





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

© 1985

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages detached/
Pages détachées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Showthrough/
Transparence |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents | <input type="checkbox"/> Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion
along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la
distorsion le long de la marge intérieure | <input type="checkbox"/> Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blank leaves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées
lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont
pas été filmées. | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata
slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to
ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partiellement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,
etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à
obtenir la meilleure image possible. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Additional comments:
Commentaires supplémentaires: | |

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	14X	18X	22X	26X	30X
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12X	16X	20X	24X	28X	32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



Douglas Library
Queen's University

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

aire
détails
ues du
modifier
ger une
filmage

ées

re

y errata
d to
nt
e pelure.
con à



32X

Memorandum

CO

WA

LPF 50
101
A 7

ADDRESS

Members of the House of Representatives

OF THE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

TO THEIR

CONSTITUENTS,

ON THE SUBJECT

OF THE

WAR WITH GREAT-BRITAIN.

HARTFORD,

RE-PRINTED BY HUDSON AND GOODWIN,
1842.

LPF 5012
1002
A7

1207385

The und

A REPU
to govern t
is the respon
dom and pu
forms of g
speech in re
people. Ev
proximation
takes to itse
it, altogether
the important
people may
is but short

Reflection
undersigned
States, by th
witnessed a p
a novel appli
majority to a
circumstanc
tion, the right
depend upon

Principles
tive liberty; s
counts, weigh
address. A
them to the p

The mom
this topic, so
face of the w
to your repre
this most int
stances of the
unless it be f
public opinio

Except the
now before
That messag
reason for w
notorious. T
long since op
tentatively a
for successful
security of ou

ADDRESS.

*The undersigned Members of the House of Representatives, to
their respective Constituents.*

A REPUBLIC has for its basis the capacity and right of the people to govern themselves. A main principle of a representative republic is the responsibility of the representatives to their constituents. Freedom and publicity of debate are essential to the preservation of such forms of government. Every arbitrary abridgment of the right of speech in representatives, is a direct infringement of the liberty of the people. Every unnecessary concealment of their proceedings, an approximation towards tyranny. When, by systematic rules, a majority takes to itself the right, at its pleasure, of limiting speech, or denying it, altogether; when secret sessions multiply; and in proportion to the importance of questions, is the studious concealment of debate, a people may be assured, that, such practices continuing, their freedom is but short lived.

Reflections, such as these, have been forced upon the attention of the undersigned, Members of the House of Representatives, of the United States, by the events of the present session of Congress. They have witnessed a principle, adopted as the law of the House, by which, under a novel application of the previous question, a power is assumed by the majority to deny the privilege of speech, at any stage, and under any circumstances of debate. And recently, by an unprecedented assumption, the right to give reasons for an original motion, has been made to depend upon the will of the majority.

Principles more hostile than those to the existence of representative liberty, cannot easily be conceived. It is not, however on these accounts, weighty as they are, that the undersigned have undertaken this address. A subject of higher and more immediate importance impels them to the present duty.

The momentous question of war, with Great-Britain, is decided. On this topic, so vital to your interests, the right of public debate, in the face of the world and especially of their constituents, has been denied to your representatives. They have been called into secret session, on this most interesting of all your public relations, although the circumstances of the time and of the nation, afforded no one reason for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension of the effect of public debate, on public opinion; or of public opinion on the result of the vote.

Except the message of the President of the United States, which is now before the public, nothing confidential was communicated. That message contained no fact not previously known. No one reason for war was intimated, but such as was of a nature public and notorious. The intention to wage war and invade Canada, had been long since openly avowed. The object of hostile menace had been ostentatiously announced. The inadequacy of both our army and navy, for successful invasion, and the insufficiency of the fortifications for the security of our seaboard were, every where, known. Yet the doors of

Congress were shut upon the people. They have been carefully kept in ignorance of the progress of measures, until the purposes of administration were consummated, and the fate of the country sealed. In a situation so extraordinary the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no act of theirs to sanction a proceeding, so novel and arbitrary. On the contrary, they made every attempt, in their power, to attain publicity for their proceedings. All such attempts were vain. When this momentous subject was stated, as for debate; they demanded that the doors should be opened.

This being refused, they declined discussion; being perfectly convinced, from indications, too plain to be misunderstood, that, in the house, all argument, with closed doors, was hopeless; and that any act, giving implied validity to so flagrant an abuse of power, would be little less than treachery to the essential rights of a free people. In the situation, to which the undersigned have thus been reduced, they are compelled reluctantly, to resort to this public declaration of such views of the state and relations of the country, as determined their judgment and vote upon the question of war. A measure of this kind has appeared to the undersigned to be more imperiously demanded, by the circumstance of a message and manifesto being prepared, and circulated at public expence, in which the causes for war were enumerated and the motives for it concentrated, in a manner suited to agitate and influence the public mind. In executing this task, it will be the study of the undersigned to reconcile the great duty, they owe to the people, with that constitutional respect which is due to the administrators of public concerns.

In commencing this view of our affairs, the undersigned would fail in duty themselves, did they refrain from recurring to the course, in relation to public measures, which they adopted and have undeviatingly pursued from the commencement of this long and eventful session; in which they deliberately sacrificed every minor consideration to, what they deemed, the best interests of the country.

For a succession of years the undersigned have from principle disapproved, a series of restrictions upon commerce, according to their estimation, inefficient as respected foreign nations and injurious, chiefly, to ourselves. Success, in the system, had become identified with the pride, the character, and the hope of our cabinet. As is natural with men, who have a great stake depending on the success of a favorite theory, pertinacity seemed to increase, as its hopelessness became apparent. As the inefficiency of this system could not be admitted, by its advocates, without ensuring its abandonment, ill success was, carefully attributed to the influence of opposition.

To this cause the people were taught to charge its successive failures and not to its intrinsic imbecility. In this state of things the undersigned deemed it proper, to take away all apology for adherence to this oppressive system. They were desirous, at a period so critical in public affairs, as far as was consistent with the independence of opinion, to contribute to the restoration of harmony in the public councils; and concord among the people. And if any advantage could be thus obtained in our foreign relations, the undersigned being engaged, in no purpose of personal or party advancement, would rejoice, in such an occurrence.

The course of public measures also, at the opening of the session, gave hope that an enlarged and enlightened system of defence, with provision, for or security of our maritime rights, was about to be com-

menced, A
ty to foster,
as unobtrac
public duty.
was cause of
by an unpre
by the chief
excite revent
against a port
anted by ev
It has alw
peace was th
tion, and int
the theatre o
thing but a n
as parties int
seems to be
blition. The
convulsed.
Quit our ov
ing our desti
and prosperi
mour or cap
In addition
should deter
war, there w
exture of th
form of gov
powerful and
which are c
into situation
by which the
fall into acti
a form of g
tle and matu
dersigned fr
war, we did
quacy of our
of great wei
It appears
States have t
interests, an
which, in the
which war v
British vesse
imperiously
sea-coast de
they be cons
the part of t
with respect
fect informa
press act of

n carefully kept
oses of adminis-
ealed. In a sit-
it their duty by
arbitrary. On
to attain publi-
in. When this
manded that the
g perfectly con-
od, that, in the
and that any act,
e, would be little
ole. In the situ-
d, they are com-
of such views of
their judgment
his kind has ap-
anded, by the cir-
d, and circulated
enumerated and
agitate and influ-
e the study of the
the people, with
strators of public
signed would fail
to the course, in
ave undeviatingly
entful session ; in
eration to, what
a principle disap-
ding to their esti-
urious, chiefly, to
entified with the
as is natural with
of a favorite the-
as became appar-
mitted, by its ad-
was, carefully at-
uccessive failures
things the under-
adherence to this
so critical in pub-
ness of opinion, to
councils, and con-
d be thus obtained
ed, in no purpose
ch an occurrence.
ng of the session,
of defence, with
about to be com-

menaced. A purpose, which, wherever found, they deemed it their duty to foster, by giving, to any system of measures, thus comprehensive, an unobstructed a course as was consistent with their general sense of public duty. After a course of policy, thus liberal and conciliatory, it was cause of regret that a communication should have been purchased by an unprecedented expenditure of secret service money ; and used, by the chief magistrate, to disseminate suspicion and jealousy ; and to excite resentment among the citizens, by suggesting imputations against a portion of them, as unmerited by their patriotism, as unwarranted by evidence.

It has always been the opinion of the undersigned, that a system of peace was the policy, which most comported with the character, condition, and interest of the United States. That their remoteness from the theatre of contest in Europe, was their peculiar felicity and that nothing but a necessity, absolutely imperious should induce them to enter as parties into wars, in which every consideration of virtue and policy seems to be forgotten, under the overbearing sway of rapacity and ambition. There is a new era in human affairs. The European world is convulsed. The advantages of our own situation are peculiar. Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the tolls of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humour or caprice?"

In addition to the many moral and prudential considerations, which should deter thoughtful men from hastening into the perils of such a war, there were some peculiar to the United States, resulting from the texture of the government, and the political relations of the people. A form of government, in no small degree experimental, composed of powerful and independent sovereignties associated in relations, some of which are critical, as well as novel, should not be hastily precipitated into situations, calculated to put to trial, the strength of the moral bond, by which they are united. Of all states, that of war, is most likely to call into activity the passions, which are hostile and dangerous to such a form of government. Time is yet important to our country, to settle and mature its recent institutions. Above all it appeared to the undersigned from signs not to be mistaken, that if we entered upon this war, we did it as a divided people ; not only from a sense of the inadequacy of our means to success, but from moral and political objections of great weight and very general influence.

It appears to the undersigned, that the wrongs, of which the United States have to complain, although in some aspects, very grievous to our interests, and, in many, humiliating to our pride, were yet of a nature, which, in the present state of the world, either would not justify war, or which war would not remedy. Thus, for instance the hovering of British vessels upon our coasts, and the occasional insults to our ports, imperiously demanded such a systematic application of harbour and sea-coast defence, as would repel such aggressions, but, in no light, can they be considered as making a resort to war, at the present time, on the part of the United States, either necessary, or expedient. So also, with respect to the Indian war, of the origin of which, but very imperfect information has as yet been given to the public. Without any express act of Congress, an expedition was, last year, set on foot and pros-

* Washington.

ceded into Indian territory, which had been relinquished by treaty, on the part of the United States. And now we are told about the agency of British traders, as to Indian hostilities. It deserves consideration, whether there has been such provident attention, as would have been proper to remove any cause of complaint, either real or imaginary, which the Indians might alledge, and to secure their friendship. With all the sympathy and anxiety excited by the state of that frontier; important as it may be, to apply adequate means of protection, against the Indians, how is its safety ensured by a declaration of war, which adds the British to the number of enemies?

As "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has not induced the two houses of Congress to concur in declaring the reasons, or motives, for their enacting a declaration of war, the undersigned and the public are left to search, elsewhere, for causes either real, or ostensible. If we are to consider the President of the United States, and the committee of the house of Representatives, on foreign relations, as speaking on this solemn occasion, for Congress, the United States have three principal topics of complaint against Great-Britain. Impressments;—blockades;—and orders in council.

Concerning the subject of impressments, the undersigned sympathize with our unfortunate seamen, the victims of this abuse of power, and participate in the national sensibility, on their account. They do not conceal from themselves, both its importance and its difficulty; and they are well aware how stubborn is the will and how blind the vision of powerful nations, when great interests grow into controversy.

But, before a resort to war for such interests, a moral nation will consider what is just, and a wise nation what is expedient. If the exercise of any right to the full extent of its abstract nature, be inconsistent with the safety of another nation, morality seems to require that, in practice, its exercise should in this respect, be modified. If it be proposed to vindicate any right by war, wisdom demands that it should be of a nature, by war to be obtained. The interests connected with the subjects of impressments are unquestionably great to both nations. And in the full extent of abstract right as asserted by each, perhaps irreconcilable.

The government of the United States asserts that the broad principle that the flag of their merchant vessels shall protect the mariners. This privilege is claimed, although every person on board, except the Captain, may be an alien.

* The British government asserts that the allegiance of their subjects is inalienable, in time of war, and that their seamen, found on the sea, the common highway of nations, shall not be protected, by the flag of private merchant vessels.

The undersigned deem it unnecessary here to discuss the question of the American claim, for the immunity of their flag. But they cannot refrain from viewing it as a principle, of a nature very broad and comprehensive; to the abuse of which, the temptations are strong and numerous. And they do maintain that, before the calamities of war, in vindication of such a principle be incurred, all the means of negotiation should be exhausted, and that also every practicable attempt should be made to regulate the exercise of the right; so that the acknowledged injury, resulting to other nations, should be checked if not prevented. They are clearly of opinion that the peace of this happy and rising community should not be abandoned, for the sake of affording facilities to cover French property; or to employ British seamen.

The claim
novel, nor p
be common
land, has m
war, the se
ing into fore
No man
American
board that F
ited States
For very
France, or
ation, the
language, in
Britain is at
the United S
distible;—h
war-service
face of qual
That Eng
pparently
upon the effe
ble; and th
regulated ex
actly, for th
ry, is—whe
tempting to
on, in failu
A dubious
ght should
ation, before
self, but that
ise of a righ
on to the su
it no injury
Certainly,
ther human
ur own, it s
nd so long
ole interest
war for the
merchant ves
The claim
ke British s
his claim, h
ne America
offers redre
resulted to th
ar be proper
ation has fai
e proper, un
foreign nation
The under
h seamen, i

ed by treaty, on
about the agency
as consideration,
would have been
al or imaginary,
friendship. With
that frontier; im-
tion, against the
war, which adds

has not induced
reasons, or im-
signed and the
al, or ostensible,
es, and the com-
ions, as speaking
States have three
impressments;—

signed sym-
s abuse of power,
count. They do
ts difficulty; and
ow blind the vis-
to controversy.

nation will con-
If the exercise
inconsistent with
that, in practice,
it be proposed to
ould be of a na-
with the subjects
ons. *And in the
ps irreconcilable.
e broad principle
mariners. This
except the Cap-

of their subjects
found on the sea,
ed, by the flag of

as the question of
But they cannot
y broad and com-
e strong and num-
ities of war; in
ns of negotiation
e-attempt should
at the acknowl-
e checked if not
ce of this happy
e sake of afford-
British seamen.

The claim of Great-Britain to the services of her seamen is neither novel, nor peculiar. The doctrine of allegiance, for which she contends is common to all the governments of Europe. France, as well as England, has maintained it for centuries. Both nations claim, in time of war, the services of their subjects. Both by decrees forbid them entering into foreign employ. Both recall them by proclamation.

No man can doubt that, in the present state of the French marine, if American merchant vessels were met at sea, having French seamen on board that France would take them. Will any man believe that the United States would go to war against France, on this account?

For very obvious reasons, this principle occasions little collision with France, or with any other nation, except England. With the English nation, the people of the United States are closely assimilated in blood, language, intercourse, habits, dress, manners and character. When Britain is at war and the United States neutral, the merchant service of the United States, holds out to British seamen, temptations almost irresistible;—high wages and peaceful employ, instead of low wages and war-service;—safety, in lieu of hazard;—entire independence, in the place of qualified servitude.

That England whose situation is insular, who is engaged in a war, apparently for existence, whose seamen are her bulwark, should look upon the effect of our principle upon her safety, with jealousy, is inevitable; and that she will not hazard the practical consequences of its unregulated exercise, is certain. The question, therefore, presented, directly, for the decision of the thoughtful and virtuous mind, in this country, is—whether war, for such an abstract right be justifiable, before attempting to guard against its injurious tendency by legislative regulation, in failure of treaty.

A dubious right should be advanced with hesitation. An extreme right should be asserted with discretion. Moral duty requires, that a nation, before it appeals to arms, should have been, not only true to itself, but that it should have failed, in no duty to others. If the exercise of a right, in an unregulated manner, be in effect, a standing invitation to the subjects of a foreign power to become deserters and traitors, is it no injury to that power?

Certainly, moral obligation demands that the right of flag, like all other human rights should be so used, as that, while it protects what is our own, it should not injure what is another's. In a practical view, and so long as the right of flag is restrained, by no regard to the undeniable interests of others, a war on account of impressments, is only a war for the right of employing British seamen, on board American merchant vessels.

The claim of Great-Britain pretends to no further extent, than to take British seamen from private merchant vessels. In the exercise of this claim, her officers take American seamen, and foreign seamen, in the American service; and although she disclaims such abuses, and offers redress, when known, yet undoubtedly grievous injuries have resulted to the seamen of the United States. But the question is, can war be proper for such cause, before all hope of reasonable accommodation has failed? Even after the extinguishment of such hope, can it be proper, until our own practice be so regulated as to remove, in such foreign nation, any reasonable apprehensions of injury?

The undersigned are clearly of opinion that the employment of British seamen, in the merchant service of the United States, is as little re-

conciliable with the permanent, as the present interest of the United States. The encouragement of foreign seamen is the discouragement of the native American.

The duty of government towards this valuable class of men is not only to protect, but to patronize them. And this cannot be done more effectually than by securing, to American citizens the privileges of American navigation.

The question of impressment, like every other question relative to commerce has been treated, in such a manner, that what was possessed, is lost without obtaining what was sought. Pretensions, right in theory, and important in interest, urged, without due consideration of our relative power, have eventuated in a practical abandonment, both of what we hoped and what we enjoyed. In attempting to spread our flag over foreigners, its distinctive character has been lost to our own citizens.

The American seaman, whose interest it is, to have no competitors, in his employment, is sacrificed that British seamen may have equal privileges with himself.

Ever since the United States have been a nation, this subject has been a matter of complaint and negotiation; and every former administration have treated it, according to its obvious nature, as a subject rather for arrangement than for war. It existed in the time of Washington, yet this father of his country recommended no such resort. It existed in the time of Adams, yet, notwithstanding the zeal, in support of our maritime rights, which distinguished his administration, war was never suggested by him, as the remedy. During the eight years Mr. Jefferson stood at the helm of affairs, it still continued a subject of controversy and negotiation: but it was never made a cause for war. It was reserved for the present administration to press this topic to the extreme and most dreadful resort of nations; although England has officially disavowed the right of impressment, as it respects native citizens, and an arrangement might well be made, consistent with the fair pretensions of such as are naturalized.

That the real state of this question may be understood, the undersigned recur to the following facts as supported by official documents. Mr. King, when minister in England, obtained a disavowal of the British government of the right to impress "American seamen," naturalized as well as native, on the high seas. An arrangement had advanced, nearly to a conclusion, upon this basis, and was broken off only, because Great-Britain insisted to retain the right on "the narrow seas." What, however, was the opinion of the American minister, on the probability of an arrangement, appears from the public documents, communicated to congress, in the session of 1808; as stated by Mr. Madison, in these words, "at the moment the articles were expected to be signed, an exception of 'the narrow seas' was urged and insisted on" by Lord St. Vincents, and being utterly inadmissible on our part, the "negotiation was abandoned."

Mr. King seems to be of opinion, however, "that, with more time than was left him for the experiment, the objection might have been overcome." What time was left Mr. King for the experiment, or whether any was ever made has not been disclosed to the public. Mr. King, soon after returned to America: It is manifest from Mr. King's expression that he was limited in point of time, and it is equally clear that his opinion was that an adjustment could take place. That Mr.

Madison
Messrs. J
he uses t
" failed to
" with L
" impress
" ish prin
" Hawk
" And Lo
the narr
" Britain
a full ack
right of i
was vnxi
It furth
with Mess
nature of t
crown offi
ment, that
the right v
out taking
ling to me
ing, howev
for British
merican ve
ing it per
citizenship
ments, in s
ated 11th
his propos
y our min
and, and s
rable and
Mr. Monr
ry of State
ended wa
ports the u
us: for in
to Mr. Mad
I have on
ground of
per of the
explanati
ous to the
on the pa
never bef
which wa
With the
al admis
Monroe, al
reastment o
rrangement
at all hop
smith a pr

of the United States discouragement

of men is not only to be done more effectually, but the privileges of American citizens

relative to what was possessed, right in a consideration of the subject, both of the right to spread our influence, and the right to our own

we have no competitors; and we may have equal

is subject has been the former administration is a subject rather than a resort. It existed, in support of our nation, war was never light years Mr. Jefferson a subject of controversy for war. It was his topic to the extent England has effected native citizens, it with the fair pre-

understood, the under-official documents, the avowal of the British seamen," natural right had advanced broken off only, because "the narrow seas." minister, on the proposed documents, compiled by Mr. Madison were expected to be signed and insisted on by our part, the

at, with more time on might have been the experiment, or to the public. Mr. Madison from Mr. King's and it is equally clear place. That Mr.

Madison was also of the same opinion is demonstrated, by his letters to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, dated the 3d of February, 1807, in which he uses these expressions. "I take it for granted that you have not failed to make due use of the arrangement concerted by Mr. King with Lord Hawkebury, in the year 1803, for settling the question of impressment. On that occasion and under that administration the British principle was fairly renounced in favor of the right of our flag, Lord Hawkebury having agreed to prohibit impressments on the high seas." And Lord St. Vincent's requiring nothing more than an exception of the narrow seas, an exception resting on the obsolete claim of Great-Britain to some peculiar dominion over them." Here then we have a full acknowledgment that Great-Britain was willing to renounce the right of impressment, on the high seas, in favor of our flag;—that she was anxious to arrange the subject.

It further appears that the British ministry called for an interview with Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, on this topic; that they stated the nature of the claim, the king's prerogative; that they had consulted the crown officers and the board of admiralty, who all concurred in sentiment, that under the circumstances of the nation, the relinquishment of the right was a measure, which the government could not adopt, without taking on itself a responsibility, which no ministry would be willing to meet, however pressing the exigency might be. They offered, however, on the part of Great-Britain, to pass laws making it penal for British commanders to impress American citizens, on board of American vessels, on the high seas, if America would pass a law, making it penal for the officers of the United States to grant certificates of citizenship to British subjects. This will be found, in the same documents, in a letter from Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney to Mr. Madison, dated 11th November, 1806. Under their peremptory instructions, his proposition, on the part of Great-Britain, could not be conceded to by our ministers. Such, however, was the temper and anxiety of England, and such the candid and good sense of our ministers, that an honorable and advantageous arrangement did take place. The authority of Mr. Monroe, then minister at the court of Great-Britain, now Secretary of State, and one of the present administration, who have recommended war with England, and assigned impressments as a cause, supports the undersigned in asserting, that it was honorable and advantageous: for in a letter from Richmond dated the 28th of February, 1808, to Mr. Madison, the following expressions are used by Mr. Monroe, "I have on the contrary always believed and still do believe that the ground on which that interest (impressment) was placed by the paper of the British Commissioners of 8th November, 1806, and the explanation which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous to the United States, that it contained a concession in their favor on the part of Great-Britain, on the great principle in contestation, never before made by a formal and obligatory act of their government which was highly favorable to their interest."

With the opinion of Mr. King so decidedly expressed, with the official admission of Mr. Madison, with the explicit declaration of Mr. Monroe, all concurring that Great-Britain was ready, to abandon impressment on the high seas, and with an honorable and advantageous arrangement, actually made by Mr. Monroe, how can it be pretended, that all hope of settlement, by treaty, has failed; how can this subject furnish a proper cause of war?

With respect to the subject of blockades; the principle of the law of nations, as asserted by the U. States, is, that a blockade can only be justified when supported by an adequate force. In theory this principle is admitted by Great Britain. It is alledged, however, that in practice, she disregards that principle.

The order of blockade, which has been made a specific ground of complaint, by France, is that of the 16th of May 1806. Yet, strange as it may seem, this order, which is, now, made one ground of war between the two countries was, at the time of its first issuing, viewed as an act of favor and conciliation. On this subject it is necessary to be explicit. The vague and indeterminate manner, in which, the American and French governments, in their official papers, speak of this order of blockade, is calculated to mislead. An importance is attached to it, of which, in the opinion of the undersigned, it is not worthy. Let the facts speak for themselves.

In Aug. 1804, the British established a blockade at the entrance of the French ports, naming them, from Facamp to Ostend; and from their proximity to the British coasts, and the absence of all complaint, we may be permitted to believe that it was a legal blockade, enforced according to the usages of nations. On the 16th of May, 1806, the English Secretary of State, Mr. Fox, notified to our Minister, at London, that his government had thought fit to direct necessary measures to be taken for the blockade of the coasts, rivers and ports, from the river Elbe to the river Brest, both inclusive.*

In point of fact, as the terms used in the order will show, this paper, which has become, a substantive and avowed cause for non-intercourse, embargo and war, is a blockade, only of the places, on the French coast, from Ostend to the Seine, and even as to these it is, merely as it professes to be, a continuance of a former and existing blockade. For with respect to the residue of the coast, trade of neutrals is admitted, with the exception only, of enemy's property and articles contraband of war, which are liable to be taken, without a blockade; and except the direct colonial trade of the enemy, which Great Britain denied to be free by the law of nations. Why the order was thus extended, in its form, while in effect it added nothing to orders and regulations, already existing, will be known by adverting to papers, which are before the world. In 1806, France, had yet colonies and the wound inflicted on our feelings, by the interference of the British government in our trade, with those colonies, had been the cause of remonstrance and negotiation. At the moment when the order of May 1806, was made, Mr. Monroe, the present Secretary of State, then our minister plenipotentiary at the Court of Great Britain, was in treaty on the subject of the carrying trade, and judging on the spot, and at the time, he, unhesitatingly, gave his opinion, that the order was made to favor American views and interests. This idea is unequivocally ex-

* The terms of the order are these: That the said coast, rivers and ports must be considered as blockaded, but, "that such blockade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships and vessels, laden with goods, not being the property of his majesty's enemies, and not being contraband of war from approaching the said coasts and entering into and sailing from the said rivers and ports save and except the coast, rivers and ports from Ostend to the river Seine, already in a state of strict and rigorous blockade; and which are to be considered as so continued," with a proviso, that the vessels entering had not been laden at a port belonging to, or in possession of, the enemies of Great-Britain, and the vessels departing were not destined to an enemy port, or had previously broken blockade."

pressed,
of May,

And
retary of
blockade

"ado of
the U

It app
our trade
his coun
blockade
from Ost
and for
complain
nce; th
after the
was appr
e taken

Of this
the admin
bargo as i
deal of th
during th
Erskine,

cerning
the Uniter
both auth
voke or
tral com

on. And
was to ce
quence of
was made
November

remov
was not in
was deem
under the
ation of th
on; an in
as directl

he foll
thus spe
to extend

from many
the Seine, ex
izable with
emy as c

free in th
been the co
dubted that
if inten

On
en strengt
ow to the c
highly s

pressed, in Mr. Monroe's letters to Mr. Madison of the 17th. and 20th^o of May, and of the 9th of June, 1806

And as late as October, 1811, the same Gentleman, writing as Secretary of State to the British minister, upon King of the same order of blockade of May, 1806, says, "it strictly was little more than a blockade of the coast from Seine to Ostend." "The object was to afford to the United States an accommodation respecting the colonial trade."

It appears, then, that this order, was, in point of fact, made to favour our trade and was so understood and admitted by the government of this country, at that time and since; that, instead of extending prior blockades it lessened them; that the country from Seine to Brest, and from Ostend to Elbe was inserted to open them to our colonial trade and for our accommodation, and that it was never made the subject of complaint, by the American government, during its practical continuance; that is, not until the first order in council; and indeed not until after the 1st of May, 1810; and until after the American government was apprized of the ground, which it was the will of France should be taken upon the subject.

Of this we have the most decisive proof, in the offers, made under the administration of Mr. Jefferson, for the discontinuance of the Embargo as it related to Great Britain; none of which required the repeal of the blockade of May 1806; and also in the arrangement made during the administration of Mr. Madison, and under his eye with Mr. Erskine. The non-intercourse act of March 1809, and the act "concerning commercial intercourse" of May 1810, vest the President of the United States with the very same power, in the very same terms, both authorise him "in case either Great Britain or France shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States" to declare the same by proclamation. And by the provisions of one law in such case, non intercourse was to cease; by those of the other it was to be revived. In consequence of power vested, by the first act, the arrangement with Erskine was made and the revocation of the orders in council of January and November 1807, was considered as a full compliance with the law and as removing all the anti-neutral edicts. The blockade of May 1806, was not included in the arrangement, and it does not appear, that it was deemed of sufficient importance to engage even a thought. Yet under the act of May, 1810, which vests the very same power, a revocation of this blockade of May, 1806, is made by our cabinet a *sine qua non*; an indispensable requisite! And now, after the British minister has directly avowed that this order of blockade would not continue after

The following are extracts from these letters. In that of the 17th May, 1806: "thus speaks of that blockade. It is 'couched in terms of restraint and professes to extend the blockade farther than was heretofore done, nevertheless it takes from many parts, already blockaded, indeed, from all East of Ostend, and West of the Seine, except in articles contraband of war and enemies property, which are allowable without blockade.—And in like form of exception, considering every enemy as one power, it admits the trade of neutrals, within the same limits, to be free in the productions of enemies colonies, in every, but the direct route between the colony and the parent country." Mr. Monroe adds, "It cannot be doubted that the note was drawn by the government, in reference to the question, and if intended as the foundation of a treaty must be viewed in a favourable light." On the 20th of May, Mr. Monroe writes to Mr. Madison, that he had been strengthened in the opinion that the order of the 16th was drawn with a view to the question of our trade with enemies colonies, and that it promises to be highly satisfactory to our commercial interests."

a revocation of the orders in council, without a due application of an adequate force, the existence of this blockade, is insisted upon, as a justifiable cause of war, notwithstanding that our government admits a blockade is legal, to the maintenance of which an adequate force is applied.

The undersigned are aware, that, in justification of this new ground, it is now said that the extension on paper, for whatever purpose intended, favors the principle of paper blockades. This however, can hardly be urged, since the British, formally, disavow the principle; and since they acknowledge, the very doctrine of the law of nations, for which the American administration contend, henceforth, the existence of a blockade becomes a question of fact; it must depend upon the evidence adduced, in support of the adequacy of the blockading force.

From the preceding statement it is apparent, that whatever there is objectionable, in the principle of the order of May 1806, or in the practice under it, on ground merely American, it cannot be set up as a sufficient cause of war; for until France pointed it out, as a cause of controversy, it was so far from being regarded, as a source of any new, or grievous complaint, that it was actually considered, by our government, in a favorable light.

The British Orders in Council are the remaining source of discontent, and avowed cause of war. These, have, heretofore, been considered, by our government in connexion with the French decrees. Certainly, the British Orders in Council and French decrees, form a system subversive of neutral rights and constitute just grounds of complaint, yet, viewed, relatively to the condition of those powers towards each other, and of the United States towards both, the undersigned cannot persuade themselves that the Orders in Council, as they now exist and with their present effect and operation, justify the selection of Great Britain as our enemy; and render necessary a declaration of unqualified war.

Every consideration of moral duty, and political expedience, seems to counsel in warning the United States, not to mingle in this hopeless, and, to human eyes, interminable European contest. Neither France, nor England, pretends that their aggressions can be defended, on the ground of any other belligerent right, than that of particular necessity.

Both attempt to justify their encroachments, on the general law of nations, by the plea of retaliation. In the relative position, and proportion of strength of the United States, to either belligerent, there appeared little probability, that we could compel the one, or the other, by hostile operations, to abandon this plea.

And as the field of commercial enterprise, after allowing to the decrees and orders, their full practical effect, is still rich and extensive,

• Mr. Foster in his letter of the 3d July, 1811 to Mr. Monroe thus states the doctrine, maintained by his government.

"Great Britain has never attempted to dispute that, in the ordinary course of the law of nations, no blockade can be justifiable or valid, unless it be supported by an adequate force destined to maintain it and to expose to hazard all vessels attempting to evade its operation."

"Mr. Foster in his letter to Mr. Monroe of the 26th July, 1811, also says, The blockade of May 1806, will not continue after the repeal of the orders in council unless his Majesty's government shall think fit to sustain it by the special application of a sufficient naval force, and the fact of its being so continued, or not, will be notified at the time."

re seem
itics, for
ng, in eit
tent, wit
te of the
to the r
ification
a com
withstand
interest
their peac
of arg
on the
of th
order of
nt, there
United S
ish inter
ciples of
part of th
his prin
ht, he par
y extrav
our the B
oting a
e injury
ands, in
ndence
a prize o
manufas
ts was c
in which
e Berlin
whole con
e Marine
red our m
November
ill be gov
untries."
tember
at the in
rench arg
ity, or
d that he
ight not
nd, althou
s, so obv
cedent ag
, any col
hese assu
to the Be
of Januar
ember so
France,

application of an
 stated upon, as a
 riment admits a
 quate force is ap-

this new ground,
 ever purpose in-
 his however, can
 w the principle ;
 e law of nations,
 eforth, the exist-
 ust depend upon
 f the blockading

whatever there is
 1806, or in the
 not be set up as a
 out, as a cause of
 ource of any new,
 d, by our govern-

source of discon-
 fore, been consid-
 h decrees. Cer-
 crees, form a sys-
 ounds of some-
 e powers towards
 the undersigned
 ncial, as they now
 ify the selection of
 a declaration of

expedience, seems
 e in this hopeless,

Neither France,
 e defended, on the
 rticular necessity.
 the general law of
 position, and pro-
 belligerent, there
 e one, or the other,

owing to the de-
 ich and extensive,
 ards thus states the

the ordinary course of
 unless it be support-
 expose to hazard all

1811, also says, The
 the orders in coun-
 ain it by the special
 ng so continued, of

ere seemed, as little wisdom s. gation to yield, solid and certain
 ilitics, for unattainable pretensions. The rights of retaliation, as ex-
 ing, in either belligerent, it was impossible for the United States, con-
 tent, with either its duty, or interest, to admit. Yet, such was the
 te of the decrees, and orders of the respective belligerents, in rela-
 to the rights of neutrals, that, while, on the one hand, it formed no
 ification to either, so on the other, concurrent circumstances, for-
 a complete justification to the United States, in maintaining,
 withstanding these encroachments, provided it best comported with
 interests, that system of impartial neutrality, which is so desirable
 their peace and prosperity. For, if it should be admitted, which no
 use of argument can maintain, that the Berlin decree, which was in-
 on the 21st of November, 1806, was justified, by the antecedent
 ers of the British admiralty, respecting the colonial trade, and by
 order of blockade of the 16th of May, preceding, yet, on this ac-
 nt, there resulted no right of retaliation to France, as it respected
 United States. They had expressed no acquiescence either in the
 ish interference with the colonial trade, or in any extension of the
 ciples of blockade. Besides, had there been any such neglect, on
 part of the United States, as warranted the French emperor in adopt-
 his principle of retaliation, yet in the exercise of that pretended
 nt, he past the bounds of both public law and decency; and, in this
 y extravagance of that exercise, lost the advantage of whatever
 our the British had afforded to his pretences. Not content with
 opting a principle of retaliation, in terms limited, and appropriate,
 he injury of which he complained, he declared, "all the British
 ands, in a state of blockade; prohibited all commerce and corres-
 ndence with them, all trade in their manufactures; and made law-
 prize of all merchandize, belonging to England, or coming from
 manufactories, and colonies." The violence of these encroach-
 ta was equalled only by the insidiousness of the terms, and man-
 in which they were promulgated. The scope of the expressions
 e Berlin decree, was so general that it embraced within its sphere,
 whole commerce of neutrals with England. Yet Decree, Minister
 e Marine of France, by a formal note, of the 24th December, 1806,
 ed our minister Plenipotentiary, that the imperial decrees of the
 November, 1806, "was not to affect our commerce, which would
 ll be governed by the rules of the treaty, established between the two
 untries." Notwithstanding this assurance, however, on the 18th
 tember following, Regnier, Grand Minister of justice, declared
 at the intentions of the Emperor were that, by virtue of that decree,
 rench armed vessels, might seize in neutral vessels, either English prop-
 erty, or merchandize proceeding from the English manufactories;
 d that he had reserved, for future decision the question whether they
 ight not possess themselves of neutral vessels going to, or from Eng-
 nd, although they had no English manufactures on board." Pretens-
 e, so obviously exceeding any measure of retaliation that, if the
 edent acts, of the British government, had afforded to such a re-
 any colour of right, it was lost in the violence, and extravagance
 hese assumed principles.

To the Berlin decrees succeeded the British orders in council, of the
 of January, 1807, which were merged in the orders of the 11th of
 umber following. These declared "all ports, and places belonging
 France, and its allies, from which the British flag was excluded,

"all, in the colonies of his British majesty's enemies, in a state of blockade;—prohibiting all trade, in the produce and manufactures of the said countries or colonies; and making all vessels, trading to or from them, and all merchandise, on board subject to capture and condemnation, with an exception, only in favour of the direct trade between neutral countries and the colonies of his majesty's enemies."

These extravagant pretensions, on the part of Great Britain, were immediately succeeded by others, still more extravagant, on the part of France. Without waiting for any knowledge of the course, the American government would take, in relation to the British orders in council, the French Emperor issued, on the 17th of December following, his Milan decree, by which "every ship of whatever nation, which shall have submitted to search, by an English ship, or to voyage to England, or paid any tax to that government, are declared denationalized, and lawful prize."

"The British Islands are declared in a state of blockade, by sea and land, and every ship of whatever nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo may be, that sails from England, or those of the English colonies, or of countries occupied by English troops, and proceeding to England, or to the English colonies, or to countries occupied by the English, to be good prize." The nature and extent of these injuries thus accumulated by mutual efforts of both belligerents, seemed to teach the American statesman this important lesson; not to attack the cause of his country to one, or the other; but by systematic and solid provisions, for sea-coast and maritime defence, to place its interests, as far as its situation, and resources permit, beyond the reach of the rapacity, or ambition of any European power. Happy would it have been for our country, if a course of policy, so simple and obvious, had been adopted!

Unfortunately administration had recourse to a system, complicated in its nature, and destructive in its effects; which instead of relief from the accumulated injuries of foreign governments served only to fill up what was wanting in the measure of evils abroad, by artificial embarrasments at home. As long ago, as the year 1794, Mr. Madison, the present President of the United States, then a member of the House of Representatives, devised and proposed a system of commercial restrictions, which had for its object the coercion of Great Britain, by a denial to her of our products and our market; asserting that the former was, in a manner essential to her prosperity, either as necessaries of life, or as raw materials for her manufactures; and, that without the latter, a great proportion of her labouring classes, could not subsist.

In that day of sage and virtuous fore-thought, the proposition was rejected. It remained, however a theme of unceasing panegyric among an active class of American politicians, who with a systematic pertinacity inculcated among the people, that commercial restrictions were a species of warfare, which would ensure success to the U. States, and humiliation to Great-Britain.

There were two circumstances, inherent in this system of coercing Great-Britain by commercial restrictions, which ought to have made practical politicians, very doubtful of its result, and very cautious of its trial. These were the state of opinion in relation to its efficacy among commercial men, in the United States; and the state of feeling, which a resort to it would unavoidably produce, in Great-Britain. On

one hand
the U. S.
on the U.
tern imp
Without
attempt
ering w
ed beco
r was
Haid.
vowed
which a
with
ison, b
ing the
ain, and
osition.
cial how
he decr
treaty,
rejecte
ratificati
uspended
ember,
on the 2
of forc
in the v
to yo
reputem
justice an
part of
the 17
the part
in the p
porane
ter an in
belligere
time; r
ority, ho
Britain,
port of F
Nov. 18
nistratio
all time
nce of t
forms,
by the
they con
ficed, in
they d
that the
Without
question
able fro

nerable, in a state of
e, and manufactures
all vessels, trading to
subject to capture and
of the direct trade
majesty's enemies.
Great Britain, were
evagant, on the part
of the course, the
to the British order
th of December fol-
of whatever nation,
English ship, or to
ment, are declared

blockade, by sea and
to cover the nature of
of the English col-
s, and proceeding to
ries occupied by the
scent of these injuries
gerents, seemed to
sion; not to attack
at by systematic and
ce, to place its inter-
beyond the reach of
r. Happy would it
so simple and obvi-

system, complicated
ch instead of relief
nts served only to fill
pad, by artificial em-
r 1794; Mr. Madis-
en a member of the
stem of commercial
Great Britain, by a
erting that the for-
y, either as neces-
res; and, that with-
g classes, could not

the proposition was
ng panegyric among
systematic pertina-
restrictions were a
the U. States, and

system of coercing
ught to have made
a very cautious of
ation to its efficacy
the state of feeling
Great-Britain. On

one hand, it was undeniable that the great body of commercial men, in the U. States, had no belief in such a dependence of Great-Britain; on the United States, either for our produce, or our market, as the term implied.

Without the hearty co-operation of this class of men, success in an attempt was obviously unattainable. And as on them the chief reliance would fall, it was altogether unreasonable to expect that they would become co-operating instruments in support of any system, which was ruin to them, and without hope to their country. On the other hand, as it respects Great-Britain, a system proceeding upon an avowed principle of her dependence upon us was among the last, which a proud and powerful nation would yield.

Notwithstanding these obvious considerations, in April 1806, Mr. Madison, being then Secretary of State, a law passed Congress, prohibiting the importation of certain specified manufactures of Great-Britain, and her dependencies on the basis of Mr. Madison's original proposition. Thus the United States entered on the system of commercial hostility against Great-Britain.

The decree of Berlin was issued in the ensuing November, (1806). A treaty, which had been signed at London, in Dec. 1806, having been rejected by Mr. Jefferson, without being presented to the Senate for ratification, and the non-importation act not being repealed, but only suspended, G. Britain issued her orders in council, on the 11th of November, 1807.

On the 21st of the same month, of Nov. Champagny, French minister of foreign affairs, wrote to Mr. Armstrong the American Minister, in the words following. "All the difficulties, which have given rise to your reclamations, Sir, would be removed with ease, if the Government of the United States, after complaining in vain of the injustice and violations of England, took, with the whole continent, the part of guaranteeing it therefrom."

On the 17th of the ensuing December, the Milan decree was issued on the part of France, and five days afterwards the embargo was passed on the part of the U. States. Thus was completed, by acts nearly simultaneous, the circle of commercial hostilities.

After an ineffectual trial of four years to controul the policy of the belligerents by this system, it was on the part of the United States, at length, relinquished. The act of the 1st of May, 1810, gave the authority, however to the President of the U. States to revive it against Great-Britain, in case France revoked her decrees. Such revocation, on the part of France was declared, by the President's proclamation on the 11th of Nov. 1810, and, in consequence non-intercourse was revived by our administration, against Great-Britain.

At all times, the undersigned have looked, with much anxiety for the revocation of this revocation. They wished not to question, what, in various forms, has been so often asserted by the administration and its agents, by their directions. But neither as public men, nor as citizens, they consent that the peace and prosperity of the country should be sacrificed, in maintenance of a position, which on no principle of evidence they deem tenable. They cannot falsify, or conceal their conviction, that the French decrees neither have been, nor are revoked.

Without pretending to occupy the whole field of argument, which the question of revocation has opened, a concise statement seems desirable from the occasion.

The condition on which the non-intercourse, according to the act of 1st May 1810, might be revived against Great-Britain, was, on the part of France, *an effectual revocation of her decrees*. What the President of the United States was bound to require from the French government was, *the evidence of such effectual revocation*. Upon this point both the right of the United States and the duty of the President seem to be resolvable into very distinct & undeniable principles. The object to be obtained, for the U. States from France *was an effectual revocation of the decrees*. A revocation to be effectual, must include, in the nature of things, this essential requisite:—the wrongs done to the neutral commerce of the United States, by the operation of the decrees, must be stopped. Nothing short of this could be an effectual revocation.

Without reference to the other wrongs resulting from those decrees to the commerce of the United States; it will be sufficient to state the prominent wrong done by the 56th article of the Milan decree. The nature of this wrong essentially consisted in *the authority given to French ships of war and privateers to make prize, at sea, of every neutral vessel, sailing to, or from, any of the English possessions*. The authority to capture was the very essence of the wrong. It follows therefore, that *an effectual revocation required that the authority to capture should be annulled*. Granting, therefore, for the sake of argument (what from its terms and its nature was certainly not the case) that the noted letter of the Duke of Cadore of the 5th of August 1810 held forth a revocation, good in point of form, and unconditional, yet *was not that effectual revocation*, for which the act of 1st May 1810 alone authorised the President of the United States to issue his proclamation, *unless in consequence of that letter, the authority to capture was annulled*. The letter itself is no annulment of the authority to capture, and it is notorious, that no evidence of the annulment of this authority to capture, ever has been adduced. It has not even, been pretended. On the contrary there is decisive, and almost daily, evidence of the continued existence of this authority to capture.

The charge of executing the decrees of Berlin and Milan was, so far as concerned his department, given by the terms of those decrees to the French minister of Marine. According to established principles of general law, the imperial act, which gave the authority must be annulled by another imperial act, equally formal and solemn; or, at least, the authority to capture must be countermanded by some order or instruction, from the minister of marine. Nothing short of this could annul the authority according to the rules of the sea service. Was such annulling act ever issued by the French Emperor? Were any such countermanding orders, or instructions, ever given by the French minister of marine? In exercising a trust, committed to him by the legislature, on a point, so interesting, to the neutral commerce of the United States, and so important to the peace of the nation, was it not the duty of the President to have the evidence of such annulment before the issuing of any proclamation? Has he ever insisted upon

This article is in these words:

Art. III. The British islands are declared to be in a state of blockade, both by land and sea. Every ship of whatever nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo may be, that sails from the ports of England, or those of the British colonies and of the countries occupied by English troops, and proceeds to England, or to the English colonies, or to countries occupied by English troops is good and lawful prize, as contrary to the present decree and as captured, by our ships of war or our privateers and adjudged to the captor."

According to the
Britain, was, on the

What the President
the French govern

Upon this point
the President sees

principles. The object
an effectual revocation

include, in the measure
done to the neutral

of the decrees, must
effectual revocation.

coming from those de-
will be sufficient to

of the Milan decrees
the authority given

at sea, of every neu-
possessions. The au-

It follows there-
authority to capture

sake of argument
not the case) that

of August 1811
unconditional, yet

of 1st May 1811
es to issue his pro-

authority to capture
the authority to cap-

annulment of this au-
is not even, been pro-

most daily, evidence
ure.

of Milan was, in
terms of those decre-

to established prin-
the authority must

and solemn; or,
ded by some order

nothing short of the
of the sea service

ch Emperor? We

vidence? Was it of no consequence in the relative situation of
country, as to foreign powers, that the regular evidence should
received by our administration and made known? Why has a mat-
of evidence so obviously proper, so simple, in its nature, so level to
eral apprehension and so imperiously demanded, by the circum-
stances of the case, been wholly omitted? And why, if the Berlin
Milan decrees are annulled, as is pretended, does the French Empe-
withhold this evidence of their annulment? Why does he withhold
when the question of revocation is presented under circumstances,
much urgency?

ot only has it never been pretended that any such imperial act of
oliment has issued, or that any such orders, or instructions, coun-
manding the authority to capture, were ever given, but there is de-
vidence of the reverse in the conduct of the French public armed
and privateers. At all times since Nov. 1810, these ships
privateers have continued to capture our vessels and property, on
high seas, upon the principles of the Berlin and Milan decrees.
Numerous list of American vessels, thus taken, since the 1st of Nov.
now exists in the office of the secretary of state: and among the
ares are several vessels with their cargoes, lately, taken and de-
ved, at sea, without the formality of a trial, by the commander of a
sch squadron, at this moment, cruising against our commerce, un-
orders, given by the minister of marine, to whom the execution of
decrees was committed; and these too issued in January last. In
Baltic and Mediterranean seas, captures by French privateers are
n to us, by official documents to have been made, under the au-
thority of these decrees. How then are they revoked? How have they
to violate our neutral commerce?

ed any repeal, or modification of those decrees, in truth taken
it must have been communicated to the prize courts, and would
been evidenced by some variation either in their rules, or in the
ples of their decisions. In vain, however, will this nation seek for
proof of the revocation of the decrees. No acquittal has ever been
in any of the prize courts, upon the ground that the Berlin and
decrees had ceased, even as it respects the U. States. On the
ary the evidence is decisive that they are considered by the French
as existing.

ere are many cases corroborative of this position. It is enough
te only two, which appear in the official reports. The American
Julian was captured by a French privateer, on the 4th July 1811,
in the tenth of September 1811, the vessel and cargo were condem-
ed by the council of prizes at Paris among other reasons, *because she*
visited by several English vessels. On the same day the Hercules
merican ship was condemned by the imperial court of prizes, al-
th "that it was impossible, that she was not visited, by the ene-
ships of war." So familiar to them was the existence of the de-
and such their eagerness to give them effect against our com-
e, that they feigned a visitation to have taken place, and that not-
standing the express declaration of the captain and crew, to the
ary. In addition to which evidence, Mr. Russell's letter to the
tary of State, dated 8th May 1811, says "it may not be improper
remark that no American vessel captured since the 1st Nov. 1810
yet been released."

om this it is apparent, that the commanders of the national vessels,

the privateersmen, and the judges of the prize courts, to which may be added also the customhouse officers, who, as the instruments of carrying into effect the decrees, must have been made acquainted with the repeal had it existed, have been from first to last, ignorant of any revocation; and uniformly acted upon the principle of their existence.

If other evidence of the continued existence of those decrees were requisite, the acts of the French government afford such as is full and explicit. Champagny, Duke of Cadore, minister of foreign relations, in his report to his majesty the Emperor and king, dated Paris, 3 Dec. 1810, speaking of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, says expressly, "As long as England shall persist in her orders in council, your majesty will persist, in your decrees." Than which no declaration can be more direct not only that the Berlin and Milan decrees are unrevoked, but that they will so remain, until the English orders in council are withdrawn. And in the address delivered, by his imperial majesty, Napoleon, to the council of commerce on the 31st March 1811, he thus declares, "The decrees of Berlin and Milan are the fundamental laws of my empire. For the neutral navigation I consider the flag an extension of territory. The power, which suffers its flag to be violated, cannot be considered as neutral. The fate of the American commerce will soon be decided. I will favor it, if the United States conform themselves to these decrees. In a contrary case, their vessels will be driven from my empire."

And as late as the 10th of March last, in a report of the French minister of foreign relations, communicated to the conservative Senate, he declared, "that as long as the British orders in council are not revoked, and the principles of the treaty of Utrecht in relation to no treaty put in force, the decrees of Berlin and Milan, ought to subsist for the powers who suffer their flag to be denationalized." In none of these acts, is there any exception in favor of the United States. And on the contrary in the report of March last, by placing those decrees on the basis of "the principles of the treaty of Utrecht," the French minister has extended the terms of revocation beyond all previous pretensions.

Those who maintain the revocation of these decrees, as it respects the U. States, rely wholly upon the suspension of the decisions of the French prize courts, in relation to some few vessels, and the liberation of others, by the special direction of the French Emperor. Can there be a stronger presumptive evidence, of the existence of those decrees than this—that no vessel is excepted from their operation, until at the special exercise of the Emperor's will, in the particular case.

If the decrees were effectively revoked, there would be no captures; or any were made, liberation would be a matter of course and of general right, instead of being an affair of particular favor, or caprice. Is it for vexatious indulgences, like these, that the people of the United States are to abandon commerce and peace? Is it for such favors, they are to invite the calamities of war? If the resources of negotiation were exhausted, had the government powers remaining to diminish the causes of national controversy, by preventing abuses? After this, had it no powers to provide for protecting indisputable important rights, without waging a war of offence? In the regular exercise of legislative and executive powers, might not the fair objects of interest for country have been secured completely, by consistent and wholesome plans of defensive protection? And would not a national position, strictly defensive, highly respectable, have been less burthensome to the people than the protracted war? Would it not be more friendly to the cause of our own seamen—more safe for our navigation and commerce; more favorable to the interests of agriculture; less hazardous to national character; more worthy of a people jealous of their liberty and independence?

to which may be acquainted with the ignorant of any their existence. those decrees were such as is full of foreign relations g, dated Paris, Milan, says expressers in council, you no declaration ca decrees are unrevocable orders in council his imperial majesty (1st March 1811), ase the fundament consider the flag its flag to be the American co United States crac, their vessels w

of the French m conservative Senate, a council are not, nt in relation to n ap, ought to sub national. In no of the United Stat by placing those of Utrecht, tion beyond all p

decrees, as it respec of the decisions of us, and the liberat emperor. Can the nce of those decre operation, until a particular case. be no captures, on nd of general right. Is it for vexations etes are to abandon invite the calamities had the government troversy, by prevent ing indisputable the regula exercise sjects of interest for d wholesome plous, strictly defensive, people than the pro our own seamen to the interests of ore worthy of a pe

entering into these hostilities is there any thing in the French decrees, of France, in its nature very interesting, or allowing? Will the rest of the country fold of French trade, which we seek, in any way compromise the rich harvest of general commerce, which by war we are about to shut? When entering into a war, with Great Britain, for commercial rights and interests, it seems impossible not to enquire, into the state of our commercial relations with France, and the advantages the United States will obtain. We shall be enabled to judge whether the price is worth the contest.

An official statement made to Congress during the present session, it amounts of 45,264,000 dollars of domestic productions of the United States, exported from September 30th, 1810, to October 1st, 1811, only 1,194,775 dollars exported to France and Italy, including Sicily, not a dependency of France is now deprived of all her foreign colonies, and by reviewing our relations with that country for several years past and before the date of the orders in council. It will appear that, exclusive of her foreign possessions, it has been severely inconsiderable. The annexed statement marked A taken from official documents, shows the quantity of particular articles, the produce of the United States exported to all the world, distinguishing the amount both to France and to England and her dependencies from 1810 to 1811. From this statement it appears, how small a proportion of the great staples of our country is taken by France. While France retained her colonies, her annual production its way to the mother country through the United States, and our relations with her in these articles, was not inconsiderable. But since she has been deprived of her foreign possessions, and since the establishment of her municipal regulations, as to licenses, this trade has been in a great degree annihilated. In respect to colonial produce none can be imported into France except from certain ports of the United States and under special imperial licenses. For licenses our merchants must pay what the agents of the French government think proper to demand. As to articles of our domestic produce, they are loaded with such exorbitant duties, and are subjected to such regulations and restrictions on their importation as, in ordinary times, will amount to a prohibition. On the 6th of August 1810 the very day of the Duke of Cadore's noted declaration a duty was imposed on all sea Island cotton, imported into France, of more than six cents per pound, and on other cotton of about sixty cents per pound amounting to three, or four, times their original cost in the United States. As to tobacco, the French minister here on the 23d of July 1811, informed our government that it was "under an administration (en regie) in France; administration (he says) is the only consumer and can purchase only the quantity necessary for its consumption." And by other regulations not more than a seventh of all the tobacco consumed, in France, can be of foreign growth. The ordinary quantity of tobacco annually consumed in France is estimated at one thousand hogheads, leaving only about two thousand hogheads of foreign tobacco to be purchased in France.

In addition to these impositions and restrictions, the importer is not left at liberty with respect to his return cargo. By other edicts, he is compelled to dispose of the avails of his importations, if after paying duties and seizures, any remain in such articles of French produce and manufacture, as the French government thinks proper to direct. Two thirds at least must be laid out in silks and other third in wines, brandies, and other articles, of that country. To give that this account of our commercial relations with France does not rest on the authority of the undersigned would refer to the statements and declarations of our government on this subject. In a letter from Mr. Smith the late Secretary of State appears by it that for twelve years past, France has not taken in any year

Wool	7,000,000 Pounds.	Tobacco	16,000 Hogheads.
Wine	7,000 Tierces.	Dried Fish	87,000 Quintals.

It also appears by it, that the annual average taken by France for twelve years, past

Wool	2,664,090 Pounds.	Tobacco	5,927 Hogheads.
Wine	2,253 Tierces.	Fish	24,735 Quintals.

It also appears by it, that in these years some of those articles have not been shipped at all, directly to France, but have probably, found their way thither through the northern ports of Europe.

Secretary of State to the minister of France here, of the 19th December 1811 speaking of our trade to that country, under its regulations, after the pretended repeal of the decrees, Mr. Smith says, "The restrictions of the Berlin and Milan decrees had the effect of restraining the American merchants from sending their vessels to France. The interdictions in the system that has been substituted, against the admission of American products, will have the effect of imposing upon them an equal restraint."

"If then for the revoked decrees, municipal laws, producing the same commercial effect have been substituted, the mode only, and not the measure has undergone an alteration. And however true it may be, that the change is lawful in form, it is, nevertheless, as true, that it is essentially unfriendly, and that it does not at all comport with the ideas, inspired by your letter of the 27th ult. in which you were pleased to declare the "distinctly pronounced intention of his Imperial majesty of favouring the commercial relations, between France and the United States, in all the objects of traffic, which shall evidently proceed from their agriculture, or manufactures." "If France, by her own acts, has blockaded up her ports against the introduction of the products of the United States, what motive has this government in a discussion with a third power, to insist on the privilege of going to France? Whence the inducement to urge the fulfilment of a blockade of France, when, if annulled, no American cargoes could obtain a market in any of her ports? In such a state of things, a blockade of the coast of France, would be to the United States as unimportant, as would be a blockade of the coast of the Caspian sea."

And so far has the French emperor been from relaxing in whole, or in part these odious regulations as to us, in consequence of our submitting to give up our English trade, that they have been made a subject of special instructions, the minister, who has been sent to the court of France. Mr. Monroe, in his letter of instructions to Mr. Barlow of July 26, 1811, says, "your early and particular attention will be drawn to the great subject of the commercial relations which is to subsist, in future, between the United States and France. The President expects that the commerce of the United States will be placed, in the ports of France, on such a footing as to afford it a fair market, and to the industry and enterprise of their citizens, a reasonable encouragement. An arrangement to this effect was looked for, immediately after the revocation of the decrees, but it appears from the documents, in this department, that that was not the case; on the contrary, that our commerce has been subjected to the greatest discouragement, or rather, to the most oppressive restraints; that the vessels which carried coffee, sugar, &c. though sailing directly from the United States to a French port, were held in a state of sequestration, on the principle that the trade was prohibited, and that the importation of these articles was not only unlawful, but criminal; that even the vessels, which carried the unquestionable productions of the United States, were exposed to great and expensive delays, to tedious investigations, in unusual forms, and to exorbitant duties. In short that the ordinary usages of commerce between friendly nations were abandoned."

Again Mr. Monroe, in the same letter, says, "If the ports of France, and her allies are not opened to the commerce of the United States on a liberal scale, on fair conditions, of what avail to them, it may be asked, will be the revocation of the British orders in council? In contending for the revocation of the orders, so far as it was an object of interest, the United States had in view trade to the continent. It was a fair legitimate object and worth contending for, while France encouraged it. But if she shuts her ports on our commerce or burdens it with heavy duties that motive is at an end." He again says, "I will see the injustice and endeavour to prevent the necessity of bringing, in return for American cargoes sold in France, an equal amount in the produce or manufactures of that country. No such obligation is imposed on French merchants trading to the United States. They enjoy the liberty of selling their cargoes for cash, and taking back what they pleased from this country, in return. It is indispensable, that the trade be free, that all American citizens engaged in it be placed on the same footing, and, with this view, that the system of carrying it on, by licenses, granted by French agents be immediately annulled."

The despatches from Mr. Barlow, by the Hornet, most clearly show that the expectations of our government have not only not been realized, but that the promises obtained, by our minister are of a very unsatisfactory nature. Indeed while Bonaparte is sending armies to the north of Europe to take pos-

of the por
 tions, ven
 notwiths
 a govern
 and peac
 what ven
 lid be ab
 limited
 circum
 the disc
 give a ou
 ling to t
 French
 narrative.
 of May
 under in
 1807, as
 were
 per custom
 were, ha
 7, the tru
 re revoked
 minister "tr
 which is now
 north as t
 gdom of I
 rther with
 sea govern
 Italy, to b
 The effect
 of the com
 the coun
 be forme
 our comm
 nation of
 exports o
 the two ye
 across the
 which are
 in coun
 posed to
 trade bur
 nation, an
 continents
 in the s
 the many
 ited State
 ts, there
 things, on

*Ve
 To Fran
 To Holl
 To Ital
 To Eng
 To all s

18th December 1806
 after the pretence
 of the Berlin and Milan
 decrees from sending
 that has been said
 will have the effect of in
 ducing the same con
 that the change is lar
 ly unfriendly, and th
 r letter of the 27th
 ounced intention of h
 between France and
 evidently proceed fro
 r own acts, has block
 s of the United State
 a third power, to ins
 cement, to urge the A
 merican cargoes cou
 f things: a blockade
 important, as would
 ing in whole, or in p
 submitting to give
 special instructions,
 Mr. Monroe, in his l
 "your early and par
 ne commercial relati
 and France. The Pr
 will be placed, in t
 market; and to the
 encouragement. An
 der the revocation of
 ument, that that
 on subjected to the
 aints; that the vess
 from the United Stat
 on, on the principle
 these articles was not
 carried the unquesti
 great and expensive
 to exorbitant duties.
 ndly nations were ab
 ports of France, and
 tes on a liberal scale
 ed, will be the rev
 the revocation of th
 d States had in view
 and worth contend
 ports on our comm
 l." He again says, "n
 ecessity of bringing
 int in the produce or
 ed on French mercha
 of selling their carg
 country, in return.
 can citizens engaged
 that the system of c
 ed immediately annul
 ed clearly show that
 realized, but that
 satisfactory nature.
 f Europe to tak

of the ports on the Baltic, and by his fleet sailing squadrons, is burning A-
 merican vessels, on the Atlantic, all expectations of a free trade from France
 not be worse than vain.
 notwithstanding the violence of the belligerents, were the restrictions of our
 government removed, the commerce of the United States might be exten-
 sive and profitable. It is well known that from the gallantry of our seamen, if
 merchant vessels were allowed to arm and associate, for self defence, they
 would be able to repel many unlawful aggressions. The danger of capture would
 be diminished, and in relation to one of the belligerents at least, the risk, under
 the circumstances, would soon be measured by insurance.
 The discussions of our government, in relation to the British orders in coun-
 cils, give a currency to the opinion that they exist, without any modification ac-
 cording to the extent of the first principles, on which they were issued. And
 the French minister, in his last communication on this subject, made to the
 Legislative Senate, on the 10th of March last, speaks of the blockade of the
 ports of May 1806 "as annihilating the rights of all maritime states and put-
 ting under interdiction whole coasts and empires;" and of the orders in council
 of 1807, as though still subsisting, and that according to their principles all
 vessels were compelled "to pay a tribute to England, and all cargoes a tariff
 for customs." What the real extent and principle of the blockade of May
 1806 were, have already been explained. With respect to the British orders of
 1807, the truth is, that by a new order issued on the 20th of April 1809, they
 were revoked or modified, and the obnoxious transit duty called by the French
 minister "tribute and tariff" was done away. The new order of April 1809,
 which is now the subject of complaint is limited to "all the ports and places as
 far north as the river Ems, inclusively, under the government styling itself the
 Kingdom of Holland, and all ports and places under the government of France,
 together with the colonies, plantations, and settlements in the possession of
 these governments respectively, and all ports and places in the northern parts
 of Italy, to be reckoned from the ports of Orbitello and Pesaro, inclusively."
 The effect then of the British orders of blockade, now in force, is to deprive
 the commerce of France, Holland and a part of Italy. And they leave open
 to the commerce of all the rest of the world. What that is, some estimate
 may be formed by recurrence to the subjoined table, which exhibits the state
 of our commerce during 1806 and 1807.—The two last years antecedent to the
 operation of our restrictive system. By this table it appears that the value of
 our exports of our domestic products to France, Holland and Italy was during
 the two years, at an average only of about six and a half millions of dollars,
 whereas the average of our domestic exports, to all other parts of the world,
 which are now left free, to us notwithstanding the effect of the British or-
 ders in council exceed thirty-eight millions! So extensive a commerce, it is
 proposed to surrender, for the restricted trade the French emperor will allow.
 The trade burdened by impositions, or harassed by vexations, from French do-
 mination, and French Douaniers, or customhouse officers, in almost every port
 of continental Europe.
 In the scale of commercial advantages France has little to offer, in return,
 for the many obvious hazards, which according to the wish of her Emperor, the
 United States are about to incur: so, in the moral estimate of national pros-
 perity, there is little character to gain, or consolation to expect in the dark scene
 into which we are entering.

* Value of articles of domestic produce, exported to all the world.

	In 1806	In 1807
	Whole amount, \$41,253,727.	Whole amount, \$48,699,592
To France	3,226,698	2,716,141
To Holland, now part of France	3,609,964	3,098,234
To Italy	185,346	250,257
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	7,022,008	6,064,632
	<hr/>	<hr/>
To England and dependencies	19,179,981	27,015,077
To all other parts of the world	15,051,740	14,719,883
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	34,231,721	42,634,960

A nation, like the United States, happy in its great local situation; removed from the bloody theatre of Europe; with a maritime border, opening vast fields for enterprise;—with territorial possessions, exceeding every rival;—its resources rich;—its arms undivided;—from invasion nothing to fear;—from agitations nothing to hope;—how shall such a nation look to hazard for its safety, while throwing away, as though they were worthless, all the blessings and joys, which peace and order distinguished her islands! With what confidence can it address the Great High, when it prepares to pour forth its youthful vigour upon a neighbouring people; from whose strength, it has nothing to dread, from whose devastation it has nothing to gain!

Your ill-were of a nature that war would remedy; if war would compensate any of our losses; or remove any of our complaints, there might be some alleviation of the suffering, in the sphere of the prospect. But how will war upon the land, protect commerce upon the ocean! What value has Canada for wounded honour! How are our mariners benefited by a war, which exposes those who are free, without promising release to those, who are impressed!

But it is said that war is demanded by honour. Is national honour a principle, which thirsts after vengeance, and is appeased only by blood; which trampling on the hopes of man, and spurning the law of God, unmotivated by what is past and careless of what is to come, precipitates itself into any folly, or madness, to gratify a selfish vanity, or to satiate some unhallowed rage! If honour demands a war with England, what evils baffle that honour to sleep over the wrong done to by France! On land, robberies, seizures, imprisonments, by French authority; at sea, pillage, sinkings, burnings, under French orders. These are notorious. Are they unfeared because they are French! Is any alleviation to be found in the correspondence and humiliations of the present Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the French Court! In his communications to our government, as before the public, where is the cause for now selecting France as the friend of our country and England as the enemy!

If no illusions of personal feeling, and no solicitude for elevation of place, should be permitted to misguide the public councils; if it is, indeed, honorable for the true statesman to consult the public welfare, to provide, in truth, for the public defence, and impose no yoke of bondage; with full knowledge of the wrongs inflicted by the French; ought the government of this country to aid the French cause, by engaging in war against the enemy of France! To supply the waste of such a war and to meet the appropriations of millions extraordinary, for the war expenditures; must our fellow-citizens, throughout the Union, be doomed to sustain the burden of war-taxes, in various forms of direct and indirect imposition! For official information respecting the millions deemed requisite for charges of the war; for like information, respecting the nature and amount of taxes deemed requisite for drawing those millions from the community, it is here sufficient to refer to estimates and reports made by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Committee of Ways and Means, and to the body of resolutions, passed in March last, in the House of Representatives.

It would be some relief to our anxiety if amendments were likely to be made for the weakness and wildness of the project, by the prudence of the preparation. But in no aspect of this anomalous affair can we trace the great and distinctive properties of wisdom. There is seen a headlong rushing into difficulties, with little calculation about the means and little concern about the consequences. With a navy, comparatively nominal, we are about to enter into the lists against the greatest marine on the globe. With a commerce, unprotected and spread over every ocean, we propose to make profit by privateering, and for this end, at the wealth of which we see honest proprietors. An invasion is threatened of our colonies of a power, which, without putting a new ship into commission, or taking another soldier into pay, can spread alarm or desolation along the extensive range of our seaboard. The resources of our country, in their natural state, great beyond our wants, or our hopes, are impaired by the effect of artificial restraints. Before adequate fortifications are prepared for domestic defence, before men or money are provided for a war of attack, why hasten into the midst of that awful contest, which is laying waste the globe! It cannot be concealed, that to engage in the present war against England is to place ourselves on the side of France; and exposes us to the vassalage of states, serving under the banners of the French Emperor. The undersigned cannot refrain from asking, What are the United States to gain by this war!

Will the gratification of our...
the desperate...
New York...
A war of invasion...
and as to the...
we...
A Crisis...
Globe...
and...
have...
or any political...

October 1800

all parts of the world

1800	17,750
1801	20,911
1802	27,301
1803	41,101
1804	56,111
1805	70,301

Spain

1800	112,000
1801	94,800
1802	79,800
1803	61,800
1804	47,800
1805	36,800

* In 1800
pounds of O
6 millions
10 millions
1810
for...
Norseway, &
+ In 1811

Will the gratification of some private interests compensate the nation for the... of our legitimate commerce by the extended empire of our enemies, which... the desperate act invited. Will Canada compensate the middle states for... New- York, to be the eastern states for New-Orleans? Let us not be deceived. A war of invasion may invite a return of invasion. When we visit the provinces... and, as to the innocent soldiers of Great Britain with the horrors of war (as... we are assured that our own coast will not be visited with like horrors.)

In crisis of the world such as the present, and under impressions such as... the only under signed could not separate the war, in which the U. States... have, in secret, been proclaimed, as necessary, or required by any moral duty, or any political expediency.

GEORGE SULLIVAN,
MARTIN CHITTENDEN,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
ELIJAH BISHOP,
WILLIAM CRY,
JOSHUA WHEELER,
WILLIAM KEITH,
EADY TARRANT,
LADAM WHEATON,
LEONARD WHITE,
RICHARD HENNING, JR.
ELIHA B. FOSTER,
NATH. GRANTON,
JES. BAYBERRY, JR.
LEMAN LAY,
JOHN C. MCNEELY,
TIMOTHY FOSTER, JR.

LEWIS B. STURGEON,
BENJAMIN TALLEMANT,
H. BRADEN,
JAMES WELLS,
ASA HENGE,
THOMAS A. COLE,
JAMES MILLER,
H. M. BROWN,
C. GREENWOOD,
PERRY B. KEY,
PHILIP STUART,
JOHN HARRIS,
JAMES BISHOPMAN,
JOSEPH LEVY, JR.
THOMAS WILSON,
A. MCNEELY,
JES. FRANK,

NOTE A.

Quantity of particular articles, the produce of the United States, exported from 1800 to 1811, viz.

COTTON.

Table with columns: To all parts of the world, To France, To England, To all parts of the world, To France, To England. Rows: 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803, 1804, 1805. Units: lbs.

WOO.

Table with columns: Tissues, Tissues, Tissues, Tissues, Tissues, Tissues. Rows: 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803, 1804, 1805. Units: none, lbs.

* In 1809, in consequence of the Embargo and non-intercourse act, 4 millions of pounds of Cotton were shipped for Madeira, 10 and a half millions to the Floridas, 6 millions to Foyal and the Azores, 1 million and three quarters to Portugal, and 10 millions to Sweden.

† In 1811, 9 millions of pounds of Cotton were shipped for Russia, 3 millions for Portugal, 3 millions for Madeira, 10 millions for Floridas, 2 millions for Europe generally, 4 millions for Foyal and the Azores, 14 millions for Denmark and Norway, and 5 millions for Sweden.

‡ In 1811, 9 millions of pounds of Cotton were shipped for Russia

TORACCO

Year	To France		To England		To other ports		To Russia		To America	
	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.
1800	77,400			37,798	1806	46,108		8,122		
1801	103,800			41,330	1807	42,282		8,876		
1802	77,711	16,316		39,988	1808	9,376		568		3,326
1803	106,081	9,815		67,839	1809	43,321	none direct			8,922
1804	133,343	16,693		34,700	1810	54,134	do.			24,067
1805	74,353	12,135		18,169	1811	35,828	do.			20,342

FISH, Dried or Smoked.

Year	Quintals		Quintals		Quintals		Quintals	
	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.	Quintals	Bbls.
1800	392,737		141,420		1806	237,667	19,347	66,377
1801	418,548	1,667	111,030		1807	479,824	57,654	55,242
1802	440,926	37,067	92,679		1808	144,000	16,144	26,998
1803	441,870	3,491	71,495		1809	104,000	none	66,566
1804	457,828	3,765	79,822		1810	288,004	2,150	55,456
1805	524,240	75,064	55,476		1811	316,307	28,622	33,242

PICKLED FISH.—None exported to European France.

FLOUR

Year	Bbls.		Bbls.		Bbls.		Bbls.	
	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.
1800	653,053	none	365,739		1806	762,724	none	308,048
1801	1,102,444	none	758,021		1807	1,249,819	none	619,918
1802	1,136,348	14,658	454,885		1808	263,813	none	73,084
1803	1,311,853	18,045	502,066		1809	845,247	none	230,822
1804	810,608	1,074	288,515		1810	798,431	none	192,477
1805	777,313	none	235,176		1811	1,443,012	2,965	375,534

NAVAL STORES—TAR

Year	Bbls.		Bbls.		Bbls.		Bbls.	
	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.
1800	89,410	none	58,793		1806	82,793	none	89,663
1801	87,467	none	62,638		1807	59,282	do.	91,222
1802	37,497	797	21,330		1808	18,764	do.	17,000
1803	78,089	none	75,295		1809	128,090	do.	53,072
1804	58,181	do.	45,310		1810	87,810	do.	48,000
1805	72,745	do.	59,439		1811	149,798	do.	112,000

TURPENTINE

Year	Bbls.		Bbls.		Bbls.		Bbls.	
	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.	Bbls.
1800	28,128	none	22,206		1806	74,781	none	71,254
1801	30,418	do.	24,748		1807	54,451	do.	52,197
1802	36,764	do.	66,768		1808	17,001	do.	17,000
1803	61,178	do.	60,752		1809	77,206	do.	82,883
1804	77,828	do.	76,950		1810	62,512	do.	66,993
1805	95,640	do.	84,228		1811	100,448	do.	97,450

LUMBER

Of the vast quantities of Lumber exported from 1800 to 1811, only a few Shives and Heading went to France, as follows, viz.

Year	Thousands of Shives and Heading		Year	Thousands of Shives and Heading	
	Shives	Heading		Shives	Heading
1801		6,245	1806		715
1802		357	1807		614
1804		321	1808		105
1805		468			

20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000

Quinta
66,377
55,242
26,958
66,366
55,458
33,262

Bbia
308,048
619,918
73,084
230,822
192,477
274,434

Bbia
20,668
21,222
17,222
23,072
20,000
17,222

Bbia
71,854
82,197
17,000
22,622
26,905
27,222

New Slives and

718
614
100

