

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES



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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD

Statement to the House of Commons on May 22, 1964,
by the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
the Honourable Paul Martin.

On November 28 last, I made a full statement to the House on Canadian policy concerning a wide range of major international issues. Today I propose to concentrate on the most important developments that have taken place in the meantime in areas of primary concern to our country.

Since last November I have attended a number of important conferences and meetings, including two ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council, one in December of last year and one last week, the United Nations Trade and Development Conference in Geneva in March, and a session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I also accompanied the Prime Minister on visits to France and the United States in January, and we received here in Ottawa in February the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom.

Three Main Developments

In one way or another, all these meetings had to do with the three main developments which have characterized the last decade in international affairs, the continuing contest between the Communist and non-Communist worlds in both a military and an economic sense; the changing relationships which are taking place within both the Communist and non-Communist camps, and finally the adjustments which both groupings have been making in their relations within the so-called third world, the less-developed and often non-aligned nations which now comprise more than two-thirds of the United Nations.

These three main tides of development have brought with them such a host of new and unfamiliar problems that there has been an understandable, and perhaps inevitable, tendency to try to deal with them piecemeal and in separate compartments. Yet the obvious interrelationship of these major political trends should convince one that at some stage -- and I do not pretend to know how or when -- the means whereby we are endeavouring to cope with some of the major unresolved problems must be brought together. It is clear to me that, when we in NATO decide on a particular size and structure of defence arrangements to cover a given future period, we must not only consider whether that structure is adequate to ensure our physical security but what impact it will have on what we are simultaneously trying to accomplish in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and how it might affect prospects for a settlement of European security problems. Again, when we contemplate the rash of local conflicts which have broken out in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia,

we should not, in our anxiety to contain them, overlook what we are trying to achieve in the United Nations and in the Disarmament Committee by way of more orderly and lasting international peace-keeping machinery. In piecing together the parts of this complex puzzle, I believe we are, during the months and years, going to have to rethink a great deal of what has been traditional policy.

Four-Way Relationship

I have just returned from the NATO ministerial meeting in The Hague, followed by a short visit to Germany. Together, these two visits were concerned with most of the fundamental issues in our contemporary international life, our relations with the Communist world or worlds still being the dominant preoccupation. For years, in NATO and in all the Western countries we have been speaking rather loosely about East-West relations. I think the time we admitted that this shorthand phrase is no longer adequate. When we say "East-West relations", we imply that we are thinking in terms of a bipolar world between the Communists and the rest of us. In fact, today there is no longer one Communist world and it is quite misleading to equate "East" with "Communist world". It is equally misleading to equate "West" with "the rest of us" or even with "NATO". What is actually happening is a more complicated form of competition than our old terminology suggests, a competition in which the Chinese Communists are making a determined takeover bid for the Communist leadership in Asia and Africa. We must think more of a four-way relationship among the West, the Soviet Communists, the Chinese Communists and the non-aligned countries, rather than of the old "East-West" terms.

If there is a pause or a détente in our relations with the Soviet Union, based on what is really a common appreciation, since the Cuban crisis, of the unacceptability of nuclear warfare -- if this is true, we can pass the same verdict on our relations with the other Communist world. For the Chinese, nuclear war is certainly unwanted but not unthinkable. Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that after the First World War there were 200 million Communist and after the second 900 million; so he predicts that, after the third, Communism will take over what remains of the world.

I know that, apart from the Chinese Communist invasions of Tibet, India and the troubles to which they are a party in Southeast Asia, there is no reason to believe that the Chinese Communists would deliberately allow their theories to push them over the brink. Their bark may, as we must hope, be worse than their bite. We have had experience before -- bitter experience -- of men whose theories were explicit and public, but we were too rationalistic to believe that they meant what they said. I am not prone to believe that we are in the same situation now, but there are similar dangers. It does not appear at present that the West's détente with Moscow extends to Peking, but we must continue to test the intentions of the Chinese Communists, intentions little affected by Soviet views or aims, by all means at our disposal. In the meantime it would be premature and irresponsible to dismantle our defences, either materially or psychologically, even though for the time being we think that the Soviet world Western relations are showing some real, though limited, improvement.

This is the first time that, as External Minister, I have tried in this House to analyze our relations with the Communists in this way. When the differences between Moscow and Peking first became apparent, there was a natural reluctance on the part of the West to attach too much importance to them lest the cleavage be short-lived. While this was a prudent reaction at the time, we can now begin to draw a new balance sheet and get away from too exclusive a preoccupation with only one of the Communist giants. They are clearly at odds with each other on national, historical and racial grounds, though as Communists their differences find expression in ideological terminology. These differences, which have been coming into the open for perhaps four years, are obviously not a transient phenomenon.

Change in the Soviet Bloc

It is impossible to say how deep the détente, or the pause, with the Soviet Union will go, or how penetrating it really is. In the meantime, I think it should clearly be our intention to encourage this pause or détente, while remembering that Soviet positions have not changed on most of the central issues which divide us, including the division of Germany, the cruel, special case of Berlin, and the fomenting of unrest throughout the non-Communist world under the guise of liberation. Moreover, as we have recently noted in Ottawa as well as in other parts of the world, Communist efforts to subvert individuals and groups in free countries, and to expand their power and influence by other means than war, have continued unabated despite the détente.

This kind of situation, of course, requires the most careful examination. Each week brings some new evidence that it is possible to modify the word "satellites" in describing the relationship between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. This trend, of course, should not be exaggerated, but it is evident that, apart from foreign policy, and within certain limits, the Eastern European countries are being allowed, much more than ever before, to develop a brand of Communism more in conformity with local conditions and the national characteristics of their peoples. Simultaneously, the process of de-Stalinization has led to a considerable reduction in the physical control over the populations in these countries. Such trends are not easily reversed.

A final element to be kept in mind is that the Communist countries are faced with substantial economic difficulties. Agriculture is clearly inefficient, and the planning and organization techniques of Communist industry are passing through a period of revision. These developments present possibilities to the West for trade and for the opening of channels of communication which may help us to break down some of the barriers between the Soviet world and our own. Yet, even if we should be able to make some really substantial progress toward an understanding, a modus vivendi, with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there would still remain the ominous question mark of Communist China.

A Question Mark

The Prime Minister and I had the opportunity for a frank discussion about Communist China with President de Gaulle and M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, during our visit to Paris shortly before the French act of recognition. While we would have preferred that France had consulted

her allies, it was apparent to us that her decision was taken after a careful weighing of all the circumstances as the Government of that country saw them. I hope the decision of France to establish diplomatic relations with Peking will help to reduce Communist China's continuing isolation. The isolation of the Soviet Union between 1917 and the early 1930's is now recognized as having brought little benefit either to the West or to the Soviet Union.

I do not wish to leave the impression that it is the West which is mainly responsible for Chinese isolation. In fact, since the Communist Chinese took control of the mainland, they have often appeared to be pursuing a deliberate policy of severing contacts with the West. They have also sought to impose conditions upon those who were otherwise prepared to enter into relations with them. It must be frankly admitted that the experiences of some governments which extended recognition and sought to establish diplomatic relations were not as happy as those countries might have hoped.

Realizing the dangers inherent in Chinese isolation, Canada has, like a number of other Western nations, encouraged increased contacts in the commercial and cultural fields with China; and I think this policy has been wise and has met with success. Canadian trade with China continues at a relatively high level, and there are increased dealings between Canadian businessmen and the appropriate Chinese agencies. With a relaxation in the Chinese attitude, one Canadian newspaperman is now in mainland China, and there is the possibility of other correspondents being admitted. This could give the public greater first hand coverage of events and developments on the Chinese mainland.

As part of this new development, we would be willing to receive an equivalent number of Chinese correspondents in Canada for the purpose of reporting -- and I emphasize the word reporting -- on the Canadian scene to their home audience. It is our hope that such reciprocal arrangements could in the long run, help to reduce the distortions which in the past have proved so dangerous to relations between Peking and the Western countries.

International Position of Communist China

As far as the international position of Communist China is concerned there are no simple solutions in sight. At the United Nations...Canada has opposed resolutions calling for the expulsion of Nationalist Chinese representatives and their replacement by representatives from Peking, on the grounds that such resolutions make no provision for the right of the inhabitants of Formosa to self-determination and appropriate international status. Canadian representatives at the United Nations have made clear the Canadian desire for an equitable solution which would deal adequately with the Formosa problem and at the same time bring mainland China into the mainstream of international affairs. This was the position taken by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, the present Leader of the Opposition in the other place, when he acted as Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1962. I also agree with what the Right Hon. Leader of the Opposition said in the House of Commons on July 25, 1963:

"I think a major challenge is presented to the nations of the Western world today. Canada, the United States and other nations will have to take another look at our policy regarding Communist China. We will have to review our thinking. We will have to consider the problem, and it is a tremendous one, in the perspective of changing events, and particularly in view of this agreement; because, unless it includes Communist China -- and I do not want to mention France in the same paragraph -- and we are able to secure the adherence of Communist China, the threat of nuclear war will hang over us to a degree that we can only anticipate with foreboding, horror and overwhelming fear..."

Recent developments have revived interest in what could be described as a one-China, one-Formosa solution. To achieve such a solution would require above all the co-operation of the parties immediately concerned; but a practical and equitable solution along these lines has not so far proved acceptable either to Peking or to Taipei.

Future Possibilities

During the recent NATO meeting questions were asked in this House concerning my references in my statement before the Council in The Hague to the realities we might face at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly which might require some modification of the policy I have just described. The Prime Minister...has already referred to one such reality, the possibility of a vote favourable to the seating of mainland China irrespective of Canada's stand on that issue.

Another possibility is that Communist China might come so close to being seated by vote at this Assembly as to foreshadow a decisive trend in that direction at the following Assembly.

In that event, as I told the NATO Council, the chances of a solution which would make provision in the United Nations for the future of Formosa and its inhabitants on a basis of self-determination might disappear if we do not move from the present static position. We must remember that, if Communist China were seated, it would occupy not only the General Assembly seat now held by Nationalist China but the Security Council seat as well, a privilege which carries with it the right of veto over the admission of new members. A third issue we might face, if Communist China were seated and Formosa automatically excluded, would be whether to recognize the Peking Government or do as we did some years ago in the case of Outer Mongolia, sit beside them in the United Nations without according recognition to the regime.

These examples will make it clear...that the extent, if any, of modifications in our position which we might wish to consider will not become apparent until we see what developments occur at the next United Nations General Assembly, but surely there can be no excuse for our failing to consider this matter in good time when important changes in the tactical position at the United Nations have taken place.

Need for Prior Consultation

In saying that Canada has no intention of doing anything that add to the difficulties of our friends, as I said at NATO, I was simply recognizing the need for prior consultation with our friends before political decisions are taken on important questions. Indeed, there is a NATO requirement for such consultation, and that is why I concluded my statement at The Hague on the China issue by urging close consultation in New York and NATO delegations on this matter before and during the forthcoming General Assembly.

We are watching the situation closely, and Canadian policy will be predicated on a number of factors. For example, the effect on the stability of countries in Southeast Asia must be assessed with care, and particularly in the light of the current critical situation in Indochina. I shall refer to this new crisis in that area in a few minutes. Canada, with other Western countries the same basic interest in helping the developing countries of Southeast Asia to maintain their independence and national unity. In addition, we have a special interest in this area through our role in International Control Commissions in Indochina.

NATO: A Healthy Evolution

It is against this background of our relations with the Communist world that I would like to report on the NATO ministerial meeting which I attended in The Hague last week. The foreign ministers of the NATO countries have an opportunity each spring to review the international situation and the state of the alliance. We all realize that it is necessary to keep the threat under constant review so that the Western response may be appropriate, not only in a military sense but, equally important, in ideological policies. Therefore I firmly believe that it is not a sign of "disarray" it is sometimes called, but of progress and sensible evolution that there are any thoughts in the Western alliance as to how our countries should react to the new opportunities as well as to the pitfalls presented by the current situation vis-à-vis the Communists.

We have heard far too much about NATO being at a crossroads and suffering from various kinds of malaise. The fact is that the alliance is going through a healthy process of sorting out the different and often variously expressed ideas of its members on the state of the alliance and what should be done to bring it up to date. Would it be healthy if it were otherwise, if we were merely clinging to the conceptions of the past and not trying to keep up with the times in a flexible way as befits free peoples?

At The Hague there was general agreement that, in the next few years, our main aim must be to ensure that NATO can meet the requirements of a world very different from when the alliance was founded. NATO has its old myths and Events are overtaking them rapidly and if the alliance is to survive, we must face the new realities. In the words of the Prime Minister at the NATO Council in January: "We must learn to deal with the difficult job of peace making while maintaining the force necessary to deter war."

But I can say that all the members, all the foreign ministers representing the great powers and the others, are agreed upon the fundamentals of this alliance, which are that we intend to remain free; we intend to maintain our military strength in the absence of political settlements and controlled disarmament; we intend to contain Communist aggression; we intend to remain firm in our dealings with the Soviet Union, but willing to explore any road to political settlement provided it does not endanger our security.

NATO Goals

There are different ideas on how to proceed in the future. What is needed in the alliance is more willingness on the part of those who want changes to propose them, and more willingness on the part of those who profess partnership to start practising it. If we are to adapt the alliance to changed conditions, there are certain goals which we believe are worth pursuing. First and foremost, so far as this country is concerned, we believe there must be increased emphasis on the transatlantic nature of the alliance. Any development within the alliance toward European or North American continent-ism will be resisted by this country, I hope. We will never choose, I hope, between the two sides of the Atlantic, because we cannot; for our historic ties are with Europe while at the same time we are a North American country. Greater co-operation between the two sides of the Atlantic is to us the only sensible policy if the Western alliance is to continue to evolve as a partnership of like-minded nations.

Second, Europe today is vastly stronger than in 1949, and many European countries think, quite rightly, that they should play a larger role in the direction of the alliance politically and militarily. I am sure concrete proposals would accomplish this and these would be welcomed by all. I urged my colleagues at the meeting to let us have these proposals.....

Finally, we need better consultation in the military as well as in the political and economic spheres. There have been enormous improvements in recent years and, as a result, the alliance is stronger today than in 1949. Because we now feel freer than before to go our own ways, there is an even greater need to tell each other what we are doing and why.

I am afraid that that is now the situation. If we fail to do so, mistrust sets in and we lose sight of the fundamental reasons which keep us together and we become obsessed by our differences.

Canada's Relations with France

When the Prime Minister and I visited Paris last January, we agreed that we would consult with France at the ministerial level. We found that President de Gaulle and his ministers shared our desire for a closer relationship. Although only a short time has elapsed since that visit, I believe I can already say with confidence that our conversations marked an important milestone in Canada's relations with France.

While I was at The Hague, I met privately with the French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, as part of our continuing ministerial consultations. We talked not only about NATO matters and Cyprus but about more general international problems and about our developing bilateral programmes in the cultural field. I am sure we will have an opportunity to give an indication of the nature of these bilateral accords which were reached with France and in connection with which I was able to report some progress in my conversations with the French Foreign Minister, who, I believe and I am sure the Prime Minister will agree, is one of the great foreign ministers. Even when we do not agree with his views, they are worth trying to understand, for I am sure they represent much more than a purely national approach to the problems of Europe and the world. I am happy to see that this was confirmed by France herself in the warm reception which the Government of France gave to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a few days ago.

In recent months Franco-Canadian programmes have been set in motion which will result in closer educational and cultural links. Our investment relationships are also actively under study, and we are looking at a number of other fields in which there may be some possibility for mutually beneficial links -- immigration, defence production, science, tourism and so on. Neither we nor the French expect to see spectacular changes overnight, but we are working to create a new atmosphere or a new structure in our relations.

I might add here that we in no way think of this new relationship as one of interest only to French-speaking Canadians. May I quote what the Prime Minister said at our dinner last January in honour of Monsieur Pompidou, the French Prime Minister. I quote the Prime Minister of Canada:

"In English-speaking regions of Canada, there is a much greater interest in the French language and French culture, the role of which is being increasingly appreciated as an essential element in our nation. This development brings about, quite naturally, a renewal of interest which serves most appropriately our relations with France, and this, I can assure you, is not limited to the Province of Quebec...The two governments are fully alive to the opportunities offered by the dynamic progress within the two countries."

The Commonwealth: A Unique Institution

I have spoken of our relations with France. Turning to the Commonwealth, I might say that we look forward with pleasure to the holding of the Third Commonwealth Education Conference here in Ottawa from August 21 to September 4. It will be recalled that, as a result of the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference held in Montreal in 1958, a Commonwealth Education Conference was held in Oxford in July of 1959. This meeting recommended the development of four types of Commonwealth co-operation in education: the scholarship and fellowship plan, the training of teachers, the supply of teachers, and technical education. Developments in all these fields were reviewed and new areas of co-operation examined at a second conference held in New Delhi in January 1962.

Mr. Vincent Massey has agreed to accept the office of president of this meeting, and this is yet another example of his high sense of national duty and of the valuable contribution he has made to Canada. The Canadian Government, provincial departments of education and the whole educational community are giving their full support to this important conference. The activities in the field of educational co-operation which will be discussed at the Ottawa meeting have already brought benefits to all Commonwealth members, and provide an example of the constructive partnership for which the Commonwealth stands.

I should like to say that much thought is being given these days in many places to the Commonwealth. It is a unique institution, as we know, which has evolved along lines which are capable of promoting the interests of its members and the improvement of international understanding. Admittedly it faces problems which may test its adaptability and cohesion, but we have no doubt it will weather these storms. The Prime Ministers' Conference in July will address itself to many of these problems. There will be a continuing search for methods to maintain its character and its purpose. It could be that the Commonwealth Education Conference provides the kind of activity needed to realize these objectives, as we pointed out to Mr. Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, when he was here in Ottawa a few days ago.

Relations with the German Federal Republic

At the end of The Hague meeting, I accepted an invitation from the German Foreign Minister to go to Germany. No Secretary of State for External Affairs had visited Germany since the war, apart from attendance at a NATO ministerial meeting held in Bonn. It was thought that it would be desirable for me to pay a visit to this leading allied country at this time, a country which has so successfully constructed a modern democratic state on the ashes of Nazi tyranny.

Our relations with the German Federal Republic are important. We have more trade with Germany than with any other European country, nearly \$200 million more than with France, for example. There are in Canada now almost a million people of German origin, while we have in Germany, if we include the families of our soldiers and airmen, about 25,000 Canadians.

I therefore agreed to go from The Hague to spend some time with the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Gerhard Schroeder, in Bonn and to spend a day in West Berlin before returning home. I can say that Mr. Schroeder gave me a full and clear account of the thinking of his country on the great problem which must preoccupy all Germans so long as their country remains divided. That, of course, is the problem of German reunification. He said again, as his Government has said countless times, that modern Germany has renounced the use of force as a means to attain its objectives. I said that the Government of Canada understands and supports the Federal Republic of Germany in every peaceful effort to reunite its peoples through the exercise of their right of self-determination in freedom.

I think there are many points of similarity in the Canadian and present German outlook on the future of Atlantic co-operation. Like us, they want to see European integration pursued within an Atlantic framework. Like

us they want the "Kennedy round" to succeed and so contribute toward the liberalization of trade on a world-wide basis.

I am glad, as I am sure the whole House will be, that we shall have an opportunity to welcome Chancellor Erhard and Mr. Schroeder here when they visit us from June 9 to June 11. Apart from the United States and Britain, Canada will be the first country outside the European Common Market that Dr. Erhard will have visited since he became Chancellor. He has been here before and we look forward to seeing him again. Both the economic regeneration and the political transformation of modern democratic Germany owe much to the Chancellor.

When I went to Berlin, I saw a different kind of evidence that Germany is not what it was when I last visited that country in 1936. As many of you who have been there know, there is not a single landmark left. The whole aspects of the Berlin I had known. Much has been rebuilt, and there are impressive new industrial and urban developments. But as one gets to the frontier of freedom, where East and West Berlin meet, there are gaping reminders of Hitler's war. Through this area, formerly the heart of the city, runs a wall, that stark, horrible monument to the failure of a system. For, if the Communist system in the Eastern zone had not failed so lamentably, why would from 3,000 to 5,000 persons a week have tried, at the risk of their lives, to escape westward to freedom? From the boundary of West Berlin it is like looking in at the outside of a great concentration camp. There are armed guards, machine guns, lookout towers, row upon row of barbed wire, tank traps, houses demolished or their boundary windows bricked up, railways and subways blocked and guarded as if the life of that regime in the East depended upon stopping people at the cost of their lives to bear witness to conditions under Communism.

The German problem is the centre of the European problem and certainly also of the relations of the West with Communist countries. The solution of the German problem could open up a real understanding between East and West. It is important for a country like Canada to understand this problem, to understand the position of some of our NATO partners, to analyse our attitude and our assessment of the reactions of the Soviet Union to any proposed solution.

Search for Controlled Disarmament

I have dwelt principally on the relations between the West and the Communist countries and within the Western community itself. Both these preoccupations converge in the disarmament discussions being conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva. It is there that the four NATO nations, Britain, Canada, Italy and the United States, are in a sense, acting for the alliance partners in the continuing search for controlled disarmament and, in the meantime for any measures to ease international tension and avert the possibility of war by miscalculation or surprise attack. It is there, too, that both the Communists and the non-Communists feel the full weight and influence of the non-aligned nations as represented by eight of their number from all the continents.

While I was in Geneva at the end of March, I attended a session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and reaffirmed Canadian support for its activities. May I add, the last time I had been in the room where that meeting took place was in 1938 when, with Mr. Lapointe, I had gone as one of the delegates from Canada to the last Assembly of the League of Nations. I could not help but think, as I sat in that room, of all that had happened since 1938, both in human and physical destruction in our world; I wondered whether our deliberations would lead to the beginning of a resurgence and of a new opportunity for mankind.

At that meeting I stressed the need to follow up the accomplishments of 1963 with further advances toward halting the arms race. While the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament is the main task of the Committee, discussions over recent months lead to the conclusion that the way to general disarmament must be prepared by agreements on more limited collateral or pre-disarmament measures.

Pre-Disarmament Measures: The Canadian View

I therefore took the opportunity to state Canadian views on a number of measures which have been proposed. I expressed Canadian support for President Johnson's recent proposal for a verified freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear-weapons delivery vehicles. It is a proposal of particular interest to Canada because those long-range weapons systems constitute the direct threat to North America. It is also consonant with our view that every effort should be made to arrest the ever growing qualitative and quantitative competitions in armament production. A verified freeze on strategic delivery vehicles would provide a practical means to that end. A halt in this most costly and potentially dangerous segment of the arms race would do a great deal to help us all find an agreed method to reverse the process and begin disarmament in earnest.

I welcomed also the proposal which has been made in differing form by both the United States and the Soviet Union for a "bomber bonfire". An early agreement to destroy some of the major means of delivering nuclear weapons would reassure a sometimes sceptical world that the great powers are really serious about disarmament. It would have the added advantage of ensuring that these aircraft, obsolescent perhaps by super-power standards but still potentially lethal, would not be disposed of to less militarily-powerful states which might use them in a way which would aggravate regional disputes.

On the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, I voiced continuing Canadian support for an agreement based on the terms of the well-known Irish resolution of 1961 and for a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. I spoke in support of the progressive development of an international system of safeguards over the transfer of fissionable materials for peaceful uses. All these measures merit our continuing support as important elements in limiting the numbers of nuclear weapons in the world and the number of nations having independent national control of them.

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As the Prime Minister said on May 7, we are issuing invitations to a number of nations with experience in this field to attend an exploratory conference in Canada within the next few months. We are following up with detailed suggestions as to the pattern which such a joint examination of this problem might follow. Out of it we hope to obtain not only improved methods by which those nations can prepare themselves for peace-keeping service under the United Nations but some concrete conclusions which could be made available to other interested states and which would perhaps encourage them to set up stand-by units within their national forces.

Speaking of the United Nations, I know I can say for all members of this House that we are looking forward to the visit on Monday and Tuesday next of the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, who will address the combined Houses of Parliament in this Chamber on Tuesday morning. He will find us a nation dedicated to the Charter of the United Nations, as has once again been demonstrated by Canada's contribution to the difficult peace-keeping operation on the island of Cyprus.

I regret taking up all this time, Mr. Chairman, but I did feel that a comprehensive statement on these matters was due ... and there are two matters of current interest upon which I cannot refrain from speaking, particularly in the light of the assurances I gave several times this week in answer to questions on orders of the day.

Cyprus: Its Meaning for NATO

So much has been said in the House about Cyprus that I would not be justified in entering into a detailed recapitulation of the United Nations operation there, either in respect of the Peace Force or the concurrent endeavours of the Mediator. I would, however, like to give the House a brief account of how this matter was dealt with at the recent NATO meeting, where it became in fact one of the principal preoccupations of the assembled ministers.

I went to The Hague representing the only country at that meeting which is participating in the Force, although two days later the Foreign Minister of Denmark was able to announce that his country's forces had just arrived in Nicosia. And, of course, the United Kingdom is a member of the Force and is also a member of the NATO Council. But the United Kingdom had a force on the island long before the United Nations force was established, and did an essential part in dealing with a most difficult situation. It is the major component, with 2,700 troops, and it is bearing a heavy responsibility.

I went to The Hague convinced that advantage should be taken of the NATO meeting to impress upon the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers two points: first, the concern of all other members of the alliance over the weakening of the southeastern flank of NATO resulting from the deterioration in relations between these two countries because of Cyprus; and second, the need for the two countries to exercise restraint in their relations with each other as well as a moderating influence on the two communities in Cyprus in order that the peace keeping and political mediation of the United Nations might be facilitated.

I met separately with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, both before and during the meetings. I listened to their views and pointed out to them my grave concern. I can say that these preliminary and other discussions were very helpful in furthering mutual understanding of our various preoccupations.

Hon. Members have already seen my references to relations between Greece and Turkey and to the Cyprus situation in the conference statement which the Prime Minister tabled on May 15. Other foreign ministers also expressed concern that the solidarity and strength of the alliance should not be prejudiced by a deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey, and spoke in support of the United Nations operation there. I believe it will be a matter of pride to Members of this House that practically every foreign minister who took part in the discussion referred to Canada's participation not only in peace keeping in Cyprus but in practically every other peace-keeping operation under the auspices of the United Nations.

It was agreed after some discussion that the Secretary-General of NATO should keep in touch, pursuant to recommendations made by the Committee of Three in 1956, with Greece and Turkey in order to be available to assist in easing relations between these two allies. In effect, the NATO Secretary-General has been given an informal watching-brief over a situation affecting the relations of two member countries.

Because of our preoccupation with Cyprus, this was a valuable part of our meeting at The Hague from my point of view. I want to make it clear that there has been no infringement by NATO of United Nations responsibilities in Cyprus. Exclusive responsibility for restoring peace and promoting a political settlement in the island rests with the two Cypriot communities assisted by the United Nations force and the United Nations mediator. But a quite separate responsibility, which has now been recognized, rests on NATO to see to it that the actions of none of its members either weaken the alliance or render the task of the United Nations in Cyprus more difficult. War between Greece and Turkey is unthinkable -- unthinkable for NATO and unthinkable, as I told the foreign ministers concerned and as others did, for the two countries themselves. I think the recent frank airing of this problem in the Council gave all the members an opportunity to express their concern and to offer assistance to Greece and Turkey in restoring good relations, and thereby contributing also to an improvement in intercommunal relations in Cyprus.

Situation in Indochina

We are reading these days about a developing and critical situation in Indochina that concerns Canada. Although the Cyprus operation under the United Nations auspices has been a constant and urgent preoccupation over recent weeks, other peace-keeping duties continue as we know to be discharged by our country. Some, such as the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza and the Observation Mission in the Yemen, are going forward quietly. Another major operation, that in the Congo, is scheduled to be wound up next month, four years after its inauguration.

Of renewed importance, although outside United Nations auspices are the truce supervision activities in which we are engaged in the three Indochina states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. It is now almost ten years since this country undertook, at the request of the participants in the Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, to serve along with India and Poland in the three International Supervisory Commissions for these three Indochina nations. Indochina is once again in a state of crisis, and I believe it is the responsibility to explain the Canadian Government's position with respect to some of the unfolding events in this area.

Civil War in Vietnam

In South Vietnam there is now a full scale civil war supplied, directed and inspired from Communist North Vietnam. This civil war runs the risk of becoming an international war, because the Communists continue to encourage their Communist fellows within South Vietnam and to provide them with help in the form of strategic direction and infiltrated supplies of arms and trained personnel, while the United States, for their part, have responded to the requests of successive South Vietnamese governments for help in the form of training and equipment against this externally organized and supported insurgency.

Both the Government of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam have made it clear that if the North Vietnam Government and its backers will cease to interfere in South Vietnam, military aid from the United States will not be necessary. There is no question of any attempt by the South to take over the North, nor of the United States desiring to establish bases in the South. What is required is for the Communist North to abandon its policy of interfering in the South. Our delegation to the Commission reports to us as an independent body, and I am satisfied that the assessment made by Canada, on its own, represents the actual situation.

There have been suggestions that neutrality would be the best policy for Vietnam. I would not disagree with this as a long-term objective; we have already agreed that it is the desirable policy for Cambodia and Laos. But there is no doubt that supporting a nominally neutralist South Vietnam in present circumstances, make that territory become anything other than an early victim of Communist subversion? I believe that genuine, viable neutrality for Vietnam can become possible, but I think it will become possible only when the present insurgency is brought to an end.

The role of the Commission on which Canada serves in this situation is very difficult. Yesterday, in the Security Council, Mr. Stevenson criticized the effectiveness of the Commission. A large part of the original terms of reference of the Commission has become a dead letter. But the Commission has performed the useful function of examining South Vietnamese charges of subversion from the North, and has presented a special report to the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference stating its positive findings. It has not done as much as we would have thought necessary. In particular, we have believed and repeatedly stated that the consideration of cases of subversion should have been more expeditious. In the critical situation obtaining in Vietnam, the Commission's duty to point to breaches of the cease-fire agreement becomes more rather than less urgent. We shall continue to press our Commission colleagues to take the same view of the Commission's duties as we do.

Cambodia-Vietnam Border Problems

One unfortunate offshoot of the war in South Vietnam has been a series of violent border incidents with Cambodia. South Vietnamese troops repeatedly cross the Cambodian border and we are told that they do so in hot pursuit of Viet Cong insurgents seeking to take refuge in Cambodia after operations in Vietnam. We in Canada -- and I have made this clear before -- support Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity and therefore are doing what we can to try to find some way to bring these incursions to an end. Although this is not, strictly speaking, among the functions set out for the Commission in Cambodia in the Geneva Agreements, we have allowed it to be used to investigate such incidents and are ourselves trying to use it to see whether some more satisfactory arrangement can be made.

Yesterday Mr. Stevenson made a number of proposals in the Security Council in the course of the debate on the Cambodian complaints against Vietnam. The proposals concerned various means by which the Cambodian-Vietnamese border might be insulated from the effects of the Communist insurrection in Vietnam. These proposals merit careful study. We have long felt that the Geneva framework for Cambodia was not designed to deal with situations that might arise along the frontier with Vietnam. We should therefore welcome all suggestions that could lead to the lowering of tension on the frontier between these two countries. Whether they are related to the Geneva framework or not is of less importance than their possible efficacy in correcting a dangerous situation. I am sure that when we discuss the problems of these countries it is not easy for us to recognize the extent to which we in this interdependent world, whether we like it or not, are obliged in our own interests, as well as in the interests of world peace, to find that these matters are of vital concern to us.

A Divided Country

Laos is also the unfortunate victim of the confrontation between Communist and non-Communist forces. An attempt was made at Geneva in 1962 to bring about conditions which would permit Laos to be united, independent and neutral. My honourable friend the former Secretary of State for External Affairs attended the conference in 1962 when we were brought in as a direct member of the conference. At the present time that country is, in all but name, a divided country. One part of it is held by Right-Wing forces which have been far from blameless; they have done many things which have made the task of the Neutralist Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, more difficult. But at least they have co-operated in some measure with the Prime Minister, and the areas they hold are generally open to inspection by the International Commission of which Canada, I wish to emphasize, along with India and Poland, is a member.

The areas held by the Communist Pathet Lao are closed to the Commission except upon rare occasions, and the Pathet Lao faction has been uncooperative to such a degree that one is forced to the conclusion that it really prefers the partition of the country to its unification under a Neutralist Government. Their latest military attacks in the Plaine des Jarres cannot be justified by any political manoeuvring of the Right Wing in Vientiane. Our delegation to the Commission has consistently supported both the authority of

the Prime Minister and the obligation of the Commission to carry out its duties under the Geneva Protocol of 1962. Unfortunately, we have not received the degree of co-operation required for success. The Commission has to act by majority vote or, in certain circumstances, by unanimous vote.

The Prime Minister of Laos has proposed that, in view of the gravity of the situation, the members of the 1962 Conference on Laos should hold consultations as provided by Article 4 of the Geneva Protocol. The Government of France has now indicated its support for this proposal in notes to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Britain and the Soviet Union. It seems to me that consultations under the Protocol could have a salutary effect on the present crisis, and I have already instructed our Commissioner in Vientiane to let it be known that Canada would be willing to take part in such consultations arranged as a result of the proposal made by the Prime Minister of Laos. It is of course, for the members of the Geneva Conference to decide whether any consultations which are agreed upon should take place with all the formalities of an international conference or, perhaps preferably, in some less formal way.

I recognize that this has not been an encouraging picture of the state of affairs in Indochina, an area where Canada has, for ten years now, at great expense to our people, sought, along with India and Poland and other countries, to bring about peaceful conditions. The key seems to lie in Vietnam, and if the Communists would renounce armed subversion a great step forward would have been taken toward restoring peace and stability to the area. Political solutions seem hardly possible for Vietnam as long as the present militant Communist interference in South Vietnam continues.

I am afraid that I have taken too long, but really I do not apologize because these are matters on which Parliament has a right to hear from me. I recognize that time has prevented me from dealing with many other questions, such as external aid, international economic development, desirable changes in the United Nations, and the Organization of American States. These and other questions will undoubtedly be covered in our discussions here and in the External Affairs Committee when my estimates are being considered.

An Interdependent World

The wide area covered by what I have had to say points up the fact that our world is interdependent. When I think of the questions with which I have to deal I cannot help but go back to my early days in this House 28 years ago, when there was little discussion of foreign affairs and when it was regarded almost as presumptuous even to put a question having to do with the foreign affairs of the nation. All that is changed because our world is changed, and with that change has come perhaps a heavier responsibility for Parliament than it really is. Canada cannot escape its responsibilities in matters which a few years ago were not regarded as our concern. We are drawn into the maelstrom of a disturbed world. We are not one of the great powers, but self respect and international obligation present us with a duty and an opportunity. Although we are not the main architects of the world's destiny, I believe we will not shirk our responsibilities in seeking to establish better conditions for peace among the nations.