by the belligerents for certain universally recognized rules of behaviour have demonstrated that UN troops cannot carry out their mandate simply armed with white jeeps and good intentions.

It is clear that in a number of operations today, particularly those intended to re-establish peace in a country or region, UN troops must employ a broad range of combat equipment, while respecting the general rule of not engaging in combat unless attacked. The higher the technological level of the weapons used by the parties, the more heavily armed peacekeepers must be in order to confront attackers, if necessary, or at least to carry out their duties in relative safety.

More traditional operations require less formidable weaponry, but a considerable amount of equipment for the transport, supply and communications functions essential to their success must still be deployed. Outfitted with a wide range of equipment for communications purposes and to transport supplies and fresh troops to front line units in time of war, national armies are generally the best suited to meet the demands of traditional operations.

Indeed, Canada specialized in logistics and signals in many operations in the past. During the Cold War, when its military resources were mainly devoted to the defence of Western Europe and North America, it was easier for Canada in UN operations to deploy logistics and signals units that had considerable talent and many trucks, but did not require large numbers of personnel.

POST-COLD WAR ADJUSTMENTS

With the end of the Cold War, which freed a large part of Canadian military resources from commitments under its alliances, one might have expected that the Land Force would be in a better position to respond to the ever-growing requirements of UN operations. However, as the need to use an increasing number of reservists in units deployed has revealed, the Land Force was caught somewhat off guard by the increasing number of operations. Even with respect to equipment, the Land Force has had to make do as best it could with what was available.

This situation stems, to a certain degree, from the fact that, of all the branches of the Canadian Forces, the Land Force emerged the loser from post-Cold War adjustments. While air force and naval equipment proved to be more of a general purpose nature and easier to switch from a NATO

commitment-based role to roles in the defence and surveillance of Canadian territory, there was greater uncertainty about the place of the Land Force's equipment, and indeed of the Land Force itself, in the post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War, the Land Force's major commitment was on the central front of Western Europe, where Canadian units would have fought side by side with units of other NATO allies, if the Warsaw Pact armies had attacked. As a result, virtually all the Land Force's equipment was purchased on the basis of what was anticipated to be the nature of combat on that front, mainly combat involving tanks and highly mechanized units.

With the end of the Cold War, major manoeuvres involving tanks and mechanized units appeared to be a thing of the past, at least for the Canadian Forces. Land Force units which are more lightly armed and easily transportable by air are apparently coming into increasing favour. Thus, while the Air Force has kept its sophisticated aircraft and the Navy has been able to continue construction of its new frigates, the Army has seen much of its heavy equipment procurement plans fall victim to post-Cold War budget cuts.

For example, the purchase of new tanks to replace the Leopard 1 tanks as proposed in the 1987 White Paper on Defence was postponed in the 1989 federal budget and cancelled shortly afterward. Still seeing the need for a combat vehicle somewhere between a tank and a wheeled light armoured vehicle (LAV), the Department of National Defence announced in the September 1991 Defence Policy Statement the proposed purchase of multi-role combat vehicles (MRCVs) at an estimated cost of \$2.8 billion.

If the Department's indecision over what form to give the Land Force in the 1990s were not already obvious, the decision announced in the April 1992 federal budget to cancel the MRCV purchase proposed just a few months earlier confirmed it. The 1992 purchase of 229 light armoured reconnaissance vehicles, which will be delivered in 1994 and will replace the Lynx vehicle, apparently met part of the need which the MRCV was to fulfil. Nevertheless, without the MRCV, the Land Force will have no heavy combat vehicles apart from the obsolete Leopard 1, which have left the central front in Europe for Canada and will be used mainly for training.

STATUS OF CANADIAN EQUIPMENT

The use of tanks in peacekeeping missions or operations such as that in the former Yugoslavia is unlikely, unless there is a radical change in the mandate of UN troops. Several witnesses pointed out that, failing a UN decision to intervene militarily in a decisive manner in the Yugoslavian conflict, the presence of tanks among UN forces would be poorly perceived by the belligerents and would risk complicating an already difficult situation.

However, to carry out duties such as escorting humanitarian assistance convoys, UN forces have had to use virtually all other types of combat vehicles in their inventory. Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who prior to his appointment as Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR in 1992, was involved in the MRCV project's preparation, told the Committee that this type of combat vehicle would have been very useful to him in Sarajevo.²⁶ However, the Canadian contingent in Yugoslavia, like that in Cyprus, had to make do with wheeled light armoured vehicles (LAVs) and M-113 tracked armoured personnel carriers (APCs), already fairly old.

Apart from its truck fleet, replacement of which began in the 1980s and is being completed with the purchase of 2,751 wheeled light support vehicles, the Land Force has a fleet of LAVs of fairly recent construction and M-113s which, apart from a few recent deliveries, have seen long years of service. These vehicles were designed for the type of combat that was expected on NATO's central front, where they were to transport troops some distance behind tanks engaged with the enemy on the front. In short, in traditional combat, these vehicles support tanks.

These support vehicles do not have as much armour as tanks. The amount of armour given to them is always a compromise between the need for high cruising speed and good protection. A very heavily armoured vehicle may be too heavy and therefore too slow, possibly making it vulnerable on the battlefield. A lightly armoured vehicle could be very fast, but highly vulnerable to enemy fire if immobilized. Other factors also influence the amount of armour on this kind of vehicle, notably the desire to minimize production costs, which would likely favour lighter armour.

Thus, like other UN contingents, the Canadian contingent in the former Yugoslavia found itself with combat vehicles that were considerably armoured, but incapable of offering protection against the shells of certain weapons used in the region. Department of National Defence officials assured the Committee that the Canadian vehicles in Yugoslavia, though not the best, were adequate to the tasks for which they were used. In discussing the M-113, Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Kenward stated:

There is only one other armoured vehicle in Yugoslavia in UN forces that has a better overall protection level, and that's the British Warrior. Ours is vulnerable, in a sense, but we are taking these measures to improve the protection.²⁷

The army equipped the M-113s in Yugoslavia with ballistic shields to protect crew members in observation positions somewhat exposed to enemy fire. It also added ballistic blankets made of kevlar on the floors inside the vehicles to protect the crew from land mines exploding under the vehicle.

Martin Shadwick, an associate researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies of York University and military equipment specialist, indicated that other modifications could be made, but he pointed out some restrictions:

I would, for your edification and further study, suggest that there are perhaps other modifications that could be looked at in the short term, a cupola or turret, various forms of up-armouring the M-113, and the installation of a spall liner. Indeed, there is actually a long list of things that one could look at with the M-113. I recognize, of course, here that there are weight penalties to these things and there are careful trade-offs necessary.²⁸

Private industry is developing armour, such as LAST Armor, which may easily be added to vehicles like the M-113. The additional weight that this extra armour might represent can be offset by replacing the engine with a more powerful model.

²⁶ Proceedings, p. 33:30.

²⁷ Proceedings, p. 32:12.

²⁸ Proceedings, p. 38:7.

The manufacturer of the M-113 in the United States has developed the A3 model, which is more heavily armoured but faster thanks to such an engine. It can also make modifications to existing models to enhance their performance in the areas of armour and speed. It is therefore possible to improve quite quickly the qualities of the M-113 without purchasing an entire new fleet, although, considering the age of most of the vehicles, some thought will have to be given to purchasing a new vehicle in the near future.

Major-General MacKenzie, for his part, said he was fairly satisfied with the vehicles available to him in Yugoslavia. He also underscored the importance of the fact that the Canadian contingent had ignored UN directives and had equipped itself with a larger number of vehicles.²⁹ Since the UN compensates supplier countries for the use of their equipment in its operations, UN officials had requested that Canada send a fairly limited number of vehicles.

The additional vehicles which Canada used, at its own expense, enabled its contingent to carry out its duties more effectively and probably afforded it better protection in difficult conditions. We must ensure that the lessons learned in this operation are carefully noted, hence the following recommendations:

- 21. That the Department of National Defence maintain equipment at a level necessary for Canada to contribute on a fair, safe and equitable basis to future UN peacekeeping operations.**
- 22. That Canada should always equip its peacekeeping contingents with the quantity and quality of vehicles and weapons which it deems appropriate for the theatre of operations where they are deployed, rather than comply with the instructions of other parties.**

NATURE OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR NEW OPERATIONS

However, while saying he was fairly satisfied with the protection afforded by the M-113, Major-General MacKenzie nevertheless reported his reservations about using the same vehicles if the mandate of UN troops in Yugoslavia is changed. He observed:

Our equipment is adequate. If, however, the mandate moves along to the right of the spectrum and we're expected to fight our way through — that's called war — our protection in heavy weaponry would have to be considered inadequate. Our M-113 armoured personnel carriers are relatively thin-skinned, but they provide as much protection as most APCs around the world, including the very good French one, which I'm particularly keen on.³⁰

It should not be forgotten that these vehicles were designed for combat and the fact they must be modified to provide greater protection for Canadian personnel illustrates that UN operations are increasingly conducted in difficult situations such as that in the former Yugoslavia, where UN troops

²⁹ Proceedings, p. 33:34.

³⁰ Proceedings, p. 33:6.

may be attacked on all sides. The possibility of purchasing specialized equipment for peacekeeping was raised when peacekeeping operations were only of the traditional variety. Today, however, the difference between combat equipment and peacekeeping equipment is becoming increasingly unclear in light of recent developments in peacekeeping. On this point, Martin Shadwick stated:

Where there's specialized equipment it might be in response to some urgent operational requirement. This is where it goes back to a point I made at the outset, that if there are limitations in our holdings of general purpose equipment they are replicated in peacekeeping.³¹

In a situation such as that in Yugoslavia, even the equipment of the foot-soldiers had to be quickly upgraded. Old helmets had to be replaced by new kevlar helmets and soldiers were issued new spall jackets and better winter clothing. The measures taken to improve the equipment of Canadian foot-soldiers in Yugoslavia may seem entirely exceptional measured against the conditions which Canadian peacekeepers normally find in other operations. However, it appears there's nothing to prevent this kind of operation from recurring in future, a sad but realistic observation given the current state of the world.

To give the Canadian military personnel involved in UN operations the best possible chance to carry out their mandate and to survive in regions where combat is ongoing, it is recommended:

- 23. That the Department of National Defence ensure it meets, as soon as possible, the urgent requests for modifications to equipment from field commanders in UN operations.**

It must be recognized, however, that it is impossible to provide absolute protection for soldiers. As Jocelyn Coulon, pointed out, equipment is not necessarily the problem when UN soldiers are killed or wounded in peacekeeping operations. He noted that UN soldiers are often killed by mistake, by mines or stray rounds fired by persons under cover.³² There are situations in which even with vehicles equipped with the best possible armour, UN soldiers are nevertheless exposed to surprise fire from persons deliberately attacking the Blue Berets. As soldiers, peacekeepers are obviously aware of the risks, but the fact they nevertheless continue to carry out their duties is further eloquent testimony to their courage and commitment.

ALLOCATING MILITARY EXPENDITURES

It is impossible to consider what measures should be taken to improve the equipment of Canadian peacekeepers without taking budgetary realities into account. Faced with both cuts in planned expenditures and increasingly complex commitments, the Department of National Defence must allocate its financial resources based not only on immediate problems, but also on those foreseen in the years to come.

The uncertainty surrounding the restructuring of the Land Force at the end of the Cold War has no doubt influenced the allocation of capital spending in the Department of National Defence budget. Cancellation of the multi-role combat vehicle project gave the impression that the Land

³¹ Proceedings, p. 38:21.

³² Proceedings, p. 41:10.

Force might have obtained less than the other branches of the Canadian Forces. However, Major-General Alan DeQuetteville, Chief of Forces Development with the Department, confirmed that, given capital spending projects under way and those planned for the next five years, the equipment purchase budget was allocated as follows: 28 per cent for the Navy, 27 per cent for the Land Force and 35 per cent for the Air Force.³³

In discussing the budget, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral John Anderson, said:

I have to be satisfied with what the government is prepared to allocate to defence, and then within that to find a balance between the demands from the naval, air, and land community, overlaid, of course, with our strategic communications requirements, our logistics and support requirements. Yes, I'm satisfied we have the best balance we can get within the circumstances of today.³⁴

However, while recognizing the difficulties encountered in establishing a balanced capital budget allocation among the various branches of the Canadian Forces in light of cuts in planned expenditures and the constantly changing international situation, it appears that a revision of that allocation is necessary. The equipment weaknesses of the Land Force revealed in UN operations in Yugoslavia and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity of reviewing an allocation of budgets which already dates from the first months of the post-Cold War period. They also suggest that some thought should perhaps be given to limiting the missions undertaken to those for which the Forces are properly equipped.

AIR FORCE AND NAVY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATIONS

This does not necessarily mean that the Land Force must henceforth receive the lion's share of the equipment budget. The last three years have shown how fast the pendulum can swing from a situation, as in the Persian Gulf war, in which the Air Force and Navy were engaged to a high degree, to the present situation in which the Land Force plays the predominant role. Any new allocation of the capital budget will have to take into account the important role which the Air Force and Navy play, if only behind the scenes, in peacekeeping operations.

For example, Martin Shadwick eloquently praised the Hercules air transports for their contribution to peacekeeping operations:

With regard to transport, the Hercules fleet remains the backbone of our air transport capabilities. I think that fleet represents a unique national asset for peacekeeping and disaster relief and related roles, and it must be preserved. It's a very important area.³⁵

The Hercules fleet is used to the maximum to transport troops and supplies necessary to ensure the success of Canadian contingents in all UN operations. Over the years, new aircraft have been added to the fleet, but most of the Hercules aircraft nevertheless have at least 20 years of service. It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary to modernize them, particularly their avionics, in order to ensure they remain effective, hence the following recommendation:

³³ Proceedings, p. 32:26.

³⁴ Proceedings, p. 32:27.

³⁵ Proceedings, p. 38:10.

24. That the Hercules fleet be modernized in order to ensure that it can continue to support humanitarian assistance operations and Canadian troop contingents in UN operations.

As for the Navy, its participation in peacekeeping operations goes back to the 1950s when its aircraft carrier was used to transport army vehicles and personnel taking part in UN operations in the Middle East. The presence of HMCS Preserver off the coast of Somalia in early 1993 and its major contribution to the deployment of Canadian contingents in that country have underscored the important role which the Navy can play in supporting UN operations.

The Preserver's three Sea King helicopters carried food, munitions, and other supplies from the ship to bases ashore. The ship's helicopters were also used for surveillance missions over land in support of Canadian ground troops during their deployment to various areas of Somalia to help restore order and facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, medical units from the ship visited a number of villages to treat sick and wounded civilians.

However, the Navy could contribute even more to peacekeeping operations if it could provide greater troop and vehicle transport capability. Transport aircraft can ship much of the materiel required by peacekeepers, but sea transport, particularly aboard commercial ships, nevertheless plays an important role. Reliance on commercial shipping to transport equipment to a new peacekeeping operation sometimes causes delays. For example, during the UN operation in Namibia in 1989, Canadian peacekeepers who arrived by air transport, had to wait a few weeks until the arrival of a commercial ship carrying their equipment.

The Navy has very limited transport capability with only three operational support ships, one of which is to be withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s. Studies are currently under way in the Department of National Defence on the possible future purchase of new operational support ships. The potential contribution of these ships to UN operations is one of the aspects under consideration. Both Martin Shadwick and David Cox mentioned that an increased maritime transport capability would be useful in transporting and supporting Canadian contingents taking part in peacekeeping operations. The Committee therefore recommends:

25. That study of the replacement of the operational support ships take into account the usefulness of such ships in supporting Canada's participation in UN operations.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The pace and scope of events since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War have challenged the international community. While a debate over the shape of a new international system has begun, a series of crises has demanded immediate responses from both the United Nations and its member states. For this reason, the tool of peacekeeping, which evolved during the Cold War as a means to allow the UN to operate usefully in a polarized international climate, has become a favourite response of the international community. Indeed, with the publication of his report *An Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has contributed to the wide-ranging debate on improving the ability of the UN to act in the grey area which exists between peacekeeping operations under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter and collective military action under Chapter 7.

Like other countries, Canada is participating in this current debate, while at the same time trying to adapt its defence and foreign policies to the new geopolitical and economic realities of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Canada is faced with conflicting demands. Before the end of the Cold War, Canada was able to make a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping operations by using a relatively small percentage of its military resources. That situation has now changed. While reducing its planned military expenditures, it is faced with ever-increasing demands for commitments of troops to more complex and dangerous peacekeeping operations.

The dilemmas facing Canada are several: Should it concentrate only on peacekeeping operations, or continue to maintain all-purpose forces to deal with any eventuality? Having decided to participate in peacekeeping, should it maintain its near-perfect record by participating in all future operations, or should it limit the number it undertakes to ensure that they are carried out as well as possible? Once it decides to participate in an operation, how can it best tailor its contribution in order to participate in the most efficient manner? Finally, as it begins to answer these questions, should it assume that the number of peacekeeping operations will continue to increase in number and complexity, or in view of past experience, expect that the number of operations will eventually decline? The answers to these questions are crucial, if only because policies affecting the size and equipment of military forces take years to implement, and as the past few years have shown, the international situation will not sit still as policies are decided. The possible options will have to be carefully studied before selecting the course to follow.

We cannot conclude, however, without mentioning the dedication and sacrifices of military personnel who have enabled Canada to do more than its share in efforts to secure international peace. While the end of the Cold War appeared to announce a more peaceful period for members of the military, a number of them have found themselves forced to leave their families and friends for months on end in order to take part in UN operations in countries scarred by wartime atrocities and famine.

Major-General Armand Roy explained that the increase in the number of UN operations and reduced strength of the Land Force would result in difficult conditions for military personnel. Not only are they deployed in UN operations overseas for months at a time, but they must also be away from their homes in order to pursue their training in Canada.³⁶

In light of the difficulties caused for individuals and their families by the large number of UN operations currently under way, the Committee recommends:

26. That the Department of National Defence maintain and augment services provided to military families and military personnel upon their return to Canada.

The contribution of Canadian military and other personnel to the cause of international peace through peacekeeping over the years is unparalleled, and is a source of pride to all Canadians. Indeed, as well as Canadian Forces personnel, more and more members of the RCMP and other Canadians are contributing to the success of peacekeeping operations. In order to recognize this continuing contribution, the Committee recommends:

27. That a Canadian Volunteer Service Medal for UN peacekeeping be established to recognize the service of Canadian military and non-military personnel who have served on UN peacekeeping missions.

³⁶ Proceedings, p. 31:7.

APPENDIX A

List of witnesses

Organizations and Individuals	Issue	Date
Canadian Forces Liaison Council John Craig Eaton, Chairman; Leo Desmarteau, Executive Director.	40	March 18, 1993
Canadian Peace Alliance Judith Berlyn, Representative; Norman Beaudet, Representative.	43	April 1, 1993
Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Bill Singleton, Executive Director.	43	April 1, 1993
Carleton University Norman Hillmer, History Professor.	30	February 9, 1993
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, York University Martin Shadwick, Research Associate.	38	March 11, 1993
Centre québécois de relations internationales Albert Legault, Director General.	36	February 25, 1993
Collège militaire royal de St-Jean Jeanine Krieger, Professor	34	February 18, 1993
Common Security Consultants Peter Langille, Partner.	42	March 30, 1993
Conference of Defence Associations Colonel A. Sean Henry, Director of Public Affairs.	44	April 1, 1993
Cornwallis Committee Norman Amirault, Chairman; John Nicholson, Representative; Harry DeLong, Representative.	45	April 1, 1993
Department of National Defence Hon. Kim Campbell, Minister of National Defence.	35	February 24, 1993
Department of National Defence Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. McLellan, Director, Military Family Services.	40	March 18, 1993

Organizations and Individuals	Issue	Date
Department of National Defence Major-General Alan DeQuetteville, Chief, Development Forces; Major-General John G. Leech, Chief, Personnel, Policy Planning and Resource Management; Colonel Mike Houghton, Director, Peacekeeping Operations.	39	March 16, 1993
Department of National Defence Major-General Armand Roy, Commander, Land Forces, Quebec Area Colonel J.A. Almstrom, Director General, Reserves and Cadets.	31	February 16, 1993
Department of National Defence Admiral John Anderson, Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Kenward, Peacekeeping Operations; Brigadier General Bernd Goetze, Director General, Policy Operations.	32	February 17, 1993
Department of National Defence Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Commander, Land Forces, Central Region.	33	February 18, 1993
Department of National Defence Lieutenant-General Paddy O'Donnell, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff; Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.	35	February 24, 1993
Department of National Defence Major-General Alan DeQuetteville, Chief, Development Forces; Pierre Lagueux, Assistant Deputy Minister, Supply; Colonel Mike Jeffery, Director General, Land Forces Development.	37	March 9, 1993
Department of National Defence Colonel Don Ethell, Former Director of Peacekeeping Operations.	36	February 25, 1993
Family Resources Centre, CFB Valcartier Daniel Simon, Director; Chantal Girard.	40	March 18, 1993

Organizations and Individuals	Issue	Date
Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cecil Berezowski, Representative.	44	April 1, 1993
Lawyers for Social Responsibility Beverley J. Tollefson Delong, Representative.	43	April 1, 1993
Le Devoir Jocelyn Coulon, Columnist.	41	March 23, 1993
Nova Scotia Government The Hon. Greg Kerr, Chairman of Policy Board; The Hon. Ken Streach, Minister of Economic Development.	45	April 1, 1993
Nova Scotia Liberal Party John Savage, Leader.	45	April 1, 1993
Nova Scotia New Democratic Party Alexa McDonough, Leader.	45	April 1, 1993
Project Ploughshares Calgary Dave Plummer, Representative.	43	April 1, 1993
Queen's University David Cox, Professor	34	February 23, 1993
Stratman Consulting Inc. Clayton Beattie, President.	42	March 30, 1993
York University Jack Granatstein, History Professor.	30	February 9, 1993

APPENDIX B

List of submissions received

Alberni Valley Coalition for Peace and Justice
Annapolis Valley Affiliated Boards of Trade
Louis Beduz
Martin Boyer
Canada Council on Human Rights and Race Relations
Canadian Peace Alliance
Canadian Physicians For The Prevention of Nuclear War
Coline Campbell, M.P.
Conference of Defence Associations
Cornwallis Committee
Mireille Coulourides
End The Arms Race
Shirley Farlinger
A.P. Fast
Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada
Foster-Miller Inc.
Sue Frazer
Lawyers for Social Responsibility
Lemmex and Associates Limited
Dan G. Loomis
Maritime/Mobile Force Study Group
Linda Meyer

Sean Murray

Hanna Newcombe

North Shore News

Jim O'Brien

Noel A. Quinn

John D. Rowe

Science for Peace

Stephen Sutherland

Teed, Teed and Brown, Barristers and Solicitors

University College of the University of Toronto

Jan Ververk

Veterans Against Nuclear Arms

Fred Williams

Richard Williams

World Life Institute

Request for Government Response

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, your Committee requests that the Government table a comprehensive response to the Report within 150 days.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs (*Issues Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 49, which includes this report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

MARC FERLAND,
Chairman.

Minutes of Proceedings

THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1993

(64)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs met *in camera* at 3:40 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 362, East Block, the Vice-Chairman, Marc Ferland, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: John Brewin, Stan Darling, Marc Ferland, Arnold Malone, George Proud and Bill Rompkey.

In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament: Wolfgang Koerner, Michel Rossignol and Jim Lee, Research Officers. *From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* Nicholas Swales, Consultant.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its study on Peacekeeping. (See *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, dated Thursday, November 26, 1992, Issue No. 27).

The Committee proceeded to consider a draft report entitled: "The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping".

At 4:50 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 1993

(65)

The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs met *in camera* at 3:37 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 701, La Promenade, the Vice-Chairman, Marc Ferland, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: John Brewin, Stan Darling, Marc Ferland, Bob Hicks, George Proud and Bill Rompkey.

In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament: Wolfgang Koerner, Michel Rossignol and Jim Lee, Research Officers. *From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* Nicholas Swales, Consultant.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), a study on Peacekeeping. (See *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, dated Thursday, November 26, Issue No. 27).

The Committee resumed consideration of its draft report entitled: "The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping".

It was agreed,—That the draft report, as amended, be concurred in.

Ordered,—That the Chairman table the report, as amended, at the earliest possible opportunity.

It was agreed,—That pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee request that the Government table a comprehensive response to this report within one hundred and fifty (150) days.

It was agreed,—That the Chairman be authorized to make such typographical and editorial changes as may be necessary without changing the substance of the draft report to the House.

It was agreed,—That the Committee print 1,000 copies of this Report with a special cover.

At 5:23 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Roger Préfontaine
Clerk of the Committee

