





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

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
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THE  
ADVANTAGES  
OF THE  
Definitive Treaty, &c.

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THE  
ADVANTAGES  
OF THE  
DIFINITIVE TREATY,  
TO THE  
PEOPLE  
OF  
GREAT-BRITAIN,  
DEMONSTRATED.

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LONDON:

Printed for W. WEBB, Junior, near *Temple-  
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THE  
ADVANTAGES

Arising from the  
DEFINITIVE TREATY, &c.

**I**T is an old Observation, that we have generally lost by our Heads what we acquired by our Sword, the Truth of which I apprehend is founded on this Principle, that the like Causes will ever produce the like Effects. Good and great Ministers have seldom made their Appearance on the public Stage in Comparison of weak and evil ones; but whenever the Nation has been so happy as to have the Reins of Government committed to such Mens Care, we find throughout the *English* History that whether Peace or War happened to be their Province, national Credit has always been greatly advanced in Proportion to the Worth and Abilities of such Men, whereas Peace or War conducted by a weak Administration, never failed of producing a Train of ill  
B Consequences

Consequences to the Public, and Disgrace to themselves. Taking it therefore for granted, that this Remark in general is pretty well founded, I shall proceed to consider how far the Treaty which we have lately concluded is to be measured by this Maxim. And in the *First* Place it would seem necessary to enquire whether the War has been conducted in such a Manner as was most likely to answer the Ends for which it was first undertaken? *viz.* A just Reparation to our Merchants for the Losses which they had sustained by the Depredations of the *Spaniards*, and a proper Security against any Molestation of their Trade for the Time to come; and finally the Support of the Pragmatic Sanction, which was formerly thought to be so necessary for the Preservation of the Balance of Power in Europe. *2dly*, Whether at the time of making this fatal Treaty, we were under an absolute Necessity of submitting to such disadvantageous Terms? If not, whether the Declaration of War made by *France* against this Country, did not afford a much more cogent Reason for the Continuation of the War than any of the preceding Motives, great as they are, could form for the Commencement of it? As to the Management of the War, I shall refer the Reader to the Author of the *Examination of the Principles of the two B \* \* rs*, in which Pamphlet are produced so many strong Instances

stances (which, I may say, almost carry Conviction along with them) of their secret Attempts, from time to time, to undermine the true Interest of this Country, by endeavouring to render the War unprosperous, that if one half of what is there alledged can be proved, I will venture to affirm that their warmest Advocates will not pretend to deny but that any Moderation of Punishment for such Crimes would be an Injustice to the Public: I can't however omit taking Notice of one or two Facts which seem to have slipp'd that Author, as they will help to corroborate and confirm what he has endeavoured to establish. Be it then remembered, that at the time *Saxony* was invaded by *Prussia*, we were in actual Alliance with the Elector of that Country, and had been obliged to him for a considerable Body of his Forces; and further, had entered into a Treaty with him in one Article, of which we solemnly promised and engaged ourselves to support and assist him with our whole Force, in case he should be attacked in his Dominions by any foreign Power, &c. Under these Circumstances, who would believe that we should have been the very People who betray'd him? who would have thought that we should have been capable of interceding with *Russia* not to send any Succours to his Assistance, which but a little before she had declared her Intentions of doing in  
the

the strongest Terms ? If it should be asked, what could induce us to enter into this treacherous Measure, when 'tis evident that there was not the least Prospect of Advantage to be hoped for on one side, or the least Pretence of Provocation on the other, I can only answer that the Fact is so: let others judge how far it is a Proof of a premeditated Resolution of the Ministry to sacrifice the War. The Time has been when the bare Word of *Great Britain* would have been sooner rely'd on by any foreign Potentate than the most solemn Treaty of some other Princes; but what will the World think of us after having been guilty of such Perfidy? Will not *British* Faith be more infamous than ever Punic Faith was? Will any thing we can say or do after this, wipe out that foul Stain which such underhand Dealing must of course leave on national Credit? But as this may possibly become the Subject of Enquiry in another Place, I will leave it to those to consider whose Duty it is to examine more particularly into this ever-memorable Transaction. And now not to say any thing of *Martinico* or *Belle-Isle*, both which Places I am assured might have been easily taken, if we had been in earnest; and if taken would have greatly distressed the Enemy: What can be urged in excuse of the Ministry's not supporting the People of *New England* in the Reduction of *Canada*, which they had projected?

projected? The *Indian Nations* we know were at that time ready to have declared for us; and such mighty Preparations were actually made by the People of *New England* for this Purpose, that had the Attempt been made by Land with ever so little Assistance of Ours, 'tis morally impossible that it could failed of Success. What Infatuation then possess'd us as not to furnish a few Troops and a little Money on such an Occasion? Was it deem'd to have been a wild and an extravagant Project? or was it not worth our Attention? Again, why did we postpone, or rather refuse to reimburse those brave People the Expence which they had actually made in the Reduction of a Place attended with much more Difficulty then probably the Conquest of *Canada* would have been; a Place too of the last Importance to *Great-Britain* and themselves, 'till such Time as the Preliminaries were sign'd? 'Tis to be hoped we were not afraid that if they had received their Money they would have been hardy enough to have made an Attempt on *Canada* without us. In short, if this War had been honestly conducted, if it had been frugally managed, if every Measure had been taken to strengthen the Confederacy, and to obtain the Ends expected from it by this Country, tho' we had been unsuccessful, it would have been some Consolation to our Misfortunes; but when to a bad  
Head

Head a bad Heart has been added, when 'tis plain that this Country has been treacherously dealt with, and its true Interest has been sacrificed either to foreign or to private Views, when 'tis evident that whilst the Queen of *Hungary* has been supported at the Expence of this Country, almost, I may say, to the Ruin of this Country, both she and our Allies have been betray'd by the Councils of this Country. Is it not matter of Astonishment to think that the Authors of such Misfortunes should not only not be call'd to account, but be allow'd, as it were, to triumph over their Country, and to continue peaceably in the Enjoyment of Places of the highest Trust, Honour and Emolument in the Kingdom. If to hold Correspondence with his *Majesty's* Enemies is deem'd to be Treason, of how much higher Nature is that Offence where a Person being entrusted with the Management of public Affairs, during a Time of War, knowingly endeavours to render ineffectual every Measure whereby we could hope to make the War prosperous? In what Light can such a Person be look'd upon by his Countrymen, other then as an Accomplice of the Enemies? Had it happen'd in a neighbouring Country that there had been the tythe Part of the same Proof against any Men there, as has been made out against some amongst us here attempting to counteract the best-concerted  
Plans

Plans which could possibly have been form'd to bring the Enemy to Reason, in order to establish little narrow self-interested Schemes of their own at home, would they have escaped being dewitted? I will venture to answer, *No*. Those People have too much Spirit to suffer themselves to be so abused. But for our Parts we seem to be so entirely regardless whether Things are well or ill managed, that one would think the People of *England* did not so much as dream of their most essential Rights and Priviledges being to be settled by this Treaty. To what this general Despondency is owing, whether it is to be imputed to the Spirit of the People being broke by long Oppression, or to the dire Effects of Corruption, which seems to have prevailed over all Ranks and Degrees of Men, I am at a Loss to ascertain. If to the first only it is owing, we are to remember that the Republic ought never to be despaired of: As long as we have any Strength left, we are bound to exert it in Favour of the Common Wealth. There is no Excuse for not doing our Duty in this Respect. 'Tis no Argument to say, that it avails not for a Handfull of Men to struggle against a Multitude: Nor can it be pleaded by any but by Men of unsound Principles; for was this to be admitted as an Excuse for any Man's not acting with Vigour and Spirit, how many might remain unactive under the false Pretence

Pretence of Despondency in others, when perhaps the true Cause of their own might proceed from private Considerations, which probably are not the more honourable for being kept secret. If to the last it is owing, I would recommend it to those whom it concerns, to consider what a rotten Support they trust to, who rely on Men of such narrow Principles, professing only their own Interest. As Reward indeed is their great Object, perhaps you'll say 'tis indifferent to them from what Hand it comes; but such is the Nature of all these Mercenaries, that as soon as they find their Master a little pressed, they are the first to desert him; of which we have had many Instances; and to the same unhappy Turns of Fortune must those Ministers expect to be ever liable who presume to govern by Corruption alone, without having real Abilities to carry on the public Service. But to return to the Matter in hand, with regard to the three great Ends for which this War was first undertaken, and which I promised to consider, *viz.* A just Satisfaction to our Merchants for the Losses which they had sustained by the Depredations of the *Spaniards*, and a proper Security for their Trade for the future; and finally the Support of the Pragmatic Sanction; every one of which Articles ought to have been *a sine qua non*. I should be glad to know if any one of them has been insisted upon  
in



in making this Treaty. On the contrary, is not signing a Peace in which there is no Provision made for the future Security of our Trade, especially as the very Reasons of declaring War were that we found *Spain* did but trifle with us on the Subject of our Demands in all our previous Negotiations: is not then I say the Reference of a Thing of this Nature to subsequent Negotiations, after having had so much Experience of the Crown of *Spain's* Non-Intention of ever settling this Matter, in Effect giving up the future Rights and Privileges of our Merchants to a free and uninterrupted Trade: for can it be thought that we shall enter into a new War if these Rights shall not be admitted, when upon the Conclusion of an old War begun for this very End they have never been insisted upon. As to the 95000 *l.* acknowledged to be due to our Merchants, perhaps it has been looked upon by our Ministry as an Object of no great Consideration to a Set of People in those flourishing Circumstances, that any Body of Merchants of this Country must needs be in at present but such a Sum to an Elector of *Hanover* considered as Elector of *Han—r* was undoubtedly a great Object; it is no Wonder therefore if our Merchants Claim was passed over in Silence; at the same Time that an old Debt amounting to near the same Sum as our Merchants Debt was, is stipulated for the

C

Elector

Electors of *Han—r.* With Respect to the Pragmatic Sanction, by which the hereditary Dominions of the House of *Austria* were to have been preserved intire to the Queen of *Hung-ry* to talk of Guarantying them to her after having carved out of 'em for the Friends of *France* in the Manner we have consented to, and obliging the Emperess to cede *Silesia, Glatz, Parma, Placentia, Guastalla, &c.* is such an Affront to common Sense, that one would think the Word Guarantee had been inserted in the Treaty with no other View but to mock and insult that unfortunate Princess. If it should be urged that the absolute Cession of *Parma, Placentia, &c.* is only an eventual thing, those Places being to be restored upon the Succession of Don *Philip*, either to the Crown of *Sicily*, or to the Crown of *Spain*, give me leave to ask if one or the other of these Cases should ever happen, which of the contracting Parties is to put this Part of the Treaty in force. If the Crown of *Sicily* should devolve on Don *Philip*, will not *Spain* be likely to interest herself in a Brother's Cause? On the other hand, if Don *Philip* should succeed to the Crown of *Spain*, will that Circumstance render this Article of the Treaty more feasible? Will *France* care to disoblige *Spain* at such a Juncture? Will the King of *Sardinia* care to disoblige either? Shall we care to enter into a new War alone,

in order to restore to the Queen of *Hun-y* to these her undoubted Rights? Lastly, if any of the contracting Parties were so unwise as to intermeddle in this Affair, is it not laying the Foundation of future Broils and Quarrels? As to *France* and the rest of the Powers having guaranteed it, have we not had Experience enough to learn that the Words of Princes are no further to be rely'd on than the Performance of them concerns their immediate Interests? I come now to consider whether at the Time of making this fatal Treaty we were under a Necessity of accepting Peace upon any Terms. And to say that we were not in a Condition of continuing the War another Year, when the Money was actually raised, and the Expence must have been near as great to us, whether the War was continued or not; for our Allies were to be paid, and our own Troops maintained abroad is such an Absurdity, that I can hardly refrain laughter when I find People would impose such a Thought on Mankind. But suppose even at the End of another Campaign had the War been carried on, every thing had not been completed to our Wishes, and that it had been necessary for us to have still continued the War, it is likely that when so many Millions were raised the last Year at four and a half *per Cent.* only that Money could not be found, even at a higher Rate, whatever Occasion we

might have had for it : Was it impossible by means of OEconomy at home to have found out proper Friends for this Purpose without oppressing Trade or imposing any heavier Burthen on landed Interest ? Was it impossible by means of OEconomy abroad to have reduced the Expence of the War within a narrower Compass. I who have seen some of the Bills of the present War, and have compared them with the Accounts of the late War, cannot help thinking this very feazible. But as the Money was actually raised for another Year, would not any body have tried the Fate of another Campaign sooner than have submitted on such Terms, when too we had so great a Superiority both by Sea and Land ? If it was true that we had been in that weak Condition as we have been industriously represented, was it not as true that the *French* themselves were reduced to the last Extremity ; and can we doubt but that they would have been glad to have given us as good a Peace at the End of another Campaign as now ; or rather let me ask if it would have been possible for them to have given us a worse ? Shall it then be pleaded, that we were drove into ' these infamous Measures thro' a want of Money, which in the Sinew of War, when 'tis notorious that the Subscriptions last Year were given to People who were known not to be worth a Groat ; at the same Time that money'd

ney'd Men who were willing to have subscribed, were refused, which was a Piece of ministerial Artifice, purposely and wickedly contrived to strike a Damp on public Credit, in order to enduce People to believe that we were under an absolute Necessity of accepting Peace upon any Terms, which God knows was far from being our Case? But to give the utmost Scope to the Argument of Necessity, suppose that we had been so far reduced as to be obliged to have abandon'd the War on the Continent had we no Refuge left, had we not a sufficient Number of Ships not only to have defended our own Coasts, but even to have made ourselves terrible to the Enemy? what had we then to fear? who ever is Master at Sea, said the Great *Pompey*, must be so likewise at Land; and it is a Maxim everlastingly true; for what is any Country without Trade? can she send forth and maintain great Armies? can she fortify herself? can she obtain necessary Intelligence? can she procure herself Allies? can she pretend to any thing more than to remain upon the Defensive? will any one then tell me that it is not in the Power of a Country, having a superior Fleet, to extinguish if she pleases, and put an entire stop to the Trade of any other Country, not having a sufficient Marine to protect and defend her Trade? But Sea Affairs we never attended to; on the contrary, our Ignorance and Neglect on this Occasion

Occasion have been so great, that tho during the War with *France*, we have had a greater Fleet than ever *Europe* saw before ; we never once knew how to use it, or to make a right and a proper Disposition of it : If we had I will venture to affirm, that instead of capturing about an 8th of the Enemies Trade, as we have done we might as easily have destroyed and put a Stop to 8 Parts in ten of her Trade. 'Tis further to be considered that the whole Expence of a Naval Force centers in ourselves, so that such a War we might have continued to Eternity, without impoverishing our Country. But possibly it might be said, could you with any Honour have deserted your Allies, to this I think it might be answer'd, that as to the Queen of *Hun--y*, if you had delivered her up bound into the Hands of her Enemies, they could never have thought of exacting harder Conditions from her than what we have obliged her to accept. And as to the States General, I have no doubt but that they might at any Time, have obtained a Neutrality for themselves, if not two of their Provinces of the greatest Consequence ; and indeed, the only Provinces of Consequence, *viz.* *Holland* and *Zealand* are so strong by Nature, that they are capable of defending themselves against the whole World , as a Proof of this we may remember that when Lewis the XIVth had almost over-run the Low Countries with his Victorious Army, the Spirit of the People at that  
Time

Time was such that they cut down their Dykes, and it was with the greatest Difficulty that that brave Army was saved from perishing. If the same Spirit is wanting in those People, now are we therefore obliged to trundle to *France* and to accept of a Peace which cannot fail of bringing irretrievable Ruin on our Country. But suppose *France* was Master of *Holland*, &c. the Time has been, when we have beat their united Fleets, at a Time too when their Fleets were much more formidable than what they are at present, and I dont question but if proper Encouragement was given to our Sailors, the same Thing might be effected again. But is another Reason why we ought not to there have been afraid of opposing *France* upon this Account, and that is, we may be assured that the States would never flourish under an absolute Monarchy as they do under a free Government. 'Tis the Liberty which they enjoy at present, which is the Soul of their Industry and Trade; take away their Liberty, and that Country, which now wears such a prosperous Face, will immediately moulder away, and revert to its Original, an uninhabited Bog. this I think is so full an Answer to those, who would willingly intimidate us with the Danger of *Holland* falling into the Hands of *France*, that I need not give myself the Trouble of shewing from the Probability, there is of *France* becoming a great maritime Power, that *Holland* is just

as likely to be subject to *French* Influence and Direction now the Peace is concluded, as she would have been, had not the Peace been made. If then we were not under an absolute Necessity of making Peace, let us in the next Place consider if it would not have been greatly for our Interest to have continued the War against *France*. In order to bring this Matter to a fair Decision, it will be necessary to take a short Retrospect of our commercial Affairs before the Commencement of the War. It is to be observed then that *France* was grown so formidable a Rival to us in Trade, that had she been suffered to carry on her Trade much longer, unmolested, she probably would, in a few Years more, have totally ruined ours, by underselling us at Foreign Markets. As it was, she had in a Manner beat us out of our *Levant* Trade, our Fishing Trade, and our Sugar Trade: For tho' it has been said that our Colonies vend now near as much Sugar as they did formerly; which nevertheless I cannot admit to be a Fact, yet as that Circumstance, if true, arises from the Use of Sugar becoming more general than it was formerly, it is so far from being a negative to what I have alledged in regard to the Diminution of the Sugar Trade, that it is in some Measure a Confirmation of it. For our Trade ought to have encreased in proportion, and necessarily must have



have done so, had not the Markets abroad been supplied with *French* Commodities. But it is not these three great Articles only of Trade that are to be considered in this Question, but many other Branches of Trade, which absolutely depend upon them. And that this perhaps would not have been deemed a warrantable Cause, agreeable to the Law of Nations, for declaring War against *France*, yet, as *France* had declared War against us, it was so strong a Reason in the Breast of every honest *Englishman* for continuing the War, which *France* had begun, that I believe there was not a Man but who thought it a lucky Incident, *France* having declared War against us, and was in Hopes War being declared, that we should have carried it on by Sea at least, 'till we had so effectually reduced the Enemy, that it would never have been in her Power again to have interfered with our Trade. What Encouragement there was to hope, that this might have been done, one may easily judge by what has been already effected by our Fleet. Their *Lewant* Trade, which they had gained from us, we totally destroyed: Their Fishing Trade suffered no less, and their Sugar Trade was greatly upon the Decline. Had we pursued our Blow, had we not allowed them a breathing Time, what might we not have done? *Canada* was at our Mercy. All the *French* Settlements, both in the *East* and *West-*

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*Indies*, were at our Mercy: Her whole Trade was at our Mercy: *France* must have submitted on any Terms. But this golden Opportunity is now lost. Let us then consider what are likely to be the Consequences of making this over-hasty and precipitate Peace. Acquainted as *France* now is with the Nature of Trade, having more-over settled and established Correspondences abroad, besides having mastered all other Difficulties attending Trade in its infant State, how long do we imagine it will be e'er she recovers her pristine Vigour? Will she not in all human Probability be soon in a better Condition than ever to give Law to *Europe*? and shall we not be in a worse to oppose her Designs? what then have we not to apprehend from this insecure Treaty? especially if we consider how close a Connection there ever must be between our Naval Power and our Commercial Interests. *France* has in a great Measure already gained her Point on the Continent; all she wants at present is to be able to dispute with us, our Prerogative on the Ocean; and if ever she should be in a Condition of doing it, there is an End to our Trade and of All that is valuable and dear to us. For we may be assured she will not remain inactive, as we have foolishly done, and I heartily wish we may never have cause to lament when it is too late, the fatal Consequences of our pusil-

pusillanimous Conduct, and inexcusable Neglect. It remains that I take notice of a few Particulars contained in the Treaty, which I shall be as brief in doing as possible, As to the Treaty, it consists chiefly of two Parts, *viz.* The Cessions which are to be made by the Queen of *Hun---*y, *Great Britain* and her Allies to the *French*, and the Allies of *France* on one Part: And the Cessions which are to be made by *France* to the Queen of *Hun---*y and her Allies on the other Part. But if we compare what is to be given up on one side, with what is to be given up on the other, we shall find the Advantages accruing to the King of *France* and his Allies by this Treaty are so much greater and more valuable than what the Queen of *Hun---*y and the *Dutch* are to receive (for as to *Great Britain* I don't find she gets any thing, unless it be the Remnant of the *Assiento* Contract, which is not worth our Merchants Acceptance) that the one hardly deserves naming in comparison of the other. For instance, the Countries which are to be given up by the Queen of *Hun---*y to the Friends of *France*, are some of the finest and richest Parts of her Dominions; whereas what is to be restored to her is a Country from which she never received a Shilling before the War, and is now reduced to that miserable State from the Calamities of the War, which she has felt the Brunt of most; that in all Probability it

will not be able to recover itself in another Age : And yet even this mighty Power is no to be bestowed till the poor Empress Queen has made not only ample Satisfaction to the *Genoese*, but to the Duke of *Modena* with Respect to his Claims in *Hungary* and *Bohemia*. In the mean time the Advantages which are likely to accrue to *France* from this Article of the Treaty in point of Trade, are too striking to escape notice ; for as *Don Philip* owes his present Establishment to the Power of *France*, she may justly expect to have shewn her in Return all the Favour and Preference that can be shewn her in point of Trade for the future, either with *Spain* or any Part of *Italy* appertaining to the House of *Spain*. As to putting the *Dutch* in Possession of *Bergen-op-Zoom*, and *Maes-tricht* (ever famous for our Ministers not knowing that it belonged to the *Dutch*) and of all that they possessed before the present War, in *Dutch Flanders*, *Brabant*, &c. I acknowledge it may be of some Consequence to themselves, but will it effectually answer the Ends of *Great Britain*? As the outward Barrier of the States is destroyed: As the Way is now open for the *French* to approach even to their very Doors, will not *French* Influence have almost as much Weight with them as if the *French* had kept Possession of these Towns? If it should be urged that these Places, which are now demolished, may in  
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time be refortified, consider how likely it is when probably the Expence of it would amount to more then the whole Country about them is at present worth. But if the Charge was less, who would undertake it? Can the Queen of *Hun--y* afford it; or would the Inhabitants of the respective Towns, who don't know To-day who may be their Masters To-morrow, put themselves to that Expence? Finally, if it was to be attempted, would the *French* suffer it? As to minuter Articles, such as the 15th of the Treaty, whereby any Country taken Possession of and fortified by *France* before the War, or any Fortifications or Stages erected, if any such there are on *Newfoundland*, contrary to the Tenor of former Treaties are ratified, confirmed and allowed of, I shall pass them over, tho' doubtless they are and might be of infinite Consequence, otherwise the *French* would not have thought it worth their while to have taken Possession of, and fortified the one, nor would the other have been so strongly provided against in former Treaties. But as to the Cession of the Royal Isle, commonly called *Cape Breton*, I cannot so easily pass that over without offering some Reasons why I think we ought never to have parted with that Place, The only thing I think *Great-Britain* has to apprehend of *France* is her becoming a maritime Power, which, as it is never to be effected by any other

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Means but by a great and flourishing Trade, whilst we were Masters of *Cape Breton* we had no Reason to fear; for Possession of this Place, would not only have deprived them of their fishing Trade, but commanded their Trade to *Canada*; and here I cannot forbear lamenting the glorious Opportunity which we have miss'd by not making ourselves Masters of this Country. Good God! what an immense Profit would it have been to us to have supply'd all *North America* with *British* Manufactures, and in return to have received their rich Furs? Such a Trade would have made us a rich People for Ages to come, and would have enabled us to have freed ourselves from all our immediate Hardships. There is not a Man, except the *Hudson's-Bay* Company, or one who has Money there, who would not have partaken of the Advantages of such an Enterprize; but, for aught I know, it might have been worth any one of that Company's While to have b——d a M——r to confound such a Project. Another Consideration which ought to have induced us to have kept this Place, is it's being so good a Nursery for Seamen, especially as we have discover'd there a rich Coal Mine, which in all Probability will, in a few Years, employ 1500 Sail of Merchant Ships. Again, the Profits which would have arisen to us from an Encrease of our fishing Trade, *Cape Breton*

*Breton* being in our Hands, is an Object not unworthy our Attention. Let me add that this Place, in an Enemy's Hands, during a Time of War, is capable of giving much Annoyance to our Colonies; in our Hands, it would have been a Place of Protection to our own, and a Place of Annoyance to theirs. In short, *Cape-Breton* is of that Consequence, that it is of more Value than all the *Netherlands*, and all the Conquests *France* has made since the Commencement of the War, and is so much the more inestimable, as it could not have been retaken; whereas, retaking the *Netherlands* is little more than the Work of a Summer's Campaign. If then, *France* should not think fit to keep her Faith with us, (and who would trust to *French* Faith?) what a ridiculous Figure shall we make! But before I quit this Subject of *Cape-Breton*, I should not do Justice to the two B——rs if I was not to inform the Public (and to the Honour of their great Wisdom be it remember'd) that we have laid out 60,000 *l.* upon the Fortifications of the Place in order to render it impregnable for the future; tho' 'tis evident that they never intended keeping it; nay, it has been reported, which I must own I can scarce credit, that the Works have been carry'd on by the People there since they received Advice of the Signature of the Preliminaries. The last Thing I shall give myself the Trouble

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ble to observe upon (tho' there are nume-  
 less Things besides in the Treaty (worthy of  
 Animadversion) is the Article of Condition, to  
 our sending Hostages, which is such a great  
 such an object, such a reproachful Condition,  
 carrying with it a Mark of such slavish Prin-  
 ciples, that it cannot fail exciting in the  
 Breast of every *Englishman*, who has any  
 Sense of feeling for the Honour and Reputa-  
 tion of his Country, the highest Indigna-  
 tion and Resentment to those who have  
 wickedly brought this indelible Disgrace  
 on the Lustre and Dignity of *Great-Britain*.  
 To conclude; such being the Case, and such  
 the Conditions of this Peace, let the World  
 judge how much Reason we have to put our-  
 selves to that idle Expence of rejoicing as if  
 we had been Conquerors.

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N. B. *The English Merchants (besides the 95000 l.  
 to which their Claim of 400,000 l. had been re-  
 duced and acknowledged by Spain) had a just  
 and an exclusive Demand on the Crown of Spain,  
 amounting to upwards of 700,000 l. on account  
 of Seizures of their Effects, which renders their  
 Case so much harder in regard to the Non-pay-  
 ment of the 95,000 l. the same having been ad-  
 justed and acknowledged by Spain; but it seems  
 neither the one nor the other has been taken No-  
 tice of in this no less disadvantageous then dis-  
 honourable Treaty.*



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**L E T T E R**

TO A

**Member of Parliament :**

IN RELATION to

**The *Bill* for punishing MUTINY  
and DESERTION, &c.**

( Price SIX-PENCE. )

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