





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

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
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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE APPROACHING

P E A C E.

*When once we are afraid to speak, we are
no longer safe.* TRENCHARD.



L O N D O N :

Printed for W. MORGAN, in *Pater-Noster Row.*

M.DCC.LXII.

1870

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1870



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1870

1870

TO THE
GUARDIANS
OF THE BRITISH
Liberties and Constitution.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

PROMPTED by the most ardent wishes for the welfare of this country, as well as for the honour and happiness of his Majesty, the writer presumes to lay the following Considerations before you. He does not seek to inflame, but to awaken a due consideration of our many conquests, and the necessity of preserving them at a peace, as the only means of preventing another
war

vi DEDICATION.

war in a short time, and as the only means of terrifying our enemies with a true and just idea of our national strength, and of our wisdom and resolution in continually annihilating their power as often as they break with us : faithfully wedded to these sentiments (the only ones which can be for the true interest of the nation, and are the general sense of all the people) let us not make peace, until our enemies will grant us such terms, as shall not only be advantageous in themselves, but safe and lasting to the future security of our lives and happiness. He confesses to have drawn from report his supposed facts ; if that report be false, so also are his arguments, as they are naturally deduced from it. That both these may be the case, shall be prayer, and is the earnest wish, of one of his Majesty's faithful subjects.

C O N-



CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE APPROACHING

P E A C E.

THE candid public have hitherto looked on the Monitor and North Briton as the trumpeters of faction, and gave little heed to their parallels and quotations from history, intended to awake in us the remembrance of former times;--but now, what have our eyes beheld! the following letter from authority proclaims the certainty of an approaching peace; at a time when it was expected by all honest men, that the career of our arms would not be stopped till our enemies were reduced to reason; till Newfoundland was retaken, and the parliament had met.

B

My

My Lord, Whitehall, Aug. 29, 1762.

“ I have the Earl of Egremont’s directions to acquaint your Lordship, that, in consequence of his Most Christian Majesty’s nomination of the Duc de Ninervois to come here to treat of a peace, the King has been pleased to name the Duke of Bedford to go to Paris for the same purpose ; and his Grace’s appointment will be declared on Wednesday next the first of September. My Lord Egremont thinks it may be of use to make this public in the city as soon as possible.

I am, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship’s most obedient
and humble servant,

ROBERT WOOD.”

To the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor.

A peace at this instant will in all probability brand the times with epithets that will be ever disgraceful in our history. Will not the people cry out, the peace of Utrecht revived! H—— and B—— revived! —Does not the general discontent throughout the nation shew how unfavourable and how unsatisfactory a peace at this juncture is to them?

We

We have been fighting France these seven years, and have met with little else but hard blows ; and now when there is some prospect of obtaining a recompence for the heroism and toils of our warriors, must their hands be tied up? Must a peace be signed just when they are entering upon their harvest, and shall they be disbanded as a reward for all their services?

Peace! peace! peace! has been the cry since the nation first demanded vengeance on the Spaniards in return for their numerous insults. Indeed could any thing else be expected? Or was it to be supposed, that they who industriously endeavoured to stave off this Spanish war, when the absolute necessity of it was first urged, would not as soon as possible wash their hands of all concern in it?

Was it not for this reason, that when the first conquest was made on the Spaniards, it became necessary to treat it as a matter of little importance?

When the Hermione's treasure was brought through the city, all signs of magnificence and illustrious parade were avoided; perhaps as tending to inculcate a dangerous spirit to bravery and conquest among the people, who might from such intoxicating shews grow fond of the war, and tempted to join in it. Can the wisdom of our mo-

dern guides be sufficiently extolled for this great act of prudence? How like the ridiculous old Roman triumph was that procession, with which the French cannon taken at Cherburgh was brought through the city, attended with the colours taken at Louisbourg? It was an incident of the utmost injury to ourselves; the people grew mad with fighting the French, and the poor poltroons were not suffered to rest in any part of their settlements. But how humane, how christian-like, are our people to be for the future! what an alteration are we to expect! Sir Edward Hawke was sent for home: was it feared he would behave so unmannerly to the Spaniards as he has often done to the French? or was it feared that our people would likewise go mad in fighting the Spaniards, that the Hermione's treasure passed with so few attendants to the Tower?—To be sure the English are an odd sort of people, they love to bring their enemies to reason; and if they cannot convince them by fair argument and negotiation, they are so hard hearted as to beat them into a conviction—until new comers and new doctrines are imbibed, by which it is logically proved they have been all the while in the wrong, and that *conquests are their ruin*.—Here is the clue to that crooked
 maze

maze of policy, in which we have been wandering since Mr. P.'s resignation.

But to be serious. It is said we have been *sueing* for a peace with France, and that they have signed the preliminary articles which *we have offered*. For God's sake what can induce us to sue for peace? Is it the general hatred, and even detestation, that is shewn to the new —, that he is afraid of raising the supplies? If that be his fear, why does he not resign (if he be a friend to this country) that some other man may hold that high office, in whom the people chuse to confide? Or have they not abilities to carry on the war, and therefore wish for peace? Or is it because the vast sums, which the support of the war naturally demands, are wanted to be appropriated to other uses? — for we are neither in so humble, nor so poor a condition, as to *sue* for peace from our enemies: there are still immense sums in the nation, and free hearts and hands to give them, if there be but confidence in the m—. There is still a spirit in the people, notwithstanding the loss of Newfoundland, to fight our enemies; and there is still a true loyalty and faithful affection to his Majesty's person. With these advantages (which are the only ones for carrying on a war with success) will not any man of honesty say we
 have

have nothing to fear, and therefore ought to continue the war, till our enemies are compelled to *solicit* a peace *from us*, or at least are reduced to reason?—but a man of discernment will answer, we have the worst of all fears, that our confidence has been misplaced, if we trusted to a vigorous prosecution of the war in hopes of being indemnified for the great sums already expended, for now behold—we *are* to have peace. Is this the glorious opportunity for making peace, when the great council of the nation stands prorogued, and the French still tremble at the names of some of our brave commanders?

To shew how injurious, how fatally injurious to this nation, a peace with France is, before they are sufficiently humbled, (which is not yet) it will be necessary to present the reader with the following sentiments of a Frenchman, which were laid before the French ministry just before the present war was declared.

“ MOTIVES for a PEACE with
ENGLAND.

By an old FRENCH SEA OFFICER.

THE peace of Aix la Chapelle gave us time, had we properly employed it, to raise a drooping trade and feeble navy. We drove on with a prosperous gale for a few
few

few, a very few years, till America became the subject of dispute. Commissaries met to settle limits. We amused the English with frequent conferences, and at the same time we maintained our rights in America. They were, at last, wise enough to speak to us in another manner; for whilst we were gaining some insignificant acres on the Ohio, they took our ships on the ocean. We drove them to this policy. They knew this would make us declare war, which we could not support without sailors, and almost all ours were prisoners in England. This was a blow we did not foresee, but have severely felt.

“ Was it prudent to risk our home trade, and to ruin all at once our marine, which began to recover itself, for the sake of supporting some imaginary rights, and making conquests in America? Ought we not to have waited, at least ten years, till we were in a condition effectually to support our claims? The English would have done our business had we permitted them. They had neglected their navy, and disbanded their artificers, who flew to France and Spain for maintenance. Whilst their individuals squandered their riches, the state grew parsimonious, and began to save in those articles on which they cannot be too profuse.—Was it our business to awake or
arouse

arouse them from their lethargy? Yet we did it, and the consequence is obvious. We have taught them to believe a real truth, *They cannot strengthen themselves too much by sea or land.* This is a resolution we never thought of. This may be fatal to us; for the longer we carry on the war, the more their effeminacy will wear off, and their ancient spirit and courage revive. They will not have more wealth, but they will have more wisdom. The military virtues and the manly exercises may become fashionable, and the nation which seemed immersed in debauchery and corruption, may think seriously, and be once more, what it has often been, the terror of Europe. This is not an unnatural supposition. They easily glide from one extreme to another. It is their natural temper, and their whole history is one continued proof of it.

“ War may empty their coffers in part, but will add strength to their body politick; and that strength will soon refill those coffers with large interest: whilst we exhaust our wealth, without any hope of regaining it by trade, which we can scarce carry on but by privateers.

“ Charles the XIIth of Sweden disciplined the Russians. France has taught policy to the Spaniards as well as to the English. She has taught them the truth of their
 their

their old maxim, peace with England. Their sagacious ministers have turned the tide of commerce into their own ports, of which we are but too sensible.

“ Our past conduct has, to all intents and purposes, really united Scotland to England. The former abounds in good officers and hardy soldiers. It even furnishes numbers for the sea, for their mariners increase by the vast increase of their trade. Their commerce strengthens that of England, by opening more channels for the entrance of wealth, which insensibly finds its way to the heart of the kingdom, and from thence diffuses itself into every part.

“ This was a fatal blow to the interest of France, and is now irreparable: but even this is trivial to what we should suffer if England should behave in the same manner to the large and fertile kingdom of Ireland. What should we say, if partiality and prejudice should subside, and that kingdom be viewed in a just light, and made a proper and natural use of? A continuation of the war will drive England into that expedient. If she should grant it the same liberty in trade as to Scotland, its commerce would extend, and a great addition be thereby made to the power and wealth of England, who would then have

docks on the west of that island, and fleets there ready in a moment for any expedition. She would then destroy our woollen manufactures (which at present hurt her's) as it would then be impossible to obtain materials. She would then furnish the Irish with the means of assisting her, and all this at the expence of France.

“ The general weakness and supineness that for ever attends immoderate wealth and luxury, hides from the English the knowledge of their own strength, real power, and true interest. Suffer them not to relapse into virtue and understanding. Plunge them not too deep into difficulties, and they will never emerge from folly into real wisdom.

“ Give them peace; and they will soon return to their amusements of elections, party and faction.

“ Give them peace; and their navy will once more be laid up to rot, and their seamen and artificers once more be turned over to us.

“ Give them peace; and we shall not fear the defection of allies, which will ruin our present system.

“ Give them peace; and they will never think of schemes for increasing their people, or for making every part of their dominions of real use to every other.

“ Pursue

“ Pursue steadily the plan for fifteen or twenty years, constantly directing the riches of the kingdom to the raising a navy, equal or superior, to England; and then, and not till then, shall we be able to strike the blow we have, for above a century, meditated.”

Here the Frenchman himself points out the danger of our making peace at such a period as the present; and surely we ought to believe him, because he speaks in the interest of his own country, which always was directly opposite to that of our's.

Hence it is evident, that a peace with France, before her riches and strength are exhausted, is the same thing as bribing an executioner to cut off our own heads; and, by the present system, France will never be exhausted, till Spain is cut off from all her resources in America; therefore Spain, as well as France, ought to be vigorously attacked in every quarter of the globe, before any terms of accommodation are ever thought of: for “ this is the time; let us crush the whole House of Bourbon*.” Our fleets and armies are in the highest spirits,

C 2. and

* Mr. Pitt's words in the council, when he strongly urged the necessity of a war with Spain—words that ought to be engraven in letters of gold.

and wish for nothing so ardently as to gratify their resentments, by conquering their islands and settlements, and seizing their treasures. It is a noble thirst, which nothing but the very objects themselves ought to quench; and must be completely done, in order to secure us from future danger, or in a few years we shall have another war.

As the French ministry have long made it clearly manifest that they never had any thing but sinister views in all the negotiations for peace hitherto set on foot, it becomes the duty of all honest men to join in defeating their purposes, by refusing, as well to offer terms, as to listen to any that may be offered, till they are so exhausted in both riches and strength as to be no longer formidable, and consequently no longer dangerous.

As there is more of distrust than sincerity to be expected from our enemies, have we not reason to suspect that there is some view for setting on foot this negociation? that it is done with a design to accomplish a cessation of arms for a limited time? or, at least, to make us relax in our measures; to call home our fleet, in order to furnish an opportunity for the Spanish register-ships, and French St. Domingo men, to get safe into their ports? by which the coffers of their

their respective courts will be replenished ; and, as soon as that is done, the negotiation is to break off, and the recruited enemies to reward us by the most vigorous efforts for our folly and credulity? That this scheme is not unlikely to be their principal aim every candid Englishman will allow ; then let us think about means for defeating it : at least let us think it is so, and be provided for the worst. Let a spirit of patriotism and emulation awake the people with a true sense of the supposed approaching danger, and let them present dutiful and becoming addresses to the throne, on the importance of our conquests, and the great necessity of keeping them ; solicit the parliament's being convened ; and, like a free people who value their privileges and properties, instruct their representatives on these invaluable concerns. These are the only means to rouse the great into fear. Let us remember the spirit of former times, and conduct ourselves by wise and animating examples. It is a merit in times of public danger to exert ourselves in defence of our country : the Romans took a pride in it.

There are instructions still extant, which were given by the electors of the county of Merioneth, to William Vaughan, Esq; their representative in the year 1742, which are written in a true *English Spirit*, and worthy

worthy of present imitation ; therefore it may not be amiss to present them to the reader.

To WILLIAM VAUGHAN, *Esq;* *Representative of the County of Merioneth.*

“ WE the freeholders of the county of
 “ Meric eth take this occasion to
 “ put you in mind, that we, who elected
 “ you to represent us in parliament, without
 “ any other motive, without any influence
 “ whatsoever, except the good Opinion we
 “ had conceived of your Integrity, and of
 “ your love for your country, think we
 “ have a right to expect that you should
 “ attend the duty of that trust, which you
 “ have taken upon you. We conceive,
 “ Sir, that you are bound by all the ties that
 “ can engage an honest man, to attend it
 “ at all times ; but that there is more than
 “ ordinary reason to be watchful at the pre-
 “ sent juncture, when (by some trans-
 “ actions) we have reason to apprehend
 “ that attempts will be made which can
 “ have no consequence but to increase our
 “ grievances.

“ We hope, Sir, that no private engage-
 “ ment, no family - interests, will prevail
 “ upon you, or any gentleman, to keep
 “ from the place where the absence of one
 honest

“ honest man may occasion the loss of the
 “ public liberty.

“ As the impunity of public criminals
 “ may tacitly encourage and authorize
 “ crimes, we conjure you to use all means
 “ in prosecuting national justice, and in ex-
 “ amining the complaints of a feeling
 “ people; since the liberty of the whole
 “ depends on the integrity and virtue of
 “ the individuals.

“ Hold no communication with those,
 “ who no sooner scented the air of a court,
 “ than they forgot the friends who confided
 “ in them, and the country which nou-
 “ rished them.

“ We desire, Sir, that you will keep a
 “ watchful, a suspicious eye, over those
 “ who are for degrading this once rich
 “ country, who are for reducing it to a
 “ province, to a land to which we are
 “ strangers. In a word, exert an *English*
 “ *spirit*, in opposing all bad designs.”

The right of instructing our representa-
 tives in parliament, is a privilege which
 Englishmen yet enjoy, and I hope will ever
 be retained. Liberty is the darling property
 of Englishmen; but it is a misfortune that
 nothing is more evident than that the people
 of England may by good words be brought
 to suffer any thing. They fix their eyes
 upon the Sovereign, and whilst they have

a gracious Prince upon the throne, whose glory is centered in the happiness of his subjects, they are intent only on those things which proceed from the throne, and hug themselves in security.

Whilst they are admiring the impartial justice of a judge, in a court of judicature, they suffer a —— to pick their pockets. Is there but one man in the nation who can make us slaves? Yes, there are thousands smiling in our faces. Let us ferret them then from their holes; of whatever magnitude they are, or in whatever class they may rank themselves.

Nothing is more ridiculous than to urge that we have nothing to fear from our present g———. Be it so. But why should we put a sword in their hands, more than justice requires? Such language is no more than this. We will prepare our necks for the yoke; but we know you will not put it on. A compliment, which might have been made properly enough by a people broken to servitude; but an Englishman, as long as he regards his honour, or his country, will abhor such intolerable servility. Shall we suffer ourselves, like Gibraltar, to be set up to the neck in batteries, without one effort to disengage ourselves?---Rather let us remedy the evil by removing the causes: if there be a want of money for carrying on the
war,

war, let us make a free-gift; shew our steadiness to our own interests, our loyalty and attachment to his Majesty's crown and dignity, and an unshaken resolution to support him against all his enemies. These are measures which will terrify the enemy, and invigorate all our commanders to act with a true English spirit. Let the grumblers who begrudge paying the land-tax, whose fortunes are immense, and whose avarice is unbounded, be regarded as the enemies of their country, who, for the sake of saving a few pounds annually, are for precipitately concluding a peace with the enemy on any terms, that will in a short time bring on another war, and impoverish perhaps ourselves and our posterity.

Can it be suspected that there are any of the servants of the crown, capable of admitting a thought that would tend to diminish the credit or interest of their country by a shameful negotiation? The people have demonstrated their sense of merit in the late conductors of their affairs, and are still willing, on all proper occasions, to give them further proofs of it; and they will, no doubt, as warmly resent any sacrifice that may be made of their rights and properties, so dearly purchased. Let us not listen to the sound of peace, till our enemies conjointly make such proposals, as we may

D

with

with honour accept: rather let us see his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, treating all foreign agents as they justly deserve both here and elsewhere, put himself once more at the head of the British army, and render himself as terrible to the French and Spaniards as he was to the rebels; and, to the disgrace of such as make war a trade, procure us a safe, honourable, and lasting peace!

The REPORTED preliminary articles* of the approaching treaty, are

The English to have all Canada, and the settlements at the back of the Carolinas and Georgia, extending westward to the river Mississippi, which is to be the boundary, according to *Vaudreuil's map*†.

The French to have a fishery on the banks of Newfoundland, in the same manner as before the war, and, it is said, to be given the island of Sable to dry their fish on. ---Likewise to have a settlement on the west side of Newfoundland, for drying, &c.

Martinico

* Although it is *reported* (and I hope there is no other foundation but report) that these are the terms; yet, I am persuaded, there is no honest Englishman who will give credit to them, till he hears it from better authority.

† Vaudreuil, was Governor of Montreal, and had several curious maps of the country drawn there. --- Quere, as these maps were drawn by a Frenchman, are they not very false?

Martinico, Guadalupe, Marigalante, and St. Lucia, to be restored to the French.--- Tobago, and the rest of the Neutral Islands, to be ceded to Great-Britain.

The affairs of the East-Indies are to be put on the same footing as agreed on with M. Bussy last year.

Minorca to be ceded to the English, and Belleisle to the French.

Senegal to remain with the English, and Goree to be restored.

The Havannah, if taken, to be restored to the Spaniards.

On these supposed articles (the most extraordinary that could be ever thought of, even if we were in a state of bankruptcy) I shall make some remarks, tending to shew the importance of those places we are said to restore, and the low estimation in which all sensible men hold those we retain; for to discuss a point fairly, however interesting to a King and People, is a privilege to which an Englishman is yet entitled; and I am by no means for abusing it.

The English to have all Canada, and the settlements at the back of the Carolinas and Georgia, extending westward to the river Mississippi, which is to be the boundary.

The retention of Canada is principally considered, as being the first object of the war, and the security naturally derived from our possession of it, to the Indian tribes at the back of our northern provinces; but it should likewise be considered, that it is a country too sharp for Englishmen to live in. It is excessive cold, and inaccessible half the year, and many parts of it very barren; and taking ten years together, it does not produce provisions sufficient for its inhabitants, therefore it received supplies from France. Its only valuable commodity is furs and skins, and not enough of those to pay for the woollen and other manufactures from France; therefore, in point of trade, it was rather a burden than profit to the French; but ever since the reign of King William, France entertained hopes from thence to be able to reduce and make herself master of our colonies, by a chain of forts at the back of our settlements; and this was the great reason that she supported Canada: But we being now masters of it, I will venture to say that we shall not reap much advantage from it in point of commerce; its great value to us is, that our fertile colonies will enjoy peace and quiet, and be no more annoyed from thence.

The

The French to have a fishery on the Banks of Newfoundland in the same manner as they had before the war; and to be given the Island of Sable for drying their fish on. Likewise to have a Settlement on the West Side of Newfoundland for drying, &c.

This article will occasion great disputes; for in one part (*the French to have a fishery on the banks of Newfoundland in the same manner they had before the war*) it is allowed according to the treaty of Utrecht; and in the latter part, the French settlement is confined to the western side only. The treaty of Utrecht stipulates thus, “ *Art. XIII.* “ The island called Newfoundland, with the adjacent islands, shall from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain: nor shall the Most Christian King, his heirs and successors, or any of their subjects, at any time hereafter, lay claim to any right to the said island and islands, or to any part of it, or them. Moreover, it shall not be lawful for the subjects of France to fortify any place in the said island of Newfoundland, or to erect any buildings there, besides stages made of boards, and huts necessary and usual for drying of fish; or to resort to the said island beyond the time necessary

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cessary for fishing and drying of fish. But it shall be allowed to the subjects of France to catch fish, and to dry them on land, in that part only; and in no other besides that, of the said island of Newfoundland, which stretches from the place called Cape Bonavista to the northern point of the said island; and from thence running down by the western side, reaches as far as the place called Point Riche."

The treaty of Utrecht thus allows the French a part of the island on the east and west sides, as well as the northern extremity. The limits fixed by this treaty are what we are to understand by the words, *as before the war*. Perhaps it is meant, that the French shall have (besides the liberty of drying their fish as abovementioned) an actual part of the territory of Newfoundland to erect forts on, build towns, &c. To this very great advantage, it is said, we give them the island of Sable likewise to dry their fish on: as this is an advantage which they never had before, is it intended that the French shall increase their fishery, since they require more land for drying their fish on? If so, we shall soon be in a perilous condition; for the French, by an increase of their former fishery, will likewise increase their navy, as it will afford them great numbers of good seamen, to
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begin hostilities afresh in a few years; nay, even contend with us upon our own element. Is it in consideration of the French relinquishing Canada, that we are to give them the island of Sable? Or is it in consideration of their restoring to us part of Newfoundland?—To shew the *real* importance of the island of Sable, it may not be amiss to give a description of it. It lies in lat. 44, 15 N. long. 59. 2 W. about 130 miles east from Halifax in Nova Scotia, and about 100 miles South from Louisbourg; it abounds with several fine sand hills, has a large lake in the middle, and is about 20 miles in length, and three in breadth. Adjoining to it is a very large fishing bank, called after its own name; and contiguous to it are several other fishing banks, which extend along the coast of Nova Scotia, and are not inferior to those of Newfoundland; and have this advantage, that the climate is by far more temperate than it is there; therefore the giving the enemy permission to cure their fish here, is not only granting them a very valuable nursery for seamen, which it is our immediate interest to prevent as much as possible; but it is doing great prejudice to our colony of Nova Scotia, which we have taken such pains to rear and protect, as there is the greatest reason to expect, that soon after this cedere

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all their fishery will be usurped by the enemy, and the colony itself be encroached upon, and insulted, in the same manner, as was done immediately after the late treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Besides, should they fortify this island, and they doubtless would, it would in a time of war be a great eye-sore to our harbour of Halifax; and though it has not either port or harbour at present, yet its situation and coast will admit of its becoming a nest of privateers to the great detriment of our trade. The only way to deal with the French nation is not to permit them to have an inch of ground near any of our North American settlements. In a word, it is the only way we can act with safety to ourselves; and if this was not the sense of the ministry when they demolished Louisbourg, what was it demolished for? Therefore Sable ought by all means to remain in its present condition. The French are to enjoy, without this island, a more extensive branch of the fishery, with its conveniences, than they ought. It was said when M. Bussy was here, that nothing less than *all* North America, and the *whole* American fishery, would satisfy the people of this nation for the injuries they have received. Have we since that time changed our inhabitants or our opinions?—I hope neither.

Martinico,

Martinico, Guadalupe, Marigalante, and St. Lucia, to be restored to the French.—Tobago and the rest of the neutral islands to be ceded to Great-Britain.

The importance of Martinico will be seen by its produce. It makes annually about forty thousand hogsheds of white sugar, and ten thousand of brown, prodigious quantities of coffee, cocoa, and a good deal of cotton: it has an excellent harbour, to which all ships repair in the hurricane season. St. Pierre is a very populous, large, and well-built town; here it is that the produce of the French Windward Islands centers, and from whence they are all furnished with European goods, as well as the four Neutral Islands. This island has ever been the terror of Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat; and, if restored, will bring us again in a future war.

Guadalupe is extremely fruitful, and capable of very great improvement; has a pretty good harbour at Point Petre, and has at present about seventy thousand negroes: it is in sight of Antigua and Montserrat, to windward of them, and not above twelve leagues distance. The great wealth of it at the time we took it was unknown,

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Martinico,

and the sole motive of attacking it, (as appears by the accounts published by authority) was, the destroying the nest of privateers, which continually infested those seas, to the great annoyance, and almost destruction, of the trade of our own islands. It is surprising, that now we are in possession of it, we should so soon have forgot, in what view it was considered when in the hands of the French. If we restore this Dunkirk of America, most probably we shall repent it in another war. On the contrary, by keeping it we may not only annoy them by privateers at the beginning of a war, but in the course of it; the island may be of great utility in facilitating our enterprizes in those seas. It would have been much better for the nation this conquest had never been made, than to restore it now; for since we have had the possession of it, the planters have been the chief gainers. They have sold their sugars and other products so dear, and bought their negroes so cheap, that it is computed they have nearly doubled their fortunes. If after this we should give up the island to the French, should we not be in the situation of a jeweller, who having received a diamond in the rough; should return it beautifully polished, without requiring any consideration. The generous capitulation
granted

granted to the inhabitants by General Barrington, not only secured that valuable conquest, but gained all their hearts, so that at present they are in general extremely disposed to become faithful subjects under so mild and wise a government. By all accounts it appears, that the annual produce of this island is not less than 66 or 70,000 hogsheds; value 20*l.* each, besides very considerable quantities of coffee, cotton, cocoa and ginger, which will employ, at a moderate computation, 4 or 500 ships to bring home, including the negro trade; and be a nursery for at least 5000 men. The Custom-House books will confirm this calculation.

Marigalante is as large as Antigua, and produces a great deal of tobacco and coffee.

St. Lucia is one of the Neutral Islands, and not above four or five leagues distant from Martinico, and has the best harbour of all the Windward Islands, and therefore claims our greatest attention, since in all our islands we have not a single harbour; St. John's at Antigua excepted. This island grows a great deal of coffee and cocoa.

It is computed that the islands comprehended in this article make annually at least one hundred thousand hogsheds of white and brown sugar, the duty of which would be 600,000*l.* a year, if we keep those islands.

islands. Their coffee, cocoa, cotton, and rum, would amount to as much as their sugar; and it could be easily made appear, that these islands would pay at least one million a year revenue; and this would pay half the interest of all the money borrowed the whole war, beside the amazing trade it would occasion to the kingdom.

The Neutral Islands which we are to have are St. Vincent, St. Domingo and Tobago, all places of very little importance, and especially the latter; of which a French merchant said, if any person was to offer him a thousand pound in one hand and Tobago in the other, he would take the money.

The affairs of the East-Indies are to be put on the same footing as agreed on with M. Bussy last year.*

The East-India Company ought to determine whether this is for their interest or not? — Observe, Pondicherry was taken since.

Minorca shall be ceded to the English; and Belleisle to the French.

It would be much better for Great-Britain if the French were to keep Minorca; for

* It is added, that the French are to have no settlements on the east side of the Ganges.

for while we had it, our fleets in the Mediterranean did nothing but lie in the harbour of Mahon, under some excuse of careening, watering, &c. Now we have it not, they must of necessity keep out at sea; and perhaps it is owing to this necessity, that Du Quesne and De La Clue were taken. Belleisle is of the same importance to us as Minorca is to the French; viz. an expence to keep it.

*Senegal to remain with the English,
and Goree to be restored.*

Pity all the other articles were not equally as equitable.

*The Havannah, if taken, to be
restored to the Spaniards.*

Why?---Why not an equivalent for this restoration? Would the Spaniards, if they had taken Jamaica, have restored it, unless we had given them Gibraltar, or some other place as valuable?---The Spaniards forced us into a war with them on account of their family-compact, and they ought to pay for it. The restoration of the Havannah without an equivalent will excite great disgusts, especially as it is probable it has, or will cost us dear. Its importance has been too recently ushered into the world* to need any farther explanation here.

Not

* Vide Gazetteer, August 30.

Not a word is reported to have been said about Louisiana, nor the family compact, tho' objects of the utmost importance; nor of Germany, which I suppose is left to shift for itself, notwithstanding the late defeat of the Hereditary Prince of Brunswic; which I am afraid will go well nigh towards frustrating our successes there this campaign; as the consequence will not only be the junction of the French armies, but will give new vigour to their troops; --- and perhaps be not without its influence on the negociation of our supposed approaching peace.

Such is the *great* importance of the *supposed* articles of our future peace, which I persuaded can never be the true ones,* because I cannot believe there is any inducement on our side to the making of them: neither do I believe that our rulers are so destitute of all sense of the national honour and interest.

Now supposing these are to be the articles (for all the way, I have nothing more than *supposed* it) what have we been fighting for? --- Canada and Sengal! --- Where then is the benefit of making war if we are to return almost all that we take? We had much better never put ourselves to expence nor hazard of our lives, in attempting to conquer any thing, if it is to be restored. Are the millions of the nation to be squandered away without any advantage made of them, and the lives of men sacrificed, and innumerable families

* I am glad to find it is *reported* that the *real* and *true* articles have not transpired out of the cabinet.

families ruined, only to acquire an empty name of glory? If this is to be the case, when at any time hereafter we break with the enemy, we ought only to act on the defensive; and instead of attempting to take any of their places, only take care of our own; it would be great saving to the nation, and shew signs of foresight and prudence.

By renouncing our conquests we renounce the very means for paying off our national debt: what then will our posterity say of us, for entailing upon them such a grievous burden of misery? Will they not curse the folly of their ancestors? and will they not blacken us with appellations, which can be then no crime to pronounce? and consider our dastardly reported reason for making peace (at this critical time when there are so many prospects of more advantages, whereby as well as by our present conquests the debt might in a great measure be paid) as an infamy that never can be wiped off, *viz.* "That we are undone; we cannot raise money to support the war another year, and therefore must make such a peace as our enemies will admit?" --- If the French were in our case and we in theirs, they would not grant us such terms.

Let those who assert the above reason for making peace consider, that as long as we have a Patriot King there can be no fear of raising what supplies are necessary to support the war;

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war ; and of our being able to compel our enemies to the necessity of accepting such a peace, as a British King shall think reasonable to give. This, and this only can fix our security for EVER on a firm basis.

Let us but follow the blows already given to our enemies, and there will in a short time be the fairest expectation, not only to get out of all difficulties, but to reduce their dangerous power within due limits for a long time to come. Nothing but our own impatience can hinder us now from what they prevented once before, by the same arts, in a parallel conjuncture. Let any man lay his hand upon his heart and say if (after the approaching peace is made on the terms as they are reported) we are ever to expect, or can always avoid a war with France? --- And when he has answered, that the growth and ambition of the French power, her breach of treaties, her rival-ship in trade, the natural antipathy and jealousy of the two nations, must bring it unavoidably upon us in a short time; let him then consider whether there can be any sense left in the people of England, if they are not earnestly desirous to push on the present war with the utmost vigour, now we stand in a situation in which we can hardly hope to find ourselves again, in order to effectually humble our enemies, and compel them

them to grant us better terms for the security of our future happiness?

In a word ; as we have had a successful war, can there be any excuse for making a bad peace? Has it appeared that there is a want of either money or spirit to carry on the war? And, is not a peace at this time (when we have reason to expect many conquests) repugnant to the general sense of the people of England? --- *Remember the peace of Utrecht!*

F I N I S.

