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
WORKING PAPER 40

The CSCE and Future Security in Europe

A report of a two-day conference
held in Prague,
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

4-5 December 1991

by
Michael Bryans

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360 Albert Street, Suite 900
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7X7

PREFACE

Working Papers, the result of work in progress or the summary of a conference, are often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publisher, and are regarded by the Institute to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers -- mostly to specialists in the field.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the participants and do not reflect the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the Institute of International Relations, Prague, co-hosted a conference in Prague 4 and 5 December 1991. This publication is a report of the conference by Michael Bryans, Senior Editor at CIIPS, and editor of *Peace&Security*, the Institute's quarterly magazine.

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FOREWORD

Two topics dominated the international security agenda in 1990. The first, chronologically, was the upheaval in Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Much later in the year the situation in the Persian Gulf vied for attention in the international media. That spring, at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in Ottawa, we decided that one of our major projects should be to examine the security situation in Europe. There were rumours of a possible summit on European security, and the CSCE participants had already agreed that a major review conference would convene in Helsinki in the spring of 1992. We accordingly decided that we would focus our attention on the CSCE and future security in Europe in the lead up to the 1992 Helsinki review.

An international conference in Europe seemed the most appropriate way to approach the subject. For practical and substantive reasons, there was an obvious attraction in finding a European partner for this project. It seemed to us that an Institute from another middle power would be desirable, preferably in one of the newly emerging democracies in Central Europe. We approached the Institute of International Relations in Prague, and they agreed to a collaborative project on this theme; with remarkably little difficulty we came to a meeting of minds as to content, format and timing. Notwithstanding personnel changes at the Prague Institute, the agreement we reached at the outset remained intact and the conference was held 4-5 December 1991 in Prague.

The substantive core of the event was five panels of three persons each addressing various aspects of the CSCE and future security in Europe. The make-up of the panels and their precise topics may be found at Appendix E. The question of written texts was left to the discretion of each panelist. Four papers are included in this report; they may be found in Appendices A through D. The conference featured a thoughtful exchange of views among a mixed group consisting of cabinet ministers, other political leaders, officials, scholars and international journalists. The conference was unique, I believe, in that it

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seems to have been the first collaboration between a major independent institution of a NATO country with a partner of a similar kind in one of the new democracies of Central Europe. The directors of the two then new CSCE institutions, the Permanent Secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Centre, both participated as panelists, and I believe this might be the first such public activity by the leaders of both organizations together.

Michael Bryans' report conveys not just an account of proceedings but perhaps, more importantly, the tone and nature of the exchanges which took place over the two days. Both sponsoring institutions are pleased to have been able to make this exchange possible; we think this report will be of particular value to officials, politicians, decision makers, scholars and journalists.

John Toogood
Deputy Director, CIIPS
March 1992

CONDENSÉ

Deux thèmes ont dominé l'ordre du jour de la sécurité internationale en 1990. Il y a d'abord eu le soulèvement de l'Europe de l'Est et la disparition de l'Organisation du Pacte de Varsovie, puis, quelques mois plus tard, la situation dans le golfe Persique qui leur a volé la vedette dans les médias internationaux. Au printemps 1990, à Ottawa, l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales a décidé qu'un de ses grands projets devrait être d'examiner la sécurité en Europe, en se concentrant notamment sur la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE) et sur son rôle dans la future sécurité de ce continent, le tout avec la perspective de la conférence d'examen de la CSCE, qui devait se tenir à Helsinki en 1992.

Pour des raisons pratiques et intrinsèques, il était évidemment intéressant de trouver un partenaire européen pour ce projet. Un institut d'une autre puissance moyenne semblait souhaitable, celle-ci faisant, de préférence, partie des démocraties naissantes de l'Europe centrale. L'Institut de relations internationales de Prague a accepté de collaborer au projet et une conférence internationale, que le présent *Document de travail* résume en un rapport, a eu lieu les 4 et 5 décembre 1991 à Prague.

La conférence, organisée autour de cinq groupes de trois personnes réfléchissant à divers aspects de la CSCE et de la future sécurité de l'Europe, a donné lieu à des échanges d'opinions sérieux dans une assemblée variée constituée de ministres, d'autres dirigeants politiques, de fonctionnaires, d'universitaires et de journalistes de différents pays. Le présent rapport rend compte non seulement des propos tenus pendant ces deux jours mais, plus important peut-être, de leur ton et de leur nature. La composition des groupes et les sujets précis qu'ils ont étudiés figurent à l'Annexe E. Quatre articles présentés à la conférence sont également joints en annexe (Annexes A à D).

Dans son exposé de clôture de la rencontre de Prague, M. David Braide, président du Conseil d'administration de l'ICPSI, a attiré l'attention sur le point le plus notable et qui est revenu le plus souvent dans les débats; à savoir : un avis minoritaire, mais

exprimé avec force, selon lequel la CSCE, produit de la Guerre froide, était anachronique, et une opinion majoritaire, selon laquelle la CSCE est un élément important de l'architecture institutionnelle européenne qui devrait cependant changer pour rester pleinement efficace.

M. Braide a aussi résumé les deux grandes catégories de défauts du processus de la CSCE définies pendant la rencontre :

- *les règles de consensus et d'unanimité* : «Elles conduiront sûrement à un certain degré de méfiance de la part des plus grandes puissances et à une tendance à 'geler' l'organisation quand se posent des questions qui touchent aux intérêts particuliers d'un ou plusieurs membres», a-t-il déclaré.

- *les notions de souveraineté et d'intégrité territoriale* : bien qu'il s'agisse des principes fondateurs de la CSCE, les inquiétudes actuelles concernent à bien des égards ce qui se passe à l'intérieur de frontières. «Le sentiment général semblait être qu'il fallait trouver un moyen de faire intervenir la CSCE dans les affaires intérieures de pays membres s'il en va de la réalisation de son plein potentiel», a-t-il commenté.

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I. *The CSCE's Place In The Family Of European Multilateral Organizations*

The nation states of Western European and the West in general are tied together by a complex lattice of multilateral organizations each with influence and responsibility, some only indirectly, in the arena of peace and security. To name them all yields up familiar and unfamiliar acronyms: Council of Europe (CE), Western European Union (WEU), European Community (EC), European Free Trade Area (EFTA), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, of course, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

There were until recently two others, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), but they perished along with the rest of the USSR's central apparatus.

All of these organizations have grown up since 1945 and a few are brand new -- the creation of the EBRD in May 1990 is a direct result of the Central and East European revolutions -- and they have radically and probably permanently altered the way nation states conduct relations with each other. The foreign and security policies of the states of Europe are, to an extent unimaginable before 1939, collective, multilateral exercises.

As far as post-Second World War institutions go, the CSCE is relatively middle-aged -- born in 1973 out of what was becoming an increasingly troubled and potentially dangerous relationship between "East" and "West." Until 1991 the CSCE was distinct among multilateral organizations; it had almost nothing in the way of an establishment. For most of its life, the CSCE has owned no property, occupied no headquarters, employed no staff, or even possessed a mailing address. As the name implies, it was intended to be a rolling series of meetings bringing senior levels of governments together to discuss and, it was hoped, agree on principles for increasing the

security and well-being of its member states. This at a time when there seemed little on which the two European military and ideological blocs could agree.

The ephemeral nature of the CSCE -- especially when compared to bodies like NATO or the EC which between them own large tracts of the city of Brussels, employ thousands, and dispose of considerable financial, political and, in the case of NATO, raw military power -- continues to be either its chief difficulty or its singular advantage, depending on whom you listen to. Throughout the two-day meeting which is the subject of this paper, the CSCE's detractors focussed on what they regarded as two basic flaws. First, the organization was burdened with a decision making mechanism, consensus or the unitary veto, that left it paralyzed during crises; and second, should it manage to reach a decision, it possessed no resources to carry through. Stalin's rejoinder, "The Pope -- how many divisions has *he* got?" was the gist of their argument.

The CSCE's defenders and proponents, on the other hand, stressed the essentially political nature of the beast, and in particular cited its calculated emphasis on dialogue and consensus, as opposed to decision and action, as the key to what they regarded as the CSCE's major success in its lifetime -- the undermining of the wall between West and East. This sentiment was especially strong among, though not limited to, participants from Eastern and Central European countries.

Nils Eliasson, the Director of the very small CSCE Secretariat in Prague, and obviously a believer, brought participants up to date on what he called "dramatic" changes in the CSCE's operations and capabilities during 1991:

1. At the Charter of Paris summit in late fall 1990, the CSCE heads of government decided there would be summit meetings every two years. There had not been one since 1975; the next will be in Helsinki in July 1992.

2. The CSCE Council of Ministers in Berlin in June 1991 asked the Council of Senior Officials to examine the future development of the existing institutions of the

CSCE -- the secretariat in Prague, the conflict prevention centre in Vienna and the office for free elections in Warsaw.

3.   The Berlin meeting also developed a new mechanism for consultation among member countries in emergency situations, making it possible to initiate a consultation process with a quorum of twelve countries plus one, thus significantly amending the consensus-unitary veto rule for the first time.

4.   The CSCE as a whole could now ask or commission some states or persons to act on its behalf. The first instance of this occurred over the issue of Yugoslavia where the EC's monitor group made a report to the CSCE, and had CSCE monitors attached to it in the field.

5.   At the 10 September to 4 October 1991 Moscow meeting on the "Human Dimension of the CSCE," the 38 agreed that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law were "matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and [did] not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned." Mr. Eliasson attached particular importance to this agreement: "What [used to] constitute intervention in internal affairs is now squarely done away with....Together with the emergency mechanism...for calling meetings, [these] make a very important new tool for the CSCE."

6.   A CSCE Parliamentary Assembly was created and would hold its first meeting in Budapest in July 1992. At the level of the 38 there was now formalized interaction between parliaments and governments, whereas previously the CSCE had been solely a negotiation and discussion among governments of states.

     Mr. Elliason's roster cut no ice, however, with one of the meeting's CSCE doubters, Christoph Bertram, Political Editor of *Die Zeit*, Hamburg. "Nothing can be more helpful than to ask the hard questions, and avoid the soft answers," said Bertram as he proceeded to severely challenge what he regarded as unsupportable assumptions about the current

effectiveness of and ultimate need for an organization like the CSCE. The core of Bertram's argument was that as a "child of the Cold War," the CSCE was unable to adapt to new conditions, had been superseded by other organizations, such as the EC and NATO, which had also taken on the CSCE's formerly unique pan-European character, and that while the CSCE might be kept in reserve for some now unidentified future role, it had outlived its usefulness.

Others, led by CIIPS Deputy Director, John Toogood, strenuously disagreed, pointing out that the CSCE was the only pan-European forum extant, the other bodies being sub-regional and exclusive in character, and the only organization with an agenda that encompassed all elements of security and cooperation.

While listening to these contrasting perspectives it was occasionally easy to forget that participants were describing the same organization. A former senior official in the grandfather of all international organizations, the United Nations, has said about the CSCE that it "seems to be a state of mind rather than an organization." So it is perhaps the relatively ephemeral nature of the CSCE when viewed alongside other European bodies, that gives rise to a wide range of subjective views about it. Whether scholar, journalist, public servant or analyst, individuals seemed either to believe in the CSCE, and take it largely on faith that it contributed significantly to events in Europe in the last few years, or they regarded it as largely a waste of time and were perplexed by those who thought that an organization with no obvious levers of political, economic or military power could accomplish anything useful.

That attitudes were changed as a result of the discussion that ensued cannot be known. What is certain is that in what became the main substantive issue of the conference -- is the CSCE an enterprise worthy of support in the New Europe? -- battle was joined early on and vigorously.

II. *Security Interests of the CSCE Signatories:*
What Will the New Europe Be Like?

When it came to predictions about the future course of European affairs -- the kind of world the CSCE, whatever its internal mechanisms, would find itself in -- there were varying degrees of gloom and very little to cheer about. As Pavel Seifter, Deputy Director of the conference's co-hosting institute in Prague noted at the start of proceedings: "A year and a half ago [when the conference was planned] Europe was more hopeful...full of understanding, confidence and security. It was far more humane."

This meeting's overall pessimism stemmed from resurgent nationalism and ethnic strife in the East, and rising neo-rightist intolerance in the West. While neither phenomenon had been much in evidence in Europe since the interwar period of the 1920s and '30s, nationalism, according to one commentator, was a problem Europe has been incapable of dealing with on its own throughout this century.

It is commonplace that the demise of the two-bloc system has released tensions and discord among European nations and peoples which had been locked away for over fifty years. However, it remains an analytical puzzle precisely why and how this is so. Peter Volten, Dutch by origin, and Deputy Director of the Institute of East-West Security Studies, offered the explanation that countries now have much more space in which to exercise independent actions and advance independent interests. This in turn acts within each country to elevate the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy decision making. As a result, Volten asserted, the relative importance of what the French political theorist Raymond Aron listed as the three main goals of foreign policy in any country --- power, ideas and glory -- has radically shifted away from the first two, and towards an emphasis on "la gloire" and "la grandeur." In Eastern Europe especially this is manifested as an "unhealthy nationalism" and fragmentation, and it was these pernicious tendencies, Volten said, that the CSCE might be able to mitigate.

Pál Dunay, a senior official in the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Ministry, continued on much the same theme, but concentrated his remarks on the current European turmoil, specifically on the "sub-region" of Central and Eastern Europe. The present turmoil in that part of world stemmed from three new forces which emerged from the ruins of the Eastern bloc: the first was economic decline, wherein the rapid deterioration of economic conditions added to the risk of domestic instability, and the demise of social safety nets accentuated social disparities, and put increased economic pressure on already marginalized peoples; the second is resurgent nationalism; and the third, potential territorial claims.

Dunay reminded the audience of the difficult history of the region where almost every country in the area had had a "golden era" when its territory was much bigger than it is today. As a consequence, every nation had some claim to part of every other which could be historically justified depending on how far back in history one chose to go. Some border changes were inevitable, he said, but these had to proceed in a "regulated manner."

The war, which at the time of the meeting in Prague was raging on Hungary's southern border between the various constituent parts of Yugoslavia, was, for Dunay, an example of how not to regulate such problems. The Yugoslavian war "highlighted many of the weaknesses in European institutions," Dunay said. In the early stages of the dispute, most of Europe had little comprehension of the gravity of the situation. The European Community's intervention was late and inadequate, he said, and both the EC and United Nations stayed too remote from the problem. As for the CSCE, Yugoslavia exposed the weakness of the organization's rule of consensus which required unanimity of the 38 to take action or even make a statement. Dunay suggested that the rule could perhaps be amended to require consensus among the 38 minus the country or countries involved in a dispute.

Mr. Dunay ended with an entreaty: since it was not the neighbours of Yugoslavia and the former USSR which had the means to influence the situation, but rather the West

and its economic institutions, he hoped that the application of economic and political pressure by the West for good reasons, "would not go out of fashion."

The most extreme expression of the new Euro-gloom came during the presentation by the *Manchester Guardian*'s Washington correspondent, Martin Walker. The turmoil currently exhibited in Europe was but "the latest version...of behaviour which has afflicted Europe throughout this century...the European tribes in tribal wars they are not able to stop without bringing in the US and USSR."..."The last forty years of peace," Walker declared flatly, "existed because we've been under adult supervision." What Europe -- and the CSCE -- faces now is a return to "all the infantile behaviour the world has seen before."

For Walker, the great paradox was that just as pan-European issues such as economic migration, the environment and economic development were becoming more urgent, the CSCE was withering "on its vine" -- a phenomenon caused by indifference towards the organization shown by the great powers. After citing Alexander Pope to illustrate current great power attitudes to the hapless CSCE -- "damn with faint praise, ascent with civil leer..." -- Walker attributed the CSCE's allegedly pathetic state and, presumably, consequent inability to take on the evident challenges in Europe, to one cause: "The great powers will not accept the discipline of an institution which gives Malta the same weight as the United States." As evidence he noted that the "serious" powers, the US and Germany, had chosen instead to engage Eastern and Central Europe through the NATO alliance, and its offspring, the very new North Atlantic Consultative Council. Once again, the rule of consensus, the unitary veto, was cited as the primary obstacle to the CSCE's becoming relevant in the new and newly troubled Europe.

However, Walker saw trouble ahead for Europe even with the help of organizations that were more to the "serious" powers liking -- institutions such as NATO and the EC. The more the EC expanded as a pan-European body and brought in more members of the old neutral and non-aligned group, the more it diluted the "broad Atlantacist traditions" of the EC. While the old EC capital was Brussels, the new centre for the

1990s, Walker said, was Bonn-Berlin, and the new "strategic direction" for Western Europe was towards the "half colony, half problem" of the East, all of which worked to loosen the ties with the United States.

Walker's fundamental pessimism seemed to stem not from Europe's own difficulties, which were in his view just more of the same. Rather they arose from the two central truths: America's present penurious condition and increasing isolationism, and, what he called, the potential "wars of Stalin's succession" arising from the collapse of the USSR. These left the continent without the hope for the return of "adult supervision" -- benign or otherwise -- that had rescued it twice before in this century. Though it went unsaid, it was clear that in Walker's melancholy world view, the future course of the CSCE did not matter much one way or the other to curing Europe's dangerous afflictions.

III. *How Will The Security Needs of CSCE Signatories Be Met:*
Who Is Going To Do What For Whom?

It is wise to be cautious about ascribing to participants at such a gathering the role of representing more than themselves -- the "voice of" the old East bloc countries for example. Nonetheless, there emerged from discussions about governments' various interests and apprehensions, considerable plain talk: finger pointing by participants from Central and East European countries at the "cocksure" attitudes and "unfair" actions of the West, and by Western participants at the nascent democracies of the East for not being "serious" about addressing their own security needs.

Each of the three main speakers on the panel on meeting the security needs of members states held true to their "representational" natures, including an academic participant from a neutral country who attempted to steer a moderate line between speakers from each of the old blocs. The quite different perspectives expressed -- including some explicit resentments -- illustrate how difficult the road to European security will be, even among states that are committed to peaceful international discourse and share the fundamental values embodied in the Helsinki Final Act.

The first to address the question was the most senior Central and East European politician in attendance, Lubos Dobrovsky, Minister of Defence of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Mr. Dobrovsky compared the current political dynamic among European states to that of a patient who knows there is something wrong but hesitates to go the doctor because once the diagnosis is made and the disease is given a name, the patient will then really start to feel sick. The disease, said Dobrovsky, was the loss of structure, direction and certainty that the old East-West system provided to the participant nations. The structure was guaranteed by international treaties created in the aftermath of two world wars, and enforced by two military power blocs more or less in equilibrium.

After we disbanded the Warsaw Treaty we failed to set up new standards for governing relations among European countries...we failed to admit that

because of the rise of nationalism, we are exposed to serious threats and new uncertainties because of the aggressive emergence of unanticipated new states.

The need now, he said, was to find a new structure to "persuade" or "compel" these new countries to fulfill the set of international commitments that bring continuity to Europe. "And what mechanisms exist for creating these new standards?" Dobrovsky asked. The CSCE is his answer.

For political veterans of the struggle against Eastern Europe's communist apparatus like Dobrovsky,[1] and unlike most Western Europeans and North Americans, the CSCE has concrete meaning and real political value. The CSCE's procedures, and the concepts they embody, matter enough to the Minister that he stood on its head the formula for assessing the value of the CSCE introduced by his counterpart Johan Jörgen Holst from Norway at the beginning of the conference (see page 22) on its head. "We need to list the various possibilities for the CSCE process. This is the way the question should be put, not 'does this process have any raison d'etre?'."

As for other institutions, Dobrovsky went out of his way to scold the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the communiqué that came from its summit in Rome in November 1991. In it, NATO invited all Central and East European states to participate in the newly created North Atlantic Consultative Council (NACC) together with standing NATO members. This was NATO's response to the clear wishes of Czechoslovakia, among other former Warsaw Treaty countries, to apply for full membership in the Alliance itself. Dobrovsky told the conference:

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[1] That Dobrovsky would look so readily to the CSCE, when all around there are doubters, especially West Europeans, is not surprising when one considers his altogether unique career path to the office of Defence Minister. An editor and international affairs journalist in Czechoslovakia until 1970, Dobrovsky was expelled from the Communist Party in the wake of the 1968 Prague Spring, and for twenty years was among other things a store clerk, a window cleaner, an editor of underground publications, a spokesperson for the dissident movement Civic Forum and signatory to Charter 77. This latter dissident organization arose directly out of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act which spawned similar human rights groups across Eastern Europe and the USSR through the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Instead of carefully differentiating between the various member states of the old Warsaw Treaty Organization, instead of considering the community of values, this declaration of Rome would throw all these states into a bag and shake it. The result is that all these countries are seen to be equally dangerous for European security, which is certainly not the case. Instability, military potential, and nationalisms are of varying scope and intensity.

Two participants from NATO countries responded to the Minister. The Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO, Ralph Lysyshyn, said he thought that European security overall was increased by NATO *not* differentiating among countries. "Would it be easier to persuade Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons and the idea of a 450,000 man army if Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were in and Ukraine out?" Lyshyshyn also said that choosing who to take in and who to leave out would have caused a lot of difficulty within NATO.

Along the same lines, Johan Jörgen Holst, Norway's Minister of Defence, said that it was important to remember that the principle challenge to European security was the breakup of the USSR. "An explicit attempt at differentiation might be counterproductive [for] this critical issue....It is important that there be a framework of open hands."

Not mollified, Dobrovsky wondered how one could claim that joining NATO would not increase Hungary's security. "Why does NATO exist then, if not to guarantee greater security for its members?" He went on to assert that as far as he was concerned the primary problem for Central European countries was not NATO membership, but rather how to guarantee democracy, civic freedoms and the rule of law, "values identical to those that the Western European countries established NATO to advocate."

In his provocative and at times combative talk on the subject of what might be done to mitigate European security problems, journalist Richard Gwyn of the *Toronto Star* identified nationalism and ethnicity as the source of greatest future problems for Europe. The evidence for this seemed to him to be all around, not only in the East. With the exception of the UK there was not a single Western European country without

a radical, right-wing nationalist party, and the first expression of nationalism in post-Cold War Europe was in the West with the re-unification of Germany which was, he asserted "the ultimate expression of nationalism and ethnicity....West Germans took in East Germans [even] though they didn't like them, [but] because they were German."

Gwyn, like many other Western participants, viewed the CSCE as a creation of the Cold War -- "yesterday's institution" which the US and other big powers would not take seriously because they could be vetoed by Albania. While he saw the EC as Europe's defining force, at the same time it seemed to offer little in coming to grips with the singular problem of nationalism and ethnicity, at least as demonstrated to him so far in the case of Yugoslavia. He termed the EC's conduct over Yugoslavia up to that time "outrageous conduct...a failure of nerve and imagination" that would have serious repercussions. Because of this first war in Europe in fifty years, the next war would not be quite as shocking, he asserted. "It will be a little bit more normal," and national extremists elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will see war as legitimate behaviour.

In words addressed specifically to the East and Central Europeans in the room, Gwyn said their countries were not being serious in addressing their own security needs, and that if they expected help from "us" (the West) they should do more themselves -- especially in the form of cooperative arrangements on trade, transportation, and security between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As an example of the sort of seriousness he envisioned, Gwyn referred to the fact that Hungary was having to cope with Yugoslav border problems on its own. "Why are there not even nominal contributions from Poland and Czechoslovakia?" he asked.

It was in the subsequent discussion with Czechoslovakia's Dobrovsky and others, that the results of over fifty years of European history replete with grievances, perceived betrayals, and mutual isolation could be heard.

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"It is statements like Mr. Gwyn's that confirm my own views," replied Dobrovsky. In what sounded much like an old-fashioned dressing down, Dobrovsky proceeded to remind participants of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia by the West at Munich in 1938; of the fact that it was Central and East European countries, admittedly with the West's help, which bore the main responsibility and risk for dissolving NATO's rival the Warsaw Treaty Organization; and that in his view, the refugees on Hungary's borders wanted to go to the West, not to Hungary, so if Hungary did not have sufficient aid, it was all of Europe's problem not just that of Central European states.

> The inequality we feel has to do with the perception of threats and we need to identify and define these threats. All of this cannot be thrown onto the shoulders of Eastern and Central Europe....We are recovering after forty years of totalitarian rule, and we are economically and morally exhausted. We need a generous ally willing to carry some of the burdens and losses of the alliance. I am afraid of politicians who will emerge to look for their allies in another direction.

Had the English translation not missed this final admonition from Dobrovsky, there would no doubt have been questions about who he thought these politicians might be and what direction they would look. As it was, he left no doubt that he and colleagues in the new governments of Central Europe felt generally put upon by the actions and attitudes of Western governments towards what he regarded as genuine threats to security in the East.

In his presentation, Karl Birnbaum -- former director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and currently with the European Centre for Peace Studies in Austria -- succeeded, to an extent, in staying above the fray. From his perspective, new Europe's central problem lay in the reality of unequal security conditions across the continent -- a "security gap" if you will.

If one included in the definition of security not only protection against external aggression, but also domestic oppression, environmental degradation, economic deprivation and widespread personal humiliation, then the East suffered greater insecurity than the

West before the communist collapse and still does after it -- the difference being that the West is no longer insulated by the Iron Curtain from the East's troubles.

On how to meet these challenges, Birnbaum underscored the view that the CSCE was unique among institutions in being concerned not only with the preoccupations of government elites, but also with societies and individuals. As did others at various times in the conference, Birnbaum identified two potential innovations in standard CSCE practice that would be highly desirable: the first would weaken the sanctity of the rule of state sovereignty and principle of non-interference by permitting intervention in "domestic affairs" under certain specified conditions. Second, the consensus decision rule would be made less stringent so as to allow the implementation of certain types of decisions.

Neutral though he was by birth, Birnbaum was far from neutral on the potential utility of the CSCE in fulfilling its members' security needs. His presentation typified the essential faith in and belief about the continuing value of the CSCE process that its advocates manifest:

> The relevance of the CSCE for European security has always been related to its political rather than military aspects. This is likely to remain so...But since future security requirements in Europe can be expected to be focussed on these non-military dimensions, the potential of the CSCE for meeting the concerns and needs of signatories could grow significantly, provided its working procedures will be adapted to the requirements of changed circumstances.

IV.   *Conflict Prevention and Dispute Settlement:*
       New Europe's Most Perplexing Challenge

An inescapable conclusion from this portion of the Prague meeting was that European multilateral institutions with responsibility, even indirectly, for security matters in Europe, will be judged on their ability to minimize the occurrence of disputes and conflicts within and among European states -- especially the new states of Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly the CSCE's critics at this conference made much of its apparent impotence in the face of the ongoing Yugoslav conflicts. Not only is CSCE "totally absent from the current European crisis situation" said Christoph Bertram, but "its structures and instruments" are products of the Cold War and no longer relevant.

Implicit in this and similar assessments is the assumption that there are other institutions better able to cope with these types of challenges -- that the job can be, and is being more effectively done by others. However, CSCE detractors at this meeting never made it clear just who these others were that were doing so well at solving European disputes. One of the CSCE's most voluble detractors, Richard Gwyn, said that in Yugoslavia, the EC -- cited repeatedly during the meeting by him, Bertram and others, as Europe's "core institution" -- had been revealed to all, including the Yugoslav Federal Army, to be a "paper tiger." And in response to Bertram's negative assessment, Bernard Wood, head of the meeting's co-sponsoring body, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, asked:

> What are these more dynamic pan-European institutions, that will do the jobs we are talking about here -- the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, effective promotion of human rights, democratic practices and minority protection. Those concerns are more important than they have ever been. They were never just a vestige of the Cold War by any stretch. I don't see the effective institutions in being that can do them.

John Toogood, Deputy Director of CIIPS, reminded participants, "regarding Yugoslavia, it is hard to fault CSCE since no one else has done any better." He also

gave credit to the CSCE for having been influential in discouraging other states from taking sides in that civil conflict -- an essential factor in the spread of previous European wars.

It was Ralph Lysyshyn, Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO, who best summed up the "cup is half full" argument on behalf of the CSCE:

> We are finding all the security institutions in Europe proving somewhat inadequate. Their inadequacy is particularly in evidence because in the period 1989 - 1990 each of them succumbed to hubris. They all said "we won the Cold War" and busied themselves with patting themselves on the back. Then the problems came [in Yugoslavia]. The CSCE was exposed because it couldn't act with its consensus rules. NATO found it had the wrong kind of military muscle. It was also prohibited from acting by the other agendas, insecurities and even prejudices of some of its members. The EC gambled and took on a big role, expecting it could use economic pressure, only to find that in this situation the Serbian irregulars and Croats weren't terribly interested in the threat of being denied EC membership. So they were all exposed; that should not be a reason to throw them all out.

> The security situation is full of uncertainties. There are still military risks and we don't know where they will come from. There are other risks -- economic, environmental, and nationalist -- that nobody has a solution to. So if we turn to find the institutions are somewhat inadequate, this isn't surprising. The idea is to fix these organizations in one way or another.

The assumption that conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacemaking are likely to be the seminal issues of the 1990s and on into the 21st century was reflected in John Toogood's assessment of how the CSCE fit into the framework of existing multilateral security institutions in Europe. While other organizations, notably the WEU and NATO, had effective military forces, and the EC had obvious economic muscle, the CSCE has what all others do not have -- an unambiguous pan-European character. In the event of deploying peacekeeping or peace restoring forces it would be important, said Toogood, "to avoid any suspicion of ganging up or the imposition of a *pax super ordineri* upon lesser Europeans" -- only the CSCE could deliver this.

In the task of creating a greater degree of military interdependence, once again the CSCE, while its instruments are nascent, had the indispensable characteristic of a multi-purpose, Europe-wide perspective. According to Toogood, "if you want to have an organization that can admit new countries, and has a flexible agenda, then you have to invent something that looks like the CSCE."

Mr. Toogood cited the November 1991 NATO Rome communiqué to support his case that there are many important things existing institutions, as powerful as they are, could not do in the increasingly crucial arena of dispute resolution.

> NATO is quite clear in its understanding of the importance of wider links and of its own limitations in its relations with other states in Europe. Thus the alliance's new strategic concept in Rome acknowledges that, "the potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the allies will support the role of the CSCE process and institutions.

In order to strengthen CSCE's capacities in this area, Toogood presented a set of recommendations that would formalize the military dialogue that had already taken place by creating a Military Staff Committee that would,

- develop an agenda for cooperation in matters such as search and rescue, and response to civil emergencies;

- draw up a report on possibilities for a European peacekeeping force;

- formulate a list of possible conflict control measures, "building on the existing CSCE mechanism for consultation and cooperation in the event of unusual military activities and hazardous incidents of a military nature.

The head of the CSCE secretariat in Prague, Nils Elliason, had already outlined (see page 2) the various important structural changes that have occurred inside the CSCE in the last few years. One of these was the creation in 1991 of a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, Austria following a decision of the CSCE in 1986. Given the widespread apprehension about European disputes in the wake of the Yugoslavian war and the continuing disintegration of the former USSR, this new Centre and the assumptions that underlie its working procedures will naturally come under considerable scrutiny.

The Director of the Centre, Bent Rosenthal, outlined for conference participants the various processes and instruments available to the Centre to deal with disputes:

- the "Berlin Emergency Mechanism" -- the adoption in Berlin in June 1991 of a mechanism for calling a CSCE consultation to deal with an emergency situation on the basis, not of complete consensus (agreement of all 38 states) as it had always been, but by the agreement of "12 + 1" members;

- the "Moscow Mechanism" which would permit the CSCE under certain situations to investigate serious threats to or violations of CSCE principles on human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in a member state; and last,

- the "Valetta Mechanism" whereby CSCE member states agreed at Valetta, Malta in February 1991, on processes and practices that could be employed for peacefully settling disputes among them.

For Rosenthal, a central issue was the CSCE's consensus rule, especially in light of recent events in Yugoslavia. While at the level of calling meetings this formerly airtight procedure had been weakened by the decision taken in Berlin, at the level of decision making the requirement of consensus still made it all but impossible for the CSCE to deal with problems internal to member states. How and why this was so, and the severe

implications this could have in the future, was the theme of University of British Columbia political scientist, Kalevi Holsti.

Holsti's thesis was that the assumptions underlying the Valetta mechanism are rooted in the model of international conflict embodied in the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter, i.e., that conflict occurs *between* states over territory, boundaries, control of strategic space, etc. Holsti contended, however, that it is the set of conflicts that occur *within* states that will be most common in Europe in the coming years, and that the formulas developed at the Valetta meeting, and which are at the heart of the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, "are relevant to only a narrow range of international conflicts, and particularly to those that are least likely to be a threat to peace." In short, "the old formulas of mediation, arbitration, and non-interference in countries' internal affairs" would appear to equip the CSCE for the wrong set of issues.

Holsti documented the extent of the threat facing Europe from internal disputes on its territory by citing fellow political scientist Stephen Van Evera:

> Today there are in Europe nine potential border disputes and at least thirteen significant ethnic groups that may either seek independence or be claimed by others. The figures do not include Yugoslavia....Van Evera notes that of the Soviet Union's 262 million population, there are 104 nationalities. Twenty-four percent (64 million) live outside of their home republics. Another 25 million (9 percent) are members of small nationalities without home republics; they would be minorities wherever they live. In the potential successor states, there are 89 small minorities.

In examining specific sections of the Valetta mechanism in light of this probable future, Holsti found many shortcomings. Among the most dramatic was Section XII which excludes from the mechanism's purview any dispute that "raises issues concerning [a state's] territorial integrity, or national defense, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to jurisdiction over other areas..." Since these exclusions would effectively appear to eliminate from legitimate CSCE action any of the problems in Van Evera's smorgasbord of potential East European conflicts, Holsti's conclusion that,

the CSCE Council of Officials...will have to be very imaginative to bypass the consensus principle or to devise conflict resolving processes that go beyond the very limited possibilities found in the mechanism created at Valetta,

seems, if anything, understated.

In addition to questionable assumptions about the nature of the conflicts with which it would be faced, Holsti found fault with the new dispute settlement mechanism on procedural grounds. Parties to a dispute would have to make application to the CSCE, "by itself," Holsti said,

the CSCE [could not] initiate action in the early stages of a conflict. It has no advance-warning capacity, and no organizational capability for identifying situations that are likely to lead to armed attack.

In describing a path down which the CSCE might travel in order to deal with the real conflicts before it, Holsti drew participants' attention to the CSCE's current inability to take action, the rule of consensus and the principle of sovereign equality. He suggested modifying the rule of consensus so that it was retained for most issues (arms control and disarmament, confidence and security building measures, etc.) but modified "where the actions of one or more states, or non-state actors, were deemed by the Council to constitute a threat to the community as a whole."

In offering justification for this change in procedures, Holsti referred to the principle advocated by the Canadian delegation to the San Francisco UN conference in 1945, which asserted that,

in order to be effective, an international organization must incorporate some hierarchical principles, namely that capability confers authority, but the exercise of that authority is always under the scrutiny of the organization as a whole.

While Holsti pointed out severe shortcomings in the CSCE, he was clearly on the side of those who would fix and modify, rather than discard:

> The CSCE has some important fundamentals. It is the only organization that represents all of Europe. Unlike NATO, it cannot be perceived by anyone as a threat or as increasingly irrelevant....In some ways [the EC] is better equipped to act effectively than is the CSCE, but it suffers from the limitation of representing less than one-third of Europe's countries, and does not include Canadian or American participation. It also lacks some elements of authority and legitimacy that the CSCE does possess.

One relatively optimistic scenario for the CSCE, once again a vision based largely on faith, was presented by Miroslav Potocný of the Department of International Law at Prague's Charles University. In his view, the CSCE was slowly turning itself into an international organization with permanent organs, settlement procedures, and the like. This evolution, Potocny asserted, would eventually produce a regional organization for collective security -- a process that has occurred with many other organizations. Gradually the principle of consensus will disappear, he said. "[These] organs cannot function permanently on the basis of consensus."

Certainly the consensus among this particular gathering of experts was that the CSCE would have to be much more active very soon if it wished to make a difference to the rush of European political and military events.

V. Are There Opportunities for Middle Power Leadership in Matters of Security in Europe?

In the context of this conference, the issue of middle power leadership amounted to asking whether there should be a CSCE which functions in the future with procedures that are recognizably similar to the current ones. What became apparent throughout the entire discussion was the fact that small and middle powers ascribe relatively higher value to the CSCE compared to the great powers, and compared to middle powers which are already members of some of the other multilateral clubs. If one includes Russia, the US, the UK, Germany and France in the category of "great powers" -- a list which includes ex-great powers and great power "wanabees" -- then certainly half of the other thirty-three states would fall into the definition of "middle power" as defined by Bernard Wood in his presentation, i.e., states that number in the top thirty world GDP performers.

Johan Jörgen Holst, Minister of Defence for Norway (a middle power by Wood's definition, as well as a member of NATO, the EFTA, the OECD and the Council of Europe) remarked early in the conference that he was suspicious of any discussion about the CSCE which was based on trying to find out how to make the institution more useful in the future.

> One gets the impression that this [discussion] serves the function of trying to define a role for countries that feel they are in the process of being marginalized in new circumstances, whether they are neutral and non-aligned who are not part of the new NATO pan-European organization, or the Canadians who are neither European or the USA. It is important to find out what has to be done, then develop a mechanism to do that.

In a curious lapse of debating spirit (perhaps the early parts of conferences tend to the over-polite) no one at the time asked Holst whether countries feeling marginalized should simply accept this as a fact of life and cease the attempt to gain access to larger European multilateral enterprises. It was the Czech and Slovak Defence Minister, Lubos Dobrovsky, who later formulated the problem exactly the other way round; he said, in

essence, that since we already have what has proved an extremely useful mechanism (the CSCE), how can we modify it so it serves our needs even better?

The head of the Czech and Slovak Foreign Ministry's CSCE Department, Ivan Busniak, used the case of the neutral and non-aligned states to account for some of the differences in country attitudes to the CSCE. In his view, with the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the USSR, the NNA group (Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, etc.) had lost its organizing principle -- the policy glue which within the consensus procedures of the CSCE had encouraged the former West and East blocs to take these countries seriously for the first time.

In Busniak's construct, small and middle powers, because of their size, are suspicious of institutions that exclude them, which Busniak noted, was precisely what was happening to relations between the new North Atlantic Consultative Council (NACC) and what was left of the former NNA group. The new NACC included the original NATO 16 plus the former WTO countries to make 25. Left out were the rest of the CSCE 38. "Thus there is some suspicion...," said Busniak, "that there is yet another institution to which they have no access, a growing feeling of isolation. Which is why we have stressed that we do not regard [the NACC] as a replacement for the CSCE process."

Other reasons underlying this extra middle power self-interest in the CSCE, and multilateral organizations in general, were elaborated upon by Bernard Wood from Canada, again Ivan Busniak from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and the Director of the Prague Foreign Ministry's Analysis and Planning Department, Miloslav Had.

Mr. Had expressed it in stark military terms:

> Small and middle-sized states can devote only limited resources to their defence. They are potentially more vulnerable to outside threats and, in fact, are unable to maintain forces sufficient to deal with a major military contingency.

Mr. Busniak cited the current situation in his own country which had recently been forced to come to terms with its neighbours:

> One of the main points about small and medium powers is that they cannot work out national interests the same way as great powers. [We] cannot think about the economic, political and ecological issues of this country without taking into full account those of Poland, Hungary and other neighbours....Efforts to develop some sort of shared security is an important feature of Czech foreign policy. We cannot feel fully secure until Poland and Hungary feel secure as well. There are practical problems with doing this of course; we have not had experience with forming policies of national interest that include our neighbours.

Mr. Wood outlined the reasons for middle power propensities to support multilateralism in theoretical and geo-political terms: "Middle powers need functional multilateral cooperation because most of the time they have interests that are wider than are their capabilities to influence outcomes on their own. So they must act in coalition."

It was left to another Canadian participant, John Bosley, MP, the Chair of the Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, to articulate Canada's emotional and historical case for its long championship of the CSCE. Bosley emphatically rebuffed Johan Jörgen Holst's concern that too much of the talk about the CSCE was based on certain national fears about being "marginalized."

> Canada was one of the founders of the CSCE and we did it on purpose. We have lots of people buried in this part of the world and we care deeply about it. Europe was important to our past and we intend it to be important to our future. We were terrified, as any middle power would be, about a situation where the two big guys seemed to sitting, aiming everything at each other, without anybody having any capacity to break the logjam.
>
> That is why the middle powers wanted a CSCE process, and they knew the only process that people would be comfortable in was one in which they had an equal voice at the table. We have arrived at the end of the Cold War...now we are asked to accept the notion by some that the process that gave us the Helsinki Final Act and all of the procedures around it, are some how out of date. I cannot come to accept that notion, if only because while circumstances change, the procedures that gave us the confidence to build

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the relationships that helped us get to documents like the Helsinki Final Act, with all of the implications that had for confidence building -- those procedures we cannot afford to lose.

We believe in trying to help find the solutions in Central and Eastern Europe not just because it is in the interests of these emerging countries, but because it is our interest as a middle power. All of the discussion about the CSCE come down to an essential Canadian view of multilateralism. We want to find ways among ourselves as equals to build structures that will allow us to be comfortable about being able to manage our own collective future safely. That is why we are here.

Left unexplored through this discussion was the attitude of the great powers towards the CSCE. Why should *they* be involved in an organization that served the interests of small and middle powers so well, and did not institutionally recognize relative distribution of international power? Indeed, this question was at the heart of almost the entire case presented by CSCE detractors: the CSCE is not serious; it has no real power; the countries that matter can be vetoed by countries that don't; so why bother?

Curiously, as the two-day exchange neared its end, it was the German journalist and foreign affairs analyst (and the conference's first CSCE naysayer, Christoph Bertram) who came closest to explaining what it is that keeps the CSCE going, even with all its ephemeral qualities. He said that he continued to be struck by the traditional manner in which international affairs are still discussed,

We talk about foreign ministers as if they don't spend most of their time sitting in collective bodies, which they do if you look at the comparison between purely domestic discussions and multilateral ones. Political scientists have not caught on to this yet. Even the United States accepts that it must act collectively.

He then offered the final substantive recommendation of the conference. The smaller powers wanted to keep the consensus voting rule in the CSCE because they believed it ensured their continuing influence, but in Bertram's view, the consensus rule actually gave smaller countries less power than they might believe. He noted that

in the EC, states adhered to the "qualified majority voting" system which obliged the great powers to form coalitions with smaller members[2]. "It is probably in the interests of [the smaller powers] to move towards something different [from the consensus rule] in which they could use their bargaining power." The CSCE could thus become more activist and more relevant and yet still ensure that small and middle powers continued to have their say.

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[2]In the EC Council of Ministers, the Qualified Majority Voting system weighs votes roughly according to country size; for example, Germany, Italy, France and the UK get ten each while Luxembourg gets two and Denmark three. Items to be decided on in this way must pass not only with the requisite number of votes (in this case 54 out of a total of 76), but this winning vote must come from no fewer than eight of the twelve EC member states. Thus, a few large states with heavily weighted votes cannot wholly dominate the decision making process. See, *European Communities and Beyond*, Commission of the European Communities, March 1991, Brussels, pp. 23-24.

VI.   *Conclusion*

"The CSCE has survived this conference with some scars but nevertheless intact," is how David Braide, Chairman of CIIPS Board of Directors, assessed the two-day Prague colloquium in his presentation that concluded the meeting. He drew attention again to the most conspicuous and recurring issue of the conference: a minority view -- but one with considerable weight and authority -- which held that the CSCE was anachronistic and a product of the Cold War, and a majority opinion that the CSCE was an important part of the European institutional architecture but one that needed to change if it was going to be fully effective.

Mr. Braide distinguished between two major categories of defects in the existing CSCE process that had been identified during the meeting:

- *consensus and unanimity rules* -- "these are bound to lead to a certain amount of distrust by the larger powers and to a tendency for the organization to 'freeze up' when issues come up that effect the special interests of one or more members."

  This led, noted Braide, to introducing concepts of hierarchy into the process, and that of "delegation" to other groups or institutions. "But we were warned that the consensus aspect of the organization is one of its unique values, and one from which it derives immense moral power, and therefore should not be meddled with."

- *notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity* -- while this was a founding principle of CSCE, current concerns are in many respects about those things happening inside boundaries. "There seemed to be a general feeling that a way must be found for the CSCE to intervene in the internal affairs of members if it is to reach its full potential."

Mr. Braide also made a plea for increased institutional tolerance. "We should learn to be happy with untidy organizational solutions. It is unrealistic to expect that a monolithic solution is available any more. A diversity of institutions is inevitable and desirable."

From the advantageous position of being last to speak, Braide made a final personal intervention on the side of the CSCE's defenders. Acknowledging that the organization did indeed have shortcomings, he criticized what he perceived to be a lack of alternatives put forward by those who said the CSCE had lost its relevance:

> I thought that the absence of alternative solutions tended to make such observations suspect. The only alternative I heard was that in some manner the European Community, by using its economic levers, could enforce its rules of behaviour on countries thousands of miles away, which had not participated in the formulation of those rules. I found that not only impractical, but perhaps a little obscene.

Those at the Prague meeting who would ignore the CSCE or put it in cold storage offered little proof that the CSCE is today and always will be irrelevant. Instead, they asserted strongly that NATO, the EC and WEU were Europe's "core institutions" and were more powerful. But this form of argument says more about the professional and national-cultural predilections of those making the statements than it does about the effectiveness of the CSCE.

Is it more than a coincidence that the three professional international affairs journalist presenters were also the three sternest CSCE critics? The objective circumstances are that the CSCE's obviously ephemeral and until recently even transient character (no fixed address, meeting in different cities in Europe at irregular intervals, no spending power, no bureaucrats to interview and no obvious political muscle) presents real problems to those who would wish to understand it better. Modern print and electronic journalism, when it perceives the institution at all, has a hard time explaining just what the thing is.

One way to account for a journalist's discouraging, even disparaging, view of the CSCE -- its lack of "power" and "relevance" -- is its relative invisibility compared to the many other actors on the international stage. One very compelling measure of utility, effectiveness, importance, and intrinsic worth for those creating media products, as well as for those watching them, is sheer quantity. The more an event or phenomenon is reported the more important it is, leading in turn to its being reported even more. This influence is pervasive even though all participants in modern journalism, consumers and creators, know better.

Another observation about those at the meeting who regarded the CSCE as largely irrelevant, is that they came from one or other of the Western "great powers" (Bertram from Germany, Walker from the UK, Gwyn though now Canadian was born and educated in the UK). On the other side, many of the CSCE defenders and supportive critics, are nationals of smaller Western powers and the new Eastern democracies (Toogood, Lysyshyn and Holsti from Canada, Dobrovsky from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Volten from the Netherlands, Elliason from Sweden).

The UK and Germany have already cast their lot with other institutions over in they have a great measure of control and which have served their interests well in the past -- for example, NATO in the case of Britain and the EC for Germany. Smaller powers with less control (or in the instance of Canada and the EC, none at all), and new democracies in the East, would logically tend to gravitate towards an organization which has served *them* well, and in which they might have a larger voice. And of course by the yardstick of national power, the great powers would find an organization they do not fully control an implicit threat. As Martin Walker stated so forcefully: "The great powers will not accept the discipline of an institution which gives Malta the same weight as the US."

While Walker's assertion is almost certainly correct, as such it is merely a comment on how decision makers in a superpower might regard an international institution it does not dominate, and how the relative distribution of power among nations is reflected in

different kinds of multilateral institutions. It does not, however, constitute evidence one way or the other about the institution's intrinsic value to the community of nations as a whole. Other measures will have to be used.

Ultimately, the CSCE's utility in solving the security problems of the new Europe described at this conference will be decided by a complex assortment of factors some of which are not yet well understood. Miroslav Potocny's hopeful but rather vaguely defined expectations (page 21) of a sort of natural evolution from consensus decision making to something else more like other European institutions might come to pass. But then the question will be: if the CSCE process is modified to resemble that of other more "activist" European and Western institutions, will the CSCE have lost one of the essential qualities that made it worth having in the first place?

Appendix A

THE CSCE AND OTHER SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
by
John Toogood

It is somewhat daunting to be the first to speak on the substance of our agenda at a gathering such as this knowing that I will be followed by such a distinguished group of government decision makers, senior scholars, and internationally respected journalists. Not infrequently, many of us in organizations such as mine envisage ourselves as being in the business of offering advice to these other groups and of course proffering advice is always a risky business. This was stated most clearly by Samuel Griffith in his introduction to Sun Tzu's Art of War in which Griffith portrays the role of what we might now call think tanks during the period of the warring states about three or four hundred years before Christ. He characterizes this time as one in which "hundreds of scholars who wandered from one state to another were eager to peddle ideas to rulers 'anxious over the perilous condition of their countries and the weakness of their armies'. Sovereigns competed for the advice of battalions of professional talkers, who, in 'interminable discussions', captured kings, dukes, and great men with arguments of 'confusing diversity'. When their advice turned out to be good they frequently attained high position; if poor, they were unceremoniously pickled, sawn in half, boiled, minced, or torn apart by chariots."

With this potential fate before me it seemed a prudent beginning might be to try to establish the outer limits of what is meant by the term "security". In the European world of the past 24 months it has become fashionable to refer to the wider definition of security. Indeed, some have used the term the new, wider definition of security. The boundaries of the various definitions one hears are wide indeed but the constituent elements are certainly not new: they are as old as the history of conflict itself. What was new in our century was the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers with global, competitive interests and philosophies. What was new after 1945 was the massive armed confrontation between the two and their allies anchored in Europe. And what is new since 1989 is the break up of that confrontation.

One result of this latest development is that "threats", in the NATO vocabulary, have been replaced by "risks". Another consequence is that the strategic studies community has a changing agenda. Impassioned debates about the validity of minimum deterrence, the ladders of flexible response, the military un-wisdom of forward defence in Europe, the preemptive risks inherent in a forward maritime strategy, the launch on warning perils of INF deployments, the destabilizing effects of supersonic cruise weapons, have lost their former interest.

Now the focus is shifting to matters such as clandestine weapons distribution, water rights, demographic movements, religious conflicts, ethnic tensions, maldistribution of wealth and resources and all those other items that are in the various catalogues of the wider definition of security. And virtually every one of them is to be found in some form somewhere in the sixteen year old Final Act of Helsinki, a tribute to the prescience of the drafters of that remarkable document.

The institutions primarily involved in security in Europe are the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the European Community (EC). The relationships among these four organizations in various respects are a matter of current debate. Two of them -- NATO and the WEU -- have significant military capabilities, while the other two, the CSCE and the EC, have virtually none. Between NATO and the WEU there is a continuing debate regarding the status of their military forces, in particular those of the nine members of the Western European Union. Do they constitute a European pillar within NATO? A military dimension of European Political Cooperation (EPC)? A bridge or link between the European Community and NATO? Answering these questions is a major challenge on the table of the 12 members of the European Community as they struggle to agree on the nature of a "common foreign and security policy" in their work on the process of European integration. Their 9 December summit will have to address this key issue, among others.

NATO leaders also had to confront these issues at their summit in Rome in early November. The outcome was not particularly enlightening. Sections 6 and 7 of the "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" of 7-8 November contain three statements that appear to preserve the positions of all sides of the question. Section 6 opens by welcoming "the further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance..." (emphasis added) and ends with a promise "to develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the 12 and the WEU, and the Alliance". Section 7 addresses these two divergent views in a not immodest statement welcoming "reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance...".

With considerably greater clarity, the Rome Declaration endorses the importance of the CSCE in the European security framework. I will return to this later but I would note here that the statements in the document suggest an appreciation of the sometimes subtle political processes of the CSCE. This is a welcome development because it was not too long ago that there was some preliminary debate as to whether the CSCE might be a competitor that could replace NATO. This caused considerable alarm in pro-NATO circles even though it became apparent fairly early in that debate that militarily the two organizations were so very different that there was no question of one at the expense of the other mainly because, so far at least, the CSCE has no military capability whatever. The vestiges of that debate remain, however, particularly among some of the more ardent supporters of NATO who either do not have or do not wish to have much of an understanding of the role of the CSCE. The CSCE remains what it was in the first place: quintessentially political and pan-European. NATO, too, remains what it has been: a sub-regional alliance primarily of a military nature.

Those who favoured abolishing NATO with a coincidental strengthening of the CSCE have now mostly recognized the need for both institutions, at least in the near

and medium term. Indeed, if NATO has any competitor it is probably an independent Western European Union rather than the CSCE.

The discussion in this paper has so far centred on only one of the dimensions of security that should be taken into consideration when assessing the effectiveness of the institutions under review. There are at least five other roles and challenges to be taken into account. In addition to military defence, the others are conflict resolution, conflict prevention, the maintenance of a balance of power, demographic movements, and response to emergencies.

On conflict resolution, one need not assess in the abstract because mighty efforts have been under way for some months to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia. Whatever assessment one makes of the effectiveness of the institutions which have been engaged, it is encouraging to note that no outside power has aligned itself openly in support of any of the warring parties in that country, at least not so far. The contrast with earlier Balkan wars is clear.

The Yugoslav situation was an early test of the new CSCE mechanisms agreed only in November 1990 and embodied in the Charter of Paris. The Council of Foreign Ministers met to address the situation as did the Committee of Senior Officials, and the latter body continues to meet frequently. The new Conflict Prevention Centre assisted these efforts. Finally, the Risk Reduction Confidence and Security Building Measure that provides for consultation about unusual military activities was also brought into play.

It would be wrong to conclude that, because the conflict continues, these mechanisms have failed. For whatever reason, the conflict has been contained within the country itself without other states joining in, and it would be reasonable to assume that this is at least in part a consequence of the multilateral activities which have taken place through the CSCE mechanisms. It is also relevant to note that some of the European Community's activities have come under a mandate from the CSCE that, *inter alia*, has broadened the EC operations to include nationals from states which are not part

of the 12 but are members of the CSCE. An illustration of this fact is the presence of first six, and now 10, Canadian nationals on the EC Yugoslav observer team. It is also interesting to note that the activities of this "12 plus" group might be seen as an operational subgroup of the CSCE 38. This is not exactly a circumvention of the rule of consensus because the CSCE mantle of respectability could have been denied by any one signatory, but it nevertheless does seem to be some sort of demonstration of flexible practical action on the part of the CSCE.

Whether one agrees or not with that slightly contentious observation, the link between the two organizations -- the CSCE and the EC -- is quite clear. It is also clear that the EC has adopted a security role much earlier than normal negotiations toward political union and the development of a common foreign and security policy would have accomplished had the Yugoslav situation not occurred. Also worthy of note is that the multilateral activity in this situation has to all intents and purposes excluded NATO and the Western European Union as actors in any direct way, although no doubt those fora have been useful for consultations among their members. For whatever reason -- including widely rumoured internal dissension -- the EC efforts have not, at this writing (November 1991) been sufficiently effective to stop the conflict in Yugoslavia. It may well be that no European mechanism can do so. In that case one must look to the United Nations Security Council as is now happening and the provisions of Chapter VII of the charter as the last and perhaps best institution to take effective action. Article 41 in particular might be appropriate at this time with its provision for "interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications". An oil embargo is a step, but only that.

It is clear that the European mechanisms to resolve future conflicts must be improved and it is reasonable to expect they will be. One of them will probably be the development of plans for a European peacekeeping force in the traditional sense of that term. Neither should the possibilities of future peace restoration roles be discounted. In both cases such a force should be truly pan-European so as to avoid any suspicion of ganging up, or the imposition of a *pax super ordineri* upon lesser Europeans. The CSCE

would seem to be the best mechanism for this development when the time is propitious, but the tested mechanisms of NATO's consultation, cooperation and command and control practices are attractive in this regard. Thus, some sort of remit to NATO from the CSCE (by consensus) or other linkage might be contemplated under some circumstances.

Conflict prevention is somewhat different in nature, involving on the one hand deterrence and on the other the development of interdependencies, perhaps principally in the economic sphere, to a degree where any state would believe that its vital interests would be jeopardized were it to find itself in military conflict with another state in Europe. The 12 members of the European Community are already at that stage.

Deterrence is usually thought of exclusively in military terms and not infrequently, but wrongly, as only a nuclear weapon phenomenon. This is too narrow a concept. NATO and the Western European Union rely upon conventional forces for deterrence as a principle strategy for the protection of their members with, admittedly, a nuclear capability in the background in the case of NATO.

Deterrence can be extended to protect others -- sometimes in the form of security guarantees -- but the difficulties the NATO countries are having agreeing on how to protect the new democracies in Europe illustrate the trickiness of this strategy. The recent Rome Declaration contains no form of extended deterrence, offering merely an exceedingly modest agenda for "consultations and cooperation...on security and related issues" (section 12). In a sense one might say the EC has an economic deterrence capability.

The CSCE has neither military nor economic deterrents at its disposal and it is regrettable but true that the purely political consequences of potential military aggression have simply not been of much weight in adversarial situations. And, as has already been mentioned, it will be a very long time before the CSCE develops a military capability of its own that could replace other forms of collective deterrence, although preliminary steps in that direction are possible.

Conflict prevention through interdependence is an entirely different matter. A new term -- cooperative security -- has been emerging in scholarly literature and speeches by government officials in recent times. To my knowledge there is not as yet a commonly accepted definition of what this term means but it would seem to me that prevention through interdependence must surely be an integral part of it.

As mentioned, the European Community enjoys an extensive degree of interdependence. Indeed it is safe to say that interdependence has now developed to such a point that conflict between EC member states is virtually inconceivable. The EC is also developing links with countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as well as extending associate membership to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus a process of preventing conflict through extended economic interdependence has begun.

Interdependence within NATO is not quite as thoroughly developed. True, NATO has highly developed mechanisms for military command, coordination, and cooperation which, in war, would make alliance members fully interdependent. But in times of peace there is little true interdependence within NATO *qua* NATO. One need only think of relations between Greece and Turkey, for example, to illustrate this point. Those two countries no doubt saw themselves in a common security situation with the other allies in the days of perceived threat from the Soviet Union, but in the new Europe I wonder how much common security either believes it has with the other. The conclusion to be drawn is that cooperative security must rest upon something more than military links, important though they may be.

NATO is itself quite clear in its understanding of the importance of wider links, and of its own limitations in its relations with other states in Europe. Thus the Alliance's new strategic concept agreed in Rome acknowledges that "the potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other

states in Europe. <u>To this end</u>, the allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions." (Section 34) (emphasis added.)

But so far the CSCE remains a weak instrument for cooperative security in both economic and military fields. What it does have that the others lack, however, is the pan-European nature of its membership. It also has a nascent mechanism for the development of a greater degree of military interdependence. I refer here not only to the system of confidence and security building measures but also to the opportunity to build upon the two military doctrine seminars that have been held so far. It would appear that with the end of the East-West military confrontation the dialogue about military doctrine may well have run its course, but the practice of bringing together senior military officers of all the CSCE signatories should not be allowed to wither.

I mentioned earlier that steps toward developing some sort of interdependence could be taken. I have in mind the tasking of middle level staff officers of all the CSCE states to continue the practice of meeting. However, instead of simply holding exchanges of views they could, at the outset, be required to develop an agenda for the elaboration of common plans for cooperation in such matters as search and rescue and response to civil emergencies of various kinds. Such plans would necessarily address the need to develop common communication circuits, interoperable equipments, standardized operating procedures and so on. To this agenda could be added the development of proposals for mutual assistance such as industrial training for tradesmen.

Two other tasks for a military staff committee would be of a slightly different nature. The first would be a preliminary investigation and report on the possibility of developing European peacekeeping forces. The second would be a similar investigation into the possibility of developing what I might term Conflict Control Measures. Such measures would be the next logical step in the sequence that began with the Confidence Building Measures in the Final Act, and developed into the Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Vienna Document. Conflict Control Measures would, in particular, be an advance on the mechanism in the Vienna Document for consultation and

cooperation in the event of unusual military activities or hazardous incidents of a military nature. Again, the Yugoslav experience has shown that these existing measures need to be developed further if the CSCE is to be more effective in dealing with conflicts. However, the mere act of investigating the potential for additional measures in a permanent staff mechanism would contribute to the development of a system of cooperative security.

Of course, further work on CSBMs proceeds in Vienna and it is generally acknowledged that this will be carried forward as a result of the Helsinki review next year. What I am suggesting here, however, is a further step in the institutionalization process through the introduction of a CSCE military staff committee system. In papers presented at the Brookings Institute in Washington and to the Canadian Anciens of the NATO Defence College, I have recommended that NATO develop its Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS) by inviting all CSCE signatories to join in addressing an agenda of non-military subjects. Here I am suggesting what might turn out to be a parallel structure and membership but with a military agenda. This agenda would also differ from that for the development of CSBMs because of the task of drawing up common staff plans and recommendations.

I would like to summarize these recommendations in case some may think the suggested transition from the military doctrine seminars is too ambitious and abrupt.

The proposal consists of four steps.

Step 1: Develop an agenda of topics that might be addressed in subsequent steps. The agenda could have three items at the outset:

a. Cooperation in search and rescue;

b. Cooperation in emergency response;

c. Mutual assistance in training.

Step 2: a. Draw up a report on possibilities for a European peacekeeping force;

     b. Draw up a list of possible Conflict Control Measures.

Step 3: Prepare staff planning papers for agenda items agreed after steps 1 and 2.

Step 4: Negotiate/implement step 3.

The fourth role for security institutions is the maintenance of a continent-wide balance of power so that no one state could aspire to a hegemonic position. This of course is the essence of NATO. The only other grouping of states which might be able to take on that task with credibility is the Western European Union, or a successor military conglomerate, that was the *de facto* (or *de jure*) military arm of a European political union. As with earlier comments about military deterrence, it will be a very long time before the CSCE could have credibility in this role -- a reliable system of cooperative security would likely come first.

The last two roles are of a somewhat different character but they bear inclusion here because of their very real importance in the new Europe. The first is the security dimension of mass movements of peoples from any direction arising for any reason. We have seen some such events but they have been of a limited nature so far. The possibility of much greater challenges of this kind will have to be addressed.

The military option is clearly the last way in which any state would wish to deal with migrations of peoples. The primary option, of course, must be dialogue between states and, to the extent necessary or to the extent it can be structured, dialogue with the substate organizations represented within the migrations. Either way, political cooperation is the key. This is another dimension of cooperative security. The principles for cooperation in this respect are already found in the original Final Act of Helsinki but subsequent declarations from review conferences and other meetings amplify the relevant provisions.

This problem is pan-European (actually global) in nature, and, of the organizations considered here, the CSCE is clearly the prime forum for discussion and action. When it comes to operational activities, the CSCE has already demonstrated its capability to mandate appropriate programmes to other bodies, if necessary.

The final role to be considered is the ability to respond to emergencies that may arise within any one country in Europe, within international sub-regions of Europe and, ideally, as in the situation in the Gulf, to provide a European response to events happening anywhere on the globe. Infrastructure and organization are obviously key factors, and internationally, they are found primarily, but not exclusively, in military structures. NATO's capabilities in this regard are excellent, but its charter constrains it to clearly defined situations within a clearly defined area. The Western European Union is not similarly constrained territorially but as presently constructed, it is doubtful that it could respond in its own right as it would be unclear to whom it might be responsible other than the individual nations that contribute forces. In the future however, should the WEU become in some fashion or other an agent of the European Community, or perhaps even an arm of a European union, it might be available for these purposes. At this time, however, there is no reason why it could not also act on a remit from the CSCE. And finally I would remind you of my earlier remarks about tasking a CSCE military staff committee to develop agreed plans to deal with emergencies.

Conclusion

When one looks over the present European scene it is inescapable that an as yet unclear pan-European security structure is evolving. Although the process began with the CSCE in 1973, it has only become apparent since the revolutions of late 1989. At the end of 1991, there are standing arrangements for pan-European CFE verification and CSBM implementation, institutions within the CSCE, special membership arrangements for some countries not full members of the EC, new security functions for the EC, a re-awakened WEU and a NATO reaching out for joint activities with non-members.

What of the future? NATO envisages a system of interlocking organizations, presumably based on 1991 models. This may turn out to be the shape of the future, but perhaps not. I suspect the WEU will either lapse back into its former somnolence or, more likely, evolve as a military dimension of some sort of new and developing European political community. Either way, it cannot have any meaningful non-military function on its own. NATO's concept of its new place was revealed in Rome. Here one finds a programmed outreach to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (but without membership or security guarantee), an emphasis on linkages and a papering over of the relationship between NATO and the WEU.

The Helsinki Review Meeting of the CSCE should clarify some of these questions but certainly not all of them. It seems to me that none of these organizations will continue as we now know them; some will adapt, and it is even possible that, like the Warsaw Treaty Organization, one or more may disappear altogether.

Appendix B

SCENARIOS FOR MEETING THE SECURITY NEEDS
AND CONCERNS OF SIGNATORIES

by

Karl E. Birnbaum

What we have been asked to do in this session is to sketch a set of developments that would meet security concerns and security needs of CSCE signatory states. This assignment raises a host of questions of which I shall mention just a few to indicate the complexity of our subject. They relate to key concepts in the rubric, first and foremost security.

Security -- for whom: states, nations, individuals? Against what kind of threats: external aggression, domestic turmoil, the spill-over of instabilities from adjacent territories, environmental destruction?

Secondly, there are the terms concerns and needs. How do we distinguish between and assess them? Concerns are usually -- but not always -- articulated in pronouncements of government officials and other elite groups and thus contain an element of subjectivity on the part of those giving expression to them. Needs suggest something more objective, irrefutable. Concerns may be justified but they may also be unjustified or at least exaggerated. Needs on the other hand are usually associated with fundamentals, involving existential interests and ultimately the survival of nations, communities and individuals. But can such needs be ascertained in an authoritative fashion acceptable to all involved?

Finally there is the term "the signatories" in the title of this session. They are the representatives of states participating in the CSCE. But can we limit our analysis to the views of governments? Clearly not, for this would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the CSCE itself. While its documents reflect the perceptions and assessments of governmental elites, one of the innovative features of the CSCE process has been the claim that it is not only concerned with the preoccupations of governments but also with those of societies and of individuals. It is this societal and human dimension of the CSCE

process that introduced an element of dynamic change into the rigidly frozen political landscape of the 1970s and 1980s, and it can be argued that it helped those popular forces in Eastern Europe that toppled communist governments by the largely peaceful revolutions in 1989. But the societal and human dimension of the CSCE remains crucial in the totally transformed Europe of the 1990s with its new challenges and uncertainties.

I am not raising these complexities and ambiguities in order to dodge my assignment; I intend to deal with them in a pragmatic fashion, and some replies to the questions we have been asked to address are in fact inherent in these initial observations.

In the new environment of European and global politics security must clearly be conceived in broad terms, including protection not only against external aggression but also against domestic oppression and other ways of depriving individuals and groups of their life chances. With regard to the distinction between security concerns and security needs, the pragmatic solution I have chosen is to ignore definitional and epistemological problems and to deal with concrete issues in terms of an admittedly intuitive assessment of different degrees of urgency. Let me therefore try to list a number of major security issues and challenges that confront both governments and their constituencies, and to suggest ways to deal with them constructively by utilizing the potential of the CSCE, where appropriate.

The first and overriding challenge is to handle and eventually solve the problems deriving from prevailing unequal security conditions in different parts of Europe. While lip-service has repeatedly been paid to the principle of "equal security" in international agreements and arms control negotiations, the reality of security conditions in Europe has long been characterized by inequality. This remains so even after the revolutionary upheavals of recent years. What distinguishes the situation to-day from the one prevailing prior to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the fact that conditions of potentially severe insecurity and conflict in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are no longer contained by repression but have come out into the open. They are therefore of more immediate concern not only to the governments and peoples of those

regions but also to others, including in particular West Europeans, who have grown accustomed to enjoying a far greater measure of security than their less fortunate brethren in the East from whom they are no longer insulated by the East-West divide. People in the East face differing but very tangible degrees of suffering resulting from economic deprivation, personal humiliation, environmental destruction, domestic disorder and sometimes outright violence. Governments and citizens of the West on the other hand are mainly concerned with worrying scenarios of a different kind, such as the potentially disruptive repercussions of massive migratory movements into their countries and the conceivably catastrophic consequences of disintegration and instability in the former USSR, including the frightening prospect of proliferating Soviet nuclear arsenals.

From this overriding challenge -- the need to do something about the security gap between East and West in Europe -- one can deduce a number of specific tasks that must be attended to. For the sake of brevity I shall enumerate them in short-hand fashion:

- There is an obvious need to keep up the momentum in the recent trend toward demilitarizing international politics in Europe by arms control agreements and reciprocated unilateral arms limitations.

- The war between Serbia and Croatia and the existence of similar explosive tensions in other parts of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe suggest the urgency of preventive measures to contain the outbreak or spill-over of large-scale violence but also the difficulties involved.

- Positive counterparts to preventive, conflict-containing measures are efforts to promote community-building in strife-ridden areas. They involve long-term strategies aimed at resolving rather than containing conflicts and creating conditions that would prevent the occurrence of violence.

- Finally, despite the fundamentally transformed and improved security situation in Europe, we cannot totally disregard the danger of external

aggression, both within Europe and from outside Europe. Hence precautionary arrangements to contain this danger must also be part of efforts to safeguard European security.

To what extent can the existing, emerging or potential machinery of the CSCE help to meet these security requirements?

The major challenge of diminishing and eventually overcoming the inequality in welfare and security conditions between different parts of Europe involves in the first place the transfer of substantial financial assets to the East, not only or primarily of technical skills and know-how -- there are indeed indications of technical "overassistance" in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it involves improving the export chances of East European countries on Western markets to encourage direct Western investments in East European economies, safeguarding the rule of law, and last but not least the patient build-up of democratic institutions and practices. The CSCE may help to promote these fundamental processes of societal transformation by providing frameworks for cooperation and by coordinating efforts in a great variety of fields. But the main burdens of the work involved must be carried by societal forces in the liberated countries, by individual governments in East and West and by two intergovernmental organizations that are especially well equipped for the jobs at hand: the European Community and the Council of Europe.

The role of the CSCE could well be a different and more conspicuous one with regard to some of the specific tasks enumerated before. This is particularly true of exertions to keep up the momentum in the trend toward demilitarizing international politics in Europe. In the new European security environment the CFE and CSBM negotiations will have to be adapted to new conditions and requirements. But their continuation -- probably in a joint forum -- is essential not only to ensure the implementation of existing and forthcoming arms control agreements but also -- and perhaps more importantly -- to provide crucial incentives and reassurances of unilateral reciprocated arms cuts. In view of its comprehensive membership the CSCE

is an appropriate organ -- although surely not the only one -- for further efforts along these lines.

The CSCE may also be called upon to develop the machinery for insulating trouble spots in Europe and possibly also for containing the outbreak and/or spread of armed violence within disintegrating entities like Yugoslavia and the USSR or across existing national boundaries. The proposal submitted by Poland to the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials on 22 October 1991 for creating a CSCE monitoring and peacekeeping force, points in this direction. But the problems encountered in current efforts to install a UN peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia indicates the magnitude of the obstacles that would have to be overcome to create efficient CSCE instruments for peacekeeping and peacemaking purposes.

These difficulties to contain or resolve conflicts once armed violence has occurred on a large scale lends added significance to peace building efforts, which in turn would seem to depend crucially on community building within and across national and ethnic boundaries. Exposure and friction between individuals and groups with different traditions, outlooks and interests are inevitable concomitants of more freedom, openness, contact and cooperation in the new Europe of the 1990s. If these opportunities -- welcomed by so many -- are to be conducive to community building rather than tension and hostility, they will have to be associated with an enhanced capacity for mutual tolerance and empathy. These desirable attitudes, however, can neither be decreed nor produced quickly. They presuppose a lengthy learning process that broadens horizons and involves a gradually increasing sense of mutual understanding. The CSCE could play a significant role in this crucial endeavour, particularly, if its activities were effectively combined with those of other organs. The programmes and practices of the Council of Europe are of obvious relevance in this context. But these efforts must also involve and be integrated with emerging regional and local initiatives on the level of social movements and citizens groups in different parts of Europe. Finally, with regard to the residual but continuing need to contain the dangers of external aggression, the CSCE is likely to play a marginal role at best and only in relation to problems arising within Europe. Current debates and

presently foreseeable contingencies suggest that the main burden of containing the dangers of eternal aggression, particularly from outside Europe, will have to be carried by Western security organizations: a transformed NATO, the WEU and possibly the EC, if it were to be equipped with distinct security functions. What seems to be at issue is how these burdens are to be distributed between the three institutions; but there is hardly a tangible prospect for transferring them to a new institution.

The relevance of the CSCE for European security has always been related to its political and societal rather than military aspects. This is likely to remain so in the future as well. But since future security requirements in Europe can be expected to be focussed on these non-military dimensions the potential of the CSCE for meeting the concerns and needs of signatories could grow significantly, provided its working procedures will be adapted to the requirements of changed circumstances.

Two innovations in particular, implying departures from traditional CSCE practices, would seem to be overdue:

- introducing the right to intervene into the domestic affairs of participating states under certain specified conditions; and

- modifying the consensus rule to allow at least the initiation of CSCE-activities aimed at promoting the implementation of agreed CSCE commitments by less stringent decision making procedures than the consensus.

Both developments are inherent in recent CSCE decisions. What I have in mind is the introduction of new CSCE mechanisms which were decided upon at the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council in June and at the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in September-October 1991. Their activation does not require a consensus of all participating states and at least the latter also envisions a measure of intrusion into "domestic affairs". These and even more far-reaching

innovations have been forcefully advocated by prominent politicians in East and West, notably the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev and Germany's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In view of the situation in Yugoslavia and the potential risk of escalating conflicts on the territory of the former USSR, a potential convergence of opinion among participating states on these issues might well be formalized in the near future.

Appendix C

A 'ZONE OF CIVILITY' IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS?
THE CSCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

by

K. J. Holsti

Since the end of the Napoleonic wars, Europeans have been trying to build international orders that would bring forms of international governance and more civility to their mutual relations. Following the medieval centuries when hierarchy characterized the conduct of political life, anarchy, sovereign equality, and political fragmentation became the principles upon which Europe (and subsequently the rest of the world) was organized. The greatest challenge to European statesmen has always been to moderate the most significant consequences of anarchy, namely incessant warfare among states.

The Concert of Europe developed management practices and sets of norms that worked reasonably well to bring more civility to the mutual relations of its members.[1] These arrangements, however, ultimately failed to prevent the Great War. The next two great order-building exercises, in 1919 and 1945, devised universal governance institutions and norms, some of which were based on nineteenth century European practice. But they were systematically violated or abused by twentieth century totalitarian dictatorships, all of whom developed their own visions for reorganizing the world. The "new orders" promoted by the Nazis, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union were to be based on anti-Westphalian principles, including hierarchical organization based on race, culture, or class, abrogation of the principle of sovereign equality of states, legitimation of the use of armed force by the superiors against recalcitrant or rebellious inferiors (the Brezhnev doctrine), and in the case of the Nazis and Imperial Japanese, the glorification of war as a means of building and maintaining the "new orders." World War II destroyed these visions of international order and reaffirmed the Westphalian principles of sovereign

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[1]For an analysis of the operation of the Concert, see K. J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: The Politics of Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century Europe," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Governance Without Government*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

equality, non-use or threat of force, consultations, reciprocity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes -- all key norms promoting civility between nations.

Today, following the collapse of the socialist world, there is an academic and diplomatic industry of speculation about and prescriptions for building a Europe that would integrate all of its parts, including all components of the former Soviet Union, into a new area of civility. Within states, the ideological bases of the new order are democracy, the rule of law, guarantees for human rights, protection of minorities, and economies based on market principles. In relations between states, the norms of civility are enunciated in the Helsinki Final Act and some of its follow-up agreements, especially the Charter of Paris (1990).

A new order in Europe requires more than general principles and codes of conduct. There must also be a new "security architecture," defined as obligations, roles, and commitments of capabilities that will provide safety for all members of the European "house." And there must be procedures and institutions for resolving conflicts short of violence, and should those fail, to provide mechanisms for controlling and containing crises and wars.

The tasks of this essay are to examine critically the theories of conflict prevention and resolution in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. But to assess the possibilities for the CSCE, we must first inquire into the theoretical assumptions underlying all conflict resolution procedures and institutions, evaluate briefly the historical record of international conflict resolution, and estimate in what ways conflict resolution theories and the assumptions on which they are based are relevant to the types of issues that are likely to generate conflict in the new Europe. The discussion concludes with an assessment of prospects for building an effective conflict prevention and resolution regime through the CSCE process.

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Assumptions of Conflict Resolution Theory

The idea that the international community has a responsibility for managing and resolving inter-state conflicts was first enunciated in the 1815 settlements, but not formally institutionalized until 1919 in articles 10 through 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. Those procedures and obligations were based on certain nineteenth century practices of the Concert of Europe as well as on prescriptions developed in nineteenth century liberal thought. The most explicit theory of conflict prevention and resolution was developed by Woodrow Wilson in his proposals for a League of Nations. Many of his ideas survived to become the intellectual foundations of the UN Charter and the CSCE Final Act. Contemporary conflict resolution theory, reflecting Wilson's formulas, contains the following assumptions:

1.   the essential actors in international conflicts are states; it is therefore states (through their governments), whose behaviour must be modified in order to resolve international conflicts;

2.   international conflicts are, by definition, conflicts of interest between states;

3.   the threat or use of armed force is an illegitimate means of changing the status, rights, or possessions of states, except in the case of self-defence or community coercion (international sanctions);

4.   in most cases, states employ armed force because they fail to understand adequately each other's points of view or vital interests;[2]

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[2]Jeremy Bentham, for example, argued that "between the interests of nations there is nowhere any real conflict; if they appear repugnant anywhere it is only in proportion as they are misunderstood." Quoted in F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963, p. 83. The idea that international conflicts are caused by misunderstanding has a long pedigree and underlies much of the conflict resolution machinery in the League of Nations and United Nations.

5. international procedures and institutions can be constructed to prevent or vastly reduce the probabilities of using force;

6. internationally sponsored conflict resolution procedures such as conciliation and mediation can put an end to armed combat and may be essential for forging lasting settlements to conflicts.

Underlying these assumptions of Wilsonian liberalism and modern conflict resolution theory is a single meta-proposition about the nature of international society: peace between states is the normal condition of the international system, while conflict and war are deviations from the norm of inter-state civility. Despite the absence of an overriding authority that can legitimately compel states to order their relations peacefully, there is an underlying harmony between societies that, unless distorted by governments, will lead to peace. Thus, armed combat, like a disease, is a manifestation of some sort of faulty decision making or pathological condition within governments and foreign policy elites, usually hypothesized as a high degree of misunderstanding, poor information and misperceptions, or the atavistic drives of despots and military regimes. The Wilsonian image of world politics is distinctly not analogous to a Hobbesian state of nature, which is characterized by a perpetual struggle for power and domination. Democratization, self-determination, the enunciation of norms and covenants, and increased communications between societies -- through, for example, multilateral diplomacy and increased trade -- should prevent conflicts from arising in the first place. But should militarist, despotic, and/or decision making distortions nevertheless remain, the elaboration of norms against the use of force, combined with arms control and disarmament measures and the institutionalization of conflict resolution procedures, should suffice to reduce significantly the incidence of wars and international violence.

The United Nations and the Resolution of Conflicts: The Record

We have now a lengthy history of attempts by the international community to constrain the use of force and to resolve international conflicts by peaceful means. There is thus an empirical foundation for assessing the assumptions and prescriptions of the Wilsonian-liberal theory of conflict prevention and resolution. Our discussion will focus on the record that deals with conflicts involving the threat or use of armed force, thus excluding that narrow range of issues where international judicial institutions have functioned, often successfully.

While academic studies of the League of Nations and the United Nations do not agree entirely on the effectiveness of those institutions in the area of conflict resolution[3] -- primarily because they use different research methods, cases, and measures of success -- there is today sufficient evidence to make some evaluations of conflict prevention and resolution processes and institutions.

The United Nations, for example, encourages the use of, or provides facilities for: resolutions, the Secretary-General's interposition, fact-finding commissions, mediation, conciliation, adjudication, peacekeeping operations, and various forms of coercion. All have been used with varying degrees of success. The United Nations was instrumental in providing facilities and services for the process of de-colonization; many potential "wars of national liberation" were avoided because of these services. The process of state-creation, constitution-drafting, and establishing independence in the Third World was vastly aided by the international community. Indeed, as Robert Jackson has pointed out,

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[3]For evaluations based on statistics of cases, see Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*. 2 vols., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942, Vol. 2, pp. 1429-1431; Ernst Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," *International Organization*, Vol. 37, Spring, 1983, pp. 189-256; Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, "International Crises 1945-1975: The UN Dimension," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, March 1984, pp. 45-68; K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 6th ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ., Prentice-Hall, 1992, chap. 14.

many of the present states would not exist today except for the actions of the United Nations and other international bodies.[4]

In contrast, those international conflicts that came under the rubric of the Cold War were for the most part impervious to multilateral conflict resolution procedures. To the extent that they were resolved, crises, force, deterrence, and occasional bilateral and multilateral negotiations that explicitly excluded the UN, were the norm. The UN played no role in most of the Cold War crises and today its functions in the Middle East peace process are only symbolic. Some types of conflict, then, appear beyond the reach of the kinds of interventions and services available in contemporary international conflict resolution institutions.

Between de-colonization and Cold War issues, there is a large domain of potential or actual armed conflicts that have arisen primarily in the Third World, and which have been placed on the agenda of the United Nations or various regional organizations. The record here is mixed; peacekeeping operations have often helped terminate armed combat, but the underlying issues of the conflicts have not been resolved through an authoritative and legitimate settlement. The agendas of the United Nations and regional organizations remain littered with conflicts that have had been "de-bellicized" through UN actions, but that remain unresolved: Kashmir, Cyprus, Morocco-Polisario, Afghanistan, Israel and its neighbours, and the like.

This record should lead us to question some of the assumptions of Wilsonian liberalism and its derivative conflict resolution theory. For example, much of the armed violence in the Third World has not been driven by "conflicts of interest" of states. It has involved, rather, aspiration for statehood, driven by "peoples," the real or imagined persecution of minorities within states, and secessionist groups, appealing their case under the doctrine of self-determination. How can international organizations "resolve" (meaning

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[4]Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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to fashion an authoritative and legitimate settlement) ancient ethnic/religious/language animosities, the drive for self and group identification, and the often spontaneous outbursts of communalism? The model of international conflict built into the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter, as well as most regional organizations, is a model of only one type of international conflict: the state versus state conflict over territory, boundaries, control of strategic space, and the like. But this does not cover the full range of possibilities. Since 1945, in fact, most international conflicts have begun with armed violence between state authorities and ideological/ethnic/religious/language groups seeking statehood, autonomy, or protection against persecution within their states.[5] International peacekeeping forces can put an end to fighting (provided the state party to the conflict consents to their presence), but they cannot resolve these kinds of conflicts. One is hard-pressed to come up with more than a couple of ethnically-based conflicts that resulted in an authoritative settlement through international conflict resolution techniques. Namibia may be a marginal exception rather than typical.

If international organizations have had only a mixed record in conflict resolution, another reason is that they have only primitive monitoring, early-warning, or early intervention capabilities.[6] In almost all instances (except in the area of de-colonization), the United Nations has acted only after armed combat has begun. Although member states and the Secretary-General can put on the agenda any item that is a "threat to the peace," in fact they have been loathe to do so, defining instead a "threat" only after the fighting has already started. Today the Secretary-General is developing a monitoring and early-warning capability in the Secretariat (OCRI), but as yet it has not been used in a preventative or preemptory fashion to head off impending armed conflict. The UN, for example, stood immobilized during the two weeks prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, as

[5]K. J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, chap. 12; Jean-Christophe Rufin, "Minorités, nationalités, États," *Politique Étrangère*, No. 3, Automne 1991, pp. 629-630.

[6]Tapio Kanninen, "Frameworks for the Monitoring of Emergent or Ongoing Conflicts," Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association, London, April 1989.

it did in the summer of 1991 when Yugoslavia was beginning to collapse under the weight of ethnic separatism. In both cases, there was no dearth of early warnings.

The United Nations experience demonstrates that there are some flaws in the theory of conflict resolution, the most serious of which is the assumptions about state actors, the nature and sources of international conflicts in the current age, and the presumption (or practice) that no action can or should be taken until the conflict has reached the stage of large-scale organized violence.

International Conflict in the European Context: The Threats

Any effective security, conflict prevention, or conflict resolution regime must address the kinds of issues and threats that it is likely to confront. Conflict resolution procedures, for example, must be linked to the socio-economic-political conditions that generate armed conflicts. Are the old formulas and procedures of mediation, arbitration, and non-interference in countries' internal affairs appropriate in the new European context? The results of the CSCE conference on conflict resolution held in Valletta in February 1991 suggest they are not. The formulas developed there, as we will see below, are relevant only to a narrow range of international conflicts, and particularly to those that are least likely to be a threat to peace. In order to assess the conflict resolution possibilities of the CSCE, we must first speculate on the kinds of actors and issues that are likely to raise difficulties in the future Europe. What will be the "threats to peace" in future?

The process of nation-state creation that began with the Greek war of liberation in the 1820s has not yet run its course in Europe. Indeed, as one publication has termed the rise of ethnic-based armed conflicts, particularly in the Balkans and the Soviet Union, ethnicity has become the "AIDS of international politics."[7] The list of actual and potential

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[7]*The Economist*, July 6, 1991, pp. 13-14.

armed conflicts is long and distressing. Stephen Van Evera has found that today there are in Europe nine potential border disputes and at least thirteen significant ethnic groups that may either seek independence or be claimed by others.[8] The figures do not include Yugoslavia. The collapse of the Soviet Union presents even a greater potential for armed conflict. Van Evera notes that of the Soviet Union's 262 million population, there are 104 nationalities. 24 percent (64 million) live outside of their home republics. Another 25 million (9 percent) are members of smaller nationalities without home republics; they would be minorities wherever they live. In the successor states of the Soviet Union, there are 89 small minorities.

The Yugoslav federal experiment has collapsed and the potential for irredentist claims throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans remains high. Whatever the ultimate shape of a federation of former Soviet republics, irredentist claims, and national minority insecurity are already on the horizon. The prospects that some of these problems will become internationalized has to be taken seriously. Numerous scenarios come to mind. Macedonia might become an arena of competing territorial claims or irredentist movements in which Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia become entangled. Would Romania remain indifferent to a Russian armed intervention into Moldava to protect the Russian-Ukranian minority there? What of the potential for irredentism relating to Albania? Forty-four percent of the Albanians live outside of Albania, most in the immediately adjacent areas of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro.[9] Who would protect the Russian minorities in the Baltic states if they feel beleaguered? Or the South Ossetians, are already being persecuted in Georgia? The list of potential ethnically-based armed conflicts emerging from the collapse of the Stalinist empire and Yugoslavia is lengthy.

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[8]Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, Winter 1990/91, pp. 48–49.

[9]Paul Landvai, "Tensions nationales et menace sur la sécurité dans les Balkans," *Politique Étrangère*, No. 6, Automne 1991, p. 646.

The sources of future conflict do not stop with ethnicity. Speculating on the growing agenda of difficulties, Joan DeBardeleben has written:

> The floodgates of regional unrest have been thrown open by the final collapse of communist power. The war of sovereignties has already stoked the fires of regional violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Georgia, and elsewhere. And regional unemployment and competition for scarce resources have already produced violent clashes in parts of Central Asia. But even larger problems loom if accommodation is not found between the newly-emergent states. Massive population movements, establishment of new regional dictators, strife in border and mixed-population regions, further dramatic declines in economic well-being...and regional wars are all possible consequences of failed accommodation.[10]

Optimism and simplistic rejoicing over the demise of communism are certainly understandable, but the terribly painful adjustments to democracy and capitalism in the former communist states have created conditions that could lead to policies of despair. So far, the construction of new societies based on Western liberal principles has been accompanied by the collapse of local cultural institutions, a flood of western pornography to East Europe, high unemployment, dramatic increased in crime, predatory practices of primitive capitalists, increasing class cleavages, and plenty of ethnic minorities to act as scapegoats for all of these and many other problems. We must recall that many of the former communist states have histories of "glory and greatness." Once they were kingdoms and empires vastly more extensive and politically, culturally, and militarily more commanding than they are today. Appeals to national greatness, regeneration, and salvation may seduce populations that have suffered during the long transition between socialism and liberalism. In most of the former socialist countries there are nationalist, neo-fascist, and racist demagogues waiting in the wings. Chauvinist policies usually represent threats to minorities and to neighbours whose territories once constituted part of the old kingdoms and empires. One can certainly hope that the liberal agenda for

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[10]Joan DeBardeleben, "Madly Off in All Directions: What to Make of the Old USSR's Cavalcade of National Sovereignties," *Peace&Security*, Vol. 6, Winter 1991/92, p. 4.

reconstruction will work, but since it is a long-run strategy at best, we have to anticipate that in the short-run there will be significant problems.

These and many other scenarios are possibilities, but it is impossible to rate them in terms of probabilities. Pessimistic scenarios can even be imagined in Western Europe. Some have argued that the massive Soviet threat provided an important prop of Western European unity in the four decades of the Cold War. In its absence, the range of domestic and foreign policy interests will widen, and one could anticipate greater abrasiveness in the mutual relations of the Western European countries. A return to the power politics reminiscent of the early 1900s or the 1930s[11] is a possibility, although at the time of writing it seems remote. The habits of democracy and civility are now deeply rooted in Western Europe, and all the states there are "strong" in the sense that their borders have established legitimacy, secession movements have been placated for the most part through local autonomy, and arms racing against imagined threats is nowhere to be seen.

My prognostication is that the new Europe, whatever its formal shape, will have two zones: there will be the vast western European-Scandinavian zone of peaceful relations, where conflicts of state interest revolving around commercial and environmental problems will wax and wane, where the essential actors will be states and commercial/environmental groups, but where the probabilities of armed conflict are extremely low. It is in this zone that the traditional processes of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, occasional mediation, and legal procedures can resolve most conflicts peacefully. Over time, this zone will likely expand to include the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and Hungary. In the case of the latter three, the governments have already established special mechanisms to defuse any crisis emerging from ethnicity or other problems generated by reconstruction.[12]

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[11]Cf., John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.

[12]Vaclav Havel, "Address to the NATO Council, 21 March 1991," in *Nato Review*, Vol. 39, April 1991, pp. 31-35.

The second zone includes the successor states of the Soviet Union, and the Balkans. Ethnic/religious/language groups, perhaps overlaid with ideological cleavages, will drive the conflicts, not states. "Weak" states[13] -- not in the military sense, but weak because they are new, inexperienced and/or lack effective control over their populations, and particularly over national minorities -- may be unable to prevent armed conflicts among their citizens or the meddling of neighbour states that become involved with irredentist groups. Judging from the UN experience, it is precisely these kinds of actors/issues that are not amenable to many of the traditional conflict resolution procedures being developed by the CSCE. They may require new initiatives and techniques, including some that circumvent sovereignty and non-interference principles.

But before we can estimate the CSCE potential to handle the looming problems of the future in the second zone, we need to assess critically what, exactly, present institutions and procedures are designed to accomplish. A review of narrowly-defined conflict resolving procedures, such as those proposed at Valletta, may not do justice to the potential of the CSCE and other European institutions. In fact, the Europeans, joined by North America, have developed a variety of approaches to building peace and civility between states. These are based on Wilsonian liberalism, expectations about the political consequences of free market economies, and more traditional forms of armed conflict prevention through arms control and military deterrence.

Conflict Prevention, Control, and Deterrence in Europe

The construction of a new security regime for Europe involves much more than redeploying the armed forces of NATO or setting up mediation facilities for states engaged in a potentially lethal conflict. The CSCE incorporates a theory of conflict prevention, as well as some modalities for conflict resolution. Other European institutions

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[13]The concept of weak and strong states is developed in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton, Sussex, The Harvester Press, Ltd., 1983, pp. 132-34.

provide a capacity for deterrence, economic coercion, and/or collective diplomacy. The discussion examines four distinct types of activity presently available in the numerous fora and institutions of Europe:

1. conflict prevention: altering or undermining the kinds of social/economic/political conditions within and between states that are likely to generate armed conflicts;

2. conflict control: limiting and/or reducing the means of pursuing or defending objectives through armed force;

3. deterrence and coercion: raising the costs of military action when a conflict develops;

4. conflict resolution: providing procedures and/or institutions that help conflict parties to achieve formal settlements to disputes; or, at a minimum, that terminate armed hostilities.

Montesquieu was among the first to argue that republics, in contrast to despotisms, enjoy the pleasures of peace above all. His theme was further developed by Kant, Bentham, and many mid-nineteenth century British theorists who located the sources of wars in types of regimes, particularly in "feudal" or military governments. Woodrow Wilson's theories of international politics were strongly rooted in the British liberal tradition and in American constitutional theory. The foundation of peace, he reasoned, lay in the interests of the common man and in international commerce. For a variety of reasons, democracies are not expansionist, and they keep their covenants. The essential condition for peace between states, then, is democracy within states. Democracy includes not just republican institutions, but also the advancement and protection of basic individual and national minority rights.

The peace-through-democracy theory is implied in many of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and is explicitly enunciated in the Charter of Paris in which the signatories "undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government in our nations".[14] The observance and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the document goes on to argue, are "the foundations of freedom, justice, and peace." While the CSCE review conferences of the 1970s and 1980s were the scene of numerous Western attacks on the socialist states' human rights records, the Soviet and allied delegations constantly replied that the "democratic theory of peace" built into the CSCE is basically a formula for subversion. To a certain extent they were correct. But the justification for such "subversion" was not just to support individual victims of human rights abuses; it was also belief in the proposition that in the long run you cannot construct peace between states if totalitarian regimes and practices prevail in some of them.

The preventive approach to peace contained in the CSCE Final Act and the Charter of Paris also incorporates the traditional liberal hypothesis that relates increased communication, including trade, with civility. These documents commit member states to expand their mutual commercial, humanitarian, and social contacts, reflecting the expectation that the more people know of each other, the more they will empathize, understand, and sympathize with their neighbours.[15] Communications erode misunderstandings, stereotypes, and the suspicions that drive international conflicts.

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[14]Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, Paris, CSCE, 1990.

[15]The beneficial influence of increased communication on conflict remains contested in the empirical literature. It is an article of faith in liberal theories of international relations that inter-societal communications decrease nationalism and bellicosity, and increase mutual understanding and empathy. The significant theoretical work of Karl Deutsch on international integration started with this assumption, but the empirical work did not support it sufficiently to confer on it the status of a valid generalization. The increase in particularism and political fragmentation in Canada, Spain (the Basques), Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere suggest that increased communications might expand communal sentiments at the expense of loyalties or emotional ties to larger political units. See Karl Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, and for a review of his work, Arend Lijphart, "Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm of International Relations," in Richard L. Merritt and Bruce Russett, eds., *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honour of Karl W. Deutsch*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 233-251.

The ideology of the free market was not explicitly raised as a path to peace in the 1970s, but throughout the negotiations of the Final Act and in subsequent review conferences the NATO and NNA (Neutral and Non-aligned) delegations often expressed the hope that commercial practices could forge bonds that would reduce animosities and suspicions between the western and socialist bloc states. There was at least an unstated expectation that "the more you become like us economically, the greater the prospects for peaceful relations between us."

During the past four years, European and North American leaders have almost daily enunciated the "peace through free markets" theory. In a recent policy address to the European Democratic Union, for example, British Prime Minister John Major argued that "trade is a peacemaker -- one of the most powerful and persuasive".[16] There is, then, a consensus in western Europe and North America that in the long run democracy and free markets are the essential recipes for preventing international conflicts. These same leaders have emphasized repeatedly that regimes not undertaking the prescribed reforms will not qualify for diplomatic recognition, membership in various European multilateral institutions, or Western economic, technical, and humanitarian assistance.[17]

The CSCE has also emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of national minorities. While the impetus for the development of norms to protect distinct national groups may come more from concern with human rights than with problems of international conflict, there is a link between the two. Certainly anyone with a knowledge of nineteenth and twentieth century European history acknowledges that the insecurities of minorities or their persecution can give rise to diplomatic difficulties and sometimes to armed conflict between states. The 1991 Geneva conference on national minorities

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[16]John Major, "The Challenge of the New Revolution," Address to the European Democratic Union Party Leaders' Conference, Paris, 12 September 1991.

[17]For a detailed examination of the ideological criteria for, types, and donors of aid to the former socialist countries, see Jeanne Kirk Laux, "Reform, Reintegration and Regional Security: The Role of Western Assistance in Overcoming Insecurity in Central and Eastern Europe" Ottawa, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Working Paper* #37, October 1991.

within states made the linkage explicit. It concluded that the development and protection of minority rights are a foundation of peace between states, and went even further to insist that issues concerning those rights "are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair..."[18]

Finally, the CSCE Final Act enunciates a number of standard norms that attempt to limit the use of force in the relations of states. As in the UN Charter, states are prohibited from the threat or use of force, and the alteration of territorial boundaries through armed means is proscribed. Armed intervention, for whatever reason, is prohibited, thus undermining the Brezhnev doctrine and similar rationalizations for hegemonial and coercive policies. Although few would suppose that the enunciation of norms is sufficient to prevent the use of armed intervention or war in all circumstances, the provisions of the Final Act are clearly designed to raise the costs of armed action. These norms are therefore a form of conflict prevention.

The theories of conflict prevention embedded in the CSCE Final Act and subsequent documents are explicit and implicit. Some would argue that they are naive; others that they are, while ideologically inspired, realistic. Structural realists like Kenneth Waltz would argue that creating norms and changing the attributes of states (democratization) will not significantly alter a recurrent outcome of anarchy, namely war.[19] But the empirical evidence lies on the side of the CSCE theory; one of the few empirical generalizations about war that transcend time, place, and personality, is that democracies,

[18]Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva, CSCE, 1991, p. 4.

[19]Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

whatever their proclivities to use force elsewhere, do not war against each other.[20] The "peace through democracy" thesis has significant factual underpinnings.

The idea that peace is constructed through democratization, increased communication and market economies, and the development of norms and conflict prevention and resolution procedures is certainly attractive. The Montesquieu, Kant, Bentham, and Wilson hypotheses have a reasonably solid empirical foundation. Apparently, however, faith in these formulas is not yet adequately rooted to justify the allocation of extensive resources. During the years of the Cold War for example, the United States spent on average 1.5 billion dollars annually to provide for the security of Europe. The means were the traditional ones of forging an alliance and constructing military deterrents. Since the collapse of communism in eastern Europe in 1989, however, it has donated only about one billion dollars (not including commercial and agricultural credits) for the resuscitation of the former socialist states' economies. Most NATO countries, while spending significantly more than the United States, have not contributed to the former communist areas a fraction of the resources they committed to military defence.[21] It appears politically much easier to impose tax burdens to deter a demonstrable military threat than it is to mobilize populations for the lengthy and uncertain tasks of economic reconstruction, democratization, and conflict prevention. Thus, the CSCE norms and conflict prevention theories constitute only long-range strategies, but it is not yet evident that they are paying off in the "zone of conflict" that is in such a high degree of flux today.

[20]Rudolph Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, 1983, pp. 27-71; T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So why Kant Democracies Fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, June 1991, pp. 187-211; Michael W. Doyle, "An International Liberal Community," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking American Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1992, pp. 307-333.

[21]For a detailed examination of sums of aid to the eastern and central European countries, see Laux, "Reform, Reintegration and Regional Security", esp. Appendix III.

The CSCE process has also addressed the means of conducting conflict. Through a series of conferences, including the CFE negotiations, the members negotiated a variety of confidence and security building mechanisms (CSBMS) and arms control measures. Open skies routines, visits by military staffs, prior notification of manoeuvres, and exchanges of information on strategic doctrines are all designed to create military "transparency," thus making intimidating manoeuvres such as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, surprise attacks, and accidental war improbable if not impossible.[22]

The CSBMs and military strategy discussions are designed to address Rousseau's fundamental problem of international relations, the security dilemma. As insurance, states must build military establishments. But in these defensively-motivated acts, they create threat perception in other states, which must then respond with military buildups of their own. In Waltz' cryptic modernization of the Rousseau problematic, "the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened.[23] The CSBMs and strategic doctrine exchanges are designed to remove this last fatal connection; to demonstrate that military force deployments do not necessarily signal malevolent intent. One can have (reduced) armaments and security for all. This is the essential theoretical construct underlying the CSCE's CSBM measures.

In the realm of disarmament (also controlling the means of conflict) the CFE agreement of 1990 incorporates dramatic force reductions, although some types of weapons systems remain outside its parameters. As part of the programme to bring more responsibility to the CSCE in the disarmament area, there are plans to organize further negotiations under its auspices.

In the rapidly blooming literature on security arrangements in the new Europe, few have advocated dismantling NATO. Even with the demise of the Warsaw Treaty

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[22]George Bruce, "The Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures: The Vienna Agreement and Beyond," *Nato Review*, Vol. 39, No. 1, February 1991, pp. 15–20.

[23]Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 64.

Organization in 1991, most observers believe that there will be a necessary role for the Alliance. In part, this is because it automatically commits the United States and Canada to European security affairs. As presently constituted, the CSCE, the EC, and the WEU have no military means of coercion. NATO remains the only organization with a deterrent or coercive force, although today it is by no means clear who is to be deterred from what. As a form of general European insurance, NATO makes sense -- but only to cover a set of contingencies that is not presently on the horizon (the comment refers to Europe, and not to the possible use of NATO forces and installations in military operations outside of the continent). NATO is not an arrangement for all types of contingencies. Its capacity to deal with ethnic violence, secessionist movements, and potential armed conflicts in Europe's peripheries remains to be seen. NATO might play some coercive role in such conflicts, but given the terms of the NATO treaty's Article 5, which permits collective action only in the event of an armed attack on one of the signatories, this would be stretching its mandate considerably.

The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, issued at the November 1991 Council Meeting in Rome, acknowledges the new, more diverse and uncertain strategic environment, including many of the problems arising from ethnicity and political transformations. It does not specify NATO tasks in these situations, but notes that crisis prevention in the peripheries could have a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.[24] Rather than emphasizing deterrence, as in the past, the new Strategic Concept underlines crisis management, political cooperation with the former socialist states, and peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept is long on what NATO hypothetically might do, but short on specifying what it is specifically prepared to do. Reflecting NATO's dilemmas, the NATO Council Declaration expressly urged the CSCE to increase its capabilities in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution.[25] It would seem that NATO

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[24]For the text of the alliance's new strategic concept, see *Nato Review*, Vol. 39, No. 6, December 1991, pp. 25-32. The discussion of crisis prevention is on p. 26.

[25]The text of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation is in *Nato Review*, Vol. 39, No. 6, December 1991, pp. 19-22. The reference on enhancing the capabilities of the CSCE is on p. 21.

is destined in the foreseeable future to be an organization seeking a role. Its relevance to the kinds of issues that will generate armed conflicts in the new Europe seems remote.

The Yugoslav case demonstrates that unlike NATO, the European Community may try to act as an agent and agency of conflict resolution, if not conflict prevention. Unlike the CSCE, the EC has taken a direct role in the Serb-Croatian war, but apparently its actions did not decisively alter the conflict. Individual EC members sought to bring pressure to bear on the situation by recognizing Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states but these acts -- seen as coercion in Belgrade -- have not demonstrably affected the conflict, much less resolved its underlying issues. The EC effort demonstrates, as the United Nations has found, how difficult it is to put a lid on ethnically-inspired violence.

Contemporary Europe is thus characterized by a variety of conflict prevention and conflict control strategies, processes, institutions and capabilities. There is no single organization that is equipped to handle all contingencies. Long-range theories of conflict prevention and order-building around an ideological consensus are included in the CSCE Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and various commitments undertaken with regard to the protection of minorities and human rights. But the evolution of democratic and free market practices in the former socialist states will not result primarily from CSCE efforts. At best, they offer a framework and a set of norms of civility through which more concrete organizations (the G-7, the Council of Europe, the OECD and the like) and processes can take place. The CSCE will continue to expand the CSBM agenda and will eventually take over jurisdiction of the disarmament portfolio, but the deterrent function will remain for the foreseeable future in NATO, while the EC may offer some conflict resolution or coercive capabilities.

If conflict prevention is a long-range strategy with uncertain outcomes, if controls over the means of violence, though marked by considerable success, still have much left to achieve, and if NATO deterrence seems largely irrelevant to the future conflict agenda of Europe, what about conflict resolution strategies, institutions, and processes? Here,

many have argued, is the domain where the CSCE can build up meaningful capabilities for the future.

Conflict Resolution in the CSCE

The Helsinki Final Act outlined no procedures for resolving conflicts between the signatories. They were merely urged to handle their disputes without recourse to the threat or use of force, and to act according to United Nations principles of conduct. The lacuna of CSCE conflict resolution mechanisms was a subject of some discussion in various follow-up and specialist meetings. Conferences on peaceful settlement of disputes in Montreux (1978) and Athens (1984) failed to develop any new institutions or processes. The sixth principle of the Vienna (1986) conference's Concluding Document emphasized the members' continuing commitment to "pursue continuous efforts to examine and elaborate...a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes." More important, the parties accepted in principle the mandatory involvement of a third [CSCE] party "where a dispute cannot be settled by other peaceful means."[26] The Paris summit of November 1990 approved yet another meeting of conflict resolution experts to be held in Malta's capital in January-February 1991. The document that emerged from those negotiations offers almost the sum total of the CSCE's conflict resolution machinery to date.

We need not go into great detail into the procedures of the "Dispute Settlement Mechanism" outlined in the concluding document of the Valletta Conference.[27] The delegates obviously had a very narrow conception of what constitutes a dispute amenable to treatment through the mechanism. Indeed, it is interesting that the preamble of the report (p. 3) emphasizes the conflict prevention focus of the CSCE Final Act: "Full

[26]Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Concluding Document, Vienna, CSCE, 1989, pp. 5-6.

[27]Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta, Malta, CSCE, January-February 1991.

implementation of all CSCE principles and commitments constitutes in itself an essential element in preventing disputes." But what if violations of those principles take place? Or, what if, as in Yugoslavia, conflicts are not between recognized states wielding effective control over the instruments of violence?

The report states that all disputes will be settled on the basis of international law. But how does international law relate to the kinds of ethnic/communal/ideological disputes that are likely to lead to armed contests? There is no answer, except that the framers of the document were aware of the limitations of legalism when they specified that whatever procedures are used, they should be "suited to the nature and characteristics of the particular dispute." The document does not go on to specify, however, the range of procedures that could be developed.

The principle of third party involvement is reiterated, but only in the prescriptive sense "when a dispute cannot be settled by other peaceful means." Any CSCE member may bring to the attention of the CSCE's Committee of Officials a situation that is "of importance to peace, security, or stability among participating states." This *casus foederis* is relatively broad and vague, providing maximum flexibility for CSCE involvement. Unlike the United Nations, there need not be a threat or breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

If the conflict cannot be resolved through bilateral negotiations, any party to the problem can request the establishment of a CSCE "Dispute Settlement Mechanism," which is basically a list of individuals, nominated by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the parties, whose members can then recommend further procedures, including fact-finding, conciliation, mediation, and the like. The parties to the conflict may request substantive advice from the panel, but the report does not specifically designate for the panel a recommendatory authority, much less any coercive capacity. The Mechanism looks suspiciously like the 1899 Hague Conference's Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is neither permanent, a court, nor an arbitral body, and which has seldom been used for any dispute involving significant stakes.

If the concept of a dispute is narrowly conceived in the Valletta report, this is dramatically underlined in Section XII which excludes from the Mechanism's purview any dispute that "raises issues concerning [a state's] territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with respect to the jurisdiction over other areas." Shades of the Hague Conferences, where the participants agreed to adjudication and arbitration in all cases except those involving vital national interests or "national honour!" Almost as a sop to the leftovers, Section XIII encourages, subject to mutual agreement, the parties to the dispute to "accept any comment or advice of the Mechanism as binding, in full or in part."

Looking at the conflicts that have led to war since 1945, it is hard to see a single one that could have been resolved successfully under these kinds of procedures. Even with the concluding admonition (Section XVI) that the parties to a dispute will "implement meaningfully and in good faith the CSCE Dispute Settlement Procedures," there is not much here, and certainly not for the kinds of disputes in the new Europe that are likely to involve or lead to armed violence.

The CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers met in Berlin in June 1991 and approved the report of the Valletta conference.[28] But it is apparent that the Council members saw in the report a triumph of the principle of sovereignty rather than the germ of an effective conflict resolution procedure. They therefore approved a further project whereby the Committee of Senior Officials could meet in the event of any "serious emergency" (not defined) which may arise from "a violation of one of the principles of the Final Act, or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, and stability." An emergency meeting of the Committee can be called with the request of any member(s), seconded by 12 or more others. The Committee may recommend "means" to arrive at a solution, or it can decide to convene a full ministerial (CSCE foreign ministers) meeting. Moving beyond the Final Act's emphasis on consensus, no such meetings can be

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[28]Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Meeting of the CSCE Council, Berlin, CSCE, 19-20 June, 1991.

vetoed by any member, although the consensus rule applies to any substantive decisions or recommendations.

This is the state of progress to date. The "Dispute Settlement Mechanism" is clearly an instrument relevant to a highly circumscribed set of conflict types, namely those with relatively low stakes, where legal principles are involved, and where both parties prefer a settlement to gaining their objectives. More important is the Committee of Officials, which can, under a very flexible *casus foederis*, take up any issue so long as about one-third of the CSCE members agree on a meeting. Virtually nothing is spelled out in terms of mediation, conciliation, or fact-finding procedures, suggesting that ad hoccery will prevail. It has already demonstrated its flexibility by sending a team of observers to Nagorno-Karabakh. But the CSCE Committee of Officials or a meeting of Foreign Ministers will have to be very imaginative to be bypass the consensus principle or to devise conflict resolving processes that go beyond the very limited possibilities found in the Mechanism negotiated at Valletta.

Conflict Resolution Theories and the Conflict Realities of Europe

The discussion in the previous section suggests that there is a misfit between the character of anticipated armed conflicts and the procedures of conflict resolution developed, so far, to deal with them. Several assumptions underlie the conflict mechanism outlined at Valletta, but none adequately reflects the kinds of problems that are likely to arise in the new Europe.

The assumption that states will be the primary conflict actors is unlikely to be the case. The Yugoslav conflict demonstrates that in a situation of collapsing power, secession, and ideological reversals, central authorities may well lose control over the instruments of authority, order, and coercion. The conflict there has been waged by Croatian irregulars, Serbian guerrillas seemingly under no one's control, and by federal armed

forces acting frequently without political direction or control from the centre. Repeated cease-fire breakdowns neatly reflect the situation.

Conflict resolution theory's assumptions of state monopoly over the prosecution of conflicts, and of central control over the instruments of violence are not likely to be accurate in ethnic and communal disputes or civil wars of the future. Already, there is evidence piling up that the old sovereignty-based concept of institutionalized war between states is being eroded if not eclipsed. According to Brian Jenkins "[w]ith continuous, sporadic armed conflict, blurred in time and space, waged on several levels by a large array of national and sub-national forces, warfare in the last quarter of the twentieth century may well come to resemble warfare in the Italian Renaissance or warfare in the early seventeenth century, before the emergence of national armies and more organized warfare."[29] The limited relevance of the Valletta document's "Dispute Settlement Mechanism" to this type of situation hardly needs underlining. Even were the Committee of Officials or the Council of Foreign Ministers seized of a warlike situation, what could its 48 members do? Who would speak authoritatively for a splintering Yugoslavia or for a secessionist movement under diverse leaderships? What kinds of resolutions or recommendations would the numerous, and sometimes unknown, parties to a Yugoslav-type conflict accept?

The Valletta procedures assume that state actors have clearly identified interests to promote or protect (excluding all issues revolving around territory, national defence, or sovereignty) and that these conflicting interests can be adjusted according to principles of international law. But what is at stake in Yugoslavia is the continued existence of an old federal state, versus the birth of new states based on the ideological principle of national self-determination. The interests in play here are those of ethnic and ideological groups (sometimes combined), not those of states. They often concern the birth and death of political organisms that are not co-extensive with presently established territorial

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[29]Brian Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict*, Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, 1983, p. 17.

jurisdictions. One could hardly expect the Croatian community and its various armed formations to agree in advance to accept any recommendations of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism, any more than as an individual I would agree to an life or death outcome when I had not even committed a crime. The Yugoslav situation is likely to be prototypical of the zone of conflict in the new Europe, not exceptional.

The third assumption of the Valletta arrangements is that the primary value of dispute parties is to find some sort of compromise outcome. Unfortunately, as the history of international conflict shows only too repeatedly, the value of achieving objectives usually is much greater than the value of finding a compromise. As most theorists of conflict resolution techniques have pointed out, the primary task of mediators and conciliators is to alter the cost-benefit calculations of the conflict parties. That is, the parties must be convinced that the costs of achieving victory are higher than the costs of compromise.[30] Obviously, if victory is seen to be in the offing, compromise is not going to be a compelling choice. But it takes a special set of circumstances -- most notably a stalemate or some sort of deadline with "dire consequences" attached to it -- to alter the cost-benefit analyses that drive conflicts. While there is any prospect, as seen by any of the conflict parties, of an imminent or even long-range victory, the chances of a mediated resolution to the conflict succeeding are slight. We should note in this regard that the military staying power of ideologically, ethnically, or communally-based armed groups since 1945 has been prodigious. The Vietnamese engaged in armed struggle for more than twenty years; the Eritreans for almost thirty years; the Tamils for more than a decade; the Kashmiris, off and on, since 1947; the Shans in Burma since 1962.[31] The high motivation, the extensive hopes, and the great expectations of ultimate victory load the calculations in favour of pressing on rather than compromising.

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[30]Cf., I. William Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts," in Alexander George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention*, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983, p. 352.

[31]K. J. Holsti, "L'État et L'État de Guerre," *Études Internationales*, Vol. 21, December 1990, p. 713.

In addition to the narrow assumptions underlying the Valletta mechanisms, there is the problem of incompleteness. The CSCE mechanism would come into effect only after one of the conflict parties made an application -- something it is not likely to do while there is any prospect of victory. By itself, the CSCE mechanism cannot initiate actions in the early stages of a conflict. It has no advanced-warning capacity, and no organizational capability for identifying situations that are likely to lead to armed conflict. The fact that the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Foreign Ministers Council had to devise procedures for holding a meeting in an "emergency" situation shows the extent to which the entire thrust of the CSCE conflict resolution strategy is reactive rather than proactive. Many of the lessons of the United Nation's limitations in this regard have not been taken into account in planning for a CSCE role in conflict resolution. There is little to indicate that the CSCE might be seized of a situation before the shooting starts. And once that has taken place, there is little in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, with its legalism and formalism, to suggest that it would be a useful device for putting an end to the bloodshed. As suggested, the Valletta formula is one for disputes between "civilized states," that is, parties that normally maintain good relations and that are quarrelling over issues of relatively minor importance. Ideologically, ethnically, and communally-driven conflicts are seldom of this type.

This raises the question whether the present CSCE theories of conflict resolution offer realistic alternatives to the prosecution of some types of armed conflict. But if we examine the record of international organizations' intervention into armed conflicts we cannot escape the conclusion that in the absence of authoritative modalities for peaceful change, some situations may be better dealt with through military victory than compromise. Conflict resolution theory uses the domestic analogy of conflicts and projects it to the international level. The procedures of the League of Nations and United Nations, as well as many regional organizations, are designed from the means man has developed over the past three hundred years to resolve conflicts within societies. The notions of mediation, fact-finding, arbitration, adjudication, and plebiscites really derive from democratic political theory and practice. They might well remain as standards towards which a world of nation states and many other types of actors might aspire. But

they often will not be relevant to the kinds of situations that prevail in contemporary international politics, and more specifically to the kinds of problems that are going to arise in Europe's "second zone."

United Nations conflict resolution procedures have produced very few authoritative and legitimate settlements, aside from assisting in the process of de-colonization. Rather, they have driven conflicts underground, from where they reemerge in violent combat, sometimes two or three decades later. It is by no means a defence of war in general to acknowledge that sometimes armed combat is a necessary condition for bringing about a lasting and authoritative settlement to a problem, particularly where traditions or modalities for peaceful change do not exist. It is difficult to believe that an Israeli-Egyptian peace could have been fashioned in the absence of the 1973 military stalemate. The Finns fought and lost two wars against the Soviet Union before they learned how to create a manageable relationship with their great power neighbour. Could the Eritrean and domestic Ethiopian crises have been resolved without the military victory of the rebels? These observations do not constitute an advocacy of armed force to resolve domestic and international problems. But we must recognize that just as "suffocating" a conflict through peacekeeping forces, or a bad peace, can be the father of later and more terrible wars, so some wars can be the father of peace. The Gulf War is a telling example of the proposition.

This is not an argument for ceasing to develop better conflict resolving techniques. On the contrary, all the arguments would be in favour of "civilizing" international politics, perhaps someday to the point where virtually all disputes could be resolved through procedures such as those developed in Valletta. But we are far from that point, and the new Europe is going to contain a zone of instability and occasional armed violence. Although the CSCE did formally mandate the EC involvement in Yugoslavia in July 1991, the general ineffectiveness of the CSCE and the EC in the face of the Serb-Croat war shows the serious limitations of presently available institutions and procedures. Very likely there will be the need to develop instrumentalities with substantial coercive capacity. The CSCE is moving slowly in this direction; and while NATO has the capacity, it may not

have the will or legal authority unless the security of one of its members is directly threatened. This leaves the United Nations and the WEU which, as some have already suggested, might offer some sort of peacekeeping force. But as the Yugoslav situation underlines, peacekeeping cannot take place until both or all parties to the armed conflict have reached a point of stalemate or for some reason have altered their preference structure in favour of compromise instead of victory. Short of that situation, the peacekeeping force would necessarily become a war-fighting force. No one appears willing yet to propose that as an alternative.

A final alternative is to allow the combat parties to resolve the issue by force of arms, while trying to keep the conflict from escalating into adjacent territories. The purpose of the CSCE/WEU/EC would be to isolate the conflict and to make certain that no outside powers, motivated by irredentist hopes or sympathy for ethnic kin that might be losing the war, intervened to internationalize it.

Policy Prescriptions

The conflict resolution mechanism that was outlined at the Valletta meeting is a small step forward and potentially useful for a limited range of conflicts. These would be disputes involving the established European states, contesting questions of law, and risking relatively low stakes. They are appropriate for the European "zone of civility," but are only an addition to a rich menu of bilateral and multilateral arbitral, mediation, and other conflict resolving treaties that already exist in it. The mechanism is inappropriate for those conflicts where questions of territory, status, identity, power, security, and community are at issue, and where there is either the strong likelihood or actual use of armed violence, often involving one or more non-state actors under no effective state control. These are the characteristics of conflicts that are most likely to appear on the European agenda over the next decades. The question is whether the CSCE can play any useful (e.g., conflict control, amelioration, or resolution) role in these situations.

Analysis of this question alerts us to some incompatible principles underlying contemporary conflict resolution procedures in general, and the CSCE in particular. One of the fundamental ideological principles of the liberal theory of international relations is that the states making up the system should reflect popular will. Self-determination is the most important principle legitimating the birth of new states. But no international institution or process, such as the CSCE, has authoritatively determined whether self-determination resides in a specific territory (the majority view among United Nations members) or in distinct population groups, as devotees of ethnicity, language, and religion argue. In the European context during the twentieth century, the territory principle has been the rule, so long as the rights of minorities are guaranteed and protected. How can the CSCE respond? So far, if the Yugoslav case is any guide, it cannot respond because it has not endorsed one doctrine to the exclusion of the other. Many CSCE members sympathized with the Slovenian and Croatian secessionist movements (ethnically-based self-determination), but the argument for the continuity of the Yugoslav state -- territorial self-determination -- also had many adherents. Aside from putting an end to violence, there was little the CSCE could do substantively in Yugoslavia because no pan-European consensus on the legitimate bases of the self-determination doctrine has been achieved.

CSCE documents also incorporate contradictory principles on questions of sovereignty. The rule of consensus decision-making and the prohibition against interference and intervention in domestic affairs derive from the classical rules of the sovereignty game. Both principles constrain certain kinds of conflict resolution activity (e.g., the consent of the parties to the conflict; but what if one of the parties is not a state?)

Yet, the history of the CSCE also demonstrates that in some ways the CSCE members are willing to compromise the sovereignty principle in furthering and protecting democratic principles. The many review conferences and special meetings on human rights have firmly established that sovereignty is not a bar to the analysis and discussion of member states' human rights records. The concluding document of the 1991 Human Rights Conference in Moscow circumvented -- even undermined -- the sovereignty principle by sanctioning CSCE and NGO monitoring, investigating, and reporting tasks

within a member's territory even in the absence of its consent.[32] The CSCE has also taken the position that questions of the protection and provision of guarantees for national minorities cannot be excluded from international scrutiny. In January 1991, the CSCE decided to send a fact-finding mission to Nagorno-Karabakh. Although approved in this instance. The CSCE might well have taken action even against Azerbaijani objections. So far, then, the CSCE, often overriding the sovereignty and consensus principles, has arrogated for itself the authority to examine, report on, and discuss the internal affairs of its members.

To be effective in the area of conflict control and resolution, however, the CSCE will need to go one step further. It will need to appropriate or develop the authority to take action, including coercive measures. The power of ostracism may be effective to prevent or ameliorate some kinds of abuses. The EC has used membership as leverage against Turkey and its treatment of the Kurds. Similarly, since the CSCE represents the main organizational expression of belonging to the European "club," denial or suspension of membership (proactive or reactive sanctions) in certain circumstances could be an effective tool of coercion. But among those for whom belonging to Europe is less compelling than achieving certain other purposes, denial of membership in the CSCE may amount to little. Georgia applied for membership in 1991 and, after informal consultations among CSCE members, was turned down in September. It is doubtful that this decision had any subsequent impact on the domestic policies of the Georgians.

Economic and/or military coercion presents more complex problems. It is unlikely that all 48 members would easily agree to enforceable economic sanctions. The use of military force for imposing a cease-fire, aiding victims of persecution, or imposing terms of settlement appear unlikely as the membership of the organization expands. There has been enough difficulty obtaining a consensus in the 12-member EC on economic sanctions in Yugoslavia to suggest that 48 or more governments -- including the target -- could

[32]Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, CSCE, 10 September to 4 October 1991.

agree on such measures. In brief, in those situations where more than the authority to examine, discuss, and possibly to ostracize is required, the CSCE in its present guise is unlikely to be an effective instrument for conflict control and resolution.

Finally, the overlapping members of CSCE and NATO need to develop a better understanding of their respective roles. While the Rome NATO Council documents urged a strengthening and further institutionalization of the CSCE, some members of both organizations have taken exceptionally conservative positions on issues where there are major opportunities for CSCE development and growth. At Valletta, for example, the United States delegation took a leading role in arguing the case for highly limited and legalistic approach to conflict resolution institutions for the CSCE. Apparently, its position was based on a desire not to reduce the role of NATO (and hence, American influence) in European conflicts. Thus, while most Europeans agree that the new "architecture" for the continent must include multiple institutional expressions, there is as yet no consensus on how diplomatic tasks relating to security and conflict resolution should be divided between them. Ad hoccery remains the name of the game.

This conclusion inevitably leads to a discussion of alternatives. Despite the doctrine of sovereignty and legal equality, most international organizations in one way or another reflect actual power distributions. The four victorious powers against Napoleon arrogated for themselves the right to make peace in the name of all of Europe, and to construct the Concert of Europe, a loose coalition of the great powers that would govern the affairs of the continent. The League of Nations Council and its successor in the United Nations gave pride of place to the great powers. Bowing to the demand for the application of more democratic principles, the smaller powers insisted on a role as well, and today two-thirds of the UN Security Council members come from the ranks of the minor powers.

This raises the question whether the CSCE might, in certain circumstances, compromise the principle of sovereign equality, which prevents or limits effective action, in favour of a principle of responsible and delegated authority to those who have the

capacity to act effectively.[33] This is a principle raised by the Canadian delegation to the San Francisco conference in 1945; it acknowledges that in order to be effective, an international organization must incorporate some hierarchical principles, namely that capability confers authority, but that the exercise of that authority must always be under the scrutiny of the organization as a whole. In July 1991, the CSCE's decision to mandate an EC intervention in the Yugoslav imbroglio implicitly acknowledged a "capability leads to authority" principle.

Such a principle suggests amending the CSCE along the lines of the Concert of Europe, an idea that has already been introduced in the scholarly literature.[34] But a Concert-type solution does not seem appropriate because it smacks of hegemony. There should be two significant differences between the Concert and the CSCE: (1) a mandate to specific governments -- presumably leading powers -- would be granted only when necessary, and would not become an organizing principle or decision rule for all CSCE activities; and (2) the leadership of the great powers in Europe or a collective body like the EC would be monitored, supervised and controlled by the full membership in ways that did not exist in the Concert. The Concert, when it acted collectively, did so without consulting, much less being significantly influenced by, the small states.[35] Collective diplomacy and armed coercion against the Ottomans in the late 1800s and early 1900s effectively prevented some wars such as that between Turkey and Greece over Crete, and helped reduce Ottoman persecution of restive groups in the Empire. The European

[33]The NATO Council Rome Declaration urged the CSCE to modify the consensus rule with regard to its capacity to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The CSCE should take action "if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned." The text of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation is in *Nato Review*, Vol. 39, No. 6, December 1991, pp. 19-22. The reference to the CSCE is on p. 21.

[34]Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 16, Summer 1991, pp. 114-161; and a slightly revised version, "A New Concert for Europe," in Allison and Treverton (eds.), *Rethinking American Security*, pp. 248-266.

[35]K. J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: The Politics of Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century Europe," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Governance Without Government*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, in press.

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community at large benefitted from these actions, but except for the great powers, the other members of the community were not consulted. For effective -- and legitimate -- action today, CSCE members need to consider various formulas for delegating authority in certain situations and for controlling the policies of those who act in the name of the community.

The rule of consensus also needs to be modified. It could be retained for most issues on the CSCE agenda (e.g., arms control and disarmament, CSBMs, and the like), but waived where the actions of one or more states, or non-state actors, were deemed by the Council of Foreign Ministers or Committee of Senior Officials (or a significant majority therein) to constitute a threat to the community as a whole. Space does not permit a detailed examination of the many possibilities. Here it is sufficient to underline how the conflicting principles incorporated into the CSCE are likely to limit the role of its new institutions in controlling or resolving the kinds of conflicts that are likely to appear in the new Europe. If the CSCE is to avoid becoming marginalized as an instrument of conflict resolution, it will need to undertake a careful examination of its own rules.

The CSCE has some important fundamentals. It is the only organization that represents all of Europe. Unlike NATO, it cannot be perceived by anyone as a threat, or as irrelevant. Yet, it is the EC that seems to be appropriating the conflict resolution role in Europe. In some ways it is better equipped to act effectively than is the CSCE, but it suffers from the limitation of representing less than one-third of Europe's countries, and does not include Canadian or American participation. It also lacks some elements of authority and legitimacy that the CSCE possesses. But the CSCE in its present stage lacks capabilities, experience, and the constraints of unanimity and incompatible principles in its main texts. In its handling of human rights and national minority problems -- significant sources of international conflict -- it has moved vigorously to undermine the most conservative aspects of the sovereignty principle. In the area of conflict resolution, however, the Valletta documents demonstrate strong resistance to innovation, and the continued sanctity of voluntarism, consensus rule, and the sovereign equality of states.

Given the nature of the times, and the great opportunities for constructing a pan-European zone of civility now that the Cold War has become history, CSCE should not place the principles of 1648 at the centre of its processes and new tasks.

Appendix D

THE CSCE AND FUTURE SECURITY IN EUROPE

by

Johan Jörgen Holst

The CSCE is a unique creation in international relations. It shaped and promoted a process of transformation of a rather rigid system of confrontation and conflict. It enabled the smaller and middle powers to play a role, and some of them to break out of the bondage of the client state. Paradoxically, it was conceived in Moscow as a means of legitimating the *status quo*, but came to develop into a means of transforming the *status quo*. It contributed to the amelioration of the consequences of the systemic division of Europe and the military confrontation by which it was buttressed and sustained. It paved the way for the transition to a post-Cold War Europe. The challenge we confront today is its adaptation and relevance to the agenda of the era of the second European reconstruction after the carnage of the Second World War.

The CSCE provided a framework for a process to unfold, a process of linkage across the systemic divide. The linkage extended beyond the arena of traditional diplomatic interplay, embracing societal relations across a broad range of basic functions. The standards for the conduct of international relations in Europe were widened and deepened. Alongside a reaffirmation of the traditional principle of the inviolability of the borders of the territorial state, it instituted the principle of the inviolability of the individual human being. The two principles are not invariably compatible and hence the CSCE has left a legacy of competing imperatives, begging the issue of humanitarian intervention. It has not been confronted, but it lingers on the horizon, hovering over the intersection between the sovereignty of the territorial state and that of the individual citizen. The mediation of that tension has attained new salience and importance in the new Europe as the confines of the territorial states are challenged and transformed from within. The issue is no longer the preservation or transformation of an international order, but rather that of its constituent parts. The challenge now is for the CSCE to adapt to the requirements for management of such processes.

In relation to security, the CSCE conceived and developed confidence and security building measures. They are essentially mechanisms for mutual reassurance. They were designed to take the political sting out of routine military activities and in that context provided means for enhancing transparency and predictability. Equally important they projected an ethos of cooperation, and instituted a habit of cooperation, into the competitive field of the quest of states for security, capitalizing on shared interests and thereby contributing substance to the concept of common security. The challenge of the CSCE in the times ahead will be its ability to shape a process of transforming the concept of common security into a system of collective security.

Security in the era of the Cold War was essentially defined in terms of the classical categories of protection against trans-border military attacks. In a very real sense it remained a chimera unattainable for any states; nuclear weapons and the means of their long-range delivery had blown the roofs off the territorial states, the post-Westphalian system was coming to an end. With the end of the Cold War, security assumed new dimensions involving the imperative of community building, transcending the territorial state, often and mistakenly referred to as the nation state, in order to contain the threat of inside and across-border ethnic strife and communal conflict. The CSCE also faces the challenge of containing and transforming such conflicts in the years ahead.

The CSCE constituted a process more than an institution. It attempted to link institutions rather than substituting for them. It linked the institutions of two competing orders in Europe. Now one of the two orders has for all intents and purposes disappeared. The Warsaw Pact and CMEA belong to the past. The states of Central and Eastern Europe seek association with, and preferably admittance to, the core institutions of the West -- NATO, the EC, the WEU and the Council of Europe. They seek security against the turmoil of the East as well as against the somewhat more remote risk of imperial reimposition. They seek security against the dangers of economic and ecological collapse as well as against the spectre of ethnically based nationalism. They seek prosperity through integration into the successful economies of the West, trying to overcome decades of retardation imposed by communist mismanagement. The

CSCE needs to adapt to this new landscape featuring the preeminence of the core institutions of the West.

One fallacy which is frequently encountered is to think of the CSCE in terms of a substitute for the core institutions, rather than in terms of a supplement, a mechanism for orchestrating the interplay of partly overlapping and inter-locking institutions. The CSCE will not be able to develop institutional infrastructure to compete with the core institutions. It should not embark upon a course of wasteful duplication but capitalize rather on its unique properties, on being able to shape processes of peaceful change. That ability will depend, however, on an ability to respond to the challenges of a new era rather than to echo its responses to past challenges.

What are the security challenges of the new era? Their precise configuration and manifestation remain wrapped in ambiguity and uncertainty. However, certain propositions or working hypotheses may be advanced. The challenges are rooted in two basic phenomena: a) the break-up of the Soviet Union, b) conflict between ethnicity and the territorial state. There are no institutions available for managing and shaping those processes. They could threaten the institutions containing the present order in Europe.

The specific challenges contained by the two salient phenomena to which I have referred are the following:

- How do we prevent the break-up of the Soviet Union from resulting in a multiplication of the number of nuclear-weapon states which could generate processes of nuclear proliferation threatening the integrity of the non-proliferation regime in Europe and beyond?

- How do we prevent the enormous arsenals of widely dispersed tactical nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union from falling into the violent hands of would-be terrorist groups?

- How can we preserve the comprehensive systems of arms control agreements which were designed to promote military stability at substantially reduced levels of forces in the different regions of Europe?

- Are we able to use the CFE agreement as a means to Europeanize management of the military implications of the transformation of the Soviet Union?

- Can the standards developed in the CSCE for the conduct of inter-state and inter-societal relations be adapted to steer the conduct also of intra-state relations as territorial states fission into new sovereignties?

- Are we able to build political communities transcending the nationalist logic and prescription that ethnic and state borders should coincide? (And we know that to be an unworkable solution in the mosaic of the ethnic patterns of Europe).

- Are we able to make the transition from confidence-building and consensus decisions to peacekeeping and enforcement of agreed standards?

- How do we link the new democracies of Central Europe to the security order of the West without excluding Russia from Europe?

- How do we develop military structures and strategies which do not constitute offensive threats to surrounding states while at the same time preserving generic capacities for relevant military presence where and when it may be needed in future?

- How do we preserve open societies in a context of possible substantial migrations into and inside Europe?

The questions could be multiplied, but they suggest the scope of the challenges ahead. They involve challenges for all of the states of Europe and North America; the great powers, the middle powers, and the small powers. The nature of the challenges and the shaping of responses will depend more on the geopolitical and institutional positions and interests of the states concerned than on their size. In periods of basic transformation and reconstruction, states and institutions tend to fear marginalization and therefore to seek positions, alliances and linkages which may preserve roles and influence. That task is particularly difficult in a period of dynamic institutional development as competence shifts from national to international institutions, as divisions of labour are refashioned among those institutions and as the orchestration of their interplay is revised.

The role of the CSCE in the new Europe is still to be revised. It will need to be different from the past. Business as usual is a recipe for growing irrelevance. The ideology of the small steps is likely to prove inadequate for a period of historical leaps. However, the unique approach and nature of the CSCE suggests a model for how to break the stalemate of political conflict in other regions, such as the Middle East. Sometimes conflict cannot be resolved by direct negotiation but is, rather, transformed by processes of cooperation capitalizing on shared interests which cut across the cleavages of conflict, focussing on confidence building as a prelude to conflict resolution.

PROGRAMME

THE CSCE AND FUTURE SECURITY IN EUROPE

Prague, The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

4 - 5 December 1991

4 December 1991

Opening Remarks

Bernard Wood, CEO, Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security

Pavel Seifter, Deputy Director, Institute of
International Relations, Prague

09:00 - 10:45 *PANEL I -- THE CSCE AND OTHER SECURITY INSTITUTIONS*

Chair: Ján Kubis, Head of the Euro-Atlantic Department, Federal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, Prague

Panelists: John Toogood, Deputy Director, Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security, Ottawa

Nils Eliasson, Director, Secretariat of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Prague

Christoph Bertram, Political Editor, *Die Zeit*, Hamburg

11:00-12:45	**PANEL II -- THE SECURITY INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES OF THE CSCE SIGNATORIES: A SURVEY**

Chair: The Honourable Flora MacDonald, former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa

Panelists: Peter Volten, Senior Vice-President, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York

Pál Dunay, Head of the Department of Security Policy and Disarmament, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest

Martin Walker, US Bureau Chief, *Manchester Guardian*, Washington

13:00-15:00	Lunch

The Honourable John Bosley, P.C., M.P., Chairman, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa

15:00-16:45	**PANEL III -- SCENARIOS FOR MEETING THE SECURITY NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF SIGNATORIES**

Chair: Jìrí Valenta, Director, Institute of International Relations, Prague

Panelists: Lubós Dobrovský, Minister of Defence, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Prague

Richard Gwyn, International Affairs Correspondent *The Toronto Star*, London

Karl Birnbaum, former Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

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5 December 1991

08:30-10:15   *PANEL IV -- DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE*

Chair: The Honourable John Bosley, P.C., M.P., Chairman, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa

Panelists: Kal Holsti, University of British Columbia, Vancouver

Bent Rosenthal, Director, Conflict Prevention Centre, Vienna

Miroslav Potocný, Department of International Law, Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague

10:30-12:15   *PANEL V -- SECURITY IN EUROPE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR MIDDLE POWER LEADERSHIP*

Chair: Bernard Wood, Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa

Panelists: Miloslav Had, Director, Analyses and Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Prague

Johan Jörgen Holst, Norwegian Minister of Defence, Oslo

Ivan Busniak, Head of the CSCE Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Prague

Concluding Remarks

David I.W. Braide, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa

Appendix F

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NAME	ORGANIZATION	CITY
Claude Altermatt	CSCE Secretariat	Prague
Loginov Andrey	Radio-Canada International	Ottawa
Pál Benyo	Embassy of Hungary	Prague
Christoph Bertram	*Die Zeit*	Hamburg
Karl Birnbaum	Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs	Stockholm
John Bosley	House of Commons	Ottawa
David Braide	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
Michael Bryans	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
Ivan Busniak	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prague
Gregory Conney	Canadian Delegation to CEE/CSBM Arms Control Negotiations	Vienna
Henry Zipper de Fabiani	French Delegation to the Vienna Negotiations	Vienna
Mr. Dietz	Ministry of Defence	Oslo
Lubos Dobrovsky	Minister of Defence	Prague
Pál Dunay	Hungarian Foreign Ministry	Budapest
Jan Eichler	Institute of Strategic Studies	Prague
Nils Eliasson	CSCE Secretariat	Prague
Mark Glauser	Dalhousie University	Halifax
Nancy Gordon	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
Susan Greenberg	*The Guardian* and *The Economist*	Prague
Richard Gwyn	*The Toronto Star*	London
Miloslav Had	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prague

NAME	ORGANIZATION	CITY
Jiří Hájek	King George of Podebrad Foundation	Prague
Vladimir Handl	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Marianne Heiberg	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs	Oslo
Armin Hiller	German Embassy	Prague
Johan Jörgen Holst	Minister of Defence	Oslo
Kal Holsti	University of British Columbia	Vancouver
Vasil Hudak	Institute for East-West Security Studies	Prague
Arild Isegg	NATO Defence College	Rome
Esther Janosiová	Bratislava University	Bratislava
Ken Jensen	United States Institute of Peace	Washington
Petr Kanka	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Vaclav Kasik		Prague
Ján Kubis	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prague
Stuart Laing	Embassy of Great Britain	Prague
Anne Legare	Université de Québec à Montréal	Montréal
Vladimir Leska	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Ladislav Liska	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Roman Loznikov	Embassy of the Soviet Union	Prague
Ralph Lysyshyn	Canadian Delegation to NATO	Brussels
Flora MacDonald	Former Secretary of State for External Affairs	Ottawa
Ivan Majercin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prague
Frances Markhof	Institute for Cooperation on Security, Economics and Environment	Vienna
Dobroslav Matejka	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Peter McFadden	Central Europe Institute	Prague

NAME	ORGANIZATION	CITY
Alan McLaine	Embassy of Canada	Prague
Gunnar Mjell	Ministry of Defence	Oslo
Petr Mooz	CSCE Secretariat	Prague
Krysztof Mroziewicz	*Magazine Politika*	Warsaw
Krysztof Opalski	Embassy of Poland	Prague
Alexander Ort	School of Economics, Department of International Relations	Prague
Osman Paksut	Permanent Mission of Turkey to the CSCE and Disarmament Negotiations in Europe	Vienna
Martin Palous	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prague
Maciej Perczynski	Institute of Foreign Affairs	Warsaw
Ingo Peters	Free University of Berlin	Berlin
Miroslav Polreich	Permanent Mission of Czechoslovakia to the CSCE and Disarmament Negotiations in Europe	Vienna
Miroslav Potocny	Institute of Law, Academy of Sciences	Prague
Bent Rosenthal	CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre	Vienna
Timothy Savage	Embassy of the USA	Prague
Peter Schlotter	Peace Research Institute	Frankfurt
Pavel Seifter	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Milan Stembera	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Jan Svandelik	Institute of International Relations	Prague
John Toogood	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
Jiri Valenta	Institute of International Relations	Prague
Tibor Vincze	Embassy of Hungary	Prague
Andre Vincze	Hungarian Broadcast Service	Munich
Viera Viskupova	Institute of International Relations	Prague

NAME	ORGANIZATION	CITY
Peter Volten	Institute for East-West Security Studies	New York
Martin Walker	*Manchester Guardian*	Washington
Carmel Whelton	Embassy of Canada	Prague
Renata Wielgosz	Embassy of Canada	Prague
Monika Wohlfeld		Martinsried
Bernard Wood	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa