



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons, March 25, 1954.

...The first matter with which I should like to deal, and I think the house will expect me to, is the result of the Berlin conference, which was being held when we had our last discussion on international affairs on January 29. It will be recalled that the agenda of the Berlin conference was adopted quickly. It was a simple agenda of three items. The second and third items of that agenda were Germany and the problem of ensuring European security, and the Austrian state treaty. In respect of these two items, as the house knows, no progress was made at Berlin.

In so far as Germany is concerned, the Soviet delegation to that conference was unable to agree to the proposal for free all-German elections as the first step towards unification and a German peace settlement; while the Western foreign ministers on their part were not able to agree to the Soviet proposal, which had been previously rejected, that a provisional all-German government should be set up on a basis of equal representation of the freely elected government of the German republic and of the Communist regime in East Germany. The result was, in this matter, deadlock.

Similarly, in respect of Austria, when the Western foreign ministers, in an effort to bring a peace treaty to Austria at last, accepted the previous Soviet proposals the Soviet delegation then introduced new and irrelevant conditions with the result that in this matter too there was deadlock. So the peoples of Germany and Austria must have felt, as indeed we felt, disappointed and disillusionment over the negative results of these items of the agenda.

The first item of the agenda concerned methods of reducing international tension and convening a five-power conference. Under that item a decision was taken, as the House knows, to hold a conference in Geneva opening on April 26 to discuss the question of a Korean peace treaty and the war in Indo-China. I will deal with these matters more specifically a little later.

On January 29, when we discussed international affairs, I told the House that in my view, despite some minor

concessions and some reassuring words from the successors to Mr. Stalin in the U.S.S.R., nothing that had happened up to that time gave us cause to believe that the basic objectives of Soviet foreign policy had changed or that soviet leaders were, in fact, ready to accept a reasonable solution to major international problems. After a careful examination of all the reports of the Berlin conference dealing with Germany, Austria and the general subject of European security, it seems clear that the conclusion I put forward on January 29 holds true today. There has been no evidence of change in the basic foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. At Berlin, the same record was played, although it was played somewhat more softly and for that I suppose we should give thanks.

One of the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union has been to split the European allies, and indeed other allies, from the United States of America; to crack the solid structure of Western unity. Mr. Molotov at Berlin made it abundantly clear that this was certainly one of his principal aims. But we can all take satisfaction out of the fact that he failed in achieving that aim. Indeed, the Russian tactics served to strengthen, I think, the unified approach of the Western delegation to international problems. The teamwork and the tactics of the Western foreign ministers at Berlin, which were I think admirable in all respects, have quite possibly increased the sense of common purpose in the peoples of the free world. A stronger Atlantic community spirit might, I think, be listed as a positive achievement of that conference.

The attitude adopted by the Soviet delegation, their refusal to agree to the unification of Germany with free elections or the peace treaty with Austria, has also served to remove--if we still had them--any lingering illusions about Soviet policy. I suppose this also can be listed as a positive achievement of the conference. It is a melancholy fact, but a fact nonetheless, that in the world in which we live we must count as a step forward the removal or reduction of false hopes, because false hopes can be dangerous. Clearing the ground of illusions and facing the situation as it is makes, I think, more likely the formulation, and eventually the realization, of sound hopes and attainable visions of secure peace.

Since the Berlin conference some progress has been made by the countries of Western Europe towards the establishment of the European Defence Community. In Belgium, for instance, the Senate has approved a bill for ratification of the EDC treaty, which earlier had been passed by its house of representatives. In the Netherlands the final steps in the formal process of ratification have been completed. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Parliamentary approval has been received for constitutional amendments which would put beyond doubt the right of the German Republic to participate in Western defence. In both France and Italy, however, formal parliamentary debate on the EDC treaty has not yet begun. We must hope that it will begin soon.

The Canadian Government, as I indicated in my last statement, has welcomed indications that our friends in Europe intend to unite their forces in the interests of continental defence and continental co-operation. We have not taken the position that EDC was the only means to this end,

but we have stated our support for EDC as a satisfactory arrangement and indeed as the only one which has been put forward officially. Furthermore, as a member of NATO with which EDC if it comes into existence will be associated, we have expressed our satisfaction that the creation of the European Defence Community will strengthen the North Atlantic community and integrate the defences of the whole North Atlantic area.

Those are no mean objectives and perhaps it was unrealistic to expect their rapid realization. But surely we across the Atlantic have some right to expect that if the pace has been slow, it should be steady. Certainly, if there were any lingering doubts that we were on the right path those were dispelled by the example of Soviet policy at Berlin. We in Canada have, I think, felt and demonstrated sympathy and understanding for those in Europe who have demanded full time for consideration of EDC. In view of their history we have understood their hesitation. But while recognizing the necessity, the very real necessity, for caution and prudence, we may feel also over here that there comes a time when in certain situations failure to act may in the long run prove to have been the most dangerous of all possible courses, and that the greatest probability of safety may lie in decisive acts of faith.

At the Berlin conference the U.S.S.R. has made it very clear that they oppose EDC because they see in it a strong obstacle to their own policy. Their opposition is, perhaps, understandable, though it is based I think on false fears and false assumptions. The European Defence Community has been devised from the beginning to contribute to the defensive collective strength of Western Europe, with which will be associated the United States and Canada. The men in the Kremlin apparently feel that continued failure to ratify the EDC project would tend to serve their purposes of keeping Europe weak and divided. I agree with them, and that is one reason why we must hope that EDC or something like it will soon come into existence.

The other item on the Berlin agenda, which was dealt with has resulted, as the house knows, in the calling of the Geneva conference. I believe this conference can be welcomed. But again, we should have no exaggerated hopes of success. We must, of course, do our best to bring about that success. We must refuse to give up the struggle if we seem to be having difficulty in the first week or two. But it is not going to be an easy conference, and indeed it is not going to be a conference from which we can be sure of constructive results. For one thing, we shall have new membership at that conference in the personnel of the delegation from Communist China.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom we were happy to welcome in Ottawa only a few weeks ago, had this to say in London at a dinner on March 18:

" Now, we are facing a new chapter in the Korean story. Next month in Geneva the nations who fought under the United Nations flag in Korea return to the conference table to seek peace. At this table the Communist countries will be fully represented for the first time. The negotiations that will be undertaken in Geneva will be of extreme difficulty,

yet it would be a serious mistake to allow them to lapse again should it prove impossible quickly to conclude that peace treaty."

He concluded this part of his remarks in these words:

"It is inherent in the United Nations' approach that the Western world and the Communist world meet regularly around the conference table."

I was asked on Tuesday by the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) what would be our instructions as a Canadian delegation at this conference. Mr. Speaker, that can be stated in very general terms. We shall do our best to assist in the process of converting the Korean armistice, a somewhat uneasy Korean armistice, into a durable and satisfactory peace within the United Nations frame of reference which has been set down for this conference, and by which we as a Government, indeed as a Parliament, are bound.

The United Nations' resolution on this subject reads--at least the important sentence of it--that the objectives we are to seek are:

"Achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area."

These are the goals of the Canadian delegation to the conference, and indeed they should be the goals of each delegation whose right to participate at the conference stems from its military contribution to the United Nations' cause in Korea. I can see no obstacle that could not be overcome in the way of the realization of that resolution if there is good faith and good will on both sides; but that "if", as we know from unhappy experience, is big enough to restrain undue optimism as to the results of the conference. Nevertheless, we shall do our part as Canadian representatives, I hope, to achieve a satisfactory result which may bring peace to Korea.

At the Geneva conference there will also be discussed the question of Indo-China. It was agreed on by the four foreign ministers at Berlin that this question should be discussed by representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states. As hon. members know, the problem of Indo-China, where bitter fighting has been going on for eight years and is going on today, has never been submitted to the United Nations for consideration, and for that reason Canada has not been as directly concerned with this matter as we were with the aggression in Korea. Nevertheless, I am sure we are all conscious of the critical significance of the struggle in Indo-China as it affects the aspirations of the people of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in achieving and maintaining the independence accorded them by France, as it affects the security of the neighbouring countries in southeast Asia and as it affects the ability of France, to make the maximum contribution to European and North Atlantic security and co-operative arrangements. And so, while we do not expect at Geneva to take any active part

in discussion of Indo-China, we shall of course follow these talks with close interest and take advantage of any opportunity that may be afforded to us to help in bringing some satisfactory conclusion out of this particular matter.

There is another matter about which I think I should say a word or two. I meant to discuss this, as a matter of fact when I was speaking in the house in January, but considerations of time did not then make it possible. I refer to President Eisenhower's proposals, last autumn on atomic energy. During recent months, and indeed during recent days, a considerable amount of significant information has been made public regarding the terrible power of atomic weapons, particularly the new type of hydrogen atomic weapons which, and it is a horrible admission to have to make, have made the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima and killed 60,000 people obsolescent. There is no need for me to try to impress on the House the fearful power of these weapons and the awesome responsibility toward all future generations, which their recent development imposes on humanity.

In the face of the dangers which these developments involve, it is vitally important that no genuine opportunity for international co-operation in this field should be missed. In this respect the Berlin conference was disappointing and the Korean conference at Geneva may prove to be so, too. But surely we must never abandon the effort and the hope that sooner or later sanity and moderation will somehow prevail, and that man will exercise control over weapons, the use of which may destroy his little world.

While there are, as we know from long experience, many and bitter difficulties in the way of solution of this problem of international control of atomic energy, President Eisenhower's proposal does give us some hope that progress can be made. That proposal is in many respects a modest one. For that purpose, it may be easier to implement it. You will recall that when this proposal was first mentioned in this House--the proposal refers of course to the collection of atomic stockpiles of uranium and fissionable materials under an international atomic energy agency--the Canadian Government announced its unreserved support for it. The Prime Minister referred to it in the House at that time as an imaginative and constructive approach to what is perhaps the greatest problem of the day, namely, the effective control of atomic energy and its development for welfare rather than for warfare. But I think it is important that our strong support for this approach should be accompanied by a clear understanding, not only of what the proposal is but what it is not. For example, it does not of itself offer a solution for the terrible problem of the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes.

But while it is a relatively modest one, therein may, as I said, lie its virtue, or at any rate lie the possibility of its early and general acceptance. Furthermore, it could, if it were adopted, be the starting point for further progress and for reaching more important forward results. At this point it might be useful if I just said a word on the procedure being followed by the United States' Government in making arrangements for discussion of this proposal by the nations principally concerned. Obviously--at least it seems obvious to me--it is of great importance that the

Soviet Union should participate fully in these discussions; and for that reason Mr. Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, had been holding, as the House no doubt knows, bilateral discussions with the Soviet ambassador in Washington, and during the Berlin conference with Mr. Molotov, with a view to making satisfactory arrangements for further and more general progress.

These discussions have now advanced to the point where, on March 19, the United States government presented to the Soviet Government a memorandum outlining its views as to how President Eisenhower's proposal could be most effectively implemented. While that memorandum was sponsored solely by the United States government, which arose out of those bilateral conversations, the Canadian Government was consulted in advance about the terms of this memorandum.

After consideration we were able to say that we were in general agreement in these proposals to which we have been giving very careful consideration. And in that consideration we have had to face a number of difficult questions. For example: should the international agency suggested by the president hold in its own possession uranium or fissionable material to be supplied by contributing nations; if so, where? Alternatively, perhaps the agency might itself hold little or no material, and be in a position to draw upon stocks held by contributing nations up to the amounts pledged.

Another question to resolve is whether the proposed international agency should itself construct, own or operate atomic reactors, or whether it should confine its activities to arranging for the provision of the materials and technical assistance required by countries wishing to undertake this atomic development programme for peaceful purposes.

A problem of importance concerns the proposed international agency itself. Should it be associated with the United Nations? In what way would it be financed? What would be the basis for determining who should be represented on it?

Hon. members will note that I have framed my remarks on these matters as questions without answers. We are seeking for these answers, in consultation with our friends. But I think in view of our experience over the years that so much in the way of international discussion of atomic energy has been bedevilled by propaganda and frustrated by political fears--in view of that experience I think it is wise in the early stages at least to have these discussions conducted privately and confidentially.

And that is what has been going on. In due course, if these bilateral discussions about which we are talking turn out to be successful, then the discussions can be broadened to include other countries importantly concerned. I think in the privacy of discussions at this stage, however, lies the best hope that the talks will be used for serious negotiation rather than for propaganda.

But the more we study this question of atomic energy and its use, without control, for destructive purposes, the more important of course become arrangements, and the necessity for these arrangements, for collective defence,

for co-operation for peace among the free world.

The basis of the security which we are seeking in this field is of course international action--international collective action on the broadest possible front. Mr. Dulles himself, the Secretary of State, made that very clear in some very impressive words which appeared in an article which came out last week in Foreign Affairs, under his name. He wrote:

"The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security."

And he went on to say:

"This is true of the United States. Without the co-operation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities. Without them, our air striking power loses much of its deterrent power. With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill called the "supreme deterrent". He-- "

That is, Sir Winston Churchill.

"--credited to it the safety of Europe during recent years. But such power, while now a dominant factor, may not have the same significance forever. Furthermore, massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances."

And he concluded this part of his article by saying:

"Security for the free world depends, therefore, upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials ..."

I am sure the House will agree that those are very wise words, indeed. Now the broadest base for the accumulation of this collective community power is in the United Nations itself. It is the only international organization we have which is universal in character. But now that very universality makes its deterrent value not as great as it should be, and makes it not very effective as an instrument for collective community power at the present time.

It can be effective, and it has been shown to be effective in Korea; and it could be more effective if we implement the "uniting for peace resolution" of the U.N. General Assembly. But the fact is that, as the United Nations is now constituted, reflecting the cold war which is still raging, it cannot be a satisfactory and effective agent for universal collective security--not effective enough to remove our fears.

And so, as an alternative, we have fallen back on a regional basis for the collection of this community power; in the circumstances, an effective alternative through arrangements which include those states which are willing to accept firm commitments for collective action.

Above all, of course, there is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This regional collective security as exemplified in NATO is based on two concepts--not one but two concepts, the first of which is the importance of local defence and, the second, the importance of retaliation, especially from the air, on enemy nerve centres from bases which may be far removed from attack. Both these concepts are, of course, essential to the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Dulles, himself, talking about this at a press conference the other day, and referring to the necessity for local defence, but also to its inadequacy in present circumstances said:

"With the Soviet-Chinese-Communist world--with its 800,000 people occupying a central location; with its vast land armies--it would be utterly impossible to have local defences all around that 20,000-mile orbit sufficient to stop any blow that might come at wherever they might choose to make it. So that you have got to find some way whereby that type of local ground defence can be supplemented."

And he went on:

"Now that doesn't mean that you eliminate wholly, by any means, land forces--it means you do not necessarily make them your primary reliance because, as against the kind of danger which threatens, it is impossible to match your potential enemy at all points on a basis of man-for-man, gun-for-gun and tank-for-tank."

And so, local defence, while important, has to be supplemented by this other concept of retaliation. And yet, if we relied too much on that and depreciated the importance of local defence, that would be interpreted in many countries as meaning that some countries were expendable. And I doubt if we could maintain a coalition, even NATO, very long, on that basis. Inevitably there would be a retreat to isolation. There would be a move towards what sometimes is called continental security, both in North America and--and this is sometimes forgotten--in Europe itself.

But security of this variety, continental security, is a delusion, because, and I think the House will agree with me, there can be no continental security without collective security. And there can be no collective security without collective arrangements for collective action. And no such action can be effective without close and continuous collective consultation. There are then, as I see it, two deterrents against war, and we must be clear about them both. Certainly I believe we are clearer now about the importance, the significance, and indeed even the limitations of the deterrent of massive retaliation than we were a few weeks ago.

There has been a good deal of talk in the last week or two here, in the United States and across the seas, about this new defence strategy, or new defence concept, that is sometimes referred to as the "New Look". It was also referred to by the Vice-President of the United States in his broadcast a couple of weeks ago as a "new course". On the other hand, it was described by President Eisenhower, in his press conference last week, as "no new doctrine at all."

Whether it is new or old it is extremely important. In the words of Mr. Dulles, it means "local defence reinforced by mobile deterrent power". It means refusal to be tied to any rigid strategy, to any fixed planning, and it gives the nations of the coalition, it is hoped, more freedom of manoeuvre.

This old, or new doctrine, whatever you wish to call it, was dealt with in considerable detail by the United States Secretary of State in his speech in New York on January 12. He confirmed his views on this strategy at his press conference on March 17 in Washington when he said, and I quote from his remarks as reported in the New York Times:

"I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the greatest deterrent, and that when you are faced with that kind of potential enemy, or with the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe, that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war."

So far as I am concerned I do not criticize the view that this kind of strategy is a valuable deterrent against aggression, and a shield for defence. In my speech in Washington last week I went out of my way to say that I did not criticize it as such because it might very well be the best deterrent against war at the present time. What I thought was important, however, was to clarify some of the ambiguities of this new strategy, and to make it as clear as possible to us all where we stood as friends and allies in relation to it.

Within the last few weeks some very important and reassuring clarifications have been made in Washington of what seemed to some of us to be obscurities. I believe that has been a good result. I know that personally I feel better after having heard some of these statements.

The sentence on which I concentrated my attention in Mr. Dulles' January speech, and it is a sentence which has become pretty well known by now, is as follows. I am quoting from Mr. Dulles' speech made in New York on January 12:

"...before military planning can be changed the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions."

then he went on:

"This has been done. The basic decision was

to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."

Some weeks afterwards the Vice-President of the United States spoke over the air on March 14 and said more or less the same thing. I quote:

"Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose."

From Mr. Dulles' speech, from which I have already quoted, I picked three words which I consider as being of special importance. These words were "instantly" . . . "means" . . . "our choosing". When I spoke to Mr. Dulles in Washington last week about his speech he said that he did not quarrel with my selection of words, as they were indeed key words. But he was of the opinion that I had excluded that most important word. That word was "capacity". Dealing with that point on March 17 at his press conference Mr. Dulles said:

"If you will read my address of January, 12, you will see what I advocated there was a "capacity" to retaliate instantly. In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly under conditions that call for that. The essential thing is to have the capacity to retaliate instantly."

I certainly accept the importance of that word, but I would suggest that the word "capacity" means not only military capacity but political capacity and that, as Mr. Dulles pointed out so clearly in his article on Foreign Affairs, includes the necessity of co-operation with other countries, especially in such things as the use of bases.

Mr. Dulles has pointed out, as did President Eisenhower in his address to the United Nations, and this has also been emphasized by the Canadian delegation to the United Nations Assembly, that this aspect of the question, namely collective capacity and facilities, is in fact a safeguard against rash or provocative action, if such safeguard were needed, on the part of any member of the coalition. For action could only be taken by a joint or collective agreement.

There is a second word to which I devoted some attention in my Washington speech, and that was the word "instantly". That word, in connection with the strategy we are discussing, involves no problem, as I see it, if there is a direct attack on your own territory, or indeed possibly on the territory of your neighbour, because then it becomes a question of self-preservation and quick, effective, and instant action is essential and would be taken by any country attacked. No one, I believe, would take exception to that.

But the situation is not always so clear as that, and not always so urgent. Sometimes we have cases of unclear

or indirect aggression where the circumstances may be blurred and decisions cannot be so easily and quickly made. In that kind of situation a question at once arises as to the application of this doctrine. Against whom will the retaliation be made? Where, how, and when? The difficulty of course in getting out of that situation is that you cannot find any cut and dried formula to cover all these cases, and if you did have one you would not want to give it away by unnecessary publicity. Yet, having regard to that difficulty, there is the other difficulty, because this kind of blurred situation is exactly when co-operation and consultation with your friends is most essential and when it is of vital importance to act together as much as we can and plan as far in advance as possible.

Then there is the phrase "by means". That has been interpreted in certain quarters, and understandably so, to give some weight to the fear that the application of this kind of strategy might involuntarily convert small wars into a world war. The Secretary of State of the United States has been trying to clear up that misapprehension in recent days by emphasizing that "means" do not include any single means, let alone atomic means, that the means would have to be adapted to the circumstances and that there would be many occasions--indeed probably most occasions, even of aggression--when it would be unwise politically and strategically to use atomic means at all. Then there is this final word "our choice". Of course there were some worries about the interpretation of that word "our". Those who worried felt that they had some cause to do so because of the ambiguity of the language that was used and because it was felt--I think rightly--that if collective security is to work, the word "our" in that context must mean the free world coalition. Mr. Dulles, in his Foreign Affairs article to which I have already referred, agreed with this interpretation when he wrote:

"The main reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at a place of its own choice."

On March 19 this interpretation was made even clearer when Mr. Dulles appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was asked this question by Senator Smith of New Jersey:

"As a result of your January 12 speech, that is when you first spoke of this capacity to retaliate, there have been fears expressed that the United States would not consult our allies in the event of an attack...These fears are based on the words in your speech "by means and at places of our choosing". Now I interpreted that when I read it to mean that you were referring to our choosing rather than to the enemies choosing. You would not say our choosing exclusive of our allies? I am correct in my interpretation? "

Mr. Dulles replied in words which were very clear and to the point:

"You are absolutely correct, Senator Smith. The emphasis upon "our" was in terms of the free world or whatever portion of it is operating in counter-distinction to the Soviet world. I was pointing out that if we only respond at places and by means of their choosing then we do not exercise a maximum deterrent power, and that the differences between "their" and "our" was in terms of the free world and its potential enemy."

I think the effect of this exchange of views, this conference, these statements and these clarifications has been that we now have a fairly clear and reassuring idea of what this new strategy and this new planning for defence is. One thing this interpretation does make clear is that diplomacy and consultation, which is part of diplomacy, is under this doctrine not less important but more important than ever before. Any decisions must surely be collective, whenever that can be done, before action has to be taken.

The New York Times in an editorial on March 20, commenting on this aspect of the question concluded as follows:

"In discussing bipartisan foreign policy here at home-- "

This is in the United States.

"--the idea of "being let in on the take-off and not the crash landing" is often mentioned. That goes for our allies, and it ought to apply with special emphasis to Canada. "

I am sure hon. members will agree with me when I say that we want to be let in at the take-off so that we can do our part to help avoid a crash landing. I think this is especially true in the relations between Canada and the United States where consultation and co-operation is very essential not only in respect of security matters but also in respect of economic matters and every other matter.

We had a very good illustration last week in Washington of the importance and the value of consultation on economic matters when we met in Washington at the first session of the Canada-United States committee on economic affairs.

We in this country have already built up with our friends in the free world valuable habits of consultation and co-operation. We know now that our fundamental interests are identical. There is, of course, a long way still to go. We must, for instance, increasingly apply the realization of interdependence to our economic policies as well as to our defence policies. In respect of consultation for defence, defence planning and all that kind of thing, I suggest that we should try to use the North Atlantic Council more than we have in the past. We have a Permanent Council in session in Paris. It is meeting every few days and I think this council should be an effective vehicle for consultation in this field. Next month, on April 23, we are going to have a ministerial meeting of the North

Atlantic Council. The only subject on the agenda of that meeting is exchange of views on the international situation between the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic countries, all of whom will be there and all of whom will be discussing the subject that I am discussing now. That is the kind of subject that should, I think, be discussed at the North Atlantic Council not only at occasional meetings of ministers but continually through the permanent representatives so that in that agency of consultation we can clear our views on defence and foreign policy.

We must also constantly seek not only to preserve but to widen and develop still further our attitudes and habits of confidence, frank discussion and consultation, restraint and tolerance. Notwithstanding the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which I have just emphasized. This must be done on a scale which is not limited to the North Atlantic alliance but which is as broad as the globe. Indeed, our co-operation, our friendships must extend beyond our western civilization. Improving the economic and social conditions under which the major part of humanity lives will not ensure peace but it will make peace more likely. More important possibly than even economic aid is the opportunity for understanding and for genuine friendliness between the peoples of Asia in their hundreds of millions and those of the western world. These Asians will form their impressions of our civilization and values above all by what they learn and sense of our real attitudes. That is only one reason, I think, why all members of the House have been so happy over the magnificent results of the journey of our Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) into that part of the world.

I would go even further and say that our sense of understanding must even extend to the very people whom we think threaten our peace. We cannot be soft-headed about this matter for power in the hands of irresponsible rulers could be dangerous to our peace. But while we need not be soft-headed, we should certainly be clear-headed, I agree that we must be careful and alert. But also we must not let fear freeze our diplomacy into immobility or fire it into panic action. The purpose of Canadian policy--and I do not think there is any division of opinion in this country about this--is not merely to build up military collective strength, important as that is. Our purpose is to work together with our friends in solving our own problems and also, if possible, to negotiate with those whom we fear, in solving those other problems which now divide the world. Canada is anxious to pay its part also in this form of collective security, anxious to play its part in seeking, by negotiation, international solutions to differences, to seek them by negotiation from the strength, which we are now collecting, and with strength but also with wisdom, with a full realization of the calamitous result of failure, and in the hope that one day security will rest upon a stronger basis even than the certainty of massive retaliation, atomic retaliation if you like, against anyone who would break the peace; retaliation which would certainly annihilate the enemy but might also destroy ourselves.