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**JOINT CANADA-US GENDER SENSITIZATION TRAINING FOR  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PARTICIPANTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

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# WHOSE SECURITY? RE-IMAGINING POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING FROM A FEMINIST

## PERSPECTIVE

*Dianne Otto*

### Introduction

Feminists have utilized a range of strategies to analyze matters of international security.<sup>1</sup> One strategy is to look for silences and gaps in the mainstream discourse, to think about what is not being articulated and to ask where the women are, so as to bring to the fore issues of gender that had previously been erased.<sup>2</sup> A related strategy is to examine whether apparently neutral policies and programmes have gender-differentiated impacts and to thereby lend a transparency to those who are actually benefiting from the way neutrality is understood.<sup>3</sup> A third strategy is to examine who has access to and participates in decision-making in order to problematize the narrow, masculinist interests represented by those who have the power to determine security priorities.<sup>4</sup> A fourth approach is to critique the conceptions of gender that are being

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<sup>1</sup> Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, "Violence Against Women: A Global Issue" in Julie Stubbs (ed), *Women, Male Violence and the Law* (1994) 13; Kathleen Barry, "Female Sexual Slavery: Understanding the International Dimensions of Women's Oppression" (1981) 3 *Human Rights Quarterly* 44; Judith Gardam, "A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law" (1992) 12 *Australian Yearbook of International Law* 265; V Spike Petersen, "Security and Sovereign States: What is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?" in VS Petersen (ed), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory* (1992) 31.

<sup>2</sup> Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (1989). Enloe asks the question "where are the women"?

<sup>3</sup> Rhonda Copelon, "Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture" in Rebecca Cook (ed), *Human Rights of Women* (1995) 116.

<sup>4</sup> Hilary Charlesworth, "Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist Futures for the United Nations" (1994) 3 *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems* 421; Dorinda Dallmeyer (ed), *Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law* (1993).

produced by the dominant discourse in order to highlight discursive strategies for resisting the production of gender and other hierarchies. I draw something from all of these approaches in answering the question of *whose* security is of primary importance in the post-Cold War era.

Security is one of those slippery concepts which can take us in contradictory directions. Security goals can be used “protectively” to reinforce an oppressive *status quo* or they can be a means of promoting “liberating” outcomes which challenge the *status quo*. We have seen this paradox played out in domestic legal responses to girls who are at risk of sexual abuse by members of their families or from within their communities. All too often girls’ lack of security is addressed by removing them from their homes and communities and housing them, for their own *protection*, in institutions which we call *secure* but which are in fact little more than prisons. Analogous protective<sup>5</sup> measures have been adopted in post-Cold War responses to threats to international security in the creation of *secure* spaces like the safe havens in Northern and Southern Iraq, and the partitioning of the former Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. This approach restricts the liberties of those whose security is threatened and has the corresponding effect of allowing the threatening or dominating behaviour to continue outside the boundaries of the protective enclosures. The outcome, which passes for a form of peace, is the defence of the *status quo* of global power distribution. This outcome is disguised by cogent arguments which talk of the need to *protect* the vulnerable while, in reality, they justify an intensification of militarization.

Alternatively, security measures can be aimed at the aggressor, at addressing

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<sup>5</sup> There is a considerable body of feminist analysis of “protective” approaches to women taken by legal discourse. The effect is to disempower and control women and to reconfirm the dominance of men. See Natalie Hevener, “An Analysis of Gender-based Treaty Law: Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective” (1986) 8 *Human Rights Quarterly* 70; Rebecca Cook, “The Elimination of Sexual Apartheid: Prospects for the Fourth World Conference on Women”, *Issue Papers on World*

the underlying causes of the insecurity, with the result of *enhancing*, rather than curtailing, the liberties<sup>6</sup> of those at risk. With respect to girls at risk of sexual abuse, this involves removing and punishing the perpetrators of the abuse and embarking on community education campaigns to build a culture in which girls are empowered and communities are committed to ensuring everyone's safety. In the global context, this approach requires an understanding of security as something more than the absence or the containment of armed conflict, as many feminists have argued.<sup>7</sup> Such an approach is suggested in the words of the former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he says, in his *Agenda for Peace*, that addressing the security crises of the post-Cold War world requires "our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons".<sup>8</sup> A liberating approach to security is obviously much more difficult to achieve than a protective approach because it necessitates directly addressing issues of domination and inequality, and involves acknowledging the ways in which the most powerful states and economic interests contribute to global insecurities.

It is possible to find support for both protective and liberating approaches to global security in the *UN Charter*. The *Charter* clearly defers to the *status quo* of world power distribution in the way that the Security Council is constituted and

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*Conferences*, no.5, American Society of International Law (1995).

<sup>6</sup> I am using the term "liberty" in its broad sense to include not only civil and political liberties but also economic, social and cultural liberties.

<sup>7</sup> J Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (1992) 54-66. Tickner argues that security is multidimensional and is as much about economic security, social justice, sustainable development and environmental security as it is about military security and national interest.

<sup>8</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace* (1992) para 5. This report was prepared by the Secretary General at the invitation of the first meeting at the level of Heads of States and Government held by the Security Council in January 1992.

endowed with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.<sup>9</sup> In so doing, the *Charter* conceives of security protectively, in realist terms, as an outcome of the maintenance of the existing world order. However, the *Charter* also suggests a liberating approach in the links it asserts between equality, self-determination, overall socio-economic cooperation and respect for human rights, and the achievement of world peace.<sup>10</sup> While the Cold War approach to global security was clearly protective in seeking to maintain the balance of power that East/West *detente* relied upon, are there some indications that this approach may have shifted in the post-Cold War era? Might we interpret the increasing use of peacekeeping forces, at least in the first few years of the new era, as a sign of more liberating shift? What gender identities are being produced by these shifts? These are the questions I want to address.

I begin with a brief overview of the changes in the way that security is officially understood in the post-Cold War environment and the dramatic increase in peacekeeping activities that has accompanied this change. Second, I advance a feminist critique of these developments focussing on three aspects: the increased powers assumed by the Security Council; the extension of militarism to ever more local forms; and the neo-colonial overtones of many peacekeeping efforts. Third, I suggest that from a feminist perspective some aspects of these developments are potentially positive. In particular, I suggest that peacekeeping is, in some ways, a strategy of demilitarization; that there is some evidence that militarized gender identities are in a process of renegotiation; and that Boutros Boutros-Ghali's stated commitment to addressing the underlying causes of global insecurity might be something to build upon. I conclude that global security, in the sense of enhancing the

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<sup>9</sup> *UN Charter*, arts 23(1), 24 (1), 27.

liberties of those whose security is currently or potentially at risk and addressing the primary causes of that insecurity, is still a long way from realization but that post-Cold War peacekeeping could make important contributions to such a goal.

### Security and Peacekeeping post-Cold War

The protective Cold War approach to security, which buttressed the bipolar *status quo*, conceived of global security in military and state-centred terms. It relied on guarding the territorial integrity of sovereign states from superpower expansionism and upholding the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, even in the face of massive human rights violations.<sup>11</sup> This approach to security did not even purport to address the underlying causes of global insecurity on which superpower dominion relied. Even the UN's decolonization agenda served the interests of the Cold War powers by producing postcolonial elites with allegiances to one or the other version of Europe, despite Concerted Third World attempts at non-alignment.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the Cold War concern with racial discrimination as a threat to international peace, particularly in Southern Africa,<sup>13</sup> while immensely significant, was consistent with superpower agendas. The concern with racial inequalities did not, for example, extend to the indigenous peoples of the world. Issues of gender or sexuality discrimination and persecution were never considered important enough to be the basis of an international dispute, revealing the commitment of both sides of the East/West divide to a global narrative of the subjugation of women and to heteronormativity, notwithstanding the different forms that male domination takes in

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, arts 1(3) and 55.

<sup>11</sup> For example, the Idi Amin regime in Uganda, the Pol Pot Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

<sup>12</sup> Dianne Otto, "Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference" (1996) 5 *Social and Legal Studies* 337.

<sup>13</sup> Southern Rhodesia SC Res 217, 20 November 1965; International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, GA Res 3068, 30 November 1973 art 1(1) recognizes

different cultural and ideological contexts.<sup>14</sup> This *gender and sexuality blindness* occurred despite overwhelming evidence that, as many feminists have observed, “the most common form of violence in our [global] society is violence against women by men”.<sup>15</sup>

Although the *Charter* makes no specific reference to peacekeeping, it was invented during the Cold War as a strategy of *detente* in the face of the Security Council deadlock. The enduring image of Cold War peacekeeping is that of policing the separation of belligerents, usually by interposing third-party troops between warring states to patrol safe buffer zones and to monitor ceasefires.<sup>16</sup> Three primary peacekeeping principles were defined during this period: that there be a strict separation between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement; that a necessary precondition was the consent of the warring parties; and that peacekeeping forces be neutral or impartial with respect to the dispute, which was understood to exclude troops from the five Security Council veto powers.<sup>17</sup> In sum, the Cold War security agenda safeguarded a dualized world order that depended on a multitude of economic and social inequalities and relied, for its legitimation, on hierarchical constructions of both gender and race. It was a protective approach to security.

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apartheid as “a serious threat to international peace and security”.

<sup>14</sup> Dianne Otto, Wayne Morgan and Kristen Walker, “Rejecting (In)Tolerance: Critical Perspectives on the United Nations Year for Tolerance” (1995) 20 *Melbourne University Law Review* 192.

<sup>15</sup> Christine Chinkin, “Women and Peace: Militarism and Oppression” in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds), *Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge* (1993) 405, 410 quoting B. Roberts “Reclaiming the Discourse: Feminist Perspectives in Peace Research” in D. Russell (ed), *Exposing Nuclear Phallacies* 278.

<sup>16</sup> The first operation of this kind was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) established by the General Assembly in 1956 to supervise the cease-fire in the Middle East following the Suez crisis. There followed the 1964 UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) following conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the UN Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) which patrols a buffer zone between Israel and Syria, and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) which polices the border between Israel and Lebanon. An important exception to this pattern was the UN intervention in the internal conflict in the Congo 1960-64 (UNUC).

<sup>17</sup> The three core peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force were identified by Secretary General Doug Hammarskjöld in 1956. See Ove Bring, “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Prospective Issues for the United Nations” (1995) 20 *Melbourne University Law Review* 55, 56.

Perhaps the most significant change precipitated by the end of the Cold War was the new consensus in the Security Council. Many expected that this would result in a reduction in threats to world peace, less armed conflict and vastly improved international security. However, despite optimistic predictions, there has been a dramatic increase in armed conflict in the new uni-polar world, particularly in what are ostensibly civil disputes.<sup>18</sup> These conflicts are often accompanied by a total collapse of institutions which provide the means of state and local governance, they frequently revolve around religious or ethnic differences and involve unusual cruelty which often targets women.<sup>19</sup> Further, the main casualties are civilians<sup>20</sup> which has produced large flows of refugees and internally displaced people, the majority of whom are women and children.<sup>21</sup> The dominant discourse about the security issues of the post-Cold War world is a narrative of small-scale crises which could threaten global security unless checked and managed. This has fostered a broader understanding of what might constitute threats to international security and the Security Council itself stated in 1992 that “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security...non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to international peace and security”.<sup>22</sup>

The changed conception of international security has had extensive

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<sup>18</sup> Of the 32 UN peacekeeping operations established between January 1988 and December 1994, 22 or two thirds have been in response to internal conflicts. Internal conflicts did, of course, occur during the Cold War but they were seldom treated as a threat to international peace and security. The Congo crisis was an important exception.

<sup>19</sup> A Stiglmeier (ed), *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (1994).

<sup>20</sup> The percentage of civilian, as opposed to military, casualties of war has progressively increased since the first World War reaching the level of 90% in 1994. C Lamb, “The Laws of Armed Conflict” in Hugh Smith (ed), *The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander* (1994) 1, 17 referring to the results of a study reported in United Nations Development Project, Human Development Report (1994).

<sup>21</sup> Jacqueline Greatbach, “The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse” (1989) 1 *International Journal of Refugee Law* 518.

<sup>22</sup> UN Doc S/23500 (31 January 1992), statement issued from the Security Council Summit Meeting.

repercussions for peacekeeping activities prompting Boutros Boutros-Ghali to claim, in 1992, that the UN has become "the world's most active peacekeeper".<sup>23</sup> There were more UN peacekeeping operations launched between 1989 and 1992 than during the entire preceding forty-three years.<sup>24</sup> Further, the role of peacekeepers is no longer one of *detente*. Instead, they are expected to perform a wider range of tasks in increasingly complex and often dangerous situations.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps the most far-reaching change has been that peacekeeping operations may continue, or sometimes only be established, after peace negotiations are completed in order to assist in the implementation of negotiated settlements<sup>26</sup> or to assume a longer term role over a number of years to ensure that the underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian causes of conflict are addressed.<sup>27</sup> To this end, the focus of much peacekeeping activity is now on peace-building: on establishing legal institutions, building democratic polities and governmental structures in states which have "collapsed".

But whose security concerns are motivating these endeavours? Is the UN finally addressing the underlying causes of global insecurity by identifying such factors as poverty, environmental degradation, population growth and non-sustainable development as issues of security? Why are there still silences about gender subordination in this new scheme? Has the goal of international security changed

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<sup>23</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Remark: Beyond Peacekeeping" (1992) 25 *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 113, 113.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid* 114.

<sup>25</sup> *Agenda For Peace*, above n 8, para 20. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his efforts to bring some order to the burgeoning of peacekeeping operations, notes that by 1995 UN peacekeepers were involved in four types of activity: first, in preventative diplomacy and peacemaking by, for example, providing on the ground support for diplomatic missions; second, in expanding the possibilities for the prevention of conflict and the making of peace as before; third, in the implementation and verification of negotiated settlements; and finally, in assisting post-conflict micro-disarmament.

<sup>26</sup> This has happened in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique.

<sup>27</sup> *Supplement to An Agenda For Peace*, A/50/60-S/1995/1, para 22. "Only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation."

from protecting the inequitable *de facto* distribution of world power to one of liberation? Or, to put it in less utopian terms, do these developments open some new possibilities for promoting a more liberatory approach? In attempting an answer to these questions I will examine, first, the ways in which the new security and peacekeeping developments function to reinforce dominating forms of global power and, second, how they also create new conditions for the contestation of militarized notions of gender and security.

### Peacekeeping as a Protective Strategy

There are many ways in which post-Cold War security and peacekeeping developments are serving to entrench existing global regimes of power which are reliant on the production of narratives of gender which subordinate women. I will focus on three: first, the enormous powers that have been assumed by the democratically unaccountable Security Council in constructing how we understand contemporary threats to international peace and security; second, the blurring of the boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement resulting in an extension of the legitimized use of force in international law and the corresponding normalization of militarism in ever more local forms; and third, the neocolonial effects of many peacebuilding efforts.

### Security Council Powers

Turning first to the issue of Security Council powers in the post-Cold War UN: this can be thought about in several ways, one of which is the Council's power to construct an authoritative global discourse or *Truth*<sup>28</sup> about global security. In

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<sup>28</sup> Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in Colin Gordon (ed), *Power/Knowledge* (1980) 78, 93. Foucault describes knowledge or Truth as the product of a complex of power relations whereby Truth is the product of power and power is exercised by the production of Truth.

exercising this power, the Security Council has created a new discourse of *global insecurity* which has enabled it to push at the boundaries of its *Charter* powers in a number of ways. For example, the expansion of what might constitute a threat to global security to include social, economic, humanitarian and ecological causes of instability suggests an almost boundless competence of the Security Council to sanction the use of force under chapter VII and not be limited by the principle of state sovereignty.<sup>29</sup> Christopher Greenwood has observed that the requirement that the Security Council determine the existence of a "threat to international peace and security" before invoking its Chapter VII powers is increasingly treated as a procedural rather than substantive prerequisite.<sup>30</sup> This creates a new sense of the indispensability of the Security Council and legitimates the Council's assumption of a policing role in areas which, as Martti Koskenniemi points out, the *Charter* originally envisaged would fall within the competence of the General Assembly.<sup>31</sup>

Further, despite the new rhetoric of tackling the underlying *causes* of insecurity, the Security Council's discourse of global insecurity functions to resolutely conceal them. One way in which this masking is achieved is by characterizing the majority of contemporary conflicts as essentially civil disputes associated with local ethnic or tribal differences which have random and even primitive origins. This construction suggests, falsely, that civil wars and ethno-nationalist violence present a *new* set of circumstances which necessitate Security

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<sup>29</sup> *UN Charter*, art 2(7) creates an exception to the principle of state sovereignty when enforcement actions under chpt VII are being applied.

<sup>30</sup> Mats R Berdal, "The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold War" (1996) 7 *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 71, 76 referring to Christopher Greenwood, "Legal Constraints on UN Military Operations", IISS Strategic Comments, 22 March 1995.

<sup>31</sup> Martti Koskenniemi, "The Police in the Temple, Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View" (1995) 6 *European Journal of International Law* 325.

Council action and that the conflicts are somehow outside world politics.<sup>32</sup> These discursive manoeuvres blur the fact that the Security Council makes the *political choice* to become involved in internal disputes rather than that it has suddenly become obliged to. The narrative of localized ethnic conflicts also masks the many ways in which global networks of power are responsible for the contemporary disputes which result in various ways from colonialism, neocolonialism, the Cold War itself and, in the current context, the globalization of capital which is deepening the gender, class and race-based disparities in the global distribution of wealth.

Peacekeeping was given a central role in the new paradigm of global insecurity, at least initially. The Cold War rules of engagement for peacekeeping, which required consensus, impartiality and abstaining from the use of force were officially reaffirmed<sup>33</sup> and underwrote the initial public enthusiasm and moral authority that peacekeepers enjoyed. However, despite their retention, the Cold War peacekeeping principles have been seriously compromised in a number of ways. For example, the Security Council has stretched the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence beyond recognition to include defence of the humanitarian goals of peacekeeping mandates as, for example, in Bosnia<sup>34</sup> and Somalia.<sup>35</sup> As a result, peacekeepers have used force in efforts to variously protect humanitarian relief operations, to protect civilians in areas designated as safe havens and to prompt the parties to move more quickly towards national reconciliation. The Security Council mandate regarding Haiti also included a confusion of chapter VI and chapter VII

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<sup>32</sup> Peter Rosenblum, "Save The Tribunals: Salvage the Movement, a Response to Makau Mutua" (1997) 11 *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal* 189, 193.

<sup>33</sup> Boutros Boutros Ghali reaffirmed these principles in 1995. See *Supplement*, above n 27, para 33.

<sup>34</sup> Berdal, above n 30, 81. SC Res 836, UN SCOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc S/RES/836 (1993) para 9.

<sup>35</sup> SC Res 794, UN SCOR, 47th Sess, 2-4, UN Doc S/RES/794 (1992); SC Res 814, UN SCOR, 48th Sess, 1, UN Doc S/RES/814 (1993).

functions.<sup>36</sup> Concurrently, the Security Council has consistently reaffirmed the principle of the non-use of force, hopelessly blurring the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.<sup>37</sup>

Transgression of the principle of non-use of force has also assumed other alarming dimensions as reflected in the reports of rape by peacekeepers in Bosnia, Cambodia and the Gulf,<sup>38</sup> of child sexual exploitation in Mozambique;<sup>39</sup> and of torture of local petty thieves in Somalia, one of whom was actually killed by the peacekeepers. Yet it is surely inconceivable that these activities are consistent with the cardinal principle of the non-use of force. It would seem that defending the physical security of the local population, particularly when they are women and children, still does not figure in the security calculus and certainly does not extend to protection from the peacekeepers themselves. In this respect, the new world security order is hardly distinguishable from the gender blind security system of the Cold War years.

The discourse of global insecurity also legitimates the Security Council's exercise of power in its decision-making about which situations constitute a threat to international peace and security and how they will be responded to under chapter VII. We are to assume, as an article of faith, that the Council operates within restraints established by international law and with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet Security Council decision-making lacks transparency,<sup>40</sup> can hardly

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<sup>36</sup> Robert O Weiner and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, "Beyond the Laws of War: Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework" (1996) 27 *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 293, 321-323.

<sup>37</sup> The confusion has been compounded by the Security Council's increasing practice of formulating peacekeeping mandates using their chapter VII powers.

<sup>38</sup> Anne Orford, "The Politics of Collective Security" (1996) 17 *Michigan Journal of International Law* 373, 377. Orford also points out that it was officially acknowledged that 24 US servicewomen deployed in the Gulf were raped or sexually assaulted.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid* 378. Orford cites Gayle Kirshenbaum, "Who's Watching the Peacekeepers?", *Ms Magazine*, May-June 1994, 12.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid* 377-378.

claim to be democratically accountable, and its actions under chapter VII are probably not even amenable to judicial review.<sup>41</sup> The system is so closed, and the Security Council so all-powerful, that there are no mechanisms which provide redress for those (individuals or states) who suffer harm and no means by which local communities might challenge decisions which affect them. As Ruth Wedgwood observes, the sense is that we really ought to cherish the Council for what it is doing and worry about the fine points later.<sup>42</sup>

The peacekeeping principle of impartiality, which has also been transgressed, illustrates some of the concerns this raises. The Security Council is an unashamedly political body controlled by the veto powers and therefore hardly capable of designing neutral interventions. We have seen neutrality (mis)used as an excuse for Security Council inaction to disguise its lack of political will, in the Rwandan situation<sup>43</sup> and in Bosnia.<sup>44</sup> Impartiality has also justified the inaction of peacekeepers in the face of disappearances, extra-judicial executions, rape allegations and other serious human rights abuses.<sup>45</sup> Anne Orford points to other disparities between the rhetoric of an impartial Security Council and the realities with respect to women's security. She argues that women are often *less* secure as a result of Security Council actions:

Security Council actions, including military operations and economic sanctions, have [negatively] influenced the struggle of women to acquire basic sociopolitical rights, improve health and survival, secure freedom from rape and sexual harassment, and establish economic security. Perhaps the clearest

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<sup>41</sup> W Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations" (1993) 87 *American Journal of International Law* 83; Ruth Gordon, "United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and Beyond" (1994) 15 *Michigan Journal of International Law* 519.

<sup>42</sup> Ruth Wedgwood, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping" (1995) 28 *Cornell International Law Journal* 631, 631.

<sup>43</sup> Rosenblum, above n 32, 192.

<sup>44</sup> Berdal, above n 30, 78.

<sup>45</sup> Weiner and Ni Aolain, above n 36, 313-314.

examples of gender-differentiated consequences of such actions concern the growing number of complaints of rape by peacekeepers, the harsh effects of economic sanctions on women, and women's status in militarized cultures.<sup>46</sup>

These are hardly neutral outcomes, yet critical views like Orford's are silenced or discredited in the "warm glow" of the official narratives of the post Cold War collective security system. It is all too apparent that the new discourse of global insecurity continues to rely on the silences of women and other less powerful groups. The effect is to endorse the Security Council's unaccountable power and self-interest, and to legitimate the way in which the Security Council orders and narrates the world by authorizing military and economic coercion in order to protect, first and foremost, the interests of the global *status quo*.

#### The Extension of Militarism

The post-Cold War blurring of the boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement has the effect of extending the scope of the legal use of force in international law. In eroding the non-violent and non-coercive foundational principles of peacekeeping operations, the Security Council's authorization of the collective use of force to achieve humanitarian goals is expanding what passes for "military necessity". Historically, the underlying assumption in the development of laws of war has been that it is possible to humanize war through law by striking a balance between judgments of military necessity and humanitarian considerations. However, when we look more closely at the history of war we see, as Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand have argued, that "the development of a more elaborate legal regime has proceeded apace with the increasing savagery and destructiveness of modern war".<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Orford, above n 38, 377.

<sup>47</sup> Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand, "The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War" (1994) 35 *Harvard International Law Journal* 49, 55.

Their argument is that law provides a "humanitarian cover" which legitimizes, and even promotes, unrestrained military responses rather than humanitarian practice.<sup>48</sup>

Further, Judith Gardam has argued that the doctrine of military necessity operates to justify or excuse gendered violence and to disguise the interdependence between militarism and male violence against women.<sup>49</sup>

In the post-Cold War context, we can see the pattern of expanding normalization of militarization continuing, in direct contrast to the prognosis of a more peaceful world. The deployment of peacekeeping missions in increasingly dangerous situations has been used to justify the increasing resort of the Security Council to its chapter VII powers.<sup>50</sup> The image of defenceless peacekeepers assembled in the midst of what was essentially a war in Bosnia prompted many calls for more "robust" or "muscular" peacekeeping, as Mats Berdal observes.<sup>51</sup> Even in the comparative safety of the Cambodian peacebuilding operation (UNTAC), Force Commander Colonel John Sanderson noted, with concern, the passion with which the use of force by peacekeepers was espoused.<sup>52</sup> The dilemmas thrown up by the contradictions of using force in connection with peacekeeping have even led to suggestions that a "rapid reaction force" of qualified troops be made available to the UN Secretariat,<sup>53</sup> an idea which is completely outside the collective security system envisaged by the *Charter*. In sum, peacekeeping has helped to create the conditions for heightened political tolerance of the use of armed force under the auspices of the UN.

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid 56-59.

<sup>49</sup> Judith Gardam, "The Law of Armed Conflict: A Feminist Perspective" in Mahoney and Mahoney, above n , 419. See also P Strange, "It'll Make a Man Out of You" in D Russell (ed), *Exposing Nuclear Phallacies* (1989); Robin Morgan, *The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism* (1989).

<sup>50</sup> Bring, above n 17.

<sup>51</sup> Berdal, above n 30, 76. Support for the idea of more "robust" peacekeeping is also evinced by proposals that "peace restoration" become a chapter VI 1/2 activity which would enable intervention without the consent of the warring parties but still fall short of full scale resort to the use of force.

<sup>52</sup> John Sanderson, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: A Critical Retrospective" (1995) 20 *Melbourne University Law Review* 35, 41.

<sup>53</sup> *Supplement*, above n 27.

In tandem with the blurring of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the expansion of NATO, the build-up of national and regional defence forces around the globe<sup>54</sup> and the continuing threat of nuclear weapons provide further examples of the way in which military thinking has been normalized in the post-Cold War period. Christine Chinkin defines militarism as “the belief system that upholds the legitimacy of the military control that the State exercises and the assumption that military values and policies are conducive to creating an orderly and secure society”.<sup>55</sup> As many feminist theorists have argued, citizenship and identity in a militarized framework are built on the masculine archetypes associated with war and the, corresponding, feminization or subjugation of non-military social identities and functions. Male domination and militarism are therefore interdependent.<sup>56</sup> In this paradigm women are maternalized in that their primary responsibility is to reproduce soldiers<sup>57</sup> and, along with other targets and victims of war, women are reified or reduced to objects which makes it possible for them to be killed, humiliated and raped in the course of legally and morally justifiable wars.<sup>58</sup>

To extend the legality of the use of force in international law is to deepen the militarization of international society which is to underscore a global construction of gender that affirms male dominance and its corollary of female subordination. Post-Cold War peacekeeping has proved to be an effective means of re-militarization rather than de-militarization, and of promoting the normality of militarism at ever more local levels through peacekeeping missions. The gender identities produced legitimate

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<sup>54</sup> Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (1993) 28-30.

<sup>55</sup> Chinkin, above n 15, 405-6.

<sup>56</sup> Enloe, above n 2.

<sup>57</sup> Morgan, above n 49, chpt 8. Morgan describes the pressure on Palestinian women in refugee camps to have children who will become the next generation of fighters for Palestinian self-determination.

<sup>58</sup> Chinkin, above n 15, 410; Ann Scales, “Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?” (1989) 12 *Harvard Women's Law Journal* 25, 26; Ninotchka Rosca, “Effects of Militarism and State Violence on Women and Children” in Mahoney and Mahoney, above

women's secondary citizenship and make the gendered consequences of armed conflict more acceptable and less visible.

### New Forms of Colonialism

The third aspect of recent peacekeeping developments which supports global regimes of inequitable power is its resemblance to colonialism. The idea that states have "failed" and need direction and expertise to assist with post-conflict peacebuilding is, potentially, a new assertion of European superiority and a new version of Europe's global "civilising mission". Indeed, as Orford points out,

[c]ollective security texts create a context of fear of disorder, difference, and tribalism, in which increased military and economic intervention in the affairs of developing states is legitimized to create a ruthlessly "ordered" world.<sup>59</sup>

The suggestion to reactivate the Trusteeship Council, which was established by the *Charter* to assist strategic colonial territories to achieve independence, is an example of the revitalization of European paternalism and assimilationism. The proposal invokes the neo-colonial belief that non-European peoples need to be educated into accepting the ways of modernity before they will be capable of assuming the responsibilities of statehood and sovereignty.<sup>60</sup> The dogged determination with which the colonial boundaries in Africa are defended - admittedly an extremely complex issue - is a further example of the Eurocentrism of the security agenda. There have been some attempts by Southern states to resist more radical discussion of UN intervention in internal conflicts, and to oppose further expansion of Security Council powers, because of concerns about Northern imperialism.<sup>61</sup>

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n 15, 237, 238.

<sup>59</sup> Orford, above n 38, 404.

<sup>60</sup> Otto, above n 12, 351-352.

<sup>61</sup> Berdal, above n 30, 91 referring to discussion in Sally Morphet, "The Influence of States and Groups of States on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980-94" (1995) 21 *Review of*

Post-conflict peace-building involves a large cast of outside actors including civilian police, human rights experts, election monitors, and other specialists and advisers. It is highly likely that almost all of these actors work uncritically within their own frameworks which are based on masculinist and European norms. While the peace-building language of democratic institution building and the rule of law does not *inevitably* lead to the imposition of western political and legal forms, the hegemonic grip of the West is not easily resisted. The emphasis on elections, for example, assumes that centralized and representative forms of democracy make sense to diverse local communities.<sup>62</sup> Further, Western forms of democracy and the common law system involve dualistic thinking and are essentially adversarial in form. These ways of thinking do not lend themselves to the expression of a multitude of positions and viewpoints, let alone to conciliatory styles of negotiating such differences or to consensual outcomes.

It must also be remembered that masculinist and racialized gender identities are deeply embedded in neocolonial encounters between the North and the South. The exotic and exploitable "woman" who emerges from Edward Said's deconstruction of the Orientalism of the West<sup>63</sup> is in danger of being reinvented in the peace-building process. It is all too easily overlooked that western-style democracy disproportionately empowers men; that human rights protections as currently constructed are based on masculinist, European standards; and that economic development is, in many ways, colonialism in its most recent guise.<sup>64</sup> There is little doubt that the elites of the global *status quo*, including post-colonial elites, stand to benefit most from the establishment of European-style governmental and legal

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*International Studies* 435.

<sup>62</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Modernity and Ethnicity in India" in David Bennett (ed), *Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity* (1997) (*forthcoming*).

institutions in non-European states. Therefore international security in the post-Cold War era, despite promising a liberating new world order, may prove to be nothing more than new clothes for the same old dominating Emperor.

In sum, the post-Cold War discourse of global insecurity, and the peacekeeping developments that have accompanied it, have a vast potential to do no more than re-privilege and re-legitimate dominating forms of global power and a world order that continues to rely on hierarchical constructions of gender, race and other diversities. The cooperative endeavours of the unchecked self-interest of the Security Council to authorize the collective use of force in response to an expanding catalogue of potential threats to international peace and security, the extension of the legitimate use of force in international law, the corresponding intensification of the militarized character of the global order, and the neocolonial overtones of peacebuilding mandates, lay the foundations for a protective, rather than liberating, approach to global security.

### **Reimagining Peacekeeping as a Liberating Strategy**

At the same time as having the ability to reinforce the power of global elites, the increased mobilization and expanding functions of peacekeeping forces have some potentially transformative effects. This potential lies largely in the different attitude and approach that peacekeeping requires of military personnel at all levels of the military hierarchy in conducting "operations other than war". Second, it also lies in complementary shifts and blurrings of the archetypal gender roles, traditionally associated with militarism, by the increasing number of women and openly gay men employed in the armed forces, at least in the West. And third, the liberatory potential

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<sup>63</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism* (1978/1995).

of peacekeeping lies in the commitment, albeit rhetorical so far, to addressing the underlying causes of conflict.

### The "Attitude" of Peacekeeping

First, there is no doubt that peacekeeping involves an altogether different logic than peace enforcement. As Colonel Sanderson has described it:

Peacekeeping is based on the consent of all the parties involved, including that of the peacekeepers. This requires that peacekeepers, for their own protection, make an overt display of impartiality to establish their credentials as "honest brokers" in the process. This display is totally different from the display required for enforcement, which is warlike and concentrated to establish seriousness of intent.<sup>65</sup>

In a study of the training needs of peacekeepers undertaken in 1993-1994, researchers Barry Blechman and Matthew Vaccaro describe the peacekeeping "mind-set" as a "tuning down" of the attitude required for traditional military operations.<sup>66</sup> They suggest that combat troops who have been deployed in peacekeeping operations need "a little refresher training...before getting back to their previous level of aggressiveness".<sup>67</sup>

Blechman and Vaccaro found there were many tasks undertaken by troops engaged in peacekeeping which required specialized peacekeeping training, and that often the effective performance of these tasks was critical to the success or failure of the peacekeeping mission. The tasks they found were *not* covered in traditional military training included: controlling crowds in an appropriate manner, administering

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<sup>64</sup> Chakrabarty, above n 62.

<sup>65</sup> Sanderson, above n 52, 39

<sup>66</sup> Barry M Blechman and J Matthew Vaccaro, "Training For Peacekeeping: The United Nations' Role", The Henry L Stimson Centre, Report n 12, July 1994, 2.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

humanitarian relief, negotiation skills, validating compliance with negotiated agreements, preventing refugee flows and establishing and/or administering a criminal justice system.

The study identified further skills which were not *adequately* covered by existing training such as interacting with civilians, liaising with foreign forces, applying the laws of war and using loudspeakers.<sup>68</sup> Blechman and Vaccaro identified a third category of skills which needed *modification* in the peacekeeping context. They detail two examples in particular. First, the task of “seizing and clearing a building” in combat conditions involves taking control of the building with guns blazing, a method clearly inconsistent with the restraint expected of peacekeepers. Second, military marksmanship training does not equip soldiers with the specialized shooting skills they need to discriminately target snipers who are, for example, using a civilian crowd for cover, without killing innocent bystanders.<sup>69</sup>

I have gone into some detail here in order to make the point that the logic of peacekeeping is significantly different to that of military combat operations. This is underscored by the reluctance of the US armed forces to provide *any* peacekeeping training because, as Blechman and Vaccaro found, they were fearful that it “would degrade that unit’s warfighting utility”.<sup>70</sup> Even States like New Zealand, who today identify the primary purpose of their armed forces as assisting in peacekeeping missions, are completely resistant to the idea that peacekeeping training might actually replace basic military training. At best, peacekeeping training is viewed by military establishments as an add-on to training for combat rather than a replacement.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid 3-4. Other tasks identified as needing greater emphasis than was given in traditional military training were: applying the rules of engagement, guarding operations, counter mine operations and convoy security.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid 4. They also identified training in the use of force, interactions with NGOs, disarming belligerents and civilians and static defences as needing modification

Evenso, it seems clear that peacekeeping forces are learning to respond to conflict situations by using an array of peaceful, or minimally forceful, dispute resolution techniques. Further, they are applying these techniques with a broad range of non-military personnel including civilians, NGOs, government officials, non-military members of peacekeeping missions and civilian police, as well as with the disputing parties and multi-national peacekeeping forces.

The developments in military training and practice, although emphatically secondary to the war-oriented and protective military discourse, potentially have far-reaching implications. Although these developments have taken place *within* a military framework, and therefore could hardly be considered *de-militarized*, they could assist in reversing the hitherto intractable trumping of humanitarian considerations by military necessities. They could change the ways in which militaries understand themselves and lead to a reimagining of the militarized world order so that it is no longer dependent on notions of dominating masculinities and subordinate femininities in order to legitimate sending soldiers to war.<sup>71</sup> These developments could raise the profile and increase the capabilities of chapter VI actions so that chapter VII eventually becomes redundant.

### Renegotiating Militarized Constructions of Gender

The archetypal militarized male gender roles are also undergoing a process of change because of a second important shift: the increasing participation of women, and of openly homosexual men, in the regular armed forces of many states. As Cynthia Enloe argues, Cold War militarism relied on the idea that *real* men were those who were prepared to kill for their country, which required that women were

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid 10.

<sup>71</sup> Rebecca Grant, "The Quagmire of Gender and International Security" in V Spike Petersen (ed),

barred from killing for their country.<sup>72</sup> The new female and gay presences within a previously exclusive male and heterosexual domain, transgress the clarity of earlier militarized male and female gender roles and suggest that a new relationship might be developing between the patriarchal state, and women (including lesbians) and gay men. By extension, this could help to lay new foundations for the way that global security is understood, achieved and maintained. I am not suggesting that mere presence of women and gay men in the military will alter the militaristic world order, because it is the structures themselves, and the gender identities that they produce, which need to change. Rather, I am proposing that disruptive presences might be an initial step towards more fundamental structural change

I am also not suggesting that women and/or gay men are *inherently* more predisposed towards the peaceful resolution of disputes or *intrinsically* more likely to take an anti-militaristic position than heterosexual men.<sup>73</sup> To understand peacefulness as a feminine quality, in the context of a militaristic and patriarchal world order, is to unwittingly repeat the characterization of non-militarized peace as unmanly. As bell hooks says, associating women with peace and men with aggression

may be stereotypical norms that many people live out, such dualistic thinking is dangerous; it is a basic ideological component of logic that informs and promotes domination in Western society. Even when inverted and employed for a meaningful purpose, like nuclear disarmament, it is nevertheless risky, for it reinforces the cultural basis of sexism and other forms of group oppression.<sup>74</sup>

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*Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (1992) 83, 91.

<sup>72</sup> Enloe, above n 54, 17.

<sup>73</sup> The view that women take a more caring and connected approach to the resolution of conflict is supported by the work of Carol Gilligan, *In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (1982).

<sup>74</sup> bell hooks, "Feminism and Militarism: A Comment" (1995) 3 & 4 *Women's Studies Quarterly* 58,

Alternatively, it is important to recognize that the institution of the military plays a central role in constructing what we understand to be characteristics of masculinity and femininity. As Enloe suggests, we must ask what new masculinities and femininities are being produced in the post-Cold War peacekeeping environment. Is UN peacekeeping reshaping what we understand to be "real men" in a way that disengages masculinity and femininity from militarism? What strategies can we employ to assist in breaking the nexus between the maintenance of gender, sexuality and other dominating hierarchies, and the military?

### Addressing Underlying Causes

Finally and very briefly, the emphasis, of Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the necessity that peacekeeping strategies address the root causes of global conflict, also opens some more liberating possibilities. The realization of these possibilities depends in large part on the extent to which the local communities, which are supported by peacebuilding operations, are able to determine the form and content of their political and legal institutions. Local empowerment is essential to enable space for the assertion of non-militarized notions of citizenship, by which I mean citizenship which is not founded on dominating masculinities and violence.<sup>75</sup> Addressing the underlying causes of global insecurity also depends on the political commitment and will of the UN membership to address the gendered distribution of power globally, to change the inequitable distribution of wealth within the North and between the North and the South, and to demilitarize their discourse of peace and security.

Liberatory change also involves transforming ourselves so that we interrogate our own participation in global militarism, resist from the use of violence in every

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<sup>75</sup> Stephanie A Levin, "Women, Peace, and Violence: A New Perspective" (1992) 59 *Tennessee Law*

part of our lives and resist militarized conceptions of gender, race, sexuality and other differences. I also cautiously agree with Koskenniemi's suggestion that achieving global security involves empowering the more democratic General Assembly to play a central role in peacebuilding, thereby reducing the scope of the Security Council's powers, even though the Assembly has not proved to be any less masculinist than the Council. His strategy opens another dimension of the relentless convergence of state interests and subordinating narratives of gender, that feminists must also tackle. Which leads me to stress the critical importance of local and transnational women's movements and solidarities, in the struggle to address the underlying causes of global insecurity. In total, this is an ambitious project - a feminist reimagining - which has, at least, some post-Cold War rhetorical support from the highest levels of the UN bureaucracy.

### Conclusion

The claim by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 that the UN has become the world's most active peacekeeper in the post-Cold War period is something which it might reasonably be expected that feminists would welcome and support. Principles like the non-use or minimal use of force, consent of the parties, respect for human rights, democratic processes and the rule of law, the development of military expertise in the use of non-lethal methods and weapons, even the broader definitions of what might constitute threats to international peace and security seem to, in some ways at least, respond to many feminist critiques of global militarism. But do these principles simply cloak the same global elites in a newly palatable legal and humanitarian disguise?

An examination *whose* security is at the forefront of the contemporary security agenda indicates that little of substance has changed. Global security is still dependent on the vagaries of power politics, on a militarized commitment to the use of force and on subordinating narratives of gender, race and sexuality hierarchies. The imperative of global security, even in its peacekeeping form, remains the coercive containment and silencing of the dissent produced by the inequitable world order. While some signs of a more liberating approach have accompanied the post-Cold War intensification of militarism, these are as yet embryonic and uncertain. We need a theory of peacekeeping that enables us to build on these shakey foundations towards a non-military calculus, a non-dominating discourse of global security and a liberating discourse of gender.

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The Role of Women in United Nations Peace-keeping

Introduction

Since its founding in 1945, a central purpose of the United Nations has been the maintenance of global peace and security. The United Nations role and function in peace-keeping missions has expanded greatly since the "Blue Helmets" were first dispatched in 1957. Following the cold war, United Nations operations to maintain international peace and security, as defined by the Secretary-General in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, have expanded and become increasingly complex. Moreover, UN peace-keeping operations have come to account for the largest share of the Organization's expenditures.

UN peace-keeping missions today include more non-military/civilian components for preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. These civilian components have meant a broadening in the range of personnel and skills deployed beyond the traditional military.

The expanding participation of women in UN peace-keeping is the subject of this issue of women 2000. Two questions are addressed: the question of gender balance in UN peace-keeping, and the question of a women's perspective on peace-keeping and the influence which women may have on peace-keeping as a result of this perspective. In relation to the issue of gender balance, two hypotheses are explored. One is that special measures (e.g., affirmative action) are needed to produce greater gender balance in peace-keeping. The second is that gender balance in peace-keeping operations contributes to more effective peace-keeping.

This article first examines why women have remained largely excluded from military and police roles in UN peace-keeping operations and then analyses apparent reasons for their limited participation in the civilian components of peace-keeping missions. It also analyses why, in the non-military areas of UN peace-keeping, women have increasingly made a contribution, but largely as members of the rank and file, not in decision-making positions. The article documents the trends in women's participation in peace-keeping, which show a slight increase in recent years, and explores possible explanations for these trends.

UN peace-keeping - where are the women "blue helmets"?

Since its founding 50 years ago, the United Nations has undertaken a total of 36 peace-keeping operations, 20 of which have taken place since 1988. In total, peace-keeping missions have involved more than 720,000 personnel from 77 Member States, including UN staff, at a cost of more than US\$12.4 billion. In 1995, some 69,356 military and civilian police personnel are serving in the 17 active military peace-keeping operations.1 Article 8 of the Charter of the United Nations calls for equal participation of men and women in the work of the Organization. Yet, almost no women have served in the military contingents

of UN peace-keeping operations, and until recently these operations were almost entirely military in nature.

Statistics gathered from a number of Member States which contributed troops to military peace-keeping missions indicate that only 5 of the 6,250 troops who served between 1957 and 1979 were women. During the period 1957-1989, out of a total of approximately 20,000 military personnel, there were only 20 women.<sup>2</sup> These served mainly as nurses in medical units. Between 1989 and 1992, the total number of women rose to 255, still representing little more than 1 per cent of military personnel (see table 1, page 2). Despite the increased presence of women in national militaries and, more specifically, as officers in combat units in at least four countries, women in UN peace-keeping still comprised only 1.7 per cent of military contingents in the 17 peace-keeping missions active in 1993 (see table 2, page 3).

#### Changes in women's participation in national militaries and UN peace-keeping

"One of the most striking characteristics of militaries themselves is that they are almost exclusively male."<sup>3</sup> This is a question of both numbers and culture. The small number of women in UN military peace-keeping operations is partly explained by national policies which discourage the participation of women in the military and, more specifically, in combat roles. Many countries continue to prohibit women from military service, and only a few allow women to serve in combat roles. In only 5 out of 25 reporting countries do women comprise more than 10 per cent of military personnel.<sup>4</sup> Only a few countries have permitted women to serve in the military for a sustained period, while some have opened up to women only recently (see table 3, page 4).

The United Nations has no detailed policy on women in peace-keeping. Notably, the United Nations did not specifically request women peace-keepers until 1994. However, in UN document A/50/691, paragraph 59, the Secretary-General has recommended to the General Assembly, inter alia, a target of 50 per cent women in UN field missions. A number of UN officials have indicated to Member States that the Organization would welcome more women soldiers, but the UN has little control over the selection and allocation of peace-keeping troops. Member States control their own national militaries and determine policies regarding who receives combat training and which units are assigned to peace-keeping duty. Once political approval has been obtained within Member States, decisions regarding which units are selected for peace-keeping duty are the prerogative of the highest-ranking military authority in the country, generally the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Consequently, in spite of recent UN requests for women peace-keepers, contributing Member States still may restrict or prohibit women's participation in UN peace-keeping.

Table 1. Member-State contributed male and female personnel in UN peace-keeping missions by office/enlisted/other for selected years, a/ 1957-1992.

Male=Male F=Female	Total		Officers b/		Enlisted c/		Other d/	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1957-1979 e/	6205	5	509	0	5673	5	23	0
% women		0.1		0.0		0.1		0.0
1989-1992 f/	17463	255	2051	39	14945	186	467	30
% women		1.4		1.9		1.2		6
Total 1957-1992 g/	23668	260		39	20618	191	490	30
% women		1.1		1.5		0.9		5.8

#### Notes:

a/ Available data for personnel contributions to missions of select countries (e.g. Austria, Brazil, Canada, Fiji, Finland, France and the United Kingdom)

b/ Military officers include all ranks Lieutenant to Colonel.

c/ Enlisted personnel include all ranks from Private to Master Sergeant

- d/ Other includes all non-military personnel contributed by Member States, including civilian police, electoral monitors and other specialist functions.
- e/ Selected years 1957, 1961, 1965, 1967, 1974, and 1979.
- f/ Selected years 1989, 1991, and 1992
- g/ Total for selected years listed in notes 5 and 6.

Source: Report of the statistical compilation of women in peace-keeping prepared by the United Nations Statistical Division for the second issue of The World's Women: Trends and Statistics, Statistical Division/DESIPA, STAT 321(a), United Nations, 29 March 1994.

Nevertheless, the situation is slowly beginning to change. Since 1970, the percentage of women in national militaries has been increasing slowly but steadily. Several countries now allow women to serve in combat roles, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States, Venezuela and Zambia. Other countries have specific restrictions in combat zones.<sup>5</sup> In regard to peace-keeping missions, a noticeable change finally came in the early 1990s in the Western Sahara operation (MINURSO), where women comprised 10.2 per cent of military personnel as of 1993 (see table 2, page 3). One possible explanation for the relatively high percentage of women is that a number of the troop-contributing Member States, including France, the United States and Australia, are nations with relatively higher proportions of women among their peace-keeping staffs. Another is the presence of a large medical unit in Western Sahara composed of mainly female nurses and doctors. In fact, a majority of women who serve in military peace-keeping missions still do so in non-combat roles.

A number of countries have actively recruited females into national peace-keeping forces. In 1979, Sweden first included women on an experimental basis. At that time, more than 4,000 women applied, and 42 were finally admitted.<sup>6</sup> Among the 1,400 Swedes who currently serve in UN peace-keeping forces, the vast majority (90 per cent) serve in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. Currently, 44 (3.3 per cent) out of the approximately 1,300 Swedish nationals serving in UNPROFOR are women. Twenty-one women serve as nurses and support staff in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Macedonia, one Swedish woman serves in the military police, and five females are administrators. In Croatia, there is one woman professional military officer and a female reserve officer and 15 female administrators who serve in the peace-keeping forces. One Swedish female police officer served in Mozambique with ONUMOZ.<sup>7</sup>

In Sweden, women who have undergone basic military training may apply and are recruited on the same basis as men. Moreover, Swedish women without military training also have the opportunity to serve in UN peace-keeping forces overseas. They serve mainly in nursing, liaison, office and administration, mail and canteen functions. The 1994 Swedish national report submitted to the United Nations for the second review and appraisal of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies states that additional efforts should be made to raise the awareness of UN peace-keeping personnel regarding the vulnerable situation of women civilians in armed conflicts and suggests that an increase in the participation of women in UN peace-keeping operations would contribute to a better understanding of this problem.

Similarly, there has been a slight increase in women's participation in military peace-keeping missions at the initiative of other troop-contributing Member States. Of the more than 3,600 United States military personnel assigned to six UN peace-keeping missions, women have served in a variety of positions, including medical and administrative jobs, logistics and supply, military police and other occupations that are not traditional or combat-related.<sup>8</sup>

Table 2. Current Member States contributed personnel to UN peace-keeping

## missions, by mission, 1993

Mission	All Personnel		Military a/		Civilian Police	
	Total	%Women	Total	%Women	Total	% Women
UNOSOM II (Somalia)	29,703	2.1	29,703	2.1	0.0	0.0
UNTAC b/ (Cambodia)	19,232	n/a	15,684	n/a	3,548	0.2
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia)	24,853	1.6	24,200	1.6	653	2.1
ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	6,501	0.1	6,501	0.1	0.0	0.0
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	5,247	2.3	5,247	2.3	0.0	0.0
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	1,237	1.1	1,201	0.7	36	16.7
UNDOF (Golan Heights)	1,103	4.0	1,103	4.0	0.0	0.0
ONUSAL c/ (El Salvador)	706	0.3	161	0.6	545	0.2
UNIIKOM d/ (Kuwait/Iraq)	369	1.9	369	1.9	0.0	0.0
MINURSO e/ (Western Sahara)	350	9.4	324	10.2	26	0.0
UNAVEM II (Angola)	316	1.0	256	0.0	60	5.0
UNAMIR (Rwanda)	512	0.0	510	0.0	2	0.0
UNTSO (Jerusalem)	220	0.0	220	0.0	0.0	0.0
UNOMIL (Liberia)	246	0.0	246	0.0	0.0	0.0
MICIVIH (Haiti)	113	2.7	62	0.0	51	5.9
UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)	38	0.0	38	0.0	0.0	0.0
UNOMIG (Georgia)	12	0.0	12	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	90,758	1.7 e/	85,837	1.7 e/	4,921	0.7

## Notes:

a/ Including all military personnel (e.g. officers, enlisted, military observers); excluding civilian police.

b/ Figures reflect staffing levels at second quarter 1993.

c/ Figures for ONUSAL reflect deployment of personnel during the entire period of 1993.

d/ Military figures based on field communique and lengths of rotations among Member State contributors

e/ Excluding UNTAC.

Source: Report of the statistical compilation of women in peace-keeping prepared by the United Nations Statistical Division for the second issue of The World's Women: Trends and Statistics, Statistical Division/DESIPA, STAT 321(a), United Nations, 29 March 1994.

According to its national report submitted for the second review and appraisal in 1994, Ghana sent an infantry company composed of male and female rifle soldiers to serve in the refugee camps with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). In recent years (1991-1993), Australia deployed its first female soldiers for UN peace-keeping duty with the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in Cambodia. 9 Women accounted for approximately 3.2 per cent of Australia's National Defence Forces involved in UN

peace-keeping operations in 1993.<sup>10</sup> Women in the British Armed Forces are currently serving in support roles in the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>11</sup> Also, women volunteers have served in a military contingent on loan from Finland to the United Nations. Currently, women from the Danish Home Guard and the Armed Services are assigned to UN peace-keeping forces and operations in the Balkans.<sup>12</sup> Finally, the first French female military officer has been serving with UNPROFOR in Sarajevo as a media spokesperson for the United Nations.<sup>13</sup>

Another factor which may contribute to women's participation in peace-keeping is the presence of women in top-level decision-making positions in the military. Examples are the former Minister of Defence in Finland, Ms. Marta Elisabeth Rehn, and the former Deputy Minister of Defence in Poland, Ms. Danuta Waniek. Similarly, women occupy civilian leadership positions in the United States Department of Defense. For example, Ms. Sarah Sewall is the first person to occupy the recently created position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peace-keeping and Peace Enforcement Policy.

#### Civilian police forces - a role for women

One area in which improvement in the low percentage of women's representation might be achieved is in the civilian police components of UN peace-keeping operations, as there are more women officers in civilian police forces than there are women in the military. However, the average participation rate of women in UN civilian police forces is 0.7 per cent (see table 2, page 3). One reason for this very low percentage is that many UN police officers are on loan from military police units, an occupational category where women are largely underrepresented. Should Member States shift to contributing civilian police, given the growing presence of women in the national civilian police forces in many countries, this could result in greater female participation in UN peace-keeping operations.

Statistical data on police personnel in national settings from 1986 indicate that on average women constituted 11 per cent of the civilian police forces in 33 nations, both developed and developing (see table 4, page 5).<sup>15</sup> Although the highest percentages of female police officers were found in Finland (22.1 per cent), the United States of America (21.1 per cent) and Portugal (21.1 per cent), a number of developing countries also demonstrated significant percentages. By using civilian police officers, the current level of women's participation in UN peace-keeping missions could be increased, as has been the case in Cyprus, where women comprised 16.7 per cent of the civilian police forces in the UNFICYP mission in 1993 (see table 2, page 3). A woman also has served as police commissioner in Kismayo, Somalia.<sup>16</sup>

#### Multi-purpose peace-keeping mandates and the expanding role of women

As a result of the significant increase in the civilian components within peace-keeping missions, new roles and expanded opportunities for women's participation have evolved. Women have served as legal and political advisers, civilian police officers, election and human rights monitors, and information specialists and administrators. They have been involved in promoting national reconciliation and democracy, refugee repatriation, and humanitarian assistance. Women have also served as team leaders in human rights and election-monitoring missions and, in a very few isolated cases, have been in decision-making roles, supervising international and local personnel.

Between 1957 and 1991, women constituted from 5 to 23 per cent of the international civilian staff serving in UN peace-keeping operations for which data are available (see table 5, page 7).<sup>17</sup> In 1993, 11 of the 19 UN peace-keeping missions had significant civilian components, and one third of the international UN civilian staff were women. The 12 missions with the highest percentages of women were all established since 1990. In contrast, 5 of the 7 with the lowest percentages were established more than 15 years ago,

in part because of the small number of civilians participating in these missions.

Table 3. Women in regular armed forces

Country	Total active armed forces		Women in the forces
	Number	Proportion of total	
Australia	61,600	7,600	12%
Belgium	63,000	3,000	5%
Brunei	4,000	250	6%
Canada	78,100	8,700	11%
China	2,930,000	136,000	5%
Cyprus	10,000	445	4%
Denmark	27,000	1,000	4%
France	409,600	16,400	4%
Germany	367,300	280	0.08%
Greece	159,300	5,900	4%
India	1,265,000	200	0.02%
Ireland	13,000	100	0.8%
Japan	237,700	8,000	3%
Netherlands	70,900	2,600	4%
New Zealand	10,000	1,150	12%
South Africa	78,000	4,200	5%
Spain	206,500	200	0.1%
United Kingdom	254,300	17,650	7%
United States	1,650,500	198,800	12%

Source: The Military Balance 1994/1995 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).

#### The introduction of women military officers in the UN Secretariat

For reasons similar to those discussed in the section above on "Changes in women's participation in national militaries and UN peace-keeping", from 1957 to 1993 no female military officers were assigned to peace-keeping offices at UN Headquarters. In the Military Adviser's Office, including the Office of Planning and Support, only 3 out of the 60 Professionals (5 per cent) are women. Of the 47 military officers on loan to the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), only 2 (4.2 per cent) are women.<sup>18</sup> In general, women occupy the lower-level positions in the peace-keeping arena. Professional women and female military officers are largely absent from senior management levels in peace-keeping.

This trend has begun to be reversed with the recent appointment of a few women military officers to Professional posts in the UN Secretariat. In January 1994, the first female military staff member was posted from the Royal Netherlands Army to the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) in DPKO. Three more women officers were appointed in 1995 to Professional posts.<sup>19</sup> In addition, a non-commissioned officer from France is assigned to personnel and administrative duties connected with peace-keeping, bringing the total number of women to 5 (4 per cent) out of a total of 122 military personnel in the UN Secretariat.<sup>20</sup> These women were recruited after a specific request for more female military officers was made to the Military Adviser's Office by the Focal Point for Gender in the United Nations and by concerned women Professionals.

Table 4. Civilian police personnel for 1986

## Number of police personnel

Country	Total	Male	Female	% female
Argentina	31,584	28,867	2,717	8.6%
Austria	27,656	27,632	24	0.1%
Bahamas	1,572	1,427	145	9.2%
Bangladesh	74,508	74,295	213	0.3%
Botswana	2,424	2,371	53	2.2%
Burundi	126	114	12	9.5%
Canada	54,604	52,420	2,184	4.0%
Cyprus	3,781	3,713	68	1.8%
Denmark	9,416	9,060	356	3.8%
Dominica	380	365	15	3.9%
Finland	11,589	9,027	2,562	22.1%
France	199,757	195,347	4,410	2.2%
Honduras	6,100	5,200	900	14.8%
Hong Kong	25,762	23,599	2,163	8.4%
Italy	76,092	75,420	672	0.9%
Jamaica	5,781	5,410	371	6.4%
Japan	256,546	239,900	16,600	6.5%
Kiribati	228	226	2	0.9%
Liberia	2,085	1,759	326	15.6%
Malta	1,383	1,318	65	4.7%
Nepal	23,620	23,495	125	0.5%
New Zealand	5,307	4,472	835	15.7%
Norway	5,996	5,603	393	6.6%
Philippines	55,900	52,700	3,200	6.0%
Portugal	1,736	1,370	366	21.1%
Singapore	7,397	6,383	1,014	13.7%
Sri Lanka	23,739	22,976	763	3.2%
St. Kitts and Nevis	329	306	23	7.0%
Sweden	17,390	15,565	1,825	10.5%
Trinidad and Tobago	4,849	4,585	264	5.4%
United States	629,745	496,870	132,875	21.1%
Uruguay	23,786	21,344	2,442	10.3%
Zimbabwe	17,034	16,174	860	5.0%
Total female	1,608,208	1,429,313	178,843	11.1%

Source: Women's Indicators and Statistical Database 1995 (Wistat), version 3, CD-ROM (United Nations publication Sales No.E.95.XVII.6)

The presence of gender-aware persons may have also contributed to changing the situation of women in peace-keeping. For example, Major General Maurice Baril (Canada), Military Adviser at the United Nations, served on the Chief of the Defense Staff's Special Commission on Women in Combat in 1986 in Canada. This commission recommended lifting the restriction on female participation in combat roles in all but submarine units in Canada.<sup>21</sup>

#### Women Professionals in peace-keeping missions

The percentage of women Professionals assigned to UN peace-keeping missions has varied significantly depending upon the type of mission. The election/human rights mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) has had the highest proportion of women (48.7 per cent). Many of the external mission applicants were women, in particular lawyers concerned with human rights, who were well informed about indigenous issues and could relate well to local human rights workers, the majority of whom were women.

Similarly, the International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH), which has monitored human rights, has featured a high percentage of Professional women (39.2 per cent), in comparison to the military observer mission (UNMIH), with only 12.9 per cent women. The multi-purpose UN observer mission in El Salvador, with human rights monitoring, military and police mandates, also has had a significant proportion of women (37 per cent) (see table 6, page 8).<sup>22</sup>

Clearly, UN peace-keeping missions with multi-purpose mandates attract and allow for a higher proportion of women than do strictly military and/or police peace-keeping missions.

Throughout the history of UN peace-keeping, there have been only two women in top decision-making positions. In February 1992, Margaret Anstee (United Kingdom) was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in conjunction with the Angolan Peace Accords. She served as Chief of Mission until civil war erupted following elections.<sup>23</sup> She was the only woman to serve as Special Representative of the Secretary-General among the 25 appointed since 1948 (4 per cent). The only other woman to serve in a senior position was Angela King (Jamaica), in the all-civilian United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). Ms. King served initially as Chief of Mission for 16 months and later as Deputy Special Representative.

According to UN data, there were no women in top policy- and decision-making levels (D-2 to USG) in any of the UN missions active in June 1995. Nor were there women in senior management positions above the rank of P-5 in either MICIVIH (Haiti) or ONUSAL (El Salvador), and only one woman at the P-5 level in MINUGUA (Guatemala). At the P-5 level, there was one woman in MINURSO (Western Sahara), one in UNFICYP (Cyprus), one in UNMIH (Haiti) and three in UNOSOM II (Somalia). In terms of the percentages of UN women staff members serving on various mission assignments, there were none of D-2 to USG rank, 14.0 per cent at the P-5/D-1 level, 20.3 per cent at the P-3/P-4 level and 34.5 per cent at the Professional entry level (P-1/P-2) (see table 7, page 9).

Between 1957 and 1970, the percentage of women in General Service posts of UN peace-keeping missions varied from 49 to 86 per cent. Between 1975 and 1991, the percentage decreased, with women comprising only 15 to 30 per cent of the General Service posts in UN peace-keeping operations (see table 5, page 7). Among factors explaining why the administrative support units of UN peace-keeping missions have fewer women, particularly in recent years, is that in the earlier missions the vast majority of General Service staff were part of the international personnel assigned to the missions. In recent missions, however, many General Service staff have been hired locally.

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), Namibia, 1989-1990

A few case-studies provide insight into the expanded roles and contributions of women in civilian peace and security missions. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 1989-1990, provides the most illustrative example of an operation in which women were encouraged to play significant roles. Its multi-purpose mandate included both military and civilian functions, such as the disarmament and repatriation of armed groups, monitoring the repatriation of more than 43,000 refugees, the release of political prisoners, monitoring local police activities, and supervising voter education and elections for a Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting a new Constitution.<sup>24</sup> Extensive interviews, training and careful selection of UNTAG staff occurred before the mission began. Selection criteria were based upon staff qualifications, experience and geopolitical balance. Moreover, there was a deliberate policy of recruiting women at all levels.<sup>25</sup>

Impressions of women in peace-keeping missions: making a difference

- When a critical mass of women in UN peace-keeping missions exists, local women in the host country are mobilized through a positive demonstration effect. For example, the success of local women and NGO's in being able to diffuse violence in South Africa probably contributed to the conclusion that UN military personnel were not needed in preparing for elections. - The participation of women in UN peace-keeping missions focuses attention on the need for an up-to-date code of conduct for UN peace-keepers, particularly in the area of human rights and gender issues.
- In performing their tasks, women were perceived to be compassionate, unwillingly to opt for force over reconciliation, willing to listen and learn, and contributors to an environment of stability and morality which fostered the peace process.
- The presence of women seems to foster confidence and trust among the local population, a critical element in any peace-keeping mission.
- Women are successful as negotiators, active in proposing constructive solutions, action-oriented and often willing to take innovative approaches to establish a dialogue between polarized groups. They sometimes use unorthodox means such as singing to diffuse potentially violent situations.
- Women's participation helps to break-down traditional views and stereotypes of women in countries and local communities where they serve and among peace-keepers.
- Contrary to some expectations, many women willingly accept the challenges of working in all types of situations, including dangerous and isolated areas.
- Civilian women peace-keepers work effectively with both military and police personnel.

Table 5. International UN civilian staff in peace-keeping missions, by selected years, 1957 - 1991

Year	All categories	
	Total	%Female
1957	266	11.7
1961	783	22.2
1964	460	12.0
1965	356	11.2
1970	264	5.3
1975	669	8.7
1980	956	12.6
1985	958	13.4
1986	1166	12.5
1987	1127	12.2
1988	1099	12.7
1989	1590	23.0
1990	1506	14.2
1991	1449	14.5

Year	P5 to USG	
	Total	%Female
1957	8	0.0
1961	24	0.0
1964	29	3.4
1965	22	0.0
1970	9	0.0
1975	16	0.0
1980	12	0.0
1985	10	0.0
1986	9	0.0
1987	11	0.0
1988	15	0.0
1989	59	10.2
1990	23	0.0

1991 20 0.0

P1 to P4		
Year	Total	%Female
1957	17	11.8
1961	116	11.2
1964	37	5.4
1965	17	17.6
1970	4	0.0
1975	13	0.0
1980	16	0.0
1985	20	15.0
1986	17	35.3
1987	10	10.0
1988	12	25.0
1989	258	38.6
1990	23	13.0
1991	28	25.0

GS-1 to GS-7		
Year	Total	%Female
1957	45	64.4
1961	328	49.1
1964	104	50.0
1965	53	69.8
1970	15	86.7
1975	310	18.1
1980	503	19.7
1985	487	15.0
1986	698	16.6
1987	678	17.0
1988	729	16.5
1989	902	29.8
1990	875	20.3
1991	894	19.1

FS-1 to FS-7		
Year	Total	%Female
1957	196	0.0
1961	315	0.0
1964	290	0.0
1965	264	0.0
1970	236	0.4
1975	330	0.6
1980	425	4.9
1985	441	11.8
1986	442	5.4
1987	428	4.9
1988	343	5.0
1989	471	6.2
1990	585	5.6
1991	507	6.3

Source: Report of statistical compilation on women in peace-keeping for the second issue of The World's Women: Trends and Statistics, Statistical Division/DESIPA, STAT 321(a), United Nations, March 29, 1994.

The background of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Namibia was probably an important factor. He came from the Nordic region, where women have "broken through" to play a prominent role in national political decision-making and where women have achieved the most significant gains in the struggle for gender equality. A conscious policy decision by the Special

Representative apparently enabled more women to participate, particularly in leadership and decision-making positions, in various aspects of the UNTAG operation. Notably, 60 per cent of the Professional staff who were recruited for UNTAG were women, including many in decision-making positions.<sup>26</sup> Although the highest-level positions were occupied by men, five women served at the Director level (D-1/D-2), and women held 3 out of 10 senior field posts as regional directors.<sup>27</sup> One regional director had 800 peace-keeping troops under her supervision at a border post in northern Namibia. Reflecting on her experience, she noted that the Deputy Representative had also supported the strategic placement of women in positions of decision-making and authority in UNTAG. In her experience in dealing with the South African police, being a woman provided an element of surprise and gave her an advantage.<sup>28</sup>

#### The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA)

Another mission which deserves mention is the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), which is the only completely civilian UN mission to date. In this mission, women comprised approximately one half of its international personnel, at least during its initial phase. UNOMSA was composed entirely of civilian observers. There was no military presence or perspective in the mission's concept of operations. During its earliest period, the number of observers was limited to 50. The Chief of Mission of UNOMSA, Angela King, appointed women to 50 per cent of the team leader positions as regional coordinators.<sup>29</sup> Female regional coordinators were assigned to Natal and the Eastern Rand, two areas which experienced over 80 per cent of the political and criminal violence during the pre-electoral process. During the first 16 months of UNOMSA, women comprised 53 per cent of the mission staff, especially in peace-building and peacemaking structures. Later, the mission's mandate was expanded beyond human rights monitoring, conflict avoidance and peacemaking to include election monitoring. Immediately prior to the April 1994 elections, when 3,500 election monitors were selected by their national Governments, the participation rate of women declined dramatically, to 21 per cent.<sup>30</sup>

#### The United Nations Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC/UNTAC)

A second large multi-purpose peace-keeping operation (UNAMIC/UNTAC), involving 22,000 mission personnel, took place in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993.<sup>31</sup> Its mandate included human rights, electoral monitoring, military operations, civil administration, civilian police protection, refugee repatriation and rehabilitation components, culminating in national elections. The participation of women in UNTAC in Cambodia was particularly disappointing in the light of their previous involvement in Namibia. Although there was a substantial female representation among the civilian international staff, UNTAC was predominantly a male peace-keeping operation in which women held no decision-making positions. All of the Director-level posts, 7 at the D-2 level and 13 regional directors at the P-5/D-1 levels, were held by men.<sup>32</sup> Despite requests to national Governments which did not send women, there was little visible high-level presence of women among international civil servants assigned from UN Headquarters, from the UN specialized agencies and among mission appointees.

Table 6. Percentage of women in UN peace-keeping missions

MISSION	% female
MICIVH/Haiti	39.2
ONUMOZ/Mozambique	16.6
ONUSAL/El Salvador	37
OSGAP/Afghanistan	0
MINURSO/Western Sahara	23.3
UNAMIR/Rwanda	15.7
UNARDOL/Lebanon	0
UNAVEM/Angola	3.2

UNDOF/Golan Heights	0
UNCYP/Cyprus	14.2
UNIFIL/Lebanon	20.0
UNIIKOM/Kuwait/Iraq	11.1
UNMB/Burundi	0
MINUGUA/Guatemala	48.7
UNGIP/India/Pakistan	0
UNMIH/Haiti	12.9
UNMOT/Tajakistan	0
UNOMIG/Georgia	10.5
UNOMIL/Liberia	0
UNOSOM II/Somalia	15.3
UNPROFOR/Yugoslavia	20.8
UNSCO/Occupied Territories	0
UNTAC/Cambodia	0

Note. Statistics as of 31 May 1995, United Nations.

A few women served in the Australian, Canadian and Netherlands military contingents of UNTAC. But there were few women in the civilian police, of whom there were approximately 4,000 in the UNTAC operation. One woman serving with the Board of Inquiry Office commented that the presence of more women in the military and police might have dispelled the impression of some of the local population that the United Nations was "an army of occupation".<sup>33</sup> The UNTAC civilian police monitors represented the only semblance of a functioning police/administrative system, so their presence and role were extremely important.<sup>34</sup> A visible presence of female officers would have enabled the Cambodian population, especially women and children, to regard the civilian police as an ally in their daily struggle for survival.

Allegations of sexual abuse and mistreatment of women and children by UN male military and police personnel became an important issue for local communities in UNTAC. The United Nations responded by creating a Community Relations Office within UNTAC. No formal code of conduct for peace-keepers exists, but UN peace-keepers are expected to act as model citizens and in conformity with UN norms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Standards of Conduct for International Civil Servants. A new Code of Conduct for UN Peace-keepers, which includes guidelines on the human rights of women and children and gender issues, is currently being developed.

#### Women in peace-keeping- making a difference

According to the hypothesis stated above, that women's perspective is important in management and in peace-keeping missions in making a difference, it is not sufficient that peace-keeping operations have the participation of women at all levels, including at policy- and decision-making levels. It is not simply a question of gender balance and numbers; it is also a question of the differences women can make.

Evidence suggests that the increased presence of women helps to create good relations with local communities, since the establishment of trust is an essential element in any peace-keeping operation. For example, in Rwanda (UNAMIR), an infantry company composed of male and female rifle soldiers from Ghana is working in the refugee camps. That experience and others suggest that women refugees often would rather discuss their problems with women soldiers than with male soldiers. The inclusion of women in military, police and civilian components of UN peace-keeping has acted as a deterrent to the abuse of power, including sexual harassment and rape. It has been argued that problems involving the abuse of power and sexual exploitation might be minimized, if not eliminated, by increasing the number of women in peace-keeping missions, especially in decision-making positions. This could result in a positive change in attitudes towards women.

Table 7. Professional women as percentage of UN Mission staff as of 31 May, 1995 a/

LEVEL	per cent of UN mission staff
D2 to USG	0%
P5/D1	14.0%
P3/P4	20.3%
P1/P2	34.5%
Total	23%

Source: Statistics compiled from UN personnel statistics as of 31 May, 1995.

a/ Includes UN staff members on fixed-term contracts of limited duration (less than 12 months).

Some scholars subscribe to a feminist theoretical perspective on conflict resolution. This school of thought asserts that women are socially conditioned to be more peaceful and peace-loving and less violent than men. They attribute the more pacifist orientation of females to the roles that women play as mothers responsible for giving birth to and nurturing future generations and as conciliators within the family and in their local communities. They argue that women, as a result of their intermediary role within the household and community, have well-developed negotiating skills which could and should be extended into conflict resolution and negotiations in national and international arenas.

It has also been contended that the presence of women contributes to differences in decision-making in terms of content, priorities, management style, organizational culture and group dynamics.<sup>35</sup> Women's leadership is likely to bring less militarily inclined peace-keeping. There is a minimum level of representation required to enable any minority to influence the culture of a task-oriented group. It has therefore been argued that where women have joined organizations or decision-making bodies in sufficient numbers, they have created a more collaborative atmosphere, characterized by mutual respect, and sought consensus rather than a winner-take-all (zero sum game) solution. According to this perspective, women tend to focus more on resolving rather than simply discussing problems,<sup>36</sup> a characteristic important in dealing with peace and security matters, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacemaking and peace-building.

Existing evidence on UN peace-keeping operations, although fragmentary, seems to confirm the "critical mass" theory and the hypothesis that women's participation brings new elements, values and perspectives to such operations. Discussions with a number of former participants in recent UN peace-keeping missions suggest that the participation of women, although they have been few in number, has contributed a new dimension to these missions.

#### Conclusions

Gender bias by the United Nations, even if unintended, has apparently been a factor contributing to the low representation of women in UN peace-keeping operations, especially in top-level positions. This may change if a recent proposal is implemented to extend ". . . the target of 50 per cent women and men in posts subject to geographical distribution by the year 2000, as set by the General Assembly in resolution 49/167, to all other categories of posts; namely to posts with special language requirements as well as field missions and mission replacement posts, irrespective of the type or duration of the appointment, or of the series of Staff Rules under which an appointment is made. The percentage should apply both overall and within each category".<sup>37</sup>

Moreover, the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995, in its recommendations on women and armed conflict, called for actions to be taken ". . . to promote equal participation of women and equal opportunities for women to participate in all forums and peace activities at

all levels, particularly at the decision-making level, including in the United Nations Secretariat with due regard to equitable geographical distribution in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations".<sup>38</sup> The Platform for Action further recommended that national Governments "strengthen the role of women and ensure equal representation of women at all decision-making levels in national and international institutions which may make or influence policy with regard to matters related to peace-keeping, preventive diplomacy and related activities and in all stages of peace mediation and negotiations, taking note of the specific recommendations of the Secretary-General in his strategic plan of action for the improvement of the status of women in the Secretariat (1995-2000)".<sup>39</sup> Implementation of these recommendations could also lead to an increased role for women in peace-keeping operations.

The growing presence of female officers in national militaries, including in combat roles, and in civilian police forces is also likely to contribute to increasing participation of women in UN peace-keeping missions. Growing experience with women performing in various roles and functions in civilian peace-keeping missions may also contribute to change.

Finally, another determinant relating to the participation of women seems to be the result of "organizational" or "mission culture". This too is changing, albeit slowly, as more women participate in peace-keeping and make a difference, particularly in policy- and decision-making positions.

Research for this issue of Women 2000 was carried out by Janet C. Beilstein, Division for the Advancement of Women/DPCSD.

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32 "Peace: Women in International Decision-making", op. cit., para. 28.

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37 Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, General Assembly, UN document No. A/50/691, 27 October 1995, para. 59.

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#### Notable Events

International Year of the Eradication of Poverty, 1996

15 January - 2 February

Committee on the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women  
(New York)

5-16 February

Third Preparatory Committee Meeting for the United Nations  
Conference on Human Settlements - Habitat II (New York)

6-8 March

Ad Hoc Inter-agency Meeting on Women  
(New York)

11-22 March

Commission on the Status of Women, fortieth session (New York)

15-19 April

Resumed General Assembly fiftieth session on public administration and

development (New York)

3-14 June

United Nations Conference on Human Settlements - The City summit (Istanbul, Turkey)

25 June - 26 July

ECOSOC, 1996 session (New York)

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*Also by Edward Moxon-Browne*

EUROPEAN TERRORISM (*editor*)

NATION, CLASS AND CREED IN NORTHERN IRELAND

POLITICAL CHANGE IN SPAIN

# A Future for Peacekeeping?

Edited by

Edward Moxon-Browne

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## 8 Gender, Race and the Politics of Peacekeeping\*

Sandra Whitworth

Peacekeeping has been a central feature of UN activities for over thirty years, and yet one which has been relatively insulated from any form of critical scrutiny. The general disposition toward peacekeeping has been that it is, at a minimum, a benign use of military force. In part, this assumption depends upon the requirement that peacekeeping forces are brought into a situation with the consent of the parties involved and that they will fire only in self-defence. Those criticisms that exist around peacekeeping tend to focus on the question of whether a particular situation is suitable to peacekeeping efforts (i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina), and potential 'inefficiencies' in particular elements of peacekeeping exercises, but not on the value and dynamic of peacekeeping itself. Moreover, there has been a renewed interest in peacekeeping, not only at the level of international organizations<sup>1</sup> and national governments, but within the popular media and general public as well. Too much of this attention has adopted uncritically and without careful examination the stance that peacekeeping is a viable and welcome alternative to other forms of military force.

Part of the argument of this chapter is that the favourable image associated with peacekeeping within the international community is not always supported by the events associated with actual missions. This chapter will examine two cases, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, or, as it is more popularly known, the Somalia Inquiry. An examination of these two cases demonstrates that, as in any military mission, the relations of power informing peacekeeping missions are far more complex than a superficial reading of the peaceful and altruistic blue-bereted soldier reveals, and depend at least in part on important gendered and racialized distinctions. Those distinctions sometimes have enormous consequences for the people in countries in which peace-

keeping missions are deployed: in the Somalia example, two men were shot by Canadian peacekeepers and a third, Shidane Arone, was tortured and beaten to death; in Cambodia, accusations of sexual harassment, violence and abuse surround public perception of the UNTAC mission there. Under such circumstances, we must ask: if peacekeeping missions result in violence, sexual harassment and abuse, how *peaceful* the peacekeepers?

### THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – UNTAC – is cited by the UN and regarded by many mainstream observers as something of a success story for the UN. William Shawcross, speaking at the general assembly of the International NGO Forum on Cambodia, called it an 'international triumph'<sup>2</sup> and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has written that the 'international community can take satisfaction from the peacekeeping operation it mounted and supported in Cambodia.'<sup>3</sup>

The success, achieved in an 18-month mission in Cambodia, included the reduction of violence, the repatriation of some 370,000 Khmer refugees, and the conduct of a relatively free and fair election in which some four million people, or 85 per cent of Cambodia's registered voters, participated.<sup>4</sup> The UN claimed as well, again in the words of Boutros-Ghali, that the mission 'boosted Cambodia's economy by raising funds internationally for economic rehabilitation and expansion throughout the country.'<sup>5</sup>

The UNTAC effort also achieved some important successes with regard to women within Cambodia. Most notably, the freedom of association which prevailed in many respects during UNTAC and the efforts of UNIFEM to incorporate women's issues into the general election resulted in public education and information campaigns in the printed media and on radio and television. In addition a four-day National Women's Summit brought together Cambodian women from all sectors of society in order to identify and prioritize women's issues in order to lobby political parties contesting the election and then later the government itself.<sup>6</sup> The Women's Summit has been credited with the emergence of an indigenous women's movement within Cambodia as well as a number of indigenous women's NGOs, which in turn have been credited with a very effective lobby of the

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Cambodian government such that important equality rights provisions eventually made it into the new Cambodian constitution.<sup>7</sup>

Though UNTAC was considered a success in many respects, there are also some discussions of problems associated with the mission. For example, the UN failed to achieve a situation of political neutrality, as pledged in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, in part because the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the demobilization and cantonment process and threatened throughout the mission to disrupt the election campaign.<sup>8</sup> This problem was widely attributed to poor planning in advance of the mission and, in particular, the delayed deployment of the UNTAC mission.<sup>9</sup>

Likewise, the presence of UNTAC may have diminished, but did not stop, political violence, which was aimed at both political party members and ethnic Vietnamese. The massacres and exodus of ethnic Vietnamese, many of whom were second- and third-generation Cambodians, were not sufficiently addressed by the UN according to critics. As Grant Curtis points out, 'no party, including UNTAC, made efforts to protect the rights of Cambodia's ethnic Vietnamese population.'<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the extent of the UNTAC response was to organize the 'Safe Passage' operation, which as Raoul Jennar writes, effectively legitimized the forced departure of the Vietnamese.<sup>11</sup>

These are obviously very serious concerns, but there are also another series of issues which emerged throughout the UNTAC mission, and which are seldom discussed in UN documents or mainstream accounts of the mission.<sup>12</sup> Though credited with helping to create the emergence of a fledgling women's movement as well as a number of women's NGOs, there were also a number of important negative consequences for women within Cambodia as a result of the UNTAC mission. These include the reported exponential increase in prostitution to serve UNTAC personnel, with the Cambodian Women's Development Association estimating that the number of prostitutes in Cambodia grew from about 6,000 in 1992 to more than 25,000 at the height of the mission.<sup>13</sup> Some reports indicated that the majority of prostitutes were young Vietnamese women, though these estimates are more likely a result of anti-Vietnamese sentiment as any reflection of reality.<sup>14</sup>

While the presence of prostitutes was not new, and by many accounts frequenting prostitutes is a regular feature of many Cambodian men's behaviour, Cambodians were nonetheless alarmed by the dramatic increase in prostitution and noted that prior to UNTAC it was quite hidden in Cambodian society but became something which

was very prevalent and open.<sup>15</sup> The rise of child prostitution has also been linked in some NGO reports to the arrival of UNTAC.<sup>16</sup> The widespread use of prostitutes was raised by the Khmer Rouge as part of their efforts to undermine the peace process when they accused peacekeepers of being too busy with prostitutes to check on the presence of Vietnamese soldiers.<sup>17</sup> As Judy Ledgerwood wrote: 'Some Cambodians were more inclined to believe Khmer Rouge propaganda that UNTAC was collaborating with the Vietnamese to colonize Cambodia when they saw UNTAC personnel taking Vietnamese "wives".'<sup>18</sup>

The influx of nearly 23,000 UN personnel and the dramatic rise in prostitution also appears to have resulted in a dramatic rise in cases of HIV and AIDS, with the WHO reporting that 75 per cent of people giving blood in Phnom Penh were infected with HIV (though this is considered inflated by some observers) and another report indicating that 20 per cent of soldiers in one French battalion tested positive when they finished their six-month tour of duty.<sup>19</sup> UNTAC's chief medical officer predicted that as many as six times more UN personnel would eventually die of AIDS contracted in Cambodia than had died as a result of hostile action.<sup>20</sup>

As criticism toward UN personnel within Cambodia grew, a number of what Judy Ledgerwood describes as 'telling' actions were announced. Peacekeepers were warned to be more discreet, for example by not parking their distinctive white vehicles outside massage parlours and in red light areas and by not frequenting brothels in uniform.<sup>21</sup> A second response was to ship an additional 800,000 condoms to Cambodia.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to prostitution, charges emerged also of sexual abuse and violence. Raoul Jennar reported that in 1993, 'in the Preah Vihear hospital, there was for a time a majority of injured people who were young kids, the victims of sexual abuse by UN soldiers.'<sup>23</sup> A number of interviewees reported that there were frequent claims of rape and sexual assault brought to women's NGOs during the UNTAC period, but often many days or weeks after the rapes were alleged to have taken place, such that the usual expectations surrounding evidence collection could not be carried out and therefore claims could not be substantiated to the satisfaction of UN officials.<sup>24</sup>

It is also a widely shared view among many Cambodian women and men that the phenomenon of 'fake marriages' was widespread during the UNTAC period. Simply put, a UN soldier would marry a

Cambodian woman, but only for the duration of his posting to Cambodia, at which point he would abandon her. Some women were reported to have been abandoned as far away as Bangkok, and left to their own devices to make their way home. In addition to the emotional trauma of fake marriages, they were enormously 'shameful' for women in a society, which as in most societies, has very strict norms about what is appropriate behaviour in 'good' women.<sup>25</sup>

In part as a response to the sexual harassment which prevailed during UNTAC, an open letter was delivered to the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cambodia, Mr Yasushi Akashi. In the letter, 165 Cambodian and expatriate women and men accused some UNTAC personnel of sexual harassment and assault, violence against women and against prostitutes and of being responsible for the dramatic rise of prostitution and HIV/AIDS.<sup>26</sup> Mr Akashi responded by saying that it was natural for hot-blooded young soldiers who had endured the rigours of the field to want to have a few beers and to chase 'young beautiful beings of the opposite sex'.<sup>27</sup> After an outraged response Akashi pledged to assign a Community Relations officer to hear the complaints of the Cambodian community.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, and in contrast to the claims by Boutros-Ghali about UNTAC contributions to economic development in Cambodia, the UNTAC mission has been blamed instead for economic dislocation. Grant Curtis reports that with skyrocketing inflation the price of a kilogram of high quality rice rose from 450 riels to a high of 3,000 riels, and settled eventually at some 1,800–2,000 riels; the price of fish and meat rose by 80 per cent; housing rental prices increased at least four times and UNTAC personnel often paid Phnom Penh-based rents at the provincial level, resulting in increases there also. UNTAC did contribute somewhat by hiring locals, but also drew most of the few trained or experienced Khmer away from Cambodian administrative structures and into UNTAC, and salary payments to local staff comprised less than one per cent of total local expenditure. Finally, the riel was devalued by 70 per cent during UNTAC.<sup>29</sup> In situations of economic dislocation and inflation, the most vulnerable members of society become even more vulnerable still, and within Cambodia women comprise a large proportion of the vulnerable.

Such an analysis of the mission, while concerned primarily with issues of social justice and security for women in Cambodia, also has implications for those looking for policy-relevant advice. As Kien

Serey Phal notes, there are important lessons to be learned from a mission whose military focus may not have been up to the task of the larger, and more long-term, concerns of community-building, peace-building, human security and development. She writes:

There is a need for the recognition of the success of the peace process in protecting the political rights of Cambodian people and facilitating the improved political participation of women but also of the relative failure of the process to promote social and economic equality, and in particular, to prevent and mitigate violence against women and ensure the protection of fundamental human rights.<sup>30</sup>

For those of us coming from countries which deploy soldiers on peacekeeping missions, the lessons should be obvious. As Cynthia Enloe notes, 'Everyone who sends troops needs to rethink what kind of soldiering works to keep the peace. Because a peace that involves sexual exploitation and sexual violence is no peace at all.'<sup>31</sup>

#### THE SOMALIA INQUIRY

Mainstream accounts of the kinds of issues raised above about the UNTAC mission are often attributed, as Janet Heininger writes, to the problems of establishing a 'common standard of behavior' among contributing countries.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the problem is explained by the fact that some contributing countries, usually those with less experience in peacekeeping missions, send troops not well-suited to the expectations associated with peacekeeping. In the Cambodian case, the Bulgarians are cited as the chief offenders. While not to deny that particular contributing country soldiers may have caused specific sets of problems, it is important to note also that such arguments deflect attention away from more general critical concerns and turn such issues into 'technical problems'. Thus rather than ask questions about the value of relying chiefly on *soldiers* as peacekeepers,<sup>33</sup> ethnic arguments are deployed in such a way that the primary concern becomes 'problems of co-ordination'.

One contributor country normally excluded from any concerns about 'coordination' and which has been viewed in general as the peacekeeping country *par excellence* is Canada.<sup>34</sup> The very favourable image associated with Canadian peacekeeping has been undermined recently, however, as a result of the shooting of two Somali

men and the torture and murder of a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone, by a number of Canadian peacekeepers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment on duty in Somalia in March of 1993. On 4 March of that year two Somali men were shot in the back by Canadian peacekeepers, one of whom died. While an initial investigation concluded that the Airborne members had acted properly, a Canadian military doctor later reported that the dead man had been killed 'execution style' and moreover that he had been pressured to destroy his medical records concerning the murder.<sup>35</sup> On 16 March, at least two Airborne members beat Shidane Arone throughout the evening, abusing him verbally throughout with racist epithets, and by midnight he had died. Arone's murderers also photographed his ordeal, which were released in the course of courts martial proceedings in November of 1994.

The release of the very graphic and horrifying photographs of Arone's murder (the soldiers themselves called them 'trophies'), and the subsequent revelations by the Canadian military doctor that he had been pressured to cover up details of the 4 March shooting led the Canadian Minister of National Defense to call for a public inquiry into the Somalia mission. This was followed two months later by the release of two sets of videos, the first a video from the Somalia mission, portions of which portray Airborne soldiers describing the Somalia mission as 'Operation Snatch Niggers', the second a number of videos depicting the Airborne's hazing rituals which included, among other things, images of Airborne soldiers vomiting or eating vomit, being smeared with faeces, and with the single black soldier in the regiment being forced to walk around on all fours with the phrase 'I love the KKK' written in faeces on his back.<sup>36</sup>

The first reaction by mainstream observers of peacekeeping to the Arone murder was to dismiss it as the act of a few 'bad apples'. The bad apple theory, moreover, was quickly linked by military apologists to problems associated with economic downsizing. As Joseph Jockel argued, the Somalia crisis was the result of a personnel shortage, itself the result of years of underfunding. Under these circumstances, for Jockel, the army 'felt compelled to send to Somalia a unit of the Canadian Airborne Regiment whose fitness for deployment was doubtful.'<sup>37</sup>

The release of the Somalia and hazing videos undermined the 'bad apple' theory and suggested, at least, that the type of behaviour which led to the shootings and Arone's brutal murder was more pervasive within the Airborne Regiment, if not the Canadian military as

a whole. And importantly, it was not the shootings or the murder of Shidane Arone, but the release of the hazing video which led the Minister of National Defense to announce on 23 January 1995 that the elite Airborne Regiment would be disbanded.<sup>38</sup> As Romeo St Martin writes:

Allegations of racism, torture and murder weren't enough to bring down the Canadian Airborne unit. Even a videotape filled with racist comments was dismissed as 'bravado' by the unit's supporters. However, video of the Canadian troops frolicking in a sea of vomit, piss and shit outraged the public and was cause for swift action by Defense Minister David Collenette to disband the regiment.<sup>39</sup>

A concern with a breakdown in the 'chain of command' replaced the assumption that the Somalia murders (usually referred to as 'unfortunate events') were the result of a few bad apples. It is an examination of the chain of command which is the focus of the Somalia Inquiry.

Whether it is a 'few bad apples' or problems in the 'chain of command', what we are *not* likely to see at the inquiry or any of the more traditional analyses made of it is any analysis of the ways in which these events are a product of what many feminists describe as militarized masculinity.<sup>40</sup> What is clear, however, is that there is ample evidence in the shootings, the murder of Arone, the various videotapes and now testimony emerging at the inquiry to support such an analysis. In addition to Arone's torture and murder and the visual evidence from the hazing videos, what has been shown in testimony, questioning and documents submitted thus far to the inquiry is that, in contrast to the notion that the Canadian military by virtue of its participation in peacekeeping missions is a quite benign, altruistic and peaceful institution, in fact, it is one in which the glorification of force, hierarchy, racism and violence against women are, like most militaries, an important part of its culture.

Within the first week of the inquiry's evidentiary hearings, for example, the Canadian public learned that military officials had allowed members of the Airborne who were either known members of racist skinhead organizations or who were under investigation for suspected skinhead and neo-nazi activity to be deployed to Somalia.<sup>41</sup> None of the suspected skinheads were charged in Arone's murder, but considerable concern was raised that knowledge of the racist activity had been clearly documented over a year before the unit was deployed to Somalia. Indeed, those documents indicated that the

entire Canadian Forces Base Petawawa (home to the Airborne) 'appear to be one of the several areas where right-wing activities are centered.'<sup>42</sup>

Other revelations followed. In November, lawyers for the Canadian Jewish Congress alleged that members of the Airborne held a celebratory dinner to honour Marc Lepine, the man who massacred 14 women at the Université de Montréal in 1989. A former member of the Airborne confirmed the dinner had taken place and commented, '... it would have been the same as having an Adolf Hitler party on his birthday... It's just the shock value.'<sup>43</sup>

One of the questions which Inquiry Commissioners posed to many witnesses in the first phase of the hearings concerned a number of incidents involving the Airborne prior to its deployment to Somalia. The first was a reported 'torching' of an officer's car at the base and the second was a shooting spree by members of the Airborne within a nearby provincial park. The Commissioners wondered aloud whether officers should have taken these incidents more seriously and as evidence of a real problem of command and control within the regiment.

Retired Major-General Lewis Mackenzie's response to these questions was revealing. He suggested that because the Somalia mission had been upgraded from a Chapter VI (peacekeeping) mission to a Chapter VII (peace enforcement) mission, the soldiers were all 'psyched up', and though he did not want to excuse their behaviour prior to deployment, he thought that excitement might explain these incidents. He pointed out that there had only been three Chapter VII missions in UN history to that point: Korea, the Gulf War and Somalia. Somalia had become 'a non-blue beret fight, as it were', and that while 'some of this is macho stuff', there was 'more prestige' for Airborne soldiers being deployed on a Chapter VII mission than a Chapter VI.<sup>44</sup> There is more prestige, in other words, for soldiers to be involved in a mission of real soldiering, in which they are no longer restricted to firing only in self-defence.

In addition to these various revelations, one of the first documents tabled at the inquiry confirmed what feminists have long argued:<sup>45</sup> the level of violence against women is disproportionately high within militaries, and this is true also of the Canadian military. The Hewson Report was a 1985 inquiry into infractions and antisocial behaviour within the Mobile Command, with particular reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Major-General Hewson had been charged with investigating whether there was a

higher rate of disciplinary infractions (i.e. criminal behaviour) within the Canadian forces than within Canadian society more generally. The report was initiated after a series of media stories covering crimes by Airborne members, one of which involved the murder of a civilian with a machete.<sup>46</sup>

Hewson reported that there was no higher incidence of crime within the Canadian Forces, and in fact 'there appears to be a lower incidence of serious pathology and violent behaviour in the CF than in the Canadian population at large.'<sup>47</sup> However, two important qualifications were noted, the first was that while there was a lower incidence of violent crime more generally, there was 'a relatively higher frequency of sexual offences which should be further investigated.' The second was that within the Canadian Forces, there was a higher incidence of violent crime within the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

Hewson's explanation for the higher incidence of violent crime within the Airborne relied on explicitly gendered arguments and focused on the 'characteristics' of local residents and the concentration of single soldiers in Petawawa. The Report noted that 'Due to the physical nature of local industry (lumber and agriculture) the local civilian male population is considered robust and tough.'<sup>48</sup> Add to this a concentration of single male soldiers, the report noted, and there resulted the potential for violence, particularly in 'disputes over girls':

When compared to a relatively small local female population, this high concentration of young single soldiers creates an unbalanced, artificial society which is a source of undue stress to many servicemen. The young single soldier with his new 'sporty' car, regular and higher pay and job security has a tendency [*sic*] to attract the local female population; this further antagonizes the local male population already frustrated (particularly so in Quebec) by the high level of unemployment. This creates a highly volatile situation; the local civilian police on both sides of the river state that most incidents of violence are over girls.<sup>49</sup>

The report had comparatively less comment to make on the higher incidence of sexual assaults within the Canadian Forces, noting only that it deserved further study. Further studies were not forthcoming, perhaps in part because Hewson never indicated *how much* higher the level of sexual assaults were.<sup>50</sup> In fact, however, an appendix outlining 'crime case synopses' for 1984/85 indicates that the number of

sexual offences within the Canadian Forces is staggering. If one includes within the category of sexual assaults all assaults in which the victim is a woman, more than half of the 141 crimes listed were either sexual assaults or physical assaults against women: 76 out of 141 cases, or 54 per cent. It is very telling that not only did these figures not appear in the text of the report but in commenting on these statistics, Hewson noted that the crime case synopsis 'does not, statistically, reveal any significant or alarming trends.'<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the recommendation to study further the 'higher frequency of sexual assaults' did not even make it into the Report's Summary of *Main Recommendations*.<sup>52</sup>

What is being revealed at the Somalia Inquiry is the extent to which even Canada's beloved blue-bereted soldiers rely on the racism, violence and sexism which is inherent in the creation of soldiers and militarized masculinity. In an observation which could serve as a textbook definition of militarism and militarized masculinity (and which could have been read as a prediction of Shidane Arone's murder in Somalia when the Airborne was deployed there almost ten years later), Major R.W.J. Wenek wrote in 1984:

The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units. This is implicitly recognized in the aggressive norms of behaviour permitted and encouraged in elite units, such as commandos, paratroopers, and special service forces. Particularly in units such as these, but also in other combat units, behaviour which may be considered verging on the sociopathic in peacetime becomes a prerequisite for survival in war. Aggressiveness must be selected for in military organizations and must be reinforced during military training, but it may be extremely difficult to make fine distinctions between those individuals who can be counted on to act in an appropriately aggressive way and those likely at some time to display inappropriate aggression. *To some extent, the risk of erring on the side of excess may be a necessary one in an organization whose existence is premised on the instrumental value of aggression and violence.*<sup>53</sup>

Or, as a paratrooper in the newly recreated Light Infantry Battalion at Petawawa noted: 'People worry we're too aggressive. But that's what soldiers are supposed to be. You don't go out and give the enemy a kiss. You kill them.'<sup>54</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

The observations presented here about the Somalia Inquiry and the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia are intended, first, to call into question the very comfortable assumptions about peacekeeping which prevail in both national and international contexts. They are intended, secondly, to outline some of the ways in which peacekeeping politics – like all politics – depend upon gendered and racialized hierarchies. Soldiers are not born, they are made; and the training of soldiers depends in part upon notions of militarized masculinity which privilege violence, racism and sexism. This is true whether those soldiers are trained for warfare or for peacekeeping, and indeed, many proponents of peacekeeping argue that soldiers *must* be trained in the arts of war in order to be able to perform their peacekeeping duties.<sup>55</sup> The cases presented here, however, suggest that if there *is* a future for peacekeeping, then at a minimum we need to rethink the automatic response found in most quarters that soldiers make the best peacekeepers: for many women in Cambodia and for the Somali men killed by Canadian peacekeepers, it is quite clear that soldiers trained well in the arts of militarized masculinity can by far also make the worst peacekeepers.

## NOTES

1. See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992, Ch. V and *passim*; and *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60, 25 January 1995.
2. Cited from R.M. Jennar, 'UNTAC: "international triumph" in Cambodia?', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, p. 145. See also Judy L. Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping missions: the lessons from Cambodia', *Analysis from the East-West Center No. 11*, Honolulu: East-West Center, March 1994; Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, pp. 1–8. Peter Utting also notes the way in which 'world opinion has been quick to label the United Nations operation in Cambodia "a success"', and contrasts that view with the research presented in his volume on the social consequences of UNTAC. See Peter Utting, 'Introduction: linking peace and rehabilitation in Cambodia', in Utting, *Between Hope and Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process*, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994, p. 3 and *passim*.

3. Cited in *The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995*, New York: UN, 1995, p. 55; see also 'What the United Nations learnt in Cambodia', *The Economist*, 19 June 1993, p. 36.
4. Ker Munthit, 'Akashi: election "free and fair"', *Phnom Penh Post*, 6-12 June 1993, p. 3; Nate Thayer and Rodney Tasker, 'Voice of the people', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 June 1993, p. 10. See also Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Ch. 4 and *passim*; Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, 'The UN in Cambodia: lessons for complex peacekeeping,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 117-47.
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**JOINT CANADA-US GENDER SENSITIZATION TRAINING FOR  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PARTICIPANTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

**FIRST BILATERAL OFFICIALS MEETING**

**OTTAWA  
WEDNESDAY 27 MAY 1998**

**BRIEFING  
ON THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN  
AND PROJECTED PLAN OF WORK**

**JOINT CANADA-US GENDER SENSITIZATION TRAINING FOR  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PARTICIPANTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

**FIRST BILATERAL OFFICIALS MEETING**

**OTTAWA  
WEDNESDAY 27 MAY 1998**

**8:30 - 15:00 B3-500**

**Participants**

Meghan Barresi, US Embassy  
Anita L. Botti, US Department of State  
Cecile Bensimon, DFAIT  
Adele Dion, DFAIT  
Patricia Fortier, DFAIT  
Fiona McFarlane, DFAIT  
Kirsten Mlacak, DFAIT  
Kirsten Ruecker, DFAIT  
Ginette Saucier, DFAIT  
Taylor Wentges, DFAIT

**Point of order:**

Section three of the agenda, Process, amended to include b.2 Workshop and subsection (f) Evaluation and Monitoring.

**Prefatory Remarks:**

The session began with participant introductions and a review and acceptance of the agenda. The initiative find its genesis in a Canadian-US agreement during Secretary of State Albright's visit to Minister Axworthy in March 1998 on developing joint gender sensitization training for civilian and military participants in peace operations. Participants agreed that the timing is right for

an initiative of this kind which is also in keeping with the UN objective of mainstreaming and a widespread organizational interest in gender and peacebuilding. Moreover, given a seeming absence of gender sensitization in current UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations this creative initiative has a real opportunity to shape the future of multilateral peacebuilding operations on a global scale.

The pilot is scheduled to begin around 08 March 1999 in order to coincide with International Women's Day and to mark the first year anniversary of the 09-10 March 1998 meeting between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy in which they announced the Joint Canada-US Gender Sensitization Training for Civilian and Military Participants of Peace Operations.

### **The Pilot Project**

In moving the initiative beyond the conceptual phase, the discussion established the initiative's concrete goal: a training course outlined in the "Points of Reference". As the idea of a course was developed further it was also accepted that the curriculum and course would be disseminated beyond the initial pilot group.

A review suggested that other target organizations could include the UNHCR, UNHCHR, OAS and the OSCE. A number of participants stated in the meeting that individuals in the aforementioned organizations had expressed support for and interest in the initiative and its objectives. This initiative can link to other organizations, including the United Nations through the UN training assistance team and/or the lessons learned unit and the UN Staff College.

A stand-alone design model that can also easily be integrated into already existing modules of training would make the initiative more marketable, easier to disseminate and tap into a growing interest in gender sensitivity training. However, the program should be clearly identified in its gender objectives so that when it is implemented it will not be misused, misinterpreted and risk counterproductivity. In spite of this there was a recognition of the need to be culturally sensitive and to allow for regional modifications yet maintain the objective of the integration of a gender analysis into peacebuilding.

## **The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPC) as Potential Implementer**

One method of dealing with these sensitivities is to use the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPC) as the site and implementing agent for the pilot. The PPC was tentatively accepted as the initial implementer with the condition that the initiative not be wedded to the PPC and that its product can be marketed elsewhere. It was stressed that the PPC is not the only prospective implementer of this initiative. Moreover the PPC will not be the owner of the issue of gender and peacebuilding nor will it claim ownership to the initiative and its products. The core of the Steering Committee will continue ongoing negotiations with the PPC to ensure that these goals are met and the integrity of the initiative remain intact.

The PPC does offer comparative advantages including its receptivity to the initiative, its organizational history, willingness to be flexible and ability to bring international experts to the site. The Steering Committee will ultimately be responsible for providing strong direction to the PPC as it does not have the expertise in this area.

In principal, the initiative should be guided by three vital principles: first, that the Steering Committee's relationship to the PPC be directive in nature; second, flexibility of the model to ensure its application beyond the pilot; and third, that the development of the initiative be consultative and include substantive input from gender experts with direct field experience of armed conflict, peace operations and/or peacebuilding.

### **Preliminary Thoughts on the Course**

The materials provided to course participants should include a theoretical component that will include conceptual work in the area, a clear explanation of the program objective and its importance, and information to demonstrate the need for an integration of gender analysis into peace operations and peacebuilding. The materials should include literature that clearly identifies the relationship between security and gender, and argues that gender is a tool of analysis that brings into view the gender differentiated experiences of conflict, peace and security, which

conventional approaches obscure. While the training should be directly related to the functions of peace operations, it should also include the function of political advocacy.

The training could then shift to the practical aspects of peacekeeping. It was generally concluded that the implementation of this program utilize a case study approach moving the participant from theory to practice. The program needs to be easy for the deliverers to understand and incorporate into practice. This can be achieved by identifying themes or aspects of conflict and then follow actors throughout their gendered experiences. For example, in the case of demobilization, the appropriate case study could be Angola; while a study on human rights could be situated within the Guatemalan context.

A recap of discussions thus far focused on operation definitions and moved to an acceptance of the definitions provided in the "Points of Reference". It was reiterated that the focus should be placed on gender as an analytic tool and the avoidance of the equating gender with women.

### **The Steering Committee**

It was agreed that the focus be placed on the creation of a Steering Committee instead of an Advisory Committee to better reflect the directional role of the Committee. The Steering Committee's mandate will be to develop the substance of the training curriculum, to direct the implementing agent in its delivery and to provide strategic input on questions of process and dissemination. The Committee will ensure that all aspects of gender and peacebuilding will be covered, and assist in the identification of gaps of expertise.

It was also agreed that participants should draft a list of government and NGO experts that would be suitable members and exchange these lists as soon as possible. The lists of experts will then be collected and used in the compilation of a list that will be complementary and not overlapping to avoid duplication of areas. In this regard it is expected that some experts may cover a number of areas and roles.

The active participation of non-governmental gender experts is vital to the success of the initiative. It is clear however that this initiative will not involve specific

NGOs per se as much as drawing on experts who may or may not have NGO affiliations.

As well it is expected that government agents, experts and resource people that participate will be expected to speak to gender in the conduct of their work.

The Committee will:

- cover aspects of delivery, give guidance on policy parameters and outcome;
- be a substantive resource for the implementer;
- have a core body consisting of Anita L. Botti and Ginette Saucier; and
- will be responsible for negotiations on issues of contractual obligations and substance with the implementer although it may choose to engage others as resource persons;
- will consist of American and Canadian government officials, but is not exclusive to Americans or Canadians;
- gather approximately 12 persons according to a working formula of one third: policy makers, delivery NGOs and recipient NGOs;
- be small and constant in its composition;
- in addition to the governmental representatives, consist of field experts, government agents (i.e. the RCMP) and gender experts in peace operation issues and field activities.

Finally, it was agreed that the initiative should be monitored and evaluated with the opportunities for feedback to be directed to the Committee. Therefore, the Committee should remain active over the course of this process.

### **Workshop**

In the middle of July, the Steering Committee will hold a workshop, possibly over two days, in order discuss points of substance to be included in the curriculum. The objective of the workshop is to refine the theoretical framework for the initiative and to engage in questions of epistemology, pedagogy, and curriculum content.

Additionally, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) will be invited to make a presentation of their capabilities in implementing this initiative during this

Workshop.

The Steering Committee will produce from the Workshop a statement of work which will in a later meeting be provided to the PPC for their consideration. This session will also give the Steering Committee the opportunity to outline the genesis of the initiative, as well as the aims and objectives to the PPC/Implementing Agency and allow for clarification of terms, approach and field questions.

The pilot is scheduled to begin around 08 March 1999 to coincide with International Women's Day and to mark the first year anniversary of the 09-10 March 1998 meeting between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy in which they announced the Joint Canada-US Gender Sensitization Training for Civilian and Military Participants of Peace Operations.

### **Work Calendar**

01 July 1998	Steering Committee constituted
15-16 July 1998	2 Day Workshop of Steering Committee
mid September 1998	Terms of Reference provided to Pearson Peacekeeping Centre/Implementing Agent
mid September-01 November 1998	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (or alternate implementing agency) will develop a curriculum proposal.
01-15 November 1998	Steering Committee to review proposal
15 November 1998-01 January 1999	PPC/Implementing Agency prepares curriculum.
15 January-01 March 1999	(i) PPC/Implementing Agency organizes logistics. (ii) Steering Committee reviews curriculum. (iii) Steering Committee develops list of participants and provides it to PPC/Implementing Agency.
08 March 1999	Pilot launch.

### **Funding Arrangements**

Monetary disbursement and contract modalities will be determined in the near future. The US has however confirmed two year funding for the initiative.

**JOINT CANADA-US GENDER SENSITIZATION TRAINING FOR  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PARTICIPANTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

**FIRST BILATERAL OFFICIALS MEETING**

**OTTAWA, WEDNESDAY 27 MAY 1998**

**8:30 - 15:00 B3-500**

- Objectives:
- To agree on the parameters of the joint initiative, ie. scope, substance, time line and process;
  - To agree on a work calendar ;
  - To agree on roles and responsibilities and next steps.

**AGENDA**

**8:30**

1/ Review the meeting's objectives;

2/ Discuss the terms of the joint initiative:

a) in general: the deliverable;

b) in particular: - gender;

- peace operations;

- scope: clientele;

**10:00** \* coffee break \*

3/ Discuss the process:

a) establishing a core advisory committee;

b) bringing in non-governmental expertise from North and South and OGDs;

c) requesting a proposal from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC);

d) consulting on the proposal received;

e) developing the pilot, testing, and revising for delivery.

4/ Discuss roles and responsibilities, and time line;

5/ Agree on work calendar and next steps.

**12:30** \* lunch \*

**13:30**

6/ Wrap-up.

7/ Joint review of the draft conclusions of the meeting.

**JOINT CANADA-US GENDER SENSITIZATION TRAINING FOR  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PARTICIPANTS OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

**FIRST BILATERAL OFFICIALS MEETING**

**OTTAWA, WEDNESDAY 27 MAY 1998  
8:30 - 15:00 B3-500**

**POINTS OF REFERENCE**

**1. Bilateral initiative's genesis and objective:**

Canada and the US agreed during Secretary of State Albright's visit to Minister Axworthy last March 1998 to develop jointly gender-sensitization training for civilian and military participants involved in peace operations. The initiative comes as result of a common recognition of the need to integrate a gender awareness into peacebuilding policy, strategies and operations.

**2. Policy context:**

This bilateral initiative is in keeping with the conclusions drawn from the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women and the ECOSOC 1997 Agreed Conclusions on mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the UN system.

The initiative is also in keeping with Canada's current efforts to develop, within the context of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative and in close collaboration with representatives of the non-governmental sector, an integrated gender approach to peacebuilding policy, strategies and operations.

**3. Proposed product:**

A pilot/prototypical gender-sensitization training course delivered at a specific location within the next year to a set number of civilian and military participants involved in peace operations.

**4. Proposed implementing agency and location for delivery:**

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPC).

**5. Possible participants:**

Sample distribution of participants as per the main functions involved in peace operations, ie. the diplomatic, humanitarian, military and civilian policing components. Participants to the pilot training should include civilian and military personnel, and representatives from UNDPKO, UNDP and at least one regional organization. The composition should reflect as much as possible a realistic participants' functional and geographic distribution.

## 6. Operational definitions:

### a) Peace operations:

Peace operations serve to promote stability or peace through conflict prevention, management or resolution activities. Specifically, they are third party interventions that normally involve a multilaterally sanctioned (though not necessarily multilaterally-led) mandate with start and end dates, often with multifunctional characteristics. They may or may not have a military component.

Subsumed under peace operations are such activities as classical peacekeeping, peace enforcement, civilian missions, and humanitarian interventions. Resources engaged in peace operations are now employed in a variety of circumstances, ranging for example from cease-fire supervision to the delivery of humanitarian aid, the monitoring of elections, and the clearing of land-mines.

Examples of peace operations would include: UNDOF (Golan), Operation Desert Storm, MICIVIH (Haiti), MINURCA (Central African Republic), UNTAC (Cambodia), SFOR (Bosnia), MINUGUA (Guatemala).

### b) Gender:

The term "gender" refers to the socially constructed roles, norms, expectations and stereotypes accorded to women and men (rather than the biological distinction of men and women). Thus a gender perspective implies analyses of social relations between women and men (girls and boys) in a given context (i.e. a culturally and historically determined context).

Mainstreaming or fully integrating a gender perspective implies a process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programmes, in all areas, at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's (girls' and boys') concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men (girls and boys) benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.

Effective integration of a gender perspective into peacebuilding strategies and operations cannot proceed in isolation of the design, implementation and tracking of such activities nor can it proceed as an add-on effort. Gender analysis must proceed from the outset and throughout. It should seek to recognize and address women's and men's (girls' and boys') gender-differentiated experiences of armed conflict, peace operations and long-term peacebuilding. It should also cast its analysis such as to include gender-differentiated experiences of pre-conflict social organization -- from governance and legislation to human rights and socio-economic conditions -- in order to best capture the gender dimensions of the context in which conflict management and resolution as well as post-conflict reconstruction activities will be taking place.

## 7. Process:

### a) Setting up an advisory committee:

As the development, testing and delivery of the training will be delegated to an implementing agency, a core advisory committee should be established to track and guide the training curriculum's development and delivery. Its composition should include Canadian and American officials covering the diplomatic, military, humanitarian and civilian policing components of peace operations. Non-governmental representatives can be invited to join the advisory committee.

### b) Seeking non-governmental gender expertise:

In order to ensure field relevance, input from non-governmental gender experts involved in peace operations issues and/or field activities should be sought at an early stage. Their active contributions could be shared with members of the advisory committee at a multi-day workshop where curriculum proposal requirements could be identified (e.g. determination of need and rationale, lessons learned, audience consideration, contexts for delivery, coordination with other bodies such as the UN Staff College, UNDPKO, DAW, OSCE, etc.).

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