





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


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CANADIAN HOSTILITY TO ANNEXATION.

ANNEXATION is as familiar a word to American statesmen as it is to British leaders. Louisiana and Florida, Texas, Northern Mexico and Alaska, have been acquired one after the other and in various ways. Cuba, Hayti and Hawaii have come within the sphere of discussion. But the problems connected with any proposition to annex the Dominion of Canada to the United States are so entirely different from those involved in all previous extensions of territory as to afford no room for legitimate comparison. Whether such a proposition is spoken of as "political union" or as "continental union," it involves the addition of a territory larger than that of the Republic; the amalgamation of a people who, as a whole, are intensely proud of their country, of their union with the British empire, and of their loyalty to the Queen; serious diplomatic difficulties, if not war, between the United States and Great Britain; the disruption of the British empire to a degree not measured by the secession of Canada, important as that would be; and finally, the commercial and political supremacy of the American Republic upon this Northern continent, and a marked diminution of British power, trade, territory and prestige.

Until the last two or three years, the idea has been only fitfully discussed in Canada and is now only indirectly referred to or supported. Thus, the party in power believe that the policy of the Opposition would result in annexation if it were carried out in the manner proposed; but they also believe that an attempt on the part of the Liberals to accomplish a policy of commercial discrimination against Great Britain would result in a Parliamentary overthrow, followed by a popular reversal of any success which might have been obtained through disguising the issue during an election contest. In the United States, however, the principle of "manifest destiny," as Charles Sumner called it, runs like a thread through every page of its international history, and is woven into many parts of its internal policy. The efforts made during the War of the Revolution to bring the Canadian Provinces, or Colonies as they were then called, into the new Confederation of States, are known to every reader of his-

tory. In Article XI of the Constitution of 1777 it was specially provided that

"Canada, acceding to the confederation and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of, this Union; but no other Colony shall be admitted to the Union unless such admission shall be agreed to by nine States."

But the British provinces refused to be won by persuasion and were left unconquered by force. Most Canadians believe to-day that the United States has shown a steady, deliberate dislike of their country and has pursued a policy more or less injurious to their interests.

The Oregon boundary dispute; the Maine boundary troubles, settled, it was thought, most unjustly by the Ashburton Treaty; the San Juan question; the abrogation of the fishery clauses of the Washington Treaty; the Atlantic Coast fisheries dispute; the refusal to allow Canadian volunteers to cross American territory during the North-West Rebellion and previously to the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, although dozens of American regiments had passed through Canadian territory during the Civil War; the annexation of Alaska in order, as Secretary Seward once pointed out, to prevent British-Canadian extension on the Pacific Coast and to strengthen American influence in British Columbia; the Behring Sea fisheries dispute and the unfriendly manner in which Canadian sealers have been treated; the McKinley bill and its injurious agricultural schedule; the Alien Labor law, and its aggressive enforcement against Canadians; the constant threats regarding the Canadian Pacific Railroad; and refusals to entertain any proposition for fair reciprocity—all these things have combined to make Canadians as a rule consider the inhabitants of the Republic what the Liberal Premier of Ontario once termed them, "a hostile people." And these historical incidents, these evidences of doubtful friendship, are among the most powerful obstacles to future union or closer relations.

Intimately connected with these considerations is the concealed dislike of so many Americans to Great Britain or their avowed hostility to its interests. Whether this feeling is representative or not of the United States as a nation, Canadians are prone to look upon it in that light, especially when considering the utterances of politicians like the late General Butler, or the appeals to international prejudice made by leading American newspapers. Such incidents as America's expression of sympathy with Russia during the Crimean War and with Arabi Pasha during the Egyptian campaign are not

forgotten when the relations of Canada and the States are discussed. In a word, another serious obstacle to annexation is the possibility, dim or vivid, as it may seem to the individual, that some day the United States may drift, or be dragged, into a war with Great Britain, which under Continental Union would force Canadians to be false to their new flag or else to the honor and gratitude which they owe to their mother-country. "Manifest destiny," therefore, is dependent for the first step towards realization upon the Canadian people's being impressed with a conviction of the genuine friendship entertained by the United States towards themselves and Great Britain.

It must not be supposed, however, that there is no annexation sentiment in Canada to meet the annexation talk in the United States. There is some—probably the same proportion that existed in 1774, or that could have been found in 1812, in 1849, in 1867, or in any year since the Thirteen Colonies severed their connection with England. Periods of depression give the feeling a slight impetus, as was the case in 1849, when a number of young Montreal men signed a document in favor of annexation. Many of them subsequently rose to eminence, several were knighted, one became Prime Minister of Canada and another Chief-Justice of Quebec; and all who have ever been heard of, lived to express their sincere regret for a hasty ebullition of anger.

In recent years, a brilliant but intensely unpopular Englishman, Professor Goldwin Smith, has devoted his pen and his time to advocating annexation. The result of this advocacy was first visible about five years ago, when Mr. Erastus Wiman and Sir Richard Cartwright tried to convince the Canadian people that the only hope for Canada lay in its immediately obtaining free, unrestricted access to the American market. It was pointed out upon a thousand platforms that this could not be arranged without practically adopting the United States tariff against England, and charging high duties upon British goods while American were admitted free. But naturally, when the changes were rung from day to day upon the statement that free-trade with the Republic was necessary, even at the expense of a discrimination which would probably involve separation from the empire and control of the Canadian tariff by Congress at Washington, many of the supporters of these leaders became tinctured with annexation ideas. In any case, argued many, dependence upon Britain for protection and dependence upon the States in trade and fiscal matters would involve an impossible, anomalous, and disgraceful

position. Many Liberals in the elections of 1891 refrained from voting, others voted with the Conservatives, the party was again defeated, the Hon. Edward Blake, one of its leaders, retired and publicly announced his reasons for rejecting the party policy, numerous bye-elections followed, and Mr. Blake's manifesto having opened the eyes of Liberals everywhere, the Dominion Ministry received a majority never before equalled in a Canadian Parliament. Since then, the temporary increase in annexation sentiment has again subsided and Professor Goldwin Smith's little "Political Union Club" in Toronto is one of those organizations which never meet and concerning which no one knows anything or seems to care.

Apart from the difficulty of its being carried out, there are of course several ways of regarding this proposition. From the United States standpoint, it would mean the addition to the Republic of a vast area of fertile lands and rich resources in nickel, copper, gold, silver, coal, iron, and a hundred other minerals; the acquisition of half a continent; the amalgamation of an intelligent and liberty-loving people; the chance of advantage to one or other of the great political parties; the removal of a possible rival in power and population; and the addition of a voting population to the Union which would aid effectively in the settlement of the Southern and negro problems. From the Canadian standpoint, it would mean the surrender of many advantages; the sacrifice of hundreds of millions spent upon the railways, canals and public works necessary to the achievement of a national ideal laid down at Confederation twenty-six years ago; the abrogation of a Constitution which is considered, rightly or wrongly, as the combination of all that is best in the British and American systems; the adoption of new institutions, new political principles, a new history—if such a phrase may be used—new ideas of business and commerce, and new fiscal regulations, all of which the average Canadian thinks inferior to his own. And these considerations would have to be dealt with after the nation's sentimental regard for Great Britain had been superseded by a friendly feeling towards the United States, which has not yet been encouraged by the Republic and which under the most favorable circumstances would take a long time to grow.

The defects in American national life have long been keenly studied and criticised in Canada, and the most enthusiastic advocate of annexation knows that this belief in the superiority of Canadian institutions, laws, politics and even morals, is ingrained in the heart of

the average citizen whom he endeavors to convert. I will summarize briefly a few of the most important considerations which occur naturally to a Canadian when annexation is mentioned.

I. Responsible government, as compared with Presidential rule. In Canada the Governor-General represents the Queen, and reigns but does not rule. Parliament sits, legally, for seven years—practically, for five or six years, and the Premier must have the confidence of its majority. If the country is generally alarmed or indignant, it acts upon the members and they vote against the Ministry. Public posts in the control of Parliament, or of its delegated representatives—the Ministry of the day—are held for life during good behavior. On the other hand, the United States has its President chosen in the midst of a violent turmoil every four years—every two years, if preparation be part of the battle—and he is during his term responsible practically to nobody. The people cannot control him, Congress cannot overthrow his authority or that of his Cabinet, and the whole machinery of government, including the spoils system, rests to a great degree in the hands of one man.

II. Legislative methods. It is believed that injurious and poorly-digested laws, together with appropriations for large sums and important purposes, rushed through without care or consideration, are characteristic of the Congress system. These slipshod methods not only compel the courts to spend much time in testing the constitutionality of various laws, but encourage the corrupt legislation which is the chief source of lobbyism and its multitudinous evils. The absence from Congress of authoritative Cabinet spokesmen much enhances this difficulty, which has its root in that serious constitutional error, the lack of responsibility for legislation. At Ottawa, on the other hand, as in London, careful preparation is given by selected members of the Cabinet to all government bills, and where the measure is of vital import, the whole Cabinet probably deals with it clause by clause before submitting it to Parliament. After it is submitted to the House of Commons or to the Senate, as the case may be, all publicity is given to its terms. So with legislation on private bills, of which two months' notice is required and concerning which the fullest opportunity is given for criticism in the select committees to which the bills may be referred.

III. Divorce laws and morals. This consideration is alike important and difficult to deal with. It is not necessary to affect or presume superior national morality in order to express regret at the

looseness of the marriage-tie in the great Republic. Cardinal Gibbons pointed out not long ago that between 1867 and 1886 two hundred thousand divorces were granted in the United States, as compared with one hundred and sixteen given in Canada. The trouble, of course, is caused largely by a difference in the laws of the various States, which permit the anomalous and disgraceful condition of a man or woman's being married in one State and single in another. And Canadians are disposed to see in the vast number of divorces granted yearly in New York, Chicago and more Western centres, a reflection upon the morality of the community and an evidence of a widespread lack of respect for the sacredness of the marriage-tie. Whether justified or not, this feeling is almost universal in Canada and constitutes another considerable obstacle to closer national relationship.

IV. The elective judiciary. Canadians are exceedingly averse from any judicial system founded upon an electoral basis. They recognize the merits of the United States Supreme Court, the ability and impartiality which characterize its judges; but the respect paid to its decisions and to the Court itself is believed to be due to the fact that the judges are carefully selected and hold office upon a life tenure. But lower down in the scale of courts, the unfortunate electoral system comes into play. At once, the lack of respect for the bench and its decisions we think, rightly or wrongly, becomes apparent; the judge is only an elected official, no longer impartial, but the servant of the people or of the party which elected him. In Canada, the judiciary is appointed for life and is composed of men of the highest legal standing. Sir John Macdonald, during his many years of Premiership, selected most of the principal judges, and, like the other party-leaders, chose men irrespective of politics or political services. The consequence is that from the lowest court to the highest, the bench of Canada is admired and respected throughout the Dominion.

V. Lack of respect for law. Whether it be a result of the elective system or a consequence of innate lawlessness in a part of the population, the frequency of lynch-law outrages throughout the Union is to Canadians incomprehensible. The great Canadian North-West has been opened up, the Indians have been dealt with; a half-breed population has been trained in self-government, the mines of British Columbia have been made to produce fifty million dollars in gold, and that great province has been opened up to civilization and settle-

ment, while thousands of miles of railway have been built, and all without one lynching! Such incidents, therefore, as the frightful tortures inflicted upon the negro who was burned to death at Paris, Texas; the hanging at Burnet, Texas, upon the very slightest suspicion, of a colored girl who was afterwards found to be innocent; the lynching of the man Denmark by a mob in South Carolina, with the Governor's practical connivance or approval, after the alleged victim had declared him innocent; these and similar occurrences produce a sensation of horror in the onlooker, equalled only by amazement as to the condition of the laws, or the public disregard of them, which permits such deeds. If they were exceptional and occasional, little would be thought of outbursts of this nature; but taking place constantly and extending as they do, from New Jersey to Texas, from New York to San Francisco, the average Canadian can hardly be blamed for disliking and fearing the general national conditions which permit such results.

VI. The spoils system. In Canada, positions in the Civil Service are obtainable after examination and are held during good behavior, which as a rule means for life. In the United States, the motto, "To the victors belong the spoils," has been lived up to in principle and practice. Senator Pendleton, during a speech on December 31, 1881, said that the idea that one hundred thousand offices, purely administrative, almost absolutely clerical in their nature, paying one hundred million dollars a year in salaries, should be distributed by the President and his friends after every election, was a crime against civilization, and "the prolific parent of fraud, corruption and brutality." This is a severe indictment, but it represents a very general feeling in Canada, strengthened by such incidents as the contention of Mr. Blaine's friends that he was beaten at the Minneapolis Convention by office-holders; the many weeks' struggle of President Cleveland and his whole Cabinet with office-seekers, to the neglect of national business; and the recent discoveries of fraud in the Pension Bureau.

VII. Banking and currency. In Canada, there seems no doubt that the American banking system is on its trial, and that the currency of the Republic is in a deplorable condition. Time may adjust matters, but the financial instability of the United States is a source of much dread to Canadian bankers and business-men and constitutes a most important factor in any discussion of international relations. Canadians are naturally cautious, and the spectacle of experiments

such as the Sherman act; of agitations such as those the free-coinage men have been pushing; or of schemes such as the Populist leaders propose from time to time, fills them with uneasiness. The American system provides small banks for every part of the community, connected with each other by no apparent link, started upon no particular principle, with little capital and often no experience. The Canadian banking arrangements include a score of large banks, chartered by the Dominion Parliament every ten years, after a wide public discussion of necessary changes, having many branches in every portion of the country, with skilled and trained officers who rise by ability and are required to possess experience, enabling the General Managers accurately to measure the conditions in all parts of the country, to send money here and withdraw it there, to avert undue expansion and undue tightness; meanwhile giving the public a circulation which, issued by the banks and secured beyond all possibility of risk, affords the only known system whereby the public are assured of a rise and fall in the supply of money exactly in accord with the requirements of the moment. Such is the Canadian system, based upon a well-sustained public confidence and established in a manner to defy assault from the causes which every day overthrow small American institutions. This at least is the Canadian view of the situation; and coupled with a gold basis for our Dominion currency and no trouble whatever with the silver question, it affords another pretty strong objection to any proposed annexation scheme.

It is unnecessary to go at length into other Canadian objections. The obstacle afforded by a tariff double or treble that of the Dominion, may be alleviated in time, if President Cleveland during his term of office is able to persuade Congress to lower the duties—presuming that he wishes to do so. The difficulty looming dark upon the horizon in connection with seven millions of negroes whom the average American is indisposed to treat upon equal terms; the extreme length to which monopolies and trusts are carried; the dislike felt to wealthy monopolists and the danger arising from the constant accumulation of huge fortunes in a few hands; the cost and turmoil of the almost continual elections; the memory of that near approach to civil war at the time of the Tilden-Hayes contest; the enormous expenditure upon pensions;—all these considerations militate against the spread of annexationism in Canada. Were the question to be publicly and generally discussed they would be heard of in every detail and particular from a thousand platforms—and this with-

out anything but respect for the United States as a nation. There are indeed few appeals to patriotism which exercise a stronger and more immediate effect in Canada, than the picture of that great people battling with disunion and rebellion over a term of years, spending thousands of millions in money and thousands of lives for their flag and country. The Union's progress is appreciated; its Constitution, in many points so excellent, is respected; its prosperity in the past has been greatly admired, its future welfare is universally desired. And above all, Canada, in preserving and cementing its national unity, in protecting and promoting its trade and internal commerce, in extending its railways and encouraging immigration, wants no better exemplar.

One more point remains to be considered. Annexationists, wherever they may be, insist that Canada is suffering under terrible depression and poverty; that its commerce is restricted and its condition generally retrogressive instead of progressive—the only cure for all these evils being political union. Figures may be cited almost at random to prove the expansion of Canada since 1878, the year in which Sir John Macdonald came into power and in which the Conservative policy of protection was prepared for application in 1879. The exports, for instance, rose from \$79,323,067 in 1878 to \$113,963,375 in 1892; the imports from \$93,089,787 in 1878 to \$127,406,068 in 1892. The export of mineral products during this period increased by three million dollars; of fisheries, three millions; of forest products, three millions; animals and their products, fourteen millions; agricultural products, four millions; and manufactures, three millions. Meantime, the home production increased, as importation of foreign-made articles decreased, and Canadian industries soon showed the difference. As the census figures indicate, the number of factories increased from 49,923 in 1881 to 75,768 in 1891; the capital invested, from \$165,302,623 to \$353,836,817; the number of employes, from 254,935 to 367,865; the wages paid, from \$59,429,002 to \$99,762,441; the cost of raw material, from \$179,918,593 to \$255,983,219, and the value of products, from \$309,676,068 to \$475,455,705. It is estimated, upon these and other figures, that Canada added to its wealth \$89,000,000 per annum, during the decade, as compared with \$33,000,000 a year in the previous decade. Other evidences of this industrial progress are found in the importation of raw wool, which increased from 4,900,000 pounds in 1879 to 10,200,000 pounds in 1892; of raw cotton, which rose from 9,700,-

000 pounds to 46,300,000 pounds, and of raw sugar, which leaped up from 21,000,000 pounds to 343,000,000 pounds.

That the United States is not the best market for Canadian farmers is held to be shown by the fact that Canada exported in 1891 \$10,917,357 worth of farm products to the Republic and imported from it \$9,395,747, while it exported to Great Britain \$25,074,464 and imported from that country only \$1,408,239 worth. That Canadian trade compares favorably with American is indicated by figures, also for 1891, which show that Canada's trade, *per capita*, was in imports, \$24.77 and in exports, \$20.32; while the trade of the United States was in imports only \$13.45 and in exports, \$14.08. The Canadian debt of \$237,000,000 is now stationary and compares favorably with the Australian debt of more than \$700,000,000. If American railroad mortgage debts of more than \$4,000,000,000 were included in the debt of the United States, as the chief railway indebtedness is included in figures for the Dominion, there would be an equally favorable showing as between Canada and the United States. But Canada has spent \$114,000,000 on railways, \$36,000,000 on canals and \$35,000,000 on other public works since 1867, besides assuming at Confederation and afterwards \$109,000,000 of Provincial debts; so that she does not feel the burden of indebtedness, in face of substantial results, public approval of the expenditure, redundant revenues and enhanced credit. Without, however, going further into figures, Canadians may well be pardoned for inquiring why in such circumstances they should be pessimistic, and why pessimism should lead them into despair—and the American Union.

To summarize, the conditions of the annexation problem seem simple and easily understood. Canada is contented with her present national position, and conservative Canadians entertain a profound belief in the superiority of the British system of government over the American. They think the institutions, laws, morals, finance and legislation of the Dominion superior to those of the United States, and they would not care to risk serious changes through annexation. They are every year becoming more attached to Great Britain and more grateful for the power and liberty which can be obtained within the British realm. They are afraid of American aggression, suspicious of American dislike to the mother-land, averse from the necessity which would exist of hostile fiscal legislation under annexation, and of possible future conflict with Great Britain. They are becoming profoundly interested in the British market, as opposed to the

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old "sixty million market" theory, and have defeated by an overwhelming vote unrestricted reciprocity schemes which seemed to involve trade discrimination against England. Their commerce, railways, steamship lines, cable projects, and waterways all converge, east and west, toward Britain and British countries, instead of south to the United States. And of Americans who feel inclined to support passively or aid actively some annexation propaganda, the majority of Canadians honestly ask, Why should you desire or expect us to do what you would never dream of doing yourselves? Why should Canada, with its vast and wealthy territory, its intimate connection with the greatest naval, commercial and territorial power on earth, and its splendid institutions, seek union with another nation, whatever its wealth and population, progress and prospects may be?

J. CASTELL HOPKINS.

