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CANADA
HOUSE OF COMMONS

Special Committee on Defence
1964

INDEX

	Nos.
A O M See Advisor on Militia.....	
Advisor on Militia.....	12 p.365
Air Industries Association of Canada Brief.....	23 p.931-6
Air Industries Association "Policy for Industrial Technology in Canada" Only copy filed with Committee's papers in Committees Branch. Not in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Committee.....	
Alcide, Visit to. See H M C S Alcide.....	
Approved Building and Conversion Programme (Chart).....	26 p.1056
"Armament and Modern Weapons" by Department of National Defence.....	Supp. p.153-170
Arms Control, Disarmament and.....	Supp. p.131-152
Armstrong, Elgin B. Deputy Minister of National Defence. Regular Officer Training Plan.....	9 p.285-8
Statement (Bill C-90).....	4 p.113-8
Bill C-90.....	1-6 incl.
"Bobcat" program.....	21 p.877-9
Bonaventure, Visit to. See H M C S Bonaventure.	
Bull, Hedley: "Disarmament and Arms Control".....	Supp. p.131-152
Bylaws No. 5-7 of Canadian Commercial Corporation	25 p.1035-41
C A F R C's (Canadian Armed Forces Recruiting Centres).....	27 p.1094-99
C A F R C's. Examples of Organization.....	27 p.1096
C A F R C's Location and Geographical boundaries.....	27 p.1097
C D A See Conference of Defence Associations..	
C E P See Civil Emergency Planning.....	
Canada's Obligations to the United Nations and International Operations.....	Supp. p.51-63
Canadian Commercial Corporation Bylaw No 7.....	24 p.995-6
Bylaws No 5-7.....	25 p.1035-41
Glassco Commission.....	24 p.998-9
.....	25 p.1015
Persons authorized to sign documents re contracts, etc.....	25 p.1022-4
Canadian Commercial Corporation P.C. approving bylaws 6 and 7.....	25 p.1027
Canadian Commercial Corporation Status (Mr. Winch) Witnesses.....	20 p.830-4 24

CANADA

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Special Committee on Defence

1964

INDEX

Nos.

A D M See Advisor on Militia..... 12 p.365
Advisor on Militia..... 29 p.991-6
Air Industries Association of Canada, Brief.....
Air Industries Association "Policy for Industrial
Technology in Canada" Only copy filed with
Committee's papers in Committee Branch. Not
in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Committee.....
Alcide, Visit to. See N M C 3 Alcide.....
(Chart).....
"Armament and Modern Weapons" by Department of
National Defence.....
Arms Control, Disarmament and.....
Armstrong, Elgin R. Deputy Minister of National
Defence. Regular Officer Training Plan.....
Statement (Bill C-90).....
Bill C-90.....
"Bodcar" program.....
Bonaventure, Visit to. See N M C 5 Bonaventure.
Bull, Hedley: "Disarmament and Arms Control"....
Bylaws Nos. 5-7 of Canadian Commercial Corporation
C A F R C's (Canadian Armed Forces Recruiting
Centres).....
C A F R C's. Examples of Organization.....
C A F R C's Location and Geographical
Boundaries.....
C D A See Conference of Defence Associations..
C E P See Civil Emergency Planning.....
Canada's Obligations to the United Nations and
International Operations.....
Canadian Commercial Corporation Bylaw No 7....
Bylaws No 5-7.....
Disarmament Commission.....
Persons authorized to sign documents re
contracts, etc.....
Canadian Corporation P.C. approving
Bylaws 6 and 7.....
Canadian Commercial Corporation Status (Mr. Wand)
Witnesses.....

	Nos.
Canadian Commercial Corporation Employees Integration into Civil Service	21 p.847-8
Canadian Defence Expenditures against Prime Contracts placed in Canada for 4 Major Industries 1960/61; 1962/63	22 p.906-7
Canadian Defence Policies since 1867	Supp. p.5-23
Canadian Maritime Command, Atlantic visit	15
Canadian Military Participation in Peacekeeping and Truce-Supervising Activities since November 9, 1945	Supp. p.63
Cardin, Hon. Lucien Associate Minister of National Defence	3, 10, 11, 13,16
Cardin, Hon. Lucien Associate Minister of National Defence Militia's role in Defence	13 p.386-9
Cardin, Hon. Lucien Associate Minister of National Defence Statement re Commission and Committees on naval and air force reserves	16 p.482-5
Charles, Commodore John A. National Defence Dept. (Navy)	26 p.1046-54
Civil Emergency Planning	7, 8
Clarke, Commander G.	10
Columbia Visit to. See H M C S Columbia	
Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia) Brigadier E.R. Suttier, Chairman, Witness	14
Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia) Report. Part 2	18 p.641-799
Commodore Groos	9, 10
A Comparison of Defence Expenditures in Canada and Certain Other Countries	Supp. p.87-94
Conference of Defence Associations Brief	12 p.357-60
Construction (New) and Conversion Programmes See New Construction and Conversion Programmes	
Conventional and Nuclear Armaments by John Gellner	Supp. p.171-9
Curtis, W.A. Air Marshal Statement	6 p.163-5
Davis, Commodore S. Mathwin National Defence Dept. (Navy)	26 p.1054-9
Defence Actual Expenditures	3 p.83-5
Cash Disbursements	3 p.83-5
Defence, Dept. See also National Defence, Dept of	
"Defence Expenditures and its influence on the Canadian Economy" April 1964	22 p.895-907
Defence Expenditure and Canadian Economy	
Drury, C.M.	22 p.907-26
Harkness, D.	22 p.916-19
Lambert, M.	22 p.908-9
Smith, H.	22 p.913-17
Winch	22 p.910-13
Text of report	Supp. p.95-107
Defence Expenditure and its Influence on the Canadian Economy Text	Supp. p.95-107

Nos.

Canadian Commercial Corporation Employees
Integration into Civil Service..... 21 p.847-8
Canadian Defence Expenditures against Price
Contracts placed in Canada for A Major
Industries 1900/01; 1952/53..... 22 p.906-7
Canadian Defence Policies since 1867?..... Supp. p.3-23
Canadian Maritime Command, Atlantic visit..... 15
Canadian Military Participation in Peacekeeping
and Truce-Supervising Activities since
November 9, 1945..... Supp. p.63
Cardin, Hon. Lucien Associate Minister of
National Defence..... 3, 10, 11, 13,16
Cardin, Hon. Lucien Associate Minister of
National Defence Militia's role in Defence.. 13 p.386-9
Cardin, Hon. Lucien Associate Minister of
National Defence Statement re Commission and
Committees on naval and air force reserves... 16 p.482-5
Charles, Commodore John A. National Defence
Dept. (Navy)..... 26 p.1045-54
Civil Emergency Planning..... 7, 8
Clarke, Commander G..... 10
Columbia Visit to. See H M C S Columbia.....
Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian
Army (Militia) Brigadier E.H. Butler,
Chairman, Witness..... 14
Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian
Army (Militia) Report, Part 2..... 18 p.641-799
Commodore Cross..... 9, 10
A Comparison of Defence Expenditures in Canada
and certain Other Countries..... Supp. p.87-94
Conference of Defence Associations Brief..... 12 p.357-60
Construction (New) and Conversion Programmes
Programmes..... See New Construction and Conversion
Conventional and Nuclear Armaments by
John Collner..... Supp. p.171-9
Curtis, W.A. Air Marshal Statement..... 6 p.163-5
Davis, Commodore S. Mathwin National Defence
Dept. (Navy)..... 26 p.1054-9
Defence Actual Expenditures..... 3 p.83-5
Cash Disbursements..... 3 p.83-5
Defence, Dept. See also National Defence, Dept of
"Defence Expenditures and its Influence on the
Canadian Economy" April 1954..... 22 p.895-907
Defence Expenditures and Canadian Economy
Drury, C.M..... 22 p.907-26
Harkness, D..... 22 p.916-19
Lambert, M..... 22 p.908-9
Smith, H..... 22 p.913-17
Winch..... 22 p.910-13
Text of report..... Supp. p.95-107
Defence Expenditures and its Influence on the
Canadian Economy Text..... Supp. p.95-107

	Nos.
Defence Expenditure and the Gross National Product 1947-1963..Text	Supp. p.109-130
Defence Expenditures A Comparison Canada and other Countries	Supp. p.87-94
Defence Expenditures against Prime Contracts 4 Major industries	22 p.906-7
Defence Expenditures, (Estimated) by Provinces	22 p.925
Defence Policies of NATO Members and some other Nations	Supp. p.35-49
Defence Policies Related to Foreign Policies	Supp. p.25-33
Defence Policies since 1867	Supp. p.5-23
Defence Production Dept. Chart of Dept	21 p.853
Defence Production Dept. "Defence Expenditure and its Influence on the Canadian Economy"	Supp. p.95-107
Defence Production Dept. Hon. Charles M. Drury's Statement re	20 p.823-8
Defence Production Dept. of Special Paper Respecting Defence Expenditure and its Indluence on the Canadian Economy	22 p.895-907
Defence Production Dept. of Staff Summary	20 p.843-4
Dept. of National Defence See National Defence Dept. of	
Disarmament and Arms Control	Supp. p.131-152
Disarmament Economic Consequences of	Supp. p.109-130
Disarmament References (Bibliography of 7 items)	Supp. p.130
"Draft Report" of the sub-committee to the House considered as 4th report of the Special Committee on Defence to the House	17 p.607-23
Draper, W.J. Capt. Conference of Defence Associations	12, 15
Draper Report	16 p.593-6
Drury, C.M. Minister of Defence Production	
Canadian Commercial Corporation	24 p.979-82
Defence Expenditure	22 p.907-8
Defence Production Dept	20 p.823-8
E.M.O	7 p.230-43
Witness	7,8,20,22,24,2
E M O See Emergency Measures Organization	
Eayrs, James Canadian Defence Policies since 1867	Supp. p.5-23
Economic Conditions & Defence Expenditures	
Drury, C.M	22 p.907-26
Harkness, D	22 p.916-19
Lambert, M	22 p.908-9
Smith, H	22 p.913-17
Winch, H	22 p.910-13
Economic Consequences of Disarmament by G. Rosenbluth	Supp. p.109-130
Emergency Measures Organization Established	7 p.230-47
Questions	8

Nos.

Defence Expenditures and the Gross National
Product 1947-1963...Text..... Supp. p.109-130
Defence Expenditures: A Comparison Canada and
other Countries..... Supp. p.87-94
Defence Expenditures against Prime Contracts
& Major Industries..... 22 p.909-7
Defence Expenditures, (Estimated) by Provinces.. 22 p.925
Defence Policies of NATO Members and some other
Nations..... Supp. p.35-49
Defence Policies Related to Foreign Policies.... Supp. p.25-33
Defence Policies since 1867..... Supp. p.5-23
Defence Production Dept. Chart of Dept..... 21 p.859
Defence Production Dept. "Defence Expenditure and
its Influence on the Canadian Economy"..... Supp. p.95-107
Defence Production Dept. Hon. Charles M.
Drury's Statement re..... 20 p.829-8
Defence Production Dept. of Special Paper
Respecting Defence Expenditure and its
Influence on the Canadian Economy..... 22 p.895-907
Defence Production Dept. of Staff Summary..... 20 p.843-4
Dept. of National Defence See National Defence
Dept. of.....
Disarmament and Arms Control..... Supp. p.131-152
Disarmament Economic Consequences of..... Supp. p.109-130
Disarmament References (Bibliography of 7 items) Supp. p.130
"Draft Report" of the sub-committee to the House
considered as 4th report of the Special
Committee on Defence to the House..... 17 p.607-23
Draper, W.J. Capt. Conference of Defence
Associations..... 12, 15
Draper Report..... 16 p.595-6
Drury, C.M. Minister of Defence Production
Canadian Commercial Corporation..... 24 p.979-82
Defence Expenditure..... 22 p.907-8
Defence Production Dept..... 20 p.829-8
R.M.O..... 7 p.290-43
Witness..... 7,8,20,22,24,25
E M O See Emergency Measures Organization.....
Eayrs, James Canadian Defence Policies since
1867..... Supp. p.5-23
Economic Conditions & Defence Expenditures
Drury, C.M..... 22 p.907-26
Harkness, D..... 22 p.916-19
Lambert, M..... 22 p.908-9
Smith, H..... 22 p.913-17
Winch, H..... 22 p.910-13
Economic Consequences of Disarmament by
G. Rosenbluth..... Supp. p.109-130
Emergency Measures Organization Established.... 7 p.290-47
Questions..... 8

	Nos.
Erskine, Mr. D.M. Dept. Defence Production	21
Estimated Defence Expenditures by Provinces 1963/64	22 p.925
Examples of an organization for a CAFRC and a sub-CAFRC	27 p.1096
External Affairs Dept Canada's obligations to the United Nations and International Operations	Supp. p.51-63
Faguy, Mr. Paul Emergency Measures Organization.	7, 8
Foreign Policy, Defence Polices Related to	Supp. p.25-33
Fourth report of the Special Committee on Defence to the House is the "Draft Report" or 9th report of the sub-committee	17 p.607-23
Gellner, John "Conventional and Nuclear Weapons".	Supp. p.171-9
Golden, David President Air Industries Association of Canada Biographical data	23 p.955-6
Golden, David Air Industries Association of Canada Brief	23 p.931-6
Gordon, King, An International Police Force	Supp. p.65-66
Groos, Commodore H.V.W. National Defence Dept.	9, 10
H M C S Alcide, Visit to	15 p.441-3
Bonaventure, Visit to	15 p.441-3
Columbia, Visit to	15 p.441-3
Kootenay, Visit to	15 p.441-3
Provider, Visit to	15 p.441-3
Restigouche, Visit to	15 p.441-3
Stadacona, Visit to	15 p.441-3
H M C S Bonaventure (Picture)	26 p.1050
H M C S Provider Construction Contract	21 p.875-6
H M C S Provider (Picture)	26 p.1057
Halifax Area (Canadian Maritime Command, Atlantic)	15
Harkness, Mr. Remarks re NATO	20 p.834-9
Harris, W. Canadian Commercial Corporation	24
Hellyer, Hon. Paul T. Bill C-90; Background information	1 p.10-31
Hellyer, Hon. Paul T. Questions to, on	19 p.803-820
Remarks re Statement by Mr. Hellyer	6 p.211-14
Reorganization of Canadian army Militia	19 p.803-820
Statement on reorganization of Canadian Army Militia	18 p.627-40
Hellyer, Hon. Paul T. Minister of National Defence Witness	1,2,3,6,26,27
Hendy, Commodore R.J. Conference of Defence Association's	12, 15
Hendy Report	16 p.532-92
Hodgson, Dr. Jack Ass't. Deputy Minister of National Defence	3
Hunter, Mr. G.W. Deputy Minister Dept. of Defence Production	21 p.849-59
Indexes of Real Domestic Product for Selected Canadian Industries	22 p.906
Integrated Recruiting Organization	27

	Nos.
Integration of Canadian Commercial Corporation Employees into Civil Service	21 p.847-8
An International Police Force	Supp. p.65-66
Involuntary Retirements	7 p.225
Jackson, James I. Defence Policies of NATO Members and some other Nations	Supp. p.35-49
Keith, R.M. Dept. of Defence Production	21
Knowles, Capt. C.R. Dept. National Defence Brief	27 p.1084-95
Knowles, Capt. C.R. Dept. of National Defence Newly created Integrated Recruiting Organization	27 p.1084-95
Kootenay, Visit to See, H M C S Kootenay	
Lambert, M. Canadian Commercial Corporation Questions to Mr. Drury	25 p.1016-19,
	& p.1026-9
Lamoureux, M.H. Canadian Commercial Corporation Bylaw No 7 signature	24 p.996
Statement re background of Canadian Commercial Corporation	25 p.1010-1012
Witness	24 p.982-1006
Witness	24 p.1010-1021
Lawson, W.J. Judge Advocate General	6
Learmonth, Lt. Col. W.R. Conference of Defence Associations Hendy and Draper Reports	12 p.363-5
Statement	12 p.354-6
Suttie Report	12 p.360-3
Legge, Col. B.J. Conference of Defence Associations	12
Location and Geographical Boundaries of Proposed C A F R C's and sub-C A F R C's	27 p.1097
Lyon, Peyton V. Defence Policies Related to Foreign Policy	Supp. p.25-33
McPherson, Colonel C.P. Director of Militia and Cadets	13, 16, 18, 19
Macklin, Major-General W.H.S. Statement	6 p.185-211
Malone, Richard S. Publisher, Winnipeg, Manitoba. Charts	5 p.140-44
Statement	5 p.133-49
Maritime Command, Atlantic, Visit to, See Canadian Maritime Command, Atlantic	
Membership of Committee	1 p.2-3
Militia, Reorganization of the Canadian Army Part II	18 p.644-699
Modern Weapons, Armament and	Supp. p.153-170
NATO Members, Defence Policies of	Supp. p.35-49
National Defence Act	1-6 incl.
National Defence Dept. "Armament and Modern Weapons	Supp. p.153-170
National Defence Department: A comparison of Defence Expenditures in Canada and Certain Other Countries	Supp. p.87-94

Nos.

	Nos.
National Defence, Dept. of, Estimated Expenditures by Province, fiscal year 1963/64.....	24 p.925-7
National Defence, Dept. of Position on the Recommendations of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia)	18 p.741-53
Naval Shipbuilding Programme.....	26
Navy Annual Operating Costs - Navy Reserve 1963-4.....	13 p.385-6
Navy Report of the Steering Committee on.....	12 p.353-4
New Construction and Conversion Programmes 1965/66 to 1971/72 Chart.....	26 p.1047
"Newly created integrated recruiting organization" by Capt. C.R. Knowles Dept. of National Defence.....	27 p.1084-95
Norfolk, Virginia Saclant Headquarter.....	15
Nuclear Armaments by John Gellner.....	Supp. p.171-9
Officer Training Plan, Regular.....	10
Organization and Functions, Proposed new Recruiting System.....	27 p.1098
Organizational Meeting (Minutes only).....	1, 5
P.C. 1964-663 approving bylaws 6 and 7 re Canadian Commercial Corporation.....	25 p.1027
Peacekeeping, a Selected Bibliography.....	Supp. p.86
Peacekeeping and Truce-Supervising Activities since November 9, 1945, Canadian Military Participation in.....	Supp. p.63
Plant, J.L. Air Industries Associations of Canada Brief.....	23 p.936-42
Police Force, An International.....	Supp. p.65-66
"Policy for Industrial Technology in Canada" prepared for the Air Industries Association (<u>not included in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence</u>. Only copy filed in Committees Branch	
Policy, questions for discussion on.....	1, 9
Provider, H.M.C.S. See H.M.C.S. Provider.....	
Provider, Visit to. See H.M.C.S. Provider.....	
ROTP See Regular Officer Training Plan.....	
ROTP and Officer Production Statistics.....	17 p.615-6
Randolph, Visit to. See U S S Randolph.....	
Recruiting, Integrated.....	27
Regular Officer Training Plan.....	9, 10
Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia) Part 2.....	18 p.641-799
Replenishment Vessels on the East Coast (Chart).	26 p.1051
Reports of Sub-committee	
First.....	1 p.9
Second.....	2 p.37
Third.....	3 p.63-4
Fourth.....	7 p.227
Fifth.....	7 p.227-8
Sixth.....	12 p.351

Nos.

National Defence, Dept. of, Estimated Expenditures
by Provinces, Fiscal Year 1965/66 ..... 24 p.925-7
National Defence, Dept. of, Position on the
Recommendations of the Commission on the
Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia) 18 p.741-53
Naval Shipbuilding Programme 26
Navy, Annual Operating Costs - Navy Reserve
1965-4 ..... 13 p.385-6
Navy, Report of the Steering Committee on 12 p.353-4
New Construction and Conversion Programmes
1965/66 to 1971/72 Chart 26 p.1047
"Newly created Integrated recruiting organization"
by Capt. O.R. Knowles, Dept. of National
Defence 27 p.1081-95
Norfolk, Virginia Seaway Headquarter 15
Nuclear Armaments by John Collier ..... Supp. p.171-9
Officer Training Plan, Regular 10
Organization and Functions, Proposed new
Recruiting System 27 p.1095
Organizational Meeting (Minutes only) 1, 5
P.C. 1964-663 approving bylaws 6 and 7 re
Canadian Commercial Corporation 25 p.1027
Peacekeeping, a Selected Bibliography ..... Supp. p.86
Peacekeeping and Truce-Supervising Activities
since November 9, 1945, Canadian Military
Participation in ..... Supp. p.63
Plant, J.L. Air Industries Associations of
Canada Brief 23 p.936-42
Police Force, An International ..... Supp. p.65-66
"Policy for Industrial Technology in Canada"
prepared for the Air Industries Association
(not included in Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence. Only copy filed in Committees Branch
Policy, questions for discussion on 1, 9
Provider, H.M.C.S. See H.M.C.S. Provider .....
Provider, Visit to, See H.M.C.S. Provider .....
ROTP See Regular Officer Training Plan .....
ROTP and Officer Production Statistics 17 p.615-6
Randolph, Visit to, See U S S Randolph .....
Recruiting, Integrated 27
Regular Officer Training Plan 9, 10
Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia)
Part 2 ..... 18 p.641-799
Replenishment Vessels on the East Coast (Chart). 26 p.1051
Reports of Sub-committee
First 1 p.9
Second 2 p.37
Third 3 p.63-4
Fourth 7 p.227
Fifth 7 p.227-8
Sixth 12 p.351

	Nos.
Reports of Sub-committee (cont'd)	
Seventh	12 p.351
Eighth	15 p.444
Ninth	17 p.607-23
Tenth	20 p.821
Eleventh	23 p.929
Twelfth	25 p.1009
Thirteenth	26 p.1043
Reports to the House	
First	1 p.4
Second	6 p.160
Third	7 p.225
Fourth	17 p.607-23
Fifth	27 p.1079
(All above printed in one volume and bound at end of series)	
Reports, Special prepared for the committee and called Special Studies. Bound at end of series after "Reports to the House"	
Reports to the House (First to Fifth) Separately paged and bilingual. Bound in at end of series	
Reserve Forces	11-16 incl.
Reserve Forces Information requested by H.E. Smith	13 p.408-9
Restigouche, Visit to, See H M C S Restigouche	
Retirement of Service Personnel Information requested by Mr. Temple	2 p.57-60
Rosenbluth, G. Economic Consequences of Disarmament	Supp. p.109-130
Rutledge, J.C. Dept. of Defence Production	21 p.858-888
Saclant Headquarters, Norfolk, Va. visit to	15 p.443
Sawyer, Col. W.R. National Defence Dept	9
Selected Bibliography (Peacekeeping)	Supp. p.86
Ships Bonaventure (H M C S) Picture	26 p.1050
Ships D D H Type (Picture)	26 p.1048
Hydrofoil (Artist's Sketch)	26 p.1053
Ships Operational Support Ship (diagram)	26 p.1052
Ships Replenishment Vessels on the East Coast Chart	26 p.1051
Ships Restigouche Class Destroyer (Picture)	26 p.1049
Ships Construction of, See Naval Shipbuilding Programme New Construction and Conversion Programmes	
Smith, H.E. Information re Reserve Forces requested	13 p.408-9
Smith, J.E. Air Industries Association of Canada	23
Special Studies prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons. Bound at end of series after "Reports to the House"	
Stadacona, Visit to See, H M C S Stadacona	

	Nos.
Stevenson, M.T.E. Air Industries Association of Canada	23
Sub-C A F R C's Examples of organization	27 p.1096
Sub-C A F R C's Location and Geographical boundaries	27 p.1097
Summary of Militia Effective Strengths.. May 31, 1964	16 p.597-603
Supplement 1964-65, Special studies prepared for the Committee Bound at end of series	
Suttie, Brigadier E.R	14
Suttie Report	16 p.501-31
Suttie Report Comment by Colonel Learmonth	12 p.360-3
Temple, R., M.P. Information requested re Retirement of Service Personnel	2 p.57-60
Tri-Service Advertising Costs	27 p.1099
U S S Randolph, Visit to	15 p.443
Vice-chairman chosen	5
Warship Design and Construction	26 p.1054-5
Weapons, Modern and Armament	Supp. p.153-170
Winch, Mr. Discussions on matters of policy	9
Winch, Harold, M.P. Remarks on Militia	13 p.397-400
Wooll, G. Air Industries Assoc. of Canada	23
Work of the Committee, 12th report of sub-committee	24 p.1009

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 1

TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1964
TUESDAY, MAY 26, 1964

Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act

WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20873—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),
Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Granger,
Groos,
Hahn,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel,
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacLean,
MacRae,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
Nielsen,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

Quorum—13

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

FRIDAY, May 8, 1964.

Resolved,—That a Special Committee be appointed to continue the consideration of matters relating to Defence begun by the Special Committee at the past Session and to report from time to time its observations and opinions thereon;

That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records and to examine witnesses;

That it be empowered to adjourn from place to place;

That the minutes of proceedings and evidence taken by the Special Committee at the past Session be referred to the said Committee and made a part of the records thereof; and

That the Committee consist of 24 members to be designated by the House at a later date, and that Standing Order 67(1) be suspended in relation thereto.

TUESDAY, May 12, 1964.

Ordered,—That Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act, be referred to the Special Committee on Defence.

THURSDAY, May 14, 1964.

Ordered,—That the Special Committee on Defence, appointed May 8, 1964, be composed of Messrs. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, Martineau, Matheson, McMillan, Nielsen, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch.

Attest.

LEON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

20873—1½

REPORT OF THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, May 20, 1964.

The Special Committee on Defence has the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT

Your Committee recommends:

1. That it be empowered to print such papers and evidence as may be ordered by the Committee, and that Standing Order 66 be suspended in relation thereto;

2. That it be granted leave to sit while the House is sitting.

Respectfully submitted,

D. G. HAHN,
Chairman.

(*Note*,—Report concurred in on same day).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, May 19, 1964
(1)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 2.05 o'clock p.m. this day for organization purposes.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Lambert, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, MacRae, Martineau, Matheson, McMillan, Nielsen, Pilon, Smith, Winch (19).

The Clerk attending, and having called for nominations, Mr. Béchard moved, seconded by Mr. McMillan, that Mr. Hahn be elected Chairman of the Committee.

There being no further nominations, Mr. Hahn was declared duly elected as Chairman.

The Chairman thanked the Committee for the honour conferred on him.

The Chairman invited nominations for a Vice-Chairman.

Mr. Deachman moved, seconded by Mr. Pilon, that Mr. Temple be elected Vice-Chairman.

Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*) moved, seconded by Mr. MacLean, that Mr. Lambert be elected Vice-Chairman.

After discussion, Mr. Deachman moved, seconded by Mr. McMillan, that there be two Vice-Chairmen. Motion negatived *on division.*

The first motion for Vice-Chairman was negatived.

The second motion for Vice-Chairman was adopted unanimously and Mr. Lambert was declared duly elected as Vice-Chairman.

Mr. Smith moved, seconded by Mr. Nielsen, that a Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and four members, to be named by him, be appointed. After discussion, by leave, Mr. Smith withdrew his motion.

On motion of Mr. Brewin, seconded by Mr. Deachman,

Resolved,—That a Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure comprised of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and five members, to be named by him, be appointed.

On motion of Mr. MacLean, seconded by Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),

Resolved,—That the Committee recommend to the House that it be empowered to print such papers and evidence as may be ordered by the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), seconded by Mr. Lambert,

Resolved,—That the Committee request permission to sit while the House is sitting.

The Clerk read the Committee's initial order of reference.

Mr. Winch requested an early meeting of the Steering Committee to discuss urgent defence matters, the White Paper and Bill C-90 and their priority of consideration.

Various suggestions were recommended to facilitate and expedite the work of the Committee.

Mr. Hahn referred to a visit of twenty-five R.M.C. cadets to the House of Commons on Thursday, May 21.

At 2.25 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

M. Slack,
Acting Clerk of the Committee.

TUESDAY, May 26, 1964.
(2)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.15 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Lambert, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Martineau, Matheson, McMillan, Nielsen, Temple and Winch. (20)

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister; and Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister

The Order of Reference, referring to this Committee Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act, was read.

The Chairman announced that the following have been appointed to the Steering Subcommittee: Messrs. Lambert, Langlois, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, Temple, Winch and Hahn. He then presented the following as that Subcommittee's First Report:

Your Subcommittee recommends:

1. That the Committee meet on Tuesday and Thursday mornings at 10.30 a.m.
2. That pursuant to its Order of Reference of May 20, 1964, the Committee print 1,000 copies in English and 500 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.
3. That Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act, be the first matter for the consideration of the Committee.
4. That the Minister of National Defence be invited to make a statement to the Committee on Tuesday, May 26, and Thursday, May 28.
5. That the Deputy Minister of National Defence be invited to make a statement following the completion of the Minister's statement.

On motion of Mr. Winch, seconded by Mr. Lloyd,

Resolved,—That the First Report of the Steering Subcommittee, presented this day, be now concurred in.

Clause 1 of Bill C-90 was called, the Minister was introduced and requested to outline the purposes of the Bill.

The Minister described the present and proposed administrative set-up of the Department of National Defence and the purposes of Bill C-90. During his statement, certain points were emphasized by the use of charts.

Agreed,—That the above-mentioned charts be included at the appropriate points in today's Evidence.

The Minister was questioned on the subject matter of his statement and on related matters.

At 12.30 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, May 26, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. You will please come to order. I am going to start by reading to the Committee the second Order of Reference for the Committee. The first Order of Reference was the resolution which was read at the last meeting. The second Order of Reference is dated Tuesday, May 12; "*Ordered* by the House that Bill C-90 an Act to Amend the National Defence Act be referred to the Special Committee on Defence."

At our organization meeting it was agreed that the Steering Committee, a Subcommittee, should be appointed by the Chairman after consultation with party whips, and that it should consist of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and five members of the committee. I shall now announce the names of the steering committee. In addition to myself and Mr. Lambert, the other members are Mr. Temple, Mr. MacLean, Mr. Winch, Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), and Mr. Langlois.

Following our last meeting the Steering Committee met and I shall now read the First Report of the Steering Committee, as follows:

Your subcommittee recommends:

1. That the committee meet on Tuesday and Thursday mornings at 10.30 a.m.
2. That pursuant to its order of reference of May 20, 1964, the committee print 1,000 copies in English and 500 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.
3. That Bill C-90, an act to amend the National Defence Act, be the first matter for the consideration of the committee.
4. That the Minister of National Defence be invited to make a statement to the committee on Tuesday, May 26, and continue on Thursday, May 28.
5. That the deputy minister of National Defence be invited to make a statement on June 2.

May I now have a motion for the adoption of the report of the Steering Subcommittee?

Mr. LAMBERT: I wonder about the Committee meeting for June 2. After all, it may be that we are not finished, at that time, in hearing the minister.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we change the Report to read that the Deputy Minister of National Defence be invited to make a statement upon the completion of the minister's statement?

Mr. WINCH: May I bring up one point which was not mentioned? It was my understanding in the subcommittee that along with considering the bill you have mentioned would come questions for discussion on matters of policy with regard to separation of those who may be leaving the service.

The CHAIRMAN: I did not specify it in the report, but it was discussed, and the general opinion of the Steering subcommittee was that in discussing Bill C-90 we would discuss the Bill and its effect on unification of command of the services including the problems of separation of personnel, but that we would not at this stage go into the probable ramifications involved because it would be a separate topic to be taken up at a later stage. So I think we might leave this as understood in the consideration of Bill C-90, as it is part of Bill C-90.

Now may we have a motion for adoption of the report? It is moved by Mr. Winch and seconded by Mr. Lloyd. Yes, Mr. Fane?

Mr. FANE: I would like to suggest that you have a meeting with the Chairmen of all Committees to arrange times that do not conflict with meetings of the other committees, because on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 10.00 a.m. the public accounts committee has arranged to sit also, and those of us who are members of both committees cannot possibly attend meetings of these two important committees at the same time. Therefore, I suggest that the chairmen get together with whomever it can be arranged with, to bring about some organization of the times of meetings of these committees so that they do not conflict. If they would do this it would be a very acceptable thing for those members who have to attend more than one committee.

The CHAIRMAN: In that connection there are about five committees now meeting on Tuesdays and Thursdays. The steering subcommittee, the subcommittee of this committee discussed it. It poses problems, and the only alternative is to meet on Mondays and Fridays. There is caucus of course on Wednesday. So the steering subcommittee was unanimous that we continue our sittings as suggested, on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

Mr. MCMILLAN: I was going to bring up the same subject. Would it not be better to meet, let us say, at eleven o'clock, in order to give another committee such as public accounts a chance to meet, let us say, from 9.30 a.m. until 11 o'clock? I believe you said that we were to meet at 10.30 a.m.; is that so?

The CHAIRMAN: At 10.30 a.m.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Surely there are a number of us who are on both these committees.

Mr. HARKNESS: Certainly I think some effort should be made to try to co-ordinate the times of meetings of the committees which will be meeting regularly during the next month or two months. There have been efforts along this line in the past, though not too successful. But I think some progress could be made in order to prevent the times overlapping, which would otherwise take place unless there was some co-ordination among the chairmen of committees which will be meeting during this present period.

The CHAIRMAN: I suggest that for the time being we adopt the sittings as agreed upon. We will see if it is possible to avoid conflict. It is extremely difficult to do this. Now are we ready for the question? All in favour of the adoption of the Steering subcommittee report? Opposed?

Motion agreed to.

I declare the motion carried.

We have with us as witness the Minister of National Defence. The first item before the Committee for consideration is Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act. I now call clause 1, and ask the minister to make his statement on clause 1.

On clause 1,—*Duties of chief of the defence staff.*

Hon. PAUL HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,—

Mr. BREWIN: Before the minister begins, may I ask if you have an extra copy of this bill somewhere?

The CHAIRMAN: Copies of the bill are being distributed and all members will receive them along with copies of the consolidated National Defence Act.

Mr. LLOYD: I suggest that the minister proceed while we are waiting for the distribution.

Mr. HELLYER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a preliminary to the discussion of Bill C-90 it may be useful to review briefly some of the background leading

to the proposal which is now before you. As you know, we undertook several studies in the Department of National Defence covering a wide range of problems.

As the result of the studies a number of decisions have already been taken. These are quite well known to you and cover a wide range, from the cancellation of various procurement programs such as the general purpose frigates and the follow on CF-104 aircraft, to the reduction of overhead and the closing of various bases and depots, to a proposed reduction in reserve forces, and now a recommendation to replace the chairman, chiefs of staff committee, and the three service chiefs by a single chief of defence staff. In order that you may better understand the problems related to this action, I would like to repeat some of the more important considerations at this time.

First of all in respect of the equipment programs, we examined each one from the standpoint of its effect on future policy. It has been alleged that policy has been set to agree with the equipment already decided on. Obviously, if all the funds available for equipment are committed and if a change in policy should require different equipment, flexibility is lost because of lack of funds. Therefore, any plans to buy equipment which would unduly restrict our choice of future policy were carefully reviewed and several were cancelled.

At the same time, discussions were held with the government in respect of the level of funds that we could expect for defence requirements for the next few years. In considering this question, the government was very much aware of the overall financial position which faces it. A series of large deficits have increased the size of our national debt and the annual cost of servicing the debt. Statutory expenditures have been rising sharply and the prospect of continuing large deficits is a matter of concern. Defence expenditures represent the largest area of non-statutory or controllable expenditures, and so it was decided that an effort should be made to hold expenditures for defence at approximately the present level. I may say that to accomplish this will not be an easy task.

The problem is made much more difficult by the fact that defence expenditures have been and remain out of balance. To be specific, we are spending too large a proportion of our funds for operations and maintenance and not enough for equipment. If this trend is not reversed, it will only be a few years until we will have no new equipment at all. Obviously something must be done. If we are to have in the future fully effective, well equipped and flexible forces, we must spend much more on equipment and much less on overhead. Also, because we cannot afford to do well all of the things we are now doing, we must spend more on high priority items and less on lower priorities.

To determine the scale of priorities was not an easy task. It is, of course, a question of judgment. However, we had to look at the world as it presently exists and learn from the experiences of the past. At the beginning of the first and second world wars, we did not have significant forces in being and we had to rely almost completely on mobilization potential. Consequently it was some months before we were able to play an important part in the execution of the war. Even more important is the suggestion that if the allies had strong forces in being, the second world war might not have happened.

Following world war II we demobilized most of our forces and returned to the pre-war policy. For several years this policy made sense due to the large stockpiles of new equipment left over from the war and even more important because of the large reservoir of trained manpower. Following the Korean conflict and the acceptance by Canada of sizeable commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our defence partnership with the United States, Canadian policy changed radically. The emphasis shifted from mobilization potential to a forces-in-being concept. This concept is valid today and our widespread commitments demand its continuance.

The purpose of our forces in being is to preserve peace by deterring war. This principle applies throughout the whole spectrum of possible conflict. At the high end of the scale, thermonuclear war and major non-nuclear war are deterred by the existence of sufficient force to make any aggression unprofitable. Similarly, at the lower end of the scale in peace-keeping and other activities, it is the existence of, and in some cases the use of forces in being which contains or tends to contain the conflict in a limited way and prevent it from escalating into something more dangerous. In most situations in the real world then, it is flexible forces in being which may be useful to keep the peace and deter war. The chance of calling on mobilization potential, though possible, is quite remote.

This assessment must guide our setting of priorities. Forces in being which traditionally have been low priority are at the top of our list and reserve forces which have been the backbone of our mobilization in two world wars, are moved down the scale proportionately.

This is not to say that we have no further requirement for reserve forces. On the contrary, they will continue to play an important place in the scheme of things. For example, although we do not think there is a high probability of mobilization, we think it would be unwise, in the light of history, to ignore the possibility. Our plans will include, therefore, a limited but effective potential. In addition, we have specific requirements for reserve forces to assist in the defence of Canada and for civil survival. We have roles to be assigned to reserve forces and we feel that the direct relationship between role and force will be good both for morale and effectiveness in a reorganized militia.

To assist us in the reorganization of our reserve forces, a commission and two committees were established. The committees relating to the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve and the Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary have reported. The Commission headed by Brigadier E. R. Suttie of Montreal, has been considering how the militia might be reorganized to meet our requirements and at the same time best preserve the special characteristics and traditions of a great organization. Brigadier Suttie and his group have had the full co-operation of the conference of defence associations to assist them in their important task. The preliminary report of the commission is expected within a few days. Hon. members of this committee may wish to study the recommendations at a later date.

To reorganize our permanent forces in a manner which will permit a satisfactory balance in expenditures between overhead on the one hand and new equipment on the other, we have two choices. We could either reduce the number of operational units or seek savings in overhead, particularly in headquarters, supply, training and related staffs. Between these two, and because we were convinced that substantial savings could be effected in headquarters and related areas, we decided to turn our full attention in the direction of reductions in overhead which would not affect our operational capability.

In considering the reorganization most likely to accomplish this goal, two important criteria were kept in mind. First the development of the most streamlined and responsive force possible, and second the maximum reduction in duplication and consequent savings in personnel. I think the fact should be underlined that we cannot possibly restore an acceptable balance within the present level of defence expenditures without a substantial reduction in personnel. To achieve our purpose, therefore, the option adopted must be the one which will permit the maximum reduction in headquarters and other establishments.

One of the options studied was, of course, that suggested by the royal commission on Government organization. It was in effect that service and support organizations common to the three services be transferred and placed under the jurisdiction of the chairman, chiefs of staff committee. This suggestion was carefully studied and ultimately rejected on two counts. First, unless the chairman was given authority to impose decisions on the services, the committee system with all its inevitable frustrations and delays would remain. Second, it did not appear that manpower savings could be effected. Based on our experience and that of our allies, there was a strong possibility that the manpower requirements might have increased by the creation of what has sometimes been called the "fourth force".

The option chosen is more fundamental and more direct. It is in substance the application of the corporate principle to the armed forces and the consequent requirement of a single command structure. This solution is widely held both by professional officers and by students of military organization. Bill 90 contains the provisions required to implement the change in command. The positions of chairman, chiefs of staff committee, chief of the naval staff, chief of the general staff, and chief of the air staff are being replaced by a single position designated chief of defence staff. The chief of defence staff will be responsible for the administration of navy, army and air force. The bill before you is drafted to implement this transfer and to effect the consequential amendments resulting from the transfer. When you come to the clause by clause examination of the bill, I am sure that the Judge Advocate General would be willing to answer questions in respect of any specific points that might arise.

The chief of defence staff will be assisted in his administrative responsibilities by a defence staff to whom he can delegate responsibility in various fields. To assist in the determination of this top command structure, I asked the chiefs of staff to set up a special ad hoc committee. This committee of senior officers consisting of representatives of the joint staff, navy, army, air force, defence research board and the deputy minister's staff, worked assiduously at their task and set out in concise detail the considerations involved. The associate minister and I are deeply obliged to the chiefs of staff and their committee for invaluable assistance in a most difficult task.

In a few minutes I will outline the proposed senior military staff, but first I would like to briefly discuss the question of civil control and how it will be effected. As you have already indicated the deputy minister will be discussing with you the relationship between his staff and the military. In consequence my remarks will be limited to the broad principles.

Would you give me the first chart, please?


PARLIAMENT
CABINET
CABINET COMMITTEE
ON
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS & DEFENCE
MINISTER of NATIONAL DEFENCE
ASSOCIATE MINISTER of NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEFENCE
COUNCIL
CHAIRMAN
DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD
CHIEF OF
DEFENCE STAFF
DEPUTY
MINISTER

As with other government departments the ultimate approval of matters relating to defence is vested in parliament with the cabinet deciding the precise defence policy to be recommended to parliament for approval. However, the cabinet is too large a body to deal effectively with the numerous and complex policy problems of national defence. Consequently, a smaller committee of cabinet members is established to deal specifically with matters affecting foreign policy and defence policy. This cabinet committee is known as the external affairs and defence committee and is called upon to consider defence questions and to report to the cabinet upon major matters of policy relating to the maintenance and improvement of the armed forces. A number of officials, while they are not members, may attend meetings of this committee and may be asked to express their views. These include the chairman, chiefs of staff committee, the various chiefs of staff, the chairman of the defence research board, the deputy minister of national defence and officials from other interested government departments. The Prime Minister acts as chairman of the external affairs and defence committee.

As ministers responsible for the Department of National Defence, the Minister of National Defence and the Associate Minister of National Defence both report to the cabinet and to the external affairs and defence committee on matters of major defence policy for which cabinet direction is required. Within the department under the terms of the National Defence Act as it now exists the overall administration of the Department of National Defence is the responsibility of the two ministers. The minister and associate minister are equal in status and either can act as Minister of National Defence. However, for the day to day work at the ministerial level of the department it has been mutually agreed that the Minister of National Defence will be mainly responsible for defence matters of an operational and international character, such as those involved in the United Nations and NATO. The Associate Minister of National Defence will deal mainly with administrative matters affecting the department.

I may say, as I have indicated before, that without this assistance from the associate minister, who does undertake the bulk of administrative work within the department, it would have been impossible for us to give the time and thought to the proposed reorganization which has been required.

Under the act the deputy minister reports directly to the two ministers and he is responsible for the control of all financial matters pertaining to the department, parliament and legal business including all proposals for legislation and submission to the governor-in-council and treasury board and formal communications to other government departments and the general public.

The chairman of the defence research board, which was established on April 1, 1947 under part III of the National Defence Act also reports directly to the ministers. The basic responsibilities of the defence research board are: providing scientific advice to the Minister of National Defence, to the chiefs of staff and to the armed services; providing for the research needs of the armed services and to contribute to the collective security of the NATO alliance in scientific fields, and to encourage and support basic research in defence interests in Canadian universities.

On the military side, the ministers' advisers at the present time are the members of the chiefs of staff committee including the chairman of that committee and the chairman of the defence research board. Each of the members of the committee have direct access to the minister, as does the deputy minister.

Would you just briefly show the other chart?

PRESENT CHANNELS (6) TO THE MINISTER AND ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



This indicates the present organization in which, in effect there are six avenues of direct input to the minister and associate minister. The deputy minister, the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, the chairman of the defence research board, the chief of the naval staff, the chief of the general staff and the chief of the air staff each have direct access. This is one of the administrative problems which we found and about which we felt something must be done: in effect, at the present time it is very difficult to exercise the control and management of the department as required of the ministers by law.

One of the main objects, then, of the new proposed organization is to simplify these channels of communication to the point at which the minister and associate minister can effectively exercise the responsibility and control with which they are charged by law.

There is another advisory body about which I will have something further to say, and that is the defence council. This council—which is chaired by the Minister of National Defence has as its members the associate minister, the deputy minister, the associate deputy minister, the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, the chiefs of staff of the armed services, and the chairman of the defence research board—deals in the main with matters of policy related to administration within the department. There are, of course, many other committees within the department as was pointed out in the white paper. The majority of those committees are tri-service in nature, and it is important to note that in these many departmental committees, outside those in which the ministers participate, there exists no overriding individual authority in so far as decisions or recommendations being made.

I am now going to review the history of the defence council for hon. members of the committee, and I apologize for doing it in great detail, but it is necessary because there are many people interested in this particular body and in the function which it has played in the past and which it is intended it shall play in the future. Perhaps members of the committee will permit a somewhat more lengthy review than otherwise would be warranted.

Under Bill C-90, which the committee is now considering, the positions of chairman, chiefs of staff committee, and of the chiefs of staff of the three services are being eliminated in favour of one chief of the defence staff. Therefore, the chiefs of staff committee will also cease to exist and consideration had therefore to be given to the establishment of a body of advisers who would have direct contact with the ministers on all major problems, both military and administrative. This will be done through the defence council, which I have already mentioned, but the composition and the terms of reference of this council will be different from those in the past.

The defence council was established by order in council P.C. 1252 on June 20, 1922:

> To advise the minister on all matters of defence including or relating to the militia, the military, naval and air services of Canada, and on all matters referred to it by the minister.

References to the militia council and the various regulations were henceforth to mean defence council. The composition of this council was as follows: president, the minister of militia and defence and naval service; vice president, the deputy minister of militia and defence. The members were as follows: the deputy minister of the naval service; the chief of the general staff, department of militia and defence; the director of the naval service. Associate members were the adjutant general, department of militia and defence; the quartermaster general, department of militia and defence; and the director of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

On July 17, 1936, P.C. 1742, in recognition of the fact that the judge advocate general had been a member of the militia council, revised the mem-

bership of the defence council as follows: president, the minister of national defence; vice president, the deputy minister of national defence. Members were the chief of the general staff; the director of the naval service and chief of the naval staff; the senior air officer, Royal Canadian Air Force. Associate members were the adjutant general; the quartermaster general; the master general of ordnance; and the judge advocate general.

In consequence of the appointment of a minister of national defence for naval services and a minister of national defence for air as well as associate acting deputy ministers, it was considered necessary to change the composition of defence council to conform to the organization within the department of national defence. To that end, order in council P.C. 1252 and order in council P.C. 1742 were cancelled, and order in council P.C. 4737, dated September 13, 1940, was approved. The duties of the defence council were to advise the minister on all matters of defence, including or relating to the naval, military and air services of Canada, and all matters referred to it by the minister of national defence.

The composition of the council was as follows: chairman, the minister of national defence; vice chairmen, the associate minister of national defence, the minister of national defence for naval services, the minister of national defence for air. Members were the chief of naval staff, the chief of the general staff, the chief of the air staff, the associate acting deputy minister naval service, the associate acting deputy minister militia service, and the associate acting deputy minister air service. The secretary was to be appointed by the minister of national defence.

Subsequent orders in council—in 1947 P.C. 887 and in 1951 P.C. 886—repealed previous orders in council and amended the membership but made no changes in the duties.

In 1953 when a further submission was made to the privy council to update the membership, the clerk of the privy council returned it stating that, as the defence council was an intra-departmental body with its members under the direct control of the minister and with no duties except to advise the minister, there was no need to continue the past practice of providing for defence council by order in council. Accordingly, P.C. 1953-442, March 26, 1953, revoked the last order in council which was P.C. 886. The then minister of national defence, the late hon. Brooke Claxton, on March 18, 1953, issued an order stating that:

> There shall be a defence council consisting of the following: chairman, the minister of national defence; vice-chairman, the associate minister of national defence; other members, the parliamentary assistants to the minister of national defence, the deputy minister of national defence, the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, the chief of the naval staff, the chief of the general staff, the chief of the air staff, the chairman of the defence research board, the associate deputy ministers of national defence. The secretary was to be such person as the minister of national defence shall appoint.

In addition, such persons as the chairman or vice-chairman may request shall from time to time attend meetings of the defence council.

The duties of the defence council shall be to advise the minister of national defence and the associate minister of national defence on matters relating to the naval, army and air forces of Canada and on all matters referred to it by the minister of national defence or the associate minister of national defence, and this order is still valid today. However, over the years through custom a division has occurred between the duties of the defence council and the chiefs of staff committee. The Canadian chiefs of staff committee was formed in June, 1927, and was known at that time as the joint staff. However, in 1938 when the chief of the air staff was appointed, it changed its name to the chiefs

of staff committee. This committee functioned with the three service chiefs as members throughout world war II. After the war when the defence research board was set up the chairman became a member of the chiefs of staff committee with the status of a chief of staff.

When events deteriorated between the west and the Soviet union, Canada played a leading part in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So important were the military negotiations and the implication of these defence arrangements that it required almost the continuous attention of the then chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, who was also at that time the chief of the general staff as there was no separate chairman. Also at the beginning of the Korean incident the individual chiefs of staff were greatly concerned with the build-up of their own services. These were major considerations which caused the government to agree to the reorganization of the chiefs of staff with the appointment of a permanent chairman on February 1, 1951. The terms of reference for the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee were as follows:

(*a*) To act as the Chairman of a committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff and such other members as the Minister may designate;

(*b*) To co-ordinate the operations and training of the Canadian forces; and

(*c*) To perform such other duties as the Minister may direct.

Since then, the chiefs of staff committee advises the minister of national defence and the cabinet external affairs and defence committee on matters of defence policy and prepares strategic appreciations and military plans as required. In addition, the committee has been responsible for co-ordinating the efforts of the armed services in fulfilment of a single defence policy and over-all policy direction of joint service organizations, establishments and operations.

In consequence, the defence council has been liimted in practice in its own considerations to the following functions: (*a*) To review and determine major questions of departmental policy in the fields of personnel, both military and civilian, and logistics; (*b*) To institute studies of departmental organization and practices with a view to achieving economies, improving managerial methods or co-ordinating departmental and governmental policy; (*c*) To take under consideration any other matter of departmental policy which may be referred to it by any member of the defence council. In practice, it has been used less and less throughout the years, and it is now proposed that the defence council will be used in a much more comprehensive manner and, in the future, will act as the principal departmental policy group.

In an integrated organization, the role of defence council will be basically the same as under the former tri-service headquarters organization. It will co-ordinate information and make decisions on defence matters. The difference in the new organization is, of course, that there are and will be fewer separate functions to co-ordinate. That is, instead of three services we will be dealing with a single defence staff which will have presented military problems on a co-ordinated basis. The essential elements for co-ordination, therefore, will be the fiscal considerations as represented by the deputy minister, the military considerations as represented by the chief of defence staff, and scientific considerations as represented by the scientific adviser, the chairman of the defence research board.

In addition, there is a need for inter-departmental co-ordination on many of the elements of defence policy. This can be accommodated by having representatives of the department sit in with the defence council whenever items that affect their departments in an important way are to be considered.

These will not be members of the defence council but can put forward the views of their own departments on any matters under consideration.

In addition to the above, specialist advisers from the defence department will be expected to attend on any matters affecting their specialities under consideration. These advisers would normally be the functional heads, as will be designated on the chart of the defence staff. The functional heads will not be full members of the defence council; they will, however, be expected to attend as specialist advisers whenever necessary. This same criterion would also apply to the associate deputy minister and four assitant deputy ministers in respect of matters within their field.

The defence council in this concept would then consist of the minister of national defence, the associate minister of national defence, the parliamentary secretary, if any, the deputy minister of national defence, the scientific adviser to the minister, who is the chairman of the defence research board, the chief of the defence staff and the vice chief of the defence staff. The principal departments which might be expected to provide representatives to attend specific meetings are the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Finance and the Department of Defence Production.

I would like now to outline the senior military staff organization. I will begin by reviewing the present organization of the services as it exists. The organization of each of the three services varies considerably.

The Royal Canadian Navy is organized on a part functional and part regional basis; the Army on a geographical basis; and the Royal Canadian Air Force on a functional basis. This chart shows the organization of the Royal Canadian Navy. At headquarters, one sees the chief of naval staff is assisted by members of the naval board, which include the vice chief of the naval staff, the chief of naval personnel, the chief of naval technical services, and the naval comptroller. The command structure from headquarters is to the flag officer, Atlantic coast, at Halifax, Nova Scotia; the flag officer, Pacific coast, Esquimalt, British Columbia; and the commanding officer of the naval divisions at Hamilton, Ontario.


CNS
RCN
NAVAL SECRETARY
STAFF DUTIES
VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE
PLANS (1)
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
OPERATIONS
Operational Training (Units)
Operational Readiness
Operational Doctrine
Tactical Development
ENGINEERING (2)
Design Authority (Ship Characteristics)
COMMUNICATIONS
Operational Aspects
Safety-Flight
Operational Research (3)
Security
CHIEF OF NAVAL TECHNICAL SERVICES
PLANS (1)
Base, Project & Budgeting
PROGRAMS (TECHNICAL)
Development (4)
Management
PERSONNEL SERVICES
Food Services
DEVELOPMENT
Test
Evaluation
ENGINEERING (2)
Design Authority
Transport
Construction
Aeronautical
Ship & Submarine
Communications
Miscellaneous
Repair & Maintenance
SUPPLY
Movements
Inspection Services
SAFETY & INSPECTION
MSE
POMC
Ship
Industrial
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (3)
CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
PERSONNEL
Recruiting
Basic Training
Administration
Transfers
Promotions
Careers
Operational Training (Individuals)
PERSONNEL SERVICES
Medical
Dental
Padres
Welfare
Pay & Allowances (Policy)
STATISTICS (5)
NAVAL COMPTROLLER
PROGRAMS (4)
Development
BUDGETING
ACCOUNTING POLICY & PROCEDURES
PERSONNEL SERVICES PAY & ALLOWANCES
ORGANIZATION
ESTABLISHMENTS
MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING
STATISTICS (5)

The next chart represents the organization of the Canadian army as it presently exists. At headquarters, the chief of general staff is assisted by the members of the army council, including the vice chief of the general staff, the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, and major general survival, and the comptroller general. In Canada, the command structure from headquarters includes western command headquarters at Edmonton, Alberta; central command headquarters at Oakville, Ontario; Quebec command headquarters at Montreal, province of Quebec; and eastern command headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Outside these various commands are the brigade group in Europe and the various armed forces assigned to the United Nations.

CANADIAN ARMY



This is a chart of the Royal Canadian Air Force headquarters organization.

The chief of air staff is assisted at headquarters by members of the air council including the vice chief of the air staff, the air member for personnel, the air member for technical services, and the comptroller.

The air force commands are on a functional basis including training headquarters command at Winnipeg, Manitoba, the maritime air command headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia, the air transport command headquarters at Trenton, Ontario, the air materiel command headquarters at Rockcliffe, Ontario, and the air defence command headquarters at St. Hubert, Quebec. In addition there is the No. 1 air division at Metz, France.

RCAF



INTELLIGENCE

PLANS

PROGRAMMES
- Development

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

OPERATIONS
- Operational Training
- Operational Readiness
- Operational Doctrine
- Tactical Development
- Tactical Evaluation

SYSTEMS EVALUATION

PROGRAMMES
- Management

DEVELOPMENT
- Test
- Evaluation

ENGINEERING
- Design Authority
- Transport
- Construction
- Aeronautical Engineering
- Communications
- Repair & Maintenance
- Miscellaneous

SUPPLY
- Movements
- Inspection Services

SAFETY
- MSE
- POMC
- Industrial
- Nuclear

PERSONNEL
- Recruiting
- Basic Training
- Administration
  - Careers
  - Transfers
  - Manning

PERSONNEL SERVICES
- Medical
- Dental
- Padres
- Welfare
- Food Services

STAFF DUTIES

SECURITY

BUDGETING

ACCOUNTING POLICY & PROCEDURES

PAY & ALLOWANCES

ORGANIZATION

ESTABLISHMENTS

MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING

STATISTICS

This chart represents the proposed unified headquarters of the armed forces of Canada.

Under the minister and associate minister will be the chief of defence staff and his vice chief. Reporting to the chief of defence staff will be the divisional heads of the armed forces, the chief of operational readiness—and I may say that the categories here are set up as indicative for planning purposes; the planning is now proceeding. This is the organization as it is presently contemplated. It must of course be subject to change if experience should show that change is required.

We have the four deputy heads, the chief of operational readiness, chief of personnel, chief of logistics and engineering, and the comptroller general. Each of these will have a deputy, the deputy chief of operational readiness, the deputy chief of personnel, and the deputy comptroller general.

In respect of the chief of logistics and engineering however there will be two deputies. This is to divide the heavy work load between the deputy in charge of logistics and the deputy in charge of engineering and development. This is a variation from the proposal to establish an additional head.

We think it will work satisfactorily and that it will accomplish our purpose. However, if in the future it should be found that it does not work satisfactorily, we would be prepared to take another look at it.

Responsibilities under each of these are planned to be as follows: under the chief of operational readiness, forces readiness for all the armed forces of Canada; operational training and training standards required to keep satisfactory our state of readiness in the forces; combined training; operational doctrine; tactical developments; standard operating procedures; communications; and safety.

Under the chief of personnel will be recruiting; manning; individual and basic training; personnel administration including careers, postings, promotions; personnel services including dental, medical, chaplain, welfare; and pay and allowances.

Under the chief of logistics, on the logistic side, will be stores and supplies; movements; transportation; accommodation; victualing; and repair and maintenance.

On the engineering and development side will be design, development, test, evaluation, inspection and quality control.

Under the comptroller general will be program management, budgeting, organization and establishments.

Reporting directly to the chief of defence staff and his vice chief will be the assistant chief of defence staff responsible for intelligence, plans, operational requirements, programming, planning, and analysis. This division has been adopted because what we are doing has no precedent and because of the necessity to have close co-ordination in respect of planning where elements of the three traditional forces can be combined into a single plan and single program, and where this can be done under the close and immediate supervision of the chief of defence staff or his vice chief.

There will be a secretariat as there is in the case of each of the present armed forces. The method of handling communications to and from commands will be exactly the same as it is at present. Communications to and from commands will go through the defence secretariat and be sent from the secretariat to the appropriate functional division for attention.

In respect of the rank structure it will be this. I think perhaps I will use the army ranks and equivalents because they are best known. The propensity seems to be to use the United States army ranks, and I note this being done now in the reorganization of the British forces. I do not know whether that will be an ultimate universal arrangement or not but I think if we use our present army equivalent ranks they will be understood by all.


MINISTER
ASSOCIATE MINISTER
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
INTELLIGENCE
PLANS
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
PROGRAMME PLANNING & ANALYSIS
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
SECRETARIAT
CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL READINESS
DEPUTY
CHIEF OF PERSONNEL
DEPUTY
CHIEF OF LOGISTICS & ENGINEERING
DEPUTY LOGISTICS
DEPUTY ENG. & DEV.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL
DEPUTY
FORCES READINESS
OPERATIONAL TRAINING & TRAINING STANDARDS
COMBINED TRAINING
OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE
TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
COMMUNICATIONS
SAFETY
RECRUITING
MANNING
INDIVIDUAL & BASIC TRAINING
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
Careers
Postings
Promotions
PERSONNEL SERVICES
Dental
Medical
Chaplains
Welfare
Pay & Allowances
STORES & SUPPLIES
MOVEMENT
TRANSPORT
ACCOMMO-DATION
VICTUALLING
REPAIR & MAINTE-NANCE
DESIGN
DEVELOP-MENT
Test
Evaluation
INSPECTION
QUALITY CONTROL
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
BUDGETING
ORGANIZATION
ESTABLISHMENTS

The chief of staff will hold the rank of full general or equivalent. The vice chief of defence staff will hold the rank of lieutenant general or equivalent. The chief of operational readiness, the chief of personnel, the chief of logistics and engineering and the comptroller general will each carry the rank of lieutenant general or equivalent. The deputy chiefs of operational readiness, personnel, logistics, engineering and development, and the deputy comptroller general as well as the assistant chief of defence staff will have the rank of major general or equivalent.

In considering this organization as against the present combined organizations at national defence headquarters the number of positions of general rank, and that is major general and above, in the headquarters organization is reduced from 17 as it is at present to 12. It is anticipated that similar savings can be effected as the integration proceeds on down through other echelons.

I might say, in case any member may notice this, that the calculation does not include the surgeon general because he is not included in this headquarters staff.

That, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, is the proposed organization of the military forces of Canada. It is a straightforward organization. It is one that we feel will operate satisfactorily, one that we feel will operate efficiently. We have no doubt that it will be able to keep our armed forces in a high state of readiness and, at the same time, effect the savings and improvements throughout the headquarters organization and the support organizations that we feel are absolutely essential.

One further point should be mentioned. We have given each chief a deputy. There is no experience or work load on which to base this, and it may or may not be proven through time to be an absolute requirement. However, certainly for the present time, it is felt that it is necessary for two important reasons. The work load in each case will be very heavy and there are many problems to be solved. Each step has to be carefully thought out and there will be standardized procedures to be developed in each case. Consequently, the work load will be very considerable and the deputy will have the authority to substitute for the functional head in his absence, if he is on leave or ill, and will be able to assist in relieving him of a considerable part of the heavy work load. In addition to that, there is in the establishment of a unified headquarters staff at the outset the necessity for achieving a proper balance of skills and training. In other words, it is necessary to have a combination of people who are thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the defence forces of Canada and who have experience in the navy, army and air force, who are trained in all the operational aspects of our defence forces, and who are thoroughly familiar with all of the problems that will be raised. It is our intention that the deputy chief, at the outset—and I must underline that this is an interim measure which is necessary as we grow into this combined operation—will be from a different service from that of the functional chief. This will give the balance of experience and training necessary to make sure that there are no gaps in the total amount of knowledge and experience required to make the organization effective.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that pretty well sums up my presentation in respect of the bill. If there are any questions that hon. members would like to pose I will do my best to deal with them.

Mr. MATHESON: May I suggest that the charts which we have studied be included in the record?

The CHAIRMAN: Arrangements are being made to have the charts included. Before we start questioning the minister, I would suggest that we proceed with our questioning on the same basis as we did during the last session, that is I will take your names and we will try to exhaust one topic before moving on

to a second topic. Supplementaries therefore will not be asked, but you will indicate that you want to speak on the same topic.

Mr. TEMPLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we get into the charts on the unification may I say that a good many questions have been asked me regarding the proposed reductions of 10,000 personnel. I understand that already some 500 officers of the R.C.A.F. are due for discharge in July. Could you tell the committee how many of the 10,000 will be discharged through normal retirements?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think we can give any precise information in this regard because the determination of the actual people to be retired is only possible as we go through each individual stage. We might be able to give the committee some very rough approximations, and if the committee would like to have further information on this particular aspect perhaps we could prepare a special paper on the subject of retirements which could be made available perhaps on Thursday.

Mr. TEMPLE: To follow that question, I believe legislation would be necessary to amend the superannuation act concerning the armed services.

Mr. HELLYER: In order to waive the penalties; is that what you mean?

Mr. TEMPLE: That is right.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is proposed—and the associate minister can correct me if I am wrong—that this should be done as an item in this year's supplementary estimates.

Mr. TEMPLE: Then in effect will these 500 officers who are to retire in July not be penalized, or will they have to wait for some months or longer?

Mr. HELLYER: It is our intention that they will receive all of the benefits which are planned but this is of course subject to the parliamentary approval.

Mr. TEMPLE: I take it then that legislation will be introduced soon?

Mr. HELLYER: It will be included in the next supplementary estimates.

Mr. TEMPLE: Regarding severence pay, I understand that the individual serviceman being retired will pay 85 per cent of the ordinary income tax rate.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, of his ordinary income tax rate on the benefits.

Mr. TEMPLE: Let us say someone is making $7,000 a year and he is being prematurely retired. Let us say his severence pay might come to $3,000. Will he pay his income tax on the whole $10,000 or not?

Mr. HELLYER: I think the important point is that the rate will not be increased as a result of the additional increment. They will just be paying 85 per cent of the rate they would have been paying without any special benefits. This is a special arrangement which applies to members of the armed forces. They would not pay a higher rate as a result of the special benefits.

Mr. TEMPLE: I also believe that some years ago in the United Kingdom they had a somewhat similar situation and that income tax was not paid. If I am correct on that, why is income tax being paid even at the rate of 85 per cent?

Mr. HELLYER: This question can be better directed to treasury. We have not made a habit in this country of making payments which are not subject to tax. This is a long established principle and I think probably it was felt the establishment of a precedent of this nature inevitably would lead to requests that this be applied to the whole economy, to the retirement benefits for everyone, including civilians.

Mr. TEMPLE: I know it is difficult to have an exact chart showing the amount which each retired serviceman will receive because of the length of time they are in and the different ranks they have held from time to time, as a

result of which the amounts will vary, but could the committee have a rough outline in the near future of the procedure concerning severance pay.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Temple, I think the information is pretty well public, but if you would like to have a schedule of the benefits payable to a representative group of different ranks and with different lengths of service this probably could be prepared. However, I would hope the request would be kept to a reasonable minimum in respect of the number of examples given in order that it would not require too much computation.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, is it on the same subject matter?

Mr. LAMBERT: No, Mr. Chairman. I want to get away from the bread-basket aspects of this, I think a lot of this is quite theoretical. This plan of retirement will be phased out over a number of years so that we will have varying degrees of service between now and that time. This is not the current problem. My concern is the basic criteria which have motivated the minister to come to this decision in respect of unification of command. It would appear from your remarks that it concerned savings of money; in other words that the minister was looking forward to obtaining money out of the defence budget, which seems to be pretty well fixed by circumstances, for other purposes than, shall we say, housekeeping, and in order to get this extra money he had to go after personnel. In my opinion, this has been the basic criteria. I am interested in the balance of military efficiency.

Mr. HELLYER: In my statement I mentioned there were two criteria; the first and most important is a streamlined effective force capable of co-ordinated action, the single plan, and the second is the maximum elimination of duplication, with consequent savings.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, those are a lot of fine words but what I am concerned about are the basic criteria. Is it for the improvement of military efficiency of the forces, starting with this command structure, or is it a question of savings of dollars which is the prime consideration?

Mr. HELLYER: It is both, Mr. Lambert, and you cannot separate them because, first of all, the organization is important from the standpoint of response, readiness and co-ordination. But, in addition to that, the availability of modern weapons and equipment is important in order to have a highly flexible and ready force. These things are complementary and it is impossible to consider them in complete isolation because, in fact, they are related. It is for both reasons we have made the proposals that are now before you.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I want to make it quite clear that I agree with the idea of unification of command. I have my own reasons for it but I wanted to know your reasons because you are the one who is putting the changes into effect. I want to get to the crux of this whole matter. I want to know your ultimate plans and upon what advice you have acted in this connection.

Mr. HELLYER: I think the motivation is simply this, to get the maximum amount of effective forces in the highest state of readiness for the least amount of money.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes; I have heard that from four or five different ministers and I think that is a general hope of all ministers of defence, together with other ministers. But, where does the advice come from in this regard. Were you under advice in this regard?

Mr. HELLYER: The advice comes from many sources, as you know. The ministers obtain their advice from many persons. I have mentioned a number of the committees, both ad hoc and otherwise, which advise the minister. These are sources of advice.

Mr. LAMBERT: Was the plan which now has been disclosed to this committee primarily the result of the studies of the minister which he spoke about at the last hearings?

Mr. HELLYER: The report primarily is based on the experience of ministers in the administration of the armed forces of Canada.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is your own experience?

Mr. HELLYER: Not at all; our experience plus the advice and the reports of the studies all combined. There is one concept.

Mr. LAMBERT: Perhaps the minister will be a little more open. I am not trying to beat you. I want your view. What was the source of the planning for this reorganization? I know you had your committee; you had your own idea. Presumably advice was sought from the chiefs of the various services; but where else?

Mr. HELLYER: Like yourself, Mr. Lambert, I do a considerable amount of reading, as does the associate minister, and we get ideas and advice from many sources. I do not think we should waste too much time finding out what each individual thinks. Under our system, the ministers of government are responsible for the decisions made in the proposals put forward to parliament. Regardless of where the advice comes from, how slanted or how put together, the ministers have the responsibility and it is on that basis we are prepared to discuss the proposal put before you.

Mr. LAMBERT: The minister is asking the committee to examine what would be a fundamental reorganization of the forces. He is asking us and parliament to approve of it on his word and on the word of the government. Is that the sole yardstick we are to use? I am attempting to find out what have been the yardsticks to evaluate this plan.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is the responsibility of each member of the committee to apply his intellect to the problem and solution and decide for himself whether the proposals put forward are the best ones or not.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I see we have a disagreement with the minister in this regard on this point; at least I have.

Mr. MATHESON: Personally, I take the strongest exception to the proposition made by the Vice-Chairman of the Committee that this committee should engage in a searching and probing operation to see which members of the minister's staff might agree or disagree with recommendations he proposes to bring before parliament, and this committee. Surely, the former Privy Councillor, my friend the Vice-Chairman of this Committee, is not going to suggest that a defence committee is going to act in that irresponsible fashion; if so, surely the usefulness of this committee has come to an end.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now 12.30 p.m. We will adjourn until Thursday.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I am not asking for individual names of advisers of the minister. I wanted him to indicate generally the source of this plan. I do not accept Mr. Matheson's observation.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is adjourned. May I see the members of the steering committee for a few moments?

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-Sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 2

THURSDAY, MAY 28, 1964

Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20875—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),	Harkness,	Martineau,
Béchard,	Langlois,	Matheson,
Brewin,	Laniel,	McMillan,
Deachman,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	Nielsen,
Fane,	Lloyd,	Pilon,
Granger,	MacLean,	Smith,
Groos,	MacRae,	Temple,
		Winch—(24).

Quorum 13.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, May 20, 1964.

Ordered,—That the Special Committee on Defence be empowered to print such papers and evidence as may be ordered by the Committee, and that Standing Order 66 be suspended in relation thereto; and that it be granted leave to sit while the House is sitting.

Attest

LEON J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

20875—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 28, 1964
(3)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacRae, Matheson, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch (17).

In attendance: Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence; and Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence.

On motion of Mr. Laniel, seconded by Mr. Fane,

Resolved,—That the time of the meetings of this Committee be changed to 11.00 a.m. on Tuesday and Thursday mornings.

The Chairman announced that the Steering Subcommittee soon will suggest the names of outside witnesses to be called respecting Bill C-90.

Agreed,—That information, respecting retirement of service personnel, tabled today by the Minister, as requested by Mr. Temple on May 26, be printed in the Committee's records. (*See Appendix "A" to today's Proceedings*)

The Committee resumed consideration of Bill C-90, An Act to Amend the National Defence Act.

The Minister, Mr. Hellyer, was further questioned respecting his statement to the Committee on May 26.

Mr. Winch suggested that the committee give early consideration to the matter of the involuntary retirement of certain personnel from the defence services. This question was referred to the Steering Subcommittee.

At 12.30 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11.00 a.m., Tuesday June 2, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, May 28, 1964.
11 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN: We now have a quorum. The meeting will come to order.

Before we start on the Bill I should like to say that at our last meeting the Steering subcommittee made a recommendation that the hours of sitting be at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. It was recognized that there is a conflict at that hour with a number of other committees. Since the last meeting I have had some discussions with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee and I have an understanding that they are going to change their hours of sitting to 9:30 a.m. to 11 o'clock. This means that, if we start at 11 o'clock, we will follow them. It may not solve the problem for members who are on two committees—who may find it too much to sit from 9:30 continuously—but it will at least solve the problem as far as accommodation and staff are concerned. We will then be able to have a room with simultaneous translation, and so on.

Mr. FANE: So our sittings in this Committee will be at 11 o'clock, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: How long are our sittings supposed to last?

The CHAIRMAN: Eleven to one o'clock—we will begin one half hour later.

I will read the recommendation of the subcommittee:

> That the time of the meeting of this committee be changed to 11 a.m. on Tuesday and Thursday mornings.

Mr. LANIEL: I so move.

Mr. FANE: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: If anyone would like to speak in the French language today, there are Interpreters available. There is no Shorthand Reporter to take down French, therefore the interpretation would have to be taken down.

At our next meeting we will bring forward a Steering Committee Report indicating the witnesses to follow the Minister and Deputy Minister.

There are some sheets here containing answers by the minister to questions asked by Mr. Temple. These will be distributed to members of the Committee, and if it is agreeable to the Committee I would suggest that they be printed as an appendix to the proceedings of today's sitting. (*See Appendix "A"*)

Mr. HARKNESS: I would suggest, in connection with the questions that were asked by Mr. Temple at the last meeting, that a definite time be arranged to go into all of those matters.

Mr. WINCH: May I say, first of all, that I apologize for being late—it is the first time in 11 years—but unfortunately my ankle is to blame.

May I ask, sir, whether or not it is your policy that we should continue today with the first question that was asked by Mr. Temple at our last meeting. If so, then I would like my name to be put down on your list.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we were discussing the organization of the Department. We had started on that line of questioning. As soon as we exhaust that

line, we will go back to the area opened up by Mr. Temple, and proceed in that direction.

We have here today the Minister of National Defence and the Associate Minister of National Defence, and we will now proceed to consideration of Bill C-90, Clause 1, and with the questioning of the Minister. Might I suggest that the acoustics here are not very good, and so I would ask members to speak clearly and loudly, please.

On clause 1—*Duties of chief of defence staff.*

Mr. MACRAE: Mr. Chairman, my question is directed to the Minister, and then there will be two or three brief related questions. What has been the actual duty and responsibility of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff up to this particular point? I think we now have a pretty good idea of what the new chief of the defence staff will do, but I would like to know what the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff has done up to this point; what has been his role?

Hon. PAUL HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee has presided over meetings of the chiefs of staff committee which have included, in addition to himself, the three chiefs of staff, the chairman of the defence research board, and the attendance of the deputy minister. His role has been largely one of co-ordinator of proposals put forward by the various chiefs of staff and by other committees which have reported to the chiefs of staff committee. In addition to that, he has been the officer primarily responsible for negotiations between the government of Canada and the Department of National Defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American air defence command, in respect of military policy matters and requirements.

Mr. MACRAE: Have the chiefs of staff of the three services up to this point had direct access to the ministry? In other words, could they bypass the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff if they so chose?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. MACRAE: My final question, Mr. Chairman, is this: I would like the minister to define the difference, if there is any, between the deputy minister's role in the past, before the passage of this act, in the integration of the armed forces, and any role he may have in the future. Will there be any difference whatsoever?

Mr. HELLYER: The deputy minister will go into the answer to this question in more detail when he appears before you, but fundamentally his role will be the same. He has an overriding jurisdiction in respect of the use of resources in the Department of National Defence. I think the main difference will be in practice, in that it is proposed, that submissions from the military force, from the chief of defence staff to the minister and associate minister, will be considered and analysed by the deputy minister's staff before they are considered in the defence council and before decisions are taken in respect of them. In other words, the civilian branch of the department will examine all proposals having to do with policy or the expenditure of public funds before decisions are made, so that the minister will have the advantage of a civilian point of view and a reassurance that all major considerations have been taken into account in respect of the proposal which is being considered.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has this not always been done?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I am afraid it has not always been done in respect of all matters. It has been done in respect of some matters, particularly those having to do with the administration, but there have been many cases throughout the years when proposals, particularly those having operational aspects, have not been given any analysis other than the analysis they received in the forces before being proposed to the minister.

The CHAIRMAN: I have on my list Mr. Groos, Mr. Fane and Mr. Laniel.

Mr. MACRAE: My questions are finished.

Mr. SMITH: Can I ask a supplementary question to Mr. MacRae's question?

The CHAIRMAN: We are trying to avoid supplementary questions.

Mr. SMITH: Do we not lose the thread of continuity? That was one of the advantages of the system under which we operated last year, that we were allowed a certain continuity.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us try supplementaries if they are strictly on the topic of the last question and if they are brief.

Mr. SMITH: My supplementary was related to the duties of the deputy minister. Does not the new organizational chart indicate that there might be a duplication of the work of the deputy minister and the comptroller general?

Mr. HELLYER: There is inevitably some duplication when you have work prepared by a military organization which is then reviewed by the civilian organization. There is bound to be an overlapping and a duplication in such a case. The goal is to get the amount of review which will satisfy the minister and the government, and through them parliament, that the decisions taken are the right ones without, at the same time, affecting reviews on such a scale that it will slow down and interfere with the work of the military organization. This is a delicate balance, but some review is required. We hope to get a balance which will permit all points of view to be put forward without, at the same time, engendering undue delay.

Mr. GROOS: I wonder if we could have that chart up there again, Mr. Chairman—the organization chart. We have only the little one.

Mr. Chairman, I was very interested to see this organizational chart as it has been drawn up, and of particular interest to me was this new position of the chief of operational readiness. To my mind, this will prevent the three services from walking down different roads and it will prevent the three getting out of step with one another when travelling down the same road. I become a bit nervous when I look at the idea of co-ordination in respect of the three armed services piecemeal, and I wonder if the minister is in a position at this time to tell us how far this unification is going to go. I am sure it would help us if we could see how this particular organization will fit into the overall organization.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, this is the step proposed at the present time and this is the step which is immediately consequential upon bill C-90, which we are considering. As to what further steps are taken, these will have to be worked out by the defence staff, and this is one of the reasons for the early appointment of a defence staff.

So far as the ultimate objective is concerned, this has been clearly stated in the white paper, and I think this is a fair recognition that this is the first step toward a single unified force for Canada.

Mr. GROOS: I understand that but I am concerned with the extent of unification. We have seen statements made that we expect to have the three services unified by 1967. As I said, it is really the extent of the unification which interests me, and I think that is only reasonable.

We have seen this complete unification at the very lowest level now. We have three individual services which, I am sure, can be unified in some way into a single service. But, it is the method of doing this and the extent of the unification at the lower level which interests me. I do not want to put any thoughts into your mind but I would like to hear your views on this matter.

Mr. HELLYER: My views are that the defence staff will evolve this unification down through the various strata on a continuous and careful basis as they

proceed, and I think it would be wrong at this stage to anticipate the immediate steps and how long they will take. These matters have to be carefully thought through and carefully worked out. But, we have decided, and I think it is the right course because it was given a lot of consideration, to start at the top. First of all, there is very little argument about unifying the top command. This will permit co-ordination; it will permit a unified policy and even, more important, it will permit the implementation of a unified policy which would not have been possible, in my opinion, without this kind of unified headquarters structure.

Now, as to how they will proceed at the lower strata, I think we must wait to determine as recommendations come forward. In effect, what changes will take place in functional or area commands will have to be considered from recommendations put forward. We think this is the right method of approach because it is an evolution rather than attempting to predetermine precisely what an ultimate theoretical structure will be. I think we will work it out in practice and see how it responds to the new command control.

Mr. GROOS: In other words, you will start at the top with unification; you will be working down and you will be prepared to stop at any level that it becomes necessary, and it is not definite that all three services are going to be completely unified down to the lowest level, even though there will be a certain amount at all levels.

Mr. HELLYER: I think all one can do in this case is to project some sort of a common sense standpoint of what is likely to happen. There are so many trades which are common to two or more services that it is likely after several years of cross-posting, after men have been posted only on the basis of where they can serve best and, secondly, where they can enhance their own careers best, that you will have sufficient movement between the three traditional armed forces that, in fact, they become unified.

I think this is what you would expect to happen. Only time will tell how precisely it follows the anticipation, but this is what I would expect to happen. There have been many cases of surpluses of manpower and trades in one service which were not, in fact, available to meet shortages in others, but with a single chief of personnel, with his basis of personnel selection being only to meet the needs and requirements of the whole, you will then get a *de facto* unification. This, however, does not mean that everyone is going to be a specialist in every trade, as this is not possible. It is contemplated you will have the same degree of specialization in the unified force as you presently have in a single force. This cannot be avoided. But, what it will mean is that you can take advantage of surpluses of similar or identical trades which now exist in one area and move them freely to another; also, if a trade becomes redundant you can take these people and rather than discharge them as redundant you can retain them, if it is in their interests and the interests of the service, to fill some new function, which does provide a degree of flexibility which has not been available in the past. There are many examples, which I am sure, you are familiar with, where this capability would have been advantageous both from the standpoint of the men and from the standpoint of the services.

Mr. GROOS: I am glad to hear you say that because in the absence of any statement along those lines all sorts of remarks have been made and I think your statement has clarified a number of things.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you a question Mr. Fane?

Mr. FANE: The minister answered one of my most important questions in the statement which he has just completed. I have several more questions. First of all, may I say that I am very pleased to know that the minister realizes that in this case he cannot start at the bottom and unify the services from there up, that the top is the place to start.

However, I have two or three other questions and perhaps one I may have to hold in abeyance until you discuss the special benefits being accorded to those members of the services who are being retired.

Would it be right at this time to ask the minister for information in respect of those members who are being retired. It is my understanding the services are recruiting new men all the time and, in view of this, would it not be possible to keep some of those who already are in the services and move them to different positions rather than discharging them?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Fane, if it is agreeable to you I think we should hold that type of question until we get to the proper section when we will be discussing the whole problem in respect of retirements and replacements.

Mr. FANE: Fine. And, I presume, you also would want me to hold any questions in respect of the reserve forces?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. At this time we are dealing essentially with the organization of the unified command.

Mr. FANE: I would like to register at this time a caveat on the spot to discuss these things at a later date.

The CHAIRMAN: We will be discussing the reserve forces as a separate topic of discussion after we have completed this bill.

Mr. FANE: Then, those are all the questions I have for now.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. LANIEL: In his brief the other day the minister said just a few words on civil control of national defence and, on another occasion, it has been mentioned—and I do not know whether I can attribute this to the minister or to someone else—that the new set-up might bring better control by civilians over national defence. I am wondering whether the minister would emphasize the civil control of our national defence policies, making more or less a parallel between the present system and the present channels in comparison with the changes that will come into effect after the adoption of Bill No. C-90 and implementation of the unification of command, touching on the advantages of these changes.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, I think there are two main advantages in our proposed method of handling things. The first is a reduction in the number of direct channels to the ministers. At the present time, with the six channels of direct input, the material is not co-ordinated to the extent it should be as part of a whole before it has to be considered, and perhaps decided on by the minister.

With the present prerogative of the chiefs of staff to come directly to the minister with their problems and submissions, there are many cases where proposals are dealt with by the minister in isolation from a co-ordinated picture. This will be overcome in our proposed organization by the fact that all military proposals will come through one channel, and therefore must in effect be co-ordinated before they come to the attention of the minister. Therefore, I think this probably is the biggest single improvement; that is, that you will have an over-all picture, an over-all plan, or a combined approach to the national defence requirements at the time it reaches the minister, rather than the minister having to do what he can to co-ordinate the various elements coming from all different directions.

The second major change is the one on which I touched earlier; that is, that in the future it is proposed, in addition to proposals having to do with administration and finance only which in the past have been reviewed by the deputy minister's staff, that all proposals having to do with policy as well as finance will be considered and a point of view registered in respect of them which will be available to the minister for consideration when the subject

is being dealt with. This is a change from the present practice and a strengthening, really, of the civil side of the Department of National Defence, and a re-enforcing of the information available to the minister and to the defence council at the time that major proposals are considered and decided.

Mr. LANIEL: Did not the defence council have at the end the minister, the associate minister, the president and vice president, and more or less obtain the same purpose by having all the chiefs of staff there and the chairman and the council?

Mr. HELLYER: The defence council has been acting less and less for anything except minor administrative matters.

Mr. LANIEL: Not policy?

Mr. HELLYER: Not policy. Policy has been considered in the chiefs of staff committee which, theoretically, has been the main advising body to the ministers and to the government. In the past, however, because of the direct access which has been a right of the individual chiefs, many important, and I would say the most important, matters often have not been given the consideration by the chiefs of staff committee that is required in order to contain them within one program. In other words, they have come from each individual element for consideration rather than come forward as a whole package.

What we want to get, because it is easier to cope with, is a package so that we can look at the whole thing at one time and not have to deal with major items in isolation where in some cases a favourable decision would have a very serious effect on the other proposals which might come forward at a later time, and which might not then be possible because of the allocation of resources which already had been set.

Mr. LANIEL: Did the problem mainly come from a lack of interdependence between the forces and organization up to the point where they were more trying to build up the image of their forces and forgetting about the image of the Canadian defence as a whole?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not say there had been any overt attempt to do that, but I would say so long as you have in effect three separate corporations it is just natural that each one would place a strong emphasis on its own point of view, and each one would consider its position more important, perhaps, relatively than some others. So long as this point of view can be put forward independently of a reconciliation with the others, then the minister is in the position where he really does not have the staff, and the time to effect the reconciliation at that level.

We are sure that the proposed changes will permit the minister to get a total view which will enable him to know all of the individual elements which are proposed so that they can be dealt with as a whole picture rather than in isolation one from the other.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions which really flow from the statement which the minister made yesterday. I think these questions are really basic in nature. First of all, from your statement yesterday and from previous statements, it is apparent that the basic premise on which the numbers in the armed forces, the amount to be spent for their food, accommodation, and general maintenance, and which will be available for equipment, and so on, is all based on an expenditure of $1.5 to $1.6 billion a year for defence purposes.

My first question is, how was this figure arrived at as the amount which would meet the defence needs?

Mr. HELLYER: I would say the short answer to that is the same way it was done in the several years when the hon. gentleman was minister of national defence.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would say that during that period the amount varied considerably. It varied considerably depending upon what the circumstances were and what the needs were.

Mr. WINCH: Could the hon. member give us an idea of what the variance was when he was minister of national defence?

Mr. HARKNESS: When the situation in Berlin was particularly threatening, for example, we provided for a considerable increase in our forces and considerable increases in the expenditures as a result.

What I am really interested in is whether any consideration was given, or any calculations made in regard to the amount of money required to meet our commitments to NATO, under the Norad agreement, to look after what we might call the local defence needs for the immediate defence of Canada, and to look after the commitments we already have made and probably commitments for the future, to the United Nations, including some additional ones we have at this time? Was any calculation made along those lines regarding what will be required in the way of forces and new equipment in order to meet all these needs?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, Mr. Chairman. In fact, the forces' goals which are set out in the white paper. First of all they meet our present commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Norad, and make available forces for the United Nations, and project what we believe will be an adequate contribution to these international organizations in future years. This amount of money will permit the organization of and equip the forces as set out. We feel that this is a proper contribution for Canada in the immediate years ahead.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you place before the committee those calculations regarding the amounts that will be required for these various purposes?

Mr. HELLYER: You already have the over-all figures. You have the forces structure in general terms and you have the amount of money in general terms. As far as budgeting on a functional basis is concerned, this is presently being worked out. As you know, it has not been done in the past and it will take about a year before we can produce the figures by function, which I think will give all of us a better indication of what we have been spending on each function and where we plan to go in the future.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far I can see, the situation was really decided on a financial ground, and expenditures for defence will be kept somewhere in the order of $1.5 or $1.6 billion dollars per year, and the amount of equipment, as I said earlier, and everything else that will be required are based on that figure. No real consideration has been given or no real calculations have been made regarding the amount of money which really is required to meet our defence needs.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not deny that the over-all financial consideration was a factor, and that fact was included in my statement to the committee. I am sure the hon. member would not deny that it was a factor when he was minister, because it was.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is always a factor.

Mr. HELLYER: It is always a factor and cannot be ignored, but at the same time there has also been an evaluation of what the reasonable contribution by Canada would be in the future. The force structure set out in the white paper is considered to be a reasonable contribution in view of the situation existing in the world at the present time. To maintain forces, as set out in the armed

forces, we have indicated it will require approximately this level of expenditures in constant dollars. There will have to be a review as time goes along, depending again on many factors including the international situation.

Mr. HARKNESS: I take it the situation really is that no calculations were made regarding the amount of money that will be required to meet our various defence commitments and needs?

Mr. HELLYER: That is not true. I should use the word "precise" because I do not think our system will permit precise calculations, but a calculation was done in respect of the amount of money required to train and equip the force structure as outlined in the white paper, and that amount is approximately $1,500 million to $1,550 million in constant dollars. This presupposes savings based on the changes in organization which have been outlined to the committee. Unless we can effect the savings which have been indicated then, of course, we cannot get as much equipment as we have set as a requirement.

Mr. HARKNESS: If those calculations have been made I think the committee should have them placed before it.

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Chairman I should like to ask a supplementary question in respect of that point. My observation is based on the line of questioning by Mr. Harkness dealing with a problem which I would suggest this reorganization will enable you to handle in a better way than in the past. It seems to me we should tie this questioning to the significance of the integration of the forces. Will the integration of the forces as outlined to us by the minister assist the departments in evaluating the effort that Canada should make with its military force, and will it provide a degree of efficiency in arriving at the effort that we should make?

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I could make this comment. I have been listening to Mr. Harkness's line of questioning which I feel is really outside the ambit of our current discussion, having to do with the reorganization of our defence structure. I think as long as the discussion deals with or ties in with this defence structure question it is in order. I realize that one of the arguments advanced for this reorganization is a financial one but I think at this stage we should try to avoid a general discussion in respect of budgeting techniques. I think that is a separate topic in itself which I hope the committee will consider at a later date.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I would submit that on the basis of the statement made yesterday we should be free to ask questions in connection with that statement and the particular things which were referred to in it. The particular matter I am dealing with I think is absolutely basic to the work of this committee if this committee is in fact really going to consider how the defence of Canada should and could be best carried on.

The CHAIRMAN: I quite agree, Mr. Harkness, that this is a very important factor in dealing with the problem of defence of Canada but I suggest that we should limit ourselves to the implication of this particular problem before us, which is the unification of our defence structure.

Mr. SMITH: Surely one of the bases for unification is the projected savings in one line of national defence which may be applied against another and it would seem that we should be supplied with thoroughly detailed information regarding how these projected savings in respect of personnel are being made so that they may be applied against other defence needs. I believe this goes to the root of the whole matter. In other words, do these savings represent a real projection or are they "ball park figures," to use one of the ministers favourite expressions?

Mr. HELLYER: The answer to that has already been given. They are "ball park figures" because it is impossible to determine what the result will be until each decision has been made, from the standpoint of manpower and its

effect on cost. No secret has been made of the fact that we cannot tell precisely what the savings will be nor where they will be until each step has been taken.

I hope I have not given the impression that we can tell you now which jobs will be eliminated and which functions can be integrated, and the dollar value of each, because it has not been determined. However, "ball park" estimates have been made for planning purposes, and those are the ones that have been stated.

Mr. SMITH: I do not think the minister has given that impression but it has been taken by many people.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness was questioning the minister. We moved to a semipoint of order and I think we should now go back to the original line of questioning.

Mr. HARKNESS: The basic point I am trying to make and upon which I am trying to obtain some information is really whether the defence needs of Canada can be met by saying that we will spend $1.5 million or $1.6 million a year and that this will continue for some considerable number of years in the future, irrespective of the conditions and irrespective of whether that amount of money will in effect enable us to meet our needs. Particularly in connection with that I would like to know what proportion of the gross national product this represents.

Mr. HELLYER: I would respectfully submit, Mr. Chairman, in view of the understanding we had that we would discuss this bill and at a later stage go into the broader aspects of defence policy, including the white paper and any discussion that members would like to have in respect to it, that questions relating to the adequacy of the force structure as predicted or the adequacy of our contribution as a percentage of the gross national product and other considerations should be left until that time.

Mr. HARKNESS: In reply, I would say that we have had a statement from the minister, and the members of the committee certainly should be in a position to put forward their own ideas in regard to that statement and in regard to whether or not it really covers the situation. In essence, that is what I am doing here.

The CHAIRMAN: Again, Mr. Harkness, the members of the Steering Committee, in considering how the Committee might tackle our work, were unanimous in the opinion that we should deal with Bill C-90 and everything impinging directly upon Bill C-90, and that we should limit our discussion on Bill C-90 to the specifics covered in the bill; that is, the unification of our command structure. It was decided that we should not deal with the broader problem of integration which, of itself, is a very major and important topic and which will be taken up at a later date I would hope. There are also many items from our last report, including budgeting and factors affecting the amount that is spent by the country on defence, that were listed as topics for study by this committee. I would hope we can deal with Bill C-90 and then move on to these topics one after another in an orderly fashion. I am afraid that if we try to open up a general discussion on defence policy at this time we would be running over the whole area without focusing on the specific problems one after another.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think you can get away from general policy in connection with a matter of this kind. As long as there is going to be an opportunity to consider these questions in detail, however, I am quite agreeable to deferring my question.

What agenda has the steering committee set up? What provision has it made for discussion of matters of this kind?

The CHAIRMAN: We have tentatively agreed that when we have finished with Bill C-90 we will move on to a discussion of the role of the navy, which

we touched only very briefly in our last deliberations. We have not yet gone beyond that in the planning of our committee work

Mr. WINCH: May I ask one question on priority? I do not want to interfere with Mr. Harkness.

I am most interested in what you have said and what Mr. Smith said a few moments ago when he mentioned personnel. We are now dealing, of course, with the bill in front of us, but it was also recommended by the steering committee and accepted unanimously at the last meeting of this committee that, tied in with the bill, there should be certain questions relating to personnel.

If my thinking is correct, I believe it will take us a few meetings at the very least before we are able to report on the bill itself. Again if my thinking is correct, plans are now going forward which may mean the release of a number of staff, either military or civilian, within the next few weeks. I hope I am not interfering with Mr. Harkness, but I would like to ask for consideration by the committee, if not now at some time today because of the fact that personnel will be released either voluntarily or compulsorily within a very few weeks, of the suggestion that this committee may consider this matter as a priority for our next meeting. There are a number of what I consider most important phases regarding personnel including the basis of their separation pay, the relationship between military and civilian personnel, and also a certain number of other aspects. Without going further than that, I will merely say I honestly believe that if we are to do a job it is the responsibility of this committee, with the present plans, to give some thought and perhaps make certain recommendations to the minister, the associate minister or the house itself on those who have served us well as civilians and military and who may be released in the next few weeks. Of course, that would then cover those who may be released up to the eventual 10,000.

May I ask whether or not you will now give some consideration to this most important matter and establish some basis of priority?

The CHAIRMAN: We had really broken this problem down into two sections.

Mr. WINCH: I may also say that I raise this not only because I think it is of major concern but also because it was the first item raised by Mr. Temple at our meeting yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN: We have broken down the unification into two parts; one is the organizational structure and the other is the impact on the personnel affected. We are now proceeding with a line of questioning dealing with organizational structure. As soon as we complete this we will move on to the second phase, the one that you have raised.

I would hope that we may proceed with our questioning of the Minister and the Deputy Minister, who will be here on Tuesday. I would suggest that we continue with our current line of questioning now and see what progress we make in this area. Then, hopefully, when we have concluded the questioning of the Minister in this area we can move to the topic you have suggested.

Mr. WINCH: My suggestion was not only made hopefully. If we do not finish this topic I would respectfully ask that our first order of business at our next meeting will be the matter of personnel.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we proceed with our order of questioning and see what progress we can make?

Mr. HARKNESS: Section 15 of the National Defence Act states that the Canadian forces, the naval, army and air forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada, shall consist of three services; namely, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force. There is no proposal at the present time to repeal that section, so I take it that the three services will continue.

Mr. HELLYER: This is correct. The three services will continue as legal entities at least for some considerable period of time. The change being proposed at the moment is to put each of the services under the command of the chief of defence staff.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, as the three services will continue, what is going to happen? Who is going to represent each of these services? To whom, in other words, will the commanding officer of a naval, an army, or an air force unit, as the case may be, look really? Or at least, perhaps we can put it in this form: How is the chain of command going to operate in these circumstances?

Mr. HELLYER: The chain of command is as set out in the chart.

Mr. HARKNESS: Up to date if anybody in one of these services has a particular problem, the chain of command is such that it finally winds up with the chief of the service concerned and he would deal with it if it were a matter which concerned his service entirely and nothing else. How would it be dealt with at the present time?

Mr. HELLYER: In exactly the same way. The grievance procedure will go right up to the chief of the defence staff, where there will be a member from each of the three services. They will carry out, I am sure, their functional responsibilities and at the same time make sure that any particular aspect represented in an individual service which they consider important will be put forward and given fair consideration in the deliberations of the defence staff.

Mr. HARKNESS: As a result of a long period of trial and error there came into effect a naval board, an army council and an air force council, and in each case they brought expert opinion and advice on which the chief of staff concerned could rely as far as making decisions was concerned on any matter. Will this board, and these two councils be abolished? My understanding is that they were.

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. HARKNESS: Then from where is the chief of defence staff going to get expert opinion which has been available up to date through these two councils and the board through the chiefs of the respective services?

Mr. HELLYER: He will get it from his defence staff which will include senior representatives of each of the existing forces.

Mr. HARKNESS: It seems to me that you are going in effect to have a more complicated and slower working organization than you have had up to date under the circumstances?

Mr. HELLYER: On the contrary, I think the change will be such an improvement that it will be a great relief to many people who have suffered the old one for a considerable length of time.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, theoretically you may think that is the case, but from the point of view of actual practice I would personally doubt it very much. In other words, I think as far as each of these services is concerned, they have to have somebody really at the top that they can go to, and that person really has to have the benefit of something similar to the naval board, or the army council, or the air council.

Mr. HELLYER: What you are suggesting is a continuation of the status quo. Is that what you recommend?

Mr. HARKNESS: What I am suggesting is that with the system which you envisage I doubt whether you will get the results as rapidly and as effectively as from the system which has existed. In other words, the process I think will be slowed down, if everyone has to go to the one man rather than to go to three men.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so. I would be surprised and disappointed if this were the case, and if it proves to be the case, there will be some other changes made very rapidly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Nothing will show this except practice?

Mr. HELLYER: That is right.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would be very doubtful of it. This matter was brought up on the chart which is before us at the present time. You have made quite a point of the fact that there were six persons with direct access to the minister, thus allowing the presentation of difficulties and so on. I quite fail to see that that is the situation. It seems to me that the minister is in a very much better position if he has got the advice from six people in connection with military matters rather than as now envisaged, to be getting advice from three people. You have really reduced it from six to three?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so. I think the minister can still get advice from a number of people; but he will get recommendations from fewer people, consequently there is a greater degree of co-ordination, planning and plan of program before they recommend to the minister.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask that the present chart be changed to the new one which shows the new set up so that we can have it in front of us?

Mr. HELLYER: Do you have the one just showing the chief of the defence staff?

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, the point here I think is that in actual practice I doubt whether there will be very much difference from the situation which has existed in the past. You made the statement that the most important matters have not been given consideration by the chiefs of staff committee. But that was never my experience.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I said that they have not been given consideration. I said they were not co-ordinated as part of the whole package. This has been one of the great weaknesses of the chiefs of staff committee. The chiefs of staff committee, because it has been a committee, would send through to the minister just about anything.

In the case of anything useful recommended by one of the individual services, it is human nature. Suppose a good proposal comes from one of the services. It has to be put forward with figures to the chiefs of staff. Why would the chiefs of staff not recommend it to the minister? There is no reason why they should not, because the chiefs of staff do not take the responsibility for fitting these projects within a total package. In other words, they do not put it forward as a totally integrated plan. They put forward papers as proposals from the army, from the navy, or from the air force individually recommended by chiefs of staff, to the chiefs of staff committee, or concurred in by the chiefs of staff committee.

Such a proposal is not assigned a priority and it is not put in as a part of a total package. So that the total projects put forward by the chiefs of staff committee would far exceed the resources available for national defence. Thus the problem of reconciliation came in. Now, we are returning to the military the responsibility for ascribing priority in putting forward recommendations which have been given consideration and as to how they should fit into the total defence procedure.

Mr. HARKNESS: I must say that this was not my experience.

Mr. HELLYER: I am tempted to bring forward one or two examples from your time to demonstrate exactly how the system worked.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would be glad if you would bring forward any examples to show how in actual practice the system worked, and to show precisely

from any one of the particular services what was considered by the chiefs of staff committee, and considered separately. They would have had the financial considerations, and I think they would have had the deputy minister's branch and his financial people particularly. Personally I had a meeting every Monday morning with the chiefs of staff committee and these matters were all discussed in the group. Various opinions were put forward, and I would have advice from each of the chiefs of staff, from the chairman of the defence research board, and from the deputy minister incorporated in the particular proposal. Therefore, I can say that in actual practice I would doubt very much whether the pre-existing system will be changed by this.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I think this is a most important matter, in view of the discussion during the last few minutes between the present minister and a former minister. I wonder if the minister could give us a clear indication of what he has in mind, in view of the denial made by the previous minister of national defence.

Mr. LLOYD: On the same subject, I agree in principle, but let us approach this subject objectively. Actually the questions so far from Mr. Harkness have had to do with a comparison, but before we get ourselves bogged down in a dogmatic position on this, let us have a chance to hear a couple of illustrations which might help all the members of the committee.

Mr. WINCH: That is exactly what I had in mind. It is my submission that this is a most important issue, and one on which there is a complete difference of opinion. I hope that this committee will not be the same as it was last year with no comparisons, but rather that we have brought before us all the facts. We have present the minister in this committee who is taking a diametrically and completely opposite stand, and if the matter is to be approached methodically, then I think on a non-political basis we should be given the principles involved even if it requires illustrations.

Mr. MATHESON: On this point regarding the proposition put forward by the minister, it seems to me clear that it is easier to be guided by recommendations that come from these sources which are struggling with the problems of a co-ordinated policy than it is to start to scramble them and to draw them together into one policy when you have six voices speaking, if you like, in concert. Surely, this does not call for illustrations, and this kind of thing it seems to me, would really destroy the usefulness of this committee. Observations by distinguished members of the committee such as Colonel Harkness are useful and helpful. He is Colonel Harkness to me and I remember when he received the George Cross. However, it seems to me that there is a principle in what the minister put forward; he is recommending something that is in effect asking the depatrment to co-ordinate their recommendations before coming to the minister himself. Surely, this is manifest without illustrations.

Mr. LLOYD: I do not want to be misunderstood. I support the principle of Mr. Winch's observations. I was hoping however we could maintain a high degree of objectivity and learn from the experience of the former minister. On this committee there are people without military experience but with public responsibility as elected representatives. Any information those with experience can bring to the committee could help us with experience in the organizational field to make some practical observations. I would like specific illustrations.

Mr. HARKNESS: The basic point I was making really was that I consider the minister, who has to take the responsibility in the final analysis for any policy that has been put into effect or any decision which has been taken, to be in a better position to do that if he has the advice of a number of people

with their differing points of view, than if he depends, as far as military advice is concerned, on the advice of only one man.

Mr. HELLYER: In principle there is no disagreement with that, and you will have noted that provision is made for advice from more than one man, and this is a sound principle. I do not think the principles are really in conflict, but there are two important improvements which we are attempting to effect, and that is that the military advisers reconcile their proposals from the standpoint of priority and programming, and that they have the responsibility for putting recommendations forward after this has been done. I think this would be a considerable improvement. It would make the department much more manageable from the minister's standpoint, and I really think you would agree that considerable improvement could be effected in that direction.

Mr. HARKNESS: I still feel quite strongly that the minister, whoever he may be, would be in a better position if he received advice, as has been the case in the past, from people, all of whom are experts in military matters, rather than theoretically getting it from one man, which is what that organization proposes. In other words, there would be six people who have direct access to the minister, which in effect really means that in most cases, if there is a question to be co-ordinated or a policy to be decided upon, he has always in the past met with them as a group and they threshed out the matter. He gets their opinions, and then he has to come to a decision.

Mr. HELLYER: This is true in respect of individual submissions.

Mr. HARKNESS: It has been true in respect of all major policy matters, and particularly relating to expenditure matters.

Mr. HELLYER: This is also true, but he has not had all of the proposals on policy or expenditures at that time or in a way so that they could be considered as part of a total. Consequently, he found himself—I am sure it is true in your case as well as in others—dealing with fairly important policy matters in isolation from the whole picture.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would not agree that that is the case. Actually, any major expenditure for equipment, construction or otherwise, was always a matter of consideration by that whole group and advice from them on it, and very frequently what it came down to was that the demands of all services had to be cut down so that you could come within what funds you had available.

Mr. HELLYER: This is true. There is one example which I think we can discuss fairly dispassionately. I hesitate to raise it because I agree with members of the committee that we want to be as objective in these matters as possible, but it covered two administrations and perhaps is indicative of the problems of management in the department, and that is the example of the Avro Arrow. Here is a proposal which came through all of the normal channels, I am sure, and was considered by the chiefs of staff committee. It was recommended by the minister to the government, and proceeded upon. Individual changes were recommended from time to time, including the development of a fire control system and other changes, which increased the cost very substantially. All of these were considered by all of the groups that you have mentioned and by the minister, and decisions were taken. Eventually, however, this came to the point where the total proportion of resources required to carry the program was so out of balance with other defence needs, in other words out of balance with the whole picture, that the government really had two alternatives: One to proceed with the project which had the blessing of the military advisers and on which positive decision had been taken all the way along, and increase defence expenditures very markedly, or else eliminate almost completely funds for capital expenditures in all other areas of our national defence posture.

This is what I have in mind. Here is a situation which developed and in which hundreds of millions of dollars were wasted, whereas, if there had been a program management from the outset, showing the cost of development over a period of time, showing the cost of the operation of the development which had been carried through to completion, and showing the cost of the project in its entirety in relation to the cost of maintaining antisubmarine forces and equipping them, as well as ground forces and equipping them, and all of the other elements of national defence, with periodic reviews which would ring the bells of management to say the cost was getting out of hand if we went ahead and developed an independent fire control system—if that method of management had been in effect at the time, the problem which did arise would not have arisen.

Now, this is the type of thing that we want to avoid if we can in the future, and it is the reason why I say we want to get a picture so that we know what we are getting into and what its long range manifestations are at the time the decisions are made, not just in respect of one element, the isolated proposal which may make perfectly good sense in itself, but in relation to the whole, so that some months or years later we are not confronted with a situation which is quite untenable in relation to the whole picture.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would say, in regard to that, that the example I do not think has really any relationship to the matter that we were discussing of the way in which the minister gets his advice. The chief thing that your example shows is that the cost estimates which were made originally were grossly miscalculated.

Mr. HELLYER: No, I do not think it just shows that. I think the cost estimates perhaps were low. But, there were decisions made all the way along the line in the way you have been describing today; there was something else to add, something which increased the cost. And, this is on the basis of the project and this is without a complete correlation between the project and all other requirements of national defence.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think the basic thing was that the cost estimates put in to begin with and subsequent cost estimates for some time later were not realistic. The matter of having a better means of arriving at cost estimates I thoroughly agree with. I think the method must have been at fault in that the cost estimates in respect of the Avro Arrow were so very much lower than proved to be the case; and, secondly, the information available on which these cost estimates were based must have been extremely inadequate or distorted by various people, manufacturers for instance.

Mr. HELLYER: One of the marked improvements we expect in our new organization will be in costing because the service will be immediately aware of the consequence of inadequate costing. They are putting forward a package proposal where if they are wrong by any real margin of error in costing it will affect some other proposal already put forward. We think that the advantage of program costing and of program recommendations, which we have in mind, will be very considerable in providing a more adequate basis of information to the civilian authorities before the die is set.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but would you not agree this is a totally different matter than the way in which the minister gets his advice. This is a costing procedure problem rather than the means by which advice is given to the minister.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is all part of the same thing because every proposal which is put forward has many implications. There may be implications of operational effectiveness, implications of personnel requirements and costs, and there may be others. But, all these things have to be taken into account, and

my point is that the more information which is available at the time the decision is made the less chance of waste and inefficiency through having to change decisions or to make negative decisions on something else that comes along later and which might be more important.

Mr. HARKNESS: No one would disagree with the statement that the more information which is available the better position you are going to be in to make a decision and, naturally, every effort should be made to get the maximum amount of accurate information. But, I do not see the relation of that to, shall we say, the means by which the minister gets his advice.

Mr. HELLYER: I think there is a direct relationship in our proposed organization. The plans and programs are all produced in the same shop so that they come forward in a co-ordinated way from the same source after consideration has been given to the whole picture. I am sure a proposal would not come forward from this source if it was going to have an adverse effect on another proposal which was going to have a higher priority and was in the planning stages at the time.

Mr. HARKNESS: But this, essentially, has always been the situation. Will not the situation in the future be that your cost estimates, say in respect of aircraft, will come from the experts in the air force and, if it is for an army vehicle, this information is going to come from the experts in the army development and engineering branches, and so forth.

Mr. HELLYER: Undoubtedly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Really, you will still have the cost estimates prepared by the same people.

Mr. HELLYER: Undoubtedly they will be prepared by experts in their field, but undoubtedly they will be very carefully reviewed at the service level by the combined planning group.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Mr. Chairman, I am not opposed to the questions being put forward by Mr. Harkness because they are very interesting. But, we have the minister before us for only a limited amount of time. Up until now Mr. Harkness has taken a good deal of the committee's time. I think if we are going to have to spend all this session with Mr. Harkness, then we had better call him as a witness to appear before this committee. To date, Mr. Harkness has taken a full hour.

Mr. HARKNESS: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the time that has been ascribed to the putting of my questions, namely an hour, is incorrect; I have taken less than half an hour. I have been watching the clock very closely. To begin with, we did not start our meeting until approximately 11 o'clock.

However, Mr. Chairman, if there are other members of the committee who would like to ask questions I will quit at this point in order to allow them to proceed.

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Harkness to continue his questioning but always bearing in mind that the subject matter we are discussing at this time is integration of the services and the justifications for it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, as we have only 15 minutes left I would ask that other members who wish to put questions at this time to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN: There are seven members who have indicated they would like to put questions to the Minister in the area we have under review.

As I have explained, the Minister will be back with us.

While Mr. Harkness has been asking a number of questions I think the members of the Committee all realize that Mr. Harkness has a specialized and detailed knowledge in this area and his questions may prove very worth while from the committee point of view.

If you are approaching the end of your questioning, Mr. Harkness, perhaps you would go ahead and complete them.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, I would rather not. I would ask that others be given an opportunity at this time.

Mr. WINCH: How many did you say you had on the list, Mr. Chairman, who wished to put questions?

The CHAIRMAN: There are seven.

Mr. WINCH: On this phase of the matter?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: Then, Mr. Chairman, if I could have your consent at this time, in view of the fact we have seven more members on your list and in view of my remarks about an hour ago, which I am not going to repeat, I would like to move, if I can get a seconder, that at the next meeting of the committee priority shall be given to consideration of policies affecting military and civilian personnel who may be voluntarily or compulsorily leaving the government service.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch has put forward a motion; is there a seconder for his motion?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I feel that perhaps this is a matter for the steering committee.

I do feel that what Mr. Winch is suggesting is perhaps a very important matter. But, if the steering committee could find some way of ensuring that this subject will be discussed at an early date I would appreciate it very much, and I would prefer it in that way rather than the members of this committee directing what will be the next subject for us to consider. Several members want to put questions in respect of the subject we are now discussing, but I would not want us to lose Mr. Winch's point.

Mr. WINCH: I said a moment ago that I did not want to repeat, but I would like to bring to the attention of the committee that I am certain it is going to take us a number of meetings on this most important bill and on the organization itself. But, certain policies are already in mind and have been announced by the minister or his associate. I am not going to say civilian but military personnel, I understand, will be leaving the service in a matter of weeks and, on that basis, I think it is absolutely a matter of priority that this committee should give consideration to any thoughts we have or any recommendations that this committee might like to make to the two ministers and parliament in respect of those who very soon will be leaving the service.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch has proposed a motion which has not been seconded.

Mr. BREWIN: If no one else will second the motion, I will, but somewhat without enthusiasm.

The CHAIRMAN: I was going to suggest the Steering subcommittee might give consideration to this. I have been hoping that we would get the Steering subcommittee together before our next meeting and plan our program from here on. There are only ten minutes left today, and I think we might fruitfully continue the discussion. Unless you really feel forced to second the motion, perhaps we might deal with the matter through the Steering subcommittee.

Mr. HARKNESS: At the beginning of the meeting, I proposed this matter myself; that is, that we should have an early date arranged for discussion of these matters. I wonder whether it would be satisfactory if we did that a week from today. In other words, at the next meeting we would continue the discussion we are on, and then at the following meeting a week from today go ahead with this particular matter.

Mr. WINCH: I would accept that, if you would make it an amendment to my motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Might we take that as a recommendation and have the Steering Subcommittee discuss it? Could we now proceed with the questioning?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, dealing first of all with Bill No. C-90, if I understand the explanatory note correctly in reading the bill, what it does is formally substitute a chief of defence staff, a single individual, for the former chiefs of staff which consisted of a number of different individuals in the different services, with a chairman. That is the actual act itself.

Mr. HELLYER: That is the essence of the act, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Therefore, the other matters, such as integration, and so on, are not directly affected by the statute.

Mr. HELLYER: They are not affected directly by the statute, but I think the point must be recognized that part and parcel of the immediate effect of the statute is the elimination of the naval board, the army council, and the air council in favour of a single defence staff, and this much, at least, has to be considered more or less as an immediate consequence of the act.

Mr. BREWIN: In other words, it is a first statutory stage to be followed almost immediately by reorganization along the lines of this chart?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Then we should consider this chart as an integral part of the whole scheme?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is fair. I do not think you can consider only the establishment of the chief of defence staff in isolation without appreciating at least that it will result in this kind of unified command at national defence headquarters.

Mr. BREWIN: Then, if I may turn to this particular chart, I would like to find out how it would work; let me put it this way: Does the future of this type of organization depend to some extent on the type of operation you are going to carry out. For example, if you are carrying out a combined operation which involves different services—and that is the general nature of the operations you contemplate—this sort of organization clearly would be useful from an operational point of view.

Mr. HELLYER: In our opinion it will be very helpful in combined operations.

Mr. BREWIN: Let me put to you the other side of the coin. Suppose the operations you are going to carry out are those of an army brigade stationed, shall we say, in Germany, or an air force doing something somewhere else in an isolated strike reconnaissance role in Europe, and the navy carrying out an antisubmarine role in co-operation with a unit of the air force; is this set-up equally useful in dealing with that problem? Suppose your chief of operational readiness comes from the navy and his deputy—because there would be an effort to mix them up—comes from the army, would that be a very good situation for dealing with the problem of a strike reconnaissance role which is an air force role?

Mr. HELLYER: I think there would be subordinate commanders, operational commanders, for any particular type of operation; that is, commanders who are specialists in their field. This would be true in any operation. If we were going to concentrate in the future on isolated operations of the kind you have described, then perhaps it is less important; but the whole trend of modern warfare is toward combined operations, and there is much evidence in support of this view. Practically everything we do and practically everything we propose

to do is a combined operation in the sense that it requires elements of two or more forces. This trend is inevitable and unmistakable throughout all the armed forces in the world.

I think our proposal will be more and more useful through time if it is in step with the times.

Mr. BREWIN: I believe we do have to contemplate the type of operation we expect our forces to carry out. If we are going to continue a series of isolated one service operations—and we have some of those now, and I think your white paper recommends continuing with them—this type of organization might present difficulties.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so. If you check the white paper you will find there is a projection of a much closer co-operation than has been the case in the past. For example, we are suggesting there should be a provision for tactical support of ground forces. This is a much closer relationship than that which has been the case in the past.

In many of our present roles we have combined operations. This includes our anti-submarine role where there are elements of the air force and the navy. Then there is the civil survival. Even in North American air defence, if you take the whole continent, you have elements of the army, of the navy and the air force working together. Therefore, I do not think there is any question about the trend toward combined operations which, in my opinion, will become even more pronounced in future years than at the present time.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to switch to another line of questions, which you, Mr. Chairman, might like to rule on. I am alerting you. The minister did tell us that one of the major purposes of the proposed reorganization, and so on, was a reduction in expenses.

I would like to question the minister with regard to the basis of the statement at page 19 of the white paper that sufficient savings should accrue from unification to permit a goal of 25 per cent of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment. It must be a little more than that, and there must have been something worked out in the form of a general outline with regard to how this is arrived at.

Just to complete the outline of that about which I wish to question the minister, at page 24 of the white paper there appears a list of major expenditures which will be required in the next few years, and these major expenditures are for the listed items dealt with earlier in the white paper. I should like again to ask for an assessment of what these major expenditures in "ball park figures" are likely to amount to so that we can see whether there really is a balance between the proposed savings and the additional expenditures, and then determine that, if perhaps we cannot go above the limit we have set, something else has to give because we are doing too much. This is a rather long preface to my question, but my question is, can we acquire from the minister at this stage or soon an analysis of the supposed savings which are going to accrue, and an analysis of the major expenditures that we are supposed to undertake?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in my answer to Mr. Smith, a detailed analysis of the proposed savings is not possible at this stage because it is an estimate based on the contention that we can reduce by about 20 per cent the personnel involved in headquarters, training and logistics organizations. We have yet to find out from practice whether or not this can be realized. That is our planning goal. That is what we are hoping to achieve. That is what we are going to strive to achieve.

As far as the expenditures are concerned, the expenditures required to provide the equipment listed there to equip the forces, and this again is a "ball park figure," is approximately 25 per cent of the $1,550 million throughout a

decade. That is the plan and these will both have to be achieved. Only time will tell whether we are capable of achieving them or not but certainly we are going to strive to do so. For instance, if we cannot effect the savings we are talking about, then again we are back with the two basic considerations; either an increase in the expenditures or a decrease in what we are able to do. There is no alternative mathematically.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now 12.30.

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Chairman just before Mr. Harkness leaves I should like to suggest that if it is convenient to members of this committee and the minister, since we did not start until eleven this morning, perhaps we could proceed until one.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am sorry, but I happen to have a luncheon engagement.

Mr. MATHESON: Perhaps I could make one suggestion particularly relating to these questions put to the minister by Mr. Harkness. Really the questions have to do with how policy is formulated. If the minister could furnish us with statistics in relation to the proportions of moneys spent on the army, navy and air force perhaps in the post world war II period it would afford some idea whether or not there has actually been any creative change during that period or whether a rigid policy formula has been followed. Surely that is the essence of this discussion. As our defence conditions tend to change the question we are concerned with is, are these changes making themselves manifest at the ministerial policy making level? It seems to me that really this is germane to the very interesting dialogue between the minister and the former minister of defence this morning.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now 12.30. I think the minister has heard your suggestion, Mr. Matheson.

Perhaps after the steering committee has decided how we are going to proceed and when we return to this topic I should carry forward the list of names of members who wish to ask questions consisting of Mr. Brewin, Mr. Smith, Mr. Deachman, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Lessard, Mr. Temple and Mr. Matheson in that order.

We now stand adjourned.

APPENDIX "A"

INFORMATION RESPECTING RETIREMENT OF SERVICE PERSONNEL REQUESTED BY MR. R. TEMPLE, ON MAY 26

An Outline of Retirement Benefits

In recognition of the fact that the unexpected termination of an officer's or man's military career, as a consequence of a planned reduction in the Armed Forces, may result in hardship, a special cash benefit will be provided to assist in his rehabilitation. The special benefit is partial compensation for the premature termination of a Serviceman's military career. The benefit will not apply to those who are released for reasons of misconduct or inefficiency, or who request their release.

The amount of the special cash benefit, to be paid in one lump sum, will increase with length of service up to a maximum of the equivalent of 10 months pay for those with 15½ or more years of service. It will be reduced progressively as normal retirement age is approached. Officers serving on Short Service Commissions are in a special category. The period of time by which their service is shortened will be the basis for calculating their benefits.

A table showing these special benefits is attached.

Following are examples of the estimated maximum amounts payable in special benefits to officers and men released under this scheme who have 15½ or more years of service.

	Special Benefit (10 months Pay and Allowances)
Major-General	$15,840.00
Colonel	11,550.00
Captain	6,350.00
Warrant Officer I	5,600.00
Sergeant	4,200.00
Private	3,300.00

Because of the significant number to be released compulsorily before reaching normal retirement ages or completion of fixed periods of service, the Government proposes to offer, in addition to the above-mentioned special benefits, the following additional benefits:

(i) Waive the present provision in the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act which provides a 5% reduction in annuities for Servicemen who have less than 20 years service but more than 10 years (maximum reduction 30%). This to be accomplished by the inclusion of an item in the next Supplementary Estimates of the Department of National Defence to obtain statutory authority for the Treasury Board to direct payment of a full immediate annuity to contributors to whom clause "A" of sub-para (ii) or para (c) of sub-section 3 of section 10 of the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act applies on retirement. The granting of this benefit is subject to the approval of Parliament.

(ii) Remove present provision set out in paragraph (6) in Article 206.22 of Queen's Regulations for the Armed Forces which provides that officers under fixed periods of service (Short Service Com-

mission) forced to retire early, would receive a gratuity reduced by the amount of deferred pay withheld. The Department proposes to give a payment of an unreduced gratuity to the officer. This requires approval of the Governor General in Council.

In addition to these special benefits, Servicemen retired under this scheme are entitled to the normal retirement benefits which include:

(*a*) pension and related benefits under the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act;

(*b*) rehabilitation leave equal to one month for every five years of continuous service;

(*c*) in some cases, special leave up to an additional thirty days;

(*d*) if they have over ten years continuous service, they and their dependents, furniture and effects will be transported at public expense to their selected places of residence in Canada.

Premature Retirement Benefits Table

The Scale of Special Benefits is to be as follows:

Officers and Other Ranks

Based on Length of Service:

A. With More Than Five Years But Less Than Ten Years Service:

Over 5 years but less than 6	2	months Pay and Allowances
6 years but less than 7	2½	" " " "
7 years but less than 8	3	" " " "
8 years but less than 9	3½	" " " "
9 years but less than 10	4	" " " "

B. With Ten Years Service Or More And With Five Or More Years To Compulsory Retirement Age:

10 years but less than 10 years 6 months..	4½	months Pay and Allowances
10 years 6 months but less than 11 years..	5	" " " "
11 years but less than 11 years 6 months..	5½	" " " "
11 years 6 months but less than 12 years..	6	" " " "
12 years but less than 12 years 6 months..	6½	" " " "
12 years 6 months but less than 13 years..	7	" " " "
13 years but less than 13 years 6 months..	7½	" " " "
13 years 6 months but less than 14 years..	8	" " " "
14 years but less than 14 years 6 months..	8½	" " " "
14 years 6 months but less than 15 years..	9	" " " "
15 years but less than 15 years 6 months..	9½	" " " "
15 years 6 months or more	10	" " " "

C. With Ten Years Service Or More And With Less Than Five Years To Compulsory Retirement Age:

The Special Benefit Computed in Accordance with B. reduced as Follows:

4 years 8 months to CRA but less than 5 years	½	month Pay and Allowances
4 years 4 months to CRA but less than 4 years 8 months	1	" " " "
4 years to CRA but less than 4 years 4 months	1½	months Pay and Allowances

3 years 8 months to CRA but less than 4 years	2 " " " "
3 years 4 months to CRA but less than 3 years 8 months	2½ " " " "
3 years to CRA but less than 3 years 4 months	3 " " " "
2 years 8 months to CRA but less than 3 years	3½ " " " "
2 years 4 months to CRA but less than 2 years 8 months	4 " " " "
2 years to CRA but less than 2 years 4 months	4½ " " " "
1 year 8 months to CRA but less than 2 years	5 " " " "
1 year 4 months to CRA but less than 1 year 8 months	5½ " " " "
1 year to CRA but less than 1 year 4 months	6 " " " "

Except that the benefit payable shall not be less than 4 months Pay and Allowances.

D. With Ten Years Service Or More And With Less Than One Year To Compulsory Retirement Age:

The Special Benefit Shall Be Four Months Pay And Allowances Reduced By Ten Days Pay And Allowances For Each Complete Month Approaching CRA. This Results in a Special Benefit Payable As Follows:

11 months but less than 12 to CRA	3 20/30 months Pay & Allowances
10 months but less than 11 to CRA	3 10/30 " " " "
9 months but less than 10 to CRA	3 " " " "
8 months but less than 9 to CRA	2 20/30 " " " "
7 months but less than 8 to CRA	2 10/30 " " " "
6 months but less than 7 to CRA	2 " " " "
5 months but less than 6 to CRA	1 20/30 " " " "
4 months but less than 5 to CRA	1 10/30 " " " "
3 months but less than 4 to CRA	1 month " " "
2 months but less than 3 to CRA	20 days Pay & Allowances
1 month but less than 2 to CRA	10 " " " "
less than 1 month	Nil

Officers Serving on Short Service Commission

Based on Time to Serve to End of Current Fixed Period:

More than 1 month but less than 2 months	10 days Pay & Allowances
2 months but less than 3 months	20 " " " "
3 months but less than 4 months	1 month " " "
4 months but less than 5 months	1 10/30 months Pay & Allowances
5 months but less than 6 months	1 20/30 " " " "
6 months but less than 12 months	2 months Pay & Allowances
12 months but less than 24 months	3 " " " "
24 months and over	4 " " " "

The Estimated Extent to which the Projected Reductions in the Armed Forces will be Achieved by Normal Retirements and Attrition

So far as it is reasonably possible, reliance will be placed upon normal retirements and attrition rather than on compulsory release. It is difficult to make an accurate forecast of the extent to which the projected reduction of 10,000 officers and men in the Canadian Armed Forces can be achieved by normal retirements and attrition. Recruiting must continue. A continuous flow of young men into the forces is vital to maintenance of an effective and efficient defence organization. In addition, as the problems of defence become more complex, the need for specialists in the Armed Forces is becoming as important as the need for specialists in civilian life. This need can be met only by ensuring that there is no interruption in the enrolment of officer cadets through the Regular Officer Training Plan, Canadian Services Colleges, and the universities. The reduction in the forces that can be achieved through normal retirements and attrition will, therefore, be offset to some extent by the need to maintain recruiting at a reasonable level. Nevertheless, it is expected that a very large portion of the reduction will be met by normal retirements and attrition. The attached summary shows a forecast of the anticipated losses of personnel by normal retirements and attrition during the current and next fiscal year.

It will be noted that the normal attrition anticipated over the next two years will be very largely in the lower ranks for both officers and men. At this stage in the re-organization it is impossible to state the precise continuing requirements for officers and men of all ranks and all specialties, but it is quite clear that some of those at present serving will have to be released compulsorily.

SCHEDULE SHOWING A FORECAST OF ANTICIPATED LOSSES OF PERSONNEL BY NORMAL RETIREMENTS AND ATTRITION DURING THE FISCAL YEARS ENDING 31 MARCH 1965 AND 1966

Ranks (or equivalent)	Year 1964-65	1965-66	Total
Lieutenant General and Major General	3	7	10
Brigadier	7	6	13
Colonel	27	37	64
Lieutenant Colonel	110	129	239
Major	324	354	678
Captain	558	644	1,202
Lieutenant and 2nd Lieutenant	408	496	904
Total Officers	1,437	1,673	3,110
Warrant Officer 1	177	183	360
Warrant Officer 2	221	290	511
Staff Sergeant	362	360	722
Sergeant	515	522	1,037
Corporal	1,097	1,050	2,147
Private	9,574	6,992	16,566
Total Other Ranks	11,946	9,397	21,343
Total All Ranks	13,383	11,070	24,453

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 3

TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 1964

Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence; the Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; and Dr. Jack Hodgson, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence (Finance).

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20877—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),
Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Granger,
Groos,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel,
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacLean,
MacRae,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
Nielsen,
Pilon,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

Quorum—13

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 2, 1964
(4)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Martineau, Matheson, Smith, Temple, Winch (16).

In attendance: Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence; Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; and Dr. Jack Hodgson, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence—Finance.

The Chairman presented the Third Report of the Steering Subcommittee as follows:

Your Subcommittee recommends:

1. That the following informative papers, requested by the Special Committee on Defence during the past session for the use of this Committee, be distributed to Committee members:

(*a*) Conventional and Nuclear Armaments.

(*b*) Canadian Defence Policies Since 1867.

(*c*) Defence Policies of NATO Members and Other Countries Including Communist Countries.

(*d*) Defence Policies as Related to Foreign Policy.

(*e*) International Police Force.

(*f*) Economic Consequences of Disarmament.

and that the authors of these papers each be paid the sum of $300.00.

At this point, on motion of Mr. Winch, seconded by Mr. Temple,

Resolved,—That the first recommendation in the Steering Subcommittee's Third Report be concurred in.

The Chairman submitted the balance of the Subcommittee's Third Report as follows:

2. That on Tuesday, June 2, 1964 the Committee sit during the morning and afternoon to question the Minister of National Defence on the General Organization of the Department of National Defence, and then on the matter of the involuntary retirement of certain Service Personnel.

3. That, if necessary, the Committee meet on the afternoon of Wednesday, June 3 to hear the Deputy Minister of National Defence.

4. That Brigadier Richard Malone, of Winnipeg, Manitoba, be invited to appear before the Committee on June 4, 1964 to outline his views respecting Bill C-90.

5. That Air Marshal W. A. Curtis and Major General W. H. S. Macklin, both of Toronto, Ontario, be invited to appear before the Committee on June 9, 1964 to express their views respecting Bill C-90.

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6. That reasonable living and travelling expenses, as well as per diem allowance be paid in connection with the appearance before this Committee of Messrs. Malone, Curtis and Macklin.

7. That the Committee invite the Minister of National Defence to be in attendance on Tuesday, June 9 in the afternoon and evening, if necessary, to reply to questions of a general nature respecting Bill C-90.

8. That on Thursday, June 11 the Committee continue with its consideration of Bill C-90, with the Associate Minister of National Defence and the Judge Advocate General in attendance.

On motion of Mr. Laniel, seconded by Mr. Groos,

Resolved,—That recommendations numbered 2 to 8, inclusive, in the Steering Subcommittee's Third Report, be concurred in.

The informative papers listed above were identified respectively as *Exhibits Nos. 1 to 6.* An additional paper respecting *"Defence Expenditures and its Influence on the Canadian Economy"* was identified as *Exhibit No. 7.*

The Chairman announced that copies of these papers will be distributed to Committee members following this meeting.

The Minister of National Defence was further questioned respecting his statement of May 26, 1964, on the General Organization of the Department and on other matters related to Bill C-90.

Agreed,—That certain statistics, respecting the expenditures of the armed services, tabled by Mr. Hellyer, be included in the Committee's record at the appropriate place in the evidence.

The Committee turned to the matter of the involuntary retirement of certain Service Personnel, the Associate Minister of National Defence, Mr. Cardin, answering questions thereon.

At 1.00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3.30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(5)

The Special Committee on Defence resumed at 3.48 p.m., the Chairman, Mr. D. G. Hahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Martineau, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch (17).

In attendance: same as at morning sitting.

The Committee resumed its consideration of Bill C-90 An Act to amend the National Defence Act. The Associate Minister of National Defence, assisted by Dr. Hodgson, answered questions on the involuntary retirement of Service Personnel and on related matters.

Mr. Temple, seconded by Mr. Fane, moved,

That this Committee recommends that the necessary amendments be made to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act to provide for the benefits set out in subsection (i) on page 2 of the information supplied the Committee on Thursday, May 28th, 1964 and that Parliament be asked to proceed with these amendments forthwith.

Agreed,—That the above-mentioned motion be allowed to stand.

The questioning of Messrs. Hellyer, Cardin and Hodgson was continued.

Mr. Winch suggested that the Steering Committee consider the advisability of this Committee holding an *in camera* meeting in order to prepare a Report to the House respecting the matter of the involuntary retirement of Service Personnel.

By leave, Mr. Temple was permitted to withdraw the above-mentioned motion and to substitute therefor the following:

That this Committee go on record as supporting the intention of the Government to amend the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act as set out in subsection (i) of page 2 of the information supplied the Committee on May 28th, 1964; and expect that this will be done as soon as possible.

The said motion was adopted unanimously.

At 5.00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3.30 p.m., Wednesday, June 3, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, June 2, 1964.

(*Text*)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Would you please come to order.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I would ask you to state in your introductory remarks whether or not you have been able to work out some arrangements in respect of the sittings of this committee and the public accounts committee.

The CHAIRMAN: First of all, we have a report of the steering subcommittee to deal with, which splits itself into two general topics. Before reading this report and asking for concurrence in it I will give you a little explanation.

The first item deals with certain papers. At the end of the last session the Defence Committee recommended that 12 papers on various topics be prepared, and a motion was passed recommending we commission these papers and pay a sum of money for them. Out of the 12 papers we now have received 7, with one refused by the author who did not have sufficient time. The balance is coming in.

The first recommendation of the Subcommittee calls for payment for six of these papers that were prepared by outsiders. These papers have been reviewed by the Steering Subcommittee; we have looked at them and have ascertained they are worthy of payment.

The second general item in the subcommittee report deals with our agenda from now through the next week or so. We have these problems to reconcile. A number of committee members still have questions on the general area of organization to put to the Minister. In addition, there is the topic of the involuntary retirement of certain personnel which has to be dealt with. We also want to hear the Deputy Minister. Then, we have three outside witnesses who are going to start on Thursday. We have to have the first witness on Thursday because he happens to be from the western part of the country and he will be in Ottawa at that time. So, we have to try and get through the first portion of the Minister's work and the Deputy Minister's before Thursday. The Minister is going away next week and we want to have an opportunity to try and tidy up any further questions that arise, from the outside witnesses' testimony, with the Minister before he goes. So, over the next week unfortunately we are going to have a fairly heavy schedule. Based on that, the report is as follows:

> Your subcommittee recommends:
>
> 1. That the following informative papers, requested by the Special Committee on Defence during the past session for the use of this Committee, be distributed to Committee members:
>
> (*a*) Conventional and Nuclear Armaments.
> (*b*) Canadian Defence Policies Since 1867.
> (*c*) Defence Policies of NATO Members and Other Countries Including Communist Countries.
> (*d*) Defence Policies as Related to Foreign Policy.
> (*e*) International Police Force.
> (*f*) Economic Consequences of Disarmament.
>
> and that the authors of these papers each be paid the sum of $300.00.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, can we stop there for a moment.

I have had an opportunity to read over the week end all these papers and I completely agree with the Steering Subcommittee that they are worthy of study and worthy of payment, as suggested.

I would like to move, if I could get a Seconder, that this recommendation be adopted and that payment be made in the amount of $300 for each paper.

Mr. TEMPLE: I will second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been moved by Mr. Winch and seconded by Mr. Temple that payment be authorized in the amount of $300 for each of these papers as listed in the Subcommittee's recommendation. Is it the wish of the committee to accept the motion? All those in favour? Contrary?

Motion agreed to.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I in particular draw attention to the members who have not received or read these papers to date that the one that I thought is outstanding is the one on the history of defence in Canada for the past 100 years. It is a marvellous document.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, when and where do we get these papers?

The CHAIRMAN: These will be distributed immediately after this meeting to all committee members.

Now, moving on with the report of the steering subcommittee:

> 2. That on Tuesday, June 2, 1964, the committee sit during the morning and afternoon to question the Minister of National Defence on the general organization of the Department of National Defence, and then on the matter of the involuntary retirement of certain Service Personnel.
>
> 3. That if necessary the committee meet on the afternoon of Wednesday, June 3 to hear the Deputy Minister of National Defence.
>
> 4. That Brigadier Richard Malone, of Winnipeg, Manitoba, be invited to appear before the committee on June 4, 1964 to outline his views respecting bill C-90.
>
> 5. That Air Marshal W. A. Curtis and Major General W. H. S. Macklin, both of Toronto, Ontario, be invited to appear before the committee on June 9, 1964 to express their views respecting bill C-90.
>
> 6. That reasonable living and travelling expenses, as well as a per diem allowance be paid in connection with the appearance before this committee of Messrs. Malone, Curtis and Macklin.
>
> 7. That the committee invite the Minister of National Defence to be in attendance on Tuesday, June 9 in the afternoon and evening, if necessary, to reply to questions of a general nature respecting bill C-90.
>
> 8. That on Thursday, June 11 the committee continue with its consideration of bill C-90, with the associate Minister of National Defence and the Judge Advocate General in attendance.

Gentlemen, may I have a motion for acceptance of the balance of the report.

Mr. LANIEL: I so move.

Mr. GROOS: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, before we continue with our questioning of the Minister there is one paper that was not listed in the group previously mentioned which is entitled "Defence Expenditure and its Influence on the Canadian

Economy", which has been prepared by a Government Department. These 7 papers will be listed as exhibits numbers 1 to 7. This paper to which I have made reference also will be circulated to members of the committee.

Now, in carrying on our questioning we want to try, if we can, to finish our questions so far as possible on the general organization of the department. When we have finished this area of examination it was the feeling of the Steering Subcommittee that we must move into the other area of involuntary retirements today. Therefore, at approximately 12.30 we will stop questioning in respect of the general organizational area and move into this second area, and any questions still outstanding on general organization will be dealt with by the Minister in his next appearance before the committee.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, could I ask at 12.30, when we go into this problem, if the Associate Minister who, I understand, has had a great deal to do with the administration of this, will be present?

Hon. Paul T. HELLYER (*Minister, Department of National Defence*): It was my expectation he would be here. I expect he will be here by the time we reach this subject. The assistant deputy minister of finance is also here to assist us in this area.

The CHAIRMAN: In proceeding with the questions on organization I have a list of 7 members which has been carried forward from our last meeting. I will read the sequence of names. The first I have is Mr. Brewin, who is not here. Then I have Mr. Smith, Mr. Deachman, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Mr. Temple and Mr. Matheson. We now will proceed with Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Hellyer, I gathered from your previous statements that there are two main bases for the reorganization of the forces; one is economy and the other is military effectiveness. Is that right?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. SMITH: And, in your explanation to the members the other day I gathered that the estimate of the economies to be effected were arrived at by a projection of the reduction of the armed services in numbers of personnel and you multiplied that by the cost of feeding, housing, dressing and paying the soldiers. Is that right?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, that is correct, plus the savings in accommodation and—

Mr. SMITH: Housing was one of the words you mentioned.

Mr. HELLYER: —all these other areas—

Mr. SMITH: Yes, feeding, housing, dressing and salaries.

Mr. HELLYER: —associated with them.

Mr. SMITH: So, if there was an increase in salary by reason of the fact that the soldiers will be more highly trained there would be a lessening of the personnel economy and the economies themselves, would there not?

Mr. HELLYER: Would you mind stating the question again, please.

Mr. SMITH: If there was a general pay increase to the armed services then the projected economy would be less than it is now estimated.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think the two things should be confused; one is economy and the other is an increase in cost due to general increase in salaries.

Mr. SMITH: And, if there is an increase in the cost of living which would reflect in the armed services the economies would be less than they are now projected, would they not?

Mr. HELLYER: The costs would be greater than they are at this moment.

Mr. SMITH: And, the savings would be less so there still would be a lesser amount available for new equipment, and so on, so long as you are going to stay within the same dollar budget.

Mr. HELLYER: I think one point is essential. We have stated the program, as projected in the white paper, requires this expenditure in constant dollars, and the reason we have said that is to make provision for the adjustments in costs and salaries. So, the general plan is based on this concept. Consequently, increased costs must be met by an increased budget or by some other means.

Mr. SMITH: By some other economy or cut back?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. SMITH: The second basis of the reorganization is to provide military effectiveness; is that right?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. SMITH: I refer to economical military effectiveness. Regarding the guide lines that you have used in the white paper have you followed in a general way the military organization in some other country or some other military force?

Mr. HELLYER: No. I think generally speaking that we are going ahead in this field at the present time. I think we will probably have the most up to date military organization in the western world.

Mr. SMITH: We often hear suggested, not by yourself I will say but by other people, that Canada's armed forces should follow the general organization of the United States Marine Corps.

Mr. HELLYER: The similarity is that the United States Marine Corps is an integrated force which has proven, if one requires proof, that you can operate an integrated force of that kind. I do not think there is any specific experience on which our plans are based other than the recognition of our opinion that this organization will be effective.

Mr. SMITH: I understand there is within the United States military organization a permanent joint strike force which is a combination of all the three services. Has that been studied?

Mr. HELLYER: This is a new concept they are just now developing which in fact is another integrated force.

Mr. SMITH: I understand that the general criticism in the United States of that force is that there is not much room for air force and navy. I understand up to this moment that is the criticism.

Mr. HELLYER: I have not heard that criticism, Mr. Smith, but I am sure whenever something is being done that is new there is criticism.

Mr. SMITH: To turn just for a moment to the organization and the chart that we were given last week, one assumes that there will be operational chiefs for each of the sea, air and ground forces, is that correct?

Mr. HELLYER: That is not exactly the organization that is planned. There will be chiefs of functions. I think this is the basis of organization.

Mr. SMITH: Will there not be some person who is the chief of the sea forces of the Canadian military forces when those seagoing forces are not performing some part of the operational functions?

Mr. HELLYER: There will be a flag officer, Atlantic, who will be in command of the Atlantic forces.

Mr. SMITH: Will there not be a similar officer for the ground forces?

Mr. HELLYER: Each force will have a commander, Mr. Smith. I think that is traditional.

Mr. SMITH: Yes. What I was really leading up to was, where is that commander going to fit in in your organization? Will he be responsible to the chief of operational readiness?

Mr. HELLYER: He will be responsible to the chief of the defence staff.

Mr. SMITH: If he is responsible directly to the chief of the defence staff are you not going to fall in to the difficulty you are trying to avoid by having a multiplicity of commands and multiplicity of views?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so, Mr. Smith. This is the way the organization works at the present time and the chief of defence staff will delegate his responsibilities in certain areas such as operational readiness, to a chief of operational readiness.

Mr. SMITH: Then you are contemplating that the chief of each of these forces will have the same rank as the chief of operational readiness?

Mr. HELLYER: No, that is not the plan.

Mr. SMITH: Will they have a higher or lower rank?

Mr. HELLYER: They will have a lower rank.

Mr. SMITH: They will have a lower rank?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: They will not be responsible to the chief of the defence staff through the chief of operational readiness?

Mr. HELLYER: They will report directly to the chief of defence staff and the chief of defence staff will delegate, to the extent that he deems advisable, responsibility for various functions to the functional chiefs.

Mr. SMITH: I should like to ask a question about the defence council. Has it been considered that the chief of the operational research council, or the head of the national research council, ought to be a member of the defence council?

Mr. HELLYER: That has not been considered. We have an excellent working liaison between the defence research board and the national research council.

Mr. SMITH: It has not been considered.

Mr. HELLYER: It has not been, no.

Mr. SMITH: Is there not always the danger that the civilian research which could very often be applied to military projects would not be used to advantage? Would it not be better to have the president of the national research council as a member of your defence council?

Mr. HELLYER: There is existing machinery to prevent duplication in this area, and also to keep communications alive in both directions.

Mr. SMITH: So there is no change or simplification there?

Mr. HELLYER: There is no change. However there is, as you know, a committee being established in the privy council office to study the proper application of government participation in research and development.

Mr. SMITH: The weapons evaluation or program evaluation organization will be consulted in that regard?

Mr. HELLYER: This will be a teamwork arrangement between the deputy chief of engineering and development reporting to his chief and the chief of operational readiness. These things, as you know, have to be team operations because the operational people set the requirements and provide opportunities for field testing while at the same time the deputy chief of engineering and development will have the technical evaluation of tests required.

Mr. SMITH: Program evaluation is still going to remain largely a military matter?

Mr. HELLYER: Are you referring to program evaluation?

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. HELLYER: You were referring a moment ago to the weapons system.

Mr. SMITH: I am sorry, yes. I was referring to weapons system testing.

Mr. HELLYER: Program evaluation will be, as it has been, in the military field, yes.

Mr. SMITH: Under whose direct control will fall program evaluation?

Mr. HELLYER: Can you explain what you mean by program evaluation?

Mr. SMITH: Weapons are usually related to a program of defence. For example, a weapon may be technically very highly efficient, but will it be useful in say the whole defence program, or your defence policy? You have to relate cost, as you stated on an earlier occasion in respect of the Avro Arrow.

Mr. HELLYER: Programming will be the responsibility of the group reporting directly to the chief of defence staff, and the implementation of this will be delegated to the responsible commanders as required.

Mr. SMITH: I think I will give someone else a turn now, although it seems to me that on a number of occasions the term "groups of teams" has been used in your answers, Mr. Hellyer, and I am doubtful whether the end result of your concept of delegating responsibility will be on more clear lines.

Mr. HELLYER: The only caveat I would enter, Mr. Smith, is if you are concerned about what I have told you, you must realize that we have this presently multiplied by three.

Mr. SMITH: I think that perhaps we will still have it multiplied by three, but we will await events.

Mr. HELLYER: I hope that will not be so.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have a series of questions which relate chiefly to the determinants of the philosophy behind the establishment of the dual organization, and I am very concerned with a comparison between whatever determinants may have been used by the national defence department or by the minister, with those used by Mr. Robert McNamara, who brought about considerable reorganization in the United States system. I wonder whether or not the minister has followed along similar lines and whether he has made a particular study of the determinants used by Mr. McNamara in bringing about his own reorganization.

Mr. HELLYER: We have in the course of our studies, Mr. Deachman, looked at some of the things that have been done in the United States. Some of the ideas are being incorporated in our plans and in some cases we are moving beyond what they have proposed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Hellyer, I want briefly to draw attention to the system of examining defence functions in terms of on-going programs of breaking examinations of defence down into strategic forces, logistic forces and technical forces. I wonder whether or not you have followed the theory of organization upon lines of on-going programs and components of on-going programs as one of the main determinants of bringing about your reorganization.

Mr. HELLYER: This is forecast in the white paper. The deputy minister will be having more to say on the subject when he speaks to the committee later.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, will he deal at some considerable length with the subject of programs?

Mr. HELLYER: At greater length, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Now there is another feature which arises from the examination of these components through their lifetime. I understand that not only do they determine the number of aircraft, or of strategic aircraft required, let

us say, for logistical problems of supply such as Cyprus at the present moment, but also the production of lifetime functions of the aircraft in order to make comparisons with other methods of logistics or of other aircraft and so on. I wonder whether this type of extrapolation of the various components of your program has been followed through in your reorganization?

Mr. HELLYER: It is an essential part of functional budgeting. It is planned.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What can you say about the methods of examination of alternative programs? May I refer for a moment to what Mr. McNamara said: Namely, that our problems of choice among alternatives in the field of weapon systems have been complicated enormously by the bewildering array of entirely workable alternative courses which our technology can support. This perhaps is a very difficult problem in alternatives. We ourselves get into difficulty in the field of alternatives in the setting up of individual programs.

Mr. HELLYER: Where there are alternative courses of action they will be proposed as alternatives and a preference indicated by military planning groups. They will then be discussed in the defence council and a decision made in the normal course. This will be part of management function.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Where there are alternatives which are hotly disputed, or where they are put forward, let us say, by two elements within the defence department offering to the minister two alternative programs, what are the determinants which you will follow as minister in assessing those two functions or two alternatives?

Mr. HELLYER: In the immediate future I will try to determine which alternative most closely follows the policy set out in the white paper.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to turn for a moment to the chart which is on the board and to refer to some of the sections of it. Taking first the subject of recruiting which appears under the chief of personnel, manning, individual and basic training, in the reorganization of the forces below that level do you anticipate that there will be a joint recruiting or that we will no longer be seeing an R.C.A.F. recruiting office, or a navy recruiting office, but rather that a man will be taken directly into the armed services in the future?

Mr. HELLYER: I certainly hope that we tend in that direction. It is an obvious area of potential economy. The details will have to be worked out by the defence staff when it is set up. That will be one of its functions which would appear to make sense.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would this man be taken into the armed forces of Canada and be given his basic training in the army, the navy or the air force?

Mr. HELLYER: I think you are getting into an area of questioning which we agreed not to take up because it relates to decisions yet to be taken as a consequence of reorganization. We deliberately decided not to answer all these questions before proceeding. We decided to amalgamate the high command and let them work out the answers to questions like the ones you are asking this morning. I think it would be better if we waited until these things have been considered by the defence staff, and recommendations come forward and decisions are taken.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is it fair to say that what you have now is a definite plan before you for reorganization from the top down to the level of what we show on the charts, and having accomplished this, you are studying developments with respect to everything underneath it?

Mr. HELLYER: Within a few days I hope that a study group will be established to work out plans of reorganization of national defence headquarters that we have announced will be our first stage. After that has been

completed, we will then begin reorganization in other areas such as the ones you mentioned this morning, in recruiting, training, logistics, and other facets in national defence.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So your immediate objective is reorganization of defence headquarters?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Have you set up a schedule in which you expect to achieve that accomplishment, and then proceed to set down the reorganization below the level of defence headquarters?

Mr. HELLYER: We have a rough planning date in mind as a guide.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Can you give us any indication of the scope of time you are working in?

Mr. HELLYER: It is very difficult to meet schedules as you know because as soon as you miss it by a little bit, there are newspaper and other inquiries about what went wrong with the schedule.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am sure no one here would query anything along that line.

Mr. HELLYER: I hope we can complete our reorganization of national defence headquarters within a year from the time the act is proclaimed. Every day that we could pick up in getting on with the program would help considerably both in effecting economies and meeting the longer range schedule.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I know that Mr. Smith and Mr. Winch will want to help you as much as they can. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. LLOYD: In looking at the chart one immediately gets the impression that your chief of logistics and engineering branch or division seems to represent a major change in your organizational structure. Is that so, or do I misread the present or past practice? To put it another way, the navy is responsible for designing the specification of ships. The army would be responsible for certain types of weapons, while the air force would be responsible for the design and development of aircraft, and with anything that has to do with the responsibilities which they have to discharge. Were there in existence three development branches within the armed forces before this?

Mr. HELLYER: There have been branches in each of the armed forces doing roughly the functions listed here under logistics and engineering. The change is not as great as it might appear. There has been a division of responsibility in the past, and it has been slightly different in each of the forces. I think what we are doing here is to recognize the distinction at a fairly high level between the storekeeping side of the operation, if you want to call it that, the acquisition, warehousing, distribution, and line maintenance, functions from the engineering and scientific functions which are more closely related to the evaluation of weapon systems, and their design and development in cases where we do develop them.

Mr. LLOYD: Well, looking at the larger picture, the government concern over all with the defence department is to relate the capacity of its industrial sectors to reduce the things in this sector which the armed forces need. There must be some very close liaison with the industrial capacity of the country. I presume your development, logistics and engineering departments would be perhaps more keenly related to that sector of your economy than perhaps has been the case in the past. Is this so?

Mr. HELLYER: There has been a close relationship between the forces individually and industry. This has existed. What we intend to do, which is new, is to give recognition to industries so that they will be aware of what our wants and requirements are. The main reason for our division between logistics and engineering is to make sure that the problems in the development area in particular should come up through the chain of command and reach the decision-making level as quickly as possible.

You have heard the case of the Bobcat given as an example of frustrated development where we lost the initiative which we originated. What we are attempting to do here is to have a chain of command which will permit submissions in the development area to go through to the decision-making level quickly without being sidetracked at some lower level, and this is in order to maintain initiative and to give us a better advantage, competitively speaking, when we do have an area of development which is at all unique or in advance of the art.

Mr. LLOYD: It would be expected that this will result, as I think you have said, in more reconciliation of conflicts between higher echelons of defence and decision-makers before they are reduced or they disagree.

Mr. HELLYER: I certainly hope so.

Mr. LLOYD: This has been the case in the past?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: You said in the past.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think there is any doubt about it, actually.

Mr. LLOYD: I would emphasize the fact that this would seem to me to be one of the main reasons for this whole approach to reorganization; it is that you, at the ministerial level, would put a little more emphasis on it, and that you want a pretty objective statement coming from the staff. I think there are conflicts and those conflicts should be recited and stipulated before they reach us rather than perhaps to have easy acceptance. Would this scheme or arrangement affect this co-operation between the three elements of the armed forces, or how do you think it would eliminate it?

Mr. HELLYER: I think it will facilitate cooperation. This is one of the two main objectives in the reorganization.

Mr. LLOYD: You mentioned the Bobcat. I was not going to bring it up specifically, but now that you have mentioned it, I am informed that destroyer escorts are being converted to helicopter capability with platforms, and that the program appeared to develop this way. It was agreed on the kind of helicopter that would be used, and it was agreed that there would be small platforms or landing platforms constructed on the destroyer escorts, and hangars for that purpose. And it has also been suggested to me from some source, whether reliable or not I do not know, that the size of the helicopters is larger than the size of the hangar. Is that so?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is an exaggeration. In the trial process and the development of this concept, the first hangar was a little narrower than we would like to have seen. But this is being remedied. As often is the case with a new weapon system you have to learn as you go along particularly where it involves a new concept. I can assure you that any problems which did arise earlier in this program have been recognized.

Mr. LLOYD: There was a problem?

Mr. HELLYER: I think we would admit there was a problem, but it has since been dealt with.

Mr. LLOYD: To get back to this specific illustration, the chances of such things happening you consider would be less under this kind of organization, although there will always be a chance of there being a percentage of lack of co-ordination?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think there is any guarantee that there will be perfection in the design and development process. In any new weapon system, whether it be an aircraft, or an armed personnel carrier, there are problems to be worked out. Sometimes the design is extraordinarily good, but, on the other hand, sometimes considerable modification is required. I do not think the organization itself can correct this. It depends on the quality of the people in the design and development organization, and in their experience in a particular field.

Mr. LLOYD: I have one final question which has to do with the efforts which Canada has plans to make in concert with its allies. You use broad figures to show the chief of logistics and engineering departments and other developments in their opposing programs or changes in programs. I think you move it back to some figure. Would this kind of organization make the task easier for you?

Mr. HELLYER: The organization would make it easier to reconcile projects within the over-all program as laid down in the white paper. This is being done jointly, as you will see, by a group which will have the specific responsibility of co-ordinating all plans along the lines indicated by Mr. Deachman, so that we can look at the whole picture, the cost of equipment, the requirements for personnel both civil and military, the cost of operation and so on right through the life of the system.

Mr. LLOYD: Finally, I realize I said I had only one question, but I have another arising from it. I wish to find out the function of the council that is proposed here.

Mr. HELLYER: The defence council?

Mr. LLOYD: Yes.

Mr. HELLYER: The defence council will review the plans and programs which come from the armed forces and this is where we have civilian input reconciled with the military, where you have the deputy minister and chairman of our defence research board sitting in with the senior military advisers with all points of view being considered at the time a decision is taken.

Mr. LLOYD: In effect in defence policy the main overhead relates to key personnel with various functions, engineering, operational, personnel and finance, and expansion takes place depending upon events as they become apparent in Canada necessitating an expanded effort in some direction? So your biggest overhead is really related to this kind of organization of which you are talking where you get expansion and expenditure, and this is where your counsel will perhaps function more than in any other area?

Mr. HELLYER: If I understand your question correctly, I should state that we are trying to make the fixed costs, if you want to call them that, as small as possible for the type of force we operate. I think we could effectively spend more money if we could get it but as that prospect is not in sight we do want to keep expenditures, within our present limit, more in balance so we have more for the operational end.

Mr. LLOYD: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: The next questioner I have on my list is Mr. Lessard. Before Mr. Lessard begins his questions I should like to state that there are translation facilities available. I have on my list Mr. Lessard, Mr. Temple,

Mr. Matheson, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Martineau. There are approximately 40 minutes left until we change topics, so I would ask that you govern yourselves accordingly.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Mr. Chairman, my questions will be in another direction, somehow because the others have already been covered. I should like to ask the minister whether to his knowledge, the members of the Glassco Commission asked a firm specialized in administration to supply them the personnel required for studying the efficiency of military administration, or whether they relied entirely on the reports and information given to them by the military personnel.

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I would be competent to indicate just exactly what means were used by the royal commission in coming to the views that they expressed. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on that aspect of their report.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): My point would be: to your knowledge, did they ask for personnel outside the military department for this enquiry which they made in the department itself?

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: The personnel who did the research for them and made the study for inclusion in the commission report, I understand were, primarily people not directly connected with the department of national defence.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): To what extent did the Glassco Commission report influence your decision to integrate the three armed services?

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: The conclusions that they came to and the point of view that they expressed in the commission report reinforced the conclusion that we had come to by independent means.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): In your statement, last week, and in Mr. Harkness' line of questioning, I noticed a point of interest. You suggest changes in the administration and certain integrations in certain areas. I should like to ask you this question: Were the advisers for the selection or equipment replaced or will they be replaced? The reason why I ask this question is this: the past being always a certain guarantee for the future, I wonder whether we have kept the same personnel or will keep the same personnel for guidance and selection of future equipment? What will ensure an improvement, when we think of the failure of the Avro, the Bobcat, the change in policy with regard to the frigates, and your latest decision, the purchase of the three Oberon submarines which, I presume, was recommended by about the same specialists. In short, are we going to replace the group of technical advisers or keep the same people?

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, I am not in a position to discuss personnel in specific terms this morning, but I think the important point relating to your question is this. In the past these projects were approved or could be approved without extending the consequences; in other words, without extending the cost of the equipment, the cost of support equipment, the cost of personnel

both military and civil and the cost of operations during the life of the equipment so that you could then relate this to all your other defence costs to see if in fact it would come within the limitations of resources available to you. We hope in the future and, in fact will insist in the future on having sufficient information so that we will know whether a particular project can be implemented without at the same time interfering with other important projects which are all part of the total defence picture. It is in this area that I think much advantage will result. I do not say it always will because, after all, no organization is perfect and, secondly, no organization is more perfect than the people participating in it. It should, however, eliminate major problems of the type raised by the general purpose frigate program or the Avro Arrow program.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I want to say something before I ask my next question. I do not want to cast any doubt on the integrity of any member of our forces in the army. This is my question.

(*Translation*)

Mr. Minister, how can we possibly hope that a group of men who have initiated the present system, who built the present system which we admit is defective, how can we possibly hope that these men can change it themselves since, to some extent, they would be condemning themselves and condemning their policies, they would be depreciating their past efficiency or their past policies, and I am asking this question because I am comparing it with administration in private industry where, when we need a change or when we believe a change is needed somewhere we always consult an independent organization who can come and study the situation objectively, without prejudice, and make recommendations. In reality we are concerned about changing our military system and we have called on, and we are going to continue to call on the people who were involved in it one year, two years and three years ago, to do so. How can we possibly hope that these people will bring about a radical change in the present situation, I wonder?

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: I wish to reassure my hon. friend at once, that first of all all the people involved in both the present system and the future system are loyal subjects of Canada.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I am sure.

Mr. HELLYER: There is no doubt about that. The thing that is really changing is the system. There has been no reflection on the people, but the system has made it difficult for reviewing projects or proposals in the light of the total program. This is what we are changing. There is a new blueprint. There is a plan and there are roles and tasks set out by the government and laid down as policy for the defence forces of Canada. I have no doubt that the officers who are charged with the responsibility of putting these plans and programs into effect will do so capably and effectively. This is the whole basis of their training. The blueprint is established and they know the course that has to be followed, and actually they are quite anxious and enthusiastic in getting on with the job. I have great confidence in them and I wish my hon. friend to have the same confidence because I am sure it is justified and he will find that it is as we go along.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): You want to apply a new policy. You have certainly no assurance of succeeding in every field. Tentative efforts are being made, and this groping must be limited by the will of those who are going to make such groping effort, and I do not believe these people, who

sincerely believed in the policies they applied two years ago can suddenly change overnight and state that what was white is now black. And even if you yourself intend in your objective, to say that we must proceed in such a way, they will still be influenced in the way they work by the methods they followed for so many years. In any case, I will ask you one final question in another connection.

As the number of men in the three armed services is going to decrease, that will have to be compensated by quality. By that I do not mean that the present staff is not qualified. We shall have to try to get staff even better qualified. Does the Department intend to pay more attention to the military colleges in Canada so that the staff that will make up our armed forces or who will direct our armed forces will have an extremely broad basis of very thorough technical knowledge?

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: First of all I should like to agree with my hon. friend that the quality of men and women of the armed forces is excellent. I have said publicly and repeat now that I think that man for man and woman for woman they are without peer anywhere in the western world or, in fact, in the whole world. As far as the future is concerned we have every reason for confidence because the standard of education is rising universally and with this rising standard of education there is a rise in the formal qualifications of many of the young men and women coming into the armed forces. I am specifically referring to our service colleges. These young men get a wonderful education. This is a really outstanding education, scholastically, militarily and in every sense, such as from a citizenship point of view. The men are of very high quality. As long as we have men of that quality in the armed forces we have no fear whatsoever in regard to our future capability. These young men win scholarships at universities like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cal-tech and other outstanding engineering universities in the United States. We have one or two Rhodes scholars this year. Our graduates are brilliant young men and their input into the armed forces is going to provide for the future the dynamism which is required to maintain effective capabilities.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): This is a supplementary question. Do you think we shall have to increase the capacity of the military colleges so that they can turn out a larger number of graduates each year?

(*Text*)

Mr. HELLYER: My offhand answer is, I do not think so, but I must say that this is an interim answer until we have had a chance to do a thorough manpower study in respect of our whole requirements. We propose to undertake a manpower study to determine not only the kind of men we need but the length of time we need them. This study will take a considerable period of time to complete. I cannot prejudge exactly what the findings will be because I do not know; but if you ask for a guess, my guess is the service colleges input will be adequate to meet our needs in the foreseeable future.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Chairman, I have several questions, but before I put them, I have some matters for clarification by the minister. It is my understanding that this is in three steps. Bill No. C-90 which is before us defines the fact that there will be a defence staff chief and you said you think it will take approximately one year. Subsequently, there is the reorganization of the field command structure, and the third and final move will be the unification of the three services into a single defence force.

Mr. HELLYER: This is a logical projection. As I indicated earlier, we have no definite plans beyond the first step, but in the white paper we have indicated that in taking the first step we did so in the belief it would follow through the other two stages you have outlined.

Mr. TEMPLE: Would they all take approximately a year?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not want to establish any more milestones. They will have to be met one at a time.

Mr. TEMPLE: I take it, of course, that procurement will come under the chief of logistics and specifically a deputy chief of engineering?

Mr. HELLYER: The actual procurement, after the specifications have been determined, will come under the logistics side. Once the specification has been written for the nuts, bolts, or paint, or whatever is required, it will be the function of the logistics to get it, warehouse it and distribute it. If engineering service is required through development until a weapons system is proven this will fall under the engineering and development side.

Mr. TEMPLE: I note that under the deputy of logistics comes transport, and I assume that includes air transport.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: And then under the chief of operational readiness also would be included air transport?

Mr. HELLYER: There is a distinction to be made here. I do not wish to go into detail, because there has been no firm recommendation yet. However, the transportation referred to under logistics and engineering could include one or both of these functions. This is something on which a recommendation will have to come forward.

Mr. TEMPLE: Then there could be some overlapping until the recommendation is made?

Mr. HELLYER: A transport command moves material and if the same aircraft also move personnel from time to time, it may best be operated as a single command unit. This is something on which I would expect military advice as we go forward.

Mr. TEMPLE: You might have the air transport moving something under the chief of operational readiness, and on the advice of logistics, and then there would be the question of whether you have the same thing in respect of the air force and the navy.

Mr. HELLYER: What we want is the maximum utilization of our resources, and I am sure this can be worked out without too much difficulty.

Mr. TEMPLE: Under the assistant chief of defence staff, there is intelligence. I take it that this includes security?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not want to give a categorial answer to that. You would have to define security a little more closely with regard to whether you mean security of bases, and so on, or whether you mean the type of security largely related to security of information.

Mr. TEMPLE: I may be getting a bit afield.

Mr. HELLYER: You are getting a little premature in some of these areas.

Mr. TEMPLE: I was going to suggest that later after we have gone through Bill No. C-90 we might have a list of the services which are duplicated or triplicated, such as the air force police, the provost, and naval intelligence, and how they all co-ordinate or do not co-ordinate.

Mr. MATHESON: When I look at these two charts with regard to channels, in the proposed scheme it seems that we limit it to the chairman of the defence research board, the chief of defence staff, and the deputy minister, and that we

do not have all six as previously. We are cutting out the chief of the navy and the chief of air. It seems to me that in successive administrations and perhaps back to world war II, we have had cases of the chiefs of these respective staffs sort of sitting as avenging angels, if you like, for their own services and demanding a certain percentage of the defence budget. Would the minister tell us whether or not there has been any pattern over a period of years of a proportion of our defence dollars going to the navy, the army or the air force, perhaps in this order, and secondly whether or not an attempt has been made to push our chiefs away where we feel they will not project themselves into a carrying out of over-all objectives which might have the result, perhaps, of reducing the importance of one of these services, or perhaps two of them?

Mr. HELLYER: We have the figures on the expenditures for the last ten years. These are statistics which are available.

Mr. MATHESON: Have they been published?

Mr. HELLYER: I think they have.

Mr. MATHESON: Since I have not had the opportunity of looking at those figures, could you interpret them in any way in the light of the questions I have asked?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not care to give an interpretation. It is fair to say that each person looks at a problem from his own point of view, and undoubtedly there is some propensity to support projects, causes and developments which reflect your point of view.

One of the advantages of our new organization will be that points of view will be reconciled at the service level so that our program will be developed on a co-ordinated basis. Personally, I believe this will have many advantages; also, I think it is essential to have a co-ordinated plan. If you propose to follow a policy which involves the co-ordination of the traditional forces, the best way to get the components in balance is to have it done by the professions themselves at a subordinate military level.

Mr. MATHESON: I am thinking now not in terms of possible projected economies, but in terms of efficiencies. You really are saying to the services, put your heads together and decide what type of thing we are going to be called upon to do, and how this might best be done, and bring me a proposal; do not bring me your difficulties and your rivalries to the council table. Is that in essence what you are doing?

Mr. HELLYER: I agree that this will be a result of our new organization.

Mr. MATHESON: I will not trespass longer on the time of the committee. Thank you.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Hellyer, the other day you said that with this revision and unification the plans and programs would be produced at a level confined to the chief of defence staff, and in an answer to Mr. Harkness you also said that the different forces in the country would have their representation at that level. I am wondering whether at different times this would bring about a conflict at that level, because you would have your chiefs of function—as I think you called them—making recommendations and preparing programs and plans which would be going through the chief of defence staff level before they reach the defence council, the minister, and so on. Is there not a danger of a battle at that level where the forces will be represented by perhaps less senior officers, but senior officers who might have more concern about, let us say, development in the field of engineering and technical development in their own force in relation to the whole pragram?

Mr. HELLYER: There would have to be a certain amount of give and take; but I think the concept of a unified approach to the defence program will permeate the whole organization very quickly.

Mr. LANIEL: Is there not a problem of people looking not at the problem as a whole, but looking at the problem of one force?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think any person is without bias; any individual has a point of view. I would not expect all individuals at the staff level to think alike; I would expect them to put forth their particular point of view on any subject under consideration. I would also expect them, because they are reasonable men, to accommodate their particular point of view to the over-all program, and, once having stated their point of view, to see the other fellow's point of view as well, and reach a reasonable solution.

Mr. LANIEL: In your statement have you told us the composition of the new defence council, or will it be the same composition as now so far as military and civilian representation is concerned?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I gave this at the last meeting, Mr. Laniel.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you finished, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: The last questioner I have on my list is Mr. Martineau.

Before Mr. Martineau poses his question, with the agreement of the committee I will ask that the charts of information which have been distributed be included in the evidence.

Agreed.

The charts follow:

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—ARMY

ACTUAL EXPENDITURES—CASH DISBURSEMENTS

$Millions

A—Major Equipment

B—Other



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—NAVY

ACTUAL EXPENDITURES—CASH DISBURSEMENTS

$Millions

A—Major Equipment

B—Other



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—RCAF

ACTUAL EXPENDITURES—CASH DISBURSEMENTS

$Millions

A—Major Equipment

B—Other



Mr. MARTINEAU: Mr. Chairman, in answer to a question from Mr. Smith the minister stated that this reorganization will make our force the most up to date one in the world. This appears to me to be a rather sweeping statement. I wonder if the minister can give some specifics on this. On what is he basing his opinion that we will now have the most up to date organization in the world?

Mr. HELLYER: I am not sure that I said that, Mr. Martineau, but I think it is true.

Mr. MARTINEAU: No doubt, but on what specific do you base that assertion?

Mr. HELLYER: I think it will be the best miiltary organization, the most responsive to co-ordinated action, and that because of its simplified lines of communication it will be able to develop new concepts and techniques more quickly and more rapidly than it would have had it not been reorganized.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Is there any proof that this reorganization will work? Is it not a fact that up to the present date it is entirely experimental and on paper?

Mr. HELLYER: It is like marriage; there is no proof of what the fruits will be until after the consummation.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I would not like to relate matrimony?—

Mr. SMITH: With military service?

Mr. MARTINEAU: That is right. In any event, so far the minister is still speaking in very broad terms and I would like to ask him if his phrase "the most up to date in the world" relates, for instance, to weaponry.

Mr. HELLYER: I would certainly hope that for the tasks our armed forces will be expected to undertake and for the roles they have been assigned by the white paper, they will have the best equipment available for those tasks.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Besides the minister's hope, are there any positive strides that are being taken or contemplated because of this organization in the field of weapon development, for instance?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Martineau, it is a little difficult until we have the organization set up to know just what weapons systems they will recommend. This will include development.

Mr. MARTINEAU: But in the mind of the minister does not the modern element of the force relate also to its weaponry and equipment?

Mr. HELLYER: Quite so, and this of course is the second major reason for the reorganization which is to provide greater resources both for development and for weaponry.

Mr. MARTINEAU: May I take it, then, that the minister's thinking has not yet reached the field of equipment and technology?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not agree with that broad generalization. If you mean have we decided upon the specific weapons systems which will be incorporated as a result of the white paper, you are correct; these decisions have not yet been taken.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Has the minister made any decision as to the role of this new force?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, Mr. Chairman, and this is outlined in the white paper.

Mr. MARTINEAU: What is the new feature?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I should have to read into the record the roles and tasks which have been laid down for the armed forces and which are all set out in considerable detail in the white paper on defence which was presented a few months ago.

The CHAIRMAN: I would suggest, Mr. Martineau, that we should try to keep our questions as closely as possible to unification of command.

Mr. MARTINEAU: My questions do bear very directly on the answers given by the minister, and I would therefore suggest to him that the new role that he envisages for the forces is, in actuality, the same role as they have always performed.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that is true, Mr. Chairman. There are a number of changes, both in role and in emphasis, forecast in the white paper; and I am sure that this will be self apparent to the hon. gentleman if he will check back.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Are these the changes that the minister hopes will make the force "the most up to date in the world"?

Mr. HELLYER: I think they will permit the implementation of the roles set out in the white paper in such a way that we will have the best force anywhere.

Mr. MARTINEAU: In regard to the echelon of command, there will now be this new position of chief of defence staff. I have noticed there will also be a vice chief of defence staff, and there will even be an assistant chief of defence staff: as well as the three service chiefs. I assume also that each of these senior officers will have a secretariat and a considerable personnel and staff. Can the minister say if their total number will be less than the total number of the staff, personnel and assistants to the three service chiefs of staff.

Mr. HELLYER: The broad answer to that question will be, of course, that the total headquarters figures will be very markedly reduced. This is one of the areas of considerable saving which we expect to make.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Will it be a re-shuffle or an actual reduction?

Mr. HELLYER: It will be a reduction in the national defence headquarters as a whole.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Has the number of staff of each of these persons I have mentioned been determined or established yet?

Mr. HELLYER: Not yet.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Does the minister then think that he can defeat the tendency or the Parkinson law of empire building which may be applicable to the selection of personnel for each of these people?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think it can be defeated, Mr. Chairman, but we are going to give it a running battle.

Mr. MARTINEAU: In answer to a question from Mr. Lessard, the Minister stated that there was a new blueprint; that this was a new blueprint and a changed system. I believe the minister also answered that the same people who were administering the former system will be administering the present system.

Mr. HELLYER: It was not I who said that; it was Mr. Lessard who said that.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I think you admitted that.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not remember admitting it; I said I was not in a position at this moment to discuss personnel in precise terms.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I am interested to know, if there has been a change, why these persons made this change in their thinking. Has this change been imposed upon them from above or is it something they themselves evolved?

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is both, Mr. Chairman. There have been many contributors to the policy which was laid down in the white paper. Now that it has been laid down, the second phase is implementation. In so far as implementation is concerned, the people who are charged with the responsibility for carrying out this task will use as their blueprint the roles and policy which have been laid down by the government.

Mr. MARTINEAU: That is all.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now just 12.30, the point at which we will change to the topic of involuntary retirement of certain personnel. The Associate Minister of National Defence is here and I see Mr. Winch is anxious to ask a question.

Mr. WINCH: I appreciate very much the understanding of all members of the committee of the importance of this matter which is now before us with the result that we are able to bring it up at this time for discussion. I refer, sir, of course, to the general policy as I understand it, and as outlined by the minister, that within the next two years there may be approximately 10,000 personnel leaving the service of the defence department.

It is my understanding that although there may be some 10,000 people involved over a period of two years, within the next two months the retirements will start to take place. On that basis, therefore, I feel it is of the utmost importance that this committee should have a full understanding, right in the very beginning, of the policies on retirement.

In my estimation, sir, the entire question boils down to four problematical matters. With your consent I would like to put all of them before the committee in one statement because I honestly believe, sir, it will expedite any answer from the minister or associate minister and that it will also expedite the consideration by our committee.

If I have your permission to do it in that way I will be as brief as I possibly can.

Agreed.

The first question is this: Is it the policy of the defence department under this new plan that all separations from the defence department in its employee relationships shall be on a compulsory basis? What I have in mind there, sir, is whether any thought has been given, in view of the department's policy, to find out if there are those people in the armed services now, under the new policy, who would like to retire on a voluntary basis, thereby making it unnecessary to have so many released on a compulsory basis, and thereby retaining in the service the ability or abilities of personnel who would be of advantage to the Department of National Defence?

Whether the separations be on a voluntary or a compulsory basis, we then come to the question of separation pay. To the best of my recollection the only announcement made by the minister has had to do with compulsory retirement on a cash basis.

I am in receipt of a number of letters in connection with this matter, and there is one in particular to which I would like to draw your attention. This letter is written by a man who says he represents a group in an air force base in Ontario who think they may come under this compulsory retirement plan. They ask whether or not there could be consideration of a different form of separation pay when they leave the service. They have explained their point of view and they say it is possible that if they receive the cash—and I think it goes up to a high as ten months' pay—the money might be frittered away or invested in a small business which might go bankrupt. It was their suggestion that it would be preferable to have an option and for them to have, under government auspices, a retaining scheme which would adapt the knowledge they gained, at taxpayers expense, in the armed service to civilian occupation conditions, while at the same time receiving sustenance as though they were still in the armed forces, and then having a further month or two of assistance while they obtain employment in civilian life. I have been asked to draw this to the attention of the committee and to the attention of the minister.

From that point we follow to the position of civilians in the Department of National Defence. To my own knowledge there are many who have served, and served ably and well, in important positions going back 10 and 15 years

and to the time of the second world war, people who have served not in uniform but who have been doing an effective job. What is their position? No announcement has been made on that. Are they to be given a notice of one month, and out? Or can they be considered as employees of the Department of National Defence who have performed a necessary and essential job, albeit out of uniform, on a basis comparable to those who have also served but who have worn the uniform of the armed services?

This is a most important matter, a matter upon which I hope to hear some comment.

My fourth point follows from that, and I honestly admit it is a most difficult one. A great many men and women will be retired from the forces of Canada, men and women of great ability. They will undoubtedly be grabbed by private enterprise because of their knowledge and ability. If they go into private enterprise they will receive salaries applicable to private enterprise and be entitled, without discrimination, to receive their pension. However, if the government of Canada wanted to use the brains and ability of these ex-service personnel in some service of government, under the regulations those people must not only receive less than they would in private enterprise but also they will be unable to receive any pension. Therefore, we have a most difficult situation. Although the government of Canada, in its various services, might like to use the brains of those who will be compulsorily retired, they will be in a position in which they would have to make a real sacrifice by taking the lower wage offered in government service and also losing their right to a pension while they are employed.

As I say, that is a very difficult problem. It is one we have never faced, but I think in view of the fact that thousands will be released and perhaps many could be of useful service in a different phase of government administration, it is one that we as members of this committee—and I am going to say as members of parliament—will have to face. I believe this is a most important issue that we have to discuss now, an issue upon which some conclusions will have to be reached.

I have raised four points upon which, of course, I give top priority to the question of cash or training on separation, an option, and the position of the thousands of civilians who may be affected under the new plan. I sincerely hope, sir, that the minister or the associate minister or the representative from the treasury department can give us some detailed explanation of the entire situation and of its implications.

The CHAIRMAN: Before that question is answered I would like to identify the third witness for the benefit of the committee. He is Dr. Jack Hodgson, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence (Finance).

Mr. LUCIEN CARDIN (*Associate Minister, Department of National Defence*): I do not have to tell the committee that I am not an expert in accounting. It is for that reason that we have brought along Mr. Hodgson this morning.

In answer to Mr. Winch's statement, in which he mentioned the figure of 10,000 people who would be retired from the armed forces in a relatively short time and up to a period of two years, I would say of course that, as the minister has mentioned this is a ball park figure. Somewhere around 10,000 is what we expect. It does not mean that these 10,000 will be all compulsorily retired. There will be the normal attrition taking place, and it is felt that the majority of the people to be retired will retire under this attrition process.

Mr. Winch asks whether or not it is government policy that all separations will be compulsory in nature. No, the answer to that is that it is not intended that all separations will be compulsory. The normal voluntary means of leaving the services will continue to exist. The difference will be that those who voluntarily retire before reaching their compulsory retiring age and those who

are released because of misconduct will not receive the benefits provided for those who will be compulsorily retired. The idea of the compulsory retirement is that we will be in a better position to see in what areas there are redundancies in the field of personnel. We feel we will have better control after looking over the slate and that we will be able to say, "These positions are redundant."

I would like to say here again—and unfortunately there seems to have been some misapprehension on this point—that we are not retiring people compulsorily because we are not satisfied with their services; it has nothing at all to do with the loyalty of the people who are being retired. On the contrary, they have been very loyal and devoted personnel. What we are bound to do in this area is to try to have a career structure which will eliminate all redundancy. It is by compulsory retirement that we will be able to control the retirement and the positions more adequately. But, as I mentioned before, people still will be allowed to retire voluntarily or will be put out because of misconduct, as in the past, the only difference being they would not receive the benefits provided by compulsory retirement. I think most members of the committee will realize, as I do, that if we put someone out compulsorily, we do owe these people who are being retired in that fashion some recognition of the fact that they had a certain number of years of service and that they are now being asked to retire. In that sense they deserve some compensation. But, as I said, this is not true of the people who voluntarily retire or those who are put out because of misconduct.

Then Mr. Winch asked a question in respect of the use of the benefits and whether or not we should give them an option of obtaining training provided by the government or a cash allowance. I know Mr. Winch has asked this question before and, so far as my answer is concerned, I still think it is the same, that we feel it is far better to allow these people who are being retired to utilize the money according to their own judgment. These are all mature people; they know the value of money. And, if some of them wish to go ahead and acquire technical training of any type they can do so with the amount of money that is provided. And, as a matter of fact, that is the purpose of the benefits that are now being contemplated. I think also that in the field of civil employment someone who wanted to be rehabilitated or retained would perhaps do far better in a university than in any facilities which could be provided by the government.

The third point was in respect of the release of civilian personnel in the armed forces in conjunction with reorganization of national defence. Well, in this respect it is not thought that there would be comparable releases in the field of civil servants; the number will be far less than what is contemplated for the armed forces. We have in conjunction with the civil service and the national employment office come to an agreement and a system which seems to be working out very well, where we do everything that is possible to utilize the service of people in the civil service, let us say, within the Department of National Defence, to try to find other positions within the Department of National Defence; and we also have arrangements with other departments to accept civil servants who are being retired in national defence.

Then, there is the employment office which also participates in the field. So far, our experience has been that the civil servants who have been displaced have to a very large extent been able to find positions elsewhere, either in the Department of National Defence or in other departments. In addition, we have provided for people who can obtain transfers from one area to another in one department of government, to apply for transportation or removal allowances of up to $500 in order to help them move from one place to another without out-of-pocket expenditures. This has proved successful enough to make us believe that there will not be any great problem with the retiring of the civil employees.

The last part, of course, is this question of the people who are being retired from the forces and who go into private entreprise and who are allowed to keep their full salaries, whereas those who are retired and go into the government service would have only part of that pension. I must say here, of course, that this is not something new; it has existed for a considerably long time and it is not part of our proposal. It has to do more with the civil service than it does with national defence. However, in spite of this, and it is to the credit of many, most of the people in the services are extremely devoted to the services, and it has happened in the past that people prefer to remain with the governement service as civil servants and to accept this reduction of pension giving them a level of salary which is lower than they would get if they were in private enterprise. This of course is not an excuse that I am trying to make. I say that this is to the great credit of the people who decide to do this, but, as I mentioned before, this particular aspect of the legislation does not particularly concern us; it is an over-all law which has been standing for a long time, and of course it is not up to us to decide on that particular point.

I think that covers the four points that Mr. Winch mentioned.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to wait with further questions until someone else has put other questions.

Mr. HARKNESS: On this sheet which was issued I note you show a total of 24,453 for all ranks who will be separated from the armed forces through normal retirement and attrition during the next two years, or the two years ending 1965-66. How much of that attrition do you expect to be made up by recruitment, intake from the service colleges, and so on?

Mr. HELLYER: It is rather difficult to explain, Mr. Chairman. We expect that the number to be taken in during that period will be that number less the number of reduction in the force which is achieved through attrition. This is just a mathematical truism. I am sure we could recruit the total number, but as we want to reduce the over-all number during this period, the number that will be taken in will be that figure less the planned reduction by attrition during the period.

Mr. HARKNESS: What I am trying to get at is the number of people who will be compulsorily retired, and I thought I would get at it this way: Have you any estimates of the pepole who are going to be recruited in this period? You could then arrive at the number of people compulsorily retired.

Mr. WINCH: How many will be retired on a compulsory basis as a result of your policy?

Mr. HELLYER: We do not know the answer to this yet, Mr. Winch, because it will depend on the age and rank groupings after the new establishment has been determined.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you no estimates on this at all?

Mr. HELLYER: The ball park estimate will be a fifth of the total, or something in the order of 2,000 compulsory retirements—but that is right off the top of the head. There is no scientific data which could support that figure.

Mr. WINCH: How do you explain then the newspaper reports of certain changes which I believe your department and you yourself announced last week? The reduction in the air force was to affect 500 aircrews this year. Surely those 500 are not reduced by attrition?

Mr. HELLYER: These were all compulsory because they were surplus aircrew.

Mr. HARKNESS: To continue, have you had any survey made of the number of people who were prepared to retire voluntarily, or have you put out any questionnaire with a view to finding out the number of people who for one reason or another would be prepared to retire?

Mr. CARDIN: No, Mr. Chairman, there has been no survey made of the people who would voluntarily retire. However, the processes of people asking for voluntary retirement are still in effect, and those who desire to leave the services before the compulsory retiring age continue to send in requests to do so, and we allow them to leave if they are in a particular category of which we are not short.

Mr. HARKNESS: Undoubtedly, there are considerable numbers of people in the armed services who would be prepared to retire and go into other employment. They may have opportunities of other employment if they did not suffer thereby as far as their pension rights were concerned, and things along that line. This is one of the difficulties, as I see it, in the program that you have in mind. You are going to be retiring compulsorily a considerable number of people, quite a few of whom do not want to be retired at all. On the other hand, you will be retaining considerable numbers of people who would really like to retire but are not able to do so or do not feel they are able to do so because they would suffer financially in the process.

Mr. CARDIN: I think it is quite possible that a good number of these people who really want to retire will find themselves on the lists of those to be retired. That is not an impossible situation.

Mr. HARKNESS: It may or may not be the case but I would think it would be a much more reasonable way to handle this problem to have a survey made or to put a questionnaire and in this way determine what people would be prepared to retire, and to make provision that they get the same benefits as the people who will be compulsorily retired if they are in the same bracket.

Mr. CARDIN: What I mentioned a while ago has a direct bearing on this; we want to try to have a career structure in the services which is effective, efficient, and not redundant. It is because of this requirement that we feel we should try to select for compulsory retirement those people whose positions are redundant. Those people who might want to retire and whose jobs are essential in our new structure should not, in my mind, be put out in this way. It would seem to me that apart from the desire of the people involved, there is also the responsibility of the department to see to it that the career structure of the forces does not suffer.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think the career structure of the forces would suffer if we proceeded somewhat along the lines I indicated, and in fact I think that the morale in the services would be very greatly improved as a result of that.

Mr. CARDIN: There is a bit of both in here. I think, in each case it is important to look at both sides of the question. What would happen if, for instance, someone wanted to retire voluntarily, and if he were to be a key man whom we would like to continue in the reorganization? We then have a problem whether he should be retired or not. We feel that it is more effective for us to try to take a broad look on what would be the requirements in the future, and have those people compulsorily retired who will not be needed.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as the key man is concerned, you will find, I am quite sure, in a large number of cases—retirement of 500 aircrew is a good example of it I think—that you are going to retain a certain number of aircrew and that you are going to get rid of a certain number of aircrew. Selection of who goes and who stays is, to a large extent, an arbitrary one based on the judgment of a certain number of people. Among those 500 people you are retiring you will undoubtedly have a considerable number who would like to remain, and, on the other hand, among the people you are retaining you would have a number who would want to get out. As a result of this, I think, you would reduce the efficiency of the whole force if you proceeded along this basis.

Mr. CARDIN: I am not sure the example of 500 airmen is a very good one because, as you perhaps know, this is really outside of the reorganization. These 500 airmen, as Mr. Hellyer pointed out, are surplus, and the problem in the reorganization of the national defence would not be quite along that particular line.

Mr. HARKNESS: The 500 people you are getting rid of, the air crew, are not surplus.

Mr. CARDIN: What is that please?

Mr. HARKNESS: These particular 500 people individually are not surplus. You will retain I do not know how many aircrew. What is the number of aircrew to be retained?

Mr. CARDIN: I could not give you that answer.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well let us say 2,000 just for the purpose of argument. So you are getting rid of one fifth of the number of air persons or aircrew, and in the 500 that you will compulsorily retire there is bound to be a good number who would like to stay, and in the other 2,000 there is quite a number who would like to get out. Why not bring the two things together? Why not make an effort to bring them together?

Mr. CARDIN: I think in practice when the decision is made to retire some people compulsorily there will be—I am quite sure, a very close look at the record of the people involved. I think you will find from the record that you will be able to determine those people who are really keen on the service and those who are less keen. In that way we shall have a fairly accurate idea of the desire of the individuals concerned.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are now saying exactly the opposite to what you said a while ago, that there is nothing meant in all these people being retired. Now you say that you are going to retire people who are none too good.

Mr. CARDIN: No, I did not say that.

Mr. HARKNESS: In fact that is what it sounded like. This is another objection to this method of dealing with the problem.

Mr. CARDIN: I certainly do not agree with you that I said that by looking at the records we will decide on the people we want to get rid of and that they are no good. Everyone in the forces has records that can be looked at. There are people who have many, many reasons, often quite competent, quite devoted, with all sorts of credits to them, but because of circumstances, family or otherwise, they would be desirous of leaving. That all appears in the records. And there are other people, who also have great ability, who are keen and who want to stay on in the services. I think that by checking the records it should be possible to decide which ones really wish to stay and which ones would prefer to leave.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would it not give you a better indication if you made a survey to find out the desires of the people?

Mr. MATHESON: It would throw the forces into chaos.

Mr. CARDIN: There are many people on whom we are counting particularly to carry out certain jobs who would elect to go voluntarily, and then we would be in a rather awkward position of trying to keep them on.

Mr. HARKNESS: Because you make a survey to try to find out if people want to go does not mean that you have to give to get rid of A, B, and C, simply because they said that they wanted to go. If there is a particular man it is essential to retain, then you would retain him anyway. Why not get this done on the basis where you would satisfy a lot more people and then

bring about a much better general feeling of morale in the services than to operate on the basis you are going to work on, one which I consider to be an arbitrary basis.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now one o'clock. We should adjourn. But if the minister would like to answer this one question, very well, and it would be the last one until we reassemble.

Mr. WINCH: In view of the schedule you outlined at the beginning of the meeting, would this mean that the next meeting would be when we would not have an opportunity to continue questioning the minister?

The CHAIRMAN: At the next meeting we shall resume the questioning on this topic. It will be at 3.30 this afternoon.

Mr. HELLYER: I shall be here.

The CHAIRMAN: I was going to ask everybody to be here promptly so we do not have to wait for a quorum. We shall resume with your questioning, Mr. Harkness, unless you are finished. The meeting will be at three thirty or immediately following the orders of the day whichever comes first.

AFTERNOON SITTING

TUESDAY, June 2, 1964.

(*Text*)

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting will come to order. We will proceed with the questioning.

Mr. HARKNESS: At the time we adjourned I was expressing the hope that some effort might be made to find out what officers are willing to retire, and to integrate to a greater extent then seems to have been contemplated the matter of the compulsory retirements. I can see no really good reason why a questionnaire or just a simple request to the people who are willing to retire could not be put out and these people then included amongst this group who are being retired with these particular pensions.

Mr. CARDIN: Perhaps in order to clarify this point I may perhaps read a small memo which puts the point more clearly than I could express it myself.

This morning Mr. Harkness made a suggestion that the armed forces be surveyed to ascertain which individuals wish to be selected for retirement as part of the forthcoming reduction in establishment. I can assure Mr. Harkness that this idea was studied during the preparation of the present special benefits plan. After examination however it appeared preferable to base the plan generally upon compulsory retirement on the basis of selection.

It was considered that a survey of 120,000 people to determine their wishes regarding retirement would inevitably prove upsetting to many, particularly as the scale of the anticipated reduction is a relatively modest proportion of the total strength. Moreover, it is anticipated that the majority of the reduction can be achieved through normal attrition, as we mentioned this morning. The problem facing the services is to determine the personnel requirements by rank, skill, age, and so on, as soon as possible, and having done so to make certain that the personnel needed are retained, that is that those to be retired are in fact the personnel who can best be spared. It is reasonable to expect that among those who will naturally be selected for release would be those approaching compulsory retirement age, those whose special skills are no longer required, or those who can no longer be expected to serve in operational employment. There will be occasions when the determination of

the wishes of the personnel in particular categories of rank, skill, age, and so on, should be part of the process of selection, and this will certainly be taken into account, but it would not be an across the board survey of those who would be voluntarily retired.

Mr. HARKNESS: In connection with these 500 aircrew who are to be compulsorily retired, have you now got the figures on what proportion of these 500 are of the trained aircrew, particularly the active aircrew in the service?

Mr. CARDIN: I am sorry, I have not the figures but we might get them before the end of our meeting.

Mr. HARKNESS: What proportion of these people are short service officers?

Mr. CARDIN: About half of them would be short service officers.

Mr. HARKNESS: How many people are being trained as aircrew at the present time?

Mr. CARDIN: I am afraid I shall have to get that information later.

Mr. HARKNESS: The committee should be aware of the number of people under training for aircrew at the present time and see how this relates to the number of people who are being compulsorily retired. Also, I think we should know what is the cost of training a man as aircrew. I recall that it is a very large figure, a surprisingly large figure, and I would like to have that given to the committee so that we could gain some idea of the amount of money which has been spent on these people who are now being compulsorily retired, and how much is being spent on people essentially to replace them, or others who are being retained at the present time who would subsequently be going?

Mr. CARDIN: We can get this information for you. Unfortunately, we do not have it here.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have just one other question which I would like to ask. I see on page two of one of these sheets you put out that people who have over ten years of continuous service can have their dependents, furniture and effects transported at public expense to a selected place of residence in Canada. Short service officers do not have ten continuous years of service. What is going to be the policy in regard to them? Normally I think if they were retired at the end of the short service period, the cost of moving to their place of discharge was covered.

Mr. CARDIN: I think they would get it under these circumstances.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you make certain of that?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think it would be manifestly unfair for a man on a short service commission who normally, at the end of seven years, would have had the cost of moving paid, not to get it under this scheme.

Mr. CARDIN: I am quite sure they will get it, but I will check.

Mr. TEMPLE: These 500 aircrew officers who are being retired, I believe, were notified on April 17 that they would be retired in three month's time, and they are going to be retired by around July 17.

Now, a great many of them are friends and neighbours of mine, and having to do now with one particular section of the Canadian forces superannuation act I would like to move at this time, if I can get a seconder that:

> This committee recommends that necessary amendments be made to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act to provide for the benefits set out in subsection (1) on page 2 of the information supplied to the committee on Thursday, May 28, 1964, and that parliament be asked to proceed with it forthwith.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Temple, this is a recommendation from a committee for an expenditure of funds, which I think is outside the ambit of our jurisdiction.

Mr. TEMPLE: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. We sit here and we discuss various things that might be done or might not be done or should be done or should not be done. Now, the minister has supplied us with the information of what is intended to be done, and I think the committee should go on record that we are in favour of getting it done, and to recommend this to the house as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: I would believe that as a notice of motion from a private member the committee might recommend that the government give consideration to doing something, but the committee cannot recommend or order the government to make an expenditure of funds.

Mr. TEMPLE: I will make a resolution in the house to the effect, and I would like the support of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Could you give us your motion again, and we will see if you can get a seconder?

Mr. TEMPLE: My motion is that this committee recommends that the necessary amendments be made to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act to provide for the benefits set out in subsection (1) on page 2 of the information supplied to the committee on Thursday, May 28, 1964, and that parliament be asked to proceed with these amendments forthwith.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there a seconder for Mr. Temple's motion?

Mr. FANE: I second the motion.

Mr. CARDIN: I know Mr. Temple realizes of course that this is contemplated, and that we propose to do this by an item in the estimates, and that it would be retroactive.

Mr. WINCH: Might I ask that this motion be tabled until we have comcompleted our discussion on this matter?

Mr. TEMPLE: All right, I agree to that.

Mr. WINCH: I move that it be tabled until we have completed our discussion on the allowance.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, we will table this motion and it will be dealth with then, at the time we have completed our study of this subject. Have you any other points?

Mr. TEMPLE: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Lessard.

(Translation)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I have one brief question, Mr. Chairman, I wish to ask the ministre whether it is true that a large majority of Air Force officers among the 500 who will be retired in the near future, are chosen among those who were commissioned while on active service without prior attendance at a military college, and whether, in other words, with regard to remaining in the service, preference will be given to the military college graduates over those who earned their commissions through active service in the Air Force.

Mr. CARDIN: I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we have attempted a short while ago to spell out the norms on which we would base our keeping certain military personnel and releasing others; that had no relation to what my friend was saying. Rank, efficiency, age, etc. would be taken into consideration with regard to the discharge of military personnel. Then, as I have explained

this morning, we must establish a career framework and we hope to find the best people for this, of whatever type may have been their preliminary training.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I have another question. Obviously, it may be somewhat controversial. How is it that, in order to discharge surplus personnel in the armed services, we should have to consider giving them some form of compensation, while in industry we have men who have worked hard for many years and, when they are laid off, they do not necessarily get this same consideration? Why, exactly, is there this feeling of obligation to compensate those who are thus forcibly retired?

Mr. CARDIN: Well, I believe that there is a fairly substantial difference between employment in the armed forces and employment in private industry. It is fairly easy, I believe, for a man with experience in private industry to find a job in various industries. Military training, on the other hand, although some technical skills are taught, is a rather limited field. It is rather difficult for someone, a pilot for example, who does this kind of work for a part of his life, to find suitable work in other fields of private industry.

That is the reason why we believe necessary to give them this advantage. Besides, we are not doing here in Canada something that is not being done elsewhere in all countries where it has been found necessary to discharge military personnel. It has always been thought useful to give them a sum of money in order to help them find a place in private industry.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I thank you for those particulars, Mr. Minister. If I have asked for them, it is precisely in order to have them spelled out, because those questions were asked of me, and I have answered them, but I preferred to have the answers come from you.

Mr. CARDIN: There is also this point that I have overlooked: armed forces personnel do not receive unemployment insurance benefits, while civilians, of course, do get this assistance.

(*Text*)

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. LANIEL: No, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH: There are airmen who are now being discharged because of the change of the role of the air force, and you have mentioned a figure of 500 aircrew. In that group what is the total number that will be discharged?

Mr. CARDIN: The 500.

Mr. SMITH: Just the 500? Are there no supporting airmen, mechanics, and people who maintain the aircraft?

Mr. CARDIN: No, not in that 500 group.

Mr. SMITH: Will there be more? These people are not to be discharged by reason of the unification of the services but by reason of the fact that the weapon they use has become obsolete.

Mr. CARDIN: There will be more than 500 in the normal reorganization of the department.

Mr. SMITH: No, I am sorry. I would like, if I could, to have a separate figure for the people who are likely to be discharged by reason of the change of weapons. Into this class must fall the 500 aircrew. How many more are there in the air force who will be discharged by reason of that change?

Mr. CARDIN: I wonder if you would be a little more specific about the changeover.

Mr. SMITH: Five hundred aircrew are being discharged by reason of the reduction of the use of Voodoos. Is that not so?

Mr. CARDIN: No.

Mr. SMITH: Which plane then?

Mr. HELLYER: The 500 were aircrew which had been built up over a period of time in excess of requirements. If the policy had been to acquire more aircraft in certain roles, they would have had useful employment; but as the policy has not involved the acquisition of more aircraft in certain roles, such as strike, reconnaissance, air defence and so on, consequently they become surplus, and in order to even out the number of pilots available to fulfil the requirements over a longer period of time it was felt desirable that they should be—

Mr. SMITH: You are reducing the number of Voodoos too?

Mr. HELLYER: No, we are not reducing them, no. This is a fallacy resulting from newspaper articles. The only change really is to use the ones which we have more efficiently.

Mr. SMITH: There is no corresponding reduction in the air force personnel, the ground crew, relating to these aircraft who are being discharged?

Mr. HELLYER: Not specifically.

Mr. SMITH: But in particular are we to assume that this is the only reduction to be made in the air force at this time?

Mr. HELLYER: This was a pocket of surplus personnel that was being dealt with strictly on that basis. There was no employment available nor would there be in the foreseeable future. Consequently they are being released at the present time.

Mr. SMITH: The Voodoo squadron at North Bay is to be reduced sometime in the reasonably near future. What will happen to the ground crew which operates that squadron?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, there may be some small surplus accrue, or there may be a shortage in some other area to which the ground crew would be transferred. That is something we would have to look at. We did have new requirements all through the months of the fall, at the time we were contracting in some areas, and consequently many personnel were transferred. Just what the situation would be in respect to the ground crew of these two disbanded squadrons we would have to determine.

Mr. SMITH: It is not possible to give us a complete figure or projection of the amount of the reduction of air force personnel which will take place in 1964 by reason of the change of role, or the change of aircraft? Then, it is not possible to give us a complete figure or a projection of the reduction of the air force personnel which will take place in 1964 by reason of the change of role, the change of weaponry, or the change of aircraft?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think there was much of a change. I mean the consolidation from five so-called squadrons into three real squadrons was just a move to increase the efficiency with which the available aircraft were being used. This would have very little effect except for a few less ground crew required and less operating cost. But there would be very little change in personsonel outside of that.

Mr. SMITH: Then, how many personnel will be affected by the close of the base in France?

Mr. HELLYER: This figure has been given. We can get it for you.

Mr. SMITH: Is it in the hundreds or in the thousands?

Mr. HELLYER: It was several hundred. But, as I say, we will have to get this figure for you.

Mr. SMITH: If you would, please. I have a further question. Is any special consideration being given in respect of discharges of these people who are

within a fairly short time of reaching the age limit in their particular rank and who are anxious to get out of the service in order that they can get into such industry where there exists pension plans.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, actually of the 500 air force personnel who were selected for discharge one half were permanent force officers who were exactly in that position, who were reaching compulsory retirement age and who would as a result of this decision be able to readjust themselves sooner than they would if they had served their full term.

Mr. SMITH: Would that principle be applied in the general reduction of the forces? Is there any acceleration for the last couple of years of service for those people who obviously are not going to get promoted.

Mr. HELLYER: This is one of the criteria the associate minister mentioned in his statement this afternoon which would be taken into consideration.

Mr. SMITH: One hears a great deal of comment in that respect. I have another question which concerns people with shorter service and who are in more or less dead end trades or jobs. I have in mind one particular trade, and I know it is a small one to mention to the committee, but I am referring to male registered nurses. Is any help being given to them in view of the fact that there are lots of opportunities for employment outside the service at the present time.

Mr. CARDIN: I am told that officers and other ranks who become redundant in their specialty would be considered as going, this would be applicable also if it would be difficult to retrain them usefully; the other group is the officers enrolled for a fixed term of service and who are no longer required would also—

Mr. SMITH: Does that apply to non-commissioned officers?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, right across the board.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I would like to ask the associate minister a question. I believe he said this morning that the cash benefits were being extended to facilitate, instead of training, rehabilitation. Is that correct?

Mr. CARDIN: Well, the purpose of the benefits is to permit the people who are being retired before their normal retirement age to be able to rehabilitate themselves or to keep them going until such time as they can find something.

Mr. MARTINEAU: That is, find a new job?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Now, will the minister agree that all men being released are more or less on the same footing, as far as that goes?

Mr. CARDIN: What do you mean when you use the words "the same footing"?

Mr. MARTINEAU: In respect of their need for rehabilitation.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, I would think there would be differences. They are not all equally qualified. There are three different services and the qualifications and special skills for each of the three services are different.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Would the minister say if it will be easier, say, for a private to rehabilitate himself and retrain for a civilian occupation than, say, one of the senior officers, a colonel or major?

Mr. CARDIN: Well, I think this is a very hypothetical question. Of course, it depends on the private and the type of training he has had, his skills and so on.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Well now, the purpose of my question is this. According to the statement and the information that has been released on the request of Mr. Temple the maximum benefits are as follows. In the case of a major general they range from $15,840 down to $3,300 in the case of a private. The minister has stated the reason for these payments is to facilitate rehabilitation and the

retraining of these people. I am asking the minister does he consider it fair to the private to receive a sum which is about one fifth that of a major general or one quarter that of a colonel when his difficulties are likely to be as great and probably in the natural course of things much greater in finding a new job and in retraining for a civilian occupation.

Mr. CARDIN: I think that you are well aware that the basis on which the benefits have been calculated took into account the rank, the number of years spent, and so on.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I understand that.

Mr. CARDIN: Would you feel that a man who has been a private would warrant the same type of salary that a major or a man who has had a considerable amount more of responsibility warrants? Do you feel that would be equitable?

Mr. MARTINEAU: No, Mr. Chairman, I do not feel that everyone should receive the same salary, but I do feel, and I am putting this out as a suggestion to the minister, that if these benefits are being given to facilitate the rehabilitation of these people that the criteria should be the need of the recipient, and I suggest to the minister the need is likely to be as great for the lower ranks and probably much greater than for the higher ranks, and I wonder if it would not have been fairer if the minister or the department had treated all equally on that basis inasmuch as all of them are in the same situation in regard to being thrown out of an occupation in which they expected, in the normal course of events, to be committed for several years hence and, probably, until the end of their active life.

Mr. CARDIN: I can tell Mr. Martineau that this particular phase of the benefits was considered by the department and the armed services themselves rejected the idea. Place yourself in a position where you are a major and you have an expectancy of four or five years at a certain salary and it is immediately cut off. Then you find you are in a very awkward position; you require more money than would be the case if you were a private who has had a relatively small amount of salary. And, his requirements are less, as a result of which he would be losing less than the major or the captain would be if his normal term of office were to continue. It is on that basis we felt that the scale of salary should also be the scale of the benefits we pay.

Mr. MARTINEAU: In order to compensate or to re-establish an equilibrium between the ranks would the minister consider extending to the lower ranks an additional benefit in the form of optional training, if they desired, at a cost to the department, in order to facilitate their rehabilitation.

Mr. CARDIN: I think if you will take a look at the scale you will find so far as income tax is concerned there is a considerable difference in the amount of money which is withdrawn from a private as compared with that withdrawn from a major general. For instance, out of the $15,000 the major general would receive, he pays income tax of $3,105, and the private out of his $3,100, pays $77.13. With this amount of money we feel it is possible for him to be able to rehabilitate himself, and it is proportionate to the amount of money he was earning while he was in the services.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I understand there was some consideration to be given in respect of the deduction that would be made for income tax. Has the department reached a final decision in that regard?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. We do not feel it would be wise to exempt the benefit from being taxable. As members of the committee know, there are several gratuities in national defence, and all of these are taxable. When the benefit in this particular context was studied, it was felt it would be better to give the

person a greater amount of money and tax it, than to give a lesser amount and not have it taxed, so that we can keep uniformity in our treatment of gratuities.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Has there been consideration given to studying the tax burden on that person, say, over five years rather than over a single year?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. Consideration has been given to this and I understand it has been decided it would not be in the interest of the person paying the income tax; he would be paying more in that manner than he would if it were in one lump sum.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Concerning training, has the department considered issuing certificates to departing personnel which would attest to the skills or trades which they have acquired during their service years, and giving that certificate a standing similar to that of certificates issued by civilian authorities?

Mr. CARDIN: I am not sure whether that has been done. However, I understand there may be some difficulty in giving certificates in certain specialties. I will be happy to look into that.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Has the department given consideration to facilitating the transfer, say, of an airman to another service such as the army? Perhaps he may be redundant in one service and yet his services may be required in another. Has any consideration been given to such a transfer on an automatic basis from one service to another?

Mr. CARDIN: I think this matter automatically would be looked into on a selective basis when we are deciding which people are to go and which are to stay. I think this would be considered at that point.

Mr. MARTINEAU: The minister has no definite information on that?

Mr. CARDIN: The reorganization of national defence is being done across the board and when it comes time for the selection of people who will be let go, I imagine that someone who is qualified, let us say in the air force, and could have a place in the army, would be considered as being retained. This would be part of the normal selective basis on which we would work.

Mr. LLOYD: I wonder whether the minister might enlarge on the question of the significance of income tax payments. A question was asked and I think the associate minister answered by saying that if it was spread over five years it would cost more. I think this is because of the particular way we tax the services. I believe we should have an explanation of how they are taxed, compared with other individuals, to illustrate the advantage which they may have taxwise.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Hodgson will answer.

Dr. J. HODGSON (*Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence-Finance*): I would like to say that I am not an income tax expert. I can speak only about certain applications of the Income Tax Act. Members of the services pay their income tax not on an annual basis, but on a monthly basis. Their taxable income is determined practically in the same way as that of other members of the community. The tax on special benefit is determined in this manner: Firstly it is counted not as income, but as a gratuity. Secondly, only 5 per cent of the special benefit is taken into account at all for income tax purposes. Thirdly, the rate of tax that is applied to that 5 per cent of the special benefit is the same proportion that the tax in his last serving month formed of his pay and allowances in that month. So, if he is receiving, shall we say, $500, and paid in that month $50 tax, then his rate would be $50 over $500 which is 10 per cent. His income tax, therefore, would be 10 per cent of his special benefit.

In most cases this means that his income tax is well below half of what his tax would be if this sum were treated as income. We calculated the case of an army captain with 16 years service, married with two children, and not within five years of his compulsory retirement. This captain would be entitled to a special benefit of $6,350, and he would pay on this system of income tax on the special benefit $583, approximately, whereas if it were treated as income and dealt with in the same year, he would pay $1,206.50. If it were treated as income and spread over several years, it would be some intermediate figure between those two.

Mr. LLOYD: If the wife is earning income, does it affect his exemptions for tax purposes in the service at these rates?

Mr. HODGSON: This is calculated on the basis of what he makes.

Mr. LLOYD: If he were to obtain a job in the same year immediately upon severance, or if some income is earned, or if he had other income, that would be taxed at the usual rates and this would not accelerate because of his other income to a higher level of tax.

Mr. HODGSON: This is precisely so.

Mr. LLOYD: The impact of the income tax on the amount of the gratuity income is considerably less than would be the case which we might expect otherwise if it were normal.

Mr. HODGSON: That is right.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, I must say it is very difficult to follow seven such avid questioners as I am following! Mr. Martineau just about completed all the questions I had to ask, particularly with regard to income tax, but I think there is one other matter I would like to bring up.

I would like to ask the minister if he has considered keeping people who are to be retired from whatever service they might be in rather than recruiting new people for the various services. The people who are already in the services are trained, and keeping them would obviate the necessity for training other new people who have no training. I am speaking now of officers with short term commissions. Some of them may be available for rehiring if there is the necessity for people in their category when they are to be retired.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Fane, we stated earlier that if any of these people are required they will be retained. That is the basis upon which we are working. Whether or not we should stop all recruiting in order to utilize those who are in the services but do not have positions any more is another matter. We would unbalance our structure if we were to do that. It would result in the retention of a considerable number of older men, and I think it would not be advantageous to do this. We should continue to recruit younger men and try as much as possible to bring in specialists in their field. As you know the forces are becoming more and more technical, and that is the reason for which we feel we should continue recruiting.

Mr. FANE: And training these new men as the older ones have been trained already?

Mr. CARDIN: People who are doing jobs that are still required will be retained. We are speaking now of people who have been trained in certain fields which are no longer required.

Mr. FANE: Yes, I understand that.

All the questions I had intended to put have been answered, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WINCH: In view of certain questions that have gone before I would like to ask the minister of national defence if I am correct in my belief that

the minister denies reports that 500 air crew are to be relieved from duty because of a couple of plane crashes and the mothballing of them. That was a press report.

Mr. HELLYER: I did not see that press report, Mr. Winch, but I can assure you that would be highly inaccurate.

Mr. WINCH: May I now ask the associated minister two questions?

Is the associate minister putting himself in the position of being the know-all as far as members of the service are concerned? Many have requested that they be given the same opportunity as was extended in the last world war on cessation; that is, they were given the opportunity of a training instead of cash. Have you closed your mind to this request which has come from many members of the forces?

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Chairman, I certainly would not want to be the one responsible for answering all questions and I certainly have not closed my mind to the idea of retraining in the services. However, even though my mind may be open on this question, I still believe that it would be to the advantage of the people who are being compulsorily retired to be given an amount of money so they will have the choice and option of doing with it what they will.

Mr. Winch, you would be the first to agree that if we had done just the opposite and if we had stated that instead of giving cash benefits we would go ahead with retraining the service members, we would have found ourselves involved in a really controversial exercise. Those who want to be rehabilitated can be rehabilitated with the cash benefits they will obtain. Those who want to put their cash into business can do so. I think the people are mature and wise enough to be able to spend their money far more favourably than you suggest.

Mr. WINCH: I am sorry, sir, but I do not see the halo over you head! However, I am afraid you do not know human nature as well as apparently a lot of our service people do. Numbers of them would like to have the opportunity of training. You are not prepared to give that as an option?

Mr. CARDIN: The number of people who would be compulsorily retired in this way would not be great enough for us to start off on a universal retraining program. It is felt it would be easier for those who want to rehabilitate themselves to go to university or technical colleges in whatever field they wish; it would be difficult with a relatively small number of men to start out on a full rehabiltation training program.

Mr. WINCH: I have another point to put to the associate minister. You spoke this morning about the civil service. Can we take it from you that civilians on the defence staff who may no longer be necessary will be taken care of and transferred to other departments? I am interested in those who have long service. What provision are you making for those people to be given jobs in other departments? What provision are you making for them?

Mr. CARDIN: I wish I could say that there will be no civilian employees who will be out of work. Unfortunately, I cannot say this because there will be some, and in order—

Mr. WINCH: I am asking what provision you are making for them if they have long service.

Mr. CARDIN: Just to show you I have an open mind, let me tell you that whole question is being studied again by the treasury board and the civil service Commission.

Mr. WINCH: How soon do you expect to be able to make an anouncement of that?

Mr. CARDIN: I hope very soon, but I have no idea just when the announcement will be made.

Mr. WINCH: I have one more question for the associate minister.

With regard to the change of policy which will mean compulsory retirement, will any of those engaged in overseas service on the Gaza strip, in Cyprus, in France or in Germany be affected?

Mr. CARDIN: I cannot answer that question just now because, as we mentioned before, this will be reviewed right across the board. I could not say whether or not there will be people in Gaza or in Europe who will be compulsorily retired.

Mr. WINCH: You contemplate that it is possible?

Mr. CARDIN: I would think so, yes.

Mr. WINCH: What provision is being made for the eventuality of their retirement and their return home, particularly if they are not of officer rank?

Mr. CARDIN: I would think we are back again to the key question of the whole thing—requirement. If they are required they will be kept on; if they are not required they will be withdrawn. This is the key to the whole program.

Mr. WINCH: Will you give consideration to the terms on which they are brought back as far as their own freight is concerned? I ask that, Mr. Chairman, because I am very concerned about information which I have received in regard to the most discriminatory basis upon which officers and other ranks are allowed to come back to Canada and the amount of freight they can bring. This is the most discriminatory regulation I have ever seen in my life. However, perhaps we can discuss that at a later time. I presume you know what I am referring to.

Mr. CARDIN: No, I do not. I wish there could be a little more clarification on this.

Mr. WINCH: Now or later?

Mr. CARDIN: Whenever you wish.

Mr. WINCH: Do you mind?

The CHAIRMAN: Is it the wish of the committee that Mr. Winch proceed?

Agreed.

Mr. WINCH: This is with regard to people coming back from service overseas and their allowance for freight. If one is an officer—

Mr. GROOS: What is the source of this information?

Mr. WINCH: This regulation is referred to as "package entitlement". If you are an officer on repatriation you are allowed 500 pounds. If you are an airman on repatriation you are allowed 200 pounds. I was in the armed services both as an O.R. and as an officer and the only excess baggage I had as an officer over what I had as an O.R. was for mess dress. An officer on repatriation is allowed 500 pounds and an airman is allowed 200 pounds. A school teacher on repatriation is allowed 500 pounds and the wife of an officer, an airman or a school teacher is allowed 550 pounds. Dependents other than wives are allowed 350 pounds whereas flight cadets, army cadets and other summer employment personnel are allowed 100 pounds. This to me is an extraordinary situation, and I raise this now because I referred to it earlier. For God's sake, and I say for God's sake, an officer only has his mess dress in addition to that which an O.R. has, yet he is allowed an additional 250 pounds in respect of what he can bring back from service overseas. I hope this situation will be looked into especially if these personnel are to be brought back under this policy.

Mr. CARDIN: I will look into that situation, Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: I have two further questions I should like to ask the associate minister.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps you will allow me to interject at this point, Mr. Winch. This line of questioning appears to be getting away from the specific problems of Bill C-90 and the retirement of people involuntarily as the result of the unification of command. I think we are getting into an area of general personnel problems.

Mr. WINCH: That may be true except that I asked whether or not there might be some individuals coming back from overseas service falling in this category.

The CHAIRMAN: I appreciate that fact.

Mr. WINCH: If there are I want to know what the position will be. I am interested in what they can bring back and who has to pay for bringing it back.

May I now ask two questions of Mr. Hodgson?

Can you tell me whether it is by regulation or by legislation that a person coming into the employment of the government service has to forego his pension? Were you here this morning when I asked this question?

Mr. HODGSON: Normally a pension is abated in certain circumstances, and it is done by legislation.

Mr. WINCH: Can you tell me the name of the act?

Mr. HODGSON: It is the Armed Forces Superannuation Act.

Mr. WINCH: It states that you cannot draw a pension if you go into another branch of the government service?

Mr. HODGSON: It says that if your salary in another branch of the civil service is more than a certain amount your pension is abated progressively.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: This does not apply to everybody.

Mr. WINCH: That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. HARKNESS: This only applies to officers and does not apply to O.R.'s. You have now got this in reverse to the way you referred to it awhile ago. You have a discrimination against officers.

Mr. WINCH: No. If a person at the moment is in the armed service and is going to be compulsorily retired let us say at the end of July or something of that nature, and goes into the service of the government, does he automatically have to lose the pension he would have been entitled to if he went into private industry?

Mr. SMITH: That depends on whether the individual is an officer or a serviceman of another rank.

Mr. WINCH: When an individual is compulsorily retired he is no longer an officer.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, but he was an officer.

Mr. HODGSON: If he was previously an officer now on pension under the Armed Forces Superannuation Act, if his salary in the civil service is such that the pension and salary otherwise would be in excess of his former salary then his pension is abated by the excess amount. He does not lose his whole pension, it is just shaded down.

Mr. WINCH: That means that if an individual formerly was an officer in the armed forces of Canada and is now in government service as a civilian, no matter what his salary is he shall be entitled to receive what he received formerly as an officer?

Mr. HODGSON: That is the principle, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: He is not entitled to receive more.

Mr. LLOYD: He is not entitled by way of salary and pension to more than his former salary.

Mr. WINCH: I think I will study this a little further.

May I now direct one or two questions of the deputy minister in respect of the matter of separation allowance as outlined under the new policy? Who made the decision in this regard, the department of national defence or the department of finance?

Mr. HELLYER: I think perhaps I should answer the question, Mr. Chairman. The decision was made in that same simple fashion in which most decisions are made in the government. It came through from a recommendation in the Department of National Defence to the ministers, from the ministers to the treasury board, from the treasury board to cabinet for approval.

Mr. WINCH: So you basically are the man responsible?

Mr. HELLYER: Under our constitutional system the associate minister and I are willing to share the responsibility for this along with all our other cabinet colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you any other questions, Mr. Winch?

Mr. MACLEAN: I have one or two brief questions Mr. Chairman.

Has an estimate been made of the number of personnel who will be prematurely retired, and what percentage of them are veterans of world war II or of the Korean war? Are those who are veterans disqualified as a group from receiving benefits under the veterans charter or will they receive the same benefits under the veterans charter for which they still might qualify, and I am thinking chiefly of settlement and small holdings under the Veterans Land Act, or something along that line?

Mr. CARDIN: I do not know whether it is possible to give any percentage in respect of the people who would have served in the two world wars at this stage. However, those who did serve and who have special benefits would not be affected in respect of those benefits at all by the provisions of benefits provided for here.

Mr. MACLEAN: Their intermediate service in the permanent force will not disqualify them?

Mr. CARDIN: No, I would think not.

Mr. MACLEAN: So they would be in the same position as though they had not joined the permanent force after their service in the Korean or world war II, which ever the case may be?

Mr. CARDIN: They would not be deprived of any advantages, that is correct.

Mr. MACLEAN: Thank you.

Mr. MACRAE: Mr. Chairman I should like to direct my question to the associate minister and it deals with retirement with special benefits. It relates also to personnel in a low category who are reasonably near the retirement age and who request retirement. In order to lay the groundwork to my question, and I will be brief, I should like to give an example with which I am familiar.

A major in the Canadian army, who is within five years of retirement and whose category has been dropped to category P-3, will be kept on until his retirement from the forces. That is his understanding and I believe that to be the case. He is only using a portion of his potential because he was a regimental officer. This is a specific case but I am sure the minister will concede that there very well might be a number of officers and other ranks in the three services who would fit this description. The minister has said that he has an open mind. I ask him whether he would not concede that perhaps in the interests of the service itself, careerwise, having regard to others who have been held up in

their careers because of promotions and from an economical point of view, some consideration should be given to officers and men in this particular category? I think Mr. Harkness touched upon this situation this morning but I wanted to repeat the general question in order that the minister could consider whether it would be of advantage to the service to take another look at the situation resulting from officers and others requesting retirement with a special benefit.

Mr. CARDIN: I think that this situation would normally be considered.

I am quite sure that, without having to go through a whole survey of this, people in that category would definitely make known their desires, and this certainly would be taken into account.

Mr. MACRAE: In other words, you would look upon that with favour.

Mr. GROOS: I did not really want to ask much in the way of a question but it is more in the nature of an observation. I am tryingto keep this in perspective. We are trying to run a force of 25,000 reduced by 10,000. This is not such a gigantic operation or a very excessive figure. Perhaps the thing has been thrown out of proportion by this one group of 500 that arrived bang on our doorstep at the very outset, because I think if you look back at the figures of some of the armed services you would see that over a period of 10 years, in the normal course of people going out of the service, practically 100 per cent of them have passed through in that 10 year period, so if we are running down 10,000 of 125,000 over a period of only two years it would not surprise me to find that this is not of very great significance at all. It really is a matter of trying to choose the right people to go and the right people to stay behind.

I would also like to remark that I presume we have had the advantage of being able to see how other countries have handled this problem. We are not the first to do this in peacetime, and we have, in this instance, the regulations that the minister has presented before us. I presume we have had the advantage of seeing what other people have done in other countries. Is this not so?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, we have the experience of the British and the French. One thing that might be interesting is that normal attrition in the armed forces is a thousand per month.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other questions?

Mr. GROOS: I hear in the British forces this is called the golden bowler and in Canada it is called the silver stetson. I have no more questions.

Mr. SMITH: My question has been substantially asked. I would like to say that I support what Mr. MacRae has said. He put the problem much better than I could. I am referring to the people who are reaching towards the end of the road, and the fact that every consideration should be given to accelerating their discharge. I think that probably will take up the balance. It seems too that the figure of 10,000 that was bandied about caused unnecessary alarm perhaps among the people, because it appears clear from the associate minister's answer to Mr. Groos just now that it really is not going to be, in most branches of the services, a very startling decrease.

There is one other figure which I should like to know: How many people, if any, are going to become unnecessary in the air force this year, and who will be discharged by reason of the closing of the radar stations that are presently notified for closing and those which may be closed during the year?

Mr. HELLYER: Practically none, Mr. Chairman. The personnel from the radar stations which have been closed were urgently required to man the new radar stations which were being open.

Mr. SMITH: By reason of their high technical training.

Mr. HELLYER: They were required to man the heavy radar stations, and consequently most of the personnel who were engaged were just transferred to their new employment in the same field.

Mr. SMITH: Will every opportunity be given in various services for transfer from one service to another as integration progresses?

Mr. HELLYER: This is certainly one of the benefits which will accrue from the new organization.

Mr. SMITH: It ought to be one of the benefits.

Mr. HELLYER: It had better be, so that people can be posted where they can serve best, and so you will not have, as has happened once or twice in the past, a surplus in one service, a shortage in another occurring simultaneously, and no effective means of using the resources which are available.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the list of questioners on this phase.

Mr. WINCH: I will not make a motion but I would like to make a suggestion to you, as Chairman, that perhaps the steering committee may take under immediate advisement the calling of a special *in camera* committee meeting to consider the advisability of making a special Report to the House of Commons relative to the policy terms of both the armed service personnel and the civilians who may, under the new government policy, have to leave the services.

The CHAIRMAN: This is an item that the Steering Subcommittee should consider and recommend to the main committee.

Mr. WINCH: Will you have a meeting of the Steering Subcommittee?

The CHAIRMAN: I will call a meeting of the Steering Subcommittee.

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I put a motion before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: We could do one of two things, Mr. Temple, I would suggest, if you would be agreeable, that possibly the motion might be withdrawn in view of the meeting of the Steering Subcommittee. I believe that if we start to try to write a Committee Report piecemeal through motions of the general committee, that it is not a very orderly way of proceeding.

Mr. TEMPLE: I agree it is not orderly but it is a matter of some urgency.

Mr. SMITH: Could we have an explanation of the motion?

The CHAIRMAN: Your motion is in order with some rewording.

Mr. TEMPLE: Perhaps, with the agreement of Mr. Fane, I could put a substitute motion:

> That this committee go on record as supporting the intention of the government to amend the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act as set out in subsection (1) of page 2 in the information supplied to the committee on May 28, 1964, and expects that this will be done as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you agree to that rewording of the motion?

Mr. FANE: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order; I do not agree that the motion is in order. We sympathize with the point of view expressed by Mr. Temple, and I think he has made his point perfectly clear, but I do not think that such a motion is the proper committee procedure to deal with this matter.

Mr. WINCH: May I perhaps express an apology to Mr. Temple but I made my suggestion because I knew of his previous motion. That is why I sug-

gested that there should be a Steering Subcommittee meeting to consider all these matters, and that we ask for a special meeting *in camera* to discuss the advisability of our Committee making a Special Report on all these phases to the House of Commons. I offer my apologies for not having discussed that with Mr. Temple but I had this suggestion in mind. Would Mr. Temple and the Seconder agree that this ties in with the broad principle of his motion, that is to have the Steering Subcommittee meet and go into this entire matter with the idea of an *in camera* meeting to discuss whether or not we shall make a Special Report on all these matters? Does that cover the entire situation that you have in mind?

Mr. TEMPLE: This does not preclude the balance of it. It is my understanding that the granting of the benefits under the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act to which I have referred is subject to approval by parliament, and also that these officers are being discharged about the middle of July. While we can go on with the other matters, this requires the approval of parliament, and I just want to show, if we feel that way, that this committee agrees with that intention. With the agreement of this committee there is not likely to be any prolonged debate of it in the house.

Mr. SMITH: I think you are perfectly safe.

Mr. TEMPLE: This is just to ensure it.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I have a copy of the new motion? The motion is by Mr. Temple seconded by Mr. Fane, and is reads as follows:

> That this committee go on record as supporting the intention of the government to amend the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act as set out in subsection (i) of page 2 of the information supplied the committee on May 28, 1964; and expect that this will be done as soon as possible.

Is there any discussion on the motion?

Mr. WINCH: Just a little, to start with; I am a little bit disturbed about this because there is no Bill before the House, and there is no Bill referred to this Committee. This is not something we can take up and have a general discussion about.

Mr. TEMPLE: We are not asking for any legislation. We are expressing a pious hope or expectancy.

The CHAIRMAN: It was a motion expressing a sentiment or hope dealing with one of the items that we have had under discussion, as agreed to by the committee, under Bill No. C-90. Therefore I believe it is in order, and if there is no further discussion I believe we should have the question. All those in favour of the motion? Those opposed, if any I declare the motion carried unanimously.

Mr. WINCH: What do you intend to do with it now?

The CHAIRMAN: It is merely on record. When we write our report, presumably it will be considered. It is on the record of the Committee. We have now concluded our questioning on this particularly phase and I have no further questioners. Would the committee be agreeable to this: we have two choices, one, to adjourn, or if the committee agrees, since the Judge Advocate General is here, we could stand clause 1, and start proceeding with the bill clause by clause.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I think it is a little late.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there a motion for adjournment?

Mr. SMITH: I move we adjourn.

The CHAIRMAN: It is agreed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 4

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 1964

Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

WITNESS:

Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20923—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame de-Grâce*),
Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Granger,
Groos,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel,
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacLean,
MacRae,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
Nielsen,
Pilon,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

Quorum 13.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, June 3, 1964.
(6)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 4:20 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, Nielsen, Smith, Temple, Winch—(15).

In attendance: The Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; and Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of National Defence.

The Committee continued its consideration of Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

Mr. Armstrong read a prepared statement respecting the proposed set-up and operation of the National Defence Department. The Deputy Minister was questioned on the contents of his statement and on related matters.

At 5:40 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m. Thursday, June 4, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

20923—1½

EVIDENCE

WEDNESDAY, June 3, 1964.
4:20 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: We now have a quorum. We are continuing with Clause 1 of Bill No. C-90. We have as witnesses the Associate Minister of National Defence and Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, deputy minister of the Department of National Lefence who will make a statement to be followed by questioning Mr. Armstrong.

Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong (Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cardin, and members of the committee, Bill No. C-90 proposes only one far-reaching change in the organization of the Canadian forces. The amendments to Section 19 would replace the chairman, chiefs of staff committee and the chiefs of the naval staff, the army staff and the air staff with a chief of defence staff with the same responsibilities and powers over all of the Canadian forces as now reside in each of the chiefs of staff over the component of the Canadian forces which he commands. The remaining amendments proposed are consequential on the amendment to Section 19 in that it is necessary to revise those sections of the act which refer to the offices which will be replaced by the office of the chief of defence staff.

These proposed amendments do not change the responsibilities of the deputy minister. These responsibilities are associated directly with those of the minister for control and management of the Department of National Defence. This is essentially a staff management function which is not affected by the changes proposed in Bill No. C-90, under which the chief of defence staff, subject to the direction of the minister, is charged with the control and administration of the forces precisely as each chief of staff is now in respect of the component of the forces which he heads. The chairman of the defence research board continues to be the Chief executive officer of that organization. It is important to efficient administration that those charged with operating responsibilities have clear authority to direct and control the operations they command. It is equally important that management define the objectives for the operator and allocate appropriate resources to his command to do the task assigned. These basic principles apply to the present organization as well as the proposed one. It is at the same time management's job to achieve its goals as economically as possible. Because of the interrelationships between the forces at all levels, headquarters, support, training and operations, a variety of methods have been devised to achieve the desired results under the present organization. Joint staffs have been established at headquarters, individual services have been assigned supply functions in certain areas for all three Services, a single Canadian forces medical service has been established and so on. I am sure the members of this committee are familiar with the many such arrangements that have been brought about in recent years. While these arrangements have worked, by and large, fairly well, they inevitably come up against, to some degree, the responsibility of the individual service chief to control and administer his own Force and there is a limit beyond which the complications outweigh the advantages that might otherwise be obtained. The change proposed in Bill No. C-90 would ease considerably the organizational difficulties that exist under present arrangements.

Insofar as the deputy minister is concerned, various statutes including the Civil Service Act, the National Defence Act and the Interpretation Act, deal with and define the duties and responsibilities of the deputy minister. Briefly these statutes establish that the deputy minister:

(1) may exercise all the powers vested by Statute in the Minister, unless the vesting authority specifically provides that the Minister must act personally;

(2) has general control of the business of the department, except that he has not the power to oversee the armed forces or to issue orders to them except through the chief of staff.

To put this into greater detail, the Deputy Minister is responsible:

(1) as the minister's deputy, for ensuring that all resources, financial, manpower and material, available to the department are used to best advantage;

(2) for the general management of the business of the department;

(3) for ensuring that the programs of the department are in consonance with government policies and within the statutes of Canada;

(4) for keeping under supervision and review the organization and administrative methods of the department.

Some changes will be made in the deputy minister's branch of the department as a consequence of the change in the military organization and in consonance with the policy of strengthening the civil control function. In proposing the changes in organization of the Branch account has been taken as well of the recommendations of the Glassco Commission. I would direct the committee's attention to the organization chart.

The top line shows three divisions reporting to the Deputy Minister. The first is the departmental secretary. This is an existing function which will alter in degree as a result of the re-organization of the Forces. He is the provider, at the present time, of secretarial services to a number of tri-service committees in addition to other general duties related to the secretarial function of the department. As tri-service committees will disappear, these services, formerly provided in this respect, will no longer be necessary. The departmental secretary will continue to provide secretarial services for defence council as he has done in the past. In addition he will have supervision of the Central Registry, the library; services provided for the department as a whole. The Judge Advocate General's branch serves both the military and civilian departments for legal services in addition to the Judge Advocate's responsibilities with respect to judicial matters. There will be no change in this organization. Information services are provided at the present time through public relations branches in each service with one officer in the deputy minister's branch to co-ordinate central activities. It is planned to have a single information service branch for the department as a whole. This branch will service all elements of the department in this respect and will provide central planning and direction to these activities. It is believed that adequate information service can be provided in respect of defence activities in this way at considerably reduced cost.

Below it will be noted that, as at present, there are four assistant deputy ministers and that in very general terms, their fields of interest remain the form of organization of the administration branch harmonizes well with the form of military structure which the minister has already outlined to the committee. As far as possible the functions of the various assistant deputy ministers have been grouped in order to correspond with those of the senior staff officers of the chief of defence staff, so that each assistant deputy minister


DEPUTY MINISTER
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY MINISTER
DEPARTMENTAL SECRETARY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
PARLIAMENTARY RETURNS
ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER FINANCE
Programme Planning & Analysis
Programme Follow-up
Estimates Preparation
Expenditure Analysis and Follow-up
Financial Arrangements and Procedures
Internal Audit
Accounting Policy
Civil & Military Organization & Manpower Establishments
Management Engineering
Statistics
ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER PERSONNEL
CIVILIAN
Programme Development
Policy & Administration
Recruiting
Development & Training
Industrial Relations
Superannuation
MILITARY
Policy Analysis
Recruiting, Training
Conditions of Service Including Pay and Allowances, Pensions, etc.
Dependants' Education
ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER REQUIREMENTS
Programme Development
Analysis and Policy Control—
Defence Requirements
Procurement
Supply
Management
Procurement Action
Development Review
Patent & Copyright
Catalogue Policy
Loans, Sales, Surpluses
ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER WORKS
Programme Development and Control
Requirement Analysis
Construction design, Specifications & Standards
Contract Arrangements & Supervision
Building Maintenance—Policy & Standards
Property Procurement
Utility & Service Arrangements
Property & Utility—Management—Policy & Standards
Surplus Disposals

will transact most of his business on the service side with one senior service officer.

Mr. WINCH: Are they all civilians?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Those are all civilians, yes. The Judge Advocate General staff, as you know, is mainly military. The assistant deputy minister (works) is a military officer seconded to that job. For example, the assistant deputy minister (personnel) will be the approximate counterpart of the chief of personnel, in the military structure, and the assistant deputy minister (finance) corresponds roughly to the service comptroller general.

The principal changes proposed are the following:

(*a*) Introduction of a defence programming system. This System has been mentioned by the minister in the House of Commons, and will be described in greater detail in the present statement.

(*b*) Various changes designed to implement the recommendation of the royal commission on government organization "... that the deputy minister be given greater responsibility for keeping under review the organization and administrative methods of the Canadian defence establishment". These changes include:

(i) Formation of a management engineering group to assist the services in the continual improvement of administrative procedures and the application of modern management improvement techniques.

(ii) Control of military as well as civil establishments, excluding military operational units.

(iii) Establishment of a staff group responsible for operating policy and procedures in the accounting field.

(iv) Establishment of a civil staff group in the field of logistics management, to complement the staff groups on the material and equipment requirements side.

That will fall under the assistant deputy minister requirements.

(*v*) Assumption of certain additional responsibility in the works field for construction design as well as property and utility management.

Apart from these, there will be other functional adjustments. For example the Inspection Services will be transferred from the deputy minister's organization to that of the chief of defence staff. Inspection Services now come under the deputy minister for administrative purposes and under the principal supply officers' committee for technical direction. In some areas because of the need to maintain a very close association of the user and the inspection and quality control service, particularly in the aircraft and ship construction fields, the Service concerned operates its own inspection service. With the revised organization it will be possible to have a single inspection service reporting directly to the chief technical officer in the service overcoming the difficult inter-relationship problems that have been present in the present organization.

Another change in the other direction is that the total internal audit function of the department will be concentrated in the chief auditor's section, on my staff or the assistant deputy minister of finance staff, and the emphasis upon management auditing techniques will be increased. This will result in an increase in the staffs of the chief auditor but in an over-all net reduction in the auditing staffs of the department as a whole.

The committee will be interested in more specific information regarding the defence programming system. Defence programming, of course, is a long-standing and well-established activity of the Department of National Defence. What is new at this time is the particular method to be introduced.

In the past the principal instruments of programming have been what has been known as the "mark document" and the departmental estimates. The mark document is an outline plan, prepared annually by the chiefs of staff, stating the proposed programs of the armed services and the approximate costs of these programs during the next fiscal year and the succeeding four years. It is prepared in order to obtain guidance from the minister as to the military programs to be included in the estimates for the approaching fiscal year. When these decisions have been made, the Services proceed with the preparation of their financial estimates for the year, and these estimates are reviewed by the deputy minister, the minister and in due course the treasury board.

The new plan consists of a management system for planning and controlling major defence programs at the departmental level. Instead of the mark document, which is an annual statement of proposed programs, the new system will be based upon a detailed presentation of the approved long-term program, which will be up-dated at regular intervals. As was stated in the defence white paper, the purposes of the system are:

(*a*) to assist top management in the department in decision making by providing the means of analyzing and assessing various military programs and activities in terms which will relate military effectiveness to financial costs, manpower requirements, equipment needs, etc.

(*b*) to provide the type of data which will enable the effects of defence decisions to be clearly expressed in terms of forces, manpower, equipment, and money both in the short term and over a period of years.

For purpose of the programming system, the total Canadian defence program will be set out in terms of major programs. Each program will be analyzed into principal components, sub-components and elements. The elements will consist of military units or groups of units. The documentation to be maintained for each of the elements will ultimately cover:

(*a*) the forces involved

(*b*) major equipment and other resource data

(*c*) manpower, military and civilian

(*d*) the financial implications in general terms (capital and operating costs).

The time-phasing of each element over the future years will also be shown. Thus there will be available to the Minister at all times clear and detailed information which will assist in arriving at decisions on the most effective use of defence resources.

Proposals for changes in the approved long-term program will be submitted in terms of the program elements affected. A proposal will show, for example, not merely the capital cost of a proposed purchase, but also the operating cost, the personnel involved, the time phasing, and the effect upon the previously approved program. If the program change is approved, the elements involved are suitably amended so that the approved program is at all times up to date.

The system will also include a scheduling arrangement to confirm that approved program changes are in fact carried out in accordance with the approved time-table, or alternatively that changes in scheduling are brought to the attention of appropriate authorities without delay.

Once the defence program is set out in detail and is approved by the minister, it would serve the following major purposes:

(*a*) As a management aid to the minister, deputy minister and chief of Defence staff. This will be of particular value for purposes of

program reviews, such as at estimate time, and in examining new defence proposals which can be conveniently assessed in relation to the over-all defence program.

(*b*) It will provide defence planners with an agreed frame of reference.

(*c*) It will serve as a starting point for preparation of the budget.

(*d*) It will be a useful aid for assistant deputy ministers and their staffs in assessing proposals for procurement of capital equipment, new construction and in manpower questions.

(*e*) It will be a departure point for cost effectiveness studies by operational research personnel.

(*f*) It will provide an objective means of reflecting the effects of budgetary changes or other decisions which may be made from time to time respecting procurement of equipment, manpower ceillings, etc. Without a detailed long term program, the full implications of such decisions are sometimes not brought to attention or followed through adequately.

(*g*) It will enable program changes to be evaluated in the context of the over-all programs and according to a uniform procedure.

It should be added that the defence programming system will not of itself affect the form or presentation of the regular departmental estimates. The system is perfectly compatible with changes in the form of estimates, such as the introduction of program budgeting, but is of itself an internal management system to assist the minister and the department in program formulation.

In conclusion I believe that the changes proposed in Bill C-90 in the military organization will enhance the ability of the civil staffs to carry out their control and staff management functions. The intimate working relationships between the civil and military staffs that are essential to good management in the defence department will be more readily achieved. Many of the barriers associated with the present structure to sensible organization of resources that cut across service ties will be removed. The appropriate assignment of responsibility and authority will be easier to accomplish than it has been. In short there should be an improved output in terms of military forces for the resources applied than would otherwise be the case. This is the objective of management, common to both the civil and military staffs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Armstrong.

Before we proceed with the questioning there is one matter to be dealt with. The chart used in Mr. Armstrong's discourse will be printed in the evidence where he first makes reference to it.

The first questioner I have on my list is Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MACLEAN: I have just a general question or two, Mr. Chairman.

The National Defence Act is a fairly brief outline which confers powers to be made by regulation, and by reading the act alone one cannot have a very clear indication of what can be the organization of the Department of National Defence. The wide powers can vary the organization by regulation. I am wondering what changes are contemplated in the way of amalgamation of services within the three services. Mention was made of the fact that the medical services have been amalgamated, and I am wondering what other changes are contemplated along that line as a result of this amendment to the act or in addition to this amendment to the act. Is it contemplated that there will be a common pay service, for example, for all three services?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Mr. MacLean, as I think has been said, the first task is to reorganize national defence headquarters. The detailed question of which

organizations will be brought together really has not yet been tackled. However, I would expect—and confidently expect—that pay services and common functions of that kind would in fact be brought together. I do not think there is really any question about this, ultimately.

Mr. MacLEAN: Leading from that, I recall that until 1940 or 1941 the army provided the pay services and the medical services for the air force, for example. When these functions are amalgamated is it proposed to give the responsibility of a function to a service for all three services or is it contemplated there will be a pool of all three services in each one of these functions?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I would think undoubtedly it would be a pool. I think it is inevitable that there must be a pool.

Mr. MacLEAN: Yes, that would be my supposition also.

As time goes by, is it contemplated that the number of personnel from each of the services will be kept roughly in the same proportion, or is it contemplated that there would be a move towards a predominance of personnel from one service in each of these functions as attrition takes care of the personnel presently existing in all three services?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Without setting any really hard rule in this respect, certainly where services are brought together and it is a group of people from three services, one would hope that the proportions would be reasonably maintained.

Mr. MacLEAN: Would the witness care to give some indication of what services might be amalgamated in this way—or just some indication of the present thinking? I know it has not gone very far and maybe it is an unfair question at this point.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We really have not gone very far in this. I can name a few that inevitably will be amalgamated. You mentioned pay services; and I suppose, ultimately, our security services will be brought together. It seems to me that perhaps the major area in which we would hope to achieve some substantial improvement in terms of cost for the job that has to be done would be in logistic services. Another example, I think, is that of bringing together construction services. All of these, I believe, ultimately—although there are many things one has to do to make them function properly—will result in very considerable savings.

Mr. MacLEAN: That is all I have to ask.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I have three questions. I think you have in part answered the first one. I refer to the chart. From here I can see nothing but a blur under "Deputy Minister". I was wondering whether a photostatic copy can be produced in addition to copy presented here, as has been done previously. I have found the practice of including a photostatic copy in the proceedings most useful.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not have one with me, but I would be very glad to provide one.

Mr. WINCH: My second question is this. The deputy minister made a comment which I found most interesting. He referred to what he called a "mark paper". How do you spell "mark" there?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Mark—m.a.r.k.

Mr. WINCH: A mark paper? If I have understood correctly, the mark paper is a document which outlines not only the provisional estimates for the following year but—and this intrigued me—a projection of an approximation of four years. Am I correct?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: You are right.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to ask if it is possible, for the information of the committee and for better understanding by the committee, for a sample of a mark paper to be produced, first for an estimate of a year and then for a projected four years. Is it permissible for that to be given to us?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: This particular document is an internal document for management purposes within the department, and it is classified.

Mr. WINCH: Is it possible, however, to have some kind of breakdown so we may obtain a more particularized understanding of estimates and a projection for four years? That is my interest. Is it possible to present to us the real meaning of this mark paper without providing us with something that is classified?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: This is really a question you should direct to the minister, but might I say this at the moment, with the development of new policies announced in the white paper, with the reorganization and so on, we are in the process only now of producing a version of the mark document to serve for this year. We do not actually have that produced right now.

Mr. WINCH: Have they been in the past?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We have had one for several years.

Mr. WINCH: Is there any way whatsoever for this committee to get a more detailed understanding of it? I am particularly interested in it. You not only get the estimates for the year ahead but also a projection for four years ahead. The information given this committee on more than one occasion has been that there has not been a correct projection. Is it possible to get in any way whatsoever, without breaking classified information, a clear understanding of what is meant by a mark paper and how it has worked in the past?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think I can give you a clear understanding of what it comprises if you do not ask me to tell you what is in it.

Mr. WINCH: I am not quite certain whether I like that answer. I think all members of the committee know exactly what I am driving at now. You are now saying that there has been for a year a mark paper which not only gives the estimate for the next year but also a projection of the next four years.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is right.

Mr. SMITH: It is what they hope to get.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: This is a good comment.

Mr. WINCH: Does that include planning of production equipment?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I can explain it very briefly. In the past it has been produced and analysed by each service, the navy, the army and the air force. Each service has been broken down into perhaps half a dozen of the major functions in which it is involved such as in the case of the navy, its contributions to SACLANT, in the case of the R.C.A.F. air defence in Canada, and so on. Projections are made of the total personnel who would be employed in these various functions in the service. A general projection is made of the possible operating costs without going into detail in this respect, and then each service lists what it anticipates would be required in the way of capital acquisitions, resulting in a total for the service which, when all is added together and the general departmental elements are put in, gives a projection over a period of four years of the probable requirements for defence.

Now, as I say, this is an internal document which essentially becomes a basic working paper for eventually resolving the problems associated with a final defence budget. It does not constitute at that point—perhaps I should say at any point—what could be regarded as an accepted and total government

policy over a period of years, but for the defence department purposes it gives us a base from which to work.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the deputy minister whether there is any possibility of getting something more detailed.

At the same time and on the same question, I would like to ask the deputy minister the following question. In view of what the deputy minister just said, that for several years they had this mark paper which deals with the estimates for the next year and a projection for the next four years, is he in a position now to tell us that he had a projection on the mark paper for four years on the Avro Arrow and the Bobcat?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes. It would have been included in it. I am not suggesting that the figures there were necessarily right.

Mr. WINCH: But you did have, on your mark paper, the projection four years ahead on the Avro Arrow and on the Bobcat?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I think we did. Mind you, I would add this qualification, and I think you are all familiar with it because the story has been told many times, that the figures on the Avro Arrow did change very substantially from year to year.

Mr. WINCH: But you had a four year projection every time you got your mark paper every year?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: Does that apply to the Bobcat also?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I would think it did. I do not recall the Bobcat being there specifically but I would say it was there.

Mr. WINCH: We will come back to that afterwards.

I have one further question, Mr. Chairman. If my understanding is correct, in one of the policy views expressed by the minister on this new approach to the armed services' integration, he has said time and again that it will give greater civilian control. I know the deputy minister must have been in very close co-operation and collaboration on this matter. Is the deputy minister in a position now to tell us what is his understanding of the meaning of greater civilian control as the new government policy is proceeded with in regard to integration of the armed services?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Essentially it is this: As I explained in the statement I made, there are certain elements up here in the deputy minister's organization which—

Mr. WINCH: Does greater civilian control mean responsibility on your shoulders as the deputy minister, and if so what responsibility?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I assume it does, in addition to responsibility on the minister, but I am there to assist him as the senior permanent civilian in the department, and I hope that I made it clear what I consider this to be, that the deputy minister has a responsibility to the minister for good management in the Department of National Defence. That includes the general control of the resources that are available to the department. Our objective in this, as it is I think in any area in defence or otherwise, is to achieve our assigned tasks as economically as we can do so.

Mr. WINCH: I hope the deputy minister understands I am not trying to put him on the spot.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I am sure you are not.

Mr. WINCH: But I am interested in what is meant by this. In the new policy of integration, starting now at the top level, it has been stated that it

means greater civilian control. What do you understand by greater civilian control?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Let me explain what I would say it means in the sense of the reorganization. First of all, I think I said that it eases the problem of the relationship in the department between the military and the civilian. Under this organization we will be able to establish, because of the parallel senior officers in defence staff—and there is only in this case one senior officer to deal with—a very close working relationship between our principal assistant deputy ministers and the principal military officers. Secondly, I think—and this I think is quite important—that with the single organization and the stated policy the defence council will in fact become what it has not been in practice in the past, a policy making body of the department, if you would like to call it that, in which all proposals that are going to that council, most of which will come initially and be developed by military staffs, will flow through, be reviewed by the civil staffs and, I hope, in the course of their development the civil staff and the military staff will have an interchange of views and eventually go to the defence council. This should ensure that in every case the civilian view is there for the consideration of the minister when policies are developed. Now, of course, this is possible under the present organization in the sense that one can do it; but it is a much more difficult thing to do under an organization that is established as it is now. And, I do believe that the simplicities that are introduced here in terms of civilian control will, in fact, make it much easier to exercise than it has been before.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

Do I understand from what the deputy minister has just said that he anticipates not only a greater civilian administration control but the possibility of policy influence? Am I interpreting your answer correctly?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Of course, the deputy minister never has been completely remote from policy influence. I do not think there is a change here.

Mr. WINCH: In other words, civilian control, as we have been told, means administrative only?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not think it means administrative only; what I said was that the deputy minister always has been concerned with policy in the department.

Mr. WINCH: What was the meaning of great civilian control? You have been a deputy minister for a long time now and I would like you to answer that question.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I have been endeavouring to explain this in the sense of how it operates and how this new organization makes it possible for it perhaps to be more effective in terms of civilian control than it has been in the past.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed now, Mr. MacRae.

Mr. MACRAE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to ask you to consider a suggestion. The statement that was made by the deputy minister was an exceptionally good one; however, it was a lengthy statement and I wonder if in the future such statements might be made available in order that we will have them while the witness is reading. Also, it would be very helpful in putting questions after. I think it perhaps will be a week or two before this evidence will appear in our reports. Perhaps I could make that suggestion for the future.

Mr. Chairman, my first question has just been answered; I was interested in the civilian control of the military and I am willing to accept the answer that the deputy minister has given.

Now, in the discussion of the organization I did not notice that the deputy minister had given any duties for the associate deputy minister. Would the deputy minister be so kind at this time to tell us what have been the duties of the associate deputy minister up to this point and what are his expected duties under the new organization?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: The associate deputy minister, aside from being a general associate of the deputy minister, has been concerned in particular with the field of dependants' education. As you know, we do operate a rather extensive system of schooling for the youngsters of the service people overseas and also at the bases in Canada. He also has been concerned particularly in respect of pension plans. He is a member of the pension board. He has dealt in particular with a variety of problems that arise in the province of Quebec and French Canada. He also has supervised generally the policy in respect of entertainment arrangements in the department. There may be some other duties. Also, he is a member of the board in Oromocto.

Mr. MACRAE: Yes, I fully realize that.

Mr. WINCH: Perhaps Mr. MacRae might ask what you meant when you said that the associate deputy minister deals with a variety of problems that arise in the province of Quebec.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, as you know, the associate deputy minister, Colonel Mathieu, is a French speaking Canadian as well as English speaking. He has dealt on my behalf in many cases with particular problems that arise in Quebec. He has not dealt with all of them; however, we do have a great many of them, you know, not that they are necessarily different in Quebec from other places. There are matters to look into in respect of relationships with municipalities, school boards and a great many other things.

Mr. MACRAE: I have one final question. Would the deputy minister advise if it is anticipated that the future organization will require more, less, or the same number of civilians at national defence headquarters? Really, that would be just a projection.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Are you speaking of the future organization in toto?

Mr. MACRAE: No; I am speaking of the organization of national defence headquarters itself and I am referring to the civilian staff at this headquarters to run the forces of this country.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Do you mean including the civilians employed with the services as well?

Mr. MACRAE: Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not know, frankly but, on the whole, I think it would be less.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed with your questions now, Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the deputy minister some questions relating to his remarks in respect of programming and, again, with regard to the question of the mark document, following along the line of questioning asked by Mr. Winch.

In preparing the mark document do I understand this is in reality just a simple matter of drawing up the estimates of the department, and it follows along very much the standard line of estimates which other departments use, and the term "mark document" really is not much different from whatever terms they may use, say, for the Department of Transport, when they are drawing up their document for estimates. Is that correct?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, it probably is not. If I remember rightly, the origination of the term "mark" was that when this was first introduced it

went through a series of versions. I think we called the first one mark I and the second mark II and so on. It became known as a mark document. There is no significance of the name in that sense.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Then, really it is just a departmental estimate?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes. It is the assembling of the material in a form that we believe has helped in the past to make decisions within the department.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And, this just follows the form of 22 standard objects or those regulations as laid down by treasury board?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No. In the mark document we do not follow that form. But, of course, later on when the estimates are developed the material is put into that form.

Mr. DEACHMAN: It is put into the form of the 22 standard objects required for examination by parliament?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If it is put into that form later, then the form in which you examine it is rather by branches within the department and the different functions within the branches?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Essentially its functions within the department and the headings are much more general than the great detail which the 22 objects of expenditure provide. As I mentioned, we deal with operating costs really in one line; we do not break them down into a great deal of detail in this document.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you find that the 22 standard objects which parliament uses for examining the estimates are useful to you?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: They are useful in some respects in that the material is analysed in a particular form, but it is not the form we really need it in for all management purposes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If you were an outsider analysing what is going on in your department, would you reach for the 22 objects, or would you reach for some other form of analysis?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I would reach for some other form for the particular purposes of departmental management.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is to say, the standard objects system which parliament uses for the examination of estimates is not really a very good system for examining what goes on within a department. Is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, I do not think it necessarily is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I do not think it is either. I am glad you concur.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Mind you, there are other purposes which it serves.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I understand that you are moving out of the system of analysis that you use in the mark paper now. In the new system you will be moving into a system of examination by programs and components of programs, and a study of ongoing programs.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes. In a sense this is a development of the mark document. We will break down programs very similarly, I would think, at the outset, into headings which we have accepted in the mark document, and then break them down still further into details, subcomponents and elements which will get down to more detail than we have had in the past in respect of what comprises a program. Additionally—and I think this is the important thing—the object of this exercise is to end up with a program which is not going to be too detailed, but which will have in it enough detail that the minister, myself, or anyone else who wants to look at it will have

a reasonably good comprehension of what it is that makes up the defence department, and the costs involved.

If this thing is to work satisfactorily, it has to be kept current; it just will not work if you take a look at it maybe only once a year. You have to have something that is current, and in which changes are made periodically and developed to the point that it does in fact constitute a proper document for everyone in the department. This means developing the concept of the mark II document a good deal further than it ever has been developed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When you use the word "program" in discussing components of the program and the breakdown of the program, and in discussing the evolution of the mark document, what exactly do you mean by program; are you speaking here, for instance, of our forces abroad as being a program; are you speaking of the whole field of logistics as being a program and the whole field of ancillary services as being a program? Would you give us an explanation of what a program is?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It might be best if I give you an example of the document as it is now in its present form and as it is being developed. A major program would be your forces for SACEUR; this would be broken down into certain main components—the forces in Europe, army forces; the forces in Europe, air force forces; the forces in Canada that are earmarked for SACEUR; the forces in Canada that support the air division. For example, the operational training units that are directly there because of our maintenance of an air division in Europe, and they again would be broken down into certain subcomponents which would break out the operational forces and the static support forces behind it. The elements then would be broken out.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Who would you charge headquarters off to? Let us take weaponry, and so on; what charges will you put behind weaponry? In the cost of operating weapons will you charge off headquarters into that, into operation; or do you maintain headquarters separately?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We would maintain headquarters, but not in weaponry. We would maintain a separate function for headquarters, unless you could specifically allocate it to a major program. The weaponry that is required, for example, by the brigade group in Europe would be assigned to the brigade group in Europe.

Mr. DEACHMAN: As this program develops, do you anticipate that at least the broad figures of these programs could be made available for parliament? I realize you have your problems in respect of internal documentation and the very elaborate breakdowns you must follow for your purposes; but do you see anything that would stand in the way of parliament, let us say, having the broadest figures with relation to the programs for examination rather than the 22 standard objects that we get now?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think obviously this is a policy matter for the government to decide. My experience would indicate there always are some difficulties in projecting figures in a public sense over too long a period in the future; there always are uncertainties.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I realize that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, if I might interject, you are straying a little away from Bill No. C-90 and we do have three other members who wish to ask questions.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I will rest my questions at this point. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TEMPLE: Many of my questions have been answered, with the exception of one or two. I have two questions dealing with the new detailed presentation

of long range programs which would be updated at intervals—and I stress programs. With these new detailed programs, will there be one, say, presented for the air force, one for the navy, and one for the army, or will they be integrated?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: These programs will be integrated and they will be worked out by the defence staff.

Mr. TEMPLE: Will these new detailed long range programs go beyond the length of the previous mark programs of four years, and if so, are you at liberty to say how much further?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Initially I think we would start them out on five years; this is a practical consideration. I think it is useful to go a little further, but it becomes difficult to predict with any degree of certainty when you get too far afield.

Mr. TEMPLE: Have you in mind what the optimum might be?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think if you could manage it—and perhaps we will eventually try to do this—you might get perhaps seven or eight years.

Mr. WINCH: Would Mr. Temple please now ask—I hope he will—does a project of four or five years on a mark paper mean a commitment of future years' estimates?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Not necessarily. When we go to parliament and when the government presents its estimates, there is a particular wording in the defence vote, as I am sure you know, which refers to commitments. Those are commitments in the total sum; the estimated total commitments that will be entered into in that particular year. They do not constitute all the commitments to be undertaken over a period of five years.

Mr. WINCH: I wish Mr. Temple would follow this up.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we will be able to get back to you, Mr. Winch, and you could finish this off.

Are you finished Mr. Temple?

Mr. TEMPLE: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Starting at the bottom of your organization chart with the assistant deputy minister requirements and works, it seems that a lot of these functions are now performed within the Department of Defence Production. What consideration has been given to the amalgamation of similar functions within the two departments?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: With respect to the assistant deputy minister of works, as you will probably recall, the Glassco commission did recommend that Defence Construction Limited be moved over to our department. That would put the two things together. This is now under study, but a final decision has not been taken. As to the assistant deputy minister of requirements, of course the contracting for the department is done by the Department of Defence Production. I am not aware of any proposal at this moment to change it.

Mr. SMITH: Is there not going to be an overlapping, for example, in ship building requirements, directly in Mr. Rutledge's job with some of the types that are involved?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We develop the specifications and tell the department what we would like to buy. Inevitably the man who makes the contract has to develop a pretty thorough knowledge of these things before he makes the contract. It could be argued that there is some overlapping. Other people would not agree with me that there is, but it is conceivable that there is.

Mr. SMITH: Does it not follow through that in many of these things, for instance, in the general purchasing branch, clothing, textiles and so on, that there is going to be an overlapping of functions?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There will be no more overlapping of functions than there has been in the past.

Mr. SMITH: But there will not be any less?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There will not be any less.

Mr. SMITH: It makes me somewhat sceptical to think that maybe Mr. Parkinson will win this reorganization after all.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It does not have any particular bearing on what we are doing in the Department of National Defence, to reorganize and to do these things with fewer people.

Mr. SMITH: But it will have in respect of which pocket you pay it out of in the end?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It is a rather complicated subject in the sense that the Department of Defence Production does have somewhat wider responsibilities than that of simply buying for the Department of National Defence. You must look at the whole context of their operations.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, I know. In many lines and branches they do not have a much wider responsibility, for instance, in the purchase of aircraft.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, we are the main purchasers of aircraft.

Mr. SMITH: And in the purchase of ships, and having regard to what the Department of Transport does?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, considerably.

Mr. SMITH: And in clothing, textiles, for example, how much wider responsibility do they have?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, they are in the process of taking over responsibility for buying in this field of common user items for other government departments as well as for those of national defence.

Mr. SMITH: Now, let us move to the assistant deputy minister personnel. Will he have charge of the hiring and provision requirements of civilian personnel within the whole defence structure?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: He will be responsible for the civilian personnel in the defence department, but hiring in most cases is done under the Civil Service Act.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, I realize that, but shall we continue to have under the new director of civilian personnel a director of civilian personnel army, a director of civilian personnel air force, and a director of civilian personnel navy? Shall we continue to have these?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We definitely would not have them, no. There will be a director of civilian personnel for the services as a whole.

Mr. SMITH: And in an army camp such as Camp Borden, would we continue to have a civilian personnel officer air force, and a civilian personnel officer army, with their separate little empires?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: You are getting into specifics now. I would expect or rather hope in the long run that we would have one civilian personnel officer.

Mr. SMITH: I do not want to get down to specifics, but the moment you get down to a single specific you make the problem a little clearer. You say you hope there would be a single civilian personnel authority?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: And they would hire for all the branches within the limits of the Civil Service Act?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Subject to the terms that you use, they do not really hire.

Mr. SMITH: Well, let us say that they administer?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: They would administer.

Mr. SMITH: I used the word hiring loosely.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: Now you mentioned defence programming, and you went into it with Mr. Deachman, I thought, substantially. As to planned forward programming, in the United States department of defence secretariat they have a branch within their broad program planning called I think "systems analysis", which is largely a civilian analysis of the proposed programs put forward by the military branches. Is there going to be a counterpart to that under the new organization of the Department of National Defence?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We have not actually made a decision on this. There are system analysis branches in the services now, and they are mainly staffed and supplied by the defence research board. We will certainly have a system of some kind for such system analysis as we think it necessary to make. But we have not decided exactly where to put it, or how to have it staffed.

I have had a little concern, myself, quite frankly, that it would be difficult with the volume of work that might be involved in this to try to set up that kind of very highly qualified staff, and in a very small group as in the deputy minister's office. It is perhaps desirable to have such a service provided through the defence research board.

Mr. SMITH: Has any consideration been given to the appointment of a scientist associate deputy minister whose charge would be to oversee these proposed programs, and who could call upon various civilian resources on a temporary basis, and who might do this systems analysis or program analysis outside of the present orbit of the armed services?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, we have not thought in terms of setting up an assistant deputy minister for this purpose, in terms of giving scientific advice to the department. We would continue to rely on the chairman of the defence research board.

I think the thing you have to bear in mind in this case is the fact that the United States after all is working on systems development that encompass strategy over the whole world and these problems are not quite as extensive in this country.

Mr. SMITH: Our resources to pay for them are not as extensive. The one thing that strikes me about the evidence we have heard from witnesses in the past is that even though a person may be from the defence research board he intents to become an advocate rather than an analyst of the program particularly if the person has developed the program, and then it is more difficult for that individual to look at it with a dispassionate view.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I suppose it is inevitably human nature that one tends to be an advocate of the thing one really believes in, and part of the function of the civilian review is, to throw in the other side of the argument. We would attempt to design our organization to give a reasonable assurance that that was done.

Mr. SMITH: It would seem to me desirable that we have someone or somebody no matter how small, within the defence department, who would not have had any responsibility for the development, to analyse programs.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We have, as you probably cannot read from where you are, put under the assistant deputy minister, requirements, responsibility for doing this.

Mr. SMITH: I think that is too low down the scale.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: He is not very low down. He is an assistant deputy minister.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, but he has requirements and he also has responsibility for programming as well as development.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: He is essentially concerned with requirements on the equipment side, technical matters and logistics. I think you have to look at development from the point of view of your requirements at least in part. Where are you going? If you are going to spend money on development what is the ultimate product you get, what is it going to cost you and where are you going to use it? So you do have to put these things together.

Mr. SMITH: You then must have someone to audit him in a scientific sense?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, that is right.

Mr. SMITH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Armstrong you indicated that the organization on the civilian side is remaining essentially the same and you also pointed out that the new proposed organization on the military side will parallel this fairly closely, each being in four streams. My first question is, is the proposed new military organization to a considerable extent based on the organization which has been existent for a long time on the civilian side?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No it is not. The military organization was based on the considerations that were thought appropriate for a military organization. I am not sure but I believe the minister explained that he did set up some working groups to work on this. We set up a working group to look at the deputy minister's side of the business and the two of them did work together to some degree. When I said that this is essentially the same, there are a few changes that we are making to achieve the objective that I stated, of having a pretty direct relationship between our assistant deputy minister and the people on the military side.

For example, the assistant deputy minister of personnel in the past has not dealt with policy questions affecting military personnel: pay and allowances, conditions of service, finances and all the rest of it. That has been over on the assistant deputy minister of finance's side. We are moving that over so that the assistant deputy minister of personnel will in fact have as part of his responsibility the things that are also encompassed by and large in the chief of military personnel's side. So there will be a very direct and close link with him.

Mr. HARKNESS: However, that is just a minor change as between two assistant deputy ministers?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is a change, yes. I think I can say quite definitely that the military organization was not based on this.

Mr. HARKNESS: There is such a striking parallel it leads one to wonder how much effect that organization might have had on the new organization which has been brought forward for the military side.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It had not occurred to me in the past but that might be so. This is definitely not how the military organization came about, there is no question about that.

Mr. HARKNESS: There was some talk about the mark document. Would you agree that this has been, to a large extent, what you might call a planning and co-ordinating device?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes. It was set up for that purpose.

Mr. HARKNESS: I thought I should bring this point out because I think there perhaps is some confusion or ambiguity in the minds of some members regarding this mark document. I think there is no doubt that it was a planning and co-ordinating device to a very large extent.

In that connection would you say that one of the reasons that such a document has been essential is that when you start a program of any sort, particularly a re-equipment program, whatever you spend in the initial year inevitably carries with it commitments in succeeding years?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I agree with that.

Mr. WINCH: I am glad you asked that question. That is what I have been trying to find out.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is one of the reasons why you must have a document of this sort, in order to give some indication not only within the department, but to the Department of Finance and to the government as a whole regarding what the probable expenditures are likely to be for a particular equipment program in years ahead.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I agree completely. That is essential.

Mr. HARKNESS: One of the reasons why this is essentially there is that the decision in regard to starting any one of these major equipment programs is essentially a political decision?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I agree with that. It is essentially a policy decision.

Mr. HARKNESS: That decision is really taken by the cabinet or government as a whole rather than by a department?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I am already overdue and I see that our time for this meeting is also overdue, so I think I will quit at this point.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, in respect of the matter of a quorum, I should like to point out that six of the eight Conservative members were present here and there are only seven of them in Ottawa this afternoon.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Mr. SMITH: I would not have pointed that out except for the actions of Mr. Matheson who got out in a hurry when he already knew that Mr. Nielsen wanted to leave.

The CHAIRMAN: Before the committee adjourns I should like to remind you that our next meeting is at eleven o'clock tomorrow morning. Mr. Malone will be our witness. The meeting will not be in this room but in Room 371, west block, at eleven o'clock tomorrow morning.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 5

THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 1964

Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

WITNESS:

Brigadier Richard S. Malone, Publisher, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20925—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),
Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Granger,
Groos,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacLean,
MacRae,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
Nielsen,
Pilon,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

Quorum 13.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 4, 1964.
(7)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.35 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, Nielsen, Pilon, Temple, Winch (15).

In attendance: Brigadier Richard S. Malone, Publisher, of Winnipeg, Manitoba.

The Committee continued its consideration of Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

Brigadier Malone was introduced and requested to present to the Committee his views on Bill C-90.

During his statement the witness tabled four charts respecting the proposed organization of the Department of National Defence and the Defence Services.

Agreed,—That these charts be inserted in the Committee's record at the appropriate places.

Mr. Malone was questioned on his statement; he was thanked for his testimony and permitted to retire.

At 1.00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11.00 a.m. Tuesday, June 9, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

20925—1½

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, June 4, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. I would ask you to speak quite loudly, if you would, because the microphones overhead are not too effective.

We continue with Bill No. C-90, Clause 1.

Our witness this morning is Richard S. Malone, publisher of the Winnipeg *Free Press.*

Mr. Malone will make a statement and I would ask him to open his remarks by giving us a little of his background.

Mr. RICHARD S. MALONE (*Publisher, Winnipeg Free Press; Executive Vice President, Vancouver Sun, Vice President and General Manager, F. P. Publications Limited*): Mr. Chairman and hon. members, I did a lot of wandering around during the war but, may I say, I do not propose to pose as an expert in my appearance before you.

My military experience commenced about 1923, when I joined the Queen's Own Rifles in Toronto. I served a long time in the militia and then at the outbreak of war I was called out with the P.P.C.L.I. In 1940, I was seconded for duty as special assistant to the then minister of defence, Colonel J. L. Ralston. Then, as military secretary, I accompanied the minister to London for a discussion with the British chief at that time, Mr. Churchill, in respect of mobilization plans. Following that I organized the army directorate of public relations. Then I attended staff college and was posted overseas to the fifth armoured division, then went as a brigade major in the first division. I participated in the Sicily, Italy and Normandy landings and the airborne landing in Japan. I was personal liaison officer for Field Marshal Montgomery in the invasion of Italy, A.D.P.R. for 21 army group and performed liaison duties with Field Marshal Montgomery in the Normandy invasion. Toward the end of the war I headed a Canadian mission to General MacArthur's headquarters at Okinawa and the Phillipines. I retired from the Canadian army with the rank of brigadier. I think that is all I have to say at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MATHESON: That is a great contribution.

Mr. MALONE: I may add I was called back in the army at the time of the Winnipeg flood in 1950 to handle the planning in that connection. Would you like me to carry on?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, if you would.

Mr. MALONE: I have not prepared a brief. I have just returned from England and I did not have time to prepare a brief, with footnotes and references. But, I have a statement here and, if you will bear with me, I will deal with this. I hope my comments may be of some assistance to you.

In pioneering this development of unification of the services undoubtedly we may make some mistakes and there is certain to be a large element of trial and error in it as we feel our way. However, I am very much concerned that we may make one primary mistake and, if we make a mistake at the start of this thing we could do very great damage to this project which you have in mind, which could, in my view, jeopardize the entire scheme and, indeed, it

could produce very disastrous results which might not be apparent for several years. The ultimate cost to the nation, could be very great indeed.

I refer here to the commander in chief or "supremo" principle which seems to be inherent in the proposed new plan or organization which you have before you. Now, there is provision for a so-called defence council in your organization, but this appears to me to be purely for the purpose of consultation or advice rather than the exercise of any direct responsibilities or real authority. To establish anything in the nature of a commander in chief, regardless of his title, would be in my opinion a fatal error. As in the new British system, the defence council I feel should come immediately under the minister. In this connection may I quote from an official release on this point issued in London. I will read you the one paragraph. Referring to the setting up of a defence council in England it states: "The council will exercise the powers of command and administrative control". It could not be clearer than that. That is what they are charged with. In the present plan, this is not the statutory responsibility of your board or council; this is a consultive board, as I read it.

It may be argued that the proposed Canadian organization does not embrace the commander in chief principle. May I suggest that the members of this committee, however, ask themselves the following questions.

Will the proposed chief of defence staff be accepting orders, directions and decisions from the defence council or will he in fact be imposing his decisions on this council?

Will other members of the defence council be in a position to question him or over-rule him or veto his decisions?

Will other members of the defence council be junior and subordinate to him?

Will not the chief of defence staff in effect determine the actual duties, responsibilities and even the appointments and promotions of other members of the defence council?

Will the chief of defence staff be the chief adviser to the minister? Officially will other members of the defence council have to speak to the minister through him?

In fact, will the actual authority for carrying out the government's policies, as directed by the minister, be vested in the council or in the chief of the defence staff?

Again, will the chief of the defence staff be in a position to reject the advice, even the majority advice, of the other chiefs in the services?

If these above factors exist, in my opinion it is inevitable that the chief of defence staff will gather about him either his friends, yes men or like thinking officers.

In that connection I might point out that when a new commander has taken over command of an army, a corps or division invariably he changes his staff. Quite often he gets rid of his G-1, chief of staff, or second in command simply for the reason that he wants someone to work with him who thinks the same way he does. This is a recognized thing. I think this is quite proper where a commander is in charge or a force in action. He must then be the supreme commander, but here where you are dealing with a government I do not think you can afford to have a new chief of staff appointed who is going to change the council to suit himself. This is where the great danger lies.

If the other chiefs on the council are not able to veto his decisions they will hardly risk opposing him either within or outside the council. In short we may be creating a "God" as I call it of all our defence services. Remember, we are not now considering in effect a commander in chief simply of the army, but of all three services, and any error by this one man could be threefold in consequence. This is far too much responsibility for any one person. If this is estab-

lished, such a system will ultimately fail, but perhaps not before great harm has resulted.

May I for a moment quote from your Bill No. C-90. I am quite sure you are more familiar with it than I am, but if you run through it very quickly you will see the authorities given to the commander in chief. It starts out by stating:

> The Governor in Council may appoint an officer to be the chief of the defence staff, who shall hold such rank as the Governor in Council may prescribe and who shall, subject to the regulations and under the direction of the minister, be charged with the control and administration of the Canadian forces.

This is the process of the government of Canada, but right through the bill you will see this same principle recognized in respect of non-public property of a unit and other such things. The bill continues, stating that things come under the general chief of staff and are authorized by him, and there is page after page of this type of authority. All the conditions of duties and responsibilities are to be laid down by the chief of defence staff. In other words you are creating here in my opinion a commander in chief of the services.

If we do in fact establish a chief of staff with all the powers of a commander in chief, and the chief adviser to the minister, in my opinion this chief must either dominate his minister, destroy him or, in time, be destroyed himself by the minister. While the minister does represent the power of parliament it is difficult for him to ever reject the advice of a single professional adviser.

It is much like the relationship between a doctor and a patient. If the patient is not prepared to accept the advice of his professional adviser, the doctor, the doctor must resign or be fired from the case. There is no alternative.

As in the situation studied by Lord Esher in 1904, the committee found that the army's commander in chief carried a burden of responsibility far too heavy for one individual, and that he tended to rely for advice on others whose training and habits of thought were identical to his own. The secretary, or in Canada referred to as the minister, for his part, was a transient political figure obstensibly senior in authority but in fact almost totally dependant upon one man for advice. Unless he and the commander in chief happened to be men of rare congeniality one was bound to destroy or demoralize the other.

In our defence services this situation can be avoided if decisions and authority are based on a council with a majority deciding and with the minister or his deputy participating in decisions and answerable to parliament for these decisions. This system has been proven repeatedly but there have been many times when the principle has been forgotten with disastrous results.

May I go back briefly in history to illustrate this point. There were two major reforms in the British army in modern times. The first was the Carswell reforms about 1860. The second was the reform recommended by Lord Esher's committee and implemented by Lord Haldane.

I should like at this stage to suggest that the reformations you are about to bring into effect will be just as historical and perhaps even more historical if our plans proceed and prove effective.

Lord Esher's committee was established to investigate a series of costly mistakes made by the British army during the Boer war. This committee clearly established that the errors were directly attributable to the commander in chief principle. In contrast, it was pointed out that the British navy, directed by a board of admiralty, repeatedly proved to be the more sound system. As a result, the commander in chief principle in the British army was abandoned and the system of an army council or defence council has been adhered to in Britain right up to the present. The success of this system was so apparent that it has been closely followed by the Royal Air Force as well.

Even despite the safeguards against the creation of a commander in chief, difficulties have often arisen when any single commander through force of personality, public acclaim or reputation has been in a position to impose his sole will about the authority of army council or defence council. Our proposed system to my mind surely encourages this problem. One has only to study the early days of world war I to recognize that this was one of Britain's chief problems with Lord Kitchener. I should also state that in personal correspondence Lord Esher after his report was implemented said that in spite of these safeguards he was not sure that even they were enough. Owing to this one thing, even with statutory provisions, a commander through his popularity and prestige, which often developed to an overwhelming extent, the government itself were almost afraid to tackle him.

More recently, another example of this was the position of great authority achieved by General MacArthur during the Korean war, where his personal reputation and prestige allowed him to challenge even the authority of the United States President. The results were tragic. General MacArthur, one of the ablest commanders ever produced by the United States, had to be removed. No commander can be a law unto himself under our present system of democracy as we understand it.

Also important in the defence council system is the matter of civilian participation in the actual direction of the forces. The weaknesses of full military control of each service have been illustrated over and over again in other countries. Lloyd George in his war memoirs cites the German general staff which was supreme in military matters and powerful eough to ignore the advice of civil authorities. Germany lost whatever chance she might have had of achieving her objectives in the 1914-18 war by invading Belgium and, later on, by conducting an unrestricted U-boat campaign. The one brought Britain into the war and the other the United States. Both decisions were opposed by the German civil government, but the weight of the German military command was such that it simply over-ruled that advice.

A modified army council system rather than the commander in chief principle prevailed in Canada in the early part of the war. Unfortunately, this system started to break down again in the final months of the war.

I think it may be fairly suggested now that the reason why General Simmonds, the senior active Canadian officer at the time, for example, was not immediately brought back to Canada as chief of the general staff at the end of the war was the fear by the government of the day that he would prove too difficult and autocratic in this appointment. In my personal opinion, General Simmonds was unquestionably the ablest field commander produced by Canada during the war. Like all successful field commanders, however, he had been trained and grown to practise the principle that in action his decisions as commander and commands must be absolute. Indeed this must be the situation with a commander in charge of actual battles and campaigns. There must be a single voice of authority and it must be unquestioned while he holds command. If he fails to produce victories or carry out his duties, however, he is of course removed from command. This same situation and requirement, however, does not and should not exist in the relationships between the chief of the general staff, the chief of defence staff; as you are going to call him, and the minister or the cabinet.

Decisions made to implement the policy of the government should not be the matter of a moment's decision or the responsibility of one single person regardless of his ability, integrity or experience.

Shortly after world war II, in Canada, the army council system was entirely abandoned and we established a commander in chief in actual fact. This change was brought about around 1950. The powers then granted to the chief of the general staff in effect made him a commander in chief. If there remain any

doubts on this subject, may I quote from the official regulations. In the King's regulations and orders for the Canadian army, 1939, which were in effect throughout the war period, the individual duties of the staff and channels of communication were clearly defined. To illustrate this I will refer to the two books here which are the regulations and orders. I think all the amendments are up to date but perhaps my staff duties have not been carried out 100 per cent perfectly.

All the way through the 1950 edition you will see the authority set out for the chief of general staff. It suggests here that no portion of the army orders may be altered, but they may be altered on the authority of the chief of general staff with communication to higher authority and these shall be made through such channels of communications as the chief of general staff may prescribe. Nobody can approach the minister unless they accept what the chief of general staff says. This is the commander in chief; make no mistake about it. However, you can go through the book.

Then there is the question of the exercise of powers. The power and right is vested in any act or thing which, by Queen's regulations (army) is required or may be done by the chief of general staff. He can override even all these orders. Then one sees lower down:

> —the officer holding the senior appointment in each branch at army headquarters when acting within the scope of the duties assigned to him by the chief of the general staff;

Then the duties of these other officers are defined.

There is no sense whatever in imagining, therefore, that he has equal authority with them. He can change the job and make appointments.

In regard to orders:

> When they are designed to be reasonably permanent, detailed orders made by the chief of the general staff.

And I could go on for page after page illustrating this.

In dealing with control and administration we see the following:

> Unless the governor in council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions to the Canadian army that are required to give effect to the decisions and carry out the directions of the government of Canada or the minister, shall be issued by or through the chief of the general staff.

Duties of staff at headquarters:

> The duties of staffs and services at army headquarters, command and area headquarters shall be as prescribed by the chief of the general staff.

Do not fool yourselves that we do not have the commander in chief principle here in Canada; and this is reflected in your new program.

In contrast to that I would like to refer you to the previous King's regulations, the 1939 regulations. I do not want to read a great deal here for you, but the specific duties and to whom they are allocated are set out, and you will see that on page after page. Here they are: "Duties of deputy minister"; "Duties of Judge Advocate General"; "Duties of Adjutant General"; "Duties of Quartermaster General"; "Duties of Master General of Ordnance". The individual chiefs are specifically held responsible for duties, not the chief of general staff.

I do not want to dig up old bones, but I know how this was operated. One member of the army council was dealt with on this basis when certain things went wrong in the army. He was called in to account for the problem by the minister and he pointed out that this thing went wrong and that thing

went wrong, and mistakes do happen in the army. The minister said: "This didn't happen", and "That didn't happen", and so on. He then said to the member of the army council concerned, "By statute this is your responsibility. There is no sense in saying the chief of defence staff or the army council or someone else is responsible; this is your responsibility by statute." He had fallen down on his duties and he was removed. In the new system it is said that the chief of general staff "may decide", and this is far too vague.

In recent years I have been curious as to who in fact is charged with the responsibility for organization. I have not been able to find out. I have not been able to do a great deal of research on it, but a few years ago I telephoned to the minister's office at that time and said to the assistant, "Could you quote me the order in council showing who is charged with this job?" He said he would let me have it, but I have never received it to this day. My point is that it should not be vague and I hope in the new system it will be clearly defined that specific officers have specific responsibilities and that they answer to the defence council, not to one man.

> But it is in article 11.01 of the present Queen's Regulations and Orders that the C.G.S. has his most potent weapon for direct personal control of the army through the selection of officers for senior staff positions:
>
> "The promotion—

and note this—

> —of an officer to the rank of colonel or to any higher rank shall require the approval of the minister on the recommendation of the chief of the general staff".

He will move his friends around him; do not doubt that—and I would do the same thing. It is much easier to operate as commander in chief, but it does not necessarily mean that it is the best thing for the country.

It should be apparent from what I have said that, starting in about 1950, we had once more created a commander in chief in Canada. As I have stated, such a system is bound to fail and in my opinion it has repeatedly failed in recent years.

For confirmation of this you might recall the famous Currie report. Unnecessary mistakes have been made in our armed services due to the one-man command principle. As to the manner in which this system either destroys the minister, or the commander in chief, I would give as an example the fact that although when General Simmonds was ultimately appointed chief of the general staff in Ottawa he was undoubtedly Canada's ablest officer at that time and was still a comparatively young man. Owing to the impossibility of his position, as in effect a commander in chief, in relation to his minister, the Hon. Ralph Campney, General Simmonds' services, I suggest, were lost to the country prematurely.

At the time the commander in chief principle was reinstated in the Canadian army, the opposition in the government at that time raised a very loud protest. A re-reading of *Hansard* of that time will reveal that although the principle itself was not too well understood by many members of parliament it was clearly recognized by General Pearkes, then military critic in the opposition. As recorded in *Hansard*, General Pearkes clearly forecast that this system would not work.

In the light of the opposition's remarks at that time, I have always been puzzled why the situation was not rectified when a change of government was effected and new ministers were appointed. The only reason I can think of is that the commander in chief principle was so well entrenched by that time that it was impossible even for the minister himself to challenge or change

this system. Believe me, the difficulty of changing and bucking the hierarchy in the army, once it is well established, is a very tough one.

Again, I must apologize that time has not allowed me to follow the deliberations of your committee in recent weeks. A few days ago I returned from England and I am not up to date, so I hope I will not be repeating some of the matters you have already dealt with. I have, however, brought with me a few charts showing the proposed organization, which I understand is presently before you, as well as a chart of the new organization in Britain. I have also been rash enough to draft very quickly a rough suggestion of my own to help to illustrate this commander in chief principle which I fear we may stray into. May I distribute copies?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. If you have copies they can be distributed.

Is it your wish that the charts be incorporated into the proceedings?

Agreed.

Mr. MALONE: The charts follow.

PROJECTED CANADIAN ORG.

No. A



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

No. B

NEW BRITISH ORGANIZATION No. C



NOTE:
All three Services under one Minister but not Unified.
Authority still exercised by either a Council—or in each Service by a Board not by a Single Man.

I will deal first with Charts "A" and "B". They simply show the organization which I believe is called for under your present bills. On "A" you will notice there is a defence council shown but that it is not in the line of direct command; it is an appended thing and, as I understand it, could be called together for consultation and advice but does not carry the authority nor does it issue orders in any direct chain of command from the minister.

Chart "B" shows how it is broken down from the chief of defence staff, after coming from the minister and associate minister, into various departments.

Chart "C" shows the new British organization.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that there they are not attempting to do what we are doing here. They are attempting to centralize the command structure only; they are not trying to unify the forces. In Britain three ministers are being maintained under a single secretary of state. Directly under the ministry level you will notice there is a defence council, not a chief of defence staff. The chairman of that council is the secretary of state himself. The secretary of state must participate; he must be part of the decisions; he cannot say, "The experts told me this"; he must be part of the decision and he must answer for it in parliament; and either he or his deputy must attend.

Then, they are going to have the members of the three services, but in your case you will not have the three services but you will have heads of branches, that is the G branch, the administrative branch and the supply branch—call it what you will, I prefer in my own chart to simply call them administration and supply as they are simpler this way.

Now then, the defence council breaks down into three services, in the case of the British plan, but it does not go to chief of staff, chief of air council, admiralty board, or anything; it goes to a board. At the bottom of the British chart you see the admiralty board, the army board and the air force board. In the old days it used to be called the army council, the air council and the board of admiralty. They are still maintaining that this board will have the authority, and not a single man.

Now we come to the fourth page of charts. This is the one I rushed out rather hastily yesterday and I will not guarantee it is expert but it does bring out the principle that I am trying to illustrate here.

SUGGESTED TYPE OF ORGANIZATION



No. D

I would suggest that directly under the minister there should be the defence council—composed of the minister, the associate minister, the deputy minister, the chief of defence staff, the chief of supply and services, and so on; (you may have different names for that but I pick the simpler term as it is more descriptive.)

Then you have the chief of administration, the chief of defence research, and I have suggested that this should be the level for liaison with civil defence. At times the chief or the director of civil defence should have access to that committee.

Matters will be decided by the defence council which will have a bearing on civil defence, and at times he should be called in. There will be decisions there that will affect the civilians. Underneath that you have the three military chiefs, the chief of supply staff, the chief of defence staff, and the chief of administrative staff, who answer directly to that council—that is where they take their orders, not from the defence chief himself. Of course, there has to be some area of co-ordination. This has been tried at various times in history, but here I simply showed you the co-ordinating staff. We have attempted things such as a staff duty directorate. There must be a co-ordinating section. This would operate under the chief of defence staff. This defence council I have suggested is composed of three or four military members and three or four civilian members—there is a strong element of civilian control in there—as well as the minister, his deputy or his associate. I will not take your time up any longer. An expert could perhaps pick some holes there, such as the deputy chief of defence staff having those duties assigned to him which I have assigned to another person. I do not think it is necessary in the argument I am trying to make here at the moment.

Many of our present defence difficulties in Canada are not a result of incompetent officers or military bungling in the services themselves. The armed forces by and large have been led by dedicated men whose highest objective is that the services they command are as efficient as they can make them. I have very great pride in the Canadian forces. I have seen them in operation in many parts of the world; they are operating now. I do not think we need to take our hats off to any other troops in any way. When difficulties arise it would be totally unfair to blame these people for the dilemma when it was the system itself which was at fault.

Of equal importance in the defence council principle rather than the commander in chief principle, may I repeat, is the fact that the former introduces a really strong element of civilian leadership. Civilian authority under our present system has been exercised from time to time at the top, for example, the Right Hon. Mr. Diefenbaker's veto of the Avro Arrow. More often than not, these have come much too late in the decision making process to be effective. These, in my opinion, should have been settled at the defence council level. Under the present system it has not been uncommon for the services to be working for months on new weapons, research, and so forth, and committing large sums of money for research and so forth without a proper understanding by the civilian authorities until it is too late.

It will be noted that in the British system since the war the civilian element has not only been retained but has indeed been strengthened and broadened. Over the years I have kept up a little correspondence with Professor Cyril Falls, Chichele, professor of military history at Oxford university. I asked him what the trend is in Britain as the British have brought in various changes. I asked him whether there was any weakening of the element of civilian control. He said it was just the reverse, the British have been extending this control. They have included some extra civilians.

Might I also illustrate my point by the experience of Arthur Balfour one half century ago, when the British army was commanded by a single commander in chief. He held that having had no part, either personally or through his representatives, in the decision making process up to that point, the minister must either accept his experts' recommendations, in which case his superior authority is mere form, or he may enter into a debate on the pros and cons of the project and start afresh, in which case he has in effect rejected his experts' advice. Either way he has placed himself in a false position. The experts prevail over him or he, a layman, overrules them, with consequent loss in time, effort, money and morale.

Assume for a moment that we could find a paragon of all the virtues to occupy the post of chief of the defence staff, in fact, a commander in chief. Look at the position in which he would be placed. All his professional associates would be junior to him, accepting his directions and orders and therefore not likely to challenge his decisions and no power to veto his projects. Above this one, top expert or professional soldier are the amateurs or civilians, in many cases not qualified or prepared to question his professional advice. It is hard to believe that such a top chief would not have some blind spots, some professional biases, some personal prides or fixations which could cause disaster. Surely the matter of national defence and the huge costs involved should not be subjected to such hazards. Certainly from an individual standpoint it is much easier to operate by yourself and be the complete boss and not have the problem worked through a committee, but it is not the individual interest we are thinking of here but the question of what is the right thing for the country.

You will have noted in the organization chart No. D, which I have suggested, that I have shown three areas reporting directly to the minister's office not through the chief of staff or even the defence council. The reasons for this are very real, though I do not feel I should take up the time of the committee to enlarge on this at the moment. In passing, I would simply say that the tradition of the inspector general reporting to the minister directly is most important. His reports must not be inhibited by the operations staff, the chief of staff, the deputy or anyone else, if he is to properly carry out his function. If he is going to be the inspector, he must report directly to the minister and not have to qualify his report because the chief of staff vetoes it first.

Similarly, in the matters of press and psychological warfare—I have referred to it that way but it is now called public relations. Public relation has come to mean something quite different in commercial life today. During the war we called that P. and P.W., (press and psychological warfare). I think the army should revert to it because it is much more descriptive of the function. This is a thing we do not see in peacetime. We did not understand this early in the war in Canada. There are several functions in this branch: There is the question of the information to your own people. At times it has to be used for a special purpose and I can quote many examples. For example, in England at the time of the V-1's and the V-2's, it was a matter of government decision that this control of public information had to be exercised so as not to alarm the public. They could not have reports on the effect of the V-2's reaching the Germans. You must have some branch to cope with that. You do not need it in peacetime but only in wartime and it must be dealt with through the ministers of the government.

There is a question of information to your own troops, and the question of propaganda to the enemy. This was done by loud speakers, leaflets dropped by air and infiltrating news to the news services, and so on. This is a function you do not see much of in peacetime but it must exist, and I suggest it must operate through the minister's office.

You cannot have a serving officer, who does not answer to parliament, issuing orders on what is going to be fed to the press and what is not going to be fed to the press. I have said here it is a grave mistake to have this placed under the control of any single department, directorate or senior officer. In theory only the minister should make public announcements or comment on policy, and so on. He must answer in the house for the armed forces. It is not the function of a commander or serving officer to express his views on defence policy in public.

This is, however, too wide a subject to cover here. After many bitter lessons in this area during the war, I was instrumental in drawing up a memorandum on the subject at the end of the war. I am afraid much of our wartime experience, however, has been lost in this connection. I throw that out in the chart to show where I feel it should be dealt with.

But to return to and conclude my comments on the main issue I have raised, may I just touch on only a few quotations to illustrate my point. By drawing so largely on history, I trust my views will not seem archaic. It is simply a principle I wish to illustrate. You will, I think, agree with me that General Wolesly was recognized as a highly qualified commander; he had a very successful military career in various parts of the world. He was here in Canada on the Wolesly expedition. When appointed commander-in-chief, however, in Whitehall—with the widest authority—the British army became completely discredited—due to countless mistakes.

As Prime Minister, Salisbury on reviewing army inefficiency since the days of Wellington, concluded that the failures, leading up to and during the Boer War, were so complete that bad generals alone could not account for it—clearly the system or machinery itself was wrong.

Writing on this same subject back in 1942, the late Grant Dexter said as follows:—

The commander-in-chief was abolished for reasons which the Esher committee regarded as decisive. They were expressed by Mr. Balfour in the British House of Commons and they apply to any minister who tries to control the army without the aid of an army council. To retain the commander-in-chief, said Mr. Balfour, meant that he would advise the secretary of state—then minister in Canada—and thereby the secretary must be destroyed. He would inevitably become only the nominal head—the puppet of the commander-in-chief, the mouthpiece only. In discussing this point, Spenser Wilkinson, then the Chichele professor of military history at Oxford, agreed with Mr. Balfour. For a minister to deal directly with individual military experts is to place both minister and expert in a 'false position'. The minister, he said, must either confirm the expert's decision, in which case his position as superior authority is a mere form, or he must enter into the reasons for and against and decide afresh, in which case the expert becomes superfluous. It is bad organization to have two men (the minister and the expert), one over the other, to do the same business.

It is my own conviction that the defence forces of Canada will be much more effectively directed by a defence council of both military and civilian personnel, rather than by a single officer directly under the minister. I would further suggest that each member of the defence council, should be specifically charged by statute with clearly defined responsibilities. In my opinion areas of actual responsibility are far too vague under our present system. I am convinced that these senior service members of the defence council should take their orders from the council as a whole not from a single commander-in-chief—or chief of the defence staff—call him what you will.

The specific findings of the Esher committee on this point are as follows:—

With respect to the army council, the report (Part II) says:

(Para. 4). The members of the army council will act in a dual capacity: (*a*) as colleagues of the secretary of state at the council table, and (*b*) as superintendents of the several branches into which the business of the war office will be divided.

(Para. 5). The responsibility of the secretary of state to parliament and to the country for the administration of the military forces will in no sense be diminished, but it will be shared by the members of the council.

(Para. 6). The council will decide all questions of military policy, and all important questions affecting more than a single branch of the war office.

(Para. 7). The decisions taken—in our case the defence council—will stand, and executive orders will be issued in the name of the council as a whole.

There is no question in their minds in terms of where the authority rests. It thus become the duty of any military member or members of the council who may dissent from a decision taken, either to resign office, or to accept a share of responsibility for the action involved. While, therefore, loyalty to the service should prevent any member from retaining office, if what he considers a vital principle of policy is contravened, loyalty to his colleagues will prevent the opinions of individual members from becoming known outside of the council room. In other words, there must be a unanimous opinion. The dissent of any member who does not thereupon resign is, by that fact, annulled, and he must accept his share of the consequent responsibility.

With regard to the selection of good men to head the branches the report says, Part I, paragraph 23: While we are strongly of opinion that immense improvement can be effected in the war office and in the army, by reconstructing the administrative machine on sound principles, we are well aware that the personal qualifications of the individual members of the council must be factors of great importance. Men of exceptional abilities can obtain fair results from a bad system, but under a good system, personal shortcomings produce the minimum of disadvantage, and they are, moreover, easily detected. It is of the essence of a bad system that mediocrity or worse is effectively shielded.

The duties and functions of the heads of the four branches are clearly set out. In those days they had the M.G.O.'s branch which does not exist today; it has been shifted over to the munitions and supply branch.

(Part II, Para. 8). The main duties of members as superintendents of branches will be:

(*a*) To take any action entailed by decisions of the council.
(*b*) To give decisions not requiring the authority of the council.
(*c*) To bring before the council any important questions which may arise in connection with the work of their branches and may require decision by superior authority. In other words, they do not go running to the chief of staff. These are brought to the council where civilians sit.

(Para. 9). Members of the council will be responsible for the efficient working of their branches, and in order that responsibility may not be divorced from power, they will have full control over the personnel acting under their orders. There is no buckpassing there; they are held responsible.

(Para. 16). In the absence of a member of the council,—for example, if he is relieved—his duties must be performed by another member. (That is to say, there can be no deputies, as is the case with the army council at Ottawa.)

(Part I, Sec. 2). The appointment of the military members of the army council should follow exactly the long-established practice of the admiralty.

The selection of the military subordinates in each branch should be made by the secretary of state—in our case the minister—upon the sole recommendation of the responsible member of the council; in other words, not by the chief of staff alone.

In your proposed plan you will have him having a great deal to say with regard to who are his pals around that board.

On this point of continuity, you have a chief of defence staff who serves for four or five years, and then a new one will come in. Under the present system, the new one is able to say I want such and such a chap to serve with me. You cannot have that chap coming in and changing the whole system on the whim of one man. He could change the whole organization and policy of the government. There will not be the continuity under a chief of staff which there would be under a council.

I will endeavour to answer any questions by drawing on my own experience. If your are interested, I might try to outline some of the views of General MacArthur on unification. I had some discussion with him on this subject in the Philippines. I might add that Sir Winston Churchill, who had quite a bit of experience in military matters in a few wars, is fully in favour of a council system rather than one man. He is a very strong personality, as you know.

I think that concludes any statement I have, Mr. Chairman. I am a little hesitant here as I see some experts in the audience, including a former minister.

Mr. HARKNESS: That does not mean an expert.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will now proceed with the questions. First I have Mr. Lloyd, then Mr. Harkness, Mr. Temple, Mr. MacRae, and Mr. Groos.

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Malone, being the first questioner, may I express appreciation for the effort you have made to bring to the committee, through your past experiences, proposals, and what you see as some challenging possibilities. First of all, may I ask you a general question.

I did not hear you, or I did not hear any observation from you as to the organization for defence in a nuclear age as compared with the considerations that were given to it prior to the advent of this type of modern warfare. Would you care to draw any contrast between these observations?

Mr. MALONE: I do not think it calls for any basic difference, but there must be a greater emphasis on the question of research and science. You have to decide on the extent to which you want to extend your present research board. I think the basic factors are the civilian authorities, such as supply ministry, the scientific arm, and so on. Undoubtedly, there must be greater emphasis placed on the scientific end in the future.

Mr. LLOYD: As you know in the last several decades we have been increasing our knowledge and appreciation of organization from governmental, civilian, and private corporations, and many techniques have been developed. As I listened to you I wondered whether you had appreciated the staff work that must be accomplished at the chief of staff level? If he is a well qualified man in the post, is he not really reflecting to a very large degree the collective wisdom of the people around him?

Mr. MALONE: Not necessarily. Of course if they are his friends, he will gather around him, if he has this authority, only the people who think the way he does. For example, if he has a chap on the council who is opposed, let us say, to the Bomarc he will get rid of him and get someone who will play it his way.

Mr. LLOYD: You have reminded us that Mr. Churchill liked the idea of the defence council.

Mr. MALONE: Yes, he used it in the admiralty in world war I.

Mr. LLOYD: But he himself did make many decisions.

Mr. MALONE: Yes, as prime minister.

Mr. LLOYD: But on the basis of collective wisdom too?

Mr. MALONE: Yes. But he was quite happy to operate through a board, such as an admiralty or an air defence council rather than through a single chief of staff. He never worked simply through General Alanbrooke, the chief of the imperial general staff. Alanbrooke answered through the army council in England.

Mr. LLOYD: Do you observe any fundamental difference in our approach to this problem in Canada as compared to their approach in Great Britain which might lead to some differences?

Mr. MALONE: Britain adheres to the council, or to the board system. That is the fundamental difference.

Mr. LLOYD: Does this come about because of traditions with respect to the navy? Is the air force, influenced to any extent because of such traditions?

Mr. MALONE: Towards the end of the war we had some rather forceful commanders who came home and wanted to be boss, and we let them do it. This will not work at government level. That is where the trouble starts.

Mr. LLOYD: When we were in England last November on the question of this proposed reorganization I recall the authorities there expressing concern about the future of the R.C.A.F., for example. It was a difficult political decision to subtract from that force.

Mr. MALONE: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: It played a prominent role as one of the elements of the military forces and there was great appreciation of the air force and what it accomplished in world war II. But with the advent of atomic warfare, the missile age and so on, it was also apparent there would be an increasing role to be played.

Mr. MALONE: I quite agree.

Mr. LLOYD: I gathered from observations there that there was some watering down of the scheme of organization so as to meet purely political considerations rather than the pure scheme of organization for this age. Did you run across this?

Mr. MALONE: I think undoubtedly unification will come in Great Britain. Under their present new plan, they still keep the minister for air on the same level as the minister for navy and the minister for the army. They will still keep the minister for air under their set-up.

I would like to think that what you are projecting here could form a pattern for many other countries. I hope I am not misunderstood. I am very much in favour of this completely unified service in Canada. I think we are away ahead in the game. We may make mistakes, but I am in full support of this thing. But there is one principle which might jeopardize your whole program, and that is the setting up for control by one man. He might be a very fine chap, excellent and clever, but you are basing the whole thing on this one man. I would be much happier if you had a council answering to the minister, rather than just this one man.

Mr. LLOYD: To you a defence council is more important because of the nuclear age?

Mr. MALONE: Absolutely.

Mr. LLOYD: The civilian influence in decision making is an important element at the defence council level?

Mr. MALONE: If anything I think it could be much more important because of scientific development and so on. Civilian industry and everything else are subject to a much greater role in any future war.

Mr. LLOYD: Bearing in mind the techniques delegating authorities to officers down the line, are you saying in effect that one must be very careful to define the functions and role and authority of the defence council?

Mr. MALONE: That is quite true.

Mr. LLOYD: And by the same token the functions, role, and authority of the chief of staff in relation to that council?

Mr. MALONE: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: That is in essence what you say; and you believe I gather in the abundant use of a system of checks and balances?

Mr. MALONE: Very much so. At the moment the committee will be determined by the chief of the general staff. This is a very vague thing. There is a great error in placing everything else under him. If you are the chief, then you are responsible for all administration and detail.

Mr. LLOYD: But you still cannot guarantee that with a council there will not be mistakes made, and that even dominant personalities might beat the system.

Mr. MALONE: Lord Esher said that we have done the best we can, but we must not encourage the system. We have men who are commanders because they have strong personalities, but their absolute control must not be encouraged. Let us think of Lord Kitchener in world war I when Britain had a terrible time, when he held large responsibility and was dogmatic; and let us think of General McNaughton at the start of the war, who was a great general to organize an army, and who was a very powerful figure. But I am not quite sure that the government of the day did not have some real hesitancy in vetoing some of his actions.

Mr. LLOYD: I think you will agree that the men who reach this stage are men capable of occupying the position of chief of staff. Surely those men have learned along the line to reflect the collective wisdom of the men around them, and that in their conflicts with the men surrounding them, they would tend to gather around them like-minded people merely because they wished to push on with their viewpoints and get them into operation, and possibly because of the parliamentary system.

Mr. MALONE: They are going to push their projects along and if somebody stands in the way, they get rid of him and get somebody else. This is because of the relationship which you have between the armed services and the minister through a commander in chief. This is where the breakdown occurs, I think.

Mr. LLOYD: Might I sum it up in this way: you suggest to the committee that they pay very close attention to the role of the defence council? It is obvious from your statement?

Mr. MALONE: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: And that in any event very close attention should be paid to how the terms of reference and the authority will function, and how they are to be drawn, and not to leave too many loose ends open for exercising wider authority?

Mr. MALONE: That is exactly my point. You may make mistakes in the unification of your service. I think they can be corrected. But in a fundamental way if you start off with this one error of principle, then the whole system might break down.

Mr. LLOYD: In fairness to the minister, I presume that other members of the committee are suffering under the same difficulty at the moment, that we have not got full details of how the defence council will function. Your

observation is a very temporary one, as to how we should direct our steps in looking in this direction. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I should like to compliment Brigadier Malone on his presentation and on the quite evident large amount of thinking and work behind it. I think it is a great advantage to the committee to get the advice of a person with Brigadier Malone's wide military background and from one who has continued his interest in these matters and done so much thinking about them.

Now, I would like to come to some specific questions. I take it from what you have said that you consider the minister, who is ultimately responsible for all actions that are taken, is in a much better position to make a final decision on any matter which is brought before him if he has independent advice from two, three or four military men rather than from one.

Mr. MALONE: That is the essence of it, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I might say that I tried to bring out this matter one or two meetings ago. I am very strongly of that opinion myself. I think the minister is in a much better position, on the basis of my own experience, if he has several people from whom he can obtain advice; and he is much more likely to arrive at the best decision in this way than if he is dependent on one man only for advice.

Now, so far as the defence council is concerned, I take it that what you are getting at is really the principle of cabinet solidarity, which is one of the principles of our type of government, namely that the cabinet must speak in one voice, in the same way as the defence council, and anyone who does not agree on a question of principle which he considers of great importance must either resign or accept the view of the majority.

Mr. MALONE: He must support it whole-heartedly or get out; you have to be on the team or off it in this business.

Mr. HARKNESS: Once again, this is one of the basic principles of our type of government which I think the government should apply also so far as the defence council is concerned, and I fully agree with that. Now, you brought up the matter that it is charged with the responsibility for the administration of the army and you said it is very vague. In effect, is not the chief of the general staff charged with that as he is with everything else?

Mr. MALONE: Really, in effect, this is what it is. The terms are so broad in the Queen's regulations you could say that. One phrase says he is responsible for the duties of the staff; they will be as he directs. But, this is too vague. He may say: "I told so and so today". It is not written down as to whom, and he could change it tomorrow, and say: "You do it today and someone else do it tomorrow". It is too loose.

Mr. HARKNESS: But the fact is the chief of the general staff is the one man who is responsible for administration as well as everything else so far as the army is concerned?

Mr. MALONE: Yes, and this is far too big a responsibility for one man. His judgment cannot be perfect and it is too big to leave to one man's judgment.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think there is no doubt that the systems arrived at in respect of the admiralty board, the air council and the army council, which we had at one time, which were arrived at as a result of a long period of trial and error, outlines some of the trial and error experience in Great Britain, after which we copied these things. I think there is no doubt that we have to pay a great deal of attention in respect of what happened in the past, not only in this country and in Great Britain but in other countries so far as evolving a system of organization which will work is concerned. I personally would take

the view that having found over a long period that a board or council works more satisfactorily than one supreme commander we should not desert that principle.

Mr. MALONE: That principle is not quite as convenient as it might be but it is the one that has stood the test of time.

Mr. HARKNESS: You also referred to the matter of appointments particularly in respect of the army, and that they were made on the recommendation of the general chief of staff to the minister. You also suggested that the general chief of staff naturally, as a result of human nature, will recommend various appointments of individuals whom he knows and whose thinking probably agrees more or less with his own.

Mr. MALONE: Yes, that is right.

Mr. HARKNESS: If one man is doing this I think it is apparent that there will be more, shall we say, uniformity of thinking in the department and thus more likelihood of mistakes being made than if you have several people working on an independent basis. I presume you would agree with that statement?

Mr. MALONE: Yes, absolutely.

Mr. HARKNESS: You also made some reference to why the C and C principle in the army was not changed when General Pearkes became minister, whom I followed, and I would suggest that the reason for that was that in effect a defence council system was in operation during that time. I indicated to the committee at an earlier stage that all the time I was minister I had a meeting at least every Monday morning with the chiefs of staff plus the associate minister of defence, the research board chairman and others. We had meetings quite often more frequent than that, at which all these matters were discussed and decisions made as a result of the advice of those people. So that in effect for some considerable time past a defence council system has been in operation as far as the Canadian forces are concerned.

Mr. MALONE: I would not like to disagree with the hon. member, but I do not think it was as complete as it should have been.

Mr. HARKNESS: It may not have been as complete as it should have been, and it was not in such formal terms as it might have been, but in effect it was in operation.

Mr. MALONE: I believe it was in effect for the purposes of consultation only. The minister at that time was able to consult with these people but they were not the authority issuing orders. The general chief of staff issued the orders. I believe I am correct in that regard.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but any decision in respect of the orders to be issued was made by what was in effect a defence council.

Mr. MALONE: The Queen's regulations and orders which I read out a moment ago state very clearly that the chief of general staff had almost an overriding authority on military aspects and answers to the minister. He also sets the duties of the other officers.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, as I suggest, there was a defence council in operation and decisions were really made as a result of discussions at those meetings to which I referred. A decision was made at that time and as far as the army was concerned the chief of the general staff, of course, issued the orders.

Mr. MALONE: I would suggest to you that the council to which you refer was formed purely for the purposes of consultation and advice but had no authority as a council.

Mr. HARKNESS: The authority actually was in the hands of the minister.

Mr. MALONE: Yes, and he issued his orders to whom?

Mr. HARKNESS: He issued his orders to the chief of the general staff.

Mr. MALONE: That council did not act in the name of the council but in the name of one man.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is purely a formal matter. As far as the effect is concerned it does not make very much difference whether you have this written down in the Queen's regulations and orders or whether you do not have it written down, as long as you are working in that system.

Mr. MALONE: As you have suggested, you had a situation involving a minister and a chief of staff, who are competent people and agreeable to work together, but that does not necessarily mean the system is right. This all depends on personality rather than a system.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think that personalities determine these things to a large extent no matter what the system is, but the point I am making here is that in effect we have been working under a defence council system. The only point I was making here was that in effect we have been working under the defence council system.

You brought up the matter also of the press or P.R. section or division in the department reporting directly to the minister. I would like to state that I thoroughly agree with that. I think there is no question that this should be part of the minister's office and there should be direct reporting rather than reporting through a deputy minister or a chief of defence staff or someone else along this line.

Mr. MALONE: It has varied since the war, as I understand it. Some ministers have operated directly with their press section; other ministers have delegated the authority either to a deputy minister, a vice chief of staff, or intelligence, or something like that.

Having established the P.R. organization and having unified the three services in Canada, my own experience certainly convinces me that it should be dealt with by the minister. Let me illustrate that point a little. You see, this is something about which we knew nothing at the start of the war. We arrived in the field and found a different situation existing because communication was so rapid. A war correspondent, for example, would file a story in Italy and it would go over the high speed wire out of Naples and would be in the evening edition of the Toronto *Telegram*, and the government would know nothing about it until perhaps three days later. The poor minister would be confronted with questions in the house trying to answer something about which he knew nothing. The army channels are much slower than other channels.

On that basis I was granted authority—which I very seldom used—during the war, approved by General Crerar and General Montgomery, which would enable me in an emergency to use a direct line to the minister in Canada. I only used this on two or three occasions when a commander, inadvertently or because of strong feelings, undertook to give out a statement which I knew would give rise to trouble and that the minister must be alerted. There is no sense in saying that one has to go through a corps headquarters or the adjutant general in those circumstances because it would never get to the minister in time. I could give you a hundred illustrations of that principle.

Areas of political consideration must come into this. The situation is very difficult for a serving officer who must have no political interest whatsoever. That is why I feel there must be a direct line to the minister.

Mr. HARKNESS: In this delicate situation I think there is no doubt that it must go directly to the minister and that there must be a direct line of communication to him.

Mr. MALONE: I am very glad to hear that you agree with me on that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Temple.

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Malone, I take it that your main objection to the proposal is that there is insufficient civilian control.

Mr. MALONE: That is not quite right, no. My chief objection to this is that directly under the minister under your proposed system will be one chief of staff, a professional. I feel there must be a council directly under the minister and there must be a strong element of civilian participation in that council. I think that is a clearer definition of my feelings.

Mr. TEMPLE: Then that is fine; I wanted to clear it up. It is not then the case that you feel there is insufficient civilian control under the proposed new set up?

Mr. MALONE: No, except I would say that they are not in the position of authority in which I think they should be under that arrangement.

Mr. TEMPLE: You were mentioning several dangers in having a single chief of the defence staff. How do you rate those dangers? In what order do you rate them? Do you rate them in the order of political danger, danger as to any direct take over of authority, financial danger, the great waste of money which might result, or a poor defence force?

Mr. MALONE: I think the last one should come first. I have no great fears under the system of Canadian democracy that the army will take over in this country.

Mr. TEMPLE: Nor have I.

Mr. MALONE: You will recall that Mr. King suggested that at one time, but this is not possible. In Latin America it may be the case, but I do not think we will be faced with that possibility here.

Mr. TEMPLE: Then we can rule that out.

Mr. MALONE: I think I would say poor administration.

Mr. TEMPLE: So we can centre pretty well on that?

Mr. MALONE: In my opinion, yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: Now, you said the inspector general would be reporting directly to the minister. The inspector general reports on the accounting policy?

Mr. MALONE: Not necessarily. The former minister here may be able to correct me since I have not followed the point since the war to the same extent. The inspector general, by and large, reports on the efficiency of the forces. He actually visits units, installations, stores, equipment, and so on, and sees that the army functions well. It is not necessarily an auditing operation. Mr. Harkness, I think you could tell me, does the inspector general still report directly?

Mr. HARKNESS: There has been no inspector general.

Mr. MALONE: I made inquiries about this and in my opinion this is a great lack at the moment.

Mr. TEMPLE: To get back to the part of the administration which we have agreed is, in your opinion, the main breakdown in the proposed system, does it, in your opinion, really matter, under administration or under the inspector general, or under what the inspector general might do—there are many phases of this—whether he reports directly to the minister or to the deputy minister.

Mr. MALONE: In actual fact undoubtedly the deputy minister would handle a great number of the items, but it must get to the minister's eyes. If something goes wrong in the unit over in Germany, Cyprus, or wherever your problems are, it could be covered up right up the chain of command. This might reflect on whoever is the senior man, and it might go very high.

If someone has made a mistake or failed to think something through, the minister must know and it must not go through someone else's hands.

Mr. TEMPLE: And yet, with so much going on, does it not really follow that it should go to the deputy minister, and of course from the deputy to the minister? There has to be some way of channelling it.

Mr. MALONE: In actual practice the system was this: Early in the war, during the mobilization period we had an inspector general for eastern Canada and one for western Canada. The reports came directly to the minister's office. As a rule items were drawn to the minister's attention. In many cases he read the thing direct and the item would be referred to the deputy minister for implementation. If the minister was absent, the deputy would take over, but it was the minister's office and not one of the service heads who dealt with it. That is really the point.

Mr. TEMPLE: In effect then—perhaps we are not too far apart on this—it would be the minister's office, but could we then not include the deputy minister?

Mr. MALONE: Yes, but not one of the service chiefs.

Mr. TEMPLE: In the proposed set-up where you have parliament, the cabinet, the cabinet committee on external affairs and defence and so on, we have the chairman of the defence research board, the chief of defence staff and the deputy minister, all of them reporting to the Minister of National Defence.

Mr. MALONE: I think that if you deal with this through the three services, the three branches of the services, that is the supply, administration and operation or G branch, they answer to the defence council. The defence council deals with the minister. The minister, in effect, sits in on that defence council. As I said in my brief, they become his associates, members of the board with him, and they are on the team with him.

Now, regarding the question of the research board and the civil defence, and there may be others there that you would put on—Britain has different ones—there are civilians there and they may not answer necessarily to the defence minister. I do not know whether there is anything wrong in having civil defence as we had it under the Department of National Health and Welfare, but when matters of the defence of the country are concerned they must have a voice on that board because it may have a great bearing on their plans, projections and so on. I do not think it is essential whether they answer to the Minister of National Defence, but they should have a voice on that board.

Mr. TEMPLE: The deputy minister is responsible, I take it, for a great many of the items that formerly were looked after or were the responsibility of the inspector general. Have you had an opportunity to see the proposed charts?

Mr. MALONE: I believe that is the present system; yes. Under the old arrangement prior to the war, the duties of the deputy were pretty well set out in the administrative end—running the department as such. He was not concerned with operations, intelligence, or anything like that. He did not enter into the operational aspect at all. I would assume—and Colonel Harkness may correct me if I am wrong—that he does in effect carry out some of the functions of the old inspector general at the present time; I do not know.

Mr. HARKNESS: I suppose that may be so, but not from the military point of view.

Mr. TEMPLE: Perhaps there is a need for clarification of the word administration, at least in my mind. We had agreed that the basic danger as you saw it was that the defence force would not be of the best because of poor administration?

Mr. MALONE: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: Can we break administration further into two parts; administration so far as the actual military programs are concerned, equipment and the roles of the armed forces and, secondly, into administration as it relates to personnel, auditing, pay, living conditions, education and dependants?

Mr. MALONE: Yes. There is a confusion of terms here. Again I think Colonel Harkness may bear me out. A junior officer used to have to memorize what is meant by administration. His functions had to do with matters of pay, and so on. This is another field. Here we are talking about a broader term—administration of the department. I think that is where the confusion arises.

Mr. TEMPLE: Is the basic danger, as you see it, owing to the lack of military programming, and the roles that Canada's defence forces may play, and the type of equipment they may need?

Mr. MALONE: No. You are going to take your chances in that area that you have good and able men in these jobs. However, in my opinion, that could be destroyed if you depend on one man whose judgment may be weak and whom no one can question.

Mr. TEMPLE: It is a matter of checks and balances.

Mr. MALONE: I have discussed some of these things with the present Minister of Defence. I am in agreement with everything this government is trying to do, except on this one point. Certain decisions must be political decisions—government decisions. Are we going to send a force to Cyprus—this is a government decision. The question is, are we going to do it, and then they decide to do it; the minister takes up with the defence council the matter of how they will do it. They say, we can do this and cannot do that, and they write it into policy. Then the army council, as I see it, should implement that policy and carry it out.

As an example, in 1950, we came to a great test in Europe on the question of the Berlin airlift. Field Marshal Montgomery at that time was the C.I.G.S. The decision had to be made whether or not we were going to go to war. The Russians had cut off all supplies going to Berlin. I was in Field Marshal Montgomery's office, and I said, "What is going to happen?" He said, "This is not my decision; it is political; it is the government's decision, and they have to decide whether or not we are going to fight for Berlin". Later in the day I asked him whether he had had his answer, and he said, "No, they are arguing it". I said, "What is your view", and he said, "It is quite simple; we cannot hold Berlin". He said, "They can fight because of Berlin, but they cannot fight for Berlin because the army cannot hold it".

Mr. TEMPLE: I have one further question. You mentioned Cyprus. Of course there was the advantage of realizing for several weeks that this might become a probability. But with something like Berlin, that you mentioned, it happened, very, very quickly, just over night, when they cut off supplies.

Mr. MALONE: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: When faced with that type of emergency, would we be in a better or a worse position by having a single chief of defence staff to come to a decision, or would we be better off to have three or four chiefs?

Mr. MALONE: I suggest that you are in a worse position depending on the one man. If you must have a decision made, there is no reason why a committee should not make it, with the majority ruling. Thereby you get a better decision. I am not talking about a commander in the field who is in jeopardy of somebody firing a mortar at him. He must make a decision and his troops must back him up.

Mr. TEMPLE: Would not the chief of the defence staff be able to call upon the heads of the other services and take their advice?

Mr. MALONE: Yes, but if they are all his friends, they cannot overrule him. This is the trouble.

Mr. MACRAE: In order to assess the representations of Brigadier Malone we should know the personnel of the proposed defence council that the government introduces here. And what seems to me to be more important is that we should know what the intended role of this defence council will be. Has that been given to us? Have we been given that information up to this point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, if you will read the evidence of our first proceedings, you will see that the minister did discuss the Defence Council. But he will be back as a witness and can be questioned further on this particular point.

Mr. MACRAE: It could well be that the role of the defence council would go much along the line that Brigadier Malone has suggested. That is why I raised the point.

Mr. MALONE: It would not appear so under the present chart which you have. It does not show it in a direct line at all.

Mr. MACRAE: That is all.

Mr. NIELSEN: Is Brigadier Malone personally acquainted with General Walsh?

Mr. MALONE: Yes. I served with him in the first division, and with General Allard. I have a very high regard for them.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now one o'clock and we have reached the time to adjourn. I still have people who indicated that they wished to ask questions. I am afraid they will not be able to do so, and I can only urge committee members to get here more promptly next time so that we do not have questions left unanswered.

Mr. LLOYD: I wonder if Mr. Malone is free for lunch? I have invited those whom I could contact. Some cannot come, but I would be happy if those members of the committee who can come would like to join me for lunch with Mr. Malone.

Mr. MALONE: Thank you very much.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-Sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 6

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 1964

Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

Including Second Report to the House

WITNESSES:

Air Marshal W. A. Curtis, and Major-General W. H. S. Macklin, both of Toronto, Ontario. *From the Department of National Defence:* The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, Minister; and Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20927—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman:

and Messrs.

Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Granger,
Groos,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel,
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacInnis,
MacLean,
MacRae,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
McNulty,
Nielsen,
Pilon,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

THURSDAY, June 4, 1964.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. McNulty be substituted for that of Mr. Asselin (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce) on the Special Committee on Defence.

MONDAY, June 8, 1964.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. MacInnis be substituted for that of Mr. Lambert on the Special Committee on Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

20927—1½

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, June 10, 1964.

The Special Committee on Defence has the honour to present its

SECOND REPORT

Your Committee has considered Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act, and has agreed to report it without amendment.

A copy of the Committee's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to this Bill (*Issues Nos. 1 to 6*) is appended.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID G. HAHN,
Chairman.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 9, 1964.
(8)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Deachman, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch—(17).

In attendance: Air Marshal W. A. Curtis (Retired), Industrialist, of Toronto, Ontario.

The Committee continued its consideration of Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

Air Marshal Curtis was called; he outlined his military and civilian background and then stated his views respecting the purposes of Bill C-90 and on related subjects. The witness was questioned and permitted to retire.

At 12:45 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(9)

The Special Committee on Defence resumed at 3.50 p.m., the Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McNulty, McMillan, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch—(18).

In attendance: Maj. General W. H. S. Macklin, (Retired) of Toronto, Ontario.

The Committee continued its consideration of Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

General Macklin was called, introduced and requested to outline his military background. The witness then presented his views respecting Bill C-90 and on related matters; he was questioned and permitted to retire.

At 6.00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 8.00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(10)

The Special Committee on Defence resumed at 8.15 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch—(18).

In attendance: Honourable Paul T. Hellyer Minister of National Defence; Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; and Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

The Committee resumed its consideration of Bill C-90, An Act to amend the National Defence Act.

Respecting the objectives of Bill C-90, Mr. Hellyer replied to points raised at the last three meetings, by persons from outside the government service. The minister was further questioned.

The Committee proceeded to a detailed consideration of Bill C-90, Mr. Hellyer and Brigadier Lawson answering questions thereon.

Clauses 1 to 10 inclusive, the Title and the Bill were adopted, without amendment.

The Chairman was instructed to report Bill C-90, without amendment, to the House.

At 9.15 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

Note—The evidence, adduced in French and translated into English, printed in this issue, was recorded by an electronic recording apparatus, pursuant to a recommendation contained in the Seventh Report of the Special Committee on Procedure and Organization, presented and concurred in, on May 20, 1964.

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, June 9, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we now have a quorum. Would you come to order, please.

This morning we continue with Bill No. C-90, clause 1.

On clause 1—*Duties of chief of the defence staff.*

The witness this morning is Air Marshal Curtis. Before Air Marshal Curtis makes his statement, on behalf of the Air Marshal I would like to mention that he indicated to me that he has been quite ill over the week end. He is not feeling too well this morning and it was only by persuasion that he decided to appear before us today. So, after the Air Marshal has completed his statement I would ask that you make your questions as brief and to the point as possible so that he can get away early.

I will now ask Air Marshal Curtis to give a few remarks about his backgroun and then to make his statement.

Would you proceed, Air Marshal.

Air Marshal W. A. CURTIS (*Retired*): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I joined the army in 1915. I transferred to the Royal Naval Air Service in 1916. I started flying in May, 1916. I served as a fighter pilot overseas during World War I.

Following the war I joined the Toronto Scottish and spent eight years with them. Then, when they organized the auxiliary air force I transferred to that and served there until the outbreak of war as commanding officer of 400 squadron in Toronto.

During the war I commanded Uplands air station. The year before that I was on postings and records.

At the end of 1941 I went overseas and became Deputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Canadian Air Force in London. I remained there until January, 1944, when I was posted back to Canada, where I served as the Director of Operations and air member for operations. Then, later I became Chief of the Air Staff. I retired in 1953.

Following my retirement I joined the board of the Hawker Siddeley group, then known as A. V. Roe. Although I am still with them I am retiring from that post at the end of this month. I have been Vice Chairman of the board there. However, I think it is time I stopped punching a clock at 9 o'clock every morning and from July 1 forward I will have time to myself rather than be expected to be at a certain place at a certain time every day. Shall I carry on, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: If you would, Air Marshal, with your remarks.

Mr. CURTIS: I have been most interested in the white paper and the proposition of saving $100 million a year. I think it is terrific; it has received the applause of editorials from coast to coast, as it should have done. I think that is a remarkable thing. I understand this will call for a reduction of roughly 10,000 troops in order to make that possible because integration itself will not come anywhere near to doing that. Also, I would think it would take probably a reduction of closer to 20,000 troops to make a saving of $100 million a year possible.

I am very happy to note that the government is arranging for a cash bonus on separation from the services, and I think that is very necessary. However, I do think that a little business education to the troops going out, particularly the officers, would be most valuable. The average businessman thinks that sailors, soldiers, and airmen are very good but that they do not know anything about business. These people do not realize the number of administrative jobs which are held in the services. I know both the University of Western Ontario and Queen's University have short six week courses in the summertime on business administration. This not only would give the retiring officers some knowledge of business but it would help them to make contact with business firms and men in business, which would assist them greatly in relocating.

Also, a good many of the officers have university degrees. As you know, there is a very great shortage of teachers in high schools and universities and I think a course in pedagogy for the few who will decide on that would be very helpful.

I have tried to interest the universities in retiring officers but I have not had much success to date. They seem to think that an officer probably would not be the right man for that profession. I think they would be outstanding because the discipline they have had would help them discipline students all the way along as well as assisting them in their outlook. My feeling is that a short course in pedagogy before they retire would be good.

Now, for the other ranks, there is the greatest shortage in trades of tool and die makers. I believe a lot of airmen would benefit by having these courses. I understand the government is setting up two different schools to teach these trades. There is a great shortage of men in these trades in Toronto and in other parts of the business world and I am sure that tool and die makers would help relieve that situation, as well as helping the men get jobs, which is so important to all of us. Two or three of the young lads who were with me as aides have experienced difficulty in finding civilian employment. When a man is in his late forties or early fifties it is not easy to step into any kind of a job other than, say, a service station or something along that line. So much for that.

Now, in respect of bill 90 and the changes contemplated therein, the administrative changes that are taking place is another matter, and a very serious one. I feel that to do away with the chiefs of staff is a terrible thing to do to the services. I do not care what you do, you are not going to have one service immediately. You may get it in 20 years but, in the meantime, our services are going to go down hill both in respect of morale and spirit.

I feel the three different services are like ships without a rudder; they are tossing around on the sea without a chief or a leader to lead them. That is what the C.A.S. is, the same as the C.G.S. and C.N.S. And, you cannot substitute a chairman who is removed two or three times and who is bound to be from one of the other services. He cannot possibly have the same intimate knowledge of every service that the chiefs have. I think if we had given the chairman the authority he should have had at the start with his command of the three services he would not have the problem that he apparently has had in trying to get agreement on budgets and that sort of thing. I know when General Foulkes was our chairman we did not go into the minister with our separate requests and try to persuade him; although we had discussions with him, we thrashed out our cash requirements and allotments with the chairman, the deputy minister and the three chiefs. We sat around a table and it was quite a battle; but it was an interesting one and was good for the services. Having three chiefs is a good thing; you always have two to keep the other one in line.

We are all anxious; every commanding officer in the whole world is trying to do the best he possibly can for his troops. And, when you have commanding

officers of two other services there to question everything you are doing you have to be pretty sure of the statements you make and the things you are after. So, in doing away with the chiefs of staff we are going to be put in a very bad position from now on. We deal principally with the United States and the United Kingdom. They are not going to go to one service.

I was in Washington two months ago and the report I got from the senior officers there was that although this was an interesting experiment they were too polite to say what they thought but they are not going to attempt it. As you know, we have had naval officers conventions in Washington SACLANT discussions, air officers' conferences as well as army officers' conferences and right now in the next year I suppose there will be no problem in getting officers for these duties, and I suppose they can carry on. But, in two or three years time, when we are all mixed up and we do not know whether an officer is air, army or naval, we will be in an embarrassing position when appearing at joint commissions in Paris, NATO or down in Washington, and I think we will be at a very great disadvantage.

In my opinion, integration at the top one or two echelons is all right. I think the chairman has to become a neutral officer; he usually bends over backwards to be fair to the other two officers and he has to ensure that he does not injure his own service. I have always found the chairman very fair. But, I do think we should have given him the authority he requires to force his views upon the other services rather than doing away with the other services and confusing the three services for a number of years to come. I cannot express myself too strongly in my view that this is a terrible mistake.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will now proceed with questioning.

Would you proceed, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Air Marshal Curtis, there is one point upon which you did not touch in your opening remarks but I do know that you have had a great deal of experience in this connection. Under the proposed organization we have a deputy chief of staff, engineering and development. We have been told that he will be responsible for design, development, testing, evaluation, selection and quality control. From my limited experience it would seem to me that a lot of these duties that he is being given now are performed partly by the aircraft branch as well as by the other branches of the Department of Defence Production. In that do you see that there ought to be functions transferred from defence production to the Department of National Defence which would come more under the orbit of this particular deputy chief of staff?

Mr. CURTIS: That is something I have not studied and really I am not in a position to say.

Mr. SMITH: Except, of course, when you were in the air force you dealt with procurement and since you have left there you also have dealt with supply?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, that is true. Well, I am not in a position to answer really. You must remember I am out now 11 years and they have made a lot of changes in the organization during that time. Although I feel that that is very important I am not in a position to comment one way or the other about it.

Mr. SMITH: To move to another area, you think that the chiefs of staff of the three services ought to be continued. What are your views on the giving of a statutory authority and specific duties to a defence council in line with Brigadier Malone's evidence the other day, who feels there ought to be control and supervision specifically allotted to a defence council.

Mr. CURTIS: We had a cabinet defence committee and we had a defence council, and we discussed many matters there, the chiefs with the deputy

minister and the minister. I felt that that was a very useful thing for thrashing out our over-all financial problems. I think that it is very necessary to continue it.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think it might be stronger if the defence council were given some sort of permanent form under statute?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. LLOYD: Air Marshal Curtis, you used the expression that what is proposed is a terrible thing to do, and it would greatly affect the morale and the spirit of the forces. You went on to say that we need other leaders and so on. Would you be more specific as to how this could come about?

Mr. CURTIS: The department did a wonderful job in explaining the set-up of the forces to the general public. The comments from coast to coast were wonderful. There was much praise for it. Unfortunately that same amount of knowledge or planning was not passed on to the troops. The result is that the troops in the field are very upset right now. I have had it from officers in the army, navy, and air force, all of them. I think the navy and air force more than the army are more upset and more disturbed about the whole thing. They do not know where they are going. The thought is that if they could do away with the chiefs of staff, then anything can happen in the future.

The other day a father said to me that his son, a captain in the army, had written to him to say that there was a very, very disturbed feeling throughout the services. I talked to 150 individual officers in the air force a little while ago, and they do not know where they are going, and what it is all about. There is a very disturbed situation as a result of this bill.

Mr. LLOYD: Would there not be a certain degree of uncertainty about the future in any event under any reorganization proposal?

Mr. CURTIS: I think there would, but here there is no assurance that the end degree has been spelled out, whether they will put us all into one service, and put us into the same uniform, and we would all be the one rank. You see, the question of tradition enters into it. The navy has the greatest tradition of all. How do you get a fighting force? How do you get men ready to fight and to die? You cannot do it by an organizational chart, and by putting one man over it.

Mr. LLOYD: On the other hand, you have to have an organization in order to determine the relationship.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, but we have had an organization and we still have it.

Mr. LLOYD: The only difference I can see in it is that I think that more authority should be given to the chief of staff.

Mr. CURTIS: To the chairman of the chiefs of staff.

Mr. LLOYD: Yes, to the chairman of the chiefs of staff.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, and he is going to be in command over the chiefs.

Mr. LLOYD: No. Let us suppose that the Chief of Staff was given this authority, would it not automatically bolster the morale and spirit of the whole forces?

Mr. CURTIS: If you leave the chiefs there, and give him that authority, yes.

Mr. LLOYD: Would there not still be some uncertainty as to the future of matters in the organization?

Mr. CURTIS: It all depends on how you change the organization. If you bring about just the one organization and put them all into the one kind of uniform, that is one thing. But it has not been spelled out. I was present at

a dinner where there were questions asked, and one person said "I hope that I shall be out of the service before that happens." There is nothing cut and dried, for example, about the type of organization and so on that we shall have. In my opinion the playing will not be good music.

Mr. LLOYD: I find it difficult to imagine any situation in the past where a great many uncertainties did not exist.

Mr. CURTIS: That is right.

Mr. LLOYD: I think you will always have those who are in conflict with a situation where technological changes are coming about. International relations, obligations are changing our roles. Do you not have this state of change?

Mr. CURTIS: These are all situations which are expected and are normal. But here you have a man's way of life being changed.

Mr. LLOYD: Is it correct, or do I understand you correctly when you say that the desirable thing is to have the chief of staff—

Mr. CURTIS: The chiefs of staff.

Mr. LLOYD: The chiefs of staff, who have over them one man, a chairman, with authority to make a decision and in fact to carry it out efficiently.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: That is what would happen, and that is all there is to it?

Mr. CURTIS: When I say a person, he might have a planning board, and intelligence, and the planning board could supervise the planning of the three services. That planning board is very important. I think that should be one of the responsibilities of the chairman. But if the chairman had authority to command over three chiefs, then I think there would not be the uncertainty that there is today.

Mr. LLOYD: All right. But I think it difficult to find the degree of difference in your concern. I do not know. I am not an expert about it myself, and I am just asking these questions as a layman. But I have been in a city where there are several thousand service personnel and my experience has been to the contrary to yours. They are looking forward to that change. Younger people look forward to changes and improvements. The younger men in the services do not seem to be disturbed. What age group and what rank were the preponderance of the people who expressed their views to you? Were they mostly senior officers?

Mr. CURTIS: Most of them were in their forties. The odd one might be younger, but most of them were in their late forties.

Mr. LLOYD: And that was the consensus of those you talked to?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: How many did you talk to about it?

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, 150 would be a round number.

Mr. LLOYD: How would these conversations take place? Would they be just involuntary observations?

Mr. CURTIS: No, I spoke at a meeting and I was questioned by different officers.

Mr. LLOYD: Where was this meeting held?

Mr. CURTIS: In Montreal. It was an air force meeting.

Mr. LLOYD: And you gave an address?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: Following your address what happened?

Mr. CURTIS: I gave an address and questions were asked. I came to this opinion as a result of the questions. I have talked to senior naval officers from the east and the west coasts and I can assure you that they are upset.

Mr. LLOYD: Yes, they are concerned—perhaps concern is a better term—about what their roles will be.

Mr. CURTIS: It is more than concern.

Mr. LLOYD: In other words, what you suggest, is to give authority to the chief of staff to impose his decision?

Mr. CURTIS: I mean to give the chairman of the chiefs of staff authority, and let the services have their leaders.

Mr. LLOYD: And you think with this decision morale and spirit would be better?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know if it would be cured, but it would not remain the way it is now, because a leaderless organization is not much use.

Mr. LLOYD: It would be a different step from what is proposed here.

Mr. CURTIS: You are going to amalgamate the three services. Let me suggest an illustration. Take General Motors. They have a president at the General Motors headquarters. They also have a lot of companies such as Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, and Buick. These companies will compete with each other. They also compete with Ford and other motor car companies. Now, you would not expect General Motors to take away the president or the general manager from those companies and have them function properly, would you? I think that is a case more or less similar.

Mr. LLOYD: When you get into a formally defined relationship it depends on how it is stipulated. Is it stipulated in the form of a statutory provision, or are there rules and regulations or orders in council, in some way establishing the relationship to the various points of authority, as to how they shall be expressed and divided? Is this not where you get organizational relationship? Do you think you can fairly judge this, until you have these various details?

Mr. CURTIS: You mean the details of the services?

Mr. LLOYD: And how the flow of authority will be guided or directed.

Mr. CURTIS: It has not been made clear. It is something which is to happen in the future.

Mr. LLOYD: If this is made clear, perhaps we could do a better job of judging it.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, possibly we could. But I would be surprised if without a leader any organization could do very well.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Groos.

Mr. GROOS: My question has already been answered.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Lessard.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Shall I speak in French or in English? It is easier for me to speak in French.

(*Translation*)

Air Marshal Curtis, you said you were satisfied with the plan designed to reduce by $100,000,000 a year, to save $100,000,000—

(*Text*)

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, Mr. Lessard. The switch was wrong. Would you mind repeating your question, please?

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I understood you to say you were pleased with the plan designed to reduce, or to save $100,000,000 a year. Is that what you said?

(*Text*)

Mr. CURTIS: That is correct.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): You also said that in order to bring about that saving, the armed forces would probably have to be reduced not by 10,000 men as expected, but by 20,000 men.

(*Text*)

Mr. CURTIS: I said it could be as high as 20,000, yes.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): You also stated that at the present time the integration plan is having a bad effect on morale. Do you not think the bad effect on morale is caused, not so much by the integration plan itself, as by the uncertainty as to Canada's future military role?

(*Text*)

Mr. CURTIS: I think that the future military role of this country, as we have been following it lately, is a very good one. I think the Prime Minister has done an extremely fine job in organizing and getting a police force to go to different parts of the world. This is a role that the Canadian army has played extremely well and it will continue to do it well. I think this is a better contribution than we can make in any other way, that is, after our NATO and NORAD commitments have been satisfied.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): That is the point, since you accept the fact that Canada's future role will be that of a military police force, in that case is it not supported by the statement and the plan to reduce Canada's military strength, I mean as regards attack since our role will mainly be—I entirely agree with that—a peaceful role. In that case would it not be perfectly normal for us to attempt to centralize our military administration under a single directorate since we shall only have one role to play? We shall no longer have three roles to play as we had before namely in the air, on the sea and on land, since the said police force will mainly play its part on land, the navy, as such, will not have much of a part to play, nor will our air force since we have already begun to lay aside the Voodoos, and it is not planned to acquire others in the near future for use as combat aircraft. Our air force, as such, will soon become merely a transport unit to give mobility to the international police unit we intend to train in Canada. In the context of Canada's future role, is it not perfectly normal that our air force officers should feel a bit lost since they will no longer be playing the part they used to play? Should we not accept that situation, since there is no other alternative?

(*Text*)

Mr. CURTIS: If Canada's military role in the future is to be anything more than that of a police force, that would make it quite different. But if our role is going to be nothing more than purely a peacekeeping one, I think that there would be a waste of time in having an air force at all, and that you would do better to have T.C.A. run your transport. I would get rid of the air force right away. And I do not think you would need a navy to run transports. The Canadian navy is not designed to do anything but a transport role. It is

of course a fighting service. And once you take away the fighting role from any service, the service loses its push, and it is not much good. If you are not going to have an air force which has a fighting role, and we have commitments to NORAD and to NATO, then if there is ever a war of any size, you will be in difficulty, you will need an air force. Since 1918 you cannot have a fighting war with troops without some form of air force to protect them. If the enemy has an air force, then we have to have one.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): We have to face the possibility of a future war, which, it is more than probable, if it is a large-scale war, will be a nuclear war. So what part will the forces play in a nuclear war since it is now asserted that that war will be waged with the use of guided missiles, against which the air force, to all intents and purposes, will have no part to play? Hence the original role of the air force is eliminated. Do you agree?

(*Text*)

Mr. CURTIS: One of the bases of a nuclear war, one of the thoughts in planning up to the present time has been that after the initial onslaught of missiles then the bombers come over and clean up. Missiles soften the target and the bombers come over to clean up. That is the theory they have been working on for some years. And in the event of a nuclear war would we not need an air force afterwards to interfere with bombers coming in?

Everyone seems to have lost any thought of fighters, or air superiority, or reconnaissance, or photography. Since we have been talking of nuclear war the whole of the country seems to have gone mad about bombers and interceptors, saying that if we do not have a nuclear war, then we do not need an air force. Nothing could be farther from the truth than that unless someone has made the decision that we are not going to have a war again, that we are not going to have any more normal kind of fighting—and that is a pretty big decision to make; but if that decision has been made then all other things are of little or no importance.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): One final question, you stated that you would have preferred to retain the chiefs of staff of the three groups. You also stated that what was wrong, was that there was not enough authority or that the head of the chiefs of staff had no authority and that if he had had authority, certain mistakes that occurred might have been avoided. Do you really believe that greater authority would have avoided a mistake such as that of the Arrow into which we poured billions of dollars, or that of the Bobcat, into which we poured millions of dollars, or that of the frigates which we just escaped in time by putting a stop to them, or maybe like that of the three conventional Oberon submarines we have just ordered. If these people had had more authority do you think they might have decided that these things should not be done since, when all is said and done, they proved useless.

(*Text*)

We are concerned with money and we have to save money not only on people but on materials too.

Mr. CURTIS: That is true. You see, you cannot say that those things were all mistakes. I made a promise some five years ago and again two and a half years ago that I would not discuss the Arrow, but I would like to say this. The Arrow was a terrific success. As an aircraft, it met every specification; it went up to 50,000 feet and, on its third flight, it travelled at 1,400 miles an hour. It was the greatest manufacturing-design effort that Canada has made in any advanced form.

I have said that I am not going to enter into discussions on that because that is a closed book, and nothing would be gained by my saying anything about it. I feel that that is water over the dam. However, I do feel that Canadian industry built a wonderful aeroplane.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): In that case, just one last point, could we in Canada, to beat Egypt, allow ourselves to build pyramids like the Egyptian pyramids here in Canada, just to make them taller and finer so as to show that we are capable of doing things better than they can, if they are of no use to the country as such?

(*Text*)

Mr. CURTIS: This was not a pyramid; this was something which was of use to the country. However, I am not going to talk any more about that; it is sufficient for me to say that it was not a pyramid. It was a very fine production on Canada's part; it showed great skill, though that was not the reason for it. I will not go into that.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Thank you very much.

Mr. MATHESON: Air Marshal, you spoke a moment ago about the perhaps cavalier way in which a lot of people are tending to dismiss the fighter and reconnaissance roles. Would you not agree, however, that as time progresses and as we see it now the fighter and the bomber role must diminish very substantially in importance relative to the transport role for the Canadian air force?

Mr. CURTIS: It all depends. It depends upon whether or not we are going to have a war, a major war—and by that, I do not mean a world war. There are many hot spots that could develop into war. If we are prepared to say that we are not going to have that, that we are never going to have another war, then your statement is quite right. But I do not know who is prepared to make that statement.

Mr. MATHESON: Air Marshal, assuming we are able to carry on as we hope in a period of peace or comparative peace and that these changes and shifts do in fact take place—that is a diminution of the fighter and bomber roles relative to the transport role—is this in itself not very disturbing to the air force personnel, particularly those in the age group of 40 and above?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not think so. The air force has been pretty advanced in their thinking and they are very flexible and are prepared to change as they go along. I do not think that worries them very much; I really do not. If there is no role for fighters or bombers, then there will not be any fighting and there will not be any war.

Mr. MATHESON: When you made comments on the lack of a chief of the air force, a chief of sea forces and so on reporting directly to the Minister of National Defence, were you bearing in mind that Mr. Hellyer told us, I think, that the chief of air forces, the chief of land forces and the chief of sea forces were reporting directly to the chief of defence staff who was producing a consolidated view for the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: That is right. They can do that. It is only a matter of an order to be issued to say they are not to come direct but they are to go with the chairman. If the chairman is dealing with a problem affecting them, he will take them with him. They are the top men in that branch of the service.

Mr. MATHESON: We might well have an air officer who would be senior officer of the defence staff—

Mr. CURTIS: We have at the present time.

Mr. MATHESON: —and I wonder how it could be contended by you or your air force friends that the views of the chief of the air force would not be brought forcibly to attention.

Mr. CURTIS: I do not think any chairman can possibly know enough about every service to speak in detail to the minister about them. I think there are times when he would want to take that chief in with him. I do not think it is humanly possible for one man to have all the knowledge necessary to understand all the intricacies of every department. I really do not think this is humanly possible. They are very complicated services in this age of technology when we are going ahead faster and faster, and I do not think it is possible. The higher up you go and the farther away from the working level the more difficult it is to understand everything. With three services you have a man who has been brought up and trained all his life through one service. What hope has he of understanding the other two? Not very much.

Mr. MATHESON: But, Air Marshal, can you conceive that it is possible and desirable in Canada's over-all future defence policy that from time to time the role of one of the services may diminish relative to others and that there may be a change in emphasis?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. MATHESON: You do see that?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, I see that.

Mr. MATHESON: That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. LANIEL: Part of my questions have been answered already. I was impressed by the witness's comment, as was Mr. Lloyd, and I am wondering if it is really as bad as that. I have been in the air force and I have served for eight years in an anti-aircraft unit. I was not personally too much affected or worried about decisions at a high level; I was more worried about the decisions affecting me at a lower level. Even if these changes are made and if the chiefs of staff are removed, I am wondering if you would not think, as I do, that there will be some other components and there will be still a commander of the different services until such time as there is integration, whereby the morale and spirit of each of the services will be maintained. I do not really see how it could be as bad as you have put it. We have the experience here in Canada of our military colleges in which each one has a change of command every four or five years and not necessarily a change of personnel, although there may be a change in administrative personnel to a small extent. I do not think that really affects our military colleges. I am wondering if this would not be a comparison that would at least bring to our minds the benefit of the doubt towards such a change.

Mr. CURTIS: The point is that there will not be a leader. They can go to the personnel department with their problems but there is no person responsible; there is no one for the different services. When they let the chiefs go—which I understand will take place in July of this year—there will be no one to speak for the three services. The chairman's will be the only voice there is.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but there will be some representation of the services at the level of the chief of staff, as we were told by the minister.

Mr. CURTIS: There are lots of committees set up throughout the place but there will be no one there to speak for the navy or the army or the airforce as such.

Mr. LANIEL: You commented upon the report and the white paper. That was well received by the country and it would be a good thing if we could manage to save $100 million.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: There is also the fact that our defence expenses are growing bigger and bigger all the time. We must think about money at the same time. I am going to ask you this question: in your many years of service have you found other ways in which to secure an efficient military force within our financial means? Have you found any way other than unification of the services?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not think unification of the services is the answer to that; that is just an administrative change—calling things by different names and doing things in different ways. I do not believe our defence budget has been going up and up every year. I believe it has been stationary or even coming down since I was in the service. In comparison with other countries in NATO I understand we are pretty well down the ladder. We are not carrying our weight to the same extent financially as we were ten years ago. We are now over half way down the list.

Mr. LANIEL: By doing this we have to shrink and shrink and to forget about the period ahead because we are trying to economize rather than look forward?

I think the servicemen are worried, because of this unification of command, that there will be a broader spectrum for civilians within the programming of defence in Canada while, at the same time, bringing this country in defence to the size of our possibilities.

Mr. CURTIS: I have no quarrel with reducing the size of the forces if that is necessary and if the finances are not available to do otherwise, but I do not think the proportion of money now being spent on administration is right. If we have a five year plan that will add $100 million to that spent already, our forces will be well equipped and will be kept well equipped, and that is something that is very important.

Mr. LANIEL: In what way do you say that we would look silly—or whatever term you used—in attending meetings of joint committees of NATO and other international forces? Is it a matter of sentimentality again?

Mr. CURTIS: No. If there is a naval conference one must send naval officers; one cannot send someone who knows nothing about the navy or the conference. To SACLANT, where they are discussing north Atlantic defences, one must send naval officers. To send someone who has no naval training is a waste of time, and one certainly need not send them.

Mr. LANIEL: We have had federal-provincial conferences many times, and the minister attends. Although he does not know the angles, he brings qualified personnel. They become quite constructive sometimes.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, but I do not think it would be a happy and congenial arrangement to have other than naval officers at a naval conference. I think we have to have that if we are going to carry on and be a part of NATO and NORAD, where we have to take part.

Mr. PILON: Mr. Chairman, my main question has been answered.

I would prefer to deal with grass roots and other ranks than the illfeeling among high ranking officers. I believe in tradition; I believe in a lot of things, but we are living now in 1964 and I would like to make an allusion to the example you gave us a while ago concerning General Motors of Canada. A man who is helping to build an Oldsmobile should be getting the same salary as the man who is helping to build a Chevrolet.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McNulty.

Mr. McNULTY: Air Marshal, I was interested in your observation that the United States are not thinking of integration. As Mr. Pilon has brought out, you made a comparison when you were answering Mr. Lloyd's question of the General Motors set-ups. They have a manager for Chevrolet, a manager for Oldsmobile and so on. I take it you were talking about the United States organization and not the Canadian General Motors set-up?

Mr. CURTIS: The Canadian General Motors set-up has managers or presidents for each of its industries.

Mr. McNULTY: But all these different units are manufactured in the same organization; they are integrated.

Mr. CURTIS: Are they not just assembled here?

Mr. McNULTY: The parts are made here.

Mr. CURTIS: It is because of size, is it not?

Mr. McNULTY: Is it not the same with our defence set-up?

Mr. CURTIS: No, where they are doing it all in one place they have a manager or president in one place. In General Motors they have a president in Oshawa, Ted Walker.

Mr. McNULTY: But there are different units manufactured and assembled there. I am just wondering if, because of the size of our country and the amount of money available, we do not have a completely different set-up than there would be in the United States and, necessarily, a different role to play.

Mr. CURTIS: If you were starting from the bottom and going up and building up our services, you could do it much more easily than when starting from the top and going down. If we were building new services it would not cause half the problem it does with our present organization where they have had tradition for years and years and years.

Mr. McNULTY: You are considering tradition and the set-up which they have had for many years; but the same applies to General Motors, who have to accommodate themselves now to automation. This is taking an entirely different look at the picture and the needs for the future.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, I would like first to say that I missed the presentation given by the witness at the beginning of the meeting because I was attending another committee. Therefore, if I ask questions that have already been asked I would wish you to say so in order to eliminate repetition.

I have some concern, Mr. Chairman, that our National Defence Act is very sketchy; it has given wide powers to the chiefs of staff since some time during world war two and now gives wide powers to one chief of the defence forces. This being the case, it would seem to me that the total responsibility in a wide field rests with the chief of the defence forces as one man; and therefore any defence set-up is, by the very nature of things, going to be the plan of that man as an individual, to a greater or lesser extent.

We are going forward in perhaps a trial and error business to a certain degree. This being the situation, do you not think there is a danger that errors will not become evident early enough because there will be a tendency for the chief of the defence forces to defend his decisions, even in cases where there may be a difference of opinion on whether or not things are being done in the best possible way? For that reason, would it not be more sound to have a defence council with certain responsibilities charged to each member of that defence council by legislation so that if some segment of the defence situation is not up to par one individual will be responsible for that particular aspect?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not believe you could operate properly in that way. The officer in command has to have authority and responsibility. I do not believe that a committee would be of any great use in a military set-up such as this. The senior officer has to be responsible and bear that responsibility. However, he may make a mistake, and he would not be human if he did not make some, I suppose.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Perhaps I have not expressed myself well. I was trying to compare or contrast the system we have in Canada with the system that is in use in the United Kingdom. I think perhaps the United Kingdom system has safeguards that we do not have in this regard.

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know about that. I do know they have given their chairman command over the three chiefs. They did exactly what I was suggesting that we do. But, I do not know of any other arrangements they had internally to protect them.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I have a further question. Does the witness think it would be beneficial to have an inspector general of the forces or some other official who is technically qualified to pass judgment and who would have direct access to the minister in respect of the efficiency of the defence forces? The thing that concerns me is that non-professionals, as most members of parliament are, including the members of any government, find themselves in a difficult position when arguing against a plan or a course of action which is proposed by the defence forces because of the fact they have no technical advisers who are qualified to pass judgment on this plan other than the people who have created the plan, and human nature being what it is there may be a little prejudice involved.

Mr. CURTIS: We have had inspector generals in the services. Some countries have them and operate with them. However, my personal view is that they are not of much use. If they were on the staff of the minister, reporting to him alone, they might be of some use. But, the experience I had during the war is that they were not very good. I was not impressed.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I want to go now to the administration of the Department of National Defence. When parliament votes supply and passes estimates for the defence department, large contracts, other programs, purchases and so on have to be approved finally by the treasury board before the purchases and other actions are taken.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): How can the treasury board be in a position to pass a valid judgment on the sense or otherwise of such a proposal?

Mr. CURTIS: They have treasury officers in each department; these men are very active and very much in the picture in respect of all the costs. I think the defence department in every one of the services had treasury officers. Certainly the deputy minister's office has men. That is his job as well. But, they report to the treasury and advise treasury.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I am aware of that. However, I think there have been cases in the past where treasury board has not accepted this advice and have contended that a certain proposed program by a certain department is not the best course of action. Therefore, you have the treasury board acting as a sort of super minister, if you like, and I take great exception to the philosophy that treasury board should have this power. I would agree that treasury board should have the right to say you must spend X number of dollars less but you should make the savings where you see fit. But, to say that a particular program is not going to be approved I think is outside of the reasoning and jurisdiction of treasury board.

Mr. CURTIS: I am very familiar with the troubles we have in getting our policies through treasury board and through the deputy minister's office. Financial people quite often have the faculty of delaying, delaying and delaying, and they take so long to look into things that half a year is gone before the authority comes through to spend your money, and the services then are blamed for asking for more money than they want. But, that is government; that is not the services.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): In the wide field then does it not boil down to the fact that you have to have the best men possible in the defence forces as senior officers, which I believe we have?

Mr. CURTIS: I think so.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): And, have had. I think as a country we have been extremely fortunate in this case. But then, in actual practice, does not any government have to rely upon their judgment in the final analysis and hope that they are right?

Mr. CURTIS: That is right, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Will you proceed now, Mr. Temple.

Mr. TEMPLE: Air Marshal Curtis, am I correct in assuming from what you have said that if we have the chiefs of staff or advisers—let us say advisers to all the services—and then have one chairman of the chiefs of staff or one defence chairman that in a time of emergency it is better to have that one man, who may have called upon the others for their advice, to make the decision rather than have a prolonged debate between three or four people in respect of what is to be done.

Mr. CURTIS: I would say yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: Is flexibility a key word in the defence forces?

Mr. CURTIS: It is in the air force anyway and I think it is in the other services. But, that is one of the main foundation stones.

Mr. TEMPLE: As Mr. Lessard said earlier perhaps he cannot see much of a role for a fighter air force or bombers—that is, tactical—there could be conceivably situations aside from NATO commitments where we might put several thousand men into peacekeeping operations. In your opinion, would it be wise if we had several thousands of men in a peacekeeping operation and had no tactical air force for them?

Mr. CURTIS: It depends on the situation entirely; if there is any possibility of it breaking out into a larger show than peacekeeping you would need it.

Mr. TEMPLE: Not only that but if we had several thousands of men in a peacekeeping operation would it be wiser to have our own tactical air support or to have to rely upon one or another nation to supply that?

Mr. CURTIS: Now, you see, our peacekeeping efforts are not done in conjunction with the United States or the United Kingdom as a rule; they try to keep the smaller countries in that role. Therefore, it may be we would have to have an air support unit to back them up because if the United States was in they obviously would have air force personnel there.

Mr. TEMPLE: Have you had the opportunity yet to read the minister's statement to the committee in full?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: Would you propose any changes to the present set-up of the armed forces?

Mr. CURTIS: Do you mean as outlined by Mr. Hellyer?

Mr. TEMPLE: No. Any at all.

Mr. CURTIS: Well, I do not quite get the question.

I have mentioned that I would like to see the chairman kept in his position, the three chiefs of staff remain and the committee under the chairman of intelligence and planners, and leave the rest of the organization with moderate changes. I do feel very strongly that the main big change we are making is not a technological change; I think it is a step backward.

Mr. TEMPLE: Am I correct in assuming that you would propose very few, if any, changes?

Mr. CURTIS: Very few unless the situation is changed and we are not going to have another war, so that our main role in the world is going to be a peacekeeping force. That would change it entirely. If there is no danger of war; if someone feels sure enough that we are not going to be engaged in another major war, then that changes the entire picture very quickly.

Mr. TEMPLE: Well, I believe you did say that one chief of defence staff, one man, a head man—

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: I will call him the chief of the defence staff; he would be much better able to make decisions, especially emergency decisions that had to be made.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, I think that is right, but having three chiefs as advisers.

Mr. TEMPLE: Now, going into the matter of treasury, as you said, treasury officials investigate so often that half the year might have gone by before they are in a position to do anything financially. Would you agree then it would be a good idea to have a long range plan of five to seven years in so far as expenditures in respect of the procurement of equipment and manpower are concerned?

Mr. CURTIS: I would, yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: Thank you. Those are all my questions.

Mr. HARKNESS: Air Marshal Curtis, one of the propositions put before us so far as the proposed change is concerned was that there would be a great advantage in having one channel of military advice so far as the minister is concerned rather than the present four channels of military advice from the chairman of the chiefs of staff and the chief of staff of each of the services. Do you consider it an advantage to the minister in arriving at a decision—and, he is the one that has the final responsibility in important decisions—to have military advice from one source or would it be better if he obtained it from several sources?

Mr. CURTIS: I would think he should get it pretty well from the one source, but have specialists in the different services to support it because I am firmly convinced that no one man can give all the answers in detail. It is just not physically humanly possible.

Mr. HARKNESS: Then, what you are saying, in effect, is that it is better for the minister to get advice from these various sources than it is from one source?

Mr. CURTIS: No, from one source. He would have to go through the chairman and do it that way. But, I really feel that the chairman, if he has the authority, is that source.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, let us say that you were still the chief of staff of the air force, would you be content to have advice in respect of air force matters coming entirely through the chairman or would you prefer to give it directly?

Mr. CURTIS: I would much prefer to give it directly. I think I could put my case better than the chairman could. That is my personal opinion.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is really the whole point I am getting at. My own view is that the minister is in a much better position if he gets advice from three or four sources rather than one source.

Mr. CURTIS: But I understand that one of the problems of the minister is trying to meet the requests of all three services in respect of expenditures—

An hon. MEMBER: Hear, hear.

Mr. CURTIS: —and their budget. And, that point has always been thrashed out during my time with the chairman, the deputy minister and the three chiefs around the table. I discounted that part of it. Things may have changed since I left.

Mr. HARKNESS: The main point here I think is that it is intedned to have really only one source of advice for the minister which, in my view, is a weakness rather than a strength. I think there has been some confusion, as evidenced by the questions here, in regard to the heads of the services. The proposal in the bill that we are considering is to do away with the heads of each service; there will be no head for the army, the air force or the navy, as the case may be, once this bill is passed.

Mr. CURTIS: That is right.

Mr. HARKNESS: And, this is the thing that you object to particularly. You feel very strongly that there should still be a head for each service?

Mr. CURTIS: I do, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, there are two things, in my view, that we are considering. One thing we are considering directly is the unification of command and the unification of staffs at national defence headquarters. In addition to that there is the matter of the extent to which the three services will disappear, with one service taking their place. What is your view in that regard?

Mr. CURTIS: I think we will lose more than we gain there. We are not going to save any money on uniforms. The rank does not matter so far as the air force and army is concerned. If they want to change the air force rank to army rank that would not worry the air force. But, I could not imagine a naval officer going on board ship and saying "good morning, colonel", to the captain. I think that would be difficult. But, I can see no problem there.

Mr. HARKNESS: Your view is that the maintenance of the three separate services would be an advantage and sort of lumping them all together into one would be a disadvantage.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes. I do not think this has been spelled out. It has been left up in the air. No one knows whether it is going to be one service with pink or green uniforms or three services, as we have now with the tradition and spirit of each of the services remaining to carry on. But, once they spell that out and tell us how it is actually going to happen that will settle a lot of problems for a lot of people in the field.

Mr. HARKNESS: You stated you were in favour of saving $100 million on, say, general administrative expenses, and putting that money somewhere else, it is not a saving but a matter of a transfer.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: And, putting that into equipment, say, instead?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you any idea in what particular fields the reduction of personnel should take place?

Mr. CURTIS: I think I would rather not answer that question. I have an idea but I would rather not answer that. That is something which has to do with the different services and I would rather that was answered by someone in the services.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you make a distinction in this regard between what I would call the fighting units and administrative units or personnel.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes. You have to have a certain number of administrative personnel; you cannot avoid that. But Parkinson's law applies there and you build up automatically at a terrific rate.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you consider the most effective way of saving personnel and of getting perhaps a more effective organization would be by the integration of the administrative functions, by which I mean, of course, the medical services, the pay services, the repair of vehicles, the supply of food and so forth?

Mr. CURTIS: Well, could you have the same gain there? We amalgamated the chaplain services, and what happened? We got two air commodores, one a protestant and the other a catholic superimposed on the group captains who had been there before. So we reorganized the chaplain services and made a great saving by adding two senior officers to it. We amalgamated the medical service, which might have had a lot of benefits in the field, but again we put a major general at the head of the medical services where we had had air commodores and brigadiers before.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is an example of Parkinson's law.

Mr. CURTIS: Well, I am afraid that is what you get into with a new organization.

Mr. HARKNESS: Generally speaking do you feel that there is a better opportunity to save personnel by the integration of these administrative functions rather than by attempting to integrate new units?

Mr. CURTIS: I would say definitely that you could have quite a savings, let us say, in signals, for instance, if you had all your communication systems grouped in one command.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think there is no doubt about it, that there is in this the greatest possible saving of personnel without loss of efficiency, and with perhaps an increase in efficiency. That is as at least a theoretical position. Whether it is practical when carried into effect is a different matter. It depends on how you do it.

Mr. CURTIS: All these things are aside from the fighting forces. If military people are supposed to be prepared to fight, you must keep their spirits up and motivated, and not let them be frittered away.

Mr. HARKNESS: I thoroughly agree with you that you must distinguish between the fighting unit and the administrative unit and its functions. From the point of view of morale which you mentioned, I take it from your experience and the conversations you have had with the people with whom you have been in contact, that this led you to the view that there has been a very considerable loss of morale?

Mr. CURTIS: Everyone is worried. Morale is starting to go, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: And you think this mostly has been due to a great extent to uncertainty as to what the situation will be in the future?

Mr. CURTIS: I cannot speak very much for the army because I have not talked to many army officers and to any troops at all. I do not know what their view is really; but I have spoken to senior naval and air force officers and to retired naval officers, and that is where I am basing my statement.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you place uncertainty on lack of information as to what the planning is to be as the chief cause of this?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, that and worry about losing their identity.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I must say that my experience has been very much the same as yours. I think anybody who has any considerable military back-

ground and experience is bound to have a lot of people talking to him about these things. Certainly I have. There is no doubt that there has been very considerable loss of morale, and I think there is no doubt that it is due to this uncertainty. In order to prevent further deterioration of morale, I think the sooner something definite can be done about it, the better it will be. Would you think that as long as the present situation continues there might be considerable loss of the best and the brightest officers in the service?

Mr. CURTIS: I would think so, and I would think that a lot of our technical officers can go outside and earn twice as much money as they are getting in the service. I would not be surprised to see them start to go and take jobs which offer pay better than they can receive in the service.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am very much afraid not only about technical people particularly but also about the actual fighting units and those in command positions and so on who are sufficiently able that they can get jobs quite readily in civilian life and they will be doing this in large numbers unless the present situation is cleared up.

Mr. CURTIS: That is my feeling, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: There has been a bit of talk about roles here, and I think there must have been some confusion between Mr. Lessard and the others as to what our military roles are to be. I would refer to the first 15 pages of the white paper issued, which laid down very definitely that the roles are going to continue in practically the same way as they have in the past several years; in other words, that we are going to continue to maintain forces in NATO and NORAD and to have them available for peacekeeping operations under the United Nations for the protection of Canada and so on, and that the general composition of the fighting forces is to remain more or less as it has been. I am talking about the fighting units.

Mr. CURTIS: I understand.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Do you agree with the point of view expressed by Mr. Harkness?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, I read it, and I believe that is where it is supposed to be or is going to be.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, in connection with what Mr. Lessard mentioned of what is to be our chief role for peacekeeping operations, is it your understanding, that it is our chief role?

Mr. CURTIS: No, I think it is an active side role where we really are doing a lot of good with a few men.

Mr. HARKNESS: In connection with the discharge of that role, do you think it is possible to discharge it unless you have well balanced naval, ground and air forces, in which a variety of military skills of all kinds is to be found?

Mr. CURTIS: So far they have been in parts of the world where they have not required any fighter support, any air force support other than transport.

Mr. HARKNESS: No.

Mr. CURTIS: And in that case I think we have done a good job in furnishing air transport. But the air force must be very mobile and must be trained in going to all parts of the world to be able to get into these places and do a job. I think they have supported the army very well in that way.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was not thinking of what role the air force has played in the past particularly. I was thinking generally, in order to meet any requests which we might receive from the United Nations for peacekeeping operations, and that every request we have received so far has been different.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: There has not been any request which was the same as a previous one, and in order to be able to meet requests which may be of almost infinite variety, is there any way to do it except to have a pretty well balanced and flexible force?

Mr. CURTIS: It has to be a force in being.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, in being.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, there is no other way of doing it.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think that is the point. That is the only way you can carry out any peacekeeping operation.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, the forces have to be available, and ready to be sent immediately.

Mr. HARKNESS: And the forces must have a variety of capabilities.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Air Marshal Curtis, when you were chief of the air staff you said this morning that you met with the chief of staff and the chiefs of the staff committee and with the deputy minister and thrashed out budgets?

Mr. CURTIS: That is right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I believe also you yourself had access to the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: On what matters would you have access to the minister? What problems would come up in the main as to which you would have discussions with the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, the minister always has a lot of questions. He receives hundreds of letters from constituents and from different people, and the chief of the air staff is called in to give him the answers. I do not know if I could offer you a specific case now. But he would want to know different things about the air force, what we were doing here, what we were doing there, what we were planning, and he would send for the chief and discuss it with him.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Referring to the word planning, would you be called in for instance to discuss your budget, or your whole departmental program?

Mr. CURTIS: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You say you would not?

Mr. CURTIS: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Or your individual budget, this would never be brought up between you and the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: He discussed the budget with the chief of staff committee? Did he attend that committee?

Mr. CURTIS: He discussed it with the chiefs of staff, but he would not attend that committee.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You say that he did not attend that committee?

Mr. CURTIS: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This discussion of the budget would be between the minister and the deputy minister and between the minister and the chief of staff?

Mr. CURTIS: And the chairman of the chiefs of staff.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And the chairman of the chiefs of staff, but you would not yourself be concerned in the matter of discussing the budget with the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The problems which you would discuss with the minister would be those relating to inquiries in regard to some incident or something in the branch?

Mr. CURTIS: That is right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Let us take the case of new weaponry, or something of that kind. Would you discuss a matter of that kind with the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, I would brief him, and usually I would advise of the advantages or disadvantages of certain aircraft, or of plans of what we were doing in Europe, France, or Germany, in our bases over there, just to keep him generally informed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: To what extent would you initiate conversations with the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, quite often, if there was a problem, on which we wanted a decision, I would have an appointment and go in and discuss it with him.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What kind of problem would arise in which you would initiate an interview with the minister? Can you recall any plot or class of problems which might require your initiation of an appointment rather than his?

Mr. CURTIS: No, but there were plenty. Many times I have even gone in and discussed something on which I wanted to get his view.

Mr. DEACHMAN: How often? When you say "plenty", how often would this arise? Would you be seeing the minister weekly?

Mr. CURTIS: Certainly every other week. Sometimes it was weekly, and sometimes two or three times a week. Other times it would be two or three weeks.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The other chiefs, the C.G.S. and C.N.S. would be doing the same thing?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So we would expect that the minister would have anywhere from three to half a dozen visits a week on matters from each of the service chiefs?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know if he would have quite that many.

Mr. DEACHMAN: As a sum total?

Mr. CURTIS: He might have from three to six a week.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You say from three to six a week from the service chiefs?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And these would be concerning various matters and dealing with these particular services?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And then in addition to that there would be the chairman of the defence committee, and his interviews with the minister would be on a more frequent basis, would you say?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, that is right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you recall if there was any discipline within the chiefs of staff committee as to what matters would be referred to the minister and how they would be referred to him?

Mr. CURTIS: No, there was not any.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Did the minister on any occasion indicate to you, or was there any communication to the committee, that there were too many visits going on with the minister and too much of his time was being occupied by this, and that other channels might be more available for handling them?

Mr. CURTIS: No, there never was. Our meetings would usually be of ten to fifteen minutes time in length. They were not much longer except occasionally when something was important. They were short meetings.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you. I think I have covered everything I wanted.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Having listened to the discussion and having read fairly widely on national defence matters it seems to me that one of the minister's chief problems both in the past and in the future is to get a proper evaluation of the competing plans of the various services, or, in certain cases, of various weapons. In the United States in the past it has developed into great lobbies. I do not think Canada has been entirely free from lobbies by the proponents of one weapon or another. Do you think in this proposed reorganization there is anything which indicates to you that the minister will get a better or a more dispassionate analysis of the schemes put forward by the proponents of various weapons?

Mr. CURTIS: I should not think so. You are not going to stop lobbyists from coming in and lobbying and putting their wares before the minister in the best light they possibly can. There was one comment made about this among the senior officers which to my way of thinking has been overplayed or over-estimated. I am a very good friend of every chief I was with, who was my opposite number when I was chief. I see them quite often. I believe it is just the same with members of parliament who battle away, but when they get out of the house they do not carry the fight with them. We battled and criticized each other, but I think that it has been overplayed by the press and by the public.

Mr. SMITH: As you probably know, in the United States department of defence there is a branch which is fairly completely or theoretically completely divorced from the armed services. It is called systems analysis, and it attempts to evaluate matters economically and militarily.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think that such a branch or department in the Department of National Defence, even on a small scale, would be a good thing for Canada at all?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not think we have enough new developments and new equipment to warrant it. If we were building submarines, ships, these new types of armed fighting vehicles, and new escorts in any quantity, it would be another matter, but we are not. I think it would be an expense which would cut away from that $100 million.

Mr. SMITH: My final statement is this: Do you think that some of the criticism of the present bill would be corrected if a defence council with certain definite statutory responsibilities were set up and in which the chiefs of land forces and the chiefs of the air force and the chiefs of the sea forces had a certain definite responsibility and place?

Mr. CURTIS: There was a defence committee and it worked. While I was there we had quite a number of meetings, probably once a month or once every two months. It was a very important committee.

Mr. SMITH: Perhaps I am being a little too technical, but it has no statutory or legislative responsibility.

Mr. CURTIS: No, but would that make it much more effective? It comes up through other departments to the minister in the long run.

Mr. SMITH: That is all. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the questioning, gentlemen.

Mr. McMILLAN: Before you adjourn, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the air marshal a question.

Air Marshal, you agreed with Mr. Harkness that diversified forces should always be available. Under the new arrangement do you think they would not also be available?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know what the new arrangement is. It is so nebulous and so far off in the far blue yonder that I do not know. From some of the remarks that were made I have a feeling that what is emerging from this is the thinking that you have ground forces and will not need anything else. That is what I think from two or three remarks that have been made. If that is the decision, it is a surprise, but—

Mr. TEMPLE: I am sure that is not in the white paper.

Mr. CURTIS: No, it is not in the white paper but some of the remarks from around the table led me to believe the thinking was going in that way.

Mr. McMILLAN: But that is not in the white paper?

Mr. CURTIS: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have one point following on what Mr. Deachman said with regard to the preparation of the budget, which I would like to see clarified. I think perhaps the impression was left that you, as chief of defence staff, had no talks or conferences with the minister about the budget. I do not think you perhaps meant to leave that impression.

Mr. CURTIS: No, I did not.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am quite sure you had considerable numbers of discussions on the air force budget with the minister, the chairman, the deputy minister and other chiefs present, or perhaps just yourself and the chairman, the minister and the deputy minister, and so forth.

Mr. CURTIS: We did, but I did not put a program in front of the minister and say, "May I have your approval of this?" We discussed—

Mr. DEACHMAN: You had a great many discussions on this topic?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes; he was right in the picture.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I thought that perhaps the impression was left that you had no discussion at all, and this I wanted to clarify.

The point I wanted to bring out particularly was this: Do the chiefs of the forces each go in to see the minister alone or with members of their own staff but not with others present?

Mr. CURTIS: On occasion.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And they discuss the budget in that way?

Mr. CURTIS: On occasion.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And do they, for instance, present their ideas on what they will require for the budget for that particular services?

Mr. CURTIS: They have done that.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So this does take place?

Mr. CURTIS: It does.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Was the budget thrashed out among the chiefs at the committee level?

Mr. CURTIS: The minister never made a decision and said, "You can go ahead and do this."

Mr. DEACHMAN: I had realized that, but the presentation of your own program could be made by you directly to the minister?

Mr. CURTIS: Not in detail but in a general way, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In a general way?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, but not in detail.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So the minister was the recipient of three separate programs on three distinct occasions from three separate services?

Mr. CURTIS: Not as a general rule. Over the year we would discuss things, but when we came to the final discussion of the budget it was always done with the chairman and the deputy minister.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have one more question. Did you consider it in your interest to have the ear of the minister to explain your program in general terms?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And each service chief would feel the same?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the questioning.

Before we adjourn, I would like to remind the committee that we will be meeting at 3.30 or immediately after Orders of the Day in this room. General Macklin will be the witness. We will also meet at eight o'clock this evening in this room with the Minister.

I wish to thank the witness on behalf of the committee for attending, particularly in view of the fact that he was not feeling up to his best today.

We will now stand adjourned until 3.30.

AFTERNOON SITTING

TUESDAY, June 9, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: We now have a quorum, gentlemen. We are resuming our discussion on Bill No. C-90. Our witness this afternoon is Major General W. H. S. Macklin, (retired). General Macklin will give a statement after which we will proceed with the questioning.

Major General W. H. MACKLIN (*Retired*): Mr. Chairman and members of the special committee on defence, I first wish to thank you for asking me to come here and give you my views in respect of Bill No. C-90. Having regard to my qualifications, I will give you a very brief resume of my military career. In the first war I served in the ranks of the infantry for some three years when I was between the ages of 16 and 19. I managed to put in about a year at the front. I then graduated in electrical engineering and because there was no market for engineers, I joined the Signal Corps as a lieutenant in 1925. Then I attended the staff college in India for two years between 1933 and 1934. I was attached to the air force for a year and joined the general staff in Ottawa. I held a large number of staff appointments in peace and in war in three large headquarters. I spent all told about 13 years here at army headquarters in Ottawa, and had many dealings with the Chiefs of Staff committee, and with the Ministers of Defence and the Deputy Ministers. During this period I served in all ranks from Captain up to Major General. I think that is enough of my military background.

I listened with great interest to the Air Marshal this morning, and this afternoon I intend to put to you a view which is diametrically opposed to what he was telling you this morning. I will say at once regarding Bill No. C-90, that I think this bill when enacted will just about represent the most important and far reaching reform in the controlling organization of the armed forces we have ever had. I shall comment on the bill in more detail later.

First, I would like to give you a bit of the history in respect of what has gone on in the defence department since the second world war. I do not

think you can look at Bill No. C-90 objectively unless you have some idea of how the existing system has worked. That is what did not come out this morning. There was a good deal of talk about the terrible effect this might have on the armed forces. It certainly will be a shock to a good many people in the armed forces; but I do not think this is what matters. The question you have to decide is, is the system which the air marshal wants to perpetuate, with a few changes in the powers of the chairman of the chiefs of staff, and a few other changes, one which works, and do the taxpayers get value for their money? I say it has not worked, and they had not had value for their money.

The defence department has been in a mess ever since the second world war, and there are various reasons for this. I intend to give you the history of the thing as I see it. I am not so conceited as to pretend to know all the answers in respect of defence organization; but I studied defence and war in all its aspects for many years; I worked here in the defence department, and certainly know how this department works.

I have studied carefully the white paper which was issued last March. It is far superior to any of the two or three such documents which preceded it, all of which were useless. This is a much better piece of paper than anything that went before it of the same sort. However, I think this white paper still reflects certain deep-rooted misconceptions regarding the nature of war and of the armed forces needed to keep the peace or to fight if peaceful efforts collapse.

For example, dealing with the post-war reorganization, the paper says that the navy and the air force achieved real, rather than nominal equality with the army. It adds that this reflected the lessons of the second world war regarding the importance of air and sea power. With all respect to the drafters of this statement, let me say that in the British army staff colleges, where Canadian staff officers were trained between the wars, air power and sea power were stressed every working day. Even before the second war there was a belief in Canada, widely held in Britain too, that by some miracle an air force might win a war without the awful bloodshed of the first great war. In April 1939, a scant four months before the outbreak of war, Mr. King told the house that the days of great expeditionary forces were over. I often wondered if he recalled that on D-day, five years later.

Our army, if not our statesmen, was well aware before 1939 that it could go nowhere outside Canada without sea power, and could not hope to fight without adequate air support and sometimes sea support too, as on D-day. We knew that.

So it did not really need any lessons from the second world war to drive home the vital importance of sea and air power. Actually, one of the principal lessons of that war was, or should have been, that, vast as were the achievements of the air forces, they were scarcely equal to the truly stupendous efforts, industrial, financial, and military that were invested in them.

The paper goes on to say that there was a general belief that Canada's contribution in a future war could best be made in the air or at sea. Here, of course, the wish was father to the thought, since it had been the army's manpower troubles that brought on the political crises of 1917 and 1944. If you could only avoid that, how nice that would be.

I must say that after the war I never heard much about concentrating on the navy. The whole emphasis was on the air force, called the weapon of the future. That this is true is proved by the fact that for over a decade we have spent a lot more on the air force than on navy and army combined.

Ten years ago, anyone who ventured to question the future supremacy of the air force was regarded on all sides as a fossil, or a blimp, or just a plain old fool.

You will note that this paragraph of the white paper refers to a future war and does not mention peacekeeping at all. But the prevention of war is as important as the winning of war if it starts. We have to plan for both, as the paper says elsewhere. In the role of peacekeeping it has been the army which has predominated—in Kashmir, Indo China, Suez, Congo and Cyprus.

Also, in the greatest war we have had in our history, barring the world wars, I mean Korea, the army predominated overwhelmingly.

We sent at least 20,000 men to the war. We had about 500 killed in action and about 2,000 wounded. The navy kept three ships in the theatre throughout the war but the costly air force did not and could not put a single unit into the war theatre because it had neither the aircraft nor the crews for the job and had to confine its efforts to a small airlift in North Stars to Japan.

At this point I suggest to you that although there has been some talk of sea power and ten times as much about air power hardly anybody has ever bothered to produce an accurate definition of the meaning of those terms in order to determine if our existing forces can produce sea and air power. I will define these expressions for you as I see them.

Air power simply means that ability to use the air for our own purposes while denying its use to the enemy. Sea power means exactly the same thing with respect to the use and denial of use of the sea.

I should like to point out to you that the terms air power and sea power are not synonymous. We have had a multibillion dollar air force for many years but I hope to show you that this air force has never at any time since the war wielded any significant air power commensurate with its enormous cost because the airmen and statesmen alike were obsessed by the heady concept that the air force alone could win wars and the armies, and maybe the navies too, were obsolete. They deliberately set out to build an air force that would be good for air warfare and good for nothing else. The national defence department and successive governments acquiesced in this policy.

No plans at all were made for aircraft to support the army in battle. Why should we bother if the army is to be done away with anyway? The air force did not much relish the truck driving aspect of air transport and tended to do as little as it could.

Moreover, this country had decided, quite rightly, to make no nuclear bombs and, anyway, even in spite of the vast sums allotted to it, our air force simply could not have afforded great modern bombers at ten or twenty millions of dollars or more apiece. They could not afford that so it came about that as far as fighting aircraft were concerned the air force plumped for the type known as the jet interceptor which was designed to destroy manned bombers. As you know, for over a dozen years they have devoted enormous proportions of their huge budget to these aircraft and to the elaborate and costly air bases and ground equipment needed to operate them. As you know, we had nine squadrons of these in Canada and twelve in Europe. I submit the brutal fact is that these jet interceptors as a type were stillborn weapons and obsolete before they ever got into service in our air force in 1948 or 49. In other words, these interceptors never could perform the military functions for which they were designed.

You heard the air marshal talking about the Arrow this morning, suggesting that it could, he said, go to 50,000 feet and fly 1,400 miles an hour. He said it was a wonderful machine and it was, but what good was it? Could it have done the job it was intended to do? The answer to that question is, no it could not. It does not matter how high it can fly, how fast it can go or how far it can go, it still could not prevent the Russians from dropping a nuclear bomb on Ottawa if the Russians decided to drop it. Therefore, it was an obsolete and worthless weapon, and all of the interceptors have been in the same category.

Two new inventions rendered these aircraft obsolete. The first was the rocket missile and the second was the nuclear bomb. As for the missile, I would point out that some four years before our air force had its first interceptor into service the Germans had launched 1,600 rockets into London from a range of 230-240 miles. The interceptor never even pretended to cope with the rocket and the rocket was four years ahead of the interceptor. The first nuclear bomb was dropped on Japan about three years before we had interceptors. The nuclear bomb was not then something as slight in definition as former weapons but was of a force of a new order of magnitude. This bomb was not five, ten or twenty times as big as its larger predecessors but at least 2,000 times as big as a ten ton bomb and only a baby compared to the hydrogen bomb which is a force measured in megatons, and nothing will stand against it.

As you know, of course, nuclear bombs were carried in bombers and still are. Increasing reliance is placed on the missile carrier, and the President of the United States said one or two days ago that the United States now has more than a thousand of these intercontinental missiles, and the Secretary of Defence said the United States now number their nuclear devices in the tens of thousands.

The cry for many years has been that the bomber remains a threat so we must have a defence against it. We never have had such a defence. The argument is completely fallacious because it would take about six hydrogen bombs accurately landed on our cities to destroy this country as a political and economical entity. Our so-called air defences have never been able to prevent Russia from delivering such bombs since Russia had them and the bombers to carry them, not to mention the missiles.

I should like you to look at the civil defence exercise Tocsin "B" which was conducted two or three years ago. This envisaged an attack by some 30-odd bombers and a few missiles, and at the end of it it was solemnly announced that some seven important cities were destroyed and over 2,500,000 people killed with about 1 million injured. That was the official word out of the defence department and I would not call that defence.

I remind you as well that NORAD about which we hear so much is not an air defence for Canada but a creature of the United States strategic air force and its primary purpose is not to defend Canada at all but to defend or to attempt to defend the bases of the strategic air force. It has been called the air defence of Canada, but that is just to fool the public.

It has been admitted again and again by the most responsible statesmen that nuclear war would be suicide. The present Prime Minister when accepting the Nobel peace prize said it would bring the "Peace of Extinction". The British white paper of 1958, of which I have a copy here on the table, spoke of "The Balance Terror of Mutual Annihilation". Mr. Khrushchov has repeatedly said that a nuclear war would make no sense and has quarrelled violently with his former Chinese ally on this point. When the Chinese said that the United States is a paper tiger Mr. Khrushchov said that it was a paper tiger with nuclear teeth. He does not want to be destroyed.

If you cast your mind back to the U-2 incident you will recall there was a lot of fuss made about whether that plane was shot down or fell down. It does not make much difference. The point is it did get to the middle of Russia and was only one of a number of aircraft that have crossed Russia. So much for the discussion of what Russia has in the way of air defence.

You must accept the fact that this bomb is intended as a deterrent and cannot be used to wage a war without producing an over-all holocaust. It has proved impossible up to date to produce a military defence against it, and the NORAD system is simply a hopeless attempt to project the methods of the Battle of Britain into the age of missiles and nuclear bombs.

Look how inconsistent we have been in this business. There were twelve defence squadrons of interceptors in Europe and suddenly with no explanation or debate it was announced that four would be disbanded and the other eight rearmed with a totally different type of offensive aircraft. They would have to be fitted for nuclear rockets. How was this complete revolution possible if the interceptors were needed and were any good? We just washed them out without a word of explanation and replaced them with something totally different. If that is consistency, I do not know the meaning of the word.

In pursuit of their obsession the R.C.A.F. have run through a whole family of interceptors, and always complained that the one they had was out of date. All I can say is that they were all out of date the whole time. There was the Vampire, the CF-100, the Sabre, and the Voodoo. Then there was the luckless Arrow that never got to the service. Some of these aircraft, certainly the CF-100 and the Sabre, ran through a whole series of versions, or marks. There were five marks of the CF-100, but mark V was never put into service because there was no armament for it. Billions of dollars were squandered on these aircraft, and now all but a handful of them are scrap.

Let me turn to the navy, and sea power. I want to say this: In spite of assertions to the contrary that have lately been made, I, for one, believe that the navy is technically efficient, and I do not think we should forget that the admirals who have been castigated in some of the magazines and in the press were the sea captains who won the terrible battle of the Atlantic, and we owe our survival to them and their like. They cannot be as stupid as they have been made out to be. However, the question is: Why do we now have a navy, and what is it now supposed to do? For centuries the chief function of navies was to protect trade. In the words of the naval prayer, it was to guard "those who pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions".

Our navy has always been an antisubmarine force. During the second world war we knew exactly what it was doing. It was convoying cargoes across the seas. The submarines which it was hunting and killing were aiming their torpedoes at those cargoes. But now, in 1964, as far as Canada is concerned, we have no ships to convoy. Our merchant marine, which was large in 1945, has utterly perished long since.

In 1956, we had to send a force to Suez. It was so small that I would say that Champlain might have lifted it in his canoes. Yet the air force could not lift it, and the navy in Canada did not have a single sea transport to take it. For political reasons it was impossible to charter a British ship at that time, and they did not want to get the United States mixed up in this either. So how did we solve this problem? We disarmed a multimillion dollar aircraft carrier, the only one we had, and we turned it into a transport that a swordfish might have sunk, and we sent our troops and our transport in that. That was a poor way to treat a costly warship, and it left the navy without the services of its carrier for six months in a time of crisis. That is the sort of defence that you have been getting for $1,700 million a year.

Russia has hundreds of submarines. The advent of some armed with nuclear missiles was forecast in one of the previous white papers several years ago. More and more our navy has been quietly turned, without debate, towards the task of hunting nuclear-armed submarines. This task is just as hopeless in its way as that of the jet interceptors, because if the navy could sink nine such craft and the tenth landed its bomb on Halifax, that would be the end of the navy, and of Canada, too. I cannot stress too often that there is neither naval, air nor land defence against the hydrogen bomb.

Since Canada is one of the world's great trading nations a case could be made for the re-creation of a sizable merchant marine. The money we blew on the Arrow aircraft alone would have subsidized a large merchant fleet for 20 years. It seems to me incongruous, and even faintly humiliating, that we can-

not send forces abroad without chartering somebody else's ships, or disarming a warship. This does not emphasize our trumpeted independence. In short I say, with respect to the navy, that its role should be re-examined in the light of what is possible, and when that role has been determined with accuracy and assurance, the navy should be equipped to fulfil it.

I will now speak very briefly of the army, with its two elements, militia and regular. The axe is about to be put once more to the militia, and much has been made these last few days, of the fact that some of its units consist of two officers and six men. I tell you, the reduction may be wise and it may be necessary but I want to say here that having regard to the way the militia has been treated by government and by the press and the public since the second world war, it is a miracle that the militia has survived at all. It has been organized and re-organized times without number. You would almost need an electronic computer to add them up. It has been mocked and scorned by politicians, press and public alike, as being obsolete and useless. It has been insulted by such vandalisms as the destruction of the historic University avenue armouries in Toronto and by bulldozers to build a new law school. I ask you: Who would join an organization so poorly regarded? In fact, it has survived as always by the unrewarded patriotism of a handful of people, and it has not been as worthless as most people believe.

In 1950, when we had to raise a brigade for NATO in a hurry, we only could do it by basing its mobilization on the militia, and in no other way could we have raised it so quickly.

If the militia is to be retained at all, my contention is that it should be supported and encouraged, rather than be treated as it has been treated, because it is a poor thing to keep a dog just to keep kicking it. The regular army which was only 20,000 strong at the time, contributed heavily to the Korean war, and maintained the NATO brigade for many years.

I will outline what I think are the chief defects of the regular army. First, there is the obsolete nature of some of its equipment, for instance the armoured carriers. You know the sad tale of the Bobcat. That had the longest period of gestation of any animal known to natural science. It then proved, like the interceptor, to be stillborn. The second defect is the lack of air transport. I think the brigade in Germany has, or will have, a dozen helicopters, which is pretty meagre. With that recent exception, the defence department has resolutely refused to give the army its own air transport, and the air force never got around to producing any for it. For years we kept a parachute brigade at immense cost, and never did we have it airlifted with its equipment. I do not know what is the present status of that formation. In Korea we depended upon the United States for tactical air support and even to lift our wounded off the battlefield. I visited that front as adjutant general, and I had to borrow a United States helicopter and a British light aircraft to see the troops. When we sent a battalion to Cyprus a few weeks ago, there was not enough airlift for its heavier equipment, and so it went into that hostile island, half equipped and half armed, and waited two or three weeks for the rest of its armament and equipment to come by sea. What a risk that was to subject Canadian soldiers to. That is the state of your defences in 1964. You cannot even move one battalion with its equipment. The 12 helicopters will not be enough, and for the most part the NATO brigade will be as glued to the ground as was Caesar's legions. Doubtless it would be more economical to have the necessary air transport provided by the air force. The criterion must be that it shall be permanently and absolutely under the control of the brigade commander, even as are his motor trucks, or his wheelbarrows—what is the essential difference between an airplane and a wheelbarrow; they both are carriers.

The third defect is that there are absolutely no reserves of any kind anywhere behind the formations of the regular army. If the NATO brigade got into

a battle, it would be into a manpower crisis in no time. You might as well try to operate the O.T.C. without spare parts. It would soon come to a grinding halt.

I believe it was a major error to commit the regular army to civil defence, apparently because local authorities just declined to take on the job. This is akin to a plan to send your police forces and fire brigades to the war on its outbreak. That would not be considered very sensible. It is sure that the army cannot fight and do civil defence at the same time. It seems to me that there are two or three jobs lined up for every soldier when the emergency happens.

Well, gentlemen, that is a brief and incomplete review of the record of our forces since the second world war with emphasis on the defects. In that time we have spent perhaps $20 billion and a huge percentage of this has been sheer waste. Defence has been a heavy burden on the economy, but has produced very little actual protection for our cities and our citizens. I say no child has slept safer in bed because of our colossal investment in jet interceptors.

This result was partly because of governmental obsession with the concept of a supreme air force which was shared by most of the public, which would, if accurate, solve all manpower problems, but it came about largely because of the incredibly clumsy and ineffective method of controlling the armed forces at the top.

To start with, we had in 1946, the chiefs of staff committee, consisting of the three service chiefs. Getting agreement on any matter of importance from these competing chiefs was hard enough, and rarely accomplished, but the government soon compounded the problem by adding two members to this committee who were civilians, and not chiefs of staff at all. There was the chairman of the Defence research board, a scientist, and the deputy minister, a civil servant.

Here you had a good example of the dangerous practice of giving men power without responsibility, an attribute ascribed to the famous harlots of Babylon. For these two members, while not responsible for the efficiency of the forces, could argue, delay and frustrate propositions advanced by the chiefs, or by any chief.

A few years later, to add to the confusion, and make the committee still more ineffective, there was appointed a chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, with rank, you will note, one above the chiefs themselves. He was a general and they were a lieutenant general, a vice admiral, and an air marshal.

If you will carefully read section 19 of the Defence Act, printed in the notes to Bill No. C-90, and to be repealed, you will find it completely incomprehensible; it makes no sense.

For here is an officer, senior to all the chiefs, sitting as chairman of the chiefs' committee, co-ordinating both training and operations of the forces, and doing whatever else the minister tells him to do.

Yet the act says each chief remains responsible for the control and administration of his own service, and all four of these officers, as well as the two civilians, have direct access to the minister. The result could only be confusion and chaos and conflicting advice to the minister. Whose advice is he to take? The only committee of that sort I heard of which ever accomplished anything was the committee which produced the King James version of the Bible.

In practice the chairman was a super chief of staff, but again without responsibility if one service broke down. He was the real arbiter of the advice on defence policy tendered to the government. Whatever section 19 was intended to mean, this chairman wielded immense power. I noted this for years.

Below this clumsy, wrangling, six man committee there has been a whole cascade of subcommittees, dealing with such matters as manpower, pay, supplies, and a host of other details. I was a member of a number of these for five years, and I wish to tell you that these committees worked in an atmosphere of frustration, for as often as not when some proposal appeared on the agenda some member would announce that his chief did not agree, and that ended discussion. And if a sub-committee produced a proposal that some chief disapproved the member concerned incurred the wrath of his superior. So effective and constructive work by these committees was almost impossible, and the time they wasted will never be reckoned.

Then, in all the realms of training, intelligence, planning, procurement, and administration, there has been unnecessary and grossly wasteful triplication of staffs. In recent years the medical and chaplains' services were unified. I doubt if the health or the spiritual welfare of the forces has suffered as a result.

Finally, and I shall comment more on this later, there has been superimposed on this triplicated service organization, a gigantic, and largely superfluous, civil service. This has added huge sums to the overhead, and its main result has been to hamper, delay, and even veto all sorts of projects.

So there you have it; some $20 billion spent since 1950. We have got for it three armed services totally independent of one another. They can neither co-operate effectively, nor fight together. The fighting element of the R.C.A.F. is strapped to the U.S. strategic nuclear air force. The navy has no merchant ships to convoy. The army has outworn equipment, no air transport, or very little, and no reserves. It is immobilized to a dangerous degree.

This doleful situation is the outcome of several factors. For one there has been the belief in the supremacy of air forces. For another there was the outworn concept that in some way, sea power, land power, and air power can be regarded as separate entities. They are not. Actually it is hardly possible to win a dog fight without the participation of at least two, and often all three of the armed forces. They should be considered as a Trinity—three in one.

Would you not agree that it is fantastic that we have had an air force for 40 years which has never in its whole lifetime been able to support the army in battle? The result has been to make it a sort of colonial appendage of the U.S. Strategic Air Force.

Therefore I welcome this farreaching proposal in Bill No. C-90 to abolish the useless chiefs of staff committee, and to instal one chief, placing under him unified staffs, dealing with operations planning and training; manpower, equipment, construction, and supplies, and other aspects of organization. Doubtless time and experience may modify details, but the principle is sound.

I have, however, a few opinions to give on the working of the proposed new system. One chart shows three people reporting to the minister;—chairman dominion research board, chief of defence staff, deputy minister. The dominion research board and the deputy minister should be made to confine themselves to their own spheres, scientific and civil. They should not be allowed to encroach on the responsibilities of the chief of staff in respect of military policy. Otherwise the minister will get conflicting advice, two thirds of which will be irresponsible. I will mention the deputy minister in a moment. The new bill says clearly that the chief of the defence staff is to be responsible for the control and administration of the armed forces; so, I say, let everybody else keep their hands off.

I turn to the function and status of the deputy minister. There has been considerable pressure, including the report of the Glassco Commission, to increase what is called "Civilian control of the armed forces". I have no hesita-

tion in saying that this would be disastrous. There is too much civilian control already; I have mentioned the vast clogging superimposed civil service.

There is absolutely no evidence, and no reason to assume, that civil control would be more economical or more efficient than military control. You do not entrust control of your forces in great battles to a horde of civil servants. Why do it in peace? The past has proven the fallacy of the notion.

I served on the general staff here in Ottawa from 1936 till after the outbreak of war in 1939. We then had complete, absolute control by the deputy minister. The minister himself came to see us once a year to wish us all a merry Christmas. Not a dog could bark in the armed forces unless the deputy minister approved.

The department was run by this official on a political patronage basis, and the chiefs of staff were powerless. I was there and I saw it. There was a gate to the office, and there was an office boy who escorted people in who wanted something.

No wonder the forces were paralyzed. On the outbreak of war three ancient aircraft fell in the state of Maine trying to get to Halifax. We had exactly four useful antiaircraft guns without proper fire control. The coast defences were incomplete, the navy was sadly depleted, the army likewise. Actually we were virtually defenceless. It was a poor way to do it, but so notorious was the situation in the department that both the minister and the deputy minister were replaced in the first week of the war, and strangers to the department were installed. That is how bad the situation was, and the prime minister knew it.

I have contended for years that the defence department does not need a deputy minister at all. If that startles you, I suggest you think it over. In every other department, the deputy minister is the trained, permanent, professional adviser to the minister, whoever he may be. In defence, on the contrary, the professional adviser ought to be the chief of defence staff. If any deputy minister gives contrary advice it is irresponsible according to the very terms of this bill, and therefore dangerous.

What is wanted on the civil side is a financial superintendent, or prepetual auditor, with no say at all in defence policy. Then you could dispense with the bulk of the costly, hampering civil service you now have. What a saving that would be.

One more important thing I want to mention. There is an intimation in the white paper that Bill No. C-90 is just the first step in what is called there the unification of the forces. My own view is that Bill No. C-90 will be about enough. I think it would be the worst possible thing to put all the forces into one amorphous uniform, and sink the identity of all the various elements out of sight.

The navy is intensely proud of its distinctive dress, and its traditions going back to Sir Richard Grenville, and Nelson at Trafalgar, and the same applies to the air force and its blue dress. As for the army it has its corps and its regiments each proud of its battle honours, its uniform, badges and record. Do you want to consign to oblivion the Princess Patricias or the R. 22 R. now in Cyprus? Are we to take the kilts from our highland regiments? There has been nothing like the esprit de corps engendered by our army organization since the Roman legions. If you abolish the identity of the navy, air force and all the diverse elements of the army you will do enormous harm, and accomplish no military object. On the contrary. Besides, these variations are immensely popular with the public, who love their air force, and their navy and all the rest of the trappings. Do not tinker with long established customs and traditions.

But we must distinguish between sentiment and tradition. Tradition rests on a basis of loyalty and efficiency. Sentiment says we must stick to horses or

to sails in the modern age. It was largely sentiment that impelled the air force to cling to the obsolete interceptor. It was so fast and shiny.

I will now say bluntly, that if the only war the government contemplates is a nuclear war, it would be best to reduce the armed forces to a token, for such duties as aid to the civil power or the protection of fisheries—that is for police work—and save the money. If we spend all we have got we cannot defend ourselves against the "H" bomb. Nor can we add to the effectivenesss or credibility of the deterrent now possessed by the United States, and Britain.

I should just like to remind you that we have had a dozen wars in the past 20 years in Malaya, Algeria, Indo China, Korea, Egypt and so on, and these wars have been fought, and other wars have been averted by conventional arms. The United States has spent about $300 billions on strategic nuclear weapons and has ended up with the communists in Cuba 90 miles from Florida. That is a good example of the uselessness of trying to defend yourself against communism with the hydrogen bomb. This cannot be done. You cannot defend this civilization with the hydrogen bomb, you can only destroy it.

What Canada needs are armed forces under unified control at the top, as now proposed. They should be capable of rapid organization into ad hoc task forces in varying sizes of composition depending on the job. They should be mobile by land, sea and air. We can produce this result without damage to the pride or tradition of any element of the forces, and that is what should be done.

As a sort of anticlimax I just want to say a few words about the clauses of Bill No. C-90 dealing with non-public funds. I know they are not under discussion but I will not have a chance to refer to them again and the subject is dear to my heart.

After the second world war there was a most incredible and inexcusable discrimination made between the services in the disposition of non-public funds. In the case of the army the regimental funds board expropriated every penny which belonged to every institute or mess in the active service force. Every mess and every canteen was sold off at public auction and the regular army was left with a bare floor and the task of replacing them out of its own money. The government then passed an act of parliament setting up a benevolent fund for the relief or army veterans of the second world war. When I was adjutant general, as time went on, the number of veterans in the regular army continued to diminish while the number of non-veterans continued to increase and I did not receive a cent to look after the distress cases of the non-veterans and had to assess every institute in the regular army a percentage of their profits in order to create a new fund to do that.

In the case of the navy and air force they kept their non-public funds in the amount of several million dollars. These funds have remained to this date under the control of the chiefs of staff of the navy and air force. They have been administered for the relief of distress of anyone in those forces and also for the replacement of moneys lost to the institutions for new messes which they had to set up. Furthermore, they kept all their furniture. It was not sold at auction and they did not have to replace it out of their pockets.

I see now that non-public property is to be vested in the chief of defence staff, except that contributed to any specific unit or other element of the defence forces. I do not quite know what this means in respect of the balance of the millions that were formerly under the control of the chiefs of the naval and air staffs. Will the new chief take all this over or not and, if so, for whose benefit will he be able to administer it? I think there would be much anger if he diverted these funds to army distress cases, and maybe it is too late to undo the incredible inequality of treatment meted out to the army by the government in 1946. The matter needs thought and it should be handled with discretion. I wanted to bring this to your attention. There is the situation as it exists

as a result of what I cannot refer to as anything but a blunder, in my mind, made in 1948 whereby all the army's money was grabbed and the other money was not. That is all I have to say.

I think Bill No. C-90 is a great reformation and I would remind you that about 2,400 years ago the Greek philosopher Aristotle said: "In a multitude of rulers there is evil. Therefore let there be one prince".

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you general. We will now proceed with our questioning and I have Mr. Temple's name first on my list.

Mr. TEMPLE: First of all, General, let me state that I have found the last 55 minutes to be most interesting. You referred to an airlift of the army. I understood you to state that the new transport aircraft should stay under the control of the Royal Canadian Air Force, but following operations, bringing troops from one place to wherever they are going, these transport aircraft should then remain under the control of one person. Would that individual be the chief of defence staff?

Mr. MACKLIN: No. What I meant to say is that the business of purchasing, servicing aircraft and the training of aircrew is a specialized business and there is no particular reason for dividing this business up between a lot of different individuals. The R.C.A.F. has been doing this for 40 years and can continue to do so. The criterion is that when perhaps a dozen transports have been allotted to a NATO brigade, or as many as may be needed to do a job to give that brigade mobility, those transports, having been allotted to the brigade, should be under the brigadier's control and should not be taken away any more than should his motor trucks be taken away. The air force may purchase them, supply them ,train the aircrews and produce the spare parts for those transports but they then belong for operational purposes to the brigadier and should not be removed by the air force for some other function. We have had this trouble again and again. Incidentally, one wants an airplane and one may get it or may not get it. If the chief of the air staff wants to go somewhere he orders up an airplane and goes but if the chief of general staff or adjutant general wants to go somewhere he can ask for an airplane and maybe he will get it and maybe he will not.

Mr. TEMPLE: Do you not believe that the chief of the defence staff should have the ultimate authority regarding whether or not a plane should be left where it is or whether it is badly needed somewhere else?

Mr. MACKLIN: I certainly do believe that, because the chief of defence staff controls everything. He allots everything to everyone. He is the man who says you can have four battalions in this brigade and only three in that one, or you can have 12 airplanes now but you are coming out of the line and you do not need them so I will reduce the number to six for the time being. That is absolutely correct, but while the airplanes are given to the brigade they should be under the command of the brigadier and no one else should have any say in respect of their operational employment. Otherwise how could a brigadier make any plans for operations at all, particularly when he does not know whether he is going to have 12 airplanes, six or none?

Mr. TEMPLE: I have another question relating to the 1956 stripping of the H.M.C.S. *Magnificent* of its armament in order to have that aircraft carrier transport troops to Suez.

Mr. MACKLIN: That is what was done.

Mr. TEMPLE: Was it not foreseen in those years that there could be an eventuality requiring those troops to be moved quickly?

Mr. MACKLIN: You had better ask the successive ministers of defence why that was never foreseen. The army always knew it had to have some means of moving. We could not swim.

Mr. TEMPLE: I presume the principal reason for a defence force now is that of keeping the peace. Its second purpose is, if it cannot keep the peace, to win any war that might be fought. You have referred to the billions of dollars that have been spent, and I believe you suggested that it was squandered. However, the peace has been kept.

You suggest that Canada's role in NORAD really is not that of defending Canada but only that of defending the SAC bases?

Mr. MACKLIN: That has been the function of NORAD ever since it was created. This was never made clear to the public at any time of which I am aware until the former prime minister made that statement in the House of Commons just before the state department landed on his head. He said that but, of course, the rest of us have known that for many years. As a matter of fact, you will find this statement in various articles I have written and had published.

Mr. TEMPLE: Would you agree that the SAC bases with nuclear weapons have been and are a deterrent?

Mr. MACKLIN: Of course they have been, and have been the only thing that prevented the Russians from an aggressive war. I have never questioned the value of that deterrent. What I do question is, firstly, the necessity for providing a military defence for that deterrent, which NORAD is supposed to be and, secondly, the possibility of providing it. There are two fallacies in respect of NORAD. One is that you must have a military defence for those bases and the other is that it is possible to produce it. Both of those assumptions are false. You do not need this defence of the bases and you cannot produce it if you did need it. I do not know what the present situation is but not long ago the United States had more than 70 air bases around the world in four continents and in about a dozen different countries, and all that NORAD was purported to be was a defence for that portion of those bases in continental United States.

Mr. TEMPLE: Those bases represent a major portion of them, do they not?

Mr. MACKLIN: How much deterrent do you need? The United States had bases in Turkey, Pakistan, Africa, Spain, Germany, Great Britain and Japan, and I do not know where else. They had Russia ringed with bases. It was fantastic to assume that Russia could knock all those bases out in one raid in half an hour. It was just plain nonsense to think that could be done. If the Russians had attempted that they would have been destroyed and Mr. Khrushchov knows that as clearly as I am saying it.

Mr. TEMPLE: Therefore, does it not follow that the SAC bases do help Canada because they provide a very real deterrent?

Mr. MACKLIN: I never suggested that they did not provide a deterrent. What I said was that you cannot provide a military defence for that deterrent and you do not need to provide a military defence in any event. The deterrent itself is there and we must have it. It consisted in former times almost entirely of bombers. It now consists of more and more missiles including the Polaris which cannot be touched because it moves around under the sea. The enemy does not know where it is so it cannot hit it. That is the deterrent and there is enough of it.

All the evidence indicates that the United States has got several times as much nuclear power as the Russians have and you do not have to take my word for that because I can quote you chapter and verse from such responsible publications as the *Atlantic Monthly* of Boston. The United States has four

or five times as much nuclear power and there never was a missile gap. There has been a lot of noise made about it but it never really existed.

Mr. TEMPLE: I have one final question in respect of the air force. You said you agreed with a good portion of the white paper on defence and Bill No. C-90, particularly with reference to pages 22 and 23 of the white paper on defence dealing with tactical air support for our ground forces and increased emphasis on the air transport role. Do you agree generally with those suggestions?

Mr. MACKLIN: Yes, and I have just said so or I hope that I have said so. I welcome these suggestions and that is why I said that this is by far the best white paper that has been produced since the war. I think for the first time we are going to have an air force which can actually operate with other Canadian forces. Do you want to keep your army in the battle without air support in this air age?

Mr. TEMPLE: I agree with the white paper.

Mr. MACKLIN: It is a most remarkable thing that there is now recognition for the first time of that which constitutes air power and that in itself is one of the elements of air power.

Mr. TEMPLE: Thank you.

Mr. DEACHMAN: General, I think in referring to the landing at Cyprus you suggested the Canadian troops owing to the lack of air transport facilities were landed without adequate heavy equipment to protect them?

Mr. MACKLIN: What I said was that an infantry battalion like the 22nd battalion has certain armament and certain transport as an integral part of its equipment. I do not know what that includes now in 1964, because I am out of date, but it included quite a number of motor trucks, jeeps, cars and one thing and another, and some fairly heavy armament. What was done at the time this battalion went to Cyprus was a movement of the soldiers and their lighter equipment such as their rifles and perhaps their Bren guns or whatever guns they have now, into the aircraft and then to Cyprus, but their heavy equipment such as motor trucks and that sort of thing was not transported by air but by sea and the unit was left in Cyprus for two or three weeks without that equipment. I think this was a very hazardous thing to do. You will remember the Hong Kong expedition of 1941 in respect of which we had a royal commission. That expedition landed in Hong Kong and its transport was on a United States ship and never did get to Hong Kong. There were 256 vehicles involved and Brigadier Jake Lawson fought the battle there without any transport. That was not a very smart piece of work.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The British forces had been in Cyprus up to this time in force. Do you know whether any arrangement was made with the British forces to make use of their heavy equipment until such time as the equipment belonging to the Canadian troops arrived? Do you know whether any use was made of the heavy equipment that was in Cyprus and which belonged to the British forces?

Mr. MACKLIN: I have no idea in that regard. You will have to ask that question of the planners, but in any event I should like to point out to you that as far as I know the British army never has any transport to give away to anyone else. In fact during the second world war the British came to me on several occasions when I was the vice chief of general staff asking me if I had any heavy equipment to help them out.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You are not certain that the Canadian troops were without equipment because there may have been some arrangements made for

those troops to use the heavy equipment belonging to the British during that period, in which case they would have been adequately equipped; is that right?

Mr. MACKLIN: I can only tell you that the over-all equipment would have been spread over a much greater number of troops than was intended.

Mr. DEACHMAN: As you know, at that time the British troops had been withdrawing from the area. Is it not possible that arrangements were made with the British troops for the Canadian troops to make use of the British equipment until such time as the Canadian equipment arrived because, as you know, the British troops had been in there for a long time?

Mr. MACKLIN: I have no idea in that regard. I do not know what arrangements were made, but if Cyprus is an independent country, as we say it is, are we to depend on our begging and borrowing from the British in order to equip our unit there?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I should like to refer again to your statement that the Canadian troops arrived in Cyprus without any arrangements being made for any kind of heavy equipment.

Mr. MACKLIN: I did not say that. I said the Canadian troops arrived in Cyprus without a portion of its equipment.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You do not know whether arrangements had been made to provide our troops with equipment during the gap; is that correct?

Mr. MACKLIN: Ask the planners, do not ask me.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But the statement was made with the implication that we had put troops in there without providing adequate equipment for them, and you cannot substantiate this, sir. I suggest you made a statement which you are not able to substantiate to this committee in respect of the protection of Canadian troops by this government.

Mr. MACKLIN: I can certainly substantiate the fact that the Royal Twenty-second battalion went over there by air and part of its equipment went by sea. That is what I said.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We know that.

Mr. MACKLIN: You think it was a good thing?

Mr. DEACHMAN: You further went on to say that we left them without protection. I say that this was not substantiated by knowledge which you are able to bring before this committee.

Mr. MACKLIN: What I can say with assurance is that the over-all forces in Cyprus were short of that equipment while they were on the sea.

Mr. DEACHMAN: They were not necessarily without equipment.

Mr. MACKLIN: Why did we ship it?

Mr. DEACHMAN: In order to permit the British, who were withdrawing from Cyprus, to return their equipment to Britain.

Mr. MACKLIN: Oh, well, all right, I leave it with the rest of the committee to decide whether it was a good idea to send those soldiers over there in that condition.

I will go back and give you another illustration of this. At the time of Suez we were supposed to send an infantry battalion to Egypt. It was stopped because Nasser made tremendous objections and the Canadian government decided not to send it. It therefore went to Halifax and never went past Halifax. This was the Queen's Own Rifles. The battalion was formed by taking the trained men out of two battalions of the Queen's Own and putting them into one battalion, and taking all the untrained and unfit men and putting them into the other battalion. I can leave it to your imagination what the other battalion looked like after this process had been carried out. A question was asked

in the House of Commons, I think, by General Pearkes when he was in opposition—I am not sure of that but the question was certainly asked—how many men in the battalion going to Egypt were under 19 years of age. The answer was 186. We were sending 186, 18 year-olds to a hostile country 6,000 miles away, and that was the best the army could do at that time after spending $16 million a year. We were certainly not getting results for the money. You will find that record in *Hansard*. I can substantiate that.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to move to another question. These are questions relating to statements of yours to the effect that Canada does not have the power to make a decision to fire upon an enemy but would have to get the permission of the President of the United States to do so. This I believe relates to NORAD or to the North American defences. Is this correct?

Mr. MACKLIN: That is so.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is it your opinion that we should have a unified North American defence?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not think we need a North American defence at all because I have said, in 14 pages of my manuscript here, that the thing is useless and always was. It was put there at the urgent request of the Pentagon when the Russians got the means to deliver a nuclear bomb. They went into a flat spin and they built the DEW line up in the north and rebuilt the mid-Canada line, and then there was the Pine Tree line, and then we provided all these squadrons of interceptors for NORAD. The plan was made, I think, in Washington, and we concurred with it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I take it you do not believe it is necessary for the maintenance of NORAD?

Mr. MACKLIN: I have been saying this for years, if you had read what I published, and I do not suppose you have and I do not blame you. It has been published in many newspapers right from Montreal to Victoria.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In your opinion NORAD's function of detection, warning and identification, that is identification of foreign vessels entering our waters or foreign aircraft entering our air space, and so on, is a function that is not worth continuing?

Mr. MACKLIN: I would not say that some of the radar elements of NORAD are useless—I would not say that. Interceptors are useless because they cannot stop the Russians from dropping bombs on the cities on which the Russians want to drop bombs.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you consider the DEW line useless?

Mr. MACKLIN: You are putting a technical question. It is getting more and more obsolete, like everything else.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you believe it has had its uses in its day?

Mr. MACKLIN: Very limited. I doubt it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You would scrap it?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know. I am not qualified to say that. I do not intend to commit myself on such a technical question.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to move to another area. You say that in the establishment down on Cartier square we can see scores of civil servants lining up at the punch clock every day.

Mr. MACKLIN: I have seen it for years myself.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is it an exception to see hordes of employees anywhere line up at the punch clock?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know anything about what happens in the General Electric Company or the Westinghouse Company or the de Havilland aircraft

factory. I have not been there to see. I did live in Cartier square for years and very frequently I was summoned to the office of the chief of the general staff or the minister, or the deputy minister, at say a quarter past twelve. I wanted to get some information. And then, you would see a line of people all the way down the hall, from the door down to here, ten or fifteen minutes ahead of closing time, each one determined to get ahead of the other to the punch clock.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you think the practice is different from what it is in any other department of the civil service?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know anything about other departments; I never was in the Department of Justice or the Department of Transport. It was not my business to go there, so I do not know.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So you are not aware whether it was unusual or just the practice of the clock punchers anywhere else?

Mr. MACKLIN: I submit it is a bit expensive.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would you replace those civil servants with soldiers?

Mr. MACKLIN: I could dispense with a great many of them if I could only get rid of the enormous overhead of the deputy minister's branch. The deputy minister's branch is a complete duplication in many, many respects. For instance, he has a sort of director of manpower in there. This fellow had no means of getting information so he would come to my staff and ask for it. You could fire him and you would not be any worse off. My staff had the information, and they would give the information to the minister or to the House of Commons or to anyone else if they wanted it. He did not need to get it from a civil servant who had to get it from us in the first place. This is a tremendous duplication of effort.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have one more question on the subject of non-public funds. I know you would like me to ask you a question about non-public funds. You are referring here to excesses of mess funds accumulated by a mess such as the one at Petawawa, and so on.

Mr. MACKLIN: There were dozens and scores of institutes, messes, canteens—mostly messes and canteens by the hundreds—in the active service force in Canada and in Great Britain and elsewhere during the war, and they all made profits and they all had funds. The department set up the regimental funds board to see that these funds were not stolen or lost or misappropriated or embezzled. At the end of the war the regimental funds board simply impounded all of these funds. One example was that of a friend of mine who was going to buy a brass figure of Mercury as a memorial for the signal corps. He had it all fixed up, and he found a sculptor who was going to make the figure, and the soldiers voted the money for this. However, before he got the thing made, the money disappeared. They seized it all and they took it away. They then came to Camp Borden, the army services corps mess, and the medical mess on Elgin street here, and a hundred other messes and institutes, and they had an auction sale in every mess, and all the equipment was sold at the auction, and the money was taken by the regimental funds board and put into the fund, and the total was about $9 million. Parliament then passed an act creating a benevolent fund. Now, the benevolent fund is a good thing.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What was the benevolent fund used for?

Mr. MACKLIN: It is administered by a board of people for the benefit of the army veterans of the second world war who may be in distress. They can come to this board and they can ask for a loan or a gift, and the case is investigated with great care. This is a welfare service. If they decide that this is a worthy case, they either loan the man some money or give it to him.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You believe these funds should not have been left with the messes or do you believe they should have gone into this welfare fund?

Mr. MACKLIN: I only point out that what was done for one service should have been done for all three, and it was not done for all three. The army service corps mess in Camp Borden was sold at a public auction, all the furniture, the pictures on the walls, and everything there, and the postwar officers were forced to replace it at their own expense. Half a mile down the road is an air force mess, and it still has furniture which it had during the second world war.

The CHAIRMAN: Pardon me, Mr. Deachman. We have a number of other questioners. Is this your last question?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I will close on this question. I know, as a junior officer who was, during the hostilities, only a boy and who helped to contribute to that fund as thousands of others did, that I am glad to see it went into a benevolent fund of this kind, and that it was not just returned for the use of the permanent force messes, because the major contributors to that fund were people who were only there during the hostilities and left the money in passing through. The thing that astonishes me is that in the air force and in the navy the funds are still retained. I would like to know why.

Mr. MACKLIN: You would like to know why and I will tell you. I did not quarrel with the setting up of this benevolent fund. What I quarelled with was the discrimination between the three services in respect of this money. The chief of the air staff and the chief of the naval staff had each a large fund. I do not know how much it was. It comes to millions of dollars. I do not know whether it is $3 million or $5 million. They can administer that as they see fit. However, the chief of the general staff did not have a cent that he could administer. It may be a good idea that they should all have benevolent funds set up by an act of parliament, but why did parliament set up one for the army and not for the other two? Under this bill it would appear to me that the air force and the navy will still keep control of that money.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think we all get the point. In the course of the committee's work we will want to return to this subject again.

The CHAIRMAN: There will be an opportunity when the Judge Advocate General is before us, so I think we must move on. Mr. Lessard is next, and before he starts there are four people who have indicated they would like to ask questions. The discussion has widened out well beyond the provisions of Bill C-90, and I would like to ask the members to try to keep to the provisions of the bill.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I have three short questions.

(*Translation*)

General, first of all, I must say that you are the best military critic I have ever heard. It seems that there are too many office soldiers, that is, too much administration; in short, there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians in the army. I would like to ask three precise questions, and even if the Chairman said that we must remain within the scope of Bill C-90, I believe that to a certain extent those questions may derive from that Bill. I would like to know to what extent the misunderstanding, the rivalry or the lack of cohesion in the administration of the three armed services were responsible for the disastrous failure and the butchery of the suicidal operation of Dieppe?

(*Text*)

Mr. MACKLIN: There has always been some rivalry between the services, and it would be a good thing if it were controlled at the time. The only real

control you have to prevent rivalry is the minister himself, and he is pretty well overwhelmed in attempting to reconcile the demands of the three services who are in competition with each other for a limited amount of money. Each one of them wants, like Oliver Twist, some more porridge, and the only real person who can decide what each gets is the minister. Usually he gets advice from the deputy minister who is no military expert and does not know the answers. The present deputy minister is a very excellent person indeed and I know him very well, but he is a member of the department of treasury; he is not a soldier, sailor or airman. I doubt if he would know a ship from an aircraft. And yet, he is called upon to judge between these conflicting demands. What is wanted is a military expert.

I cannot go into the battle of Dieppe here. I do not think the disaster of Dieppe was due to rivalry of the services. I think it was due to a bad system of planning. That is my personal opinion. It is a very controversial subject and I would not want to get into that.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Can you tell me whether it is true that the Air Force had not as such supported or preceded the Dieppe raid to destroy the bases which were located there, and that this would have resulted from the lack of cohesion between the military forces?

(*Text*)

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know but I certainly would not want to make any adverse remarks about the operation of the air force during the second world war. I think they were magnificent and extremely costly.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): It is getting late, but allow me to ask two short questions. With respect to NORAD, you did not mention nuclear missiles which we have been having for some time. Do you believe that the nuclear warheads should be deemed as obsolete, together with the interceptors which you think are useless?

(*Text*)

Mr. MACKLIN: I think that the Bomarc is just as useless as the Voodoo. I frequently said so, and I will refer you to what secretary McNamara said. He said the thing is not much good but they spent a lot of money on it and they might as well keep it for the time being. Let me put it this way. I said this was a reversion of the battle of Britain. In the battle of Britain it was considered that if you could knock down about 10 per cent of invading enemy aircraft and keep doing this, you could compel the enemy to desist before he could win a decisive victory, and that is what happened in the battle of Britain. As I said, the Germans sent 200 bombers, so we knocked down 15, 20 or 25, and after six or eight weeks he quit. This does not arise in respect of a nuclear bomber at all. You only need to have one bomb on Ottawa, and there is no Ottawa. You would have a crater eight miles across and nobody in it. If you knock down 99 and one hits Ottawa, you have no Ottawa. That is no defence.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): You mentioned the Suez crisis as far as the military problem was concerned, and you said that the Canadian regiment which we intended to send was refused by Mr. Nasser in 1956. Can you tell me why it was refused? If I remember well, it was because the symbols which identified it were identical to those of England, which was the adversary at Suez. Was that the reason why this regiment was refused in 1956?

(*Text*)

Mr. MACKLIN: Well, I cannot tell what Colonel Nasser was thinking about. He just did not want an infantry battalion, period. I do not think it would have mattered whether they were dressed in battle dress or in any other way. He just did not want them, and so we did not send them. Whether his objection was that they looked like Englishmen is something I do not know.

Mr. SMITH: General Macklin, in answer to Mr. Lessard you touched on a question which I would like to ask you. What consideration have you given to this problem: The Minister of National Defence is a man with very little technical knowledge, generally speaking. What method of evaluation should be open to him in order to test the validity of the advice he receives from his chief of staff?

Mr. MACKLIN: There is no way in which you can test this validity. What he has to do is get a chief of staff in whom he has confidence. If he loses confidence, he should fire the chief of staff and get another one right away. It is just plain terrible for a minister to keep in office a chief of staff whom he does not trust, and then go to somebody else, who is not responsible for what happens, and say, "What do you think?". This is what Mr. Lloyd George did in 1918. He had no confidence in Lord Hague, the commander in chief in the field, but he did not want to fire him. Therefore, he kept on asking the Frenchmen what they thought about things. This had a most demoralizing effect on everybody, and was a very bad thing to do.

Where a responsible minister loses confidence in his military adviser, the only course open to him is to get rid of that adviser and get another one in whom he has confidence. He should not go on keeping that man in office while taking advice behind his back from somebody else; a minister should not do that.

Mr. SMITH: The United States defence department has a systems evaluation or weapons evaluations branch which is largely civilian. You do not advocate a smiliar set up in the Canadian Department of National Defence?

Mr. MACKLIN: That is a very technical question, and I do not know whether or not I am qualified to answer. However, I think probably because the Americans do it is a good reason we should not do it. We borrowed a chief of staff from Washington, and when I was at the defence college as a student, the chief of staff of the United States army came up to lecture and we asked him how this chairman was going to work? He said he did not know. The fact is he works there the same as he did here. He became in effect a super chief of staff. There was a time a few years ago when the admiral and the first chief of the United States navy fell out with the chairman, and they fired the admiral. That is the way they did it in the United States.

I think the whole concept of this irresponsible chairman is incomprehensible. His terms of reference in the present Defence Act are incomprehensible as even the judge advocate will tell you because he could not figure them out.

Mr. SMITH: When you speak of the deputy minister being irresponsible, you speak of it in a sense that the chief of staff will have the responsibility for the well-being of the forces, and the ordered condition of the forces.

Mr. MACKLIN: That is what I mean. In using the term irresponsible, I mean he can give advice without taking the consequences. If the army fails to function, the head which is laid on the block belongs to the chief of staff, and not the deputy minister.

Mr. SMITH: On this chart of reorganization, in broken lines, there is a defence council. Would you have any comment or suggestion concerning the composition of or the responsibility of a defence council?

Mr. MACKLIN: Well, that is a long story. It would take me quite a while to answer. The defence council in its first instance, at its inception many years ago, was a policymaking body, advising the minister on matters of defence policy. Then, under the regime of the late hon. Brooke Claxton, the body advising on defence policy was the chiefs of staff committee, and the defence council became simply an administrative body which met at very irregular and rather lengthy intervals to discuss entirely matters of administration, such as what kind of a show are we going to put on on Dominion day or on some other day. That is not the sort of thing the defence council considers. It had ten or 12 members, and was an unwieldy body which did not deal with defence matters at all.

If you want another defence council dealing with this sort of thing, I would not object. The main thing is that you want to get a real defence policy, and all the rest will follow on from that.

Mr. LLOYD: General Macklin, your very vivid descriptions of past defence policies certainly point up a very interesting question about this proposed organization. If we accept everything you say as being objective criticism, we must begin here by reconciling democratic control with military effectiveness and efficiency. What in essence you are saying is, you will maintain democratic control through a minister. Government policies as formulated and approved by cabinet are one thing, but once it has been decided you must get it to a single responsible command as fast as you can. In essence, is that what you say?

Mr. MACKLIN: I think so. To me the chain of responsibility under the system of government which we have, and which I consider is probably as good as any in the world, and much better than the United States system, is perfectly clear. Parliament is responsible to the electorate; the Minister of National Defence is responsible to parliament, and the chief of defence staff is responsible to the minister. There is a chain of responsibility which is as clear as crystal. Parliament votes sums of money. The minister is responsible for determining the policy of spending that money and getting the kind of force he decides on, and the man who recommends it is the chief of the defence staff.

Mr. LLOYD: Just before we get to parliament voting the money, there is the process of identifying and defining the policy. This requires consultation before it gets to policy.

Mr. MACKLIN: I am sure Mr. Harkness would know more about this than I do, but surely it is the Minister of National Defence who has to put his projects to parliament. He has to stand up in parliament and justify them.

Mr. LLOYD: He has got to justify the effort expressed in terms of projects, manpower, materiel, productive capabilities of Canada and take responsibility for that total effort?

Mr. MACKLIN: The minister is responsible for what happens in the Department of National Defence.

Mr. LLOYD: Before he reaches the point of decision where, as a responsible minister, he must act, he must at some point receive advice and guidance in respect of the total policy he proposes?

Mr. MACKLIN: The situation works something like this, as I remember it.

Mr. LLOYD: I am not asking how it works now, I am asking how you think it would work best. I am trying to find out the role of the defence council as is proposed in this document. You will notice on the chart off to the left there is a defence council. Would it be useful to the minister in this field of identifying and determining the defence scope and range of defence policy to have such a defence council?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not think so. I think the defence council, as shown by the dotted line there, should keep its nose out of policy and deal only with matters of administration.

Mr. LLOYD: There is a meeting in Paris of defence officers associated with NATO policy. I presume that at some point the Canadian defence minister will be involved in the discussions respecting Canada's role with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At some point an attempt will be made to determine what Canada's effort shall be to the total defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members. I do not know how Canada's total effort in this regard will be determined, but perhaps it will be done by trial and error. In any event, these people will arrive at a decision in respect of Canada's role. Who would advise the Minister of National Defence at that level of decision making?

Mr. MACKLIN: The minister receives his advice, and I am sure, as I say, that Mr. Harkness can tell you more about this than I can, from two sources. He is between two fires. On the one hand, there is the Minister of Finance who tells him that is all the money he can have and he cannot have any more, and on the other hand, there is the chief of the defence staff who indicates that he wants this, this, and more.

Mr. LLOYD: I prefer to believe that the Minister of Finance indicates to his colleague the minister of defence that he has a problem and they negotiate a reasonable conclusion. I should not like to think that the Minister of Finance tells the minister of defence that he can have just so much and that is all.

Mr. MACKLIN: That was the situation at one time. I remember very well when I was at defence college that we had an exercise which we called cutting up the budget. We received word from Ottawa that we could have $450 million and we sat down as a group of students, to see what we could do with $450 mililons. We finally went back to the acting minister and said that we could not do anything with $450 million because with that limitation all the services would be put on a care and maintenance basis, and that we needed $650 million. The acting minister said that we could not have that much so we said that was all we could get, and that he could not have any more candy than $450 million would buy.

Mr. LLOYD: Surely the Minister of Finance reaches his decision in the light of some weight of consideration regarding the need for a defence effort on the part of Canada?

Mr. MACKLIN: One would think he ought to do that but I sometimes suspect that he does not.

Mr. LLOYD: You suggest that a defence council would not be of any value at this particular level of policy making?

Mr. MACKLIN: No, I do not think so. I think you have one policy making body and that is the Minister of National Defence. He receives the advice of the chief of defence staff who in turn receives his advice from a whole horde of subordinates in all spheres such as manpower, equipment, transport, accommodation and 57 others. The minister can then take that advice or reject it and that is his responsibility. The function of the chief of defence staff, just the same as the function of any staff officer, is to give the best advice of which he is capable and after that he does what he is told.

Mr. LLOYD: What you are suggesting then is that the chief of defence staff should have the same powers, and in fact there is perhaps more reason for him to have the same powers to carry out policy, once it is decided, as Donald Gordon has, for example, in respect of the C.N.R.

Mr. MACKLIN: I believe in some arrangement of that sort. The chief of staff gives his advice to the minister. The minister in light of his political considera-

tions, about which the chief of the defence staff does not know much, makes a decision. He either accepts that advice or he rejects it. He may say that he does not accept the advice because of very good reasons of which the chief of defence staff is not aware. He may indicate that such and such is the plan and tell the chief of defence staff to go away and do what he has been told. That is what should be done.

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Chairman, I am asking questions in an attempt to pin point this discussion around the matter of integration at the top.

General Macklin you said earlier that the deputy minister in essence was a fifth wheel to a carriage. You did not say that in those words but that is the impression I gained. What role would you envisage for the deputy minister? You have suggested a chief of staff should have direct access to the minister and you are eliminating the defence council because it is of no value. What would be the role of the deputy minister as you see it?

Mr. MACKLIN: I have said, which is a revolutionary thing to say, that I do not think there should be a deputy minister at all. Perhaps there should simply be an auditor or superintendent to see that the money is not misdirected.

Mr. LLOYD: I do not feel there is anything revolutionary about that statement. You are really suggesting that the chief of defence staff be placed in the same position, as the deputy ministers are in very many instances particularly in terms of their powers in operating departments. I do not look upon your statement as extreme at all. As a matter of fact, I rather like the clarity with which you have expressed yourself on these things and I should like to see the record filled with as much clarification as you are giving us possible. I am not in disagreement with you but merely emphasize and pinpoint to this committee the fact that you feel there is more need for more effectiveness and efficiency in the defence forces. You have given illustration after illustration involving the expenditures of some $20 billions over many years in order to make your point. You suggest that there will not be the degree of effectiveness and efficiency consistent with democratic control unless the chief of staff has direct access to the minister and there is nobody in between to thwart, bypass, frustrate, shall we say, the carrying out of his responsibilities. Is that what you are suggesting?

Mr. MACKLIN: What does happen under existing conditions is something like this, and it is very complicated. Again and again I have experienced occasions when proposals have been made to the Minister of National Defence and have been initialed by that minister as approved, at which time the deputy minister rushes in with both feet and suggests that he must have a look at this plan. After about six weeks an answer is given to the effect that the plan is not good. The deputy minister will say to the minister that he has made a mistake, and suggest that he rub out his signature because the proposed plan is not desirable. Six weeks time has elapsed and there has been a lot of frustration with nothing happening. I do not think the deputy minister should have any say in respect of the matter of defence policy because he is not an expert. The deputy minister of finance is presumably an expert. Certainly Mr. Clifford Clark was an expert. He had many many years of experience in financial matters before he went into that department. The deputy minister of public works presumably is an engineer or something of that sort.

Mr. LLOYD: Perhaps I may interject here to wind up this discussion. The Deputy Minister I take it is a policy formulating aid to the minister, but once the policy has been determined the function of carrying out that policy moves quickly to the chief of defence staff, is that what you suggest?

Mr. MACKLIN: I will tell you what I think is the weakness of our system. The deputy minister is in effect, and has been, the deputy of the minister, which is a different thing.

Mr. LLOYD: I think we all understand that.

There is one final question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Short, I hope.

Mr. LLOYD: I can make it very short, but I do not know what the answer will be. You did make a point on the time occupied with what, you suggested, might be financial considerations.

Mr. MACKLIN: This was 25 years ago.

Mr. LLOYD: It does not exist today?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know; I have not been around here for 10 years.

Mr. LLOYD: It is inherent in the democratic process. Do you think that in this scheme of organization we would minimize, if not eliminate, the incidence, of patronage?

Mr. MACKLIN: This is a political question. I am not a politician and I have never been one. My criticism is non-partisan.

Mr. LLOYD: I think you have the moral courage to deal with that.

Mr. MACKLIN: That is a question for you to answer, not me.

Mr. LLOYD: I am looking for answers.

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know the answer to that one. I would not even comment on it.

Mr. LLOYD: You would say that reference to patronage was incidental to your comments?

Mr. MACKLIN: I was stating a fact of what happened under the civilian control of the armed forces.

Mr. LLOYD: Therefore it is still a fact today?

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not know.

Mr. LLOYD: If it is still a fact and exists to a degree that should be curbed, then you think it could be curbed best under the kind of organization to which you subscribe?

Mr. MACKLIN: I think it can only be curbed by the Prime Minister. I do not know how you can curb it. You should ask the Prime Minister that question, but do not ask me.

Mr. LLOYD: It can be curbed.

Mr. MACKLIN: Certainly I do not think that any system will deal with it except the system of the government itself. This is not a military matter and has nothing to do with me.

Mr. BREWIN: General Macklin, I understood—and I believe you put it very vigorously—that the whole continental system of air defence in your opinion is a mistake, that it is based upon a mistaken strategic concept.

The CHAIRMAN: May I interject here? I know I allowed other people to get into this area. It is way off the topic of the bill. Because I have allowed other people, I must obviously allow you, but I would ask you to confine your questions, please.

Mr. BREWIN: I think you would save time if you would allow me to get on with the question. This is a preliminary question. I would have liked, as a matter of fact, to ask the general a wide series of questions about the white paper and a lot of other things, but I have refrained from that. This was a central point that you made, General Macklin, that the concept of the defence of North America by knocking down manned bombers is totally unrealistic at the present time.

Mr. MACKLIN: That is true in my opinion. It amounts to this, that the hydrogen bomb, or any other nuclear weapon, cannot be used to wage war

without producing what some people call the peace of extinction, and others call mutual annihilation, and so on. The nuclear bombing strategy is a deterrent, and if you use it you will destroy yourself. Now, the United States has an enormous nuclear deterrent located in some airfields, some silos under the ground with missiles, and so on and, some in submarines floating around the ocean.

The concept of the NORAD air defences was that we needed a military or air defence to protect this deterrent from being destroyed before it could be used. That is what the NORAD system was built for. It was not built for the defence of Canada; it was not built for the defence of the cities of the United States; it was intended to defend the bases of the strategic nuclear air force. I would say in the first place those bases do not need a military defence, and in the second place, you cannot produce it if they did need it. I have said it several times.

Mr. BREWIN: I understand that, and I may say I think there is a great deal of force to your argument, but this is the question I would like to come to; do you think that that strategic concept would be any different and would have been any less likely to have been adopted by Canada and the United States if Bill No. C-90 would have been in effect? How do you link the proposed reorganization with these major strategic concepts, some of which may be very mistaken?

Mr. MACKLIN: I cannot tell what any chief of defence staff is going to recommend and whether or not he will agree to NORAD, or would have agreed to NORAD at the time. For one thing I am not familiar with what pressure was put on us from Washington to do this. We sometimes do things under pressure from Washington which we would not do otherwise. I do not know. I can only tell you that under the system which was adopted here by the government 15 or 18 years ago, of devoting most of their time and attention to the air force since the air force could not afford bombers and did not want to support the army which was going to disappear, this was what the air force got into. They tumbled into this business because there did not seem to be anything else for them to do. If they were not going to support the army, if they were not going to produce masses of air transport, and if they could not afford big bombers, there was not anything else available but jet interceptors, so they bought them, and stuck them into this system. I think they might just as well have bought a large number of race horses and put them in the system.

Mr. BREWIN: But we are really mainly concerned at this moment with the form of organization. Is it your view that a single chief of defence staff might have a clearer look at over-all strategy instead of picking these various things for each service to perform because it might want to perform some service? What is the link between the recommendations in Bill No. C-90 and your views on the strategic task we should be undertaking?

Mr. MACKLIN: These questions are extremely abstruse and rather difficult. The army to which I belonged for 33 years, consists of many arms and corps—there is infantry, artillery, the armoured corps, the engineers, the signals, and so on. Now, an officer serving in the army serves in his corps until a certain stage in his career when it is decided that he is good enough and sufficiently qualified to be a staff officer. When he gets to a certain rank on the staff, he puts on a red hat, takes off his regimental badges, throws them away, and becomes a staff officer.

Of the last three or four chiefs of general staff which we have had one was an engineer, one was an infantry officer, one was a signaller, and one was an artillery gunner, and yet, when they achieved this high rank they did not favour their own arm of the service; they looked at this thing from the over-all point of view of the army, and they gave their advice on that basis. It did not

matter whether the chief of the defence staff used to be in the navy, in the air force or in the army. If he has been properly trained, when he gets to that high office he will give a balanced judgment, regardless of what effect it may have on the service he came from. Just the same as these different chiefs give the government advice, regardless of whether they had been signallers or engineers or artillerymen. That is the way I see the chief of defence staff working.

Mr. BREWIN: I have one other question. Is not the argument you made about the uselessness, for example, of our continental air defence, an argument that you do not require any great military training to appreciate? Is it not perhaps an argument that the civilians under civilian control would help to make effective, rather than if we left this matter, as I think you suggest largely or almost entirely to the advice of someone whose experience would be purely military?

Mr. MACKLIN: I cannot say that. I believe you are a member of the legal profession, Mr. Brewin; would you suggest that I, as a soldier, would be better advised to go and plead the case before the judge than you would be?

Mr. BREWIN: No, but I think you would be quite capable of using quite sound judgment in respect of some matter that affected some of your peers.

Mr. MACKLIN: It could be, but I am not learned in the law.

Mr. BREWIN: I appreciate that; but in respect of this problem which you raise—for example, the effectiveness of the whole North American defence system—I suggest to you the argument which you have made, which I have followed over the years, I may say, and which I think makes very good sense in my judgment, is something which is more likely to appeal to a civilian who is controlling the broad over-all policy than someone who has come up through the services, and has as you suggest perhaps, some natural feelings of preserving the role of his particular service.

Mr. MACKLIN: I do not think so. I must say that I visualize the chief of defence staff as an exceedingly highly trained and specialized person who has many years of service and years of education in staff colleges, defence colleges, and that sort of thing. He is familiar with all the aspects of defence, not only military, but financial, industrial and political as well. I remember one chief of staff, who shall be nameless, who said to me in a very forceful way, "In my job it is not enough to be a soldier; you have to be a politician, too".

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. LANIEL: In speaking of unification of command and so on, in your opinion should the emphasis be centred, let us say, on the army, with the air force and navy supplying the different components of support; would that be a good basis for the Canadian service to be working on?

Mr. MACKLIN: No. During the second world war, the United States invented the expression "task force". When they wanted to carry out operations such as the capture of the islands of Guadalcanal, or Okinawa, or some of these other places, they put together a force to do the job. That force included warships, aircraft, tanks, infantry, guns, and everything else needed to do the job. Then they appointed a commander and said, "Here is the material; go and take the fortified hen coop over there at point X; that is your job and this is the means we give you to do it".

What we want in the armed forces is the ability to produce task forces of any given size for any given purpose, and it will include warships as necessary, aircraft as necessary, infantry as necessary, artillery as necessary, tanks as necessary, and so on. You put together this force.

Every operation is different. The Congo force largely is composed of signallers; it is very heavy on communication. The Suez force is different. The Cyprus force is all infantry, and so on it goes. Each one is different. In order to produce

the Cyprus force, you want aircraft to take it there; or you may want warships to support it. We should have a balanced force of suitable warships, suitable aircraft, and suitable army units, so that we can form a force of arms as required to do a particular job; just the same as if I was going to build a skyscraper. I would sit down and make a list of materials; I would assemble them all on the job and appoint a foreman and say to him, "There is the blueprint, there is the material; you build it". A military operation is like that.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you mean by this that we should forget about defending the world and prepare for mainly peacekeeping operations and that type of thing?

Mr. MACKLIN: You may have to do anything. One day it is an emergency which breaks out in the Congo; the next day it is in Cyprus, or a war may break out somewhere like it did in Korea and you have to go and fight. However, if you have ships, aircraft, infantry, and so on, in due proportions, then you can break that down into components, just as the army does, or the air force or the navy. If the navy has a job to do which entails a squadron of ships to do the job, they send the squadron of ships. In Korea they had a squadron of ships and they relieved them at intervals. It was decided that three ships was the right number to have there. We decided we would send a brigade and organized it accordingly. We had so much infantry, so much artillery, so many tanks, and so on. We did it very well.

Mr. MCNULTY: You favour Bill No. C-90 and the idea of integration. Suppose you were given the responsibility of implementing the integration, what steps would you recommend and and how far would you go?

Mr. MACKLIN: Just about as far as that bill goes now. I think I said Bill No. C-90 is about enough. You are going to replace the unworkable chiefs of staff committee of six members, with an irresponsible chairman, by one military adviser who is to have under him a properly balanced and organized staff to give him the information he needs to advise the Minister of National Defence. I really do not see any great difficulty. The whole thing depends upon the wisdom of the government in selecting the right chief. That means a man in whom they have confidence and who is qualified. I have no intention of embarking on personalities in this thing; but that is the criterion. We have such men in the armed forces.

I see this developed in this way. A young man comes into the armed forces at the age of 20, 21 or 22. He may come out of R.M.C. or university, or somewhere else; he may be in the navy, or air force, or in the artillery. As a rule he will spend eight or ten years serving with his own part of the service, and he will be watched all that time. When he is 28 or 30 years of age, if he is a way above the average, he would be selected to start studying staff training, and then he will have to pass a series of very stiff examinations. If he passes those examinations, he will go to a staff college, which will be a unified staff college and not like now where there is one for the army, one for the air force, and none at all for the navy. There he will be taught the higher aspects of war and the very complicated business of supplying armed forces. He will be taught that for two or three years, perhaps, as they did in Germany. When he comes out of that, he is a marked man and is about 31 or 32 years old. He may go back to his own service, or he may come on the staff as a junior staff officer, and start working as a staff officer. Suppose he gets in another five, six or eight years as a staff officer in various grades, then he becomes, say, a commander in the navy, or a wing commander in the air force, or a lieutenant colonel. Then there is another selection, and those persons who are selected again are sent to the defence college where they learn the higher direction of war in all its aspects, financial, industrial, political, and everything else. It does not matter whether they start in the navy, the air force, the army,

or anywhere; it is from those persons that you will draw the leaders of your armed forces, and out of that ultimately you will select your chief of defence staff. That is the way you work it.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is now six o'clock. The committee will meet again at eight o'clock tonight here in this room at which time the Minister of National Defence will be the witness.

Before we adjourn, on behalf of the committee may I thank General Macklin for his attendance.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

The CHAIRMAN: We now stand adjourned until eight o'clock.

EVENING SESSION

TUESDAY, June 9, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: We now have a quorum. May we come to order, please. We are resuming discussion of Bill No. C-90, clause 1. The witness is the Minister of National Defence who will open with a few remarks before the questioning. Mr. Hellyer.

Hon. PAUL HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, you have heard at your last two sessions some views from people who are versed in defence matters. They have represented quite a wide spectrum of viewpoints. May I say that these views together with many others were carefully considered and analysed by the department during the time that we were preparing the white paper and Bill No. C-90 which is based on it.

I personally have talked to scores of people who are interested in national defence, with experience in this field, and I have had the benefit of their wisdom and experience in reaching the judgment which was the basis of the recommendations of the government.

One of the views that was placed before the committee I would like to comment upon at some length. So if you will permit me, I should like to read a brief statement in respect to it. That is the view put forward by Brigadier Malone when he appeared before you the other day.

Brigadier Malone has had a distinguished career in the Canadian army during the war and since then has taken a keen interest in Canadian defence matters. Therefore, his views on the proposed reorganization of the defence forces should be, and have been, given very serious consideration. I know that members of the committee were impressed with his presentation last Thursday and we are all grateful to him for appearing before the committee.

In commenting on what Brigadier Malone had to say, I think that in fairness to him I should point out that he himself admitted that, due to the fact that he had been out of the country recently, he had not been able to follow the proceedings of the committee prior to his appearance. Thus, he was not aware of the discussions that had previously taken place, including my statement to the committee on May 26.

The main burden of Brigadier Malone's statement was related to his apprehension at the idea of having one chief of defence staff and also the need to ensure civilian control. Later, in his remarks, he referred briefly to public relations and stressed his opinion that this should be directly under the minister. I will have something to say about this further on.

In outlining his objections to one defence chief, Brigadier Malone posed a number of questions and his conclusions depended upon the answer to these questions being in the affirmative. If this was not so, then I submit that the apprehensions of the brigadier are not, in fact, valid.

I would like, therefore, to take each of these questions in turn. The first: "Will the proposed chief of defence staff be accepting orders, directions and decisions from the defence council, or will he, in fact, be imposing his decisions on this council?"

The answer to this is that the chief of the defence staff will be accepting orders from the Minister and Associate Minister. These orders will be based on decisions taken following full discussion within the defence council.

His second question was: "Will other members of the defence council be in a position to question him or overrule him or veto his decisions?"

The defence council will be the senior policy making group within the Department of National Defence under the chairmanship of the Minister and all members of the defence council will be perfectly free at all times to ask any questions they so desire and to express their opinions on any subject which is before the council.

The third question was: "Will other members of the defence council be junior and subordinate to him?"

The answer to this is, as I have already stated, that the membership of the council will consist of the Minister, the Associate Minister, the ministers' parliamentary secretaries, if applicable, the chief of the defence staff, the vice chief of the defence staff, the deputy minister and the chairman of the defence research board. Of these, only the vice chief of defence staff can be considered subordinate to the chief.

Brigadier Malone then posed the question: "Will not the chief of the defence staff in effect determine the actual duties, responsibilities and even the appointments and promotions of other members of the defence council?"

The answer to that is in the negative.

The next question was: "Will the chief of the defence staff be the chief adviser to the Minister? Officially, will other members of the defence council have to speak to the Minister through him?"

The answer to the first part of the question is that the chief of the defence staff will be the senior military adviser to the Minister. To the second part, other members of the defence council will speak in the defence council directly to the Minister, if required, and, as I have already stated, both the deputy minister and the chairman of the defence research board will have direct access to the Minister at all times.

Brigadier Malone then asked: "Will the actual authority for carrying out the government's policies as directed by the Minister, be vested in the council or in the chief of the defence staff?"

The answer to that is that the policies of the government will be carried out by several members of defence council in accordance with their responsibilities.

The final question was: "Will the chief of the defence staff be in a position to reject the advice, even the majority advice, of the other chiefs in the services?"

Bill C-90 which is now before you, calls for the abolishment of the position of chiefs of the individual services in favour of one chief of defence staff. Therefore, the question of rejecting or accepting the advice of the chiefs of the individual services will no longer arise. Certainly, with the abolishment of the positions of the chiefs of the individual services, the naval board, army council and air council will cease to exist. In their place, there will be one equivalent body to advise the chief of defence staff. This will consist of the chief of defence staff himself, who will act as chairman, the vice chief of defence staff, the assistant chief of defence staff and the four functional chiefs, as spelled out in the chart already submitted to the committee.

One other point raised by Brigadier Malone was to the effect that when a new chief of defence staff is appointed, he would have the authority, one

might say, to hire and fire the various functional chiefs as he so desired. This, of course, is not correct. The functional chiefs, as are other senior officers, can be appointed only with the approval of the Minister and I am sure members of the committee are aware that over the years the appointment of a new chief of the individual forces has meant no immediate change in the senior headquarters positions directly under him.

I hope from the foregoing that members of the committee and Brigadier Malone will realize that the pitfalls envisaged by the Brigadier are not, in fact, likely to occur. I do not agree that any military service can be run by a committee and I do not agree that it has been in the past. The army council, the naval board, and the air council have been advisory bodies for the chief of each service and I do not think anyone can deny that in the military structure as we have known it over a number of years, the head of each individual service has been the chief of that service beyond question.

I would also say that in Britain, no matter what the theory may be, the fact remains that the chief of the Imperial general staff, the chiefs of the Royal Navy and the R.A.F have been, in fact, the men ultimately responsible for their services.

What we are asking for in Bill C-90 is to reduce the number of chiefs of staff from three to one, to replace the naval board, army and air councils by one defence staff and to increase civilian control of the Department of National Defence. I do not believe that the establishment of one chief of defence staff under the organization we are proposing will in any way lead to a so-called "supremo".

The other point raised by Brigadier Malone was with regard to public relations. As the deputy minister told the committee a few days ago, it is the intention to establish within the deputy minister's branch an information section which will be responsible for informing not only the public, but also members of the service on matters relating to defence. This organization will be established for the purpose essentially of providing factual information. Brigadier Malone, on the other hand, related his remarks to psychological warfare and what was essentially censorship of news reports from operational fields. I do not think there is a particular relationship in what Brigadier Malone was referring to and what we intend to establish in the information section.

It is my opinion that the information service should not come directly under the minister.

Mr. Chairman, I have dealt at some length with the comments of Brigadier Malone. This has been possible in part because he was the first witness to appear, and there has not been the same opportunity to prepare statements in respect of evidence that was given before the committee today.

There is one further thing I would like to say. Air Marshal Curtis has stated that in his opinion the three services should remain. I would like to quote as a witness on the other side of this argument another very famous airman, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Harris, well known as "Bomber". This is a direct quote from Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris:

> There is only one answer to this otherwise inevitable tendency in each of the services to get tied to a particular and invariably obsolete weapon, and all weapons are obsolete as soon as they are in use. There must be only one service. The survival of three of them at this stage in the development of armaments is wholly idiotic, and there never was any reason or need for them at any time.

Perhaps, if I may say, I would just like to put one other quotation on the record of a number which are available from distinguished military men. This one is from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, and I quote:

> One of the most important and least understood factors in modern war is that it is essentially a matter of perfected teamwork. Perfected teamwork results as much from friendly association over a period of years as it does from the more obvious reasons of combined tactical training and doctrine. By unification at the top, we emphasize to our soldiers, sailors and airmen the essential truth that each wears the uniform of the nation's fighting forces, and that his natural friends and trusted associates are the others who wear that uniform, regardless of its colour or design. Unity of command in the field, so vital to our success, was not easily achieved. When war came at Pearl Harbor we had joint command. It was not until we surprised the enemy in North Africa that the first large scale example of unified command emerged. But it was a new device, and there were many difficulties which yet remained to be overcome. All of these had to be met and surmounted during the actual operations when lives were at stake. In my opinion, those difficulties grew directly from the traditional operation of army and navy, which is the inevitable outcome of the present organization of our military departments. Separation at the top necessarily fosters separation all along the line.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I just cite these as two examples of many men with a lifetime of military experience who support the ideas which have been included in the white paper and which are now to be implemented through the bill which is under consideration. We have given this matter very careful consideration and much thought. We feel that it is the right solution. We admit that there are very great problems to be overcome in working it out in practice, but we are willing to solve these problems one at a time as we come to them. We would recommend the bill to you and express the hope that it might be referred back to the house so that it can be implemented and so that we can get on with the action at an early date.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions?

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I just have a very short question. Taking into account the last remarks of the minister that very careful thought has been given to this change, I am wondering if, after the bill is referred to the house and is put to application in the unification of command, it would be possible, after a period of several months—I do not know how many months—for this matter to come back to the committee so that we would know how much ground has been covered, how the difficulties have been met and how right were our views and yours on the possibilities and success of such an operation.

Mr. HELLYER: I am sure the committee will be interested in the progress that has been made in the implementation of this program, and I am confident that we will be more than happy to report it to you from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have really no further questions to put to the minister. I am not going to take up the time of the committee to repeat the points already made here, but I would like to say that I think that a lot of the points that Brigadier Malone brought up, which the minister has dealt with, chiefly in regard to the dangers of what amounts to a supreme commander, and particularly from the point of view of leaving the minister, whoever he may be, in the position of having only one military adviser, is a very dangerous precedent. It is a matter of going back, as Brigadier Malone pointed out, to a system which was tried for a long time in Great Britain and other countries and found wanting. I regret that the type of organization, more along the line of the one which exists in Great Britain or the type of thing which was suggested by Brigadier Malone, is not being put into effect.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I just have one small question by way of clarification. The minister said, as I understood him, that the chiefs of the various services would still be appointed with his approval.

Mr. HELLYER: The functional chiefs.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I am not questioning that, except that the position, as far as the statute is concerned, will not be the same as it is when you have three separate chiefs of staff. Under the act, the government is required to appoint them. However, as these decisions are not specified in the act. If this bill passes, what is the authority by which the minister must give approval to their appointments? Why cannot the chief of defence staff object to or question his choice?

Mr. HELLYER: Because the minister has the authority to approve the promotion of people in the armed forces and he exercises it from the level of colonel and above.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, there is one phase on which I am not clear; perhaps I am a bit confused, perhaps my question may sound confused also. It relates to the integration at the top level of the armed services. How does the integration of those in uniform with the civilians come about? Where is the line of demarcation as between the employees in uniform and those who are civilians?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not quite understand your question.

Mr. WINCH: You have many thousands of civilians in the services. Under whom do they come? Is there now, or is there going to be in the future, a civilian at the top so that you would have integration not only at the top of the three services but also of the civilians?

Mr. HELLYER: The brief answer is that many civilians work directly under the civilian side of the department—the deputy minister's staff. Others in the field work directly with and under the forces. That is the position as at present, and this position would not change substantially, although there might be some changes in particular detail.

Mr. LLOYD: My question, Mr. Hellyer, has to do with the appointment and functions of the council. You named the representatives on the council. I am not sure whether they were in your original paper or not. Would you repeat them for me?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes. It is the minister, the associate minister, the parliamentary secretaries, if applicable, the deputy minister, the chairman of the defence research board, the chief of the defence staff, and the vice chief of the defence staff.

Mr. LLOYD: I suppose in the main this body would be responsible for assisting the minister to define and establish policy.

Mr. HELLYER: It is the main policy-making body to advise the minister.

Mr. LLOYD: In practice the tendency will be to delegate to the chief of the defence forces the responsibility for carrying out the policy agreed upon in general?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes. He carries out the policies which relate to the armed forces of Canada.

Mr. LLOYD: If there is doubt, this is where consultation takes place. This brings me to the question of appointments of the functional chiefs who are below the chief of the defence committee. You say they are appointed by the minister. Is there a requirement by statute that you must have a recommendation of the chief of the defence committee before you make such an appointment?

Mr. HELLYER: No; there is no such requirement. Normally you would seek his advice.

Mr. LLOYD: So, there is not to be any statutory requirement.

Mr. HELLYER: There is no statutory requirement.

Mr. LLOYD: This is a device which has been recommended in schemes of organization of government.

Mr. HELLYER: Perhaps we might ask the judge advocate whether there is any statutory requirement. I know of none. He shakes his head in the negative.

Mr. LLOYD: This would leave it to the minister to follow the established policy. I would think the minister at least would want the recommendation of the chief of the defence forces.

Mr. HELLYER: You are correct and he would normally ask for it.

Mr. LLOYD: You would ask for it and then you would appraise it, and either approve or disapprove?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. LLOYD: It is a technique which I am not sure should not be written into the legislation; that is, that you must have a recommendation from the chief of the defence staff.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think in practice it would make any difference. Any minister certainly would ask for it.

Mr. LLOYD: It would not make any difference, but it makes a tremendous difference when an issue should arise and you are reporting to the house as the responsible minister; then it makes a difference, because it pinpoints that a specific recommendation had been made.

Mr. HELLYER: I can assure you that regardless of whether a recommendation is made verbally or by other means, the minister still has to accept the ultimate responsibility for the decision whatever it is, under our system.

Mr. LLOYD: I suggest this is a principle which is the result of a very intensive study in the United States by the public administrative service. This service is applied not only to cities in the United States, but also to government departments. One of the devices which they very consistently recommend is that when you get to the very top echelon, the person in supreme command or control who had the responsibility for direction of or carrying out of policy, had the right to recommend, but not the right to appoint. The policymaking body made the appointment. This is a practice and it would be established as a practice over the years. The way we work in parliament, this would be the kind of thing we look upon as precedent and established practice. We may not need a written law, but certainly that is the way I would expect it to go.

Mr. MACRAE: I would like to ask the minister how far he has gone in considering appointments for the projected Canadian organization? My question is prompted by an article written by David McIntosh, a most knowledgeable writer on military affairs. In the article it is suggested that the vice chief of the defence staff most likely would be General Walsh, and that also the chief of operational readiness would be General Allard. I do not recall that this ever has been mentioned in any committee meeting. Would the minister either confirm or deny that those are the two senior officers slated for those jobs, and perhaps advise us how far beyond that he has gone in planning appointments at this point?

Mr. HELLYER: If the committee would permit me, I would prefer to neither confirm nor deny, but merely say that a considerable amount of thought has been given this very important subject.

We will be prepared to announce our recommendations promptly after the bill is referred back, so that we can get on with the planning. There is an intermediate stage of planning which has to be performed before the bill can be proclaimed. During this planning period, we will have to designate the men whom we intend to nominate for those positions. Therefore, I can assure you that we will be in a position to act promptly if the committee will agree to refer the bill back so that we can get on with the job.

Mr. MACRAE: I would like to comment that the article said this information came from informed sources. I am wondering how far your thinking has progressed beyond these three. It is not that I disagree with any of this, but I thought you might take the committee into your confidence and tell us something more.

Mr. HELLYER: I think I have taken you into my confidence when I said we have considered the question in considerable detail, and have a pretty firm idea of what we propose to recommend.

Mr. GROOS: Mr. Hellyer, I think you said the organizational charts that you have drawn up here are still flexible, and that in the light of experiences changes can and should be made, if necessary.

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is prudent.

Mr. GROOS: I do not like to leave this subject without once again expressing my uneasiness in respect of this little section of the big picture. We speak of co-ordination and unification at the top—and I can find no fault with this—but I am worried about what is going to happen further down. It seems to me that whether we call them the navy, the army or the air force, we still are going to require various arms of the service because of the different duties they perform. Having removed the chief of staff from the position of leadership of those three arms, so long as those arms continue, they are going to have to have some sort of spokesman through whom the members of these various arms can speak to the functional chiefs. This is my concern; we have not been told anything about this. In fact, from what we read in the newspapers, there is likely to be more unification than co-ordination further down the scale. In respect of your remarks a little while ago concerning a statement made by General Eisenhower, when he was in the position of President of the United States, he did not go all the way as he indicated in his quotation he would in putting everyone in one uniform.

Mr. HELLYER: He just said he would have, had he had his way.

Mr. GROOS: I think he had it. In answer to a similar question you told me before that this would be revealed to us later on. I am waiting very interestedly to find out to what extent this unification will take place at the lower echelon, because so long as there is not complete unification, I think each individual arm of the service will require a spokesman.

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is fair, but I think it is important to reiterate, with deference, that some of the reports which have been circulated are not accurate. You will always have commanders who are specialists in their field; this cannot be avoided. These are the men who prod sailors and soldiers on to greater things. I can assure you that the organization will provide for proper training and proper liaison between commands and the headquarters staff.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Matheson.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, as there has been reference to personnel may I say that I would certainly like to offer the hope that the announcement that was made today that General Bernatchez is retiring is not the end of his service. I regard the loss to Canada of this gallant and gifted Canadian as important, and I do hope the department will bear in mind his talents in a variety of directions.

With respect to a question asked earlier today, General Macklin made a comment which I understood to be to the effect that he did not really any longer see the need for a deputy minister of defence. I concluded that his view was that this position could be covered by the efforts of the chief of defence staff. I wonder if the minister has any comment on this view, which I found rather extraordinary.

Mr. HELLYER: I think the associate minister would agree with me that we find the deputy minister very helpful! Therefore, I would hope that we would be able to keep him and his very fine organization in our service.

Without going into the argument at great length, I think perhaps one of the problems of which General Macklin likely was thinking was the degree of co-ordination which has been necessary, much of it because of the individual services; that, because it was felt there should be uniform standards in some cases and maximum co-ordination, committees were set up and secretariats provided; that the lines of communication were sometimes, in that sense, longer than people who would like to get the job done quickly would appreciate.

We think the advantages of our proposal will be the lesser requirement of co-ordination because the standardization of procedures and so on will be worked out internally between the forces themselves. Consequently, I think much of General Macklin's concern can be met, without at the same time reducing in any way the control and effectiveness of the civil side of the department, which I think is effective and essential.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, without in any way questioning what the minister has said, would I be correct in believing that the scheme envisaged by the minister in this bill—Bill No. C-90—does result in the deputy minister becoming more military and perhaps somewhat less civilian? I am not questioning what the minister has to say, but I was rather impressed with what appeared to me to be a wide range of military duties, involving a good deal of technical judgment, in what I saw of the schematic plan under the responsibility of the deputy minister.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that would be a fair interpretation, Mr. Matheson. The deputy minister and the chairman of the defence research board are financial and scientific advisers to the minister. The military side, including tactics and doctrine, must come from the armed forces.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, you had another question?

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, if I interpreted correctly one phase of Brigadier Malone's statement last Thursday it was to the effect that he was concerned that there should be almost a pinpointing of responsibility of various individuals in the higher echelon. I think I am correct in saying he carried that to the point at which he thought the specification, the pinpointing of responsibility, should go so far as to be included in the statute.

Has the minister any comment to make on that?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think there are two essential points in his argument. If I may use an analogy, the first is the difference between the civil law and the common law, the difference between codifying responsibility by statute and having it assigned and understood and changed from time to time on the basis of precedent and as a result of changing requirements and circumstances.

In practice, I think one could have either system. We have followed the latter. I think it is adequate for our purposes that the functional chiefs be assigned responsibility in certain areas; these are understood. I think they can be changed from time to time as circumstances warrant without building in the inflexibility of codification in a statute of law.

The second essential difference or point that he raised was in having the functional chiefs sit on the defence council. I have already stated to the committee that although they will not be members of the defence council in their

own right they will in fact be asked to sit in and give technical advice to the ministers and to the members of the defence council on matters coming within their particular jurisdiction. So, in point of fact, there is very little in these two major points that he has made that is not being taken care of, and the difference I think is really in terminology and method.

Mr. WINCH: Do you agree with the interpretation of the brigadier that under Bill No. C-90, as far as the statute goes, the top man, the chief of staff, is by statute 100 per cent responsible for anything and everything in all defence circumstances?

Mr. HELLYER: In exactly the same way as an individual service chief is today. There is no change.

Mr. WINCH: There is no change?

Mr. HELLYER: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Hellyer, I wonder if you would care to comment upon a statement made by General Macklin this afternoon with regard to the lifting of troops and supplies by air to a point at which they were in an exposed position in Cyprus because they were landed before heavy equipment arrived. Perhaps before we go too far away from the discussions with General Macklin the minister would care to give an explanation of his statement.

The CHAIRMAN: There were many many topics discussed today which were very wide of Bill No. C-90. I hope we can confine our discussions to Bill No. C-90. For the record, we will allow this one.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I would deny that categorically. Before the troops were moved communications were set up with the British troops on the island to determine what equipment could be made available and would have to be included with the original airlift. Everything that was required was taken with the troops on the airlift and it was only equipment that was not required until a later date which went by sea. The scout cars were available from the British, the ration supplies, and there was no problem whatsoever of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. Temple.

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Hellyer, on the point raised by Mr. Winch and others, in codifying certain requirements that had to be done, such as the defence council having to consult in respect of this and that, are not the key words that by going by precedent or with what happened before rather than by statute gives you more flexibility?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is a fair statement, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions of the minister?

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be chewing at this old bone and fixing responsibilities but I did like what I heard from witnesses, the importance in so far as you could do so, compatible with flexibility, of fixing responsibility down the line.

Under clause 1, section 19 (1) of the bill in the second section I notice these words:

> Unless the governor in council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions to the Canadian forces that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the government of Canada, or the minister, shall be issued by or through the chief of the defence staff.

Now, presumably there will be many things which he will issue which will be in the nature of administrative orders, and I presume they would be written orders. I do not know how you would refer to them but I would

imagine there would be many detailed administrative instructions fixing responsibility to officers below him. Would that not be the case?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: And, this is where you would get the ability to fix responsibility down the line?

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions of the minister?

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on the chart of the proposed organization that was mentioned there are one or two things I note. Under the chief of operational readiness there is operational training and training standards, combined training and tactical development, but under the chief of personnel there is individual and basic training. This would appear to set up what you might call two training channels and I would doubt very much whether this is a good form of organization. I think in each of the services up to date you have had a director of training or the equivalent who was responsible for training of all kinds. And, we are going to have certain types of training, orders for which come down from the chief of personnel and other training orders for which a majority of the orders come down from the chief of operational readiness. I think you are going to have a split or division there which will not make for efficiency and which also will result in duplication of staff.

Mr. HELLYER: The division was recommended by the military planning group. Of course, it is subject to revision if it does not prove practical. The thinking behind it was that the chief of personnel would take new entrants through their basic training and trades training and that they then would come under the jurisdiction of the chief of readiness at the time they went to units or to operational training units. This was felt to be a logical break-off point between their initial training period and the time that they moved into close association with one of the operational units. But, this is something which is completely open, to be determined on the basis of experience and getting the best possible organization from the administrative standpoint.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, in respect of people engaged in training, whether it is basic training or a little more advanced training, there is what you might call no clean cut saw-off point in connection with it, and the type of basic training that is given is dependant to a great extent on the type of advanced or further training which these people will have to take, particularly on the training doctrine.

Mr. HELLYER: This is true but there is, in fact, at the moment already this division along these same lines wherein you have people responsible for basic and trades training and then you have different people in charge of operational training at different units and so on. So, in effect, there is no radical change here; it is just a question of the break-off in organizational responsibility.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, similarly, you have operational doctrine under the chief of operational readiness; you have operational requirements under the assistant chief of defence staff, and I would think again you are likely to have some overlapping and difficulties in that regard. Myself, I would think it would be better to have both of these in the one branch.

Mr. HELLYER: Theoretically, Mr. Harkness, I think you are right, and this may be the ultimate solution after the integration has taken place over a period of years. The separation at this time is for the purpose of putting the planning staff and operational requirements in a separate department closely under the supervision of the vice chief of defence staff during the initial stages when there are many new problems to be tackled and solved.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you a question, Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Yes. Would you mind enlarging on that a little bit. I think Mr. Harkness possibly had the same thing in mind as I have; under the

assistant chief of defence staff you have program planning and analysis and under the comptroller general and his deputy you have program management. What is the differential between the two?

Mr. HELLYER: It is the difference between working out a program and the administration of it after it has been agreed—and, control.

Mr. WINCH: Do you not think the one who works out the program is the correct body to follow through and to analyse it. I am just interested on that basis.

Mr. HELLYER: I am too.

Mr. WINCH: Well, as you say, this is subject to change.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Following along the line of the last two or three questions, I note on the chart the chief of logistics and engineering is responsible for the design, development, test evaluation, inspection and quality control, and others are responsible for program planning and analysis and program management. It seems to me that some of these functions are now being carried out or being duplicated by the department of defence production and that a considerable amount really of inspection, quality control and programming in respect of the building and procurement of ships and airplanes now is, at least so far as a layman is concerned, being duplicated. Will this increase the duplication or is it contended to control the function of defence production in procurement of military items?

Mr. HELLYER: If my memory serves me correctly, Mr. Smith, there is no change in the division of responsibility which is in effect at the present time. Inspection, for example, of quality control is done by the Department of National Defence.

Mr. SMITH: Will there continue to be the present duplication?

Mr. HELLYER: If there is any duplication, and I do not wish to comment on this, it is in the other areas of the requirements field.

Mr. SMITH: You do not think there is any duplication now?

Mr. HELLYER: I did not say there was not any duplication. I have not examined this aspect of it thoroughly.

Mr. SMITH: If there is any duplication have you any plans to get rid of that duplication?

Mr. HELLYER: I think we are concentrating on a rather major project at this time, Mr. Smith, which will keep us fully occupied for a considerable length of time.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I have one question I should like to ask for clarification in respect of something referred to this afternoon. I understood General Macklin to comment this afternoon in a questioning way regarding whether or not our forces had the capability to move the necessary equipment by air to Cyprus. I do not know whether he went on to say, but perhaps he did, that the troops were in an exposed position until the equipment arrived by sea. Nevertheless, if that was not the case, and I think it was not, was it only a fortuitous circumstance that the British force had this necessary equipment readily available on the spot? Was this a kind of serendipity that you cannot depend on, on every occasion?

Mr. HELLYER: I would agree with you but, as you know, we already have a number of additional aircraft on order for this purpose, and it is our plan to augment the airfleet even further in future so that we can move larger quantities of equipment immediately when required.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions in respect of clause 1. Shall clause 1 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Clause agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Clause 2 carry?

On clause 2—*Non-public property of units.*

Mr. HARKNESS: In connection with this clause, General Macklin raised several points this afternoon regarding the administration of the naval and air force funds. Perhaps we should have some clarification at this time.

The CHAIRMAN: We have joining us now as a witness the Judge Advocate General, Brigadier Lawson.

Brigadier W. J. LAWSON, (*Judge Advocate General*): May I have the question repeated?

The CHAIRMAN: Would you repeat your question please Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: My question essentially was, what will be the position of the present naval and air force funds, the responsibility for whose administration is presently in the hands of the chief of each of these services?

Mr. LAWSON: That is not strictly the fact, Mr. Chairman. The R.C.N., R.C.A.F. and army benevolent funds do not come under section 39 of the National Defence Act. The R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. funds are part II companies, incorporated under the Dominion Companies Act. The army benevolent fund is governed by a special act of parliament. Section 39 has nothing to do with any of those funds.

Mr. WINCH: Was there a special act of parliament required in respect of what was mentioned by General Macklin this afternoon, leaving the benevolent funds of the navy and air force alone but confiscating the funds of the army?

Mr. LAWSON: A special act of parliament was passed to set up the army benevolent fund in 1946.

Mr. WINCH: I was not referring to the setting up of the fund but to the taking over of the funds, whereas the other two funds were left alone.

Mr. LAWSON: The act did that as well.

Mr. SMITH: Does that act deal only with property presently in being and in the hands of specific units?

Mr. LAWSON: You are referring to section 39, are you?

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. LAWSON: Section 39 deals only with current funds.

Mr. SMITH: It deals only with current funds in being now and in the hands of some units?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, it deals only with funds in being now or those which will come into being in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on clause 2?

Shall clause 2 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Clause agreed to.

Clauses 3 to 10, inclusive, agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the Title carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Title agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the Bill carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Bill agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall I report the Bill without amendment?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: The committee now stands adjourned to the call of the Chair.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 7

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1964

THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1964

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

Including Third Report to the House
(Involuntary Retirements)

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Defence Production; and
Mr. Paul Faguy, Director, Emergency Measures Organization.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20974—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman:

and Messrs.

Béchard,	Laniel,	Matheson,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McMillan,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	McNulty,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Nielsen,
Granger,	MacLean,	Pilon,
Groos,	MacRae,	Smith,
Harkness,	Martineau,	Temple,
Langlois,		Winch—(24).

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, June 17, 1964

The Special Committee on Defence has the honour to present the following as its

THIRD REPORT

1. During the Committee's consideration of Bill C-90, evidence was heard respecting the impact of the proposed service reorganization on the manpower requirements of the Services and the Department. Information adduced was to the effect that the manpower requirements of the Services will drop by approximately 10,000 personnel over the next few years. The reduction in civilian strength may be considerably less, but no specific figures were available in this regard.

2. It was noted that the largest part of the reduction in strength would come from normal attrition. It was also recognized that the Services must attain a proper balance of age and skills. To achieve this objective, recruiting will have to be continued and some personnel will have to be involuntarily retired. It was estimated that the latter group might number 2,000 persons, in addition to approximately 500 Aircrew who have already been notified of their impending release.

3. Whilst your Committee generally approved the proposed retirement benefit set out and printed as Appendix "A" to Committee Proceedings No. 2, dated May 28, it further recommends:

(*a*) That recruiting be continued to ensure an adequate balance of skills for the maintenance of operational efficiency within the Services.

(*b*) That, in those ranks, skills and age groups where reductions become necessary, every effort be made to ascertain those persons who wish to retire. This will assist those persons, who wish to retire, to do so with the benefits to be provided, while at the same time reducing the number of involuntary retirements amongst those who wish to remain in the Services.

(c) That guidance or counselling be given, on request, to those being retired, so that those who wish to use their benefits for special training or education in civilian institutions will be given every help and encouragement;

(*d*) That the matter of displaced civilian employees now being studied by the Civil Service Commission and Treasury Board be quickly resolved, bearing in mind the specialized service rendered and the comparative benefits being provided to Service Personnel who are being involuntarily retired.

A copy of the Committee's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, relating to these matters, was tabled with the Committee's Second Report on June 10, 1964, and is recorded as *Appendix No. 3* to the Journals of the House.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID G. HAHN,
Chairman

20974—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 16, 1964.
(11)

The Special Committee on Defence met *in camera* at 11:00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch (20).

The Chairman outlined briefly matters to be given precedence in the Committee's studies during the next few weeks. He then presented the Fourth Report of the Steering Subcommittee as follows:

Your Subcommittee recommends:

1. That the Committee meet *in camera* on Tuesday, June 16 to consider its Report on involuntary retirements.

2. That the Minister of Defence Production be invited to appear on Thursday, June 18 to discuss Civil Defence.

3. That Mr. Paul Faguy, Director, Emergency Measures Organization, be invited to appear on Tuesday, June 23.

On motion of Mr. Winch, seconded by Mr. McNulty,

Resolved,—That the Fourth Report of the Steering Subcommittee, presented this day, be now concurred in.

On behalf of the Steering Subcommittee, the Chairman presented a "Draft Report to the House", respecting involuntary retirements in the Department of National Defence. The said report was amended, and adopted *unanimously* as amended. The Chairman was instructed to present the Report to the House.

Discussion arose respecting the necessity for early consideration of Naval equipment procurement practices, and for a study of the role of the Active Army. These matters were referred to the Steering Subcommittee.

At 11:50 a.m. the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m. Thursday, June 18, 1964.

THURSDAY, June 18, 1964.
(12)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Fane, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple (16).

In attendance: Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Defence Production; and Mr. Paul Faguy, Director of Emergency Measures Organization.

The Chairman presented the Fifth Report of the Steering Subcommittee as follows:

1. That the Committee consider *Service Colleges and related training plans* on June 25 with Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan, in attendance.

2. That the Committee continue its enquiry into the operation of *Service Colleges and related training plans* on June 30 and July 2 with the Associate Minister of National Defence and Commodore Groos in attendance.

3. That on July 14 the Committee consider the *Reserve Forces* with the Associate Minister of National Defence in attendance.

4. That on July 16 the Committee hear a presentation respecting Reserve Forces by the Conference of Defence Associations.

5. That on July 21 and 23 the Committee continue its consideration of the Reserve Forces with Brigadier E. R. Suttie in attendance.

6. That reasonable living and travelling expenses, as well as per diem allowance be paid in connection with the appearance before this Committee of Brigadier E. R. Suttie.

On motion of Mr. Laniel, seconded by Mr. Lessard,

Resolved,—That the Fifth Report of the Steering Subcommittee, presented this day, be now concurred in.

The Committee turned to a study of *Civil Emergency Planning.*

Mr. Drury was called; he read a prepared statement, respecting Civil Emergency Planning. The Minister, assisted by Mr. Faguy, replied to questions on that statement and on related matters.

Samples of pamphlets and documents prepared by *Emergency Measures Organization* were distributed to Committee members.

At 1:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, June 23, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, June 18, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we now have a quorum. Could we come to order please?

Before we hear our witnesses this morning, I have a report of the steering subcommittee dealing with agenda to present to you, and a word of explanation before I give you that report.

We are having, as approved at the last meeting, meetings today, and on next Tuesday, dealing with the Emergency Measures Organization. We were then hoping to have the Suttie report available so that we could start our studies on Reserve Forces. The Suttie report will not be available until about July 9, so we are going to move from Emergency Measures Organization to three meetings dealing with the Service Colleges, and related training programs. We then have a week, which is the week of July 2, open, in the hopes that if the Flag Debate is completed we might use that week to go and see the Navy. Following that, we then start with our study of the Reserve Forces. The Suttie Report will be available to us.

The report of the subcommittee is as follows:

> Your subcommittee recommends as follows:
>
> 1. That the committee consider service colleges and related training plans on June 25 with Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan, in attendance.
>
> 2. That the committee continue its enquiry into the operation of service colleges and related training plans on June 30 and July 2 with the associate minister of national defence and Commodore Groos in attendance.
>
> 3. That on July 14 the committee consider the reserve forces with the associate minister of national defence in attendance.
>
> 4. That on July 16 the committee hear a presentation respecting reserve forces by the conference of defence associations.
>
> 5. That on July 21 and 23 the committee continue its consideration of the reserve forces with Brigadier E. R. Suttie in attendance.
>
> 6. That reasonable living and travelling expenses, as well as per diem allowance be paid in connection with the appearance before this committee of Brigadier E. R. Suttie.

May I have a motion for acceptance of this report, please?

Mr. LANIEL: I move the adoption of the report.

Mr. LESSARD: I second it.

The CHAIRMAN: Any discussion? Is the report approved?

Carried.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: We are now beginning a study of the Emergency Measures Organization. Our witness this morning is the Minister of Defence Production, in his capacity as the minister to whom EMO reports.

The minister has a statement which I believe has been distributed to committee members—

Mr. PILON: Not yet.

The CHAIRMAN: It will be distributed to you now; perhaps we can distribute that before the Minister starts his statement.

There is also some other material that will be distributed after the Minister has delivered his statement. You all have copies of the statement now, so Mr. Drury will present his statement.

Hon. C. M. DRURY (*Minister of Defence Production*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am very happy to have been provided this opportunity to make a statement to your committee on civil emergency planning in general and on the activities of EMO in particular. The honourable members should keep in mind that the term "Civil Emergency Planning" as used in this context, has a broader meaning than Civil Defence. The term "Civil Defence" is usually interpreted as covering the measures taken to protect the general public, civil emergency planning includes not only civil defence measures as such, but also the planning required to help ensure continuity of government at all levels—federal, provincial and municipal; continuity of government being most important in assisting the population in surviving the conditions created by a war emergency and essential to help assure the proper conduct of the war and recovery of the economy after the emergency.

The interest by the public in the activities of EMO fluctuates with the degree of danger inherent in the international situation. There is always a great demand for information and serious concern on the part of the population whenever there is a crisis, such as the Cuban or Berlin crisis. Civil emergency planning, as military planning, cannot meet the requirements for adequate plans to protect the Canadian population if it is to work on a "stop and go" basis. On the contrary, adequate civil defence measures and civil emergency planning require long-range planning, training and testing.

Why Civil Emergency Planning Now?

For a variety of reasons, some people have argued that civil emergency planning is not necessary, that it is a waste of talent and money. We believe that civil preparations must be continued for the following reasons:

(*a*) If military defence is required, so is civil defence. Any future conflict would affect the Canadian population.

(*b*) It has been implied at times that the development and deployment of an anti-intercontinental ballistic missile system, the ICBMS, in North America might eliminate the need for civil emergency planning because of its effectiveness. This is not so! As stated in the white paper on defence "the future priority to be assigned to civil defence measures will be influenced greatly by the decision to deploy or not to deploy an anti-ICBM system . . . . In the meantime, approved projects will be completed and maintained." This is further supported by statements made by United States Defence Secretary McNamara and military leaders. Mr. McNamara has said: "The effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system in saving lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defence system" and "that recommendation (of production and deployment of anti-ICBM systems) will be entirely contingent upon acceptance by the Congress of a satisfactory fallout shelter program; without a fallout shelter program there is no basis whatsoever for deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system".

(*c*) Even if no Canadian targets were involved, Canada would be affected by random hits or by fallout from explosions in the United States.

(*d*) Effective use can be and has been made of civil defence in peacetime disasters to save lives. This is an immediate and practical use of civil preparations which, unfortunately, has not always been publicized.

Role and Aims of the Emergency Measures Organization

Because of the short warning time in the missile age and the consequences of a nuclear war, it was thought highly desirable to help ensure, not only the survival of the Canadian people, but also the continuity of government. Civilian control and leadership must be maintained in wartime. Seventeen departments and agencies have been assigned emergency roles and therefore are involved in varying degrees of planning, as required, in close co-operation with provincial authorities whenever applicable. Appendix 1 to this statement gives an outline of departmental responsibilities. These responsibilities are subject to review in the light of developments in emergency planning. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will make it available for the record without reading it.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that agreed by the committee?

Mr. DRURY: For the reasons given above and to ensure co-ordination of all planning, the emergency measures organization was established officially by a 1959 order in council (P.C. 1959-656) dated 28th May 1959, amended in 1963 (P.C. 1963-993) dated 27th June 1963, which indicates that the Minister of Defence Production shall have and through the emergency measures organization, shall exercise the following civil defence powers, duties and functions:

(*a*) the co-ordination of civil defence planning by departments and agencies of the government of Canada;

(*b*) the preparation of civil defence plans in relation to matters that are not the responsibility of any other department or agency of the government of Canada;

(*c*) assistance to provincial governments and municipalities in respect of preparation for civil defence where assistance is not the responsibility of any other department or agency of the government of Canada;

(*d*) general liaison with other countries, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with provincial governments on matters relating to civil defence; and

(*e*) direction and administration of the Civil Defence College at Arnprior, Ontario.

The aims of EMO are threefold

(1) To plan measures, including the most sensible use of our resources, that will assist the population to survive the hazards of a nuclear or conventional war.

(2) To plan for the continuity of essential elements of all levels of government so that civilian leadership, guidance and necessary instructions can be given to the Canadian people.

(3) Provision of assistance to provinces, and through them to municipalities, in developing their emergency services to meet disasters, through the medium of financial assistance on the basis of up to 75% federal contribution, the provision of training courses at the Canadian Civil Defence College and, generally, through the preparation of planning guides.

High Priority Programmes in Civil Emergency Planning

A great number of measures can be taken to ensure the preparation of complete plans. However, it has become necessary to deal with priority areas related to the two basic requirements: Public survival and continuity of government. To meet these requirements, the following high priority programmes were agreed:

(*a*) Public Survival

(1) Provision of warning of attack systems, including the location of explosions and fallout reporting. This is, and has been, a responsibility of the Department of National Defence.

(2) Provision of an emergency broadcasting system, capable of operation under fallout conditions to give instructions to the public and information of a general character on the conduct of war.

(3) Implementation of a public information programme with emphasis recently on instructions to the public in times of emergency, to assist in the saving of lives.

(4) Provision of emergency medical and welfare supplies and services.

(5) Protection against radioactive fallout. This is being effected through the provision of shelters, radiological defence and instructions.

(6) Preparation of plans for the mobilization of resources required in an emergency, e.g. supplies, manpower, communications, transportation, essential utilities. A system is under development for the rapid evaluation of the resources remaining after an attack.

(*b*) Continuity of Government

The following measures have been taken:

(1) Provision of emergency government headquarters and departmental supporting units, with adequate communications, at the federal, regional or otherwise provincial and zonal levels of government and also at the municipal level, wherever considered necessary. These preparations include arrangements for the warning of designated officials, their transportation on short notice and the manning and operation of facilities, with essential records available. (The construction and operation of central and regional emergency government headquarters is at present a responsibility of the Department of National Defence.)

(2) Drafting of emergency orders and regulations to ensure legal continuity of governmental authority by delegation of powers and decentralization of services, keeping in mind the need for close co-operation between federal and provincial authorities.

(3) Preparation of war books and readiness plans for all departments and agencies, outlining in summary form, for quick reference, plans and actions to be taken, the authorities, the inter-relationships of departmental activities, areas where government decisions are essential, and other related matters.

(4) Carrying out of training programmes, studies and exercises.

Progress to Date

I would not like to read to you a list of achievements in civil emergency planning to date and by emergency measures organization in particular. Again with your permission, Mr. Chairman, this outline will be made available for the record as Appendix 2 to this statement. A good deal remains to be done, however, to complete the above mentioned high priority programmes. It is suggested that this might be carried out over a period of some five years, and follow the following general lines.

1. Completion of the warning of attack systems, including location of nuclear detonations and fallout reporting.

2. Protection of the emergency broadcasting system facilities and personnel.

3. Completion of the network of emergency headquarters with communications. The zone programme is now underway.

4. Completion of the medical stockpile programme and provision of additional welfare supplies and services.

5. Consideration is being given to the initiation of a public shelter programme by the identification of available shelter space in existing buildings and with the provision of only the minimum of ventilation, water and sanitation. A survey of all federal buildings has been completed. Another survey of all public buildings is being carried out in Alberta to develop techniques of survey which could be applied in a national survey, and to determine the amount of fallout protection which could be made available for public use generally.

Major Points of Interest

Emergency measures organization is aware of the need to keep up to date with planning assumptions, research and development and to plan on a long-range basis in a co-ordinated and practical fashion. Consequently, the following points are of interest:

1. Close co-ordination with military plans for survival operations is most important. As stated to your committee by General Walsh on 11th July 1963, for budgetary reasons, "The full manning of survival operations system had to be curtailed". As indicated previously, the national defence programmes in warning system and emergency government headquarters are not complete. This affects civil emergency planning. It is recognized that there must be close consultation between emergency measures organization and Department of National Defence.

2. To assist in long-range planning, consideration will be given to the allocation of a five-year plan to emergency measures organization and civilian departments interested in civil emergency planning.

3. Greater emphasis will be placed on preparations for assistance in peacetime disasters. Whatever plans are made or services provided here, they would also be useful for a nuclear or conventional war emergency.

I would hope that the above statement has indicated to the honourable members of the committee the need for civil emergency planning in Canada, as outlined briefly above, and as carried out by the emergency measures organization and departments or agencies in their effort to help ensure public survival and recovery of the Canadian economy in and after possible wartime emergencies, and the saving of lives in peacetime distasters.

Appendix 1 to
Statement on CEP

Civil Emergency Planning—Departmental Responsibilities
In Wartime

1. Agriculture

(1) Production on the farm including the provision of advice and guidance to farmers on the protection of farms, crops and livestock against wartime hazards such as radiation.

(2) Be responsible for inspection and regulatory functions relating to the quality and wholesomeness of food, to its freedom from an unacceptable degree of radioactive contamination, to plant and animal insect and disease control.

(3) Make post-attack assessments of the availability of farms, crops and livestock.

(4) Provide assistance and advice to provincial governments on a combined federal-provincial organization to carry out the above-noted civil emergency powers, duties and functions.

2. Defence Production

(1) Establish a War Supplies Agency to

(*a*) make post-attack assessments and determine the availability of surviving resources of food, energy, ready-to-use survival materials, production facilities and raw and semi-processed materials;

(*b*) assess supply requirements based on claims submitted by other departments and agencies at all levels of governments; compare requirements with availabilities; make reconciliation of competing claims and establish priorities as required;

(*c*) make arrangements for control and bulk redistribution of food, energy, suvival materials and other essential commodities including those in government-owned stockpiles, except medical stockpiles and articles or equipment or things under control of the military authorities;

(*d*) regulate internal and external trade where practicable, particularly with respect to rationing, price control and foreign trade;

(*e*) procure by purchase, requisition, or other means, all goods and supply services required by government for civil and military purposes;

(*f*) control international supply transactions and maintain effective liaison for this purpose with supply agencies established by NATO or its members, specially the United States of America; and

(*g*) control industrial production, including the allocation of raw and semi-processed materials.

(2) Manage any government sponsored stockpiles of supplies, except military and medical supplies.

3. External Affairs

(1) Assess the international situation and report to Cabinet on international developments.

(2) Conduct relations with foreign governments and international organizations.

(3) Protect Canadian interests in other countries.

(4) Participate in information activities abroad in consultation with other interested government departments and agencies, including the provision of general policy guidance to the international service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

(5) Maintain and operate communications facilities for purposes described in paragraphs (1) to (4).

(6) Assist and advise other departments on matters having international implications.

(7) Interpret, in consultation with other departments as appropriate treaties and other international agreements to which Canada is a party.

4. Finance

(1) Through the Department of Finance

(a) assess the availability of and restore banking and other necessary financial facilities, and exercise emergency controls over all financial institutions, including the Bank of Canada;

(b) provide and control the use of funds to cover normal and emergency federal expenditures including

(i) funds needed to re-establish the working capital of essential business, and

(ii) emergency financial assistance to provinces;

(c) advise cabinet respecting the imposition of emergency taxation and other emergency fiscal measures;

(d) advise cabinet on priorities to be given to competing demands on the financial and economic resources of the country in collaboration with other departments;

(e) implement financial moratoria as required, and

(f) conserve foreign exchange and control international financial transactions, in collaboration with the Bank of Canada and the chartered banks.

(2) Through the Bank of Canada

(a) provide assistance and advice to the Department of Finance on financial matters, as required;

(b) if required, operate a foreign exchange control system in collaboration with the Department of Finance, and

(c) have performed those normal functions and duties of the Bank of Canada as may be essential, dependent on the survival of facilities and the circumstances of the emergency and the directions of the government of Canada for which the bank is fiscal agent.

5. Fisheries

(1) Assume control over all fish catching, landing and processing operations up to the point where consumable fishery products enter into storage or directly into distribution channels.

(2) Make post-attack assessments to determine the extent of survival of fishermen, fishing vessels and gear, fish processing plants and fishery products in storage.

(3) Requisition or appropriate, or procure by contract or agreement as required the services of fish producers, fishery products, fishing vessels and gear used in catching fishery products, dock-side facilities required for landing such products, and fish plants and fish processing equipment.

(4) Carry out inspection procedures to determine

(a) whether a fishery product is suitable for consumption, and

(b) the extent if any of radioactive contamination of fishing vessels, plant and equipment and fishery products.

(5) In collaboration with other agencies of government, control the movements of and protect fishing vessels.

6. Justice

(1) Through the Department of Justice,

(a) formulate and implement emergency measures and advise the cabinet in connection therewith;

(*b*) advise other departments and agencies on legal problems that may arise in connection with the re-establishment and maintenance of the normal functions of government, and

(*c*) perform in relation to the emergency, the normal duties and functions of the Department of Justice.

(2) Through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,

(*a*) exercise responsibility for

(i) the internal security of Canada in all matters of subversion and espionage,

(ii) the protection of specified vital points,

(iii) Port and travel security control,

(iv) the administration and operation of civilian internment camps, and

(v) the providing of assistance to other services and departments in the identification of persons unable to identify themselves;

(*b*) exercise responsibility in accordance with the police jurisdiction of the R.C.M. Police and in co-operation with other police forces, for the internal security of Canada in all matters of sabotage and police assistance in the enforcement of federal statutes and emergency legislation, and

(*c*) assist provincial and municipal governments and their police forces as requested in all matters pertaining to the co-ordination of emergency police planning and operations.

7. Labour

(1) Establish a National Emergency Manpower Authority to

(*a*) control and allocate all civilian manpower except those persons exempted from its authority;

(*b*) formulate general emergency manpower policies based on assessment of manpower needs and resources, and recommend any necessary legislation relating thereto;

(*c*) establish essential activities and critical occupations as a basis for manpower priorities, and

(*d*) maintain liaison with other elements and agencies of emergency government on matters relative to manpower mobilization and utilization.

(2) Through the services of the Department of Labour,

(*a*) analyze national manpower needs and resources;

(*b*) make recommendations to the authority concerning changes necessary in the priorities of essential activities and critical occupations, and

(*c*) control labour-management relations, conditions of employment and wages.

(3) Through the services of the Unemployment Insurance Commission,

(*a*) provide the principal field representatives of the national emergency manpower authority;

(*b*) prepare and disseminate directives and instructions for the control and allocation of manpower;

(*c*) apply and enforce manpower priorities and controls, and

(*d*) provide local labour market information and analysis.

8. National Defence

(1) Provide technical facilities and operate a system to give warning to the public of the likelihood and imminence of an attack.

(2) Provide technical facilities and operate a system to determine the location and yield of nuclear explosions together with the predicted and actual patterns of fallout, and

(a) give the necessary warnings of fallout to the public;
(b) prepare preliminary estimates of casualties and weapons effect data from which physical damage or other hazards may be estimated, and
(c) co-ordinate and collate nuclear activity data from other available sources.

(3) Provide, maintain and operate a communication system for the national emergency government.

(4) At the request of the regional commissioner, or if communications are not available as may be necessary, control, direct and co-ordinate all survival operations in areas damaged by nuclear explosions or seriously contaminated by radioactive fallout, including

(a) the conduct of necessary operations, including rescue, first aid to the injured and decontamination, in these areas;
(b) the maintenance of law and order, the control of traffic, and the movement of people;
(c) the allotment of firefighting and police tasks;
(d) the allotment of tasks for the restoration and maintenance of essential public utilities and services, and
(e) during operations the co-ordination of such support as may be required by civil agencies working under the direction or control of the army in these areas.

(5) Provide, as requested, and having regard to other commitments at the time, emergency support to provincial and municipal authorities in the conduct of any survival operations which may be undertaken by these authorities during an emergency.

9. National Health And Welfare

(1) To be responsible through an emergency health services organization for

(a) assistance and advice to provincial and municipal governments and other agencies in the operation of emergency medical, nursing, hospital and public health services, and in the health aspects of the provision of potable waters;
(b) assistance to provincial and municipal governments in the provision of medical and health supplies from the national medical stockpile;
(c) the inspection and regulation of health standards for drug and pharmaceutical manufacture;
(d) advice to the war supplies agency in the manufacture, procurement and distribution of medical and health supplies;
(e) the establishment of regulations covering the health standards for food and food products including the permissible levels of radioactive contamination;
(f) the control and allocation of civilian medical professional manpower, other than members of the Canadian Forces, i.e. physicians,

dentists and nurses, and direction or supervision of allied health manpower allocated to emergency health services;

(*g*) medical advice to departments and agencies on the health hazards of radiological, biological and chemical warfare and on general health problems;

(*h*) detailed medical estimates of traumatic and radiation injuries;

(*i*) an estimate of damage to medical installations and an assessment of surviving medical manpower, and

(*j*) the co-ordination of medical mutual support action between the provinces and between Canada and the United States of America.

(2) To be responsible through an emergency welfare services organization, for

(*a*) assistance to provincial and municipal governments in the operation of emergency welfare services, consisting of emergency feeding, clothing, lodging, registration and inquiry, and personal services and without restricting the generality of the foregoing

(i) control and allocate federal welfare material and assigned personnel resources, and

(ii) in consultation with other departments, advise on priority use of essential survival resources, both material and personnel available throughout the country;

(*b*) operating emergency welfare services within a province or provinces where adequate services are not being provided, including the priority requisitioning of accommodation for emergency lodging purposes during the immediate survival phase following a nuclear attack, and

(*c*) co-ordinating welfare mutual support action between the provinces and between Canada and the United States of America.

10. Postmaster General

(1) Operate postal services under emergency conditions.

(2) Distribute and handle emergency change of address and safety notification cards.

11. Public Works

(1) Establish in conjunction with the provincial authorities a wartime organization responsible through central, regional, zonal and local authorities for the control of all accommodation including

(*a*) the use of all existing and useable accommodation, including the requisitioning, appropriation and procurement of property, dwellings, commercial and industrial accommodation, except during the shock phase where these controls may be exercised by emergency welfare services and other emergency government services delegated such authority;

(*b*) rent and sale controls, and

(*c*) the allocation of rehabilitated or newly constructed accommodation.

(2) Through Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation assist the provincial authorities in the general co-ordination and implementation of emergency housing construction programmes, including the provision of the associated water, sewage and other utility services.

(3) Assist the provincial authorities with wartime maintenance and construction programmes for roads and road bridges, and co-ordinate the inter-regional and international aspects of such programmes.

(4) Establish in conjunction with the provincial authorities a wartime organization responsible through central, regional, zonal and local authorities for the control of all engineering and construction resources, except those under the control of military authorities or other exempted emergency government services, including

(a) the direction, control and regulation of the engineering resources represented by the equipment, material and assigned manpower of engineering and construction contractors, including the various subtrades and consultant and other engineering services, and of government at all levels except that during the shock phase these controls may be exercised by the Canadian army and other emergency government services delegated such authority;

(b) the co-ordination and demands for engineering and construction resources and the allocation of these resources to meet demands which are approved by the executive authority at the appropriate level of government, and

(c) the co-ordination of demands on the war supplies agency and the national emergency manpower authority for engineering and construction equipment and manpower.

(5) Establish, in conjunction with other departments and agencies concerned, an organization responsible for the maintenance, repair, reconstruction and construction of all ports, harbours and inland waterway facilities.

(6) These wartime organizations shall not, without the consent of the military authorities or other exempted emergency government services, appropriate or control the use of accommodation buildings, water sewage or other utility service under their control.

12. Transport

(1) Place under federal government control all transportation, meteorological and telecommunications resources, facilities and services in Canada, except those operated by the Department of National Defence and the telecommunciations facilities operated by the Department of External Affairs.

(2) Establish and operate an emergency transportation control organization capable of functioning under national, regional, zonal and municipal authorities, as appropriate, to

(a) control all types of transportation facilities and services in Canada, including fishing vessels in Canadian waters, but excluding transportation facilities operated by the Department of National Defence, and

(b) direct the employment of all types of transportation to essential tasks for the survival of Canada as a nation.

(3) Establish and operate an emergency national telecommunications organization capable of functioning on the basis of decentralized authority to control all forms of telecommunications including broadcasting.

(4) Assess available transportation, meteorological and telecommunications resources, except those operated by the Department of National Defence.

(5) Provide maximum support to tasks accepted by Canada as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(6) Through the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation provide an emergency broadcasting service on an international, national and provincial basis

over the facilities of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and privately-owned stations including the operation of such facilities as required; such broadcasting to be co-ordinated to meet the general requirements of Canadian and NATO civil emergency plans.

Emergency Measures Organization,
Ottawa, June 12, 1964.

Appendix 2 to
Statement on CEP

Results to Date—Civil Emergency Planning

1. A national survival attack warning system is operational and, through sirens and emergency broadcasting, can warn the public.

2. A nuclear detonation and fallout reporting system has a limited operational capability. To complement this system, five provinces are developing a radiation monitoring capability in municipalities.

3. An emergency broadcasting system, involving participation of all radio and TV stations, is in a continuous state of readiness.

4. The army has a re-entry capability with operational plans in readiness.

5. Substantial stocks of emergency health supplies have been procured and are being located in regional depots.

6. The Canadian Civil Defence College has trained, since 1954, over 30,000 persons. Some 2,000 provincial and municipal emergency planners are being trained annually.

7. A public information programme involving press, radio, television and distribution of pamphlets, has been carried out on a continuous basis.

8. A programme of design and development aimed at reducing the costs of shelters is well in hand, and tests are conducted through the DRB.

9. A survey of all federal buildings, some provincial government buildings, and of certain mines has been made to determine their potential as fallout shelters.

10. Approximately 3,000 home shelters are estimated to be in existence but of these only 200 were built using federal financial assistance through the NHA.

11. National exercises, involving provincial and federal components of emergency government, have been conducted.

12. Through the production of planning guides and federal financial assistance, provinces have made steady progress in the development of emergency measures.

13. An urban characteristics survey of all likely target areas has been started.

14. Readiness plans have been prepared for the relocation of government at all levels with the necessary warning, movement and manning orders at the national and regional levels.

15. A national government emergency communications system, based on the Canadian army signal system, is approximately 60 per cent complete.

16. Draft orders-in-council and regulations, defining the authority to be given in wartime to federal agencies have been prepared.

17. Essential records have been selected and stored in emergency quarters.

18. Drafts of departmental war books are now being reviewed within departments, outlining action to be taken under every phase of alert and on the declaration of war.

19. Work has begun on the development of a national system for rapid assessment of damage after attack and determination of surviving resources.

20. A joint study of the effects of a nuclear attack on North America in 1965, on the economies of Canada and of the United States, is in progress.

21. An interim organization has been developed to control all types of supply, for rationing, control of prices, industrial production and external trade.

22. Arrangements have been made for a wartime manpower agency.

23. Plans for the control of all transport and telecommunications facilities are being developed.

24. Plans are being prepared, in co-operation, with provinces, for the wartime control of accommodation, engineering and construction resources.

25. Planning is going forward to provide advice to farmers, in co-operation with the provinces, on the protection of farms, crops and livestock, for the inspection of food against radiation and for the control of insects and deseases affecting plants and animals.

26. Provision is being made for catching, landing and processing of fishery products in conjunction with provincial departments.

27. Assistance and guidance to provinces is being provided by national health and welfare in the operation of emergency health services.

28. Assistance and guidance to provinces is being provided by national health and welfare in their programme to provide lodging, feeding, clothing and other personal services. This programme is well underway in eight provinces.

29. Arrangements have been made for the continuity of minimum postal services.

30. Special plans have been made by the RCMP to help ensure the internal security of the country in wartime.

1964-65

1. Conduct a pilot fallout shelter survey in Alberta in order to develop procedures and techniques should it be considered desirable to carry out a national survey.

2. Continue the shelter research and development programme.

Appendix 2 to Statement on CIP

3. Pursue the urban characteristics study.

4. Carry on the operation of the Canadian Civil Defence College with emphasis on training of key officials and staff in their essential duties.

5. Continue to develop, in conjunction with provinces and municipalities, a public information programme, with special emphasis on local disasters.

6. Emphasize the provision of equipment and give guidance for the development of the municipal radiological defence services.

7. Further encourage the development of emergency measures within provinces through the financial assistance programme and planning guides and correlate federal, provincial and local planning.

8. Improve the operational capability of the emergency broadcasting system.

9. Work even more closely with the United States in co-ordinating the respective civil emergency programmes.

10. Further implement the construction programme of emergency headquarters:

(*a*) at central level: provide for another 200 officials with staff in departmental relocation units;

(*b*) at regional level: provide departmental support units to federal and provincial elements of government in 4 regions;

(*c*) at zonal level: provide for 13 additional zone headquarters.

11. Continue evaluation of resources and provide an analysis by regions for a situation 30 days after an attack.

12. Pursue the joint study of effects of a nuclear war on the economies of Canada and of the United States.

13. Further develop the interim capability of a War Supplies Agency, with particular emphasis on operations and responsibilities at the local level.

14. Develop further planning on control of manpower.

15. Prepare more adequate plans for the use of all transport facilities with special emphasis on road transport.

16. Pursue planning for the maximum use of all communications in Canada, and generally to study the feasibility of providing a technical control organization to ensure rapid and effective use of all main commercial telecommunication systems.

17. In co-operation with provinces, continue planning with respect to agriculture and fisheries.

18. Provide further guidance and assistance to provincial emergency health and welfare services, including more implementation of emergency medical stockpiles, hospital disaster planning, surveys of health supplies and medical manpower.

19. Continue assistance, through provinces, to local police forces, continued organization of auxiliary police, and completion of R.C.M.P. emergency network.

20. Progress with planning for the necessary administrative orders and press and radio releases for pre and post-attack situations.

21. Canvass all projects and programmes rigorously in order to determine those most likely to provide peacetime as well as wartime benefits, for example dual-purpose construction serving normal peacetime purposes and fallout shelter if required, and also to determine those plans and projects likely to give

worthwhile returns in natural disasters, or in the event of conventional war, as well as under the greater demands of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the Minister's statement. I think in questioning the Minister it might be wise to work through his statement, section by section, and then move on to questions in the appendices that go with the statement. I think we should deal in the first section with the general reasons for civil emergency planning; the role and aims of the emergency measures organization; which takes us down to page 3.

Mr. Brewin was first. Do you have a question on this initial part, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I have a few questions. First of all, I would like to call the minister's attention to what is said here as one of the grounds for saying civil preparations should be carried out, and it is said that U.S. defence secretary McNamara says the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system in saving lives depends in a large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defence system, and again, that the recommendation of production and employment of anti-ICBM systems will be entirely contingent upon acceptance by the congress of a satisfactory fall-out shelter program.

Now, first of all, am I not correct, Mr. Drury, in assuming that at present at any rate the American government has decided not to proceed with an anti-ballistic missile system, on the grounds largely that the expense would be prohibitive?

Mr. DRURY: Well, I think the present situation is that there has been a great deal of developmental work done on an anti-ICBM system. This has led to a sytem which is very expensive, as you have mentioned, and rather than proceed to instal the presently developed system, Mr. McNamara and the administration would hope to continue developmental work, with a view to making it more economical, less expensive, to install and operate, having in mind always that an occasion may arise when even the present very high level of expense might have to be assumed if the emergency appeared to warrant it.

Mr. BREWIN: Then may I put the converse to the proposition here? Without an adequate antiballistic missile system, would not a shelter program be almost useless, because of the fact that the fall-out shelter system would not protect against blast and fire?

Do the two not necessarily go together?

Mr. DRURY: No, blast shelter and an ICBM system have a direct relationship, obviously, one to the other.

If you are able to prevent a blast taking place, you do not need blast shelters. If you have no means of preventing a blast occurring, then an argument can be made for the necessity of blast shelters. However, in either case, as Mr. McNamara makes clear, with or without an ICBM system, there will be a fall-out problem, and the degree of protection which an anti-ICBM system, at very great expense, would provide would be largely rendered useless, or wasteful, if at the same time the consequences of this protective system could not be kept from the general public through fall-out shelters.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, but I was trying to make the point that a fall-out shelter as such is no protection against blast. There are two things, are there not, a blast shelter and a fall-out shelter?

Mr. DRURY: Correct, they are quite different.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps in that connection I might come over to appendix 2, but it relates to this. There is a statement in item 10 on appendix 2 that approximately 3,000 home shelters are estimated to be in existence, but of these only 200 were built using federal financial assistance through the National Housing Act.

Now, I appreciate that in addition to that there are federal buildings, and other things, other than home shelters.

Is there any estimate of the capacity to absorb personnel of the other buildings, other than home shelters?

Mr. DRURY: As yet there is no estimate. I do not think there is probably even a guess.

As I mentioned at the end of my statement, one of the things we are doing now is to develop measuring or surveying techniques—with the co-operation of the government of Alberta—with respect to measuring or surveying, with a view to fall-out protection, all public buildings in Alberta. The object of this is to try and develop a satisfactory method of measuring and cataloguing all public buildings in Canada, with a view to determining what is available, and what the capacity would be, but we have not yet got the answer to your question.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Drury, would you not agree that the provision of 3,000 home shelters, 200 of which were built with the assistance of the N.H.A. is totally inadequate if there is to be any serious attempt to provide shelters which would have any real meaning in the case of a nuclear war?

Mr. DRURY: Manifestly 3,000 home shelters is not going to do very much to protect a population of some 18 million against fall-out. I do not think there is any question about this.

The provision of home shelters to be constructed at the owner's expense has not in the past proved to be attractive on the basis of encouragement, exhortation, and the provision of plans by the public authorities.

The alternative to it being done at his expense is to do it at public expense, and this would entail on the part of the government for huge sums of money.

It is for this reason that we are proceeding to ascertain what might be the capacity of, not homes, but public buildings across Canada.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I do not want to monopolize the questioning. I am sure others have questions, but I would like to finish up by saying that is it not misleading in fact to pretend that without vast expenditure of money we can provide defence against nuclear warfare, any substantial protection?

Mr. DRURY: We can with modest expense, I think, provide defence against some of the aspects or effects of nuclear war. Now, I think this is hardly my field, but I understand that in your discussion of defence policy, it has been made clear that a massive attack, direct attack, on Canada itself is not very likely, not very probable, and the principal thing which Canada as a whole—I am not talking about specific areas, but as a whole—has to be on guard against is fall-out.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I do not think, if I may comment on your observation, that we got the impression, at least I did not, that Canadian centres of population would be immune. We got the impression that Canada would not be attacked alone, but if you envisage an attack on North America, surely some Canadian centres might call for some attention, and in this event would have much more than fall-out to worry about.

Mr. DRURY: In those centres?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes.

Mr. DRURY: And I tried to make that point, that in these particular possible target areas, obviously one has to worry about more than fall-out. The only protection against this kind of attack is destruction of the attacking weapon. It is impracticable, I think most people have agreed, impracticable to try and construct a shelter which will be immune to direct attack. I say impracticable in terms of cost, not of technological capability, but impracticable in terms of cost, certainly for a country like ours, but at the same time, through

intelligent organization of existing buildings, and particularly large public buildings, with comparatively little expense in the way of provision of additonal facilities, it should be possible to prepare a fairly large measure of protection against fall-out, which represents in terms of population numbers, the largest threat. It poses the threat to the greater number of people in Canada.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder if I might ask just one more question. Is it not true that as you provide a shelter program, countermeasures are likely to be provided equally quickly?

In other words, are you not running a race that you can never win?

Mr. DRURY: In respect to fall-out shelters?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes.

Mr. DRURY: I do not think so, no. To the best of my knowledge there has been no modification of these explosive weapons designed to make fall-out either more lethal or more penetrating, or to overcome the kind of protection which a fall-out shelter provides.

Mr. BREWIN: I will provide you later with an article I have, indicating that the bulletin on atomic science does not agree with your conclusion.

Mr. HARKNESS: First of all, I would like to ask Mr. Drury is the cabinet committee on emergency measures organization still in operation?

Mr. DRURY: It is still in operation.

Mr. HARKNESS: And that continues to be, really, the chief co-ordinating body for getting all departments of government worked into the emergency measures organization scheme?

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is one of the centres of co-ordination, that is correct. When you say chief, I am not quite sure how you measure co-ordination.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, with the large number of departments which are directly involved in this, and at least half a dozen who have to play a major part in any effective scheme, it seems to me a committee of that kind is perhaps essential in order to bring their activities into any reasonable working arrangement.

Mr. DRURY: I would agree with this, and this is the obvious reason why the body has been continued, and is continuing in operation, continuing to function.

Mr. HARKNESS: And is the annual conference on emergency measures with the provinces still taking place?

Mr. DRURY: I do not know. There has been a formal annual conference, has there?

Mr. PAUL FAGUY (*Director, Emergency Measures Organization*): Not in the past year, sir, but it is intended. We hope that there will be one, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: There is no definite date set for that meeting?

Mr. DRURY: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I would suggest that this is one of the essentials as far as coordinating the federal government's activities and the provincial and municipal governments' activities.

It always seemed to me, when I had responsibility for these operations, that this was the only means by which we made progress in coordinating the provincial and federal governments.

Mr. DRURY: I agree with you, this is a very useful step and as Mr. Faguy has mentioned, it is planned to continue with this type of collaboration and co-operation.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I would hope that there might be some definite date set for that, and the committee might be informed of that before the present session is over.

I regret to hear that there has been no conference since, I presume, the last one I presided over, which will be two years this coming December.

Mr. DRURY: Well, there has not been one, I know, since April, 1963, and I am not sure of the last date previous.

Mr. HARKNESS: The last one I know of, I think, was in December, 1962.

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, December 29, sir.

Mr. DRURY: We did miss in the calendar year, 1963. I would hope that we would not miss in the calendar year 1964.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I would have just observed, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee might recommend that this conference be held in the fairly near future.

Now, on the first page of your presentation you have a statement from the white paper, the future priority to be assigned to civil defence measures will be influenced greatly by the decision to deploy or not to deploy an anti-ICBM system.

I cannot see, myself, why that is. What effect will the decision to deploy or not to deploy an anti-ICBM system have on the extent to which you carry on emergency measures?

Mr. DRURY: Well, an active effective defence against attack will call for, or have a direct relationship on the kind of things that are done in respect of civil defence.

Mr. HARKNESS: Why?

Mr. DRURY: Well, I do not think there is much doubt that an effective active defence alters, or is likely to alter, the character of the attack, and if the probable character of attack is one kind, the appropriate passive or civil defence measures would be of one kind, and if one contemplates a different type of attack, you should have different civil defence priorities.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you give us an example which would illustrate this?

Mr. DRURY: I think probably if one were to take, by way of example, a large urban agglomeration in Canada, if there were no effective means of stopping the descent on to it of a guided or a ballistic missile, the plans for minimizing the damage to that population would, of course, be quite different from the plans that one would develop for minimizing damage to the population if there were an effective means of preventing the descent of a missile on to that same area.

Now, in one case, if there is no defence, one possible means of minimizing the damage is evacuation. If, however, you are in a reasonable position to ensure that there will be no descent, then evacuation does not enter into it as a likely, or even a probable means of dealing with means of minimizing damage.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, what this amounts to, really, is, is it not, that if you have a guarantee that there will be no nuclear weapons discharged in this country, then you do not need any civil defence at all, or emergency measures set up, but there is no possibility that that situation will ever be reached.

Mr. DRURY: Well, let me deal with the first premise. I would not agree that the guarantee of no nuclear explosions on Canadian cities would do away with the need for emergency measures planning, and emergency measures organization.

There will still, even with an effective theoretical defence, be problems of fall-out arising from either detonations on the surface in Canada in non-populated areas and detonations on the surface in the United States. Both of these will produce a fall-out danger, a fall-out problem, in Canada.

Mr. HARKNESS: But is not the actual situation the same in this regard as it has been down through the ages in regard to any weapon? No perfect defence has ever been evolved against any weapon, and it is beyond the bounds of credibility that any perfect defence will be evolved against ICBM's, or other means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, is not the situation that we have to accept that some weapons in the event of a war of that type developing will land in this continent, and therefore we are going to have the emergency measures program, or the necessity for it, always with us.

This is why I do not understand this phrase here that it is going to depend on whether an ICBM system is put in or not. In my view, I think you have to have this emergency measures organization, the arrangements for continuity of government, the arrangements for trying to ensure that as many as possible of your population survive, irrespective of the defence which is evolved against ICBM's.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I think perhaps the phrase that you have quoted may not have been—

Mr. HARKNESS: It is not a very happy phrase, I would say.

Mr. DRURY: —as lucid. What was meant was rather not that the continuation or otherwise of civil defence measures will depend, but that the priorities within civil defence will change, depending on whether or not there is an effective anti-ICBM system.

I agree heartily with you that regardless of whether we have this, we must have—

Mr. HARKNESS: I would agree that there might be a difference in emphasis depending on how effective an ICBM defence you think you have, but it would be just a difference of emphasis. It would not materially alter what you have got in the way of emergency measures organization.

Mr. DRURY: I agree heartily.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, on this question that Mr. Brewin raised in connection with the blast protection, fall-out protection, home shelters, and so on.

Is not the situation this, that as far as any area where a direct hit is concerned, you are going to have any centre of that area, depending on the size of the warhead which is dropped there, an area of total destruction. It would not matter what degree of blast protection you put in. You would have nothing left anyway, and therefore you are in a situation where not only from the financial point of view, but from the practical point of view, it is not much use trying to provide blast protection except for a very limited number of, we will say, government headquarters, where you would hope there would not be an absolute direct hit, and therefore the headquarters would be able to survive and operate.

Mr. DRURY: That is correct.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the other hand, fall-out may take place, and in the event of a nuclear war, it probably would take place everywhere in the country, and therefore there is every argument for providing fall-out protection, more or less universally.

Well, has the government at the present time any program of encouraging to a greater degree than has been the case up to date the building of home shelters?

Mr. DRURY: There are no plans for doing anything more in respect of home shelters than has been done in the past.

There is a continuing development program, the purpose of which is to try to devise for the home owner the most satisfactory, easiest, and the most economical methods of him providing for himself, and at his own expense,

modifications to his own home, to provide a reasonable measure of fall-out protection, and a continuation of the program to make this information readily available to home owners all the way across Canada, but it is not contemplated at the present time that there will be any extension of this limited program by way of direct financial assistance to home owners, or the provision of material, or items at government expense to home owners.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, well, I think myself it is very regrettable that the efforts which were made in the way of putting out pamphlets, and so on, which were put out in very large numbers, outlining how a cheap home shelter could be constructed, and encouraging people to put in the home shelters, did not meet with more success.

As you have pointed out here, the number of people who will build a shelter is really related directly to a crisis developing. As soon as a crisis begins, people start building shelters, and as soon as the crisis is over, everyone forgets about it.

I recognize that it is a very difficult problem to get practical results on.

Now, in that connection, is any consideration being given at the present time to a scheme which was designed to encourage this, and which was under active consideration some two years ago, of the houses owned by the government? A large number of them are Department of National Defence houses, of course, but there are also Department of Transport, and Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, which have housing owned by the government. The scheme was to build fall-out shelters in any new construction, and to put them into construction already existing, and there was no final decision made on that the last that I was concerned with it, but it was under very active consideration, and in fact it was almost agreed to at one time.

What is the situation of that program at the present time?

Mr. DRURY: It is not under active consideration at this time.

If I may make an observation on this, such a program would have as its objective either the provision, as its end object, the provision of a limited number of fall-out shelters, at government expense, to a selected group of people, and this, I think, would perhaps be rather unfair, in that those who happened to be occupying government-owned quarters would have at public expense, personal fall-out shelters, whereas the vast bulk of the population would not.

There is, therefore, in such an arrangement some element of inequality, if this were to be the object of installing these in government-owned quarters.

If the object, however, is to serve as an example, or an encouragement, to the general public to emulate it, I myself would have very serious doubts as to the effectiveness of setting this kind of example. I think it would likely lead, in the present state of the general public's view of the international situation, to no more being done than has been done by home owners now under the present state of exhortation, and this type of example, I do not think would materially increase the numbers of private owners who are prepared to take it on their own.

The CHAIRMAN: If I might interrupt just a moment, I have six other questioners. I have been arbitrarily trying to work it out on the basis of about ten minutes each so that everyone would have an equal chance to question.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would agree that the argument in connection with this revolved around the points which you have just mentioned, but it seems to me that if the government does not provide fall-out shelters in housing which it owns and operates itself, it is pretty difficult to persuade the general public, the individual, that he should put one in his own place.

In other words, I do not think there is any chance at all of very many individuals putting in fall-out shelters, unless they do have an example of

this sort provided for them, if the government takes the matter sufficiently seriously that they provide fall-out shelters in houses owned by themselves.

Mr. DRURY: I certainly agree with that proposition, that unless the government sets the example it is unlikely that the public will take the lead. There is not much disputing that.

However, I still think that even if the government were to set the example, at this juncture it would not be followed.

Mr. HARKNESS: But will you not agree that if the government does not set an example of this kind, you might just as well forget about the fall-out shelter program?

Mr. DRURY: Rather than forget about it, I would rather that for the time being the emergency measures organization should limit itself to endeavours to develop the most effective economic means of modifying homes to provide fall out protection, and to disseminate this information to the public interested in it, and when the general atmosphere appears to be more receptive, more likely to be receptive, to the notion of fall-out shelters in homes constructed at the owner's expense, then would be a more appropriate time for setting the example.

In the meantime, I do think that the emergency measures organization should continue to do what it can in the provision of fall-out protection in public buildings, buildings at all levels of government.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would like later, when some other people have talked, to come back to this matter of the provision of public shelters.

At this particular point, I would just like to make this final observation. It seems to me, then, that the government has adopted the same attitude as that of the general population, that the international situation is not such that it really warrants the expenditure of the funds required for fall-out shelters in its own houses.

Mr. DRURY: In homes, that is correct, but one must distinguish between fall-out shelters in homes, and fall-out shelters provided in public buildings.

Apart from anything else, on a per capita basis, per capita protection, the provision of fall-out shelters in public buildings is very much cheaper than the cost per head to protect in a home.

Mr. FANE: You would not have any trouble getting them built as soon as the first ICBM lands.

Mr. BREWIN: That would be a little bit too late.

Mr. SMITH: A few months ago, an American nuclear physicist was on a television program in Toronto, and in answer to questions very much like Mr. Brewin's questions to you today, sir, he made these points: that since an enemy attack would be for the purpose of conquest, they would want to conquer as much of the country as they could in a viable state; that they would be likely to direct the main attack towards vital targets; and that since few of these vital targets were in Canada, and most of them were in the United States, he suggested that civilian defence and survival training was more possible, and more likely to be effective, in Canada, and therefore was more important for Canada than the United States.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. DRURY: Well, I would agree with what I take to be the general proposition.

Mr. SMITH: That our survival chances are better?

Mr. DRURY: Our survival chances are better in the event of a massive attack, and one is talking about probabilities in all these cases, our survival chances are better, and the kind of threat we face is more easily countered than would be the probable threat to the population of the United States.

Mr. SMITH: So, therefore, survival steps in Canada are probably more worth while than they are in many parts of the United States?

Mr. DRURY: Well, let me put it another way, which perhaps says the same thing. For a dollar invested in this field, we in Canada are likely to secure more survivability than a dollar invested in the United States would provide.

Mr. SMITH: Therefore, with our survival in Canada, it does not necessarily follow that we should follow the lead, or the lack of lead, which is given by the United States, whose problem is considerably different from ours.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I do think that there should be some relationship between the steps taken by the United States and the steps taken by ourselves, but that the emphasis we place on one form of emergency measures may well be quite different from the emphasis placed by the United States on the same form, or on the relative forms.

Now, I think what you are suggesting is that if the United States goes all out on emergency measures, or civil defence, we should not necessarily follow right along in their trail, and conversely what you do argue, perhaps a little more strongly, is that merely because the United States does nothing is no reason why we should be doing nothing.

Well, you must look at the other side of the coin, too, and if one is true, so is the other. I would agree with you that a dollar spent in Canada is likely to produce more survivability than a dollar spent in the United States. You must remember, however, that what we are contemplating here is basically a form of insurance against a contingent event, having in mind that if the United States takes out no insurance at all against this risk, that is perhaps not a compelling reason that we should take none.

On the other hand, if the United States is prepared to invest very heavily now in this kind of insurance, one must bear in mind that we in Canada can get the same insurance coverage for considerably less cost.

Mr. SMITH: A minute ago you spoke of the difference of emphasis. Would it be a fair conclusion that you think the emphasis in Canada perhaps should be on fall-out shelters, rather than blast shelters?

Mr. DRURY: Precisely.

Mr. SMITH: And one or two final questions on this curiously muddled sentence in the white paper. There is no assurance, or guarantee, that any anti- until it has been tried.

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is a generality.

Mr. SMITH: Well, there is no assurance that any defence system will work until it hos been tried.

Mr. DRURY: We could say that there is no assurance anything will work until it has been tried.

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. DRURY: All right. I will not argue that too much.

Mr. SMITH: So, just to make it perfectly clear, your feeling is that the effect of the deployment of an anti-ICBM system by the United States will not be whether or not we will have survival training and emergency measures organization set up, but only the direction.

Mr. DRURY: The kind of direction, that is right.

Mr. MACRAE: My questions have to do with Order in Council P.C. 1963-993, and I would ask the minister if that is, as listed here, is that the order in council complete, all that particular one which actually designates the Minister of Defence Production as the responsible minister, and then spells out certain duties. Is that order in council complete here, or are there others?

Mr. DRURY: When you say complete, do you ask if this particular order in council is an outline, or tell the whole story?

Mr. MACRAE: Yes?

Mr. DRURY: The answer is no. It is a complete order in council. It has got a heading, and a date, and a signature.

Mr. MACRAE: I do not mean about the formalities, but in the body of it. Is that in here?

Mr. DRURY: No, this is an order in council under the public service rearrangements and transfer of duties acts, and it merely transfers to the Minister of Defence Production the responsibility for the emergency measures orgonization.

Now, the order in council which is the basic one establishing the organization itself is the 1959 order in council.

Mr. MACRAE: Then the second question, have there been other orders in council, other than this one of 1959, and this one of 1963 in connection with this? Are there others?

Mr. DRURY: None directly relating to the emergency measures organization. There have been general orders in council, covering the whole of the government service, and so on, which have a bearing on the emergency measures organization, or the personnel within it, but not specifically related to the emergency measures organization.

Mr. MACRAE: Well, my final question, Mr. Chairman, what changes have been made in the whole basic plan of the emergency measures since you took over, Mr. Drury? Are there any, or are you in effect—and perhaps a brief answer here is all that is required—are you in effect carrying on the plan as it was set up before 1963?

Mr. DRURY: Carrying on the organization which was in existence prior to 1963, and with the kinds of change in emphasis which I have indicated in my outline remarks, the program which has been evolving gradually since 1959.

Mr. MACRAE: So there have been no basic changes, other than in emphasis?

Mr. DRURY: There have been no basic changes in direction.

Mr. GROOS: I wanted to ask the minister a few questions on the matter of co-ordination and co-operation with the United States.

I recall when we visited NORAD, at Colorado Springs, there was a very close liaison between their civil defence organization and the North American air defence organization. They were both in the same building, and their job seemed to be largely centred around providing early warning of the point of impact of ICBM's, and in providing confirmation, through various sensors, and so forth, that the impact had taken place in that area.

I notice that there were a number of these sensors spread all over the United States, but they did not extend up into Canada, and this seems to suggest to me a very great gap, a very dangerous gap, and I could not quite see the reasoning behind this.

It suggests to me a very legitimate field for civil defence planning, and I was going to ask the minister if our defence plans, or our civil defence plans, include closer co-operation with the United States, and perhaps an extension of these sensors up into Canada, because it seems to me that it is an over-all problem, and not just one that is confined to the United States.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I think most members of the committee will be pretty familiar with the co-operative arrangements which NORAD represents, and as you remarked there is in the NORAD headquarters a United States civil defence unit, and there is a link between the United States air forces and

the United States civil defence organization, not only at the level of the NORAD headquarters, but at United States air defence subordinate headquarters.

The same organization obtains in Canada, and there is the same chain of command and information on the civil side that there is on the military. At North Bay there is the same arrangement for co-operation and inter-communication between the military in the North Bay headquarters and the Canadians in the civil defence organization, and even at subordinate Canadian headquarters there is the same crossover.

I would suggest that while there may be in some areas differences in either the type or scales of equipment provided for civil defence in certain regions of the United States and regions in Canada, the general organization, the general level of activity is intended to be substantially the same.

Because of the over-all part played by the Canadian army in civil defence, and I mention in my statement that national defence is responsible for the construction and operation of the main governmental regional headquarters, there is a representative of the Canadian army at Colorado Springs. It is the headquarters of NORAD, and he is the liaison between the NORAD command directly through to the Canadian element.

Mr. GROOS: Well, that partly answers my question, Mr. Chairman, and I can understand that there is complete co-operation in so far as we in Canada could be warned through the United States, and by using their computers of the projected impact area of these ICBM's, but it seems to me that the thing that is lacking is the method of confirming that the missiles actually have fallen in this area, and of course this very much affects our problem in so far as we are interested in fall-out, and we must know exactly where, and in some area that is not too highly populated these missiles have fallen, so I really was interested in finding out whether we have any plans for providing these sensors in this country.

Mr. DRURY: Well, we have, as they have in the United States, an organization and system of reporting the location of detonations, and reporting on fall-out.

Now, these will vary as to how continuous and how extensive on a full time basis such an organization should be.

We now have the skeleton of such an organization, and part of the continuing growth or improvement of the emergency measures organization includes the improvement of the communications of this particular group for locating and reporting of nuclear detonations.

Mr. GROOS: One last question, then, Mr. Chairman. Is this organization and this system that we have completely coupled in with that of the United States, and if so, why would it not have been shown down there in NORAD?

Mr. DRURY: Well now, why it was not shown down there, I do not know. There is a Canadian system. There is provision for cross-linking the exchange of information at every level as between the NORAD regional headquarters and as between the NORAD stations, on a north-south basis, and our nuclear detonation reporting system is linked to, and works with the United States system.

Now, why it was not displayed, I frankly do not know.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Drury, I wonder whether you could give us the approximate annual cost of the E.M.O. to Canada?

Mr. DRURY: The annual appropriation is of the order of $10 million. This does not include expenditures made from the appropriations for their own sort of specialties of other government departments.

By way of example, the Department of National Defence, the Department of National Health and Welfare, the Department of Defence Production, the Canadian broadcasting corporation.

But for the emergency measures organization itself, in the accomplishment of the purposes I have outlined here, the annual appropriation has been running in the order of $10 million.

Mr. HARKNESS: Could I ask a supplementary question? Is it not that most of the expenditures for the emergency measures organization have beeen borne by the Department of National Defence?

Mr. DRURY: In the past this has been true, and these expenditures have been related principally to the provision of capital facilities. The large complex to provide an alternative to Ottawa for the operations of the government, the similar, but smaller scale headquarters in the regions, and the provision of capital equipment for inter-communication. It is quite true.

Mr. MCNULTY: Do you have any idea of the total cost, taking into consideration the amount budgeted for the other departments?

Mr. DRURY: On an annual basis, or since 1959?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could interrupt, and refer the minister to this document in our folders, called E.M.O. National Digest, December, 1963, and the figures are given at page five of this.

This is the answer he gave in the house to a question that was asked him.

Have you seen this? I do not know whether it is accurate or not, but I think it answers the question.

Mr. DRURY: This does give a summary, yes, and I had better not offer any figures that are perhaps less accurate than these.

The approximate expenditures over the last six years, for all departments are: 57-58, 4.1 million; 58-59, 4.1 million; 59-60, 15.6 million; 60-61, 26.2 million; 61-62, 69.8 million; 62-63, 40.8 million; for a total of 160.6 million, since 1957-58.

Mr. MCNULTY: What would the approximate cost be for the average family fall-out shelter?

Mr. DRURY: In a home?

Mr. MCNULTY: In a home, yes.

Mr. DRURY: It is hard to be precise about this, but a simple home constructed fall-out shelter should be obtainable for about $500.

Mr. MCNULTY: How much of this would be government subsidy?

Mr. DRURY: In terms of direct financial assistance, nothing. There is an element of subsidy in the cost to the government of development work, to work out the plans, and the tests to ensure the usefulness of such plans, and there is also the possibility of obtaining for this purpose a loan from C.H.M.C.

Mr. MCNULTY: Does this come under their winter building program?

Mr. DRURY: When you ask do they come under, there would be no bar to a man securing the bonus for winter construction by reason of building a fall-out shelter in his house, but it would not alter the amount of the bonus.

Mr. MCNULTY: Have members of parliament ever had a practice exercise in the emergency movement of the government, and how successful was it, if they did?

Mr. DRURY: Success, of course, is I suppose a relative term. This has been practised on a number of occasions, with a satisfactory result.

Mr. MCNULTY: When was the last time?

Mr. DRURY: The last time this was done was in 1961.

Mr. SMITH: Members of parliament have a pretty low priority in this, do they not? There are other people more important.

Mr. DRURY: Well, when you say pretty low, they have a lower priority than those whose job, or whose presence is important to the continuity of an executive function.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, the field of questions has narrowed down quite a bit. I have been asking myself, and I still do, about the co-operation that the federal government receives from lower levels of government, and the result that it gives, actually.

I know it is purely a matter of education, and you do not give to the people something that they do not ask for, and with the sayings that we hear here and there, that a nuclear war is impossible, and people say well, we will have to chance that. It might not come, and why spend money, but I wanted to ask how much the emergency measure planning has been costing in the past year?

The figures did not impress me too much, because I say to myself the federal government has to take the initiative, and it does in the field of national defence, actually. We spend billions of dollars to defend and protect the population against an attack, or to stop wars, and all that, and I do not think we do our share in dollars and cents to protect the population against the threat of nuclear war, which is a possibility, a future possibiilty.

I do not want to put this as a question, but I think in my views, and I am just preparing the field for my main question, I feel that the federal government should do more, and should do more to protect the population, and educate the population, and I wanted to ask a question of you, sir, what would be your opinion about, let us say, an adjustment of my proposal of compulsory service, into a sort of home guards organization, which would give you a good field, the E.M.O. field, around which you may adjust your organization, this compulsory service for the people of Canada, and at the same time educate the young people, which would go back to their families, and would educate the population in general, and maybe would make the population more conscious of their responsibility in that field, and at the same time it would help this country quite a lot.

What do you think of that?

Mr. DRURY: I would certainly say that it is much more imaginative, much more, in my view anyhow, useful, to have national service conducted under the, if you like, main purpose of emergency measures, or civil defence, than it is under the aegis, or having as its purpose the teaching of young people to bear arms.

Mr. LANIEL: I am moving towards that direction. That is why I asked you that question.

Mr. DRURY: This would seem to be a much better banner under which to launch such a proposal, I agree with that, but of course one of the serious obstacles to any scheme of national service, for whatever purpose it might be, or under whatever heading it might be, is the question of cost, and whether this is the most important area to which the efforts of a very large segment of the Canadian people should be directed for, I agree, a relatively short period of their life, and in terms of the acceptable use of our total national resources, this would represent a large diversion from the present allocation of the national resources.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but sir, when you know that we have spent $700 million up north to protect this country about something which may never come, and might be obsolete soon, would it be worth while to look into the possibility of spending $250 million a year for such an eventuality, which would have a much broader field?

Mr. DRURY: Well now, again this is not entirely my field, but the purpose of national defence expenditure is not to protect people in the sense, I think, that you have been using it.

The purpose of this expenditure is to, in so far as we are able, ensure that this event does not take place.

On the other hand, the purpose of emergency measures expenditure is quite different. It is to protect people should the event take place, and you cannot really regard both of these expenditures being directed toward the same object. They are not, they are directed to quite different objects. One is protection in the event of something happening, and the other, the national defence expenditures, are directed at preventing that event happening, not to protect people from the consequences of the event, but to prevent the event happening.

Now, one can argue that not as useful a purpose is being served by spending large sums of money in preventing nuclear war, and we would be better off spending money to make Canadians more fit to prosper in a world where there was no nuclear war, but this kind of expenditure would not serve, I suggest, to represent our part in preventing a nuclear war happening. This would be a complete change of object from the present one, but certainly if we are going to have any kind of national services scheme, this is a much better basis, philosophical basis, for launching it, than training people to bear arms.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lessard, we have an interpreter present, if you prefer to speak in French.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) I have four short questions. Do the national building standards include standards for protection, as well as durability?

Would there be any possibility of a religious organization building a church, say, in a city, and providing in the basement some form of protection?

Would there be standards to cover that, to provide a fall-out shelter in the basement, and if so, would there be any form of financial assistance available?

Mr. DRURY: (*Interpretation*) Yes, if, suppose that religious communities do wish to concern themselves with this matter, then there will be assistance available for them, in the form of standards, and technical advice, but when it comes to financing, that is where we stop.

(*Text*)

I might add, we hope they would avail themselves of this advice.

Mr. BREWIN: May I give a theological supplement, Mr. Chairman?

Might not they be better upstairs on their knees, rather than bothering to get down into the basement?

Mr. LANIEL: Are you looking to such an eventuality as having grants available?

Mr. DRURY: Not at the moment. As I mentioned, what we are now doing is to try and work towards surveying all existing capacity, and getting a measure of what is needed to make these useful as fall-out shelters.

If, by some unlikely event, there is already existing in Canada sufficient to take care of all our needs, then no further development would be needed. Now, this is only theoretically possible.

Mr. LANIEL: You would not build churches just to make shelters.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) A subway is being built at Montreal, and one has been in existence in Toronto for a number of years. I would like to know if when the construction of these subways was undertaken, the federal government took any steps to provide for their use, in the event of necessity, as underground shelters?

Mr. DRURY: (*Interpretation*) At the time of the construction of the subway in Toronto, and with the present construction of the subway in Montreal, attempts were made to interest the constructors in the provision of shelter facilities, but without too much success.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) Was that owing to the fact that you did not wish to make any financial contribution?

(*Text*)

Mr. DRURY: Precisely.

Mr. SMITH: Is it not a fact that, though, that the subways, as they are built, would have a reasonable, or a considerable amount of easy convertibility into fall-out shelters?

Mr. DRURY: Well, some elements of some subways.

Mr. SMITH: I mean, the mere fact of their depth in some cases.

Mr. DRURY: The subway in Toronto, for instance, spends a lot of its time either on the surface, or very close to it.

One must bear in mind that what one is looking at, is not protection against a relatively short downpour. It is not like getting in out of the rain. It is not too difficult to find in a number of places in Canada shelter, immediate shelter from fall-out. The problem, basically, is how to exist for some time in this particular environment.

Now, just a plain, ordinary hole in the ground would provide you with the necessary mass barrier between you and whatever the fall-out there may be, and as long as you remain in that hole, you would be protected, but one has to look beyond the mere problems of a shield, to surviving for as long as may be necessary.

Now, in the case of the subways, some of them anyhow, are large underground caverns; there is a lot of physical space, but if people are going to remain and survive in here, all kinds of things, principally sanitation, and the provision of air, fresh air, and fresh water, are needed, and in some ways these kinds of services are not easily provided or readily available in the case of subway tunnels. It could be more economically done in the basement of a large building, which already has sanitation and water facilities in it.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) First of all, I am sorry that the federal government missed a good opportunity to make a financial contribution to what might have been useful shelter facilities, and now a question regarding the Saguenay region.

You make reference in your document to certain storage centres, where food, first aid supplies, and drugs, and so forth, are kept.

Do any such storage centres exist in the Saguenay region?

Mr. DRURY: (*Interpretation*) These storage centres contain only drugs, medicines, clothes, but no food and no supplies of any other kind.

At the present time, the stocks for the Quebec region are in Valcartier, and there is no such storage centre for the Saguenay area.

(*Text*)

Mr. FANE: Just working on the premise that we have to have somebody locally to organize the E.M.O., that in my mind is something that should come first.

I want to know who in the places where reserve units of the Canadian forces have been disbanded is taking over that duty, if any?

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is a very large question, covering quite a few localities, and the answer will tend to vary with the locality.

I might say that the role of the reserve forces has been to provide, within the whole emergency measures framework, specific services and specific functions, but they have not been responsible, as such, for the emergency measures organization.

This is quite a separate hierarchy, and is organized a bit like the armed forces, on the basis of a central apparatus, largely devoted to planning, in Ottawa, with the federal government, and a further chain extending through the provincial governments, and finally a municipal, a modest municipal organization.

Now, involved in the municipal organization will be a co-ordinator of civil defence, in the municipalities where we have succeeded in persuading them to establish such an office, and his job is to co-ordinate all the municipal functions whose services would be useful and usable in the event of either a nuclear or indeed a civilian disaster, and the disbanding of a reserve force will not affect this organization.

There may be a gap in certain functions which the military within that municipality, within that locality, would have been called upon to perform.

Mr. FANE: Would it not provide a very serious gap in the organization that could be definitely controlled, because nobody can control a civilian organization as well as a military, or semimilitary organization can be controlled.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I am an old time democrat. I cannot subscribe entirely as to the virtues of military control. I do not think that there is any question about it. In time of emergency the military tend to be more disciplined, to be more coherent, to be better organized, and as a consequence, perhaps, better able to carry out a specific function, and this, indeed, has been the role of the reserve forces.

Now, where a reserve force unit has had a specific role, or specific function, to carry out, and this reserve unit is being disbanded, some means will have to be found for the effective discharge of the role, or the function previously allocated to that unit, but I would point out that there are areas in Canada where there is a civil defence organization, and a plan evolved, for emergency measures and where there are no military units.

Mr. FANE: That is more or less what I was trying to say, in my own inarticulate way.

However, I have one more question, which has to do with the first item in your appendix 1, that is agriculture.

Just how, and where, and in what way, are agricultural products that can be used for food going to be protected, and in a usable form, should a nuclear attack occur?

Mr. DRURY: It would be very expensive indeed to try to provide a protected four or five months supply of food for the whole Canadian population. Not only would this require an awful lot of space, it would also involve very substantial carrying charges, and further, it would involve the problems of turnover, and waste involved in this turnover, and this may go on for years, and years, and years.

Because of the difficulties inherent in this kind of stockpiling on a protected basis, the emergency measures organization has directed its efforts rather at devising machinery to ascertain, as rapidly as possible, the surviving food, and the surviving sources of food, and prepare to make the most efficient and the most effective utilization of what remains, rather than to actually protect the whole.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the list of questioners. There were still some outstanding questions.

Next Tuesday, Mr. Faguy will be the witness. If anybody would have further questions they would like to direct towards the minister, he could be back. Mr. Brewin and Mr. Harkness would like to direct further questions to the minister.

This committee stands adjourned, then, until Tuesday, at 11 o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 8

TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1964

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Defence Production; and
Mr. Paul Faguy, Director, Emergency Measures Organization.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20976—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman:

and Messrs.

Béchard,	Laniel,	Matheson,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McMillan,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	McNulty,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Nielsen,
Granger,	MacLean,	Pilon,
Groos,	MacRae,	Smith,
Harkness,	Martineau,	Temple,
Langlois,		Winch—(24).

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 23, 1964.

(13)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch. (16)

In attendance: Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Defence Production; and Mr. Paul Faguy, Director, Emergency Measures Organization.

The Committee continued its study of *Civil Emergency Planning* and in particular the work of E.M.O. Mr. Drury, assisted by Mr. Faguy, answered questions respecting the statement, on these matters, presented to the Committee on June 18, 1964.

At 12:55 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m., Thursday, June 25 at which time the Committee will consider *Service Colleges and related training plans.*

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

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EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, June 23, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: We have a quorum. Come to order, please. We are continuing this morning with our discussion respecting E.M.O. The Hon. Mr. Drury, the Minister of Defence Production, and Mr. Faguy, the director of E.M.O. are present at witnesses. There are no prepared statements this morning, so we shall proceed with the questioning of the witnesses. The first questioner is Mr. Fane.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Harkness asked me to say that he was called away, and that he would not at this time be able to ask the questions of which he had given notice. But there is one question I would like to ask the minister, and that is: How is it that the Emergency Measures Organization reports to the Minister of Defence Production rather than to the Minister of National Defence?

Hon. C. M. DRURY (*Minister of Defence Production*): The choice of ministers or the choice of minister to be responsible for civil defence measures is obviously a question of judgment, and whether it be the Minister of National Defence or another minister will depend on the general structure of government, and an assessment of the way in which responsibilities may best be carried out.

In the United Kingdom, as you are aware, civil defence comes under the home office rather than under the defence department. The reasons for this are perhaps related to the greater burden, or load, or degree of specialization of the minister concerned in the particular country.

In the Department of National Defence there is currently a very large job to be performed, and very heavy responsibilities, both national as well as international, to be carried by the Minister of National Defence. Perhaps it would be wise—and it has been felt for some time to be wise—to have a civil minister engaged in civil activities charged with this responsibility. Now, one of the large elements of the civil defence program is the emergency supplies planning branch which is an element of the Department of Defence Production. The Minister of Defence Production, as a consequence, has direct relationship and a continuing relationship, and an important relationship with civil defence. Perhaps for these reasons he is the appropriate minister.

Mr. MCMILLAN: There has to be close co-operation, then, between your position and the Minister of National Defence in connection with civil defence?

Mr. DRURY: There has to be very close co-operation because of the substantial operations as well as the planning of emergency measures in Canada which is carried out by and through the Department of National Defence. This applies equally to the Department of National Health and Welfare, of course.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: It seems to me as I understand the program, that civil defence, survival, and the Emergency Measures Organization are clearly part of our national defence. Would that be a correct assumption?

Mr. DRURY: They are part of our national security.

Mr. SMITH: I did not mean it in the sense of a department, but rather in the sense of national defence for the defence of our country.

Mr. DRURY: National defence and national survival, or national security, are perhaps the same thing. In the sense in which you mean them, civil defence or emergency measures is a part of the whole, a part of the fabric, I agree.

Mr. SMITH: One part of the British North America Act which one never hears questioned, is the responsibility of the national government for national defence. I have never heard anyone suggest that we when we reform or amend the constitution, that this should not be the case. I think that is a reasonable assumption, is it not?

Mr. DRURY: I would go along with you.

Mr. SMITH: I know it was not your responsibility in writing this, nor do you have to accept the responsibility for writing the order in council, and I would think it was not that of the previous minister, either. But I think it is an important matter with legal draftsmen somewhere in the civil service. This brings me to paragraph (c) of the order in council.

Mr. DRURY: You mean the 1959 order in council?

Mr. SMITH: Yes. It says to assist the provincial governments in respect of the preparation for civil defence where assistance is not the responsibility of any other department or agency of government. To me that particular paragraph is a real hodgepodge, and it does not explain much. Perhaps you, Mr. Drury, could put me straight on it with regard to what that paragraph does mean.

Mr. DRURY: Well, it is perhaps a bit like the British North America Act in that this is a residual clause. Where there are departments or agencies of the government of Canada which have specific functions in relation to assistance to provincial governments or municipalities covering their particular field, that continues to be a responsibility of that particular federal government department or agency. Where assistance is involved which is not covered specifically, then this covers it, and it is sort of a catchall for the Emergency Measures Organization.

By way of example, we were discussing last week the question of shelters and a shelter program. There is no agency or department of the federal government which has the responsibility for providing assistance to municipalities in this field. This therefore becomes under this clause the direct responsibility of the Emergency Measures Organization.

Mr. SMITH: Now that you have the responsibility, might I suggest that you and your staff should start working on a new order in council which would be more precisely definitive.

Mr. DRURY: You mean one which would be clearer?

Mr. SMITH: One which would more precisely define responsibilities within the national government. One of the criticisms you hear locally of the Emergency Measures Organization runs something like this: With the way it operates, the local chief of police will immediately report to the man who has been designated as chief of police for the province, or to head up the police in Ontario—it is the head of the provincial police; and the local fire chief will report immediately under a certain set of circumstances to the man who has been designated as the chief of the fire services—I think it is the fire marshal of Ontario. There is a great tendency to centralize.

The particular people involved in municipal affairs think, instead of their reporting to a fire commander, there ought to be some designation within the municipality of one person who would have the responsibility in case of an emergency, and who would have local responsibility, and who would be responsible for complete co-ordination within that area, rather than to have this rather complicated chain of commands that is set up. I may be wrong with this criticism, but I would be happy to be told that I was wrong.

Mr. DRURY: I think that one has to look at this as an endeavour to provide adequate arrangements for as wide a measure of decentralization as possible. In the event that decentralization becomes necessary, or desirable, you must

have the machinery and the organization to operate on a decentralized basis. At the present time the government of the provinces operate to a greater or lesser degree on a centralized or a decentralized basis, for some functions, and in some areas municipal organizations, municipal councils, mayors, reeves, or whatever they may be, and their advisers are supreme, although they are not completely autonomous, or completely decentralized.

In respect of other functions, however, particularly technical functions, there is and perhaps there must be a higher degree of centralization, or concentration of authority, because of the greater technical knowledge and skills in the provincial governments. So there are in peace time, or in normal times, some fields in which there is complete decentralized local autonomy, while in others there is a degree of exercise of central authority.

It is the object of the Emergency Measures Organization to carry on in so far as this is possible, a chain of responsibility, and a normal chain of authority, but with provision for complete decentralization to the extent that it may become necessary. And to this end it is our hope that there will be, or there would be in respect to every community or local municipal organizations the ability to function entirely on its own. And if the emergency measures organization in any particular municipality seemed to envisage a greater degree of centralized authority than is now the case, I think there has been perhaps some misunderstanding of the philosophy.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY: I wonder if the minister could give us some information about the amount of publicity that is put out by the various departments such as the pamphlets that we receive from national health and welfare, from the queen's printer, from various presses under the authority of the queen's printer and from Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as well as from E.M.O. itself. They all put out literature directly concerning things we should do in the event of a disaster, and things like that. How much co-ordination is there between these various departments? Do they sit down with you and agree upon the information that they shall put out?

Mr. DRURY: Yes. All these pamphlets, and publications follow consultation with approval by the Emergency Measures Organization itself. This is done with a view to insuring that there are no duplication of effort or conflict of policy.

Mr. MCNULTY: I was just wondering. You are the minister responsible for this. Do you have meetings with other departments, and are moneys allotted in their budgets with regard to the Emergency Measures Organization? Do you have any co-ordinating meetings to control it?

Mr. DRURY: The co-ordinating body, as Mr. Harkness pointed out, in the final analysis is the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Measures. This committee consists of the ministers who have specific emergency measures functions to perform.

Mr. MCNULTY: So, if a request goes out by this committee to national health and welfare to do certain work, and to the queen's printer to put out certain publications and things like that, it is supervised?

Mr. DRURY: The queen's printer is merely a contractor in this area. He executes the demands made upon him by various government departments. It may be that in respect of a particular instruction or pamphlet, the idea may come from the cabinet committee; or it may come from the E.M.O. itself, or it may be the idea of a particular department concerned. In most cases this would be the inspiration of the particular department concerned with a specific function.

Mr. McNULTY: Then there is a certain amount of watchfulness or care taken to see that there is no duplication in the publicity put out by the various departments at every level?

Mr. DRURY: That is the purpose of this co-ordination; it is intended to avoid it, and I hope we have been pretty successful to date.

Mr. BREWIN: Are you in a general way familiar with American efforts in this field?

Mr. DRURY: Well, if "general" is not too specific, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I have an interesting article here entitled "civil defence in a balanced national security". The author is Steuart L. Pittman, assistant secretary of defence for civil defence apparently up to April this year when he resumed his law practice in Washington. He has this to say:

> The civil defence program is geared to a low level of expenditures and makes no pretense of saving large numbers of lives in the impact areas. Although budgetary limitations were an important consideration, the avoidance of difficult and immeasurable problems of a psychological, political and strategic nature also contributed to shaping the moderate characteristics of the program.

I want to ask you if you think our civil defence effort is also geared to a low level of expenditures which, I would suggest, is relatively lower than it is in the United States?

Mr. DRURY: I am not quite sure of all the factors which you feel should be used in equating these things, but I am told that in the United States for their fiscal year 1964-1965 which is the one beginning July 1 next there has been provision made for some $358 million. How much of that will be spent, of course, remains to be seen.

In the United Kingdom for the fiscal year ending April 30 of this year, the expenditure was in the sum of $38½ million. This compares with our current figure of the order of $19 million.

Mr. BREWIN: Would you agree—and I think we should have the facts on this—that our program as well as the American program as described by Mr. Pittman really does not pretend to save large numbers of lives in the impact area?

Mr. DRURY: Neither program pretends to do so. I think that is right. Neither program pretends to save a large number of lives in the impact area. That is quite correct.

Mr. BREWIN: And another article I have, if you wish to refer to it, is to be found in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" of June, 1964, which contains an article by Marvin E. Rozen who is associate professor of economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He has this to say:

> Moreover, any conceivable civil defence program would still mean that millions would die.

That would be in the event of a nuclear attack. That is a fair enough statement, is it not?

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is a bit in the speculative realm I think, when he says that any conceivable defence program would still mean that millions would die. If he is saying any conceivable civil defence against any conceivable attack—given those two absolutes—this statement is probably correct. But it is quite possible to construct caverns at sufficient depth, and to equip them with a decent environment but at staggering cost, which would enable people to survive an attack by known weapons, or existing weapons.

Mr. WINCH: It has been done?

Mr. DRURY: It has been done.

Mr. BREWIN: Are the key words not "staggering costs"? This makes it a little impractical, does it not?

Mr. DRURY: I think it does.

Mr. WINCH: The only reason I bring that up is to suggest that perhaps we should be careful in our statements and not hold out excessive hope as to what can be done with respect to these survival programs. I notice in that connection on page 2 of this statement you have produced here, it says:

Mr. BREWIN: In that connection, on page two of the statement that you have produced here, it is said:

> Because of the short warning time in the missile age and the consequences of a nuclear war, it was thought highly desirably to help ensure, not only the survival of the Canadian people, but also the continuity of government.

The words "ensure not only the survival of the Canadian people" should be taken realistically in relation to any program that is not one of staggering cost with very small results. Some people may survive, but in the main target area very few would probably survive, no matter what we do about it.

Mr. DRURY: Certainly in the immediate area of impact there would be a high rate of casualities, very little survival, and the cost of ensuring a high rate of survival in the impact area would be so high that I question whether Canadians certainly, and United States citizens probably, would wish to pay for it at present.

Mr. BREWIN: In the allocation of the dollars that we have available for defence purposes, in the broader sense, I take it that the reason for the decision of the government to confine itself to a relatively inexpensive program of civil defence is that the government feels that a concentration on other means of defence which would prevent war is more important than trying to deal with the consequence of a war if it occurs.

Mr. DRURY: That is correct. They necessarily attach a higher priority and are prepared to put more money into preventing a war than in accepting the fact that a war will occur and trying to do more in the sense of ensuring the survival of the population in the impact areas. The amount of money we are now spending on preventing a war would not even begin to ensure the survivability of those in the impact areas in any event.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you not agree that it would be sensible for the Canadian people to realize that even if some civil defence measures are worth while and should be undertaken, that this does not give them any real measure of protection against the devastating effects of a nuclear strike?

Mr. DRURY: It does not give any guarantee of immunity to those in the area of an explosion. There is quite modest expenditure providing a large element of survivability for those who are not in the impact area and who will suffer from the dangers of fall-out and a breakdown of our present system of material supply.

Mr. BREWIN: Even for those in those areas there would therefore be an immense problem of contamination of crops and food and various supplies that are used, no matter what measures we take, which would create dangers of non-survivality, if I may put it that way.

Mr. DRURY: It would certainly create difficulties because most of the materials and supplies in the impact areas would be finished and would be useless. Reliance will then have to be put on organizing the remaining undamaged supplies for distribution.

Mr. TEMPLE: How many municipalities have taken advantage of the 75 per cent contribution from the federal government to build up their own emergency services?

Mr. DRURY: As of last December, some 2,100 municipalities.

Mr. TEMPLE: Out of how many municipalities?

Mr. DRURY: Out of a total of approximately 4,000 municipalities.

Mr. SMITH: Are the 4,000 municipalities urban or rural? Is there any classification of those municipalities?

Mr. DRURY: I have not a breakdown between urban and rural municipalities.

Mr. SMITH: Relating to Mr. Temple's questions, could you supply us with a breakdown because it would make the statistics more meaningful?

Mr. DRURY: Yes. The information is as follows:

	Number of Municipalities (1)	Participating Municipalities (2)	Organizations (3)
British Columbia	130	121	98
Alberta	305	179	88
Saskatchewan	788	63	34
Manitoba	188	152	37
Ontario	959	754	49
Quebec	1408	674	61
New Brunswick	43	42	17
Nova Scotia	78	58	23
Prince Edward Island ...	28		Covered Provincially
Newfoundland	89		Covered Provincially
	4016	2043	407

(1) Information provided by provinces in 1963.

(2) Municipalities include incorporated cities, towns, villages, municipal districts, rural municipalities, counties and townships.

(3) Organizations are comprised of individual incorporated municipalities, or groupings of municipalities, into area, unit, or county organizations.

(4) The municipalities participating in emergency measures represent at least 80 per cent of the population of Canada.

Mr. DRURY: (Continues) Obviously the largest number of municipalities in Canada are rural municipalities. The urban municipalities tend to be big and relatively few in number. The rural municipalities are much smaller and greater in number.

Mr. SMITH: So they would have much less need of this, probably.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Can I put a supplementary question? Can we have a breakdown by provinces?

Mr. DRURY: We can give you the municipalities by provinces.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Could we have those statistics?

The CHAIRMAN: With the agreement of the committee perhaps this information could be put into the record at the appropriate point.

Mr. SMITH: At the point where Mr. Temple asks the question.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: What is the amount that the federal government contributes? I know they contribute 75 per cent, but is it on the basis of so much per citizen in each municipality?

Mr. DRURY: No. The practice is for the municipalities to cost these plans and to formulate their monetary requirements, which they then send forward to the provincial government. The provincial government examines, scrutinizes, approves these, and sends them on to the federal government, the Emergency Measures Organization in Ottawa. The level of municipality activity varies quite substantially as between municipalities and the various provinces. The level of interest and activity varies. So far we have been able to substantially meet all the expressed needs of the municipalities in this direction. They have to put up 25 per cent themselves, and the necessity of advancing the 25 per cent themselves does condition the size, to some extent at any rate, of their demands on E.M.O.

Mr. TEMPLE: How often are the war books and readiness plans for all departments and agencies revised?

Mr. DRURY: Continuously.

Mr. TEMPLE: I thought that might be the answer. It is a simple answer. It has then been done continuously and an examination of the safeguards has been kept up?

Mr. DRURY: Yes, it has been done in E.M.O. and also in each of the government departments concerned. It is a job of this staff to keep war books up to date. They will obviously tackle one aspect of their war book at a time, and it might be that one element of it might be out of date for a month or so, but generally speaking these are kept pretty well up to date. This kind of operation is necessary because of the changing structure of government departments and because of the changing nature of the jobs that various people do. It is not merely an overhauling on the basis of new organization or new management techniques being developed.

Mr. TEMPLE: I suppose that as soon as they are prepared or revised they are then sent out to the provinces, or are they sent directly to the municipalities?

Mr. DRURY: No, the war book is a departmental document and it sets forth the procedures to be followed upon the introduction of the Emergency Measures Act. Is that correct?

Mr. PAUL FAGUY (*Director, Emergency Measures Organization*): At the federal level it is an order in council of 1959, and in the provinces they have their own civil defence act.

Mr. TEMPLE: I have one further question. Obviously the government sponsored stockpiles of supplies would include food and clothing. Would they also include any materials or light machinery that would be needed to get the basic parts of the economy going again?

Mr. DRURY: It is quite a difficult task to predict with any kind of accuracy the location of an impact. Consequently, one really has no clear idea of what might be knocked out, and any attempt to stockpile basic or fundamental machinery would lead to a high degree of possibility that what you have stockpiled was precisely what survived the impact and what you had not stockpiled was the same as that which was destroyed. Secondly, there is, in the Canadian economy, a great deal of multi-purpose machinery available—after all this is a sophisticated industrial economy. Rather than try to stockpile machinery, and to do so would be expensive, it seems better to try to get a rough inventory of what our industrial assets are and to try to make contingent plans for mobilizing and using what does survive in the event of an emergency.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, I would like to lead the minister back for a moment to the general concept of the purpose of civil defence. I may be wrong but I have a feeling that the general public have the notion

that the whole concept of civil defence is rather a futile exercise in this regard, that it is a rather hopeless attempt to salvage, as a last resort after the catastrophe has occurred, some of the population and some of our resources. In my judgment it is impossible to expect to survive a nuclear war to any worth-while degree, and therefore it seems to me that the real purpose of civil defence is in part our ability to retaliate and to demonstrate to any would-be aggressor that we have the capability to retaliate at least to a degree that would bring a catastrophe to him as well. It is therefore this ability to retaliate that gives a credible deterrent to any would-be aggressor. The ultimate purpose of civil defence, to my mind, is the deterrent to prevent such a catastrophe ever happening, and in that way we hope that we might be successful in saving the whole population from a nuclear attack. I think that this is a concept of civil defence which is not sufficiently publicized or stated and I would like to have the minister make a statement of his general approach to the whole problem of survival in a nuclear age.

Mr. DRURY: I would agree with you that this is an important facet of civil defence which certainly in this country has not been too well emphasized. The point that you make is that this is evidence of our resolve to mean no when we say no, that the Canadian people are prepared to make sacrifices to accept the consequences of continuing to say no when in fact we do mean no. In the framework perhaps of the western or the northern hemisphere, the Canadian resolve is perhaps not as important as the United States resolve. For this reason I think perhaps more has been made of this in the United States than in Canada. I think it might be a little presumptuous on our part to suggest that a possible aggressor, who might be prepared to launch an all-out nuclear war, would be significantly deterred from doing so by reason of the Canadian determination alone. But certainly the combined determination, of which we form a part, of all the western powers can be significantly measured by their approach to civil defence, and it is our contribution to the total evidence that the western world means no when it says no. In this sense it is a useful and I think significant contribution to the credibility of the deterrent.

Mr. MACLEANS (*Queens*): In other words, if a would-be aggressor believed that if he could pull off a successful surprise attack all resistance would immediately collapse, his temptation to do so would be very great. To dispel that notion from the mind of any would-be aggressor civil defence becomes a part of our ability to retaliate. When I say our ability to retaliate I do not refer just to Canada but to the defence of North America as a whole.

Someone else would like to ask a supplementary question.

Mr. BREWIN: I just wondered when you are talking about credibility as an aspect of civil defence, whether the government has given consideration to how much credibility can be purchased with a type of civil defence which, as you have said, still really leaves a great side of the population without protection. If you cannot afford a sufficiently high degree of civil defence to give credibility, you have far more credibility deterrence if you spend the money on making your retaliatory weapons immune than if you try the rather impossible taskk of making the population immune to an attack.

Mr. DRURY: I would perhaps take issue with you in your assertion that our expenditures on civil defence not only are modest but really do not purchase anything. If there were an all out war, the emergency measures that are contemplated and which are being taken now will provide a very substantial degree of protection against the probable threat in Canada.

Now, because there is no provision for immunity of those in what might be the first impact areas, this does not mean that the bulk of the population of Canada has no protection whatsoever. It is likely that the threat to the bulk of

the population of Canada will not be a threat of immediate destruction or incineration. Rather, it would be a threat of the consequences of a breakdown in the distribution of the necessities of life, and a gradual deterioration of the situation rather than a sudden one.

The same thing, to a somewhat similar degree, is true of fall-out. The fall-out is not sudden and instantaneous like a blast; it is something which tends to be a bit more creeping. It is the job of the Emergency Measures Organization to devise means to enable people to meet and survive these threats. With the expenditures currently being made and the plans being drawn up, I think provision is being made for a high degree of survivability against what appears to be a probable attack.

I would agree with you that it would be wrong to convey the notion that civil defence as it now stands is any key to or guarantee of immunity for those who might find themselves in an impact area; it is not. On the other hand, for those who are not, their chances of survival of the consequences of fall-out and disruption of the peacetime or normal means of distribution of the necessities of life, their protection against these threats, I think is quite measurable.

You suggest rather than spending money on civil defence, one should spend money on immunizing the weapons of retaliation. As you know, the means of retaliation rests in hands other than Canada's and consequently expenditures to immunize these are not made or controlled by Canada, but by other countries. There is no means of retaliation in Canada. The weapons we have all are defensive.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): This question may have been asked at the latter part of the last meeting when I had to leave. I would like to ask the minister when any segment of the Emergency Measures Organization has last been exercised under simulated conditions of nuclear attack.

Mr. DRURY: The last exercise was at the end of 1962. We have not had a large scale one since then.

Mr. McMILLAN: Four or five years ago a number of shelters were built in the basements of public buildings. I understand they were equipped with equipment to measure the degree of fall-out. I wonder whether that equipment is kept in readiness. Early last year I asked two postmasters who would have access to these particular shelters in time of emergency, and neither one of them seemed to know. Who is responsible for this?

Mr. DRURY: When you say, responsible for maintaining the buildings, it depends a bit on where it is, and whether it is a federal building, a provincial building, or a municipal building.

Mr. McMILLAN: They were in post office basements.

Mr. DRURY: The responsibility for seeing that these are operational, or the custodianship, rests with the zonal headquarters within the province. Perhaps if you would be more specific than mentioning just a post office, Mr. Faguy might be able to tell you precisely who it is. In general, however, it is the zonal headquarters which is charged with the responsibility for supervising the continued readiness of these shelters.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that all, Mr. McMillan?

Mr. McMILLAN: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have some specific questions which I would like to ask concerning the militia. I think I might address these questions to Mr. Faguy. When the policy for the establishment of the emergency measures organization was drawn up, what specific role was assigned to the militia at that time?

Mr. FAGUY: The responsibility was assigned to the army as such to give the necessary warnings of fall-out to the public, and to assist the municipalities. The army decided the militia would assist it in fulfilling their roles.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When the militia was assigned the task of assisting, can you advise what specific tasks were assigned to it by the Army?

Mr. FAGUY: More specifically the re-entry operations, re-entry into the target area, such as a city which might have been hit. They would care for the wounded until the medical people took over, and would provide necessary information for the re-entry forces.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Were these roles pretty well defined, and was the militia actually exercised in these roles?

Mr. FAGUY: The militia was exercised in these roles as part and parcel of their early program. Also, a special exercise was held in 1961-62, and a special militia course at the beginning of 1962.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would this concern the militia in the larger city centres particularly, or in centres everywhere across Canada?

Mr. FAGUY: It is more applicable to the major centres, but this responsibility applied to the militia in general.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If they had a re-entry role to play, and if they were the militia in major city centres, would they not be in the area of attack and not able to play a re-entry role?

Mr. FAGUY: The plan was to have these people located outside the target areas so that they would be able to operate at a headquarters outside a target city, or devastated area.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do I understand the militia was located outside the target area of major cities?

Mr. FAGUY: Not in peacetime, but in time of war. They would be moved to reception areas outside and would be ready to move back in.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If the militia is composed of civilian soldiers, how would you muster them out of their jobs at such times; at a time of early warning, let us say, how would you muster them out of their civilian jobs in the city into an area on the periphery.

Mr. FAGUY: This is a part of the plan where the militia people are told what part they will play at the time of the warning.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You would expect on early morning they would be mobilized and moved to that area?

Mr. FAGUY: Certain people would be called out, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you conceive that this is going to be a very useful role for the militia to play?

Mr. FAGUY: Certainly I think this is a useful role.

Mr. DEACHMAN: With the reduction of the militia forces, do you believe this role will suffer?

Mr. FAGUY: I am afraid I could not answer that; it is a matter of government policy what role the militia will play in the future.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Up to this point you have considered it to be a useful role?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, certainly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I notice that the exercises ended in 1962 and that was the last time there was any major exercise. Was the militia involved at that time?

Mr. FAGUY: The army was involved and therefore the militia in the sense we did review our plans at that time.

Mr. SMITH: Just so that an incorrect impression is not left, there have been militia exercises since 1962, and several which have involved re-entry training.

Mr. FAGUY: This is still part of their responsibility.

Mr. SMITH: And these exercises are still going on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: May I direct my final question to the minister. If the militia forces are reduced—and we understand from our studies here that this is to take place—will this role suffer, and if it is going to suffer, what plan is the Emergency Measures Organization making to adopt itself to this?

Mr. DRURY: It is likely there will be fewer militia units available, and we are looking forward to the report of the committee under Brigadier Suttie to make suggestions with reference to how most usefully and most effectively the reorganized militia can fulfil these functions.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Am I fair in saying that the Suttie report and its augmentation are matters of considerable concern to the Emergency Measures Organization?

Mr. DRURY: A matter of great interest.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, I am not supposed to ask questions, but perhaps you might ask a question for me concerning the practicality of expecting reserve forces in a target area to go out to a headquarters leaving their wives and families in the target area.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I will direct the question to the minister. I think I know what this leads to. If civilian soldiers in a large metropolitan community are to be put on alert, what is going to be their attitude toward leaving their wives and children in the centre of the city while they go out to the mobilization centre outside the city with the prospect of waiting until the bomb drops, and then going in and collecting the ashes of their families. Is there a paragraph anywhere in the book which covers this little item?

Mr. SMITH: What happened to the British soldiers all over England in the last world war? Goodness gracious!

Mr. DRURY: This is obviously one of the dilemmas.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This is a little different.

Mr. DRURY: This is one of the dilemmas that war visits on people. The problem is the same in respect of the civilian members of the population who have designated tasks in wartime, and for whom, because of their important executive function, special provision has been made. There are hosts of those in our civil service who will find themselves in exactly this same position. One would hope that those who have these specific designated functions to perform would be much more knowledgeable than perhaps some other members of the general public, in the action to be taken, and the consequences which might be expected in the event of an attack on Canada. In the pamphlet on instructions for survival, there are instructions in respect of the action to be taken by the families or next kin of those who have special duties to perform.

Clearly, however, this is one of the problems which we have to face where the man of the family is ordered into relative safety in anticipation of an event, and there is no similar arrangement made for his dependants. For everyone involved in war, this poses a moral dilemma. However, because of the fact that the militia men know what they themselves have to do, and the kind of thing they are going to be up against, they are in a much better position, or should be in a much better position, to make provision for the anticipated removal of their dependants to areas of apparent greater safety.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would you not agree, Mr. Drury, that the evacuation of the young and healthy men from an area of imminent total destruction and terrible disaster while leaving their families there poses a rather new question in warfare compared to the sending of soldiers to the front to protect an area behind, which has been the case in wars previously.

We are faced here with problems, such as mobilization problems quite beyond anything we have ever anticipated before, and that are really quite to the contrary of Mr. Smith's remarks. This not related to any problem of mobilization that we have had to face before, where the man was evacuated to safety, while the bomb fell on his family. That has not been our previous experience.

Mr. DRURY: If by "our" you mean Canadian, that is true. However there have been a number of men in the United Kingdom who were sent out to India to be stationed in southern India and they left their families in London. In terms of physical risk from the effects of war, the man was in comparative safety while his family was left exposed not only at London, but almost anywhere in the United Kingdom. This is not something new except that it is new for Canadians. But certainly in so far as the continent of Europe is concerned, and particularly the United Kingdom in the last war, this dilemma was pretty common.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Had these soldiers left London when it stood a very good chance of being destroyed completely? I do not think so. This was not our experience or belief at that time. We did not believe that our names were on the bomb. I know that was not my feeling, at least when I was in London. I did not believe it and I am sure you did not believe either, or else we would not have stayed there.

Mr. DRURY: There are very few people, no matter where they are, who believe that their names are on the bomb. There are very few people anywhere who believe that. That is one of the useful defensive mechanisms of the normal human being.

Mr. GROOS: I have an important question for Mr. Faguy. Short of an all out nuclear war, I am sure the public thinks that E.M.O. has a role to play. I am thinking for example of the recent Alaska earthquake and the tidal wave which swept down the Pacific coast. I think it increased public confidence very much in E.M.O. with the feeling that they are flexible enough to be able to deal with this sort of emergency. I happened to be out on the west coast at that time, and there was certainly an indication of a liaison between the various United States and Canadian military and civil authorities in this earthquake. It seems to me that the interpretation of the effects of the earthquake and the warning to the public was that they would be evacuated out of the area almost completely. This came about by radio, and by the press over the radio. I wondered if you had carried out any sort of investigation as a result of this incident to find out whether there are some lessons to be learned therein?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we are getting reports now not only from our own people on the west coast, from British Columbia, from the provincial authorities, and we are also obtaining reports from the United States as to what they found out in the greater disaster which occurred in Alaska. Quite evidently this shows the need first of all to have an authority in being to be available to people so that they can ask for help, and so that there will be co-ordination immediately on the spot. That was certainly proved in Alaska where the Alaskan civilian defence co-ordinator was considered by the army and civilian departments to be the co-ordinating authority. At Alberni also, the civil defence people were able to assist in welfare and health and general information. We feel that because of this liaison there should be more or greater emphasis placed on E.M.O. being able to assist local authorities in peace time disaster.

Mr. GROOS: I was thinking more specifically of the events before the tidal wave struck. I think the thing which impressed most people out there was that they just heard it on the radio. They happened to have their radios turned on when it was said that there was going to be a tidal wave striking in the vicinity of that area.

Mr. FAGUY: We discussed this matter with the Department of Transport and they are now studying better means of warning people in the case of a tidal wave. Of course, naturally, when there is an earthquake, you cannot always warn people ahead of time. But in the case on a following tidal wave, they might be able to give a warning. This thing is now under review.

Mr. GROOS: That answers my question.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I go to Mr. Smith, there is another member who wishes to ask a question, Mr. Matheson.

Mr. MATHESON: I think this question has to be directed to Mr. Faguy. From what I can judge, the common denominator in E.M.O. training, and civil service training generally is really the St. John's Ambulance, and that our military and civilian authorities concerned with survival seem to have it as a basis of their training, be it either elementary or senior. They feel there has to be St. John Ambulance training. Is that true?

Mr. FAGUY: The St. John Ambulance type of training naturally is a good type of training.

Mr. MATHESON: In emergency or civil defence work?

Mr. FAGUY: The St. John Ambulance type of training is a good training. But emergency or civil defence work is centered around a core of people who have to deal with many more aspects than simply the St. John Ambulance type of thing.

Mr. MATHESON: I am referring to the common denominator which runs through the training received by the military, be it either full time or militia, or the training received by the E.M.O. people, or even by civil servants in Ottawa.

Mr. FAGUY: Are you talking about first-aid type of training?

Mr. MATHESON: Yes, I am thinking of the answers given by a former government and by the recent government to questions with respect to the number of people who are in active service, or in the militia, and who are E.M.O. trained under the St. John Ambulance.

Mr. FAGUY: Yes sir.

Mr. MATHESON: Does this not tend to be really a common training for all these people? It is true that there are other agencies which operate specialized parts, which go beyond that.

Mr. FAGUY: I would not suggest that it was the only common denominator. For example, there is first aid, which is extremely useful to have at all levels of government, and for defence workers, there are also other aspects of training.

Mr. MATHESON: Is there anything else which is common to all?

Mr. FAGUY: I would suggest anything that had to do with warning, reporting, the continuing of government responsibility, the functioning and availability of reserves—all these aspects are part and parcel of emergency planning. First aid is only one aspect of it.

Mr. MATHESON: Am I right in thinking that it is a major aspect?

Mr. FAGUY: It is a most useful aspect, because we want people to survive.

Mr. MATHESON: That is right. That appears to me to be clear. I am quite interested in our local E.M.O. I have worked with them, and I am also interested in the militia, which is trying to do a survival role very seriously. I am

thinking of the Brockville Rifles. It is pretty difficult, however, to persuade the average Canadian specifically, to integrate himself with the E.M.O. program, unless it is under the broader aspect of simple survival under nuclear attack.

Mr. FAGUY: As we have stated in our statement, we feel that the responsibility of E.M.O. is not just for nuclear war, but for conventional war, as well as for peacetime disaster. We think it is quite important, for us to be able to assist in a peacetime disaster.

Mr. MATHESON: Could you give us an idea what departments of the federal government actually make use of the St. John Ambulance in one way or another?

Mr. FAGUY: E.M.O. recommends first a training for all civil defence workers, and we also pay an amount of roughly $4 per head to those people who have successfully completed the course. This is done through the financial assistance program to the provinces and municipalities. This is done generally right across Canada.

Mr. MATHESON: You could not go beyond the Department of National Defence?

Mr. FAGUY: The department of defence has a similar type of training, and our department is part and parcel of their training program. I do not have the figures to suggest how many in each department have been part and parcel of the training program.

Mr. MATHESON: The arrangements between the departments are generally comparable, one to the other, in that respect.

Mr. FAGUY: That is right; and we have an emergency service co-ordinating this type of training. It is directed by a medical doctor.

Mr. MATHESON: I have been interested in E.M.O. for some years, and I have the feeling that the St. John Ambulance Association, which is made up essentially of a great corps of retired service personnel, and those who have governmental responsibility in different areas, is a pretty useful corps for E.M.O. to rely upon from time to time, even for advice and guidance. It would be a very valuable group to work with. Does E.M.O. work with these people?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we do. For instance, when there is an annual conference for the emergency health service, the St. John Ambulance people are always available and take part at the various discussions which take place from time to time.

Mr. MATHESON: Do you happen to know Brigadier Johnson?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we know Brigadier Johnson very well.

Mr. GRANGER: I gather that survival depends roughly upon two things: one is to assure peace as much as possible. The other would be to live underground. I take it that the latter is unrealistic for a number of reasons. Therefore, every possible attention is being given to maintaining peace in order that people may live normal lives as much as possible. But in the event that an emergency did arise, are there in existence plans for the orderly removal of people from a threatened area? For example, would the population of a city be distributed around where there would be less danger?

Mr. DRURY: Reception areas have been organized largely through the militia for a fairly large scale movement of people. There are not, however, completed plans or completed arrangements for the removal of an entire population, let us say, such as from the city of Toronto. This does not exist. Manifestly one would virtually have to build an alternate urban complex.

Mr. GRANGER: I was thinking, perhaps, not of the removal of all parts of the population who were necessary to carry on the business of the people, but rather to cover them over in as wide an area as possible.

Mr. DRURY: What at the moment is contemplated is a voluntary individual decision in relation to evacuation without any specific indication where people might or should go. What we are doing is to make provision to notify people of the areas into which they should not go because of the dangers of fall-out. This would depend on a whole reporting scheme, the location of the detonation, and the direction in which the fall-out would be most intense. These would be danger areas. There are under the aegis of the military, a limited number of reception areas contemplated to which emergency welfare services could be supplied, and to which people could repair if they had no other place to go.

Mr. GRANGER: I could take it then that this is a matter which is under constant consideration?

Mr. DRURY: It is, and I do not think that with the changing nature of the threat it is possible to say today that we have a final and immutable plan. It keeps getting revised and changed all the time.

Mr. GRANGER: But the problem is continually before you in your mind?

Mr. DRURY: Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: The moral implication of Mr. Deachman's question, if carried to its logical conclusion, would make one wonder if any attempt at survival in civilization as we know it is worth while anyway. I have a couple of questions for Mr. Faguy concerning the role of the militia in survival.

Is it not a fact that the way, for instance, that armories are being relocated on the edge of a city is purely to make them more useful? I am thinking of the new armories at Toronto which are up north on highway No. 401.

Mr. FAGUY: I could not state for certain what facts are involved in relocating the armories, to be honest with you.

Mr. SMITH: For instance, with the militia units on the fringe of the large cities—would they not have a large and important role in re-entry and recovery?

Mr. FAGUY: Certainly in the case of the militia, that is so. That is part of their responsibility.

Mr. SMITH: And the militia units located around or near large centres of population are quite important in that respect?

Mr. FAGUY: They are very important at the present time, yes.

Mr. SMITH: I have two simple questions to ask the minister. We are talking about exercises. The Lanark Scots were having an exercise last Sunday. Mr. Brewin in his earlier question emphasized the futility and the hopelessness of the unrealistic matter—perhaps that is not the correct word—in trying to defend a target area, where there could be a direct hit or a blast. Is there any danger in overemphasizing the difficulty of defending a target area? Does that not really tend to discourage people who live in areas which are almost certain to be fringe areas from taking means to protect themselves against fall-out?

Mr. DRURY: There is that danger. It is one I tried to qualify for Mr. Brewin.

Mr. SMITH: Your answer to a supplementary question did emphasize it, but I think it is a point which needs to be emphasized all the time and continually, that we are dealing with two problems; and that the second problem is that it would be possible for survival for western civilization, and that is the one which relates to fall-out; and in that field I think it should always be emphasized that something can be done.

Mr. DRURY: You are right.

Mr. McNULTY: I am not sure whether the minister or Mr. Faguy should answer this question. But Mr. Temple asked the same question about a number of municipalities participating in E.M.O. I notice that you may possibly have a village or township participating on its own, and I thnk you have maybe two or three counties joined together in one large complex. Do you recommend any basic unit in geography, or population, as being the most economic for E.M.O.?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we have naturally to fit our plan into what the actual situation is in each province. As you know, some call them townships, counties, boroughs, or what have you. We try to use the existing units as they now exist. But where we have a number of small villages or smaller towns, we prefer to see these units grouped together to make one civil defence unit with one co-ordinator. This is more economical and we think more effective.

Mr. McNULTY: Where you group those units together, those of the various municipal bodies would participate on a per capita basis, and they would have their director setting up a budget. He would set up this budget. Now, how much would the municipal unit have to pay towards the cost, the over-all cost? What percentage of the budget?

Mr. FAGUY: This is by agreement with the provinces. Each province decides how much the municipalities should reimburse them. The federal government pays 75 per cent and generally the province is responsible for 25 per cent. They in turn can share this with the municipalities, which comes to approximately 10 per cent.

Mr. McNULTY: This can vary from province to province?

Mr. FAGUY: The municipalities do not have to pay anything because of the province agreeing to pay up to 25 per cent of the cost.

Mr. McNULTY: Would there be a possibility of getting the figures on what the provinces charge back?

Mr. FAGUY: We could do this. The answer is as follows:

The sharing arrangements on municipal financial projects under the Federal Financial Assistance Programme, by provinces, is as follows:

	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
	%	%	%
Newfoundland	75	25	—
Prince Edward Island	75	25	—
Nova Scotia	75	15	10
New Brunswick	75	12½	12½
Quebec	75	15	10
Ontario	75	15	10
Manitoba	75	15	10
Saskatchewan	75	—	25
Alberta	75	12½	12½
British Columbia	75	15	10

Mr. McNULTY: This would be the same if the municipalities wanted to set up E.M.O. themselves. Would this have to go into the budget and they would then only contribute 10 per cent of the cost of the building?

Mr. FAGUY: That is right.

Mr. McNULTY: Would this building be the property of the municipality?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, whoever is the lowest in the government echelon becomes the actual owner of the property. In this case it would be the municipality.

Mr. McNULTY: Suppose they pulled out of E.M.O.; what would happen to the property?

Mr. FAGUY: Before disposing of the property they have to come back to E.M.O., because we did share the cost, and arrive at some agreement on what the situation would be.

Mr. MCNULTY: This is the same as in the case of buying major equipment?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, the same.

Mr. MCNULTY: I wonder if it would be possible to find out how many municipalities have taken on emergency measures organization units and then for some reason or other pulled out of the organization, and the reasons why they pulled out?

Mr. FAGUY: Perhaps we could give you an approximate number. I am not sure we could be accurate on this one. It would be especially difficult for us to be accurate on the reasons for pulling out because they vary so much.

Mr. MCNULTY: Economical reasons might have a lot to do with it.

Mr. FAGUY: Generally the cost to the municipalities is not too great and therefore this has not been the reason for it in most cases.

Mr. BREWIN: My question is directed to the minister. In the light of what Mr. Smith has said about my previous questions I would like to say that even if I am sceptical it is because I want to get the facts on these matters.

The questions I have to ask relate to two matters. I think the same questions are relevant to both. One is on the feasibility or practicability of the re-entry role, and the other is on the feasibility of the dispersion of people in the so-called target areas. Both seem to me must be considered according to the amount of warning time that is available.

At this stage I will preface my question by referring to a document that has been provided for us, entitled "the survivability in likely target areas—Blueprint for survival, No. 5". At page nine it says that a deliberate nuclear attack in North America will probably be prepared with elaborate secrecy to be delivered with maximum surprise and therefore it is unlikely the government will be able to give the public any long range warning of an attack. Defence preparations of a dramatic nature such as the ordering of evacuation of the target areas during a period of strain in national relations, could increase the danger of war starting. Later on it refers to something we are familiar with, namely that with the I.C.B.M. the warning time will be from 15 to 30 minutes. I thought the lower figure was the more accepted figure.

If a surprise nuclear attack is made with a warning period of 15 minutes, how does that make the idea possible of people engaged in business and industry having to go out into some area outside the city, collecting there and being ready and available for the re-entry operations at a later date? How does it make it possible? It seems to me completely illusory to imagine that the 15 minutes would be enough.

Mr. DRURY: Certainly not very much can be accomplished in 15 minutes. I agree with this. The 15 minutes, however, applies to the first weapon arriving on the continent, and it applies in respect of the impact area. For someone who is in this situation, 15 minutes is not going to be much help. However, it may be that in respect of subsequent weapons there may be a longer period, and more particularly the consequences may not be immediate just outside of the impact area but in an area of prospective heavy contamination. People who are organized and prepared know precisely where they have to go and what they have to do, and have thought about this in advance. There is some possibility of them being able to do a useful job. Now, the problem that you have enunciated is recognized, and this business of meeting the re-entry task is currently being restudied and under review by the Department of National Defence.

Mr. BREWIN: This of course applies a fortiori in voluntary dispersion. You spoke of the other civilian population, and I suggest it might rather complicate the factor. Perhaps one thinks of one's constituency most often, I am thinking of mine in Toronto. A fairly large scale voluntary effort to disperse might make it harder, with the roads being blocked, for people in the militia to reach the area of collection.

Mr. DRURY: This is quite true.

Mr. BREWIN: On the other side of the picture, an early dispersal taking people out of their jobs because of threatened international tensions would, as is suggested in this pamphlet, be provocative and certainly a very dubious thing. It would be very hard on the population and on the militia to start sending them out because things were getting pretty tense.

Mr. DRURY: That is recognized in the pamphlet quite specifically.

Mr. BREWIN: Does it not suggest then—I am putting it to you very strongly —that the proposed role of re-entry by people who start from the target areas in their jobs, and the proposed dispersion, have become a little obsolete in the light of the short period which we would get in an attack from an I.C.B.M.? I understand that with a bomber attack the warning would be two or three hours, but I suggest that the thinking has become a little obsolete in this case.

Mr. DRURY: Clearly a plan which is dependent on the relatively long notice one would get from a bomber attack would not be appropriate for an all-out missile attack. It is recognized, and it is one of the principal reasons for the review currently being made. But one must bear in mind that perhaps one should not be too absolute merely because there will be some people involved in the re-entry function who may only get 15 minutes' notice. There will be others, further away from what turns out to be the impact area, and one cannot predict who will have more than 15 minutes' notice. One has to try to utilize the resources which do survive as well as make a plan for those that may survive in the most effective way. I think that if a scheme can be evolved to provide for re-entry assistance, it is better to try to make use of such a plan than merely to abandon the whole thing because of the difficulties involved.

Mr. BREWIN: Would it not suggest that regular troops stationed further outside the target area would really be in a better position to do something about this than the militia units?

Mr. DRURY: Of course most of the regular troops are in fact outside of the likely target areas, or possible target areas. The militia will add to or supplement these regular forces, It is also a fact that at the present moment a large proportion—something in excess of 50 per cent—of the militia units are stationed outside of the probable target areas or impact areas.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Drury, does it not seem wrong that we are attempting to organize emergency measures from the centres of the cities in which the very people who are expected to carry out emergency measures are the ones who are first going to be wiped out by the bomb? This is exactly where the bomb is going to fall; it is going to fall on the centres of the major cities. The E.M.O. seems to be centred among the militia units at the centres of these cities, so that those who carry out the emergency measures, and the organization for emergency measures itself, will be one of the first things to be wiped out in an attack.

Should we not be reversing the whole procedure of our emergency measures and saying that this is an organization which ought to be organized out in the country, all around the periphery of those cities which are likely to be wiped out? Should we not organize the people now living there, the people whose beds can be converted to hospital beds, and setting up our stores out there? We will not prevent the bomb from falling. If the war comes it will

be here in 30 seconds. What we should do is to organize those people who will unalterably survive in such a way that they can do something for the people from the cities who would be coming out to them. Instead of that we have the whole thing reversed. I believe we are spending an awful lot of money and directing an awful lot of attention to doing things which in the first crack will be wiped off the face of the earth, when in reality we should be saving God knows how many people who are on the fringe or who are in panic when this happens. If we organized in the country instead of organizing in the city, the whole thing would be approached in a more realistic way.

The CHAIRMAN: That is a long supplementary, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. SMITH: And the facts are largely wrong also.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us keep some order. Mr. Deachman has asked a supposedly supplementary question. We will clear that one up first, if we may.

Mr. DRURY: I think perhaps your assumption that E.M.O. is designed, based on, and operates from the centre of the target area, is incorrect—this is not so. Indeed, the regional headquarters, which will be the core of the continuing operations, and the zonal headquarters, are specifically located outside of these probable impact areas. Further, the reception areas, which will be the nerve centres for the survival operation, are likewise outside. They will be manned to the extent possible by people originating from outside of the impact areas. But it is an unfortunate fact of life that the government of this country is conducted by people who normally live and operate in possible target areas. Now, you can endeavour to organize a system of government—and that is basically what we are thinking of—made up of people entirely different in charatcer, quality, and everything else, than the people who are now governing the country.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is all that will be left after the bomb.

Mr. DRURY: You are contemplating almost the worst possible circumstances. This may be true.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Matheson would like to ask a supplementary question.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Drury, although defence is not your department, no one knows more about it than you do in the cabinet.

Mr. SMITH: Flattery will get you nowhere!

Mr. DRURY: I deplore this accolade.

Mr. MATHESON: Traditionally in the United Kingdom the militia, the old territorials, were largely composed of country yeomen soldiers. They were not metropolitan soldiers. You had your large recruiting facilities in the large centres such as Liverpool, London, and so on, and obviously this was necessary. However, if our attitude towards our militia is to veer off from the idea that the militia now be a recruiting centre for a quick mobilization of world war I or world war II type—and we are thinking rather of something which partly provides security for Canada—then serious consideration should be given to the merit, which I think is inherent in Mr. Deachman's question, that in recruiting the militia emphasis should be put on the unpopulated areas of Canada outside the target areas. In other words, we should not be recruiting our militia from Toronto or Ottawa, but we should do so from areas extending all around those areas.

Mr. DRURY: Probably before expressing views of this character I would prefer to wait for the rather more considered opinion that Brigadier Suttie will produce in this committee.

Mr. MATHESON: I was thinking of the E.M.O. point of view. You are our witness.

Mr. DRURY: Obviously the emergency measures is one of the important aspects of the whole militia problem, and I am satisfied that the committee had this fully in mind.

Mr. MCNULTY: When disaster strikes in an area and you have a specific unit there, does the army, or the militia or the director of E.M.O. have charge of the survival operations?

Mr. FAGUY: Charge of the survival operations is always given, in normal peacetime, to the local authorities. Co-ordination of all the efforts is the responsibility of the co-ordinator. He is asked for assistance and he co-ordinates all the efforts.

Mr. MCNULTY: Suppose you have all three in the area?

Mr. FAGUY: The civil authority would act as required. If he wants the army to come and assist, there must be an official request to the army to come and provide assistance.

Mr. MCNULTY: They are not responsible to the permanent army unit or the permanent officer in the area?

Mr. FAGUY: The army comes in and provides assistance when requested by the provincial authorities as foreseen in the National Defence Act.

Mr. MCNULTY: Who is responsible for getting the people out of the area?

Mr. FAGUY: The local authorities, the mayor and the council. They may use the civil defence co-ordinator or some other person whom they would designate to take charge of the operations.

Mr. MCNULTY: I thought the army had authority over everyone when disaster strikes and war is declared. I was under the impression that if war is declared the army is in supreme command.

Mr. FAGUY: There are two different situations. When disaster strikes in peacetime the local authorities can request the army to come and help. In wartime, if a city becomes a target, the army has authority to come in and start re-entry operations, and give all the assistance they may be able to give.

Mr. MCNULTY: So the militia comes under the control of the permanent army?

Mr. FAGUY: And the local commander.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the list of questioners. Are there any further questions? The committee stands adjourned until Thursday at 11 o'clock. The witness will be Commodore Groos and the topic will be the *Defence Colleges and allied training plans.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-Sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 9

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1964

REGULAR OFFICER TRAINING PLAN

WITNESSES:

Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of National Defence; Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan; and Colonel W. R. Sawyer, Vice-Commandant and Director of Royal Military College.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

20978—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Béchard,	Laniel,	Matheson,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McMillan,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	McNulty,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Pilon,
Granger,	MacLean,	Smith,
Groos,	MacRae,	Temple,
Harkness,	Martineau,	Winch—(24).
Langlois,		

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

TUESDAY, June 23, 1964.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Lambert be substituted for that of Mr. Nielsen on the Special Committee on Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 25, 1964.
(14)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lambert, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacInnis, MacLean, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Winch—(18).

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan; and Colonel W. R. Sawyer, Vice-Commandant and Director of Royal Military College.

The Chairman pointed out that Mr. Marcel Lambert, who was away on official business recently, had been temporarily replaced on the Committee's membership, with the result that the post of Vice-Chairman had become vacant.

As the House has re-appointed Mr. Lambert to the Committee, on motion of Mr. Deachman, seconded by Mr. Lessard,

Resolved,—That Mr. Marcel Lambert be re-instated as Vice-Chairman of this Committee.

The Committee proceeded to a study of *Military Colleges and related training plans.*

Mr. Armstrong read a prepared statement respecting the subjects presently under review. The Deputy Minister and Commodore Groos were questioned on the subject matter of the statement and on related matters.

At 12.55 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11.00 a.m. Tuesday, June 30, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, June 25, 1964
11 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum and will now come to order, please.

Before we start with our business for this morning, there is a technical point which I would like to mention. As you know, Mr. Lambert was elected Vice-Chairman of the committee at the organization meeting. He has been away on official business for a period of time and during this period of time he was replaced on the committee by another member. So, technically, we have had a vacancy in the position of vice chairman. Now that Mr. Lambert is back, I think that we should reappoint him to that position. I would appreciate a motion nominating Mr. Lambert as Vice-Chairman of this Committee.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I so move.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: This morning we will start our discussion on the Regular Officer Training Plan which, among other things, embraces the Service Colleges. As our witnesses this morning, we have Mr. E. B. Armstrong, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, and Commodore H. V. W. Groos, the Director of the Regular Officer Training Plan. If there is a certain family resemblance between one of the members of our Committee and the witness, I think we are fortunate that we have the handsome one at the head table. This morning we will start with a statement by Mr. Armstrong.

Mr. E. B. ARMSTRONG (*Deputy Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, this statement was prepared to give a few facts in the way of background on the Regular Officer Training Plan.

The Regular Officer Training Plan provides the armed forces with permanently commissioned officers holding university degrees. The plan encompasses candidates at the Canadian services colleges and at civilian universities.

The Canadian services colleges are under the direct control of the Minister of National Defence, who is their chancellor and president. There are three colleges in this system. The oldest of these is the Royal Military College of Canada at Kingston, founded in 1876, Royal Roads College at Victoria, British Columbia, was founded originally as the Royal Canadian Naval College in 1943, and le College Militaire Royal at St. Jean, Quebec, was founded in 1952. The curriculum of the three colleges is designed to allow all cadets to complete their final two years before graduation at R.M.C. Kingston.

For several years after the second world war, the services were able to obtain sufficient wartime officers to fill their needs. The university reserve units and direct recruitment also assisted in providing young officers for both the regular and reserve forces. In 1948, the Royal Military College of Canada was re-opened and Royal Roads became a Canadian services college to enlarge that source.

During the Korean war, increased requirements for officers were met by the direct recruitment of former officers, graduates of universities and junior and senior matriculants who were trained as officers within the services.

By 1952 it had become apparent that additional measures to increase the recruitment of officers with a university education were needed. Wartime officers no longer constituted a sufficient source and the number of Royal Military College and university graduates being enrolled were insufficient in number to meet service needs.

The regular officer training plan (R.O.T.P.) was introduced in 1952. Under this plan selected applicants are educated at public expense either at a Canadian services college or at a university. The introduction of the plan was accompanied by the opening of a third services college, "College Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean" (C.M.R.). This college was designed to be bilingual in character, and to obtain its candidates from junior matriculants, whereas those for the Royal Military College of Canada (R.M.C.) and Royal Roads are drawn from senior matriculants.

The R.O.T.P., both the Canadian services colleges part and the university portion, is a triservice training plan to the extent that the conditions under which candidates enter and serve are common to the three services. However, regardless of whether an officer cadet enters a Canadian services college or a university under the plan, he is from the outset enrolled in the service in which he will serve as a commissioned officer.

The R.O.T.P. is directed at producing officers with a university education for each of the services. Each service has, in addition, training plans for officer candidates without a university education. In both the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. the majority of aircrew officers enter through the short-service commissioned officer plan. Short-service commissioned officers for the Canadian army are produced in an army training plan known as the "Officer Candidate Programme". Technical officers are produced primarily from the R.O.T.P.

At the commencement of the past academic year, i.e., October 31, 1963, there were 976 regular force officer cadets registered in civilian universities and 1102 in the Canadian services colleges. This ratio as between the universities and Canservcols, has remained more or less constant over the past several years.

Candidates for the R.O.T.P., upon application, are asked to designate whether they wish to enter a Canservcol or a university, and to signify the service they wish to enter. The applicants are then given a medical examination, intelligence tests, aptitude tests, and appear before an interview board, all within the service of their choice. The results of these various interviews and examinations are passed by the pertinent service to the R.O.T.P. selection board at national defence headquarters, which is composed of the director of R.O.T.P. as chairman and the directors of manning of the three Services and the registrars of the three Colleges. Final selection is made by the R.O.T.P. selection board, taking into consideration officer potential, results of aptitude tests and high school marks. The results of the selection are considered by a final board of selection composed of the chief of naval personnel, Adjutant-General, air member for personnel and the directors of studies of the three services colleges.

An annual intake of approximately 900 cadets has been established for planning purposes. With this intake the estimated output would be 400 graduates.

The actual intake has been below this figure. During the summer selection of 1963, a total of 705 candidates were offered cadetships. In addition, approximately 100 university students were recruited into the plan during the academic year. This exceeded the total of any previous year by some 75 cadets.

During the summer of 1963 the 705 cadets were selected from a total of 3451 applicants broken down as follows:

		Canservcols	Universities
Senior Matriculants			
1507 applicants	379 selected	193	186
Junior Matriculants			
1438 English-speaking applicants	210 selected	72	138
506 French-speaking applicants	116 selected	104	12

A block of 106 vacancies per annum is reserved for French-speaking entrants to C.M.R.

Upon entering a services college or a university, successful applicants are attested into the service. The cost of tuition, books and other fees are paid by the department and they receive $138.00 per month pay and allowances. ($73.00 per month pay, and $65.00 per month subsistence allowance. R.O.T.P. cadets at university receive their subsistence allowance in cash, whereas Canservcol cadets have rations and quarters provided by the colleges in lieu of cash). R.O.T.P. officer cadets are required to maintain a satisfactory academic standing while attending university or a services college and if they do not, are subject to discharge from the service. A cadet who fails his year may, on the recommedation of the faculty, repeat the year at his own expense.

Upon graduation from R.M.C. or a university, candidates receive a degree appropriate to the course of study they have completed and are commissioned as sub-lieutenants (R.C.N.), lieutenants (army) or flying officers (R.C.A.F.) with permanent commissions. As of June, 1964, the R.O.T.P. has produced approximately 2,400 graduates divided about equally between the Canservcol and the civilian university section. At the end of three years of full time service as an officer, R.O.T.P. graduates may elect to leave the services without financial or other obligation.

Service military training is carried out in the training schools of each service during the summer months, when the services colleges and universities are closed. By graduation, cadets are fully qualified for their commissioned rank of lieutenant in the army or its equivalent in the other services.

The Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, accepts senior matriculants and offers a four year course and university degrees in arts, engineering and science. The present optimum capacity of Royal Military College is 472 officer cadets. The cadet strength as of October 31, 1963, was 514. It has been necessary to use rooms designed for single occupancy for two cadets. Funds have been approved for a new dormitory and it is hoped that construction will be completed for occupancy in the fall of 1966.

Royal Roads, Victoria, B.C., also accepts senior matriculants; on successful completion of the second year, officer cadets go to Royal Military College for their third and fourth years. The optimum capacity of Royal Roads is 220 officer cadets. As of October 31, 1963, the cadet strength was 217.

College Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean, Saint-Jean, Quebec, accepts junior matriculation candidates who enter preparatory year and spend three years at the college. After successful completion of the course, officer cadets also proceed to Royal Military College for their third and fourth years. The optimum capacity of College Militaire Royal is 386 officer cadets. As of October 31, 1963, the cadet strength at College Militaire Royal was 371. Of this total approximately 56% are from French-speaking backgrounds and 44% are from English.

The courses of study in the first and second year at the three colleges are identical. Officer cadets on entering the third year at Royal Military College may specialize in courses leading to bachelor's degrees in arts (honours or general), science (honours or general) and engineering (chemical, civil, electrical, mechanical and engineering physics).

In addition to the academic courses, the Canservcols also include drill, officer development, sports, physical training, and military studies of a general nature in their curriculum. However, formal military training leading to professional military qualifications is carried out during the summer time with the cadets' service. The Canservcol year of 37 to 38 weeks runs from early September annually to late May or early June of the following year. The balance of the year is taken up with 10 weeks of military training and 4 weeks of annual leave.

The Royal Canadian Navy is administratively responsible for Royal Roads, the Canadian army for Royal Military College and the RCAF for College Militaire Royal. The senior military staff positions at the colleges are rotated between the services. The faculty of the colleges is primarily civilian at professor, associate professor, assistant professor and lecturer level, and responsible to the civilian director of studies at each college, up to 15% of the faculty may be serving officers. Regular force officers from the three services act as squadron and flight commanders, administrative officers, supply and accounts officers.

Officers serving on the staffs of the colleges are permitted to improve their academic qualifications through post-graduate studies leading to Master's degrees which may be granted by the Senate of the Royal Military College of Canada.

Finally, it may be of interest to note a few special features about the Canadian services colleges. Firstly, it is the objective of the college to produce bilingual graduates and all cadets are required to take courses in French or English in order to establish a reasonable proficiency in the second language before entering third year at the Royal Military College of Canada. Laboratory facilities and other up-to-date aids to language instruction are provided at each of the colleges. Commencing in September 1965 English-speaking cadets will be required to take one special course in French (other than courses in language) in their third year at Royal Military College. It is anticipated that a relatively small number of cadets will not have attained at this point an adequate fluency in the French language to permit them to do this and they will be required to take an extra course in French composition and grammar. Secondly, all of the cadets in the arts are given, during their course, at least 700 hours in mathematics and physics and all the engineering cadets take approximately 500 hours in the humanities. A comprehensive programme in physical training and athletics is undertaken, and lastly, the military programme is designed to develop qualities of discipline, integrity and leadership. It is interesting to note that of the graduates of the Canadian services colleges who have had the right to exercise their release option after three years commissioned service, 27 per cent have done so as against 46 per cent of the graduates from the civilian universities under the Royal Officers Training Plan.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed with the questioning. The first questioner I have on my list is Mr. Groos, the member of the committee.

Mr. GROOS: I am very interested in this matter of regular officers training, because I had some experience with it and with alternative systems which have been used by the armed forces of Canada at one time, when I was second in command of the naval college referred to in the paper. I would like to proceed with my questioning and investigate the success of the R.O.T.P. When I do this I would like to point out right away that I am investigating the success of the R.O.T.P. as a system. I am not questioning the success of the system as far as its turning out people is concerned.

In my opinion the graduates of the R.O.T.P. are outstanding young officers of which any nation would be proud. On page 5, of your brief, you are talking about figures, and you mention at the bottom of the page that:

> Upon graduation from R.M.C. or a university, candidates receive a degree appropriate to the course of study they have completed and are commissioned as sub-lieutenants (R.C.N.), lieutenants (army) or flying officers (R.C.A.F.) with permanent commissions.

And then you go on to say:

> At the end of three years of full time service as an officer, R.O.T.P. graduates may elect to leave the services without financial or other obligation.

What do they do in those three years from the time when they complete their three years course at the university or at the service college and the time that they pass this check point?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, it just depends of course on the service and the particular part of the service that they have chosen. An aircrew officer for example in the Air Force if an R.O.T.P. graduate would in fact go into the aircrew and would receive training during this period and complete his aircrew training. Officers take a variety of courses of training. In fact I think certainly today—although perhaps it has not been so right through the plan—each service is paying a good deal of attention to its young officers during that period, to put them in possible places which will develop their potential, and to create for them a real interest in careers in the armed services.

Do you wish to add anything to that, Commodore Groos?

Commodore H. V. W. GROOS (*Director, Regular Officer Training Plan*): No, I think that is fair enough, sir.

Mr. GROOS: So really in the first seven years these young men in the service are there as students for the first four years, taking academic training mainly at the service colleges or at some institution of learning, and for the subsequent three years they carry on with this training, but with limited use to the service for the first seven years in which they serve?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think in essence that is fair. It seems to me that obviously for four years he has been educated—possibly for five years if he was at C.M.R. He has received military training during the summertime which, at the end of the period, should result in him being equipped for commissioned rank as lieutenant. Now, inevitably I would think in the early years of a man's career not only in the services but almost anywhere else, there is a considerable element of development of the individual for greater responsibilities. I would not disagree with you that in many ways that early period is one of development and training.

Mr. GROOS: So really after seven years of training at the time when he is just becoming useful to the armed forces he passes this check point where he is allowed to elect whether he should stay in the service or not.

My next question is: How many officers are required by the armed forces each year? What is the average number?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Do you mean in total, or for the R.O.T.P. plan?

Mr. GROOS: I think it would be better for you to give the total required, because I would imagine you would like to get them all from R.O.T.P.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, we would not want them all from R.O.T.P. We are setting our planning sites on 400 graduates from R.O.T.P. I do not think I have the figures that would really tell the story in respect of this. But this would give you an appreciation of the number of officers required. You will recall that we tabled some figures a while ago with this committee, when looking at Bill No. C-90. In two years in the navy, 1964-1965, and in 1965-1966, the estimated attrition of officers is 503; in the army it is 1,054; and in the air

force it is 1,550; or in total, roughly 3,000. So you see from this that certainly the majority of officers are not coming through the R.O.T.P. This is accounted for to a large extent by short service aircrew, and others.

Mr. GROOS: I take it that the figure you have given me of 400, as you say, is the number you would like to have graduate from the R.O.T.P.?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, that is the present target number. But we plan to have another study made of this matter shortly.

Mr. GROOS: How was that figure arrived at? Could you tell me?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It was arrived at basically by giving each service a basic examination in detail of the positions throughout their service that they considered required men with university education. Sometimes this was very clear, because of a particular professional qualification. As a result of that study these figures were produced which add up to 400.

Mr. GROOS: You take 900 into the R.O.T.P. plan in order to graduate four years later the number of 400. Having continued on with their service training for the following three years, they may then elect to leave. How many of the 400 do you hope to keep, or do you normally keep?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, the numbers that graduate will vary, depending on whether they come in as senior or as junior matriculants. If they come in as senior matriculants, it averages now between 55 and 60 per cent. The others are below that. Do you recall the figure?

Commodore GROOS: You mean those who leave?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, the ones who come in as junior matriculants?

Commodore GROOS: It is only 36 per cent.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: You say it is only 36 per cent. So there is quite a large wastage with those who come in with junior matriculation, and as I pointed out earlier, for those who go through the Canadian service colleges, the history to date from the beginning shows that 27 per cent have chosen to leave the services at the end of three years, while those from the universities indicate 46 per cent.

Commodore GROOS: That is right.

Mr. GROOS: So somewhere between 27 and 46 per cent of the 400 which you hope to graduate are going to leave, when they have the option to do so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It averages out to 37 per cent combined. That is the experience. We would hope to improve it, but that is where it stands at the present time.

Mr. GROOS: You do not know what you are going to get at the end of the training period. You have no way to know what you are going to get at the end of this thing? Therefore you enter 900 in order to graduate 400, and to have about 270 remain in the services.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Actually we have never taken in 900. That is the target. We have not been getting that number, although we are getting close to it. That is historically about right, I think. We should like to take in 900 in order to get 400 graduates, and although we have not quite reached that number, nevertheless subject to that, of those we do graduate, 37 per cent opt out at the end of three years, while the remainder stay in.

Mr. GROOS: To my mind this is a great weakness in the regular officers' training plan, in so far as it is not until seven years after the class starts that you really know how many you are going to retain. I think it must be very difficult in the armed forces to allow for this, particularly as my next question is this: How do you make up for the number that you find, after seven years, you are short in the armed forces?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, there are of course other possibilities in terms of recruitment. Relatively few people come in who have graduated from universities outside of R.O.T.P. Recruitments are carried on through other plans such as the army officers candidate program, and the air force service commission program. The navy has a plan that has been known as the Venture plan, with the terms of which you are familiar.

Mr. GROOS: Yes. I was very closely associated with this Venture plan that you just mentioned. But it seems to me that we are going about this thing in a rather unbusinesslike way. When you want officers, you do not know how many you are going to get until seven years have elapsed, by which time you have no real way to replace those people in the age groups necessary. This is an important feaure. Can you go outside and make special efforts to take in someone else who has not had the advantages of all those seven years of training?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not think, if I may suggest it, that it is quite right to say that you do not know how many you are going to get. It seems to me one must do some forecasting, and you do your forecasting based on experience. That is what we do, and therefore we are able to have some idea of what in fact we will have at any given time. I think our experience supports the fact that the number that leave has not tended to be greater than our forecast. We have had some improvement in this field, and I hope it will continue to improve, but it is hard to judge when you have reached the stage where you can consider that you have done the very best you can. I do not think one could ever hope that everyone who goes through a plan of this kind would stay in the services. Obviously young people like that will have different views from time to time as they go along.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question. Is not the situation very comparable to public financial support for a medical doctor? After the very expensive period of training, which may well exceed seven years, he may then disappear to the United Kingdom, the United States, or anywhere else.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I was talking about national defence. We at least have the benefit from this plan of a well educated man going, by and large, into other useful occupations in Canada, so the man is not lost.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. Is Mr. Groos not working from an over-generalization when he speaks about seven years in relation primarily to the service college man? I would like to know ultimately what proportion of the people are in the service colleges and what is the wastage there as against the wastage at the universities? I should like to point out in addition that at the universities you get the rather more specialized men, such as, say, doctors. I think I am right in asserting that a great number of them take medical training under the R.O.T.P. because it is a long financial haul, and these are the men amongst whom you lose the most at the end of these years.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: The regular officers training plan does not encompass medicine. They have another plan, which is somewhat different in that they come into it for their final three years and they are then obliged, under their contract, to stay for three years.

Mr. LAMBERT: So we can take the doctors out of this?

The CHAIRMAN: We have a large number of questioners, Mr. Groos; maybe we should continue with questioning in the specific area of wastage.

Mr. MACINNIS: I have a supplementary on this topic in reference to the possibility of losing these recruits. Is not an assumption being made here that the original four year training plan given at the service colleges combining

education and military training is given in such a way that the services recognize the fact that before they commission these officers they are useful for the service, and that it is incorrect to imply that they have an additional three years of restricted training? They must necessarily recognize within the service colleges that the four year academic training combined with the summer military training before they receive their commissions produces useful men to the army who will serve a useful purpose for the following three years in which they are required to stay in the services.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I agree with you completely. I hope I did not give the impression that these men were not useful.

Mr. MACINNIS: We continued our discussions on the inference that seven years was the required time to train a man to a capability that was required in the particular service, but is it not a recognized fact that after his graduation from four years at military college he is then a trained and useful officer?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I would agree with that, but there are other elements of training that go on, and I wanted to point out that this does happen in the three year period. I completely agree with what you say.

Mr. GROOS: I will just finish my questioning. What I am establishing is that there is a very high wastage rate in this system which takes in 900 and keeps about 265, and that it would be very advantageous if some means could be found whereby this wastage rate was decreased so that more of the wastage appeared at an earlier period than later on after seven years.

Mr. LAMBERT: Improve the high school standards, and you will do it.

Mr. GROOS: I wonder if we could move on to the matter of costs. Perhaps I should leave it for now.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us continue with the area of the number of students going through the colleges and the wastage rates, and so on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to make this suggestion, despite the wastage of the R.O.T.P. program, it is still a cheaper way of producing an officer than the service college way of producing an officer, for the reason that if you took all costs of operating service colleges and took the graduates from your annual graduation going into the armed services, this would be a substantially greater cost of producing a student than it is to take him from the university, which is a much cheaper way of supporting a student for military training service. The result is that the R.O.T.P., I think, would produce a student cheaper than it can be done out of the service colleges. Have you figures that would substantiate this suggestion?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Unfortunately, I have figures that would substantiate almost anything! You are speaking of the lad going through the university, as against the lad going through the Canadian services colleges?

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is right. The universities would produce a graduate much cheaper.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It is very difficult to really make a sound comparison in this respect. First of all, the university costs we pay are of course not the total cost associated with running a university—we pay tuition fees. Secondly, there is not any question that the scheme which we bring into the Canadian services colleges at the junior matriculation level, which involves a considerably greater academic wastage, involves somewhat higher cost, and we have a fairly substantial proportion of those.

Thirdly, we, of course, have a fairly heavy proportion of our total graduates who are in engineering, which again is a rather costly university course. So if you take the all inclusive figures of the three colleges together and divide them by the number of graduates, and eventually the number who stay at the end of the three years as against the university side, with simply

the tuition fees and other things that we pay, the cost will be somewhat higher on the Canadian services colleges side. If you attempt to refine this, I think you can pretty readily come to a conclusion that this is not an entirely valid answer by taking into account some of the things I have mentioned. However, the difference in cost is not too large, even taking it on the worst comparative basis. To take it on the worst basis of comparison, where you simply take the tuition fees and so on and you encompass all the costs you can find for the Canadian services colleges, the cost per graduate in the services colleges is about $36,000 and the cost per graduate in the universities is about $16,000.

Mr. DEACHMAN: It then costs $20,000 more to graduate a student from the services college than from a university?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: If you take a career officer.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We have to relate this to their stay in the services over a reasonable period of time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It is $36,000 to $50,000 for the man who stays. The cost per career officer at the services college would run to approximately $50,000 on that basis, and the cost per career officer on the university side would run to about $30,000. If you take it on the basis of your senior matriculation level, and this again is difficult to do, but analysing it on that basis, the cost will come out slightly in favour of the Canadian services colleges because you take out of it the fairly substantial cost involved in taking a considerable number of people at the junior matriculation level. These figures I think mean something but they have to be treated with a good deal of caution.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have a second question related to that. Is it the suggestion that if stress were laid on the R.O.T.P. program, the R.O.T.P. program will produce a better educated and better integrated student than will the service college? I say better educated than a student of a major Canadian university for the simple reason that he is exposed to better teaching and broader teaching than you can provide in a smaller and much more specialized college, and better integrated in that he lives in the community and with the community, and his associations are much broader than they would be in a service college. So that the student who is eventually produced from the R.O.T.P. plan will have had broader educational contacts and presumably a broader education, and will be a better integrated student because of his longer association and development within the community itself.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: This is a matter of opinion, if I may so. My opinion would tend to be in the opposite direction. There are some very special features about the service colleges. Those taking engineering courses get 500 hours in the humanities. This is not so in a normal university engineering course. Those in the arts get 700 hours of maths. and physics. There is a very intensive effort in language training at the service colleges. There is an intensive effort in terms of sports, in terms of physical education, and in terms of military training and discipline. In terms of the community, I think they do become integrated in their community, judging from my observations when I go down to Kingston or those other places, and I personally do not have any doubt whatsoever about the outstanding quality of the education that the Canadian services colleges give.

Mr. MATHESON: I have a supplementary question on that point. I wonder if I could direct the question to the commodore. I think it was at the end of the war, if I remember correctly, that R. C. Wallace, who was principal of Queen's University and active in interuniversity activities, had precisely in mind this point that Mr. Deachman has raised, namely the comparative cost of producing a military college graduate. He said something in this way, that any country, particularly a country such as Canada, needs a college where

eventually you produce a person whose temperament and personality and gifts would be devoted to the concepts of duty and valour, in other words the loyalty concept, and that this is not really the function of the university whose interest lies mainly in the liberal arts or sciences. This is, perhaps, a more speculative area of education. Dr. Wallace felt that the good universities are trying to produce officer candidates, and that there had to be, if you like, a corps of graduates coming from the royal military college, and that this was a stimulus to the country. I wonder, commodore, is this thinking archaic and ridiculous, or does it make sense?

Commodore GROOS: I entirely agree with you. I think that the facts about the release option prove what you have said. Twenty-seven per cent only of the graduates of the R.M.C. exercise their release option after three years, whereas the figure is 46 per cent for university graduates. This alone shows that the graduates of the R.M.C. gain during their time in the college a commitment to serve their country. That is why we have military colleges. I could go on to say that even if we put the whole pool of persons we pick up each year into the universities, if we had to apply the wastage rates of the universities before they graduate and 46 per cent opted out at the end, we would not get anything like the present number who stay on. It is a very high figure, attributable perhaps to the fact that at the universities one learns about making money and the other stays at the Canadian services college and learns how to serve his country, which really counts in the long run.

Mr. MACINNIS: My supplementary question has been answered. I was going to suggest that perhaps it is fair to assume that the graduates from the military service college is more qualified as a serving officer, therefore would not an extension of the required regular service time go a long way to eliminate wastage, say, from a three year required time to a five year period?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think this certainly is a debatable point. I believe the problem here is to balance the commitment that the young fellow undertakes against the advantage of having a man in the service a little longer with, probably, a better chance of retaining him. We have had this under consideration recently, and I suspect there will be a policy announcement on it not too far in the future which may change the present system slightly.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is one of the points to be considered here that you might have a ganging up in the lower officer ranks if you held these regular officer training plan graduates to a five year commitment?

Commodore GROOS: I do not think we worry about this. We can promote them, of course. Currently we are not getting as many as we really would like to get. I do not think this is what really worries us.

Mr. MACINNIS: The first part of my question has not been answered. Would it be fair to assume that a graduate of a service college would be more qualified than a graduate from one of the civilian schools, shall we say, with regard to their particular training?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, they do of course get discipline and military training in the services colleges which, to some extent, is not available to those attending university. They both, of course, take some training in the services so that they attain the qualifications which arise out of that. I, myself, have always felt there is some advantage in not having the stream entirely from one source or the other, and that there is an advantage in having some people come in from the universities as well as from the service colleges.

Commodore GROOS: Regarding the quality of the education in the Canadian service colleges, this year among the graduates of R.M.C. there were

two Rhodes scholarships, one Athlone fellowship and eight other major scholarships awarded for going on to postgraduate work. I think this is an enviable record.

Mr. MATHESON: Were there not four Rhodes scholarships in the last five years?

Commodore GROOS: I think there were four in five years.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Where we left off, Mr. Armstrong, I think you had made the assertion pretty strongly that you feel a student in one of the service colleges will enjoy as broad or a broader liberal education than he would in any of the Canadian universities?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I did not exactly say that. I did say it is my opinion that it is outstanding education.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This question relates to the matters we have been dealing with, cost and education. Is there a possibility of integrating the service colleges on the university campuses as a whole faculty; has this been studied, having in mind the advantages or disadvantages?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No; I do not think I could say that really has been studied. Of course, we have the reserve training divisions at a number of the universities, and the regular officer training plan people attending those universities are looked after by those staffs. We never really have looked at the possibility of faculties of this type at universities across the country.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In the case of British Columbia, for instance, instead of operating a service college as is done now, could it be integrated as a faculty of the University of British Columbia, or as a faculty of the University of Victoria, or something of that nature?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We have some association with civilian universities.

Commodore GROOS: At the University of British Columbia there is a fairly large body of permanent force cadets on the campus in addition to the regular officer training plan. These are men in the ranks who qualify to go to universities to get their degrees. We have a tutor on the campus to help them out. There is a body of about 100 permanent force people on the campus. They are administered as a unit and looked after by their staff officers. In the case of some, there is tutoring. It works out extremely well.

We have not studied any plan to have a faculty set up anywhere at a university. If the enlisted men are young enough they can go to the Canadian services colleges, but if they are over 21 it is customary to send them to the universities to get their degrees.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There is a close association where there are universities in the same location. For example, in respect of the Royal Military College and Queen's University there are interchanges of lectures and professors from time to time. There have been arrangements with Queen's University for the granting of graduate degrees, where the work really had been done at R.M.C. This had been worked out between the two colleges. In the future we will be granting graduate degrees at the Royal Military College itself.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have one more question. What incentives are you exploring to get graduate officers within the service for a second stage of enlistment in order to replace these drop outs? This must have a cost to you. It must be a measurable cost. When losing a man, you must be able to put against it a measurable cost. When losing a man, you must be able to put against it a measurable cost incentive equal to the amount of cost involved. To what extent have these incentives been explored in order to retain men in the services?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There has been a great deal of study, of course, given to this particular subject with the object of reducing the wastage rate. We have

not, I think, considered incentives in the sense—if you are thinking of it in terms of paying a bonus to stay in, or something of that kind. But each service has very carefully examined the means by which it can improve the career pattern of these individuals. Careful attention to it reduces the possible wastage at the end of three years. This wastage varies depending on the qualifications of the individual. There is a higher wastage, for example, among certain technically qualified people who may feel that, having the experience, in their work in the service they are not devoting as much of their efforts to their civilian professional qualifications as they had hoped. They might tend to leave on that account. We would hope that with the new integration of technical services we can provide a better career opportunity in the technical field for this type of operation. We think this would prove to be beneficial.

Mr. SMITH: I hope that Mr. Armstrong used the word "wastage" in its narrowest sense, because it does not seem wastage to me to have a graduate of a military college go into civilian life in Canada.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I am being completely narrow when I say that I agree with you, Mr. Smith.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: It is my understanding that if one goes through the Canadian service colleges and spends four years, then he must serve three years before he can elect to sign out. Then there is a different plan under which you can take your training. If you come in, shall I say, as a medical or dental student you must have a contract to serve for five years before you can sign out.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There is a separate plan for both medical and dental officers. First of all, they do not come in to a university career from the outside. I believe they are obliged to sign in for five years, but I wish to check on it.

Mr. WINCH: Would you have any figures of the narrow basis of wastage in comparison with those under the other plans such as the medical and dental plan, as compared to those who come through the colleges?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not have them here. The drop outs would be somewhat larger, I would say. But I can get you the actual figures if you would like to see them.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it not a fact that there is a program whereby after five years service a man is entitled to a period of postgraduate training at the expense of the services, and that as soon as the postgraduate training is obtained, the services might lose that man?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Not necessarily.

Mr. LAMBERT: I mean the services would lose them, but nevertheless they are highly qualified as doctors in the country.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We have quite a few highly qualified specialists who have obtained their degrees and qualifications within the services, and who have stayed with the services. There is an obligatory policy that after having taken postgraduate work, they must remain.

Mr. WINCH: According to figures given by the deputy minister the number of those who graduate in the Canadian service colleges have to serve three years, as I recall it, to compensate for the attrition which takes place and other matters. May I ask Mr. Armstrong concerning a man who does not serve for four years and then three years, but who joins the service because he wants to join the service? He receives seven years training inside the service. Now, what is the prospect of those men with the seven years of knowledge, education, development, advancing to officer's rank? How do they compare, and how does it work out between the persons who have received a straight seven years

training as compared with the persons who come from the colleges of the same rank, and who would start in at the same time as lieutenants?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I thought perhaps I had the two figures on the number of men who entered the ranks and those who were now in the ROTP or in the universities.

Mr. WINCH: Do they have to go to a university?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, they do not. You ask first of all about the men who came into the ranks and went eventually to university?

Mr. WINCH: No, I am sorry. I meant those who, after their seven years, are qualified because of their services, education, and learning to be promoted to officer rank.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, not necessarily. As I pointed out, there are other sources of officers who come in under different types of commissions who do not have university education. At the same time there are plans under which a man who enters into the ranks, who shows promise and ability, may then advance into the university training program. They go to university or to a Canservcol, and of course, when they graduate, they are commissioned. There are others who will obtain a commission rank through other primary methods, generally speaking coming up through the N.C.O. ranks and ultimately being given a commission. But I do not think I can tie this in with any given period of time such as seven years, because the conditions are quite different.

Mr. WINCH: Is it usual, and is there a considerable number that can be promoted?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, there is a considerable number. I was going to give you the number who are actually in the university plan. Let me see. There are currently about 75 men from the ranks who are at university who are taking the regular officers' training plan. Now, I do not have the statistics here at the moment as to how many men over a period of time are promoted from the ranks to the commissioned officers status but I could get it for you.

Mr. WINCH: I wish you would because I think it is an interesting point. I am thinking of a person joining and serving seven years. Just what is the possibility of his being promoted from the lower ranks? And I have one other question. We have been told about wastage and drop outs. We have been given some figures of the cost of training in the colleges. If a man got three years, and in the following years he completes his seven years between college and actual service, then he is just at the height of efficiency and proficiency. Do you have any estimate of the cost of seven years, shall we say, for educating that man, and when he is proficient, in aircrew or in the navy, whatever it may be? What would be the approximate cost?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Of course I do not have the figures with me. It depends on what training is involved. If he should become an aircrew officer, as you know, the costs are very high indeed.

Mr. WINCH: I understand they run around $80,000.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, roughly $90,000 to wing standard. And if he should go on beyond that, it would be considerably more.

Mr. WINCH: How does it compare with the $36,000?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, that would be the cost of flying training.

Mr. WINCH: I was interested in this because—this may be a naive way of putting it—when you are going to figure the cost to the Canadian services of getting a proficiently trained officer, it is not only the cost of that officer to your department, but it is also the cost of those who drop out too. Therefore we are spending an awful lot of money in order to obtain 50 per cent.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, it is better than that; in aircrew the drop out runs about 25 per cent.

Commodore GROOS: In the over-all.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: All aircrew?

Commodore GROOS: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: Does it apply on a similar basis to the navy?

Commodore GROOS: In the aircrew classification, yes.

Mr. WINCH: I mean with the navy becoming so technical with all their new scientific equipment, what does it cost to train a man therein?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: The aircrew drop out is 22 per cent from the Canadian service colleges.

Mr. WINCH: What is the percentage with the navy and their technicians?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: The navy is quite high. The history so far shows an average of 48 per cent.

Mr. WINCH: You say that the average is 48 per cent?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There is a 48 per cent drop out of graduates from the university and service colleges.

Mr. WINCH: You do not have any figures as to what it costs to train that kind of personnel in the navy?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not have a figure on that, and it would of course be rather difficult to get because you have to take a look at the particular training that each man has received.

Mr. LAMBERT: I wish to change to a somewhat different pattern of questioning, so if there are any more questioners in the area of wastage and cost, I will defer to them.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have a number of questions in connection with wastage. With the constantly increasing complexity of technological knowledge required both for the maintenance and operation of modern military equipment, what proportion of the officers, is it estimated, need to have university degrees?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not happen to have the figures. Commodore Groos says he believes it is approximately one third. I might add, Mr. Harkness, that as a result, as you will probably recall, the Glassco commission made a couple of recommendations; firstly to study how many officers or university graduates were needed, and secondly the best way of getting them. These two studies will be going ahead, but because of the other changes that were being made, they were deferred a little until the new chief of personnel takes over, and we will then give this some priority. What the answers will be, I am not sure.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is estimated that approximately one third need be university graduates. What proportion have you of university trained graduates as officers at the present time?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We do not have the figure. We can get it, its quite a bit lower.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the point I wanted to make, for optimum efficiency in the services the number of university trained graduates is smaller than it should be, and therefore efforts should be made to increase the number of university trained graduates.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think that is a fair conclusion. I would not like to prejudge the study that is going to be made.

Mr. HARKNESS: Of the university graduates required, what proportion would be in the scientific and in the engineering fields?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It is about one third in the engineering, one third in arts and one third in sciences. That is roughly the figure.

I think Colonel Sawyer is shaking his head. I would not want to misinform you on this.

Colonel W. R. SAWYER (*Vice-Commandant and Director of Studies, Royal Military College*): Fifty per cent in engineering and the other fifty per cent divided between arts and sciences.

Mr. HARKNESS: This does not take into consideration the medical and dental people?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, they are excluded.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you have a further proportion beyond the one required for medical?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is right.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as wastage is concerned, there are two types of wastage: First, the wastage in the colleges themselves, and second, the wastage after the graduates have gone into the services and then quit after three, four or five years. Dealing with the first of those types of wastage, your intake is approximately 900 cadets in the Canadian service colleges. Is that intake entirely in those colleges?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: And you have an output of about 400 graduates?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I should make it clear that it is what we are striving for. We do not actually have quite that number.

Mr. HARKNESS: But in any event your wastage is around 50 per cent?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It would certainly be 50 per cent in total. In fact I think it is a little less than that probably, but in total it is a little more than 50 per cent.

Mr. HARKNESS: This, of course, is one of the reasons why the cost of securing these officers or of training these officers you get in the services is really very high, and therefore in order to cut down on these costs you have to cut down on the amount of wastage. What are the reasons for the wastage?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Of course, there are a variety of reasons. First of all, they are academic, and I might just point out for example, that, taking the year 1960, which would be the last year for which we have now a record in graduates in the Canadian service colleges, there were 349 entrants, and 181 graduates in 1964, in the university section there were 323 entrants and 133 graduates. I believe the wastage in most of these courses through universities runs at about 50 per cent. You would naturally have some others who would leave, possibly because of medical reasons and some boys who enter and then decide that this is not the life for them. You have a few dropouts on that account; but predominantly this is a problem of academic wastage, I think. Of course, that goes back to some degree to your ability to select people of a high standard who come into the courses in the first place.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is one of the deficiencies here, or one of the difficulties, an inability to select properly or sufficiently effectively?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: In our selection, by and large, we are soming up with an output that is good and I think slightly better in some cases than the universities. As indicated by the figures, we have a fairly wide selection, particularly with the senior matriculants. With those who come in from junior matriculation one does, of course, have an extra wastage that results from that year, and this adds to the total wastage figure.

We have been exploring various means of selection and various selection methods for these colleges, and the directors of studies and others have been

doing some research in this field as well, I believe, as the conference of Canadian universities, who are working in this field particularly with respect to the type of tests that are now used in the United States which are known as the college entrance board tests, and that kind of thing. So this sort of research is going on and all of these things are designed to improve the selection. However, on the whole I think our selection methods at the moment compare reasonably well with the selection methods used in other institutions in terms at least of the wastage that occurs.

Mr. HARKNESS: How does this wastage of ours compare with that in the British service colleges and with the United States service colleges?

Commodore GROOS: It certainly is higher, but our standards of education are higher too. Certainly our wastage is higher, sir, but the standards we require on graduation are also much higher. I think the British colleges do not give degrees, for instance, and the United States academies give just a set type of degree, whereas we cover a broader field and give engineering degrees.

Mr. HARKNESS: The United States colleges give engineering degrees also, of course.

Commodore GROOS: They just give the bachelor of science degree, and they are not quite comparable.

Mr. MATHESON: May I ask the witnesses if they know whether Harvard, by very careful study of selection methods, was able to reduce the wastage or attrition to something in the order of five per cent?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think you are right; their wastage was something like five per cent. However, this is a rather special institution.

Commodore GROOS: They have very special candidates applying.

Mr. HARKNESS: Certainly the amount of wastage in these colleges was always, as you perhaps recall, a great worry to me. I have been strongly of the opinion that every possible step must be taken to cut down that wastage. I think the first and most important consideration is in selection. I started asking what were the reasons for this wastage, and it would seem to me that a good deal of it is not directly concerned with academic ability. People fail these courses in many cases because they get fed up with the life, or for some other reason along this line; and in some cases I think they deliberately fail the courses in order to get out of the service college and to be discharged.

Mr. LAMBERT: The November plowing!

Mr. HARKNESS: This is where one comes to the difficulty in selection. In order to avoid that, one has as far as possible to select people with an extremely strong motivation to serve in the navy, army or air force, as the case may be.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I have no doubt that there are a few who deliberately fail because they want to get out, but I do not think the numbers are too high. Motivation, I think, is very important in this, but we are dealing with young fellows of 17 and 18 years of age and I know that it is sometimes difficult for those youngsters to have as strong a motivation at that period as they would perhaps have later. I hope what motivation they have will be fortified in the services colleges during the course there.

The CHAIRMAN: A supplementary, Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question.

Mr. Harkness has brought up the desire to have a very strong selection board in reference to the attitude of any particular applicant for service colleges. Further reasons for wastage have been given as medical and academic. I would be very much interested to know what percentage of the dropouts are brought about because of disciplinary action.

Commodore GROOS: It would be very, very small indeed. It would be a very minor factor. I would say, really, it would be insignificant. There are a few cases but they are not important as a factor, I think.

Mr. MACINNIS: Do you apply this to the academic part of the training or do you advance the whole question over the period of their flying time, say, or their specialized training in the army or the navy? Do you say the percentage is small?

Commodore GROOS: I would say it is minute.

Mr. GROOS: I have a supplementary question. I would like to substantiate from what my experience has been with regard to Mr. Harkness's remarks concerning the matter of motivation.

I had quite a bit to do with the selection of some officers for R.O.T.P. I was chairman of the selection board in the west for one year. From my experience it appeared that the great majority of young men applying for R.O.T.P. applied for Canadian services officers in Canadian establishments of any sort and they were not too strongly motivated. A great number of them came to take a look and, if they liked what they saw, they were prepared to stay.

It was my experience that if you could find some way of motivating these people earlier on there was a very, very much better chance of graduating them because they were conditioned and wished to go ahead with their academic work and service training. With that in mind, I would like to ask whether or not you have made any attempts or undertaken any studies to ascertain any means of providing this motivation toward the services in the very early stages of this seven year period.

Commodore GROOS: Yes, we have given a good deal of thought to it. There are a number of plans we are hoping to formulate.

Mr. GROOS: I have one more question. If you could have your wastage in that very first year or two and then have comparatively little wastage from thereon it would seem to me that you would be very far ahead of the game and you would not need to take in 900; you could take in far fewer. This procedure would cut down on expenses and, more important, it would cut down on the amount of effort that has to be put into the training of these people during that seven year period, such a very large part of which is subsequently wasted.

Commodore GROOS: We never have taken in 900. Seven hundred and seven is the highest number we have been able to obtain, and that was last year. We are ready to take in up to 900 but we never met this target.

I quite agree with you that if we could sort them out at the beginning, so much the better. We have done a great deal of study and given a great deal of thought to that point. This year, for the very first time, we are using as an experiment the college entrance examination board's tests to try to determine their validity in the preselection of students. McGill university and Bishops use these tests to help them in making early nominations to their universities; if we could do the same thing in the service colleges in order that by the end of June we would know what candidates we wanted, it would be much better. Then, if we could give them six weeks before university opens to indoctrinate them we could sift out before the work year begins those whose motivation is poor and who are trying to get in to get an education for free, thereby eliminating some of those whom we had preselected. If we did that we feel we could cut down a great deal on the wastage. But, as you will realize, this takes quite a bit of working out. At the present time the selection system works in such a way that we do not really know who we are selecting until the end of August, which is very late in the summer and there is no time to give them a preliminary shakedown cruise, as we call it in the navy. The American services have had great success with this "midshipman's cruise" in Annapolis. They refer to it as something else in West Point and something else again in Colorado Springs.

Mr. LAMBERT: How do you expect to do that when high school results are not out until August 1?

Commodore GROOS: That is it. We must wait for them. But, if we could correlate these tests with high school results we would know in advance which students are the best students, and we then would be able to give them a preliminary selection, as it were.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we should revert back to Mr. Harkness' questions.

Mr. SMITH: I should like to ask a single question in respect of what the Commodore has said.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a brief question, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. We have done a lot of talking about this question, but I take it you have not been able to find these people who are prepared to accept military discipline at an early stage; is that right?

Commodore GROOS: If we were able to carry out a short indoctrination course, we would have a better idea whether they really are intent on a military career, and we should be able to fire their enthusiasm.

Mr. LAMBERT: Your difficulty actually arises in the early months, is that right?

Commodore GROOS: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: Could you not accept them provincially as it were, on July 1 of the year, subject to their having passed academic examinations, so that by the end of August you would have a better idea of their intentions?

Commodore GROOS: We would then have to look after 4,000 of them.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think what the Commodore has been saying in respect of these college entrants is that you can get them early. If you can establish a proper co-relationship, which I think can be done now with the results of the tests and by considering what you can expect from the tests because the results of the examinations will come out in August, you can make your selection early and then have a little time in which to do some indoctrination.

Mr. SMITH: To cover the wastage could you take 25 per cent over the number required in July?

Commodore GROOS: That could probably be done.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think something done along those particular lines would considerably improve this situation, and I would hope something of that type can be done. I do not see any insuperable difficulty in the way because, it could be done on the basis of the academic standing of an individual during the individual's high school career. There will be a reasonable proportion of people apply for this course before their final results come out but I do not think it is essential to have their final examination results in order to have a pretty good idea of their ability.

Commodore GROOS: We have 11 educational systems in Canada.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Of course, in the final analysis one will have to test the improvement to find out the extent to which it reduces wastage compared with the cost—and it will cost money.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as the second type of wastage is concerned, and that is that which takes place after three years in commissioned service, there is a very high proportion, upwards of 50 per cent, of the graduates from civilian universities who quit at that stage. This indicates, of course, as Commodore Groos stated a few moments ago, a very large number of these people who enter the R.O.T.P., particularly in civilian universities, do so in order to have their education paid. I think this is the chief reason for the very heavy wastage after the three year period. Once again I think this matter of motivation comes into the picture. I think there should be greater efforts made than in the past

to determine whether the purpose in an individual's mind when entering this plan is to gain a cheap education or to make a career in the services.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Your suggestion touches upon the same problem, and I think you would be prepared to admit, Mr. Harkness, that there is a very difficult problem in relation to the establishing of a motivation.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is a difficult problem but in my own experience I have found that a lot of these individuals quite openly admit their intention is to get an education, which they or their families could not provide otherwise, at the expense of the national defence department and that once they have served the three years they intend to enter civilian life.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I have no doubt that that is so in respect of quite a number of cases.

Mr. HARKNESS: How much effort is made to determine whether that is the purpose of the individual when the individual makes application?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: All the boys are interviewed by the interviewing board and one of the objectives, of the examination is to find an answer to that question.

Commodore GROOS: That is absolutely correct.

Mr. MACINNIS: May I ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Is your question a short question?

Mr. MACINNIS: My question is very short. Is it not feasible for the service to give priority to the high school student who has interested himself in a student militia training program and who is a prospective entrant to the service colleges? Perhaps such a study would provide you with sort of a shakedown period during which you could get a fair idea of the individual's attitude toward the service.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is in fact done because a boy who has been interested in one of the cadet or reserve programs obviously has that as a factor in his favour in respect of selection.

Mr. MACINNIS: He is given priority now?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: The next question I would like to ask is, how much consideration now is being given to extending the obligatory period of service from three years. Perhaps you will remember I was quite strongly considering extending it to five years. In fact, my own view is that it should be at least five years. I think three years is too short. On that basis you do not get a large enough proportion of people staying in to justify the cost. I think that on a five year basis at the very beginning you would weed out a large number of people who come in solely for the purpose of obtaining a paid for education.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: This, in fact, has been under consideration. A decision has all but been taken on the subject; it has not been announced. I think perhaps I would prefer to have a minister announce it. He might be perfectly prepared to announce it to this committee when he appears before it.

Mr. HARKNESS: What is the obligatory period in the United States and Britain?

Commodore GROOS: There is no obligatory period in the British forces. They sign on to serve at the Queen's pleasure; they can get out almost any time, but very few do. In the United States forces I understand it is four years.

Mr. HARKNESS: In the British system you say they can get out, but is that actually the case? Is it not quite difficult for them to get out?

Commodore GROOS: I do not think so. When I was serving in the Royal Navy I know a number of my contemporaries resigned and had no difficulty getting out any time they wished.

Mr. LAMBERT: My question deals partly with wastage, but primarily with the standards of education in the various provinces, and the difficulty of assessing the standards when you have students from 10 or 11 provinces. The service college primarily is geared to the Ontario high school standard. What result do you get? Has any study been made which would show that students from certain provinces have a much more difficult time fitting into the pattern of your service colleges?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think there probably are statistics of that kind.

Commodore GROOS: We make a lot of studies in that regard. It is done by the registrars and the directors of studies at our colleges. All our junior matriculation candidates across Canada should come up to our standard for entry to C.M.R. They take a very brief examination. They have to pass this in order to qualify for entry to C.M.R. or to be sponsored by the services to enter a junior matriculation university.

Mr. LAMBERT: Let us get on to senior matriculation.

Commodore GROOS: This is a delicate area.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is where we are having problems. I know in my own province of Alberta there have been difficulties in this regard. I do not think that being polite or genteel about it is going to cure the problem.

Commodore GROOS: They have to write aptitude and intelligence tests which they must pass, and get a high rating. Then, their whole high school record is looked at by the registrars of the colleges, and the service selectors. As a result of screenings, they make the selection. We do demand pretty high standards in Ontario, but they are not geared entirely to Ontario. We want to pick our candidates from all across Canada. In so far as the service colleges are concerned, one half of the entrants each year in all three colleges should be distributed pro rata to the population across the provinces concerned; but the standard of senior matriculation entry is high. We like to see Ontario candidates who have about 68 per cent averages in their senior matriculation examinations. Most of the entrants at Royal Roads come from Ontario, and similarly in the case of Royal Military College.

Mr. LAMBERT: At the University of Alberta, for example, they have had to introduce remedial courses in the junior years at university in order to take care of deficiencies in the high school programs. It is not the purpose of the service college to introduce remedial course in order to bring people up to their standards. That is what I am concerned about. Do the provinces generally meet your immediate entrance standards, and your continuing standards, or from what provinces are the students who get into a difficult position in order to continue?

Commodore GROOS: Students from Newfoundland and the maritime provinces sometimes do have difficulty, let us say; but even there, generally speaking, we have been able to fill their quota allocation which covers one half of the total entrants. The colleges' vacancies are divided on a *pro rata* basis between the provinces. Newfoundland for example is allocated seven but only one was accepted last year, Prince Edward Island is allocated two, but only one was accepted. I think the other maritime provinces came pretty close to providing the numbers they are allocated. But all this is rather embarrassing.

Mr. LAMBERT: It may be embarrassing, but I do not think that some of our provincial educational standards meet our university requirements, and your service colleges requirements. It is not the role of the service college to have to give remedial courses. It is something which should be taken up at the provincial educational level.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Without getting into a discussion of it in particular, we

do in fact have cadets from all the provinces. So they do meet our requirements, at least some of them do.

Mr. LAMBERT: Let us take an average student from these provinces. He may be deficient in mathematics or science.

Commodore GROOS: Yes, but he may be up in something else.

Mr. LAMBERT: Oh, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: But is it not plain that you do not want the average student?

Commodore GROOS: That is right: We do not take the average student. It is more difficult to get into our colleges than it is to get into universities. In practice many students who do not get selected by us find it relatively easy to get into a university.

Mr. MACINNIS: What would the washouts be in regard to the applicants from the different provinces?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We do not have those statistics with us today, although I think they are available.

Mr. LAMBERT: I would like to know, over the last two years, the number of drop outs from the service colleges on the basis of the provinces from which they come. Their academic records, and things like that.

Mr. PILON: As a supplementary question: How about leadership?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I am not sure I understand you.

Mr. PILON: I say: How about leadership apart from the academic side?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I am not sure what you would like me to discuss under leadership.

Mr. PILON: We emphasize the fact that we always wait for results. There is one thing we should underline and that is leadership.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. PILON: Do you not think you should have a better average of leadership?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, actually, we agree. Leadership should be emphasized, and in fact it is at Royal Military College. This is one of the very important factors that is taken into account.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have completed my questions.

The CHAIRMAN: We are just about up to the point of adjournment. Rather than start with another line of questioning, I suggest that we adjourn. I am carrying forward to our next meeting the following names who wish to ask questions: Mr. McMillan, Mr. Laniel, Mr. MacInnis, and Mr. Smith, in that order.

Mr. GROOS: When shall we meet again?

The CHAIRMAN: The committee now stands adjourned until Tuesday at 11 o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-Sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 10

THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1964

REGULAR OFFICER TRAINING PLAN

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence;
Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of National Defence; Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan; and Commander G. Clarke.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

21023—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Granger,
Groos,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel,
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacInnis,
MacLean,
MacRae,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
McNulty,
Pilon,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, July 2, 1964.
(15)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Deachman, Fane, Granger, Hahn, Lambert, Langlois, Lloyd, MacRae, Martineau, Matheson, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch—(15).

In attendance: Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; Mr. Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of National Defence; Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan; and Commander G. Clarke.

On motion of Mr. Temple, seconded by Mr. Smith.

Resolved,—That the Committee meet at the Royal Military College at Kingston, Ontario, on Tuesday, July 7, 1964.

On motion of Mr. Smith, seconded by Mr. Deachman.

Resolved,—That the informative paper on Disarmament and Arms Control requested by the Special Committee on Defence during the past session for the use of this Committee, be distributed to Committee members, and that the author of this paper be paid the sum of $300.00.

The said paper was identified as "Exhibit No. 8"

The Committee resumed its consideration of the *Regular Officer Training Plan.*

Mr. Cardin read a short statement, respecting the required period of service for graduates of the training plan.

Mr. Armstrong supplied information requested at the previous meeting.

Messrs. Cardin, Armstrong, Groos and Clarke were further questioned on the operation of the Regular Officer Training Plan and on related matters.

At 1.00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Tuesday, July 7, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, July 2, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we now have a quorum. Before we start our meeting there are two motions which I wish to put before the committee. First of all, next Tuesday arrangements have been made for the committee subject to its approval, to proceed in the morning to Kingston, to visit R.M.C., returning late Tuesday afternoon. I would appreciate a motion that the Committee meet at R.M.C. on Tuesday.

Mr. TEMPLE: I would so move.

Mr. SMITH: I second it.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: It is agreed.

You will be notified of the time of departure. We will be going by bus, and the time is now tentatively set for 8 o'clock Tuesday morning.

Mr. LAMBERT: Please make sure there will be more people than we have here at this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: We certainly shall.

The second item is that we have received another of the papers that was ordered by the Committee last session, a paper on Disarmament and Arms Control by Hedley Bull. I would like a motion that the paper on Disarmament and Arms Control requested by the Special Committee on Defence during the past session for the use of this Committee be distributed to committee members; and that the author of this paper be paid the sum of $300.

Mr. SMITH: I would so move.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I second it.

The CHAIRMAN: It is agreed.

Motion agreed to.

We will resume our discussion on service colleges, and we will start this morning with a statement by the Associate Minister. After that Mr. Armstrong will give you some information in answer to questions raised last meeting, and then we will proceed with our questioning.

Hon. LUCIEN CARDIN (*Associate Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I have a very short statement to make concerning the regular officers training program.

Officer cadets who are offered cadetships in the regular officer training plan subsequent to September 1, 1964, will be required to serve as commissioned officers for four years following their graduation from the Canadian services colleges or civilian universities.

At present, young men who are offered cadetships in the regular officer training plan agree to serve for three years as commissioned officers following graduation. Records show that 73 per cent of those who graduated from the royal military college, Kingston, Ontario, and 54 per cent of those who graduated from the civilian universities under the regular officer training plan have remained in the services beyond the three-year period.

It is believed that the substitution of a four-year period will result in an improvement in this respect, particularly among the graduates of the civilian universities because the officers concerned will have a wider experience in the armed forces and will have advanced to more responsible and interesting positions by their fourth year. One additional year of service is not, on the other hand, considered to be too great an undertaking to ask young men to accept in consideration of four or five years of education at the service colleges or universities at departmental expense. It may result in some of these young men being motivated to a greater extent towards a military career before entering the regular officer training plan. If it does, the additional year should for this reason also be beneficial in terms of the numbers who remain with the armed forces.

This change in the terms of service had been under study for some time and the royal commission on government organization, in its report on military education, had suggested that consideration should be given to an extension in the period of obligatory service. The new regulations will not apply to officers or cadets now in the system or to candidates who are offered cadetships in August at the conclusion of the current summer selection period.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Armstrong, do you have some answers to give to questions raised at the last meeting?

Mr. E. B. ARMSTRONG (*Deputy Minister of National Defence*): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question was asked as to how many service personnel were promoted from the ranks to commission status in the last five years. There were 1,070 promotions of that character.

Secondly, how many of these completed university training? A total of 86 of 1,070 completed university training.

What percentage of commissioned officers now serving have university degrees? The total is 29.6 per cent of commissioned officers have university degrees.

There was also a question as to enrolments at the Canservcols by provinces, and the number who failed to pass their first year. These statistics cover the period from 1959-60 to 1963-64 inclusive: British Columbia, 172 enrolled, 17 failed to pass their examinations at the end of the first year; Alberta, 124 enrolled, 18 failed; Saskatchewan, 114 enrolled, 24 failed; Manitoba, 68 enrolled, 11 failed; Ontario, 612 enrolled, 76 failed; Quebec, 617 enrolled, 76 failed; New Brunswick, 34 enrolled, 7 failed; Prince Edward Island, 4 enrolled, one failed; Nova Scotia, 35 enrolled, 14 failed; Newfoundland, 5 enrolled, 3 failed. Of others that did not come in specifically from the province—this would include boys who are, for example, attending our own schools overseas—28 enrolled, 4 failed.

The CHAIRMAN: Does that complete your information?

Mr. MARTINEAU: Is it in order to ask the associate minister a question in regard to his statement?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is. I have a list of questioners carried forth from the last meeting, of whom two are here now, so that we will start the questioning with Mr. Smith, followed by Mr. Deachman, and then we will be open for further questions. I would remind the committee members that we have an hour and a quarter left, and I would ask each person to limit his questions as much as possible so that everyone gets a chance.

Mr. SMITH: I suppose a logical conclusion from the percentages given in the minister's statement this morning is that from the point of view of the armed services it is wise to continue the existence of the service colleges as separate institutions where the fall-out rate is much lower than it is in civilian universities. Is that it?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. Although the whole matter is under review, I think it is felt that the result we get from the service colleges warrants the continuance of the colleges as separate units. Within the colleges there is an atmosphere of companionship you would not find in the universities which we feel is very good for the forces.

Mr. SMITH: With regard to the shortage of university accommodation all over Canada, is there a civilian use served by maintaining the service colleges?

Mr. CARDIN: Would you repeat that, please?

Mr. SMITH: Generally speaking we hear that university accommodation is at a premium and that we need more universities. Even having regard to the people who do not make military services their careers after finishing the service college, do we get a general civilian benefit from the military colleges?

Mr. CARDIN: Oh, yes; there is no question concerning the civilian benefit that is derived either from the service colleges, or the universities. I think another thing is that so far we would not have a sufficient output of officers from our service colleges if we did not have the university trained cadets.

Mr. SMITH: Has consideration been given to accepting nominations or applications for the service colleges at an earlier level before the person's academic qualifications finally are determined, which in the case of senior matriculation comes very late in the summer of the year in which he is going to start college. Perhaps there could be a conditional acceptance, and these people could be put in special category units for the one or two summers before they finish their secondary schooling. This would give the services an opportunity to look at these boys, and would also give the boys an opportunity to look at the services.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Mr. Smith, I do not think any consideration has been given so far to carrying it back that far. Consideration now is being given to means by which selections may be made before the final examination results come out. Secondly, of course, each service does have a cadet corps, and there is some reserve training for boys in high school. When those who participate in these activities display an interest in the service, this is taken into account in the selection process; but we have not gone back, as you suggest, to attempt to make a selection as far back as two years before they graduate.

Mr. SMITH: Now that some universities go further back than the immediate entrance examination, would it not be possible to take conditional applications when a boy has reached his sixteenth birthday?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I suppose it is possible. I think it probably would be difficult. My own experience with youngsters of this age is that most of them are not ready to make up their mind with regard to what they would like to do, in any event, until they get very close to graduation. I would think it would be quite difficult to go back that far.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, the questions I have I think perhaps are best addressed to Mr. Armstrong. The R.O.T.P. program actually is a program for the education of officers to university level. I believe this is a fair description of what the R.O.T.P. is. I understand R.O.T.P. includes both the service colleges and the university programs.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And the education of men through university level followed by three years of service?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When did this program begin, as compared to the old service college program?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: This program started in 1952.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What has been the experience with regard to the R.O.T.P. program in graduating officers since its inception and to date; that is to say, what is the total number of officers graduated by the R.O.T.P. system to date? Are those figures readily available?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think it is 2,400. I thought I mentioned it last time.

Commodore GROOS: We have them. Right up to date it is 2,396.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, right up to date it is 2,396.

Commodore GROOS: Of whom 1,196 came from Canservcol, and 1,200 from the universities.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You say 1,196 came from Cansercol?

Commodore GROOS: Yes, and 1,200 from the universities.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Can you break down the Canservcol figure for me into its components?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Into which components?

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is, into the respective colleges; how many came out of the respective colleges such as R.M.C., C.M.R., and Royal Roads?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We can get it totalled up for you.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Very well, and while the total is coming, may I pass to my next question. Of the 2,396 graduates, how many of those graduates would have spent their three years of service?

Commodore GROOS: Some of them are still performing their period of obligatory service. That number includes people who graduated just recently.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But in any event, of the 2,396, the first thing you get is the service of 2,396 students who are "educatable" in some degree during their whole term of service, and you also get their service as junior officers for three years following their graduation.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes; they have an agreement to stay in for three years.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The thing which determines whether or not they will become career officers beyond that time is whether or not they sign up at the end of the three years.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No, that is not quite correct. They do not sign up again. They are commissioned officers when they graduate. They may resign their commissions at the end of the three years. But if they stay on, there is no question of their signing up.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I see. What is the thing that determines whether or not you have a career officer? Does he go on reserve at the end of the three years, or does he go on as a permanent officer? This is the checkpoint which determines whether or not you have a man for a career, or whether he is going to go on reserve.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I suppose it is in a sense. I suppose you would appreciate it in assuming that the boys who came in are going to be career officers. But I think it is quite obvious, with a group of boys coming in, it would perhaps be unreasonable to expect them at the age of 17 or 18 to say definitely that they are going to be career officers and stay until retirement age. So there is an option for them to get out if they so desire at the end of the three years.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Now, of the 2,396 who graduated, how many would remain in the service after having passed the seven check mark?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Those percentages are the ones which were given by the minister. It is seventy three per cent of those who graduated from the service colleges. Of the 2,400 not all have reached that point; but of those who have, 73 per cent have stayed; and 54 per cent of the university people have stayed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: May we have expressed as a figure the actual number of officers who since the inception of the R.O.T.P. program have remained in the service after passing the seven year check point, or after passing the three year service point?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, certainly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Might we have it as an actual figure?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: These figures are to August 31, 1963. The number who remained in service, having reached that three year point, was 361, that is, of those who graduated through the university side, and 425 of those who graduated through the Canservcol, making a total of 786.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You say there are 425?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There are 425 from the service colleges. I would say that this figure should not be compared with the total production of 2,400 as the latter figure includes those who have not yet reached the three year point.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I take it that the 425 are from the service colleges. Is it possible for you to give me a breakdown of which service colleges they came from, that is, the number from each of the service colleges? Now we are looking only at the 425 from the services.

Commodore GROOS: They all graduated from R.M.C.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Can you tell me where they originated? Is it possible to give me that information?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: In answer to your earlier question the figures have now been totalled up, as to the graduates by colleges.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You had, 1,196 to begin with.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, that is right. We have got it pared down to a total of 1,196. At R.M.C., 362 graduated; of those who started out at Royal Roads, 371; of those who started out at C.M.R., 282, and that comes to a total of 1,015. We do not have the 1964 graduates analysed, but there are 181 of them, making a total of 1,196.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Coming down now to the 425 from the service colleges who have passed the three year point and remained in, are you able to identify what colleges they came from? Have you got figures available to identify where they originated?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think we could get that information. We do not have it now. It would take some research to produce those particular figures.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Going back to the percentages which you supplied, and the percentages which you know of those who graduated from the service colleges who remained in for another three years, can you make an educated guess looking at the 425 and apportion them among the three service colleges?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: If I had to make an educated guess, I think it probably would be in proportion to the figures I have given you as to graduates.

Mr. DEACHMAN: One would have to apportion the 425 on a pro rata basis among the 362, 371 and 282; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I would say that is approximately correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The proportions would then be roughly 4, 4, and 3; is that right?

Commodore GROOS: I do not think that is correct, because the entry figures have changed over the years. R.M.C. only take in 63 recruits per year now while C.M.R. takes in 176 and Royal Roads takes in approximately 130. The entrance figures have changed over the years, Mr. Deachman, so I think I would be inclined to say they are not exactly in the same proportion across the board.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I take it you are seeking a figure which would indicate whether there are more graduates from one college or proportionately more who stay than in respect of another, and I do not have that figure.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Let me refer again to the 425 figure in respect of service colleges who remain in over the three year period. What years are covered by this figure? Does the figure cover the system from its inception until three years ago, in view of the fact we cannot count the most recent three year period? The figure of 425 represents a period of time from 1952 to 1960; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Those figures were taken as at August 31, 1963 and go back three years. They have reference to the graduating class of three years earlier.

Commodore GROOS: It has reference to 1960.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, they apply to the year 1960.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Up until that time you would then only have a graduating class of 1953?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: You would not have a graduating class.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, I think we are taking a great deal of time doing a lot of arithmetic. I wonder whether you could bring your questions to a head because there are other members who wish to ask questions?

Mr. DEACHMAN: The point I want to make is this. Over how many years were the 425 career officers produced?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: The first graduating class would be that of 1956, so you would have a period of from 1956 to 1960. Then of course C.M.R. had its first graduates in 1957.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We are then considering a four or five year period?

Commodore GROOS: The period is a little less than five years but a little more than four years.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Considering the entire service college system, we are producing approximately 100 career officers or about 108 per year; is that correct?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is correct if you take the figure on an average, but of course the figure is increasing each year. This year there were 181 graduates from R.M.C.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is the highest number of officers graduating up to this time and it will stay at that level or, we hope, go slightly above it, perhaps to the order of 200. The number of graduates from universities in this respect has increased as well.

Commodore GROOS: The number of graduates from the university section is down a little this year, to approximately 150 or 140.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The final result of our consideration is that from the point of view of producing service career officers, the combined total of the three service college output, remaining in the service for a career, is approximately 100 per year; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: If one counts on experience one must assume we have 185 graduates from the service colleges of which this year 27 per cent will not stay. There will be approximately 49 graduates who will not remain, and perhaps we can consider this number in round figures as 50, leaving 135 who will stay. In respect of universities there are approximately 170 graduates with a little better than half of them staying, giving us a figure of 90. The total number then would be 225 at the end of three years, and that is a higher figure than the one you mentioned because the number of graduates is higher currently during the period covered by these figures.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think these figures bear out the fact that the cost to produce a service officer is enormous, and I refer to an officer we know is going to stay in the service for a full term.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I suppose that is true. It is expensive, but the cost of producing any university educated man is high and that is what we are doing here.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you approaching an end to your questions, Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think I have reached the end of my questions, now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TEMPLE: Subject to conclusions later.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Subject to conclusions later.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I should like to ask the associate minister, in respect of the statement he made at the opening of our sitting this morning, why the new regulations will not apply to those candidates who will be offered cadetships in August at the conclusion of the current summer selection period. If this is a good measure, which I think it is, and it has been recommended by the Glassco commission, I cannot understand why these regulations are not to apply to those individuals. I can understand the regulations not applying to officers who have already started training but in respect of new candidates why would the regulations not apply?

Mr. CARDIN: Of course the individuals concerned who desire to take part in this program have been under the impression that it involves a compulsory three year service period. A certain amount of effort has already been done to line these people up for entrance in September. I think it would be unfair, having gone through all that work, these cadets being under the impression they would be required to serve a three year period, to automatically change the compulsory period at this stage to four years.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Those candidates have not been accepted as yet. Surely if they desire to enter this training course they should accept the conditions laid down.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. I think you will realize that all our present literature in respect of this training course lays down the three year obligatory service period.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it not a fact that, as in respect of the air force, a lot of preliminary screening has been done at Centralia during the Easter holidays?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: I believe the same situation applies in respect of the army, and preliminary screening is done during the Easter recess, is that right?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct, and at that time the individuals understood the obligatory period to be three years. I do not think it would be fair at this late date to change that period to four years. The four year service period will apply to the next group of individuals.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I wanted the minister to give us some assurance that this special provision was not being used to accommodate special circumstances.

Mr. CARDIN: To what special circumstances do you refer?

Mr. MARTINEAU: I had in mind a situation in respect of which certain candidates would become cadets, whereas others would not become cadets.

Mr. CARDIN: There is certainly no thought of that kind being entertained at all. As I explained, we feel it only fair to start this program after the present cadets who already have been worked into this program have moved on, so that new candidates for this course would then understand that a four year period was involved.

Mr. LAMBERT: The new regulations would then come into effect four years from now?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was wondering whether either the minister or Mr. Armstrong could tell me if any of the graduates from the service colleges, or under the R.O.T.P. program, are involved in the recent release from the air force aircrew?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I cannot answer that question specifically but I would venture to say definitely no. Perhaps I better check this answer out for you. I am satisfied that none of them would be involved.

Mr. LAMBERT: Thank you.

Mr. MATHESON: I am not sure to whom I should direct this question, the deputy minister or Commodore Groos but I should like to distinguish between R.O.T.P. personnel and junior matriculants entering university after the selection board has made a decision, which I understand sits in the summer, and on the other hand, C.O.T.C. officer cadets who have acquired a taste for army life during their practical phase summer training which covers three months, or more, at course schools and then are recommended to a selection board by their commanding officer at some stage in their training. I am wondering if it has been seriously brought to the attention of the department that there is a great advantage in the latter selection; that is to say, that R.O.T.P. cadets who have come from the second group rather than the junior matriculation group, that have been selected by a team in the summer, have proved to be superior and more usful to us as service officers. Has any representation been made to the department in this respect?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Certainly we would recognize there is a considerable advantage in terms of eliminating, if I might put it that way, the wastage in the early years if we take the boys in at junior matriculation or even at senior matriculation level as against bringing in a man who has been in the C.O.T.C. who has perhaps completed his first year at university and then desires to join the R.O.T.P. I would not say in terms of the graduation that one is better than the other; I do not think we have any experience that would indicate this one way or the other. On the other hand, obviously there are problems associated with this in terms of the numbers of people who come in. I think we take probably in the order of 75 to 100 now who are in the university and do not come in initially in the selection process at the junior matriculation or senior matriculation level.

In order to operate the C.M.R.—that particular element of our Canada service colleges—we do have to take people in at junior matriculation level

at the present time. Perhaps some years from now it will be possible to have all the entrants come in at the university level; and that, from our point of view, would be desirable.

Mr. MATHESON: Then, Mr. Armstrong, if it were possible, you would be happy to see persons selected who have completed their first academic year, say, and perhaps theoretical and practical C.O.T.C. training?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I think if one could get enough of these people we would be happy with that. The real problem here, I think, is that the program as it stands today offers an opportunity to a young lad who otherwise could not go to university perhaps for financial reasons. This gives him an opportunity. If he is interested in the armed forces he can come in and his way will be paid. Of course, in the other scheme the selection is limited to those who have reached the university in one way or another and then decided they would like to come in. There is no doubt that this would reduce the wastage considerably if one could obtain enough people. We do this, for example, with doctors. We take them in for the last three years of their course, and the academic wastage in that case is negligible. Almost all who come in graduate and serve their period in the forces.

Mr. MATHESON: Perhaps this has been touched on by some of the questions of Mr. Deachman; I am not sure. I have been listening to them carefully and I think it has not been raised. Have you any basis of comparison of the length of time that a man remains in the service coming from the matriculation group as against this other group coming in after having had some theoretical and practical training through C.O.T.C.? Have you any evidence that would support the proposition that the second group perhaps tends to stay in the service longer?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We do not know. These people who come in become members of the regular officers training plan and our statistics at the moment, I am afraid, do not cover them in total. There is not a large number of them proportionately to the total. The only way in which one could do this would be to take the individuals, get the figures and analyse them.

Commodore GROOS: The R.O.T.P. scheme was introduced in the first place because we were not obtaining sufficient candidates from C.O.T.C., U.R.T.P. and U.N.T.D. Therefore it was decided to bring in R.O.T.P. as a fully subsidized scheme at the beginning. There was nothing against the other scheme but it simply did not produce sufficient people and it had to be supplanted.

Mr. MATHESON: I am impressed by Mr. Armstrong's suggestion that the first scheme for matriculants presents an opportunity to a young man, who might not otherwise get to university at all, to make a career of the services perhaps from somewhat less fortuitous circumstances than the second category. I had not thought of this.

May I ask another question which I think is related? Mr. Armstrong tells us that one of the reasons for which the matriculant group in the summer selection—which appears to me to be somewhat casual—is necessary is because we have insufficient people in the supply system of officers. Has any consideration been given to substantially increasing the $110 or $120 monthly allowance? I do understand there has been quite a number of people from the second category—that is, people on their way through university and in C.O.T.C.—who might be very pleased to go into this program and make a career of the service if they felt they could really finance it adequately, but the $110 or $120 is just a little thin. Have there been any representations along these lines?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It is $138. On a year round basis it would provide a man attending university—a man who does not have family responsibilities and so on—with a reasonable amount to live on. It is not intended to be a luxurious

life. We had never thought of it as paying a substantial living, and I do not think the $138 is really a stumbling block. It is fairly attractive to a young man to have $138 and tuition and books and so on.

Commodore GROOS: Mr. Matheson has indicated that he thinks the summer selection is somewhat casual. When your committee visits R.M.C. next Tuesday there will be a selection board in full session down there, and I hope any members interested in selection procedures will be able to drop in and see how it is done. I hope the conclusion the members come to will be that the system is anything but casual.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I ask a supplementary question in relation to what Mr. Matheson was saying about substitutions?

Has any information reached the Department of National Defence of the extent of student loans under this new program and how this may affect this program? I think what one hand is giving here is going to be taken away by the other. These are contradictory and self-defeating programs.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I have no particular information on this. Obviously, as everyone is aware, I think the opportunities in terms of scholarships and loans are continuously becoming better in this country so that young people who have the ability generally speaking can get to university one way or another. There should not be too many limitations on pure financial grounds.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will not ask you for your comments on the effect of the student loan funds.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you a question Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY: How many or what proportion of the young men entering R.O.T.P. have had secondary school cadet training and what number or proportion have had militia or reserve unit training? Would this information be on their file cards?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It would be on their cards but we do not happen to have the statistics. We would have to search the individual files.

Mr. MCNULTY: I was wondering if this type of young man would tend to stay in the services longer than those who have had no military training?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: My guess is that there is every likelihood that that young man would have the motivation which would result in him staying.

Mr. LANGLOIS: Mr. Chairman, I have a short question in respect of this report that has been given out. The records show that 73 per cent of those who graduated from the Royal Military College at Kingston and 54 per cent of those graduated from civilian universities remained in the services after they had finished the three year period. There is a difference of 19 per cent, and I was wondering if there is any special reason why this is such a difference in percentage between those who graduate from the Royal Military College and those who graduate from the civilian universities. Why is it that the one who graduates from the civilian university has not the same interest to go on and continue as a regular officer?

Mr. CARDIN: I would think the atmosphere in the Canadian services colleges, which is largely military, and conducive to esprit de corps and comradeship, has an effect on the students. I think this is one reason why perhaps more cadets from the Canadian services colleges remain. In the university setting they are not in a military atmosphere to the same extent and they are tempted with all sorts of other opportunities. I think perhaps this is one of the main reasons.

Mr. LANGLOIS: Is the cost approximately the same in respect of the one student going through military college and the other going through university?

Mr. CARDIN: That is a difficult question to answer because there are so many factors coming into this. It is very difficult, as I say, to give a proper estimation, but it would appear that it does cost more to have the graduates come from the Canadian services colleges.

Mr. LANGLOIS: In view of the probable external factors contributing to the fact that 19 per cent do not continue their military career, have you stressed the possibility of trying to accommodate as many as possible in the future in military colleges instead of civilian universities. It is possible, that with a certain environment a student would fit better in the service but he may take more time to grasp his education in a civilian university than he would if he was in a military atmosphere.

Mr. CARDIN: That has been considered but, as I mentioned earlier, it is not possible to get a sufficient number of officers from the Canadian services colleges alone. To do this we would have to expand the services colleges to a tremendous degree, which would be very costly. This is not envisaged at this time and we still would not have enough output of officers.

Mr. LANGLOIS: Is it envisaged at the moment that you will expand some of these colleges in the future?

Mr. CARDIN: No decision has been taken in this regard.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it not a fact that because of the greater diversity of educational facilities in the civilian universities you are exposed to potential careers through the universities which you are not exposed to in the services colleges. For instance, a man taking accountancy in a bachelor of commerce course at a civilian university perhaps is envisaging a business administration or chartered accountant's career, and he is going to do his time and get out, whereas the courses at the services colleges are designed really for career officers in the services.

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct, and I think this is what explains the difference between the output of the two R.O.T.P. systems.

Mr. LANGLOIS: But in the long run would you not end up with a saving? In this way you are paying for 19 per cent which we actually lose because they do not make a career out of it. Would it not be better in the long run and also effect a saving if we accommodated in the future as many of these students as possible in order to get them to stay in the service? After all, you have trained them and you would like to keep them.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. As I mentioned before, this whole matter is very complicated from the accounting point of view but it is being looked at very, very carefully. So far it is not yet felt there would be any tremendous saving in doing this.

Another thing I should mention is that it is not a complete loss because they are forced to stay in service at least three years. They give at least three years of service and in this way we are getting back a bit of our expenses. And, if it is extended to four years they will then be required to give four years of service.

Mr. SMITH: Are those who leave the service at the end of their three year engagement required to stay in a supplementary reserve or are they given a completely free discharge at the end of the three year period?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There is no obligation to go into a reserve.

Mr. SMITH: Are they subject to recall on any terms?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No.

Mr. LAMBERT: Not even to a supplementary reserve?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Some of them may be, but not necessarily.

Commodore GROOS: They go on the retired list.

Mr. LAMBERT: They do not go on the supplementary reserve list?

Commodore GROOS: No.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is there any reason why they should not go on the supplementary reserve list?

Commodore GROOS: I would not like to answer that question. Perhaps Commander Clarke would like to comment on this.

Mr. G. S. CLARKE (*Commander (Navy), Deputy Director, R.O.T.P.*): I think a reasonable portion do elect to go on the supplementary reserve list but there is no obligation. And, with the four year period, it merely would be another consideration that the young lads would have to weigh, it being somewhat restrictive on their liberties if they decided they wanted to leave.

Mr. LAMBERT: Toward the latter quarter of the statement given by Mr. Armstrong the other day reference was made to the administration of the services colleges. What are the plans for the future of the one that the navy is now responsible for, namely Royal Roads?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It will remain as it is for some time to come. At some stage I would hope we would reach a point where all the colleges are administered under one organization; in other words, we would not have a separation in this respect. The assignment of one college to each of the services does work reasonably satisfactorily but there are differences in the way they are administered and I think in view of this it would be preferable if we had one responsible administration for all three colleges. I hope we achieve this sometime in the future.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do you not feel, Mr. Armstrong, that this should be done as of now rather than wait for the "D" day of integration because, as we know, there are differences in administration? I have pointed out in some speeches in other places, where the paper was a little thicker and heavier in one service as against another, that this is one of the areas in which there could be a uniform administration.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: You are probably right. It should be done as of now, but we have a great many things to do, and we will do it as soon as we possibly can. I can say that without any doubt.

Mr. MATHESON: Is it beyond the realm of possibility that as you look at this problem proposed by Mr. Lambert you might give consideration to the wisdom of having the Department of National Defence operate a college within a university, as was suggested in earlier statements at an earlier stage? I have in mind the operations at the present time of Queen's University in Kingston where great efficiencies have been effected in the last few years, partly as a result of the assistance of Dr. John Deutsch, and others who came in after the war when growth made a great deal of change necessary in the matter of supplies and adequate uses of resources. I would be completely opposed personally to seeing a university dominate a service college. On the other hand, it seems to me that there are many advantages that perhaps can result from the consideration of a service college operated by the Departmnt of National Defence working with or in or as part of a larger university complex.

There is another consideration also which is very important. I am mindful of the fact that a few years ago the Royal Military College was having a difficult time holding some of the very skilled and talented teachers, lecturers and professors we had because frankly our R.M.C. scale of pay was not adequate, and we had in mind an upgrading of salaries that was instituted by the Univer-

sity of Toronto and very quickly followed by other larger universities throughout Ontario. Surely there is a certain virtue in having some relationship between our service college and a large institution so that even from the faculty side—the senate side if you like—there is a movement that is possible between good teachers, particularly as the Royal Military College is not teaching military science any longer but doing very fine work in economics, engineering, and other courses that are really part and parcel of a university as a whole. Is it asking too much that at least this be considered?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: There is nothing that impedes movement, as I am sure you know. In the university area today there is a great deal of movement because of the expansion, and so on, and the difficulty in getting enough qualified people as professors. I think we are fortunate in all of our service colleges and in the R.M.C. in having a very good teaching staff. This is not easy to maintain, I would certainly admit that, and university salaries have perhaps even more than any others increased quite substantially in recent years, and perhaps we tend to some degree to get behind drastically although I think we now have systems that enable us to keep pretty well up to the university level.

I would think it very difficult to run a military college and get the benefits of a military college within a civilian university complex. I think this would be very difficult to do. Maybe there are ways and means of developing relationships with civilian universities that could be helpful. As we mentioned at the last meeting, there will be a study based on the recommendations of the Glassco report on the ways and means of producing officers with university degrees for the services. We hope to bring into that study some civilians who are knowledgeable of the university field and of their methods of doing things, and I think in the course of that there may be many things studied regarding how best to achieve our objectives. However, I do not seriously see us under any circumstances ending up with anything but a separate military college.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Matheson, you were on a supplementary.

Mr. MATHESON: I have another supplementary.

The CHAIRMAN: We will go back to Mr. Lambert and we will pick up your question afterwards.

Mr. LAMBERT: I had finished, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Temple is next.

Mr. TEMPLE: I notice that you have 3,451 applicants for the summer of 1963 for R.O.T.P. What percentage of those who apply would have had a father who now is or has been an officer in one of the services?

Commodore GROOS: I think that would be impossible to answer. It would take a hand search of the files. I would not like to even hazard a guess. It is not only the sons of officers who apply, but also the sons of enlisted men; they succeed too.

Mr. TEMPLE: Yes, but I am interested in knowing whether there is any check kept concerning that.

Commodore GROOS: I am afraid not.

Mr. TEMPLE: Do you feel that when an applicant's father was or is an officer that the applicant would be more likely to remain in the service after the three years, or now four years?

Commodore GROOS: I think that would be impossible to answer. We have had some odd experiences along that line. Before the session began this morning, I was describing one to the associate minister.

Mr. TEMPLE: In so far as applicants are concerned, I can be assured that whether or not his father had a commissioned rank means nothing at all in respect of his being accepted?

Commodore GROOS: On the contrary, I would say we have had many sons of officers who were turned down, or who, if accepted, did not pass, whereas we have had many sons of sergeants who have been accepted and who have passed. They get there on their merit, and that is all.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I would like to know whether the R.O.T.P. program has been reviewed in the light of the integration plans, and especially the announcement that many serving officers will be discharged from the service. How will that affect the future requirements for new officers?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It has not been determined yet how it will affect them. Again I mentioned the study that we expect to make in respect of the best means of producing officers. There is a first study preceding that in respect of how many university graduates we should aim at in terms of the requirements for the services. That study is to some degree conditioned on knowing a little more than we do at this moment with regard to the results of integration.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Is there not something slightly incongruous in the fact that while the Department of National Defence is letting people go who already are qualified officers, you should be expanding the training facilities for new officers; should there not be some kind of a tie-in there between one and the other?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: We are not expanding training facilities right now.

Mr. MARTINEAU: The statement of the minister would indicate that you are expanding it in a way, because you will be keeping the officers for one year longer.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not think this is incongruous in the sense there are some officers in particular who will become surplus. For example, as was mentioned in this committee, the group which is being released from the air force, essentially, is made up of surplus aircrew officers. At the same time we must provide, as I am sure you will appreciate, for the continuing inflow of people who will be required as the years go by to officer the military forces.

Mr. MARTINEAU: That is why I wanted to know if some revision of the program has been made?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Not yet. And I would also point out that the numbers coming in, even as they stand today, and as you can see from the figures we have given, are really short of the needs as they have been established in the past.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Is such a revision planned?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, a study is planned, and depending on the outcome of that study a revision may or may not be necessary; but it would be based on it.

Mr. MARTINEAU: That is all.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Matheson.

Mr. MATHESON: I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Very well, now, Mr. Langlois.

Mr. LANGLOIS: I have a complementary question relating to future personnel and that of having highly qualified teachers which is necessary, and which is becoming more and more difficult not only at military colleges but everywhere. I would like to refer to a plan which has been set up. I do not think it is out of order, but if it is, you will please tell me. I have in mind a plan that has been conceived. I do not know how far it has got so far in the NATO association, but the plan is to have some sort of super university, if

you wish to call it that, or an arrangement between the universities of different countries belonging to the NATO alliance. It started in 1959, and there was very strong determination to get through with it when I was there in 1962. Have you heard about anything of that sort, and not only an exchange of professors but also an exchange of military groups?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I have heard of it, but I am afraid I am not up to date on it.

Commodore GROOS: Canada has not actually participated actively in these discussions. Other NATO countries have done so, but their problems are different from ours. We think we have the answer in hand in our own country.

Mr. LANGLOIS: Could you say if you think this is helpful, if it could ever be put on a practical basis of some sort, to students, as well as to the country itself?

Commodore GROOS; Under certain circumstances, yes; but we are up against time. We must produce officers as quickly as we can. It might take four to five years now. Someone has suggested seven years. The time does not exist in which to send a man abroad unless it is for some very special purpose.

Mr. LANGLOIS: There is a point which was discussed at that meeting, that it would probably be difficult to start off with a fairly large basis at the beginning. I wondered if you were taking into consideration or if you had considered sending a few people every year at least so that they would have that training or an opportunity to take special training? Would the men who would take such training be of use to us as career officers?

Commodore GROOS: We do have some selected officers who take post graduate courses abroad, in the United States and in Britain. It might possibly be extended to some other NATO countries in the future.

Mr. LANGLOIS: It is not under the NATO plan then?

Commodore GROOS: No, not as far as we are concerned, no.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY: I would like to ask Commodore Groos to what extent we publicize R.O.T.P. in the secondary schools? What is your selling program? How do you go about getting into the secondary schools?

Commodore GROOS: We have school relation officers who visit every high school of any size at least once a year. They show a film on life in the Canadian service colleges, they hand out brochures, and they talk with the students about being career officers. Strictly speaking they are not recruiting officers. They explain what we have to offer to high school graduates who are above average. In the province of Quebec I believe something like 1,200 students per year attain the qualifications we need for our service colleges, while close to 500 to 600 apply. This indicates the measure of success we have in this program.

Mr. GRANGER: Do the number of applicants for entry into the service colleges exceed the capacity?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: The number of applicants of course does exceed the capacity, but when the selective process has been completed, I do not think it does. In fact we probably divert a few of the applicants who have designated preference for a civilian university to a service college. But the number selected in the final analysis is always enough to fill them. However we do not have a surplus of applicants who are suitable.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Are all qualified applicants assured of being admitted?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: At the present time that would appear to be the case, yes.

Mr. FANE: I should like to ask another supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. Does the selection board select a sufficient number of applicants, from those who offer themselves, to provide the total number required by the colleges and, should there not be a sufficient number of qualified applicants selected, does the board go back over the names of those turned down to bring the number up to the requirement?

Commodore GROOS: We certainly do make sure that every individual who can be accepted or who is acceptable is put on the final list and then we allocate cadetships to the best people. If a candidate is not suitable we cannot do anything about that. That individual is unsuitable and that is the end of the situation.

Mr. FANE: What I am trying to suggest is that you do not operate a college at anything less than full capacity?

Commodore GROOS: We try very hard to keep all the colleges at optimum capacity. We also try to ensure that the provincial quota to the Canadian service colleges is met each year. In a few instances we have been unlucky and not able to fill the quotas for some provinces in some years but by and large we are able to fill our provincial quotas. That is the first thing we attempt to do and, having done that, we then accept candidates on their merit.

Mr. FANE: Do you receive applications from a greater number of individuals than you require to operate your colleges at optimum capacity?

Commodore GROOS: Yes, but they are not all suitable applicants.

Mr. FANE: I realize that that is the case.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Armstrong, I have calculated some percentages as a result of the figures you gave me this morning and I should like to check them for accuracy. Of the 100 officers in the armed forces 70 do not have a university degree; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thirty officers have university degrees and of those 30, 15 will come from universities and 15 from Canadian service colleges; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I can see the logic of what you say. The inflow in a sense from R.O.T.P. is approximately 50-50. That is to say, there are 50 from universities and 50 from the Canadian service colleges.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Of the 2,396 officers graduating from R.O.T.P. since its inception, 1,196 come from the Canadian service colleges and 1,200 from universities; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That is right.

Commodore GROOS: Excuse me, Mr. Deachman, but those officers are not all still in the services.

Mr. DEACHMAN: They are not all still in the services and I will refer to that situation in a moment. Of 100 officers in the armed forces, 15 at any given moment will have come from the Canadian service colleges and 15 from universities; is that correct?

Commodore GROOS: I do not think that is a logical assumption.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I think it is correct in the sense that of the graduates from the regular officers training plan 50 per cent come from universities and 50 per cent from the Canadian service colleges. When this fact is tied to the fact there are 30 per cent university graduates in the officer corps you cannot really put them together at one time because the vast majority of those people do not come from the regular officer training plan.

Commodore GROOS: The wastages apply differently later on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Of the 30 university graduates who are officers in the armed forces, 15 have come from Canadian service colleges; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I do not think that is necessarily the fact. I think all one can state at the moment is that based on experience since 1952, 50 per cent come from universities and 50 per cent come from Canadian service colleges.

Commodore GROOS: I think 1956 is a better year for comparison.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Dividing that 15 to 15 ratio further we find that 11 of the 15 would remain after the three year period. I make this calculation on the basis of your 73 per cent figure in respect of Canadian service college graduates. Out of the 100 officers in the armed forces 11 are Canadian service colleges career men, so the Canadian service colleges produce 11 per cent of the career officers in the armed forces; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I am afraid you lost me on your last calculation. I do not think you can really come to that conclusion.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We must be able to arrive at this. If only 30 per cent of the people in the armed forces have university degrees—

Mr. ARMSTRONG: You are missing the link here, Mr. Deachman. We happen to have 30 per cent at the moment with university degrees.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And this is taking it on about a five or ten year output?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: That 30 per cent has nothing to do essentially with the output of the service colleges since 1956. The majority of these people are people who came into the services when they expanded during the war, people who stayed in the service after the war, or people who came in the service during that expansion period starting in 1950, the time of Korea. They did not come in through the regular officers training plan, so you cannot link these two things together.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have taken only output figures on the basis of what your output is today, not looking at it historically. The figures you have given to us today are that promotions from the ranks are 1,070 during the past five years, and that 29.6 per cent, or roughly 30 per cent of the officers in the armed forces have university degrees. I am suggesting that the current rate, not looking at it historically, is that of 100 officers produced in the armed forces today, 70 will not have university degrees and 30 will have university degrees.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: I am suggesting that you are misinterpreting this.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is that the rate?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: No. You are misinterpreting it. I cannot give you the figure, but I think we can probably work it out. What you end up with here is an inflow of a certain number of people out of the service colleges and universities. Over a period of years, assuming an officer's career is 30 years, if you look long enough into the future, then you will have a certain number of people in the total officer corps who have degrees, either from the service college or university, or from R.O.T.P. What that number is, I do not know offhand, but I do not think you can relate it to the existing 30 per cent.

Commodore GROOS: The 70 per cent includes temporary commissioned officers, too, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, I know that, but what I am attempting to find out here is what are the current rates at which officers are produced in the army, and to reduce these to percentages. I take it that the rate at which officers are produced is 70 per cent with no university education, and 30 per cent with university education. Is this so as a current rate excluding all those who may be in from a number of years back, and so on?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: What you want is the total number of officers we are recruiting from year to year, and what percentage of these have university education?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Year to year, let us say, over the past five to ten years, of those on whom you are putting a pip. What is the division between those that have a university education and those who do not have a university education?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Well, this I can get you. I do not have it in my head and, I doubt, whether anyone else has.

Commodore GROOS: It would be about 1,200 officers a year who actually get commissions. But, a good many of these commissions are short service. At least 800 are. Some of these get transferred into permanent commissions and although I do not know the exact figure, I think about 390 or so have degrees and get commissions, which are normally permanent ones.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Then, that would be about 25 per cent.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Twenty-five per cent what?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: If the figure of 1,200 is correct there would be about 25 per cent of those who came in with university degrees through the R.O.T.P. plan.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Through the R.O.T.P. plan?

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, or a little better.

Commodore GROOS: The others include so many temporary commissioned people.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But, the universities are producing temporary people. They are there three years. And, you are producing them from other sources. So, the rate at which you are producing them and the rate which officers come into the service is, I suggest, very close to the figures you gave me, 70 per cent with no university education and 30 per cent with university education.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes. I think this is quite close.

Mr. WINCH: What are you trying to prove, Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Of the 30 per cent these streams are made up of about one half graduates from the universities and one half graduates from Canservcol.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So, there are 15 graduates from Canservcol of the original 100 and those who pass the third year check point and become career officers number 11. So, the value of Canservcol in producing career officers for the armed forces is 11 out of 100 career officers.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: It depends on the standard of measurement you are using.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, it is almost 1 o'clock and I would not like anyone to leave with the impression that we are supporting Mr. Deachman's conclusions in this respect.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am going only on the figures we have been given this morning.

Mr. SMITH: If we had sufficient time I am sure this could be explained away.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If this is not so I would like to see it worked out and demonstrated.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: If I could say a word on this, we are producing officers for particular purposes. We produce a large number of officers who come in as short service commissioned aircrew; these officers may stay on 5, 10 or perhaps 15 years and, eventually, a percentage of them, perhaps 10 or 15 per cent, would become permanent commissioned officers. But, we are not seeking university educated men for these particular jobs; we do not think we need them. If we assume your statistics are right, the 11 mentioned are 11 people with special qualifications who you would hope, in due course, would become senior officers in the military forces. You cannot compare these things on the basis of 11 to 100. To my mind it is not a comparable situation. There are different things you have to take into consideration.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I do not think we really have dug deep enough in respect of the efficiency of the Canadian services colleges and I am satisfied that with the evidence that has been brought forth this morning we are not fully aware of the picture and, as a result, are unable to comprehend and relate this efficiency to the armed forces.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps in order to clear up this point it might be possible for Mr. Armstrong to prepare some figures showing what the rates are in respect of these officers which could be appended to the proceedings of a later meeting. In this way the figures which have been tossed around this morning could be verified or refuted.

Mr. ARMSTRONG: Yes, we could prepare figures of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now 1 o'clock, gentlemen.

The committee stands adjourned until next Tuesday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

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1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 11

TUESDAY, JULY 14, 1964

RESERVE FORCES

WITNESS:

The Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

21025—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON
DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de Grâce*),	Langlois,	Matheson,
Béchard,	Laniel,	McMillan,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McNulty,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	Pilon,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Smith,
Groos,	MacLean,	Temple,
Harkness,	MacRae,	Winch—(24).
	Martineau,	

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

THURSDAY, July 2, 1964.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*) be substituted for that of Mr. Granger on the Special Committee on Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

21025—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, July 14, 1964.
(16)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Lambert, Laniel, Lloyd, MacLean, MacRae, Martineau, Matheson, McNulty, Pilon Smith, Temple, Winch (18).

In attendance: The Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence.

The Chairman, with the permission of the Committee, placed on the record a summary of two inspection visits made by the Committee during the past week. That summary follows:

On Tuesday, July 7, 1964, members of the Special Committee on Defence assembled at the Parliament Buildings at 8:00 a.m. where they boarded a bus to travel to the Royal Military College at Kingston, Ontario.

Members present: Messrs. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, Béchard, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Lambert, Laniel, MacRae, Matheson, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch (14).

In attendance: Commodore H. V. W. Groos, Director, Regular Officer Training Plan; Commander G. S. Clark, R.C.N., and Mr. C. L. Laurin.

Arriving at Kingston, Ontario, Committee members were welcomed by Air Commodore L. G. Birchall, Commandant of the Royal Military College and senior members of his staff.

The Commandant briefed the Committee on the work of R.M.C., following which the Vice-Commandant, Col. W. R. Sawyer, and Dr. G. F. G. Stanley, Head of the History Department, as well as Commodore Groos, answered questions.

Col. G. F. Stevenson, Chairman of Army Central Command Interview Board, described ROTP selection procedures, and the operation of the board.

Committee members were given an opportunity to speak informally with candidates who were appearing before the selection boards.

After lunch, the Committee was divided into four groups for an inspection tour of the living accommodation and the engineering laboratories, as well as the computing centre.

On motion of Mr. MacRae, seconded by Mr. Laniel,

Resolved,—That the Committee visit Camp Gagetown, N.B., on Thursday, July 9, 1964.

Following a question and answer period, the Committee members boarded a military bus for the return trip to Ottawa, arriving at the Parliament Buildings at approximately 7:00 p.m.

Members of the Special Committee on Defence assembled at the Parliament Buildings at 7:45 a.m. on Thursday, July 9 with the Chairman, Mr. Hahn, leading the group.

The group, composed of Messrs. Béchard, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, MacRae, McNulty, Pilon, Temple and Winch, and accompanied by Brigadier G. A. Turcot, C.D., Director General of Military Training and Major G. S. Foggo, C.D., Office of the Chief of General Staff, travelled by military bus and aircraft to Fredericton, N.B., where it was met by Major General R. Rowley, General Officer Commanding, Field Force, Camp Gagetown, and Colonel C. D. Simpson, Camp Commandant, Camp Gagetown.

The party proceeded by car to Camp Gagetown where they were briefed by Colonel Simpson and related the camp to the surrounding area and to the Maritime Provinces. He also outlined the strength of the camp and explained the amenities provided. The Committee then toured the camp area and proceeded to the exercise area where they were briefed by General Rowley and Lt. Col. John Clarkson, who outlined the aims of concentration and major exercises. The party visited the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG) in the training area.

Brigadier Norman Wilson Smith briefed the members respecting 3 CIBG and explained an exercise designed for platoon commander leadership. Lt. Col. Gordon Sellars, Commanding Officer of 1 R.H.G. (Black Watch) enlarged on various exercises.

The group returned by bus to Major General Rowley's headquarters where he outlined the work of Army Tactics and Organization Board (ATOB), which is located at Petawawa, Ontario.

At 7:00 p.m. the Committee emplaned for the return to Ottawa.

Mr. Cardin was called and he made a statement respecting the Canadian Army Militia and the Report thereon by the Suttie Commission.

Following the Associate Minister's statement, copies of Part I of the Suttie Commission Report were distributed to members of the Committee.

The Associate Minister was questioned on the contents of his statement and on related matters.

At 12.30 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11.00 a.m. Thursday, July 16, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, July 14, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum.

Before we start with the business of today's meeting, this is the first meeting of the committee at which we will have a printed record since our visits to the Royal Military College at Kingston and Camp Gagetown in New Brunswick. I have here summaries of these two visits which I would like to have incorporated in the record, with the concurrence of the committee. I will dispense with reading them, but if the committee would like them read, I will read them.

Mr. SMITH: Do they not draw any conclusions?

The CHAIRMAN: No, they are merely a record of the trip.

Agreed. (*see Minutes of Proceedings*)

We are starting today our study of the reserve forces. Our witness is the Associate Minister of National Defence. Mr. Cardin will make a statement, and following his statement we will then be distributing the Suttie Report.

Hon. LUCIEN CARDIN (*Associate Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have a statement to make.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order; is the minister's statement of any length at all?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Could we have copies?

Mr. CARDIN: I was just about to explain that, Mr. Lambert. I want to apologize to the committee for not having had copies to go around. Actually I will be reading from a very rough draft of the statement, but I am afraid this is unavoidable. I shall try to read as clearly and as slowly as I can in order that the members may not miss any of this important statement.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee will recall that when the estimates of the Department of National Defence were up for discussion on December 5 of last year in the house, a statement was made with regard to the future role of the militia. It was pointed out at that time that a review had been made of the requirements for the reserve forces and that the conclusion had been reached that they could be reduced in strength from the present levels. It was decided that the militia should be reorganized in recognition of the changing military circumstances which put emphasis on forces in being rather than mobilization capabilities. It was also stated at that time that a select group of militia officers from across Canada would be appointed to examine this problem and to make recommendations as to the way in which this reorganization should be brought about.

We were very fortunate in obtaining the consent of Brigadier E. R. Suttie to act as chairman of the commission and in January of this year he, together with other members were appointed and the commission met for the first time in early February. I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of my colleague and myself, to express publicly our keen appreciation of the outstanding work and dedication not only of the Chairman, Brigadier Suttie, but also of the members of the commission consisting of Brigadier J. P. Carriere, Briga-

dier D. G. Cunningham, Brigadier E. G. Eakins, Brigadier F. T. Jenner, Brigadier I. S. Johnston, Brigadier V. de B. Oland, Brigadier P. Triquet and Lt. Colonel B. J. Legge.

It might be of interest to members of the committee to outline briefly at this stage the history of the militia and its present role in national survival operations.

By definition the militia "shall consist of officers and men who have, by virtue of their terms of service, undertaken to perform, when not on active service, such duty and training as may be required of them by or under the authority of the chief of the general staff".

Militia forces based on the principle of universal service existed in Canada from the time of the French regime. As early as 1627 all male colonists in Port Royal were required by law to assist the garrison when necessary, and from 1636 all males in Quebec were enrolled as militia. The first actual Canadian militia regulations were contained in a letter from King Louis XIV in 1669 to his governor in New France. These provided for a captain in each parish to be responsible for enrolling, organizing and training his command, who were also called upon for corvee or statute labour. The captains thus occupied an important position in both civil and military government, and were, in effect, local administrators.

The French system existed for many years but there was no continuity of units. It is of interest that no unit in the modern Canadian army has an officially recognized date of organization earlier than 1855. Every British colony in America had its compulsory system of militia service. In 1758 Nova Scotia passed its first militia law; in 1777 the first militia legislation was enacted under British authority in Quebec; one of the first things done by the new legislature in upper Canada in 1791 was to provide for a militia force. This force, later called the sedentary militia, existed only on paper—except for one day a year when there was a muster parade.

In the war of 1812 the militia of both upper and lower Canada fought alongside British regulars, but afterwards its activity was confined to the annual muster. Britain continued to maintain a costly garrison and the colonies were quite satisfied with their economical paper militia, which could be called out to meet such a sudden emergency as the rebellion of 1837. In 1855, however, when there was a significant reduction of British regular troops, Canada passed a new militia act which provided for the retention and improvement of the sedentary militia and also for the creation of a force of "volunteers" termed the "active militia". This was the predecessor of today's Canadian army (militia), and a turning point in the history of Canadian military organization. In spite of measures for improvement, the act marked the decline of the old principle of universal service, and the sedentary militia was never again called upon in a crisis. Shortly after confederation all British troops were withdrawn from the interior of Canada. In 1885, during the north west uprising a force of volunteers with some regular troops (for the first time entirely Canadian except for the commander and a few staff officers) fought in the campaign.

At the end of the nineteenth century Canada sent troops overseas to take part in the South African war. Contrary to a British suggestion, Canada offered an infantry battalion under the command of a Canadian officer. It was the beginning of an idea which was to persist in Canada, a preference for placing Canadian troops under Canadian command. Important as it was, the South African enterprise was small compared with the part played by the Canadian army in the first world war.

In August 1914 the non-permanent active militia was at the greatest strength which it had ever attained in peacetime, and these militia regiments provided the volunteers for the Canadian expeditionary force units raised in their areas. The majority of the officers had held commissions in the non-

permanent active militia. The first Canadian contingent actually had representation from more than 200 militia units. Canada emerged from the 1914-18 war with a much higher status internationally, due largely to the importance of her contribution in the field.

Between the wars economy was the first consideration, but a nucleus of both regular and militia units was maintained. In 1936 important changes were made in organization. The number of cavalry and infantry units was reduced and other arms and the services increased. At this time armoured units made their first appearance, but the second world war had begun before an armoured corps was authorized. This time Canada did not follow the 1914 pattern. Regiments or battalions of existing militia units were mobilized, retaining their familiar names and badges, and it was upon this foundation that Canada built its great second world war structure, when some 750,000 Canadian men and women served in the army.

After 1945 the Canadian government did not repeat the drastic reduction in the forces which had taken place in 1919. Battalions of two militia regiments, with over a hundred years of distinguished history, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, were brought into the regular army, as were two armoured regiments, The 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louises's) and The Fort Garry Horse. In 1955 another reorganization was carried out to make the role of the militia more effective. The designation "reserve force" was changed to "Canadian army (militia)".

The militia, with a great tradition of more than three centuries behind it, has continued the British connection by means of alliances with famous British regiments. Approval for the first of these was given in 1906 and today there are 12 corps alliances and approximately 96 individual armoured, artillery and infantry units allied with British counterparts.

Even a brief history of the Canadian militia is not complete without some reference to the eminent men who began distinguished military or political careers by serving in the militia. General W. D. Otter was the first Canadian to become chief of the general staff. General Sir Arthur W. Currie, the famous corps commander in the first world war, and later chief of the general staff, began his career in the militia. In 1914 the minister of militia and defence, Colonel the Hon. Samuel Hughes who later became an honorary lieutenant-general (British army) served in the militia from the age of 16. It is not too well known that General A. G. L. McNaughton, was commissioned as an artillery officer in the militia in 1910. He later became chief of the general staff, GOC-in-C first Canadian army in the second world war, and Minister of National Defence.

The purpose of this very brief historical summary is to show that the history of the militia is in fact the history of Canada. The militia has always served Canada in time of conflict with great distinction and has earned the gratitude and respect of the Canadian people and of our allies. I am fully confident that the militia will continue to make a viable contribution to the defence effort and add lustre to Canadian arms of the future.

In time of peace the militia has a responsibility for coming in aid to the civil power and has on many occasions provided assistance required at floods, forest fires, search for lost persons and the like. It has provided individual volunteers for certain United Nations commitments (Korea—Kashmir). In 1961-62 it was charged with a very large commitment when, with the aid of the regular army instructional staff, it trained approximately 70,000 individuals for rescue under the special militia training program. Its primary peacetime responsibility, however, is to prepare for the roles to be carried out in time of emergency.

The militia's present roles are:

a. Survival operations. The primary role of the militia is to carry out its commitments in national survival operations if Canada comes under thermo-nuclear attack.

b. Support of the field force. The militia will provide the back-up forces for the field force.

c. Internment and security of key points. In the event of war the militia will be responsible for assistance in the protection of key points, internment operations and in guarding prisoners of war.

These are the present roles of the militia.

Organization

At the end of world war II the militia comprised some thirty-odd division and brigade headquarters and a corresponding number of units of all corps. To better suit the militia to local conditions of population and geography a new organization was introduced in 1954 as a result of a study made by a board of officers consisting of Major Generals Kennedy, Renaud and Letson (Kennedy report). Under the new organization the former division and brigade headquarters were replaced by militia group headquarters of which there are now 27. These militia group headquarters were designed to provide coordination and control of the training and administration of a number of militia units. The grouping of units by corps and type under each militia group headquarters had no tactical significance but was designed to bring together as many units located in the same general area as could be effectively supervised by one headquarters.

At the same time (1954) the number, corps and type of units retained in the militia were modified to suit conditions of population, geography, historical background, etc. Major field units remained on a field organization but other units were reorganized on a training unit basis, through use of a system of blocks. The number and type of blocks were varied to meet tradesman potential in different areas, i.e., more RCASC transport platoons are to be found in an industrial area. The militia now consists of:

a. 27 Militia Group Headquarters.
b. 26 Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Units.
c. 44 Royal Canadian Artillery Units.
d. 17 Royal Canadian Engineers Units.
e. 20 Royal Canadian Corps of Signals Units.
f. 60 Royal Canadian Infantry Corps Units.
g. 19 Royal Canadian Army Service Corps Units.
h. 26 Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps Units.
j. 11 Royal Canadian Dental Corps Units.
k. 13 Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Units.
l. 23 Royal Canadian Electrical Mechanical Engineers Units.
m. 10 Canadian Provost Corps Units.
n. 6 Canadian Intelligence Corps Units.
o. 4 Royal Canadian Army Chaplain Corps Units.
p. 25 Miscellaneous Units { Manning Depots; Personnel Selection Units; Medical Advisory Units; Dental Advisor Units

for a total of 331 units.

A strength ceiling of 187,865 militia was authorized by order in council in 1947. A rider to the order in council restricts the ceiling to 90,000. The

present militia organization calls for an establishment strength of approximately 8,500 officers and 146,500 other ranks or a total of 155,000 all ranks. The effective strength of the militia at end of May 64 was:

Officers	6,554
Other ranks	37,142
	43,696
Non-effective	2,978

The majority of the militia is located in the larger centres of population. To provide for accommodation, administration and training there are approximately 396 armouries of which:

125 are constructed armouries
151 are converted armouries
120 are leased armouries

Much of this accommodation is inadequate and a programme of priority armoury construction is kept constantly under review. However, new construction is expensive and not easily obtained. It is worth noting that the best militia units are not always found in the best accommodation.

The terms of reference of the commission are included in the report being issued today. In order to understand the task undertaken, it would, I think, be appropriate for me to refer to these guide-lines. I have already outlined briefly the role and composition of the militia as it has been since 1959. The main emphasis has been training on national survival operations in preparation for the possible eventuality of Canada coming under a thermonuclear attack. This role was not greeted with particular enthusiasm by members of the militia, although—and I hasten to say this—the majority has buckled down to the task assigned and have made the utmost effort to achieve a high degree of efficiency in this assigned role. Essentially though, members of the militia consider that there is a more military and sensible task that they could perform. In the opinion of many Canadians, civil defence should not be primarily the responsibility of the militia since in the possible but improbable event of a nuclear attack on our country, civil authorities—federal, provincial and municipal—must play their part. The military can give guidance, direction and assistance, but it is neither logical nor sensible for military men—and the militia are military men—to undertake this responsibility alone.

Despite this emphasis on national survival, it has been pointed out that the present organization of the militia includes 26 regiments of the royal Canadian armoured corps, 29 field regiments and a number of batteries of various types of the royal Canadian artillery. This is but an example. So, on the one hand, we have an essentially national survival or civil defence role, while on the other, we have an establishment based on military field functions. We feel—and I think the Suttie commission would agree—that major changes are required not only in the roles assigned to the militia, but also within the organization itself.

From studies which have been made, two important factors emerge with regard to training for the national survival role. First, the flexibility inherent in a force trained for field operations was being lost. Survival training, when reviewed realistically is not complex and with a minimum of time a militiaman, basically well trained in military skills, can quickly be adapted to this role. Second, the training of the militia in field operations was gradually disintegrating because special to corps qualifications were no longer a requirement in survival training and because of the wastage of qualified officers and NCOs who had received special to corps training under earlier training programs. Thus, our experience has indicated a need to re-assess the roles and training programs with

a view to gaining the greatest flexibility and value for our defence dollar. This can be done by re-establishing corps training in a militia geared for field operations with sufficient survival training to ensure that the militia can undertake that important task when required.

A second important consideration—and I do not intend to underestimate its significance—is financial. The emphasis not only here but elsewhere, is on regular forces, highly trained and ready for instant action. Defence expenditures—kept within reasonable limits—must be concentrated on these forces. Therefore, funds available for the reserves, not only for the militia, but also for the navy and air force, are necessarily restricted. The figures that annually appear in the blue book on estimates as to the estimated costs of the reserve forces are only part of the actual cost to the department. Equipment, capital costs related to buildings, assistance by regular forces are all additional. In fact, a true costing of the militia and of the navy and air force reserves prior to the cutbacks announced last December are in the neighbourhood of $38 million for the militia, $6 million for the navy and $10.7 million for the air force reserves.

Our problem has been, therefore, to utilize to the maximum benefit of National Defence, the reserve forces with maximum flexibility in a realistic and sensible manner within the boundaries of probabilities and financial limitations. Ministerial committees were established with regard to the navy and air force reserves and these committees have reported their findings and recommendations. The reports are in the process of being translated and mimeographed and will, Mr. Chairman, be made available to this Committee.

In so far as the Suttie commission is concerned, a detailed study was made within the department prior to the establishment of the Commission as to the requirements for a militia force. The conclusion was as set out in the terms of reference to the effect that there was indeed an important requirement in four different but related areas.

First, and here I will read from the terms of reference, there is a military requirement for the militia in support of the regular army. The emergency defence plans call for the withdrawal of regular army personnel from the defence of Canada force and static installations to bring the field forces up to war establishments. The militia will be required to form the framework for logistic and special units which are not provided in peacetime. It is foreseen that approximately 9,000 militiamen would be needed for these two tasks within this role.

Second, there is a need to provide a training force which would be required in time of emergency to support the field force. In this role, the militia must provide for the immediate and effective mobilization of three training brigade groups to replace the regular brigade groups which may be despatched overseas and to provide the source of trained reinforcements for these forces overseas. In the initial stages, these training forces would be organized along the lines similar to the field force, but with only training scales of equipment. It will be built up in stages in accordance with the situation existing at the time and it must also be available for the defence of Canada and other tasks. Preliminary investigation reflects a requirement of approximately 18,000 officers and men.

Thirdly, for internal security, the militia will be required to provide trained officers and men for the guarding of vital points within Canada. It is estimated that there may be a requirement for at least 2,500 militiamen to be immediately available for these tasks in time of emergency.

And, finally, the militia has a role in assisting the army to fulfil its national survival responsibilities. There is a need for special militia units to be available and trained to augment the regular army to staff, on a 24-hour basis, various national survival installations. For this, it is estimated that a total of 1,500 officers, men and women of the militia will be needed.

Notwithstanding, it must be recognized that in the event of an all-out nuclear war all military forces would be employed on survival operations. Therefore, the militia with all available regulars would be required to provide a framework for the conduct of survival operations using large numbers of civilians.

The study concluded that these four tasks could be undertaken with a strength—not an establishment—of some 30,000 able-bodied men and women as compared to the present strength of the militia of 46,500. In the report of the commission it is made clear that its findings are within the terms of reference and I am grateful to Brigadier Suttie and his confreres for the views expressed on this subject in the covering letter to the report.

The Suttie commission held a series of meetings and received a number of briefs from interested organizations and individuals. Its report was submitted to me last month and illustrates, I think, the exhaustive study made by its members of the whole militia organization. The report is in two parts and I am today making part I available to the Committee. As members are aware, I did state, in answer to a question in the house, that I considered at one time the advisability of making both parts of the report publicly available at the same time. However, Part II of the report will not be made public at this time in order that a detailed study can be made by the Department of National Defence of the recommendations contained therein, decisions reached and units informed prior to publication. And this, I may add, is on the recommendation of the Suttie commission itself, in its second report.

The Minister of National Defence and myself agree with the commission in the opinion that premature publication of these recommendations would not be in the best interests of the public or the militia itself.

Members will realize that a report of this scope requires considerable study before we can come to definite decisions. I think it is advantageous that part I of the report should be referred to this committee now. In the course of its deliberations on the report, members will have an opportunity of hearing not only from Brigadier Suttie, who is at the moment in Britain on private business, and will be asked to come to Ottawa on his return, but also from the Conference of Defence Associations and other witnesses the Committee may choose to call. As I have said, they will also have the Ministerial Commission reports on the Navy and Air Force Reserves.

In due time, and I hope it will be this fall, we will be in a position to announce firm decisions on all three branches of the Armed Forces Reserves. We will have had the benefit of the views of the members of this Committee but the decisions must, of course, be the responsibility of the government. Our aim, as it is of this Committee, must be to maintain Reserve Forces that not only understand their roles, but are also meaningful in the times we live in.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, a great deal has been made of establishing effective civilian control over the operation of the Department of National Defence. I know that it is not contended, nor could it be contended, that a committee such as this should be the instrument of such effective control, but it seems to me patent on the face of it that this committee is not going to be given part II of the report at any useful time in its deliberations, and that the government by this very act is denying effective civilian control. That this will be retained for the military staffs and only such portions as may be felt safe for the people to know will be given to the committee is, in my opinion, a complete denial of the principle of the effect of civilian control.

Mr. WINCH: How can we effectively do any work if we do not have the full report and know what is in mind?

Mr. CARDIN: May I first of all say, in reply to Mr. Smith, that when we speak of greater civilian control in national defence we are of course speaking of people within the Department of National Defence. As I am sure members of

the committee will realize—and this we have said on many occasions—we are very anxious to have the benefit of the thinking of the committee. As a matter of fact, we have brought before the committee a report on which we have not yet made any firm decisions. We are going to listen to the discussions that will take place in this committee and certainly we will consider these very carefully.

When we consider either the retention or the dismissal of units throughout the country where there is as yet no firm decision, I think the only possible result of making known the recommendation of part II would be to create a tremendous panic, and a useless panic, on the part of the people involved. I think members of the committee should recognize this point. If the report of the Suttie commission and the suggestions contained in it were to be made public when we start to study which units should stay and which units should not, that would be to the advantage neither of the militia nor the public.

Mr. SMITH: So part II of this report only contains the specifics of which units are recommended for disbandment? Is that all it contains?

Mr. CARDIN: I would say that in fact is the gist of the second part of the report. I believe it would be to no one's advantage that this should be made public at this stage when no decision has been made one way or the other.

Mr. SMITH: Would it be possible for the committee to have such portions of part II of the report as do not deal with specific units?

Mr. CARDIN: If there are any such important parts in the second report.

Mr. SMITH: If there are any parts that do not deal with specific units would it be possible for the committee to have them?

Mr. CARDIN: That might be considered but, as I say, the second part of the report deals definitely with the details of the specific units.

Mr. DEACHMAN: May I ask a supplementary question with regard to page (vi) of the introduction to the report. The last sentence of the last clear paragraph of that page deals with the definition of part II and says:

> Part II has been confined to the detail of the reorganization and recommendations with respect to the disposition of those units and subunits viewed in the light of the criteria established in part I.

My question is twofold. Is this definition that deals with nothing except the specific recommendations with regard to the disposition of units and subunits precisely correct?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The second part of my question is this: Are the criteria for disposing of those units entirely contained in part I?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct. The first part gives the principles on which the Suttie commission based itself in view of the terms of reference it was given, and the second part is what they feel is the logical conclusion of part I.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Temple.

Mr. TEMPLE: I am happy to see that consideration has been given to survival operations in case of nuclear attack. Has thought been given to the location of these militia units? When I speak of the location I am thinking of several things; I am thinking, firstly, of militia units that are now in existence being located near air transport bases so that they can be quickly moved around wherever they are needed for support. Has that been done? Do you know?

Mr. CARDIN: I would imagine that has been considered by the Suttie commission.

Mr. TEMPLE: I could not find anything in reference to that when I was looking over the report. Would that be a perfectly valid consideration, in your opinion?

Mr. CARDIN: I certainly think it should be considered.

Mr. TEMPLE: Has consideration been given to militia units—a great number of them or, let us say, the majority of them—being located outside the larger cities, since the larger cities might well be the first ones to be attacked, so that they would be able to move in?

Mr. CARDIN: I would like to make a point here. The Suttie commission has made a study of this matter on its own. They were given terms of reference and they were told to go out and make a study of this subject. This is what you, the members of the committee, are now being asked to study. The department has also had this subject under consideration and when I answer questions I am answering on behalf of the Department of National Defence.

Mr. TEMPLE: And it will be the department that will make the final decision?

Mr. CARDIN: Exactly.

Mr. TEMPLE: What concerns me—and I must say again that I have only glanced through this and obviously have not been able to study it carefully—is that it appears that the Suttie commission has not taken into account the geographical location of the various units, which I think is very important. However, I am glad to know that the department has considered this matter.

Mr. CARDIN: The department has this under consideration, and I cannot say whether the Suttie commission has or has not considered it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Martineau.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Do I understand the minister correctly to say that so far no decision, despite the recommendations of part II of the report, which are being kept a dark secret, has been taken by the minister relating to the implementation of part II? Is that correct?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct. I will go further than that. I will say that, as far as Part I is concerned, we feel we can agree with some of the suggestions but that other suggestions involve recommendations that would need more study, and this is particularly true of the second part of the report.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Yes, the second part dealing with the specific units that may be disbanded.

Does the minister intend to receive recommendations or representations from various persons or groups before making a decision?

Mr. CARDIN: As a matter of fact, this committee would have time to bring down a report before the decision is taken. I understand that the defence association will appear before your committee. Those are representations which I think are pertinent.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Will members of the units directly concerned have the opportunity to be heard before a decision is taken?

Mr. CARDIN: They have already been heard by the Suttie commission.

Mr. MARTINEAU: But, as I understand it, the units are not aware whether they themselves or some other units will be affected. Is that correct?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct, yes.

Mr. MARTINEAU: If they do become aware of that, will they have the right to be heard? If they do become aware of the portent or contents of part II will they then have an opportunity to be heard before they are given the axe?

Mr. CARDIN: I feel that the Suttie commission has made a very thorough study of the situation. They have travelled from one coast to the other. Each unit has had an opportunity to make its voice heard either orally or through

briefs. I do not believe that, once a decision is taken, we will ask to hear more evidence because if we were to do this we would never get on with the job.

There is one thing of which I can assure the committee; that is that I would insist that the militia groups which are to be affected would be advised before anyone else is advised.

Mr. MARTINEAU: The minister has just stated that this committee's role will be to make recommendations. Does the minister seriously think that the committee will be in a position to make recommendations without knowing the specifics of the report?

Mr. CARDIN: I think the best work that the committee can do is particularly on the first part of the report which deals with the basic roles of the militia. I do not believe that I am in any position or that any member of the committee is in a position to decide which units should stay and which should not. This, I think, is a highly specialized job. On the Suttie commission we did have people who were very knowledgeable with regard to the role of militias. They were all militia men who have spent a good deal of their lives in the militia. I really feel there is very little that this committee could add to that aspect.

Mr. MARTINEAU: The minister stated that the units affected will be given a pre-notice. Will that notice be prior to knowledge of this report that will be communicated to the committee itself? After receiving that notice will the units have an opportunity to meet with national defence officials to discuss this?

Mr. CARDIN: I think we should be fair about this. I think the people who will be directly affected should be the first to be made aware of it and, unfortunately, if one does that—although the time lapse may be very short—they would know before the public or the committee were made aware of it. I think that the militia people who are affected should be advised of this before it is made public and before it goes to the committee.

Mr. SMITH: May I ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Will the people in the units which are to be disbanded, people who are interested in continuing to be associated with the militia in some form, be given priority for amalgamation or joining another militia unit in the area. Will some priority system be set up, do you think?

Mr. CARDIN: Of course, you are prejudging what is in the second part of the report.

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. CARDIN: I would think anyone who is a good militia man and wants to stay in would have the opportunity to join other militia groups.

Mr. SMITH: May I ask a second supplementary question?

Will you give consideration to the establishment of subunits of units that are to be retained in areas, where geographically possible, in which the existing militia unit is being disbanded? Will that be given consideration?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, I would think so but, as you can well realize, each will have to be judged on its own merits as to how big or small will be the subunit.

Mr. SMITH: All I am asking is that consideration be given to that problem.

Mr. CARDIN: I am sure it will.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Martineau, have you finished your questioning?

Mr. MARTINEAU: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: I am sorry I was late, Mr. Chairman, but I found I could not be at the Public Accounts Committee and the Defence Committee at the same time. My question may have been answered before I came, and if so I apologize.

I would like to know from you, Mr. Chairman, as Chairman just what you conceive to be the studies this committee can make on this particular area of the militia and what type of report or recommendations we can make as a result of our deliberations when, as I see it personally, at least, we are completely in the dark. Our deliberations will have to be on the basis of supposition, of guessing, of not knowing, and perhaps of leaks. I was particularly interested, Mr. Chairman, in the statement made just now by the Associate Minister of National Defence that before this committee obtains the second part of the report the militia units will have already been notified of the government's decision.

I am asking you, Mr. Chairman, just what you think is going to be the advantage derived by this committee receiving the information for our consideration and for our thinking after the government has already made its decision and has notified the militia units of their disbandment or of that retention. I must admit, sir, that this whole picture now becomes very confused to me. How can the committee study this subject and what can we do? It strikes me that the Department of National Defence is playing cat-and-mouse with this committee and that what we are to be given on this issue is a *fait accompli*, so for us to either reject or accept makes no difference.

I would like you, Mr. Chairman, because you must have given consideration to this, to tell us how we can function in an efficient and effective manner on this most important matter.

Mr. LLOYD: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, before we can make an accusation about the position of the committee, will the minister specifically answer the question posed by Mr. Winch. Are the units to be notified of abandonment before this committee is told?

Mr. WINCH: The Minister has already told us that.

Mr. CARDIN: I would like to answer this. I did say I would prefer to advise the militia people who are affected—and as a matter of fact I think we will do this—before bringing it to the committee. I also would like to put before the members of the committee the other side of the picture and suppose that the situation is the other way around, that you, being part of a militia unit which was affected in such a way, were not the first to be told. I do not believe it would be fair that these militia units should obtain that information second-hand from the press or from the committee. I think these people who are the people directly concerned are the first people to know. When I say that the government will have made a decision, that is quite correct. The implementation of that decision can be delayed, but at least we shall have something to work on and, as a matter of fact, I think it might save a considerable amount of time as opposed to the department not making any decision and waiting until everybody is in accord before anything else is done.

What I feel should be done is, after hearing as much as we can and studying the whole question of the militia as closely as we can, the Department should come to a decision. When that decision is arrived at, the militia should be advised of it, and then the members of the committee can scrutinize the decision that was taken. They can compare it with what is contained in both parts of the Suttie commission and then make whatever comments they feel appropriate.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I have a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. Has the minister any idea how long it will be before his decision is taken and how long it will be before the decision is communicated to the units concerned?

Mr. CARDIN: The decision on this subject, I would think, could not be taken before some time in October, and after advising the units themselves, it would be a matter of hours before it is submitted to the committee.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Does the Minister think that it would be fair for the morale of all the militia units that they should be operating under these conditions, with the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads?

Mr. CARDIN: That is one reason why we do not want to publish the second part of the Suttie commission report, because then the morale would fall, and they would have that Damocles sword over their heads for the next three months.

Mr. LAMBERT: In the light of the fact that the training year starts in September, you are really recruiting for your units in September. Is it not nonsense to suggest that the decision be deferred until October? Frankly you are not going to get a blessed recruit in September.

Mr. CARDIN: It is not a question of deferring the decision. The question is that as an appropriate study has to be made of this very complex problem it cannot be possibly done before the middle of October.

Mr. LAMBERT: What is going to happen? Are you going to try to recruit for your units and then some time in October or November you are going to tell the units you have to chop? In this way part of the training year will be lost. I realize this report may require even more consideration than can be given before October, but let us not talk about a date like October because to me according to the statement you have just made you are not going to recruit militia right on the head.

Mr. CARDIN: I was asked about when we felt a decision might be taken. I feel it would be possible between now and October to arrive at a decision.

Mr. SMITH: I think the minister is being over optimistic on the date.

Mr. CARDIN: I hardly think it is a fault in this context.

Mr. SMITH: No, but it may mislead people. I think it would be longer than October.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like now, if I may, to answer the question Mr. Winch posed to me as your Chairman. First of all, Mr. Winch, I am, like you, a member of the committee, and I am now looking at this report which I have not had an opportunity to go through in any detail. I think the procedure the committee might follow and the benefits that the committee might gain are something that the Steering sub-committee and the Committee as a whole have to decide, not I as an individual.

If I may just speak as an individual, and not on behalf of the Committee, it seems to me that there may be two parts to the problem: One is the general principle upon which the Reserve Forces are going to operate, and the other is the translation of that principle into detailed action. I would think that subject to going through part I in some detail, there may be scope for the committee to give some very valid recommendations on the principles upon which the Reserve Forces are operated. I will not know until I study the Report in detail.

Mr. WINCH: Do you think we can call Brigadier Suttie before us?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. We will have as witnesses the Conference of Defence Associations. They are coming on Thursday. Brigadier Suttie is coming next week for two meetings. Brigadier Suttie was to be the first witness but he is overseas now and will not be back in time.

Mr. LLOYD: Could I put a supplementary question at this time? As an aside the Minister had answered the question but not as fully as I would have liked.

If my colleague here would not try to be the Minister, the Chairman and the Secretary, I would be able to phrase my question more precisely and in accordance with the line of questions my colleague and I would like to put.

Mr. Chairman, would the minister explain to the committee this procedure again? He says that the department will notify the units that are to be disbanded.

Mr. CARDIN: That is right.

Mr. LLOYD: Do you consider it wise to notify them until at least part I has been reviewed by this committee?

Mr. CARDIN: No, as a matter of fact...

Mr. LLOYD: Part I should be reviewed first so that we at least get a maximum degree of objective thinking about your policy measures?

Mr. CARDIN: It is our hope that the Committee will have had time to report on Part I before the decision is taken.

Mr. LLOYD: So part I will be studied and considered by the Committee before the units are informed that they will be affected by the recommendations in part II?

Mr. CARDIN: That is quite right.

The CHAIRMAN: I have on my list Mr. Winch, if he should have further questions, then Mr. Lambert, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. McNulty, and Mr. MacRae.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, in so far as the report is concerned, it is just a lot of history, in so far as internal matters are concerned. But what I am concerned about—and I think this committee is concerned, too—is general policy consideration as to the role of the militia. Until we get to appendix A, where we find the terms of reference, there is nothing in this report which deals with the concept of the role of the militia. What I am particularly interested in, at page 43 is, under these terms of reference, why it deemed that the militia should be made up of four components with a certain target strength? This was a decision reached by the Department of National Defence when fixing their deterrent. I want to know what it was.

Mr. CARDIN: What was what?

Mr. LAMBERT: What are the reasons behind this, because these are based upon certain concepts; and in addition to that, I think we should be able to obtain copies of certain briefs that have been presented to this committee dealing with the role of the militia, and being interested in the preservation of that unit.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: If this could be done, might we ask the minister—what he gave us this morning was no explanation—why were 9,000 militia men needed for the replacement of certain regular army personnel? What is the concept there? Under 18,000 with three brigade groups, what are the reasons for determining this number and the disbanding of the 27 militia groups? You have made a study of it in the department. Let us have your reasons.

Mr. CARDIN: As far as the first part of the question is concerned, concerning the briefs which you wish to have tabled, might I say that this, of course, is a report made by the Suttie Commission, and when the people in the Suttie Commission appear before you, you might question them on the briefs.

As far as the terms of reference are concerned, that is correct. The Department of National Defence, when setting up the Suttie Commission, gave them terms of reference, and we have also, after making a study in the department, particularly with the Army and the Director of Militia, decided that in order to be able to carry out the roles that we feel should be carried out by the militia, this number of people would be required for these three or four different roles.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am interested in—and I think this committee is interested in it, too, as indicated by the questions which have been asked—is this: do you feel it should be the role of the commission, because the department gave the Suttie commission a sort of reorganization concept?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is a reorganization, and they were asked to find out how they were going to fit the whole militia group within this concept. I think it is incumbent on the department now to come forward to this committee and to say why they have provided this concept for the militia.

Mr. CARDIN: We did the same type of exercise for the militia that we did for the regular forces; and after making a study of the armed forces, and of what their probable work will be in future, we pushed it a little further, to have it apply to the militia and to try to tie in a flexible and effective militia which would be able to support the regular forces, as explained in my statement and also in appendix A.

Mr. LAMBERT: There is no explanation given; there are just bald statements that you made before, and are making now.

Mr. CARDIN: What type of explanation would you want?

Mr. LAMBERT: Why did you feel that the role of the militia should be changed? Why should there be a restoration of the order, of the cadres or establishments, and a downgrading of survival training? Let us have something more than just a flat conclusion.

Mr. CARDIN: I did mention this in my statement. As far as the use of the militia to back up the forces is concerned, I think it is something which is self-explanatory. This role had been taken away, and we saw the militia engaged in a survival role. We feel that the back up role should have first priority and not the last, so we have changed the role in that sense.

Mr. LAMBERT: What are your reasons for doing this?

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Asselin has been waiting with a supplementary question for some time.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is to be organized on a basis. There may be a necessary statement to come forward, to be prepared and brought forward; but it appears to me at the present time that nobody wishes to give us the reasons why you are making the changes. Why will you not make your case?

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if it would not be reasonable for the committee to look at it in this way: I think this whole thing seems to be divided into three parts, not just two. I have rapidly read through the report and the terms of reference. They specify what the roles of the militia are to be. The Suttie commission, in the context of these roles which are laid down for them, then determined how those roles can be best carried out with the number of men you have mentioned; and the second part then was which units are going to be, as you say, employed. Would it not be reasonable for this committee to begin studying first of all that which the department has determined, and, secondly, studying the criteria which the Suttie commission has then examined to carry out these roles, or has suggested for the carrying out of these roles?

I am inclined to agree with what the hon. member was saying. In other words, how can this committee examine the criteria if for instance some of us are not convinced that the four roles which are dealt with in the terms of reference are the correct ones? Do you not think that it would be better if

Brigadier Suttie should come and explain how he proceeded, so that we might discuss with the department or with representatives of the department the roles or alternatives?

Mr. CARDIN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the answer would be that the committee is the master of its own procedure, and they can go ahead and study whatever parts they wish, and in any order that they wish.

The CHAIRMAN: Now that we have the specific material before us, our Steering Committee is in a position to get together and look at the material available to it and prepare recommendations for the general committee as to the best method by which to tackle this material.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You will notice that the terms of reference are quite specific, and that they lay down what the role of the militia is to be. But the Suttie committee has not done this.

The CHAIRMAN: That is quite correct.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Personally I have several questions to ask in connection with the role of the militia.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the Steering Committee would probably agree with you and with my personal feeling that Appendix A of the Report obviously involves an area for important study, and is the basis upon which the Suttie commission reported.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, I think the information we would like to have is the mathematical formula by which it was decided that 9,000 militia men are needed for a certain role. I think we would like to know how that figure was arrived at and whether it was arrived at by the Suttie commission or the Department of National Defence. If it was arrived at by the Department of National Defence we would like to know how the people of the Department of National Defence, rather than the minister, did so, and how they justify it.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In view of the number, why are we involved in national survival?

The CHAIRMAN: The next questioner on my list is Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Chairman, as are other members, I am concerned with procedure. Mr. Lambert has already brought to my attention the necessity of examining certain calculations that were drawn by the Department of National Defence and which are referred to in appendix A. It would seem to me that the Steering Committee, as you suggested, could examine appendix A and identify those items which may have been restrictive on the workings of the committee, in some way, in ascertaining, as Mr. Lambert has pointed out, for the enlightenment of the committee, the justification for the conclusions that are implied in appendix A. I also think that a summary of recommendations, which in my opinion is normally prepared, and as we discuss each of the topical heads will develop in the committee a general understanding of the facts of our position in respect of the militia. I certainly think this should precede part II. I think it has been made clear by the minister's answer that he does not intend to notify the units of the disbandments that are implied in part II until this committee has completed its consideration of at least part I. I do not think he should do so because there would be no useful purpose in having an all-party committee.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, my questions have been answered by the last three questioners. I am wondering whether—if we come to different conclusions regarding the role of the militia, which may effect the conclusions actually contained in part II of the Suttie report—the minister of the department will reserve decision concerning the disbandment or displacement of certain militia units until our report has been considered, and whether an actual consideration of our conclusions in this regard will possibly have an effect on part II of the study report.

Mr. CARDIN: It is hoped that the committee will have had time to bring in a report before decisions are taken in respect of the units and, as a matter of fact, I have been accused of being a little optimistic in suggesting that a decision could be made some time in October. I presume the committee will have had time by that then to prepare its report.

Mr. MCNULTY: If our conclusions differ in respect of the role of the militia will they be taken into consideration?

Mr. CARDIN: They will definitely be taken into consideration.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the minister whether it is proposed to follow entirely and exactly the recommendations that are brought forward in this Suttie report, or are they to be amended by the department, by the committee, or anyone else?

Mr. CARDIN: As is the case in respect of most reports of committees, it is the normal practice to go over the recommendations, following which many of them are adopted, others are modified, while still others are not implemented at all.

Mr. FANE: They will not be accepted and blindly followed, is that right?

Mr. CARDIN: No. I can assure you that will not be done.

Mr. FANE: I hope not. The reason I say this is that I do not think that the commission, made up entirely of brigadiers, or almost so, could give an exact picture of the militia. As everyone knows, there are a lot of detached units which probably are responsible to the brigadier commander, but such commander really has not a true picture until such time as those in the lower echelons are consulted directly. I am thinking of majors, captains and so on. These people have command of these detached units and probably they have a little different picture than a brigadier has.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. I can assure you, Mr. Fane, that we are not going to accept it blindly. As a matter of fact, the department is going to study very carefully both parts of the reports. The committee will be studying the first part and the second part eventually will be made available to the committee, as a result of which we will be able to have the benefit, I am quite sure, of lots of opinions.

Mr. FANE: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: As there is no one else on my list of questioners I would suggest we adjourn.

Mr. SMITH: I have a matter I would like to bring up, Mr. Chairman, which goes back to the Minister's statement this morning.

The CHAIRMAN: Does it deal with the Minister's statement?

Mr. SMITH: Yes. In your statement this morning, Mr. Cardin, you say that a study had been made of the actual cost of the militia in addition to the apparent costs of salary and so on, and that it was concluded that the army militia cost $38 million, I think the figure was, the navy, $16 million, and the air force, $13 million.

Mr. CARDIN: I think there was a mistake. It is $6 million for the navy. I may have made a mistake when I gave you that figure.

Mr. SMITH: I may have misheard you. I would like it if the committee could be furnished with some of the details in respect of how those figures were arrived at because the suspicion might lurk in some of our minds that the people making up the costs were permanent force officers and they may have acted unfavourably against the militia. If we could be given details in respect of what items are charged into that account we would be reassured of the fairness of the study.

Mr. CARDIN: That easily could be done, Mr. Smith.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Cardin, did the Suttie Commission have any alternative but to discuss or study the terms of reference that were given to them so far as the program of their work was concerned?

Mr. CARDIN: No. When you set up any commission the terms of reference are given to it and it works on the terms of reference which it is given.

Mr. LANIEL: This would mean that among the commission you might have had some members who were not quite of the same opinion as the department so far as the four roles are concerned and they still were working on the assumption these roles could be the best roles for the militia?

Mr. CARDIN: I would suggest that would be possible, yes.

Mr. LANIEL: In respect of the second part of the report, the implementation of the recommendations found in part one, would there not be any conclusions that might influence this committee in respect of the good reasons for the basis of this study so far as the roles are concerned?

Mr. CARDIN: That also is possible. I would think that is the type of question that should be put to the members of the commission themselves when they appear before you.

Mr. LANIEL: This could be useful to the committee.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Are you in a position at this moment, Mr. Cardin, to tell the committee, if the roles which were outlined in your terms of reference were followed and if the implementations as contained in the Suttie commission, in accordance with those roles were followed, what amount of money would be saved?

Mr. CARDIN: According to the report you have before you the saving is in the order of $5 million.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I see that the reserve would be cut from 46,000 to approximately 30,000. There is a saving of only $5 million and it does not seem to add up. I grant that there is equipment and all the rest, but I am wondering whether the minister would be in a position to tell us why it is so small in relation to the cut down in the personnel.

Mr. CARDIN: As you can appreciate, that was part of the work done by the members of the committee and I think they are the ones who should answer the question.

Mr. BREWIN: The report contemplates a saving of $5 million. Does it not contemplate that although some of these recommendations will bring about these reductions, they will be diverted to the carrying out of other recommendations which will cost more?

On page 39 it says:

> Many of the recommendations have attached to them an element of cost.

I take it that means there will be an additional cost and within the same limits you might have $5 million savings through recommendations which would be available for the extra cost in carrying out some of the recommendations.

Mr. CARDIN: I think you are correct in saying the savings in one area might go to things like equipment and so on, but I am not sure it would cost more than the saving involved. If you look at page 40 it says:

> In addition to the above there will accrue considerable savings in other areas, for example, form revised establishments, reduction in the number of units—

And so on. Therefore, this $5 million figure is not all the saving contemplated.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I might rephrase my original question. What did the department have in mind in the way of savings when it outlined the roles and the numbers of personnel available for those roles?

Mr. CARDIN: It had no other actual financial saving in mind, so far as I know. The figures concerning number of personnel were made up after a study had been made of what we feel would be necessary to carry out these different roles. That is how the cut was made from 46,000 back to 30,000. I do not recall having see any figure of actual financial savings the department had estimated.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-De-Grâce*): A figure of $5 million seems very small in relation to the change in the establishment.

Mr. CARDIN: I think this can only be justified and understood after the people of the Suttie Commission have explained what is involved.

Mr. MCNULTY: Are studies similar to the one undertaken by the Suttie Commission being undertaken or contemplated for the navy and the air force?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, there are two committees that have already brought in a report: There is the Hendy committee report for the Royal Canadian naval Reserves, the Draper report of the R.C.A.F. Auxiliary. There will be made available to the committee. They are now being translated, and I understand it will take at least two or three weeks before they can be obtained.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there no other questions?

We now have the material in front of us. We have had a number of expressions of viewpoint as to how the Committee might handle this material. I will call a Steering Committee meeting prior to our next meeting, and then we will proceed with the study.

The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 12

THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1964

RESERVE FORCES

WITNESSES:

Representing the Conference of Defence Associations: Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Learmonth, Chairman; Commodore R. I. Hendy; Lieutenant Colonel B. J. Legge; and Group Captain W. J. Draper.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

21027—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),	Langlois,	Matheson,
Béchard,	Laniel,	McMillan,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McNulty,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	Pilon,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Smith,
Groos,	MacLean,	Temple,
Harkness,	MacRae,	Winch—(24).
	Martineau,	

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, July 16, 1964.
(17)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Lambert, Laniel, MacLean, MacRae, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch (16).

In attendance: *Representing the Conference of Defence Associations*: Lt. Colonel W. R. Learmonth, Chairman; Commodore R. I. Hendy; Lt. Colonel B. J. Legge; and Group Captain J. W. P. Draper; and Brigadier W. S. Rutherford.

The Chairman presented the Sixth Report of the Steering Subcommittee as follows:

The Subcommittee agreed to recommend that the schedule of meetings of the Committee be arranged as follows:

(*a*) On Tuesday, July 21, the Committee continue its consideration of the "Reserve Forces", with the Associate Minister of National Defence in attendance.

(*b*) On Thursday, July 23, the Committee continue the consideration of the "Reserve Forces" with Brigadier E. R. Suttie in attendance.

On motion of Mr. MacLean, seconded by Mr. Pilon,

Resolved,—That the Sixth Report of the Steering Subcommittee, presented this day, be now concurred in.

The Seventh Report of the Steering Subcommittee was presented as follows:

The Subcommittee agreed to recommend:

1. That during the week of July 27, 1964, the Special Committee on Defence visit the Royal Canadian Navy establishment at Halifax, take part in a fleet exercise, and visit the SACLANT Headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia.
2. That the Clerk of the Committee accompany the Committee Members on the above-mentioned visit.
3. That when the Committee adjourns from place to place, the actual living and travel expenses of Committee Members and Staff be paid.

On motion of Mr. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), seconded by Mr. Temple,

Resolved,—That the Seventh Report of the Steering Subcommittee, presented this day, be now concurred in.

21027—1½

The representatives of Conference of Defence Associations were invited to present their views respecting "Reserve Forces".

Lt. Colonel Learmonth read the Association's brief. Messrs. Learmonth, Hendy, Legge and Draper were questioned on the contents of that brief and on related matters.

At 1:05 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, July 21, 1964.

E. W. INNES,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, July 16, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we now have a quorum. Please come to order.

Before we start today's business, I have two Steering Subcommittee reports which I would like to submit to the Committee. Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met yesterday and discussed our agenda with regard to the Reserve Forces, following the discussion we had at our committee meeting last Tuesday. It was agreed among the members of the Steering Committee that this Committee very usefully could pursue an investigation of the roles and tasks assigned to the Reserve Forces, and other items which generally were dealt with implicitly, and otherwise, in Part I of the Suttie Report. In order to do this it is necessary to change our schedule of meetings. We had arranged for the Conference of Defence Associations to be here today, and for Brigadier Suttie to appear on two occasions next week. We now have changed that, because of the "Terms of Reference" as they appear in the Appendix to the Suttie report.

On Tuesday next we will have the Associate Minister of National Defence here with departmental officials to discuss the terms of reference which were set forth for the Suttie commission.

The Subcommittee's Suttie Report reads as follows:

> The subcommittee agrees to recommend that the schedule of meetings of the committee be rearranged as follows:
>
> (*a*) On Tuesday, July 21, the committee continue its consideration of the "Reserve Forces", with the associate minister of national defence in attendance.
>
> (*b*) On Thursday, July 23, the committee continue the consideration of the "Reserve Forces" with Brigadier E. R. Suttie in attendance.

May I have a motion for the acceptance of that report?

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I so move.

Mr. PILON: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: The next report of the Steering Subcommittee which I have to present concerns the Navy. The Navy people have been in touch with us and have indicated that during the week starting July 27 the fleet is exercising and this would be a very advantageous time for the Committee to visit the Navy, and that this could be done with a minimum disruption of the navy itself. They would not have to shift the vessels around to accommodate us, because they will have their fleet on exercise. Therefore, we have made tentative arrangements to visit the Navy starting on Monday, July 27, and returning here late on Thursday of that week. Of course, this is subject to cancellation should the situation in the House itself require the presence here of members of the Committee.

The Seventh Report of the Steering Subcommittee, therefore, is as follows:

The subcommittee agreed to recommend:

1. That during the week of July 27, 1964, the special committee on defence visit the Royal Canadian Navy establishment at Halifax, take part in a fleet exercise, and visit the SACLANT Headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia.
2. That the clerk of the committee accompany the committee members on the abovementioned visit.
3. That when the committee adjourns from place to place, the actual living and travel expenses of committee members and staff be paid.

May I have a motion for acceptance of this report?

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I so move.

Mr. TEMPLE: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: This morning we will continue our examination of the Reserve Forces. We have with us representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations. I will give you the names of the persons who are in attendance: Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Learmonth, who is Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations; Commodore Robert I. Hendy, Lieutenant Colonel B. J. Legge, Group Captain J. W. P. Draper, and Brigadier W. S. Rutherford. Colonel Learmonth will read a statement which will be distributed to committee members, and following the presentation of the statement, we will proceed with our questioning. I think, perhaps, Colonel Learmonth, we will distribute the statement before you start.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, as a point of information, is Lieutenant Colonel Legge the same Lieutenant Colonel Legge who is a member of the Suttie commission?

Lieutenant Colonel W. R. LEARMONTH, C.D., (*Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations*): Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Does the statement open with a definition of the organization these persons represent?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. The statement now has been distributed. Would you proceed, Colonel Learmonth?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Gentlemen, at the outset I would like to make a comment on the brief which you have in your hands. As you know, the release dates of the different reports have been changed, and because of the abridged length of time for the preparation of our brief, we have not been able to have it translated. There is no French copy available this morning. I trust that the members of this Committee who would prefer to have it in French will appreciate our difficulties.

At the outset I also would like to make the comment that we are following the procedure which we understand is the usual one before this committee; that is, we have prepared our statement in writing. The statement is quite complete and sets forth our views with regard to the reports that presently are released.

I propose to go through this statement, and if it appears somewhat tedious, I trust you will understand that this is the method which has been suggested, and we propose to follow it.

I will start at the beginning of page 1.

May I first introduce myself and the other members of the Executive of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA). My name is Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Learmonth, CD, and I appear before you as the chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations. As to my military qualifications, I have had 24 years of association with the army in various capacities commencing with Osgoode Hall C.O.T.C. in 1940 and five years active service in Canada and overseas with the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. After the war I served for 10 years with the militia including 5 years in command of the ordnance unit in Toronto I have been associated with the R.C.O.C. association since the war and am now the immediate past president.

Also with me today on my right is Commodore Robert L. Hendy, V.R.D., C.D., Q.C., whose service record consists of one year in the University of Toronto C.O.T.C. followed by 24 years in the Naval Reserve, commencing in 1936 and including 6 years active service. He has served in destroyers, cruisers, battleships and other major war vessels and attended the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, England. At the end of the war he was deputy director of warfare and training at naval headquarters, Ottawa. He has commanded HMCS York, in Toronto, the naval establishment in Toronto and was senior naval officer in Toronto for the four years preceding his retirement in 1962. He is the first naval officer to have been chairman of the C.D.A. He has been an hon. A.D.C. to the Governor General of Canada since 1952. He is a past president of the Fort York branch of the Royal Canadian Legion and a director of the royal Canadian military institute. He is honorary president of the Canadian Naval Association. He is presently the naval representative on the executive of the C.D.A.

Lieutenant Colonel B. J. Legge, E.D., Q.C., of the Canadian army is here and he has served continually in the armed forces of Canada since 1938 including almost five years on active service in various field and staff appointments. He has commanded Five Column R.C.A.S.C. in Toronto for four years and is presently the A.A. & Q.M.G. of 15 Militia Group. He is the vice chairman of the Suttie commission, the vice chairman of the Conference of Defense Associations, the first vice president of the Fort York branch of the Royal Canadian Legion, vice president of the Royal Military Institute, a member of the defence study group for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the chairman of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada in Toronto. In 1958-1959 he was the president of the empire club of Canada.

Group Captain J. W. P. Draper, D.F.C., C.D. is also here and his service record is as follows: He joined the R.C.A.F. in April of 1941 and took his training in Canada. His overseas service consisted of two tours as a fighter pilot with the Royal Air Force in England, Africa and Europe. He was released from the R.C.A.F. in January of 1946. He graduated from the University of Toronto with an engineering degree in 1950 and enlisted in the R.C.A.F. auxiliary in April, 1952. He has commanded the Toronto auxiliary as group captain for the last five years. He is presently the air force representative on the executive of the C.D.A.

First of all I would like to thank the Chairman, Mr. Hahn, and the members of the defence committee for giving us this opportunity to be of service in appearing before them and presenting the views of the Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.) to the committee in a form which will be of permanent record and reference.

My colleagues and I represent an organization that has been serving Canada for 32 years. Its first chairmen in 1932, 1933 and 1934 were Col. the Hon. G. A. Hope, D.S.O., M.C.; Col. the Hon. George Drew, V.D., C.D., P.C., Q.C., LL.D., and Lt. Gen. the Hon. P.J. Montague, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., V.D.

The object and purpose of the C.D.A. has been always to serve its country by making its advice and experience available to the government and to the Department of National Defence in a broad manner as well as for detailed problems. The defence of Canada is of such great importance that the more enlightened attention it receives, the greater the benefit to the country. The C.D.A., therefore, warmly welcomes the attention defence policy and defence affairs have been receiving in recent years. In more particular, it welcomes the establishment of this special defence committee of the House of Commons. It is also pleased to have participated in the creation of the recent committee inquiring into the operation of the naval reserves and R.C.A.F. auxiliary.

As this occasion is an opportunity for the C.D.A. to put its views on record, it is probably convenient to proceed in the following manner with your permission. Firstly, I will review the sequence of recent events leading up to our present appearance here. Secondly, I will review our short brief to this committee dated last December 5 which was not dealt with at the previous session. Thirdly, I will review the findings of the Suttie report on the militia and fourthly, deal with the Hendy and Draper reports on the naval reserve and air force auxiliary respectively. I will then deal with two other matters of importance, and conclude with general comments.

Sequence of Events

1. December 5, 1963—a brief of the executive of the C.D.A. forwarded to Mr. Sauve.

2. December 5, 1963—Mr. Hellyer announced in the House of Commons the reduction of the militia from 50,000 to 30,000 strength with an expected saving of $15,000,000.

3. January 3, 1964—Executive of C.D.A. met with minister, associate minister, deputy minister, chief of general staff regarding proposals of government.

4. January 16th to 18th—Annual meeting of C.D.A. held in Ottawa.

5. January 16, 1964—Mr. Hellyer addressed C.D.A.

6. January 16, 1964—Ministerial committee set up to make recommendations regarding R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. (Hendy and Draper reports).

7. February 16, 1964—Hendy and Draper reports presented to A.M.N.D.

8. February 18, 1964—Hendy and Draper reports received by C.D.A.

9. February 28, 1964—Executive of C.D.A. met with Mr. Hellyer and Mr. Cardin together with vice chief of naval staff and vice chief of air staff to review Hendy and Draper reports.

10. March 3, 1964—C.D.A. luncheon for Suttie commission.

11. March 26, 1964—White paper on defence issued.

12. June, 1964—Suttie report presented to Department of National Defence.

13. July 14, 1964—Special committee on defence reviewed Suttie report with Department of National Defence.

14. July 16, 1964—C.D.A. appeared before special defence committee.

As set out in the above sequence of events, the executive of the C.D.A. being aware of current developments, considered that in the discharge of its responsibilities, it should make a submission to this committee. After considering the matter carefully and drafting a submission, it was finally completed and forwarded on December 5, which date happened to coincide with the statement of Mr. Hellyer in the House of Commons. This submission is self-explanatory and states the position of the C.D.A. with reference to the proposed reductions. I would like to now go over this submission with you.

CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS

P.O. BOX 893,
TERMINAL POST OFFICE
OTTAWA 2, ONT.

20 Mason Boulevard,
Toronto 12, Ontario,
5 December 1963.

Maurice Sauvé, Esquire, M.P.,
Chairman, Special Committee on Defence,
Parliament Buildings,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Sir:

On behalf of the Conference of Defence Associations, I am taking the liberty of writing to put before you for your committee certain matters which the Conference of Defence Associations feels merit consideration in the hope that such will be of assistance in the deliberations of your committee relating to the important matter of Canada's national defence policy which it is examining.

Perhaps at the outset I should outline to you the constitution and objects of the conference. This conference is comprised of member associations from all three armed services, navy, army and air force, whose representatives meet annually in January in Ottawa to discuss matters of defence generally. The army component of the conference is comprised of various corps associations representing branches of the army such as the infantry, engineers, et cetera. The navy and the air force are represented by groups from their reserve components. The Defence Medical Association which represents the medical branches of the three services, now known as Canadian forces medical services is also a member of the conference. Preliminary to the annual meeting in January all the various service or corps associations will have held meetings at which matters of particular concern to them have been considered and discussed and arising out of such deliberations will be forwarded to the conference resolutions for discussion and appropriate action by the conference as a whole. Such resolutions are confined to those which affect more than one service or one arm of a service so that the conference's time is devoted to matters which have a broad defence interest. We feel that the conference enjoys the confidence of the Department of National Defence and the senior officers thereof. To this extent the annual conference always has the honour of being addressed by the Minister of National Defence on some occasion as well as the chiefs of the three services.

Membership in the various associations comprising the conference is drawn from ex-officers of the services with the larger number being former or present active officers of the reserve components of the navy, army and air force. The conference thus represents a responsible group of citizens who have a deep and continued interest in matters of national defence. This they demonstrate by the time they devote to questions relating to their services and the attendance at the conference itself and as well as the meetings of the various corps associations. In the past the conference has lent its assistance and support to the Department of National Defence, for instance in connection with the board of officers known as the Kennedy commission which was set up some years ago to investigate the organization of the militia.

The objects of the conference as set forth in the constitution are as follows:

> The object of the conference is to consider the problems of national defence, to assist the government of Canada in placing these problems before the people of Canada, to co-ordinate the activities of the service associations in matters of common interest in all services, to make recommendations to the government of Canada as may appear expedient, and generally to promote the welfare of the defence forces of Canada as a whole.

With the foregoing as a background therefore, at this time I should like to put before your committee some observations which we feel are pertinent to your deliberations without going into the presentation of a lengthy brief. However, you may rest assured that members of the conference would be honoured to be asked to appear before your committee to discuss at greater length the various points which will only be touched on in this letter.

Primarily, notwithstanding the very broad objects of its constitution, the conference has traditionally concerned itself with matters affecting the reserve components of the armed services. While the conference is interested in the broader aspects of defence planning, through the particular qualifications and activities of its members, it is expert in matters affecting the reserve forces. Accordingly the prime and perhaps all-embracing matter which we wish to put before you is that in making a recommendation to the government in respect of defence policy, due regard be taken of the role and place of the reserve forces in the Canadian defence establishment.

We consider under the present system of military service and having regard to geographical considerations, apart entirely from tradition, that the reserve forces for a country such as Canada produces dollar for dollar as good or better value than any similar dollar spent on defence. This is not to in any way discount in the slightest degree the position of the regular forces but it is merely a statement based on the existing conditions in this country. For example, insofar as national survival is concerned, if we are to have any effectiveness in this field there must be units trained to cope with the problems arising after nuclear attack in a great many widely scattered communities and major centres throughout the country. Obviously, the numbers available from the regular forces would be totally inadequate to either garrison or perhaps bring in personnel to the numbers required to assist after an attack. Therefore, the great burden of national survival will rest on the trained citizen-serviceman. There is also, although probably not a major threat but yet a possibility of isolated raids on the vast territory of this country for which it would be impossible to maintain forces in being at all times to deal with. Accordingly, the citizen-serviceman is in a position to play a similar role to his predecessor of many years ago when the early settlers were as ready to take up their muskets in defence of their homesteads against raiding Indians by being available to deal with such isolated raids. Hence the importance of maintaining military skills for the reservist.

Further, we believe that the reserve forces notwithstanding the great emphasis on forces-in-being and the doctrine of a short war, still have great importance to reinforce the regular forces in times leading up to and involving an emergency. Thus, the reserve components of all three services have maintained a continuing availability for call-out and for performing sudden emergency operations. This has been demonstrated many times. To mention some instances there were the disasters of hurricane Hazel and Red river floods which hit the Toronto and Winnipeg areas some years ago. Reservists of the navy and air force take part in search and rescue operations on the Great lakes and elsewhere in Canada. Further, the experience of the Korean war when it was required to raise troops for service in that theatre showed that the militia

regiments were admirably suited to find and provide men. The reserve air components of both the navy and the air force are frequently called upon for operations and other duties which are allotted to it by their respective commands and which often supplement and complement the work of the regular force. Apart therefore from the necessity and desirability of providing a nucleus from which the forces can be expanded in time of an emergency the reserve forces are in fact forces-in-being, who can upon extremely short notice, be made available for active duty. This is at a modest cost when one considers the tremendous amount of time that is devoted to their duties by personnel of the reserve forces. Thus, while provisions are made for reserve personnel to receive pay and allowances for their activities it can be stated without reservation that the amount of time they devote to their military duties is far in excess of that for which present scales of pay would provide compensation. This has always been accepted by the reserve forces as part of the privilege of serving and is not put forward in any way as a criticism of the present policy of payment for reserve duty but merely as an observation.

Apart from the feelings of the conference in respect to the importance of the reserve force establishment, we also feel that on many occasions the regular forces have indicated their support of an adequate reserve for the permanent component. We appreciate that the hearings before your committee have been mainly concerned with regular force matters respecting commitments, weapons, strengths, distribution of troops, maintenance and other similar problems related to those forces yet, we are aware that chiefs of staff and senior officers of all three services have from time to time in the past indicated that the reserve components of the respective services have a part to play and are considered as essential for the defence program. Thus under today's conditions the immediate emphasis of a reserve may have been somewhat altered from several years ago, this seems due to the fact that the regular force has taken on additional responsibilities in conjunction with Canada's international commitments and in no way seems to affect the basic need for a strong reserve of all three services. Many of your committee will recall the situation which existed prior to World War II when the principal military effort of Canada was directed to the maintenance of strong reserve forces, especially in the case of the militia and our permanent forces were regarded to a great extent as cadres for the training of the reserves. Due to the increased complexity of the problem of defence, the reserves today actually have greater numbers of regular personnel assisting them than in 1939. Thus while the role of the reserve may alter in respect to the regular force, its current role should not be lost sight of under today's conditions. We submit that the reserve fills the same important position now as it did prior to World War II, while recognizing however that the regular components have grown vastly in size and in the importance and variety of their tasks.

Earlier in this letter I referred to the work of the Kennedy commission and the conference's part therein. It may be that at the present time some further look at the organization of the reserve forces may be required. This of course, will to some extent be dependent on the organization which the regular force components take. The conference, by reason of representing all three services, is in an admirable position to lend the same assistance as it has in the past, and in particular by bringing together personnel from all three services in their reserve components a great deal can be done to develop the unity of thought which is so desirable for today's defence problems. Greater steps in this direction are undoubtedly desirable but we emphasize that the identity of the various services should be maintained. This is especially important from the point of view of esprit de corps which in a reserve force unit has tremendous importance from the point of view of its efficiency and well-being.

In summary, therefore, the conference's position is that the justification for maintaining reserve forces in at least the present level is fully warranted on the merits and does not rest on grounds of tradition or sentimentality alone. The reasons for the conference's position may be summarized as follows:

1. The role of the reserves in providing for local defence or tasks connected with national survival or disaster is as important, or perhaps more important, than ever before.
2. The reserves perform useful and important functions on even an unmobilized basis which could only be discharged by larger regular units.
3. The reserves, as in the past, continue to form the nucleus from which active service units can be drawn and expanded by maintaining their contacts with the people in the community in which they are situated.
4. On a cost basis the reserves provide good value for the defence dollar.

On a more intangible basis, the maintenance of citizen servicemen knits the defence establishment into the community and is a vital element in giving Canadians an opportunity to follow the precept laid down by the late John F. Kennedy when he stated in his inaugural address as President of the United States of America—

> Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

I trust that the foregoing comments will commend themselves to you and perhaps suggest certain avenues of further enquiry for your committee. May I also reassure you and your committee that the conference and its officers stand ready to assist in any way which you may feel our particular talents and abilities might dictate to emphasize the continued importance of the reserve force in the defence organization under today's conditions or as they may develop in the future. If thought desirable a delegation from the conference will wait upon your committee or prepare a further submission by brief.

Yours very truly,

LeSueur Brodie, Lieut.-Colonel,
Chairman,
Conference of defence associations.

Suttie report part I

Turning now to the Suttie report, I will merely start at the beginning and proceed through it, dealing with each point as it appears, giving you our observations and views.

1. On page (i) you will note that the members' letter states that the "resultant recommendations have the endorsement of each and all of us". We are all naturally aware of the problem in obtaining the unanimity of ten members in many recommendations.

2. On page (vi) it is noted that discussions were held with the army council to ensure that recommendations were workable.

3. On page (vii) it is stated that the commission co-operated with the Executive of the C.D.A. This statement is not completely accurate as the commission did not approach the C.D.A. to request its views. Despite this, the C.D.A. informed the commission that it was available to appear before it, but this offer was not accepted.

4. On page (vii) the commission considered it "unwise to attempt integration of the militia units before the regular army had assumed its new configuration". It is agreed that no integration between units should precede similar integration resulting from implementation of the white paper.

5. On page (viii) reference is made to the Hendy and Draper ministerial committees. This is the only reference in this part of the report to these committees and the commission states "that apart from endorsing the proposals made by these separate committees, no further consideration should be incorporated in our report." The following paragraph deals with surplus accommodation of naval and air force reserves.

6. On page (viii) the air force reserve in a transport role is considered. The C.D.A. fully supports the comments on air portability and recommends implementation of this role.

7. On page (ix) there is an obscure and incomprehensible reference to over-age personnel in the regular force as compared with the militia. The C.D.A. is firmly convinced that there is a need for an element of experienced and mature personnel in the militia.

8. Beginning on page (x) appears a summary of 26 recommendations. For your information and for purposes of record, it is proposed to comment on each recommendation.

9. Recommendation 1 regarding a positive public relations programme in support of the militia has been advocated by the C.D.A. for many years as a matter of high priority consisting of government encouragement, leadership and implementation from the top level down, in making the country aware of the importance of the reserve forces through a planned public relations programme.

10. Recommendation 2 refers to the anomaly of the militia C.O.'s responsibility without authority. The C.D.A. fully supports the principle of giving C.O.'s authority as well as responsibility.

11. Recommendation 3 regarding training programs is endorsed.

12. Recommendation 4 regarding weekend training is endorsed.

13. Recommendation 5 regarding equipment is strongly endorsed.

14. Recommendation 6 regarding training aids is strongly endorsed.

15. Recommendation 7 regarding training manuals is endorsed.

16. Recommendation 8 regarding corps schools is endorsed.

17. Recommendation 9 recommends the release of 332 call-outs, and allocating out 735 I. Staff to individual units. This is a major change and should result in more direct use of the I. Staff, closer relationship between the militia and regular force, and the keeping of militia more up to date, and accordingly is endorsed in principle.

18. Recommendation 10—Increased emphasis on physical fitness is desirable but is considered somewhat impractical due to the time limitation.

19. Recommendation 11 regarding overage retirements for the arms is supported only as regards to armour and infantry and in any event a discretion should remain to retain personnel medically acceptable. It is also a fact that in many cases room in the mobilization plan exists for men who have particular qualifications or long experience with military matters who are not necessarily required for combat duties but who do have the qualifications to fill particular jobs on active service. Thus it is probably better in the reserve forces to have "more chiefs than Indians" in order to ensure that you have this ready talent enlisted in uniform and available.

20. Recommendation 12 regarding recognition badges has been recommended for many years by the C.D.A.

21. Recommendation 13 regarding uniforms has been recommended for many years by the C.D.A.

22. Recommendation 14 regarding establishments—There is an understandable desire to make establishments more realistically related to strength. Notwithstanding this, there should always be a greater emphasis on efficiency, than strength and establishments. The establishments of the arms were frequently unattainable merely because it had been convenient to use field establishments. The C.D.A. is prepared to endorse this recommendation, but on a trial basis with great care and discretion to be used in changes from major to minor.

23. Recommendation 15 regarding a special reserve of officers is endorsed subject to our comments regarding recommendation 11, whereby we recommend limiting the application of age reductions, to the armour and infantry.

24. Recommendation 16 regarding administrative procedures is a major recommendation and has been advanced for many years by the C.D.A. and is now a matter of great urgency.

25. Recommendation 17 regarding attestation is endorsed.

26. Recommendation 18 regarding boards of inquiry is endorsed.

27. Recommendation 19 regarding accounting is endorsed.

28. Recommendation 20 regarding pay. The pay procedure should undoubtedly be streamlined and there have been many recommendations to this effect. However, the C.D.A. does not recommend a block system, but rather a simplified per diem pay system, with a bonus for accomplishment.

29. Recommendation 21 regarding special expenses is endorsed.

30. Recommendation 22 regarding contingency allowance is endorsed.

31. Recommendation 23 regarding armouries is endorsed.

32. Recommendation 24 regarding composite stores and messes is endorsed. Care must be taken to avoid dislocation of established messes of major units. Composite orderly rooms may be theoretically desirable but may be administratively impractical and the possible economy should be thoroughly investigated.

33. Recommendation 25 regarding disposal of surplus army buildings is endorsed, subject to costing regarding nominal rentals.

34. The C.D.A. takes exception to recommendation 26 regarding reorganization of the conference of defence associations. The terms of reference of the Suttie commission were to consult with the C.D.A. not to re-organize it.

Regarding recommendation 26 (*a*), there is no good reason to change the name of the C.D.A. It is an honourable, historic and descriptive name.

Recommendation 26 (*b*) disregards the present tri-service composition of the C.D.A. The restrictive membership the report recommends would eliminate the experience and interest of such persons as former CO's who make a valuable contribution to the C.D.A. It should be noted that no honourary appointments have been made in the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. since prior to World War II.

Regarding recommendation 26 (*c*) and 26 (*d*), it is urged that all grants be paid to the C.D.A. and that these be apportioned equitably by the C.D.A. to the corps associations, including grants to the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. components of the C.D.A.

35. On Page 40 of Part I of the report appears a recommendation with reference to implementation of the Report. It recommends that the commission should continue at the pleasure of the minister and be able to review progress and advise the minister, that the secretary should remain on loan, and also that the chairman be available from time to time. The C.D.A. opposes

this surprising suggestion which in reality perpetuates this committee after its work has been done and its report made. The same objection would be raised regarding the Hendy and Draper committees.

A logical solution is for the C.D.A. to undertake this role. It is pointed out that the C.D.A. was established for, and has performed, in a consultative and advisory capacity since its inception, especially in regard to militia matters, and latterly those of the naval reserve and R.C.A.F. Aux. It is therefore equipped and suited to discharge this function on a continuing basis. This can be accomplished without the additional cost inherent in the recommendation of the Suttie report. It is worthwhile noting that all members of the Suttie commission have their individual roles and influence within their corps associations and should participate in corps associations and in C.D.A. activities. As such, their opinions will continue to be available.

Comments on Suttie report part I

Counting the recommendation regarding implementation, there are 27 recommendations in part I. These recommendations are not necessarily inspired by the terms of reference, and indeed, one is hard put to find them in the terms of reference. Nonetheless, such a broad examination of the militia was well worthwhile, and their recommendations are in the main sound and constructive. In summary, the C.D.A. endorses 18 outright, has comments from partial approval of 7 (10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 24, 25) to rejection of 2 (26, 27).

Part II of the Suttie report we presume will contain the more detailed recommendations regarding the constitution of the militia. When part II is released we are prepared to submit our comments and recommendations.

It is regretted that the militia commission did not deal at any length with the usefulness of the militia as a force in being for a "brush fire" or conventional war and providing a pool of personnel which could back up regular units called out. The conference feels that this is an important aspect of the role of a militia and one that should be developed. Perhaps this omission is explainable by reason of there being no specific reference to this point in the terms of reference.

Hendy and Draper reports

Next, I would briefly like to refer to the work of the two committees which were set up in co-operation with the conference of defence associations by direction of the honourable, the Minister of National Defence, to consider the organization of the naval reserve and the air force auxiliary. These two committees arose as a result of a request by the conference to the minister to have an opportunity to re-examine the reserve components of the R.C.N. and the R.C.A.F. arising out of the announced cuts in the reserve forces of these two services in December of 1963. The committees were established on the conclusion of the meeting of the conference in Ottawa on the 18th of January, 1964 and were given until the 15th of February to conduct their investigations and report. Both committees in the course of their hearings travelled extensively across the country and I believe, carried out an objective and worthwhile examination of the role and organization of the reserves of these two services.

The committee's report, containing the findings and recommendations of the committee was submitted to the honourable, the Associate Minister of National Defence on the 15th of February 1964. Shortly thereafter, a revised plan for the R.C.N.R. was announced, which authorized the retention of two of the divisions which had been previously announced for closing, namely the units of Halifax and Victoria and other units were held in suspense insofar as closing down was concerned until the completion of the report on the militia. It is understood that several of the naval reserve committee's recommendations have been promptly acted upon by the naval authorities.

At this point, I should like to say on behalf of the conference, that we feel that the reaction of the naval authorities reflects the greatest credit on the chief of naval staff, vice-admiral H. S. Rayner and his advisors and is tangible evidence that with goodwill and co-operation between the services and interested groups, such as the conference of defence associations, constructive suggestions and assistance toward efficient defence planning can be achieved. We feel that the committee served to show the naval reserves that there was a genuine concern for their position and did a great deal to dispel earlier impressions that perhaps the role of the naval reserve was not appreciated nor recognized.

I should like to assure this committee that the fullest co-operation was given by the offices of both the minister and associate minister of defence and the naval authorities to the naval reserve committee in its deliberations and the arrangements made through the authority of the Minister of National Defence and naval headquarters could not have been improved upon. The committee's hearings which took place in 11 centres across Canada attracted a great deal of interest not only from serving reserve officers but also ex-officers of the navy and interested civilian groups such as the navy league of Canada and naval officers association. I am sure that the members of the committee consider that their efforts were well rewarded and the results will be apparent for some years to come in the generating of greater understanding of the problems of planning for defence especially in regard to the naval reserve.

The report of the committee for the R.C.A.F. Auxiliary has not yet been released. However, unlike the naval reserve, there has been no announcement of any change in the policy for this force from that of last December.

It is to be hoped that as there is now further endorsement of the transport role of the R.C.A.F. auxiliary, the disbandonment of some of the squadrons may now be reconsidered. It may be that some centres that have large militia establishments should have local air transport support.

General comments on three reports

It is apparent that many of the findings and recommendations of the three reports will reflect those which have been expressed over the years by the C.D.A. This is true not only for the army, but also in respect of similar types of deliberations which have been carried on by the navy and the air force auxiliary, the principal lesson to be derived from this would seem to be an indication that perhaps these recommendations from what might be called "quasi service groups" are not being given as much consideration as they should be. It does seem unfortunate that since such groups exist and are making reasonable recommendations that a need should appear every so often to have special committees set up to report directly to the minister before proper recognition is given to the opinions and recommendations of experienced officers through such groups concerning the organization and role of particular units and services.

Of those recommendations, on which there is general concurrence, we trust and hope that this defence committee will also agree, and the D.N.D. will be urged to proceed. Where the C.D.A. disagrees with the Suttie report, we trust you will give our remarks your sympathetic consideration.

Our further comments regarding the Hendy and Draper reports, and any criticisms that we may have with part II of the Suttie report, will have to await their release and publication. We would be pleased to offer our comments to this committee at your pleasure.

It is noted that to date only Part I of the Suttie report has been released and that part II, which will presumably contain detailed recommendations on the re-organization of the militia, is not yet available. As this was originally to be released last month, and bearing in mind that much speculation and uncertainty now surrounds the future of the militia which is having an adverse

effect on morale and future planning, it is earnestly hoped that the release of Part II will not be long delayed. It should also be pointed out that the future of certain naval reserve units has been announced as being affected by the findings of the Suttie report, this in the further opinion of the C.D.A. makes the early release of the Suttie report not only desirable, but essential.

Thus, any delay beyond next month will militate against the preparation of a training programme for the forthcoming training season.

Advisor on Militia (AOM)

I now propose to comment on two matters not directly dealt with by the Suttie report. The board of officers chaired by Major General Howard Kennedy, carefully considered the question of an A.O.M. and in its 1954 report, by recommendation No. 3, the appointment of a full time A.O.M. was recommended and the reasons given. General Letson was appointed A.O.M. and served until his retirement in 1958. No successor has since been appointed. The duties, functions and responsibilities of the A.O.M. were incorporated in Canadian army order 55-6, and paragraph 4 (a) thereof reads as follows:

> The Adviser on Militia (A.O.M.)—The A.O.M. is an officer appointed to advise the chief of the general staff on all matters concerning the Canadian army (militia). He has no executive responsibility. The A.O.M. will, in addition to advising the chief of the general staff, be responsible for:
>
> (i) rendering assistance on militia matters to the branches and directorates at A.H.Q.,
>
> (ii) examining problems affecting the militia and advising on the implications arising therefrom,
>
> (iii) effecting liaison with officers commanding commands on the implications of orders and regulations with respect to militia units,
>
> (iv) assisting and advising officers commanding commands on the interpretation of A.H.Q. policy regarding the militia,
>
> (v) representing the A.H.Q. at meetings of the conference of defence associations and corps associations.
>
> The A.O.M. may deal directly with staff officers at A.H.Q. on all matters concerning the militia.

It is a fact of recent military experience that major changes in training, organization and concept of the employment of military forces have occurred with considerable frequency, and this trend appears likely to continue. The militia, being a component of the Canadian army, is subject to the same trends, therefore the need exists for a senior experienced officer with militia background in the appointment of A.O.M. to ensure that maximum effectiveness of the militia is maintained in these changing circumstances so that there will be the least loss in morale and efficiency. As an example, the conference feels that the changes made in militia roles with the introduction of national survival and the special militia training programme would have gained if the appointment of the A.O.M. had been filled when these programmes were introduced.

Some of the major advantages which would accrue in the appointment of A.O.M. may be indicated as follows:

1. Morale would be improved by awareness by the militia of the existence of a senior officer at A.H.Q. whose sole responsibility is his militia role.
2. The importance of the militia's role and its essential part in the defence programme would be more effectively placed before the public.

3. The A.O.M. would perform the role of inspector general of the militia.
4. The A.O.M. would assist in the formulation and co-ordination of policy insofar as it affects the militia.

For several years now, the C.D.A. has been recommending the appointment of an A.O.M., and as a result of favourable encouragement by A.H.Q., submitted a list of recommended officers.

Due to the lack of an appointment by A.H.Q., and now the prospect of integration advanced by the white paper, the C.D.A. requests that the A.O.M. be given tri-service responsibilities.

Canadian Honours and Awards

It is also interesting to note that in one or two cases the commission suggests some form of award or recognition for service in the reserve but does not go further than this. While agreeing with this principle the conference would also like to remind this committee that it has, for the last several years, made a strong recommendation to the governments of each time to institute a system of national awards not only to service personnel but to civilian personnel as well, which would be a tangible recognition by the country of service to it. At the present time there is a great deal of talk about national symbols and distinctive Canadian emblems. It is the feeling of the conference that this would be an opportune time to therefore consider a form of award by the government for meritorious service along the lines which the conference has put forward for the last few years at its annual meeting.

Canada, probably alone amongst sovereign nations of comparable status in world affairs, is without a distinctive national award or honour appropriate for recognizing service of particular meritorious or devotion to the country rendered by citizens of all pursuits and endeavours.

During war years the granting of non-operational awards not only to members of the services but to civilians who rendered exceptional service to the war effort and the country has been followed. It would seem that if such awards are appropriate in time of war, when the exertions of everyone should be directed toward victory without any other reward, that in time of peace (or at least undeclared hostility) some recognition of extraordinary and exemplary effort is even more justified. Surely under our system of voluntary effort, which extends not only to recruitment in the services but also to the business community in making many senior executives available for government service at a nominal remuneration, some way of recognizing notable efforts on behalf of the nation would not be amiss.

Arising out of the foregoing, of course, is the absence of a means to recognize outstanding citizens of other countries who may have made some contribution toward this country, or to whom it is desired to accord some recognition by the government. For example, it might be desirable to award to American servicemen who have assisted Canadian forces in rescue or exploration work a distinctive Canadian decoration. The absence of some method of according such recognition by the Canadian government to nationals of other countries has, I understand, resulted in Canadians who might be considered by other countries for recognition of this type having to refuse an award from such other countries and this seems not only an unfortunate situation but perhaps also one creating some embarrassment.

The institution of some distinctive Canadian award would be a matter of a little expense as the value lies not in the intrinsic value of the item awarded but rather the more intangible ways in which such recognition would be regarded. In this regard it is still customary to grant to Canadians such honours as the coronation and jubilee medals. While these awards approach somewhat the

principle behind the resolution which the conference is putting forward they are, of course, only available at infrequent intervals and only in association with the particular event being celebrated. Also they are not distinctively Canadian in their origin. Such awards, of course, are not available to non-Canadians which, apart from any other aspect of this matter, detracts from their appropriateness.

In the belief that any submission should at least provide some suggestion for solution or implementation, we would submit that perhaps the solution to this matter might rest in the implementing of the issue of an award similar to the order of the British empire with civil and military divisions, and possibly degrees or classes. Military awards to be issuable to all ranks.

The C.D.A. has for many years advocated the institution of some form of Canadian honours and awards. There is broad support for such an award throughout Canada, and merely as an example, reference is made to editorials in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* of January 6, 1964 and the Toronto *Daily Star* of January 4, 1964.

The C.D.A. brings this question forward now, in the hope that it will receive the favourable support of this special committee on defence. With your support and co-operation, a stimulus to implementation will be made.

Concluding remarks

We trust that the above procedure of commenting on current developments has been a useful method for transmitting to you our general views on defence.

It is popular now to examine defence policy in the light of priorities (white paper p. 24). We can afford only so much of our G.N.P. In their wisdom the cabinet apparently have stabilized our defence budget at about 1½ billion dollars. The MND has stated that we must increase the equipment slice to 25% (white paper p. 19) and this means a reduction in plant and personnel. He has announced reduction in all three services and this has resulted in some fast footwork in all areas to avoid the axe. The M.N.D. has announced a proposed $15,000,000 saving and a 20,000 manpower reduction in the militia. Notwithstanding this, it should always be kept in mind that dollar for dollar, the best defence investment value is the reserve serviceman.

The trend among our allies is to a more flexible capability and for example, in the last two years the USA has increased its regular divisions from 11 to 16 and its strength from 870,000 to 976,000 men. (*Time* 3 July '64). In view of the importance of conventional strength, the Canadian mobilization base should not be destroyed. Economies should first be attempted in the area of organization and administration, and general efficiency. It is to be hoped therefore, that this defence committee will join with us in a plea to the D.N.D. to attempt to retain the numerical strength of the reserve forces, and to make the dollar saving necessary by increasing efficiency, organization and administration.

It is hoped that increased publicity will force attention on these problems, and that this defence committee will contribute to public approval of these worthwhile aims.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Colonel Learmonth. We now will proceed with questioning. Mr. Temple.

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Chairman, may I ask whether all the gentlemen present here today are unanimous in presenting this report?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is right.

Mr. TEMPLE: I believe Colonel Legge also was a member of the Suttie commission. Do I take it, then, that the Suttie commission was not unanimous in its findings?

Lieutenant-Colonel B. J. LEGGE, E.D., Q.C., (*Vice Chairman, Conference of Defence Association*): Mr. Chairman, I take it that the report of the Suttie commission is a document evolved on the principle of cabinet responsibility and solidarity. I take it that the same doctrine applies to the paper which emanates from the Conference of Defence Associations. On the Suttie commission we all are responsible for the report. I do not think every member of the commission is responsible for every word used, but he has to accept responsibility because of his membership on the commission. I have to accept responsibility as a member of the executive of the Conference of Defence Associations, so in that sense I am responsible.

Mr. TEMPLE: On page 12 of your submission, paragraph 1 states:

> On page (i) you will note that the members' letter states that the 'resultant recommendations have the endorsement of each and all of us'. We are all naturally aware of the problem in obtaining the unanimity of ten members in many recommendations.

It seems to me that there very definitely is unanimity. Is it unanimity of just a half measure, or is it complete unanimity? I do not see how this can be reconciled with your unanimity today as members of the Conference of Defence Associations.

Mr. LEGGE: I do not see any embarrassment. Perhaps this is a poetic way of putting it, but the group concerned is responsible for the document in each case. I do not think you could say that any ten persons would have identical knowledge, usage, or appreciation of any word; but they are responsible for the conclusion. I certainly am responsible for both documents.

Mr. TEMPLE: But where do you disagree?

Mr. LEGGE: I disagree, I think, with the poetry of the word "unanimity". I do not think minds meet identically on any point.

Mr. TEMPLE: Where do you disagree between the two documents; that is, the report of the Suttie commission and this presentation this morning?

Mr. LEGGE: I do not disagree with either, because I am responsible in part for both.

Mr. TEMPLE: There certainly is a divergence between the two documents.

Mr. LEGGE: If I may use an analogy, in the cabinet a cabinet minister would be responsible for the policies of the cabinet, and also in caucus he would be responsible for the policies of the caucus, and they may not always be identical.

Mr. TEMPLE: Do you agree there should be 50,000 men in the militia, or 30,000?

Mr. LEGGE: I do not see where in these reports it mentions either of these figures.

Mr. TEMPLE: Do you think there should be the present number of personnel in the militia, or a substantially reduced number?

Mr. LEGGE: I agree with the policy of the Conference of Defence Associations as put forward by the Chairman this morning, that there should be an efficient use of manpower. I am forbidden to comment on the number, because part II of the Suttie Commission Report is not yet issued.

Mr. TEMPLE: According to the statement of the minister Tuesday, it is approximately 30,000.

Mr. LEGGE: I believe that figure was given out by the Minister last December and reiterated in January, and this was taken as a yardstick rather than as a definitive sum.

Mr. TEMPLE: Do you agree that the present role as outlined by the Minister of having the militia revert primarily to a military role rather than a national survival role is a correct one?

Mr. LEGGE: I think both the Suttie Commission and the Conference of Defence Association support that view, sir.

Mr. TEMPLE: On page 18 is the following statement:

> It is regretted that the militia commission did not deal at any length with the usefulness of the militia as a force in being for a 'brush fire' or conventional war and providing a pool of personnel which could back up regular units called out. The conference feels that this is an important aspect of the role of a militia and one that should be developed. Perhaps this omission is explainable by reason of there being no specific reference to this point in the terms of reference.

Does not the very fact that there is the emphasis on the military rather than on the survival role really point this up; that is, that emphasis is being given to it because the "brush fire role" is the primary one?

Mr. LEGGE: I agree that that interpretation could be made, and certainly it is my feeling; but, I do not know what is the Minister's reason for reversing the militia role.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, my question is related in part to what Mr. Temple said in the latter portion of his remarks. It seems to me that the brief of the Conference addressed to this committee last December accepted in principle the, shall we say, establishment of the militia as it stood at that time, rather than as it came about, shall we say, that very same day. In the brief on page 10 in the concluding paragraph it says:

> In summary, therefore, the conference's position is that the justification for maintaining reserve forces in at least the present level is fully warranted on the merits and does not rest on grounds of tradition or sentimentality alone.

That day the establishment was cut back to 30,000, as a rough figure. I am wondering what is the view now of the Conference of Defence Associations with regard to the role and concept of the Militia? Is it as stated in the brief of December 5, or is it within the terms of reference to the Suttie commission as contained in Appendix A of the Commission's report? This also has particular reference to the emphasis on page 9 of the Conference of Defence Associations brief regarding survival operations and survival training. In the terms of reference it is obvious that survival training is being downgraded and is almost out. I would like to know where you stand with regard to this.

Mr. LEARMONTH: I do not think the suggestion is that there is any inconsistency in these two briefs. We stand by the brief of December 5; we do not think the over-all strength of the reserve forces should be cut. There may very well be some changes that should be recommended with reference to efficiency, but we feel that the over-all figure should not be cut.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, there should not be a cut from 50,000 to 30,000?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is right. I might point out that there has been no cut. This figure given by the Minister in December, as we understand it, was more of a target figure, or a suggestion. He did not announce a cut. He only announced a figure which might be a target.

Mr. LAMBERT: But the Suttie Commission does feel it comes within its terms and certainly the Associate Minister in his declaration indicated it was the 30,000 figure.

Mr. LEARMONTH: There has been no acceptance by the Suttie Commission of that reduction.

Mr. LAMBERT: Subject to returning to this, I would like to get into an elaboration of the Defence Association concept of the role of the militia. As they see it, what is the purpose of the militia, and how can it accomplish that purpose? This is what interests us.

Mr. LEARMONTH: I think we would agree with the roles as set out in the terms of reference, subject to some elaboration. We would disagree with the figures; but speaking of the roles he sets out, I do not think they are inconsistent with our position. We feel there are many roles for the reserve; it is a question of emphasis and numbers.

Mr. LAMBERT: The terms of reference outline definite figures. Starting at the third paragraph on page 43, there are the figures 9,000, in the fourth paragraph 18,000; then 2,500, and then 1,500. In the third paragraph on page 44 it states:

> Based on studies of the continued requirement for the militia, it is concluded that a strength in the order of 30,000 officers and men is required to fulfil the above roles.

I take it that the Conference of Defence Associations does not agree with that.

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is right. That is the guesstimate of the department in respect of figures. We disagree with those figures, although we might agree with the roles.

Mr. LAMBERT: There are two reasons for disagreeing; obviously there is a realignment of priorities by the Defence Associations in respect of this because if the department has come up with this figure of 30,000, obviously they have established a level of priorities in their minds. What are your priorities with reference to figures?

Mr. LEGGE: I think the position of the Conference of Defence Associations is that there may be nothing wrong with the figure of 30,000 to do jobs, but in order to have 30,000 effective people to do those jobs in the militia, of necessity you must have more people than that. In order to select the people and put them in those jobs, I think our view is that you must have more people.

Mr. LAMBERT: Would you elaborate on that; let us do it in more detail. In the appendix it says that the placement of regular army personnel in the logistics and static establishment would require 9,000 men. Do you agree with that figure, or do you not?

Mr. LEGGE: I have no way of disputing the figure. I think, probably, it is an expert's figure produced by the department.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I suggest that if you take the 9,000, the 18,000 and the 2,500, which totals 30,000, and take all these people out, then by a look at these various appointments you would then have nothing left; if there were to be a continuing militia establishment, logically you would have to have more than 30,000 people envisaged for these appointments. I think this is the picture envisaged by the Conference of Defence Associations. If there is to be continued a militia there logically will have to be more than 30,000 people on these particular appointments. I think this is the position of the defence association.

Mr. LAMBERT: At what strength do you feel the militia should be kept in order to fulfil this requirement plus the others the defence association has in mind?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Commodore Hendy will perhaps comment in this regard.

Commodore ROBERT I. HENDY, V.R.D., C.D., Q.C. (*Naval Representative on the Executive of the Conference of Defence Associations*): What I have to say really applies to all reserve forces under our system in Canada. Enlistments are all voluntary and we find, as with all reserve forces, the turnover is very considerable. One cannot have a man in a unit today who becomes part on the defence plan because he is not worth anything. He has just got a uniform on. He has had no military training and not equipped to fulfil a function. If the requirement is to have 30,000 militia men, all trained personnel, because of our turnover, because of the length of time it takes to make an effective reservist, which is far longer than a regular forces man obviously because of the limited time available, you must have an overrun of personnel in your militia compliment in order to meet this 30,000 figure. If that is the effective figure of people who can fill the appointments in the defence plan the over-run might be as high as 20 or 30 per cent. I believe this is the philosophy that reserve force people use to approach the strength figure. We say that is the need for this particular reserve component on mobilization. At any particular time how many of those individuals do you have? You have to look at your list, and you find there is no question but that you have a lot of reservists who are ineffective because of the short time they have spent in a unit.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it fair to say then that the conclusion drawn at the time the minister made the statement, that there would be a reduction of 50,000 30,000 with a consequence savings of funds does not represent a correct assessment of the position as the defence association sees it?

Mr. HENDY: That is a difficult question to answer without knowing the exact figure, and perhaps a sailor should not get into this question. I believe probably the militia may be placed with an establishment of 50,000, but perhaps there are not 50,000 militia men. I think the minister's figure indicated that there should be 30,000 effective militia men. Unfortunately, an ineffective militia man is still a burden on the exchequer because once he enlists he is drawing pay for his training. Perhaps this is something that should be changed so far as the administration of pay is concerned. We have made some comment about this situation but the fact remains that you do carry him a long time on pay before you can really say he is effective and can fill a slot in your defence plan.

Mr. LEARMONTH: Perhaps I can make the observation that the emphasis is placed on the wrong figure. The minister gave two figures, money and men. We feel there should be more emphasis placed on the money figure. If a money reduction is absolutely required for budgetary reasons we feel that this saving should first be attempted in other ways than by a reduction in personnel. We feel that the saving could probably be made up in other ways than by a reduction in numbers.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will leave that subject now in the hope that someone else may develop it.

Mr. TEMPLE: I should like to ask a supplementary question. May I take it then from what you say you need some 20 or 30 per cent more than the 30,000 in order to have an effective militia and only 70 or 80 per cent of the present militia force is effective?

Mr. LEARMONTH: It is common knowledge that when you enlist a man he is not ready to go out in the front line. At any given time in any given unit there is a mixture of personnel at various stages of training. If you require X number of men for your force in accordance with your role then you need X plus Y on strength because some are in other phases of training.

Mr. TEMPLE: Then a correct ball park figure in respect of the number of effective personnel would be 70 to 80 per cent?

Mr. LEARMONTH: If that is your definition of effectiveness, yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: You are giving these figures and I wanted to make sure we understood them.

Mr. HENDY: I think the same principle applies to the regular force. As of today we have an effective force in being. We have so many antisubmarine vessels able to take offensive action at an instant at sea. We have our brigade in Europe and a standby brigade here. We have an air division in Europe and an air force squadron in NORAD. They are already today but they must have a tremendous backup of people who perhaps are not effective today but must be in the stream so you can always meet your needs. We are not involved in a situation where we can say we are purely and simply going to have 5,000 combat soldiers in a brigade in Europe, and that is all you need in the army. They cannot stand by themselves. There must be a pool of reinforcements, and this includes training schools and the necessary administration to back up and keep this force in the front effective.

Mr. TEMPLE: So, if we have 60,000 men, for example, in the regular Canadian army naturally they are not all combat troops and not all fully effective. If you have 30,000 men in the militia, as has been suggested, it is probably contemplated that they would not all be effective. Perhaps 25,000 of those men would be effective while the other five would be in the process of being trained; is that right?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether it might be in order at the outset to congratulate these gentlemen from the Conference of Defence Associations on the tremendous amount of work which they have obviously put into the brief they have submitted to us this morning. I at least would like to do so, and tell them we appreciate their continuing interest in the defence forces of our country.

Having said that I should like now to ask one or two questions.

At page 10 of the brief, in the second last paragraph, in a letter addressed to Mr. Sauve some months ago, you discuss the development of the unit of thought between the three services. In the last sentence you indicate that the separate identity of the various services should be maintained. I am wondering whether you will elaborate a little in this regard. I understand that you probably are discussing the recent move toward integration of the services. Would you give us some idea of your view in this regard and tell us to what extent integration should or should not take place.

Mr. LEARMONTH: This question has received a good deal of airing, as you are aware. I do not think that the conference wishes to become involved particularly in any controversy.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Is there a unity of thought in respect to this question?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Notwithstanding this fact, there is no objection so far as I know within the Canadian Defence Association to the principle of integration of defence headquarters. We would not support integration at the bottom.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Would you define that for the committee?

Mr. LEARMONTH: I think that is a fair statement at this time. We must of course see any plan put forward. We have not seen any as yet, and I do not believe the members of the committee have seen any proposal of this type. We have only seen a plan of integration at the and we do not dispute it.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): There is a vast field between the top and the bottom in this matter and I am wondering where one begins and the other ends, in your view. I take it you do not have a unit of thought on this question and prefer not to go any further?

Mr. LEARMONTH: We would join you in wondering where it might end.

Mr. LAMBERT: I should like to ask a supplementary question. Is there a distinction in your mind between the words "unification of command" and "integration"? You refer to integration at the top command. Do you really mean by that unification of command, whereas "integration" means putting everything into one group from the top to the last man? Is there a distinction in your mind?

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I presume the time element enters this question as well.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am wondering whether there is a distinction in your view in this regard.

Mr. LEARMONTH: I am not sure I understand your question. It involves a matter of semantics, I suppose. We support the present bill whichever way you interpret it.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do you call its intent "integration" or "unification of command"?

Mr. LEARMONTH: I think you can call it whatever you want. I think this involves a question of semantics.

Mr. LAMBERT: Other people do not think in that way.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I think this involves quite a large question and I am wondering whether you have any hard and fast ideas about it. As a group apparently you do not, but am I correct in assuming that you want to see where things are going, the time involved in getting there and that sort of thing?

Mr. LEARMONTH: I think that is correct. If you would like our views on this question when there is more information available we would be very pleased to consider the matter and present our views to you.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Your view in that regard would certainly be of interest to me. I cannot speak on behalf of every member of the committee.

Mr. SMITH: Your position in this regard is that the end result is speculative, and I refer to the direction integration or unification is moving; is that right?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is true. We are as much in the dark as anyone else.

Mr. HENDY: I think we must look at the realities of the situation. At the present time enlistment in the regular force is for two or three years and to teach an individual a trade in one service, or one part of a service, is a full time job. After training that individual we must receive a dividend. In that respect we do not have time to teach an individual more than one technique. It is true that a combined force, such as the United States marines, which have been used as an example of the type of thing that is proposed, is what we are seeking to achieve.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-De-Grâce*): Perhaps I could interrupt you at this point. You mention in your brief support for mobility and air transport. Do you feel this may be handled by two services or by one service, and I refer to the transporting of an armed unit by air, for example.

Mr. LEARMONTH: Perhaps I should let the group captain deal with this particular point in respect of the role of the air force reserve.

Mr. DRAPER: Mr. Chairman, the role of the air force reserve at the present time is one of light air transport and search and rescue as well as co-operating with the militia or regular army or other regular service, in any survival operation or national natural disaster of a type such as war or anything of that sort.

In respect of the air side of the question, and that is the mechanics of delivering people or freight from point A to point B which involves the ability to fly aircraft to the standards as set down by the regular air force and to maintain those aircraft with a ground crew, that is at present the job of the reserve air force. The reserve air force as such is capable, willing and eager to assist in any way in respect of a national survival effort or with corps training. As a matter of fact, the auxiliary air force as at this time at Camp Gagetown is co-operating with the army on an exercise doing actual air reconnaissance of a photographic type. So, it is a pretty wide thing. We are working now with the other services.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You do not have integration at this level, but I am thinking of pinpointing a particular task arising out of activities which hypothetically might take place. I am wondering whether the Conference of Defence Associations has any feeling whether this should be handled by an integrated service, or by two separate services. For instance, if you have an army unit operating in close co-operation with an air unit, or mobile unit, should these be integrated? I agree this is hypothetical, but I would like to find out how close to the bottom your ideas come and where you object to integration.

Mr. LEARMONTH: Your question applies primarily to the navy and perhaps Commodore Hendy might like to say a word.

Mr. HENDY: I think it is a question of compatibility. This is in the realm of semantics and I do not know what is finally involved. In our service we always have been triphibious. The first troops in Korea were sailors and we always have had an air arm, or at least for many years; but that is for the particular purpose of the naval maritime commitment. However, I think what is desirable is to avoid going up to the top in one service and coming down to the bottom in another service, instead of being able to go across at some ordinary level to get the facility. Recently the army service corps has taken over the supply of food for the navy which is a reasonable thing to do; they have a larger organization, and food is food, until the cooks get hold of it. If a colonel at one level wants some air support, he should not have to go to air force headquarters to get it and back down.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): On the whole, I believe the navy approaches this with a little misgiving.

Mr. HENDY: No. I thinks it is first that the reality of the situation is that you must have unification of command with regard to compatibility of use of weapons and personnel at every level, but when you come to talk about a unified force where every man is going to be a soldier, a sailor and an airman, this is not going to happen because you cannot have everyone given the ability in every trade, because they are not compatible.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): May we turn to another subject? We might continue with the discussion concerning roles. At the top of page 11 I note:

> The role of the reserves in providing for local defence or tasks connected with national survival or disaster is as important, or perhaps more important, than ever before.

I think this is in some contradiction to the new roles as outlined in the terms of reference by the Department of National Defence and given to the Suttie commission. From your letter it would appear that you feel one of the major roles of the militia should be survival. I note that this role has been cut down rather materially. I am wondering whether the Conference of Defence Associations has any observations on this?

Mr. LEARMONTH: If we had a crystal ball and knew what would happen—

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): If we had one we would not have you here.

Mr. LEARMONTH: —in the next war, then we would know what role it would be best to prepare for. It is a question of judgment with regard to which role is the more important. It is very difficult to weight them; some people weight them one way, and others another. They all are of importance.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): It would appear that there will be a tremendous reduction in manpower in the national survival role.

Mr. HENDY: From my experience in the Conference of Defence Associations, and from hearing the army representatives year after year, I am satisfied that the militia will be absolutely delighted with the fact that they are going back to soldiering.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Personally, it pleases me, because having in mind the physical make-up of the militia and its concentration in target centres, their role of re-entry was not a realistic one.

Mr. SMITH: Of course there are militia units outside the big cities.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I have a question for Colonel Legge. I am wondering whether he might tell us why the Suttie commission did not invite the Conference of Defence Associations to present its views?

Mr. LEGGE: This is a terribly difficult question. I am not at liberty to speak for the Suttie commission, but I think it is fair to say the commission felt it had to get evidence from varied sources, and the people the commission did interview were serving people in the militia, the regular forces, and that sort of thing. We did not go to the Conference of Defence Associations, or to the defence study group, or to any other people concerned with defence.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): There is no deep dark reason.

Mr. LEGGE: There is no obscure reason at all; it was simply a matter of time, and so on.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): With reference to paragraph 28 on page 15, I am wondering whether you recommend the block system, or the one recommended by the Conference of Defence Associations?

Mr. LEGGE: Surely, both these modifications to the present pay system are a matter of opinion. There must be ways of improving the present system which exists. I think the Defence Committee will consider a way of improving it and I would support either. They are put forward as improvements of the present system, and I think we all agree in the Suttie Commission and in the Conference of Defence Associations that the present system of pay in the militia is bad and can be improved.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In paragraph 35 on page 17 the Conference of Defence Associations takes exception to the contentions or suggested contentions of the Suttie commission, and suggests that the Conference of Defence Associations can do the job better and cheaper. I think that sums it up.

Mr. LEARMONTH: Yes, sir.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Could you tell us what it costs the people of Canada to operate the Conference of Defence Associations on a yearly basis?

M. LEARMONTH: I do not have the figures.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Can you give me an approximation of the grants which may be received by the conference across the country?

Mr. LEGGE: I think it depends what you mean. I think the corps associations which are the constituencies for the Conference of Defence Associations cost something in the order of $40,000, and on top of that the conference has another pool of perhaps $10,000 or $15,000, so we are operating at a rough figure of $50,000, but I would not wish to be held to that figure.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Which group do you feel should do the job as outlined in paragraph 35, the Suttie commission or the Conference of Defence Associations?

Mr. LEGGE: I hope you will have an equally embarrassing question for Group Captain Draper who wrote the air force report, and Commodore Hendy who wrote the navy report. I can say only that I am bound by both reports, and I feel that I am submitted to a dichotomy right now and really could not answer.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Does the Conference of Defence Associations feel strongly about this article 35?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Yes; we feel it is wrong in principle.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Thank you very much.

Mr. MCMILLAN: I was interested in the answer to the effect that the executive was not consulted at all by the Suttie commission. Where would they obtain the necessary information which you would have?

Mr. LEARMONTH: I do not know whether you are referring to facts or opinions. Most facts, figures and statistics, I presume, are available to them from the regular forces; but it is the questions of policy and opinion which in our opinion they decided on a narrow approach, whereas we feel a broader approach to the problems may be perhaps more rewarding.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Are they incorrect when they say they received co-operation from your executive, except where you say you suggested that you appear?

Mr. LEARMONTH: We gave them a luncheon to show them we were willing to co-operate.

Mr. LEGGE: No business was transacted.

Mr. SMITH: Where the figure of 9,000 is given in the Suttie commission report, are we right in assuming that when you provide that number, you would need a certain percentage, perhaps 25 per cent, in excess of that?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Some percentage over that. We do not want to feel tied to a figure.

Mr. SMITH: But it would be a reasonably substantial percentage over?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Yes. I do not know what they had in mind when they produced these figures.

Mr. SMITH: We hope to obtain this information next week. Assuming these are approximate figures, if you wanted 9,000 men for a particular role, the militia should have something in excess of that, perhaps 12,000. Is that a reasonable assumption?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is right.

Mr. HENDY: Further to that, I think Mr. Smith's question is related to the effectiveness of these people. If we can devise some means by which we may hold men in the reserve forces and replace the turnover we now are

experiencing, then of course the percentage would be much less. Going back to before the war, particularly in the naval reserve and the Unit I was in, we always had a waiting list and our percentage of effectiveness was very high. We would like to see leadership from the government and the people of Canada in respect of a realization that the reserve forces are important, and that being a member of the forces is an honourable vocation for the younger generation to take part in as a part time service to their country. This would help a great deal to reduce the turnover.

Mr. SMITH: Even though you have a very high degree of efficiency in training you cannot send every trained man forward and hope to continue; is that right?

Mr. HENDY: No, but your short fall would be less. If you have a high percentage of efficient men you do not have to have such a large over-run to take care of those who are not effectively trained.

Mr. SMITH: At page 18 of the brief you refer to the usefulness of the militia as a force for a brush fire or conventional war. Has the defence association ever given consideration to the mobilization of the militia unit at a time when there is less than complete or general mobilization? I refer to the difference between the Canadian militia and the national guard in the United States in respect of which the units are completely mobilized and active for periods of time when there is no general mobilization.

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Chairman, I think members are aware that this is conditioned on the law of the country and the forces are regulated by the National Defence Act and the Emergency Measures Act, of course, and that type of legislation. How far we can turn around and say to the militia unit "you are called out", when there is no declaration of a state of emergency is something I do not know.

Mr. SMITH: That does not quite answer my question. I asked you if you had any opinion whether a change in the law of this type would be a desirable or undesirable change.

Mr. HENDY: My opinion is that if the militia units, or a particular militia unit, were asked to provide a certain number of personnel for a particular job on short notice you would find that they would provide them. This would be entirely dictated by the circumstances, but we refer in our brief to the situation that happened during certain natural disasters such as hurricane Hazel in Toronto and the Red river flood. My own experience in this regard is that in one hour we had over 300 sailors in boats out in the disaster area, and this was at seven o'clock in the morning. They went out and there was no question of whether they were to be paid or not. We were told there was a job to be done and we had to do it, and we went out and did it.

I think this is the sort of support that normally permeates reserves. The main question is, how far do you want to go in numbers.

Mr. SMITH: Under different circumstances the period of call out could be longer. If the militia is to be useful in an emergency situation, perhaps of an extra difficult national character, you would have to have the call out in terms of longer than a few days.

Mr. HENDY: It is understood, I think, by most militia people that they can be called out if the proper measures are taken. This is part of their understanding when they join the militia or join the reserve. I do not think they join the reserve to avoid this type of responsibility but rather accept it as something that may be required. They regard it as being the job. What is the legislation that will make this effective and bring these men out? Certainly when asking a man to leave his job and go out for perhaps several months you must have an entirely different concept than in asking him to go out for a week or so.

Perhaps Group Captain Draper could answer this question, because in the auxiliary air force it is traditional that their flying officers may be called out very suddenly for a week to assist in rescue operations and things of that nature. This is part of the terms of their enlistment.

Mr. DRAPER: I think there are two ways one can deal with this situation. If you are speaking, let us say, in terms of an operation similar to that presently going on in Cyprus in respect of which you require people for perhaps three months, there are two ways of accomplishing this. I believe that under the present legislation you could ask for volunteers from across the reserve components and expect to get a significant number who would be willing on a purely voluntary basis to take time off from their civilian occupations and go.

There is one other way of accomplishing this, and that is by amending the National Defence Act, making it a condition of service that when the bell rings you must go. That must then be a part of the terms under which these people join.

I can only speak personally in respect of my own units and organizations in saying that we can supply people under the first arrangement now for periods up to a year with no change in the National Defence Act, and that we would be more than willing, if the National Defence Act were changed, and if it was changed it would presumably be changed along the lines of the National guard act incorporating some of the safeguards in respect of employment, to agree to the change so that when we were called upon we would answer. That is the name of the game and it should be that way. The government should receive some payoff in respect of its reserve forces and should have these reliable individuals in these forces. I am sure my associates in the reserve air force join me in that feeling.

Mr. SMITH: Do you feel that if the National Defence Act were amended in that direction it would have a deterrent effect on the enlistment or strength of the militia units?

Mr. DRAPER: I would be rather naive if I thought no one would object to this, and I must say again I am speaking for my own service, but the majority of our people would say that is why we are here.

Mr. HENDY: I think these individuals would be delighted to know that this is part of the job. I believe the militia was called out recently in connection with floods at Comox and given an antilooting task. Was there not a number of militia men called out and posted as guards to prevent looting? Such a thing can be done in conjunction with the premiers of provinces who have the power to ask the Department of National Defence to provide personnel.

Mr. MACLEAN: Practically all my questions have been asked already, Mr. Chairman, and I should now just like to deal with two or three tag ends. I will try not to be too lengthy.

Referring to the terms of reference of the commission, I take it, especially, where it refers to roles and numbers, it does not stem in anyway from recommendations made by the Canadian Defence Association in the past, or that they have the C.D.A.'s blessing in any way?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is correct.

Mr. MACLEAN: With specific reference to these figures given here, I take it the C.D.A. hopes they refer to the effective strength of the militia in various roles rather than total numbers?

Mr. LEARMONTH: I think that is correct. We really do not know what they had in mind when they announced those figures. I think they are ball park figures.

Mr. MacLEAN: My next question is asked for the purpose of clarification. There has been a great deal of loose reference to the phrase "unification of the services". It seems to me that different people have interpreted this phrase in different ways. Some people think it means integration, creating close co-operation between the three services at various levels while others envisage this to mean complete amalgamation of the three services into one service with everyone wearing one uniform.

Do I understand the witness correctly when I assume that they would agree to what I call close co-operation and integration of that sort between the three services, but that they would not go as far as approving complete amalgamation with the obliteration of the three traditional services as we know them?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is correct, but in that connection we would like, before we jump in, to see what the government is talking about. There is no definition of these terms in the white paper, and there has been much loose talk about them.

Mr. MacLEAN: That is the point. That is all I have to say.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I note that the conference strictly endorses recommendation No. 5 with regard to equipment. Does that endorsement include the endorsation of material in the Suttie Report? It certainly seems to imply that the minimum requirements of equipment are not now available for the militia.

Mr. LEARMONTH: I think that is correct. I do not know if Mr. Legge wishes to elaborate on it.

Mr. LEGGE: I think their promise was that the Suttie report was a strong recommendation for better equipment and for more equipment.

Mr. BREWIN: Actually the recommendation deals with obtaining a commercial type of equipment, with surplus tanks from NATO. But these are just two recommendations added to the general statement in the report. It says very definitely on pages 9 and 10:

> Training cannot be effective unless there is available to units a reasonable scale of equipment. The lack of equipment in the hands of units or available on a pool basis was a principal criticism in all commands. It is impossible to hold the interest of militia men if they have no opportunity other than in summer concentration to familiarize themselves with the equipment they are expected to use in war. It is recognized that the cost of outfitting units with the generous scale of equipment cannot be tolerated. However there is a minimum requirement which must be met in order to train to the required standards. To expect infantry to maintain interest without their personal and support weapons is unrealistic. The problem increases in severity in direct proportion to the technical specialization of the individual units, that is, signal, armoured, artillery.

I wonder if you wish to elaborate or comment on that? Is it a fact that inadequacy of equipment is affecting the maintenance of interest and the general efficiency of reserve units?

Mr. LEGGE: I think that the Suttie report is very clear. It was the opinion of the Suttie report that there were serious deficiencies everywhere, and consequently the report made a recommendation to improve that deficiency. Certainly it is the view of the C.D.A. that we wholeheartedly endorse this corrective action which is recommended.

Mr. BREWIN: I do not think it would be fair to ask you to go into detail. Perhaps we may do so when we have Mr. Suttie before us.

Mr. LEGGE: I think the brigadier will deal with it.

Mr. BREWIN: I want to get back to another subject we were discussing earlier that would involve some additional expenditure to meet these conditions.

Mr. LEARMONTH: We are suggesting economies, and the Suttie report recommends an inexpensive approach rather than an expensive one. So I think what we are recommending is not a tremendous factor.

Mr. BREWIN: I wondered how realistic the thought was of saving money in the militia. First of all, if you are going to have to make it efficient, to get more equipment and other recommendations which would involve additional expense, and then cutting down of members, does this appear to be realistic? Do you think we are going to function efficiently as a reserve unit? Do you think that any cutting down of expenditures is possible?

Mr. LEARMONTH: We feel there could be a reduction in expenditures in many ways such as in accommodation, the pay system, and so on.

Mr. BREWIN: Might I ask you to be more definite in that? You said earlier in your evidence that you thought there were savings to be made. I am interested to know in what areas you think there are savings to be made?

Mr. LEARMONTH: In accommodation, administration, organization, and in the number of members. We feel there are large savings to be made in that area in the first instance which should be attempted before any numerical reduction.

Mr. BREWIN: Are your recommendations in that respect calculated somewhere specifically?

Mr. LEARMONTH: You are no doubt aware that we have no staff. We have not tabulated or costed any of these recommendations. We have no statistical information with which to support our opinions that we have to present.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Your figures are ballpark figures.

Mr. LEARMONTH: I do not think we have given any figures be they ballpark or otherwise.

Mr. BREWIN: You think there are opportunities for special savings which could be used?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: Without cutting members?

Mr. LEARMONTH: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: I notice somewhere here that you envisage a role for the militia in what you describe as peace keeping operations. On page 18 you say:

> The conference feels that this is an important aspect of the role of a militia and one that should be developed.

That is in respect to brush fires or conventional wars. I wonder whether you would comment on that point. Some of us on this committee have received the impression that you need a very highly trained specialized force with which to cope with brush fires and conventional wars. You do not envisage that the militia would be set up and mobilized and sent out to handle any of these brush fire wars, do you? Do you think it should have a type of training which would make a useful contribution in that field?

Mr. LEARMONTH: Our submission says it should back up regular units which are called out.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps you might explain what you mean by "back up"?

Mr. HENDY: This applies to the officer services. If you take the regular components and send them somewhere, you will want to back them up. We had an example nearly two years ago when the Americans were faced with the

Cuban crisis. I know they called out a great many of their naval reserve units and put them on active service. They may not have been as completely efficient as we would like to have them, but they were available and they were called out. I think this indicated American determination to resist the communist threat in Cuba. This is the type of thing. Brush fires may easily grow into something greater, but if you show determination at the beginning you may keep them small. But if you do not have anything to back up your words, then anything you may do is apt to be ineffective. I think this is more of a concept that the militia should act to back up the troops when we send them somewhere to do a particular job. It indicates that we have reserves ready to go and fill in the gap.

Mr. BREWIN: Chiefly in Canada?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: If you were sending someone away, I take it that the militia would be filling some of the gaps within Canada.

Mr. HENDY: That is within the terms of reference. They say they want to be able to call up three brigades in the event of an emergency and to be able to back up the regular brigades. But they probably would not go into active service. You would not be starting off with nothing. It is pretty hard to build a military force from nothing. You have to have an organization established.

Mr. BREWIN: Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now one o'clock, and time for adjournment. Before we do so, on behalf of the committee I would like to thank Mr. Learmonth and the other witnesses for attending before us today.

Our next meeting will be on Tuesday at 11 o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID G. HAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 13

TUESDAY, JULY 21, 1964

RESERVE FORCES

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; and Colonel C. P. McPherson, Director of Militia and Cadets.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

21249—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de Grâce*),
Béchard,
Brewin,
Deachman,
Fane,
Groos,
Harkness,
Langlois,
Laniel,
Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),
Lloyd,
MacInnis,
MacLean,
MacRea,
Martineau,
Matheson,
McMillan,
McNulty,
Pilon,
Smith,
Temple,
Winch—(24).

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, July 21, 1964
(18)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11:15 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Harkness, Lambert, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacInnis, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch (21).

In attendance: The Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; and Colonel C. P. McPherson, Director of Militia and Cadets.

The Committee resumed its consideration of *Reserve Forces.*

The Associate Minister supplied information requested at a previous meeting. He also tabled information in reply to an earlier question, by Mr. Smith, regarding expenditures relating to Reserve Forces (*See Appendix "A" to this day's Proceedings*).

Mr. Cardin read a prepared statement respecting the future functions and requirements of the Reserve Forces. He and Colonel McPherson were questioned on that statement and on related matters. The witnesses were thanked and permitted to retire.

At 1:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m. Thursday, July 23, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

Note—The evidence, adduced in French and translated into English, printed in this issue, was recorded by an electronic recording apparatus, pursuant to a recommendation contained in the Seventh Report of the Special Committee on Procedure and Organization, presented and concurred in, on May 20, 1964.

21249—1½

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, July 21, 1964.
11:15 a.m.

(*Text*)

The CHAIRMAN: We have a quorum. Can we come to order, please?

We are continuing our study on the reserve forces. Our witness this morning is the Associate Minister of National Defence. Mr. Cardin will make a few opening remarks, and then we will follow with questioning.

Hon. LUCIEN CARDIN (*Associate Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the last time I appeared before your committee as a witness I was asked several questions. Today I am in a position to answer most of them. I have with me Colonel McPherson who will also be willing to answer all factual questions concerning the militia.

Last week Mr. Smith asked whether it would be possible to have a breakdown of the costs of the three reserve forces, the navy, the army, the militia and the air force. I am in the position now of either reading this or tabling it.

Mr. SMITH: I think my question was not quite as you said. My question related to the method by which the additional costs were computed other than direct answers. That was my question.

Mr. CARDIN: Could you repeat your question again, please?

Mr. SMITH: In your statement last week, Mr. Cardin, you said that computations had been made so that a more complete cost of the militia could be ascertained, and that other factors that were not directly attributable to the militia or that had not previously been attributed to the militia, were now added, so that it increased the over-all cost somewhat. It was not just a question of dividing the figures between the air force, the army and the navy.

Mr. CARDIN: I may be answering your question if I give you the naval reserve cost breakdown. Your question may then be answered or it may not. If it is not, we will supply you with the answer. For instance, during the 1963-64 period the total cost was $6 million. This is broken down in this way.

Annual operating costs—Navy reserve—1963-64

Pay for reserve personnel	$ 1,845,000
Travelling expenditure, including costs of R.C.N. travel	361,000
Military personnel costs of R.C.N. personnel employed in support of reserves	1,700,000
Civil salaries and wages	770,000
Food and clothing—reserves	310,000
Repair, upkeep, and public utilities, including heat for divisional properties	327,000
Repair and upkeep of boats and aircraft	105,000
Supplies (including barrack, mechanical, electrical and general stores and stationery) communications, freight, postages and other services	389,000
Commissionaires' services	92,000
All other expenditures	101,000
Total costs	$ 6,000,000

Does that answer your questions?

Mr. SMITH: I think it answers it.

My only question is, could you repeat the salaries of the R.C.N. personnel in support of the militia?

Mr. CARDIN: It is $1,700,000. These are military personnel costs of R.C.N. personnel employed in support of reserves.

Mr. SMITH: Could we, at another time, have a further explanation of that particular figure? I think my question would then be fully answered.

Mr. CARDIN: I have a breakdown for the others, and I will table it if it is your desire.

The CHAIRMAN: We can include these figures as an Appendix "A" to the proceedings today, if that is agreeable.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Could you give us the total for the army and the air force?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, the militia itself was $37,719,733, and the R.C.A.F. $10,700,000.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Was the navy $6 million?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: As I understand it, a similar breakdown as the one given for the navy, with these headings, will be shown in each of the other headings.

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. LLOYD: Further to that question, and supplementary to it, just to clarify my understanding of the figures here, are these calculations on estimates of many of these items there? Will you not be able to relate these in the public accounts, for example? Do you not take all of the items and break them down in the public accounts? For example, military personnel attributable to the naval reserve activities, $1,700,000, would be lost in the general items of the classification of accounts under public accounts. You would not find this $1,700,000 set forth separately, so that in effect you made an informed estimate of this cost? Is that correct?

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Is that for the present fiscal year?

Mr. CARDIN: It is for 1963-64.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Have you any idea of the percentage that would result from the new arrangements for the decrease in the forces?

Mr. CARDIN: That cannot be estimated accurately.

Mr. MCMILLAN: That would be an estimate for another year, of course.

The CHAIRMAN: The Minister has a further statement to make; I think we should hear that statement first before we start our questioning.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Chairman, you will recall that during the last meeting I attended questions were asked concerning the roles outlined for the militia which were included in the terms of reference given to the Suttie commission. There were several questions on that point, and it is to this that I would like to address myself now.

The requirement for the militia has been conditioned by the strategical concept and priority of "forces in being" vis-a-vis the former concept of large reserves as a broad mobilization base requiring time to mobilize and equip.

Studies conducted on the role of the reserves in many NATO armies have indicated that a national levee-en-masse in time of national emergency is no longer considered valid. It will be recognized that modern war, with all the complexities of new technology and equipment, dictates that forces must be highly skilled and "in being" to provide the mobility and flexibility that are essential if forces are to have a high degree of fighting efficiency. Soldiers in

modern war must be proficient in the handling and employment of such specialized weapons and equipment as radar sets, anti-tank guided missiles, surveillance devices, infra-red devices and navigational aid devices. This points up the need for a professional force made up of men who have had intensive training over a considerable period of time. Manpower alone is no longer the answer. Today's concept of field operations dictates a highly trained force ready to move at a minute's notice. Nonetheless, an examination of the Canadian defence position as a whole, clearly shows that although the concept for using Reserves has changed, there is still a continuing and essential requirement for a well-trained militia.

The primary role of the militia is to support the regular army, and because the militia is to support the regular army it would seem to me that the army is the most logical body to decide exactly what role the militia should play. These vital tasks are well within the capability of a well-trained militia. By "well-trained" we mean a militia in which all ranks have a knowledge of the basic subjects of their particular corps—infantry, armour, signals—whatever it may be. In addition they should have a basic knowledge of the specific duties they would be required to perform in an emergency so that they would be ready to assimilate a short period of intensive training which would quickly bring them up to a standard which would permit them to take their place alongside members of the regular army. They would provide trained reinforcements to replace casualties and wastage and would fill out cadres of regular troops in those supporting units which are not required and do not exist in peacetime. They would also be needed to assist in the enforcement of the additional security measures required during a war emergency.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to elaborate on each of these tasks in turn. First, the militia's task in support of our NATO forces. As I have already mentioned, if the forces in Canada now earmarked for NATO become committed in a war emergency, we would have to form supporting units to provide what is called the "divisional slice". These supporting units range from reinforcement units in theatres of operations to special supply, stores, medical units and other base installations. These are units whose functions are similar to the functions of units in the support organization in Canada at the present time. Examples are hospitals, ordnance depots and static workshops. When a field force moves into the field, the services provided by these static units at home are still needed with the field force to maintain its effectiveness. It will be apparent, however, that it would be very expensive indeed to maintain the required service units "in being" in duplicate.

Hence, our plans for the support units for the field force call for the use of many of the Regulars now serving with the static installations in Canada, augmenting them with Militia; at the same time the Regulars removed from the static installations would be replaced by militia personnel. The field support units would probably not be needed immediately but would be follow up support that would be formed and called forward as the situation demanded. Because of this build-up period, we consider that regulars, augmented by well-trained militia, could be organized and trained to produce highly effective units. Based on our emergency defence plans which are kept under constant review, it has been estimated that some 7,000 to 8,000 militia members are needed to meet this commitment. Additionally, about 1,000 militia officers and men are slated for special types of units not provided for in peacetime. Examples of this type of unit are forward delivery squadrons and graves registration units. Thus, the overall commitment in support of the NATO force accounts for some 8,000 to 9,000 members of the militia.

Next I would like to deal with the need to have militia personnel earmarked and trained for the task of forming and operating the training organizations which would be needed if our two brigades in Canada were sent overseas in

support of our NATO commitment. The role of these training organizations in the initial stages would be to train reinforcements to support the force which has been committed. The existence of a well-trained cadre of militia officers and N.C.O.'s is of paramount importance to effectively permit these units to build up to full establishment. Well-trained militia personnel would be given a short period of intensive training and would then be capable of operating these training organizations. These organizations would also provide in Canada a force which would be available for any unforeseen contingencies. It would be organized into training brigades and would be equipped initially with training scales of equipment. It would be built up in stages as the situation dictates. It is estimated that we would need approximately 18,000 officers and men of the militia for this purpose.

I have outlined the roles of the militia in support of our NATO commitment. However, it must be recognized that operations such as Cyprus could take place before a NATO involvement. It is therefore essential to give consideration to the assignment of the militia to fill the gap in Canada should our regular forces be committed.

Another task which would be assigned to the militia would be internal security duties. In a time of national emergency it would be essential to safeguard key installations such as public utilities, since a disruption in their services due to attack or sabotage could have serious consequences. These plans are kept under continual review not only in conjunction with the R.C.M.P. but with other government agencies as well. The military requirement is really a form of aid to the civil power and would consist of supporting the civil authorities until suitable arrangements could be made for other agencies to take over the task from the military forces. There may also be a requirement to give support to internment requirements and including the provision of guards for prisoners of war. As I have already mentioned requirements and plans are kept under review with other government agencies; the best estimate which can be made now is that these tasks will call for approximately 2,500 all ranks of the militia.

I would like to turn now to national survival. The responsibilities and tasks of the army in national survival have not changed. The army continues to have a responsibility for the re-entry of damaged areas and areas of serious fall-out, as stated in privy council order 656 of 1959. In peacetime the regular army maintains, at a state of readiness compatible with world conditions, the national survival attack warning system; the nuclear detonation and fallout reporting system; and the operation of emergency communication facilities. Plans are made and are kept up to date so that they could be activated fully in time of emergency. Economy calls for manning at essential strength. This strength, while highly skilled, would be able to operate for a limited time only without relief. Therefore, to bring the whole system up to 24 hour around-the-calendar readiness that would be effective in times of emergency it would be necessary to augment the regular staffs with militia. It is planned that selected militia personnel will train with the regular cadres in peace to ensure that they would be of great help in an emergency in fulfilling this important role. Indeed in time of war they might be called upon to relieve, for service elsewhere, the broader-trained regular army personnel. It is estimated that 1,500 militia personnel will be required for this task.

A word now about re-entry operations. It is visualized that the Canadian army including regulars, militia and many civilian organizations, indeed the whole country, would become critically involved. During the past few years the regular army, in conjunction with the militia, have been developing plans and have been training to support the country in the event of nuclear attack. These plans have been developed to the point where they can be kept up to date

in the various headquarters across the country. Furthermore, it has become clear that the main requirement for re-entry operations is formed and disciplined bodies of men which can adapt themselves to meet any task that may be required using large numbers of civilian volunteers. If it is ever necessary to carry out survival operations there is no doubt that the regular army and the militia, including militia not actually mobilized, would be organized and used. It has been further proven that once the basic standard of training has been reached refresher training will preserve the standard. Thus although it is planned that the militia will revert to its military corps skills training programme they will be effective and available for survival operations should the need arise. Moreover, if the regular field force were sent out of Canada to meet our NATO commitments, this would provide further justification for the militia organization to replace these forces. National survival is still a priority within the overall concept I have described. Both the regular army and the militia have the know-how, the adaptability and the equipment to support re-entry operations if required. In addition there will be no degradation in the army's capability to perform its allotted tasks in relation to:

(*a*) The nuclear detonation and fallout reporting system.

(*b*) The national survival attack warning system.

(*c*) Damage and casualty assessment.

(*d*) Maintenance and operation of emergency communication facilities.

It must be emphasized that in the event of an all-out nuclear war, all military forces and other organizations would be employed in survival operations.

Summary

It can now be seen that some 30,000 Militia officers and men are necessary and it is planned to employ them as follows:

(*a*) Reinforcement of Field Forces	7,000-8,000	officers and men.
Special Units for NATO commitments	1,000	
(*b*) Training Force to support the Field Force	18,000	officers and men.
(*c*) Internal Security	2,500	
(*d*) National Survival Installations	1,500	
	30,000	(approximately)

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed with our questioning. Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: I wonder if the minister would be able, in the course of the next few days, to file with the committee a breakdown showing militia units by name or number, their corps or base, and their actual participation in higher formations; that is, prior to any reorganization?

The minister has indicated, I think with some greater clarification than he did the other day, some of the justifications for the militia. I do not know that he has gone far enough in my mind to show the change from the original effective strength of 46,600 to the 31,000 that I make it. But in this field, basing myself on page 377 of the transcript of evidence, the present militia organization calls for an established strength of 155,000 all ranks, with an effective strength of some 46,600. On the basis of the 30,000 to 31,000 effective strength, which is shown within the terms of reference to the Suttie commission, what would be the establishment strength?

Mr. CARDIN: As you know, what we are doing now and what we have done is to try to figure out what the requirement would be and, of course, a figure between 30,000 and 31,000 is what we require. In order to be able

to have that requirement it is possible there necessarily would have to be a greater proportion of people available. However, I do not think it is possible to say just how many more would be required in order to be able to fill that requirement.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, but what I am talking about is an establishment strength of 155,000, knowing that our militia, at the present time, is based, shall we say, on the field strength of units. Those are the paper figures. But, in respect of effective strength, there are 46,000.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: In order to get your 31,000 what does your paper strength have to be?

Mr. CARDIN: That is what I say is difficult to establish at this time.

Mr. LAMBERT: That has not been established yet?

Mr. CARDIN: No. What we have established is what we require.

Mr. LAMBERT: The conference of defence associations indicated this figure of 31,000, and said what if you wanted 31,000 trained militia men you would require approximately 30 per cent more actual bodies because you would have the difference in gradations of training and you cannot guarantee you have a militia man all the time. Do you agree in that connection with the conference of defence associations or in some variations of it?

Mr. CARDIN: There is no question there would be required a greater body of men, but I am not ready to agree it would be 30% or 20% more, I am not willing at this time to make a guess.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, the figure of 30,000 or 31,000 is to be—

Mr. CARDIN: The hard core.

Mr. LAMBERT: —the hard core of the finished product as you want to see it.

Mr. CARDIN: That is correct.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary.

At the opening of Mr. Lambert's observation, as I understand it, he asked the minister to furnish us with certain information relating to militia units. I wonder at the same time if the minister could add in that report something in respect of the attendance record of these units. Although I do not know how this would be determined I am sure the military would know how this could be done. I put this question because there are some regiments attending man for man almost 100 per cent. I would like to have this information. We are not interested entirely in numbers, names and figures; we would like to know who actually have been parading, say, over the past 1½ or 2 years?

Mr. LAMBERT: I do not agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN: I suggest that when we have Brigadier Suttie before us next Thursday one of the purposes of having him in attendance is to elicit this sort of information.

Mr. MATHESON: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you finished, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: In respect of this field, Mr. Chairman, this is all I would like to ask at this time. If anyone else has any question in this particular area I am prepared to give way because I have other questions to follow.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have questions in this particular area.

The CHAIRMAN: I have a list of questioners and I think I should ask each one if they have questions on this particular area.

Mr. Winch was next.

Mr. WINCH: My question is not related to this particular area.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: I am not sure whether my question is related to this particular area and, therefore, I will waive.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel? Mr. McMillan?

Mr. MCMILLAN: I wanted to put a question in respect of the numbers. Is that in this area?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. MCMILLAN: I think the minister said it would take 8,000 or 9,000 militia men to support the NATO forces. Does that mean when men join up in the militia they would be signing up for overseas service and, therefore, are under an obligation to go?

Mr. CARDIN: No. this would be in time of emergency, and when our regular forces would have to leave the country, then the militia men perhaps would be mobilized at that time.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Then how would you support the NATO forces if the militia was not ready to go overseas?

Mr. CARDIN: They would be mobilized, I presume, under emergency war conditions. We now are talking about the militia being trained in order to take on this role. But, during a war emergency, of course, they would be mobilized.

The CHAIRMAN: Is your question along these particular lines, Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH: Yes. In the minister's statement he mentioned the level of training. Is there a time difference in the training level between a new recruit, we will say in the infantry or service corps, and the well trained militia man being brought into active service?

Mr. CARDIN: I think I will ask Colonel McPherson to answer that question for you.

COLONEL C. P. MCPHERSON (*Directorate of Militia and Cadets, Department of National Defence*): Perhaps I should give a little of the background.

A soldier joining the militia does so in one of two ways. He can participate in the normal weekly training program with the militia or he can, if he is a student, participate in a six week training program each year. This program was introduced some years ago. He takes six weeks of intensive training each summer. Now, each training program is divided into a system of blocks, a recruit block, a trained militia man block, and then a trades block, depending on the attendance of the individual.

Mr. SMITH: But, assume for my question that he is an enthusiastic and good recruit.

Mr. MCPHERSON: An enthusiastic militia man can complete two blocks in a year. He can take his recruit training and follow this up with trained militia man training, and he will reach the militia standard we have set.

Mr. HARKNESS: This would depend very considerably on the arm or the corps of the service involved?

Mr. MCPHERSON: It does indeed, sir.

Mr. SMITH: Well, suppose we take the simpler arms of the service.

Mr. MCPHERSON: The simpler one is what I have explained. Some other corps take additional blocks, in their trades training particularly. It is considered to be a little easier to become a specialist, Army Service Corps one, than, as Mr. Harkness has pointed out, for a chap to become a gunner. But, we must remember that in 1959 the training program was changed so that

the militia man in the arms—that is, in the armoured corps, the artillery and the infantry particularly—could not take their trades training in corps subjects. They were trained very basically in military subjects for very short periods of time and then went on to national survival training. So, in the end we obtained a product who knew something about the army but not very much. He knew a little about his corps and a lot about national survival. It is hoped after we have studied the Suttie commission report that we can reverse the field, so to speak. I think it is recognized that if we have a basically well trained militia man in his corps skills that he can be used for almost any purpose. He can adapt quickly to any situation, and I think that is a characteristic of the Canadian boy.

Mr. SMITH: In terms of time what advantage would that give the army in respect of the use of that man as opposed to a new recruit with six weeks, twelve weeks or three months training?

Mr. MCPHERSON: I do not think it would be fair to relate the militia man's training in terms of weeks because in the normal course of events he might attend only once a week or on a week end.

Mr. SMITH: I am not referring to training. Suppose you have two men come into the service in an emergency and one is a raw recruit and one is a trained militia man. How much advantage or utility does the militia man have? Has his training been worth six weeks, three months, or some other period of time to you as an officer who is going to employ that man?

Mr. MCPHERSON: I would suggest it would be a tremendous advantage to have a chap who has been trained in the militia. I would hesitate to pin a figure on this, but I would say that we could dispense with his recruit training.

Mr. SMITH: Which is what?

Mr. MCPHERSONS Six weeks, or longer in the regular army.

Mr. SMITH: Could you dispense with more of his training if he was, for instance, going into the service corps?

Mr. MCPHERSON: Yes; he would be basically trained in his corps and with very little additional training he could become a member of the team and take his place to perform a useful function.

Mr. SMITH: In arriving at your figures of what is needed, has there been no projection made with regard to the time advantage the employing service is going to have?

Mr. MCPHERSON: Not that I am aware of.

Mr. CARDIN: I do not know whether you can use a yardstick of just what time element would be involved here, and the advantage in the field of time. It is quite clear that what we are trying to do is to be able to give to the militia men as much training as possible within each of the corps. There certainly is no doubt that what we are trying to do is get them as ready as is possible in order to get in the regular force with the minimum amount of additional training.

Mr. SMITH: I feel you have to make some sort of projection; you have to have some idea how much sooner you will have the use of the militia man than would be the case in respect of a raw recruit, because the shorter the time the raw recruit will be useful tends to derogate from the value of the militia.

Mr. CARDIN: From what we tried to do during the last war, I would not imagine you could get a raw recruit and make him a good soldier in anything less than six or eight months.

Mr. SMITH: That is my feeling. I think probably the militia man has a greater value than the periods of training would indicate.

Mr. MACINNIS: The minister just referred to the fact that it would be very difficult to fully qualify a militia man in less than six months.

Mr. CARDIN: I did not say it would take a militia man six months. We were talking about a new recruit.

Mr. MACINNIS: A new recruit going into the militia.

Mr. CARDIN: The regular forces.

Mr. MACINNIS: What I want to get at is the colonel referred to two blocks. How are the blocks arranged in one year in order to qualify the man, and how is it to be worked out with the student militia?

Mr. MCPHERSON: Perhaps I might explain what a block is. A block of training represents 60 training periods. As a further explanation, it represents 30 parades of 15 days' pay. Two parades represent one day's pay. Our training program is geared around this block system. Although you must remember it is spread over a period of time, in 15 days he gets his recruit training. He then progresses to other blocks in subsequent periods.

Mr. MACINNIS: I am concerned with how you go about arranging the blocks, say, for the student militia where there is a six weeks course.

Mr. MCPHERSON: It is a six weeks concentrated course. What happens is that the student militia man can take both the recruit training and the militia man training in the six weeks period.

Mr. MACINNIS: How do they break it down between the recruit who comes into the militia off the street as opposed to a student militia man who goes into the militia; how do they take advantage of the student militia training that some of them may have taken already?

Mr. MCPHERSON: The training standards are broken down into subjects on the basis—to put it broadly—of what the individual must know and the subjects that he should know. Then, perhaps, there is a further breakdown of subjects he might know. When he parades with his unit at the armoury he takes "must know" subjects. The student militia man who attends a six weeks camp takes not only the "must know" subjects, but also the "should know" subjects; in other words, he is becoming better polished in his particular skill.

Mr. MACINNIS: When a recruit comes in off the street and a former militia trainee joins the militia, is there any separation of their basic training in respect of the required knowledge?

Mr. MCPHERSON: The aim or object of the student militia program is to provide potential non-commissioned and commissioned officers for the militia. If a student wishes to join the militia full time and parades with his unit at night throughout the year, then, of course, he has higher qualifications than has a soldier who has merely gone through the normal training program at the armoury.

Mr. MACINNIS: Would it be necessary for him to go through certain repetitions in his training?

Mr. MCPHERSON: I would not say repetition; it would be necessary for him to take the non-commissioned officers course in order to be skilled in the technique of being a leader or a commander.

The CHAIRMAN: Next is Mr. Harkness. Supposedly we are dealing with the numerical strength aspect of the militia. After Mr. Harkness, I will revert to Mr. Winch.

Mr. HARKNESS: At the present time, the strength of the militia is governed by two orders in council, one which provides for a theoretical establishment of approximately 190,000 men, and another which limits the actual number which can be enlisted to 90,000 men. As we know, the actual strength

never has been much above 50,000. Is it proposed to rescind those orders in council and, if so, what strength would be provided in the proposed new order in council?

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Harkness, that part of the problem has not yet been decided upon. We were working the other way to try to find out what we require, and adjustments can be made later. At the present time I am not ready to say whether or not the order in council will be rescinded.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think this strength of 31,000 not only bothers me but also bothers militia men generally throughout the country. I will come back to the figures you gave, and if we accept those as the number of militia men you actually would need in an emergency, have you made any calculation with regard to how many people you would require in the emergency in order to get the 31,000 when you need them?

Mr. CARDIN: No. I think that was the question asked by Mr. Lambert. We do not know yet what will be the number of additional people. It could be in the order of 20 per cent or 25 per cent, but this has not yet been determined. I would think it would depend also largely on the enthusiasm with which the members look on the new roles of the militia and the attendance of the people in the different corps.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the basis of past experience, of course, we know that when an emergency develops a considerable proportion of the number of officers and men in the militia, because of family, business and other reasons, are not prepared to go on duty. In view of the fact we have no conscription system we therefore must proceed on the basis that a considerable proportion of men in the militia at any particular time are not going to be available when needed. I would think that is the primary thing we must consider and be aware of in this committee, otherwise we are dealing with things, to quite a great extent, in a vacuum. We must know the actual number of men in the militia required to meet your needs in an emergency.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Harkness, I agree with the principle that you have mentioned, needing more individuals than the total required, but I am not now in a position to state how many more will be required in order to meet that need of 30,000 to 31,000 militia men.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the basis of the number of militia men who offered themselves for service in 1914 and 1939 I would think we should have a rough guiding principle. What was the proportion in that regard or do you have those figures available?

Mr. CARDIN: I am sorry, I have not got those figures although I can obtain that information for you.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think those figures would provide a rough guide immediately. I feel the figures in respect of 1939 are perhaps more applicable than the figures in respect of 1914, in view of the changed conditions.

Mr. CARDIN: I will try to obtain that information and make it available to you.

Mr. HARKNESS: Until we receive that information I suggest we are not really in a good position to deal with the question involving the strength of the militia, and its composition.

Mr. CARDIN: I have no doubt that figure is an important one; however the main gist of the terms of reference in relation to what the army has felt is required to support the regular army and the other three roles, it would seem to me, gives members of this committee an ample opportunity to study these roles. The only part of the question not included in the statement I made has

reference to the margin between what we feel is necessary and the number of people that we should have on strength or establishment to meet the requirement.

Mr. LAMBERT: I should like to ask a supplementary question. In view of that fact, is it not unrealistic, Mr. Chairman, to speak of saving so many millions of dollars?

Mr. CARDIN: We have not spoken, as far as I know, in any accurate or formal terms. Our figures have always been based on approximations.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am referring to the $5 million figure that has been bandied about.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Chairman, I think what Mr. Lambert is referring to is a calculation that the Suttie committee has mentioned. That figure certainly is not a figure referred to by the Department of National Defence.

Mr. LAMBERT: I think the announcement on December 5, 1963, went as far as indicating a savings of $15 million, and that certainly was a departmental announcement through the voice of the minister and yourself. I did have grave doubts about the realism of that figure.

Mr. CARDIN: I think at that time the minister also claimed that he was referring to approximate figures. It is difficult to calculate exactly what the savings will be until firm decisions have been taken regarding exactly that which is to take place. I think you can appreciate that fact, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: I do appreciate that fact, hence the reason I object to the use of these large round figures on which these announcements are formed.

Mr. CARDIN: The committee continues to ask for figures and if we do not supply them they become annoyed, yet when we give approximate figures we are accused of giving wrong figures which are nothing else but approximations.

Mr. LAMBERT: I refer to the announcements in respect of large figures which are headline grabbers.

Mr. HARKNESS: We have been given the figure of 30,000 in respect of the militia strength. I feel that figure has been taken for granted by practically everyone as indicating the strength of the militia is going to be reduced from approximately 50,000 to 30,000 men. I have attempted to point out that in order to have 30,000 men available at any given time the strength of the militia must be considerably greater than that. I would suggest that the probable need is close to the number we have had on establishment in recent years, being around 45,000 to 50,000. In order to have 30,000 men available when you need them I suggest you must have perhaps something of the order of 45,000 to 50,000 men on establishment.

Mr. CARDIN: I do not doubt that that is a valid opinion, and I realize you have experience in this regard; however, I am not in a position at this time to indicate what we feel will be the number required.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would suggest that in connection with the 1,500 figure you gave us as representing the number of individuals required to help with nuclear detonation centres and general survival operations, it is a fairly definite figure and which is, I know from experience, calculated very accurately. I would suggest that is a hard and fast figure. You also refer to 2,500 individuals being required for security purposes. I am very curious about the method you used to arrive at that figure of 2,500. Can you give us a breakdown or explanation regarding the method you used to arrive at that figure? Personally I feel that is a completely unrealistic figure.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Harkness, Colonel McPherson is in a better position to answer that question than I am.

Mr. McPHERSON: Although this not within my province, I think you may and probably do remember that throughout Canada there were various installations which, as is stated in the associate minister's statement, may be disrupted as a result of sabotage, having serious consequences. These installations have been established and identified, and we have determined very roughly the number of individuals required for each of these installations; hence we arrived at this figure.

In addition, the R.C.M.P. has stated that it will require some assistance initially in certain fields such as in respect of internment operations. The numbers in this regard have been calculated as well.

I recall in 1939, on mobilization, being with a group of men employed in respect of a power station. That is the type of thing to which I have reference.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the type of thing I had in mind, and the number of people employed on these duties in 1939 I think was considerably in excess of 2,500. That is why I wondered about this figure and why I should like to have a breakdown of the figure.

Mr. McPHERSON: I do not know whether this information can be made public or not.

Mr. MACINNIS: Is there any breakdown in respect of veterans' guard personnel who were being used for this purpose during the last war? I expect the number would exceed 2,500.

Mr. McPHERSON: The veterans' guard, of course, was not organized immediately in 1939.

Mr. MACINNIS: Yes, but the purpose to be served supposedly by the 2,500 men as now planned is very unrealistic in view of the number required to perform similar services during the last war.

Mr. McPHERSON: Perhaps I should add this point, that the 2,500 figure is considered to be the immediate requirement which we can foresee in respect of these installations. Following that there would of course be a greater number required, depending on the situation.

I do recall in 1939, as I said, being with a group of men guarding what was considered to be a vital installation, the railway bridge that crossed between St. James and Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would like to ask a question on this particular point. Can we get a breakdown on how this 2,500 is arrived at because, again referring back to 1939, there were several full infantry units engaged in these duties that I know of personally, and there must have been a lot more that I never heard of.

Mr. CARDIN: May I point out, Mr. Harkness, that even in the statement I read I was referring to approximately 2,500. In answer to your question whether we can get a breakdown, I shall try to do this. There is no doubt that a number of people are involved in security which have to do with installations. Whether or not we should give out the number of people we would have in the different areas that we consider secure is problematic. I do not think it would be wise for us to go ahead and give too much indication on what we feel are security posts.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would agree that perhaps we should not indicate all the points at which you are going to put these people.

Mr. CARDIN: If we cannot do this, it then makes it difficult to give a breakdown.

Mr. SMITH: We know you have security guards on the St. Lawrence seaway and the Welland canal. I think that even the most naive enemy would know that, but I think it would be some guide to the committee on the

realism of these figures if we had an indication of what number would be involved in normal antisabotage security duties on these two installations.

Our worry, Mr. Cardin, I think, is that we are somewhat dubious of these figures as being the worst type of ball park figures, to use Mr. Hellyer's expression, and not having much realism. We would like to be reassured in that direction.

Mr. CARDIN: It is my understanding that the figures which have been given out are not as unrealistic as you might think.

Mr. SMITH: But we would like some assurance of that.

Mr. CARDIN: In so far as it is possible for us to give that assurance without divulging too much security information, we will try to do it.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would suggest, the protection of the St. Lawrence waterway alone, including the Great Lakes, the Welland canal and Sault, would require more than 2,500 alone. I think that if you look up your figures for 1939 you will find that was the case.

Mr. CARDIN: I will look into it.

Mr. HARKNESS: This was why it struck me that the figure was so unrealistic.

Mr. CARDIN: I will try to give as complete an answer as it is possible to do, keeping the security measures in mind.

Mr. HARKNESS: Those are all the questions I have on this particular matter.

Mr. SMITH: I have a simple supplementary question on figures.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it short and concise?

Mr. SMITH: Yes. Do these figures of militia take into any consideration the replacing of the military presence in those bases in northern Canada which were recently abandoned or turned over to the Department of Transport?

Mr. CARDIN: I do not think so. These establishments have at present no longer any military use, and unlikely to have even in the future.

Mr. SMITH: Even in times of stress and emergency?

Mr. CARDIN: There is always this possibility of course.

Mr. WINCH: I am most interested in this discussion on the future of the militia, having been a member of the militia myself. In order to explain what is in my mind I may have to give a little bit of background. I was most interested in the statement the associate minister made this morning regarding which I have written down two quotes. The first one is "Militia having the know-how", and the second one, and I wrote it down as he said it, was "get into the regular forces with the minimum amount of training". It is on the basis of those two quotes from what the associate minister said that I will have to give some background in order to build up to the information I want.

I had the privilege of being a member of the militia during the last war. I joined as a private in the Irish Fusiliers, the second battalion of the Vancouver regiment. I went up through N.C.O. ranks, and two years later got officer's status on examination. As a sergeant and an officer for between two and three years I was utilized wholly and solely as a weapons instructor. This was in time of war during which a great many went overseas from the militia of which I was a member. They did a wonderful job and many did not come back. However, here was my experience, sir, in an infantry battalion. We had light machine guns. We had enough for the training of one platoon, not for a battalion. We had the Lewis. Why do you have militia teaching enough Lewises for a company in time of war when the Lewis is not the L.M.G. being used overseas? Then the Lewis was removed from our battalion and we got the Brens. I had enough Brens for two sections, not for a battalion. Moreover, at no time—going back in memory—those who were instructing ever fired with

live ammunition so as to understand the recoil, and so on. We then had our submachine guns, the S.M.G.'s. In the militia unit I, as a training officer, had to teach militia in time of war the Reising S.M.G., and yet that S.M.G. was never used in the battlefield. Then the Reising was removed and we had the Stens. In our battalion I think we had three Stens. I can never remember any member of the battalion ever firing a Sten. As an infantry battalion we had antitank guns. The boys marked with one star were given the 55 mm. guns. I think we had two of them. Beyond everyone passing their T.O.E.T. on the antitank guns, it was never fired. Then we had commando training and infantry. I am only speaking of our Vernon camp and the Vancouver island camp. In one year the platoon formation was changed three times. I know of that because I was a commander instructor both in Vernon and on Vancouver island. However, how are you going to have the militia which have know-how—this is right in time of war—being able to get into the regular forces without the minimum amount of training if, from the experience which we had in the militia, we do not have the weapons which are used in time of war? There is a big difference between passing a test of elementary training and knowing what is the meaning of a recoil of, shall I say, a .55 which was the antitank gun. I resigned my commission shortly after the war but I have maintained an interest in the regiment I belonged to. What has happened since then? The straight infantry battalion becomes an anti-aircraft battalion, which it never was before.

Mr. Chairman, I have just given this hindsight, this background, from personal experience. I am asking the minister now if we are going to have an entirely different situation for the militia where they are going to be trained knowing what the objective is, and if they are going to be trained with the weapons which they will be expected to use if they go into service, and if the training of militia from now on in peacetime will be a damned sight better than it was in wartime, when you could not even train them with actual firing.

I emphasize that one word, firing, because I was called on the carpet more than once by conspiracy with the regular A-1, when we built up some of our own equipment. Let us take an example. One of our teachings was to use a grenade fired from a rifle. You cannot teach that one verbally. Unless they actually fire a grenade from a rifle they do not understand the range and so on. I almost got courtmartialed because I did it in Stanley Park. I hope you get my point. This was experience. I hope you go beyond that. We were supposed to study a two inch mortar, but I never saw a two inch mortar fired at all. We did not have one range finder. A range finder is for the artillery, but it is also part of the equipment for an infantry company, yet we did not have a range finder. I was the only man who knew anything about how to use it. Why? Because I was in politics and I was able to go to another battalion and have them teach me how to use a range finder so that I could explain it to my people.

Have I made myself clear from the point of view of the militia in time of war, and from my experience as a weapons instructor? Many went overseas, and many never came back. Many died in the invasion of Sicily. Now, as we are changing from straight infantry to anti-aircraft, to civil defence, and now to something else, I hope the minister will give us some definite confirmation that the militia is not going to be just verbally instructed, it is not going to have antiquated weapons which will never be used, but will be given an understanding of what they have to use. I shall conclude with the words of the minister when he concluded: "To get into the regular forces with the minimum amount of training."

Mr. CARDIN: I think Mr. Winch has made a very good point and made it very well. As a matter of fact, what we are now trying to do is to correct the shortcomings that there were in training people during the last war with antiquated equipment, and not giving them an opportunity of feeling what war was really like.

Mr. WINCH: Do you know that we still have the Ross rifle?

Mr. CARDIN: I know. But I think when we are speaking of the role of the militia written down in the terms of reference, it is based upon trying to give to the militia not only better training but also better liaison with the regular forces. I think you will appreciate that it would be expensive, indeed, I think impossible, to have all the equipment which is now used by the regular forces in our militia installations. This would be an extremely costly matter. But we try as much as possible to be able to get some equipment which can serve certain purposes. We shall try as much as possible to get equipment for training the militia which is as close as possible to the equipment of the regular forces.

Now, something which I think is even more important is that we have hoped and indeed it is our plan to be able to give to the militia a far greater training during the summer months with the regular forces, with real equipment used by our regular forces, and to a far greater extent than it has ever been done in the past. This is to be able, as we say, to give to the militia the know-how, and also to be able with the least possible training to have them ready to take over from the regular forces. This is our objective. It is not an easy one, nor can it be done overnight. We can, of course, increase field training during the summer months with the regular forces and with regular equipment, and we can also try as time goes on, to perfect the equipment that is now being used in training the militia.

But I think your point is well made. What we are trying to do is to avoid repetition of error, and to make sure that the militia men have fired and know what the range of fire is, if they have an opportunity to use equipment used by the regular forces. This we propose to do during the summer training to a far greater extent than ever before. Perhaps Colonel McPherson might add a word to this.

Mr. MCPHERSON: I do not think there is much that I can add to what the minister has said, but we do hope that we will be able to make militia training far more interesting and far more dynamic for the individual. It has been said that there is a turnover in the militia that at times is phenomenal. We hope that by introducing a good program with proper equipment, that this turnover will be slowed. We contend that if militia officers and militia N.C.O.'s make the training interesting for the men, and show the men that they have their interests and welfare at heart, that they are offering them a unique method by which they can serve their country and at the same time have an interesting hobby or second career, then we feel that militia men will be more inclined to stay in the militia.

Mr. WINCH: May I bring up one other point: it will mean four years of instruction, but you can instruct all you want with theory and everything else, and you can even get your men to pass their T.O.A.T., but you are not building up the morale of those men in the militia by just strictly instruction, and have them pass their T.O.A.T.'s. Let me tell you from experience that time after time after time the men would go to their instructors and say: When are we going to fire?

You can only go into camp for two weeks in a year. You are holding your exercises perhaps one week end in a month or every two months and so on. And during that time they have to be able to fire and to understand what they

have been taught. Otherwise you are hurting their morale, because you cannot just say "O.K., if you want to, go to camp". Do not forget that one half the militia do not go to camp, and they have to be able to train while they are actually training in their home barracks or armouries or on field manoeuvres.

That is one thing alone. If you only added it twice a year, it would do more in my estimation to build up morale than anything else, because morale will not grow just from taking your T.O.A.T.

Mr. McPHERSON: I think you will find with the present day militia force that they are firing more than they did in the past. There are limitations, of course, on the amount of equipment that we can give to a militia commanding officer. There are such factors as "can he house the equipment?" As you know, in our cities we have very large armouries, and even if we could, it would not be very feasible to give him all the training equipment he might think he needs, because there is no place to store it.

Mr. MACINNIS: Yes, and it is hard to hold on to today.

Mr. McPHERSON: There is also the maintenance which the General Officer Commanding usually insists upon; can the commanding officer maintain this equipment and so on. But what we hope to do is to make equipment available so that when the commanding officer chooses he can take his battalion out on week ends and use the equipment. He can take his troops to the ranges, and to a training area, and fire his weapons.

Mr. SMITH: Perhaps it would be reasonable if occasionally we let Hertz put the militia man in the driver's seat.

Mr. WINCH: I am very glad to hear this. But, as I said, I was a weapons instructor in the militia for three years during wartime and only on one occasion, namely in the armoury, were the officers allowed to fire their side arms. Now, they changed our side arms about every six months. But, as I say, only once in three years did the officers fire their side arms. This is what I am referring to and I hope this system is being changed.

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN: You are next, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I have had a similar experience to that which Mr. Winch has related, and I want to follow his same line of questioning.

I note in the Suttie commission report at page 9 that while they recognize that the cost of outfitting units with a generous scale of equipment cannot be tolerated, there is a minimum requirement which must be met in order to train to the required standards. Then they go on to speak to the point which Mr. Winch has raised in respect of the necessity for morale and to point out there is the technical specialization and the need for equipment which develops. The question I wanted to put was whether this standard of minimum requirements to train to the required standards in the militia have been worked out in any detailed way. Is there a program for filling this minimum requirement and has any estimate been made of what the cost of filling this minimum requirement would be. Or, are we just drifting along hoping we will be able to do these things without any definite plan to do them?

Mr. CARDIN: Before asking Colonel McPherson to answer this particular question I would like to point out again that you are reading from the Suttie commission report. I do not want to comment on this report until a decision has been taken.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Cardin, if you do not mind my interjecting at this point, a short while ago in the committee you referred to this committee report with some authority and now you are saying you do not want to comment upon it.

Mr. CARDIN: No. What I referred to were the terms of reference included in the report. The terms of reference were given to the committee by the Department of National Defence, and it is on that that I have spoken. But, I think members of the committee will understand we have before us a report made by a commission and I want to make a distinction between what the Department of National Defence has been thinking and what is in the Suttie commission report. I think you can appreciate that.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I appreciate they are not the same. But, before we get the full answer to the question, is there any doubt in the minds of officials of the Department of National Defence or the minister in respect of the lack of adequate equipment for the militia?

Mr. CARDIN: No, there is no doubt about it. But, I do not want to comment upon it nor do I want to be involved in a situation to the extent that you can no longer distinguish between the Department of National Defence's position and the Suttie commission report.

Mr. BREWIN: I appreciate that. I just took from this report what I assumed to be a statement of fact because we had the same thing from the conference of defence associations the other day. Mr. Winch has spoken of it and, from my own experience, it is a pretty chronic complaint by militia units that they lack the equipment to create the morale which will hold the people. I was wondering if there is not only just a recognition but if, in fact, a real plan exists in respect of these minimum requirements, that this is engaging your attention and that, in fact, you are going to try to work them in more with the regular forces. Has this minimum requirement been worked out and is there a plan to meet it? If so, what are the approximate costs?

Mr. ASSELIN: (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we should have the answer before we have a supplementary question.

Mr. MCPHERSON: Mr. Chairman, it might be of some use if I explained the present system or method by which we calculate the requirements. We have established across the country what are called command pools of equipment, recognizing that we cannot provide the full war establishment of equipment for every unit in the country. I think the factors of costs, security, maintenance and real use would negate the need for this.

We have a document that is called the unit scales of entitlement, and each unit by corps has on a separate page its entitlement for training purposes. It shows that each unit is entitled to so many, we will say, machine guns, so many artillery pieces, and so forth. When you take the unit's scale of entitlement and multiply it by the number of units you have in a given command this determines the command pool, or the amount of equipment one must have in that command for those militia units to train with. The policy is that the active units get priority in the use of this equipment. There is no question of trying to spread this as thin as possible to let everyone have a little bit of equipment, whether or not he uses it. If the commanding officer is active and has a tremendous interest in getting out to train he can be issued the equipment he requires to do his training. That is our present system. It does take into consideration the factors of cost, security, maintenance and housing or holding the equipment.

Mr. LAMBERT: And this has been the case for a number of years?

Mr. BREWIN: Is there any recognition of shortages in this connection, and is there any plan afoot to increase the equipment available?

Mr. WINCH: Do you still supply active forces' A.I.'s to militia units?

Mr. MCPHERSON: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Would the bringing of this up to the minimum requirements, which were brought up through the last two questions, take you past the point where you could say that the dollar spent in respect of the reserve and the militia is the cheapest one? In other words, would it bring you to the point where it is no longer economical? There must be some point at which it is not economical.

Mr. CARDIN: There is.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In other words, if you are going to equip them as regular forces you might as well have regular army personnel looking after them. There must be some point in there where it is no longer economical.

Mr. CARDIN: There is no doubt that there is a point there. Of course, the amount of equipment that can be made available, as Colonel McPherson has mentioned, is limited by the amount of money available. What we are trying to do is, first of all, to get as much equipment as we feel necessary and to try in time to get better equipment for the militia, but mostly to try to organize the militia to work with the regular forces with regular forces equipment. This is the basis on which we are trying to train our people.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): That is, to make the regular force equipment go further?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes. The militia would train with the regular force equipment as much as possible.

Mr. MCPHERSON: It is foreseen that during the summer months the militia would be organized for camp, and the regulars would stop their training and take on the militia, letting them use regular army equipment and firing regular army weapons.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder whether I might get a direct answer. I am not sure that I understood the answers which have been given with regard to whether there has been any recommendation concerning additional equipment required, and any estimate made, of the added cost of the equipment required to measure up to what has been described in the Suttie report as the minimum requirement.

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Mr. CARDIN: The answer is that no estimate has been made yet.

Mr. WINCH: I have a supplementary question which is of interest to me. There always has been, and I presume still is, a plan whereby the militia go to a specified camp for two weeks. I can remember in my experience we were in Vernon, Gordon Head and Nanaimo. A week or so ago members of this committee had the opportunity of going to Camp Gagetown. I understand that in the summer the active force exercises at the same time the reserve force

exercises at Gagetown and Wainwright. In view of what the minister has said about know-how and getting into the regular force with a minimum of training, has any consideration been given to the possibility that for the two week period the militia instead of training, for instance, at Vernon, Gordon Head, Nanaimo or anywhere else in Canada, could have their training tied in with the Gagetown operation or the Wainwright operation? I find this most interesting as a result of our day at Camp Gagetown.

Mr. McPHERSON: At the present time we have another aspect of the militia training program whereby we attach militia officers and non-commissioned officers to regular units.

Mr. WINCH: But not the other ranks?

Mr. McPHERSON: Officers and non-commissioned officers.

Mr. WINCH: But, I am talking about the other ranks.

Mr. McPHERSON: There was a limit to the number of people we could take and it is felt that what the non-commissioned officer and officer requires in the militia is a training in the leadership aspect such as how to command a platoon, learn how a squadron is operated or how a rifle company is commanded. For example, a platoon commander would go to Wainwright and be attached to one of the infantry battalions. He would train with a platoon, and for the period he is at the camp he could act as the platoon commander, or, if he was not up to it, he would understudy the regular platoon commander, and toward the end of the week he would have the opportunity of commanding the platoon. This is the purpose of the attachment.

Generally speaking attachments can take place at any time of the year, depending on the individual's corps. For example, a Royal Canadian Army pay corps clerk in the militia could be attached to the nearest pay office for training in pay matters at any time of the year, whenever he could get away from his civilian employment. This arrangement exists and I might say works extremely well.

Mr. WINCH: Do you still follow the practice of sending senior officers to college for training?

Mr. McPHERSON: Yes, indeed; this is the militia staff course. It is based at Kingston at our Canadian army staff college. We have a program whereby qualified officers of the militia attend and receive a higher qualification. After successful completion of this course he is granted the symbol M.S.C.

Mr. WINCH: I remember that the second in command of the Irish went from the militia to the training college and almost two months later went overseas with the Seaforths.

Mr. McPHERSON: We also have a program which directly ties in the militia with the regular army and that is by attendance at the royal schools. I think anybody who was in the militia before the war will remember royal schools. The royal schools have been brought back and militia personnel are attending these schools.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, might I just finish?

The CHAIRMAN: We have Mr. Laniel and Mr. Temple who have yet to ask questions. I would ask you to complete your questions, Mr. Brewin, and then we will have no more supplementaries.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to make sure I have this straight. The Suttie commission report has referred to the shortage of equipment and has implied that it is a serious matter, and that an extra cost is required. This particular recommendation was strongly endorsed by the Conference of Defence Associations which appeared before us. Did I understand correctly that the minister said no extra cost is contemplated if it is necessary to expand and meet this requirement for equipment for the militia?

Mr. CARDIN: No. If I understood the question correctly, you asked previously whether any estimates had been made, and the answer to that is no. That does not mean that the whole problem is not being considered.

Mr. BREWIN: The whole problem is being considered, but no definite estimate has been made?

Mr. CARDIN: No definite estimate has been made.

(*Translation*)

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Minister, I wonder how you can set up such tightly closed areas of activity as those defined in the four roles enumerated as terms of reference for the Suttie report. Do you expect to have some units that will have one or two specific roles? If that is the case I do not see how you arrive at the figures given for each area. In my opinion, and this may complete the points already dealt with, maintaining reserves is not only a matter of training and efficiency, it is also a matter of interest for the recruits who join the reserves. I belonged to an anti-aircraft artillery unit for eight years, myself. If we had not had various opportunities, because of the lack of equipment and instructors, to play at being infantry men or to do all kinds of other exercises, I do not know how the cadres of our unit could have been maintained or how the officers could have remained sufficiently interested to attend regularly. I am wondering at the same time whether such overlapping in one sector or another does not completely change your figures. I wonder whether you should not give the Reserve another direction by preparing a broader program so that everyone can have something to do, so that each sector and each part of Canada could be better covered in case of an emergency or in case any national problem should arise.

Mr. CARDIN: Well, the roles assigned to the Militia more or less cover what the regular forces would like to have in the way of support. The Militia as a whole, with the roles assigned to it is now in a position, in a much better position than it has been, let us say, since 1959, to give such support to the regular forces, whether in the field of support to the regular forces should our 2nd and 3rd Brigades in Canada be sent to Europe, or where training is concerned, in which case it would in fact comprise three brigades. So we feel that the objective corresponds to the wishes of the regular forces in the first place, and that the roles assigned to the militia are more interesting and more attractive to the men who are part of it. I think there will be much closer liaison with the regular forces than there ever was in the past. They will become real soldiers again and not be merely people who are only involved in civil defence. Each man will be trained in his cadre and they will again be of greater use to the regular forces, I believe. Consequently, I think it would be difficult to find more appropriate roles than those that have been determined.

Mr. LANIEL: In that connection I fully agree with the order of priority you have established, that their main role should be to support the regular armed forces and so on and so forth. But I see that the second role you are going to give the three brigades at the instruction stage, or their fourth role, will be to assist the Army in accepting their responsibility wih regard to national survival, and that special units of the militia will be appointed for the task. I wonder whether in my area, in Valleyfield, our unit which is attached to the Royal Vingt-Deux regiment at the present time, will simply become a special unit assigned to the Militia to take charge of survival in case of a nuclear attack. I do not agree to one particular unit being confined to maybe such a small role as survival.

Mr. CARDIN: No. The Militia will be trained in every type of training. But in case of an emergency some of them will be called upon to play a certain role, but their training will be more thorough and more detailed than in the past.

Mr. LANIEL: In that case I do not see how you can distribute the number of—

Mr. CARDIN: I think I should explain that even if the various roles are numbered one, two, three, four, it is not merely a matter of priority.

Mr. LANIEL: No but as far as numbers are concerned?

Mr. CARDIN: But the point should be cleared up in some way, but it depends on circumstances. If, for instance, a nuclear attack is launched against Canada, then of course the matter of survival is the most important. So that is when the survival role would come in. In case of operations in Europe, that would be our first role.

Mr. LANIEL: In that case would the 9,000 members of the Militia who are in the main sector of support for the regular army be automatically transferred to handle survival?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, all members of the Militia will be trained in all operations having to do with survival. All the members of the Militia will be trained for survival operations and they will also receive special training in first-aid. So, in general we want the entire Militia to get fairly general training; in some cases some groups will be assigned certain duties.

(Text)

Mr. TEMPLE: Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable discussion this morning regarding the morale of the militia, and the suggestion that in addition to the 31,000 establishment there will be required an X number of additional troops.

In respect of the matter involving morale, training, esprit de corps and competitiveness, has any consideration been given to attaching certain groups of the militia for the purposes of training to the Royal 22nd, for instance, which has a very well earned reputation, in an attempt to increase both training and morale or esprit de corps? Has any thought been given to having two or three militia regiments or battalions attached on a more or less permanent basis to say the Royal 22nd, in central Ontario to the first battalion Canadian corps, and in a similar manner across Canada? I am not aware of the administrative problems which may be attached to such a concept, but it may well be that this would create a great deal more competition, and esprit de corps, and assist in maintaining militia strength.

Mr. CARDIN: Mr. Temple, I understand that this suggestion has been made, consideration has been given to it and it is considered as being an excellent suggestion. Perhaps Colonel McPherson could elaborate on that answer.

Mr. MCPHERSON: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Temple, earlier I mentioned the fact that we were organizing royal schools. It is intended that a particular battalion will run a royal school for a given number of militia units and that kind of loose affiliation will continue throughout the year. If there are any attachments, as I described earlier, these attachments would be made to those units, and when a militia unit went to summer camp before the regular army completed its training that militia unit would be attached to the same regular unit it had been associated with throughout the year.

Mr. TEMPLE: Thank you.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, it was my intention to ask my questions last week when the representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations were in attendance. Perhaps I can obtain this information at the present time. I am wondering for what reason and at whose request the Conference of Defence Associations was formed.

Mr. CARDIN: I understand this is an association that has been set up for a number of years.

Mr. MCPHERSON: It has been in existence since 1932.

Mr. CARDIN: This is not a new organization and is made up of individuals who have either served during the war or are serving now with either of the three reserve forces. I imagine the association was set up as a result of the individuals own volition because of their desire to help in the field of defence.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might make a comment in this regard. There had existed for a long time before the formation of this association corps associations such as the artillery association, cavalry association and infantry association. Around 1930 it was felt that a co-ordinating body composed of representatives from each of these existing corps associations could serve a useful purpose. That is how the defence association came into being. It was formed really by the corps associations.

Mr. MCNULTY: It was the corps associations that actually initiated the formation of this association?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. CARDIN: Perhaps I might add to that statement by saying that up until recently, if I am not mistaken, the Conference of Defence Associations comprised mainly representatives of the militia, and recently added to that representation were representatives from the naval and air reserves. The defence association is now comprised of representatives of the three reserve forces.

Mr. MCNULTY: The association was not set up by the Department of National Defence?

Mr. CARDIN: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: No. It was set up as a result of action of the corps militia associations.

Mr. MCNULTY: What is the actual extent of their authority or function? Is their function advisory or otherwise?

Mr. CARDIN: Yes, the function of the association is mainly advisory and consultative. The association does not have any authority in the sense to which you have referred.

Mr. MCNULTY: The association has no authority over the militia but the association does receive grants. Is that association accountable for the use of those grants?

Mr. CARDIN: They are accountable for the use of the grants. If you prefer I could read to you the object of the Conference of Defence Associations. Would you like me to read this? Is that what you want?

Mr. WINCH: It was read at the last meeting.

Mr. MCNULTY: I was wondering what their authority was, whether they were given authority by the Department of National Defence or whether they took the authority themselves, or are they mainly an advisory group and do not have any real authority?

Mr. CARDIN: They do not have any real authority over the militia or national defence, but they are an advisory group. They look after the interests of different militia groups.

Mr. SMITH: They are the military counterpart of, for instance, the Canadian Manufacturers Association.

Mr. CARDIN: Exactly.

Mr. MCNULTY: Do the Canadian Manufacturers Association receive grants?

Mr. SMITH: Some agricultural associations do, if you want to make such an analogy.

Mr. MCPHERSON: In a nutshell, each corps association holds an annual meeting at which individual delegates present resolutions. These resolutions are discussed, and if they are within the interest of the corps only they may

be forwarded directly to the Chief of General Staff. If, however, the resolution is of interest to other corps or to the militia or to the reserve as a whole, these resolutions are then forwarded to the Conference of Defence Associations. The Conference of Defence Associations meets once a year, usually in January at Ottawa, and is attended by delegates of the various corps associations to consider the resolutions. Those that are acceptable are then forwarded to the Minister. That briefly is how it works.

Mr. McNULTY: Does the department have any say on how the grants are disbursed?

Mr. McPHERSON: Each corps association in the Conference of Defence Associations is given an annual grant and these associations and the conference are accountable for the expenditures, as any government agency would be responsible for its expenditures.

Mr. McNULTY: As you say, this is forwarded to the defence department after the money has been disbursed.

Mr. McPHERSON: The money is disbursed to the defence associations each year, and at the end of each year this amount must be accounted for.

Mr. McNULTY: There is no reference on how the money must be spent until after it has been accounted for?

Mr. McPHERSON: It is usually spent for such things as stationery supplies, travel arrangements, and that sort of thing.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now one o'clock. That completes our meeting. I thank the Minister and Colonel McPherson for attending the sitting. The meeting is adjourned until 11 o'clock Thursday. Our witness will be Brigadier Suttie.

APPENDIX "A"

INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MR. H. E. SMITH ON JULY 14, RESPECTING RESERVE FORCES

ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS—NAVY RESERVE—1963-64

Pay for Reserve Personnel	$ 1,845,000
Travelling expenditure, including costs of RCN travel	361,000
Military Personnel Costs of RCN personnel employed in support of Reserves	1,700,000
Civil Salaries and Wages	770,000
Food and Clothing—Reserves	310,000
Repair, Upkeep, and Public Utilities, including heat for Divisional Properties.	327,000
Repair and Upkeep of boats and aircraft	105,000
Supplies (including barrack, mechanical, electrical and general stores and stationery) communications, freight, postages and other services	389,000
Commissionaires' services	92,000
All other expenditures	101,000
Total Costs	$ 6,000,000

ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS—CANADIAN ARMY (MILITIA)—1963-64

Personnel, Operating and Maintenance Costs	
Pay	
Militia (excl. COTC)	$ 10,820,547
Student Militia	2,329,569
POR and QM Assistance	1,712,997
Civilian	3,104,620
	$ 17,967,733
Other Personal Cash	
Grants and Unit Allowances	$ 693,000
Clothing—Militia	1,194,000
Student Militia	229,000
Food Supplies—Militia	239,000
Student Militia	95,000
Medical Supplies and Services	219,000
Transportation—Militia	460,000
Student Militia	40,000
	$ 3,169,000
Accommodation Costs	
Building Rentals	$ 492,000
Other Accommodation Costs	1,623,000
	$ 2,115,000
Other Maintenance Costs	
(Stationery, Barrack and Camp Stores, Miscellaneous Ordnance Stores, Spare Parts, Repairs, Petroleum Products, etc.)	$ 2,429,000
Capital Expenditure—Based on a five year average	
Construction	$ 900,000
Equipment	2,000,000
Ammunition	490,000
	$ 3,390,000
Canadian Army Regular	
Support (including Instructional Staff, supporting services, and area HQ Staffs)	
Military Pay	$ 6,888,000
Civil Pay	1,245,000
Transportation	536,000
	$ 8,669,000
Total Costs	$ 37,719,733

ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS—RCAF RESERVES—1963-64

Civilian and Military Personnel Costs Reserve Personnel	$ 3,229,000
Civilian and Military Personnel Costs Regular Force Personnel	$ 4,668,000
Aircraft Operating Costs	$ 790,000
Station Support Costs	$ 2,013,000
Total Costs	$ 10,700,000

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 14

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 1964

RESERVE FORCES

WITNESS:

Brigadier E. R. Suttie, Chairman of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia).

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

21251—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),	Langlois,	Matheson,
Béchard,	Laniel,	McMillan,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McNulty,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	Pilon,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Smith,
Groos,	MacLean,	Temple,
Harkness,	MacRae,	Winch—(24).
	Martineau,	

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, July 23, 1964
(19)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Lambert, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacInnis, MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, Pilon, Smith, Temple, Winch (17).

In attendance: Brigadier E. R. Suttie, Chairman of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia).

The Committee resumed its consideration of the *Reserve Forces.* Brigadier Suttie was questioned on points raised in the "Suttie Report" and on other matters related to the Reserve Forces.

The witness was thanked and permitted to retire.

At 1.15 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Monday, July 27, 1964.

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

21251—1½

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, July 23, 1964.
11 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN: We have a quorum. Can we come to order, please.

We are continuing this morning with our study of Reserve Forces. Our witness this morning is Brigadier E. R. Suttie. Brigadier Suttie does not have an opening statement. The meeting is therefore open for questioning.

Mr. LLOYD: Brigadier Suttie, in the course of your deliberations no doubt you examined the records of the personnel attached to the various militia units. Could you supply the committee with the number of officers, N.C.O.'s and privates who are in the militia at present? Was such information tabulated by your committee?

Brigadier E. R. SUTTIE (*Chairman, The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia)*): I think that information is available in the department. We examined it.

Mr. LLOYD: Could you then supply the committee with the rate of turnover of each of these classes of personnel?

Mr. SUTTIE: That again would be available in the Department of National Defence.

Mr. LLOYD: Now, have you any impressions that you could give us on the rate of turnover? Was it high?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, I think it would be considered high.

Mr. LLOYD: Very high? Could we get some meaningful statistics, do you think, from tabulations that you examined?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think so, if you wished to have them.

Mr. LLOYD: Mr. Chairman, I submit that this is the kind of information that should be valuable to supplement the general conclusions drawn. I would therefore like, if it is agreeable to the steering committee or yourself, to have such information made available.

I have a further question which I would like to ask Brigadier Suttie. I gathered the impression, from reading your report, that you observed a number of reasons for discontent with the general operations of the reserve forces. This is suggested by the conclusions you draw. You mentioned the need for better public relations, for instance. Could you enlighten the committee in more detail on the nature of these specific reasons for dissatisfaction?

Mr. SUTTIE: These were voluntary statements from various units, both regular and militia, indicating areas where improvements could be made, for instance, in the administrative field and that kind of thing. Generally speaking, the scale of equipment is inadequate. This was given to us voluntarily, and if you heard it frequently enough you recognized it as well.

Mr. LLOYD: Could you give us some more specific illustrations of this general statement?

Mr. SUTTIE: As far as administration is concerned, it is probably the fact that the principal job is to do the administrative work relating to one parade a week, and in many cases that is a heavy burden.

Mr. LLOYD: You mentioned the scale of equipment was one area of discontent. Could you be more specific on what you mean by "the scale of equipment"?

Mr. SUTTIE: The amount of equipment available in any given unit, infantry, artillery and armoured.

Mr. LLOYD: Would you take a specific unit and give us an illustration of their available equipment?

Mr. SUTTIE: It is difficult to do that without reference to papers. I think there are cases of artillery units, for example, which have just one or two guns. This is not adequate to train them properly. Of course, armoured regiments have a very special problem, for instance the ability to use a tank in only certain areas; and yet more costly equipment is not available at a reasonable scale at the moment.

Mr. LLOYD: Could I pursue this a little further with you, brigadier? In your recommendation regarding the field of public relations you have something to say about the need, in general, for improved public relations. You say that a more positive public relations program in support of the activities of the militia should be implemented immediately. What do you mean by "a more positive public relations program", as opposed to what is happening now?

Mr. SUTTIE: In my experience and the experience of anyone else connected with the militia there has not been any real support of the militia as a necessary force by any level of government since the end of world war II.

Mr. LLOYD: So that they have been in existence and left to their own devices to find ways and means as best they can for officers of these reserve units to attract men to the forces, and that this has not been satisfactory? Is that your general conclusion?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes. Today, in contrast with the situation before world war II, there is much competition for young men's time. There is T.V. and hot rods, and what have you. Something has to be done to persuade young people that joining the militia is a worth-while activity and a responsibility of the citizen. In my view there is nothing wrong with the young people today provided they are given a good reason why they must do something.

Mr. LLOYD: In this experience you describe of competition for the young men's time, does this apply more generally to the N.C.O.'s and privates? Does this apply also to officers in these various militia units?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, I would think so.

Mr. LLOYD: You have difficulty getting officers to the same degree?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, to the same degree.

Mr. LLOYD: What attracts an officer to a militia unit?

Mr. SUTTIE: I would think there is a certain social attraction in belonging to a unit. I would think that most of them are also attracted by a sense of responsibility, as something one should do. Of course, they cannot do it to the exclusion of their normal family activities. There are considerably more of them than there were before the second world war, if you recall.

The CHAIRMAN: Brigadier Suttie, would you be kind enough to speak up, please?

Mr. LLOYD: Do you find that men who sought officer status in militia units generally came from those who had previous military experience?

Mr. SUTTIE: Well, we are running out of those.

Mr. LLOYD: You did not make any specific study on whether or not officers were recruited for militia from people without previous experience?

Mr. SUTTIE: Not specifically.

Mr. LLOYD: What does the militia offer as an opportunity in becoming a reserve officer to a man without previous military experience?

Mr. SUTTIE: They can join as second lieutenant and qualify as lieutenant, and so on; or if they join as other ranks, they too can be commissioned by qualifying.

Mr. LLOYD: Would you say that generally up until now the officers who are recruited are men with some previous military experience?

Mr. SUTTIE: Generally, yes.

Mr. LLOYD: So, the further you get away from a major war, the more difficult it might be?

Mr. SUTTIE: This is exactly so.

Mr. LLOYD: Do you mean that the public relations should be put to work to identify all the advantages in training with the militia? This presumes, of course, that we will overtake the shortcomings of the present militia operations?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: This is what I am trying to get at. If you could, I would like you to get away from the formality of a report and give us a frank appraisal of this. When you do business such as you do, you are bound to have some rather sharp impressions in respect of omissions and shortcomings. Would you assume that you had not written a report and give us some of this in detail; could you give us a quick appraisal of the deficiencies in the militia operation as you see them?

Mr. SUTTIE: Probably equipment is one of the principal points.

Mr. LLOYD: Is this a matter of insufficient volume?

Mr. SUTTIE: The scale of equipment available for training, generally speaking, is inadequate.

Mr. LLOYD: Variety?

Mr. SUTTIE: Variety, and in particular the latest type.

Mr. LLOYD: In other words, they are given equipment that is outdated?

Mr. SUTTIE: The equipment they have is obsolete. The problem of equipment today is that the rate of obsolescence is very high.

Mr. LLOYD: One of the omissions would be, then, that an effective militia should be given the opportunity to have training with the latest equipment, equipment which is being used by the regular forces?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, and this is very costly.

Mr. LLOYD: There is one other general question I would like to put to you. However, before I go to that, you mentioned scale of equipment; you mentioned that equipment of the kind which presently is being used by the armed forces should be made available to the militia. Is there any other area of omission or activity which would make the militia more attractive to recruits which you think should be supplied?

Mr. SUTTIE: Are you referring specifically to equipment?

Mr. LLOYD: No; any other factors. You mentioned public relations and you mentioned equipment. You also mentioned week end training.

Mr. SMITH: What about their training program, and their opportunity to use the equipment they now have. Is that adequate?

Mr. SUTTIE: As you probably know, they attend annual camp.

Mr. SMITH: But, are the opportunities adequate now?

Mr. SUTTIE: Adequate from a training point of view?

Mr. SMITH: Adequate to stimulate their interest and make them either want to join the militia or continue to be militia men.

Mr. SUTTIE: This would vary with corps. It might be adequate in some instances, and in other instances inadequate. It would be difficult to make a general statement on that.

Mr. WINCH: Can you not be more definite? I am afraid we are getting into generalities when what we want are specifics.

Mr. LLOYD: This is what I was attempting to do. I was attempting to see whether we could get specific illustrations and perhaps go a little deeper than the generalities in this report. You were given the task of examining the operation of the militia in Canada generally—the reserve forces. Your job was not to say, merely, that they have been there, they should not be disturbed, or that in the past they have produced very excellent men for the armed forces, or that in the past morale has been good. As I understand it your job was to examine, very objectively, into this question in an effort to see to what extent the militia should be maintained in the light of present day conditions, conditions of the nuclear age and conditions which exist now internationally. In order to back up our forces in Canada today, what major fundamental differences in concept of organization exist that may not have existed in the past?

Mr. WINCH: And which may be required in the future.

Mr. LLOYD: To meet the conditions of today. Could you give us some specific illustrations?

Mr. SUTTIE: One of the changes which should be made is in respect of the authority of commanding officers. I think there was a fairly general complaint that they did not have sufficient room for decision, or sufficient control over their own training. In other words, the training was too restricted, or the directives on training did not permit any shaping of training programs to local conditions. We feel the commanding officer should have an area of decision, because after all, it is part of his training to be able to make decisions.

Mr. LLOYD: Can you give us an indication of where this lack of decision has operated to make militia operations less effective?

Mr. SUTTIE: There is the difficulty, for example, in arranging a week end training exercise at one of the training areas. This has to be processed through all the various headquarters up the line and down the line. That is the type of thing which irks them. The commanding officer should be able to arrange his training with the commandant of the training area which is available, and then advise headquarters that this has been done.

Mr. LLOYD: Is there, then, a number of steps which have to be taken before the commanding officer can arrange with the area commander for utilization of facilities and equipment for a training program; in other words, there is a deadly routine of red tape to go through?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: It is a stifling routine; there is a volume of red tape. These are the type of statements in respect of which I would like you to be testifying.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, could we allow the witness to make the statements.

Mr. LLOYD: I am not getting the answers which should be expected by a committee which is assigned to do a job of this kind. I am not getting the kind of answers which I would expect would come to us in support of this report. I would have expected the brigadier to have said that when they examined the militia operations they found, in the case of the commanding officers of units, exactly what he said a moment ago. As an illustration and only as an illustration, I said to you: "Brigadier, are you telling us there was a stifling deadly routine of red tape between the C.O. and the area commandant which,

if eliminated, would greatly invigorate the direction of the militia by commanding officers?" I used some illustrations. I was hoping the adjectives which I used to describe the situation perhaps might give a clue to what I am trying to seek from you, which is something more specific by way of criticism of the militia operations.

Mr. TEMPLE: Would you mind repeating that question?

Mr. LLOYD: Well, Mr. Chairman, after one year of learning from the seniors in this place, I find that their accomplishments with adjectives are vastly superior to mine.

I see you are putting me to a strange task. Here am I trying to obtain specific details from Brigadier Suttie. I find that committee members are the ones who are acting as counsel for Brigadier Suttie at the moment. I thought you would be with me. I think we have had an interesting story about commanding officers. Now, let us go on to training programs.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not wish to interrupt, but I am trying to apportion the time among the committee members as best I can. Perhaps you might complete this particular question, and then we will pass on to other members and come back to you later.

Mr. LLOYD: I hope to co-operate if I can, but much depends on the answers I receive. With present level of expenditure for reserve forces of approximately $50 million, in terms of cost effectiveness are you satisfied that we are receiving a return on that annual investment of Canadian dollars?

Mr. SUTTIE: I would say not at the moment.

Mr. LLOYD: Can you give us an illustration to supplement what you have already said?

Mr. SUTTIE: The maintenance of units which basically are ineffective is not good value for the money.

Mr. LLOYD: You are submitting all these things about the training program, the authority of commanding officers and so on as set out at pages 10, 11 and 12 as essential elements of a revitalized militia operation, justifying the expenditures of this volume of dollars?

Mr. SUTTIE: That is right. We do not include in our report the sins of the past or even of the present. We looked more at what they required in the future. The reason for the division of the report into two parts was to lay down conditions and criteria which we believe would provide an effective and vital militia force. We felt that by putting it all under one part, when anyone examined it he would spend most of his time looking at the answers in the back rather than at the principles in the front. We felt that the recommendations which we made in Part I were essential conditions to get value for the taxpayer's dollar and to provide a sensible and reasonable background for the regular forces.

Mr. LANIEL: I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: At the last meeting I allowed a wide variety of supplementaries in order to see how it would go. I found that the supplementaries varied so far from the original questions that they tended to open up new topics. I think, if the committee is agreeable, we should revert to our former procedure and limit supplementaries, allowing each committee member an opportunity to ask his questions, and the other members may raise supplementaries when their turn comes. If this meets with the approval of the committee, I think it would make for a more orderly procedure.

Mr. LANIEL: This one would actually fit in at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, if your supplementary question is very specific and short, very well.

Mr. LANIEL: The Brigadier has said that he does not agree with the conclusions of the brief as submitted by the Conference of Defence Associations.

The CHAIRMAN: I think this would be opening up an area which you could deal with separately when your turn comes. Now, Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. LLOYD: I think that perhaps I have stimulated some questions. So heeding your observation that you would like other members to follow, I suppose they will follow. I have not been too successful, although I think I have had some success. However, I now leave it to the other members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: To deal particularly with the question of equipment, your observation is that you felt the equipment was inadequate in variety and kind. Do you think it is feasible to issue a fairly generous scale of equipment to the units which would use this equipment, and that they should have more specialized equipment in their hands rather than to have it held in a common pool? What do you assess to be the deficiencies or the value of either program?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think that if more regular army assistance was provided to the unit, the unit would be in a position to hold and care properly for more equipment than it is able to do at the moment. The general practice is for equipment to be pooled and sent out to units as required. This does not always mesh properly with the training requirements and the number of units involved. But with regular army support they could hold more equipment, and therefore have more flexibility in planning their training.

Mr. LAMBERT: To use an illustration in terms of gunners or tank men, do you feel that the artillery militia unit should have more guns right within their units, or that this equipment should be held in a pool to be used on a scheduled basis, bearing in mind the different ranges, and so on?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think a battery should at least have a troop of guns. That is the smallest unit, because the care and maintenance of equipment are very much a part of a gunner's training. If they see a gun only when they pick it up and have a training exercise, they are missing part of their training.

Mr. LAMBERT: How about the army? What did you find there? What scale of distribution do you have for tanks?

Mr. SUTTIE: The scale is very limited because the availability of tanks is very limited. There is an opportunity to use mock-ups and that type of thing to train tank crews.

Mr. MATHESON: I have a supplementary question. Do you consider that a worth-while establishment should be a full troop?

Mr. SUTTIE: I said that was the minimum.

Mr. MATHESON: That is exactly 50 per cent of its establishment full time.

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes; but they could train with a troop of guns. It is very difficult to train a battery with one gun, which happens to be the case in some instances now.

The CHAIRMAN: I would prefer it if you would pursue your questions later, Mr. Matheson.

Mr. LAMBERT: Your conclusion is that this type of equipment should be issue to militia units on a greatly expanded scale.

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, of course.

Mr. LAMBERT: Subject to budgetary limitations?

Mr. SUTTIE: I recognize, of course, that much of this equipment is very expensive indeed.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it available?

Mr. SUTTIE: Probably not in the quantity required to look after the armouries at the moment, but I believe the artillery should be able to have a redistribution of guns which would satisfy their needs.

Mr. LAMBERT: In so far as gunners are concerned, and just using gunners as an illustration, do you find, with the degree of co-operation between the regular forces and the militia, let us say in an area such as Winnipeg, again using it as an illustration, where there is a gunner battery stationed, that the militia units are able to use the equipment there with the desired degree of co-operation, or does everybody say "This is my pea patch and I am going to look after it?"

Mr. SUTTIE: I think in areas where there are units of the same regular corps they co-operate extremely well with the militia and are very pleased to do whatever they can to assist them.

Mr. LAMBERT: Thank you.

Mr. SMITH: I think in answer to Mr. Lloyd you said the rate of turnover in the militia in respect of enlisted and commissioned men was quite high, did you not?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: In your report, appendix A, which is the terms of reference, you were given certain force figures and requirements on mobilization. You referred, for example, to 9,000 required in an emergency to replace certain defence forces, and 1,500 for specific tasks. Did you give any consideration to the total number of persons we should have in the militia in order to produce these figures, and I refer again, for example, to the 2,500 militia men needed for security duties? When you were preparing your report did you make any recommendation or give any consideration to the number of men required for enlistment in militia units to produce that 2,500 figure?

Mr. SUTTIE: That information is contained in Part II.

Mr. SMITH: That information is in Part II.

I am not mentioning specific units, but did you use any percentage criteria in order to produce the 2,500 security men figure? Do you feel that there should be ten per cent, 20 per cent or 30 per cent more than the enlistment?

Mr. SUTTIE: We did not use a precise percentage and I do not think anyone knows what it is. Obviously, if we are going to produce 30,000 for these four roles we must have at any given time considerably more than 30,000. Perhaps 25 per cent is a more accurate figure than ten per cent. I also think that the requirement would vary with the intensity of the situation and the emphasis would shift.

Mr. SMITH: Again, without in any way prying in respect of specific units, we can assume that in Part II of your report you have provided for enlistment in the militia greater than 30,000?

In respect of your terms of reference, what criteria did you use in preparing recommendations regarding which units should be retained and which should not be retained?

Mr. SUTTIE: The question of numbers alone does not represent a complete criteria.

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. SUTTIE: The existence of units geographically had to be considered.

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. SUTTIE: Our situation, as in any other business, is complicated by distance.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, that is very true.

Mr. SUTTIE: One might assume that in three or four metropolitan areas one could obtain the total requirement, but there must be sufficient outlets or intake points left in, if you want to put it that way, in the event of an emergency so that you have a collection area for recruitment for any build-up that would follow.

Mr. SMITH: What consideration was given to the present apparent efficiency of units? Was that one of the criteria that was used?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, the efficiency of a unit was considered as well as the present strength, recognizing of course that the strength of units fluctuate.

Mr. SMITH: Would consideration be given to the fact that some units are better reporters than other units?

Mr. SUTTIE: Without being cynical I think we did take that into consideration.

Mr. SMITH: I think one does not have to be cynical but realistic.

Mr. SUTTIE: Realistic perhaps is a better word to use.

Mr. SMITH: You took that factor into consideration, and the mere fact that a unit is apparently strong at the present time would not in itself be enough reason to retain that unit?

Mr. SUTTIE: No, the unit would have to meet other criteria as well.

Mr. SMITH: To conclude my questions in respect of appendix A, and this may be repetitive, the recommendations in Part II of your report do not visualize the total strength of the militia as 30,000 but visualize a percentage in excess of 30,000?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes. The revised establishments for the militia would greatly exceed 30,000, perhaps by 25 per cent or by whatever figure you decide to use. I do not think it is possible at this moment to know what the actual enrolment will be, because certain units can only come up to certain strengths, whether it is 80 per cent across the board or otherwise, and this will not be known, but will depend on the number of conditions in respect of the revitalized militia implemented and the interest stimulated in the localities.

Mr. SMITH: Perhaps I could now turn for a moment to a consideration of some of the recommendations for improving the militia contained in your report. You stress public relations. In the last seven years one of the great thorns between the public and the militia, certainly in my area of Canada, has resulted from the difficulty of obtaining authority to use armouries for public purposes when the militia units are not using them. Has that situation been brought to your attention?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think reference is made to that situation in my comments regarding the authority of the commanding officer. The commanding officer should have the authority without going through a cumbersome process to say that someone may have a flower show in the armoury, because armouries are the property ofthe public, and if they are being used only two nights a week by the militia it would not make sense that a responsible organization could not use them when they are not being used for another purpose.

Mr. SMITH: Any responsible organization should be able to obtain a quick decision from the local C.O.

Mr. SUTTIE: That is correct, because if there is this kind of reform established locally the unit will benefit.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think the decision should be made by the subunit commanders?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, if there is a subunit in existence, of course.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think the decision should be made by battery commanders?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, and made on the spot.

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. LLOYD: This would circumvent Parkinson.

Mr. SMITH: You have referred generally to flower shows and I agree that if possible the armouries should be used seven days a week. Do you think it would be possible for provisions to be made to regularize the use of armouries by air cadets and naval cadets when there are navy league and air cadet units in the locals?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes indeed. The unification, which is another picture altogether, should encourage this sort of thing.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think moonlighting is a factor in enlisting people into the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think there are many instances in which people who have a five day week job do moonlight.

Mr. SMITH: And they sometimes enlist in the militia for the income?

Mr. SUTTIE: I do not think the money itself is the prime consideration; it is an important one with most of them. I do not think any unit that has a strength made up of moonlighters is in very good shape.

Mr. SMITH: My final question comes back to the militia. You speak of having a more modern militia. Would you agree that if the commanding officers were permitted freer use of the equipment they already have it would help to stimulate their activities and interest in the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: I would agree, of course; yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MACLEAN: Brigadier Suttie, have you noticed any variation in the general efficiency of militia units, or is their efficiency uniform across the country? By this I mean their morale and strength relative to establishment and so on? Is there a fluctuation across the country, or are they fairly uniform?

Mr. SUTTIE: I would think there is a wide variation.

Mr. MACLEAN: This leads me to my next question. Does this wide variation follow any discernible pattern? For example, is there a pattern from command to command? Is there a pattern from large urban centres to small towns, or from types of units, such as from infantry to artillery? Is there any pattern that can be discerned?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think generally units fluctuate with the interest and enthusiasm of the commanding officers; that is basic. Between commands there is a fluctuation owing to the difference in regular army interpretation of instructions from army headquarters. This can have a bearing on morale. Everything that goes through three or four levels sometimes becomes distorted, and if the distortion is extreme the recipient probably can be frustrated, and all the rest of it.

Mr. MACLEAN: Is there any noticeable difference in efficiency between the large metropolitan areas and the smaller more isolated locations?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think the metropolitan areas have a very special problem. They have to work harder to hold impetus. In the smaller communities the local unit has more significance. Of course, it depends a great deal on the amount of support they obtain locally.

Mr. MACLEAN: Has any study been made on the basis of starting with perhaps the best militia units in the country and trying to discern why they are the best, and all the factors that make them the best, in an attempt to apply these things to the less efficient units and to make corrections in the general picture?

Mr. SUTTIE: One might be able to determine the conditions that make one unit better than another unit, but one might not be able to duplicate those conditions in another locality. Generally speaking, it varies for very recognizable reasons.

Mr. MACLEAN: Is there a great variation in the efficiency between the various corps in the militia, the types of unit? Are some types more attractive to militia men than others?

Mr. SUTTIE: It would appear that the rate of recruitment is fairly uniform. In any locality where there are three or four units there are those who are interested in artillery and those who are interested in infantry. There is an indication, of course, that in some areas there are too many units and they are competing with each other for a relatively small group who are coming in; in other words, they are cutting it too fine.

Mr. MACLEAN: What about the effect of the facilities available to a particular unit? I am thinking of armouries, and not only armouries in the traditional sense but also the availability of suitable training areas where artillery units or amoured units can exercise, and this sort of thing. I would imagine that in some areas it is very difficult to have, for example, an artillery unit which can function satisfactorily in its training role.

Mr. SUTTIE: That is perfectly true, and unless the armoured units and the artillery units can at least have an opportunity to practice with their equipment in training areas it is very hard to maintain interest.

Mr. MACLEAN: With regard to armouries—and I am thinking now actually of buildings—is there a relationship between efficiency and interest and the kind of accommodation they have? In my riding, for example, to take a parochial view, we have armouries which were donated to the federal government in 1873 for $1. I believe that in a tentative program of new armouries, the possibility of constructing new armouries in various areas, this was one of the localities to which consideration for improving the facilities was given. However, is any consideration being given to improving the facilities for militia units in some areas of the conutry where the facilities are extremely deficient?

Mr. SUTTIE: In part II of the report we make specific recommendations where the situation is quite critical. Yet there are contradictory situations which make one wonder how they can put up with the type of armoury they have, and yet they do extremely well.

Mr. MACLEAN: I suppose the reverse is true, that there are locations where there are excellent facilities and where they do not do so well.

Mr. SUTTIE: That is quite right.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I think most of my questions have been answered by Mr. Smith, but I would like to review a couple of these for a moment. May I turn to page 25 of the white paper. The first clear paragraph on page 25 begins with the words:

> The primary role of the militia is to support the regular army.

It then goes on to describe what the militia role is, and that paragraph ends with the sentence:

> The ministerial commission—

That is the Suttie commission

> —will advise in respect of the best organization to fulfil these roles.

My first question is simply this: In regard to the militia, that policy was first laid down in a white paper. Is that not so? Actually, then, your commission, the ministerial commission, was a commission which was given a directive to produce a plan based on a policy which had already been laid down within the white paper? Is that not correct?

May I now turn—

Mr. WINCH: May we have the answer to that question?

Mr. DEACHMAN: You agreed, did you not, Brigadier Suttie?

The CHAIRMAN: Will you repeat the question as we do not have the answer on the record.

Mr. DEACHMAN: My question is this. The white paper lays down the policy with respect to the militia, and I am referring particularly to the paragraph on page 25 of the white paper. Is that not so?

Mr. SUTTIE: That is correct, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The purpose of your commission, then, was to produce a plan to carry out the policy recommendations which are set out within the white paper?

Mr. SUTTIE: When I was first approached on this matter the Chief of the General Staff, who is admittedly the expert in such matters, spent a great deal of time briefing me on the new concept, the requirements, and so on. Agreement to that was part of the business of deciding to take on this job, as no one in his right mind would volunteer to do!

Mr. WINCH: Then you did not have a free hand on investigations?

Mr. SUTTIE: I did, indeed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But, the point I want to make clear to the members of the committee is that the policy itself was firmly established in the white paper before your own report began?

Mr. SUTTIE: The white paper was issued sometime in March, I believe—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes.

Mr. SUTTIE: —and the terms of reference for the commission were approved on January 14. I was submitted a copy of the terms of reference and was asked to examine them and make any changes. Certain changes were made. But, before the commission was set up the terms of reference had been accepted by me.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Then, these terms of reference were embodied in the white paper as defence policy?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think we indicate in the report that the white paper was received after we had started business and that we did not find our objectives altered or affected materially by the white paper for this specific job we were asked to do.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Am I correct in saying then that the terms of reference which appear in your report and the paragraph which appears at page 25 of the white paper form the broad defence policy in respect of the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: Certainly they are compatible.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Then, your report goes on to set out a plan within the framework of that policy.

Mr. SUTTIE: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Therefore, the terms of reference to you, on which you worked, become more of a directive really than terms of reference for the production of a plan based upon a policy which you already had been given and had agreed to.

Mr. SUTTIE: I would not regard it completely in that light.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In what light would you regard it?

Mr. SUTTIE: The terms of reference were related specifically to the reorganization of the militia in the light of the new concept which was established as part of defence policy. I did not regard it as a directive or an instruction. The terms of reference outline the requirements and are deliberatly very broad so we were able to investigate virtually anything we felt had a bearing on the matter.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Sir, I want to refer to appendix A, at page 43, which are the terms of reference, and particularly to the wording of that paragraph which is about half way down the page, which reads as follows:

> The militia will be required to form the framework for logistic and special units which are not provided in peacetime.

The next paragraph begins by saying:

> The second role for the militia is to provide a training force which will be required in time of emergency to support the field force.

Then, later on, in the second last sentence of that paragraph, it says:

> It will be built up in stages in accordance with the situation existing at the time and it must also be available for the defence of Canada and other tasks.

The last paragraph on page 43, beginning at the end of the first line, sets out these words:

> the militia will be required to provide trained officers and men for the guarding of key points

And so on. The point I want to make is that this is the language of a specific directive rather than language of the terms of reference, and the specific directive is that you set out a plan for making available the numbers of militia men in the categories set out on pages 43 and 44, and the policy in regard to this already had been very clearly set out at page 25 of the white paper and on pages 43 and 44 of the appendix. Is this not correct?

Mr. SUTTIE: Well, it certainly is the responsibility of the general staff and the minister to determine what the requirements are.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And this is where they were set out by the general staff and this is where the requirements were set out?

Mr. SUTTIE: And, they were explained to me in sufficient detail that it seemed to make sense.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In the schedule it shows 9,000 for logistics force.

Mr. SUTTIE: As a number?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes.

Mr. SUTTIE: This was the conclusion of the general staff.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And, field force of 18,000, key points guard of 2,500 and national survival units of 1,500. These were the specifics given to you upon which to draw your plan.

Mr. SUTTIE: They were the numbers related to the respective roles they had arrived at in their judgment and knowledge. I am not an arm-chair strategist but they seemed to make sense to me.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You were not asked to vary or comment upon that number but to find ways and means of providing that number.

Mr. SUTTIE: That was my understanding.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Those were the terms of reference or directive, or whatever you want to call it, given to you?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have another question which is along the same lines. Did you discuss budget as you were being briefed on the question of the terms of reference in respect of what the annual cost of the militia would be?

Mr. SUTTIE: We were given the present costs in considerable detail before we actually started operations and we spent two full days, during which the members of the whole commission were briefed by the respective departments in order to get some understanding and appreciation of the over-all problem. We did have a detailed briefing from the director of budget.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Was a budget target or figure suggested to you to work on?

Mr. SUTTIE: At no time.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When you discussed budget you only discussed it in terms of the historic budget figures of the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: And the estimates as they existed at that time for the current year.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And the estimates for the current year. Were any forecasts shown to you in respect of what they expected the militia figures to be for the future?

Mr. SUTTIE: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Therefore, in dealing with this force of 31,000 you did not deal with it in terms of budget figures?

Mr. SUTTIE: Not as a cost.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have one final question. When you looked at this figure of 31,000 did you look upon it as numbers which the department or the chiefs of staff expected you to deliver when called upon? Was it within the terms of reference that what you were expected to have on hand was a 30,000 or 31,000 figure when called upon?

Mr. SUTTIE: I will answer that question this way. The members of the commission did not regard this as an operation to reduce from the present total to 30,000. The explanation of how this figure was arrived at, given to me by the chief of staff, was that it was going back to the beginning on a build-up and was not related to the present total in any way; and in respect of the 31,000 figure, it was recognized that if you want 31,000, then there must be more than that available at any given time.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This was your clear understanding, as you set about doing your test, that if you were going to produce 31,000 you would have to have more on strength than the 31,000. Are you able to say now, having completed your survey, what strength you would want to see on hand in a round figure?

Mr. SUTTIE: In round figures possibly around 40,000 plus.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And what is the current strength of the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: It is 48,000.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So you are not anticipating any appreciable reduction in the strength of the present enlisted persons in the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: If the various recommendations concerning age, and this sort of thing are applied, there will be quite a reduction.

Mr. DEACHMAN: There would be an upgrading, that is to say, you are looking at it from the standpoint of a weeding out of certain members within the force now on the basis of age and the like, but that these would be replaced actually by more physically sound militia men.

Mr. SUTTIE: Exactly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You are proposing that the strength not be reduced but that the physical requirements be upgraded. Is that correct?

Mr. SUTTIE: This will take some time to adjust. Initially, it may be a cut-back, and then a build up. To the extent that the 31,000 can be completed and clearly available, the overage you must carry will be reduced. If we carry a lot of ineffective people from the point of view of being able to take the field, then we are going to have a great many more than the 31,000.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This leads me to the question whether the interested militia man in Canada today, in reasonably good physical condition, need not fear that he is to be struck off strength under the existing plan.

Mr. SUTTIE: No. If he is healthy and interested he will be kept.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Finally, I want to ask whether it is possible that he may have to find himself posted to another unit in the revision of the militia.

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes. In certain areas where there presently appears to be too many people competing for the number available he will be given the opportunity, I would hope, of joining another unit. If he is really keen in being a militia man, changing his hat badge will not be that serious a problem.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Can you give us an idea on your schedule for implementing your recommendations?

Mr. SUTTIE: This is the part that is now in the hands of the department. Our job was effectively finished when we delivered the report. To what extent it is accepted, and keeping in mind the time interval before implementation, is a matter for decision within the department.

Mr. TEMPLE: Brigadier Suttie, which units—and I do not expect you to refer to them by name at all—were the least effective and worst equipped? By that I mean infantry as opposed to armoured, and artillery. Did you find, for example, that the infantry were generally more effective or better equipped than the others?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, the infantry because of the nature of their equipment are more easily equipped. However, even there the scale of personal weapons is not adequate. I think that every infantryman wants his personal weapon. If he is not armed, he is not an infantryman, and unless he has his weapon to care for, he is not armed.

Mr. TEMPLE: What group was the least effective?

Mr. SUTTIE: You mean what corps?

Mr. TEMPLE: Artillery or infantry?

Mr. SUTTIE: It varies with the geographical location. In some areas the armoured is at the bottom of the pole, in other areas it might be the artillery.

Mr. TEMPLE: You were able to say that the infantry was at the top of the pole, can you say who is at the bottom?

Mr. SUTTIE: No, I cannot, not that easily. I do not think that I said that the infantry were at the top of the pole.

Mr. TEMPLE: You said that the infantry is probably, by its very nature, best equipped.

Mr. LLOYD: I have a supplementary question here.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope it is right to the point and short.

Mr. LLOYD: Yes, it goes right back to the beginning when you said you were more concerned objectively with identifying roles for the future because you felt that it would be a waste of time to try to look at the experience of the past. Is it not in essence what you said?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes. Obviously, we are all taxpayers, and where it was apparent that an operation was ineffective or inefficient, as taxpayers we felt this was not good. That same amount of money could be applied to some other area or some other unit and could produce better value.

Mr. LLOYD: It was not the case of merely amending the existing policy but of forming an entirely new policy.

Mr. TEMPLE: What percentage of the 46,000 militia that we have at the present time is effective?

Mr. SUTTIE: Do you want a ball park answer on that?

Mr. TEMPLE: As exact an answer as can be given in the circumstances.

Mr. SUTTIE: Considering the time available to us, which was only four months, we were not able to examine it in detail. For example, I would think that in many of the so-called fighting units—infantry, artillery and armoured—a lot of the N.C.O.'s and a lot of the officers are beyond the age for field service. They are doing a good job in training, but in the new concept they would not be available for service.

Mr. TEMPLE: What percentage of the 46,000 militia men do you believe are effective?

Mr. SUTTIE: The reported strength of the militia is the number on strength. A militia man who attends every parade might only be 50 per cent of the reported strength in some units. In other units 80 per cent might be on parade. Under the present rules a militia man can go to one parade, miss two, turn up on the fourth, and still get paid.

Mr. TEMPLE: Could you give me the ball park figure on it?

Mr. SUTTIE: Let us say 50 per cent. Mind you, there are a lot of first class younger people in the militia, and the full effect is not yet apparent. However, this so called young soldiers program should, in due course, produce a lot of good recruits for the militia units provided all these other things that make the militia interesting are implemented.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, to come back to the supplementary questions I did not ask, Brigadier Suttie, the Conference of Defence Association says that the reserve provides good value for the defence dollar. Some other people even say that they give better value for our defence dollar in comparaison with other military units in Canada. Are you of the opinion that this is really more a question of image which the militia or the reserve give to the population because of the strength on paper of the different and numerous units that we have across the country, in comparison with the real effectiveness of these people?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think it is a matter of degree. I am satisfied we can get better value for our dollar than we are getting at present. It is a matter of opinion whether we are getting value at the moment.

Mr. LANIEL: At page 45 in your comments on the terms of reference, the first paragraph talks about physical fitness and states:

> The training of the militia requires study of the need for constant physical fitness of all ranks for immediate service, the training assistance required from the regular army and appraisal of the best method of training that can be achieved in the present day pattern of living.

Do you think in the militia this really is possible?

Mr. SUTTIE: I do not think with the present time available for training that you can afford to waste too much time on p.t. and that type of thing; but more time can be spent on this, provided the facilities are available. It would

be a very dangerous thing in the heart of winter in Edmonton to give militiamen an hour of p.t. without the opportunity to change. So, unless the facilities are available it is not on.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not think it is a matter of facilities. You mentioned the lack of authority of the commanding officers, and things like that. This may not be what you had in mind, but I do not think it is a good thing to go out and have an hour of p.t. if you then have two hours of beer after this and a late night. This really does not help the physical fitness of a recruit.

Mr. SUTTIE: With the young people I think it is possible to stimulate interest in being fit in the same way older people take an interest in calories when they start getting the middle aged spread.

Mr. LANIEL: I am wondering about the old concept of the militia. Personally, I am of the opinion that you really were restrained by the terms of reference which did not give an opportunity to look into the principles of the militia. I even ask myself whether or not your committee should have had the opportunity, let us say, to go into one of the possibilities which is close to my heart, compulsory reserve training, things like that, or other fields of organization.

Mr. SUTTIE: In the present day situation it is accepted that forces in being are a requirement if we are to provide a backup to the regular force personnel who are reasonably well trained in all arms, and with some knowledge of their corps training. This is infinitely less costly from the taxpayers' point of view than having them on the strength of the regular army.

Mr. LANIEL: In referring to what you said about the cost of the reserve, is not one of your secondary aims, arising from the terms of reference, a reduction of units and personnel? I think that aim, too, might be limited, because if you look at page (vi), it states:

> In part I will be found the criteria and conditions which, in the opinion of the commission, are best calculated to produce an efficient militia capable of undertaking the roles assigned to it by the terms of reference.

On the other hand, if you look at pages 44 and 45 you will find:

> Conclusions should lead to recommendations on the numbers, types, and locations of units of each corps that should remain in the order of battle of the militia—

Then on page 45:

> It is expected of the commission to recommend the selection of units to meet the aim of a reorganized Canadian army militia—

I am wondering whether the department was looking to your commission to be the man with the axe to chop off instead of asking you to make an orientation of the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: No; we were not given any instructions in that direction. I was present alone and was briefed by the chief of staff and the associate minister. The members of the commission had the same reservation, largely because of the suggestion which had been carried in the press that there was a 40 per cent cut, or whatever it was, in the militia. They had not the advantage of the briefing session I had had with the associate minister and the chief of staff. The associate minister met with us before we started our first session. At that time he satisfied them, as he had me, that this was not an axe wielding operation, but was a constructive approach in an effort to arrive at figures which would be determined by exports. We were asked to make exactly what the name of the commission indicates, a study into the reorganization of the militia. This is exactly what we tried to do as best we could.

Mr. LANIEL: Let us hope that Part II gives us that impression. Will you comment on what is said at page 12 of the submission of the Conference of Defence Associations when they say that your statement concerning co-operation of the commission with the Conference of Defence Associations is not completely accurate because you have not aproached them?

Mr. SUTTIE: That again is a matter of opinion. Certainly, I could not disagree too much with an association which endorses part I almost completely. I think there is a misunderstanding in the intent of the terms of reference. I believe it said it was recognized that during the course of our deliberations we would consult with the Conference of Defence Associations through the executive committee. Now, there is a great difference between consulting and consulting with. Had the terms of reference said we would consult, this would have suggested that we would turn to them for advice and guidance. However, consult with has quite a different concept. We did consult with them; we met them in Toronto, had lunch with them, and as you probably know, they had a member of the executive on the commission who was given a free hand in reporting at his direction to them on anything which he felt they should know. Further, on May 13 I was in Toronto and gave them an opportunity to meet with me. Unfortunately, they were all away with the exception of the past president and the member who was on the commission. I spent an hour and a half with him. I do not think they have been badly treated as is suggested in their brief.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

Mr. SUTTIE: Mind you, I would not want to make an issue of the matter.

Mr. MACINNIS: Brigadier Suttie, you emphasized the necessity of physical fitness in the militia, and in answering Mr. Deachman a few minutes ago you said that if a member of the militia is healthy and interested, he would be kept. I would submit there is a difference between health and physical fitness. I do not desire to cast any reflections on any member of this committee, or on any of those who are at the head table, but I would say they are healthy but—speaking for myself—they are not physically fit. If you think you are, I can give you a very simple test.

Did the commission during its hearings have any professional advice from qualified physical training instructors, and if so, what were the recommendations of these professional or qualified people?

Mr. SUTTIE: No, not specifically.

Mr. MACINNIS: Where did the recommendation come from in reference to equipment? For example, on page 17, you speak of ground mats, which I agree can be very useful; and parallel bars and wall bars and so on. Where did such recommendations come from in a physical fitness program for the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: This was suggested, as a matter of fact, by one of the senior regular officers.

Mr. MACINNIS: Is he a qualified physical fitness director?

Mr. SUTTIE: This particular one is, yes indeed.

Mr. MACINNIS: How can he recommend the use of parallel and wall bars which require specific and careful training for the individual using them in a physical fitness program? Was this a question put to him? Where in the Canadian permanent army can you find a physical fitness program being carried out, on a mass scale, with parallel and wall bars? This does not add up to the type physical fitness program which could be adapted on a mass scale with a large number of recruits. To me it does not appear to be a very sound recommendation on the part of your qualified senior officer who was speaking on the matter of physical fitness.

Mr. SUTTIE: Well, there are available in the army physical instructors who could be posted or made available to units for a program, if they are interested.

Mr. MACINNIS: I realize that instructors are available, but I am thinking of this type of equipment being made available to militia units or permanent forces. This equipment is no doubt stored somewhere. I suggest it is of very little use to any fitness program that the army or militia may undertake.

Mr. SUTTIE: I think it is admitted generally that in one night you can not do a physical fitness program and have your training as well. But in certain areas, if you had a leader, he might be able to stimulate young fellows to come out another night in the week to learn how to tumble and do these things.

Mr. MACINNIS: That is quite possible, but there again, as you have indicated in your brief, it is left to the initiative and interest of the recruit himself to maintain these standards.

Mr. SUTTIE: It has to be stimulated, obviously.

Mr. MACINNIS: It could be considered as an official parade. There is however in physical fitness standards this ability to pass a medical test. Possibly everybody here could pass a medical test and get into a militia unit or the army. But they have no set standard. Is that true? I mean, a recruit who is perhaps 18 or 19, or even one who is 35 or 40 would not be required to perform any physical fitness task to qualify himself as being physically fit, such as running a six minute mile, or something like that?

Mr. SUTTIE: No.

Mr. MACINNIS: Do you not agree that a physical fitness standard should be included in any medical test which would be applied to recruits coming into the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: This might preclude the enlistment of a lot of people.

Mr. MACINNIS: That is exactly what I am getting at. It would preclude the enlistment of a lot of people who are not physically fit to begin with, therefore they would not be able to come up to the requirements as suggested to be physically fit.

Mr. SUTTIE: I think it would be much sounder to enlist them if they are healthy, and then to make them physically fit after they get in.

Mr. MACINNIS: How do you propose to do this with parallel bars?

Mr. SUTTIE: I am not a physical training instructor.

Mr. MACINNIS: That is exactly what I am getting at. You may suggest that there are more important things, but I have found that a physically fit person is more mentally sharp than one who is not physically fit.

The commission has seen fit to emphasize physical fitness within limits. I would be very much interested to see if militia groups have qualified persons, and if necessary, if they could send them along to the regular army physical training schools in order to make sure that the units do have personnel available to give this type of training. The mere supplying of this equipment will not do it.

Mr. SUTTIE: Not in itself by any means. But if it is supplied it would help. Actually this is a very abbreviated proposal. I might give you full details of this proposal. It was suggested that if equipment were made available there would be no problem in taking N.C.O.'s from a unit and qualifying them as p.t. instructors who are able to run classes in the unit, at proper army schools, and not just putting these bars on the wall and saying "Away you go." You would find that you ended up with broken arms and broken heads.

Mr. MACINNIS: That is true. I only suggest that it would be more effective to apply the funds available for this type of equipment to supplying trained

and qualified personnel who could bring about a course of physical fitness without this type of equipment, and that this would serve a much better purpose. I think there is still far too much money spent. I had experience with the regular forces myself with such equipment. I think it would be better to qualify more personnel who could create an interest in a physical fitness program which did not require parallel bars, wall bars and so on, of which you seem to have quite a bit lying around unused.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Matheson next, on my list, and following him Messrs. Asselin, Winch, and Fane.

Mr. MATHESON: The tenor of your report as I understand it, and the comments to this committee indicate your search for a more viable militia role, as you refer to it, within the concept of the terms of reference. You have not been very free to go beyond those terms of reference.

Some months ago this committee was in Europe looking at our elite brigade there. It was perfectly clear from the evidence we had that they were underequipped in many areas. I am disturbed by the answer you gave that you were seeking to give control of a fully equipped troop of guns to each battery of artillery.

In your seeking for a more viable role within these terms of reference, does it not occur to you as sensible that a dollar invested in a lightly equipped force, such as the infantry, would be infinitely more valuable in this over-all program than to be invested in heavy capital equipment such as armour and medium guns?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think the ratio of infantry units to other units would indicate that this is recognized.

Mr. MATHESON: You do recognize this?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. MATHESON: Having in mind that which is set out in the white paper and the list of priorities, there is apparently an indication of the intention of the government to orientate in favour of light mobile peace keeping type forces rather than the traditional type of establishments we have been thinking of even as late as world war II. Would you not think you must improve the requirements of a viable militia role by picking young men, placing the training emphasis on the skills of the infantryman alone, seeking to advance as many of them to commissioned and N.C.O. status making this an elite training force which may be called upon to play another role, rather than building up establishments?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think you must provide the supporting arms as well as the infantry, because even a light force is a mixed bag and does not contain entirely all infantrymen trained in all corps. In the first instance men are trained in basic common to all arms subjects. In other words, we hope we can produce a reasonably well trained militia man who might be an armoured corps man, a gunner, a signal man, an engineer and so on. He would not be fully trained really in his specialty, but he would be fully trained in common to all arms subjects.

Mr. MATHESON: You have itemized a good number of references and I presume you are familiar with the contents of those. Has consideration been given at all by your commission to the greater and stronger reserve forces in other national militias, and I am thinking of the territorials in England where I believe there has been greater emphasis placed on light field forces rather than regular establishments?

Mr. SUTTIE: One of our members did spend two days with the territorial people in England and found out what they were doing. We recognize, in Part II of the report, that there has to be some kind of a corps d'elite to stimulate

and hold interest. This type of special unit is really a specialized infantry unit in terms of equipment, and so on. The territorial army, of course, is still set up on a divisional basis with armour and tanks. Of course, they have a different problem in that they have a larger population and a smaller country, and can do things in the way of training that we could never attempt to do. That is not a parallel situation. There are many things in common, in particular the fact that we are now both on a voluntary basis.

Mr. MATHESON: I do not wish to delay the committee's progress but there is one thing which I personally feel is something of an oversight in this report. Having in mind that we are approaching the 100th anniversary of this country and the existence in the country of a militia with dignity and pride, of some national importance, perhaps even from the standpoint of security, has this commission given consideration to the importance to Canada in the next two or three years of having an excellent militia unit which can participate in drills at various places such as Fort Frontenac in the Kingston area, and the Upper Canada Village, where there is a great demand for troops which can be turned out well and can foot drill and parade, as they do now on many occasions? Has this idea been considered?

Mr. SUTTIE: We did not give specific consideration to that idea.

Mr. SMITH: That subject was not included in the terms of reference.

Mr. MATHESON: Are you not overlooking this matter?

Mr. SUTTIE: No. We did not go into that idea specifically. I would hope this report is just a base and that these things will be pursued and developed. We have hinted at things which were not possible to develop properly in the time available. It is quite important to do this kind of thing as quickly as possible. The units are now waiting for an answer. This is by no means a perfect job but it is the best job we were able to do in the time available. We have hinted at these things in Part II, and we have been told these will be followed up and developed.

Mr. MATHESON: If you do not do a good deal more than hint at them in Part II you are not going to have this force available in the next year or two, are you?

Mr. SUTTIE: I cannot answer that question.

Mr. MATHESON: We have shifted out of the E.M.O. role, to some extent, and tried to give the militia a more realistic traditional military role. Are you also bearing in mind the responsibilities that are going to be imposed largely on the militia rather than the regular forces as we approach our 100th anniversary?

Mr. SUTTIE: No.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): To follow along that line of questioning, it might be fair to say that such an idea was not suggested in the terms of reference.

Mr. SUTTIE: It was not suggested. We were not asked to provide this information.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You were not asked to consider this idea, even though it may be a good one?

Mr. SUTTIE: Obviously, it has a great deal of merit, there is no question about that.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Brigadier Suttie, I am interested in your first recommendation in respect of which you seem to place a great deal of emphasis. I refer to your statement in connection with public relations, that the present system should be abandoned because it is too costly and

ineffective. Can you estimate the difference in the cost between the system you suggest, central public relations, and the system now in existence?

Mr. SUTTIE: I do not have those figures at the end of my tongue.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Could you give me one of those famous ball park figures?

Mr. SUTTIE: As you are aware, under the present system there is a P.R.O. attached to each unit responsible for local public relations. The effectiveness of this has been fairly spotty, and in large areas such as Toronto, Montreal and other large cities, it has been almost non-existent because there is not much interest in this type of news. We felt that a positive program would form a much better approach.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You are not prepared to give an estimate of the savings involved?

Mr. SUTTIE: No.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I am wondering whether the emphasis you place on this recommendation stems from negative publicity, rumors, and ideas which are fairly widely held, perhaps not in the best informed circles, that the militia is a fine club to join with the advantage that one does not have to pay to be a member but, in reverse, is paid, and that the greatest benefit of membership is social?

Mr. SUTTIE: That is quite so. The image of the militia to the public at large is not a particularly good one. Most people read headlines; they do not read the detail.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Most of us here are politicians, and we know this.

Mr. SUTTIE: The kind of publicity that gets into the paper is not too helpful. The only time a picture appears is of some ball or something of this sort. It is unfortunate. I think the kind of publicity that is needed is on the really good job that has been done, on the whole, by many units.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): It would seem to me that it is not only publicity that is required but also an actual good job by the units involved.

You mentioned a few minutes ago, I think in answer to a question by Mr. Laniel, that the units were aproximately 50 per cent effective at the present time. This means that some units are less than 50 per cent effective. Correct me if I am wrong.

Mr. SUTTIE: That is right. Any average has a high and a low.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In other words, some of this image may be deserved.

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, and yet on the other hand you find units—

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I must say first of all that the one or two units of which I have had any experience have, to my observation, a very high degre of effectiveness and operate very well in the area I come from. This image, however, does exist and I realize there must be other units that are not 50 per cent operative. Will you continue with your answer?

Mr. SUTTIE: Se Part II.

Mr. WINCH: We are not allowed to see Part II.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Have you finished your answer?

The CHAIRMAN: The Brigadier answers that if you were to look in Part II you would find your answer.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I must say that many of the questions in which I was interested were answered when you were being questioned by Mr. Laniel.

You mentioned that the cheapest dollar that was spent on defence was on the militia.

Mr. SUTTIE: In effect, yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In spite of the low effectiveness?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, it is still the cheapest.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I am wondering if you could tell me from your observations across the country—and you have interviewed many militia units—what is the percentage of the effective strength of each unit between officers, N.C.O.'s and men. In other words, what is the relation of chiefs to Indians?

Mr. SUTTIE: In general, officer strength is fairly well up to establishment and the N.C.O. strength is high in comparison with that of the O.R.'s. To be more specific, in a metropolitan area, under one roof, a unit had a strength of, say, 200; that was pretty high. That is the total. The establishment at the present time is 600 plus. There is absolutely no hope of any militia unit ever reaching present established strength. You will find other units where there are sub-units in two or three locations where the total numbers might exceed 300, or even more.

Mr. MATHESON: May I ask a supplementary question on that? If the officers and N.C.O.'s in that unit are really passing courses and qualifying themselves, is that a very dangerous situation?

Mr. SUTTIE: It is not a bad thing at all. In any circumstances in the militia I would think there should be a weighting of officers and N.C.O.'s, but they must have sufficient other ranks or men to get the training they need in leadership and this type of thing.

Mr. ASSELIN: (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): This was the point I wanted to come to in relation to the effective strength. The officer and N.C.O. strength is maybe 80 per cent or maybe 90 per cent effective strength?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): When we say 50 per cent effective strength, what we should say is that other ranks may be, say, 33 per cent—200 out of 600—and the effective strength of officers and N.C.O.'s is up to scratch?

Mr. SUTTIE: It is considerably higher—80 per cent.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Do you feel the balance here is right?

Mr. SUTTIE: Mind you, the task is somewhat different. It is a lot easier to find 40 people than to find 340.

Mr. MACINNIS: But your reference to percentage—the 50 per cent—does take in O.R.'s?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I could ask a clarifying question. This ratio is not pertinent across the country? It would vary?

Mr. SUTTIE: Oh, yes, it would vary very much.

Mr. SMITH: If we are talking about effective strength it seems to me that of those who would be physically fit for mobilization, among the other ranks you might get a higher percentage available to go forward and available to go out.

Mr. SUTTIE: Fifty per cent was given for availability for service rather than strength.

Mr. SMITH: Other ranks might be more available than officers?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I was coming to that point. Your effective strength has to do not only with the people you have on strength but also with their parading? I wonder if you noticed in your investigations whether the officers and N.C.O.'s paraded more effectively than the other ranks. In other words, is there a real job now to be done for the other ranks in having people trained and ready to replace the others, and is this not one of the underlying problems that has to be solved before the militia will become something other than what many of the public believe is a private officers' club?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes, I would think on the straight number basis, without going into detail with regard to what they do when they get there, there are more officers and N.C.O.'s who parade regularly than there are men.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I have attended one or two parades which would have looked to be more realistic if the roles had been reversed. I might add those were not in the Montreal metropolitan area.

From your investigations, Brigadier Suttie, could you tell me now whether the recommandations you are making will effectively meet this problem and how they will meet it? Which ones will meet this?

Mr. SUTTIE: The recommendations we have made we believe, perhaps in combination, will achieve the objectives of having a vigorous and revitalized militia. I think probably the most important thing—

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): How would you attract more other ranks, for instance? Is this in the public relations role?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think that is a very important role. There have been occasions in certain areas when a militia man has been almost ashamed to appear on public transport vehicles in uniform because of the remarks made by other people on the bus, and this sort of thing.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Do you think handling publicity centrally will cure this problem? It has been my observation in some areas that the makeup of the commanding officer and the makeup of the officer corps has a lot to do with this, and that is local. In other words, if they are very active in the recruiting sphere and offer certain inducements they are quite effective; and, as you point out, in some units they have a much higher strength of other ranks than in other areas and other units. I would hope, in other words, that this recommendation would not be one that would remove all initiative in connection with public relations from the individual units.

Mr. SUTTIE: No. What is really needed is a positive plan of public relations, and this would have to be worked out at unit level. I think instead of having someone paid as a P.R.O. on unit strength, someone in the unit should be detailed to look after public relations through the P.R.O. who is located in the area. Certainly one cannot get it down to the bottom through a central location, but a plan could be developed which we feel would be more effective than the present shotgun approach.

Mr. MACINNIS: How far do your recommendations go with regard to the centralized P.R.O.? Does this require one P.R.O. in each military command, or more than one?

Mr. SUTTIE: In each command and area there are P.R.O. elements and they should remain there. I think they are better qualified, or should be, to get things in the paper that should get in. For example, a unit goes to summer camp, and a few names of people who do well and qualify has significance to the individual and to the unit.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is just about 1 o'clock and I still have Messrs. Winch and Fane who would like to put questions, as well as Mr. Lambert. Also, Mr. Smith indicated earlier that he wanted to ask further questions.

Would your committee be agreeable to meeting after Orders of the Day for a short period of time in order to clear this up?

Mr. WINCH: The Public Accounts Committee is meeting at 3.30 this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Then, is it impossible? If that is the case, then I am afraid we have exhausted our time, unless the committee wishes to carry on for a few minutes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): How many members on this committee are also sitting on the public accounts committee? I am prepared to come, Mr. Chairman, and I assume that Mr. Lambert would be here.

Mr. LAMBERT: He is tied up with the house.

The CHAIRMAN: Is the committee agreeable to staying a few minutes longer now to see if we can clear up the business at hand?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. WINCH: With the exception of one question, Mr. Chairman, all the questions I had in mind have either been put or commented upon by the brigadier. However, there is one phase in which I am vitally interested and I would like to hear a few words from the brigadier in this respect.

I know that all members of this committee are interested in having the type of militia which will interest persons coming into it and, in my opinion, what would be more important is that once they are in the militia there should be some means of holding their interest so that they will want to stay. Very briefly, could I state that, in my opinion, in order not only to encourage those that are already in the militia but to hold those in who are there, radical changes are necessary in the training program itself. There is too much emphasis being placed on lectures and not enough on practice.

Of course, I am going back a few years now but I want to let you know just what I have in mind. I would like to ask how do you imbue interest and then hold it in the membership of the militia if—and I am speaking from experience—never in three years do they get to fire a submachine gun; if only once in three years they ever get to fire a light machine gun; if never in four years they get to fire an antitank gun; if an officer only once in two years gets to fire his side arm, after having passed all the T.O.E.T., and where an instructor in the militia, who wants to demonstrate and find out whether his men understand all the field signals, has to do this on the concrete floor of an armoury? If this is the case, just how, with that type of training, are you going to imbue and hold interest, and add to it? Members of this committee who were in Gagetown over a week ago, where the regular forces numbering between 9,000 and 10,000 are now on summer exercises, would note that they were restricted in what they were doing because of a lack of live ammunition. The same situation, it would appear to me, exists today as it did years ago, and if that is applied on a budgetary basis to the reserves, then I would think perhaps they are in the same situation as I found myself in in the four years I was in the militia. I think perhaps the brigadier understands the point I am driving at. Brigadier, did you make any study during the course of your commission work in respect of training procedures and needs for changes or do you have any comment to make on what I think is a most serious aspect of maintaining the interest and activity in our militia? Perhaps this does not come within your personal responsibilities but are we not being perhaps a little bit

false in our approach in not supplying what may be the required amount in order that this training becomes an effective, pleasurable and agreeable thing?

Mr. SUTTIE: I highly agree with what you say. Certainly, in order to hold the interest of the militia men there must be opportunities to use their weapons; there must be opportunities to move on to a more sophisticated type of equipment, antitank, and so on, in respect of the infantry; they must go regularly to camp, and at camp they must fire their weapons. This is particularly necessary and important to armoured corps and the artillery, and this ammunition must be made available for these purposes.

Mr. WINCH: Is that part of your study?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: And you made recommendations?

Mr. SUTTIE: I think it is implicit in the fact that we have not referred to savings as such. We have made reference to reduction in costs and I would hope that the money made available from these sources to a large extent would be spent on these necessary things.

Mr. WINCH: Would you not agree that there should be more field exercices and less lecturing?

Mr. SUTTIE: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. Fane.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say at the present time that in the 28 years experience I had as an officer in the Canadian militia I at no time had to face the troubles Mr. Winch has mentioned. I perhaps was in 10 or 15 units during that time and none of these units were faced with the difficulties that Mr. Winch has expressed. We got very good service. Maybe we were blessed with commanding officers that were more efficient than some or we were working in a district that was better looked after. I am speaking of N.D. 13 and western command.

Mr. WINCH: That is very peculiar; I was in western command, too.

Mr. FANE: Well, I just wanted to put that on the record.

Now, speaking in respect of the recommendations of which the first concerns public relations, you suggested that the public relations of the militia should be placed in the hands of a national agency. Do you really believe that that will be worth the snap of your fingers in getting more people to join the militia and making it more effective?

Mr. SUTTIE: Well, we feel that a national agency skilled in these things can more effectively design a program that will stimulate interest than the present situation does.

Mr. FANE: Well, although I would question that, you have put in your report and you are the people who were paid to make that report. However, in the past I have found that the efficiency of any unit, the number of enlistments, and so on, have a direct bearing on the efficiency, public relations and the commanding officer, so naturally if he was efficient he picked efficient officers to work for him. In my opinion, that is better public relations than anything else that could ever be done.

Mr. SUTTIE: I would agree.

Mr. FANE: You would agree with that?

Mr. SUTTIE: I would agree with that.

Mr. FANE: Very good. In respect of the authority of the commanding officer, I agree with you that commanding officers of local detachments or detached detachments should be given more authority on how the armouries

are apportioned and what is done with them. As you say, the present system is very bad and this needs to be rectified.

Then, in respect of training programs and weekend training, equipment, and so on, naturally the militia hardly can expect to have the very latest equipment all the time. But, I am sure, as you suggest, that training with any kind of comparable equipment, even if it is a little outmoded at the moment, is good training. I would agree with that.

Now with regard to regular army support, naturally the militia must have the support of the regular army units that are available there. That has been very noticeable in the past.

I next come to uniforms. I would like to commend you for suggesting that the reserve army be equipped with uniforms the same as the active army.

I am not asking very many questions, Mr. Chairman. I am making observations as a one time detached unit commander. It makes me wonder sometimes whether having your commission composed almost entirely of brigadiers was perhaps the best set-up you could get, Brigadier Suttie. I would not ask you to remark on that but that is my observation.

I agree with what you say about attestation. This should not be for two years, it should be a continuing set-up.

With respect to the boards of inquiry, I agree with what you have to say there also, that on the certificate of the commanding officer minor losses and damages would be written off.

Accounting, has always been a great difficulty with the detached units, and I presume with undetached ones also.

I have already spoken on the armouries.

On the whole I must say that I consider your report quite good with the exceptions that I have mentioned. I would take more exception to your recommendation about public relations than to any other part of it.

You cannot expect physical fitness in a unit that parades once or twice a week to be comparable with the physical fitness in an active army.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have now made my report.

Mr. LAMBERT: My question reverts back to the rate of turnover. There are only two questions I have in this regard. First of all, among the younger soldiers who participate rather actively in the militia, what did you find to be the incidence of turnover of enlistments in the regular forces? You get young soldiers getting the taste of military life and then going on to the army. Is there an appreciable amount of this?

Mr. SUTTIE: There is quite a significant amount of this, and it is particularly true in the east, in the maritime provinces. In a lot of the local units you see men going on to join the army. This is all to the good.

Mr. LAMBERT: My second question is: How much carry on in the militia do you find from people who have graduated or been commissioned through the C.O.T.C. and people who have gone through the R.O.T.P. who have fulfilled their commitment in the active service and then gone on into civilian life? Do you feel that generally, across Canada, we are succeeding in providing in our civilian army a corps of men who have been well trained?

Mr. SUTTIE: The intake from C.O.T.C. is very disappointing. These young men really are quite well trained in their two summers in the corps camp, but they do not join the militia in the numbers they should. Again, in our second report you will find a reference to this. I think one of the reasons is there is no undertaking; there is no obligation. In the absence of any undertaking it is perfectly in order for him to do nothing about it; but if before he received the training it was understood that he would make an honest effort to join a unit when he completed his training, and was established in his locality, I am satisfied quite a lot more would do so.

Mr. LAMBERT: How about the chap who has gone through R.O.T.C. and has had three or four years or more as a regular? When he severs his connection with the regular force, does he then go into the militia?

Mr. SUTTIE: Not in any appreciable numbers. I think when they have finished their tour of duty it satisfies them.

Mr. LAMBERT: They have had it.

Mr. SUTTIE: Pretty well.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel has one more question.

Mr. LANIEL: I am surprised about the fact that your commission did not make any stronger recommendation concerning training aids. Your recommendation only says:

> That the pursuit of an imaginative program for the development of training aids be fully supported by the department.

Considering the fact that in industry these days quite a bit of emphasis is being given to audio visual training, I am surprised, in view of the lack of equipment, that you did not make any stronger recommendation.

Mr. SUTTIE: We are suggesting this should be pursued, because this is a matter which should have considerable study. I am sure there is a field there which could provide substitute equipment at a cheaper cost which would stimulate the interest of the young militia man. For example, in Edmonton we saw a subcalibre type of mortar which was operated by compressed air. They could lay out a target area and go completely through the drill outside the armouries, of firing a mortar. The cost of this device was only $500. In Winnipeg we saw an indoor range where the entire cost was only $600. This provides training for infantry, artillery and armour. This is the type of thing which can be developed to an extent which would hold the interest of a young fellow much more than marching up and down the armoury floor.

Mr. LANIEL: I am interested in this because in an anti-aircraft unit I was in, one of our men who is a specialist in electronics made a set-up in our drill hall for anti-aircraft training. This was quite realistic and was worth while, but we had to pay it out of the officers' mess funds.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that completes our questioning.

Before we adjourn, on behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Brigadier Suttie for coming here and submitting to two and a half hours of bombardment by the committee.

We stand adjourned until Monday morning at 8.15 when we proceed to Halifax.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1964

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 15

MONDAY, JULY 27, 1964 to THURSDAY, JULY 30, 1964
(Visit to Canadian Maritime Command, Atlantic, and to SACLANT Headquarters, Norfolk, Virginia)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1964

RESERVE FORCES

WITNESSES:

Commodore R. I. Hendy, RCNR; and Group Captain J. W. P. Draper, R.C.A.F. Auxiliary.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

21253—1

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David G. Hahn

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and Messrs.

Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*),	Langlois,	Matheson,
Béchard,	Laniel,	McMillan,
Brewin,	Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*),	McNulty,
Deachman,	Lloyd,	Pilon,
Fane,	MacInnis,	Smith,
Groos,	MacLean,	Temple,
Harkness,	MacRae,	Winch—(24).
	Martineau,	

(Quorum 13)

E. W. Innes,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, July 27, 1964.
(20)

The Special Committee on Defence assembled in front of the Parliament Buildings at 8:30 a.m. under the leadership of the Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn.

Members present: Messrs. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Harkness, Lambert, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lloyd, MacLean MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch—20.

In attendance: Honourable Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence; Brigadier H. E. Doucet, Executive Assistant to the Minister.

Accompanying Officers: Captain H. A. Porter and Lieutenant J. C. Bonneau.

The Committee proceeded by Military Bus and Aircraft to the Halifax area. The group was welcomed in Halifax by Rear Admiral J. V. Brock and Air Commodore F. S. Carpenter, Maritime Commander and Deputy Maritime Commander, respectively.

Following luncheon the Committee viewed a static display of RCN and RCAF anti-submarine warfare aircraft and equipment as well as a flying display to demonstrate torpedo drops, weaponry and helicopter sonar.

The Committee then toured HMC DOCKYARD, the shops and facilities, and was briefed by Commodore E. N. Clarke, Commodore Superintendent Atlantic Coast.

HMCS STADACONA was next visited to observe the operations of the 'Fleet School', to see a demonstration of the 'Operations Trainer', and the Committee was briefed by Commodore R. L. Hennessy, Commodore Personnel Atlantic, and Lt. Cdr. W. T. Marchant.

The group toured HMS ALCIDE, an "A" class submarine, and HMCS BONAVENTURE, an ASW aircraft carrier, where it was welcomed by Lt. Col. S. S. R. Conway, and Captain R. W. Timbrell, respectively, the Captains of these ships.

Following an informal reception on board HMCS BONAVENTURE, the visiting party was divided into small groups; these groups were billeted in various ships as guests of the respective Commanding Officers.

TUESDAY, July 28, 1964.
(21)

The Special Committee on Defence assembled on board HMCS ASSINIBOINE at 9:00 a.m. under the chairmanship of Mr. David G. Hahn.

Members present: (Same as on Monday, July 27, 1964).

In attendance: (Same as on July 27, 1964).

21253—1½

The Committee was briefed by Cdr. W. S. Blandy, Captain G. C. Edwards and Lt. Cdr. S. H. Rowell, as well as Lt. Cdr. D. H. Tate, respecting Anti-Submarine Warfare and the co-ordination of destroyers and helicopters. A demonstration of destroyer-helicopter operations and variable depth sonar was also provided.

HMCS PROVIDER, the new supply ship, was inspected; there the Committee was briefed by Captain T. C. Pullen, the ship's commanding officer.

In the afternoon the group visited Maritime Headquarters where it was briefed on the contributions to Maritime activities of RCAF Maritime Air Command and the functions of the Maritime Commander's operations room. Here, information was supplied by: Rear Admiral J. V. Brock, Air Commodore F. S. Carpenter, Squadron Leader Robert McNair, Mr. W. B. Bailey, Mr. R. Dexter, Lt. Cdr. H. J. Bird and Lt. Cdr. W. A. Byatt.

Later the Committee visited the Joint Maritime Warfare School for briefings on RCN Atlantic Command and The Canadian Maritime Commander Atlantic and the Canadian Atlantic Sub Area of NATO. Relevant information was supplied by: Lt. Cdr. R. F. Strouts, Commodore J. C. Pratt and Cdr. C. G. Pratt.

Following an informal dinner in the wardroom HMCS STADACONA the group returned to the host ships for overnight accommodation.

WEDNESDAY, July 29, 1964.
(22)

The Special Committee on Defence boarded three Argos Aircraft at HMCS SHEARWATER at 8:00 a.m. under the chairmanship of Mr. David G. Hahn.

Members present: (Same as on Monday, July 27, 1964).

In attendance: (Same as on July 27, 1964).

On board the aircraft, the Committee Members proceeded to Bermuda. During the flight Committee members observed the demonstration of the operation of the equipment on board the aircraft and the procedures followed in anti-submarine detection.

Arriving in Bermuda the Committee was divided into three groups and members were assigned to three ships of the Fifth Canadian Escort Squadron, which is under the command of Captain D. L. Macknight.

The ships concerned and their Commanding Officers were:
HMCS KOOTENAY—Commander D. H. P. Ryan
HMCS COLUMBIA—Commander A. E. Fox
HMCS RESTIGOUCHE—Commander B. C. Thillaye

Proceeding to sea, Committee members had an opportunity to observe tactical exercises, both anti-aircraft and anti-submarine. During the course of these exercises an RCAF Neptune Aircraft, an RCN Tracker Aircraft and HM Submarine *Auriga* took part.

Late in the day the Committee returned to overnight accommodation in Bermuda.

THURSDAY, July 30, 1964.
(23)

The Special Committee on Defence assembled at 7:30 a.m. under the chairmanship of Mr. David G. Hahn.

Members present: (Same as on Monday, July 27, 1964).

In attendance: (Same as on July 27, 1964).

The Committee proceeded by Military Aircraft to Norfolk, Virginia, where they were met by Vice-Admiral R. D. Hogle, Chief of Staff, SACLANT Headquarters. At SACLANT Headquarters the Committee was briefed by Admiral H. P. Smith, U.S. Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and Vice-Admiral Charles E. Weakley, U.S. Navy, Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic, assisted by Cdr. J. B. Carling, Major J. D. Dillon, Cdr. S. Bruland, Cdr. J. J. Doak and Cdr. J. L. Davis.

These Officers outlined the work and responsibility of SACLANT, with particular emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. They were questioned on related matters.

Following luncheon at SACLANT Headquarters, the Committee proceeded to the Navy Yard for an inspection of USS RANDOLPH (Carrier—ASW).

On board the *Randolph*, the Committee was welcomed by the Commanding Officer, Captain R. J. Davis.

Following a further question period at which Vice-Admiral Weakley answered questions, the Committee travelled by Military Bus and Aircraft to Ottawa, where the Members disbanded at approximately 7:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, August 13, 1964
(24)

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11.05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Lambert, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple (17).

In attendance: Commodore R. I. Hendy, RCNR (Retired); Captain L. B. McIlhagga, RCNR (Retired); and Group Captain J. W. P. Draper, RCAF (Aux.).

A document entitled *Canadian Obligations to the United Nations and International Operations* was tabled by the Chairman and identified as *Exhibit No. 9*.

On motion of Mr. Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), seconded by Mr. MacRae,

Resolved,—That the Informative Papers on Defence Matters, prepared in conformity with the Order of the Special Committee on Defence, dated December 18, 1963, be assembled in booklet form; and that 1200 copies in English and 500 copies in French of the said booklet, be printed.

The Chairman presented the Eighth Report of the Steering Subcommittee as follows:

The Subcommittee agreed to recommend:

1. That on Tuesday, August 11, 1964, the Hendy and Draper Reports, respecting the RCN and RCAF Reserves respectively, be distributed to Members of the Defence Committee.

2. That on Thursday, August 13, 1964, the Defence Committee consider these Reports with Messrs. Hendy and Draper in attendance.

3. That reasonable living and travelling expenses as well as a per diem allowance be paid in connection with the appearance before this Committee of Messrs. Hendy and Draper.

4. That on Tuesday, August 18, 1964, the Committee continue its consideration of "Reserve Forces" with the Associate Minister of National Defence in attendance.

On motion of Mr. MacRae, seconded by Mr. Lambert,

Resolved,—That the Eighth Report of the Steering Subcommittee, presented this day, be now concurred in.

Agreed,—That the Committee proceed with its consideration of the Hendy and Draper Reports, with approximately one hour being allotted for the consideration of each Report during this meeting; but if the consideration of the Reports is not then completed, the Committee will meet again this afternoon.

The Committee continued its consideration of "Reserve Forces".

Group Captain Draper made a brief opening statement and was questioned on the Report respecting the *Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary.*

Commodore Hendy was introduced; he in turn introduced Captain McIlhagga and then made a short statement. The witness was questioned on the *Role and Organization of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve.*

At 12.50 p.m. the Committee adjourned until this afternoon when the "Orders of the Day" have been reached in the House.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(25)

The Special Committee on Defence resumed at 3.30 p.m., the Chairman, Mr. D. G. Hahn, presiding.

Members present: Asselin (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*), Béchard, Deachman, Fane, Hahn, Lambert, Laniel, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Temple (13).

In attendance: (Same as at morning sitting).

The Committee resumed consideration of the *Hendy* and *Draper* Reports concerning respectively the *Royal Canadian Navy Reserve* and the *Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary.* Messrs. Hendy and Draper answered questions on matters raised in these reports and on related subjects.

The Chairman thanked the witnesses for their assistance and they were permitted to retire.

At 4.25 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11.00 a.m., August 18, 1964.

E. W. INNES,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, August 13, 1964.
11.00 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN: We now have our quorum. May we come to order, please? Before we start with today's business there are a few items of a procedural nature that I would like to dispose of. We have now received a paper from the Department of External Affairs entitled "Canada's Obligations to the United Nations and International Operations", which I shall table and identify as *Exhibit IX*.

Exhibit No. IX: Paper entitled "Canada's Obligations to United Nations and international operations".

This is one of the papers that was called for last session. In connection with these papers—we have now received nine of the eleven papers that we shall receive—leaving two papers which are due to be received shortly. They are coming from two of the Departments of Government, not from outsiders.

There have been many requests for these papers so I think it is a good idea that they should be printed in booklet form. I would like therefore to have a motion from the committee, calling for the printing of these papers. This means that when these two remaining papers are received, the Clerk of the Committee can, on the strength of this motion, arrange to have them printed.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I so move.

The CHAIRMAN: The motion reads:

> That the informative papers on defence matters, prepared in conformity with the order of the special committee on defence, dated December 18, 1963, be assembled in booklet form; and that 1200 copies in English and 500 copies in French, of the said booklet, be printed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: On that point, has it been discussed whether or not they would be prepared as separate booklets for each paper, or will the booklet be a compendium of all eleven papers?

The CHAIRMAN: The booklet would be a compendium; that is, they would all be printed together.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): What does "compendium" mean?

The CHAIRMAN: I assume it means a mix.

Mr. MACRAE: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we all in agreement?

Motion agreed to.

We now have a report of the Steering Subcommittee dealing with Agenda. Before I read the Subcommittee's report let me say that we are meeting today to discuss the Hendy and Draper Reports dealing with the Naval and Air Force reserves. We shall have the Associate Minister following. It was the thought of your steering subcommittee that we should prepare an Interim Report and hold an In Camera meeting in order to complete that report, discuss it, and then submit it to the House, and that this should probably pretty well wind up our business for this part of the session.

The steering subcommittee report reads as follows:

> The subcommittee agreed to recommend:
>
> 1. That on Tuesday, August 11, 1964, the Hendy and Draper Reports, respecting the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. reserves respectively, be distributed to members of the defence committee.
>
> 2. That on Thursday, August 13, 1964, the defence committee consider these reports with Messrs. Hendy and Draper in attendance.
>
> 3. That reasonable living and travelling expenses as well as a per diem allowance be paid in connection with the appearance before this committee of Messrs. Hendy and Draper.
>
> 4. That on Tuesday, August 18, 1964, the committee continue its consideration of "reserve forces" with the Associate Minister of National Defence in attendance.

May I have a motion for the acceptance of the report?

Mr. MACRAE: I so move.

Mr. LAMBERT: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: To deal with the Hendy and Draper Reports, we have with us this morning Group Captain Draper and Commodore Hendy, who are the Chairmen of the two committees whose reports we have before us. Because of the nature of the material and the amount of time it may take to deal with it, I think it would be advisable to proceed by dividing the time that we have this morning into two portions, half of the time to be allocated to the Draper report and the other half to the Hendy report. Then, with the agreement of the committee, if there are any outstanding questions unanswered we will meet this afternoon and attempt to clean up the questions completely. Is that agreeable to the committee?

Agreed.

On that basis, then, we can start with the Report on the Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary. It is now approximately a quarter past eleven, so we will deal with the air force report for approximately an hour and we will then switch to the report dealing with the Royal Canadian Navy Reserve.

Our witness is Group Captain Draper, who has a brief introductory statement to make, after which we will proceed with the questioning.

Mr. J. W. DRAPER (*Group Captain, Royal Canadian Air Force*): Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I have a few brief comments to make on the preparation of this report.

Each of the twelve medical units, the eight technical training units and the eleven flying squadrons were invited to submit their unit thoughts to their respective wing commanding officers. The commanding officers then consolidated these unit reports into eight different wing submissions, which were received at meetings by the committee. These were further condensed into the nine pages which are before you. As such, the report represents the sincere beliefs of the whole of the auxiliary air force as it was constituted on December 5, 1963.

The committee was formed on January 18, 1964. Four weeks later, on February 15, the final product was presented to the Associate Minister of National Defence. Time and distance precluded our presenting a fully documented, statistically reinforced study. We were aware of the announcement of the Minister of National Defence of December 5 concerning reserve cutbacks. At the conference of the defence association meeting in January we heard the Chief of General Staff suggest that the militia would consist of

approximately 30,000 men and that their main efforts would be shortly directed to corps training as opposed to national survival. The white paper on defence had not been published.

I mention these facts so you can realize the timing of the events when we were writing this report.

Our self-assigned ground rules were relatively simple. They were: (1) To determine whether or not the R.C.A.F. auxiliary could make a significant contribution to the defence forces of this country; if not, recommend its disbandment; if so, find the best use for this arm of the service. (2) To operate within the reduced budget of about $3 million to give the Department of National Defence and the Dominion of Canada the highest possible value for its defence dollar.

I will be glad to answer any questions to the limit of my knowledge and as frankly as I am able.

Mr. TEMPLE: I would like to deal first, Mr. Chairman, if I may, with page six of the report which concerns tactics. Paragraph (a) says:

> Close support with an air to ground attack capability utilizing training type aircraft for the most effective ordnance delivery.

Do you mean only for training, or do you mean both for training and the actual military function?

Mr. DRAPER: This technical capability was included as something we wanted to look into in the future based on the aircraft that would be available to us. The type of aircraft we had envisaged would be Harvard or T-33 aircraft, and certainly it would be in a training role.

However, I think it must be appreciated that this is only one facet of our primary role. Under the heading of equipment, you will note we have stated that the equipment we have currently can be used in our primary and secondary roles, and that long range planning should be undertaken with a view to supplying more suitable aircraft as the role develops and as the real needs become more apparent. We felt this was a role we could undertake, but we did not know. We wanted to look into it to make sure. We thought this would develop and we could then make a determination.

It is realized that our role—be it called primary or secondary—is really that of medium light lift with reconnaissance and communications capability. That is basically our role. It is not the primary role; but a military or, if you prefer it, a wartime title for the same function as that expressed in the peacetime term, our secondary role. It is really a wartime way of saying that light transport is to carry these people about in a military function, but in peacetime you do not call it that.

Mr. TEMPLE: You agree that the present technical training type aircraft would not be really effectively used in wartime for tactical support?

Mr. DRAPER: Certainly not the Harvard aircraft, sir, and, in view of recent proof in Asia, the T-33 is doubtful. We certainly need something more sophisticated than a T-33.

Mr. TEMPLE: You say there were eleven squadrons to begin with?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: Those have been chopped down to what number?

Mr. DRAPER: Six.

Mr. TEMPLE: The budget upon which you are operating now is approximately $3 million?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: What was the budget before?

Mr. DRAPER: The budget was approximately $9 million. The figures are actually in evidence. The Associate Minister of Defence introduced this on July 31 at page 409. In the year 1963-64—that is, the fiscal year which in effect would be the year before the cut actually took place—a total of $10,700,000 was expended; it is now $3 million.

Mr. TEMPLE: Where are the majority of the savings effected? I am speaking of the difference between $10 million and $3 million, the $7 million saving.

Mr. DRAPER: This would come into the field of costs again. There was a little over $3 million attached to the reserve and the civilian pay and allowances. That is the amount paid to the members of the reserve. This has been cut by more than half while our squadrons have not quite been reduced by half. We have lost our medical units and our technical training units, so there has been a very significant strength reduction. As a consequence, our regular force has been equally reduced. Our aircraft operating costs have been cut in half because we are operating only half as many. Our station costs have been cut by almost half because of the stations which have been disbanded.

Mr. TEMPLE: Have you any figures to show what it would cost to have the other five squadrons that have been disbanded re-activated in accordance with these recommendations?

Mr. DRAPER: You can take the existing $3 million and divide it by six and say it is approximately $500,000 per squadron, but in fact it is not that amount. We had hoped, by dividing the services of some of the squadrons and combining maintenance, that we could do it on a considerably more economical basis; and it was our belief that we should be able to maintain the eleven squadrons, or perhaps ten of them, for another $1 million, or perhaps even less. Again, sir, you must appreciate that time prevented us from going into a definitive study on cost accounting, and these are the best and most accurate estimates that we could make.

Mr. TEMPLE: I have some other questions, but I am sure many other members wish to ask questions, and therefore I will pass.

Mr. GROOS: Mr. Chairman, I notice the ministerial committee's report says that they think the primary role which would be most effective for the R.C.A.F. auxiliary is that of army air support, and I can believe this. This seems to me to be a very useful role for an auxiliary, but in deciding what this role would be it seems to me that it is necessary for any one of the reserves or the auxiliaries to know exactly what the service to which it is an auxiliary is going to be called upon to perform. Now, in deciding the merits of these reports my difficulty is in ascertaining exactly what form the services are going to take at this point or exactly what role we now call the individual services are going to be called upon to perform within this new joint concept of the armed services. And, I am sure this is a difficulty which you also faced.

Again, if I may repeat, I find it very difficult to decide on the merits of these reports what roles these services are going to be called upon to perform without knowing what the services, to which they are now auxiliaries, are going to be called upon to do or exactly what form they are going to be in when they are called upon to do it.

I myself would be somewhat reluctant to make any changes beyond those already made in either the size of the auxiliaries or in the direction in which they are told to go until this primary problem has been resolved.

I would like the chairman's comments in this respect.

Mr. DRAPER: Well, sir, you will appreciate that this report was written before the white paper came out, which announced integration was taking place or going to take place. We had no way of knowing this was going to happen. However, in view of the fact that the Canadian armed forces in the last few years have really been engaged in peace keeping operations throughout the

world, and as the militia again was going to start being soldiers in the sense of corps training as opposed to survival training, we assumed it might be that the government would be looking to a continuation of that role of peace keeping type of action and that that would be where we best would fit in. And, as we had the previous summer worked with the army at camp Gagetown and planned to do so again in the summer of 1964, we felt that was the role we should be doing. That is a role which transport command, of which we are a part, is doing now. The equipment we have lends itself to that without any additional expense or cost to the crown. It must be remembered we already had been cut in numbers and, faced with this virtual *fait accompli,* we have to operate within this budget. So, in respect of these things we had to make an assumption. We assume that you have read in our report where we suggested we should operate the R.C.A.F. auxiliary as part of a tactical air group, providing the services required by a closely integrated defence establishment. As I said, this came out before the white paper and, in effect, what we have been doing at Camp Gagetown is setting up a separate unit, and we have acted in that capacity during the summer.

Mr. GROOS: In the light of the information subsequently revealed in the form of the white paper, discussions held in this committee and articles published in the press, do you regard your conclusions and recommendations here to be still valid?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, I think now in view of the minister's announcement that perhaps we would put more emphasis on mobility and logistics and less on the tactical side, because this is the way it has swung, and this is what we have been doing, which involves photo reconnaissance, which is a form of tactics; however, yes, the report would be virtually the same today with slightly more emphasis on that side of the role.

Mr. GROOS: On mobility and logistics?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes.

Mr. GROOS: Those are all the questions I have at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: I wonder if Group Captain Draper could give us what his committee assessed to be the role of the air force auxiliary as it existed on December 5 and how in their estimation it failed to meet what they conceived to be the purpose of an air force auxiliary? As you know, there have been some rather drastic changes made. True enough, this is an interim report which has been considerably modified by the philosophy of the white paper. However, I would like to know why, outside of the mere budgetary considerations, these changes were suggested.

Mr. DRAPER: Well, sir, prior to the Conference of Defence Associations meeting, when the minister asked the Chief of the General Staff to give some thoughts on the militia and what, in effect, would be the guiding lines, in the Suttie commission. The role of the militia, I believe—certainly the auxiliary air force—had been one of national survival. That was our primary role. This is a rather difficult thing to practice from the air. But, we did have a secondary role, and this role in those days was transport both in wartime and peacetime, and we had kept on with training in the transport field. So, in effect, we had been doing to a large degree what we had suggested as our new role. Really, there is no difference, if you look at our primary and secondary roles; they are virtually the same in respect of mobility, logistics and tactics. These are names used in respect of our role of transporting people about. We had done this before. We knew from the announcement of the chief of general staff that the militia was swinging from national survival to soldiering, so obviously it was no role for us to hang our hat on, if I may use that expression. It looked as though we were going into the support of the soldiering business too and

we had better get on with the job. That is why we came up with this role, sir, which was really our secondary role before. We just made it our primary role.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, you feel there was no longer any need for training for preparation for emergency disaster operations and that these might be combined with your essential transport role?

Mr. DRAPER: Well, that is a difficult question, sir, in that it is hard for me to determine where there is a need for survival training. We felt that our training which we had done in this regard—and we have done a considerable amount of national survival training—had been carried out to the limit of the equipment we had available and, therefore, we should get on with the next job. We are still able to do the role that we were called to do under the national survival scheme or the context of what we were supposed to be training for, so while we felt the emphasis was swinging to the military side as opposed to the survival side we felt we had better provide ourselves for that as well.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now, carrying on with this primary role, do you feel that the equipment that may be available to you is satisfactory to develop this transport role?

Mr. DRAPER: Not to develop, no, sir. We have suggested again under equipment that something should be provided in the future. But, remember, we are operating under pretty severe budgetary limitations and if we recommend an annual operating cost of $3 million and a capital expenditure of many more millions we are not going to get very far. So, we had to work with what we had. However, we do believe that not only in the reserve air force but in the total R.C.A.F. there will develop in the immediate future a definite need for a medium light lift transport.

As you know, we are retiring our aging C-119s and North Stars, which are being replaced by the more versatile and larger Hercules aircraft. These Hercules aircraft do a wonderful job on a long haul where large loads are required, but it is uneconomical to use them over short distances; you must feed into the main bases over short distances. With the departure of the C-119 and the North Star there is going to be a dearth of this type of airlift capacity within the whole of the R.C.A.F. The auxiliary, because of its locations across the country, could provide these services if they were equipped with aircraft like the Caribou, the Buffalo or Dakota, and they could provide this on a continuing basis in cases where our high lift capability was called out of the country and we had to depend on medium lift.

Mr. LAMBERT: With what degree of certainty do you feel there will be provided this medium lift capability in order to justify your strong recommendation that this now be made the most viable role for the auxiliary?

Mr. DRAPER: This actually applies to the regular force as well as to the auxiliary force. There will be a need for that equipment. However, in the meantime, we can do a job with the Otter and the Expeditor aircraft we have. Of course, we cannot do the same job, we cannot do it to the same extent that we could if we had bigger aircraft, but we can still do it. We could do it more economically and more efficiently with the larger aircraft.

Mr. LAMBERT: How can you justify this strong dependence on this role unless you have some degree of assurance, which we have not as yet seen, that this will be so, that you will have this capability with this medium lift aircraft?

Mr. DRAPER: Whether or not we get the new equipment, we are now able to do it with the existing equipment. Ultimately it is bound to have to be replaced some time in the future, but we are operating at present under the budgetary limitations which, frankly, we hope will be lifted in the future, to a degree at least.

Mr. LAMBERT: You suggest that the Expeditor, as far as I am aware from my own limited knowledge of aircraft capability, is not really a transport aircraft?

Mr. DRAPER: It is a transport aircraft for a light load. It will take relatively few people, but there are occasions when you have to lift only two or three people, and in these cases it is more efficient and more economical to use an Expeditor than to use a Hercules. This is certainly where it fills a role now in the transport field. On the other hand, the Otter will lift greater numbers of people over shorter staging differences, but eventually it will get there.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Mr. Chairman, group captain, you have made a recommendation that squadrons could operate more effectively from non-R.C.A.F. bases by leasing accommodation and purchasing depot maintenance. That appears in your fourth recommendation on page four. Could you tell me how many squadrons operate at the present time on a regular basis and how many squadrons operate on their own bases as opposed to the regular air force bases?

Mr. DRAPER: At the present time there are six auxiliary squadrons. They are all operating from existing regular air force bases that are used as regular force bases. Edmonton is a transport command station, Winnipeg is training command, Downsview is a transport command station, and St. Hubert I think was just turned over to a D.O.T. base but it is actually an air defence command headquarters. There are none presently operating on non-R.C.A.F. bases where there are not regular air force installations.

If I may go back over the suggestion, however, I did not say they could operate more effectively; I said they could operate effectively.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Presumably, the suggestion then is to save money?

Mr. DRAPER: Frankly, sir, the suggestion there was that if the air force or the Department of National Defence felt there was a need or a use for an auxiliary squadron in an area where there was not an air force station, for instance in Calgary, we felt it could be operated there by that unit operating out of rented hangar space, and, with the assistance of our naval friends operating out of the naval reserve unit in Calgary for urban headquarters, it would not be necessary to put in a regular force station. We had hoped that the heavy maintenance, that is their overhauls, could be done at the nearest reserve base, and then there would only be a requirement for front line servicing and maintenance at Calgary which could largely be handled by a reserve component.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In other words, this recommendation is primarily to permit the expansion of the flying squadrons of the auxiliary force at a lower cost in those areas where there is no regular station in operation?

Mr. DRAPER: Not exactly. The retention of those units that were disbanded. There was a unit at Calgary and we had hoped that by this means we could possibly retain it.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): And still keep within the new budgetary restrictions of your terms of reference? Have you made an estimate that would show that you could reactivate these squadrons and still remain within the budgetary requirements of your terms of reference?

Mr. DRAPER: Within the limited time and with the limited statistical figures available to us, all our studies indicated that this could be done. We did, however, recommend a further study by the regular component of the air force, in concert with the auxiliary, to investigate this to a greater depth. We felt it was possible.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In your opening remarks, group captain, you indicated that your recommendations were unanimous. Does this mean that the committee was unanimous, or that all the recommendations were accepted by all the eight wings which were made up of all the units that made recommendations to you?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir, I believe I can say they were unanimous. Perhaps there were minor differences regarding what some people thought such as what units should be retained or regarding the priority of certain units, but in the main the decisions were unanimous. I think all of my associates would agree here. It was not by any means a minority report.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I would not like to suggest this, but it was quite a sweeping suggestion on your part.

Mr. DRAPER: I can think of no one at the present time who disagreed with any of the principles of this report. There may have been others which they would have like to see included.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): So that everybody in the auxiliary force feels that army air support should be the first role of the auxiliary air force?

Mr. DRAPER: Army air support is a wartime connotation of it. We have been and are doing army air support to a limited degree.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I take it this role would require some new aircraft?

Mr. DRAPER: Not immediately. That was not included in our $3 million budget. We could not pare it down and still buy new airplanes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Could you do the two things that you seem to suggest here, that is reactivate the deactivated squadrons and at the same time carry out this role without the new aircraft? I am wondering whether your recommendations, to put it quite frankly, are within the financial limitations that were outlined for you?

Mr. DRAPER: To the best of our ability to determine it, they are, sir. However, I must go back to the fact that we recommended a further study.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You have not provided any supporting evidence as far as savings are concerned. I realize it must have been difficult for you in the time allotted, as you have pointed out, but this might be something the committee might be interested in having. Possibly, Mr. Chairman, we might be able to obtain some of this information through the Department of National Defence.

Mr. TEMPLE: I have a supplementary question. I thought Group Captain Draper said it would cost approximately another million dollars over and above that figure to have the 11 squadrons.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): But presumably there are savings in other areas which you suggested which would compensate for this. I understand that you are suggesting that we should have more flying squadrons and that it would be possible under the budgetary limitations with the savings you have recommended.

Mr. DRAPER: We believe this could be done, sir. However, we were unable to get all of the figures that would be necessary to prove it, which is why I stated we were not able to back this report and be dead sure.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I find it a little skimpy as background information. I am wondering if you might explain a little further why you say you were not able to get the figures and information you required.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir. We had four weeks, and the last week was taken up with printing and putting it down in its final form.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): It was a time limitation and not a refusal to supply?

Mr. DRAPER: By no means a refusal. There were only two weeks in which to get to the meat of it.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Under (*h*) you have suggested that the retention of the technical training units could not be justified. I wonder if you could elaborate on that.

Mr. DRAPER: There was no financial justification for their retention.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Which are the ones you suggest?

Mr. DRAPER: We lost our medical units and our technical training units. When we lost the technical training units we lost the corporate entity of the technical training units but we did have vacancies within our flying squadrons and we were able to absorb many of the people there. The function of the training is now incorporated within our wings. It used to be that we had a unit whose job was, so to speak, to act as the school. They trained the people and then they went to the squadrons. We have had to pull this in, and we now do it within our wing complex.

As far as the medical units are concerned, the army has doctors in their medical units. Again, as we were on an enforced economy drive, we had to figure out what was our job, and we felt that our job was to provide the country with as many operational aircrew and aircraft as possible to get on with the flying side of it. It was with reluctance that we had to leave the doctoring to our associates in the army.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): What would be the strength of the new auxiliary air force as you see it?

Mr. DRAPER: The strength would be somewhere around 860.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): And what was it?

Mr. DRAPER: Twenty three hundred.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacRae.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether Mr. MacRae would mind if I asked three or four questions at this time. I have a long standing out of town engagement.

The CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: How many and what type of aircraft do the six remaining squadrons have?

Mr. DRAPER: Each squadron is equipped with four Otters and four Expeditors. In two of the six squadrons, two of the Otters are amphibious, so we have four amphibious Otters, 20 wheel-ski configurations and 24 Expeditors.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is this a sufficient number of aircraft to carry on the role you envisage in the immediate future?

Mr. DRAPER: In the immediate future, yes, but we would like to see it expanded, because we find we are able to get more aircrew than we have aircraft time available to keep them trained to the full operational requirement set down by Air Transport Command. We feel we should have greater strength, but we are limited by the fact that we only have so many hours in which we can fly them. We can use more aircraft because we could provide more crews and trained personnel.

Mr. HARKNESS: I take it that you recommend these present aircraft be replaced, supplemented, or increased, perhaps, by additional aircraft in the form of Caribous or Dakotas.

Mr. DRAPER: Replaced. I think we would like to see our Expeditors replaced by Dakotas or Caribous. It may not be that we would get them on a

one for one basis, but we feel we could do more with these aircraft. For instance, a Dakota costs 2.7 times as much as an Expeditor, but the cargo capacity is three to one, and the passenger capacity 4½ to one, so you are getting more for the ultimate dollar. In the case of the Caribou it is three point four times as expensive, but its cargo capacity is five times as great, and its passenger capacity eight times as great; in addition, it can operate, just about, off anything, whereas the Expeditor cannot.

Mr. HARKNESS: To your knowledge, does the R.C.A.F. hold in non-operational use the Dakotas which could be made available?

Mr. DRAPER: They do hold Dakotas, but I would not say they are in non-operational use. I do not think these are in the bank, so to speak. They are all attached to units and are used in training or in transport commands, or air defence commands. To the best of my knowledge, they all are in use.

Mr. HARKNESS: Are there any other aircraft at present being held in moth balls which you could use?

Mr. DRAPER: To the best of our knowledge there are no aircraft in the present air force inventory which are not being used which would do a better job than the Expeditor. If this had been the case, we certainly would have asked for them long before now.

Mr. HARKNESS: The only possibility of increasing your load carrying capacity without a capital expenditure would be by having turned over to you some of the Dakotas which at present are being used by the regular R.C.A.F.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: In connection with what you put down as your secondary role—and I am thinking particularly of search operations, aid to the civil authorities in the event of a regional emergency or disaster, and rescue and mercy flights—and in view of the five squadrons now having been disbanded, what exists to carry out those functions?

Mr. DRAPER: The short range transport function that was operated by those squadrons obviously has been taken over by the regular force because there was nobody there to do it. The search operations are taken on by those units which are designated as search and rescue units, which must fly, when looking for lost aircraft, by pooling with aircraft from training command. In the past they would not have engaged in these searches when the auxiliary was called out. The auxiliary flew 600 search hours when we were looking for Dr. Michaud, a year or so ago. The area covered by that search still is served by auxiliary squadrons. However, on the Pacific coast, for instance, there are not now any auxiliary squadrons, and in the event of a search developing, aircraft would have to be flown in from perhaps Edmonton or they would have to operate out of Comox, or perhaps Vancouver.

Mr. HARKNESS: So, the apparent saving secured by disbanding these five squadrons, in many cases, is not a real saving so far as these functions are concerned.

Mr. DRAPER: I think that is a reasonable assumption.

Mr. HARKNESS: In respect of the whole region of southern Alberta where these functions were carried on by the flying squadrons in Calgary, which now have been disbanded, anything along this line now would have to be carried on by aircraft actually from Edmonton?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would think the actual cost of carrying on operations of those three types now will be considerably greater than was the case before.

Mr. DRAPER: I cannot disagree with you on that, but I am not an authority on the costing side of it. I would imagine that if a search did develop in

southern Alberta, the aircraft certainly would have to come from Namao or Rivers, or some of these places. If they were concentrated in that area, they would have to move a temporary search headquarters into McColl field and operate out of there.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think this is one of the rather serious losses which has resulted from the disbandment of these squadrons in Calgary. I would hope it might be possible to reactivate at least one of the squadrons there in order to have something to carry on search and rescue operations for which there constantly is a need in that whole area of southern Alberta.

Mr. DRAPER: I am sure my associates in Calgary will join me in welcoming your suggestion; we certainly endorse it.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): May I ask a supplementary question? Would your associates in Calgary feel that the cost of maintaining the squadron would be justified by the occasional air search that this squadron would carry on?

Mr. DRAPER: No, sir; there is no question of that at all.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Earlier in his evidence Group Captain Draper gave the cost of the Caribou compared to the Dakota. I think he meant compared to the Expeditor.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes.

Mr. MACRAE: My first question dealing with the roles and item (j) with regard to aircraft in the R.C.A.F. inventory, and so on, has been completely and lucidly answered. My second question deals with the recommendation above, which is recommendation (i) found on page 5 of the report. This recommendation states:

> the terms of service of an auxiliary officer or airman should be changed to ensure his availability when required.

I wonder whether you would explain just what the term "service of an auxiliary officer or airman" in the air force means, and what you suggest should be the changes.

Mr. DRAPER: An officer serves at the Queen's pleasure; an airman enlists for three years, and can re-enlist for that period. The intent here, I think, was covered in part when I appeared before this committee with the Conference of Defence Associations. I believe it was Mr. Smith who asked what guarantee we have that we can use the reserve forces when we need them. What we are suggesting here—and I would add this was without any question the unanimous feeling of all the auxiliary people—is that our job is to be there when we are required. Under the present terms of the National Defence Act it takes a national emergency to call out the reserves. We are suggesting here that this act well could be amended so that the reserves could be called out for something less than a national emergency on a unit or individual basis to serve the country; but this would require, we feel, a provision of job security similar to that offered by the United States National Guard in respect of which the president can call them out as units for periods and they have, to put it bluntly, job protection. They go back to their jobs. In the present circumstance, if we detailed a search for three months, you probably would get away with it once, but if you made a regular habit of it, the employers of the personnel might get fed up. So, we think it not unreasonable that some protection should be afforded.

Mr. MACRAE: The terms of service in the air force auxiliary are exactly the same as in the militia?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes.

Mr. MACRAE: In your own experience and in the experience of your fellow commanders, are you able to take all the officers and airmen who wish to go into a summer camp such as at Camp Gagetown this summer; do all of those who wish to go have the opportunity?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I would like to pursue a little further the line of questioning initiated by Mr. Asselin with regard to the question of leasing accommodation as recommended under (d) on page 4. Has any study been made with regard to the comparable cost of doing it in this way; would it be cheaper or not? I would like you to explain, in layman's language, and in a little more detail, exactly what is envisaged.

I believe that during the commonwealth air training scheme, during world war II, there was air flying training operated by civilian contractors. I believe that even now the R.C.A.F. and the United States air forces have air training operations conducted by civilian contractors. Have any studies been made along this line with regard to the efficiency in terms of cost of operating auxiliary squadrons and having this service provided by civilian contractors?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir. I anticipated that this might be an area where questions might be asked. When we talk about non-R.C.A.F. bases, it must be understood that this was not intended to apply to Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, or Edmonton, where it is obviously cheaper to operate from service bases, and where facilities are presently in use, which would lie idle if auxiliaries were not occupying them. It was hoped that a further detailed study would confirm our belief that at Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, and Saskatoon we could lease hangar space on existing aerodromes and share accommodation with other reserve force units in these areas.

At Hamilton or Calgary we would expect the second line of overhaul to be done by the R.C.A.F. at our bases, such as at Toronto or Edmonton. Therefore, fewer regular force personnel would be required. In the case of Vancouver it is probable that even second line maintenance that we now have would be done by contract.

We have only rough estimates on the relative costing. However our figures, which were secured by a member of a committee with a long history in the Canadian aircraft industry, indicate the possibility of a reduction in cost as opposed to an increase if we are to operate on this basis.

I cannot go any further because our studies were done very quickly. In fact, all we did was to make out, so to speak, tenders. We asked civilian suppliers, such as one from the Northwest Industries at Edmonton, and one from Timmins Aviation at Montreal to submit tenders on the job as we saw it, that we thought could be done, in order to get prices. The prices that came in indicated if anything that they were slightly lower than having it done by service personnel. I think that tenders are notoriously low initially, so to speak, when they are put in for budget financing.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): This is probably outside your terms of reference, but it has been suggested that it would produce a savings to operate even the permanent force training instruction in this way. Have you any opinion to offer or any figures that you obtained, from studying this matter, from the other air forces that do have training instruction operated by civilian contractors?

Mr. DRAPER: I do not have that information. Frankly, I did not attempt to get it. I did not have the time to do it under these circumstances. I think I would be stepping away out of line if I attempted to tell my associates how to run their air lines.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): You mentioned that in some cases search operations cut deeply into your budget, and that it was an uncontrollable expense.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): In your judgment could the cost of search operations be drastically cut by the employment of more modern equipment? I am not thinking now that the auxiliaries should be equipped with this equipment, but in your judgment, is there a more efficient way in which to do search operations?

Mr. DRAPER: There is a more efficient way to do search operations, yes. This is by using crash position indicators; but you must remember that if you work roughly on the basis of $35 an hour cost, and if you have to use 600 hours, for example, as in looking for Dr. Michaud, this does not include the crew time or the salary spent; but it would have been considerably more economic if the government provided free a crash position indicator which we could operate and home on right away.

The only way I think this could be done would be to make it a condition when obtaining an aircraft permit or licence in Canada, that there was an aircraft crash position indicator on it. But this of course would impose a financial obligation upon the civilian individual and he might not take kindly to this type of legislation. But from the department's point of view it would be almost cheaper to equip them all as a gift, and to get out of the search business, and go straight to it.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have any indication of the cost of a crash position indicator?

Mr. DRAPER: I am sorry, but I have not. I could probably get it for you by this afternoon should we have a session then. We shall attempt to secure that information for you by this afternoon.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You think it would be a money-saving idea?

Mr. DRAPER: I do not have the authority to legislate it.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): I made the suggestion some years ago that they should be made available to operators of private aircraft so that we would not be wasting an amount of money like that for search operations.

Mr. DRAPER: All our aircraft are equipped with SARAH, but it depends on the civilian operator to have a SARAH transmitter which could take it up. They just do not do this.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): What is your main source of air crew at the present time? I suppose after the war they were mostly personnel who had served in the regular forces at one time or another. But now where do you get them?

Mr. DRAPER: Right now we have several sources; our retreads are going, there are very few of us left who are still within the age limit. The post war entries have come from short service people being released from air force upon the completion of their short service commission, who have a good record which we consider acceptable, or short, short service commission people who are people sponsored by the auxiliary, who come into the air force after training. They take roughly a year out of their lives, and they come in and are trained. Whether or not they go back to the auxiliary or to regular force—history shows that the majority of them have joined the regular force. This is a good thing. It provides a good source of people. But they are all previously trained military pilots with their R.C.A.F. graduation, that is, their wings.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): You do not get any who have only civilian training?

Mr. DRAPER: No, sir, none at all.

Mr. McNULTY: I have one short question on page 8 under "Operating costs", item (d) "disbandment of all auxiliary bands". This may have been

touched upon, I am not sure. But I was wondering how many bands are involved, and what substantial savings would be involved?

Mr. DRAPER: I would not say that they would be substantial; but we were out to save every dollar that we could with a view to retaining operational units. We found it difficult to justify the retention of a band, let us say, when it would have kept another air plane flying. The price of a brass band is $19,500 a year. That is for a brass band. A pipe band costs $9,500 a year. We have presently a total of six bands in the auxiliary, and I believe four of them are brass bands, while two are pipe bands. We dearly love our bands, but we dearly love our aircraft just a bit more. We wanted to keep the aircraft.

Mr. TEMPLE: How many aircraft were there at each squadron previously?

Mr. DRAPER: The same number, but the disposition was different. We had two Otters, and six Expeditors at that time, whereas now we have four Otters, and four Expeditors.

Mr. TEMPLE: You have two more Otters than you had previously. At the top of page 8 you say:

> The committee considers that it is entirely feasible to operate squadrons in cities in which there are no R.C.A.F. bases. This could be accomplished by renting hangar facilities and combining with the army and navy units for mess accommodation. Supply, accounting, and other services could be obtained as required from the nearest permanent R.C.A.F. base.

I take it that you are in favour of integration.

Mr. DRAPER: Do you want my personal opinion on it? We have been working with the army for a number of years. If you take it out of the context of its being the army, navy, or air force, and look at it, it is the Department of National Defence for whom we all work. We are already, to that degree, integrated, and if it should go a little further, I can see no harm in it at all. That is my personal opinion.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): I am wondering, in view of the fact that every year in Canada millions of dollars are lost through forest fires, whether you or your committee have given any consideration to the capability of fighting them, or giving assistance to local authorities or to provincial governments or anybody else engaged in this realm of forest fire fighting? I understand that equipment is now available for loading water while in flight—equipment that can be attached quite easily. Have you considered this as a role to add to your search operations and your rescue operations?

Mr. DRAPER: No, we have only four aircraft in the auxiliary with float capability, and they have amphibious floats because we have to be able to land on the aerodromes as well as on the water. It is doubtful whether we could carry water bombing equipment with amphibious floats. In the provincial air services there are 34 aircraft which are equipped with water bombing equipment, and these are located in the areas where they would be most used. Our contribution would be relatively small; but certainly if we see a fire we report it immediately to the departments of land and forests, and we will continue to do so.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Must the aircraft be amphibious? I understood that recently-devised equipment allowed one to load water without landing on the water; in other words, by flying close to it.

Mr. DRAPER: I would not like to do it. I have seen it being done on television using a Canso and there was an awful lot of spray coming up. I think you would find the aircraft would be skimming because the snorkel has to go into the water, and the snorkel is only a couple of feet long. I would not

want to fly a land-based aircraft as close to the water as that; it would be unhealthy.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Then, in other words, you have only four aircraft that could do this?

The CHAIRMAN: We have now arrived at the time at which we should deal with the Naval Reserve. Our witness is Commodore Hendy, who will introduce his associate.

Mr. LAMBERT: Before Commodore Hendy does that, as we still have some questions for Group Captain Draper I wonder if you have any idea when we will reconvene so we can also arrange our times.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we should reconvene immediately after Orders of the Day have been called, if that is convenient, to complete the questions that remain after adjournment at one o'clock.

Commodore Hendy.

Mr. ROBERT I. HENDY (*Commodore, R.C.N.R. (retired)*; Chairman, ministerial committee on the role and organization of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve): Fortuitously, Mr. Chairman, I have with me today Captain McIlhagga, one of the members of the committee which I chaired. Captain McIlhagga is from Winnipeg. He has had over 20 years' service in the naval reserve. He served in the coastal forces in world war II and he has commanded the naval reserve unit in Winnipeg. Captain McIlhagga is a graduate of the National Defence College at Kingston, and he was honorary A.D.C. to the Governor General.

In so far as the work of our committee was concerned, we were under the same time restrictions as those mentioned by Group Captain Draper. We have outlined in our report how we operated, and I think it is self-explanatory.

I would like to say at the outset that we have been critical of certain things in so far as the naval reserve is concerned, but I must emphasize to the committee—and I think this is an omission in our report, one that I regret—that on the whole the naval reserve has a good esprit de corps, and their officers are well trained through the University Naval Training Division. On the whole, the units are extremely well housed; they are in buildings that are nearly all of post war construction, and the relations with the regular force in connection with training and other matters are good. Where we have been critical, it is because we felt there were things that should be said in the light of our terms of reference and our work, but I want to emphasize that basically the naval reserve situation is all right. However, there is always room for improvement; hence the comments and the criticisms we have made.

Our report, like that of the air force, was finished before the white paper was handed down, and I would say that the naval reserve's role and tasks would not be unduly affected by the concepts outlined in the white paper. In other words, we are supporting a maritime force and, so long as we have that maritime force, our position is that there must be a naval reserve to back it up. What the name should be or how it should be organized is something that has not been disclosed yet, but I am confident from reading the white paper that Canada's naval capability is to be continued in about the same manner as at present.

I will be glad to deal with any questions the members might wish to put to me.

Mr. GROOS: The emphasis in the white paper is on the desirability of forces in being. I therefore want to speak to you about the reserve naval air division in Victoria which is being disbanded. I notice there were two naval air reserve divisions that were disbanded, one in Toronto and one in Victoria, and it seems to me that these have a very important role to play.

They are forces in being immediately available for use, and there is a very definite requirement for their services if they are to adopt this concept.

I wonder whether you have given consideration to re-activating or making recommendations for the re-activation of the reserve divisions, particularly the one in Victoria which is immediately available to the naval forces, perhaps using some of the savings that you have recommended in your document.

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Chairman, we did deal extensively with the Naval Air Reserve squadrons on page 15 of the report. Our recommendation was that both the one in Victoria and the one in Toronto should be retained. This comes down, as in the case of the auxiliary air force, to a budgetary matter. We thought we had indicated savings which were substantial enough to maintain the reserve exactly as it was prior to December 4, 1963. The navy has said that the reserve air squadrons are too expensive, and therefore they are not prepared to allot this money, irrespective of the merits.

Mr. GROOS: Excuse me, this is a recommendation of the Navy, is it?

Mr. HENDY: This is in the budget aspect. The Navy says that the air squadron is more expendable than something else because of its very high cost factor. It costs a great deal more to keep one naval reserve airman than to keep executive personnel. You are aware of that. As far as we see it, that is the basis of the recommendation.

There are a great many naval air pilots who are not in flying appointments now, and the navy feels it has a strong backlog of pilots upon which to draw from that source. There are only so many aircraft. There is no bank of naval aircraft of which I am aware, so if the reserve squadrons are to be kept in commission, they would soon have to be re-equipped. We are flying the same type of aircraft as the air force—the Expeditors. We were not flying Otters. The Expeditors were rapidly reaching the end of their life; and there were re-equipment problems. Those were the reasons against the retention of the air squadrons, notwithstanding the fact that it was realized that the air squadrons were useful.

In connection with other countries, let me say that the United States navy maintains their reserve squadrons at a very high degree of efficiency. A United States reserve squadron operated out of Halifax on an exercise this summer. They are equipped with the S-2F tracker, which we use; but it is a matter of dollars and cents, I think.

Mr. GROOS: The remarks I made to Group Captain Draper concerning the advisability of maintaining the reserves or auxiliaries in their present state until such time as the integration of the armed services takes more definite form apply equally well in this case of the naval reserve. I just wanted to put that on record.

I have one more small point for Commodore Hendy. I notice that on page 5 an appendix is referred to, but I could not find it. Can you tell me about this? It is stated that this is a brief of the Naval Officers Association of Canada (Victoria).

Mr. HENDY: I have a copy here; it is rather bulky.

Mr. GROOS: I would also like to say, Mr. Chairman, that if I am not here this afternoon it is because I have a long standing commitment that will not permit me to be here.

Mr. TEMPLE: Commodore, what was your budget before the new budget?

Mr. HENDY: Approximately $6 million.

Mr. TEMPLE: What is it now?

Mr. HENDY: It is now $4.2 million. The total saved is $1.8 million.

Mr. TEMPLE: Can you tell me what percentage of men turn out for your drills?

Mr. HENDY: Well, this will vary from division to division but, taking it on an across the board basis, I would say there is about 50 per cent on any one drill night.

Mr. TEMPLE: I am referring to page 40 of your summary of findings. In the first principal finding you state:

> The increased commitments which the R.C.N. is faced with, dictate the need for a strong and efficient reserve to back it up in all its elements.

By "increased commitments" do you mean the commitments since the second world war or the increased commitments in the last year or two?

Mr. HENDY: Basically, since the second world war and certainly in comparison with what we did between the wars.

Mr. TEMPLE: That will be all.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed, Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I would like to refer to statements made on pages 37, 38 and I believe, somewhere else. I take it that it is recommended that the division in Charlottetown, H.M.C.S. *Queen Charlotte*, should be continued if at all possible.

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I have no other questions to ask at this time.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no further questioners.

Mr. MACRAE: Perhaps I could ask one brief question. I am referring to recommendation number 8 at page 45, which says:

> Personnel administration especially in respect to multiplication of reports, returns and other documentation be revised and the principle of the administration of the R.C.N.V.R. prior to 1939 be borne in mind with a view to simplifying procedures in this regard.

In effect, are you saying here that the naval reserve is bogged down with paper all the time and that there is far too much documentation required and all that sort of thing? I know that seemed to be the feeling in the militia, and I have had personal experience there.

Mr. HENDY: Yes. This is one place where integration does exist and all three services are inundated with paper, which seems to be increasing.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I have one additional question by way of seeking information. Would you compare very briefly the naval reserve now and its establishment between the wars. Could you give us also what the changes are. Are there a vastly greater number of naval reserve stations now?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Or, are their strengths greater or lesser? What is the situation?

Mr. HENDY: The number of units before the cut was approximately the same as it was in 1939. We have not established a new unit in any one location with the exception of the tender at Kitchener. We have basically the same number of establishments. But, these establishments are considerably more elaborate in respect of their physical surroundings, their equipment and the personnel than they were in 1939. The strength of the R.C.N.V.R., of which I am talking now, as opposed to the maritime reserve, the people in the merchant ships, was about 1,500. It had been increasing. There were units started in the 1930's. We started Port Arthur, Kingston and London. These are all I can think of at the present time. However, the number of units was the same but they were on a lower complement basis.

Now, going back even further, the Naval Services Act was passed in 1910 and there was a volunteer force created. This covered the availability of

personnel, which has been dwelt on by Group Captain Draper. However, under that act there was an obligation for naval reserves to be called out without giving their consent beforehand, as I read the naval services act of 1910. Now, in respect of the National Defence Act, we have a provision in section 35 which only permits the reserves to be called out with their consent. This is one difference which I think exists. I am not exactly sure what the position was in 1939; all I remember is when war was imminent we were summoned by the commanding officer who said: "I want some officers," and we all went.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Would you say a word in that connection in respect of the use that was made of the R.C.N.V.R. at the outbreak of world war II in 1939? I have the impression that at that time the R.C.N.V.R. provided a great source of strength to the regular navy immediately at the outbreak of war. I understand experienced officers and men who had been trained went into the service immediately.

Mr. HENDY: Well, by the end of September, 1939, almost 100 per cent of the officers on the strength of the R.C.N.V.R. had been mobilized and approximately one third of the men. At that point our naval commitments did not look very large. In fact, I think it was the opinion of one of the senior officers at naval headquarters at that time that the entire strength of the navy in the war that had just begun would never exceed 5,000, but we went up to 100,000. So, there were not the places to put people in the early stages. We had to develop and we did develop as our shipbuilding program progressed. But, I think our commitments are far greater now because the complexities of the situation have increased and the threat has increased. In 1939 we were faced with a submarine offensive by Nazi Germany with about 35 submarines in commission and we are now faced with a potential threat of 400, and even if they put one twentieth of these in the vicinity of the maritime provinces they could create chaos to the shipping at sea at the outbreak of war. This would require far greater naval control than that with which we were faced in 1939 and, hence, the need to have reserves available to do this job.

But, basically, the job of the naval reserve has not changed. We are available to back up complements of ships, man bases and provide recruiting facilities across the country, and this is one of the reasons for our locations in principal cities.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Therefore, there is a far greater number of ships required for back up at the present time than was required in 1939. Could you give us an idea of the comparable numbers of ships in commission now in the regular navy as compared to 1939?

Mr. HENDY: There were about 12. We had 6 destroyers, 4 minesweepers and a couple of other auxiliaries in 1939, and now we have about 45 ships, which are much bigger and more complex. But, there is this difference; in 1939 the complements were somewhere around 60 to 75 per cent of war strength, whereas today they are closer to 90 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you a question, Mr. Asselin.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Commodore, in paragraph 13 of your summary of findings at page 41 it is stated:

> The R.C.N.R. is basically well suited to and appears satisfied with the tasks allotted to it by naval board minute of 9 November, 1960.

Would these be about the same tasks you just have enumerated in that connection?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Were there any others?

Mr. HENDY: Well, there is the survival role, which is very auxiliary, but this again is a question of a trained disciplined force available to help, if needed, which we have demonstrated in the naval reserve all across Canada.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): But, primarily, they have a back up role for recruiting across the country.

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): As well as the tasks outlined there?

Mr. HENDY: Yes. We have a regular navy now of 21,000 odd and a reserve of about 3,000. In 1939 we had a regular navy of under 2,000 and a naval reserve about the same. So, the naval commitment has increased and we have to back it up.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grace*): In the summary of findings, page 43, (27) (e), you state:

> By reviewing the needs for motor transport. Many divisions indicated staff cars were not essential.

In looking under your recommendations I do not find that you follow through with a recommendation that non-essential staff cars be dispensed with. That is the first part of my question and while giving you an opportunity to think about that I would now put the second part of the question. If many divisions indicated staff cars were not essential this would seem to indicate to me that some are essential. Would you please tell me which ones are essential?

Mr. HENDY: Well, the failure to put it in the recommendations to be implemented is obviously one of authorship. This report was still in the hands of the printer at 12 a.m. Friday and it had to be on the minister's desk Saturday morning. This is really the first draft and there are a great many limitations in language and other things, and I apologize for these omissions.

I believe that action has been taken to review the requirements of staff cars. From the point of view of purely operating many naval units as a naval reserve unit alone with no concept of the R.C.N. regular forces function in the area the staff car is not essential; a truck is useful. But, there are places where there is a great deal of naval traffic, for example through Winnipeg, Toronto and Vancouver, where a staff car is a form of transport to get people who are transients in the area about.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grace*): Reserve personnel or permanent personnel?

Mr. HENDY: Principally permanent personnel.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grace*): In that case why are staff cars charged to the reserve?

Mr. HENDY: This is what we said in our report. It is a problem of costing. The reserves accept this. I am not saying this as a criticism.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grace*): It is probably a happy acceptance, a staff car is at their disposal, but it brings with it the inconvenience of being carged with it when you probably do not need it except possibly on the evenings when you have drills.

Mr. HENDY: They are not used on those occasions only. What we are faced with here is that the naval reserve units are fleet establishments of the navy. While their primary function is, apparently, the support of a naval reserve unit, they also carry out a great many functions for the R.C.N. One of the things that staff cars are used for is for apprehending deserters. I know that in my division the car was out a lot on that sort of thing.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grace*): Is this one of the tasks of the naval reserve?

Mr. HENDY: There are a great many regular force people coming through a centre such as Toronto. It is a release centre for people leaving the navy as well as a primary recruiting centre. We also carry accounts for officers in the Air Force College, at De Havilland aircraft, the Inglis Co., therefore you get the R.C.N. administrative requirement for transportation. From the reserve point of view, to go back to 1939, there was really no R.C.N. regular force requirement at that time, and you could operate very simply. However, now that there are fleet establishments and they are doing a job which is probably far beyond reserve from a costing point of view, these things should be separated. I do not think the cost to the naval reserve is in the $6 million figure. That was what we were trying to show in our report.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): You mentioned desertion. I presume it is occasional?

Mr. HENDY: It is occasional but it still exists.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Would it justify the retention of staff cars in particular?

Mr. HENDY: It would depend on the centre. There are other uses for staff cars as well.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*) Does not the regular navy have a police force?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Do they not have a provost corps?

Mr. HENDY: We have a regulating branch which does police work, but it is not the same concept.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): There seems to be a tremendous overlapping of responsibility between the regular navy and the naval reserve.

Mr. HENDY: I do not think it is overlapping. The reserve considers itself as part of the navy. These jobs have to be done. When they say that we have a budget of $6 million and we have to cut it by $1.8 million, the naval reserve says, "Is not a lot of this $6 million spent on functions that are not related to the Reserve?" Even if you eliminated the naval reserve you are still going to have someone left over to perform these regular force functions in various areas where they exist.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Certainly in the realm of transportation, the movement of regular force personnel through such centres as Winnipeg, if you are retaining staff cars or other equipment for such a purpose, it would seem unjustified from the accounting point of view that the naval reserve should be charged with it. That is going to be assigned to you as a task.

Mr. HENDY: It is unfortunate that we should have to get into this because, as I say, the reserve is part of the navy, but the figures have to be looked at when you look at that one section.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to refer to page 14 on the subject of university naval training divisions. In the second paragraph on page 14 it is said:

> There is comment, and perhaps criticism, in some quarters that the U.N.T.D. does not require its graduates to affiliate with the R.C.N.R. on graduation and also that it is training far too many officers for the numbers required to man the reserve active list.

And then it goes on to say:

> There is also certain comment that the U.N.T.D. really provides a form of subsidy to assist the cadets to achieve a university education at the expense of the crown without any corresponding obligation to become members of the active reserve for any period afterward.

I sense in your opening paragraph that there is some real difficulty indeed with this program as it relates to the Reserve and I wonder if you would like to comment on that section.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): It comes into conflict with the B.N.A. Act, jurisdiction over education.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Holy smoke! If I were told we were going to poke into that again I would have kept quiet.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Are you a lawyer, Commodore?

Mr. HENDY: Yes. This question of affiliation or obligation to serve was exploited when we appeared before this committee before. We do not think that someone should get this training and then, when he is finished, not have an obligation to be of use to the service that has trained him. Some universities are located in areas at some distance from a naval division. There are smaller universities—this is not a criticism of the university but it is a fact—that have very small units, so that the chances of obtaining officers from that unit to serve in the nearest naval division are very slim because they may not go to a town where there is a naval division. From that point of view the U.N.T.D. did become established in too many places. On the other hand, the U.N.T.D. scheme, as far as the naval reserve is concerned is on the whole a resounding success. I think that our officers today, who are very largely graduates of the U.N.T.D. system are capable and well trained and able to take their parts in mobilization, probably to a far better extent than we were in 1939. So that from the point of view of the navy's return from the U.N.T.D., we are very satisfied with the product. Where the criticism comes in is that we are producing perhaps more than we really need. Is there a wastage there? This comment about the subsidy has been expressed. The whole matter, I know, is being explored by the military studies committee of the national conference of Canadian universities and colleges. I do not know what they are going to come up with. From the navy's point of view we would not want to see the U.N.T.D. program restricted so as to limit the number of officers we are getting. What we want to do is to eliminate the training of people we know we have no chance of getting. I was certainly pleased with the officers I got when I was in command, and I am sure others will say the same thing. At one time I was getting about 20 officers a year from the University of Toronto.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So you are getting enough officers from the U.N.T.D. program and they are good officers but your criticism is that there is a good deal of wastage in the program?

Mr. HENDY: There is some, not as much as there used to be. There is, however, still no obligation to serve, so that when they graduate they can say, "I am not going to go on the active list".

Mr. DEACHMAN: You believe there should be an obligation to serve?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What sort of obligation should that be?

Mr. HENDY: A minimum of three years in the active reserve.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What would that mean to an individual who came under that obligation? What does it compel him to do over those three years?

Mr. HENDY: Exactly what he has been doing for the previous three years, training one night a week as a cadet and in the summer he would have to take two weeks training.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would this interfere with the employment of a young man coming out of the university and attempting to get himself established?

Mr. HENDY: I do not think so. There are lots of people who are doing it in the militia, in the air force, as well as in the navy. There are some cases

where it would, and you cannot make a firm rule which is completely inflexible. This should be the navy's decision.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But is this not an onerous commitment for a working man?

Mr. HENDY: No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further questions. Some members of the Committee have indicated that they would like to ask some questions this afternoon. I think we should reconvene at 3:15 or when orders of the day have been called, and reconvene as quickly as possible. We would then not need to sit for too long a period this afternoon. I will ask you all to come here as soon as possible after orders of the day. The meeting is adjourned.

AFTERNOON SITTING

THURSDAY, August 13, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, one of our committee members, who is a good mathematician, has suggested we might have a quorum. We will proceed with the questioning and I will allow questions either on the Navy or on the Air Force rather than attempt to segregate them into brackets.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, for the sake of trying to look at things in the record later on, let us see whether we can exhaust one area first, and then proceed to the other. We will not exhaust the witnesses, but will endeavour to exhaust one area first.

The CHAIRMAN: If it is the wish of the committee, we will start with the Air Force and then go to the Navy. If there are any tag ends in respect of the Air Force, then we could come back to that.

Before we start the questioning, I believe Group Captain Draper has some information in answer to a question raised this morning.

Mr. DRAPER: Mr. Chairman, this morning someone inquired with regard to the cost of a crash position indicator. The only information we have been able to obtain in respect of this is that there is a unit made by Leigh Instruments in Carleton Place. The unit costs in the neighbourhood of $900. The installation of this unit on a pressurized aircraft such as a DC-8 or Yukon is estimated at $5,000. However, it is believed the installation cost on a light aircraft would be considerably less than that. Unfortunately, I cannot get the figures. I would suggest these could be obtained locally from this firm, Leigh Instruments in Carleton Place.

The other question concerned the cost involved in search and rescue. The estimate for the fiscal year 1964-65 for search and rescue in the R.C.A.F. is $11,425,000.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): Mr. Chairman and Group Captain Draper, more years ago than I care to mention here I was active in the auxiliary air force. One of our great problems was that the only active pilots we had were pilots who had been trained during the war. As I recall it, the attendance was not always of the best. I am speaking of a period following the war in the auxiliary air force. As this supply of trained pilots from the second world war began to run out, when these pilots went into other occupations, the auxiliary air force experienced a great deal of difficulty in finding replacements, and when it did it experienced difficulty in respect of how to train them. I wonder whether you could tell us what your attendance in respect of pilots is now, where they come from, and whether you feel there is a sufficient number of them to carry out the role which you have outlined.

Mr. DRAPER: Earlier this morning I mentioned that the retreads, those who were in the war as I was, are just about at an end. I would say that 95

per cent of the aircrew in the auxiliary are post-war trained. We have been in a fortunate position regarding aircrews since about 1956 in the Toronto area which I command.

We have a waiting list of aircrew and have had for a number of years. As a result of this, we are very selective in whom we accept as aircrew. Literally we accept only experienced pilots because they now are available in large numbers. We have a mandatory rule that our aircrew must attend 100 per cent of the time; there is no question about that. They must attend parades, although occasionally they will be excused for good reason.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): A weekday parade?

Mr. DRAPER: A weeknight parade. It is mandatory they attend on the flying week ends. In the Toronto area we attend on alternative week ends. If a person did not attend he would have to show just cause why he should be permitted to continue in the auxiliary air force.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): That seems to be a very happy situation compared to the one which existed in 1952.

Mr. DRAPER: I am pleased to say it has improved immeasurably in that respect.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): There seems to be a paradox here in that this really is quite different to the situation which exists, for instance, in the militia; you have 100 per cent attendance, whereas in other reserve situations we have a very poor attendance. I am bringing this up with a view to finding out whether or not some of the principles you have applied to obtain this happy situation might be useful in other reserve forces.

Mr. DRAPER: I think probably we have an attraction to our aircrew which may not exist in the other services. However, as I say, if you work on the basis that it is a tough outfit to get into and a lot tougher to stay in, this means you hold the key people who do the job and perform up to the standards we demand.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): In other words, if we permitted the auxiliary air force to increase its flying squadrons, as you have suggested in your report, the personnel are available to man them.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: In recommendation (e) on page 4 you say that with the implementation of the prior recommendation there would be a significant reduction of regular force support personnel. Can you tell us what level of regular air force personnel was required as of December 5 to support the 11 squadrons and other units that were then on strength, what it is estimated to be now on the present basis, and what you estimate it would be in the event that your recommendation were implemented?

Mr. DRAPER: Let us say that roughly a year ago we had a regular force support staff attached to the auxiliary units throughout the country—

Mr. LAMBERT: May I interpose a question? Is this support group on full duty on an instructional basis or other basis with the reserve unit?

Mr. DRAPER: Their full time occupation is to support the reserve units, either as flying personnel or as ground crew. Prior to the cut-back there were 600. Our estimate of today's strength is 175. This large reduction in excess of 50 per cent is accounted for by the fact that two of the stations, Hamilton and Calgary, were maintained solely for the auxiliary air force, and there were, therefore, additional regular air force personnel there to maintain the station for the use of the auxiliary. A portion of the regular force personnel on station Vancouver was apportioned to the auxiliary, and the same applies to the station at Saskatoon.

If you take station Downsview as an example of the other side, it supports regular force squadron, and supply depot. The station is there anyway. The only people directly supporting the auxiliary are those attached to the squadron, numbering 22 souls per unit. Therefore, there are approximately 44 or 45 support people at station Downsview supporting the auxiliary.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): May I ask a supplementary question? The costs of these permanent force personnel are not placed against the auxiliary air force, so far as estimates are concerned; or are they?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Is this part of the saving you achieve?

Mr. DRAPER: In the evidence of the associate minister given on July 21 at page 409, he states that the civilian and military personnel costs, regular force personnel, are $4,668,000, which formed a portion of the total of $10,700,000 to maintain the auxiliary. So, slightly over 40 per cent of the total auxiliary cost was actually regular force personnel, and, in this case, an additional 20 per cent, or $2 million, was assigned to upkeep of the stations—the real estate of those stations maintained only for the auxiliary.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): So, the reduction in the required permanent force personnel to support the auxiliary air force has been counted in another reduction from roughly $10 million to $3 million.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: Recommendation (c) deals with amalgamation of D.N.D. buildings and facilities for the reserve components of all three services. This is an intriguing recommendation. Do you mean, therefore, that in a situation like that which exists at Edmonton or Calgary, the R.C.A.F. reserve units could go into the militia barracks or the militia armouries.

Mr. DRAPER: Precisely.

Mr. LAMBERT: In Edmonton there is no need, and this would not apply because there already is a unit at the R.C.A.F. station at Namao. However, at Calgary it would mean they could be lodged in Mawatta armouries.

Mr. DRAPER: Or Tecumseh which is the naval division.

Mr. LAMBERT: This would apply also in Edmonton where the proposal had been to close down Nonsuch. Perhaps they could be connected with the Prince of Wales armouries.

Has this been discussed with the other services?

Mr. DRAPER: No, sir. But let me stipulate that this was the finding of the reserve air force; this was a recommendation of the reserve air force. A similar recommendation is incorporated I believe in the naval report. Perhaps Commodore Hendy might answer to that. If I am not mistaken I think it is also included in the Suttie commission report on the militia.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps Commodore Hendy might comment on it now.

Mr. HENDY: We have specifically recommended that general use of D.N.D buildings be made by all three reserve forces in order to get the maximum utilization, and tenancy was one of the factors.

Mr. LAMBERT: While this is all right as it goes for a suggestion, I think it should be recognized that in a number of centres the armouries which are the principal D.N.D. establishments are already heavily crowded. I was wondering how much of a hard look this had been given in conjunction with the other services which might be affected.

Mr. DRAPER: As far as we are concerned, naturally these people, these units which the minister had indicated would be disbanded, had a strong personal interest in this problem, and they looked into it rather carefully on a local basis. They realized that the accommodation which would be afforded to them would obviously not be the same as they had previously enjoyed. But if

they could literally have a roof over their heads, be it an armoury, a barn, or a hangar, this would have been more than adequate if they did not keep the aeroplanes. These would have been perfectly acceptable.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was thinking particularly of air force units in a place like Edmonton where they would be using, primarily, air cadets, and where they have one of the strongest reserve of cadets. There they are faced with the same problem in the air force as well as in the army, because with young soldiers Saturday is the day on which they parade. Traffic around the armouries district becomes impossible. They have an awful lot of people utilizing the drilling accommodation, the lecture rooms, and what have you. I was wondering if for this reason other people had been consulted in regard to this type of program.

Mr. DRAPER: I would say that we did not approach directly army headquarters or naval headquarters about this. But local meetings were held with the local opposite numbers for other services. So if the bell should start to ring, they would say: "Can you put us up somewhere and give us a room or an office?" And the opposite numbers said: "Sure. We will make a go of it."

Mr. LAMBERT: Knowing about the difficulty with many air cadets that we have in Edmonton, I was concerned over a period of years to see that they had a roof over their heads. It would have been important with Nonsuch if it could have provided them with proper accommodation, because between them and the naval cadets, a real problem is presented if Nonsuch is closed down. It is still hanging by a thread as far as the physical facilities are concerned. They should have an adequate place in which to combine them. I agree in principle with the recommendations you have made, provided there has been an appropriate consultation.

Mr. DRAPER: Again, we have not had the time to make a definitive study. But investigation, so far as we are able to go, was limited by time only and not by lack of co-operation. It indicated that it was a "go".

Mr. LAMBERT: One further question as to recommendation eight: Do you think that you will get the same result from young air cadets who went through air technical training units, now that they have been incorporated in the wings, that you would get through separate technical training units? I realize that you are faced with a cut of two thirds of your budget, and that you had to spring these things at the technical training units; but do you think you will get the same results?

Mr. DRAPER: We will get the same calibre of people. Our instructors, however, will have to work under greater handicaps than they did before; but they think that the results will be the same.

Mr. LAMBERT: Will you be able to afford the camp facilities, the six weeks training program that you did have?

Mr. DRAPER: No, sir. We voluntarily ceased that six weeks training a year or so ago. We now enlist people into the auxiliary and then train them, rather than training them first and hoping that they would join. It has been our experience with ground crew, bearing in mind our techical requirements, that the type of person best suited to remain in the auxiliary is not the chap who is finishing high school and is going on to university, because he is not going to stay ground crew. We are not going to get the benefit of his training. Nor is it the younger high school student who is probably looking for summer employment for the sake of getting employment and remuneration.

We are leaning towards people who are technically minded and who are going to technical schools, and who will end up as machinists or garage attendants, and who will have compatible civilian occupations. We find that you cannot expect a university student to remain as ground crew and by the

some taken, not everybody can expect to get to university. So we are going for the technically oriented person, because that is the type of person we are recruiting in our ground crew, and we are finding it more successful as far as we are concerned.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see. It had been my impression over the years in any event, after knowing one technical training unit, that they were funishing a rather remarkable number of recruits for the R.C.A.F.

Mr. DRAPER: For the regulars or for the reserves?

Mr. LAMBERT: For the regulars, and that this was an area in which young men were indoctrinated as high school students with the idea of the air force and with going into the air force, because they would get some preliminary training in the T.T.U., and would make admirable airmen because they were well trained men.

Mr. DRAPER: This was a fringe benefit of the days when we could afford to do it; it means that the regular forces got people that they might not otherwise have received. But unfortunately it was coming out of the auxiliary budget. As long as there are no restrictions on our budget, then we just love doing it. But when they say to us: "You will only have so much to spend on your unit. You should concern yourself about your unit and not with the entire air force," then we have no alternative other than just to look after our own units.

Mr. LAMBERT: This raises a further question. It makes no difference from the point of view of national defence whether it is you who spend the dollar, or whether it is the regulars who spend the dollar. They are going to have to spend the dollar anyway, because there are these men which you would normally have trained for the reserves.

Mr. DRAPER: I could not agree with you more; but unfortunately I just have so many dollars. My strength has been reduced. I have been told that I have only so much, and that I have to supply the auxiliary air force which the department has said it must have. That is my job.

Mr. LAMBERT: This sounds rather like the old bean game: Which shell is the bean under? Is it under this one, or under that one? I realize the problem you face, but I think it creates a little illusion.

Mr. DRAPER: I appreciate it that you are looking at the over-all picture. I hope you appreciate my position, that I have to look at the local position.

Mr. LAMBERT: I fully understand your position, but I am not overly impressed by generalized statements that are made as a result of it.

Now, in regard to item (k), have you ever had a senior staff adviser for auxiliary matters on the staff of the R.C.A.F. in the same way that the army at one time had a major general or a senior officer who was responsible for the militia?

Mr. DRAPER: No, sir, we have not, because I think of late in any event our system has been different. All the auxiliaries have been responsible to one command. In this case it is the air officer commanding the air transport command. Our feeling here was that an auxiliary officer, a senior officer, could fill what we consider to be a void, where he could assist the air officer commanding, because of his intimate knowledge with the auxiliary, and advise him, if you like, about how things are going in the auxiliary, and what needs to be done and so on with respect to the system, and staff planning. This was the intention of this insertion, namely, that there would be someone in the command who was available to the A.O.C., and who could pass on to him his advice if required, and who in some cases could act as some of us have been called on, as spokesmen for the auxiliary. That would be the type of job for this man.

Mr. LAMBERT: The alternative suggestion is in keeping with the recommendation made in the Suttie report, that there be a senior officer at air force headquarters responsible for your reserves, and in the case of the militia, for the militia.

Mr. DRAPER: Yes, there would be two ways, we felt, we could do it. You could have a regular group captain go around to visit the auxiliaries. But we felt that this was a rather expensive way to do it. We felt that a group captain who was paid on a per diem basis could do it at a savings in price. We offered two alternatives as recommendations.

Mr. LAMBERT: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. McMillan? Have you some questions?

Mr. MCMILLAN: On page four, item (h), you say:

> There is no financial justification for the retention of medical units and technical training units.

How much would you save by eliminating them?

Mr. DRAPER: I am sorry that I do not have the figures with me to give to you exactly. It seems to me that the cost of the medical units that we have in Toronto, on the basis of salaries paid—I believe we have one of the best units in Toronto—and with the number of surgeons in all aspects of medicine, is something in the region of $14,000 a year. However these people are doctors, and when you need them they are available on a consulting basis. The militia units have the army medical corps, and perhaps you realize that some of our doctors, even if transferred to the army medical corps, would still be available to us in that capacity. But it was not part of our operational requirements to have a flight surgeon or field hospital.

Mr. MCMILLAN: I was not present this morning, but I suppose you gave your estimate of savings, or percentage of savings, in your recommendations?

Mr. DRAPER: The original cost of the auxiliary air force in toto, according to the Associate Minister of National Defence as given in his evidence, was $10,700,000 I believe for the preceding fiscal year, and it is estimated to be $3,000,000 for this year.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on the Air Force Auxiliary?

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I have just two or three little tail-end questions to clear up certain things.

Do air force aircraft carry crash position indicators at the present time?

Mr. DRAPER: I believe at the present time there is a development study going on to equip our big aircraft—that is, our Yukon aircraft—with crash position indicators.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): What about the SARAH transmitters. Am I correct that our aircraft carry these?

Mr. DRAPER: Yes. However, not all of our aircraft carry them. Those which will be operating over routes which require them will be carrying them.

The CHAIRMAN: If I might ask an explanatory question at this time, is it not a Department of Transport ruling that a civilian aircraft going into remote civilian areas must carry SARAH transmitters?

Mr. DRAPER: I do not know of it if this is so, but I do not believe it is the case.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes our questioning on the air force. We will now switch our questioning to Commodore Hendy in respect of the navy.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Notre-Dame-de-Grâce*): If I might interject here, Mr. Chairman, possibly the group Captain has something he wants to do and, if that is so, I would suggest that we allow him to leave at this time. But, perhaps he would like to stay.

Mr. DRAPER: I would like to stay and if at the end of questioning on the Navy anyone else still has questions to put I would be pleased to answer them.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you a question, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. This line of questioning was started this morning, I believe. My question relates to U.N.T.D. and it parallels the question I put in regard to the Suttie report and the number of U.N.T.D. trained officers who, after leaving universities, apply and are admitted into the naval reserve. What has been the experience of the naval reserve in this regard?

Mr. HENDY: Overall, I think it is probably in the vicinity of 70 per cent. It varies from division to division and from locality to locality. They probably will join in the larger centres with big universities, where the cadets stay in that community. My own experience was that a very large percentage of the University of Toronto cadets stayed in the active reserve at York. In respect of other divisions which have either a smaller university or maybe no university in their community, complaints have been made that they are not getting enough U.N.T.D. cadets, and this was because they were not living in the community. But, overall, the response has been excellent.

The U.N.T.D. graduate is a first-class young officer, well trained and well oriented and, at the present time, he is the backbone of the officer personnel of the reserve. Anything that is done to disturb that will seriously upset the efficiency of the reserve. It is a very good program and must be maintained for the good of the reserve.

Mr. LAMBERT: This leads me to the difficulties that might arise in a place like Edmonton where it was proposed to close the reserve ship, leaving the U.N.T.D. rather an orphan at the university with nothing on which to lean, shall we say. I have many colleagues and friends who are naval officers who are very much interested in either naval cadets or in the naval reserve and this has been, what they have expressed to me, one great worry that this will mean the deterioration of the quality of U.N.T.D. at a place such as Edmonton where the naval ship is being disbanded.

Mr. HENDY: I would think it would have some effect but I do not think I would be as pessimistic as you have expressed it because the U.N.T.D. program itself is very attractive to the young cadet. He is employed to use that term, in the summer, for a period of up to 16 weeks; he has an opportunity to go aboard ships and to take extended cruises while he works and is being trained. This is a very popular form of activity. I would say that the deterioration of the calibre of the U.N.T.D. cadet at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, campus, would not be very great. We have had these units on many campuses where there are no naval divisions nearby and where they attend weekly drills on the campus. This is true, particularly in the maritimes.

Mr. LAMBERT: This may be admitted but I am referring to immediately after their graduation.

Mr. HENDY: Then they are lost to the reserve. You come to the question of productivity, and then we ask ourselves if we are training them to leave the reserve and receive no dividends from these three years and the expensive training we have given them. But, this is in a different realm.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, this is the point I am endeavouring to make.

Mr. HENDY: Well, I agree with you that it would not make sense if this is the implication you are suggesting. If this were the case it would not make sense to maintain U.N.T.D. at the University of Alberta in Edmonton if there was no naval division in Edmonton because the numbers who would then join the active reserve in another community would be very small; the numbers who had graduated from Edmonton might go to Calgary or Saskatoon where they could join the unit, but I do not think this would be very great.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, if I could interrupt, I understand Mr. Matheson has to rush off to a radio program. Would it be all right if he interrupted you at this point in order to put his questions and then we could come back to you?

Mr. LAMBERT: That will be fine after I have completed this one part of my questioning. Both Saskatoon and Calgary already have universities.

Mr. HENDY: Oh yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, they have their outputs of U.N.T.D. people so the ships in these two cities already get a full complement. I think you would find that it would be superfluous to have many people coming from another university in view of the fact that they would not be able to be absorbed into that reserve ship.

Mr. HENDY: That would depend on the complement at the time. Sometimes you find that you are below complement and the odd one or two that come in can be absorbed. There was a recommendation made by us many years ago which suggested taking these lads and putting them on a sort of supplementary list in the division, as we did with the R.C.N. cadets before the war. They were over complement but in order to maintain our hold on them, if you like, we enlisted them in the R.C.N.V.R. and put them on a supplementary list until a complement vacancy arose. But, you do get to the position where you are producing a large number to hold a very few.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am through for the time being. Mr. Matheson may proceed.

Mr. MATHESON: I am reading from the submission of the ministerial committee on the organization of the R.C.N.R. submitted by Lieutenant G. T. Fulford, now Lieutenant Commander Fulford.

May I read two small extracts from the submission. The first one is as follows:

> The prime purpose of the R.C.N.R. should be to train and maintain a small group of officers and petty officers, capable of fulfilling assigned roles in time of emergency. The efforts expended in training and retaining ordinary or able seamen have been costly for the results obtained.

And, later on, Lieutenant Fulford says:

> The prime purpose, I believe, should be to train and maintain a small group of officers and petty officers capable of fulfilling assigned roles in time of peace or emergency. Because of a limited budget, a course of this nature should produce better value than one requiring the closing of one third of our divisions so that the remainder can continue as in the past. By closing seven divisions, the reserve will lose valuable officers and petty officers who cannot be readily replaced. As we all know, it takes years to train these people, but only a matter of days to produce an ordinary seaman capable of carrying out simple tasks.

Lieutenant Commander Fulford has taken the trouble to interview me on this matter and having me speak to other people in the same vein. Does his thesis make sense to you? I would like to hear your comments on this proposition.

Mr. HENDY: I think basically that is right. We are faced in an emergency with people who can do responsible jobs in the first instance and, therefore, this is officer and N.C.O. calibre. When he says: "a small group" this relates to the over-all figure. The figure of 1,000 might be small for some purposes and 5,000 small for something else. I am not sure what he is proposing in actual figures when he says "small". You have to have a certain number coming in at the bottom to work up to the top so you have to have all ranks available. But, it is the experience of the reserve that the number who stay in the rank

of ordinary seamen is not equivalent in proportion to the same number that you have of those ranks in the regular force because they come in for a year or so and then leave. But, the view is held that a small proportion will stay on and work up to become leading seamen and petty officers, and then your officers will be coming in from other sources, such as U.N.T.D. and other programs. I think the expression was used in respect of the reserve that there are more chiefs than Indians, but I think this is one of the purposes because the type of man you want in an emergency is that type of man.

Mr. MATHESON: In other words, an imbalanced militia reserve or R.C.N.V.R. perhaps is the wisest course and possibly it means more training per dollar.

Mr. HENDY: Well, you say what you want; you say: "we need X officers, X sergeants and X petty officers." To me, that is not an imbalance; that is specifying what you require, and you train to that because it does not take too long to take a man off the street when he enlists for active service and make him into a fairly useful hewer of wood and drawer of water in a short time, whereas it takes a longer time to produce all the qualities of a leader at the senior N.C.O. and officer level. In an emergency you want them.

Mr. MATHESON: Following that comment of yours I think elsewhere Lieutenant Fulford suggests that perhaps the R.C.N.V.R. is covering too broad a training program and sees some merit in taking these people at the higher level and pushing them into special trades and keeping them there. Does that make sense?

Mr. HENDY: I would not say the reserve program is trying to be too broad. I think at one time it was; we were faced with technical training tasks which were not practical for the reservists to achieve with the time at their disposal. The present training program, which has not been in force very long, is far more realistic in respect of the availability of the reservists.

Mr. MATHESON: Is it possible under the present program of the R.C.N.V.R. that we could take personnel at the petty officer or officer level and make them signals or gunnery officers?

Mr. HENDY: That is the way they are trained.

Mr. MATHESON: And would this be to the standards of the permanent force?

Mr. HENDY: I say that the young officer from U.N.T.D. can go into a destroyer escort tomorrow and act as second officer of the watch, and it would not be long before he would take a watch on his own. They are well trained young officers.

Mr. MATHESON: On page 8 of the report in respect of the R.C.N.V.R. there is a reference to forces in being and the availability of reserves. Do you think reserves are available and does the present legislation cover this? Have you any comments or suggestions to make on this subject?

Mr. HENDY: Basically, I think the reserves are available in the same way that Group Captain Draper has mentioned in respect of the auxiliary. The naval reserve probably is not in the same category as is the flying personnel although when we had air squadrons they were. I think most people join the reserve and expect to be available. Under the present legislation, the National Defence Act provides that a member of the reserve cannot be called without consent. This, I think, is a change from the situation with which we started originally in 1910 when the navy was established under the naval service act which created a force of naval volunteers which were available to be called out. There was nothing in that act which provided for consent. Frankly, I feel that this should be changed. We pay the naval reserve, and all the reserve forces, looking at it from the point of view of a retainer. We are giving something in order to get some service, and yet the legislation is such that we can be

frustrated if the fellow does not consent. This is tied in with the problem which was mentioned by Group Captain Draper.

Mr. MATHESON: You are pointing to a juridical defect in the legislation?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. MATHESON: The proposed strength of the naval reserve is to be 2,400, plus or minus. The committee states, as I understand it, that this is inadequate. Why?

Mr. HENDY: The information we obtained, and which has been admitted since, was that the 2,400 figure was predicated more on budgetary requirements than on defence requirements. When we finished our reports and showed certain areas in which economies could be effected, the naval headquarters immediately, to their credit, implemented some of these recommendations and preserved two units and put the others in suspense until the report of the militia commission could be brought in. This goes back to Mr. Lambert's questions about sharing accommodation. We suggested positively, for the areas where our units were being closed down, that sharing of accommodation would effect economies. In order to maintain a reserve at the same dollar amount, but getting more people—and it was shown that more were necessary—and also by putting off the seven divisions, we lose 247 officers approximately, and about 400 men of the rank of leading seaman and above.

Mr. MATHESON: So the grievous loss here is, as Fulford would suggest, in the case of officers?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, because at the very least that represents a loss of three years' training. The junior officer is a product of three years' training of U.N.T.D.; the senior one is probably the product of 15 or 20 years' service. These people would have positions to fill in an emergency in the plan.

Take Fulford's thesis; it is better to have smaller units where you will not lose those people, units in which you have well trained people, than to cut them out and try to build up strength in other divisions, where you might not do it effectively or the type of increase would be in the untrained people. It will take that much more time to pick up your loss.

Mr. MATHESON: I have one final question. It flows from the comments you make about the juridical defect, as you see it, in the militia requirement to serve, subject to call out in the event of emergency. From your experience, would it be your judgment that the person who is a petty officer or a commissioned officer and who receives that type of training would be more amenable to signing up subject to no limitations at all than the able bodied seaman? Or is there any difference?

Mr. HENDY: I think he would look at it harder because he would be agreeing to sacrifice a little more. He may be a man with a better job, a man with a family, whereas a younger chap may be just out of high school and it would not bother him so much if he were called out. However, the problem is really more apparent than real. If they are asked to do a job, they do come up—they have demonstrated this time and again—but there is no power behind it.

Mr. MATHESON: If the legislation was changed, would it seriously affect the calibre, quality and numbers of people prepared to come forward, in your judgment?

Mr. HENDY: I do not think so, because I think they expect to be called. In this country we are always giving. If we are going to put these men on the basis that they are part of the forces and are paid, we should demand something in return. We have to do something for the country.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have a supplementary question to ask in this area, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: This applies to both these gentlemen, the one representing the navy and the one representing the air force. If this legislative change were made providing for call out beyond a certain period, coupled with a job security feature—because this would be the only thing that would work—do you think public opinion here in Canada would be amenable from the employer point of view?

Mr. HENDY: I cannot answer that, Mr. Lambert. I certainly know there are some who would and some who would not be amenable.

Mr. LAMBERT: It would be my feeling that in those highly industrialized areas in which there is a technically trained work force in large numbers, employers might take the position that a man cannot join the reserve forces because the work force would be apt to be disrupted, and then they have to take on men. There are no two ways about it, the job security is there. I think this exists even now. Certainly some companies do not like their people in the reserves because there is the annual training to be considered and they have to ask for additional leave. This has been debated frequently.

Mr. HENDY: I do not think the change in legislation would make that much difference; it would not have an impact. I think a lot of people are probably surprised that they are not callable now, and that is why I say some companies do not like their people in the reserve forces because they feel that, given a choice, the fellow will probably go out if required.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mind you, I do not disagree with your thesis when I put this question, but I think it is a matter of public opinion in this country not being conditioned to this.

Mr. HENDY: We have really walked backwards.

Mr. LAMBERT: It went so far back that no one remembers it. You may recall that even in wartime there was some difficulty about the job security.

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. MACLEAN: This morning I asked the Commodore about the strength of the R.C.N.V.R. before world war II and today. To round out the picture, I would like to ask the same question with regard to the naval reserve.

Mr. HENDY: Before 1939 there was a very considerable naval reserve—

Mr. MACLEAN: Made up of merchant marine officers?

Mr. HENDY: —which consisted largely of people in the merchant service. There were 500 in the old R.C.N.R. in 1939.

Mr. MACLEAN: Am I right in assuming that this does not exist now? Or does it?

Mr. HENDY: There is only one reserve now and those people can be members of the present reserve. Arrangements are made for them to attend summer training if they cannot attend weekly drills because of their jobs taking them to sea. However, we have very little merchant marine now in any event from which to draw these people.

Mr. MACLEAN: The point I am making is that the present reserve is fulfilling the function of the R.C.N.V.R. and the naval reserve.

Mr. HENDY: That is right; that is why the two were put together.

Mr. MACLEAN: When you contrast the present naval reserve with the situation as it was then, you have to take both of the pre-war organizations into consideration.

Mr. HENDY: Then the figure of reservists would have been about 2,000 in 1939 from both components of the reserve.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions to put to Commodore Hendy?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, I would like to ask a question.

There is a recommendation that perhaps recruiting offices should be integrated or amalgamated. I notice this is dealt with in Nonsuch in Edmonton. It is suggested that they could perhaps utilize some of the facilities there for their recruiting services in Edmonton. Subject to any legal requirements of leases on premises presently owned by the crown, I think this would be a good idea. I would go further and I would like to ask your opinion about the validity of the separate recruiting services. We have in many of our cities today the three services represented by recruiting officers all in the same building but each man having a separate office. One will find an air force officer, an army officer and a naval officer each with his complement of N.C.O.'s and stenographic service. What about having one man with his N.C.O. and stenographic service, under present day conditions, doing the recruiting for all three services?

Mr. HENDY: We may come to that anyway. It may come to that anyway in this integration of the services, but at the present time there are different requirements and conditions of service. While I do not say it is beyond the capability of one person to acquire knowledge of them all in order to adequately recruit or counsel a man on which service he should go into, it just has not been done under our present division of the three services.

In the larger centres I think there is enough to justify three people because there is enough work for three, but in the smaller areas there is not, and maybe a recruiting counsellor able to advise on all three services and on opportunities would be a good idea. As we said in our report, recruiting was not, strictly speaking, one of the things we were supposed to look into, but people kept talking to us about this, and the problem, as you mention, is space, facilities, and efficient use of manpower and accommodation. This came up in relation to what we could use. Some of the naval reserve units, for instance, felt the loss of the navy recruiting personnel because they had time that could be used in assisting the reserve unit to be administered. When this man was physically removed from the premises, he was not available so presumably he still had the spare time which was not being used.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions of Commodore Hendy? Does anyone have any questions referring back to the air force?

Before the committee adjourns may I, on behalf of the committee, thank Group Captain Draper and Commodore Hendy for coming and for submitting to our questions.

The committee stands adjourned until Tuesday at 11 a.m. The witness then will be the Associate Minister of National Defence and the subject will be the Reserve Forces.