

Pamph. H.M.C. L.
Informateur Ottawa

REVELATIONS

OF

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY



OTTAWA
J. DE LABROQUERIE TACHÉ
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1918

Under Authority of Director of Public Information.

INTRODUCTION.

Germany has reached that stage in the war at which nothing matters. If she wins, the foulest crimes of her government will be forgiven and forgotten. If she loses, nothing will be forgotten or forgiven and the fate of her military rulers is sealed.

In these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the authorities of that country with their peculiar psychological outlook should have lost the extreme sensitiveness—symptomatic of the morbid, nervous fear of one about to commit a crime—they exhibited in 1914 as to the causes of the war. However, notwithstanding the present apparently nonchalant attitude of the militarists in respect of such matters, the publication of several documents written by men of the highest standing in Teutonic circles created several distinct sensations in the ranks of the people themselves, who, if they had not forgotten the explanations of the commencement of the war had at least ceased to think about it in their anxiety to see the finish.

To the German people the recent remarkable disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky and the almost equally remarkable statements of Herr Von Jagow and Dr. Muehlon were revelations indeed; because of all the peoples involved in, and affected by, the war, those of Germany have been the most deceived. Rather, it may be said, they alone have been deceived. To a nation not mentally trained and organized as they have been the story of the war from genesis to revelations, as expounded by its leaders, would have been inexplicable; but they, probably, for the present at least, in the same blind confidence, have accepted the one as they accepted the other, as a mystery of the divinity swaying its destinies. To the documents in question, with their suggestiveness and timely interest, the following pages are devoted.

[We are indebted to Current History Magazine of the New York Times for the text of the Lichnowsky Revelations.]

REMARKABLE PUBLICATION.

One of the remarkable publications that has come out of Germany in respect of that nations' part in the war is what is known to English readers, for whose benefit it has been translated, as "Revelations of the Last German Ambassador in England, 'Prince Lichnowsky.'" It is the most remarkable, because it contains the clearest and most authentic refutation of the claims put forward by Germany at the outbreak and for a long time subsequent that the war was forced upon her by her enemies, and that she was fighting for her existence. Not only were these claims put forward and proclaimed officially and by the public men and the press of Germany in that country as an excuse to her own people, but a propaganda almost world-wide was set in motion to educate the people of neutral nations and the pacifist elements of the nations of the Allied cause. In the United States, which Germany was the most anxious to influence, German professors and pro-German advocates openly toured the country delivering addresses, and the press of the United States so far as its columns could be made available, was flooded with articles of German origin.

Not only did Germany proclaim in this wholesale way that she was engaged in a defensive war into which she was compelled to enter to save her own people from being crushed by her enemies, but the invasion of Belgium, whose neutrality by treaty she was bound to respect, was explained in two ways:

First, as a matter of "military necessity," regarding which war knows no law, but this was buttressed by the falsehood that the German military authorities had certain knowledge that France intended striking through Belgium. The German Chancellor in his celebrated apology for this outrage on humanity and international rights specifically stated that he knew France stood ready for invasion. "France," he stated, "could wait; we could not. A French attack on our flank in the lower Rhine might have been dangerous. Thus we were

forced to ignore the righteous protests of Luxembourg and Belgium. The 'wrong'—I speak openly—the 'wrong' we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims are attained. He 'who is menaced as we are' and 'is fighting for his highest possessions can only consider how he can hack his way through.'

Second, a little later, the Germans claimed the invasion of Belgium was justified because they had discovered in the archives of the Belgium capital proofs of an understanding between Great Britain and Belgium that the former was to invade Germany through the latter.

It is not necessary to state that the allegations in respect of the intention of Great Britain and Belgium were as unfounded as those in respect of France; but, incidentally, it is a curious illustration of German logic that so far as Great Britain and Belgium are concerned, Germany invaded Belgium for reasons which she did not know existed until after the invasion took place.

Germany laboured thus to defend an action which common knowledge of the world should have told her would, as it did, shock humanity.

GERMAN CLAIMS SHATTERED.

The revelations of Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to Great Britain in 1912, the one man of Germany who knew most of the diplomatic mind of the country to which he was accredited and of the people of Great Britain as a whole, in respect of peace and war, are of the utmost importance to the world and of very special importance to the people of Canada as part, and as fighting in the cause, of the Empire. They completely shatter every pretence made by Germany for declaring war and for invading Belgium, the two most monumental crimes of all modern times.

It is perhaps not remarkable that Prince Lichnowsky, in his retirement, and without hope of, and without ambition to again occupy, any public position, a man of ideals, of high sense of international justice, of wise and judicial perceptions, of generous and even benevolent disposition, of good motives and of scholarly habits, should wish to place on record for the benefit of his descendants and of his confidential friends and intimates the truth of the situation in which he was placed and an explanation of the memorable part which he endeavoured to play in averting a world catastrophe; but it is remarkable that it should have been published with undoubtedly official

consent in Germany. For what motive or with what possible change of policy in view their publication was permitted, or encouraged, as the case may be, is a matter of much speculation. One writer has regarded it thus:

"Do the militarists think their triumph is safe, and the time come for them to throw off the mask? Or have the opponents of militarism, who seemed so crushed, succeeded in asserting their power? Is it a plan to induce the ever docile German population to hate England less?"

It is to be noted that the story of his "Mission to London, 1912-1914," by Lichnowsky, was published at a time when Germany had triumphed in the East and had made such complete and colossal military arrangements as to apparently promise certain victory in the West. Recent German writers and official correspondence of recent date have not attempted to disguise the real aims or the atrocity of German methods in this war and there are grounds for the almost certain conclusion that it is all part of a settled policy of terrorism whereby through dread of worse to come the Allies may be induced to accept a peace on German terms. It is explicable on the very basis of the diabolic German conceptions of all this war and all it portends of German ambitions.

Lichnowsky has told us nothing that is new, nothing that the world did not already know, or suspect; but as a German document it tells, as Professor Gilbert Murray expresses it, "a ghastly story of blindness and crime," which renders it impossible to treat with the military leaders of Germany in any other sense than that they are self-confessed criminals, who have none of the alleged chivalry of bandits or pirates and with whom it is imperative and inevitable that the struggle should continue to a conclusive end. A recent cartoon represents a soldier who has been through and witnessed the horrors of the war, shaking hands with His Satanic Majesty and saying: "You'll excuse me for thinking so wrongly of you. You're not a half bad old cock." He is at least the Devil we always knew. The German is the devil we did not know, but have found out.

One feature of importance in Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum, is his very clear, very fair and exceedingly accurate analysis of the British attitude of mind, of the British aims of foreign policy and of the social conditions which affect British politics and of how politics react as creating social cleavages. In fact, the ex-ambassador in the pangs of regret almost takes upon

himself the onus of bringing on the war, because his representations as to the peaceable disposition and amiable intentions of the British Government and British people had probably deceived the high military authorities of Germany into believing that Great Britain would not enter the war under any circumstances. His estimate of Sir Edward Grey, of whom he had the very highest opinion, as a man and as a statesman, is a splendid tribute to the great diplomat, who had steered Europe through several great crises and who would, had it been humanly possible, have averted the present war. Concluding his pen-portrait of this gentleman, diplomat and scholar, Prince Lichnowsky remarks:

"This is a true picture of the man who is described as 'Liar Grey' and instigator of the world war."

The Lichnowsky document deserves the most careful reading, not because anything is required now to convince us of German falsity, intrigue, double-facedness and rapacious ambition; but because it is so highly illustrative from the vivid contrast it affords by comparison of British methods, aims and ideals as compared with those of Germany, a point of view upon which we as Canadians have not sufficiently dwelt. It is in vain that he advised and warned the German authorities. So bent were they upon this war, they would not have listened had one risen from the dead.

Lichnowsky is careful to refrain from aspersions upon his associates in Germany, except in one or two individual instances, and he is without reflection upon the Kaiser—he is a true German at heart and throughout—but, inferentially the arraignment is severe, far more severe than any Englishman could write with all the facts laid bare before him.

Germany in contrast with Great Britain and her Allies made many pretences. As already stated, she tried to make the world believe that the war was forced upon her. Germany represented herself as menaced by Russia and France, but afterwards shifted the blame upon Britain and concentrated all her hate upon the British.

All the evidence that has been collected and could be collected—from "a cloud of witnesses"—prove that Germany willed the war and planned it almost to the clock. There had been several previous outbursts of the spirit of war in the Morocco and other incidents, but Germany forbore. Preparedness was not assured until the completion of the Kiel Canal, one month after which

war was declared. It followed upon Von Jagow's memorable declaration to Lichnowsky "We must take a risk."

EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN.

While Germany created excuses of war for home and foreign consumption, she had for a long time previous carried on among her people a campaign of education. Bernhardt was perhaps the most specific and frank in his teachings, but Bernhardt really was a small and unimportant factor in the work. The teachings of others were far more insidious and general, in fact, intimate and ingrained in the entire German system.

War was deified. It was preached as a "Biological necessity." It took on all the authority of Holy Writ. German Kultur was exalted as a superior brand of civilization, which for the good of all the nations should be imposed upon them, by force, if necessary. The German people were taught to regard themselves, as the Israelites of old, as a peculiar and especially favoured people, whose right it was to enter in and possess the Canaan, flowing with milk and honey, wherever they happened to lie. As a great and prosperous people they were led to believe that it was their divine right and should be their privilege to "expand" irrespective of the rights of which other nations might deem themselves possessed, or of boundary lines or spheres of influence. By degrees the theory that the limits of power were only circumscribed by the ability to take infiltrated the German mind until the pagan doctrine prevailed that "Might was Right." Germany as a nation became obsessed with the desire for more elbow room and "a place in the sun." War was the inevitable outcome of this universal creed of the Germans, and, with German thoroughness, it was entered upon when the last nail and screw were in place in the supposed invincible armament. Prince Lichnowsky's revelations prove the case against Germany with singular clearness.

It is the contrast between a nation imbued with such aims, ideals and principles as have been briefly described and those of Great Britain, as outlined by Prince Lichnowsky in his memorandum that gives to it such an interest and value at the present time.

The "revelations" of Lichnowsky, moreover do not lack confirmation from other German high sources. Herr Von Jagow who held the position of Foreign Minister in the German government of the day, attempted a defence, which was also published

and however well it may have satisfied the home conscience had but one meaning to the outside world and that was that the German Ambassador to Great Britain was right. His first categorical charge was:

We (the Germans), encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.

The text of Von Jagow's defence is a series of allegations among which are:

We had to recognize as justified Austria's steps against the provocations by Russia which culminated in the Sarajevo crime.

(Why? And what proofs have ever been published to show that Russia or even Serbia was at the bottom of that crime?)

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The closer we would stand by Austria the sooner would Russia yield.

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We could not agree to the British proposal of a conference of ambassadors, for it doubtless would have meant a serious diplomatic defeat for us.

(Von Jagow admits that even Italy, Germany's own ally, would have gone against her. Germany was so sensitive of her own pride that she was willing to plunge the world into war rather than to risk a "diplomatic defeat.")

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The best and only possible alternative was the localization of the war, and an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We directed all our energies to the attainment of that end.

(This, knowing that Russia was bound to assist Serbia, in a war of oppression and that Austria, as we know, would have yielded had it not been for pressure from Germany.)

There is a number of other statements in Von Jagow's defence with reference to the entire situation covered by Prince Lichnowsky's review of it, which are equally significant, but to which reference is unnecessary; but his reference to Sir Edward Grey is especially worthy of mention. He said:

"I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his serious desire to come to an understanding with us." But he allowed himself to get entangled in the

nets of the French-Russian policy. He could not find the way out and did not prevent the world war, which he could have done.

Sir Edward Grey is the man whom Germany branded as "Liar Grey," and the cause of the war. It is true he could find no way out—no honourable way, and not permit Germany to have her own dishonourable way. The "assurances in regard to France and Belgium," of which Von Jagow speaks in his statement, did not include a pledge to observe Belgium's neutrality and Great Britain, as pledged to Belgium, as Germany was, had no recourse but to take to the sword. Taking Lichnowsky's "revelations" and Von Jagow's reply together, the only possible conclusion is that Germany was irrevocably bent on war at all hazard and "the Sarajevo crime" was the only possible available pretext.

Still another confirmation of the Lichnowsky revelations comes from Germany, and is contained in a document written by Dr. Muehlon, which caused almost as much of a sensation as the other. Dr. Muehlon was a director of the Krupp works and interested himself in the financing of that concern. Government spokesmen, since the statement was printed, have tried to break the force of it by describing him as a "nervous wreck." He says he had frequent conversations with Dr. Helfferich, then a director of the Deutsche bank and now Vice-Chancellor. The conversations had bearing on business phases of the war situation in which the Krupp concern and the Deutsche bank were keenly interested.

Helfferich told Muehlon in the middle of July, 1914, all about the Serbian embroglio and indicated what would happen, as did happen, in certain eventualities. "The Austrians," Dr. Helfferich said, "have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a severe ultimatum to Serbia with a short interval for the answer." This, Dr. Muehlon said, was the first intimation he had about the Kaiser's discussion with his allies on the subject. Helfferich's statements to Dr. Muehlon were subsequently confirmed to him by Dr. Herr Krupp Von Bohlen. The latter seemed very much annoyed at the time that Dr. Helfferich should know so much and he made a remark to the effect that the "Government people can never keep their mouths shut." "However," the statement goes on, "as I already knew, he could not tell me that Helfferich's statements were accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to know more details than he

did. He said that the situation was really very serious. The Kaiser had told him that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about. The Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost comic in its effect. On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia appeared. At this time I was again in Berlin and I told Helfferich that I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as simply monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the note had only that ring in the German translation. He had seen the ultimatum in French, and in French it really could not be regarded as overdone. On this occasion Helfferich also said to me that the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only as a 'blind'; he had not arranged that cruise on the usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch."

And Dr. Muehlon further says: "Immediately after the Vienna ultimatum to Serbia the German government issued declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had acted all alone, without Germany's previous knowledge. When one attempted to reconcile these declarations with the events mentioned above, the only possible explanation was that the Kaiser had tied himself down without inviting the co-operation of his government, and that, in conversation with the Austrians, the Germans took care not to agree with the text of the ultimatum."

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"He said that whatever point of view one took, we ought not to give ourselves into the hands of the Austrians and expose ourselves to eventualities which had not been reckoned out in advance. One ought to have connected appropriate conditions with our obligations. In short, Herr von Bohlen regarded the German denial of previous knowledge, if there was any trace of truth in it, as an offense against the elementary principles of diplomacy; and he told me that the intended to speak in this sense to Herr von Jagow, then foreign secretary, who was a special friend of his. As a result of this conversation Herr von Bohlen told me that Herr von Jagow stuck firmly to his assertion that he had had nothing to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that Germany had never made any such demands. In reply to the objection that this was inconceivable, Herr von Jagow replied that he, as a diplomatist, had natur-

ally thought of making such a demand. When, however, Herr von Jagow was occupying himself with the matter and was called in, the Kaiser had so committed himself that it was too late for any procedure according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing more to be done. The situation was such that it would have been impossible to intervene with drafting proposals."

Herr Muehlon authorized the Humanite, a Paris Socialist paper, through its Swiss correspondent, to publish the following remarkable letter which he addressed from Berne, on May 7, 1917, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, then Imperial Chancellor:

"However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumulated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I nevertheless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our directors. It was with this hope that I put myself to a certain extent at your disposal in order to collaborate with you in Roumania, and that I indicated to you that I was disposed to help in Switzerland, where I am living at present, if the object of our efforts was to be rapprochement of the enemy parties. That I was, and that I remain, hostile to any activity other than reconciliation and restoration I proved soon after the opening of hostilities by the definite resignation of my directorship of Krupps' works.

"But since the first days of 1917 I have abandoned all hope as regards the present directors of Germany. Our offer of peace without indications of our war aims, the accentuation of the submarine war, the deportations of Belgians, the systematic destruction in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have so degraded the governors of the German empire that I am profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever for the elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The personalities may change, but they cannot remain the representatives of the German cause.

"The German people will not be able to repair the grievous crimes committed against its own present and future and against that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods—the methods by which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and politically—would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the supreme hopes of mankind. One has only

to imagine that a people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence, should consent to a peace with a government which has conducted such a war, in order to understand how the general level and the chances of life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive.

"As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away definitely from the present representatives of the German regime. And I have only one wish—that all independent men may do the same and that many Germany may understand and act.

"In view of the fact that it is impossible for me at present to make any manifestation before German public opinion, I have thought it to be my absolute duty to inform your excellency of my point of view."

Admiral Hood, who perished in the Jutland battle, made a statement to William Roscoe Thayer, of Cambridge, (Mass.), who publishes it in the "New York Times," May 23, 1918. Prince Lichnowsky was crossing over on the battleship commanded by Admiral Hood, and the two became very

friendly. During the crossing the Prince was much dejected and he said:

"I might as well jump overboard, for my career is ended. Three months ago (that is about May 1) his Majesty the Emperor wrote and instructed me to investigate secretly the state of English public opinion and to let him know whether there was any likelihood that the English would enter the war in case we made war. I looked over the ground in all directions and replied that the English were not likely to go to war on any account. In the first place, they had ceased to be a martial nation. They had grown so rich that their chief desire was to enjoy the luxury and comfort which their wealth brought them. Next, they had a civil war on their hands in Ireland. Then, they had only a very small army ready—160,000 men—and it would take them at least a year to train any considerable force. Finally, I added, they had grown so unmilitary that they allowed even women (suffragettes) to intimidate them."

"I have no doubt," said Lichnowsky, "that my report must have influenced the decision of the Emperor in forcing the war. So you see what my fate is likely to be."

REVELATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY.

Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Great Britain at the outbreak of the war, is the author of a secret memorandum, entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," which was intended only for his private family archives, but which became public in March, 1918, creating a profound sensation in Germany. The document was written in 1916 at the Prince's country seat in Silesia. It relates Lichnowsky's experiences as intermediary between the German and British Governments during the crucial period leading up to the war, and its historical importance due largely to its revelations of Germany's actions in precipitating the crisis. Through channels described elsewhere in these pages, a copy of Lichnowsky's memorandum reached a newspaper in Stockholm, the "Politiken," which published it in part. Other parts appeared in Berlin and Munich newspapers. The various parts were assembled by "The New York Times" and by the Current History Magazine of The New York Times Company, and the

memorandum is herewith presented in its entirety, along with the full text of the reply made by Herr von Jagow, who was German Foreign Minister at the time. The corroborative evidence of Dr. Muehlon, former Krupp Director, with other matter, is also presented. Prince Lichnowsky was deprived of his rank when his memorandum became public. On April 27 the Prussian upper house decided to grant the request of the First State Attorney of District No. 1 of Berlin, authorizing him to begin criminal proceedings against the Prince "for infringing the secrecy of documents officially entrusted to him." Prince Lichnowsky in the meantime is virtually a prisoner on his estate in Silesia. Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German General Staff, who was concerned in giving publicity to the Prince's memorandum, was arrested early in April on the charge that in aiding in the distribution of these documents he had been guilty of treason.

TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM.

Kuchelna, 16 August, 1916.

Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only. His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation, he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression.

To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me, and I spent my time on my farm and in my garden, on horseback and in the fields, but I read industriously and published occasional political articles. Thus eight years passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to His Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wachtler wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Gratz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me, as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not died, it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favourable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

THE MOROCCO QUESTION.

Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian col-

league, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: "The French had begun to forget la revanche. You have regularly reminded them of it by tramping on their toes." After we had declined Delcassé's offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there—an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world war. The pitiable conference of Algieras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcassé's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British rapprochement. In face of "the German peril" all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.

The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algieras, and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under "encirclement," and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wachtler, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's fall and before the Algieras conference we could have obtained harbours and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

ENGLAND SOUGHT AGREEMENT.

When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France

and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Councillor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties—which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war.

GREY'S DESIRES.

This was Sir Edward Grey's programme in his own words: "Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together."

In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as "The Westminster Gazette," "The Manchester Guardian," and "The Daily Chronicle." To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour,

who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on "the writing on the wall," and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of "The Observer." During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and simple-minded, while the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the role of mediator.

I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favoured Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the

conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece.

In Greece to-day whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty was also in favour of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.

TURKEY, RUSSIA, ITALY.

Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, while at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia—our natural friend and best neighbour—into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-

Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations.

As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance, consequently, was worthless.

Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other point d'appui. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aehrenthal was during the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless.

I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Hapsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy.

BALKAN QUARRELS.

Since the seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also, perhaps, in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pan-German particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so here a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our

interests would suffer; while, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest, we should have to "épouser les querelles de l'Autriche."

We, therefore, had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our alliance with its single original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and under those conditions he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation.

BACKED WRONG HORSES.

We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold.

Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his role of "honest broker" he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on

the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good-will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view, we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second.

GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY.

My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was "casus foederis," and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbours in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war—which was afterward brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask "our allies" to make concessions.

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives.

Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia.

As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian programme without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question—the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question—was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.

The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.

His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France.

I once said: "The feeling in Russia is very anti-German." He replied: "There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian."

It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests.

PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY.

[The next passages, which had formerly been suppressed by the Swedish Government, appeared in the *Politiken* of Stockholm on March 26.]

At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and savoir faire he could always win sympathy.

Next to him a great role was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention.

M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff.

In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold—and naturally we with him—was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers.

AUSTRIA'S PRESTIGE INJURED.

Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan war and Serbia's victory, as well as the Rumanian advance, naturally constituted a reproach to Austria. The idea of equalizing this by military intervention in Serbia seems to have gained ground rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by the Italian disclosure, and it may be presumed that the Marquis di San Giuliano, who described the plan as a "pericolosissima avventura" (an extremely risky adventure), saved us from a European war as far back as the summer of 1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian relations were, the aspiration of Vienna must have been known in St. Petersburg. In any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that an attack on Serbia on the part of Austria meant war with Russia.

In the spring of 1914 one of my secretaries, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirschky (German Ambassador in Vienna) had declared that war must soon come. But as I was always kept in the dark regarding important things, I considered his pessimism unfounded.

Ever since the peace of Bucharest it seems to have been the opinion in Vienna that the revision of this treaty should be undertaken independently, and only a favourable opportunity was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest could naturally count upon our support. This they knew, for already they had been reproached several times for their slackness. Berlin even insisted on the "rehabilitation" of Austria.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

When I returned to London in December, 1913, after a long holiday, the Liman von Sanders question had led to our relations with Russia becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey called my attention with some uneasiness to the consequent unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: "I have never seen them so

excited." Berlin instructed me to beg the Minister to urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was quite willing, and his intervention contributed not inconsiderably to smoothing matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg served in a like manner on several occasions when it was a question of carrying through something of which our representative there was completely incapable.

During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support." The good and dependable relations I was fortunate in making not only in society and among influential people, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with others at public dinners, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward devoted himself honestly to further this rapprochement, and his intentions were especially noticeable in two questions—the Colonial Treaty and the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway.

THE AFRICAN AGREEMENT.

[This portion is translated from the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten.]

In the year 1898 a secret treaty had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt (then German Ambassador in London) and Mr. Balfour, which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest between us and England. As the Portuguese Government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up or adequately to administer its extensive possessions, the Portuguese Government had already at an earlier date thought of selling these possessions and thereby putting their finances in order.

Between us and England an agreement had been reached which defined the interests of the two parties and which was of all the greater value because Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England. This treaty was no doubt to secure outwardly the integrity and independence of the Portuguese Empire, and it only expressed the intention of giving financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Consequently it did not, according to the text, conflict with the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed

under Charles II and which guaranteed the territories of the two parties. Nevertheless, at the instance of the Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not ignorant of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Windsor treaty—which confirmed the old agreements, was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal.

ENGLAND'S GENEROUS ATTITUDE.

The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun before my arrival, was to alter and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained many impossible features—for example, with regard to the geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely accorded with our wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was allotted to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe, which lie north of the equator, and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to make lively, although vain, representations. Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the frontier was formed by the Likungo.

The British Government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good-will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development, because England hoped to divert Germany's development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the world-sea and Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to me.

THE CONGO STATE.

Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State was to be included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of pre-emption and a possibility of economic penetration in the Congo State. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economize our successes? With regard also to the practical realization of the real but unexpressed object of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese colonial possessions—the new formulation showed considerable advantages and progress as compared with the old. Thus the treaty contemplated circumstances which

would enable us to enter the territories ascribed to us, for the protection of our interests.

These conditional clauses were so wide that it was really left to us to decide when really "vital" interests were concerned, so that, in view of the complete dependence of Portugal upon England we merely needed to go on cultivating our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realize our mutual intentions.

The sincerity of the English Government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, before ever the treaty was completed or signed, called our attention to English men of business who were seeking opportunities to invest capital in the territories allotted to us by the new treaty, and who desired British support. In doing so he remarked that the undertakings in question belonged to our sphere of interest.

WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES.

The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor (Herr von Bethmann Hollweg), in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counselor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, before I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.

Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1808 and 1809; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signature. In the (Berlin) Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage (the reference is apparently to Herr von Stunm), who played the part of Herr von Holstein,

was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.

WRECKING THE TREATY.

Consequently, it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlobe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II, which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions!

In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the (Berlin) Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen (British Ambassador in Berlin) that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me.

When in the spring of 1914 I happened, at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt (then Colonial Secretary) was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he (Mr. Harcourt) wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on for so long.

"A DISASTROUS MISTAKE".

When I reported to this effect I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter.

I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer His Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agreement between me and the leading (German) personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later.

Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good-will of the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf (German Colonial Secretary), in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war.

BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY.

[This portion is translated from the Stockholm Politiken of March 26.]

At the same time, while the African agreement was under discussion, I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kuhlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor.

In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandria. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained

a share in the harbour works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways.

The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.

GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT.

Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.

People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war.

From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and

between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."

UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE.

During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party, a one year's pause in armaments. Officially the suggestion was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill spoke to me on repeated occasions.

I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to secure economies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people.

I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the workmen employed for this purpose? How about the technical personnel? Our naval programme was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other purposes. I maintain that such expenditure would have benefited home industries.

NO TRADE JEALOUSY.

I also succeeded, in conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, in keeping away from that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and in preventing the Government's proposal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the Government's favourite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our good-will and considerably strengthen and increase the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. But, as I have said, it was possible in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays to come to an understanding.

In that spirit I had carried out my mission from the beginning, and had even succeeded in realizing my programme when the war broke out and destroyed everything.

Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of

circumstances. It is a fact that Germany's progress as a trading country after the war of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list of all European exporting countries, a fact I always referred to in my public speeches, had allowed the desire to mature to preserve good relations with England's best client and business friend, and had gradually suppressed all other thoughts and motives. The Englishman, as a matter of fact, adapts himself to circumstances and does not tilt against windmills. In commercial circles I found the greatest good-will and desire to further our common economic interests.

AMIABLY RECEIVED.

In other circles I had a most amiable reception, and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government. No one there interested himself in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even the French representative, in spite of the imposing personality and political success of the last named. Only the German and American Ambassadors attracted public attention.

In order to get in touch with the most important business circles I accepted invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, the London and Bradford Chambers, and those of the great cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. I had a hearty reception everywhere. Glasgow and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I promised them visits. People who did not understand English conditions and did not appreciate the value of public dinners, and others who disliked my success, reproached me with having done harm by my speeches. I, on the contrary, believe that my public appearances and my discussion of common economic interests contributed considerably toward the improvement of conditions, apart from the fact that it would have been impolitic and impolite to refuse invitations.

In other circles I had a most amiable reception and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government.

INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN.

The King, very amiable and well meaning and possessed of sound understanding and common sense, was invariably well disposed toward me and desired honestly to facilitate

my mission. In spite of the small amount of power which the British Constitution gives the Crown, the King can, by virtue of his position, greatly influence the tone both of society and the Government. The Crown is the apex of society from which the tone emanates. Society, which is overwhelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied by ladies connected with politics. It is represented in the Lords and the Commons, consequently also in the Cabinet.

The Englishman either belongs to society or ought to belong to it. His aim is, and always will be, to be a distinguished man and a gentleman, and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its elegant women.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY.

British gentlemen of both parties enjoy the same education, go to the same colleges and university, and engage in the same sports—golf, cricket, lawn tennis, and polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth, all have the same habits, and all spend the week-end in the country. No social cleavage divides the parties, only political cleavage. To some extent of late years the politicians in the two camps have avoided one another in society. Not even on the ground of a neutral mission could the two camps be amalgamated, for since the Home Rule and Veto Bills the Unionists have despised the Radicals. A few months after my arrival the King and Queen dined with me, and Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to be together with Sir Edward Grey. But there is no opposition from difference in caste and education as in France. There are not two worlds, but the same world, and their opinion of a foreigner is common and not without influence on his political standing, whether a Lansdowne or an Asquith is at the helm.

The difference of caste no longer exists in England since the time of the Stuarts and since the Whig oligarchy (in contradistinction to the Tory county families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the towns to rise in society. There is greater difference in political opinions on constitutional or Church questions than on financial or political questions. Aristocrats who have joined the popular party, Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, and Crewe, are most hated by the Unionist aristocracy. None of these gentlemen have I ever met in great aristocratic houses, only in the houses of party friends.

We were received in London with open arms and both parties outdid one another in amiability.

It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections in view of the close connection in England between society and politics, even though the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government. Between an Asquith and a Devonshire there is no such deep cleft as between a Briand and a Duc de Doudeauville, for example. In times of political tension they do not foregather. They belong to two separate social groups, but are part of the same society, if on different levels, the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they are often related or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd George, a man of the people, a small solicitor and a self-made man, is an exception. Even John Burns, a Socialist labour leader and a self-taught man, seeks society relations. On the ground of a general striving to be considered gentlemen of social weight and position such men must not be undervalued.

In no place, consequently, is an envoy's social circle of greater consequence than in England. A hospitable house with friendly guests is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man of insignificant appearance and too small means would, in spite of all his learning, acquire no influence. The Briton hates a bore and a pedant. He loves a good fellow.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S SOCIALISM.

Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, he used to say on important occasions: "I must lay that before the Cabinet;" but it is equally true that the latter invariably took his view. Although he did not know foreign countries and, with the exception of one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he was closely informed on all important questions, owing to many years' Parliamentary experience and natural grasp. He understood French without speaking it. Elected at an early age to Parliament, he began immediately to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became in 1906 Secretary of State under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and filled the post for ten years.

Sprung from an old North of England family of landowners, from whom the statesman, Earl Grey, is also descended, he joined

the left wing of his party and sympathized with the Socialists and pacifists. He can be called a Socialist in the ideal sense, for he applied his theories even in private life, which is characterized by great simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. All display is foreign to him. He had a small residence in London and never gave dinners, except officially, at the Foreign Office on the King's birthday.

SIMPLE MODE OF LIFE.

If, exceptionally, he asked a few guests to his house, it was to a simple dinner or luncheon in a small circle with parlor maids for service. The week-ends he spent regularly in the country, like his colleagues, but not at large country house parties. He lives mostly in his cottage in the New Forest, taking long walks, and is passionately fond of nature and ornithology. Or he journeyed to his property in the north and tamed squirrels. In his youth he was a noted cricket and tennis player. His chief sport is now salmon and trout fishing in the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, when spending his week-ends with Lord Glenconner, he came 30 miles on a bicycle and returned in the same way. His simple, upright manner insured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were more easily to be found in home than in foreign political circles.

Lies and intrigue were foreign to his nature. His wife, whom he loved and from whom he was never separated, died as the result of an accident to the carriage driven by him. As is known, one brother was killed by a lion.

Wordsworth was his favourite poet, and he could quote him by the hour. His British calm did not lack a sense of humor. When breakfasting with us and the children and he heard their German conversation, he would say, "I cannot help admiring the way they talk German," and laughed at his joke. This is the man who is called "the Liar Grey," and the "originator of the world war."

ASQUITH AND HIS FAMILY.

Asquith is a man of quite different mold. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend of the ladies, especially young and beautiful ones, he loves cheery surroundings and a good cook, and is supported by a cheery young wife. He was formerly a well-known lawyer, with a large income and many years' Parlia-

mentary experience. Later he was known as a Minister under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and friendly to an understanding with Germany. He treated all questions with an experienced business man's calm and certainty, and enjoyed good health and excellent nerves, steeled by assiduous golf.

His daughters went to a German boarding school and speak fluent German. We quickly became good friends with him and his family, and were guests at his little house on the Thames.

He only rarely occupied himself with foreign affairs. When important questions cropped up, with him lay the ultimate decision. During the critical days of July Asquith often came to warn us, and he was ultimately in despair over the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, when I saw Asquith in order to make a final attempt, he was completely broken, and, although quite calm, tears ran down his face.

NICOLSON AND TYRRELL.

Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the Foreign Office. The former was not our friend, but his attitude toward me was consistently correct and obliging. Our personal relations were of the best. Neither did he wish for war, but when we (moved?) against France he undoubtedly worked for immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, and was in constant touch with him, and was destined to succeed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and had concluded the treaty of 1907 which enabled Russia to turn again to the West and the Near East.

Sir Edward Grey's private Secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater influence than the Permanent Under Secretary of State. This unusually intelligent man had been at a school in Germany, and had then entered the Diplomatic Service, but he was abroad only a short time. At first he belonged to the modern anti-German school of young English diplomats, but later he became a determined supporter of an understanding. To this aim and object he even influenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was very intimate. After the outbreak of war he left the department, and went to the Home Office, probably in consequence of criticism of him for his Germanophile leanings.

CABALS AGAINST LICHNOWSKY.

The rage of certain gentlemen over my success in London and the position I had achieved was indescribable. Schemes were set on foot to impede my carrying out my duties, I was left in complete ignorance of most important things, and had to confine myself to sending in unimportant and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war. Soon after my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this opinion in repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without gaining credence, although Lord Haldane's refusing of the formula of neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis were clear indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were known to the department. I repeatedly urged that England, as a commercial State, would suffer greatly in any war between the European great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available means; but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance of power, and to prevent Germany's overlordship, would never tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this shortly after my arrival. All influential people spoke in the same way.

THE ARCHDUKE'S DEATH.

At the end of June I went to Kiel by the royal orders a few weeks after I had received the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, an honor no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen had received. On board the Meteor we received the news of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the throne. His Majesty complained that his attempts to win the noble Archduke over to his ideas were thereby rendered fruitless. How far plans for an active policy against Serbia had already been made at Konopischt I am not in a position to judge. As I was not informed about intentions and events in Vienna I attached no further importance to the matter. I could only observe that the feeling of relief outweighed the other feelings of the Austrian aristocrats. One of the

guests on board the Meteor was the Austrian Count Felix Thun. In spite of glorious weather sen sickness had kept him to his cabin. After receiving the news he became well. Shock or joy had cured him.

On reaching Berlin I visited the Chancellor, and said I considered the situation of our foreign policy very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time. In France a pacifist Government was at the helm. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism, and complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, and pointed out especially that Russia had absolutely no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would not receive Anglo-French support, as both countries, England and France, desired peace. Then I called on Dr. Zimmermann, who represented von Jagow, and learned from him that Russia was about to mobilize 900,000 new troops. From his manner of speaking he was evidently annoyed with Russia, who was everywhere in our way. There was also the question of the difficulties of commercial politics. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was working eagerly for war. But I learned that Herr von Tschirschky had received a rebuff for having reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.

AUSTRIA'S WAR PLOT.

On my return journey from Silesia I only remained a few hours in Berlin, but I heard there that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia to put an end to this intolerable situation. Unfortunately I undervalued the importance of the information. I thought nothing would come of it, and that it would be easy to settle the matter if Russia threatened. I now regret that I did not stop in Berlin, and at once declare that I could not agree to such a policy.

I have since learned that the inquiries and appeals from Vienna won unconditional assent from all the influential men at a decisive consultation at Potsdam on July 5, with the comment that it would not matter if war with Russia resulted. This is what was stated, anyhow, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorffs received in London. Shortly afterward Herr von Jagow arrived in Vienna to discuss the whole question with Count Berchtold.

Subsequently, I received instructions to work to obtain a friendly attitude on the part of the English press, if Austria dealt

Serbia a deathblow, and by my influence to prevent so far as possible public opinion from becoming opposed to Austria. Remembering England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion sympathized with Serbian rights to Bosnia, and her kindly favouring of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one thing and another indicated so strongly the improbability of British support of the proposed punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers, that I felt bound to issue a serious warning. I also sent a warning against the whole project, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous, and advised moderation being urged on the Austrians, as I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.

JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF.

Her von Jagow answered that Russia was not ready, that there would be some fuss, but that the more firmly we held to Austria the sooner would Russia give way. Austria, he said, had already accused us of flabbiness (*flaumacherei*), and so we must not get into a mess. Opinion in Russia, he added, was becoming more and more pro-German, so we must just take the risks. In view of this attitude, which, as I subsequently found out, was the result of Count Pourtalès's reports that Russia would in no circumstances move, and caused us to urge Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy, I hoped for salvation in English intervention, as I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in the direction of peace could prevail. I availed myself, therefore, of my good relations with the British Foreign Minister to beg him confidentially to advise moderation on the part of Russia in case Austria, as appeared probable, should demand satisfaction from the Serbians.

In the beginning the attitude of the English press toward the Austrians was quiet and friendly, as the murder was condemned. Little by little, however, voices increased in number insisting that, however necessary the punishment of a crime might be, no elaboration of it for a political purpose could be justified. Austria was urgently called upon to act with moderation. The whole world outside Berlin and Vienna understood that it meant war, and world war. The British fleet, which happened to be assembled for review, was not demobilized.

The Serbian answer corresponded with British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch

had accepted all but two points, about which he was prepared to negotiate. Had England and Russia wanted war in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been given, and the unspeakable note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian answer with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Government. We even discussed his proposal for intervention, which should insure an interpretation of these two points acceptable to both parties. With Sir Edward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the points under discussion, which were mainly concerned with the part to be taken by Austrian officials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With good-will all could have been cleared up in two or three sittings, and a simple acknowledgment of the British proposal would have brought about a *détente* and further improved our relations with England. I therefore urged it forcibly, as otherwise a world war stood at our gates.

In vain, it would be, I was told, wounding to Austria's dignity, nor would we mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. We left it to our allies. I was to work for the localization of the conflict. It naturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been!

INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS.

After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer (from Berlin) than that it was an enormous "concession" on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.

The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff (Russian Foreign Minister), later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals

of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano (Italian Foreign Minister) and of Bollati (Italian Ambassador in Berlin), my urgent advice—all were of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred.

The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey.

So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE.

After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.

Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of August 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another.

Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question without any obligation, because our conversation, as I have already explained, was to take place soon afterward. In Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—this news was used as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram from the King of the Belgians. The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three members, who resigned.

PEACE HOPES DESTROYED.

Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague also felt himself by no means secure, as I learned from a private source. As late as August 1 the King replied evasively to the French President. But in the telegram from Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England.

Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on August 5 at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and, "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately, this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace via England.

Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left, the King had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me personally. Princess Louise lamented our going. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to say good-bye.

A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.

At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff (Austrian Ambassador) appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain in London. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war.

A BITTER RETROSPECT.

When now, after two years, I realize everything in retrospect, I say to myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years has lived only on tradition and routine, and which tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are combated, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes arouse hostility and uneasiness.

I had abandoned opposition to our mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that

it was useless and that my warnings were represented as Austrophobia and an *idée fixe*. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics, or playing with documents, but the conduct of the business of the firm, there is no such thing as likes and dislikes; there is nothing but the interest of the community; but a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe.

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who, at any rate, reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonoff was saying to us: "*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français.*" and M. Cambon (French Ambassador in Berlin) said to Herr von Jagow: "*Vous n'avez (pas) besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout.*"

We needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history. And if Russia had been relieved of trouble in the West, she would have been able to turn again to the East, and then the Anglo-Russian antagonism would have arisen automatically without our interference—and the Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than the Anglo-Russian.

We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to bother about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all, without sentimental services on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.

I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

ARRIVAL AT BERLIN.

On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe of which our Government had made itself guilty in opposition to my advice and my warnings.

The report was persistently circulated by official quarters that I had let myself be

deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtales, whose reports could be relied upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved "splendidly," and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed.

"What has Russia got to do with Serbia?" this statesman said to me after eight years of official activity in Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. In the Foreign Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case have come to war. But then Russia would have been "ready," and so it was better now.

As appears from all official publications, without the facts being contraverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war.

GERMANY'S WAR SPIRIT.

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns

and villages destroyed? Were these people not right who prophesied that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian gentleman; that the love of dueling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the Parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side? Cramb, a historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion:

Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?
Träume, wer träumen mag!
Krieg ist das Lösungswort!
Sieg, und so kllngt es fort.

Militarism, really a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, makes policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude which would not be permitted by a democracy which had disengaged itself from military-junker influences.

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capatilistic industrialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Freidrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.

JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE.

To-day, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromised peace only upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which in any case signifies for us a burden and weakness and the peril of new wars. Consequently, everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme.

Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.

RUINOUS RESULTS.

Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the future, from imperialism, from world policy. Central Europe is mediaevalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a cul de sac, and not a road into the open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German people.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of Continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East.

And what result have we to expect from the struggle of peoples? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, of Australia, and of Oceania, and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.

In Asia, the Russian and Japanese will expand their borders and their customs, and the south will remain to the British.

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a colonial empire.

For we shall not supplant the sons of Japheth; the programme of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of mankind in British expansion and British imperialism, will be realized.

Tu regere imperio populos Romano, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbes.