


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OF

GREAT BRITAIN

In Regard to our

Present Contest with France:

Exemplified from the

HISTORIES

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Macedon and Athens.

There is nothing new under the Sun.

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
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be measured by the Intention of Writers, we should find their Praise or Censure more judiciously dispensed, and more regarded by the sew selected Persons whose Judgments fix the Standard of Taste, and whose Opinions are a Guide to our Sentiments: But when the loose and idle Ideas of false Patriotism are spread abroad by the Pen of a Scribler, it is strange, I say, when the Public applauds these declamatory Trisles,

that the rest should let their Thoughts remain in Silence, to avoid being overborn with a Storm of Clamour and Impertinence. Yet such are too often the political Writings of the present Age: And all Sciences appear as despicable, when they suffer so unworthy a Prostitution. A Minister (whether from Party-Prejudice I will not determine) seldom sails of suffering by Abuse, or of being exalted with smooth Panegyric; from the Folly, the Violence, or the bad Intentions of his Cotemporaries.

THESE are the particular Circumstances which have stigmatized the Science in general, and cast an Odium on the Writers without Distinction. Nor is the Aspersion ill founded; the numerous Treatises, Essays, and voluminous Performances on this Head, serving rather to entangle than unravel the Knots of political Resections: But the Evil is not to be remedied; and such is the boasted Liberty of the English Press, that every free-born Briton has a Right of exposing himself with Impunity.

HERE let me not be accused of Arrogance or Presumption, nor endeavour to raise my own Fame on the Ruins of another's Reputation.

of Writing; nor do I imagine that mine will live beyond the usual Date, but will fink into Oblivion with the rest of my Fraternity: So that when I profess I expect no Continuance to my Work, nor Fame from the Publication, I hope my Endavours will be ascribed to a Motive not unworthy of an Englishman. For if any Patriot should be warmed by my Exhortations, to a more vigorous Exertion of his Talents for the good of his Country; my End is fully answered, and I shall remain contented with that Reward of my Labours.

To explain the Word Patriot, I shall obferve, that he is a Character whom the Bad reverence, and the Good emulate; the Pride and Glory of every Nation; who strives to fave a finking State, by subduing foreign or (what is more critical) by withstanding domestic Enemies: The one effected by Force of Arms, and the other by opposing with Intrepidity the Attacks of Corruption.

A Politician is one whose Qualifications give him a large Insight into public Affairs; his Attention should be quick, his Comprehension clear, and his Judgment solid and

refined; in short, he ought to be a Man every Way formed to execute what the Patriot does by Inclination: The one is a Patriot in Theory, the other a Politician in Practice.

HAVING fixed the Ideas of the two Characters, we find it is no Impossibility that they should sometimes be connected, althor

by Moderns esteemed a Paradox.

If this is allowed, and if bright and refined Talents are joined with Solidity of Reasoning, and guided by true disinterested Principles; ought not such a Man to be honoured and regarded, as the most conducive to the Preservation of a sickly State?

In the present Situation of our Affairs, that there is an Occasion for the Exertion of such patriot Principles, will be allowed, I suppose, without Hesitation: An immense national Debt, a long and unsuccessful War, and an ineffectual Peace, are the apparent Causes of a latent Disease.

THE visible Effects are the innumerable Taxes and Burthens on the People, which rather increase than diminish under this Ad——n. I would not here be understood as condemning them for new and uncommon Systems. We have seen the Conduct of their Predecessors productive of the

fame

fame Inconveniencies, and the present Ad—n seem only following their Footsteps. Not that I am of Opinion, their Errors ought at any Time to plead Prescription and Example. But is it not more excusable for a blind Man to walk upon a beasen Track, through ever so dirty a Road; than attempt a better Way, which his natural Desect renders impossible to find?

UNDER these Circumstances (bad as they are) we are threatened, by a Power whom Policy and Arms have contributed to render formidable. What must we oppose to this? Must we be amused with Negotiations, and lose in the Cabinet what we acquire in the Field? No, let us not any longer depend on so fallacious a Support. Let Resolution and Constancy be our Weapons; these we can depend upon, these must be effectual. Such did our Ancestors employ, when France herself submitted to the Arms of an Edward and a Henry.

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But though at this Time our Constitution is so widely different, that we should find no general Assistance, by comparing our own with remoter Ages: And though the Conduct of our Ancestors will not suit with the

present System of Affairs; yet the Use of 'a comparative History, is, I believe, evident.

THE grand End of this Branch of Know-ledge, is, that we may affift ourselves in a Comparison; either by avoiding the Errors, or by taking Advantage of the good Policy of former Times. In this View, there is not only Pleasure but Profit, arising from an historical Narration.

My Intention, therefore, was to chuse a History adapted to my Purpose; and after searching the different Periods, I sound none so well calculated to answer my Design, as that of the Athenians in their War with the Macedonians.

LET us endeavour to set their Mistakes as a Mark by which we may steer our Conduct, and avoid splitting on their Example. This however, cannot be effectually compleated, without stating the Views of the Antagonists, and observing how the Means were proportioned to the Ends designed by the separate Parties.

Athens was a Republic which all the Efforts of a popular Faction could not for many Ages enflave; but their Government was much altered from the Time when their Ancestors had gained the Victories of Maratkon

rathon and Platæa: Pericles was the Man who broke the Balance of Power, and like Henry the Seventh of England, destroyed the Influence of the Nobility by a more equal Division of Wealth and Preferment. Their Dominions were large enough to have opposed Philip, and their Revenues were proportionable: Being possessed of a flourishing Kingdom by Right, and enjoying Euboea by Conquest, their Influence must necessarily be extensive; but their chief Dependance was on their foreign Colonies, which fugplied them with the Necessaries of Life; as England is from the American Plantations, Notwithstanding all these Advantages the People were degenerate; they were vain and indolent; Vices which introduced Corruption by their natural Tendency, and exposed them not only to the open, but the fecret Attacks of every Invader. The public Offices were distributed by Cabal and Interest; these were the Authors of Party-Zeal and Prejudice; and these again extended the Influence of Corruption. Their former Prosperity had opened the Way to Pleafure; Senfuality was the next Step, and an indolent Supineness was the Consequence. Unwilling to fight, even for their own Liberty,

berty, they employed mercenary Troops in their foreign Wars; but with so bad Success, that their Reputation was greatly sunk in the

Opinion of their Allies.

The better Part was sensible of this Deficiency, and their Eloquence brought the People by degrees to a Sense of their Danger; they sound the Designs of *Philip* to be such as tended to the Subversion of Liberty; they saw the Necessity of preserving a political Balance, not to permit the Arms of one to acquire a Dominion, which would render the whole obnoxious to his Invasion. Such was the Opinion of the wisest Counsellors of Athens; a Maxim confirmed by Experience, and applicable as much to the present Times as to the ancient System of Greece or Macedon.

LET us suppose the Case our own: Should not we, when France shall endeavour by Force or Fraud to extend her Limits, and to settle a Tyranny over the allied States; should not we, I again repeat, exert that Power and Authority, which have more than once reduced her Dominions to proper Bounds? Let this be granted, and it will follow, that Athens undertook a just War, when she endeavoured to effect a Diminution of the Strength, and put a stop to the Encroach-

ments of Philip. The Evil became certain, not barely contingent:

NEVERTHELESS her Conduct is blameable in many Respects; and in none more apparently than in the Indolence and Supineness, generated by that oftentatious Self-confidence, which made her imagine, that the Name of Athens carried Victory to the Side she embraced. But Philip instructed her otherwise. and was found equally capable of fubduing by War as by Policy. This Monarch, with the most extensive Views of universal Dominion, had a Head as fit to defign as his Heart was willing to execute; his Accomplishments, naturally prodigious, were improved by the most arduous and intense Application; his Courage in War, and his Constancy in pursuing his Aim, were remarkable; his unwearied Care, his refined Policy, and his encreasing Power, made him formidable to the most distant, and courted by his neighbouring Powers. But his Heart was as dark and deceitful, as his Words feemed fair and open; his private Interest was preferred to the most solemn Treaties; no Oaths, no Engagements could bind, where an Evasion offered a temporal Advantage. Such is Philip represented by Historians; and in the Course

of his Affairs, his Actions will testify the Truth of these Observations.

Greece was divided into feveral States, the chief Strength of which confisted in their Union; as the Power of England, and its Allies, subsists by that indissoluble Connection of Treaty.

The King of Macedon was a common Enemy to them all in general, and equally endeavoured to supplant the whole, by fomenting Divisions or acting Hostilities against some, and laying others asleep with salse Professions of Amity and Alliance. He quickly perceived the Athenians were the only People capable of putting a Stop to his Designs; and upon attempting to cross Thermopylae, he found himself effectually retarded by a Fleet and Army ready posted to guard that important Passage.

THE Straits of Thermopylæ were the Barrier between Thebes and Macedonia, as the Flemish Towns were the Barrier of Holland and France; and it behoved as much the Athenians to inspect the Motions of Philip, as it does England to have a watchful Eye over France and its Adherents.

A Cessation of Arms was concluded on by both Sides, and a Treaty was ratified, which carried

carried only the Appearance, not the Reality of a lasting Peace: for Philip's Conduct was enough to convince every one, that his Intentions were no farther pacifick, than fuited with his Convenience. Yet ever fertile in Expedients, his Orators persuaded the Athenians that he meant fincerely, while his Actions infringed every Article of the Treaty he had so lately sworn to. Such is Gallic Faith, and so far it may be relied on in Matters of Consequence; for if we judge of History, by comparing one with another, we may find the Treaties with France (I will not particularize any) violated as foon as formed, and see another Philip in the Heart of every Frenchman.

But to proceed to our Narrative: This last Truce, which may be stilled a barrier Treaty, was broke through as soon as concluded on; Philip taking Advantage of the Security of Athens broke through the Limits, and ravaging the Allies destroyed their Towns, dismantled their Citadels, all out of Goodwill to the Athenians, and the Sasety of Greece in general.

LET every Englishman, when he peruses these Lines, re-consider the Policy of Philip not as a mere Event which happened above

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Two Thousand Years ago, but as that which might, nay which hath been feen in the late Treaties between Great Britain and France. Was not every Article of the Peace at Ry/wick, Utrecht, or Aix la Chapelle circumvented by Policy, or infringed by Violence? yet while our Arms have laid still, how oft have the Soothings of their Ambassadors retarded all our Attempts, or deceived us with fpecious Appearances? Such were the Remarks that great Friend to public Liberty Demosthenes himself made at the Ratification of the Peace. ! What, (fays he) has not Philip done to recommend himself to any of the Grecian States, rather than to you? Are not his Views larger and more exten-' five than merely affronting you? Yes! But having univerfal Subjection in his Eye, and regardless of Law, Justice, or Equity; he sknew well (O my infatuated Countrymen) 'that you were not proper Confederates in ' fuch an Enterprize: he saw too plain that you. as Friends to univerfal Liberty, both from the Constitution of Government, and ' your free and generous Spirit, would be a little inclined to affift the Favourers of Slaf very, even when employed against Enemies. On the contrary, That you would with f Violence

oppose all Measures, that ⁴ Violence ' might tend to fuch a Consequence.' Such was the Opinion of the greatest Orator and Statesman that ever shone in the brightest Age of Learning and Science. I have preferved, I hope, his Sentiments, although I have purposely avoided a literal Translation, that the Parallel might be more plainly difcerned. But let it be allowed to pursue the Orator still farther: 'Is not this, he exclaims, ' a Proof of the highest Regard and Testi-' mony of the Veneration he pays to your Generofity? Yes; Philip himself owns, that no private Interest can sway you, my 'Countrymen, to accept an Equivolent for the Slavery of your Allies.' Such were the Words of the Athenian Statesman.

Let these Considerations move us; the Danger of our Neighbourhood with Philip, in the Most Christian Majesty of this Age, is I hope plainly seen: but at the same time let the Supineness and the wavering Disposition of our Allies convince us of our Importance; how necessary it is, at this Juncture, to exert our Power to hinder that exorbitant Dominion from increasing and overwhelming our Laws, our Liberty, which it plainly designs to attempt.

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HAVING laid down these Precautions. let us rest awhile to describe the present Power of France, that England may not only discern the Danger, but at the same Time guard against it with timely Care and Conduct. We all know that in Extent of Country, France, by her Incroachments on the neighbouring States, ex reds any whose Dominions are near enough to give her Umbrage; here the is evidently the Superior: Add to this, if we reflect on her Lands abroad, we find her Settlements flourishing in Wealth and Plenty, remitting the Conveniencies of Life to their parent Country; and well defended from foreign Infults. home we see, it is true, the Commons in extreme Poverty; but the Public immenfely rich; we see the People, amidst their apparent Misery, still ready to sacrifice their Lives and Fortunes for the Glory of their Monarch: We see them tamely submit to the Oppression of a military Force, which makes all Europe tremble; we see them chearful, under a Tvranny which they can never exchange for Freedom; and enriched with the Follies of those with whom they have Dealings. In Policy are they not allowed to excel? Are

not their Generals skilled in the Art of War, beyond those of other Countries?

THESE are Points I leave to be decided, by those whose Capacicy may enable them to determine with greater Exactness: But this I believe is granted, that the King of France is absolute, with a prodigious military Power, a Country full of People ready to obey his Call, and Revenues capable of executing any Project which the most unbounded Desire of Glory could suggest.

Thus I have described, with pretty apparent Truth, the State of our Country with Respect to its Enemies: But before we proceed farther, let us draw a short Parallel of the seperate Histories, to preserve Connection and prevent Obscurity, the too general Fault of a political Treatife. We have purfued the Narrative down to the last Peace, as far as the Comparison will hold: For the ensuing Part, let us consider their Conduct with Regard to what may happen, rather than with an Eye to past Events. We have feen the King of Macedon, though feated on a Throne environed with foreign and domeflick Enemies; yet by the Infinuations of Policy, and Force of Arms, repel the Attacks of the smaller States; and lay the Suspicions of

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of others asleep, by the Arts of Persuasion and salse Professions of Peace and Friendship. We have seen the Allies of Athens harrassed with the Sword of War; we have seen the consederate Cities sold for Slaves; we have seen Olynthus, Amphipolis, and the rest of the States, perish by the Hand and Deceit of Philip; was not Thessalia subjected by his Flattery, more than his Arms when under the Pretence of delivering them from Tyrants, he somented their internal Divisions? did he not introduce, by degrees, that Slavery he affected to extirpate?

Was not this our Case, when our Allies were plundered, our Armies beaten, our so-reign Garrisons subdued? Was not Flanders (a Country abounding like Thessalia in Wealth and Plenty) reduced to open its Gates to the Conquerors? Was it not subdued more by the Louis d'Ors of France, than the Arms of Frenchmen? And when the Treaty was concluded on, how was it ratissed, and what were the Articles?

I shall avoid a Recital disagreeable to the Ears of every Englishman, who can feel for the true Good of his Country. But the Peace was made; and both Sides, tired with the Expence and Trouble of a destructive

War, which ruined the Commerce of both Parties, were induced to fign the Treaty: A Treaty which has proved an Introduction to fresh Persidy and Baseness on the Side of France, and has opened a large Field of Glory to England, if she can stedsastly maintain her Acquisitions, and preserve by Resolution and Fortitude, what the French would undermine by Venality and Corruption.

Having in this Manner deduced the History of the last Peace, let us review what has past before us, that we may not be bewildered in the Train of Ideas which the separate Histories might excite. I have hitherto only prepared a kind of Prologue to the Play which I am going to introtroduce, and for that Reason would defire the Reader to consider well the Characters I have given of Athens and Macedon, that he may not lose the Connection in the Narrative. To this I shall add but one Reslection; that in the Accounts of the Nations, I mean the collective Body, without Reference to any particular Persons.

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WE left Athens just beginning to enjoy a Peace, the Conditions of which were such, as had she been in a flourishing Condition, it

would have been dishonourable for her to have accepted; but the Treachery of the Confederates, the exhausted Revenues, and above all, the Divitions in her own Body, chiefly contributed to the Event.

THEIR Allies were either unfaithful to their Engagements, or else were tampering with *Philip*; either betrayed by their own Citizens, or through a weak Timidity were bartering for their Lives and Fortunes at the

Expence of their Liberty.

In the Number of these were the * Roectians; a Nation of fo heavy a Genius, by Reason of the Groffness and Humidity of the Air, as to become a proverbial Expreffion; their Situation lay convenient for Trade; but low, damp, and liable to Inundations of the Sea. They were a People just in their private, but infincere with Regard to public Dealings; their Parts were folid, adapted to their Government; Friends to Liberty, but neither specious nor penetrating: They had produced one Commander, who had preserved their Freedom; but after his Death they were reduced to ask Assistance from Athens, by whose

^{*} The Situation of Bocotia, feems not very unlike Holland.

whose Aid she again flourished and preserved her Dignity: A Service which she repaid with the highest Ingratitude; for on every Occasion she deceived her Allies, and made it plainly apparent, that if Athens was not betrayed, she might impute it rather to Imbecility or Cowardice, than to the Good-will of the Bocotians.

THE Lacedæmonians were a Nation, who, under the Influence of good Commanders, had extended their Power, and rendered themselves formidable and respected: Their Interests were evidently joined with the Athenians to suppress the growing Power of Macedon, fince Lacedæmonia could not stand if the Liberty of Athens was invaded. The People, though degenerate from their Anceftors, were grave, folid, and fententious; just to one another, but cruel to their Enemies; quick to conceive, flow to execute; they had not the sprightly Imagination of the Athenians, but excelled them in Strength of reasoning and Solidity of Judgment; and had the Force of their Arms been equal to their Sentiments, they would have been an overmatch for the Athenians or the Macedomans.

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Such was Lacedamon at the Time of the Peace; for by a Succession of weak Kings it was greatly diminished in its Authority over the rest of Greece, and was more celebrated for speaking with Judgment than acting with Wisdom; but still it seemed firmly resolved to exert itself to expel Philip, as the Opposer of publick Liberty.

The sfali, weak in itself, and incapable of affishing others, became Slaves to Thebes or

Macedonia, as either prevailed.

THE smaller Grecian States were of but little Consequence; too weak to resist, yet unwilling to submit, they condemned the Conduct of which they were the Practifers.

SUCH were the Allies of Athens against the Power of the most politic Prince in Europe, whose Influence was much more extensive than his Dominions!

THE Phoceans, indeed, were engaged by a strict Bond of Alliance to assist them; but what could be expected from a Nation so oppressed with the most dreadful Calamities?

THE Argives and Messenians hung wavering in the Balance of Philip or the allied
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In this Light we see the confederate Forces, not affifting, but growing jealous of the Athenian Power, which it was their Interest to have cherished and protected.

But amidst all these discouraging Circumstances, Athens still held up her Head; she mourned the Peace she had concluded, yet was refolved not to be the first to infringe the Treaty: Some pestilent Orators were rash enough to propose such Violences; but their Advice was over-ruled by the wifer Atkenians, and particularly Demosthenes, who, in an Oration composed for that Purpose, used invincible Arguments to prove the Truth of his Affertion. These Arguments are drawn chiefly from the Necessities of their Allies, their own timid Conduct, and their submissive Courtship of Philip: 'But still (says that excellent Statesman) should we submit to ' farther Disadvantages? No certainly: The 'Truce is made, and we have fworn to ob-' ferve the Articles; but should Philip any more violate that Peace, he becomes the Agressor, and the Allies can no longer be rleafed with a General whose Conduct

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'gives them such Cause for Suspicion: In this Case, they must join with you thro' Policy, to avoid a general Oppression.'

Such were the Arguments Demostlenes made Use of; and the Macedonian soon supplied him with a plausible Reason for commencing Hostilities.

IT has been mentioned that the Athenians drew a great Part of their Wealth from their foreign Colonies, which not only conftituted the Strength of their Revenues, but were necessary Checks on the neighbouring States, and a vast Accession of Power to their own Republic: They knew their Importance, and, by powerfully supporting them with Forces and Soldiers, convinced their Enemies what a Value they placed on their Trade, and how far they imagined their political Interest was connected with their commercial Advantages.

Philip was too clear fighted not to discern their Views, and with the same Ardour refolved to gain by Conquest, what they had determined to defend to the utmost Extremity. Such was their Situation at the Time of the Peace.

HE had before, taken many Places in Thrace from the Athenians, with an Intention

tion of fettling his Troops behind their foreign Colonies, and by Degrees incroaching upon all their Lands and Possessions; which must ruin their Commerce, and bring them to whatever Terms of Peace he should chuse to impose. He made a Pretence indeed of shewing a Kind of Right, but this was so very frivolous and trifling, that Philip himfelf, though Master of the greatest Art, and capable of rendering the most trivial Circumstances useful, had but little Dependance on any Thing but Force. To this he applied his Thoughts, and began with ravaging the Lands, and deftroying the Towns, in the upper Country, imagining perhaps that the Athenians would again be foothed with his Professions of Alliance and Friendship.

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non But herein Philip himself was deceived; for Diopithes, the Commander of the Athenian Forces in those Parts, looking upon this Conduct of the Macedonian in its true Light, and conscious that the Republic would approve of so spirited and at the same Time so just a Reprisal, suddenly enters Thrace, and makes the Subjects of Macedon suffer the same Evils they had inflicted upon his Friends and Allies.

Philip

Philip being employed with all his Forces in a different War, was obliged to have Recourse to Remonstrances by Letter, which he gave the Athenians with Profusion. That the Letters should be sent and received, is no way strange; but that they should be near taking Effect, is undoubtedly surprizing: Yet such was the venal Disposition of the Orators at that Time, that many were found who would have brought Dispithes to a Trial; as if his Desence of the Country and Colonies, was a Crime worthy of Death: The only Dissiculty in Dispute, was whether he ought to have begun the War without a formal Declaration.

Demosthenes was his Advocate, who, mounting the Tribunal of Harangues, employed the Force of his Rhetoric, not more in defending Diopithes, than in accusing Philip of the Violation of Treaty: 'For if, 'fays that accomplished Orator, Philip is not 'in Motion with his Forces, or if he does 'not invade your Allies; or if he does not 'privately negotiate to procure you Enemies, 'and if he withholds no Places contrary to the 'Treaty, let us then observe the Peace: But 'if it is undeniable that Philip has noteriously infringed every Article, even long 'before

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before the Departure of Diopithes; (who is now charged with Beginning the War) ' if he has excited the rest of Greece to com-' mence Hostilities against you; who will assert, ' that Peace or War is in our Choice? Force to ' Force is the only Measure we have left; un-· less we content ourselves with the Supposi-' tion that Philip is not at War; while the Citadel of Athens remains un molested.' And in another Place: 'If we disband our Forces, what ' shall we do when he invades those Coun-'tries? Why, we will accuse Diopithes: What then? We will fend Affistance. But what if the Winds should prevent their sailing? Then we will trust that Philip will not invade us.—O Athenians, would not · Philip himself wish that you might reason ' fo abfurdly.' He concludes with the strongest Exhortations, rather to approve than condemn his Conduct, to enlarge his Command rather than disband his Forces. Whether or not this Advice was strictly followed we are uncertain; but the Truth of his Arguments is too evident to be farther explained.

However from what has been said, this Inference may be drawn; that sometimes it is allowable to begin a War without a formal Declaration.

E Philip

Philip, after this, turning his Views to Policy rather than Force, employed all his Agents in Peloponnefus, endeavoured to fubvert their Councils, and by his winning Behaviour almost persuaded the States, to believe his Cause the most just and equitable: nay, if the Rhetoric of Demosthenes had not removed the Impressions his Offers had made on their Hearts, he would have seized the Whole, without enduring the Labour of a single Campaign.

But Providence determining otherwise, the Eloquence of one Man overweighed the Power of *Philip*, although united with the

Terror of his Army.

Being baffled in this Negotiation, he turned his Thoughts to Euboca, an Island which lay conveniently situated for distressing Attica: as he had before attempted the Place without Success, he failed not at this Time to employ every artificial Machinery of Politicks to win over the People to his Interest; bribed Priests, worked on their Superstition, and by the all-potent Influence of Gold opened every Fortress, and gave a ready Inlet to the Macedonians to enslave the Country. Yet even then was Athens so infatuated, as to believe that his Designs tended not to the Damage

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nage of of Greece, or that they endangered Attica in particular; which they ought to have apprehended, not more from the Troops of Philip, than the Disposition of the Inhabitants of Euboca.

THE Euboeans were generally in Extremes, either Patriots or Traitors; of a volatile Temper inclined to Profusion and Luxury; changeable, haity, yet generous and fincere when attached to a Particular; being paffionate and acting with Violence, their Enmities were dangerous but not lasting; Indolence was the general Fault of the meaner Sort, which betrayed them unavoidably into Poverty; yet this was perhaps encouraged by the Athenians supplying themselves with Necessaries from other Places. Besides, as the Island was held by a kind of right of Conquest, the Inhabitants, might perhaps imagine themselves under too much Subjection; a Suspicion without Doubt fomented by the Arts of those whose Interest it was to fow Divisions in the Island. These concurrent Circumstances made them an easy Prey to Philip and his Artifices; who entered the Island with sufficient Troops, and difmantling the most important Fortresses, settled E 2

fethed a kind of Tyranny over the conquered Towns.

HE would have subdued the Remainder, had not the Athenians been spirited up to send a General, whose Conduct forced the Macedonians to give up their Conquests, and recovered the Whole which they lost.

Philip again disappointed, had recourse to another Project, which must have ruined Athens, had the Success been equal to the Design. This was to destroy the Supplies by which that State in a great Measure sub-fisted; by attacking the Source from whence they flowed.

Attica being in itself an unfruitful Soil, had all its Corn, with a great Quantity of other Provisions transmitted to them from Perinthus and Byzantium: for which in Return they were enriched by the Athenians so much, that the Prosperity of the one was inseparable from the Welfare of the other; so united were they in Interest, both for Defence and Commerce.

THE Athenians saw the Dangers; but what could the Republic attempt, when divided by Faction and headed by Leaders unsit for the Command of Armies. Yet there are Times when even the Populace can discern the

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ern the the Truth, and form a Judgment equal to the most able Politicians. This was such a Time; the whole Assembly, agitated with Passion, and all the Incentives possible to excite their Courage, decreed Forces to be fent to the Colonies abroad, equal to the Danger which threatened them. They were fensible of their Importance, and willingly decreed Assistance; yet Party Spirit and Faction prevailed so far, that Chares was chose to a share in the Command. This Athenian was exactly the Man, whom Philip himself would have wished for to guide the Enemies Councils: vainly oftentatious of his military Skill, yet compleatly ignorant; he deceived not only the People, but himself, by a fond Imagination, that he was capable of acting as a General. Prodigal to Excess felfish Luxury, fordidly avaritious; he became despised by the Allies and his own Troops; by the former for his Rapine, and by the latter for his Incapacity. From such a General little could be expected, but even less was performed; and their Affairs would have greatly declined, had not Phocion at this dangerous Crisis retrieved the Honour of the Republic, and obliged Philip to relinquish

quish an Advantage, which his Arms and Valour had well-nigh acquired.

This Hero, whose Character we shall briefly draw, had every natural Accomplishment to form a General; yet through his Referve and modest Behaviour, had been seldom preferred to the Command. He was steady and firm; deliberate in his Resolutions but quick to execute: stedfastly uncorrupt, easy, and polite in his Behaviour; charming his own Soldiers, and the Allies, by his Sweetness of Temper, and the Mildness of his Carriage, his Valour in War indisputable but his Conduct still more extraordinary; admired for his Abilities in Peace as much as War; a happy Negotiator and an excellent Politician. Such was Phocion! who now assumed the Command; and convinced the World how much Regard should be had to the Character of a General, who is fent abroad as a Representative of the People; or at least of the Administration.

To pass a just Encomium on this Commander, we should reflect on the Prejudice the Allies must have received against the Athenians by the Conduct of Chares; together with the Discouragement which must sollow by those Disappointments; and how the Spirits of the Enemy must be elated by

their Despondence.

In this View we shall find him shine with a more distinguished Lustre: for what Talents must be required, to recover the Affections of Allies so justly alienated by so injurious a Treatment? Yet Phocion executed not only that, but with many fignal Defeats obliged the Macedonian to recede from his Conquests, and ack lowledge that the Atherians, with a good Leader, were still

capable of reducing Philip.

AGAIN disapointed yet not discouraged, he has recourse to Policy, and waits the Event with Patience: these were the proper Weapons of the Macedonian, at which his Dexterity was the most remarkable. At this prefent juncture then it behoved the Athenians more particularly with all possible Dilligence to withstand his fecret Attacks, not to fink into an indolent Supineness, nor be elated with their Prosperity. They had Reason to imagine the Siege of Perinthus and Byzantium an open Declaration of War; and while their Troops were regaining the Settlements in Thrace, their Privateers, by cruizing along the Coast of Macedon, and seizing their trading Vessels, greatly distressed the

the Enemy, and threw Philip into fo perplexed a Situation that he fued for Peace, and made Offers, as flattering in Appearance, as false in Reality. These were rejected by Demosthenes, and the Project overturned, by the immediate Concurrance of the People with the Sentiments of their Orator. ever fertile in Invention, this artful Politician, who had fpread Corruption through all the States, by Means of his Emissaries, now began to practife it more universally, and to neglect no Precaution which might secure him the Confidence of the leading Demagogues. These were the Hinges on which his Project turned: he well knew that Thebes and Thessalia would unite to oppose his Passage, if he seemed to only act for his private Resentment, and not for the common Good. To accomplish his grand Design he had Recourse to his Emissaries, who being well paid for the present, and promised more, executed his Orders with the greatest Alacrity.

THE Locrians a small State in Greece, had plowed some Church-lands which the Priests of Apollo pretended belonged to them alone. The Superstition of the People had before raised a War, concerning the Privilege of sweeping the Temple, which had given

given Philip an Opportunity of seizing the Streights of Thermopylæ, and he only wanted a like Event to put him in Possession of Greece. This they supplied him with, when they began a War for a few paltry Acres.

THE Advantage that Philip gained by the abovementioned War, ought to have deterred them from entering on another; but the AmphyEtyons, which was the general Council of the States, declared War; War must be had; and War was declared with the Locrians.

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ad en THE Confederates having wasted their Strength in vain, by weakening each other without deciding the Victory, were obliged for a while to be at Peace, and to sit down contented with their Losses.

At this Time Æschines was sent to the general Council; a Man whose Eloquence and natural Accomplishments were overbalanced by the Wickedness of his Heart, and his insatiable Avarice: He had borne a considerable Office in Athens, and deceived many by the Speciousness of his Appearance, and outward Professions; being elected an Embassador to the States from the Republic, and having received a large Bribe from Philip

Philip, he was the more capable of affifting him, as his pretended Zeal had made him the less suspected of so artful a Villainy. Having then expatiated on the Sacrilege, and shewn the Necessity of revenging the Insult, he enlarged upon the Losses they had received, and their Incapacity of terminating the War without foreign Assistance.

HAVING introduced these Arguments with all imaginable Delicacy, he proposed Philip of Macedon as one adapted to their Purpose; and covered the Danger with such delusive Ornaments, that the Amphystions, deceived by the mere Power of Sounds, consented to their own Slavery, and introduced an

Army into the Heart of Greece.

Philip, when he heard the Decree, the End and Completion of all his Hopes and Wishes, levied some Forces instantly, and passing the Streights, without concerning himself as before, with the Church Quarrels, hastily seized on the most important Fortress of Greece, from whence he might awe the whole, and either enslave the States or bring them to such a Level that they might be no longer a Check to his Designs.

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THE Effect was for the most Part such as he could have expected; Greece dared not move to oppose his Steps, but in a dread Astonishment at his Progress looked on, and in Silence waited for the Determination of her Fate.

In the midst of this general Despondence, Athens still shewed a Spirit worthy of a better Fate, had she been guided by the Advice of the wisest: But those factious Declaimers, the very Pests of Society and the Destruction of popular Assemblies, had removed from the Government every Man capable of commanding: The unhappy Effect of too much Liberty.

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Demojthenes, however, could still with his Eloquence be of Service to the Country: He it was, who inspired the Thebans with such Warmth and Ardour for Liberty, that neither the Artifices of Philip's Embassadors, nor their natural Timidity, could withstand. This was a Conduct worthy of Liberty itself; to assist the States almost against their Will, and to attempt the Deliverance of Greece almost unassisted.

WITH Regard to the Event, the bad Success was owing entirely to Faction and Party-F 2 Spirit; Spirit; for had the Generals in Battle, shewn the same Conduct as the Citizens shewed Ardour and Courage, Greece would have been delivered, and not enslaved on the decisive Plains of Chæronea.

YET such was her Fate; Philip triumphed over Liberty, and the unhappy Conduct of the Confederates became a lasting Example to succeeding Ages, to shew how far Party-Zeal and Prejudice is conducive to the Ruin of a Republic.

Thus I have touched upon the principal Periods of the Macedonian and Athenian Histories, with all possible Conciseness. Some may perhaps imagine, that I have affected an Obscurity of Stile, and would have more understood than expressed. But to clear all Doubts that may arise, if any Suspicion of that kind should be objected; I declare, that I look upon Perspicuity in writing to be of so inestimable a Value, that any one who claims the Name of Author, ought to reject the Charms of Eloquence, or the mere Pomp of Words; if by that Means he can throw any more light on his Persormance.

But it is now Time to address myself to those who have not mistaken my true Meaning, but imagine that my only intention was to draw a Parallel between the Histories, that I might the easier convince those to whom I dedicate this Treatise, how far the Danger has already proceeded, and warn them by my Exhortations, to retard its Progress.

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HERE an Objection may be started, I confess, that as the Government of Athens, and the Constitution of England, are so widely different, the Comparison will not hold altogether; and so consequently this History cannot with any Justice be given as a Parallel: And if the Circumstances are not agreeable the one with the other, then the Force of the Arguments will fall to the Ground.

My Answer to this will be: I grant the Difference of their Government; but deny the Conclusion, because I have only traced their Conduct, without describing their Method of governing. I grant also that my Design will be effectually destroyed, if the Facts should not bear a due Correspondence.

But let the Facts therefore speak for themselves.

Our present Government is by the Majority of the Nation, thought so excellent, and so harmoniously connected, that it would be depreciating its Merit, to compare it with any other in present or former Ages: Yet even this may be destroyed by Faction, Party-Zeal, and intestine Jars. With these alone, shall I compare it to the Athenian Republic; and I wish I could say with Justice, that even here it would not bear a Comparison.

WE have feen how rival Parties have preferred a Chares to the Command; how Corruption prevailed the public Council, and how the Orators would have perfuaded the People that the most flagrant Acts of Philip's Injustice, were done out of Kindness and

Good-will.

I do not here mean to infinuate that any of our illustrious Senate are venal; but if there should be some sew, there still remains a Number impregnable to the Attacks of *Philip*'s Louis d'Ors, and sufficient to over-ballance the corrupted Division. Yet this will little avail, while in the rival Parties of our *Demosthenes* and Æschines, we see Prejudice prevail over Judgment.

A Union should then be effected, since by these mutual Animosities we forward the Intrigues of our Enemies: Would they not at any Price sow Divisions among our Councils, while they insensibly aggrandized their own Dominion, and lest the rival Parties in England the sole Satisfaction that they had been made the Dupes of France? Then we may boast we have made a Peace, and procured a present Repose, that we may be afterwards Slaves to Perpetuity: This is a melancholy Reslection! But for the Truth, let me appeal to the History I have just recited; let us compare the Facts, and then judge of the Consequence.

When the Peace was proclaimed throughout all the Dominions of the European Powers, each Side seemed to lament their hard Conditions, as if none had been a Gainer: But France was, and she alone; to witness her Incroachments, her numerous Invasions, her frequent Campaigns, in which she never lost any considerable Advantage, but gained many: we shall find her Power extended beyond its former Limits, in a very large Degree; we shall find her politic Conduct to be such that her Acquisitions were certain, and what she was to surrender less fened only the Shadow of her Power, while the Substance was lest entire and undiminished.

Nor let it be deemed a Falsity to affert, that the Power of the French is larger fince the Peace, than it was at the Commencement of the late War. No furely, fays an Englishman, their Influence over us is greatly lessened by the Demolition of Dunkirk: Dunkirk is demolished by the Treaty of Utrecht, and renewed by the Treaty of Aixla-Chapelle: Well, if we suppose it is so, I would fain know what difference a few Bastions could make in the politic System of Europe: But let this over fanguine Patriot but pass over the Water, and see how this great Demolition has been repaired; he will there behold every Artifice which Fortification will supply, to render a Place impregnable: Yet England may rest secure, because Dunkirk is demolished!

But even these Politicians, so secure of Peace, are at a Loss how to account for their Conduct in the West-Indian Colonies, and by their Silence seem to confess that it requires a particular Explanation. With Regard

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gard to their Importance, I have so often in this Work, and so strongly expressed myself on that Head, as to render a farther Representation needless; and only refer those who are desirous to be better instructed, to a late published Pamphlet; entitled, "Resections on the Importance of our American Plantatic.is."

THE French Conduct appears here in its true Light; their fecret and deceitful Practifes with the Indian Chiefs, their alienating the Affections of the Natives by their cunning Treatment, their unjust Encroachments during the Time when the most solemn Treaty subsisted; all prove the first Infringement of Peace to be on the Side of France, and not of England.

What then could a maritime State attempt for her own Defence? Is not a naval Armament the only proper Bulwark to refift Invaders? And if so, may not that State, when attacked, make Use of these Arms? But England has been attacked; and if that is allowed, the Consequence is too plain to be more particularly expressed.

IF then, we may exclaim with Demosthenes, they have been deficient in every Article

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of the Treaty, the Engagement on our Side is dissolved; and we may commence Hostilitie victor to Declaration of War, as against Pires or Robbers.

Bur as in these hasty and sudden Attacks, we often rashly undertake without Premeditation, and are hurried into a War unprepared and undisciplined; so in this Place there is a large Field to commend the Care of the Administration, who at so short a Notice could provide a Fleet and an Army, not only capable of spreading Terror into the French Troops and Settlements, but to put an effectual Stop to the Progress of their Arms.

YET even here we suffered by the Misfortune of Party-Prejudice, and saw another Chares exalted to Power and Preferment, while the Virtues of a Phocion lay concealed: But Merit will buoy up at the last: and what Praises are due to him who could in so short a Space recover the Affections of the alienated Nations, and with unequal Forces not only engage but extirpate a victorious Army, and drive the Troops of this modern Philip from their Fortresses and Settlements?

IF we may judge of the future by the past, what may we not expect from an Hero who has de

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has proved himself unsuffering by Pain or Fatigue; whose Conduct is equal to his Valour, and whose Fortitude is superior to both.

SUCH are those who may be esteemed the true Supports of a State: nor are there wanting a sufficient Number at this Time in England, who may justly be entitled to such an Appellation. Him then we ought with all our Power to assist, and by supporting him with all necessary Implements whereby he may work his Design, convince our Enemies that we are on our Guard in every Place.

Lr us not endeavour so much to extend, as protect our Colonies; let us trust to ourselves, without Dependance on the Forces of the allied States; and we can never again be deceived with false insignificant Quotas, and treacherous and evasive Embassies: We shall again rise to the same Dignity, and exert the same Superiority which Britannia maintained when she held the political Balance of the Power of Europe.

But if we neglect all proper Cautions, if our Councils remain difunited, if clashing Interests prefer their own to the public Good, what may we not apprehend from the Vi-G2.

gilance of Philip, and from our Infenfibility.

YET if we believe and trust to the indolence of particulars, the Treaty is still preferved; although our Allies around us have separately been attempted by the grand Corruptor, and are so far disabled that by much the greater part are become almost only Provinces of *France*.

Boeotia is now so reduced as to be scarce able to stile herself independant; and can only now complain of her Weakness, when she might have exerted her Dominion: Thesfalia is too weak, and subject, to be mentioned in the Class of Allies; and Lacedæmon is too degenerate to be matched with Athens or Macedonia.

From whence then must we receive Assistance? Shall we again be deceived by the Boeotians; or rely on the Favour of the Lacedæmonians? Will the Phoceans, oppressed and sunk with Calamities, be able to help us? No; although with the strictest Alliance they have preserved a Faith inviolate, yet their miserable and desponding State, demands even more Assistance than England could supply.

HAPPY

HAPPY the Monarch whose Care extends to universal Charity, and blest the People who can view them with such disinterested Compassion.—Every Englishman will perceive for what Monarch, and for what People, I design this Eulogium. These are the chief Alliances of Great Britain; and on which of them she ought to rely would be hard to determine.

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LET Negotiations pass on Negotiations, but let this Maxim be adhered to, That England depends alone on the power of England. Having inculcated this Maxim, I would not have it understood that we should neglect our Allies, or their Interests; but only as to what concerns the Desence of our own Country, since our Considence in others has proved always uncertain, and often times more to our Prejudice than Advantage.

WITH Regard to Euboea (an Island so contiguous and connected that it deserves to be particularly considered) the Practices of Philip, and the Artisices of designing Priests, are too palpable to be concealed; and tho as yet no Forces have entered the Place, yet we may distinguish the inward Workings of Policy, as attempting to establish a Power which

which the Interests of our Country require should be stifled in its Infancy.

THE supine and lazy Conduct of Athens had nearly effected their own Ruin; had not the vigorous Genius of one Commander preserved them from that imminent destruction. Those who are the best acquainted with this Point of antient History, will in the clearest Manner discern how this Conjuncture was the Crisis on which the suture Prosperity of Athens, or a final Conclusion of its Liberty, depended.

SUCH is the present Period, with Regard to the Interest of Great Britain; not that I affert immediate Slavery will be the Consequence, but, unless we ardently exert ourselves, that our Influence, even now much lessened, will suffer a still farther Diminution.

I have, I think, compared past Facts with what has happened to ourselves, as far as they will go; I hope with some Degree of Propriety: As my Intention is clear, I hope my Performance will not want an Explanation.

As I am drawing near a Conclusion, I shall only endeavour to display the Schemes

of *Philip*, and offer a few Conjectures on the Manner we should oppose them. The *Macedonian* Schemes have been seen to hang on the small Point of a mere ecclesiastical Dispute; the Product of three or four Acres; which involved *Greece* in so difficult a War, that they embraced Slavery to be at Peace.

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nes of The Designs of France, although so concealed, seem to be turning on an Affair of as little Importance: This is the Election of a King of the Romans: For the Empire will be the Consequence; and when such an Acquisition of Dominions shall come, will Hungary withstand the Torrent? or the Italian States resuse to submit to the Power of France; already accustomed to Subjection, and to the Yoke of the Empire?

Ir this is gained, will Holland withstand the Shock, even now unable to oppose its Progress? Spain, by Nature formed to resist the French Power, now gained by Alliance, will be found too weak and pusillanimous to attempt its Reduction: What then will Britain assume to herself, after so general a Defection; will she not be obliged to take up with Concessions, unjust and dishonourable?

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Certainly she will; it is therefore her grand Aim to hinder this important Event.

THAT this is the Design of the French, will, I suppose, be considered as probable, by any one who reslects on the Means they use to accomplish their Ends. Corruption is the Principle which Philip has diffused so plentifully through the G—n States, that he will render them obsequious to his Will; by soothing Spain with salse Promises of Advantage, and by a constant and perpetual Care of their fortisted Places.

But they feem still to think that England is too powerful; and by their late infinuating Measures, and their present Violence, seem to leave no Method unattempted which may effect a Reduction of our Influence on the Continent: No one is certain but even England may seel the Weight of an Invasion; or, which is more probable, that Ireland may suffer under the Tyranny of France; or that some Dupe to their Designs, may stir up a Rebellion in Scotland: Any one of these would produce the Effects they desire; that of drawing our Troops from the Assistance of Allies whom it is our Interest to desend.

THESE are some few of the Methods they may take, and, if not vigorously opposed, will produce the melancholy Effect I before mentioned, of subjecting our Allies to the Dominion of our Enemies.

THE War to which we are provoked by this Gallic Perfidy, is not likely to be foon concluded: The Subject is too important to be hastily decided, by either England or France: And for this Reason our Measures should be taken with the utmost Caution, and exerted with Vigour.

LET no Confideration draw us from supporting our naval Armament; let us augment our Forces in America, but keep a sufficient Number to guard our own Coasts; while our Ships harrass the Enemy's Trade and Navigation, and cut off their foreign Supplies.

By the reverse Conduct, we suffered them in 1710, and the following Years, to be enrich'd, prolong'd the War, and were compell'd to agree to a felonious Peace, thro' that Oversight.

THE Athenians herein acted wifely, and obliged Philip to fue for Peace; but they committed an Error in not acting before,

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when their general good called upon them to defend their Allies: They were deceived by Artifice: Let us therefore not endeavour to imitate their Conduct, but reap Advantage from their Errors: Let us vigorously support our Allies; not with bare Promises, but with Deeds; nevertheless let our Dependance be on ourselves alone: Let us make Diversions to draw the Enemies Troops from our Colonies; but by no Means act the offensive Part, fo far that we neglect the defensive. We should be found every where in Readiness; and, by a Treatment altogether mild and equitable, secure the Friendship of the Eu-Joeans, and our other Neighbours, whose Affections may be wavering, though no wavs alienated.

This, together with domestic Troops, will secure us at home, and convince France that we may again be terrible to the House of Bourbon. Were this Plan for our Operations sollowed, I am apt to imagine that our Allies on the Continent would be confirmed in their Friendship; that the States of Germany, who act for France, through Fear, and not with Affection, would be glad to renounce a League which must give her universal Dominion

nion on the Continent of Europe: That Spain would at least be neutral, we are certain; and that Holland would again affert her Liberty.

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ominion This might be effected by Force and Policy, but never by Bribery and Corruption: Eut if, like Athens, we supinely rest till this modern Philip has seized the Empire, this meer contemptible Name of King of the Romans, will be a Cause of Calamities unspeakable to the Allies in general, and to England in particular.

We shall find no modern Bæotians ready to hazard their Lives for their Country, but rather to submit tamely to the Yoke; our Power must inevitably decrease; nor would it then be in our Determination, even to finish the War like Athens, by one decisive Engagement.

By the drawing these parallel Facts, I have in some Degree, I hope, answered my proposed Design, of exhorting my Country to use all possible Precautions against the Policy, Persidy, and Arms of France, by setting the Danger in Prospect before them: A Danger which their own Fears encrease; but which,

[52]

which, if we exert ourselves according to our natural Strength and Interest, will dimi-

nish as we approach nearer.

In the Characters I have drawn, I believe I have not exceeded the Truth; and if my Inferences are not deduced like a Statesman, let the Intention justify the Attempt. But if ever Indolence, Luxury, and Corruption should become the sole Ends of the Administration, in vain shall our *Phocion* defend our American Plantations; in vain shall our great and royal Commander, exert a laudable Discipline amongst his Troops; and in vain shall our Sovereign, for his paternal Indulgence, be styled the Father of his People.



FINIS.

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