




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


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
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
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


A
L E T T E R

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE

William Pitt, Esq;





A
L E T T E R

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
William Pitt, Esq;

BEING
An Impartial Vindication of the Conduct
of the Ministry, from the Commence-
ment of the present War to this Time.

In Answer to the Aspersions cast upon them by
Admiral *Byng* and his Advocates.

*The Truth is great,
Greater than THOU ; and I will give it Way.*
THOMSON.

L O N D O N :
Printed for PHILIP HODGES, at the *Globe* in
Great Turnstile, Holborn.

MDCCLVI.
(Price One Shilling.)



A
LETTER, &c.

S I R,

IN an Age ungrateful and censorious as this is universally allowed to be, it is not at all amazing to see the Characters of the *greatest* and *most worthy* Men, daily and hourly abused and traduced.

THE Darts of Malice, Envy and Prejudice, are continually pointed at those whom Fortune hath *deservedly* placed upon her highest Summit. Calumny and Greatness always go Hand in Hand together, and the Shield of Virtue, though like that of

B

Achilles,

Achilles, impenetrable, is often blackened and defiled by the Dirt, that Ignorance and Wickedness throw upon it.

THESE, Sir, are deplorable *Truths*; but *Truths* they are; and I hope you, who are not noted for the most zealous Friend to the present Ministry, will nevertheless with Pleasure see the Conduct of the worthy Gentlemen, *now* at our Helm, since the Commencement of the present War, *fully and clearly vindicated*. This Task is mine, and if my Abilities equal my Wishes, I shall sit down contented with the pleasing Thoughts of having rescued *immaculate Virtue*, from the insidious Attacks of Envy, Hatred and Malice.

BEFORE we enter upon the proposed *Vindication*, let us, Sir, if you please, cast our Eyes back to future Ages, and endeavour

deavour to find such a *glorious* Set of Warriors, Statesmen, Politicians and Patriots, as GREAT BRITAIN can now boast of.— but the Attempt is vain: The Annals of the Universe, from its Creation to this present Time, will be ineffectual for the Purpose I have mentioned. Can all the far-famed Heroes of Antiquity, co-joined with the *Conde's*, *Turenne's*, and *Eugene's* of a later Age, compare all their accumulated Victories to the single Defeat at *Culloden*?

CAN the Patriotism and Contempt for Riches, which so much distinguished the Second *Brutus*, presume to vie with those Qualities so conspicuous in the present Lord Chancellor?

CAN the Politics of the celebrated *Florentine*, *Machiavel*, or the famous *Rich-lieu*,

licu, equal those of the first Lord Commissioner of the Treasury ?

WAS the Office of Secretary of War ever so nobly filled as at present, by the illustrious Person who is as remarkable for the Goodness of his Head, as for his Perspicuity and Clearness of Expression?

OR, can we even presume to hope, that our Posterity will ever be blessed with so great a Genius as now condescends to preside over our Naval Affairs? The almost unanimous Voice of a grateful People will answer, No.

WHAT in the Name of Wonder, (may some impartial People ask) can be the Objections raised against the Ministry? Let me answer, and truly answer, *few and frivolous*. Upon the very first Notice of
the

the Encroachments of our perfidious Enemies the *French*, upon our Settlements in *America*, every Method that human Wisdom could suggest, was immediately taken to preserve those our most valuable Acquisitions. A large and powerful Fleet was fitted out with an Expedition unparalleled, to check the unbounded Insolence and Ambition of our hostile Neighbours; and the Consequence was glorious. Great Numbers of Merchant Ships and Fishing-Vessels were taken by our Men of War, which Success gave a Blow, which for some Centuries cannot be recovered, to the Trade of *France*, and reduced a great Number of its Inhabitants, especially the poorer Sort, to the utmost Distress.

IF *Braddock* was defeated in *North America*, let me ask any impartial Man, was it owing to the Negligence of those in
Power

Power at Home, or to his own Inadvertency and Precipitation? Certainly to the latter. The ill Consequences of this Defeat were *few or none at all*, and the Wisdom of the Ministry never was more conspicuous than in appointing Sir *William Johnson* to command our Forces, who recovered the Laurels plucked from *Braddock's* Brow, by defeating the united Forces of the *French* and *Canadians*.

IF *Oswego* is lost, must it not be attributed to the fatal Difference between the *New-England* Troops and the brave Veterans who were sent over to protect our Colonies; which no human Prudence could foresee or prevent? And the Blocking up of *Louisbourg*, by which the Inhabitants were reduced (by their own Accounts) to the utmost Distress, must by all be allowed to be a Master-Piece of Policy. Thus much for the

the Conduct of the Ministry in regard to *North America*, which Candour *must* commend, and Envy itself CANNOT blame.

YOU yourself Sir, must own the Assertion, that the Voice of the People is the Voice of God, to be as false as it is specious. The Clamour of the many-headed Beast the Multitude, against the Government, for a Step the most prudent that ever was taken, and which under Providence preserved this Kingdom from the Calamities of an Invasion, is a flagrant Proof. You need not be told, I presume, that I mean the bringing over of a large Body of *Hessian* and *Hanoverian* Troops for the *Protection, Defence* and *Safety* of this Nation ; a Proceeding against which the Thunder of *your* Oratory was levelled in vain. A large Number of Transports were preparing at *Brest*, the Coasts of *France* were filled with Troops ready

ready at an Hour's Notice to embark, and pour in upon us. What at that Time could have protected us? The Military Force we had in this Kingdom, was universally allowed to be insufficient. Where then could we find an Asylum from the approaching, impending Danger but in our Allies? In our *unemployed* Fleets, you will answer, which then were riding at *Spithead*. But was this Fleet Invincible? and if it was, might not the Enemy's Squadron have escaped it in the Night, in a Fog, or by a thousand other Accidents? What then would have been the Consequence?—I tremble at the Thoughts of it. Had the Militia Bill passed, what a poor Defence must a raw, undisciplined, irregular Mob, (I cannot call them an Army) have made against sixty thousand Veterans (for with no less were we threatned) headed by experienced Generals, flushed with the Victories obtained
in

in the last War. But by the Prudence and Sagacity of our Ministers the grand Scheme of our inveterate Enemies was defeated, *England* was preserved by the Assistance of her *natural* Allies, and our Fleets set at Liberty to quit our Coasts and infest those of our Enemies. Yet for this have they been branded with the odious Appellations of *Enemies* to their Country, *Infringers* of the Rights and Privileges of *Englishmen*, and every other degrading Name which *ungrateful* Men ever did and will bestow upon their *Preservers*.

BUT conscious of their own Skill and Virtue, the *Noble* Pilots rejoice in having preserved the Ship, tho' the foolish *Mariners* would rather have utterly perished; than owed their Lives to the Wisdom of their Superiors.

I flatter myself that I have now fully vindicated the Ministry in relation to *North America*, and the Importation of foreign Troops; yet, tho' much is done, still much remains behind. MINORCA, the brightest Gem in the *British* Diadem is lost, (or as some will have it given away) thro' the Incapacity, Negligence or Treachery of those who ought to have made use of every Effort to preserve it. The Garrison of that invaluable Place was insufficient for its Defence, and the principal Officers of the few Regiments that composed the Garrison, were absent from their Duty. Timely, frequent Notice was given the Ministry that the *French* were preparing to attack the Island, yet not one Precaution was taken, to prevent the Landing of the hostile Forces, reinforce the brave *Blakeney*, or relieve the Fort when besieged, tho' the Governor and Garrison defended the Place for more than
two

two Months with uncommon Vigour, in hopes of receiving Succours from *England*. This, Sir, is the Language of some Men; who *they* are I need not mention to *you*.

THE Charge indeed is heavy, and the Loss I fear irretreviable. The Key of the *Mediterranean*, the Protection of our *Levant* Trade, the commodious Harbour for Ships of all Burthens is forcibly torn from us and possessed by the Enemy, to our great Loss and Detriment. A greater Disgrace never stained the *British* Annals. But let *Impartiality* reign in *Indignation*, and Candour mount the Judgment-Seat instead of blind vindictive Rage; yet let not Pity blunt the Sword of Justice, *but where the Offence is, let the great Axe fall.*

I believe it cannot be disputed that frequent and timely Advice was received by the Government, that the *French* were making great Preparations at *Toulon*, and that the Preparations were *reported* to be destined against the Island of *Minorca*. But the *certain* Destination, however, was not known till Monsieur *de Galissoniere* appeared with the Men of War and Transports off *Minorca*. The *Reports* of the *French* had no Manner of Weight with our *prudent* Ministry, who, probably imagined their whole Design was to draw a great Number of our Ships from the Coasts of *Great Britain*, into the *Mediterranean*, in order to facilitate the intended Invasion of these Kingdoms. These Conjectures are very far from being romantic, if we consider that *French* Policy seldom declares its Intentions before-hand. However, what was imagined to be a mere
 Gasconade,

Gasconade, was verified by the Event; the Duke *de Richlieu* landed his Troops, and Fort *St. Philip* was beleagured.

UPON the first *Confirmation* of this melancholy News, every thing that Prudence could dictate was performed by the Ministry. Nothing was left undone that had the least Tendency to the Preservation of the important Place. A Fleet was ordered to be immediately fitted out to attempt its Relief; when ready, *some* Land Forces were put on Board *here*, and the Commander in Chief had Orders to receive a much greater Number at *Gibraltar*. However, the Governour of that Fortrefs, for Reasons best known to himself, refused to obey his Orders, was recalled, tried for it, and the Consequences are too well known to be enumerated here. Thus much, however, it is necessary

sary to premise, that had the Government known that General *Fowke* would not have parted with any of his Garrison, a sufficient Number of Land Forces had been sent from *England*.

A Fleet of thirteen Ships of the Line, besides Frigates, sailed from *England* under the Command of the *Honourable John Byng*, Esq; and arrived after a tedious Passage at *Gibraltar*: After unnecessarily consuming some time there, sailed for *Mabon*, fell in with *Gallissonniere's* Squadron and engaged them. Rear Admiral *West* with the Ships under his Division, as soon as Mr. *Byng* made the Signal for engaging, bore down upon the Enemy with the utmost Intrepidity. Had his superior Officer followed his gallant Example, in all human probability the *French* Fleet had either been destroyed, or so shattered
as

as to be unable to keep the Sea. A Reinforcement had been thrown into Fort *St. Philip*, and that Fortrefs, as well as the Island of *Minorca*, had been still numbered in the List of the *British* Dominions. But, alas! Mr. *Byng*, unfortunately for his King's, his Country's and his own Glory, kept at a *ceremonious* Distance from the Enemy, saw with Unconcern Mr. *West* and the brave Captains under him in the utmost Danger, without giving or endeavouring to give them the least Assistance; and what is most strange, and hardly ever will be believed by Posterity, beheld the Enemy's Fleet retreating from seven Ships only, and had not either Honour, or Resolution enough to follow them.

METHINKS, Sir, you smile at this, and reply: " Nothing is more easy
 " than to accuse a Man of Faults he never
 " committed.

“ committed. Is Mr. *Byng* *actually* guilty
“ of the Crimes laid to his Charge? Was
“ his Fleet equal in Strength to that of
“ the Enemy, either in Weight of Metal
“ or Number of Hands? Was not his Crew
“ sickly? Were not his Ships foul? And
“ did he not fight under the greatest Dis-
“ advantages?—Disadvantages occasioned
“ by those to whom the Care of our Naval
“ Affairs is intrusted.” To put this
Matter in as clear a Light as possible, I
will repeat all that Mr. *Byng* or his Ad-
vocates for him, have *hitherto* thought
proper to say in his Excuse, and Remarks
shall be made upon whatever he has offered
in Justification of his Conduct.

ARTICLE I.

Mr. *Byng* was not sent from *England*, Time enough to prevent the Enemy making a Descent upon the Island of *Minorca*.

REMARK.

This is allowed.

ARTICLE II.

Mr. *Byng's* Fleet, *said* to be sent with Intent to relieve *St. Philip's*, and assist the Garrison against a Siege from a very powerful Enemy, was unsupplied with Troops for that Purpose.

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R E M A R K.

This has been answered before. The Governor of Gibraltar had Orders to supply the Admiral with a sufficient Number of Troops.—If He disobeyed his Orders, can the Ministry be blamed?

A R T I C L E I I I.

Monf. la Gallissonniere's Squadron was superior in Weight of Metal, and Number of Men, to the English.

R E M A R K.

*It was for the Honour of Great Britain that a larger Fleet was not sent into the Mediterranean : for what Honour
can*

can be obtained by conquering an Enemy inferior in Strength? But we have only Mr. Byng's own Word that the French were superior; and it is well known, that a Coward's Telescope magnifies exceedingly. A Vernon, a Hawke, or a Boscawen, if in Byng's Place, would have been better acquainted with their Weight of Metal, and Number of Men.

ARTICLE IV.

Mr. Byng used his utmost Endeavours to destroy *Gallissonniere's* Fleet.

REMARK.

Crédit Judæus Apella. When Byng made the Signal to bear down upon the Enemy's Fleet, Mr. West gallantly obeyed, and did his Duty; while the

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Commander in Chief kept at a most ceremonious Distance, and had not one Man killed or wounded on board the Ship in which he had hoisted his protecting Flag: A certain Proof how closely he engaged. It is no Wonder therefore that Mr. West's Squadron was much damaged, when his superior Officer, with the best half of the Fleet, was a mere Spectator of the Engagement, and never offered to assist his brave Countrymen, whom he saw overpowered with Numbers, and had not Courage enough to bear down and assist them.

ARTICLE V.

Mr. Byng used his utmost Endeavours to land a Letter for General *Blakeney*, to let him know the Fleet was

was off *Mabon*, and that he would do all in his Power to assist him.

R E M A R K.

The Admiral did indeed send Captain Harvey for the Purpose abovementioned, before he engaged, or rather paid his Compliments to Mons. la Galliffonniere; but called him in when the Enemy's Fleet appeared: yet after the Engagement, notwithstanding (by his own Account) the French Admiral was obliged to edge away, never made the least Attempt to send the Letter on Shore, or relieve the brave Blakeney.

A R-

ARTICLE VI.

Mr. *Byng* and the Council of War found it impracticable either to succour or relieve Fort *St. Philip* after the Engagement, several of the *English* Ships having received much Damage.

REMARK.

Mr. Byng might have prevented the Ships in *Mr. West's* Division from suffering so much, if he could have persuaded himself to venture his Person in the Fray.—The gallant Council of War finding it would be dangerous to relieve the Fort, wisely resolved that it was impracticable. Several Land Officers who were on Board the Fleet, and assisted at the Council
of

of War, imagining (as it is supposed) that the Climate of Minorca would be too hot for their tender Constitutions, did not chuse to join their Regiments in the Fort, but unanimously agreed, 'twas better to return to Gibraltar, and cover that important Fortrefs.

ARTICLE VII.

SUPPOSING Mr. *Byng* had driven *Gallissonniere* from before *Mahon*, as he had no Land Forces on Board, and could spare no Seamen, what Assistance could he have given the *Garrison*?

R E-

REMARK.

He might have landed the Sick and Wounded which he complains of having on Board his Fleet, which would have been a strong Reinforcement to Blakeney and a vast Easement to himself.

ARTICLE VIII.

Mr. *Byng* was injuriously treated by the Ministry, who left out of the *Gazette* great Part of the Letter he sent to Mr. *Cleveland*, Secretary to the Admiralty, in order to prejudice the good People of *Great Britain* against him.

R E-

REMARK,

That Mr. Byng's Letter was not printed entire in the Gazette is allowed: But is what his Advocate says for him decent and proper? Let us hear him; "What profligate and abandoned Hearts must such Men possess, who by Omissions of whole Paragraphs of a Commander's own Letter, and Additions of others, can lessen the Force of his Justification in an Affair of Life and Death; change the Account of his Proceedings, and almost efface the whole Meaning of his Letter; to make his own Words condemn him to the Multitude, by speaking half what they express; and extorting, by this new Way of putting

E
Letters

Letters to the Torture, so contradictory to the Spirit of the English Laws, a Meaning so different from what they truly import; a Confession of Guilt which is not to be found in the whole uncastrated Original? If this appear to be a true Representation, you will not withhold a just Resentment on this Occasion; and that it is, I dare to make appear from such Proofs, that even the greatest Enemy against Mr. Byng shall be obliged to confess his Conviction of the Truth of what shall be said; and that, however guilty he may appear to be, in comparison with his Oppressors he is as innocent as the Person who treads on a Worm, compared with Cain who slew his Brother, or he who burns his own Hovel, to him that
set

set Fire to the Shattered Ruins of Lisbon amidst the Calamities of the Earthquake." Is not this, Sir; to you I appeal, endeavouring to vindicate Mr. Byng at the Expence of the Government? But can any Man, how partial or prejudiced soever, be so foolish as to imagine that the wisest and best Ministry that ever sat at the Helm of State, intended by their Method of retailing his Letter to do the Admiral any Disservice? Alas! Sir, the very contrary. They knew that the less of his Letter was published, the less the Passions of the People would be inflamed against him; and humanely refused to let the whole Letter, written with so much Pleasure, appear to his Disadvantage. This was Kindness, not Injustice; but

the Minds of some Men (I mean no Reflection on the Admiral) are so weak, that they cannot distinguish a Benefit from an Injury.

ARTICLE IX.

Mr. Byng found few or no Stores at Gibraltar, in the Magazines, to supply the Squadron; the careening Wharf, Storehouses, Pits, &c, were intirely decayed.

REMARK.

What signifies all this to the Admiral's Vindication? He was sent to fight, not to careen; and he might as well have retreated to cover Portsmouth Dock as Gibraltar.

A R.

ARTICLE X.

Mr. Byng's Letter to the *Admiralty*, dated on board the *Ramillies*, in *Gibraltar Bay*, *May 4th*, 1756, was the Occasion of his Disgrace: The Ministry declaring from that Letter, they foresaw he would not fight; whereas the said Letter contained only an Account of the Condition of the Storehouses at *Gibraltar*, Force of the Enemy at *Minorca*, &c. &c.

REMARK.

As the Admiral has grievously complained of his Letter, containing an Account of

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A R.

*of the Engagement off Minorca;
being castrated and interpolated; we
will print the Letter, the Receipt of
which, he says, may be fixed as the
Æra of his Disgrace, Word for
Word as he himself has given it to
the Public.*

“ Ra-

Ramillies, in Gibraltar Bay,
May 4, 1756.

S I R,

“ THIS comes to you by Ex-
“ pres from hence by the
“ Way of *Madrid*, recommended
“ to Sir *Benjamin Keene*, his Ma-
“ jesty’s Minister at that Place, to
“ be forwarded with the utmost Ex-
“ pedition.

“ I arrived here with the Squa-
“ dron under my Command, the
“ 2d Instant in the Afternoon, af-
“ ter

“ ter a tedious Passage of twenty-
“ seven Days, occasioned by con-
“ trary Winds and Calms, and was
“ extremely concerned to hear from
“ Capt. *Edgcumbe* (who I found
“ here with the *Princess Louisa*
“ and *Fortune* Sloop) that he was
“ obliged to retire from *Minorca*,
“ the *French* having landed on that
“ Island, by all Accounts, from thir-
“ teen to fifteen thousand Men.

“ They sailed from *Toulon* the
“ 10th of last Month, with about
“ one hundred and sixty, or two
“ hundred Sail of Transports, es-
“ corted by thirteen Sail of Men of
“ War ;

“ War ; how many of the Line I
“ have not been able to learn with
“ any Certainty.

“ IF I had been so happy to
“ have arrived at *Mabon*, before the
“ *French* had landed, I flatter myself
“ I should have been able to have
“ prevented their getting a Footing
“ on that Island ; but as it has so
“ unfortunately turned out, I am
“ firmly of Opinion, from the great
“ Force they have landed, and the
“ Quantity of Provisions. Stores and
“ Ammunition of all Kinds they
“ brought with them, that the
“ throwing Men into the Castle
F “ will

“ will only enable it to hold out but
“ a little Time longer, and add to
“ the Numbers that must fall into
“ the Enemy’s Hands; for the Gar-
“ rison in Time will be obliged to
“ surrender, unless a sufficient Num-
“ ber of Men could be landed to
“ dislodge the *French*, or raise the
“ Siege; however, I am determined
“ to sail up to *Minorca* with the
“ Squadron, where I shall be a bet-
“ ter Judge of the Situation of Af-
“ fairs there, and will give General
“ *Blakeney* all the Assistance he shall
“ require; though I am afraid all
“ Communication will be cut off
“ between us, as is the Opinion of
“ the

“ the Chief Engineers of this Gar-
“ rison (who have served in the
“ Island) and that of the other Of-
“ ficers of the Artillery, who are
“ acquainted with the Situation of
“ the Harbour ; for if the Enemy
“ have erected Batteries on the two
“ Shores near the Entrance of the
“ Harbour, (an Advantage scarce to
“ be supposed they have neglected)
“ it will render it impossible for our
“ Boats to have a Passage to the
“ *Sallee* Port of the Garrison.

“ BY the inclosed List, deli-
“ vered to me by Capt. *Edgecumbe*,
“ their Lordships will observe the
“ F 2 “ Strength

“ Strength of the *French* Ships in
“ *Toulon*; and by the Copy of a
“ Letter from *Marseilles*, to Ge-
“ neral *Blakeney*, which I here-
“ with transmit to you, their
“ Lordships will perceive the
“ Equipment the *French* have made
“ on this Occasion. It is to be ap-
“ prehended, when they have got
“ all the Ships they possibly can
“ ready for Service, they may think
“ of turning their Thoughts this
“ Way.

“ IF I should fail in the Re-
“ lief of Port *Mabon*, I shall look
“ upon the Security and Protection
“ of

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“ of *Gibraltar* as my next Object,
“ and shall repair down here with
“ the Squadron.

“ I am sorry to find, upon en-
“ quiring of the Naval Officer here,
“ that there are few or no Stores
“ in the Magazines to supply any
“ of the Squadron that may be in
“ Want of them ; and it appears
“ by a Letter I have received from
“ the Store-keeper and Master Ship-
“ wright, that the careening
“ Wharfs, Store-houses, Pits, &c.
“ are entirely decay'd, and I am
“ afraid we shall find great Dif-
“ ficulty in getting them repair'd,
“ there

“ there being no Artificers to be
“ got here, and at present he can
“ have no Assistance from the Car-
“ penters of the Fleet on Account
“ of our Sailing.

“ IT requiring a proper Person
“ to inspect into and manage those
“ Affairs, I have taken upon me to
“ give Mr. *Milbourne Marsh* (His
“ Majesty's Naval Officer that was
“ at *Mabon*, and who came down
“ with Capt. *Edgcumbe*) an Order
“ to act as Master Shipwright,
“ which, I hope, their Lordships
“ will approve, and have given him
“ Orders to use his best Endea-
“ yours

“ vours to put the Wharf, &c. in
“ the best Condition he can, for
“ very soon they will be wanted ;
“ as I apprehend, this is the only
“ Place the Ships of the Squadron
“ can come to refit, and many of
“ them are in Want of Repairs and
“ Careening; particularly the *Port-*
“ *land*, who has not been cleaned
“ these twelve Months, nor the
“ *Chesterfield* ten; besides, many of
“ the Ships that came out with me
“ are foul: I fear from the Incon-
“ veniences we shall meet with
“ here, there will be great Diffi-
“ culty

“ culty in keeping the Ships clean,
“ as there is but one Wharf for
“ them to prepare and careen
“ at.

“ By a Council of War, held by
“ General *Fowke*, a Copy of which
“ is herewith transmitted, it wa
“ not thought proper to send a
“ Detachment equal to a Battallion
“ for the Relief of *Minorca*, as it
“ would evidently weaken the Gar-
“ rison of *Gibraltar*, and be no
“ way effectual to the Relief of
“ that Island, for the Reasons therein
“ given ;

“ given ; but, as I had represented
“ that there was a Deficiency of
“ Men on board the Ships late
“ under the Command of Capt.
“ *Edgecumbe*, on account of his
“ having left a Number of Sailors
“ and Marines at *Minorca* to assist
“ in the Defence of that Place, and
“ that it was necessary to send a
“ Detachment on board those Ships
“ to help to man them, this the
“ General complied with, and I
“ shall distribute some Seamen
“ from the Ships that came out
G “ with

“ with me, to compleat their Com-
“ plement.

“ The *Chesterfield*, *Portland* and
“ *Dolphin* are on their Passage from
“ *Mabon* for this Place. The
“ *Phœnix* is gone to *Leghorn* by
“ Order of Capt. *Edgcumbe* for
“ Letters and Intelligence; and the
“ *Experiment* is cruizing off Cape
“ *Pallas*, who I expect in every
“ Hour.

“ By a Letter from Mr. *Banks*,
“ our Consul at *Carthagena*, to
“ General

Com-
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be for
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F Cape
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“ General *Fowke*, dated the 21st of
“ *April*, it appears, that twelve
“ Sail of *Spanish* Men of War are
“ ordered for *Cadix* and *Ferrol*,
“ which are expected at that Port,
“ but on what Account he could
“ not tell the Governor.

“ We are employed in taking in
“ Wine and compleating our Wa-
“ ter with the utmost Dispatch,
“ and shall let no Opportunity slip
“ of sailing from hence.

“ Herewith I send you enclosed
“ a Copy of such Papers as have
G 2 “ been

Banks,
ena, to
General

“ been delivered me, which I
“ thought necessary for their Lord-
“ ship’s Inspection.

“ *I am,*

“ *S I R,*

“ *Your most humble Servant,*

J. B.

Hon. J---n C---d, Esq;

Let

Let us examine this curious Piece, and try if we cannot find that the Admiral gave too much Reason for the Conjecture of the Ministry in it. " He is of Opinion " that reinforcing the Garrison of Fort " *St. Phillip* would be of no Service, as " it must in Time surrender." In the Name of Truth, in the Name of Justice, in the Name of common Sense, what is this but saying that his Superiors were Fools, and had sent him to sacrifice unnecessary Lives by throwing them into the Garrison? " However, he was determined " to sail up to *Minorca*, where he should " be a better Judge of the Situation of " Affairs there, and would give General " *Blakeney* all the Assistance he should require." This Man had *positive* Orders to fight the *French* Fleet; and, if possible,

to

hich I

Lord-

ount,

J. B.

Let

to relieve *Minorca*, yet declares he will sail up there to form a Judgment whether it would be safe for him to fight or not. The formidable Account he gives of the Force of the *French*, and wishing he had arrived there before they had Landed (in order it may be presumed to shelter himself under the Cannon of the Fort) were but too sure Presages of his Behaviour in the Day of Battle: And thus his Care to clean his Ships, instead of fighting them, is easily accounted for.

TO conclude; you are, I hope, Sir, satisfied, by this *clear, reasonable and impartial* State of the Case, that the Ministry are not in the least accountable for the Loss of *Minorca*: That, on the contrary, they sent out a Fleet to its Relief, consisting of thirteen large Ships, besides Frigates, *well manned, victualled and cleaned*, with a pro-
per

per Number of Land-Forces on board,
and gave the Command to an *Officer of*
remarkable Discretion and Prudence.

I am,

S I R,

Your's, &c.

F I N I S.

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