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THE CANADIAN

Military Gazette

Successor to the Canadian Militia Gazette.

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No. 24.

MONTREAL, DEC. 15, 1894.

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THE CANADIAN

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All communications and remittances should be addressed to the editor, P. O. Box 1041, Montreal.

MONTREAL, DEC. 15, 1894.

Notes and Comments

A thrill of proper pride, very natural, considering the unswerving loyalty to the empire of the Canadian militia must have passed through all ranks of the force when the cable announced the other day that at the very first appearance of a suspicion of trouble on the European international political situation the Dominion government, through its representative in London had tendered a force of Canadian troops to the home government. We have always maintained that Canada as well as the other self-governing colonies of the empire should recognise in some tangible form a fair share of responsibility in connection with the matter of Imperial defence. As our

government has not yet arranged a basis upon which Canada can bind herself to do her fair share in assisting to maintain the defensive forces of the empire, the offer of the Dominion government the other day to furnish and maintain a force in the event of war, comes very opportunely as showing that our government recognizes, as does the militia, Canada's responsibility in this important matter.

But in the name of all that is political, martial or sensible at Ottawa, why was this offer of force restricted to the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry? Did the powers that be suppose that the "regular" redcoats could be the easiest spared from the country? Did they consider the gallant regiment, the best available fighting force at hand, or had they any fell designs on the lives of such of the officers of the corps as received their commissions through political preference and do not know enough of military science to take reasonable care of themselves on a campaign? We have General Herbert's own word for it that the artillery service is much superior to the infantry, and as the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery was not included in the offer it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that it was mere excellence alone which restricted the offer to the regular infantry regiment.

As to the availability of the Royal Regiment there can be no disputing the statement that in the event of hostilities this corps should be the very last one to be taken from the duties it is at present supposed to perform, that of imparting instruction to the active militia.

The whole excuse for the establishment and maintenance at great expense of the four companies which have been incorporated into this regiment was, and is, to provide schools of instruction for the active militia. In the event of war, even of invasion, it would be a great mistake to remove these companies from their instructional duties, for each military district would lie then more in need of its nucleus of military knowledge than ever and of its school for training officers and non-commissioned officers.

There has been gradually developing among certain officers of the permanent force, particularly in the infantry, an idea that the school feature of our Canadian barracks is derogatory to their dignity and positions as officers and gentlemen, objecting alike to their institutions being called "schools" and to the men of the permanent corps being used for the very instructional parades which they are paid to provide for the attached officers and non-commissioned officers. "We are not common schoolmasters," they say, "nor are our men mere blocks for a military kindergarten," and this in spite of the fact that these corps are maintained wholly for educational purposes. Of course there are notable exceptions, officers who esteem it their highest privilege to be able to assist in their military studies the officers and men of the active Militia who pass through their hands; but enough of this absurd priggishness exists to make one all the more keenly regret as particularly ill advised, this apparent encouragement by the government of the idea that the re-

giment is maintained as a combative force rather than as a part of a military educ. tional system.

When the time comes for Canada to assist the Mother Country with a military force, that force should be drawn from the active militia. We ought to know something of the temper and resources of the force, and have not the least hesitation in saying that if Canada wanted to raise a force for foreign service with the Imperial army to-morrow, five battalions of a thousand picked and serviceably disciplined men each, could be paraded on Laprairie Common within seven days, ready to march on board the transports. When the last serious, war cloud hung over the Mother Country, whole battalions of the active militia, from commanding officer to bugler, volunteered for foreign service and they would do it again. It would be absurd to pretend that all of the active militia battalions are as effective fighting machines as the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry, but without the least trouble Ontario and Quebec could each furnish two, and the Maritime Provinces between them one battalion for foreign service well officered and with men of better general physique, even than seen in the Royal Regiment.

The Montreal press and certain of the clergy of some of the evangelical denominations are keeping up the discussion about the drinking done by the militia after drill either in the armories or in the saloons adjacent to the drill hall. So far the accusers of the men of the force confine themselves to generalities and have by no means succeeded in proving that the Montrealers who don Her Majesty's uniform are the dreadful drunkards they paint them. The Montreal militiaman is probably no better and no worse than the average young Canadian. He has to be respectable and of good character, however, to gain admission to any of the corps, and if he does drink a glass of beer after drill now and again he certainly does nothing out of the way while in uniform or he would appear in the Recorder's Court occasionally, which he never does. Some very excellent people consider the ideal young man to be the mild youth who finds the

acme of hilarity in nursing the baby, in dancing attendance upon all the crochety old maids in the neighborhood or in a game of "post-office" with his aunt. They will not find many bold, bad men of that type in the militia, and it is devoutly to be hoped that they never will.

Are any of the rural corps going to drill this year? Are the threatened changes in establishments of corps to take place? Are the authorities satisfied with the Martini-Metford rifle? If so, when is the force to be re-armed? Are the existing militia corps by systematic discouragement to be wiped out of existence and be succeeded by a small standing army? In the words of a certain epigrammatic, ungrammatical American legislator. Where are we at anyway?"

Fighting on the Afghan Frontier.

A telegram from Quetta, dated Nov. 3, states that news has reached there from Waziristan that 2,000 tribesmen made a determined attack on Col. A. H. Turner's camp at Wano that morning. They were repulsed with heavy loss, the troops pursuing them into the hills.

Another telegram, dated Nov. 4, states that further accounts from Waziristan show that the tribesmen in the early morning crept up the ravines about Col. Turner's camp, rushed past the pickets, and swept down upon the 1st Goorkhas. Our men had been waiting for an hour, armed and accoutred, in their tents, the morning being bitterly cold. A fierce hand-to-hand encounter took place, the Goorkhas behaving splendidly against superior numbers. In a quarter of an hour the enemy began to give way, and retired as day broke. The cavalry were then able to charge, but not before a heavy fire had been poured into the camp by a body of Waziris supporting the attacking party. The tribesmen were pursued some miles, and left 100 dead in and about the camp. Casualties:—Lieut. P. J. F. Macaulay, R. E., killed. Lieut. R. D. Angelo and Lieut. Herbert, 1st Goorkhas, dangerously wounded. Lieut. Hornby, orderly officer; Sergt.-Major Haig; Lieut. Thompson, 20th Punjab Infantry, severely wounded. Two native officers and nine Sepoys, 1st Goorkhas, killed; 32 wounded. Two sepoy, 20th Punjab Infantry, wounded.

Later details state that the casualties in the action at Wano are reported to be 21 soldiers and 23 followers killed. Two hundred and fifty dead Waziris have been counted. It is believed that the punishment inflicted will be severe enough to deter the tribesmen from further fighting. The reserve brigade is held in readiness to advance.

The following telegrams from the Viceroy, dated Nov. 4, have been received at the India Office:—

"General officer commanding Waziristan reports determined attack was made on camp Wano 5.30 o'clock, Nov. 3, by Waziris, who, under cover of darkness and network of nullahs, made desperate rush past pickets on 1st Batn. 1st Goorkhas, who turned out at once, and with great gallantry and steadiness, cleared their camp, although some of the enemy penetrated further. Enemy continued firing heavily, making repeated efforts to charge, which were checked by our fire. At six o'clock enemy began retiring, and at 6.15, when there was sufficient daylight, cavalry pursued, followed by artillery and infantry. Enemy, who are believed to be Mahsud Waziris, suffered severely, and left 100 killed on the ground. Our losses as follows:—Killed: Lieut. Macaulay, R.E. Wounded: Staff Lieut. Hornby, 24th Bombay Infantry, severely; 1st Punjab Cavalry, Surg.-Maj. Haig, severely; 1st Batn. 1st Goorkhas, Capt. Lang, severely; Lieut. Angelo, dangerously; Lieut. Herbert, dangerously; 20th Bengal Infantry, Lieut. I. F. R. Thompson, severely. Native ranks:—Killed: 1st Batn. 1st Goorkhas, two native officers, nine men. Wounded: 1st Batn. 1st Goorkhas, 32 men; 20th Bengal Infantry, two men. Fuller details will follow."

"In continuation of our telegram of to-day:—Troops returned Wano four p.m. 3rd. Pursued 10 miles, dispersing enemy, flying towards Khaisara and Shakai. Total enemy's loss probably exceeds 250. Our losses heavier than first reported. British officers as previously telegraphed. Native ranks:—Killed: 1st Punjab Cavalry, one; 1st Batn. 1st Goorkhas, two native officers, 17 men. Wounded: 1st Punjab Cavalry, three; 1st Batn. 1st Goorkhas, 32 rank and file; 20th Bengal Infantry, three; followers, killed 23, wounded 20."



Royal Military College Club OF CANADA.

OFFICE OF THE HON. SECRETARY-TREASURER.
QUEBEC, 1st December, 1894.

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION, No. 9, 1894.

No. 1, Annual Dinner & Meeting

The Annual Meeting will be held on Friday, the 1st of March, 1895, and the Annual Dinner on the evening of the same date in the City of Ottawa.

Place of Meeting & Dinner will be in charge of a local Committee.

Members connected with the Army or Militia are requested to appear at the Dinner in the Mess uniform of their respective Corps.

Members are requested to notify the Hon. Secretary if it is their intention of being present in order to facilitate arrangements.

The place of holding Meeting can be ascertained upon application to the Hon. Secretary in the Month of February, or from the Members of the Club in the City upon their arrival to attend the Meeting.

By Order,

ERNEST F. WURTELE,

Captain R. L.

Hon. Secretary-Treasurer,

Royal Military College Club of Canada.

OUR SERVICE CONTEMPORARIES.

There is no finality in gun construction, but improvements and modifications are, as a rule, along fixed lines. A Swedish engineer, however, is credited with taking quite a new departure, for, to diminish, if not entirely to prevent, erosion, he proposes to make the gun as well as the projectile revolve. Holding that it is the wasted gases of combustion which escape between the projectile and the bore of the gun that are the principal cause of deterioration, his suggestion is to give up rifling and revert to smooth bores. This method will, he contends, enable us not only to dispense with the cost of rifling, but to fit the projectile with gas checks, which will render it impossible for any gases to rush past them. Recognising, however, that it is necessary to make the projectile revolve, he has invented a mechanical arrangement which, at the instant of firing, will give the gun itself an axial rotatory motion, the shot or shell receiving its motion from the gun. Moreover he asserts that as he can either make his motion constant or increasing at will, the effect produced will be the same as that given by a constant or increasing twist in the rifling of a gun. The advantages claimed for the new method are improved accuracy of fire, reducing the cost of ordnance by one-half, and an increase in the life of the gun equal to 100 per cent. It seems to be a novel idea, but there are two points which make it appear of doubtful value—first, the question of whether the projectile will revolve with the gun; and secondly, whether the machinery for revolving the gun will not be very complicated and liable to get out of order in action.

M. Ulric de Civry has published in the *Echo de l'Armée* a deeply interesting article upon the French general officers, survivors of the war of 1870. Of those who then held the rank of general of division or brigade, and still live mostly in retirement, he gives a list, and some may be surprised to learn how many of these veterans have been spared. They number 83 in all, and are ranked in the second section of the general staff (reserve and retired), with the exception of Marshal Canrobert and Generals de Ladmirault and d'Exéa, who are maintained on the Active List hors cadre, because they commanded in chief before the enemy, and of Generals Saussier, de Galliffet, Billot, Viel d'Espouilles, and Prince Murat (the last named in disponibilité since the fall of the Empire), who appear still upon the list for active service. The doyen of these gallant soldiers is General Euzenou de Kersalaun, now of the age of 91, who, as Governor of Verdun, defended that place against the invaders. Marshal Canrobert, at the age of 85, is the last survivor of his rank, and with his departure the Marshals of France will have come to an end. Among the more famous or better known names are those of General Bourbaki, who commanded the Imperial Guard and the Army of the East (now aged 78); General Trochu, the defender of Paris (79); General du Barail, commander of the Chasseurs d'Afrique and afterwards of the cavalry of the 6th

Corps (74); General du Preuil, who commanded the cavalry of the Imperial Guard (75); and General d'Auvergne, Chief of the Staff of the Imperial Guard (81). In regard to age, it is interesting to learn that two of these general officers are over 90, four between 86 and 90, 22 between 81 and 85, 24 between 76 and 80, 21 between 71 and 75, seven between 66 and 70, and nine between 60 and 65. It is understood that upon the outbreak of war General Saussier would become commander-in-chief of the French armies, and that Generals de Galliffet and Billot would receive chief commands.

The feeling of hesitation on the part of the French before engaging in too extensive an adventure in Madagascar, a feeling to which intensity is given by the death of the Czar, has found loud and unequivocal expression in the columns of the *Figaro*. M. Francis Magnier, who directs the political views of that paper, and whose prudence and moderation have gained for him wide influence, makes the following curious remarks:—"In the course of this week," he says, "the Chamber will have to pronounce upon the expedition to Madagascar. It is not likely to express disapproval of it. Nobody feels any desire or need to take possession of that island, the possession of which we have very well managed to do without until November, 1894. We know perfectly well that we shall not go there, that our children will not go there, nor our investments, that it is simply a place manufactory, a land of exotic banks, and railways that have no passengers and no traffic. Unfortunately these truths, of which everyone in private is convinced, are forgotten in an artificial enthusiasm the moment that our isolated objections find themselves grouped in the Chamber, in a club, or even a café. This expedition is a very serious thing (I admit, for the sake of argument, that it is necessary). Will the Government admit its seriousness at once? Will it have the courage to mention the necessary sums, not for beginning the campaign, which is a well-known trick, but for its inevitable development? I cannot say; but in any case it is well to give a helping hand." M. Magnier then proceeds to quote a letter received from an officer who has made a careful study of the whole question of the Madagascar campaign, in which the conclusion is come to that the only possible place where the troops can be disembarked is Majunga, which is 450 kilometres from Antananarivo, the goal of the expedition. There is no road by this route, only a path which is almost impracticable to foot soldiers. The first 100 kilometres lie through the fever district. The route is entirely destitute of all supplies, so that the troops would have to be continually provisioned from the rear. The expeditionary corps would have therefore to build a road supplying it with hospital stations and stores guarded by well entrenched posts. The keeping up of the communications with the rear would alone require a force of at least 3,000 men. In the absence of all means of transport the advance could hardly be more rapid than at the rate of four kilometres a day, so that it would take from three to four months to reach Antananarivo. The resistance of this town to attack is likely to be serious, for it is provided with 102 guns, and its position is very strong. At least 15,000 men and several batteries would be needed to take it, and this would bring the total numbers of the expedition to at least 20,000 men. "These things," adds M. Magnier, "are known to specialists, and ought not be hidden from the public which pays, and which is flattered with illusions, not to say lies. The disastrous souvenir of Tonkin, and the carelessness with which the preparations were made for the Dahomey expedition, give us the right to ascertain what the new colonial adventure will cost, and what it will bring in."

News of the Service.

NOTE.—Our readers are respectfully requested to contribute to this department all items of Military News affecting their own corps, districts or friends, coming under their notice. Without we are assisted in this way we cannot make this department as complete as we would desire. Remember that all the doings of every corps are of general interest throughout the entire militia force. You can mail a large package of manuscript, so long as not enclosed in an envelope, for one cent. At any rate, forward copies of your local papers with all references to your corps and your comrades. Address.

EDITOR, CANADIAN MILITARY GAZETTE
P.O. Box, 387, Montreal, Que.

Kingston.

KINGSTON, Dec. 10.—Major-General Cameron, commandant of the Royal Military College, was interviewed recently regarding the plea advanced in the *Toronto News* by the father of ex-Cadet Plummer, in justification of the action of the latter in leaving the college without leave, rather than submit to be hazed by his comrades. The commandant said: "I most emphatically object to the statement that Cadet Plummer was justified in leaving the college as he did, and regarding the statements (made by Mr. Plummer, sr., on the authority, apparently, of his son) in the *Toronto News*, I must say that there is no recognized system of initiation or fagging in the college.

When Plummer was asked by a member of the college staff to state his grievances, he stolidly declined to give me any information whatever. He had already armed himself with a revolver and ammunition as stated by his father to meet the possibility of any attempt being made to cane him. It is impossible for me to regard Cadet Plummer's conduct otherwise than as the result of childish inexperience which, under other circumstances, could be looked upon only as a gross contempt of authority and lack of a proper sense of duty."

The officers of the 14th Battalion P.W. O.R., held their annual meeting on the evening of Wednesday, Nov. 29th. There were present Lt.-Col. Henry Smith, Majors Shannon and Gallaway; Captains, Hora, White, Dupuis, Kent, Sinclair; Lieutenants, Skinner, MacNee, Sutherland, C. M. Strange, E. O. S. Strange, Cartwright, and Surgeon Garrett.

It was decided that in future the corps shall put in the spring drill between March 15th and May 24th, and the autumn drill between September 15th and thanksgiving day, each year. The recruit classes will open on the first day of each period.

Cpts. Kent and White were appointed auditors, and were thanked for past services in that capacity. Majors Skinner and Gallaway and Surgeon Garrett were re-elected to compose the band committee, and Majors Shannon and Gallaway, Cpts. Sinclair and Kent, and Lieut. MacNee were elected as regimental committee.

A vote of thanks was given to Captain Sinclair for his efficient services as paymaster during 1894.

The 14th Club held its annual meeting

immediately after the officers' meeting had been closed. All the members being present.

The treasurer's financial statement presented was satisfactory, and was adopted, as was also that of the house committee.

The directors for 1895 were elected according to the provisions of the club's charter of incorporation. Lt.-Col. Smith was chosen president, Major Shannon vice-president and chairman of the house committee, Lieut. MacNee, secretary, and Capt. Sinclair treasurer.

It was decided to take steps to increase the usefulness and attractiveness of the club during the incoming year.

A vote of thanks was tendered to Lieut. C. M. Strange, the retiring secretary, for the satisfactory manner in which he performed his duties, and the club expressed its regret at his departure from Kingston.

The 14th Battalion suffers a heavy loss by the departure for Montreal of Lieut. C. M. Strange, who for the past two years, has had charge of "B" Company; and who was one of the most enthusiastic, energetic, and painstaking, as well as one of the most popular officers of Kingston's crack rifle corps.

Lieut. Strange, in whose veins runs the blood of a military family, entered the 14th as a private in 1886, and served in each of the subordinate ranks. After making a very creditable record as a non-commissioned officer, and earning the confidence and esteem of officers and men, he retired from the corps. But in a short time he again became a member, this time taking a second lieutenant's commission. Since being attached to "B" Company, he has bent all his energies to making that company one of the best in the corps. His good intentions were recognized and appreciated by his men who loyally supported him, and in consequence "B" Company is to-day as smart and efficient as any company in the regiment.

Lieut. Strange took a deep interest in the welfare of his own company, and the battalion in general. To his increasing efforts is due in no small degree the success of the regimental rifle association. He organized the regimental tug-of-war team, he was the first officer in the corps to call on his company to perform autumn drill, and he was from the first a staunch supporter of the proposition to establish the regimental gymnasium which is accomplishing such good work at present.

In athletic and social circles, Lieut. Strange was also a leader. He was last season secretary of the Kingston skating rink, and this season was unanimously elected as honorary president of the Granite Hockey Club. He was equally well-known and popular in football, tennis, yachting, and canoeing circles.

As secretary of the Macdonald Club of this city, he rendered important services to that organization, and the members of the 14th Club, testify to the value of his work as secretary of that club.

Before leaving Kingston he was entertained to an oyster supper and presented with a gold-headed ebony cane, accompanied by an address by the men of "B" Company 14th Battalion. He was tender-

ed a farewell dinner in the officers' mess-room at Tête-du-Pont barracks by a number of his friends, who took advantage of the occasion to present him with a beautiful gold monogram locket.

Lieut. Strange takes a position with the hardware firm of Lewis Brothers & Co., of Montreal, with whom he will doubtless soon prove as great a favorite as he was with all his acquaintances in the Limestone city.

Captains Gaudet and Hudon, of "A" Field Battery R.C.A., have returned from England where they had been taking a course of instruction. They each bear testimony to the benefit to be derived from this course. Their time was fully taken up with their studies and the performance of the duties assigned to them.

Sergt. Hamilton, "A" Field Battery, rescued the seven year old son of Armorer Sergt. Worth, of the same corps, from death by drowning in the Rideau River the other day.

The following non-commissioned officers of "A" Battery have obtained certificates: Sergt. F. Kelly, first-class, grade B, with an average percentage of 78 marks; Sergt. W. A. Wanless, first B, average 92; Corporal William Prenter, first B, average 75; Bombardier E. H. Gray, average 79; Bombardier A. McCully, average 80; Bombardier K. McKinnon, first B, average 84.

Lieut. G. R. Moore, Kingston Field Battery, has been confirmed in his rank from 3rd April, 1894.

Second Lieut. Otto E. Hewton, 47th Frontenac Battalion, has obtained a 2nd class, grade A certificate, and is confirmed in his rank from 30th September, 1894.

Eleven graduates of the Royal Military College, who passed their final examinations last summer, have been appointed lieutenants in the active militia.

We are still anxiously looking for the militia list for 1894, which is likely to be a posthumous production.

VIDETTE.

Ottawa.

The Ballistics of the Rifle.

The above was the subject of a most interesting and instructive lecture delivered by Major Perley before the Ottawa Brigade. Marksmen who heard this lecture enjoyed a treat, and many preconceived ideas were dispelled and doubtful points rendered clear. The expansion of the powder was the first point treated of. Commencing at the flight of the bullet from the muzzle of the gun to the object aimed at the lecturer showed, by the aid of a chart, how the velocity of the bullet was measured. Another interesting example was the trajectory. Aiming at 500 yards distance, it was shown that the bullet passed 4½ feet above the plane at 100 yards, 7½ at 200 yards, about 8¼ at 300 yards, and 5.89 feet at 400 yards, descending from the top of the curve, which was a little beyond 300 yards, at an angl

greater by one fifth than the angle of ascent into the mark at 500 yards. In fact the whole lecture was bristling with interesting points and had to be heard to be appreciated. There is a probability of its appearing in pamphlet form.

Major-General Herbert, in moving a vote of thanks, made reference to the new rifle, Martini-Metford, which he trusted would be in use by next year, and he said that he was satisfied with the rifle but not with the ammunition that was used with it. Col. Panet, Deputy Minister of Militia, seconded the vote of thanks which, needless to say, was carried unanimously.

The Gilmour Trophy.

A report that the 57th Batt. had won this cup was current last week. When Lt.-Col. Aylmer was seen in reference thereto, he said that he was not aware that it had been decided, as all the comparative efficiency returns were not yet in. This trophy is a cup presented by Lt.-Col. A. Gilmour to the best drilled and equipped infantry battalion in Districts 3 and 4.

Rumored Changes.

There were a good many rumors around town this week anent various changes in a city corps. Investigation revealed that one resignation was at least an accomplished fact, Lt. C. D. Fripp, of the G. G. F. G., having resigned. Mr. Fripp has been a member of the Guards for some twelve years, having risen from the ranks. He was a most painstaking and popular officer, and will be missed by his former comrades. It would not perhaps be fair to mention the names of the other officers who are spoken of as having resigned, but at least this may be said, that if it be true there will be a great many vacancies to fill and those, too, of a senior position.

Major-General Herbert left yesterday afternoon on a visit of inspection to Esquimaux, B.C. Surg.-General Bergin, M. P., will accompany him as far as Winnipeg in his official capacity.

The Artillery Ball.

The non-com. officers and men of the Ottawa Field Battery held their annual ball on Friday evening last in Harmony Hall. The affair was a decided success and the committee, composed of Sergt.-Major Ingram, Sergts. Paynter, Shattuck and Brown, Corp. Curson, Bomb. Farle and Shore, and Gunner Moore, deserved the praise which was freely given them. The 43rd Batt. orchestra supplied the music for dancing, in excellent style. The various uniforms contrasted prettily with the brilliant costumes of the ladies. Among those present were Major and Mrs. Bliss, Capt. Bowie, Lt. Eaton, Lt. Bliss, Lt. Gallway, G.G.F.G., Sergt.-Maj. Powell, P.L.D.G., Sergt.-Major Davis, G.G.F.G., Sgt.-Maj. Mahoney, 43rd Batt. Downstairs there was provided an elaborate menu, supplied by Mr. Turner. At an early hour Saturday morning the merry gathering dispersed well pleased with their evenings enjoyment.

"LANCE."

Quebec.

Mr. H. J. Lamb, U.L., spent a few days in the city last week and has gone to Ottawa. He was recently in charge of work on the Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. Engineering Department.

Capt. P. H. duPerron Casgrain, of the Royal Engineers, an old Quebecer, has passed a successful examination in the Russian language and is qualified to be an interpreter. His many friends are much pleased at the success he has attained.

Major G. E. Allen Jones, Band President of the 8th Royal Rifles, called for a meeting of the members of the Bugle Band for the purpose of commencing their annual practice. The meeting took place on the 5th inst.

The War Office have granted a special Infantry Commission to Mr. F. C. Heneker, who graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada in June last. It is stated that he will be gazetted to the Leinster Regiment. This is the first instance of a graduate of the college in question receiving a commission in the old 100th or Royal Canadians.

A general meeting of the ordinary members of the Quebec Garrison Club was held on the 5th inst at the club house, called for the purpose of considering certain notices of motion in connection with the constitution and by-laws. Some 25 members responded to the call. Lt.Col. T. J. Duchesnay occupied the chair. Capt. Chas. J. Dunn, the energetic secretary, was on hand and as usual performed his duties to the satisfaction of all concerned.

The Quebec Garrison Hockey Club was recently formed in this city and held a meeting at the Garrison Club on the evening of the 5th inst. The membership is limited to the officers of the Garrison. The following office bearers were elected: -Hon President, Lt-Col T J Duchesnay, D A G; Hon Vice-President, Lt-Col Montizambert, R C A; President, Lt-Col Wilson, R C A; sec-treas, Henri Aranet, R C A; Capt, R Davidson, 8th Royal Rifles. Committee:—Capt Ouellet, 9th Batt; Mr J Ogilvy, R C A, and Mr Turner, Q O C H. The colors of the new club are to consist of maroon and white. It is expected that a match will be arranged with the officers of the Governor-General's Foot Guards of Ottawa, to take place in that city during carnival week.

Since my last letter on the subject of heavy ordnance in the drill hall, there has been added a 40 pr field gun and two 64 pr guns. The one end is now completely blocked with a 6 inch and a 9 inch gun and the 40 pr in question, occupying a space of some 90 feet by 43 and the opposite end with five carriages and four 64 pr guns. It is expected that another gun will shortly be placed in the hall to be put in position on the carriage which at present is in excess of the number required. The Riflemen certainly

have a just ground to complain, as it was never intended that the hall should be transferred into a gun shed.

Certain improvements have taken place since the last annual training, namely, the walls whitewashed and a new railing around the galleries, a much needed improvement, as the light iron railing which was originally placed was a constant source of danger. The change consists of a substantial railing of hard wood. The good work should not cease here, as the ceiling and the rafters if whitewashed would be the means of adding considerably to the general appearance of the hall and permit of a better light. This and the question of flooring and removal of the guns should be taken up at once if it is intended that the annual training of the local corps prove beneficial to them.

The 8th Royal Rifles have received an invitation to be present at the carnival, which will take place in Ottawa in January. Should the matter of transportation be satisfactorily arranged with the authorities, it is anticipated that the regiment would turn out very strong and give a good account of themselves. Doubtless it is arranged that a parade of the local troops of that city will be held and an attack on snow shoes prove to be one of the leading features of the carnival. The attack on the citadel which formed a part of Quebec's carnival, was a pretty sight and much enjoyed by the spectators, although the movements of the troops were much hampered by the condition of the fields, as they were simply one sheet of ice, notwithstanding which, however, the 8th proved themselves a good regiment on snowshoes as well as otherwise.

PATROL.

Montreal.

All the local corps are looking forward with some interest to the performance of a new play by a local author entitled "The Relief of Gordon," to take place at the Queen's Theatre next week, for the benefit of the Free Coal Fund. All the city corps are sending detachments to appear in the production, and a competition in the manual, firing and bayonet exercises is to take place for the cups presented by Simpson, Hall, Miller & Company. Major-General Herbert is to attend the last performance and present the prizes.

There is yet some uncertainty as to the establishment of a branch military school here this winter in connection with the St. Johns School. It has been proposed to take the vacant quarters of the Victoria Rifles and the Engineers at the drill hall as quarters, but this is strenuously opposed by many officers who say that the city contributed a large amount towards the construction of the drill hall for the use of the Montreal militia and maintain that the school has no right to quarters there. The accommodation proposed to be appropriated, too, is badly needed for extra accommodation

by the corps at present occupying armouries at the drill hall.

Some officers, too, object to the establishment of a temporary school here as they say if this is once done Montreal will never get the barracks and the full company she is entitled to. There are not wanting either, those who say that the proposal to establish a "one-horse" school here is a scheme to make it appear that there is no need for a school here. Naturally there would not be a very large attendance at a makeshift course, and this would give the authorities an excuse to say that this long felt want does not exist.

Lieut. Col. Houghton, D.A.G., at the Governor-General's drawing-room, had as a staff the city commanding officers and three officers of each corps.

Surprise is expressed that some of the prizes won at the last match at the P. Q. R. A. meeting have not been paid. It appears that the trouble arose out of some mistakes in the scores.

Duke of Connaught's Own Canadian Hussars.

Number One Troop furnished a smart escort for His Excellency the Governor-General and the Countess of Aberdeen on the occasion of their drawing-room in the Montreal Art Gallery, Monday the 10th.

Sword and dismounted drill is already in full swing.

Montreal Field Battery.

Thursday, the 13th, the battery held its second assembly of the season in the armoury. It was a complete success.

About the first of the month Lt.-Col. Montizambert, R.C.A., was in the city and inspected the quarters and equipment of the battery. He found that the harness wants remending, which is not to be wondered at considering that it has been in use for thirty years.

The battery gymnasium has been opened and is already well patronized.

Montreal Garrison Artillery.

The Garrison Artillery turned out a fine guard of honor for the Governor-General, Monday, the men parading in winter uniform.

Lieut.-Col. Montizambert inspected the stores early in the month and found them in apple-pie order.

Prince of Wales Regiment.

The sergeants of the Prince of Wales Rifles held a social at their armoury on the 12th.

Everything promises a most successful year for the first battalion.

Victoria Rifles.

The armoury is being better patronized than ever this year.

Drilling is well under way, and quite a large recruit class has already been formed.

The regimental bowling team took the M.A.A. team handily into camp at the match on November 7th and 8th.

The reserves are booming this year, thanks to the new blood infused into the ranks. On the 17th inst., the anniversary of the organization of the regiment, a commemorative dinner is to be held.

Number Two Company held an oyster supper, followed by a smoking concert on the 11th.

Royal Scots.

The regimental band has been engaged to play at the Victoria rink this season.

"D" Company held its annual dinner at the Richelieu Hotel, Thursday, 6th, and a jolly gathering it was. Among those present were Lieut.-Cols. Strathy and Caverhill, Majors Ibbotson and Gault, Captains Cantlie (commanding), Foster, Fowles and Lydon, and Sergt.-Major Currie. During the evening Captain Cantlie presented each man with a photograph of the company on parade.

The battalion feels much honored at the appointment by His Excellency of Lieut.-Col. Strathy as extra A.D.C.

6th Fusiliers.

It is announced that the resignation of Captain Chambers, the adjutant of the regiment, has been sent in owing to the increased exactions of his profession upon his time. Captain Chambers has been ten years connected with the 6th Fusiliers, and all that time has been captain of the regimental rifle team, which won many coveted trophies while under his command. Previous to his connection with the Sixth he served in the ranks in No. 3 Company of the Victoria Rifles under Captains (now Lieut.-Cols.) Henshaw and Starke. Prior to that again, he served for several years in the old High School Cadets, passing through the ranks of corporal, sergeant, sergeant-major, 2nd lieutenant and lieutenant to that of captain, in which capacity he commanded the company which went to Quebec at the time of the big review before the late Duke of Albany and H.R.H. the Princess Louise. During the North-west rebellion he obtained leave from his regiment and went to the front as chief correspondent of the Montreal Star, having four other correspondents under his direction. He accompanied General Middleton throughout the entire campaign, with the exception of the steamboat trip from Prince Albert to Battleford, when he accompanied Lieut.-Col. Van Straubenzie's flying column via Fort Carlton. He was present at the battles of Fish Creek and Batoche, and for services rendered in the field was recommended for and obtained the medal and clasp as a special case. Up to the end of last year he commanded "F" Company, which at the last inspection under his command won the highest possible number of points for drill, the only company in Canada to do so. In 1887 Captain Chambers acted as adjutant of the 50th Huntingdon Borderers during Granby camp, and in 1889 as adjutant of the 60th Missisquoi Battalion at St. Johns camp, and the commanding officers of

both of these corps applied for Captain Chambers as adjutant when called out for their annual training. Captain Chambers holds both second and first-class special course certificates from the Royal School of Infantry, being at the head of a large class of attached officers when he obtained his first-class certificate.

The annual turkey shoot at the Morris tube ranges for a large number of prime birds presented by the thoughtful C. O. of the regiment, Lieut.-Col. Burland, is now going on, and there are a large number of competitors on hand every Wednesday and Saturday.

"F" Company association held its annual dinner Friday evening, December 7th. Lieut. W. B. Converse presided, and Col.-Sergt. Pratt occupied the vice-chair. The event was a success in every respect, the dinner being a good one, and the after dinner songs and speeches above the usual standard.

The Royal United Service Institution.

The historic pile known as the Banqueting House, Whitehall, so closely connected with one of the great tragedies of English history, is soon, says the *Morning Post*, to pass into the hands of new masters, and to enter on a fresh phase of existence. Her Majesty has graciously assigned the building to the use of the Royal United Service Institution, but as the space thus secured is insufficient, the Council have determined to add further accommodation on an adjoining site, a lease of which has been obtained from the Crown. This additional building is now practically complete, and the Institution may be thus congratulated on being suitably housed in a handsome structure of unique interest, situated in one of the finest thoroughfares of the metropolis. The history of the Banqueting House in one sense may be said to date much further back even than the time of the Stuarts, for though erected by Inigo Jones in 1619, it arose on the ashes of a considerably older palace which had at one time been the residence of Cardinal Wolsey, and was consumed by fire two years before the present building was completed. The elegant proportions of the latter are familiar to every Londoner, and will be recognized at once in any old print of Whitehall, towering above the humbler dwellings that long continued to hem it in. Striking though it is in appearance, it forms only a small part (Mr. E. M. Barry says one-fortieth) of Inigo Jones's original design, which included a palace with a frontage of 1,152 ft., and would, in all probability, have solved the problem of the accommodation of our public offices for many generations to come. But, like Sir John Soane's equally ambitious and undeniably tasteful designs for the Government offices south of Downing-street, Jones's project had to be relegated to the limbo of unsanctioned

schemes, which want of funds has at various times prevented the Government from carrying out. The Banqueting House itself cost £17,000 (of which Rubens received £4,000 for his decorated ceiling); so, *ex pede Herculem*, we can form some idea of the total sum which the complete design would have entailed. The present building was converted into a Chapel Royal by George I., and up to four or five years ago was devoted to public worship, while on the Thursday preceding every Good Friday the time-honoured ceremony of the distribution of the Maunday money took place within its walls. From this, and from the past glories of Whitehall Palace, "the most polite Court in Europe," as Walpole styled it, to the picturesque lumber of the United Service Museum—with its javelins and arquebuses, models of three-deckers, Brown Besses, and a thousand and one types of more or less obsolete armaments—the change is great indeed. Nevertheless, we cannot say for a moment that it is an unworthy one, for the objects of the Institution are such as touch our very existence as a nation.

It was in 1831 that a knot of officers of both services became persuaded of the necessity of some organisation of naval and military science and literature, and founded the present Institution as a concrete embodiment of their views. Since then the Institution has undergone gradual development, and at the present day forms a most useful adjunct to the naval and military services. Its famous museum contains specimens of weapons and accoutrements from all parts of the world, and models illustrative of the progress of naval architecture and of the manufacture of guns and small arms. In addition to the museum there are various useful departments. The topographical room contains a large number of maps, plans, and charts, and during the progress of any military operations the positions of the contending armies are there shown on large-scale maps. There is a library of more than 20,000 volumes in various languages on professional, scientific, and historical subjects, and a lecture theatre where papers are read and discussed, and also many charitable societies connected with the Army and Navy hold their general meetings. It is, however, the *Journal* which gives the Institution the strongest claim to general support, for in this work are published the papers read in the lecture theatre, together with the ensuing discussions. Part also of each number is devoted to papers which have not been read at the Institution, and to translations and reviews of foreign and other publications on naval and military questions. It will be seen from this that the United Service Institution plays a most useful and, indeed, necessary part in the organisation of our national defences, and one need only turn to the present course of events in the Far East to convince oneself that in the matter of armaments and tactics we of all people in the world cannot afford to relax a studious vigilance. If it be true, as Continental critics allege, that military questions as viewed in England are matters for the specialist rather than for the general public, it is to the influence of the United Service Institution and to its healthy ventilation of such questions that we must look to correct the popular indifference. We heartily commend the cause of this society, and their appeal for funds which the enlargement of the building has necessitated, to the favourable consideration of our readers, for with better accommodation for its various departments there is every prospect that the Institution will enter on a career of increased usefulness.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

Lecture Delivered by Capt. Lee, of
the Royal Military College,
Kingston, before the Mem-
bers of the Military In-
stitute, Montreal,
Nov. 24th, 1894

COL. STARKE AND GENTLEMEN :

Before I commence my lecture, I should like to express my very great thanks to you for, in the first place, inviting me to come here, and, secondly, for your turning out this evening to hear a lecture which, though I hope it may be interesting to you, you came here taking your chances upon, so to speak, not knowing what the result might be.

I see that the lecture has been advertised as being on "The Franco-Prussian Campaign." I am afraid that title is, perhaps, a little too extensive for the lecture I shall be able to give this evening. In fact, when I call to mind the magnitude of the subject, I must ask your indulgence if my task be inadequately performed. To enter into a really satisfactory study of this great struggle, and to discuss all that arises from it, would take a month of evenings like this. Within the limits of one short lecture I can only deal with one portion of the war, and I shall confine my remarks this evening to that period between July 17 and September 1, 1870, that is, the period from the outbreak of hostilities to the downfall of the Empire at Sedan. That period is really the main portion of the war, and also that from which the most valuable strategical lessons are to be derived; and at its conclusion France was prostrate at the feet of Germany.

Before going on to the actual lecture itself, I feel bound to recognize the fact that there are a certain number of officers here of French-Canadian origin, who, though fully loyal to the British flag, yet, in case of war between France and Germany, their sympathies would naturally be with France. I wish to apologize to them (laughter) for having on this occasion to show up France in rather an unfavorable light; but I am sure they will acquit me of any bias in the matter. I am simply here to state facts as they occurred, and really cannot be responsible for the course of history.

Before turning to the actual hostilities, I will run through a brief sketch of the political situation before the war broke out. France and Prussia had long been rivals. The memories of the Napoleonic era ranked very deeply in both nations. Prussia was anxious to wipe out the memories of Jena and the numerous times Napoleon had almost destroyed her. On the other hand, France had very vivid recollections of 1814, and some of 1815 at Waterloo, and she was anxious that these memories should be wiped out. Further, the success of French arms in the Crimea in 1854, and Italy in 1859, had led the French nation to suppose that her military star was once more in the ascendant; and she hoped to wipe out past memories of Waterloo. The lesser war of 1866—Prussia against Austria—in which the Prussian arms were brilliantly successful, was a most unpleasant example to the French nation of the efficiency of the Prussian forces; and from that time France became jealous of Prussia grow-

ing in military power. From 1866 to 1870 it is no exaggeration to say that France was provoking a war, but was not preparing for it; whilst Prussia was protesting, but was at the same time steadily and silently preparing for the great struggle. At the beginning of 1870 the feeling between the two countries was running very high, and, although Prussia was anxious to avoid war, France was bent on provoking it, and finally her action resulted in hostilities.

The ostensible pretext for war was a ridiculous one. The French government objected to the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne, and the King of Prussia, as he was then, King William, gave his consent to the withdrawal of the candidature, which was done. France, not satisfied with this, demanded that, whatever occurred in the future, the King of Prussia should never favor the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne. The government of Prussia could not be dictated to in this way, and refused to discuss the question, and the French minister, Benedetti, left Berlin on July 13th, 1870. War was declared on the 17th, and the declaration was received in Berlin on the 19th. The French nation went into this war with a light heart. The Chamber voted \$100,000,000 for the immediate prosecution of the war, and the French Prime Minister Ollivier and the Minister of War Le Bœuf assured the people that every man was ready down to the last button on the last man's gaiters. The cry all through France was "To Berlin!" Naturally, all Europe was impressed with it, and concluded that France would assume the offensive and invade Germany. When the French declared war they counted largely on the want of co-operation between South Germany and Prussia. Now Germany is a united empire, but then North Germany was the Kingdom of Prussia, and there were a number of states in South Germany—Baden, Wurtemberg, etc.—each with its own king. So far as internal affairs were concerned, these states were not in close sympathy with Prussia, and France calculated on the fact of these jealousies, and that probably South Germany would remain neutral, and that she would only have to deal with Prussia. The first surprise came when the South German states threw in their lot with Prussia and stood united in the face of the common enemy. This had one effect, it gave France a larger field of attack; it gave her South Germany as well, and so laid open the whole country.

The French were really in no condition for war at all. In the first place, they were hopelessly inferior in numbers. France, at the beginning of August, 1870, could not put more than 260,000 efficient troops into the field, besides which she had about 300,000 reserves; but 260,000 troops were all that were available. The Prussians could put, at least, 460,000 regular troops in the field, and had 700,000 reserves behind. Now, turning to other points of the French army, and taking, first of all, their arms, their rifle, the chassepot, was undoubtedly superior to the Germans' needle-gun; but their artillery was inferior to that of the Germans in condition and efficiency. The National Guards were simply an armed log, and the regular army was weakened by the great preferences for substitutes, men in the ranks being able to purchase substitutes. The ranks were thus filled with men not fit for the work. It is an undeniable fact that the French officers were inferior, owing to political and social reasons; they had not that moral tone which inspired the confidence of the men, and they were filled with over-weening, self-esteem and contempt for the Ger-

mans, besides which their men had practically no confidence in them, as was shown throughout the war. The organization of the French forces was about as bad as it could be. The first thing they suffered from was over-centralization. When the order to mobilize went out there were no suitable railways to transport the men from the interior to the frontier. There were four lines of railway running altogether; but they were simply commercial railways, and were unavailable for the French system of mobilization, under which there were large depots of stores in the interior and large forces near the frontier. The men forming the army lived in different parts of the country, and were forwarded by rail to the frontier, where they were supposed to be served with accoutrements food, etc., and to be sorted out into their different ranks. It might have come all right in time; but hopeless confusion resulted. Men on arriving at Metz found their boots were at Strasburg, and things which should have been at Thionville were found at Nancy. The staff officers were inefficient, and were giving contradictory orders; men were wandering aimlessly about in all directions, and before the end of July it became evident that the French army was quite incapable of taking the offensive, and was quite inferior in numbers.

Over the whole period from 1866 onwards the Germans had been preparing for this great war, and every detail had been worked out. At the end of 1868 and beginning of 1869 Von Moltke issued a memorandum for a possible campaign against France, drawing up in detail the movements of every man, practically, and including time-tables of every train. War was practically declared on July 16, and on that date a single message, "Crede mobile," was flashed over the wires all over Germany, and within two hours this vast machine was put in motion. These two words lighted the train, and within the period July 16-23 mobilization was completed in every detail. From July 23rd to August 2nd, the concentration of the troops by rail took place. The army corps were mobilized in their own districts, and were transported to the front. In that period the German forces of 460,000 were mobilized to the appointed rendezvous.

To take the plans of the opposing sides, the French, in their first light-hearted feelings, calculated on being able to concentrate with superiority of rapidity to the Germans, and that this superiority of rapidity would enable them to surprise the enemy. Their idea was to attack South Germany first. They were going to mobilize their arms, consisting of seven army corps, in the following manner: There was to be one at Strasburg, under Bazaine, of 100,000 men; 150,000 more at Metz, under Marshal MacMahon, and 50,000, under Canrobert, at Chalons. Their idea was that the Metz and Strasburg armies should combine, cross the Rhine about Carlsruhe, and fall on South Germany before Prussia could come to its assistance. They expected to easily overwhelm South Germany, and proposed to operate from there along the River Mayne, and so turn the German flank in exactly a similar way to what Napoleon did at Jena, in 1806. They then proposed to strike up to Berlin, having made terms with South Germany, and would only have Prussia to deal with. The frontier formed a regular salient angle into Germany. To the north-east and east of France was the Palatinate and the neutral territory of Luxemburg, and to the south-east was Switzerland. Therefore, the possible line of invasion was restricted to the gap between Luxemburg and Switzerland. Unless they wished to violate the neutrality

of these countries, and neither side could afford to do that, the avenue of approach to either France or Germany was that gap, which was further narrowed by the Vosges Mountains, which run up from the bend of the Rhine past Strasburg, and practically die away at Wiessenburg, where they become mere spurs of hills, and practically cease as an obstacle to invasion.

The German plan had been matured years before. Their forces were to be concentrated into three great armies. These armies assembled in the territorial districts where the men lived, and each corps had a line of railway of its own leading up to the frontier, nine in all—six from North and three from South Germany. Each proceeded to the front by its own line of railway, and throughout the entire campaign, even to before Paris, each corps was supplied by its own line. Consequently the burden of the war was spread evenly over the whole of Germany, and confusion was absolutely eliminated. They were further concentrated into three great armies, which were to rendez-vous in the Palatinate, along the line of the River Saar. The base of operations was from Coblenz to Gernershem. They advanced over that space. The first army, under Steinmetz, consisting of 85,000 men, concentrated at Sarrelouis; the second, consisting of 205,000 men, under Prince Frederick Charles, the "Red Prince," concentrated in the direction of Saarbruck, and the third, consisting of 172,000 men, under the Crown Prince, Prince Frederick William, who became the late German Emperor, crossed the Rhine at Gernershem, and concentrated opposite Landau.

I want to show you the perfect working out of that plan. When it was formed two years before Von Moltke did not know whether the French would be able to assume the offensive or not; but he disposed the troops so as to be in the best position, whatever occurred. He formed the best sound general plan. His army was in a central position. No matter on which side the French advanced, he was in a position to fall on their flank. As you know, it would be impossible for an army to advance into South Germany with an immense army on its flank, so he chose a central position, and one which, from its geographical situation, was also the shortest to Paris. These three armies were not acting independently at all, although they were three separate armies. They were joined together by basic operations, and there was constant telegraphic communication between them, and they all subordinated their movements to the general plan. Supposing that the French did not assume the offensive, what the Germans were to do was to come straight down, and turning the French right, drive them away from the south of France, which was the rich portion of the country, where they could get the best portion of their supplies, and try to drive them up to the Belgian frontier, where they would be hemmed in.

Towards the end of July it became very evident that the French could not assume the offensive, and Europe saw that the campaign would devolve into an invasion of France by Germany, instead of Germany being invaded by France, Napoleon III very soon saw the folly of the venture. When war was declared he was passive, because his dynasty was in such a state that he did not like to put himself into opposition to the public feeling. When he saw the folly of the step that had been taken he should have fallen back and taken up a strong defensive position, such as the Rivers Moselle or Meurthe, which had on them numerous large fortresses. If he had done so, he could have opposed the advance of the invader for a consider-

able period. But such was the feeling in Paris that not an inch of territory should be given up to the invader, and he was so ruled in Paris by the general feeling and the press, that he dare not retreat, and so he adopted the half-hearted measure of standing in a position that offered no advantage, and awaited the German attack. When the Germans decided on the offensive the only question was which of the three armies should commence the attack. The army on the right was favorably placed for advancing and turning the French left flank; but owing to the railways in the Palatinate not being constructed for strategic purposes, the concentration of the troops could not be made so perfect. The second army was not in a position for turning either flank, and, moreover, it was intended for a general reserve. Therefore, the third army remained. It was concentrated near Landau, and the whole country afforded opportunities for approaching the French lines with a degree of secrecy. The French neglected all reconnoitring, and were ignorant of the German movements. The country specially favored a hidden advance. If the army could get round the French right, it would compel it either to retreat or to go north. If it went north, it would be driven up to neutral territory, which it could not enter, and it could also be assailed in front by the first and second armies, and if they succeeded in turning it in the other direction, they could take Strasburg without opposition. Supposing they failed, they would be driven back into their own territory, and would not be hemmed in against a neutral territory. Therefore everything pointed to the third army commencing hostilities.

The French saw that their left was being threatened, so Napoleon, who was practically in command, put more troops to strengthen his left, and the forces were set out from Sarrelouis to Wiessenburg, standing right at the front to try and keep the Germans from crossing, and purely for sentimental reasons. Between Sarrelouis and Metz was Bazaine, with the second, third and fourth corps; at Bitsch was the fifth corps, and at Wiessenburg was MacMahon, with the first corps, and at Strasburg and further south was the seventh corps. The army of Chalons was still there. Here they waited in a line no less than eight miles in length. There was no proper scheme for mutual support, and the country being much broken, it was not good for the support of troops; and they were in about as disorganized a condition as they could be. The people in Paris got impatient, and insisted upon an advance being made. Therefore, at the end of July Napoleon ordered Bazaine to cross at all costs; but he could not do it; the troops were not in a condition to accomplish it. However, on August 2nd, his second corps, under General Frossard, attacked the German outposts at Saarbruck, with the result that the Germans were driven out of that place. The French considered this such a magnificent achievement that they retired to the heights of Spicheren and took positions there.

The third German army commenced to assume the offensive, and on August 6th it advanced from Landau to Wiessenburg. At Wiessenburg was MacMahon's advance guard, the second division of the first corps, which was attacked by nearly the entire force of the German army, with the result that it was practically annihilated, and General Douay, the commanding officer, was killed. MacMahon fell back to Woerth, where he had the first corps assembled—the first division of the seventh corps from Strasburg—and had altogether from 40,000 to 45,000 men there. He had a very strong

position in a strategical, tactical, topographical, and every other sense. Standing here, supposing the third army was advancing on Strasburg, he threatened it and covered the main line to Paris, and also, indirectly, the line to Bitsch and Metz. Therefore, his position was an exceedingly strong one.

The Crown Prince, who was in command of the third army, did not intend to attack MacMahon until August 9th; but his advance guard got mixed up with MacMahon's corps and had to be extricated, and the battle of Woerth occurred on August 6th, instead of the 7th, as was intended. The French were outnumbered and after a severe battle their right was cut off and driven to Strasburg, and their central left was driven back, with great confusion to Saverne.

After the battle the Germans pursued badly. In the first place, they were very much exhausted; and, in the second place, night came on and they were greatly misled by the troops of De Faily, which when driven back, retreated to Bitsch. The Germans thought it was the main French retreat. They concluded that MacMahon would retreat to Bitsch; but he retreated to Saverne. There is no doubt that the Germans did not exercise proper skill in this pursuit, and they allowed MacMahon's force to retreat unmolested, and had only a vague idea where it had gone. When MacMahon retreated to Saverne his force became so disorganized that he never ceased retreating until he had covered a distance of 200 miles, and reached Chalons. Anyone would have thought that he would have established touch with Bazaine; but he fell right back, coming through Lunville and Neufchateau, on the south. On the 14th August he got his men on the trains there, and reached Chalons by rail on the 20th August.

On the 6th August the first German army, consisting of the third corps of the second army, attacked Frossard at Spicheren, and after a severe battle the French were driven back to Sarreguemines.

By these two battles—Spicheren and Woerth—La Fère, who was at Bitsch, found himself a projecting post, so to speak, and he decided to retreat. Consequently, after the battle of Spicheren he followed after MacMahon, falling back through Nancy and Toul, and also proceeding by rail to Chalons, which he reached on the 20th August. Further, the seventh corps, from Coulmiers and Strasburg, also proceeded by rail, and reached Chalons on August 20th.

Meanwhile, the French Government had organized another corps, the twelfth, which joined MacMahon at Chalons, so that on the 20th, he had these troops assembled at Chalons camp—the first corps, the fifth, the seventh and the twelfth—a total of about 140,000 men, in an exceedingly disorganized condition.

We will leave MacMahon for a moment, and will glance at the third German army, which was pursuing him, having found out the direction of his retreat. One division—the Baden division—was detailed down to Strasburg, to invest it, and small forces were left to watch the fortresses in the Vosges Mountains—Phalsbourg, Bitsch, and so on. The remainder then proceeded through the Vosges, spreading themselves as much as possible, to make subsistence easier, advanced by way of Nancy after MacMahon.

We will return to the forces in the north. The battle of Spicheren is over, and Bazaine has drawn in the forces he had on his right and left, and has assembled them, to the number of about 135,000, to the east of Metz, near Boulay. On the 9th of August, Napoleon ordered

him to stand to the east of Metz, and when the Germans advanced he was to threaten their flank. It was very sound as far as it went; but about this time Napoleon had completely lost his head. He was being eternally bothered from Paris by the press, causing him to issue contradictory orders; and finally he ordered Bazaine to retreat to Verdun, and to try and combine with MacMahon. On August 14th, Bazaine was retreating through Metz, closely followed by the first and second German armies. He passed through Metz very slowly, his baggage waggons having difficulty in getting through the narrow streets, which caused him to delay, with the result that, when the greater portion of his forces had got across the Moselle, the rear portion was attacked by the advance guard of the first German army, the seventh corps. Upon this Bazaine halted, and sent the first and second French corps back through Metz to resist the German attack, and the battle of Borny, or Colombey, as it is sometimes called, occurred. It was practically a drawn battle, but so far as the tactical fighting was concerned, it might be considered a French victory. This had the effect of inspiring the French and infusing a certain amount of *morale* into them. Strategically, it was one of the worst blunders ever committed, because the delay Bazaine made in Metz allowed the German armies to approach him.

While this battle was going on, the rest of the first and second German armies were advancing in the direction of Pont-a-Mousson. They crossed the Meuse there, and wheeled up to the north. They left behind one corps to watch the east of Metz. Bazaine, who was now cut off, was naturally obliged to face them, which he did, and on the 16th August occurred the battle of Rezonville, between the first and second German armies and Bazaine's forces. It was an extremely severe battle. The French were superior in numbers, and attacked the Germans as they arrived on the ground. They outflanked the Germans' right, and were very nearly dividing them, until the celebrated cavalry charge at Mays-la-Tour took place, in which an entire troop of German cavalry sacrificed themselves, in order to delay the French until assistance came up. Practically, the battle was a drawn one tactically, and yet strategically, it was a victory for the Germans, because it effectually stopped Bazaine's retreat further than Verdun. After the battle Bazaine pivoted his army round on the left, and formed up facing to Verdun, his back to Metz. The Germans continued to wheel their armies and came round and faced him, thus effectually cutting him off from Verdun. His extreme right was at Roncourt, his left at Gravelotte, an extremely natural position. But, with the extraordinary forces the Germans had all along, the French were outnumbered two to one, and after one of the most bloody battles of modern times—Gravelotte—Bazaine's forces were driven back into Metz. The French lost the battle largely from the fact that their reserve did not support their left, and their right was practically cut off. Of the ten corps which formed the two German armies, seven were told off to invest Metz. There was practically a circle being formed round it—and the three remaining corps were formed into a separate army, called the fourth, under the Crown Prince of Saxony. It was ordered to advance on Verdun; so that we now have the third and fourth German armies advancing in echelon. Strasbourg and a number of the small places around were invested, and Metz was practically so. That was the situation on the 18th August. The formal invest-

ment of Metz had not taken place yet; but the German troops were closing around it.

We will now leave Metz for a while. MacMahon had been organizing his troops all this time and trying to get his 140,000 men into fairly efficient condition. Von Moltke, knowing of this concentration at Chalons, expected the course of events would be that MacMahon would take a position at Troyes, and so be able to threaten the German flank when the army advanced towards Paris. This would give him the whole of the south of France at his back, and the Germans would not be able to pass by him. But supposing that he did not stand at Troyes, Moltke thought he would stand at Rheims. Moltke was not prepared for the apparently suicidal course that MacMahon took. But it was not his fault. He was largely forced to take the line he did by pressure from Paris. He was ordered to relieve Bazaine at Metz, and pursuant to that order he started to march towards that city. It was now that he commenced to make a mistake himself. He had two lines of advance, one of which was possible, the other impossible; and he chose the impossible. He advanced along the northern line by way of Rheims, Rethel and Vouziers. He had received dispatches from Bazaine to say that about the 26th or 27th of August he would make a great sortie from Metz, and would try and combine with MacMahon in the neighborhood of Montmedy. Therefore, MacMahon decided to march north. By doing so he exposed his right flank to the German army. As soon as the Germans saw what he was up to, they executed what is known as "the great strategic wheel," one of the most remarkable examples of manœuvring which has been known in the history of the world. In two days they altered their line of march to one exactly at right angles to their previous direction. This looks very simple on paper. But think what it meant! It meant an entire change of direction and an entire change of the whole supply system. Nothing but the most marvelously perfect organization could have enabled it to be done. The third and fourth German armies were turned up north to strike MacMahon in the flank. Their idea was that the fourth army should advance up along the line of the River Meuse, and stop MacMahon. Meanwhile, the third army was to come up and fall on his flank in the rear, and together they were to drive him up against the frontier. MacMahon advanced in this northerly direction, and when he got to Beaumont, on the 28th August, he was attacked by the fourth army, and his forces were driven down the Meuse in the direction of Sedan. The third army came up on his flank in the rear, and on the 31st August he was driven into Sedan. These two armies closed in, the fourth on the east and the third on the other three sides, shutting him in completely. Sedan lies in a sort of hollow. The French were in the hollow, and the Germans were around. The battle of Sedan ensued the next day. The French were caught in a trap and were utterly unable to resist the artillery, and 185,000 men, as well as the Emperor Napoleon, surrendered.

The two sorties from Metz on the 31st August and 1st September failed and Metz itself capitulated on October 27th.

The whole of the French field army had been either wiped out or captured, and with the capture of the Emperor himself at Sedan, naturally the Empire came to an end. The field armies being dispersed, France was practically prostrate at the feet of Germany.

The Germans had six forces investing

Metz. The remaining 240,000 men marched on Paris, and on September 17th Paris was invested.

As I have to discuss shortly the strategic lessons of the campaign, I am unable to carry the course of hostilities further; but, as you know, they lasted until February 28th, when Paris capitulated and the treaty of Frankfurt, in which the terms of peace were settled, was signed on May 10th, 1871, with the most disastrous results to France. By it they lost the whole of Alsace and the whole of Lorraine, including the great fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz, and had to pay an indemnity of a thousand million dollars. They lost 385,000 men and 11,800 officers, besides 100,000 men who were driven to Switzerland and lay down their arms there. They lost over 1,600 field guns, 3,500 garrison guns, 600,000 rifles, and about one-third of France was in the occupation of Germany. Such a big prostration has never been seen in the world's history.

Let us turn to some of the strategical lessons that we may learn from this campaign; let us look at some of the most obvious errors made, and see how they might have been remedied. The first great fundamental error was the total unpreparedness of France for war. She provoked the conflict. The next error was when the French saw that they could not assume the offensive, they should have adopted a reasonable compromise, and taken up a strong line and awaited an attack, instead of which they headed to Alsace and Lorraine, when it became evident that they could not hold out without being destroyed.

To take the errors of individuals. Here was MacMahon at Woerth and Wiessenburg. At the first place he exposed one division of his forces to the attack of the entire third German army, with consequent annihilation, and when fighting at Woerth—of course, it was not his fault—he did not get support, as had been supposed he would, from the fifth corps. That was a case of want of mutual support between portions of the French army. When he retreated he did so with very extraordinary precipitation. Supposing that he had retreated for an almost unusually long distance, he could have taken up a position along the line of the Moselle, and extended his left to act with Bazaine, and together they could have formed a line along the Moselle ready to oppose the Germans, who would have found it difficult to turn them out. But instead of retreating towards Bazaine, he retreated away from him. Again, when at Woerth he tried to cover two separate objects—Bitsch and Strasbourg—with the result that he covered neither. He was trying to do too much altogether. When he got back to Chalons and organized his army, it might have been supposed that he would make some good use of it. Napoleon III. was nominally in supreme command; but he did nothing with his army. His great uncle, with an army like that would have cleared out the whole German forces. With 80,000 men he stood against the whole of Europe. But Napoleon III. was a perfect parody compared with his great uncle, and this big force, which had ample time to organize, was completely wasted. He handed it to MacMahon, who was not to blame for not taking up a sound strategical position at Troyes, and opposing the Germans. He was forced to advance towards Metz; but he did it in a suicidal manner. He had only two routes. By taking the northern one he took too small an area, and had no room to get out of the Germans' way, if he were attacked. At Sedan he was only four miles from the frontier, and when driven out he could do nothing but either lay down arms or

be driven on to neutral soil. By the southern route he had a shorter line of advance, and a the whole of the south o rance behind h m to threaten to force the whole German line back to Germany; and if the Germans had had to wheel to the left, instead of to the right, they would have got completely mixed up, as they were in echelon. Everything pointed to the propriety of MacMahon advancing by the southern route towards Metz; but instead of that, he took the northern one, and was completely hemmed in. Further, taking the question of a march, a flank march like he executed is one of the most difficult operations that can be performed by a general. To do it satisfactorily requires not only secrecy, but perfect discipline of the troops, in all of which there was a lamentable deficiency. He took no precautions in the march to hide his route or protect himself from the German flank, with the result that we have seen. There is one more excuse for him: When he got to Vouziers and did not hear any news of Bazaine, he concluded that the enterprise was hopeless, and made up his mind to fall back on Metz, which was the last point eastwards where he could maintain communication with Paris. But he was not allowed to take this course. He received peremptory orders to advance on Metz, and was thus driven on to his fate.

Let us now consider Bazaine's errors. He totally misunderstood the true use of the fortress of Metz. Instead of using it as a pivot for his movements, which he should abandon when it became of no further use, he treated it as his actual base of operations. As General Hamley has said in his book, "He acted like one who, when the ship is foundering, holds on to the anchor to save himself." As soon as he saw that he was cut off, he should have abandoned Metz altogether and gone to Verdun; but after the battle of Rezonville he retreated to Metz, and was shut up there, instead of going towards his friends. The battle of Borny Colombey was almost the most serious blunder of the war. Instead of retreating to Verdun, he gave the Germans sufficient time to come up and cut him off. It has been stated that, in spite of this, by being in Metz, and keeping 200,000 German troops around there, he did as much service as by being in the field. But this is a tame view to take, for it must be remembered that, though he neutralized 200,000 men, he at the same time neutralized himself, and eventually succumbed with his whole force. It has been suggested that there was a brilliant stroke open to him on the 17th August. At that time the first and second German armies had come across the Moselle, and were advancing on Rezonville, and there was only one corps to watch Metz. It has been said that if he had seized this opportunity he could have broken out of Metz, got through the corps, and have got small forces to watch the Moselle to prevent the Germans recrossing, have cut their lines of communication to Germany, have gone back to Strasburg, based himself there, and gone back to the south of France. That looks very well on paper; but in practice it is difficult to see. He, however, held on to Metz like grim death, until he surrendered. I think those are the chief errors committed by the French.

The strategical principles which are chiefly illustrated by the campaign are that an angular frontier, or a salient angle, is an advantage to a nation, if it is actively used. You have the choice of advancing on either side. In this case it is of no significance, because the French did not use it. Their original idea was to leave a force on one side, and the main army to cross and attack south Germany. At

Woerth is shown the folly of attempting to cover two divergent objects at Metz, we see how a small force, such as the seventh German corps, was able to detain the whole French army. At the action at Rezonville we see the effect of one army being compelled to form up front to flank; the French were driven away from the line of communication. Here we see the truth of the old maxim, "The most perilous thing that can be attempted is a flank march in the presence of the enemy." At the battle of Woerth, which was brought on prematurely, we see the disadvantage of large advance guards. The third German army had a very large advance guard, which took a large force out of the hands of the Crown Prince. It got mixed up with the French without the command of the Crown Prince, and as it had to be extricated, this brought on the general action. As a result of that lesson alone, the tendency in recent years has been to reduce the strength of advance guards, so as not to give them a chance of engaging in a conflict.

I think that practically closes all the strategical lessons of this campaign, which are, perhaps, only of interest to the students of the military art. But turning from these, we may come to the great moral lessons which should interest all classes of society. The first is the utter madness of subordinating strategy to politics. In moments of great national emergency—in fact, at all times—the military institutions of the country, that is to say, the army, navy, fortifications, volunteers and everything else, should be the very first concern of the government and of all classes of society, and their management should be left entirely in the hands of those who are thoroughly competent to provide for military exigencies. All political considerations should be ruthlessly thrown into the background. In nearly all great national disasters the downfall has not been traced to the failure of generals in the field, but to their being hampered by the interference of ignorant politicians at home. Take the great Napoleon. The secret of his great success was simply that he was the government and the general in one. He did not consult anybody as to whether he should do this or that; and the result was that the world saw the most extraordinary series of successes that has ever been known. The man acted according to his own intellect.

We also see the folly of relying upon untrained troops, however brave they may be. The French raised large masses of men; but they were quite unable to compete with the splendidly trained German soldiers. Likewise, we see the immense importance of the strictest discipline; and this applies especially to short service troops, and still more to volunteers. In all service nothing but the strictest and most unyielding discipline can hold troops together in the presence of a trained foe. In the French troops want of confidence in their leaders became apparent, and they suspected their officers. Therefore, besides the necessity or the strictest discipline among the men, comes the need of a high moral tone among the officers. They come from the best ranks of society, and must entirely command the confidence and the sympathies of their men; otherwise they will not follow them, and disaster must result. The men themselves were brave enough, but they were not trained, and they had no one they could trust.

Another thing we see is the necessity for a careful system of campaign being drawn out beforehand. Everything should be most carefully arranged in advance; and the system of mobilization of the material economy of an army should be brought down to the finest point possible.

The material of the army should be of the highest quality. The arms, accoutrements, equipment, and everything for the comfort of the troops should be the best procurable. As Lord Chatham said: "In war expense is the true economy;" and this holds good for all time.

Again, we see the fearful evils resulting from the misuse of the press and mob rule in a case when a nation is staking its existence on a great struggle. The movements of all the French generals were hampered by the goadings of the press in Paris, whilst the mob opposed Napoleon in every movement he took, and completely stultified the plans of the able men with the army.

Looking at all these considerations, it seems to me that all the leaders of every party in every country should ever keep before them the folly of subordinating strategy to politics; otherwise the nation used to peace and security may find itself suddenly surprised by all the horrors of national disaster; and in its degradation and ruin it may, perhaps, learn the truth of the words of one of our great poets:

A thousand years scarce serve to form a state;
An hour may roll it in the dust.

(Loud applause).

Admiral Colomb discusses in the *National Review* a phase of the question of Imperial defence which has hitherto received little attention. Admitting that the Colonies maintain 77,000 troops and spend a couple of millions a year in defence, he asks the very pertinent question, what is the use of it all as things are? If Canada and the Cape maintain troops and expend money for the defence of their landward boundaries it is good, because these are boundaries of the Empire. But the other provision (including the annual subsidy of £126,000 which Australia pays to maintain a fleet in her own waters and 32,000 troops) is in a different category. In the event of the outbreak of war, probably neither would be of the slightest use as means of Imperial defence. "They are no defence for Australia if the Imperial defence is complete. They are no defence for Australia if the Imperial defence is so incomplete as to allow her to be attacked, because then their numbers are too small." This is an argument for the concentration of defensive action, and for the contribution of all our colonies to it. In a phrase which irresistibly recalls Artemus Ward, Admiral Colomb speaks of the British Empire "as the greatest thing on earth." It is not a happy way of putting it, but what he means is that being great we may stand against a world in arms—if we choose to be prepared for such an eventuality. But the colonies by themselves can do nothing, and must either stand by the mother country or be prepared for absorption by older and grater nations which fancied them. Admiral Colomb's view is, therefore that the colonies would, as a mere matter of economy, find it cheaper to contribute to the general defence, and help to make this efficient, than to dream either that the matter is no concern of theirs, or that if the British Empire went to pieces they would by some means manage to escape the wreck.

MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS**HEADQUARTERS.**

OTTAWA, November 3rd, 1894.

G. O. 77.**Redistribution of Military Districts.**

1. His excellency, the Governor-General, in virtue of the provisions of clause 17 of the Militia Act, chap. 41, R.S.C., and by and with the advice of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, has been pleased to order as follows, viz.—

(a.) On the 8th February, 1894, that the Province of Prince Edward Island be reconstituted as a separate Military District to be known as No. 12 Military District.

(b.) On the 17th October, 1894, that Lieutenant-Colonel Frederic Strong Moore, P.E.I., Battalion of Garrison Artillery, be appointed Deputy Adjutant General of No. 12 Military District with Headquarters at Charlottetown, P.E.I., at a rate of pay of seventeen hundred dollars (\$1,700) a year in full of all pay and allowances.

2. In pursuance of the above authority, the following amendments are made in General Order 17 of the 3rd June, 1892, viz:—

(a.) Section 1, paragraph 1, and section 2, paragraph 1, are cancelled.

(b.) In subsection 2, alteration of Brigade Divisions, the addition of Prince Edward Island to the 3rd Brigade Division is cancelled. (A.G.O. 40188 M. M. and D. 13608.)

G. O. 78.**Field Hospital Equipment.**

Details of the Field Hospital Equipment issued to Military Districts are published herewith and will be issued to all concerned.

G. O. 79.**Permanent Force.****VETERINARY STORES**

Veterinary Field Panniers have been issued to the following units of the Permanent Force, viz:—

"A" Squadron Royal Canadian Dragoons.

"B" Squadron Royal Canadian Dragoons.

"A" Field Battery Royal Canadian Artillery.

"B" Field Battery Royal Canadian Artillery.

These stores will be held on charge as part of the Mobilization Stores, for the care of which the officer commanding the unit is responsible.

G. O. 80.**PAY AND DOCUMENTS OF MEN ILLEGALLY ABSENT.**

1. The names of men illegally absent will be retained on the Pay-sheets of the units to which they belong, up to the date inclusive, of which their absence is enquired into by a Court of Inquiry. The amount of pay, which would have accrued to them had they been present with their units, will be shewn in the Credit side of the account in the column under "Regimental Pay." It will likewise, after the Court has declared them illegally absent, appear in the Debit side of their accounts under the heading "Charges Credited to the Public," column "Mulct Pay."

2. The documents of men declared illegally absent by a Court of Inquiry will be retained at the Regimental Stations of their units for 5 years as prescribed in Sect. XXII, paragraph 22, Queen's Regulations.

G. O. 81.**Establishments.**

The organization of the following companies of Active Militia has been completed in accordance with the authority notified in General Order (62) of the 21st July, 1894:—

No. 6 Company, 93rd Battalion, Spring Hill, N.S.

No. 6 Company, 94th Battalion, Big Intervale (Margaret), C.B. (A. G. O. 52451.)

G. O. 82.**Allowance for Trumpeters.****(ACTIVE MILITIA.)**

With reference to G. O. (40) of the 1st June, 1894, the Cavalry Corps therein mentioned are permitted to draw the allowance for Bands, granted to them previous to that order, up to the end of the financial year closing the 30th June, 1894. After that date no further claims for this allowance are admissible from any Mounted Corps entitled to draw the allowance for Trumpeters as detailed in the above General Order.

G. O. 83.**Change of the Official Designation of Infantry Schools of Instruction.**

The stations of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry at London, Toronto, St. Johns, P. Q., and Fredericton, respectively, will in future be officially known as No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 Regimental Dépôt, R.R.C.I.

The official designation of the officer appointed to command at each of these stations will be "*Commanding No. Regimental Dépôt R.R.C.I.*"

G. O. 84.**Escorts to Lieutenant Governors at the Opening of Provincial Legislatures.**

1. An escort of Cavalry will be furnished to the Lieutenant Governor of a Province, as provided in the Militia Act, cl. 79, paragraph 4a, only on the occasion of the opening or closing of the Legislature of the Province.

2. The escort on such occasions will not exceed the following strength, viz:—

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 1 Sergeant.
- 12 Rank and file.

3. On receipt of an official notification from the Secretary of the Lieutenant Governor, the Deputy Adjutant General commanding the Military District will detail an escort of the authorized strength from the Permanent Force or if a unit of that force be not available from the Active Militia, without reference to Headquarters.

4. The notification from the Secretary of the Lieutenant Governor will be forwarded to Headquarters with the Pay-list, on which will be quoted as authority clause 79 of the Militia Act, and the number of this order. The expenditure will then be chargeable in the accounts of the Militia Department.

5. No claim will be admitted for expenditure on account of such escorts, beyond the authorized rates of pay of those employed on the duty. (A.G.O. 54012.)

G. O. 85.

November 10th, 1894.

Appointments, Promotions and Retirements.

The following appointments have been approved:

I. HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

Lieutenant Colonel de la C. Irwin, from Inspector of Artillery and Warlike Stores and Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Royal Canadian Artillery, to be Deputy Adjutant General for Artillery at Headquarters, to date from the 5th October, 1864.

2. DISTRICT STAFF.

Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Strong Moore, from Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding the Prince Edward Island Battalion of Garrison Artillery, to be Deputy Adjutant General of Military District No. 12, to date from the 17th of October, 1894.

3. STORE BRANCH.

James Edward Curren, Captain retired list, to be Superintendent of Stores, No. 9 Military District, *vice* McShane, retired with a gratuity.

4. ACTIVE MILITIA.**CAVALRY.**

5TH DRAGOONS.—To be Surgeon: Alexander Dewar, Esquire, M. D., *vice* Hopkins, retired.

ARTILLERY.

MONTREAL BATTALION OF GARRISON ARTILLERY.—Lieutenant William Douglas Macfarlane is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Lieutenant on retirement.

To be Captain: 2nd Lieutenant Frederick William Hibbard, *vice* Reid, promoted.

To be Lieutenant: 2nd Lieutenant Edward Robert Barton, *vice* Macfarlane, resigned.

NEW BRUNSWICK BATTALION OF GARRISON ARTILLERY.—No. 2 Company.—Provisional 2nd Lieutenant Arthur Drake Wetmore having failed to qualify his name is struck off the list of officers of the Active Militia.

To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally: Frederick Allan Foster, Gentleman, *vice* Wetmore, retired.

BRITISH COLUMBIA BATTALION OF GARRISON ARTILLERY.—No. 3 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally: James Parker Hibben, Gentleman, *vice* Holden, retired.

INFANTRY.

1ST BATTALION "PRINCE OF WALES' REGIMENT."—Captain Edmund Thomas Bartlett is permitted to resign his position and to hold the rank of Captain on retirement.

3RD BATTALION "VICTORIA RIFLES OF CANADA."—Captain Edward Patrick Guy, is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Captain on retirement.

To be Captain: Lieutenant Erastus William Wilson, *vice* Guy, resigned.

7TH BATTALION "FUSILIERS."—To be Quarter-Master: Richard Maxwell McElheran, Gentleman, *vice* Mackenzie, retired.

9TH BATTALION "VOLTIGEURS DE QUEBEC."—That part of General Order (63) of the 28th July, 1894, relating to the promotion of Sergeant Louis Leduc to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant, is amended by adding the word "Provisionally" after the word "Lieutenant."

The further services of Provisional 2nd Lieutenant Paul Caron are dispensed with.

14TH BATTALION "THE PRINCESS OF WALES' OWN RIFLES."—Captain Noble Palmer Joyner is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Captain on retirement.

- To be Lieutenant: 2nd Lieutenant Courtlandt MacLean Strange, *vice* Kirkpatrick, promoted.
- 16TH "PRINCE EDWARD" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—Paymaster and Honorary Major Walter T. Ross is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the Honorary rank of Major on retirement.
- No. 3 Company.—For "C. Robert Ferguson," in General Order (55) of the 22nd June, 1894, read "Charles Hobart Ferguson," as the name of the officer therein appointed Captain.
- 17TH "LEVIS" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—Major Auguste Fournier is granted the rank of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel from the 27th June, 1894.
- 25TH "ELGIN" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally: Alexander Addison McCrimmon, Gentleman, to complete establishment.
- 27TH "LAMBTON" BATTALION OF INFANTRY "ST. CLAIR BORDERERS."—No. 3 Company.—To be Captain: 2nd Lieutenant William Henry Douthwaite, *vice* Gattis, retired.
- 28TH "PERTH" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 5 Company.—Provisional 2nd Lieutenant George Currie having left limits his name is struck off the List of Officers of the Active Militia.
- To be Lieutenant: 2nd Lieutenant Henry White Copus, from No. 4 Company. *vice* Jamieson, retired.
- 31ST "GREY" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—Lieutenant-Colonel George Brodie is placed on the retired list under the provisions of paragraph 54, Regulations and Orders, 1887, with permission to hold the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
- To be Lieutenant-Colonel: Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel James Pattison Telford, *vice* Brodie, retired.
- 32ND "BRUCE" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 2 Company.—Captain W. Clifton Loscombe is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Captain on retirement.
- To be Captain: Lieutenant Hugh Clark, *vice* Loscombe, retired.
- 35TH BATTALION OF INFANTRY, "SIMCOE FORESTERS."—No. 7 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally: Charles D. Corbould, Gentleman, *vice* Clark, resigned.
- 37TH "NORFOLK" BATTALION OF RIFLES.—Major James Lorne Campbell is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Major on retirement.
- To be Major: Captain and Adjutant Thomas Robert Atkinson, *vice* Campbell, retired.
- 45TH "WEST DURHAM" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—Lieutenant-Colonel Frederic Cubitt is placed on the retired list under the provisions of paragraph 54, Regulations and Orders, 1887, with permission to hold the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
- Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel James Deacon is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on retirement.
- To be Lieutenant-Colonel: Major John Hughes, *vice* Cubitt, retired.
- 48TH BATTALION "HIGHLANDERS."—That part of General Order (76) of the 29th September, 1894, dispensing with the services of Provisional 2nd Lieutenant Robert Louis Gibson is cancelled, and the following substituted in lieu thereof:—"Provisional 2nd Lieutenant Robert Louis Gibson has been permitted to retire."
- To be Lieutenant: 2nd Lieutenant Charles Alfred Campbell, *vice* Ramsay, promoted.

52ND "BROME" BATTALION OF LIGHT INFANTRY.—Lieutenant-Colonel Calvin L. Hall is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on retirement.

58TH "COMPTON" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—Alexander Ross is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Major on retirement.

63RD "HALIFAX" BATTALION OF RIFLES.—Paymaster and Honorary Captain John G. Corbin is granted the Honorary rank of Major from the 13th June, 1894.

Captain William James Butler is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Captain on retirement.

To be Captain: Lieutenant Louis Dixon, *vice* Butler, retired.

To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally: Frederick William Stevens, Gentleman, *vice* Dixon, promoted.

65TH BATTALION "MOUNT ROYAL RIFLES."—Captain Horace Homère Manseau is permitted to resign his commission and to hold the rank of Captain on retirement.

66TH BATTALION "PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS."—To be Lieutenants, provisionally; Francis Ashley Oliver, Gentleman, from the 1st October, 1894, *vice* Moren, deceased; and Arthur Cartheart Thomson, Gentleman, to complete establishment.

67TH BATTALION "CARLETON LIGHT INFANTRY."—Surgeon Robert McCrea is permitted to resign his commission.

To be Surgeon: Isaac Burnette Curtis, Esquire, M.D., *vice* McCrea, retired.

77TH "WENTWORTH" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 2 Company.—To be Captain: 2nd Lieutenant John Dickson Courtenay, *vice* Kerr, retired.

78TH "COLCHESTER HANTS AND PICOU" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 5 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenant; Sergeant James Renforth Maxwell *vice* Sutherland promoted.

81ST "PORTNEUF" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 3 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally; Onezime Redman, Gentleman, *vice* Paré, retired.

85TH BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 3 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally; Aristide Beaugrand dit Champagne, Gentleman, *vice* Labelle resigned.

No. 6 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenant, provisionally; John Joseph Barry Gentleman, *vice* Vincent, transferred.

93RD "CUMBERLAND" BATTALION OF INFANTRY.—No. 6 Company. To be 2nd Lieutenants, provisionally, to complete establishment; Edward Custon Potter, Gentleman, William DesBrisay Matthews, Gentleman, and Duncan Blue, Gentleman.

94TH "VICTORIA" BATTALION OF INFANTRY, "ARGYLE HIGHLANDERS." No. 6 Company.—To be 2nd Lieutenants, provisionally, to complete establishment; William Rory McKenzie, Gentleman; Roderick T. McKenzie, Gentleman, and James Ross, Gentleman.

Associations for Drill in Educational Institutions.

GUELPH COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE CADET COMPANY.

To act as Captain: James Edgar Mills, *vice* Day, left the Institute.

To act as Lieutenant: Richard Day, *vice* Mills, promoted.

To act as 2nd Lieutenant: Howard Till *vice* Howatt, left the Institute.

CERTIFICATES GRANTED.

Rank, Name and Corps.	Class.	Course.	Grade.	Percentage of Marks obtained.		
				Written.	Practical.	Aggregate Percentage.
CAVALRY.						
Sergt.-Inst. James Page, R. C. Dragoons	1	S	B	85	89	87
Sergt. T. Leblond, Q. O. C. Hussars	2	S	B	55	80	67½
ARTILLERY.						
2nd Lt. B. S. Courtney, H. B. G. A.	2	Sp	A	64	64	64
INFANTRY.						
2nd Lt. Otto E. Hewton, 47th Batt.	2	S	A	59	53	58½
2nd Lt. Henry W. Copus, 28th Batt.	2	Sp	A	56½	47	51½
2nd Lt. M. F. Muir, 38th Batt.	2	Sp	A	60½	42½	51
2nd Lt. E. A. Billings, 26th Batt.	2	Sp	A	67½	48½	57½
2nd Lt. W. H. Douthwaite, 27th Batt.	2	Sp	A	58½	54	56
2nd Lt. J. R. Towers, 27th Batt.	2	Sp	A	78	58	67
2nd Lt. S. T. Blackwood, 22nd Batt.	2	S	A	69	46	57
Sergt. J. H. Wyatt, 25th Batt.	2	S	B	73	59	65½

CERTIFICATE OF THE SCHOOL OF MUSKETRY, HYTHE,

The undermentioned officer having completed a course of training at the Course of Musketry, Hythe, has been granted an Extra Certificate of Musketry, dated Hythe, 24th September, 1894, No 5733: Major L. Buchan, Royal Regiment Canadian Infantry.

EXAMINATION OF OFFICERS FOR PROMOTION.

The undermentioned officer has passed the required examination at Aldershot for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel: Major Lawrence Buchan, Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry.

EXAMINATION OF OFFICERS OF THE ACTIVE MILITIA AT THE MILITARY COLLEGE.

The undermentioned officer having presented himself for re-examination in Strategy obtained 172 marks and thereby qualified in that subject:—

2nd Lieut. F. H. C. Sutton, Q. O. C. Hussars.

Confirmation of Rank.

The undermentioned provisionally appointed officers, having qualified themselves for their appointments, are confirmed in their rank from the dates set opposite their respective names:—

2nd Lieutenant Basil S. Courtney, Halifax Battalion of Garrison Artillery; from the 11th October, 1894.

2nd Lieutenant Otta E. Hewton, 47th Battalion; from the 30th September 1894.

2nd Lieutenant Henry White Copus, 28th Battalion; from the 21st July, 1894.

2nd Lieutenant Matthew Ford Muir, 38th Battalion. from the 11th August, 1894.

2nd Lieutenant Ernest Arthur Billings, 26th Battalion; from the 7th August, 1894.

2nd Lieutenant William Henry Douthwaite, 27th Battalion, from the 2nd July, 1894.

2nd Lieutenant Robert J. Towers, 27th Battalion; from the 11th August, 1894.

2nd Lieutenant Stuart Temple Blackwood, 22nd Battalion; from the 11th August, 1894.

(To be Continued)