


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**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

**AL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)**

**1984 SESSION**



**PV**

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**ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF**

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
**FEBRUARY 1986**



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

# CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF  
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OTTAWA, CANADA

FEBRUARY 1986

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(The President)

I would be remiss if I failed to recall at least some of the other outstanding issues. The multilateral effort to proscribe chemical weapons has now been going for over a decade. True, we have embarked of late on what appears to be a more substantive debate, leading, as has just been agreed yesterday, to a concrete negotiating process. I have no doubt in my mind that by now we would have had much more to show for our effort had we applied ourselves to the specific task of drafting and putting down the concrete provisions of a future chemical weapons convention.

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(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General)

"I would like also to make special mention of chemical weapons. The cruel effect of the utilization of chemical weapons was vividly illustrated in the First World War. And the world did something about it. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 gave significant proof that nations can unite in the common interest to prohibit the use of a particular category of weapons. For a number of years negotiations have been conducted on a ban on chemical weapons. Detailed consideration of technical issues has already taken place in the Committee on Disarmament and bilaterally between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. While the complexities involved are substantial, I believe that with a determined effort outstanding political issues can be resolved, thus paving the way for the conclusion of a convention, on which so much useful and promising work has already been accomplished.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Applying this criterion, my delegation would venture to suggest that of the five working groups which met in 1983 the possible re-establishment of two of them should remain pending, to be considered at the beginning of the so-called "summer session": namely, the Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, for the reasons which I myself explained last year, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee of the General Assembly; and the Group on the item generally known as negative security assurances, for reasons which seem obvious to us, and which have already been mentioned more than once. With regard to the other three working groups -- the Group on "Chemical Weapons", the Group concerned with the "nuclear-weapon-test ban" and the Group which has been studying "radiological weapons" -- we believe that the first of these should continue without interruption the work which it has been carrying out since 16 January, while the other two should immediately resume their activities, taking as a starting point the reports which they submitted to the Committee in 1983 and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning the matters dealt with in those reports.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

In recent years, high priority has been given on our agenda to the efforts to create a chemical weapons convention. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that all States, notably the major military Powers, have a genuine political will to achieve a convention prohibiting all chemical weapons. However, the degree of complexity of the subject matter and the tense relations between the major Powers have contributed towards making progress in the negotiations painfully slow. However, necessary stages in the process have been dealt with in a satisfactory way.

Last year's Ad Hoc Working Group managed to present a report which was adopted unanimously. For this year, it is important that the results reached by the 1983 Working Group be fully utilized.

In this context my delegation has noted with interest two initiatives.

One is the announcement at the Stockholm Conference by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Shultz, to the effect that a draft treaty on the complete ban of chemical weapons be presented to the Conference on Disarmament. We welcome this as an essential contribution in the continuous negotiations in the CD on the subject. I find it urgent that these negotiations should be taken up right from the beginning of this session.

The other is the initiative of the Warsaw Pact States concerning chemical weapons in Europe. This expresses a deep concern for the question of chemical weapons. However, we feel that the work on a chemical ban in Europe should not take precedence over the global negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, none of the problems connected with negotiating a global ban would be easier to solve in a regional framework.

It is encouraging that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been able to recommend to the Conference to re-establish the Group as soon as possible and with every intent not later than the end of the second week of the Conference. It is equally promising that there now appears to be an agreement on a mandate on the negotiations for a subsidiary body on the item.

The remaining issues can only be solved in a spirit of compromise. Particularly relevant are the attitudes of those States which possess by far the largest arsenals of chemical weapons. We urge them to negotiate seriously and constructively. If so, the Conference stands a good chance in making headway towards a convention.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

One of these is the breaking-off by the United States of the Soviet-American negotiations on many key disarmament issues. It is enough to recall that at the end of 1978 the United States of America unilaterally suspended the bilateral talks on the limitation of the arms trade. In 1979, through the fault of the United States the negotiations with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite systems and on the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace were suspended. Finally, in May 1980 the Soviet-American talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons were interrupted, and at the end of the same year the trilateral Soviet-British-American negotiations on a general and complete nuclear-weapon-test ban.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This is primarily the result of the obstruction of the United States. It does not give its consent to holding in the Conference on Disarmament the negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It puts forward obstacles to the negotiations on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It puts a spoke in the wheel of negotiations on the limitation of the nuclear-arms race. It is the United States that does not give the Conference the possibility of starting negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was doing everything in order to block normal, effective negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. And finally, it is the United States that proposes us all sorts of ersatz mandates for the working groups in order to divert their attention from real political negotiations on the agenda items of the Conference.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is no accident that a group of eminent United States diplomats, former participants in the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, including Gerard Smith, Paul Warnke and a number of distinguished scientists dealing with arms limitation problems have criticized the allegation by the United States Administration that the Soviet Union violates the arms limitation agreements. For example, Warnke stated that there is no firm evidence of violations which could substantiate the majority of those allegations. And what store may be set upon the slander concerning the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons in different countries? Many times over the scientists and experts of many countries, including the United States, have proved that "yellow rain", mycotoxins discovered by the American investigators and their assistants, are nothing but the excrement of various insects. Recently, Professor Mezelon, the well-known American expert, has once again written about it. In the opinion of many United States experts the groundless public allegations about the violation by the Soviet Union of various agreements can only complicate the negotiating process. One cannot but share this opinion.

We state once again that this disgraceful campaign has only one goal -- to undermine the faith of the world community in the possibility of achieving mankind's ideal -- disarmament, and a world without weapons and wars.

(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

I would first like to say that it is of particular pleasure to present to the Conference on Disarmament, through you, the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/429. You have this before you, I believe, in English only. I understand from the Secretariat that it will be distributed in the other languages of the Conference this afternoon. Canada and Poland have for some time alternated in sponsoring in New York at the General Assembly what has become known as the "traditional" consensus resolution on chemical weapons, and indeed a Polish representative, your predecessor Ambassador Sujka, has acted as Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Working Group. Indeed my statement today will be our last act as Chairman of this Group. In presenting document CD/429 for adoption by the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to draw particular attention to the fact that the recommendations contained in the report were adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons by consensus. The recommendations, I need not add, speak for themselves.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons undertook to present a brief oral report on substantive results of the activities of the four contact groups, as follows:

There are two points; the first refers to what has become known as the "Consensus document", contained in document CD/416 and its annexes.

With regard to the elimination of existing stocks of chemical weapons, as a result of intense discussions on how such elimination would be reported to the consultative committee, there is an emerging general understanding that a period of about six months would be appropriate for submission of reports on progress in the implementation of plans for the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons.

These matters are technical, but I believe very important for our future work.

Secondly, as regards the verification of the monitoring of compliance with the future non-production of chemical weapons, again there is an emerging clarity that the meaning of the words "agreed level" and "quota" were, for the purposes of the discussion, similar.

There are also other areas of clarification. There is a detailed examination and clarification of the meaning of the word "quota". Again, there is clarification and further understanding of the meaning of "capacity" of a small-scale production facility.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

There is general understanding on what that capacity might be, but wording to express that understanding has yet to be formulated. A number of countries, in addition, have given no reports on the number of plans in their own countries making what are called key precursors.

Finally, the concept of making simple initial declarations of stocks followed by later detailed declarations of plants for their destruction was clarified to a considerable extent, although I must add that there remains no final agreement on timing of initial declarations.

In conclusion, on behalf of Ambassador McPhail, for whom I speak today, I would like to thank all members of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons without whose co-operation and active support the recommendations contained in document CD/429 could not have been agreed and presented to the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, a special word of appreciation goes to the four contact group co-ordinators, whose efforts were invaluable in bringing this phase of our work on chemical weapons to a successful conclusion. In addition, of course, Ambassador McPhail would like to thank all officers of this body and particularly the Secretariat, including our interpreters and translators.

I would ask, through you Mr. President that the Conference on Disarmament adopt this morning the recommendations contained in the entire document presented to you in my statement. Thank you.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In some sectors, the Conference on Disarmament has passed beyond the phase of preliminary talks and reached the critical threshold beyond which discussions may lead to compromises and agreements; this is the case for chemical weapons as well as for radiological weapons.

My delegation continues to give particular priority to a world-wide ban on all chemical weapons.

The conditions are ripe to make 1984 a decisive year in this sphere; the political desire to succeed in the negotiations is clearly reflected in the report of the working group submitted to us by Ambassador McPhail; document CD/416 and the reports of the contact groups provide the common ground for negotiating a Convention.

The difficulties cannot be underestimated; a number of problems have existed for so long that they seem to have become unalterable. Experience has nevertheless shown that a very close consideration of comparable positions sometimes reveals a greater convergence than was previously thought; that was recently the case, for example, of verification systems for production in small-scale facilities.

For this reason one cannot over-emphasize the need for everyone to take an active share in negotiations and for each position to be explained in detail. It is inconsistent to call for the drafting of texts without helping to create the objective conditions for such work.

In the light of these requirements, we can measure the full importance of the announcement made by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Schultz, of the forthcoming submission of a complete text of a treaty banning chemical weapons. We welcome this initiative which cannot fail to give a decisive impetus to our work. It is part of the series of very useful contributions which have marked the participation of the United States delegation in these negotiations. In this regard, I would recall in particular the success obtained by the working meeting organized last November at the United States facility for the destruction of chemical weapons at Tooele; this meeting, of undeniable interest, permitted direct observation of the procedures used in the United States and provided a unique opportunity to discuss the various means of verification of the destruction of stockpiles.

Where the substance of the negotiations is concerned, the priority questions continue to relate to stockpiling and the means of manufacturing chemical weapons. It is necessary to focus on these two aspects of the Convention, identify possible compromises and set them down in written form. I think it essential to maintain the integrated approach, adopted last year by the contact groups, in which all aspects of the same subject (for instance, declaration, destruction, verification etc. of stockpiles) should be negotiated together.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, thanks to the intensive deliberations conducted under the able guidance of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, as well as to the co-operation of experts over a long period, a clearer picture is emerging indicating various issues involved, including in particular their technical aspects.

As an advocate of the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as an important subject which may be second only to that of nuclear disarmament, Japan is encouraged by the positive outcome of the discussions held last year and expresses its strong desire for further progress in our work this year. The convention to be agreed upon is of a comprehensive character, not limited to specific regions, and aims at the complete destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons as well as the prohibition of the development, production and use of chemical weapons on a global basis.

Of these items, we believe that the starting point is the destruction of the existing chemical-weapon agents. On this issue, an important contribution has been made on the basis of past experiences by several countries such as Indonesia, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. Last year the United States placed their chemical-weapon destruction facility in the State of Utah at the disposal of a workshop in which many countries took part with great interest, and the Federal Republic of Germany has already announced its plan to hold a similar workshop this year. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the precious efforts undertaken by these States.

In the light of these developments, the international community will be justified in its expectation of an early agreement in substance on the destruction of chemical weapons. The issue of destruction has been a subject of intensive discussions in the Working Group last year as well as at the beginning of this year. In addition, we welcome the indication by the United States recently that it will submit a draft convention to this forum. My delegation hopes that intensive discussion and elaboration will make further progress and lead to a possible agreement on this most important issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons even within this year. Japan will, of course, continue to participate in this process in a positive and concrete manner.

I come now to a subject of overriding importance to my Government: the completion of a Convention banning all chemical weapons forever. We take very seriously the growing danger posed by these weapons. Not only do some countries hold large and increasing stocks of these frightful weapons but recent evidence clearly points to their use by some governments, in defiance of international condemnation. There is no reason why the Conference on Disarmament should not make rapid progress in negotiating a total ban on these abhorrent weapons, as Mrs. Thatcher urged in Budapest a few days ago. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, recalled in Stockholm last month that Britain has taken a leading role in efforts to secure disarmament in this field. As he said, we see no reason to depart from the objective, which we have set ourselves in this Conference on Disarmament, of a total and fully verifiable ban on chemical warfare, to be applied worldwide. My Government therefore warmly welcomes the intention of the United States, announced by Secretary Schultz in Stockholm, to submit to this Conference in the near future a draft comprehensive treaty with those aims.

Almost 60 years ago, in 1925, the Geneva Protocol was signed in this city. Its authors perhaps believed they had done what was necessary, by prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, to remove forever the scourge which had blighted so many lives in the First World War. The 1925 Protocol occupies a worthy place in the corpus of international agreements designed to prevent human suffering. But it does not ban the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons, nor provide for verification of compliance, which is so vital to ensuring trust. The duty of this Conference is to build upon the foundation provided by the Protocol and to ensure that a new Convention, banning chemical weapons from the face of the earth, is established without delay.

My own country relinquished its chemical weapons a quarter of a century ago. Regrettably, others did not follow suit. In the case of the Soviet Union, the capacity to wage chemical warfare has steadily increased. My Government welcomes the recent signs of renewed Soviet interest in banning chemical weapons, to the extent that these represent an acknowledgement that the time has come to reach an agreement banning the manufacture, stockpiling and use of these dreadful weapons. But I ask the delegations represented here today — does a regional ban on such easily transported weapons as chemical weapons make any sense? Why should Europe have priority in benefiting from a chemical weapons ban, when all the disturbing reports in recent years of use of chemical warfare have come from various parts of Asia? A regional approach to this problem would be a poor second best; and humanity deserves better than second best.

My Government regrets that the Committee on Disarmament was unable in 1983 to conclude a Convention to outlaw these abominable weapons. Despite many constructive proposals from the Western delegations, including the British paper on the important issue of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, which my predecessor introduced on 10 March last year, the Committee completed its deliberations last year empty-handed.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

The key to an effective Convention is effective verification. The working groups made progress last year; it is my earnest hope that they will proceed much faster this session and next. No price in effort is too great to pay for agreement. The United Kingdom stands ready to do everything possible to help to advance these negotiations towards agreement. We intend to pursue vigorously in the detailed negotiations that lie ahead the points in our paper tabled last March on verification of non-production, designed to ensure that chemical weapons are not being produced after the destruction of existing stockpiles. This will be a key element in assuring international confidence in the Treaty. We shall also play our part in trying to reach agreement on verification of destruction of stockpiles, of destruction of production facilities and of permitted production of super-toxic substances for protective purposes. I hope that all delegations will adopt a positive position on these vital issues, and will present practical proposals to this end. If they do, then this Conference will be on the brink of success.

If the Convention is to convince international opinion that full compliance will be ensured, my Government believes that it must contain a combination of routine on-site inspection and the possibility of fact-finding procedures to investigate any doubt which may arise about compliance. Without such procedures, there would be no means of resolving doubt. And doubt breeds uncertainty, destroys confidence and provokes recrimination, which would in turn undermine the Convention.

To complement the other verification proposals now on the table, I am pleased to introduce today a new British Working Paper entitled "Verification and Compliance — the Challenge Element". It is generally accepted that the Convention should contain a provision for challenge by any party. The aim of the paper is to suggest how challenges could be handled effectively in order to maintain confidence in the Convention. For this purpose it would clearly be important to ensure that action, including, if necessary, on-site inspection should follow a challenge without delay. This paper is the latest in a series of initiatives which successive British governments have taken in their earnest endeavour to achieve a chemical weapons ban. In 1976 we tabled a draft Treaty. Two years ago my predecessor tabled a paper on compliance. Last year he also introduced a proposal on verification of non-production of chemical weapons. It is our hope that this latest initiative will strengthen the present basis for an agreement.

The international community has placed squarely upon this Conference the heavy responsibility to agree a convention banning chemical weapons completely. Such weapons should have no place on the face of this earth. I urge this Conference to discharge its responsibility with despatch, and to present at the earliest possible moment to the United Nations an effective Convention for signature and ratification. An achievement in this area would not only be valuable in itself but would also do much to enhance the confidence that is needed for agreement in other fields.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

By recommending that the work of this Conference should focus on the nuclear issues, my delegation at the same time advocates that we take further the efforts on other important agenda items, the prohibition of chemical weapons in particular. As a whole, the positions of the various States are fully known. For this reason, it is first of decisive importance at this stage to proceed to the formulation of a Convention. In practical terms this should mean that individual drafts and formulae represent no more than one element in the complex and multilateral process of drafting a convention. What the Conference needs at this stage are common, mutually acceptable texts on the various sections of a convention; and secondly, not to demonstrate a one-sided approach. Otherwise, even the best of intentions will be interpreted solely as misleading manoeuvres.

Taking up another point, I should like to stress the unfavourable impression which has been created so far by the approach of NATO member States towards the proposal of the socialist countries to free Europe from chemical weapons. On the one hand, the Western States seem not to deny the positive rational element in this new proposal, while on the other, they do not want to commit themselves on its implementation. To put into practice such partial measures of a regional nature would only assist the efforts exerted in this forum, which are aimed at the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons, something that remains the ultimate goal of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The conclusion of an effective and verifiable convention banning chemical weapons is a goal Australia has long advocated. We are firmly of the view that to be fully effective a new Chemical Weapons Convention should be comprehensive in scope and contain a clear ban on the use of chemical weapons as well as on their development, acquisition, stockpiling, retention or transfer. We are encouraged by the outcome of the recently concluded three-week session of the Chemical Weapons Working Group in that agreement was reached on a mandate for the Group's continuing work during 1984 providing for the negotiation and formulation of a convention. We recognize that areas of divergence remain. But we believe these can be overcome especially if there is a political will to conclude a convention.

We expect that the work of the Conference will be very greatly assisted by the draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons on a global basis which the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Schultz, has said will be presented to this Conference shortly and we applaud this American initiative. We also wish to express Australia's appreciation to the United States for conducting the workshop on the destruction of chemical weapons in Utah in November last year. We regard this workshop as having been a very constructive initiative in the important areas of techniques for and verification of stockpile destruction. It simply demonstrated what can and should be achieved in these areas. We can move steadily forward during our 1984 session to the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. This would be a significant achievement, and it must be done. We fully endorse the recommendation contained in the Chemical Weapons Working Group's report which would enable that work to recommence as a matter of priority at the current session of this conference.

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29-30

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

We are not at all pessimistic about the future course of our session despite the difficulties we see before us. My delegation was encouraged by the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons ably chaired by Ambassador McPhail. We are also encouraged by the promise of a draft Convention on Chemical Weapons which we welcome as a positive sign of a political will to negotiate on this issue. We hope that this negotiation will take place early and that a positive agreement to negotiate will be extended over the entire gamut of disarmament issues. My delegation is also mindful of the useful discussions that took place in previous sessions, which are a foundation on which we can build. Document CD/416, for example, reflects some of these achievements. However, the value of past achievements can only be acknowledged by making them a basis for future progress and not by regressing or standing still. A pause in disarmament negotiations or a fruitless retreading of ground already covered in our discussions here is in effect a backward step. For while we talk the arms race goes on and there is no pause in the research, development and production of armaments. A pause in the manufacture and deployment of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, is what is needed.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

If nuclear arms exterminate mankind and his civilization, chemical weapons torture him alive or kill him by torture. The international community is so impressed by the bitter experience of some nations who have fallen victim to this dreadful weapon that this item has long been included in the agenda. But the progress made in this field has, due to the obstacles created by the Superpowers, not been rapid enough to halt or at least to reduce the all too long use of the existing arsenals of chemical weapons and put an end to the production of these horrible weapons. And now the world is faced with such a situation that international merchants of death and their sinister clients feel no restriction in the sale and use of such weapons.

Unfortunately, today, the only use made of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons and the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of production and stockpiling of biological weapons is the references made to them in statements of the representatives of various countries in international gatherings. These statements, when delivered by the representatives of countries themselves busily engaged in chemical weapons production, turn into a tiresome farce, which has now for many long years repeated itself in international gatherings on disarmament, and especially in this very place.

According to the reports presented to the Pugwash Conference held in Geneva last February, in the course of the year 1982, chemical and biological weapons were used in at least 13 different countries of the world. This bitter reality was being experienced by tyrannized peoples of the Third World at the same time as the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was driving a hard bargain with the major producers of these weapons on the wording of some paragraphs of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Will such pitiful scenes not push any neutral observer to arrive at this conclusion: that the international fora are getting more and more distant from the realities and needs of the international community? At a time when arms producers do not pay the least attention to existing international agreements, and even create obstacles for the adoption of new agreements and regulations beneficial to the international community, the destiny of which, if they were ever adopted, would not be any different from the preceding ones, does the Third World not have the right to feel pessimistic about the negotiations conducted between the wolf and the sheep?

You have probably heard this exchange between the Superpowers. One Superpower declares that "the production of binary weapons is essential for our national interests". The other Superpower responds, "Our armed forces will certainly produce a counter-weapon for any weapon, including binary weapons".

If the inventors of the binary chemical weapon expect us to congratulate them on this achievement in the field of manslaughter technology, we should only be grateful to them for having so openly demonstrated their anti-human intentions.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Is this single case not sufficient to show that international laws and regulations are only worthless toys in the hands of Superpowers, used either to dupe public opinion or to prevent tyrannized countries from gaining their rights? In such circumstances, do not we, and all other countries that have fallen victim to the Superpowers' ambitions and greed, have the right to bring these long, boring and fruitless negotiations and exchanges of views under consideration? Unfortunately the problem is not only limited to the Superpowers. There are other active participants in the deadly race of production and use of chemical weapons. But we have listened repeatedly to their eloquent statements on disarmament. The justification given by these countries for their participation in the arms race has always been that they are obliged to do so in self-defence. It is on this basis that the "deterrence" theory has been formulated; this theory is now the main axis of the arguments of arms producers. I am not going to analyse here this theory which is founded on the balance of terror. Historical experience has disproved this theory and shown that maintenance of the balance of terror leads nowhere but to the intensification of the arms race. There are two related points that are worthy of attention. First, adherents of this theory have reserved this right only for themselves and prevent others from following suit. The reason is clear: maintenance of their dominance over other countries requires superiority in arms. Secondly, the greater part of the arms produced in the world are intended for use in aggression against other nations or are being sold to Third World governments with some other evil designs in mind; in fact the maintenance of the balance of terror, or, as claimed by the arms producers, defence needs, have never been any incentive for the production of arms. Allow me to refer to the experience of my nation in order to clarify this point. But I would like to make clear that if, in the meantime, reference is made to the Iraqi invasion, it is by no means intended to display the dimension of this aggression, because I am dealing mainly with the subject of chemical weapons here. Since, for a while now, Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iran, reference to the aggression inevitably entails reference to the second-degree agent of aggression. I called it the second-degree agent of aggression because, we believe, the first-degree agents of aggression are the countries furnishing the arms necessary for aggression.

I am happy, on the other hand, that the representatives of the majority or rather all the first-degree agents of aggression are present here. I think they are going to provide this Conference with convincing explanations for their lethal chemical gifts that our military personnel and civilian population have, for several months and even years, been receiving from land, sea and air. If such explanations are given, we will be grateful, especially because their repeated and emotional speeches on various aspects of disarmament make us the more eager to hear these explanations from them.

You, distinguished delegates, know well that when my country was invaded, the Superpowers and other Western Powers declared total neutrality, and stated that they would not furnish arms to either conflicting party. In addition to statements made by individual countries to this effect, this position was even reflected in the Security Council's resolutions on the imposed war, which were first of all signed by the Security Council's Permanent Members.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

I wonder if our world has experienced such deep and vast hypocrisy in recent years. A look into this reality and especially where it is related to chemical weapons is very interesting and displays the seriousness of the disaster that rends the heart of anyone with any conscience. Read the reports of the Pugwash Conference held last year in Geneva and see for yourselves which countries have provided the biological weapons used against our people.

We are pleased to notice in the General Assembly's resolutions that international sensitivity against the use of chemical weapons has gained justifiably large dimensions. As you are well aware, this sensitivity was fully manifested in a recent conference held in Stockholm. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that we have, in a well-documented manner, informed the international community of the use of chemical weapons against the people of Iran in the course of the invasion of my country by foreign troops, no positive or beneficial reaction has yet been noted.

It seems that the use of these weapons is considered detestable, inhumane and to be condemned only when such a protest can be used as propaganda by one Superpower against another.

My purpose in presenting these documents is not one of propaganda. On the contrary, my incentive is based on the humanitarian and Islamic duty to present the latest proof to the international community, and particularly to those organs whose competence is to deal with such matters, and to inform those whose conscience has been awakened, of whom there are undoubtedly not a few in this forum, of just a sample of the irreversible damage and casualties inflicted upon my country.

For a better appreciation of the technical details and the medical treatment of the afflicted victims, a report has been submitted to the distinguished delegates.

The use of chemical and biological weapons in fact started sporadically from the very beginning of the imposed war against our country. Statistics presented here show a few registered cases and in no way project the full picture. In at least 49 cases of chemical strikes in 40 regions along the border area, the documents compiled state that 109 persons were killed and hundreds were wounded.

Among these victims, 26 were poisoned, 25 were suffocated, 69 suffered from nausea, 66 became dizzy, 11 had breathing problems, 362 suffered from vision problems with permanent or temporary blindness and 59 complained of skin ailments, while 100 others were severely injured in their testicles and legs. The pictures taken from those afflicted show vividly the traces of wounds, blisters, black and pink skin marks and physical malfunctions. These illustrations, along with other medical documents, were placed at the disposal of a number of foreign medical specialists at the International Medical Seminar held last November in Tehran, and a number of these victims were also examined by the participants. The results were reflected in the Guardian published in London on 25 November 1983. This report quotes one of the specialists who visited the victims of these chemical strikes in several hospitals as saying "I believe there is no doubt that the Iraqis used gas". Also this report regarding the observations of a specialist participating in this seminar from London says one of these specialists who studied the impact of the deployment of chemical weapons on the nervous system says "most definitely what has been used is an element creating blisters, which could be something like mustard nitrogen gas".

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

I would like to request all the distinguished delegates to have a glance at the report filed by the Guardian of 22 December 1983, which I have in my hands, regarding the delivery of chemical warfare equipment worth half a million dollars to our aggressor enemy. This report will give a better idea of the disrespect shown on the part of some countries regarding the 1925 Protocol. The report says this equipment was shipped two years ago to Iraq. The article of the New Scientist, dated 22 December 1983, is even more vivid and says that this equipment is used to protect those involved in the production and loading of chemical weapons.

The Denver Post of 29 January 1984 quotes one of the reports of the Middle East Magazine, published in London, as saying, "My personal investigation confirms the claims made by Iran regarding the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and even the date conforms". The weekly Jane's Defence published in London, in its 25 January 1984 edition, in a detailed report confirms that Iraq is using mustard gas, like that used during World War I, in its war against Iran. According to this magazine the chemical substances are used in artillery shells and dispersed into the air through firing.

On 8 January 1984, Reuter News Agency report the discovery on the beach of Normandy of four bottles of chemical poisons, which resulted in the alerting of the population by the French Police. These bottles were discovered to have been part of the cargo of an Iraqi ship destined for Kuwait from England.

Some of those subjected to chemical bombs have been sent to the Federal Republic of Germany for medical treatment and the medical reports of a Hamburg hospital indicate that these patients have been suffering from stomach disorders, vomiting, severe headache, eye sores, severe itching in all parts of the body, skin burns, coughing, feeling of pressure in the forehead and a burning pain during urination. Is there anyone who may doubt that these signs were anything but the use of chemical bombs? The full text of this report is available to the distinguished delegates.

I presume that the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General has been informed that our Ambassador to the United Nations in New York submitted fragments of the used bombs to the Secretariat of the United Nations for tests on 4 January 1984. Meanwhile, our Permanent Representative to the United Nations informed this esteemed Organization of the use of chemical bombs by Iraq through Memoranda Nos. 856, dated 3 November 1983, 860 dated 16 November 1983, 937 dated 15 December 1983 and 987 dated 27 December 1983.

Unfortunately, in spite of the issuance of these reports no repercussion is seen on the side of the international fora thus far to prevent the continuation of these crimes which not only violate the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention, but also are contrary to the four Geneva Conventions.

Are we not bound to condemn here the double standard governing international circles and emanating from the influence of the Superpowers? Has the United Nations Organization not been duty-bound by the Resolution 37/98 of the General Assembly, adopted on 13 December 1982, to investigate any information concerning the use of chemical weapons by any Member State reaching the United Nations and inform the Members of the results?

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

I would like to express my sincere wish that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is now under preparation by this forum, will be ready at the earliest possible time and will be fully effective, and we have instructed our delegation to do its utmost in this regard. However, if this Convention is signed but the attitude of the Superpowers and other producers and suppliers of chemical weapons remains the same, based upon colonial and inhumane motives, then all the efforts rendered so far will bear no fruits but the wastage of time, energy and budgetary resources. We believe that the position adopted by this Conference and other related organs towards the deployment of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran will show in reality the degree of sincerity and the sense of responsibility regarding the newly-prepared Convention and will form an excellent criterion to determine its status and capability in the future.

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

The prohibition of chemical weapons has for a long time received particular attention in Finnish disarmament policy. In our view the Conference should concentrate on negotiating a comprehensive convention concerning chemical weapons in order to reach as soon as possible a total elimination of the possibility of chemical warfare.

We welcome the fact that the urgency and importance of determined efforts and concrete negotiation in the field have been recently underlined, notably by the USSR in its proposal regarding a regional European approach to chemical weapons prohibition and by the United States in its announcement of comprehensive proposal to be submitted to this body. I should also like to express the appreciation of my country to the United States for the organization of the Tooele verification workshop in Utah, in 1983, which provided the participants, including some Finnish experts, with important knowledge concerning the problems of destruction of chemical weapons.

Problems relating to verification continue to delay the progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. There seems to be a general agreement on the need to verify the compliance of the parties to the treaty in all phases of its operation. Differences of view, however, continue to persist regarding the mode of functioning of verification and reporting as well as fact-finding procedures. In this connection I wish to emphasize that the progress made in recent years in instrumental verification technology has been remarkable. The durability, accuracy and reliability of automatic monitoring instruments are expected to improve considerably in the near future. Their extensive use in the verification of a chemical weapons treaty might prove possible. It is our impression that the difficult question of verification could be approached by making full use of the possibilities of modern existing and developing instrumental verification technology on the one hand and on-site inspection on the other hand, which would primarily be needed in order to secure the proper functioning of the verification equipment.

The long-standing project of Finland on chemical weapon verification is an attempt to contribute to the solution of verification problems in the area of chemical weapons. The objective is to produce scientific knowledge of methods by which their possible use can be detected, the discontinuance of their production surveyed and their destruction verified.

The results of the project are freely available to the international community. We hope that they will prove especially useful when the Conference on Disarmament comes to an understanding about the procedures for verification of the chemical weapons treaty.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In this connection I should like to draw attention to a positive shift which can be detected in the work of the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In document CD/429, the last report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, there is an agreed subparagraph in which the Ad hoc Working Group recommends to the Conference to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as other initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible.

A sufficient number of documents, among them the document proposed by the Soviet Union which can serve as a sound basis for negotiations, namely, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", are on the negotiating table.

I should like to add that the initiative of the socialist States parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposing that Europe should be free of chemical weapons is unequivocally aimed at assisting the earliest attainment of this real advance in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Another area to which my delegation attaches great importance is that of negotiations to outlaw chemical weapons. The impressive volume of specialized documentation at the disposal of this Conference on this item, the arduous negotiations which have been under way for so many years, as well as the inherent importance of banning chemical weapons, which might become the first weapons of mass destruction existing in military arsenals to be outlawed, are so many elements which should speed up our negotiations during this session. The existence of a draft convention submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, and the draft agreement which the United States delegation said it would present shortly, as well as the many concrete proposals of texts put forward by other delegations, clearly indicate, in our opinion, the possibility of proceeding this year to the preparation of the first draft of the text of the future convention. Without prejudice to any decisions which the future chairman of the working group on the item may take, the Romanian delegation would like to suggest that the setting up of a drafting body for chemical weapons would be desirable this year.

Such a body might replace the contact group or else function side by side with them. In any event, we support the proposal that a procedural decision should be taken shortly to allow negotiations to get underway as rapidly as possible on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Among the items on the agenda, the prohibition of chemical weapons is considered as one with a better chance for real progress. On this issue, as some delegates put it, there might be "a ray of hope" -- a phrase which reflects the views of many delegates. Although the outcome of the three-week discussions of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was not that satisfactory, the deliberations have nevertheless deepened understanding of the views of the parties concerned and further identified the differences. This may facilitate the resolution of the differences through negotiations in the days to come. Furthermore, the views of different parties on the question of the timing of the declaration of the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles seem to be converging. All these are indeed positive signs. I wish to express once more our thanks to the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, and the co-ordinators of the contact groups for their efforts. Like many other delegations, we also hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be re-established at an early date by the current session of the Conference on Disarmament so as to expedite negotiations on the formulation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

To refer briefly to the programme of work, and concentrating on the most significant aspect of the operative part of General Assembly resolution 38/183 I, approved by an overwhelming majority of countries, the Peruvian delegation considers that working groups on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be established urgently. Similarly, my delegation considers that negotiations should begin as soon as possible on a draft international nuclear-test-ban treaty, and also, that the necessary steps should be taken to speed up work on the elaboration of an international convention for the complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and for the destruction of all such existing weapons.

In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to a view which my delegation shares with other delegations: not all the basic issues can be negotiated simultaneously in this Conference; but some of them, already identified, should be considered urgently and in depth. We already have a valuable example to follow on other items of our agenda: the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has enabled us to demonstrate that a pragmatic approach to the items under consideration, and intensive, albeit slow, work on the substantive aspects of each of those items, may pave the way for substantial progress and prepare the necessary conditions for beginning negotiations on international legal instruments.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): In his statement this morning the distinguished Foreign Minister of Iran referred to certain newspaper articles which might be interpreted as claiming that the United Kingdom had supplied chemical weapons to Iraq. These newspaper articles are misleading and I wish to assure the distinguished representative of Iran and the Conference that the United Kingdom has not supplied any chemical weapons to Iraq or to anyone else. As we have often said, and as my Minister repeated in his statement on Tuesday, the United Kingdom gave up its own chemical weapons capability 25 years ago, and the United Kingdom has long been a leading advocate of a total ban on chemical weapons.

(The President)

I suggest now that we take up the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/429. This report is in addition to the report submitted by the Group during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament and contains certain recommendations for the present session of the Conference. May I suggest that we adopt this report on the understanding that its recommendations will be considered later, after we have adopted the agenda for 1984.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

With regard to chemical weapons, we observe some real willingness to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of this category of weapons of mass destruction. Progress in this area has in fact been measurable. Technical questions of a highly controversial character have been solved. The standpoints of delegations have been clearly defined, points of convergence identified and points of divergency likewise. The report of the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its 1983 session should serve as a basis for tackling a more concrete phase in the process of negotiation, to preserve what has been gained in the preceding sessions and to solve the questions pending on the basis of concrete proposals.

It remains for us to hope that the readiness observed in the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons shall equally emerge on other questions, and in particular on the nuclear problems.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

As my statement is of a general character it would hardly appear necessary to express our opinion on the subject of chemical-weapons prohibition, which has already reached an advanced stage of negotiations. However, it would be an omission on our part not to mention a subject which is important not only because it concerns the elimination of a particular type of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenal of States, but also because the prospects for an agreement are beginning to emerge. Although discussions have been proceeding since 1970, detailed work during the last two years have highlighted the areas of convergence as well as those of divergence, and the principal elements necessary for a chemical weapons convention have also been delineated. The principle of the need for an effective verification system to assure compliance is not an issue. The issue is to determine the modalities for an effective verification system on the basis of mutual accommodation which would provide equal security for all States.

There is now a need to generate further momentum in the negotiating process with a view to arriving at a timely agreement on a chemical weapons convention. The process of disarmament is slow and arduous and experience has shown that it takes years to arrive at a mature stage of negotiations; this has been particularly true of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The highest hopes exist in this Conference and outside it in the world regarding the completion in the course of this year of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. There is a sound basis for this, since, after many years of elaboration, definite progress has been made in the process of negotiations to this effect. A detailed consideration of technical issues has already taken place in the Committee on Disarmament, and the bodies that preceded it and bilaterally between the Soviet Union and the United States. Important contributions have been made in respect of the destruction of the existing chemical-weapon stockpiles by several countries such as the Netherlands, Indonesia, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States through the information supplied or in workshops specifically organized for the purpose of demonstrating the verification process during the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. An enormous amount of effort and goodwill has been invested by a great number of experts and by various delegations to the Conference. We also welcome the announcement made by the United States that it will submit to the Conference its own draft of a chemical weapons convention very soon. We are sure that this new contribution will receive very careful consideration alongside with other proposals

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

submitted to this negotiating forum. Although there are still some issues which need to be further elaborated, we consider that 1984 is the crucial year in which a determined effort should be made to resolve outstanding political issues. If we were to fail this year in initiating the long-awaited drafting process on those elements on which agreement does exist, this would then signify a further, very grave erosion of confidence in the importance of this negotiating forum. And on the contrary, if we are capable of submitting in our report to the United Nations General Assembly the first draft of an even incomplete text of the convention, whose final drafting would continue, this would be, after five years, the first more specific example of accord on a very important agreement in the area of disarmament. Such a development would certainly also have a broader beneficial impact.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Comrade President, today the Soviet delegation would like to touch upon the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The reason for this is that the Conference on Disarmament, having agreed in principle on the revised mandate of the subsidiary body on this subject, will, it is to be hoped, begin without delay a new important stage in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is unquestionably one of the priority items in the work of the Conference in 1984, and as before we intend to pay it our unabated attention.

The Soviet Union has always resolutely and persistently advocated and continues to advocate the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, for their withdrawal from the arsenals of States, and the physical elimination of this type

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of weapon of mass destruction. Our country was among the first to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. As far back as in 1927, in the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union raised the question of supplementing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons by the cessation of its production. It also took an active part in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament during the 1930s. The initiatives made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries during the post-war period with a view to banning chemical weapons as rapidly as possible are well known, particularly within the Committee on Disarmament: draft Convention of 1971 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and draft convention of 1972 on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. From 1976 to 1980 the Soviet Union participated in bilateral Soviet-American talks aimed at the preparation and submission to the Committee on Disarmament of a joint initiative on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is not our fault that the talks were suspended.

In 1982 at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament the USSR came forward with a new initiative: the "Basic provisions of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". During the 18 months since that time the Soviet Union has repeatedly further developed that initiative and submitted numerous constructive proposals on the subject of a chemical-weapons ban taking into account the progress at the negotiations. Among them there were the proposals to include in the convention a provision on the prohibition of use of chemical weapons; a number of proposals designed reliably to ensure non-production of chemical weapons in peaceful chemical industry enterprises and to facilitate verification in this field; a range of proposals on the problems connected with the declaration and elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons and verification of their destruction; considerations on the elaboration of a special order of destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons assuring security and interests of all participating States; and other proposals.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries deem it necessary to use all the possibilities in order reliably to save mankind from the danger of chemical war. This is the aim, in particular, of the recent proposal put by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO member States on the question of saving Europe from chemical weapons, which its authors intend to distribute as a document of the Conference.

Let me dwell upon this important proposal in some detail. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that in the conditions of the present aggravated international situation the danger of use of chemical weapons, particularly in Europe, increases. The radical elimination of the chemical-weapon

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

threat for the States and peoples of Europe, as well as for other regions of the world, may be assured by the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons and elimination of their stockpiles. At the same time, before this global task is solved and in order to promote its implementation, certain parallel steps can and must be taken within the European continent. That would make it possible substantially to reduce the risk of chemical war in Europe, and consequently in the entire world, to start the reduction of the chemical-weapon arsenals. Of course, this initiative of the socialist States is not aiming in any way at undermining the negotiations conducted at the Conference on Disarmament. On the contrary! I would like to stress that the implementation of the partial measures of a regional nature on the limitation, reduction and elimination of chemical weapons would promote, in our view, the world-wide efforts and speed up the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is the ultimate goal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that many delegations of the States participating in the Conference on Disarmament recognize the importance of that initiative of the socialist States, justly regard it as a fresh confirmation of the sincere desire of the socialist countries to eliminate the chemical threat for the States and peoples of Europe and the whole world, and to speed up the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We expect the NATO countries to consider this proposal seriously and with due attention and to give a positive reply to it.

The Soviet delegation and the delegations of other socialist countries, of course, do not claim a monopoly on making proposals on the prohibition of chemical weapons. A large number of documents on various aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons have been also submitted by other countries. As is known, the total number of documents on this subject distributed within the Conference on Disarmament is already more than 300. What matters, of course, is not the quantity of the submitted proposals but their nature. We have in mind first of all the flexibility of the positions of States, their readiness to seek mutually acceptable solution. If we regard from this point of view the proposals which are at the negotiating table now we cannot but recognize that the proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are notable for precisely these features. There is no need to give the examples. The delegations know them very well.

To our regret, frequently we do not see the same desire to seek mutually acceptable solutions, to take into account the positions of other participants in negotiations, from the part of some of our partners at the negotiations. From year to year they repeat the same proposals which are unacceptable to us. Sometimes there is a movement in quite the opposite direction: toward greater differences, tougher, maximalist, unrealistic demands. In this connection I cannot but refer to the statement made a week ago by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, containing an appeal to display readiness to compromise. But allow me to ask whether the United Kingdom itself is ready to follow this path? What compromises on its part can we speak of, when, for example, in its working document on the procedures of on-site challenge inspection of the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons it repeated the whole number of hard-line demands which had been many times rejected by other participants in the negotiations. Frankly speaking, even with a microscope one would be unable to discover in that document the signs of any readiness to compromise.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let us take another example -- the demands of some delegations to conduct immediately after the convention enters into force the verifications of the credibility of the declarations of the chemical-weapon stockpiles and to this end to submit information on the places of the storage of such stockpiles. The Soviet delegation has already repeatedly explained why it considers such demands both unrealistic and unacceptable. I shall now repeat only the following -- in certain cases they inherently threaten the national security interests of the States Parties to the future convention. Nevertheless this demand is being stubbornly repeated, even though, as we have already stated, it can lead to a stalemate in all the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time there is a simple way out of the situation which was proposed by the Soviet delegation. We have in mind the international systematic of verification, at the depots at special facilities, of the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons, through which all such stocks would proceed during the destruction process and consequently the initial declarations would also be verified.

Let us look at the situation with regard to the verification problem from the following angle. The delegations of the USSR and other socialist countries have very often repeated that the prohibition of chemical weapons may become a reality only in the case when the verification measures of the future convention correspond to the nature of the obligations and are determined in strict accordance with the requirements of such a convention i.e. on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To take extremes in this matter, regardless of how they are embellished, would torpedo the current negotiations. We pay no less attention than other States to the effective control of the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We do not have a slightest basis to trust our negotiating partners any more than they trust us. Our premise is that each type of activity prohibited or limited by the convention should be effectively verified. To this end, during the negotiations we have proposed and continue to propose a very broad range of verification measures. They include national control, the use of national technical means, on-site inspection on a voluntary basis or, as it is also called, by challenge, and international systematic on-site inspections. Confidence in compliance with the convention is also promoted by various declarations by the States parties, many of which have been proposed by us.

One of the unresolved problems remain the methods of verification of the destruction of stocks at special facilities. This is a very important question and we pay great attention to it. The Soviet delegation has already had occasion to state its approach to this question. As is known, it stated that it was in favour, in this concrete case, of the use of systematic international verifications, the annual number of which (the quota) would be determined by the Consultative Committee individually for each facility on the basis of preliminary agreed criteria. That is to say, the number of visits would depend upon such notions as the quantity of the stocks to be destroyed, their toxicity and danger characteristics, technological parameters of the destruction facilities, etc. We have described it in detail both within the Working Group and in the course of various consultations with other delegations.

Such a differentiated, one might say scientific, approach could, in our opinion give the States parties to the future convention complete confidence that the stocks of chemical weapons are being really destroyed and eliminated.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This proposal is countered by the idea of the permanent presence of international inspectors at the destruction facilities. The Soviet side has carefully listened to the arguments in favour of such approach and conducted a number of bilateral and multilateral consultations on this subject. In particular, last January there was useful exchange of opinions with the group of delegations of non-aligned States.

Further study of the question, and the consultations, have shown that systematic international on-site verifications of the destruction of stocks at a special facility on a quota basis represent a sufficiently effective verification instrument and that other delegations' understanding of this fact is increasing. They have also led us to the conclusion that in respect to some chemicals the verifications could be more strict. In the final analysis, the Soviet delegation, displaying its desire to achieve progress as rapidly as possible in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in an effort to unravel one of the most complicated and important most issues at the negotiations, and once again demonstrating its real rather than feigned interest in progress at the negotiations, declares the following.

It would be prepared, during the elaboration of the procedures for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at a special facility, to agree to such a solution when the efficiency of the verification, from the beginning of the destruction process up to its completion, would be ensured by the permanent presence at the special facility of the representatives of international control, as well as by a combination of systematic international verifications at the facility, including also the storage of the stocks of weapons at it, with the use of instruments (gas chromatographs, dynamometric counters, measuring thermoelements, etc.).

The verifications in the depots at special facilities of the next batches of chemical weapons to be destroyed could be conducted together with the inspections at the special facility. We shall state in detail our view on the subject in due time in the subsidiary body of the Conference.

In declaring today our readiness in principle to consider in a positive manner the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at the special facilities for the destruction of stocks, we would like particularly to stress that our premise is that our partners at negotiations will also for their part prove their readiness, not in words but in deeds, to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

Recently, references have frequently been made here at the Conference to a supposed presentation by the United States of a new document on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall, of course, study it as carefully as we have studied all other documents of the States participating in the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban. What is important, of course, is not the fact itself of the future presentation of the document, but its content. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will judge the seriousness of United States intentions as regards a chemical-weapons ban only by how it takes into account the position of other participants in the negotiations, in particular our position. We have heard more than enough of wishful thinking and generalities. We wait for reliable proof of goodwill and the desire to achieve an agreement. The existence of such a desire will determine success in the negotiations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Of great significance here will be correct organization of the work of the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Let me dwell upon this question somewhat in detail.

The mandate agreed upon for that body is quite impressive and promising as regards its content and purposes. It envisages advancing to a new stage in solving the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons -- to a full and comprehensive process of negotiations and the formulation and elaboration of an appropriate convention.

These terms of reference correspond to the present advanced stage of the negotiations on the prohibitions of chemical weapons and reflect, as we hope, the readiness of all the States represented here to start real negotiations. It remains far from enough, however, to turn our attention to high, I would say, noble goals, to see as our task the preparation, for the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, either of a more or less complete text of the future convention in full, or of its substantive part. We share the view expressed today by the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vidas, concerning the need to submit at least an incomplete text of the future convention to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. In order to come really closer to the solution of such tasks we need good organization of the activity of the appropriate subsidiary body.

The socialist countries have elaborated their collective opinion on this subject and have already submitted an appropriate document to the secretariat of the Conference. Without going into the detail of the approach proposed by us, I would like to state only some general considerations.

In our view, it is very important to agree at once to cover in 1984, by the process of concrete work upon the text of the future convention, all its chapters and provisions. Inter alia, this should eliminate any suspicions that the drafting work is designed to prevent delegations from considering the most vexed issues.

It would seem important to follow the principles of logical sequence in considering some or other parts of the future convention. Experience has shown, for example, that the elaboration of a mutually acceptable definition of chemical weapons is the most important question, without which the work on other problems is constantly hampered. To speak in more general terms, taking into account the relationship between different parts of the convention priority should be given to resolving in their entirety the questions of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons.

The socialist countries consider it important to agree in advance upon an indicative time-table of work which, eliminating the danger of a deadlock on one concrete question or another, would prompt consideration of the next question even when final agreement had not been reached on the previous problems. Such pauses in the negotiating process are sometimes not only useful but also necessary for special consultations both between the most interested delegations and with their capitals.

The organization of our work should have as an important rule that due account be taken of the interests and possibilities of all delegations without exception. This means that within the subsidiary body we should set up a relatively small number of subordinate bodies, avoid overloading our work with a great number of official meetings, and conduct work in such a manner as not to discuss a large number of questions at the same time.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The title of the subsidiary body also plays an important role. We consider that it should be called the Special Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The working groups and other necessary subordinate bodies would be set up accordingly within its framework.

The Soviet delegation considers it advisable to set up four working groups within the Committee. At the same time, it is prepared to consider the observations of other delegations on this score.

In the opinion of our delegation, the setting up of the following working groups in particular might be envisaged:

On questions of the purposes and scope of the Convention (definitions and criteria; formula of basic undertakings; non-production; permitted activities; non-use of chemical weapons; monitoring measures for such weapons; preamble and concluding provisions; etc.);

On questions of the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the elimination of production facilities for them (initial declarations, interim measures, elimination and monitoring);

On questions of compliance with the convention (international verification on request, national implementation measures, activities of the consultative and preparatory committees, consultations and co-operation, consideration of complaints, etc.);

On questions of the structure of the Convention (arrangement and order of articles, appendices, agreed understandings, etc.).

We believe that it may in turn be necessary to set up subsidiary bodies and other smaller organs within these working groups.

Naturally, the title of the organ itself must be fully in keeping with this complex structure of working bodies; as we stated earlier, we propose that it should be called a committee.

In conclusion the Soviet delegation would like to note your personal able leadership of our Conference which played an important role in assuring agreement on the mandate for the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are convinced that if all the delegations represented at the Conference display a responsible and honest approach to the negotiations, as well as a real readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions, the Conference will be able to solve the important task facing it -- the elaboration of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

When Mr. MacEachen spoke before the Committee on Disarmament last year, he emphasized four Canadian priorities:

Canada will press for progress toward the objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; Canada will press for a more effective non-proliferation regime; Canada will press for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons; Canada will press for progress towards the objective of prohibiting all weapons for use in outer space.

These remain, in our considered view, the issues where there are prospects for genuine progress, and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security.

We are particularly pleased at the steps that have already been taken in the Chemical Weapons Working Group towards the objective of ensuring continued progress towards a chemical weapons convention. We would hope to see an early decision on the establishment of a working group on outer space which might bring about some movement in that area. It is therefore critical that the appropriate mechanisms are found for this body to advance matters forward. Horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation is of primary concern to the world community and the forthcoming Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty will provide a focus for our efforts to restrain both. The realization of a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty remains one of the most difficult objectives of this Conference. Canada will continue to pursue realistic measures towards such a treaty. We shall continue to make a contribution within the seismic experts group and to work on other verification aspects.

Throughout our discussions, I hope we shall bring our imagination to bear on one of the most important aims of arms control and disarmament negotiations, namely, to deal not only with existing weapons systems but to gear down and eventually to halt the momentum of new technology.

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(Mr. Beasley, Canada)

Mr. President, we have heard a number of important statements this morning, and it is perhaps invidious to comment on one without commenting on all, but I do think it important to note the statement we have just heard from the distinguished representative of the USSR, given the imminence of the decision, we hope, on a chemical weapons working group. Firstly, I think I should say as a very preliminary response, that we are pleased at this positive reaction of the Soviet Union to the initiative announced by United States Secretary Schultz at Stockholm of the intention of the United States Government to table a draft convention on chemical weapons. Secondly, we are equally pleased that this new Soviet policy should be one of the first signals emitted to the West and to the world by the new leadership in Moscow, and we say this most sincerely. Thirdly, the positive Soviet response on the issue of on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons appears to develop in a concrete way the position announced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to the effect that the USSR was prepared to accept on-site inspection. It is well known of course that it is the Canadian position that this is the only viable approach from a functional point of view to this problem. Fourthly, we would hope that this new policy of on-site verification foretells an across-the-board engagement by the Soviet Union in all areas of arms-control verification. The fifth point I would like to make is that we will have obviously to react more definitively to the Soviet proposal somewhat later, after careful study and in the appropriate body. Finally, in the meantime, like others, we await with even greater interest than before the tabling of the United States draft convention which, we assume, will reflect what is now common ground on this point just discussed, and I might say of course that we await that proposal with somewhat more confidence than some others have expressed.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

Fifth, we shall work for the elaboration and final drafting of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, within the competent subsidiary body with the new mandate provided for it.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Much has been said about the prohibition of chemical weapons in this body. We have produced an impressive amount of documents, working papers and conference room papers, documents on the consultations of experts, etc. During the last years we have also received several comprehensive documents reflecting the positions of some delegations on basic aspects of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. But if all these papers are not to lose their value in the archives of the Conference on Disarmament, we should finally sit down and draw on them in the process of negotiating and drafting the text of the convention. I would like to express the satisfaction of my delegation in view of the fact, that a new mandate for the Chemical Weapons Working Group has been agreed upon. We would like to hope that this mandate will make it possible to come to real negotiation on and formulation of the convention and that it will block all attempts to avoid it.

On the eve of this year's session, the Warsaw Treaty countries advanced an initiative aimed at the elimination of chemical weapons from Europe. We consider that the removal of the chemical threat to the European States would substantially reduce the risk of chemical war on the Continent as well as in the world. The realization of this regional measure would also contribute to the efforts for the early elaboration and conclusion of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons on the global basis.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Talking about chemical weapons, I cannot but welcome today's statement by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, who gave us new aspects of approaches to a conclusion of a treaty. I am certain that his statement will be studied by all delegations very thoroughly and will contribute to an early conclusion, if not of a whole draft treaty, at least of its major parts.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, as you mentioned the question that we have not been able to decide upon so far, I should like to make a short statement for the record.

My delegation cannot but voice its concern and deep regret for the waste of time in formalizing the decision that the Conference must already have adopted. We would have thought that all the necessary elements of this decision were already present in February, when the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons adopted its report by consensus.

Given the irrelevance of the topic under discussion since a few days now, namely the designation of the subsidiary body charged with the carrying on of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, my delegation preferred not to take part in the debate. This has also been the general position of the Group of 21, whose members assign far greater importance to the start of concrete work than to procedural wrangling over organizational details.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

Through the able leadership of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons managed in 1983 to make progress. In our opinion, multilateral agreement on a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban is today a priority disarmament issue. What is needed now is to elaborate a comprehensive draft convention.

It is also to us very encouraging that progress was made during the 1983 session on issues relevant to the incorporation of a prohibition on use in the scope of the convention. This would, I think, complement the prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. As to the vital question of verification of destruction of chemical stocks, the successful and impressive demonstration by the United States in Salt Lake City in November 1983, at which Norwegian experts were present, has proved that a system based on a combination of remote sensing and on-site inspection can work efficiently. We also look forward to the forthcoming demonstration in the Federal Republic of Germany concerning these issues.

The recent announcement by the United States Secretary of State that the United States will table a comprehensive draft convention in the Conference on Disarmament concerning a chemical-weapons ban, is of particular significance to the forthcoming negotiations. The Norwegian Government warmly welcomes this as an important disarmament initiative.

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(Mr. Berg, Norway)

In this connection I would add that Norway also welcomes the important and positive statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan, on 21 February, when he declared the readiness in principle of the Soviet Union to consider in a positive manner the proposal on the permanent presence at the special facilities on stock destruction of the representatives of international control.

It is the sincere hope of my Government that the positive attitude reflected by the United States and the Soviet Union in these important announcements will indeed contribute significantly to expediting the work of the Conference in this high-priority field of disarmament.

The Norwegian Government has also noted the proposal of 10 January of the East European countries for a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, and welcomes it as a confirmation of active interest on their part in a chemical weapons ban. However, it is the view of my Government that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, implemented on a world-wide basis and hence also in Europe, would more adequately meet the need for further measures to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

I would leave you in no doubt that Norway is determined to contribute to this urgent task of the Conference. We therefore plan to present new results of our research programme on verification of a chemical-weapons convention during the second part of this year's session. The Norwegian research programme will be terminated in 1986, when we plan to submit a set of concrete and specific proposals for sampling and verification procedures for the implementation of a chemical-weapons convention.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

As a matter of fact we have for a long time been an ardent advocate of urgent measures aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons, as well as the prohibition of other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. We are firm in our belief that on the basis of the various drafts and the great expertise concentrated in this body, negotiations could and should be conducted in earnest in order to eliminate the growing danger stemming from chemical and other weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

In the view of the Belgian delegation, the problem of chemical weapons is especially ripe for genuine negotiation.

A clear basis for negotiation exists. The report of the Working Group submitted by Ambassador McPhail describes it adequately. All our States, in one way or another, have reaffirmed their desire to conclude work rapidly, and this was reflected by the wording of a mandate for a working group, ad hoc committee or subsidiary body, on the content of which we are unanimous.

The United States announced that it would shortly submit a draft treaty to us: this should help us to formulate more easily, in all its aspects, the text of the convention which we shall recommend our States to implement. To this end, of course, the United States must make haste to submit this document.

Some questions which recently still gave rise to polemics have developed in a satisfactory manner; with regard to the central problem of verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, we certainly noted a breakthrough in the statement made on 21 February by the distinguished representative of the USSR. I found that statement particularly encouraging because it clearly goes in the direction of the conclusions which I drew from attending the Workshop organized by the United States Administration at Tooele. In my opinion, the conclusions of that Workshop are quite straightforward.

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(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

The first is that effective verification of the destruction of chemical weapons in an industrial facility is possible on condition that the constraint of verification is taken into account at the design stage of the facilities to be set up. In other words, if the planning office which designs the destruction facility takes account of these constraints, the facility becomes wide open to verification; otherwise, it remains opaque.

The second conclusion is that the importance of a human presence for verification purposes in a destruction facility depends on the sophistication and reliability of the equipment. The greater its reliability and sophistication, the smaller the importance of the intrusion of human beings.

At Tooele, a permanent human presence is essential not only during the destruction stage but above all during the maintenance and setting of the instruments; otherwise, the reliability of the verification is negatively affected. The day may perhaps come when the automatization of the instruments will make it possible to do without this permanent human presence, but that does not seem the case today.

That is why my delegation was very pleased by the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February. His statement amounts to a breakthrough on a fundamental point, but we do not think that it is enough to justify euphoria on our part. For differences on essential issues still exist, particularly with regard to the means to be utilized to verify effectively in future the non-production of new chemical weapons by the industry.

We think these differences can be resolved.

Belgium, which has a large chemical industry, is prepared to accept a verification system which combines systematically organized random inspections with ad hoc inspections in the case of a challenge procedure. The USSR proposes a different system, based on prohibition of the production of certain, especially dangerous products, but verification would be carried out solely on the basis of the challenge procedure initiated in the event of suspicion.

We fear that the weakness of such a system could be that it reserves inspection exclusively for cases which are already the subject of controversy, and therefore having political undertones, whereas we prefer a routine system that would avoid controversy.

The discussion on this point should therefore be continued, account being taken in particular of the proposals submitted by the Minister of State, Mr. Luce, to the Conference on 14 February 1984.

Assuming that these conceptual difficulties are resolved, considerable effort and a great deal of perseverance and flexibility will still be necessary to work out the structure for a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. It would be a mistake to underestimate the effort which remains to be made to achieve that goal.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

In conclusion, I should like to recall that all the representatives in the Conference on Disarmament heard the moving statement made here by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even leaving aside the question of the verification of the allegations in that statement, as my office obliges me to do, the heart-rending and pressing nature of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons cannot have escaped anyone whose heart is in the right place.

I see this as yet another reason why all necessary efforts should be deployed to achieve without delay the final elimination of such inhuman armaments.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, first of all, allow me to join the list of speakers who spoke before me to welcome here in this room the State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eivinn Berg. My delegation would like to introduce a working document of a group of socialist countries entitled "Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons", which bears the symbol CD/435.

The socialist countries consider the prohibition of chemical weapons one of the most important tasks in the field of curbing the arms race and disarmament. One more demonstration of their keen interest in this problem is the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member States to the NATO member States, advanced on 10 January of this year, aimed at freeing Europe from nuclear weapons. On the initiative of the socialist countries, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session adopted resolution 38/187 A, which urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in order to achieve accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. With a view to fulfilling this task, a group of socialist countries today tables document CD/435, containing its proposals for the most effective work of the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is suggested that the working organ undertake the formulation of the text of the convention so that a draft convention, or a draft containing agreed and formulated provisions together with suggested formulations for provisions which have not been agreed as yet, could be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session as called for by the relevant resolution. The subsidiary body should make maximum use of time and the possibility of continuing its work after the spring and summer parts of the session should be considered. Taking into account the new title of this forum and the advanced stage of negotiations

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

on chemical weapons, the subsidiary body should be given a title of Ad hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Its possible subsidiary bodies and system of their functioning, based on a schedule or timetable, is also proposed in document CD/435. Namely it is suggested, that the following working groups could be established within the Ad hoc Committee:

- Working Group on purposes and scope of the convention, which could deal with definitions and criteria, formula of basic undertakings, non-production, permitted activities, non-use of chemical weapons, relevant monitoring measures, preamble and final provisions, etc.
- Working Group on the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and destruction of production facilities, which could deal with initial declarations, intermediate measures, destruction and monitoring.
- Working Group on compliance with the convention, which could deal with international verification on challenge, national measures of implementation, functioning of consultative and preparatory committees, consultations and co-operation, complaints procedure, etc.
- Working Group on the structure of the convention, which could deal with the position of articles, their sequence, annexes, agreed understandings, etc.

The order of the elaboration of the various provisions of the future convention in the working groups has to take into consideration their importance, inter-relationship, logical sequence and the structure of the convention. It has to be determined right at the beginning of the Committee's work, taking into account also the practical possibilities of participation by delegations of member States of the Conference on Disarmament in this process. Meetings of the Committee convened to decide on the programme of work and other organizational matters, for the review and appraisal of results achieved in the working groups and for the preparation of reports of the Conference could take place as necessary, but, as a rule, about once every two weeks. Working groups or their subsidiary bodies could meet at least two or three times a week. The work of all these bodies could be very flexible, in accordance with requirements, and would be based on an advance schedule of meetings as mentioned above, covering the whole period of the spring session. Organization of work for the summer part of the session should also be specified, albeit in a general form. It is also stressed that in distributing the chairmanships of subsidiary bodies of the Committee on Chemical Weapons the principle of balanced representation of various groups should be preserved.

In tabling these proposals, the group of socialist countries is motivated exclusively by a willingness to make decisive progress in the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Given the political will of all countries participating in the negotiations to prohibit this type of weapons, the tasks ahead could undoubtedly be solved in the interests of curbing the arms race and strengthening international security.

Comrade President, before I conclude, allow me as the Co-ordinator of the Socialist Group to say a few words on the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Belgium. The group of socialist countries has never called the proposals and amendments of the group of Western countries frivolous; we always study them with all sincerity and patience. This is the only way to conduct a disarmament negotiation seriously. We hope that the delegation of Belgium will also do the same and will not jump to hasty conclusions.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Foremost among these matters is a guiding principle underlying the United States approach in seeking arms control and arms reduction agreements. That principle underlies all meaningful agreement — that is the need to design effective verification and compliance measures for such agreements.

This is indeed one of the four principles referred to by President Reagan in 1981 as governing our approach to arms control and disarmament, and I should like to recall these today. First is the principle of pursuing genuine, significant reductions in weaponry, including the elimination of entire categories of weapons, where possible, second is the need for balance by imposing equal obligations on all parties. The third principle mandates that any agreement be an integral part of the larger objective of a comprehensive policy of national and international security. And finally, there must be an integral, effective verification regime to ensure compliance with each agreement achieved.

These principles apply directly to the negotiation of an effective and verifiable convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction.

If successful, our negotiations here would eliminate an entire category of weapons by imposing equal obligations upon all parties to destroy all existing stocks of chemical weapons and to undertake never to develop, produce, stockpile or transfer such weapons, in any manner inconsistent with the terms of the treaty. Moreover, the foundation of such a treaty would be an effective verification regime to ensure that the obligations of States parties are undertaken faithfully and, thus, instilling high confidence that the objective of the instrument has been accomplished. And finally, there is no doubt that such a treaty would serve to strengthen both national and international security.

With regard to the principle of verification in our chemical weapons negotiations, let me welcome as a sign of progress the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in our last plenary meeting on 21 February 1984. We are pleased that the Soviet Government will be prepared to agree, in our negotiations on the verification regime for the destruction of all existing stocks of chemical weapons, to the "permanent presence at the (destruction site) of the representatives of international control" and to the use of technical monitoring devices at such sites to augment that verification process. My delegation will be actively exploring the importance and significance of the statement of the Soviet Union. Edmund Burke once said that "every prudent act — is founded on compromise", and we note that our Soviet colleagues seem to be exercising that degree of prudence which, if continued, will help to create a firm foundation upon which we together can construct a meaningful instrument to ban chemical weapons once and for all.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Mr. President, let me recount briefly the status of our chemical weapons negotiations. Most colleagues will recall that the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, delivered an address to the Committee last February, in which he stressed the importance which the United States attaches to the negotiation of an effective and verifiable ban of chemical weapons. Following the Vice-President's remarks, my delegation introduced a comprehensive paper outlining our "detailed views" on the contents of a chemical weapons convention (CD/343). Verification played a central role in the formulation of those views. Indeed, the Soviet Union had recognized the importance of verification in their "Basic provisions envisioned to form the basis of a chemical weapons ban" (CD/294). Subsequent to an exchange of views on issues in the Chemical Weapons Working Group in the spring part of our 1983 session, my delegation introduced, in the summer part of our session, a second working paper which provided an illustrative, comprehensive review of on-site inspection procedures for the verification of the destruction of chemical stockpiles (CD/387). This paper was designed to further our search for understanding of a mutually acceptable solution to this important component of the general verification approach in the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban.

In order to provide a multi-dimensional demonstration of how these procedures could be implemented in an actual chemical weapon destruction facility, we invited our colleagues -- both members and observers -- to participate in a workshop at our chemical agent munitions disposal site at Tooele, Utah, on 15 and 16 November 1983. The 25 States that attended will agree, I believe, that the information and briefings provided at the Workshop, coupled with the tour of the actual destruction facility, were of considerable benefit in developing an understanding of what is required to provide an effective monitoring system to verify chemical weapons stockpile destruction and an appreciation of the ease and manageability of its implementation under actual circumstances.

On 17 January 1984, Secretary of State, George Shultz announced in his address to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm that, in coming months, the United States will be presenting in the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons, on a global basis. In particular, our draft treaty will be a comprehensive text, containing, among other things, requirements for the effective verification of compliance with the terms of the convention. My Government has undertaken this formidable task in the belief that our work in this Conference can be enhanced by our effort. This will be seen by our colleagues. I believe, as yet another sign of the continuing interest of the United States Government in the achievement of an effective and complete ban of chemical weapons and a genuine desire to expedite the attainment of this important objective.

But this commitment should by no means imply that the work of this Conference in resolving the many remaining issues should be held in abeyance pending the introduction of our draft text. On the contrary, our efforts to reach common understandings and agreement on the many unresolved issues should be redoubled now -- especially on key verification issues yet undecided, because without agreement on these matters, dear colleagues, there can be no treaty.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Turning now to the important agenda item of chemical weapons I would like to voice the gratification of my delegation with the considerable momentum that has recently been instilled in our work. All of us are eagerly anticipating the comprehensive draft convention which the United States delegation will soon submit, certainly as a major accelerating factor of our work. My delegation is also highly gratified with the proposals introduced by the Soviet delegation on 21 February. The readiness of the Soviet Government to accept the continuous surveillance of the chemical weapons destruction process by international on-site inspection is most encouraging. The Federal Government, by the voice of its Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, has welcomed this step in one of the crucial areas of our negotiations where an accord is still outstanding. My delegation hopes that the Soviet proposals can swiftly be translated into concrete terms. In this process, and while we consider in greater detail the requirements of on-site inspection in the destruction phase of the operation of the future convention, we will also have to visualize the inherent relationship between that particular aspect of verification and the other important verification problems to be solved. There is a logical bond between the activities of inspectors in that first important phase, and the treaty obligations we have to work out on the involvement of the international inspectorate both in the verification of future non-production of chemical weapons, and in the case of on-challenge inspections. My delegation welcomes the recent proposal of the Soviet Union in the expectation that the Soviet delegation will demonstrate a similar co-operative attitude at the time when these other aspects of verification come up for detailed consideration and negotiation.

The United States announcement of a comprehensive draft, the Soviet statement of 21 February, the helpful procedural suggestions contained in Working Paper CD 435, the Working Papers introduced in the last few weeks, among others by the delegation of the United Kingdom and my own, taken together with the swift agreement of all delegations on a forward-looking negotiating mandate for the future committee on chemical weapons, entitle us to look into the future of our work with some realistic optimism, hoping that the one "ray of hope" which Ambassador Issraelyan had perceived earlier in our session can soon broaden into lasting sunshine.

Mr. President, before demonstrating the readiness of my own delegation to contribute vigorously to this new phase of our negotiations on chemical weapons, let me briefly deal with two related developments in the chemical weapons field.

While this Conference embarks on a new phase in the attempt to ban chemical weapons forever, there continue to be chilling reminders that huge arsenals of these gruesome weapons still exist, and that there may be new incidents involving their production and use.

My delegation has taken note with preoccupation of the accusations which the Foreign Minister of Iran has levied on 16 February of this year in our very midst regarding the use of chemical weapons on the national territory of Iran. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical weapons in war. For a long time, my Government has insistently maintained that all and every allegation of the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law, wherever they are raised, must receive the same careful investigation and clarification. As regards an instrument for such investigation, there is the possibility of recourse to the mechanism with which the international community has endowed itself on the basis of United Nations resolution 37/98 D. This instrument is, as a matter of course, also available to the Government of Iran.

In his statement of 21 February, Ambassador Issraelyan has again referred to the recent proposal of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. When this proposal was first publicized, my Government underlined as its positive feature that the Soviet Union and her allies were giving new emphasis to the significance of the chemical weapons topic. However, while

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

agreeing wholeheartedly that Europe should be freed of the menace of chemical weapons as soon as possible, I would again like to stress the priority importance which the Federal Government attributes to the negotiations on a world-wide, comprehensive and reliably verifiable interdiction of all chemical weapons in this Conference. Our negotiations, we all agree, are now in an advanced state, and everything that would slow them down or serve to dissipate our energy should be avoided. Our further negotiations must concentrate upon the still outstanding issues, especially in the realm of verification. Regional solutions would undoubtedly work to the detriment of this global perspective. Were they to be given precedence, injustice would also be done to the countries of the Third World which are rightly fearful, on the basis of past experience, of the chemical weapons threat to their parts of the world. They would not understand that this vital topic of negotiation would be, wholly or in part, taken out of their hands. All countries have the same right to be freed from the scourge of chemical weapons. Since verification problems are essentially identical, in some aspects even larger, in regional contexts, my Government also has doubts as to whether the corresponding language of the Warsaw Pact offer contains any indication of willingness of the authors to deal with verification issues in an adequate way. On the other hand, my delegation is ready at all times to pursue all available contacts, including bilateral contacts, that promote the efforts of the Conference to arrive at a world-wide chemical weapons convention with the appropriate verification mechanisms.

Let me now turn to some contributions which my delegation wishes to make to our ongoing chemical weapons negotiations process in this annual session. I would first like to introduce a Working Paper that deals with the question of the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors. The paper is now before us and bears the symbol CD/439. With this Working Paper my delegation wishes to provide an input into the current discussions on "Prohibition of Transfer" and "Permitted Transfer".

Obviously, in this realm a fine balance must be maintained between the dangers inherent in the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors -- the danger that the fundamental prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons be circumvented -- and the unencumbered functioning of international trade in chemical products. We have been encouraged to undertake a new search for such an equilibrium point by our impression that these two conflicting principles have not been adequately balanced in all of the proposals for transfer limitations that are already before the Conference.

The question of which chemical products should be regarded as key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals is fundamental to the formulation in a chemical weapons convention of a transfer ban and of the provisions for permitted transfer. Underlying the present Working Paper is our long-held view that a narrow definition must apply to the term key precursor.

In the view of my delegation chemicals should be defined as key precursors only if: they have particular significance to the relevant provisions in a chemical weapons convention; they constitute characteristic chemical compounds at the final technological reaction stage for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals; and they are not used, or are used in minimal quantities only, for permitted purposes. To us, this definition appears particularly relevant for the international measures of verification of the non-production of chemicals for use in chemical weapons because it strictly limits the range of chemicals which might be covered by controls. Thus, legitimate interests of the chemical industry are duly taken into account.

Our definition implies that controls, and any limitation of production, shall extend only to the transfer of substances for "protective purposes". According to our proposal, the transfer for "permitted purposes" between States parties will not be limited.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

With regard to the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors for protective purposes, permitted transfers between States parties should be limited to the allowed production level. Notification to the Consultative Committee of any transfer of such super-toxic lethal chemicals or their key precursors shall be required.

As in a previous Working Paper, CD/326, which purports to set out the views of my delegation on various aspects of verification, the present Working Paper couches its recommendations in prescriptive language. My delegation thereby hopes to facilitate the consideration of the problems raised in the most concrete terms possible, in keeping with the now agreed mandate for the work of the committee on chemical weapons, which emphasizes that the future convention should be developed and worked out in requisite detail.

As delegations are aware, the Federal Government, on the basis of an invitation extended at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, intends to hold a Workshop for the discussion of problems of verification relating to the destruction of stocks. I take pleasure in making this invitation more concrete by informing you that the Workshop will now take place from 12 to 14 June 1984 at Munster in northern Germany. A formal letter of invitation to each head of delegation will be sent soon. In co-operation with the President of the Conference for the month of June (who is at the same time the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons and who is already informed) we intend to establish the closest possible connection between the Workshop and the ongoing negotiations at this Conference. We expect the Workshop to make a practical contribution to the problems of verification of the destruction of stocks, illustrated by the situation at a small national destruction facility. My delegation realizes that this invitation takes on a new significance in the aftermath of the proposals of the Soviet Union relating to the verification of the destruction of stocks. This gives us the hope that all delegations find it possible to participate in the event.

My delegation does not intend to concentrate its work during the current session uniquely on chemical weapons, notwithstanding the primary importance of that subject. We also hope to make contributions on other important agenda items. Among these, we share the sense of urgency which attaches to item 3 of our agenda, the prevention of nuclear war and all its related aspects. There is not the slightest doubt that the importance of preventing war has been immensely heightened by the nuclear phenomenon. Our work, however, must be based on realistic assumptions as to where the dangers to peace in our era loom, and should aim at a comprehensive strategy designed to make war in all its forms increasingly less likely and indeed impossible. As I had occasion to point out at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, my delegation is ready to embark on a thorough argumentative process on the problem of the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, with a view to operational solutions, in any work format that seems appropriate to this Conference, and we are looking forward to an early commencement of that important endeavour. My delegation likewise intends to make specific contributions during this spring part of our session to the problems of nuclear testing and radiological weapons.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

It is my intention to introduce today document CD/437 which contains the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member States to the member States of NATO to free Europe from chemical weapons. This proposal, as is stated in the document, was presented at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 January of this year to the embassies of the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United States, Turkey and France.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization proposed to the member States of the NATO to hold in 1984 a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives for a preliminary exchange of views on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons. The group of socialist countries considers that, besides lessening substantially the risk of chemical war in Europe, the implementation of such a partial measure of a regional nature would contribute to the efforts undertaken on a world scale aimed at the acceleration of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which continues to be the ultimate aim of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. Hence, this proposal is not meant to compete with the efforts to eliminate chemical weapons on a global basis but to facilitate them. And this I would like to underline and stress again after what has just been stated by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who expressed fears that there should be nothing that should slow us down or dissipate our energy in negotiating the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We are certain that our proposals will only increase our energy in trying to reach the final goal.

The readiness of the socialist countries to contribute to the early elaboration of the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons by deeds, not words, has been once more clearly demonstrated by the constructive proposal of the Soviet Union on the verification of the elimination of chemical-weapon stocks advanced by Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement of 21 February.

In advancing this proposal, the Warsaw Treaty Organization proceeds from the fact that the danger of the use of chemical weapons, particularly in Europe, increases in the conditions of the present aggravation of the international situation. The presence of chemical weapons on the densely populated territory of Europe poses an extreme danger to all European States and especially to civilian population. It is estimated that in the event of a conflict involving the use of chemical weapons the ratio of lethal casualties among servicemen and among civilians could be one to twenty.

The obligations of States with regard to the chemical-weapon-free territory, which would be defined in the accord, could include, for example, the declaration of the presence or absence of chemical weapons on that territory, the inadmissibility of the deployment of chemical weapons where there are no such weapons at present, the freezing of these weapons, the withdrawal or scrapping of the existing stocks of chemical weapons, and the renunciation of their production, acquisition, entry into and transfer to States located within that territory. In working out the accord the interested States can, as it becomes necessary, co-ordinate mutually acceptable adequate forms of verification.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

This proposal, if implemented, would undoubtedly strengthen European security, reduce the threat of war and facilitate the consolidation of mutual trust and the improvement of the over-all political atmosphere. The Warsaw Treaty countries are introducing this proposal in the Conference on Disarmament in order to underline again our interest in the elimination of all chemical weapons. Given the importance of the problem, the Warsaw Treaty Member States expect that the governments of the NATO countries will approach this proposal with all attention and seriousness.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Expectation of progress on a chemical weapons ban have grown. They are justified only if all sides are ready to do serious work on the convention. That means, above all, starting drafting work immediately. My delegation has always supported this demand, and has made concrete proposals, for instance on 22 February 1983.

At the previous meeting, the Czechoslovak delegation, on behalf of a group of socialist countries, made a number of important suggestions concerning the future method of work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are intended to help attain a new quality in our work. To carry on long-drawn-out discussions of some partial questions would only delay the formulation of the text of the convention.

To make swift progress it is necessary to display willingness to accommodate interests and to seek solutions which are acceptable to all sides.

At this juncture, we would like particularly to commend the constructive attitude of the USSR. New evidence of this constructiveness is the preparedness of the USSR to accept in principle international continuous on-site inspections in connection with the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, as announced by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February. In the interest of an early elaboration of the convention, we now expect a similar readiness for compromise on the part of the United States.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

On the same day when the USSR once again demonstrated its willingness for conciliation, the United States attempted, by means of a report handed over to the United Nations, to step up its slanderous campaign about the alleged use of chemical weapons. This gives rise to the question of whether such action can be reconciled with assurances of one's own willingness for businesslike negotiations.

The proposal to free Europe from chemical weapons submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the other States members of the Warsaw Treaty on 10 January 1984 is evidence of these countries' resolve to remove the threat of such weapons from the European continent. It reflects their firm determination to avert the danger of chemical war by practical measures which can be agreed upon and implemented very quickly.

Regional efforts to eliminate chemical weapons would promote negotiations on their elimination on a world-wide scale. The one does not preclude the other. The German Democratic Republic is prepared for negotiations with interested States on a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. My country adopts a positive attitude towards all reasonable proposals which are directed at gradually freeing Europe from chemical weapons.

(The President)

May I now put before the Conference three draft mandates dated 28 February for the re-establishment of ad hoc subsidiary bodies. The secretariat has already circulated the relevant texts for consideration by the Conference. I suggest that we take them up one by one, following the order of the items on the Agenda.

The first draft mandate deals with the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons, and it includes also the question of the appointment of its Chairman.

If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft mandate.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): I think it was understood that we should adopt this draft mandate together with a statement by the President, already agreed upon in an informal meeting. My delegation has not received, together with the documents, this draft statement by the President. I would request that we have both statements before us, before we take a final decision.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil, and would like to explain that this statement was circulated at the informal meeting: it will be read out immediately after the decision on the mandate has been taken, as was agreed. Would this satisfy the distinguished representative of Brazil? I thank you.

Then I take it that there is no objection to adopting the draft mandate 1/ for the re-establishment of the ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons?

It was so decided.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I would like to make a comment on the decision that has just been taken concerning the draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I would suggest that you make this comment after I have read the statement of the President. Thank you.

I wish to draw attention to paragraph 3 of the decision just taken by the Conference on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons which states:

"The term 'ad hoc subsidiary body' is used in this connection pending a decision by the Conference on the designation to be adopted with due urgency within two weeks for its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to existing practice in this regard".

It is my intention to begin consultations immediately in order to reach consensus on the question of designation.

It is understood by the Conference on Disarmament that the same designation be given to all the subsidiary bodies established directly under respective agenda items unless the Conference, in specific cases, decides otherwise.

Furthermore, if no decision is taken at the end of two weeks, a provisional designation should be agreed upon pending a definitive decision by the Conference.

It is also understood that no decision as to designation will have financial or structural implications.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia.

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1/ Decision contained in document CD/440.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation would like to explain, on behalf of a group of Socialist States, how the group understands the last paragraph of the decision just adopted, regarding the subsidiary body on the negotiation of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

We understand that the words "without prejudice to existing practice in this regard" in this paragraph means that the term "ad hoc subsidiary body" will be used temporarily, without prejudice to the full application of rule 23 of the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to submit now for consideration by the Conference a draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 2/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft mandate.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Before I conclude, I would like to express my delegation's fullest interest in the negotiations for the elaboration of a chemicals weapons convention during the 1984 session itself of the Conference, if that is possible.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Chemical disarmament remains the main goal of our negotiations. Recent weeks have been marked by two very positive elements: the announcement by the United States Secretary of State of the forthcoming presentation of a draft treaty and the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union on continuous verification of the destruction of stocks. Furthermore, the subsidiary body has

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

resumed its work with a broader mandate that authorizes the drafting of provisions of a treaty. The method proposed by its chairman seems to us to be well-suited to the negotiating conditions. We would hope, however, that matters relating to the prohibition of use and verification would receive more prominence. The recent allegations relating to the use of chemical weapons -- allegations recently submitted to the Conference -- call for further vigilance on the part of the international community with regard to the observance of that prohibition.

Broadly speaking, the necessary conditions seem present for the current session to make significant, and we hope decisive, progress in the negotiations on chemical disarmament.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the issues to which we all attach high priority. It is good to note that work in this sphere is well advanced. Each session which passes brings us closer to the drafting of a convention which we hope to be able to conclude during this session. That would most certainly be a major contribution to the objective of general and complete disarmament which we are pursuing.

We welcome the fact that the mandate adopted for the subsidiary organ responsible for negotiating on this question adequately reflects the state of progress of our work.

Our optimism is justified and reinforced by the recent statements of the United States and the Soviet Union whose proposals will not fail, we are sure, to give a new impetus to our negotiations.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): The message is the following:

"On this International Women's Day, we women from different countries who have met in Geneva to examine how we can contribute most effectively to the World Disarmament Campaign wish to address a message to you, the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

We turn to you in our conviction that the Conference on Disarmament — the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — must urgently take steps to help free humanity from the threat of nuclear annihilation and from the dangerous consequences of the continuing arms build-up including the horrific effects of the nuclear tests and the suffering and deprivation caused by misuse of resources on armaments. We are angry that the amount which could feed humankind for one year is now spent on the arms race in one day.

The prevention of nuclear war and progress in the negotiations for arms control agreements leading to general and complete disarmament have become the primary concerns of women the world over. Women have marched thousands of kilometers, have organized mass rallies, peace camps, conferences and mass campaigns to manifest their opposition to the arms race and to raise awareness of people to the danger this has for our globe.

We expect our governments to take concrete measures for disarmament that will reverse the dangerous situation we are in. We expect the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate vigorously in the coming months to conclude agreements that will curb the arms build-up and, for the first time, lead to true disarmament.

Although we consider that all items on the agenda of the Conference are of great importance, we urge the Members to concentrate their efforts on reaching agreements in the following areas which we consider to be the most urgent tasks facing humankind today:

The urgency of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies also in the fact that with the development of science and technology, the longer such a prohibition is delayed, the more difficult it will be to achieve it. The advancement of science and technology will not only increase the military value of chemical weapons, but also bring with it new peaceful uses for chemical warfare agents and their precursors which at present have no peaceful uses. Thus, the questions of verification and prohibition were more complex and hard to solve.

Furthermore, the harsh reality of frequent reports on the use of chemical weapons in areas of conflict decades after the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol has also made the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons a matter of great urgency.

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary-General of the Conference)

1. The prevention of nuclear war — to negotiate on the basis of the papers put forth in the last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament by the Non-Aligned, Socialist and Western groups.
2. A comprehensive test ban — to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in all environments by the end of this session given the fact that negotiations had already reached a very advanced stage in the tripartite negotiations. This treaty should be signed by all States possessing nuclear capacity.
3. The prevention of an arms race in outer space — to negotiate a treaty or treaties preventing an arms race in outer space and to call on the governments mostly concerned to observe a moratorium on all research, development and testing until such a treaty or treaties is/are concluded.
4. The conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

We come from organizations which together represent millions of women the world over. We demand that you, Members of the Conference on Disarmament, exercise the needed political will to negotiate and reach agreements that will remove the threat of the destruction of all life now hanging over us all."

This message has been sent from the participants in the Conference entitled "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", which was held in Geneva from 6 to 9 March 1984.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China)

The prohibition of chemical weapons is the item on the agenda under which the first subsidiary body was set up by the Conference and has already started its work. That is why I have chosen this subject today to present some of our observations.

Five years have elapsed since the Working Group on Chemical Weapons was first set up in 1980. In this period, hundreds of documents have been filed, and countless meetings and discussions held at all the plenary, working group and contact group levels. Thanks to the joint efforts of the successive chairmen of the Working Groups, the Co-ordinators as well as the delegations, understanding has been enhanced on quite a number of issues; divergences on others have been narrowed and some measure of agreement has been found. Among the many items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the prohibition of chemical weapons is the one which has registered more progress and has therefore been widely hailed as a field offering relatively promising prospects. However, this is no reason for complacency, as the task facing us is still arduous. Serious differences remain on some of the major issues, and we have still a long way to go before we can finally reach the goal of concluding a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We should speed up our work and enter into rigorous negotiations in order to live up to people's expectations.

The urgency of concluding a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies, first and foremost, in the ever intensifying chemical weapons-arms race and the increasing threat of chemical warfare. According to materials released by eminent international research institutions, a total of more than 400,000 tons of chemical warfare agents are in the stockpiles of the two Superpowers, and research has been conducted continuously to improve and renew these chemical weapons. The destructive power of modern-day chemical weapons is far beyond comparison with that of the older generation of such weapons during World War I. It can well be imagined how infinitely greater the menace of chemical warfare to mankind will be if such a chemical-weapons arms race is to follow its course.

The urgency of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies also in the fact that with the development of science and technology, the longer such a prohibition is delayed, the more difficult it will be to achieve it. The advancement of science and technology will not only enhance the military value of chemical weapons, but also bring with it new peaceful uses for chemical warfare agents and their precursors which at present have no peaceful uses, thus making questions of verification and prohibition even more complex and hard to settle.

Furthermore, the harsh reality of frequent reports on the use of chemical weapons in areas of conflict decades after the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol has also made the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons a matter of great urgency.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

During the previous round of three additional weeks of discussions, Sweden, Finland, Canada, the United Kingdom and other countries have tabled a number of working documents in which they have further clarified their respective positions and put forward a good number of proposals. We are studying these documents carefully. We are also glad to note the positive statements made by the United States and the USSR. The United States has announced that it will submit in March a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, while the USSR has expressed its willingness to accept in principle on-site inspection on a continuous basis during the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. The United States and the USSR are the two countries with the largest chemical-weapon arsenals and bear special responsibilities towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope that they will make further efforts to bring their positions closer.

The Chinese delegation has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. Ever since we joined the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, we have always taken an earnest and serious attitude in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and tabled some working documents. The Chinese delegation has just submitted another working document (CD/443) in which we have summarized our proposals on the major elements of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the preparation of this document, we have drawn on the reasonable proposals of other delegations and we hope that consideration will be given to it in future negotiations.

To draw up a chemical weapons convention, the first thing we have to do is to settle the scope of prohibition. China has all along maintained that the scope of prohibition should be comprehensive in nature, that is, it should include not only all types of chemical weapons but also all activities related to research, production and use of chemical weapons. We note with satisfaction that the idea of including use in the scope of prohibition has already gained wide support and that it is now commonly held that this will only further strengthen and not weaken the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We believe that through concerted effort, we will be able to work out a formulation acceptable to all parties and thus settle this question in a satisfactory manner. We are also in favour of the proposal for banning the deployment of chemical weapons on the territories of other countries. We would also like to give our positive consideration to the proposal put forward by the Swedish delegation recently regarding the prohibition of making military preparations for the use of chemical weapons.

Closely related to the scope of prohibition is the question of definition. In the absence of precise and scientific definitions, it is impossible to decide on the exact scope of prohibition. In our working document, a number of definitions on chemical weapons, chemical-weapon agents, precursors, key precursors, etc. have therefore been suggested. We have laid particular stress on the concept of "chemical warfare agent". This is because we believe that such a concept can most precisely indicate the property of the toxic substances we want to ban and reflect in the best way the combination of general-purpose criteria and toxicity criteria. Furthermore, with the help of this concept, a clear-cut distinction between toxic chemical substances which should be prohibited and toxic chemical substances for permitted purposes which should not be prohibited can be drawn and unnecessary confusion and ambiguity avoided. We have noted that Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Belgium, and France have also used the concept of "chemical warfare agent" and submitted their own definitions. We are ready to consider all the constructive proposals of other delegations so as to work out a commonly acceptable definition in this regard.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Destruction of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons constitutes one of the most important provisions of the convention. Once the huge stockpile of existing chemical weapons is indeed totally destroyed, the threat of chemical warfare will fundamentally be removed. This in turn is closely linked to the issue of declaration and verification. Taking into account the time required to draw up plans for destruction, etc., we favour the idea that initial declarations should be made within 30 days of adherence to or entry into force of the Convention, whereas detailed declarations may be made within a period of three months. As to the question of how to proceed with the destruction of stockpiles we think that consideration should not be given unduly to parity and balance between the countries possessing chemical weapons, but should centre, first and foremost, on the speedy and early elimination of the threat of chemical warfare. With this in mind, we propose that the countries concerned should destroy in the first place those chemical weapons in their arsenals which are the most toxic and dangerous and not those which are out-dated or inoperative.

Verification is one of the key elements of the convention. We have always held that a chemical weapons convention must contain such provisions for verification as to ensure strict and effective implementation of verification, on the one hand, and minimize intrusiveness as much as possible on the other. Emphasis should be put on international verification with necessary on-site inspection. Such on-site inspection should cover destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, destruction and dismantlement of production or filling facilities for chemical weapons, small-scale production of super-lethal agents used for protective purposes, and alleged use of chemical weapons, etc. As to the method of verification, proposals have been made for on-site inspection on a continuous basis, routine or periodic or random on-site inspection, on-site inspection by challenge and on-site inspection on the basis of quota. We think all these methods can be considered and that different methods of verification can be used for different verification purposes. It is our hope that on this key issue, a solution acceptable to all parties will eventually be found.

We are very happy that within a relatively short time we have already re-established the subsidiary body on chemical weapons, formulated a mandate with the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as its main target, and designated the highly experienced Head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Ekeus, as its Chairman. People throughout the world are watching our work here with great expectations. Let us respond with tangible results.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We shall, of course, attentively study the document of the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", but we can already say that we fully share the views expressed by that forum. We regard such tasks as the prevention of nuclear war and a comprehensive nuclear test ban as the most urgent tasks. We fully agree with the point concerning a comprehensive test ban, which states "To conclude a treaty on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in all environments by the end of this session given the fact that negotiations have already reached a very advanced state in the tripartite negotiations. This treaty should be signed by all States possessing nuclear capacity". We are prepared to underwrite this demand by the conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign". The Soviet delegation also shares the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a comprehensive and complete ban on chemical weapons are central tasks which should not be put off from year to year under a variety of artificial, false pretexts. Once again, we wish success to all women -- those present here and those outside this conference room -- in their struggle to prevent nuclear disaster.

We have also asked for the floor today in order to introduce the official conference document CD/444, circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation, containing the section on international affairs of a speech made by Comrade Chernenko, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a meeting with voters of the Kuibyshev district of Moscow on 2 March 1984. In this section of his speech, Comrade Chernenko outlined the Soviet Union's approach of principle to the central problems of present-day world politics and puts forward new major proposals by the Soviet Union, inter alia on disarmament matters. The General Secretary of the Central Committee

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that it would be difficult to recall a problem of importance to strengthening peace on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have not put forward concrete and realistic proposals in the past few years. The initiatives of our countries are winning ever broader support from other States. This has been forcefully confirmed by the latest session of the United Nations General Assembly. Comrade Chernenko stated that intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the United States military superiority and political achievements. Everywhere in the world, they only lead to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. People want peace and tranquillity, not war hysteria. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that all this inspires the hope that eventually developments will once more take a direction towards peace, the limitation of the arms race and the development of international co-operation. Détente has struck deep roots. This is evidenced, in particular, by the convocation of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Comrade Chernenko said that the Soviet Union's position on questions relating to the halting of the nuclear arms race is clear. We are against rivalry in building up nuclear arms arsenals. We were and remain, said the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proponents of the prohibition and elimination of all types of those weapons.

Referring to the problem of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, Comrade Chernenko devoted particular attention to the norms by which relations between nuclear Powers should be governed. Among other disarmament issues, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union singled out such matters as the drawing up of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, an agreement on the renunciation of the militarization of outer space, and a mutual freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons. He emphasized that to deliver mankind from the possible uses of chemical weapons is a very important task. The Soviet Union is in favour of effective control over the implementation of an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, their development and production and the destruction of all their stockpiles, and believes that such control should cover the whole process of destruction of chemical weapons from beginning to end. It is not ruled out, Comrade Chernenko said, that reaching an agreement on the above-mentioned issues would signal the start of a real and drastic change in Soviet-United States relations and in the international situation as a whole.

I should like to express the hope that all delegations will study Comrade Chernenko's statement with care.

(Mr. Sirjani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Yesterday, the International Committee of the Red Cross, after an undue delay, ascertained the use of chemical weapons on a large scale by the Iraqi Government. We regret that after two years, the ICRC now comes to this conclusion, and we also regret the undue delay by the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding our request on the relevant General Assembly resolution, 37/98D.

I want to put on record what has been said by the Minister of Defence of the Iraqi Government.

[Speaking in French] "However, the Minister of Defence at no time clearly and unequivocally denied Teheran's accusations. Pressed by questions from the many American journalists asking for a categorical denial, he replied: 'Why should we wash our dirty linen in public? To reveal what Iraq has in store would be contrary to the interests of our security. You know that, in any event, the conventional weapons in our possession are quite enough to achieve our successes. Besides, you can go to the battlefields and ask for the autopsy of a body you think looks suspicious'". (Le Monde, 8 March 1984)

[Resuming in English] I want to take advantage of the presence of the women of the World Disarmament Campaign, I want to make an appeal to them for a total ban on chemical weapons. I want to make an appeal to the Conference on Disarmament not to remain silent about this crime --when you remain silent, it means that you disregard every norm of international law, you disregard the Geneva Protocol, you disregard everything.

(Mr. George, Nigeria)

My delegation warmly welcomes the re-establishment of the subsidiary body on chemical weapons and is happy to note that the body has already begun its work under the efficient and thorough Swedish delegation headed by Ambassador Ekéus. We also express our sincere appreciation and thanks to Ambassador McPhail of Canada for the leadership role he played in guiding the group to sincere and meaningful

negotiations in 1983. We welcome the announcement that the United States delegation is to submit a draft treaty during the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Equally pleasing to my delegation is the announcement by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February 1984 that his country is now ready to allow on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons in its territory. We congratulate the Soviet Union on this important "breakthrough" which now almost sets the stage for meaningful and perhaps honest and final concrete negotiations which should lead to a chemical-weapons treaty in the very near future. This is the time to seize the bull by the horns. We should not allow the momentum to subside. My delegation hopes that the anticipated convention would, among other things, provide a commitment concerning the non-production of chemical weapons, chemical agents and their precursors as well as the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and their agents. With the drawing up of the convention now in sight, my delegation urges States which already possess these weapons or who intended to manufacture, deploy or stockpile such weapons on the basis of the technology and facilities available to them, to exercise the maximum of self-restraint, including a moratorium on such activities.

My delegation feels more strongly than ever before that the conclusion of such a ban has come within reach and the time is now ripe to take up the final stages of our work with reasonable confidence in a successful outcome in the foreseeable future.

My delegation was led to this belief by, amongst other things, the recent announcement of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Schultz, to the effect that his country intends to submit, in the very near future, a complete draft convention. The Netherlands welcomed this announcement at the time as a significant step forward, and I wish to repeat this today, though no delegation should of course underestimate the time and effort that remains to be invested in the negotiations of a consensus text.

The Netherlands welcomes as well the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February last, announcing a significant change in the position of his country on some aspects of the question of verifying compliance with the future chemical-weapons ban. In the view of my delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan's statement at that point constitutes an important step towards general agreement on a complex set of issues related to

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Mr. President. allow me to return now to the subject of a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban, the agenda item that our programme of work identifies for plenary discussion this week. to which the remainder of my statement of today will be devoted.

The efforts of the international community to render impossible the use of chemical weapons and remove these weapons entirely from the face of the earth have indeed a long history. The employment of poison or poisoned weapons was explicitly proscribed as long ago as in 1874, the year in which the Brussels Conference adopted its International Declaration on the matter. This prohibition has since been repeated in various forms (when, for example, the development of asphyxiating gases had to be taken into account), in a variety of international instruments of which the 1925 Geneva Protocol stands out as the one most widely adhered to.

Efforts to reach a complete ban on chemical weapons continued in the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. Success at one point seemed imminent. In 1933 the United Kingdom submitted a draft disarmament convention containing elaborate provisions for an extensive prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The draft included a ban on preparations for chemical and biological warfare in times of peace as well as of war, an approach followed in recent years in the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Sweden.

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(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

As over the years negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their use went on, issues of verification received increasing attention. The Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations intensively examined proposals for investigating violations of the prohibition on use, for an international information and documentation service for protection against chemical weapons and even for the establishment of an international cartel of chemical industries to ensure that the civilian chemical industry would not be used for concealing production for weapons purposes.

In the post-World-War-II period renewed attention for a chemical-weapons ban followed reports on the effects of chemical and biological weapons published by the United Nations Secretary-General and by the World Health Organization. After the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was enlarged in 1969 and carried on as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, agreement was reached in the CCD in 1971 to consider the problem of biological weapons in itself and to submit a separate convention thereon to the General Assembly.

Ever since the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its, now two, successors have been negotiating in order to complete the remainder of the task left to it with the adoption of the Convention on Biological Weapons. The Netherlands has been actively participating in the elaboration of a Chemical Weapons Convention since 1969.

The recent negotiating history on chemical weapons has demonstrated a tendency to place this subject more and more in the context of East-West relations. It is true of course that chemical weapons do have their share in the arsenals of East and West. It should be stressed, however, that notwithstanding the definition of chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction in 1948 the balance of terror between the two sides has never been essentially dependent on these weapons. Case-histories of proven and alleged uses of chemical weapons in the developing world, moreover, make it abundantly clear that countries in the latter part of the world have compelling reasons to be as concerned as those in the Northern hemisphere and also to put as much effort as possible in the early conclusion of a truly comprehensive chemical-weapons ban.

My delegation feels more strongly than ever before that the conclusion of such a ban has come within reach and the time is now ripe to take up the final stages of our work with reasonable confidence in a successful outcome in the foreseeable future.

My delegation was led to this belief by, amongst other things, the recent announcement of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Shultz, to the effect that his country intends to submit, in the very near future, a complete draft convention. The Netherlands welcomed this announcement at the time as a significant step forward, and I wish to repeat this today, though no delegation should of course underestimate the time and effort that remains to be invested in the negotiations of a consensus text.

The Netherlands welcomes as well the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February last, announcing a significant change in the position of his country on some aspects of the question of verifying compliance with the future chemical-weapons ban. In the view of my delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan's statement on that point constitutes an important step towards general agreement on a complex set of issues related to

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

stockpile destruction, including initial declarations and verification thereof. My delegation is convinced that it will be possible to reach a comprehensive agreement on the question of stockpiles during the 1984 session of the Conference in a process of mutual rapprochement and a spirit of understanding for each other's problems.

It is hard to think of a more propitious setting for the introduction of document CD/445, entitled "Size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate", which my delegation intends to submit to the consideration of this Conference today. This Working Paper aims at addressing for the first time some of the practical, mainly administrative, implications of the verification schemes in the framework of the future chemical weapons convention as envisaged by the Netherlands and other members of the Western Group. It may be interesting to note that these include the administrative consequences of a continuous on-site inspection by representatives of the projected international inspectorate as referred to by the head of the Soviet delegation on 21 February.

After some general introductory remarks on the verification needs of the future convention, the document proceeds to a categorization of the different kinds of verification which the various undertakings foreseen in the convention will make necessary. The document uses a number of general assumptions basically relating to the function of an international inspectorate, as well as a number of more specific assumptions with regard to the various categories of verification the convention will necessitate.

On the basis of these assumptions the document seeks to demonstrate that the administrative consequences of our ideas on the matter of verification remain safely within manageable confines.

One of the key assumptions we had to make had to do with the "output" of an international inspector. The evident example was the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna which proved to be a highly useful frame of reference. As the nature of activities that need inspection under a chemical weapons convention differ from those the IAEA has to deal with, a number of adjustments had to be made. Amongst the various problem areas with respect to the verification of a chemical weapons convention, the one on verification of non-production is dealt with in relative detail. This is admittedly an area fraught with mines and traps. As we all realize, verification of non-production should not intrude unduly in the functioning of the civilian industry and its commercial operations.

Nevertheless, a minimum of confidence concerning non-production as well will be essential to the survival of the convention. Possibilities for circumvention that would be all too readily available, let alone loopholes, could well be extremely harmful to such confidence if left without any regulation. The slumbering capabilities inherent in the very nature of the means of production for permitted non-chemical-weapon purposes cannot be left out of consideration. One of the conclusions of the present document is that the size of the inspectorate is to a rather large degree determined by this category of verification.

The main conclusion of the document is that our assumptions indicate that the future international inspectorate will be relatively limited in size. The assumptions suggest a number of 355 inspectors and supporting staff for the duration of the period of destruction and elimination, estimated, as we know, to last about 10 years. After this initial period in the life of the future convention, this total will decrease to an approximate maximum number of 140 officials, a smaller number than the comparable part of the IAEA secretariat.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

In concluding my intervention of today, I wish to turn briefly to the specific subject of non-use. In the view of the Netherlands, the verification-system to be created by the future chemical weapons convention must be a comprehensive one and therefore include a prohibition of use. It is all very well, and indeed essential, to aim at the full verifiability of the prohibition of development, of production, of stockpiling, of retention and of transfer of chemical weapons. But I daresay that through the years we all have gained a greater awareness of the practical limitations that may well prevent us from achieving perfection. The need to take into account legitimate security interests as well as the need to avoid undue intrusiveness of the inspection of the chemical industry can be cited in this context to illustrate what we have in mind. It is clear that indications of use, in violation of international law, would imply eo ipso that treaty obligations as to destruction and non-production etc. had possibly been violated. Thus, use can constitute the verifiable summit of a huge undetected, largely submerged, iceberg of violations. I therefore wish to stress that the inspectorate, roughly outlined earlier in my statement, is duly tailored to ensure verification of non-use.

The requirement of an adequate provision on non-use in the scope of the convention is not intended to-- and should in no way-- prejudice the importance of assuring continued authority for the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This international instrument will be of particular relevance in the initial phase after the entry into force of the convention, when all stocks and means of production will not yet have been eliminated.

What I just stated on the verification of use is equally relevant for reports on alleged use, such as that recently heard from the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Velayati, in this very Conference. Reports like his must never be underestimated. Meanwhile reports, such as those obtained through impartial independent observers, pointing to recent use of chemical weapons have become increasingly convincing. This situation prompts the Government of the Netherlands to express its gravest concern, a concern that it evidently shares with the world community. Use of chemical weapons by whomever and wherever in the world demands condemnation in categorical terms.

The Netherlands expresses its satisfaction about the decision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to conduct an investigation into possible violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in the conflict in the Gulf area. This decision is fully in keeping with the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security in general and can be seen in particular as a further effort on the part of the Organization to bring that war, so devastating in terms of human life and material resources, to an end. The Netherlands appeals once again to both parties fully to co-operate with these efforts.

(Mr. Türkmen, Turkey)

At the present stage, where deep anxiety is mingled with uncertain hope, the work of the Conference on Disarmament acquires great significance. A breakthrough on even one of the issues coming within the purview of this Conference will generate a feeling of trust and exert constructive influence on other arms control and disarmament negotiations and on East-West relations in general. In this context, we share the view that priority should be given to an agreement on chemical weapons. Turkey, which signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol as long ago as 1929, looks forward to a broader agreement complementing it.

An agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and the banning of their development, production and stockpiling requires an effective verification system. There have been remarkable developments in the procedures and techniques for the verification of non-production. Turkey, like so many countries, also welcomes the constructive approach of the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February regarding a permanent presence of representatives of international control agencies at the facilities where destruction of these weapons will take place.

This approach and the positive reaction it has elicited will, we hope, give a new impetus to the work of the Conference in the field of chemical weapons. We anticipate that the draft convention which will soon be submitted by the United States will be instrumental in channelling the discussion towards a concrete and positive conclusion.

As far as the proposal for a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe is concerned, we hold the view that a regional approach to the problem of banning chemical weapons will not be appropriate. If there can be an agreement on the substance of a convention on chemical weapons in Europe, there is no reason why such a convention should not be global in its scope and we are all deeply aware of the urgent need for an effective global ban.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

One of the great issues which confronts us today is the unfinished agenda with respect to chemical weapons.

It is on this item that I take the floor today. In my statement of 23 February, I reiterated the importance which the United States attaches to the negotiation of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Such a ban would complement existing international agreements and customary international law, including the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, commonly referred to as the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

As members of the Conference are aware, the United States has expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons in various regions of the world. The United States strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons — whenever or wherever it occurs. Consistent with this position, the United States has supported efforts by the United Nations to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons. The United States has also supported the efforts of the United Nations, pending eventual formal arrangements, to establish procedures to make possible the prompt and impartial investigation of information concerning possible violations of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It has done so because we believe that the legal and moral authority of this instrument is vital, not only on its own terms, but because the Geneva Protocol is an important basis for our own work in the field of disarmament.

Accordingly, the United States has noted with deep concern reports that chemical weapons have been used in the tragic ongoing conflict between Iraq and Iran. As all members of the Conference are by now no doubt aware, the United States Department of State issued a statement on this matter on 5 March. The statement makes clear that the United States has concluded that available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons in this conflict and that such a use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious breach of the Protocol and of related rules of customary international law. This situation requires the urgent attention of the world community. In this regard, we note the decision on 8 March by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, to "send experts to Iran to ascertain the facts with reference to allegations of chemical warfare." We understand that these experts have, in fact, been dispatched to Teheran, and are as we meet today at work on their important mission.

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(Mr. Fields, United States)

The United States has been working with other nations for many years to establish a treaty banning production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Secretary of State George Shultz announced in Stockholm that we will be presenting a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons, on a global basis. The use of chemical weapons in violation of international agreements and customary international law in recent conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq war, adds to the urgency of this undertaking. It underscores the pressing need for a global ban on chemical weapons.

International legal constraints, based upon humanitarian concerns, guide us in our efforts to stop any use of chemical weapons, hopefully before it starts, as well as in our desire to ban such weapons from the face of the earth. In the same vein, we all deplore the tragic and needless loss of both Iranian and Iraqi lives, especially those suffered through attacks on civilian populations. We urge both States to respect their obligations under international conventions designed to mitigate the human suffering resulting from warfare and to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. We note that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has cited the use of children by Iran as combat soldiers in this brutal conflict in violation of its obligations under the Geneva conventions. Thus we find that the Gulf war is marked by flagrant and appalling disregard not only of human life but of international law and accepted norms of behaviour among nations.

As we blow out the 22 candles on our birthday cake tomorrow, let us collectively make the wish that all conflict — but especially this sordid and bloody war in the Gulf — will soon be at an end, and let each of us resolve anew that we shall pursue with vigour and conviction the achievement of an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban so that mankind will never again have to fear these abhorrent weapons.

(Archbishop Silvestrini, Holy See)

This aspect of the relationship between "science" and "weapons" seems to me particularly important with reference to weapons in outer space, radiological weapons or chemical weapons. Regarding the latter, with which this Conference is dealing at this very moment, it is highly desirable and urgent that the agreements which already exist with a view to their total prohibition should be completed and become a reality. An adequate and effective system of verification must be carefully worked out. The Holy See, which is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons, will continue to lend its moral support to any initiative that would help to eliminate for all time the horrors of total war; it will do so in accordance with the solemn declaration of the Second Vatican Council, which renewed in this respect the expressions of condemnation already made by recent Popes. The Council stated explicitly: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation" (Constitution "Gaudium et Spes", para. 80).

(Mr. Meiszer, Hungarian People's Republic)

It is well known that there exists a positive prohibition on the use of weapons with analogous destructive effects and capacity. In the case of incendiary, chemical and biological weapons, conventional and customary international law could not allow any compromise for the sake of military necessity at the expense of the needs of humanity. Because of their extremely cruel and indiscriminate effects the use of such weapons is, partially or generally, prohibited. The strange legal and moral logic applied by certain States to nuclear weapons when trying to make them a case of exception should not in any way prevent legal regulation. Positive prohibition is to be placed on the first use of nuclear weapons having analogous destructive effects — analogous, that is, to the effects of those weapons already prohibited — such as the heat effect and the poisonous effect caused by the absorption of radio-active fall-out; and having a destructive capacity which is several orders of magnitude greater than that of those weapons already prohibited.

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(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

I also wish to express my thanks to the Conference for entrusting me with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Honoured by this confidence, I can only pledge to do my utmost to advance the work on a convention on chemical weapons as far as possible and appeal to all delegations for their co-operation, on which I depend.

Ambassador Sujka of Poland made substantial improvements in our method of work by introducing and establishing so-called contact groups, which now have developed into working groups under the Committee. Ambassador McPhail of Canada contributed to our work by managing to get an agreed report on the status for the negotiations on chemical weapons. The method of working through working groups and the results presented in document CD/416 will constitute a good basis for our work this year in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. CD/416 also shows that to a large extent

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(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

a common view already exists on the comprehensiveness of the convention. This was reflected already in CD/220, the report of the Working Group in 1981 under Ambassador Lidgard, who was then head of the Swedish delegation, and in Ambassador Okawa of Japan's report in CD/131. The fact that some differences still exist with regard to the scope should not overshadow the broad support for a comprehensive convention. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I will try to bring the work further forward in the same spirit that guided my predecessors.

The method of establishing working groups under an ad hoc committee of the conference and under chairmanships distributed between groups of delegations is intended to be a helpful and practical device in order to smooth negotiations and further the work. I am therefore pleased that the Ad Hoc Committee has now accepted the establishment of three working groups and the distribution of chairmanships as well as an outline and a time-table for the Ad Hoc Committee's work.

However, it took a considerable time before all delegations could accept the organizational arrangements. In spite of this rather slow process, there have also been reasons for a certain degree of optimism. In her speech to the Conference on 7 February, Ambassador Theorin touched upon some recent encouraging developments. One such development is the statement by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, to the Stockholm Conference in which he announced that the United States Government would present a draft treaty on chemical weapons to this Conference. This reflects the earnest approach of the United States delegation to continued negotiations on chemical weapons. However, in this context I would like to stress the importance of continued work in the Conference on Disarmament on chemical weapons. There is no reason to take a passive position in these negotiations because of the still pending United States draft.

We appreciate the new initiatives taken by the USSR delegation with respect to the question of verification of destruction of stockpiles. We have during the last year witnessed a more or less continuous development on this matter. The Soviet delegation expressed during informal meetings of the working group in January some interesting ideas on how to approach the problem. I will revert to this later in my statement.

Last week, on 8 March, the delegation of China presented proposals on major elements of a chemical weapons convention in working paper CD/443. The Swedish delegation welcomes this comprehensive contribution. I also note with satisfaction the support that Ambassador Qian gave in his statement to the Swedish proposal to prohibit preparations for use of chemical weapons. Other significant contributions have also been made during this session. I have in mind inter alia the contributions by the United Kingdom, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. These delegations have all addressed important problems which remain to be solved. Time does not permit a close analysis of the ideas presented in these papers now, but my delegation will revert to them during the course of the negotiations.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

All these initiatives help promote the work on a chemical weapons convention. But, Mr. President, it is necessary that constructive proposals and concessions are met in kind with accommodations from other parties so that there may be created a dialogue conducive to tangible and substantial progress.

As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I have presented an outline for the work of that body in document CD/CW/WP.70. Following this outline, it is my intention to provide the working groups with proposed texts to be negotiated. During the negotiations in the working groups, views and agreements will be reported to the Chairman of the Committee, who will thereafter present revised versions of the proposed texts containing also the Chairman's suggestions for possible compromise language. This should serve as a basis on which delegations may seek instructions, together with all relevant initial basic material upon which the proposals rest.

By allowing time for Governments to study these proposals before we revert to them later during the session, I hope for an effective working process, and that we need not wait unduly long for new governmental instructions to appear. This year the Ad Hoc Committee should present a set of texts, agreed concepts, and, of course, views by the individual delegations in a unanimously agreed report. If we make headway, we would by then be close to a convention.

One of the areas where progress has been made is that of the elimination of chemical weapons and verification thereof. Constructive proposals have been put forward, in particular with regard to the methods of verification under a future Convention. Thus, there now seems to be a general understanding that the destruction of the most dangerous chemical weapons should be verified by continuous on-site inspection during the destruction periods. Although even this rather straightforward approach implies many unsolved problems, I think it constitutes a necessary basis for the further work.

It might be useful to, in this context analyse some ideas put forward informally earlier this year concerning different conditions which might influence the level of verification. Thus, could the extent of verification be decided by the degree of the danger of certain types of chemical weapons? Could the military value of the weapons be decisive? Other factors influencing the extent of verification could perhaps be the amount of weapons to be destroyed, or such a variable as whether they contain dual-purpose chemicals. Although no general recognition exists that all of these aspects should determine the level of verification, a thorough analysis of these problems could be useful in our work. In this connection I would like to refer to the Swedish working paper CD/425 on the verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Another problem is the question of a possible prohibition of use in the convention. After many years of divided opinions, there now appears to be an understanding that the prohibition of use should in some way be expressed or referred to in the convention. This would imply the possibility of investigations of allegations of use under the provisions of the convention.

Regrettably, the question of prohibition of use has become of immediate importance in the last few weeks. Reports of use of chemical weapons in the Gulf area remind us of the necessity not only to uphold the prohibition of use in the Geneva Protocol, but also to get as soon as possible a convention which allows adequate means for investigation and verification of such allegations. We are gratified that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has appointed a group of experts to investigate the matter at hand.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The German Democratic Republic has suggested, at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, that, in order to increase confidence between States in Europe, States should declare the existence or non-existence of chemical weapons on their territories and also renounce the stationing of chemical weapons where there are none at present, i.e. -- and this is somewhat ambiguous language -- on the territory of those participating States which have declared the non-possession of chemical weapons as well as their intention not to acquire them. We regard this proposal as a confidence-building measure with relevance for the work on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

The Swedish delegation put forward some similar ideas in Working Paper CD/279 of 14 April 1982, aimed at facilitating the work on the convention.

It was in the same confidence-building spirit that Sweden in January this year introduced Working Paper CD/426 proposing that all preparations for waging chemical warfare should be prohibited, not only the development and production of chemical weapons. When that Working Paper was introduced, we expressed the hope that delegations would give their reactions and views on the subject. Some have already done so. Our ambition is to find a pragmatic and effective way to increase confidence in the future chemical weapons convention.

Finally, speaking again as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I wish to conclude by expressing my hope that confidence, co-operation and efficiency will mark the work of the Committee so that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons may be agreed upon.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I would like now to turn to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. As you are aware, and as the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden just mentioned, after intensive discussions on procedural matters, perhaps unavoidable ones, although unreasonably prolonged, we have finally agreed on the organizational structure of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. A new, extended mandate makes it possible to conduct full-scale negotiations on the formulation and the elaboration of a future convention. We consider that as an important result of our work opening a new stage, a result of which we should take full advantage.

Quite a lot of important questions will have to be agreed upon in the course of our future elaboration and formulation of specific provisions of the draft convention. Many governments pronounce themselves for an immediate and total ban on chemical weapons and numerous delegations participating in this Conference, have already supported their positions with specific documents in the course of the present session. This has been recently done by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, China and the Netherlands. In his important statement, to which I have already referred, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Konstantin Chernenko stated

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among other things that certain prerequisites for negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons are appearing. Achievement of an agreement in this and some other regards could constitute a beginning of a real breakthrough in Soviet-American relations and a turn in the international situation.

A strong positive impulse in our debate on the prohibition of chemical weapons were new proposals of the Soviet Union on the question of verification presented by the distinguished Ambassador Victor Issraelyan on 21 February last. In the framework of systematic international on-site inspections considered so far, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to accept in certain cases a permanent presence of the representatives of international control at a special facility for the destruction of chemical weapons. This new step by the Soviet Union has to be seen as another measure towards compromise and the successful resolution of the tasks still ahead of us. My delegation highly appreciates this Soviet undertaking. It indicates once again that the socialist States approach the negotiations in a flexible and constructive way. The proposals put forward by the socialist States with regard to chemical weapons during this and the previous session of the Conference have indicated willingness to accept a wide range of verification procedures, including systematic international control, and opened the way to the intensification of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The recent proposal of the Soviet Union just referred to promises a possibility of bringing to fruition the work on the vast and weighty problem of the verification of stockpile destruction.

Provisions of a future convention on chemical weapons, like all the provisions of international treaties, must be implemented in goodwill, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in application of wisely and adequately formulated mechanisms of international control. The term "adequacy" can be characterized as technical feasibility and practicality, together with capability for effective detection of violation and minimum interference with the life of individual nations.

One may suggest many theoretical requirements for disarmament verification systems, such as, to name only a few: high detectability of objects and activities related to the scope and subject-matter of an agreement, practical feasibility and technical sufficiency of the verification means, continuity of the verification process, timeliness of the fact-finding and of the assessment processes, flexibility of the methods adopted, economic acceptability of the verification system, etc.

But our main task is, I would say, to stay with these considerations on solid, real ground, that is, to confront always theoretical desires with practical possibilities.

It is conceivable, for example, that when the highest detectability is demanded from the verification system, it may render it too expensive or procedurally too complicated or, in the extreme case, too intrusive for many of the parties concerned. Furthermore, certain features of the so-called "adequate" verification may become contradictory to each other: in maximizing one aspect of the "adequate" verification, another one, not less important, may suffer. In short,

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every verification system is a compromise between various technical, economic and political factors. To find the best of compromise solutions is a task to be tackled in the course of our negotiations. We must remember, however, that the basic prerequisite for the achievement of such "best compromise" solutions is political goodwill. We would like to hope that it does exist in this chamber, among us, but can we really say that it has been sufficiently demonstrated?

I would also wish to express my delegation's conviction that no verification, however intrusive and elaborate, can provide us with a 100 per cent certainty that no violation, even the least meaningful, occurs. The ideal verification system would, in my opinion, be one that would ensure States' security through a high probability of detecting violation, could provide a convenient channel of communication between parties, and would help in building confidence between them. The convention we are negotiating here may become the first authentic disarmament treaty, but it is for that very reason that it is so politically sensitive. Entering into such agreements, States are, understandably, eager to gain reassurance that the agreements are mutually upheld by all.

Speaking on the organization of a most reasonable system of control, it is worth recalling also that living up to a future convention will be guaranteed through, inter alia, the moral prestige of future States parties. For their moral prestige, so to say, will be at stake. We should remember in this connection that future States parties will be most interested not to stain their reputation before the whole international community by possible offences against provisions agreed and signed by themselves. In other words, we should assume that they will apply national means of control also in good faith. Unfortunately, this means of control is rarely valued here and, even worse, its importance is often diminished. We would like to hope that, in further developing and specifying their positions in future working documents, the respective delegations will take these considerations into account. It is hard to believe that the process of elaborating a future convention will proceed smoothly if at the root of this process is a lack of confidence among the majority of the most interested partners.

Many factors indicate, on the other hand, that the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention now is in the interest of the community of all nations. Political and technical realities speak for the same. Let us then join this process in a most effective way and assure a good pace of work on the convention. Let us not stay and wait in abeyance. As you all so very well know, distinguished delegates, many important problems regarding the future convention require a negotiated solution. It is high time to undertake, on a working level and in a working spirit, a substantial and mutually accommodating negotiation process in order to achieve mutually acceptable solutions.

Remembering all the historical circumstances of the use of chemical weapons on a massive scale in Europe, Poland attaches great importance to the question of final and total prohibition of chemical weapons. We therefore work hard, and we shall continue to do so, trying to co-ordinate the agenda item on chemical weapons among the delegations of socialist countries in the framework of this Conference and to contribute, as far as possible, to this important topic of our negotiations.

(Mr. Mukamba, Zaire)

Another disarmament problem which is in my delegation's view, of special urgency and priority, and therefore deserves to be resolved without delay, is that of chemical weapons.

Everyone is aware of the devastating effects of this type of weapon of mass destruction both during earlier wars and during the struggles currently raging in some parts of the world and pitilessly causing countless victims among the population.

All our efforts should therefore be directed towards the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons and, in order to attain this objective, my delegation considers that the preparation of a treaty completely prohibiting chemical weapons, in accordance with paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and with General Assembly resolution 38/187 A and B, is one of the most pressing disarmament measures to be undertaken.

My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the positive results achieved so far in this sphere, and on the decision taken by the Conference to re-establish a subsidiary body which has already begun its work under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden.

We hope that this subsidiary organ will pursue and intensify the negotiations on this priority issue in order to elaborate a chemical weapons convention.

It is also with great pleasure that, like other delegations, we welcome the announcement by the United States that it firmly intends to submit during this session a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the statement by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Israelyan, on 21 February 1984, to the effect that: "The Soviet Union would be prepared, during the elaboration of the procedures for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at a special facility, to agree to such a solution when the efficiency of the verification, from the beginning of the destruction process up to its completion, would be ensured by the permanent presence at the special facility of the representatives of international control, as well as by a combination of systematic international verifications at the facility, including also the storage of the stocks of weapons at it, with the use of instruments".

My delegation wishes to congratulate these two nuclear-weapon Powers on the positive contribution which they have thus just made to the crucial problem of the chemical weapons threat.

In view of these efforts, which represent a major milestone in our work, we are sure that the Conference on Disarmament will this year succeed in elaborating an international convention for the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Thank you.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In connection with this position taken by the United States, I should like to draw the attention of delegations to an item in today's issue of the International Herald Tribune which cannot fail to be of interest. I shall quote some extracts from the newspaper in the original: "Senior Pentagon officials, led by Assistant Defence Secretary, Richard N. Perle, are fighting to delay or prevent Administration initiatives in several secondary areas of arms control". I quote from further in the report: "Mr. Perle ... has managed to block any United States initiative on anti-satellite weapons and ratification of the threshold treaty, citing difficulties in verifying Soviet compliance. He has slowed movement on the chemical treaty and in development of a new United States position at the Vienna talks on conventional troop reductions in Europe".

With regard to the delays in the submission by the United States of its widely publicised draft comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the possible consequences of those delays for the negotiations at the Conference, the Soviet delegation reserves the right to return to this question at the opportune time. Today we should like to point out that as a result of this activity by the Pentagon, and I quote once again from the newspaper item, "the Administration is not expected to propose negotiations to ban these [anti-satellite] weapons at this time".

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Before I conclude, may I comment very briefly on chemical weapons. We agree with the assessment that at present the subject of chemical weapons holds the greatest promise. In this context my delegation wishes to place on record its appreciation for the painstaking and imaginative work done by Ambassador McPhail of Canada in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year, and the astute manner in which Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden is now conducting the business of the subsidiary body on this subject. My delegation eagerly awaits the promised United States draft of a chemical weapons convention which would provide an added impetus to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We value very highly the spirit of compromise demonstrated by the delegation of the Soviet Union in indicating its acceptance of the concept of permanent on-site inspection and technical monitoring for the destruction process of chemical weapons stockpiles. My delegation fully supports the earliest possible conclusion of a balanced and adequately verifiable comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

Mr. President, before concluding my statement, allow me to express my satisfaction at the resumption of work by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the chairmanship of my colleague and friend, Rolf Ekéus, the Ambassador of Sweden; I have no doubt that the work of that Committee is of particular importance at this stage, and that the Committee will succeed in overcoming whatever obstacles arise and finally draft appropriate formulas for the agreed points in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In expressing my satisfaction at the encouraging statement by the United States to the effect that it will shortly submit a draft treaty in this field, as well as at the positive step taken by the Soviet delegation which would accept a permanent presence of international observers at destruction facilities for chemical-weapon stockpiles, I hope that these constructive initiatives will have the effect of furthering the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, so as to enable it to arrive at the goal for which we have waited so long, the preparation of a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today, the Soviet delegation would like, in a brief statement, to touch upon the question of the state of negotiations on one of the priority items on the agenda of the Conference — the prohibition of chemical weapons. First of all, I should like to recall that in his recent speech to the voters in the city of Moscow on 2 March 1984, K.U. Chernenko, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stressed that freeing mankind from the possibility of the use of chemical weapons is a very important task. In accordance with its consistent policy in favour of the full and resolute destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has also submitted a number of proposals during the current year. One of them related to the monitoring of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles at a special facility, and another — submitted recently by the Soviet delegation in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons — to the question of challenge on-site international verification. Our proposals have received a positive evaluation at the Conference.

During the current session, several other delegations have also submitted proposals on various questions relating to a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which, in our opinion, might help to ensure further progress in the elaboration of the convention. We have in mind, in particular, the proposals of Yugoslavia, China, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and others.

Thus, on the whole, the foundations exist for advancing rapidly towards a solution of the important task with which the Conference has been entrusted by the international community. It is no coincidence that in the speech already referred to, K.U. Chernenko said that the pre-conditions for the solution of the problem of a general and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons are now beginning to exist.

Hopes that the negotiations on the question will be businesslike and constructive have been expressed everywhere, and in this room, by representatives of nearly all States members of the Conference. Nevertheless, the situation developing today in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons gives cause for serious concern.

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(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

With less than a month remaining before the conclusion of the spring part of our session, we have in fact not proceeded to carry out the task contained in the Ad Hoc Committee's new mandate — "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting". There is apparently no need to point out that week after week has been spent on efforts to overcome various types of artificially created organizational difficulties. We are not inclined to attribute the delay in beginning effective work to the organizational activity of Ambassador Ekéus, the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Weapons. We would only wish that he made a little more use of his prerogatives as Chairman. What is the problem? Apparently, the root of the evil must be sought in the fact that someone has undertaken to stop the work of the body and not to allow the machinery of negotiations to get fully under way.

We have already had an opportunity of referring to the very enlightening statement of Mr. Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defence of the United States who, as stated in the United States press, imposed a very hard-line position on the representatives of the United States administration at the Geneva negotiations.

There are numerous other reports from which it is clear that responsible administration officials in Washington are sowing seeds of pessimism concerning the prospects of the negotiations, are crudely distorting the position of the USSR with respect to monitoring questions, as can be seen in particular by the materials published in daily bulletin issued by the United States Mission here at Geneva, and are handling the matter in such a way as to create an atmosphere for the allocation of vast sums with a view to replenishing the United States chemical weapons arsenal.

Therefore, no one can be surprised that the United States delegation becomes allergic when it sees a text beginning with the words "The States parties to the convention ...". It is in general against any elaboration of the text, although this is provided for directly by our mandate. It views its task only as one of causing delay.

Much has been said in this room and outside it about a United States draft. Many delegations have constantly expressed enthusiasm over the intention of the United States to submit a draft. In the United States press there have been increasingly frequent reports on the content of such a draft. These reports, frankly speaking, cause us concern. Describing the various provisions of the United States draft with regard to monitoring, the authors of an article published in the issue of 2 April of the magazine "Newsweek", write, referring to authoritative sources: "Taken together, the provisions would force Moscow to let foreign inspectors take a hard look at the entire Soviet chemical industry and to poke around inside military bases. No one thinks Moscow will buy that idea — so a comprehensive ban on chemwar is a long way off".

There, distinguished delegates, is the reply to the question concerning the reasons for the standstill in the work of the Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, on the prospects of the negotiations on this problem at the Conference, and at the same time on what awaits us in connection with the widely advertised United States draft. Thus, the United States draft convention, which has not yet seen the light of day, is being converted objectively into a brake on the negotiations. We have considered it necessary to express our views on this matter.

Mr. KAZEMI KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran)

In my statement today, I would like to reflect on the very important item on the agenda of this Conference which is duly given high priority because of its undoubted significance in relation to the preservation and promotion of world peace and security, that is, the item on chemical weapons.

The era of chemical arms as a means of mass destruction really started during the First World War, with the use of chlorine released from simple barrels and phosgene, an asphyxiating gas toxic only to the respiratory tract. Mustard Gas, also used at that time, appears today a dramatic reality. This gas uses the chemical agent BIS-42 CHLORETHYL SULPHIDE and causes untold damage to the human system and often results in a painful death.

According to WHO investigations, some of the long-term effects include chronic illness caused by exposure to chemical agents, delayed effects in persons directly exposed to chemical agents, the creation of new foci of infectious disease and the effect mediated by ecological changes. The delayed effects include carcinogenesis, as mustard gas and some other agents are alkylating agents which have been known to cause cancer. There was a significant increase in the incidence of cancer among those gassed during the First World War, especially cancer of the respiratory tract. Certain chemical agents can cause damage to the developing foetus and can also cause mutations due to chromosome breakage in man.

Although no long-term effects on the environment were noted after the First World War, there is a danger that anti-plant agents may cause damage to the flora leading to a significant change in the type of animal life which may flourish and may cause predominance of a disease-carrying animal dangerous to man. Equally, the quantity and quality of food produced may be affected. The psychological effects are difficult to assess.

The use of all these chemical warfare agents, deadly or merely incapacitating, was strictly forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Protocol was the result of the horror felt at the use of chemical weapons during the First World War. It expresses the fundamental sentiments of the law of armed conflict: short of banning war altogether, there have to be some limits to its barbarity. This agreement, signed by around one hundred States, among them Iraq in 1931, was the first agreement prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. This Protocol was confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 1972 Convention and resolution No. 37/98 of December 1982 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

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From the very beginning of the imposed war, we tried to bring to the attention of the international community the fact that the politics of appeasement will not pay. In the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament, we brought to the attention of the Committee the question of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Nobody was ready to listen; in all cases of use of chemical weapons we informed the responsible bodies but all our efforts were in vain; of course, it is not the first time that Iraq has used chemical weapons against a people. For instance, according to investigations made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), page 165, Vol.I, Iraq used chemical weapons in 1965 against the Kurds of the region.

On 16 February 1984, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a statement accompanied by irrefutable evidence, brought once again the systematic use of chemical weapons to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament. Very shortly after we asked the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and after the statement in the Conference on Disarmament Iraq used chemical weapons on an unprecedentedly large scale, the resulting victims numbering more than 2,000 persons, some of whom are under treatment both in the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as in several countries abroad, and some of whom have died. Again on 9 and 17 March 1984, Iraq used chemical weapons on a massive scale in the regions of Majnoon Island and Jofeir, which resulted in the wounding of many combatants. Those wounded suffered from nausea, running eyes, respiratory ailments and vertigo. The victims have been hospitalized.

Very recently a reputable laboratory in Belgium issued its findings on Iranian war victims and reported that the wounds were due to the use of gases containing Yperite (mustard gas) and mycotoxins (composite parts of yellow rain).

Medical authorities in several countries where Iranian combatants are being treated reported that the wounds have been caused by chemical weapons, and independent press reports abroad have time and again confirmed this fact.

The ICRC Press Release No. 1481 dated 7 March 1984 has also confirmed the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

"The common symptoms observed by the ICRC with regard to all the wounded are 'extensive but superficial burns (first and second degree), serious respiratory problems, Kerato conjunctivitis', seeming to progress favourably. Nevertheless the clinical progress of certain patients showed, on the eighth day after exposure, severe problems of blood composition, accompanied by a considerable decrease in the number of white corpuscles. These problems, linked to respiratory and kidney deficiencies, have caused the death of several patients, two of whom died during the visits of the Delegates.

Apart from the steps that it is taking with the parties concerned, the ICRC would insist on the fact that the use of toxic substances on the battlefield is incompatible with the respect of humanitarian principles and constitutes a violation of the law of armed conflict and recognized customary law."

Upon the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, undertook to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in a spirit of humanitarian concern, and accordingly sent a team of four eminent specialists to undertake a fact-finding visit to Iran.

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The specialists, picked for their expertise in chemical warfare, visited the fighting front near Ahwaz in western Iran and also examined soil samples soaked with the chemical substance. They also examined patients in hospitals in Ahwaz and Tehran and also in the coroners' mortuary in Tehran.

On their return from the Islamic Republic of Iran the specialists submitted a joint report to the Secretary General on 21 March 1984, in which they unanimously agreed that Mustard Gas and the nerve agent Tabun were used by Iraq in the war against Iran.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations deplored and condemned the act of using chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime when transmitting the report of the specialists to the Security Council for its information. (Document No. 6/16433 of 26 March 1984).

The report was signed by Dr. Gustav Andersson of Sweden, Dr. Manuel Dominguez of Spain, Dr. Peter Dunn of Australia and Col. Dr. Ulrich Imobersteg of Switzerland.

The concern of our delegation is due to the generally passive reactions of the Conference on Disarmament in the wake of the outright disregard of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons.

This does not concern merely several innocent Iranians nor even uniquely the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but rather it concerns the damage done to the common human conscience. The contemporary civilized human community cannot and should not tolerate such crimes.

Apart from the very limited number of delegations who share our view -- and to them we are thankful and appreciative for their concern and their condemnation of the recent inhumane act of using chemical weapons -- no positive reaction has yet been manifested in the Conference.

Of course, from the point of view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such reaction was most discouraging; from the very beginning of the imposed war we have faced such a situation.

Unfortunately, the international community did not take a firm position with regard to the Iraqi blatant aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran on 22 September 1980. This lack of political will on the part of the international community was reflected in Security Council resolution 279 (1980) of 28 September 1980. Contrary to the well-established precedent in that body, in this resolution there is no reference to the withdrawal of the forces to the international frontier. This situation led the then Foreign Minister of the Iraqi regime, Hammadi, to state that there is no international border between Iran and Iraq after the abrogation of the Algeria Treaty of 1975 and therefore the actual deployment of forces constitutes the international border between the two States; and there is no justification on the part of Iran to speak about aggression (Letter of Hammadi to the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- Document No. 3/14236-24 October 1980).

During the forty-two months' period of the war imposed upon the Islamic Republic of Iran, everyone has become well aware of the devastation of the Iranian cities and the indiscriminate and systematic bombardment of civilian populations in the civilian zone, sometimes as much as 400 kilometres outside the combat zones.

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More than 130 missile attacks, hundreds of air strikes and several thousand artillery shots systematically directed against the undefended Iranian cities have caused the martyrdom of 5,000 civilians and the disablement of 30,000. The report of the United Nations fact-finding mission No.5/15834 of 20 June 1983 is evidence of a part of the war crimes committed by the Iraqi ruler.

It was but recently that within a period of 40 days the number of wounded and martyred who were victims of the use of chemical weapons exceeded 2,000. However, as you have witnessed, in spite of the proof of the use of chemical weapons, the Conference did not in general show a responsible reaction, as would be expected, in connection with the violation of the 1925 Protocol. This same attitude was manifested by governments to the findings of the First Report of the Secretary-General's Mission to investigate damage to civilian areas subjected to military attacks, and it permitted Iraq to go as far as to use chemical weapons on an unprecedented level. The step taken by an international organization to investigate the use of chemical weapons is unique in this century and upon the reaction of governments to the findings of the United Nations on this occasion will depend to a large extent whether or not this report will act as a deterrent or as a green light to further violations.

History is clear, and the future will witness how those who strongly urged and advocated disarmament kept silence in the wake of the use of even a banned weapon by a feeble State.

We expect that all responsible countries of the world, regardless of their political leanings and affiliation, whether aligned or non-aligned, neutral or Superpower, will strip themselves of the shackles of their leanings and come into the open to denounce and condemn, in the strongest possible terms, any violation of international law and protocols which endangers the very existence of mankind; genuine value should be attached to humane principles and ideals. Otherwise there will be no difference in weapons for a violator, whether the weapon be nuclear or chemical.

I would like to express my sincere wish that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is now under preparation by this forum, will be ready at the earliest possible time and that it will be fully effective and bear fruit. I believe that the position adopted by this Conference and other related organs towards the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran will show in reality the degree of sincerity and the sense of responsibility regarding the newly prepared Convention, and will form an excellent criterion to determine its status and capability in the future.

In the light of my understanding that the review of the Secretary-General's Mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran can be of great benefit to the work of the Conference, I would like to request you, Mr. President, to allocate one meeting of the Conference on Disarmament to review the report.

I would like to take this opportunity to present a working paper, CD/484, on general provisions, which in our opinion are fundamental, for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

These provisions deal with the two-fold responsibilities under the Convention and the question of reservations and exceptions and the rules of the protocol governing the duration to be fixed for the elimination of stocks and

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facilities. Another provision deals with the question of international co-operation in the field of protection, and the agreement of States parties to consider the use of chemical weapons as a war crime.

We hope for a constructive outcome from the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and we expect all delegations to give full consideration to our proposal.

Mr. CLYNE (United States of America): Thank-you, Mr. President. I would only like to respond briefly to the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan this morning. First, I would like to note that the Soviet Ambassador and the Editors of Newsweek are obviously more informed as to the content of the proposed draft chemical weapons treaty than is my delegation. I would also like to note that periodicals do not set the policy of my Government, and that any attempt on the part of editors and writers of those periodicals at the interpretation of policy, once it is set, is only a manifestation of their freedom to do so. I reject and resent the personal attacks on senior officials of my Government. I note this is only the most recent in a series of personal attacks by Soviet authorities on Mr. Perle, and it follows closely upon two others that appeared in Izvestiya, yesterday I believe. I also reject the assertion that my delegation has deliberately held up work in the newly-formed Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Such an assertion stands the facts on their head. In this regard I will not comment on the pristine nature of the conduct of some other delegations in that Ad Hoc Committee. Such comment would not be helpful.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia):

Today I would like to introduce the Working Paper prepared by the Yugoslav delegation, document CD/482 of 26 March 1984, entitled "National verification measures", which has already been distributed to delegations. The purpose of this paper is to present some of our views which, we hope, will be useful in further negotiations on the elaboration of the Convention. They do not represent, however, the final position of the Yugoslav delegation, and can be revised in the course of negotiations.

From the outset of the consideration of banning the research, development, production and destruction of chemical weapons, it was widely acknowledged that verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system which would, in turn, ensure effective implementation of the prohibition.

Basically, the Working Paper proceeds from the generally accepted view that the effective implementation of the prohibition of the production, destruction or diversion of stocks and production facilities can only be assured if there is an effective system of international verification of compliance with a convention banning chemical weapons.

We consider, however, that national verification measures could also play a role in the implementation of the provisions of the convention in all its phases. It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, that from the very outset of the implementation of the convention there should be close co-operation between the international and national authorities in all activities related to the convention. It is understood of course that such mutual co-operation can only be achieved in an atmosphere of general confidence. Negotiations conducted so far have unambiguously shown that each State party is obliged to establish a national authority which should assist and support the work of the international authority in the implementation of verification measures. Also, the States parties to the convention shall be obliged to prevent, within the bounds of their administrative and legal regulations, any activity violating the convention. The existing classification of toxic chemicals into three categories: super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, can serve as a basis for implementation of verification measures by the national authority, as well as for determining the level of verification. In this process, close co-operation with the national authority is advisable. We are of the opinion, however, that the verification of less toxic chemicals, other lethal and harmful chemicals, as well as chemical-weapon precursors can be carried out in almost all stages under control of the national authority. This form of verification of less toxic chemicals is suggested because the majority of these chemicals today

(Mr. Mihajlović, Yugoslavia)

are referred to as dual-purpose chemicals and are widely used for peaceful purposes. It goes without saying that the State party producing these chemicals must present evidence concerning the purpose of their diversion, production facilities and end-users.

However, it should be pointed out even in this case that the measures of national verification should be agreed upon in advance among all States parties, and should at all times be an unequivocal and viable basis for the maintenance of confidence among the parties. Of course, such confidence can only be achieved on the basis of the objective and reliable data furnished by every national authority through the provision of regular information to the consultative committee about the verification measures implemented.

In other words, the control of production of other lethal and harmful chemicals, dual-purpose chemicals and precursors, and their diversion for permitted purposes should be organized in such a way as to provide authentic information at all times. In order to attain an effective system of verification and to maintain confidence among the States parties, it will be necessary to agree on co-operation among future States parties already during the elaboration of the Convention, on the basis of the exchange of expert information, standardization of methods and introduction of the known and proven monitoring systems, as well as on the basis of introducing a compatible computer system.

Such co-operation will make it possible also to exercise, if necessary, control by way of the international authority. This may be the case if there is, with the passage of time, a change in the process of production of any of the dual-purpose chemicals, or if a new technological procedure is introduced, or if production capacity increases. In addition, if on the basis of information received in the form of reports which the national authority submits to the consultative committee, the conclusion is drawn that there has been a change in production, the consultative committee may suggest that the State party concerned should also organize international control for that production facility.

On the other hand, we are of the view that confidence among States parties is also achieved by the composition and structure of the national authority. Apart from being composed of representatives of different institutions of the States parties, we think that it should also, on a voluntary basis, include one representative of the State party proposed by the consultative committee in agreement with the receiving country.

The role and tasks of the national authority for verification are essentially determined by the law of that particular country. Regardless of the fact that the administrative and economic systems of many States parties to the convention are very disparate, we believe that the structure, composition and functioning of the national authority should be such as to ensure efficiency, competence, objectiveness and the necessary confidence in close co-operation with all international institutions in the implementation of the convention.

The basic ideas presented in the Yugoslav Working Paper are meant to point both to the need for and to the usefulness of, combined national and international verification for a chemical weapons ban. When there is doubt, however, that national measures are insufficient, it goes without saying that priority should be given to an agreed international verification system. We hope that this paper will contribute to the drawing up of satisfactory provisions on the verification system of a convention.

(Mr. Lopez Oliver, Venezuela)

Approaching our work from this standpoint therefore, we think that the best sphere for attaining such concrete results in a fairly immediate future is to conclude a treaty on prohibition of manufacture, storage and use of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

Some important work has been done here, as can be seen from the report submitted by Ambassador McPhail. Very important expressions of political will have been forthcoming from the Great Powers, either in the form of the announced submission, we hope in the near future, of draft texts of a convention, or by taking a favourable position regarding basic issues such as the systematic international verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons.

These circumstances, in addition to the uninterrupted work of the Ad Hoc Committee which is negotiating this topic, lead us to think that the Conference is faced with an opportunity which it should not allow to pass and consequently should as soon as possible go on to the phase of drawing up a draft convention, bearing in mind all the initiatives submitted in that respect.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany):

Once again I would like to turn to the subject of chemical weapons. Our session has been rich in new constructive proposals and working papers, submitted with a view to accelerating our negotiating work, and we all know that another important comprehensive proposal is pending. My delegation wishes to add to this useful and increasingly concrete collection of specific working papers. I have the honour to introduce a Working Paper (CD/496) that contains considerations on the form in which a ban on the use of chemical weapons should be included in the convention. The Working Paper also contains a new approach to the right of withdrawal from the future convention.

Our work so far on the question of non-use, as an important part of the scope of the future treaty, has been fruitful, especially in the past year. My delegation as followed the negotiations in that field with a great interest and has particularly welcomed the fact that there is now a consensus on the necessity to complete the scope of the treaty by a non-use provision. There is hope that the remaining difficulties relating to the precise formulation of that interdiction can be sorted out quickly. My delegation wishes to further that process by placing the non-use concept in context, facilitating the choice of delegations among the various alternative formulations that have been introduced and discussed since last year.

The German Government ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the non-use of chemical weapons as early as 1929. It was among those Governments that attached no condition to their act of ratification. As is well known, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 completed these self-imposed restraints by a unilateral undertaking never to produce chemical as well as bacteriological and nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most densely-populated countries on earth, situated in an equally densely-populated, critical region. The application of this barbarian weapon in such an environment would have disastrous, inconceivable effects, in particular among the unprotected civilian population. The primary interest of my Government in seeing the existing non-use regime concerning chemical weapons strengthened and effectively enforced is, under these circumstances self-evident.

I stress this at an unfortunate juncture. Recent events in another region of the world have proved that the use of chemical weapons still finds its victims on

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(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

the battle fields and among innocent civilian populations. Now that the terrifying facts surrounding that recent new application of chemical weapons become clearer, this Conference should be even more strongly motivated in attempting to solve the remaining technical difficulties on the question of how to include a non-use provision in a future chemical weapons convention.

As readers of the Working Paper will recognize, the Paper contains a reasoned preference for the first formulation from among the several texts proposed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament last year (document CD/416, Annex I A/2 b).

The second part of the Working Paper contains proposals relating to a rarely discussed yet important chapter of the future convention, the possibility of suspension or withdrawal in the event of violation of treaty stipulations by other States parties. The underlying consideration of this part of the Paper is that withdrawal from a convention of this nature is a particularly grave and undesirable event and that States parties should be allowed to disassociate themselves from their contractual commitments only in very exceptional circumstances. The new element in the suggestions offered is a graduated withdrawal process, under which States parties would be allowed, with regard both to the degree of withdrawal and to the point in time when it could be effected, to respond only in proportion to a breach of the treaty by another State party.

I would wish that delegations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would closely study this Working Paper and find it useful for their work in the forthcoming weeks and months.

Before concluding, Mr. President, let me make a brief specific comment on those statements and working papers which have recently dealt with the question and modalities of national means of verification as one important element in the comprehensive verification scheme which the future convention will have to provide. I would like to make reference both to the statement of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland of 15 March, and to the equally interesting statement by Minister Mihajlović from Yugoslavia, presented to us on 3 April, when he introduced a Working Paper by his delegation on the subject (CD/483). In a comprehensive verification framework, where the necessary place is assigned to effective international controls of requisite detail and intensity, national means of verification also have a legitimate role to play, and we should be grateful to the two aforementioned speakers for having brought out this essential fact, and for having provided guidelines for national verification measures, showing what they can accomplish within their particular domain.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French):

The Romanian delegation wishes today to make a few preliminary remarks on our negotiations on the question of chemical weapons. But before broaching that subject, I should like to draw the attention of the Conference to document CD/493, circulated at the request of the Romanian delegation, which contains the text of the Appeal of our Parliament, the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania, to the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Congress of the United States of America, the parliaments of European countries on whose territories intermediate-range missiles are installed, and the parliaments of other European countries and Canada.

The Grand National Assembly proposes the holding of a meeting of representatives of the parliaments of the European countries, as well as of the United States and Canada, to examine the extremely serious situation created on the continent and to formulate and propose ways and means and solutions for the adoption of measures opening the way to the freeing of the continent of all nuclear weapons.

The circulation of the text of the Appeal at this time, when the Inter-Parliamentary Conference is holding its seventy-first session, with the problems of security and disarmament included in its agenda, clearly demonstrates the importance which my country attaches to the negotiations, carried out in a spirit of trust and lofty responsibility, which could lead to agreements designed to avert the danger of a devastating nuclear war. The Appeal of my country's Grand National Assembly aims at concerting the efforts of the members of parliament of the countries concerned in order to work together to reduce international tension and halt the nuclear-arms race, thus opening the way for agreements for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Of all the items included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the question of chemical weapons is this year in a special situation. We believe that the time has come to conclude a comprehensive agreement outlawing chemical weapons.

First of all, for a reason of principle. In the international situation of unprecedented gravity in which the world finds itself today, the adoption of genuine practical disarmament measures is more than ever necessary both for the very credibility of this Conference and to help to overcome the present deadlock in disarmament negotiations. In no other field is the military risk smaller and the political yield greater than in the elimination of the machinery of chemical warfare. That is why the Romanian delegation believes that, without

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

In any way affecting the absolute priority which must be attached to the nuclear issues included in its agenda, the Conference should make a special effort in order to make it possible to present a positive balance-sheet to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. This balance-sheet expected of us should respond to the spirit of resolutions 38/187 A and B adopted last year on the question of chemical weapons.

In this connection, we would like to express our support for the dynamic and able activities of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden. It may be said that it is largely due to his efforts that the Ad Hoc Committee has a suitable negotiating structure. As for the substance of the negotiations, we have the major initiatives and contributions made by the delegations of the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and other delegations. We are also awaiting with interest the proposals of the United States of America on a draft convention concerning chemical weapons.

Romania has always firmly advocated the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. On 17 July 1981 our delegation introduced Working Paper CD/197 containing proposals on definitions and criteria for the classification of chemical weapons. We note that these suggestions correspond to those put forward by other delegations. The existence of many common points suggests that the Working Group chaired by the distinguished representative of Brazil, Mr. Sergio de Queiroz-Duarte, has good chances of presenting agreed provisions for the future convention.

With regard to the object of the convention, the Romanian delegation believes that it should contain a general prohibition of all types of agents of chemical warfare, both super-toxic lethal chemicals and "incapacitants", in view of the fact that even the latter may be used in war with harmful consequences, above all for smaller countries which do not possess suitable and effective means of protection. The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict must also be included in the convention. We also favour the idea of finding a suitable formula for prohibiting in future all military preparations aimed at the use of chemical weapons, and above all research, modernization and improvement activities concerning the means intended for the transport of chemical warfare agents, as well as manoeuvres, military applications and other military experiments involving the possible use of chemical weapons.

The elimination of existing chemical-weapon stocks and means of production is closely linked with the question of their declaration and of verification. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, the initial declarations of chemical-weapon stocks should be made within 30 days following the entry into force of the convention for a State party. With regard to the rate of destruction of chemical warfare agents and of their means of utilization, we believe that a progressive, stage-by-stage programme with a precise time-table should be drawn up. The basis for the calculation of the time-table should be the time required for the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons held by the countries with the largest quantities and the greatest potential for carrying out chemical war. The programme should begin with lethal super-toxic chemical warfare agents and conclude with incapacitants and expired and inoperative stocks.

We believe that the Working Group chaired by our colleague, Mr. Robert Jan Akkerman of the Netherlands, has all the necessary information to present a universally acceptable approach to all these problems.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

The verification of the substantive provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is a fundamental element of this international instrument.

In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, verification should consist in a combination of national and international means, including an obligatory system of systematic inspection, including on-site inspection, as an important instrument for creating and maintaining a climate of trust between the States parties. We appreciate the important proposals made on this subject by the delegations of the USSR, China, United States, Sweden and the Netherlands.

We believe that every State should have the right, set forth in the convention, to adopt the necessary measures in accordance with its constitutional procedures to implement the undertakings entered into and in particular to prevent and prohibit any activity constituting a violation of the convention.

With regard to national technical means, our delegation believes that their inclusion in the convention will create no difficulty if it is stipulated that all parties have the right to free access to the information gathered.

The Working Group ably chaired by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Hubert Thielicke, may do very important preparatory work in the field of verification.

We believe that an important part of the future Convention should consist of the transitional provisions, in particular to establish the necessary juridical links between the future Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Warfare. In this part of the Convention it would be possible to envisage, for example, the adoption of an undertaking by parties to refrain, even before the entry into force of the Convention, from any use of chemical weapons outside the reservations already expressed in the Protocol, as well as a special transitional regime during the period required for the total destruction and complete elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons and of the facilities producing chemical warfare agents.

The preamble of the future Convention will also play an important role both in placing the instrument in its real setting of efforts aimed at the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, and above all nuclear weapons, as well as in resolving some questions which the parties, for one reason or another, have not been able to include in the body of the Convention itself.

I should like to conclude these observations concerning chemical weapons by referring to what the Romanian delegation expects from our negotiations during this session of the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, the premises exist for us to be able to submit for consideration by the General Assembly a first draft of the text of the future Convention in the areas covered by Working Groups A and B, and a first series of agreed conclusions concerning verification (Working Group C).

I should like to assure the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the full support of the Romanian delegation in achieving these objectives.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The French Government has repeatedly stressed the capital importance which it attaches to the elimination of chemical weapons. Their use is, of course, prohibited by international law, and in particular by the Protocol signed in Geneva in 1925, of which France is a depositary. The international community's concern with regard to respect for the provisions of the Protocol led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the resolution setting out a procedure to examine allegations of the use of chemical weapons. That concern and the measures proposed to respond to it were, alas, only too justified.

The information which the delegation of Iran provided us with here led the Secretary-General to carry out an investigation. The conclusions of that investigation are known to us all. Thus, the chemical threat continues to weigh upon the world. Chemical weapons exist, and despite treaties they have been used and may be used again. Their manufacture requires a technology which is widely available.

Chemical disarmament is therefore a major task for the international community, because it alone can completely eliminate any possibility of use by the destruction of the products and of the weapons. We must pursue this task here with the utmost determination. The number and the quality of the contributions presented so far, and the contribution we are awaiting from the United States, are an earnest of that determination. The conditions therefore seem this year to exist for what we hope will be decisive progress.

The French delegation wishes to introduce today a contribution, contained in document CD/494, on the elimination of stock and of production facilities for chemical weapons. It hopes that a methodical presentation of its positions on this capital aspect of the negotiations will be useful at the present stage in our work. I shall consider the following three points successively: declaration, destruction and verification.

With regard ~~first~~ to declarations, States must declare, on their own responsibility, ~~the~~ stocks and production facilities. These declarations must be detailed ~~because~~, such precision will generate trust and simplify control. The document which my delegation has just submitted therefore includes a large number of ~~binding~~ provisions.

We stress the importance of the information provided unilaterally. It is our concern to keep interference to a minimum. This rule also leads us not to demand that the sites or arsenals at which the declared stocks are kept should be inspected. Finally, in the implementation of the suggested control procedures, with regard to precursors, or production facilities, we are concerned not to jeopardize the protection of industrial secrecy.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Furthermore, every State party to the Convention should propose its own destruction plans and time-table, and naturally divulge any unexpectedly discovered stock. On the other hand, we consider it an unnecessary complication to seek to establish dates of manufacture or of stockpiling.

With regard to destruction, this should of course cover all chemical weapons.

Of course, we may, as a temporary derogation during the transitional period, admit that some quantities of toxic chemicals mentioned in the Convention should be used for protective purposes, or that pilot production facilities, which are therefore limited and controlled, should be maintained for that purpose. But within 10 years the stocks, production facilities and single-purpose precursors should be totally destroyed. We do not believe that conversion operations may be envisaged: this would involve the construction of facilities which might work both ways, in a reversible manner, thus maintaining a potential prohibited production capacity. Furthermore, the control of such conversion facilities would be both complicated and unsure. We simply accept that a chemical-weapon production plant should be converted into a destruction plant; but at the end of the cycle it should be destroyed. Finally, we wish to provide every possible guarantee that after 10 years there may be no possible return to the manufacture or use of chemical warfare agents.

With regard to verification, I do not wish here to go into the details of the various procedures, but shall merely recall that for each operation they will take place in three stages: prior to the operation, during the operation and, finally, after it. International on-site inspection will verify the sites for the regrouping and destruction of stocks. The destruction process will also be continuously monitored; finally, destruction should be duly verified. The same applies to production facilities: their closure will be verified, and then their destruction, both during the process and on its completion.

Finally, an effective and permanent human presence will not be necessary everywhere and in all cases. However, the technology which produces sensors and recorders, which will certainly have to be used, is not yet sufficiently advanced to make it possible to forego all human intervention, whether occasional or continuous, as the case may be.

If correctly carried out, the operations described above — declaration, destruction and verification — will lead to the desired goal of the final elimination of chemical weapons.

Some implementation modalities are of special importance during the transitional period. They should of course take into account both the rights and the obligations of States. The first of these rights is, of course, the right to security.

This implies that destruction should be carried out in a manner consonant with the size of the stocks and the facilities.

The time-table for destruction should be drawn up in such a way that a security balance may be maintained throughout the process, and that the latter will lead to the simultaneous elimination of all chemical warfare capabilities.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Among the provisions aimed at ensuring the security of the parties, I should like to stress the order to be established for the elimination of the stocks and of the facilities. Details are given in the document itself.

In this connection, the French delegation suggests that production facilities should be destroyed in the following order: first the filling shops, then the toxic substance production units, and finally the precursor production units. This method, in our opinion, provides an additional guarantee. The first stop in the production line would thus be made at a point such that, from the very beginning of the process, the conservation of stocks of toxic chemicals would become useless, because those stocks could no longer be prepared for military purposes.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

It was generally believed that the Conference, thanks to yet another proof of flexibility and goodwill of the USSR, would be able to make this year substantive, perhaps decisive, progress towards its ultimate objective with regard to the elimination of chemical weapons. Unfortunately, as things stand now, the latest Soviet gesture seems not to be reciprocated with the same flexibility and goodwill.

Chemical weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States has traditionally been a matter of special interest to Poland, an area to which our delegation has sought to make a special contribution, yet without detracting from the consideration of other important items on the Conference's agenda. The readiness of the delegation of Poland to continue making a meaningful contribution in all areas of endeavour in this forum is consonant with the invariable policy principles of the Polish People's Republic -- averting the threat of nuclear war, halting the arms race and promoting tangible measures of genuine disarmament.

(Mr. Peren, New Zealand)

On chemical weapons, the members of this Conference will know that New Zealand has in recent years been closely associated with efforts in the United Nations General Assembly to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The need to establish procedures for verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons is beyond doubt, and New Zealand has noted with appreciation the progress of the negotiations on this issue, as on the other elements of a chemical weapons convention, which were recorded in the Committee on Disarmament's Report to the General Assembly last year.

Recent reports of the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran have lent particular urgency and relevance to the work of the Conference in this field. The investigation into those reports initiated by the Secretary-General showed conclusively that fact-finding could be carried out expertly, impartially and with speed. If there are shortcomings in the Report, these only illustrate the difficulties that will be faced by any such mission until international verification procedures have been put in place. The Secretary-General and the specialist team are to be commended for their work.

If we may take satisfaction in the professional way in which the mission performed its task, we are at the same time dismayed at the results of the investigation. New Zealand condemns any use of chemical weapons. It is of paramount importance, as the Secretary-General has observed, that all countries strictly observe the rules of international conduct accepted by the international community. For this Conference to bring its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention to an early and satisfactory conclusion would be a substantial contribution to disarmament and to humanity in warfare. We hope that we may be able to assist in efforts to that end.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

It is my intention to address today a very old item -- that of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Next year we shall take note of the 70th anniversary of the notorious "Black Sunday" of 22 April 1915, when chemical weapons were used for the first time causing the suffocation of thousands of French soldiers under merciless green-brownish clouds of chlorine released from German trenches near Ypres. In the following years 115,000 metric tons of toxic agents were used causing 1,297,000 casualties, of which 91,200 were lethal.

It can be argued that the fear of possible use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes preceded by far their actual use. Thus we can find the first explicit mention of toxic weapons in the Declaration on Laws and Means of War, signed in Brussels 110 years ago. A number of other treaties dealt with this problem more or less extensively, for example, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Neuilly, Trianon, Sèvres and Berlin, signed between 1919 and 1921, as well as the Washington Treaty of 1922. The significance of these treaties was later reflected in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which, until today, remains the most important international document aimed against chemical warfare. It remains fully valid despite the fact that the process of its ratification took, in some countries, half a century.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

It is the considered opinion of my delegation that today, virtually 60 years after the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol, the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is fully ripe for its effective and definite solution. Not only because it is an old, almost an ancient, matter, but, above all, because it is about to acquire a new, dangerous dimension. I would hardly be saying anything new if I reminded distinguished delegates that on 27 June 1980 the United States House of Representatives approved the funds required for the erection of a new production facility for binary chemical weapons in the Pine-Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. On 8 February 1982 the production of binary weapons was approved by the relevant presidential letter to the Congress. Thus, the United States programme of chemical rearmament was launched. The fact that the United States Senate had passed resolutions on freezing the funds for the production of chemical weapons should not obscure the intensive activities undertaken in the United States with a view to carrying through their binary weapons programme. According to United States sources, the development of binary weapons cost 3 to 4 billion dollars in the 1970s. The first such types of weapons to be produced are the 155 mm XM 687 binary artillery shell with GB-2 filling. The 8-inch XM 736 binary artillery shell and the 500 lb Big-Eye binary guided aerial bomb filled with VX-2 should soon follow suit.

This new round of the chemical arms race and plans for the modernization of the United States chemical arsenal supported by an envisaged 6-7 billion dollars over the next five years open a dangerous perspective for us all. A new super-toxic lethal intermediate-volatility nerve agent, IVA, combining the high percutaneous toxicity of VX with higher volatility and much higher penetration capability through a clothing barrier is the result of intensive military chemical research and development in the United States. This agent should replace present nerve agents in future.

There are also plans to use it widely in binary weapons mounted on Pershing II and Cruise missiles, as well as for remotely piloted vehicles, binary target-guided submunitions, aerially deployed land mines, long-range artillery munitions, and so forth.

If the United States were to proceed with its plans for chemical rearmament it would seriously undermine international efforts to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons. That would be highly regrettable since in recent years active negotiations have been under way, and now our Conference and its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have, under the new mandate, a unique opportunity to respond to the urgent call to ban these cruel and inhumane weapons.

However, in order to succeed in doing so it would be necessary that we all approach the adopted mandate as a complex whole. Attempts to stress separately its various aspects cannot serve our purpose. On several occasions in the Working Groups it was remarked that we should not be engaged in the final drafting of the convention. Well, we never insisted on a final drafting in so far as the most important part of the mandate, calling on us "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention", is reflected in our daily work. As is now clearly demonstrated in Working Group C, and to some extent in Working Group A, work based on concrete texts and formulations is more conducive to solve problems and to reflect ideas more clearly.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The progress achieved in Working Group C, dealing with the national implementation measures, speaks clearly in favour of the method chosen by its Chairman. In particular, work on the element "consultation and co-operation" was further advanced, and an understanding was reached on various aspects of "fact-finding". Constructive discussion is under way on "challenge procedure" and the structure of the relevant part was tentatively agreed upon.

The treatment accorded to the problem of "old stocks" found after initial declarations could also be considered as a positive sign. These stocks have finally been given the place corresponding to their very limited significance when compared to the operational chemical-weapon stockpiles. An understanding was reached to solve this problem as a special case in an annex with a different regime of destruction and verification than in the case of the operational chemical-weapon stocks.

My delegation looks eagerly for all positive signs in the treatment by the Conference on Disarmament of the problem of chemical weapons, and is always prepared to help them evolve and develop. At the same time, looking realistically at what has been achieved during the current spring session, we are certainly far from satisfied.

The reluctance of some delegations to take an active part in the process of negotiations, mentioned above, is most clearly reflected in Working Group B. We appreciate the effort of its Chairman who has engaged in a number of informal consultations, but these, it seems, have not brought any tangible results despite the fact that important constructive and compromise proposals were recently advanced concerning the questions falling within the ambit of Working Group B. This is a disquieting and dangerous phenomenon. This room is not the right place for ignorance or obstruction of acts of good faith. The price of the possible consequences will have to be paid by us all.

We conclude that it is now insufficient and meaningless simply to call, in general terms, for the intensification of the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention. The time has come to say aloud what and who is preventing us from doing so. We fully endorse what was said by Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement of 29 March, especially with regard to the negative role played by a new United States proposal heralded quite some time ago. In this connection I would like to recall what was said by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K.U. Chernenko, in his answers to questions from the newspaper "Pravda" on 8 April, which you will find before you today. "For several months already the American leaders have been promising to table in Geneva some proposals on this score. But promises remain just promises; besides, nothing is known at all about what are they finally going to amount to, while in the meantime, as it follows from the President's remarks, a programme of building up and renovating chemical weapons, which are being deployed both on American territory and beyond it, is being accelerated in the United States."

As to the problem of verification, my delegation has always considered, and continues to do so, that verification provisions should be determined by the scope and specific nature of the disarmament measure involved. When applied to the process of destruction of chemical weapons, this principle means that the verification of stock destruction should be differentiated according to the types

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of chemical weapons being destroyed, to the volume of the stockpile and to the output of the destruction facility. Thus, we consider that the tightest verification provisions should be applied to the most dangerous chemical weapons, i.e., super-toxic lethal chemicals, both filled and in bulk, as well as their precursors and binary (multicomponent) ammunitions and devices. This principle as well as practical needs should always be taken into account when the relevant verification provisions are worked out.

In this respect we fully agree with the distinguished Ambassador of France who said in his statement of 5 April 1984 that "... a continuous and effective human presence is not necessary everywhere and in all cases ...". With respect to verification I would like to reiterate our opinion that a combination of national and international forms of control is necessary. International inspections must make use of the national executive and control systems, their documentation as well as their technical monitoring.

Let me also say that our delegation considers it necessary to be as precise as possible in determining the extent of the prohibition so as to ensure that nothing important, either today or in the future, escapes it. For this reason we also prefer the explicit mentioning of such systems as binary and other multicomponent weapons. At the same time we can hardly agree with the efforts to cover in the prohibition too wide a spectrum of chemicals, as reflected, for instance, in the lists of key precursors submitted by a number of delegations where we can find, inter alia, phosphorus trichloride or phosphorus oxichloride, which can be considered as irrelevant within the scope of the convention. As far as the definition of key precursors is concerned we see some merit in the approach suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany, which we continue to study thoroughly.

Recently, at a theoretical-tactical exercise calculated for the territory of Bavaria, it was assumed that the 21st United States infantry division received 14,000 rounds of GB ammunition. Consequently it was concluded that even well-trained and protected troops would suffer great losses from eventual chemical-weapon use. The civil population remaining in the combat area would suffer a death rate that would be almost 20 times higher. Theory aside, there remains the hard reality that on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, our neighbour to the west, huge stockpiles of United States chemical weapons are stored. According to J.P. Robinson, this amounts to about 2-4 per cent of total United States chemical-weapon stockpiles: no wonder that neither our people, with its historical experience, nor the people of the Federal Republic of Germany wish to accept this United States military chemical presence, as is witnessed by indignant protests from Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, Westpfalz and Bavaria, i.e. from those Federal States, where United States chemical stockpiles are deployed. My country knows only too well the data on "tactical exercises" by the United States Armed Forces, where it was assumed that daily some 2,000 tons or more of toxic warfare agents would be deployed on the Central European theatre. I hardly need to add anything to demonstrate that our interest in the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is nothing less than vital.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Before concluding, Mr. President, let me remind my distinguished colleagues that two days ago we noted the 12th anniversary of the opening for signature in Moscow, Washington and London of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. I should like to recall in this connection that my country, together with other socialist countries, originally proposed that the problem of biological weapons be solved together with that of chemical weapons. It would have been much easier to ban these weapons in 1972 than it is today or than it will be in the future. Let us therefore spare no effort in achieving now what we failed to do 12 years ago.

(Mr. de la Serna, Spain)

Another disarmament issue to which Spain has attached the greatest interest in the past, and continues to do so at present, is the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Confining myself solely to this forum, I may recall that all the preceding statements by representatives of Spain have reiterated in this body my country's concern about the use of chemical weapons, as well as the urgent need to have an international treaty prepared in this Conference to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol and prohibit for all time the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, as well as providing for the destruction of existing stockpiles and production facilities. Spanish experts are working on this matter, and some of them are following the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons set up by the Conference and in previous years by the Committee on Disarmament. In connection with this item a Working Paper on precursors and key-precursors was submitted during the working meetings of 1983.

We hope that the progress achieved during 1983 in the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, ably chaired by Ambassador McPhail, will make it possible this year to take the decisive step which we need in this field. In this connection, we consider promising the statement made in February indicating the Soviet Union's readiness to give positive consideration to the permanent presence of international representatives responsible for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons. Likewise, the draft agreement shortly to be presented by the United States suggests a major contribution to reaching the final objective of this Conference's work on chemical weapons.

Spain wishes to place on record in this forum its full support for all efforts aimed at the total and universal suppression of the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. It also considers with interest other efforts made in the field of the limitation or elimination of such weapons.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Experience does not seem to warrant either the contention of deterrence or Alfred Nobel's well-intentioned hopes. In the history of wars never a weapon was spared, regardless of its destructive capability or the cruelty of its consequences. War did not cease to exist either. If we confine our recollection to the present century, two examples would suffice. Chemical weapons were employed by the major Powers involved in World War I as long as they were considered militarily useful; their use was discontinued in World War II not because of their cruel effects or out of moral considerations, but simply because of their self-defeating character. Likewise, in World War II, as soon as a nuclear bomb was available and there were military advantages to be gained from its use, no other consideration prevailed against it being actually dropped over population centres.

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(Mr. Morshed, Bangladesh)

Bangladesh has always believed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction should constitute one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. We therefore feel encouraged by the positive efforts which have been undertaken in this Conference for the conclusion of a comprehensive Convention on Chemical Weapons. The time and atmosphere may have never been so opportune as it is now to achieve major breakthroughs in this particular field. Only recently the President of the United States of America declared that his country would be submitting a draft treaty on chemical weapons to this Conference. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his part declared on 21 February 1984 before this august body the intention of his country to permit the permanent presence of international controllers at sites for the destruction of chemical weapons. We welcome these positive developments and hope that they will lead to an early agreement.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Since my mission today is to "set the record straight", I cannot let this opportunity pass without pointing out, through you, to the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia that the United States has not and does not produce chemical weapons, binary or otherwise; furthermore, we hope that we shall not be compelled to produce such weapons. The issue is to a significant degree in our hands here in the Conference on Disarmament.

When President Reagan proposed to the Congress the chemical modernization programme, he advised the Congress that he took this action only to redress a dangerous imbalance in chemical weapons which had taken place in the years since 1969 -- when President Nixon ordered the end of United States production of chemical weapons. Regrettably, the Soviet Union did not reciprocate this unilateral gesture, and we are now faced with the need to correct the gross imbalance in this category of weapons. The President took the action also in his words "to provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate in good faith on a complete and verifiable ban on such weapons".

Thus, if we are successful here in a timely fashion in producing a verifiable ban on these odious weapons, there will be no binary weapons in the future!

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let us take another issue -- the prohibition of chemical weapons. It was already in 1972 that the USSR and other socialist countries proposed in the Disarmament Committee the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It was also then that they submitted a draft of such a convention.

Subsequently the USSR returned to this matter more than once, specifying its proposals. But all these years the United States impeded the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, suspended in 1980 the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations, which as is well known to the members of the Conference produced many positive results.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

Turning now to the question of the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and utilization of all chemical weapons, my delegation wishes to recall that the General Assembly stated in 1978, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, that the matter concerned one of the most urgent tasks of the multilateral negotiations.

That position is all the more justified since vast stocks of chemical weapons exist throughout the world. Moreover, no one has forgotten that chemical weapons were used during the First World War and caused about 1,300,000 victims. At present, owing to scientific and technological advances, chemical agents have become so toxic that they would cause many more victims.

It was in order to prevent the frightful devastation caused by the use of chemical weapons that, in 1925, nations adopted the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, because that Protocol left aside the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, it does not constitute an adequate barrier to halt the arms race in this field.

Chemical weapons have the particular characteristic, unlike nuclear weapons, of being relatively inexpensive and technologically less sophisticated. As a result, any country can acquire such weapons, a fact which considerably increases the opportunity for their use.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

Recent reports on the utilization of chemical weapons in some parts of the world shed light on this danger and should persuade this Conference to conclude without delay its negotiations relating to a convention on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical weapons.

In this regard, at its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly expressed its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction had not yet been elaborated and urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify during its session in 1984 the negotiations on such a convention.

In that connection, my delegation has noted with pleasure the decision of the Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

My delegation has also welcomed with satisfaction the announcement that the United States will submit a draft treaty on chemical weapons during the 1984 session of the Conference. Similarly, my delegation has taken note with pleasure of the announcement made on 21 January 1983 by the Head of the Soviet delegation that his country is now prepared to authorize on-site inspections to verify the destruction of chemical weapons within its territory.

Such proposals, together with those made by the United Kingdom, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, China and France, constitute valuable contributions to the elaboration of the convention.

Moreover, as Mr. Ekéus, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has stressed, some progress has been made, particularly with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons and its verification.

Of course, difficulties remain, but my delegation considers that with sufficient political will, they can be overcome.

The adoption of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction would constitute an important disarmament measure, the first since the 1972 Convention relating to bacteriological weapons. This can have only positive effects on the current international atmosphere of tension, confrontation and deadlock in the disarmament negotiations.

It would also help to safeguard the lives of many people, particularly those in the Third World. There is no need to stress that since 1945, the Third World seems to have become the preferred area for the use of chemical weapons.

The negotiations carried out within this body on the prohibition of chemical weapons have given rise to great hopes. Their success would contribute considerably to accelerating the disarmament process and to increasing the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament. It is to be hoped that they will achieve the results expected by all peace-loving peoples.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

It is surely correct to say that the most important practical issue on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for this session was the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The socialist countries, which have always regarded chemical disarmament as a most important task, adopted a serious and responsible attitude towards the interest expressed by other groups of States in achieving progress in that area. As is known, this year the socialist countries have detached experts from their capitals for a prolonged period and have submitted document CD/435 of 20 February 1984 entitled "Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons". Many delegations welcomed the new far-reaching proposal made by the Soviet delegation on 21 February on matters pertaining to the verification of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. Individual socialist countries, including Bulgaria, put forward specific drafts in the Working Groups on the most important aspects of the future convention. We also gave serious consideration to proposals made by the delegations of the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, China, France, the United Kingdom and others. The Chairmen of the three Working Groups have demonstrated their competence and understanding of the tasks entrusted to them. Unfortunately, all these efforts have as yet failed to lead to the process envisaged

in the new mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons: "To start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting" (document CD/440 of 28 February 1984). It is well known to everyone who it is that has exercised a restraining effect on these negotiations.

As we all know, tomorrow the United States delegation is to introduce a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The contents of the document will speak for themselves. One thing is obvious in advance: if the proposal suffers from one-sidedness, it will not serve the cause of chemical disarmament: especially if, as may be expected after hearing the statements of certain official western representatives, it conceals a prelude to the build-up of the United States military chemical potential.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

With regard to chemical weapons, we are all aware that the nations of the world are showing a very positive attitude towards their prohibition and elimination, and the related verification. As active negotiations are taking place, my delegation is second to none in pursuing the objective of an early conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention and we take pride in having made various contributions in the past. Here also, I should like to mention that a workable chemical-weapons agreement should take care to avoid the pitfalls of possible extremism. If the outcome of our negotiations would lead either to a very large loophole in verification or on the other hand to a claim for virtual international control over the entire chemical or pharmaceutical industries of the world, not only would that raise legal problems, but also it would mean either a very unreliable treaty or a highly impractical situation. I shall refrain from further references to the example of IAEA, but merely note that the willingness of the Conference on Disarmament to take its experience into account in defining the range of verification requirements regarding either chemicals or their precursors would be extremely important. I should like to take future opportunities again to present our detailed position to the Conference on Disarmament in due course.

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(Mr. Bush, USA)

And I have come to reaffirm, as well, a resolve that has dominated the American position in all arms control discussions over the last year: the resolve that the growth in the number of the most dreaded weapons of modern warfare must not simply be slowed; it must indeed be reversed. In the matter before us — chemical weapons — they must be totally banned.

I have brought with me today the latest expression of the firm United States resolve — a draft treaty banning entirely the possession, production, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Bush, United States)

This draft treaty includes an entirely new concept for overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past toward a full chemical weapons ban, namely, the obstacle of verification. This new concept is part of a package of sound and reasonable procedures to verify compliance with all the draft treaty's terms.

Except on close inspection, chemical weapons, these insidious chemical weapons, are virtually identical in appearance to ordinary weapons; plants for producing chemical weapons are difficult to distinguish from plants producing chemicals for industry and, in fact, some chemicals with peaceful utility are structurally similar to some chemicals that are used in warfare. So verification is particularly difficult with chemical weapons.

Our new concept is an arms control verification procedure that we call "open invitation". But before I outline this unprecedented procedure, let me review some of the concerns that have led the United States to propose such a step.

When I appeared before you in February last year, I quoted Franklin Roosevelt's comment that the use of chemical weapons "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind".

Unfortunately, despite the horror that these weapons evoke in all decent men and women; despite specific prohibitions such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there have been repeated instances of use over the past six decades, against combatants and innocent civilians alike -- always, I might note, against those least able to defend themselves, those least able to retaliate against such an attack.

In the last three years alone the world has heard of frequent violations of these agreements from such places as South-East Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East, and one important reason that chemical weapons use continues is that neither the 1925 Geneva Protocol nor the 1972 Convention include any form of effective verification or enforcement.

Parties signed a piece of paper, attached some stamps and some seals of their own. Arsenals remained, ready for use against any who lacked a deterrent.

The United States has advocated reinforcement of the existing agreements. We, together with other countries, have long supported proposals to direct the Secretary-General of the United Nations to initiate investigations of reported violations.

We regret that some United Nations Members States have disputed the need for such investigations and have, to date, prevented or impeded enquiries. We believe that international investigations of this sort could serve as a step toward the kind of openness required for a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty that would work.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

Surely the consequences of the absence of effective verification, as seen in the reports of continued use of chemical weapons, can only provoke profound concern among all of us today:

First, there is this unspeakable horror visited upon the victims of such weapons, many of them innocents simply caught up in the path of war.

Second, the use of chemical weapons violates existing international agreements, and so undermines the arms control process.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, there is the chance that, as reports of use continue, the world might actually get callous, act hardened to this news. It might come numbly to accept these weapons and to abandon efforts to rid future generations of this peril.

We owe it to ourselves and to our children to prevent this from happening.

For more than a decade, the United States has exercised restraint in the field of chemical weapons, and we will continue to do so. We desire an arms control solution to the chemical weapons threat. But our restraint has not induced all other States to exercise comparable restraint, and this is why we are taking steps to prepare for the possibility that modern chemical weapons might have to be produced in the absence of a comprehensive ban. However, we must and we will do all we can to achieve a treaty that eliminates any need for new production.

The President asked me to come here again this year to stress the urgency of this issue. He believes that we must do all we can to eliminate the existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities that produce them. He wants to ensure that such weapons will never be developed or used again.

Now, to that end, the President has asked me to present to this Conference today the United States draft text of a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons, and I ask that this draft be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The provisions of the draft treaty closely follow the "detailed views" that my Government presented to this Conference last year, and they also incorporate the views of many other delegations which have given us the benefit of their thoughts.

This treaty would prohibit the development, the production, the stockpiling, the acquisition, the retention or the transfer of chemical weapons. The principal criterion for distinguishing between permitted and banned activities would be the purpose for which an activity is being conducted.

In recognition of the need for confidence in such an agreement, the draft also contains sound and reasonable procedures -- among these, "open invitation" inspections -- for verifying compliance with all its provisions.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. This elementary, commonsense principle is the essence of what we mean by verification. No sensible Government enters into those international contracts known as treaties unless it can ascertain -- or verify -- that it is getting what it contracted for.

Lack of effective verification and compliance mechanisms has been a major obstacle to achieving a true and effective ban on these weapons.

As I mentioned at the beginning, the technical similarities between chemical weapons production facilities and commercial production facilities, the similarity between chemical weapons agents and chemicals for peaceful uses, and the similarity between chemical munitions and conventional munitions makes discrimination impossible without very, very close observation.

And, perhaps most importantly, strict verification is needed to protect those who do not possess chemical weapons, or are willing to give them up, from those who might maintain possession surreptitiously.

The goal of our proposal is a treaty to require States to declare the sizes and locations of their chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities, to destroy the stocks and facilities and to forswear creating any new chemical weapons.

If they are to sign such a contract, States must have confidence, in particular, that they can know:

First, that all stocks have been destroyed;

Second, that all declared production facilities have been destroyed;

Third, that the declared stocks really do constitute all the stocks;

And fourthly, that the declared facilities are all the facilities.

Without such firm assurance we cannot -- and I think everybody here knows this -- we cannot claim to have banned chemical weapons. In this regard, the United States Government has taken note of the Soviet Union's announced willingness to consider accepting the continuous stationing of international inspection teams at the locations where declared stockpiles are to be destroyed, and we welcome that.

We are encouraged by this recognition of the indispensability of on-site inspection, a matter that was tabled right here in this room, I think by Ambassador Issraelyan. The Soviet Union's announcement has advanced the negotiations toward establishing confidence in the first of the four critical requirements, that is, that all declared stocks be destroyed.

To address the second of the four criteria -- that all declared production facilities be destroyed -- we propose a similar continuous, on-site monitoring and periodic inspection.

The verification difficulties inherent in the problem of undeclared sites -- determining that there are no hidden stocks and no clandestine production facilities -- remain our most formidable challenge. It is formidable because the problem of undeclared sites can be resolved only if States commit themselves to a new, but absolutely necessary degree of openness.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

Let us face reality. Chemical weapons are not difficult to hide and are not difficult to produce in a clandestine manner. Many States have the capacity to do this. We can rid the world of these weapons only if we all make it difficult for anyone, for ourselves to do such things without detection.

The opportunity for undetected violations is the undoing of arms control. If that opportunity persists, it would render whatever chemical weapons ban we conclude illusory and really would set back the cause of peace.

And so, for that reason, the United States Government is putting forward the unprecedented "open invitation" verification proposal to which I referred earlier. As part of a chemical weapons ban, the United States is willing to join other parties in a mutual obligation to open for international inspection on short notice all of its military or government-owned or government-controlled facilities.

This pledge to an "open invitation" for inspections is not made lightly. We make it because it is indispensable to an effective chemical weapons ban. The essence of verification is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection. The "open invitation" procedures will increase the chances that violations will be detected and the chances that, in the event of violations, the evidence necessary for an appropriate international response can be collected. That is the heart of deterring violations.

If the international community recognizes that such a provision is the sine qua non of an effective chemical weapons ban and joins us in subscribing to it, we will not only have realized the noble longing for a treaty that actually bans chemical weapons, but we will have changed in an altogether salutary manner the way governments do business.

We will have set a bold example for overcoming barriers that impede effective arms control in other areas. And we will have engendered the kind of openness among nations that dissipates these ungrounded suspicions and allows peace to breathe and thrive.

We recognize that all governments have secrets. Some speak as if openness and effective verification cut against their interests alone. But openness entails burdens for very State, every single State, including the United States of America. Openness of the kind we are proposing for the chemical weapons ban would come at a price.

But an effective ban on chemical weapons requires this kind of "open invitation" inspections we propose. We, our President, the United States Government, are willing to pay the price of such openness. The enormous value of an effective ban warrants our doing so.

I know that the United States delegation to this body is eager for the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban to begin to unfold. We hope and trust that the seriousness of this work, its urgency and perhaps most of all, the humane aspirations of the peoples represented here, will spur all in this Conference towards an early and successful agreement.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

We do not underestimate the difficulties that this task presents. I have said that the key to an effective convention — a convention that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare forever — is enforcement of compliance through effective verification.

Our emphasis on this point (and our "open invitation" verification proposal) springs from a desire that the ban work permanently and effectively, to provide the security that all of us seek.

The United States is encouraged that these negotiations to ban chemical weapons have already achieved broad international support. It is significant as well that the work on this treaty is widely recognized to offer a promising opportunity for enhancing not only East-West co-operation, but also co-operation among all nations.

Our delegation looks forward to serious consultations with the Soviet delegation, and to detailed discussions with all other participants, on the elaboration of these provisions and other necessary aspects of an effective agreement. Our aim in these negotiations will be a practical one — to work hard and in good faith; to build a mutual confidence — that, frankly, is lacking right now — and to achieve real results.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

In conclusion, let me just say something about chemical weapons. There is a need, as I said in these comments, to reduce tension. If ever in the history of mankind there was something on which people from every single country agreed, not us, Government officials, Excellencies or all of that, but let us put it in terms of the people. In my view, as a father and grandfather who is getting older, (I served with many of you around this table when I was a father but not a grandfather) in my view there is no difference between a family walking along the streets of Vladivostock or Leningrad, Peoria, Illinois, or Paris or London, Caracas, Belgrade or anywhere else — every single family, every child, if they know about it, is scared to death of chemical weapons. And we have come here today with a proposal that is very very broad. It reaches way out, goes way beyond what I would have believed my own country (we pride ourselves on openness), way beyond what we would have done a few years ago. A lot of that is in response to the feeling of people. I have travelled to Africa, people mentioned it there, in all these different continents there is concern about all kinds of things, East-West relations, nuclear weapons and all of this, but everywhere there is agreement on chemical weapons. That is why I personally sound like I do. But as the second highest official in the United States of America, I came to this Conference today. We are not suggesting there will be no criticism of what we have suggested. We are not saying that we are perfect, that everything must be exactly the way, and will end up exactly the way, that that treaty is drafted. But I just didn't want to leave here without telling some former colleagues, some new friends, some with whom my country may have differences, that we come here in a spirit of goodwill, and we came here trying to address ourselves to perhaps the most fundamental question on arms existing in the world today, that is, how do we, as civilized rational people, eliminate, ban in entirety, in a verifiable way, all chemical weapons from the face of the Earth?

Mr. Israelyan (USSR)

The Soviet Union has made recently many far-reaching proposals on the verification problems concerning compliance with various arms limitation agreements. As an example let us take the negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban. During those negotiations we propose agreement on a whole range of different verification methods. These include national control, control with the employment of different national technical means, based on the latest scientific achievements, mandatory systematic or permanent international on-site verification, and finally the "challenge" inspections. Of course, the selection of any particular verification method is entirely determined by the goals of the chemical-weapon ban which it is intended to further. There is no universal system of control: each verification method must be linked to a specific activity prohibited or permitted under the convention. We have no unjustified leaning in favour of any single verification method, and we do not play with verification in order in fact to block the negotiations. The complex approach of the USSR to the questions of verification of a chemical-weapon ban completely ensures, we are deeply convinced, the effective implementation of the future convention.

Mr. Erdembileg (Mongolia)

I should like to touch briefly upon the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

At the current session, the Conference on Disarmament, after prolonged and complicated consultations, at last re-established a subsidiary body which is now functioning under the name of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. A new mandate was agreed for this body, containing the provision "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible". Such a mandate, we think, offers the possibility of starting an important new stage in negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

From the very beginning of this session of the Conference, the socialist countries have expressed their readiness to participate in the new stage of negotiations in a businesslike and constructive manner.

The socialist countries' approach of principle and their views on improving the effectiveness of the work of the Conference in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons are reflected in specific terms in working paper CD/435.

Mention should also be made of the topical nature of the proposal by the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the States members of NATO on the question of freeing Europe of chemical weapons. Mongolia firmly believes that this initiative provides yet another vivid confirmation of the socialist countries' sincere desire to remove the threat of chemical warfare from the States and peoples of Europe and the whole world and to speed up the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Evidence of its constructive and flexible position, genuine interest in making progress in negotiations and search for mutually acceptable solutions was the Soviet Union's readiness to give positive consideration to the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at special facilities for the destruction of stocks.

In its statements the Mongolian delegation has repeatedly stressed the need for an approach to the definition of verification measures commensurate with the requirements of the future convention. It has been emphasized again and again that the socialist countries attach no less importance than, say, the western States to the exercise of effective control over compliance with the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They have proposed a very broad range of verification measures. These include, for example, national control, international inspection by challenge, systematic international inspection and, in certain cases, permanent on-site inspections. The Soviet Union's numerous proposals and initiatives on verification, which enjoy broad support in the negotiating body in question, are of great interest and significance in this respect.

Mr. Erdembileg (Mongolia)

We believe that a sensible approach is called for towards determining the most efficient verification systems. It is out of place to suggest that some States are concerned with verification, are ready for it and open to it from every point of view, while others think of nothing but preserving loopholes and violating the future convention. Participants in the negotiations are well aware of the unrealistic demands of the United States of America in control matters, demands which are divorced from the requirements of the future convention. Today in the Conference on Disarmament we heard the statement of the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush. The United States presented its views on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Mongolian delegation is prepared to study this document in order to determine its position concerning it.

We are forming the impression that certain western countries, under cover of a touching solicitude for commercial interests, are in fact trying to remove from the scope of control a potentially dangerous form of activity, namely, the production at commercial enterprises of the most up-to-date and dangerous varieties of chemical weapons. They claim that many hundreds of tons of the most super-toxic lethal chemicals, allegedly proposed for peaceful uses, can be freely traded on the market.

The socialist countries propose that the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for any permitted purpose whatsoever should be limited, for any State party, to one metric ton a year and that such production should be concentrated in a specialized facility. Such activities would be placed under strict international control. And what do the western countries propose? They are in favour of permitting the production of one ton of super-toxic lethal chemicals for anti-chemical protective purposes, and of imposing no limitation on the production of such chemicals in all other cases.

The socialist countries, anxious to find a way out of the genuinely difficult situation conditioned on the one hand by the emergence of binary weapons and the possibility of producing their components at practically any chemical plant and, on the other hand, by the inadmissibility of interference in the economic affairs of States, have submitted appropriate proposals. These amount to the complete exclusion from peaceful chemical production of one highly specific category of chemical compounds, namely, those containing the methyl-phosphorus bond. It is this category which, as it were, sustains all the most dangerous super-toxic lethal chemical weapons, including binary weapons, and this category is practically not used for peaceful purposes.

In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to a fact of considerable significance. It has become known that the Pentagon is seeking a Congress appropriation for the production of binary weapons. It is planned to increase stockpiles of chemical munitions from 5 million to 5 million units and to build stockpiling bases outside the confines of the United States of America. Up to 10 billion dollars is to be spent on the implementation of this programme. We doubt whether anyone would deny that such actions are not compatible with the confidence building necessary for negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In stating some of its views on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Mongolian delegation, like many others, is guided by a sincere desire to assist the progress of the Conference's efforts in connection with the elaboration of a future convention on the complete prohibition of this dangerous class of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): My delegation is inscribed on the list of speakers today to address the subject covered by the Vice-President of the United States of America, chemical weapons.

More than half a century ago, Australia acceded to the Geneva Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases. That action gave expression, in international law, to the abhorrence felt by the Australian people for this dreadful and indiscriminatory class of weapons.

The first involvement in wider international relations of the then newly unified Australian nation was by Australian troops who went to Europe in 1914-18, every one of them voluntarily, to assist in the defence of Europe. Many of those young Australians were gassed. They were amongst the first victims of the use of chemical weapons. That horrible experience endures indelibly in the Australian national consciousness and history. It was a deeply traumatic experience and it remains today a potent source of Australia's deep commitment against chemical weapons. These weapons are abhorrent. They must be outlawed and eliminated.

The Geneva Protocol was necessary and Australia continues to support it, but it must be recognised that the Geneva Protocol is an incomplete instrument. It fails, for example, to outlaw the development, production, or stock-piling of chemical weapons. These weapons continue to exist, reportedly in quantities and kinds greater than ever before. What is worse, these weapons continue to be used.

Four weeks ago the Secretary-General of the United Nations sent a team of experts to Iran to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in the war in the Gulf. An Australian scientist was a member of that team. The experts' report was unambiguous, unanimous, and deeply disturbing. Mustard gas has been used in the Gulf war and, for the first time in documented history, a nerve agent has been used.

A new international convention preventing the use of chemical weapons and ensuring that such use is made impossible through the destruction of all chemical weapons is urgently required. The making of such a convention is a task of great magnitude. But it is a challenge we must accept.

The action of the Government of the United States in presenting to this Conference a comprehensive draft convention on chemical weapons picks up that challenge with courage and determination. The earnestness of the United States' intentions at this time has been demonstrated by the presence here today of the Vice-President of the United States of America. The length and detail of the document which has just been distributed and its presentation tell of the effort which has gone into its preparation.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

It is sometimes said that "politics is the art of the possible". In our view it is more important in politics and in history that an opportunity lost, or not recognized in time, can be an opportunity lost forever.

In the present case of chemical weapons, my Government believes that this Conference now faces an unprecedented opportunity. It is an opportunity, and a possibility, that we should not let slip through our fingers. Our peoples, and succeeding generations, would fail to understand if we did not grasp it.

We have a solid foundation for developing the final text of a chemical weapons convention such as is demanded by all members of this Conference.

The Soviet Union and the United States held extensive bilateral discussions on outlawing chemical weapons from 1976 to 1980. Those discussions produced agreement on many issues fundamental to an all-embracing ban on chemical weapons and this was communicated to the Committee on Disarmament in a joint paper at the time. The conference and its predecessor bodies have also worked for many years towards this convention.

During the last three or four years this process has been carried further. A great deal of constructive work towards a convention has been done within the Committee on Disarmament. Many Member States have made significant contributions. Well over 100 working documents covering many different aspects of matters essential to the convention have been tabled and discussed in this Conference.

This process of bilateral and multilateral consultation has produced an impressive degree of consensus on such matters as definitions, the prohibitions needed, the need to destroy weapons stocks and decommission production facilities, and the identification of activities which need to be regulated by the convention.

Just how far we have come towards common views can be seen from the significant area of accord between the Soviet Union's 1982 basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention presented to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament-- and the United States draft that has been tabled today. Both documents of course draw on the work and achievements of this Conference. Our work towards eliminating chemical weapons has now been given added impetus and relevance by this United States initiative.

What will be of critical importance is that all concerned resolve now to negotiate in good faith. That negotiation will necessarily raise many issues of real contention and concern. But because of the stakes at issue, because the weapons concerned are terrible, because the security of all of our peoples is involved, we must not be daunted by the size of the job.

Negotiation of this Convention is no less ambitious an undertaking than was the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its associated institutional arrangements. That Treaty and its mechanisms were successfully negotiated despite the difficulty of the enterprise. There were an abundance of sceptics who said it could not be done, but it has been done. That Treaty is in force in 124 nations and in the opinion of most of us it works well. Similarly with the chemical weapons convention; it can and it must be done.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Australia believes that, for an effective chemical weapons convention, special emphasis must be given to three essential elements: first, an uncompromising prohibition of the use of chemical weapons; second, provision for the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the future development and production of such weapons; third, a verification regime that will ensure that these treaty commitments are being honoured.

Rigorous standards will be involved, particularly in the area of verification. There can be no security in such a convention unless the means of verification of compliance with the convention are effective and seen to be effective. We must negotiate the verification provisions with great care.

We are aware that there are differing views on what arrangements for verification would be required to ensure confidence that the obligations of the convention are being observed. The United States draft is particularly valuable in pointing to the standard of verification needed for this purpose.

We appreciated the statement by the Soviet Ambassador to this Conference on 21 February, with regard to verification of the destruction of stock-piles. That statement addressed one of the difficulties in the area of verification. It seemed to indicate a willingness to find negotiated answers to the problems of verification and my delegation heard again with great interest today further clarification from the Soviet Ambassador on this point.

It is critical that we proceed further to extend these negotiations, particularly with regard to verification.

My Government believes that it is not beyond the ingenuity of the members of this Conference to find the required solutions to these problems, without compromising our respective national interests.

Australia deeply appreciates the political commitment expressed today by the Vice-President of the United States in presenting this draft and the stated willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations with full commitment and good faith.

We also deeply appreciate that this draft convention has been presented here to this Conference on Disarmament. That action confirms the stated and acknowledged role of this Conference. It validates a principle to which all members of this Conference are deeply attached, that arms control and disarmament agreements can be negotiated multilaterally and must be because the interests of all of us are involved.

Australia accepts the present challenge. It will not fail to seize the present opportunity. It will participate with all possible vigour, with its fellow members of this Conference, to bring into existence, as soon as possible, a convention which will ensure that chemical weapons are never again used and which will eliminate those weapons for all time.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): We have listened with the utmost interest to the statement made today by the distinguished representative of the United States, who, on this occasion, has been the Honourable George Bush, the country's Vice-President, on the frequently heralded draft convention for the elimination of chemical weapons. We propose to consider that important document with the care it deserves, and in due course we shall present here whatever observations appear desirable in that regard.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

My delegation will address the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons in the further course of our session. Today, I would like to make only a few remarks on this issue.

The German Democratic Republic, like the other socialist countries, is striving for a speedy and radical solution in this field. I may recall resolution 38/187A, of the last General Assembly, which was initiated by my country. The proposal on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe is also aimed at this objective.

In order to reach a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, it is necessary to intensify the negotiations within the framework of this Conference. A number of proposals have improved the conditions in this respect. This applies, in particular, to the far-reaching Soviet initiative of 21 February 1984 concerning the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. The working paper of China on major elements of a future convention and that of Yugoslavia on national verification measures contain valuable ideas. The mechanism of verification proposed by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and France in different CD documents are the subject of thorough examination by us. This will also be our approach to the draft convention submitted today. In any case, the yardstick will be to what extent all the documents contribute to the speedy elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

However, it seems to us quite strange that one of the draft treaties was linked with a motion addressed to Congress for granting huge sums for a programme for the production of qualitatively new chemical weapons. It is well known how difficult it is to prohibit weapons once production of them has already started. Conducting negotiations in good faith means refraining from actions directed against the purpose of those negotiations.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): The French delegation wishes to express its profound satisfaction at the presentation today of the United States draft treaty on chemical weapons announced in January in Stockholm by Mr. George Shultz. We particularly appreciate the fact that it was presented by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush.

This event certainly marks a very important stage in the negotiations undertaken here on chemical weapons. We are sure that this draft will provide a very constructive contribution to the negotiations.

France will do everything in its power to contribute to the success of the negotiations.

The chemical threat looms over the world. In Europe, it is an important aspect of security concerns.

Recent events have shown that chemical weapons were used in other parts of the world, and we know that the capacity to produce them is quite widespread.

Chemical disarmament is therefore not a matter for regional solutions but for a general solution: a multilateral treaty of universal scope.

The French Government has long advocated the conclusion of such a treaty which should include, in particular, a detailed time-table for the destruction of stocks and the dismantling of production facilities. A few days ago, the French delegation submitted a Working Paper on the subject. Needless to say, the treaty on chemical disarmament should include essential verification measures in order to create among States Parties the necessary degree of confidence in the respect for its provisions.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

It should be noted in passing that a vast publicity campaign has been mounted in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons. While nobody doubts that this is a very important question, it cannot serve as a smokescreen to conceal the lack of constructive dialogue on other vital issues, which is really the aim. The use of chemical weapons is so serious that the Vietnamese people is still suffering from the consequences of the chemical weapons used years ago on its territory by the armed forces of the United States. We are all interested in prohibiting chemical weapons, and none of us needs to be lectured on the desirability of a treaty for that purpose. What now needs to be examined is whether the draft is a serious document or a text with hidden pitfalls designed precisely to prevent it from being adopted.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Shocking events during the past months have emphasized the importance of our efforts to make a major breakthrough in the negotiations of a treaty on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

The Swedish Government condemns the use of chemical weapons, which has been established by the team of experts sent to Iran by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This constitutes a grave violation of international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It has caused great human suffering and is contrary to fundamental rules of humanitarian law.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is of the greatest importance that international agreements and principles of international law are fully respected and that all alleged violations are investigated.

A heavy responsibility rests upon every Government committing such violations of the Geneva Protocol and international law. Every effort must be made to prevent any further use of chemical weapons.

Last week Vice-President Bush presented a draft convention on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It was a valuable contribution to the ongoing negotiations. Another valuable input was made by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February when he developed the position of the Soviet Union with respect to the issue of verification of destruction of stockpiles.

New hopes have been raised by these contributions which we welcome as signs of commitment to serious negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching an early agreement.

It is important that this positive development be fully reflected in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee. The lack of confidence between the two major Powers must not be allowed to lead to a loss of this opportunity.

It is against this background that I would like to express our concern at any lack of constraints as regards the production of chemical weapons. History tells us clearly that disarmament never can be achieved through armament. There is no need for production of chemical weapons — binary or other chemical weapons. All States should refrain from producing chemical weapons during these important negotiations.

Let me end by expressing my hope that the start of our substantive negotiations on a treaty on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons will have a stimulating effect. Renewed efforts must be made during our break to prepare for an early consensus on the mandate for the work of the Ad Hoc Committees on the urgent issues related to the efforts to halt the nuclear arms race. Our efforts should be redoubled when seen in the context of the preparations needed to guarantee a successful Third NPT Review Conference.

Mr. SHEIKHOESLAM (Islamic Republic of Iran)

Today, at the moment that I am speaking to you, many years have elapsed since the inception of this disarmament forum and you are on the threshold of achieving your first considerable success. I am referring to the convention on chemical weapons which, if realised in the form desired, would be deemed one of the important achievements of the present Conference.

This is indeed a welcome opportunity for the representative of a country that has been the target and victim of the massive use of chemical weapons to take part in this meeting and to convey to you his feelings regarding the need for expediting the preparation of this convention.

During the whole lifetime of the United Nations Organization Iran has, I think, been the only victim of chemical weapons whose use against it has been confirmed by international authorities following investigations officially conducted by them. We have, therefore, more than anyone else, the right to urge the international community, and especially the Conference on Disarmament, to take more serious and rapid steps for the completion of this convention.

All of you, as Members of this Conference, are well aware that document S/16433, dated 26 March 1984, of the Security Council, which reflects the report of the on-site investigations, conducted by the experts despatched by the United Nations Secretary-General, clearly confirms the use of chemical weapons and poison gas, consisting of mustard gas and a nerve agent, prohibited by international conventions. This delegation, composed of Dr. Gustav Anderson, Senior Research Chemist from the National Defence Research Institute of Sweden, Dr. Manuel Dominguez, Professor of Preventive Medicine from the University of Madrid, Dr. Peter Dunn, Superintending Scientist of the Materials Research Laboratory of the Australian Department of Defence, Colonel Ulrich Imobersteg, Chief of the NBC Defence Division of the Swiss Defence Ministry, and Mr. Eqbal Reza, representing the Secretary-General, paid a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 13 to 19 March 1984. Members of the delegation visited and examined those injured by chemical weapons. They also collected samples of the substances used in such weapons. Besides examining fragments remaining from the weapons and munitions used, the delegation made films and photographs of such evidence.

Many of the Iranians injured by chemical weapons were sent to hospitals in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Britain, Sweden, Japan, Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland for medical treatment. The treating physicians in these hospitals have confirmed the use of chemical substances; the medical reports of the University of Ghent, in Belgium, and German, Austrian and Swedish hospitals may be quoted as supporting evidence of this use of chemical weapons. In a few months' time a medical seminar will meet in Teheran. All physicians and experts from Government and non-governmental organizations are invited to go to Iran and examine the victims of this inhuman crime. I am sure that the deliberations of this seminar will be useful and of interest to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The aggressor Iraqi regime, disappointed and frustrated by the ineffectiveness of its most sophisticated weapons obtained from certain major Powers, in return for the riches and wealth of the oppressed nations of the region, desperately committed these barbarous crimes.

A short time after the outbreak of the war, we announced the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime in various international fora and on 3 November 1983, we officially informed the United Nations that such weapons were being used by Iraq. This was reflected in the document S/16128 which was then distributed among member States. Further, one-and-a-half months before the promulgation of the report of the United Nations experts, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his address to this very Conference, informed the international community of the inhuman acts of Iraq. But what was the result? Nothing but silence and indifference on the part of the international community; this reaction encouraged the Baathist Iraqi regime to continue its crimes which have wounded human honour and dignity. Unfortunately not even the Non-Aligned Movement made any significant gesture. Does the Non-Aligned Movement no more subscribe to the Final Act of the Lusaka Summit Conference of 1970, in which the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons were clearly banned? If this were not the case would it so calmly remain silent?

As has been briefly mentioned, and as the distinguished members of this Conference know very well, there already exist international commitments and undertakings on the non-use of chemical weapons. But the basic fact that should be taken into consideration in the new convention is the promotion of such commitments by preventive and enforcement measures against any violator. Effective international measures and collective actions to punish violators should be envisaged on occasions when such violations occur. Otherwise the new Convention will suffer the same fate as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Security Council will deal with the reports of on-site inspections under the new Convention as it did with the report of the team of experts despatched by the Secretary-General to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, apart from not being comprehensive, neglects such important aspects of the matter as verification systems.

As can be seen in the report of the United Nations experts, especially the last paragraph of page 7, one or several countries have helped Iraq in manufacturing chemical bombs; Iraq is not technically able to make even the casings which were described in this report. Those countries that supply Iraq with such weapons are equally if not more responsible than Iraq before the human community. The Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon the responsible members of the present Conference to urge in any possible way the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct investigations to determine which countries have participated in supplying these weapons to Iraq.

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

As we have repeatedly mentioned, negligence in taking serious measures against the violation of important international conventions will encourage the violator to continue his violations. The price of this negligence as regards the prohibition of attack on residential areas has been paid in the past three years by the Islamic Republic of Iran through the loss of the lives of so many of its innocent and defenceless citizens. For your information, only yesterday, 17 of my dear compatriots were martyred in the bombardment of the city of Piran Shar by the Iraqi regime. Another negative effect of such negligence is that the violator is encouraged to commit more crimes and aggressions. There is no doubt that this has been one of the main factors that has encouraged the Iraqi regime to use chemical weapons.

While in international legal terms we have a free hand to use chemical weapons against Iraq, we declare that, due to humanitarian considerations, we shall not embark upon such retaliatory action. But, as you know, while the United Nations experts were in Iran and even after the distribution of the United Nations report on the use by Iraq of chemical weapons against Iran, and the condemnation of this war crime by the people of the world, Iraq continued its use of lethal chemical weapons.

Is the human conscience able to tolerate this attitude of negligence and failure on the part of the nations to take serious measures to this effect?

Mr. President, do you not think that, at a time when the people of my country are the target of extensive use of chemical weapons, the people of the world, especially my compatriots, should deduce that the super-Powers' long and inconclusive talks and negotiations and the many plans they propose are in fact hypocritical measures taken by the super-Powers, as the main producers of chemical weapons, in order to deceive world public opinion and evade their own direct responsibility for the use of chemical weapons? Is the indescribable enthusiasm of the super-Powers, especially in this Conference, anything but crocodile tears?

Should the silence of certain countries and their refusal to condemn the use of chemical weapons in general terms be interpreted as anything but their consent to the production and the extended use of chemical weapons? Is there any political consideration more important than the security of the whole international community?

The position of certain other countries that have somehow related the use of chemical weapons to the war is not much better than the position of the countries to which I have just referred. If this illogical linking between the two does not directly suggest that the use of chemical weapons is permissible in certain conditions, at least such a thing is indirectly understood from it. In this connection, I refer to the declaration of the European Community. It is astonishing for us to see that the victims of the inhuman use of chemical weapons in World War I, who have since then prohibited the use of chemical weapons have, while tacitly condemning Iraq, linked the stoppage of the use of chemical weapons to the conditions for ending the war. Of course we have a lot to say about the causes of the continuation of our legitimate defence, but this meeting is not the right place for such a matter to be discussed. We wish to ask the countries who have signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 if the continuation of the war for any reason could justify Iraq's commission of war crimes. Do you not think that in these circumstances, negotiating with such a regime would mean that chemical weapons are effective? Such an admission would certainly tend to encourage their use in the future.

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

We have all witnessed how certain countries, whose delegates are present in this very conference, refrained from the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution No. 37/98 D of 1982, concerning the use of chemical weapons. Is it not an adequate reason to suspect the goodwill of such countries as regards the adoption of the convention now being prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons? The lack of a verification system for continuous international control is an important defect in the existing international conventions that should be eliminated from the new convention. What is more important, we strongly call for guarantees and priority to be given to the inclusion of the question of the use of chemical weapons and the proper verification measures it requires in the future convention on chemical weapons. Otherwise what is the benefit of commitments undertaken on paper but not carried out and verified? Such verification should, in order to be effective, include all the different stages of development, production, stockpiling, acquiring and transfer of technology of such weapons, and more especially their use. We propose that the use of chemical weapons should be considered as a war crime for which the perpetrators would be internationally punished.

Certain countries, especially the United States, argue that they are obliged to build up their arsenals of chemical weapons in order to oblige other countries to sit at the negotiating tables. This, we believe, amounts to the elimination of the bad by the worse. Such an argument is as baseless and pointless as the other side's claim that chemical-weapon-free zones, such as Europe for example, should be created. How is one to believe that the United States, which has allocated to chemical weapons some seven billion dollars by 1987 and some eight more billion dollars for the following five years, really means what it says concerning the need for the prohibition of chemical weapons? And how can we accept that the use of chemical weapons is prohibited in Europe while their production stockpiling and use is permitted in the Middle East or the Far East?

The vast gap between words and deeds has made the climate of international meetings gloomy and bleak and is frustrating the last rays of hope. The international community is still hopeful with regard to more positive future developments that the Conference on Disarmament may bring about in its efforts to face the great responsibility assigned to it.

Certainly the international community will follow the efforts of this Conference with enthusiasm.

I hope that the present Conference would respond positively to this expectation by expediting its deliberations.

In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to His Excellency Javier Perez de Cuellar, the United Nations Secretary-General, for the measures he has taken; I wish also to thank the experts of the United Nations team despatched to Iran and their respective governments as well as the countries that have condemned the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran and those countries that have supported the report of the Secretary-General's expert team. And finally I have to express appreciation to the countries that have provided medical care for the injured Iranians.

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(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Finally, I should like to add a few words to what I said in my statement of last Wednesday, 18 April, concerning the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Mongolian delegation attaches great importance to the question of verification in any real disarmament measures. In this connection we advocate a principled, reasonable and realistic approach to working out an effective verification system, but without going to extremes and without preconceptions. We have advocated and continue to advocate a verification system which takes into account mutual interests and is based on the principle of equality and equal security.

Seen from this viewpoint, the so-called "open invitation" inspection proposed in the United States draft convention does not, in our opinion, respond to the above principles. To agree to such an approach would be to harm the interests of States and would represent a crude violation of their sovereign rights.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, for the United States, the elimination of the threat of chemical weapons -- and the elimination of the terrible reality of chemical warfare -- is a paramount objective for strengthening international security. To this end, the United States is resolved to pursue a complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The history of this effort is well known. In 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union began formal bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. In 1980, the United States moved its efforts to ban chemical weapons to this body, in recognition that the abolition of chemical weapons is an issue that concerns all States. In February 1983, after long and intensive discussions both here and in Washington, my delegation tabled its detailed views on the content of an agreement. Since then, we have elaborated our detailed views as we participated in the work of this Conference. In July 1983, my delegation also presented a comprehensive paper that set forth illustrative on-site verification procedures for destruction of chemical weapons. Last Autumn, further to accelerate work in this area, the United States invited member and observer delegations to this Conference to visit an operating facility for the destruction of our chemical weapons. Participants gained a first-hand look at the actual destruction procedures used by the United States and at the verification measures necessary to ensure effective verification of that destruction.

Then, last week, President Reagan once again sent Vice-President Dush to Geneva. In a new effort to create momentum in the negotiating process, the Vice-President came before this body and presented the draft United States convention for a chemical weapons ban. The Vice-President emphasized yet again the importance the United States attaches to the conclusion of such a ban. The Vice-President also spoke of his personal concern, as a father and a grandfather, and stated his personal resolve that chemical weapons be effectively eliminated for all time. This is a point on which surely we all can agree. In this context, I want to make it perfectly clear that the United States condemns any use of chemical weapons whenever and wherever it occurs.

This history shows a continuing United States effort to work hard and work sincerely for an agreement on the effective and verifiable ban of chemical weapons, the cornerstone of which effort is the draft convention which we presented here last week. Accordingly, I would like to take some time now to explain the major provisions of the United States draft convention.

The essence of the draft convention is in its first article, which contains the basic prohibitions. The parties would agree not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons. The parties would further agree not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons, use chemical weapons in any armed conflict, or assist others to engage in prohibited activities. In including a ban on the use of chemical weapons, the United States has been mindful of the importance attached to such a provision by many delegations. Taken together, articles I and XIV would ensure that the convention would supplement, and not replace, the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Article II presents the definitions of terms which are necessary for the implementation of the convention. Chemicals which could be used in weapons are divided into three categories according to the danger they pose -- "super-toxic lethal", "other lethal" and "other harmful". The convention would regulate these different categories in different ways. The most important of the definitions is that of "chemical weapons". We have formulated this definition using the definition that was agreed to in document CD/112. Furthermore, we have formulated the definition of "toxic chemicals" to take into account the points of view of China and other members of this Conference. The definition of "chemical weapons" is drawn very broadly so as to include all lethal and incapacitating chemicals and their precursors which are not justified for permitted purposes. It does not include chemicals which are justified for peaceful purposes, such as those used in agriculture, research, medicine and domestic law enforcement.

Permitted uses of toxic chemicals are specifically protected in article III, so that peaceful chemical activities will not be significantly hindered. In order that any misuse of these chemicals can be detected, article III also places limits on the amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors that any State party may possess for protective purposes. Similarly, the draft convention provides that the States parties may produce super-toxic chemicals for protective purposes only in a single facility, and must annually declare all toxic chemicals for protective purposes which could also be used for weapons. The parties also would be limited in the extent to which they may transfer super-toxic chemicals and key precursors to other States. Article III also provides special measures on certain types of chemicals that are used for peaceful purposes, as listed in schedules A, B and C to the convention, to ensure that these chemicals will not be diverted to use in weapons.

Once the convention enters into force, each party would file an initial declaration of its existing chemical weapons, production facilities and past transfers. Articles IV, V and VI stipulate the information that must be included in these declarations. The parties would be required to destroy any chemical weapons and production facilities over a 10-year period, and annually provide information concerning such destruction. There would be guaranteed access for on-site verification to monitor the chemical weapons and production facilities, as well as the destruction process. The effect of these various declarations and monitoring activities would be to provide confidence in compliance by giving the parties comprehensive knowledge of the chemical weapons and production facilities in existence, and by confirming their eventual destruction.

The proposed convention also contains a variety of other provisions to aid in its implementation. As suggested by this Conference, a Consultative Committee would be established pursuant to article VII to oversee the implementation of the convention and promote the verification of compliance with it. Through its subordinate bodies this Committee would conduct the on-site verification activities required by the convention. We have also adopted the concept of an Executive Council, as developed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year. This body would be delegated the responsibility for the continuing work of the Committee.

Articles IX, X and XI provide procedures for resolving compliance issues. Under article IX, the parties are required to consult and co-operate on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives of the convention, and to participate in fact-finding inquiries. Any party may request that the

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Consultative Committee conduct appropriate fact-finding inquiries, including on-site inspections. The fact-finding inquiries must be completed within two months, and if any party still has concerns about compliance which have not been resolved, it may request a special meeting of the Consultative Committee.

In article X, the parties would authorize special on-site inspections, whereby each party must consent, on 24-hour notice, to a special inspection of one of the sites for which inspection is authorized by articles III, V or VI, or of any military or government-owned or controlled location or facility. This provision has been the object of most of the comments which my delegation has heard during the past week. As Vice-President Bush stressed, the United States is offering an "open invitation" for inspection of many potentially suspect sites in its own territory. We recognize that this provision could open sensitive United States facilities and activities to international inspection. Nevertheless the United States is fully prepared to accept these risks in order to ensure an effective ban of this entire class of weapons of mass destruction. We have found no other approach which can satisfactorily deal with the problem of possible undeclared chemical weapons or clandestine production facilities. In view of the gains in relation to the costs involved -- that is, the potential of some intrusion essential to resolve concerns that the convention is being circumvented -- this step is both reasonable and prudent. There are some who have objected that the "open invitations" approach is unfair because it may place a greater burden on some States than on others. No imbalance is either contemplated or desired. The United States delegation is ready to work with others to ensure that the "open invitation" approach applies fairly to differing economic and political systems. Without this or a comparable measure, no State can rest in the knowledge that these weapons have been truly banished.

The next article in the United States draft convention, article XI, authorizes ad hoc on-site inspections. Such inspections may be made of all locations that are not covered by article X. A party must consent to an ad hoc inspection requested by the Consultative Committee except for the most exceptional reasons, which must be explained. Upon consideration the Committee may send the party another request, and if this is also refused, the Security Council would immediately be informed.

The convention would also require a number of detailed provisions for its implementation, which we propose to place in annexes to the main text. These annexes would be integral parts of the convention. Accordingly, in addition to the draft convention which was presented last week, the United States also presented its detailed views on the contents of these annexes.

Annex I provides many details concerning the Consultative Committee, including provisions for the working of that Committee. It also contains provisions for the creation of an Executive Council, fact-finding panel, and a technical secretariat, as well as provisions for the convening of special meetings of the Committee.

Annex II provides detailed views on verification. Section A of this annex stipulates the detailed information that would have to be provided in the various declarations required by the convention, such as the declarations concerning chemical weapons, production facilities, and destruction activities. Section B of annex II is concerned with procedures for on-site verification, including

(Mr. Fields, United States)

inspections. It provides detailed rules for on-site inspections and the use of on-site monitoring equipment, and provides rules to protect the rights of both inspectors and host States. It also provides for the inspection and monitoring of chemical weapons, production facilities, protective activities and destruction activities. Finally, this section stipulates criteria to be used by the Consultative Committee in evaluating requests for ad hoc inspections.

Annex III provides the basis for the three schedules which list the chemicals that have legitimate uses but which also pose a risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, there is a fourth schedule, embodying parts of document CD/CW/WP.30, to specify methods for measuring the toxicity of chemicals.

I also wish to draw attention to two actions which should be taken before the convention can enter into force. First, upon signature, every State should declare whether chemical weapons or production facilities are under its control anywhere or located within its territory. In fact, many States have already made such statements, including the United States. We would urge others to do so as well. Second, there should be a preparatory commission convened once the convention is open for signature to plan for the implementation of the convention. These actions would be agreed in a document associated with the convention, but separate from it.

This has been a brief summary of the contents of the United States draft. I would like to point out what has no doubt been obvious in your study of our draft: that much of it has been drawn from the agreements which we have previously reached in this Conference and the discussions we have held over the past several years in the Committee on Disarmament. My Government appreciates and recognizes the value of the work done in the Committee and the Conference on Disarmament, will continue to contribute to it, and has incorporated as much as possible into our draft. In view of the length and the complexity of the provisions of the draft convention, there will undoubtedly be many points on which further clarification may be helpful. The United States delegation is prepared to undertake this task and indeed is willing to do so. We have sponsored one question-and-answer session open to all delegations, and we are prepared to provide further such clarifications on a delegation-to-delegation basis.

Let me make it clear, the United States draft is not presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. It does however, illustrate our approach to a ban, and it will provide the basis for papers presented by United States representatives on specific aspects as they are discussed. But we have no monopoly on creativity. We are ready and willing to consider alternative approaches and alternative formulations, so long as these would provide an effective ban.

As Vice-President Bush emphasized, the United States delegation looks forward to close and serious consultations with all delegations in these negotiations. We are prepared to take an active and constructive role in the full and complete process of negotiation of the text of the chemical weapons convention.

It is disturbing that some chose to criticize the draft convention -- and the motivations of the United States -- before the draft was actually presented. Some have charged that this initiative is only a bit of political showmanship as part of our Presidential election campaign or is part of an effort to win approval for production of binary chemical weapons.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

These allegations are simply untrue. Our goal is to accelerate the negotiations in this body. Four times in a little more than a year the United States has made major initiatives toward that end. Twice during that period the second highest elected official of my Government has come to Geneva to emphasize the commitment of President Reagan and the United States, the people of the United States, to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons ban. The United States is not afraid of criticism. But we hope that before others criticize our draft they will read it carefully -- and come forward with comprehensive proposals of their own.

The United States delegation is encouraged by the evidence that most delegations are approaching the negotiations seriously and that the work is beginning to intensify. The important Working Paper introduced by the delegation of China, CD/443, is being studied with careful interest by our experts. We were pleased by the statement of the distinguished Soviet representative, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February regarding inspection of destruction of chemical weapons and further encouraged by his statement on 18 April that the United States draft convention would be carefully studied. We have also noted a number of constructive suggestions contained in the Working Paper submitted by a group of socialist States, CD/435, entitled "improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of prohibition of chemical weapons". We hope that these suggestions will be further explored and, as appropriate, implemented. A number of other very useful documents have been introduced in 1984, such as the working papers from the delegations of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, France, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the flexibility shown by a number of delegations has led to progress in formulating key definitions. Unfortunately, there remain important subjects which a few delegations are apparently not ready to discuss and resolve -- for example, the declaration and elimination of chemical weapons production facilities. This is to be deeply regretted. We hope that our break will allow sober reflection on the urgent need for progress on all fronts in this negotiation.

For its part the United States delegation will do whatever it can, under the able leadership of Ambassador Ekeus, to ensure that the negotiations can be successfully completed as soon as possible. To quote Vice-President Bush "Our aim in these negotiations will be a practical one -- to work hard and in good faith; to build mutual confidence; to achieve real results".

Humanity demands no less of us. Accomplishing real results will not be easy, but my delegation, myself, my Government and the people of the United States are committed to the achievement of an effective ban of chemical weapons once and for all. I know that the members of this Conference are equally dedicated to this goal, and with that dedication, Sir, I am convinced that we will succeed.

Mr. Issraelyan, USSR

After that statement some delegations of Western States blamed us for what they considered an exceedingly gloomy assessment of the international situation as a whole and United States policy on arms-limitation in particular. However, the deliberations of the first part of the 1984 session confirmed that our assessment was correct. The United States continues to block any advance in the field of disarmament and uses its participation in the negotiations for propaganda purposes to camouflage its true course aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR, unleashing the arms race where it did not exist before, in outer space, for instance, and spurring it on in those areas where it was imposed on the world long ago by the United States military-industrial complex.

The latest, I would say, graphic example of this attitude on the part of the United States to arms-limitation and disarmament issues is the broadly-publicized draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons submitted by the United States delegation on 18 April 1984. Contrary to all promises, even if there are some changes in the obstructionist position of the United States on a chemical-weapons ban, they are in no way for the better. Previously, in order to bar the conclusion of an agreement on a chemical-weapon ban the United States insisted on a verification system under which other States should at the first request allow foreign inspectors access to any chemical facility regardless of whether or not it has anything to do with the production of chemical weapons. Now Washington proposes that States should agree in advance and unconditionally to unimpeded access of foreign inspectors "anywhere and at any time".

It hardly requires very keen insight to understand that what is involved here is not verification which is really necessary for confidence in strict compliance with agreements, in which, incidentally, the USSR is no less interested than the United States. The main point is the following -- putting forward demands on unimpeded access to the territories of other States to continue to block the achievement of agreement on a chemical-weapon ban.

In reality, the United States draft can only throw the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban many years back. It not only suffers from extremism, it not only cancels the efforts of many years made by many States with a view to elaborating realistic solutions to verification problems, but it is built on a blatantly discriminatory basis, and places States with different social systems in unequal situations. This was also recognized in today's statement by the representative of the United States. Its implementation would inflict damage to the economic and defence interests of a number of States, first of all those of the socialist States, but not only theirs.

Today the representative of the United States referred to the statement of the Soviet delegation of 21 February. I should like to recall what was said in that statement. I quote from the English translation. "In declaring today our readiness in principle to consider in a positive manner the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at the special facilities

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

for the destruction of stocks, we would like particularly to stress that our premise is that our partners at negotiations will also for their part prove their readiness, not in words but in deeds, to seek mutually acceptable solutions." And now we have before us the United States draft, which should have taken into account, as we hoped, the viewpoint of the Soviet Union as well, which is very well known to the United States inasmuch as we have been carrying on negotiations with the United States for eight years at least on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

The question must be asked: Why was it necessary for the United States to put forward such a proposal which is deliberately unacceptable for the Soviet Union and many other States? Incidentally, many high United States officials have said that it is deliberately unacceptable. In fact, they could not expect that agreement could be achieved on the basis of it. No, of course, nobody expected that. And the achievement of an agreement was hardly the goal of the authors of the draft. We are deeply convinced that the draft was submitted merely in order to try to cover by the noisy publicity around the United States draft the reality of what the American administration is engaging in-- the intensive preparation of the implementation of the 10 billion dollar "United States chemical rearmament" programme proclaimed by President Reagan.

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

My Government takes very seriously the growing danger posed by chemical weapons. Not only do some countries hold large and increasing stocks of these weapons, but they have recently been used in defiance of international condemnation. At this time, it is, therefore, more important than ever that we should secure a comprehensive ban on these weapons. Agreement on a treaty, I believe it is universally agreed, would constitute a measure of real disarmament and a major contribution to international security. My delegation was pleased that, at least in this area of our work, we have been able to make progress during the current session. We rapidly reached agreement on the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee and on the formation of working groups on particular topics. Within these groups some progress has been made. Mr. Luce tabled a paper on challenge inspection on 14 February, the latest in a series of proposals that have been made by the United Kingdom in the Committee and the Conference on Disarmament. We have been gratified by the interest shown in these proposals and by the serious way in which they have been discussed, both in the working groups and in bilateral conversations.

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

The tabling last week of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, was an event of the highest significance. The British Government warmly supports this latest initiative by the United States, which will mark a milestone on the long path towards a total ban on these appalling weapons. My Government shares the United States view that strict verification is needed to assure all States that the prohibitions of any future convention are being observed. My delegation was glad to note from the statement on 18 April by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that his delegation was prepared to agree, in negotiations on this subject, to a whole range of different verification methods, including mandatory systematic or permanent international on-site inspection, as well as inspections by challenge. My delegation believes that a combination of these two types of verification will be needed, both to give confidence that all chemical weapons stocks and production facilities are destroyed; and, on a permanent basis, to give confidence that they are not clandestinely restored or created. We hope that the United States draft, by virtue of its comprehensive character and wealth of ideas, will provide a major impetus to our work in spite of the negative reactions that we have heard from certain delegations this morning. The complex nature of the proposals, indeed of the subject itself, hardly needs stressing, but we continue to hope that all delegations to this Conference will give the draft most careful study in the weeks to come and will return, as my delegation intends to do, ready to undertake detailed negotiations.

(Mr. Pietinen, Finland)

The question of a chemical weapons ban has been another basic priority in the disarmament policy of Finland. The results of our longstanding verification project in this field have been regularly presented in the Committee on Disarmament. I am this time in a position to announce that a new so-called "Blue Book", which will be entitled "Technical Evaluation of Selected Scientific Methods for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament" will be presented to the relevant Ad Hoc Committee in June.

The contribution of Finland will this year be presented in a form that is somewhat different from what has been the case before. It is our intention now to submit a comprehensive analysis of all the results that have been achieved in the course of this ten-year project.

The Working Paper is intended to cover all aspects of verification. In particular, it will discuss possible verification tasks that might be required in the future convention and the technical means for verification of chemical agents, containing automated monitoring sample collection, mobile field laboratories and a central laboratory. Applications are given describing combined use of the technical means. It does not give numerical data, but describes the technology and is thus comprehensible for a larger public.

Recent events involving the use of chemical weapons in a conflict have made the efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons more urgent than ever. We have noted with interest the latest developments in the Conference on Disarmament in this matter. These include, in particular, the statement by the Soviet Union in February on some aspects of verification and the presentation of a draft chemical weapons treaty introduced last week by the Vice-President of the United States. We see these developments as a sign of willingness of those governments to come to grips with the difficult problems faced by the Conference on Disarmament during the negotiations. As a further positive element we note that the relevant subsidiary body has been able to start actual negotiations.

We are looking forward to early concrete results from the Committee already during the course of the summer session. Finland is, as in the past, ready to give its contribution to these negotiations in particular in the field of verification technology.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

In terms of satisfaction, the delegation of France ranks the rather rapid resumption and expansion of the negotiations on chemical weapons first. We are all aware how much is at stake in these negotiations and how timely they are and we hope that, in the not too distant future, they will lead to the most important disarmament treaty ever concluded at the international level.

A great deal of time and effort has gone into the work on chemical weapons. Procedure has never prevailed over substance -- a rare occurrence indeed. Above all, extremely valuable contributions have been made to the negotiations. In chronological order, the first was the statement made on 21 February by our Soviet colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan. The position he put forward on the on-site inspection of operations to destroy stockpiles represents a major step forward in the reconciliation of views on a basic condition for verification.

We have also received other extremely valuable contributions, including that by China, which represents a remarkable attempt at clarification and conciliation, particularly with regard to the problem of definitions. The delegation of France also greatly appreciated the technical documents submitted by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It, too, was anxious to make its own contribution.

The submission by the Vice-President of the United States of the United States draft treaty was the highlight of this session and we welcomed it with the greatest satisfaction. This document is of considerable importance and we are studying it carefully.

The Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups have adopted a serious and determined approach to the task entrusted to them. The results may appear to be uneven, but the difficulties themselves were not of the same order. Undeniable progress has been made on the question of definitions.

We have great hopes that, at the second part of the session, steps will be taken to overcome certain problems and derive the best possible advantage from the work already accomplished. In this connection, we expect a great deal from the Presidency. The delegation of France wishes to congratulate our Swedish colleague, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Duarte, Mr. Akkerman and Mr. Thielicke, for their efforts. It has full confidence in them for the future.

We would also like negotiations to be held this summer on matters relating to the prohibition of use and its verification. These issues have not been entrusted to a working group, but will be discussed during the consultations to be conducted by our colleague from Canada, Ambassador Beesley. We have confidence in him as well and wish him every success in his work.

This work and the progress that has been made should now pave the way for a new stage, namely, the drafting of a convention. The Conference now has the resources it needs to carry out this important task: the United States draft treaty and the documents prepared under the auspices of Ambassador Ekéus should all be taken into account in the formulation of the text.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

However, the major reason for satisfaction is the quantum leap which we have been able to make in the field of chemical weapons. The quick determined steps which the Conference took in February to establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a comprehensive and forward looking mandate provided the appropriate ambiance in which many delegations could go on record with new and constructive views. My delegation has, in several steps, attempted to contribute to that process. But I would also like to cite as an encouraging element that the delegation of the Soviet Union has again taken a more active interest in the subject of chemical weapons, designating it, in a statement in early February, as one of the priority subjects of negotiations of this Conference. The several suggestions which the Soviet Union has submitted, in particular in a major policy statement on 21 February, and its declared general readiness to contribute constructively to the solution of all pending verification problems of the convention have been helpful and will play an important role in future negotiations. My delegation has also noted with attention the undertaking given by Ambassador Issraelyan on 18 April 1984 that the United States draft on a chemical weapons convention will receive serious study by the Soviet side; even in his more critical remarks of this morning, I find nothing that contradicts this welcome undertaking.

Heralded by Secretary Shultz' formal announcement on 16 January, the introduction of the United States draft by the Vice-President of the United States of America on 18 April has certainly been the major event of the spring part of our session. There is no doubt that the draft represents an unprecedented endeavour by one of the two leading military Powers to provide complex solutions to the problems inherent in the problem of banning chemical weapons. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that the draft not only represents detailed United States views on all aspects of the future convention but also incorporates contributions of many other delegations in the Conference on Disarmament, and indeed the results of the collective negotiating process of last year. My delegation is convinced that the United States draft will become an important basis for future negotiations and,

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

indeed, one of its determining elements. The document is proof of the political determination of the United States of America to see these negotiations to a good end in the shortest possible time. The assurance given by Vice-President Bush and a moment ago echoed by Ambassador Fields that the United States have introduced their draft with every intention to provide negotiating flexibility when needed underscores the significance of the event.

As could be expected in such an immensely complex subject-matter, the United States draft contains many aspects that will evoke controversy within the Conference and in part have already done so. Some of the views concerning verification are new and bold. Whatever position delegations might take vis-à-vis certain parts of the recommended verification system it must be recognized that the draft provides new impulses that should stimulate serious argument.

In this context it is important that the United States views on verification and especially its new concept concerning special and on-challenge verification be taken at face value. The provisions on open-invitation mandatory inspections for verifying compliance demonstrate an unprecedented measure of audacity. Delegations that evaluate the proposal in this respect should not only look at what the United States demands from others but what they are prepared to give themselves. Openness is offered on the basis of reciprocity. It is a new phenomenon that a significant military Power is prepared to pay such a high price in order to ensure compliance with a disarmament convention. My delegation is impressed with the readiness of the United States delegation to join in a mutual obligation to open for international inspection a substantial segment of its sensitive military installations. Whatever the final outcome of negotiations will be, we should look at this offer as a strength of the United States approach, and my delegation would advise that all delegations remain mindful of the political dimension of this open-invitation philosophy. It provides for a far-sighted, indeed unique approach aiming at changing the way Governments deal with each other in an important field of national security. This new concept contrasts favourably with certain antiquated views pretending that mystification and excessive secrecy are the nucleus of States' sovereignty. This new creative approach deserves a thorough discussion and my delegation would wish that all delegations engage in such endeavour in good faith.

As far as we are concerned, we are prepared to accept the challenge that the United States draft contains. The forthcoming intersessional period will offer all of us the advantage to study more carefully certain provisions which on first sight appear at variance with views our respective delegations have taken in previous negotiations.

My own delegation has submitted several working papers on the question of verification, the latest, document CD/326, already couched in formal language, such as the drafting of the future treaty will require. We have always looked for a comprehensive and mutually balanced international verification system where levels of intrusiveness and inspection efforts would be carefully dosed and measured by the sole criterion of efficiency. From this vantage point, the detailed verification provisions of the United States draft deserve a generally positive assessment.

The destruction of chemical weapons is, from the position of a Central European country, a goal of foremost urgency. The mechanism for a verified destruction of stocks should, however, not be complicated in a way that is not

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

called for by the purposes of the Convention. In this respect we shall have to study thoroughly and with some hesitation those parts of the United States proposal that deal with the verification of the initial declarations. I have already referred to the statement by the Soviet delegation of 21 February 1984 with regard to verification of destruction of stockpiles. This is an area, where a consensus in principle appears now within reach. My delegation is cautiously optimistic that we shall find negotiated answers to the more detailed problems of verification of destruction of stocks.

We are equally concerned that the mechanisms envisaged for the verification of nonproduction, as laid out in the United States draft, should not entail unnecessary burdens for the civilian chemical industry. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the chemical industry is an important pillar of our over-all economic performance. It is therefore a legitimate consideration to seek to avoid intrusive measures that would not directly raise the level of effectiveness of verification. Our joint endeavours should be directed towards establishing a correct balance between two contrasting principles: the first, that the convention should function and international verification be effective; the other that the restrictions imposed by the convention upon the performance of chemical industry must not lead to excessive constraints and burdensome, costly controls. On the basis of our strong general endorsement for the relevant provisions of the United States draft concerning the verification of non-production on a selective and random basis, many of the details will have to be sorted out in an earnest endeavour.

The distinguished Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran has today forcefully reminded us that our negotiations on a permanent ban on chemical weapons are not conducted in a vacuum, but that the production and use of chemical weapons is a grim reality of our time, in his region as in others. The Federal Government has taken note with utmost concern of the report of the experts who went to Iran at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to investigate the alleged use of chemical agents in the war between Iran and Iraq. On the basis of this report it must be assumed that one side to the conflict has indeed used chemical weapons. The Federal Government has stated its position on these occurrences publicly, and in an unequivocal manner. It regrets and condemns the use of chemical weapons as a clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of such weapons in war. The findings of the United Nations mission underline, once more, the vital importance of the early conclusion of a comprehensive world-wide and reliably verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

Let me return to a hopefully more positive aspect of our negotiations on chemical weapons. You, Mr. President, and colleagues are aware of the invitation issued to all members of the Conference as well as to interested observers to participate in an international chemical weapons workshop in Northern Germany, scheduled from afternoon of 12 to morning of 14 June 1984. As I stressed in my individual letters of invitation, it is the aim of the Federal Government to embed this workshop as closely as possible into the ongoing negotiation process. I am therefore particularly grateful for the lively response which the invitation has found and I should like to express gratitude to all delegations who have nominated their participants. Letters to all nominees acknowledging their kind response and specifying departure time, as well as other elements of the programme, are currently in the mail. My delegation is looking forward to welcoming the participants in the Federal Republic of Germany and hopes for an outcome of the workshop that will be conducive to our negotiations

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

One of the few positive signs of the spring part of our session was the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a mandate "... to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention ...". As to whether we have started to fulfil the mandate, looking at what has been done one has to admit that much more could have been achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups had all delegations taken an active part in their activity. At the same time, we appreciate the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the chairmen of the three Working Groups. Further useful exchange of views has taken place and drafting on some aspects was undertaken. Certain progress has been made on several questions, for example, with regard to the scope and definitions of the future convention. We witnessed also demonstrations of goodwill on the part of many delegations as well as efforts to bridge remaining differences. However, on the whole it was again proved that a very limited number of delegations, even one delegation, can prevent us from substantially moving ahead. But let me remind distinguished colleagues that we offered our more detailed views on what has been achieved within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in my statement of 12 April.

I would therefore limit myself now to reiterating the deep regret of my delegation that the important proposal concerning the verification of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, introduced by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February has not been matched by a similar move on the part of western countries, especially the United States. Its draft convention, introduced on 18 April, failed to bring about such a constructive step. Moreover, while not moving an inch towards the positions of other countries, the draft raised new unfounded requirements especially in the field of verification. The authors of the concept of "open invitation" not only realized but undoubtedly proceeded from its obvious unacceptability for many countries. It is politically naive to assume that States would be seriously prepared to open, on 24-hours notice, all their military installations, including those of strategic significance, to international inspectors looking at random for "hidden" chemical weapons. We believe that this fully applies also to the United States itself.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The United States draft convention is also somehow behind what has been achieved so far in the Conference on Disarmament. For example, the definition of "toxic chemical" used is scientifically unacceptable, using the term "chemical action" which is unknown to toxicologists throughout the world. The definition of precursors is related only to production which does not imply its use as component of binary or multicomponent weapon technology. We also miss a definition of key precursor. Instead one can only find an incomplete and arbitrary list of such compounds scattered in schedules A and C.

The concept of lists without definitions and the effort to relate various measures only to lists, as reflected also in the article dealing with permitted activities, is unacceptable for my delegation. We are convinced that at the time of signing the Convention, there must be a clear and binding line, which can be drawn only by means of definitions which are scientifically based, delimited by the purpose-criterion limited and concisely elaborated.

Binary chemical weapons have traditionally been a taboo subject in the United States newspapers. But it is still surprising that they are still ignored even in a comprehensive draft convention. At least in this regard, the United States draft is "consistent". This is very much apparent from schedule A, where the most dangerous chemicals are said to be summarized. We maintain that such a schedule should contain also all key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals, which, in the United States draft, it does not. For instance, the key precursor of the most toxic contemporary super-toxic lethal nerve agent forming a substantive part of the United States chemical arsenal, VX, that is, O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphinite has been "forgotten".

The draft convention is also lacking in its undifferentiated approach to destruction, with no schedule of destruction according to the danger of particular elements of chemical weapons aimed at avoiding one-sided military advantage during the destruction period.

With regard to old chemical weapons, this proposal conserves also the anachronistic and unreasonable view, which is unacceptable for small countries not possessing chemical weapons and having therefore no destruction facilities. Such countries (and they will form the majority of States parties to the future convention) need to have the right to address other States parties and the Consultative Committee in seeking know-how and/or assistance for the safe destruction of rarely-found old individual chemical weapons, rather than being submitted to verification concerning whether some kilograms of toxic material were really destroyed or illusory transferred to non-existing chemical arsenals. Besides, a number of delegations, including mine, have serious reservations with regard to a description in initial declarations of the exact locations of chemical weapons.

If we are to achieve some tangible results during the summer part of our session, all delegations should realize that the only way to do so lies through an effort to accommodate each other, to find mutually acceptable solutions and to bridge existing differences, instead of widening them.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I now wish to turn to three of the issues which we consider of paramount importance, on which, I suggest, our major efforts could be concentrated during the summer part of our session. These issues are a chemical weapons treaty, a nuclear test ban and outer space. I propose to comment also, very briefly, on the question of radiological weapons.

It is common ground that it is in our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban that the greatest progress has been made. All members of the Conference have contributed: first, through the more than 200 working papers which had been submitted to form the basis for our negotiation and, secondly, through the negotiating process from which the consensus report (CD/415) emerged last summer. The momentum has been sustained by a number of significant developments since the first of the year. There are, of course, at least three draft treaties dating back to 1972 and more than 20 other working papers, including four from Canada, pertaining to specific aspects of a convention. But certainly the United States submission on 18 April 1984 of their draft treaty is the most comprehensive and detailed draft treaty and one which, if it could be put into force tomorrow, would virtually assure a chemical-weapon-free world within ten years.

Many have commented on the recent initiatives undertaken by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of chemical weapons. In our view, they reflect a common desire to proceed with a serious negotiation aimed at achieving concrete results.

Earlier this session, in our statement of 21 February, we welcomed the Soviet proposal for on-site inspection of destruction of chemical weapons stocks. At the time, speaking immediately after Ambassador Issraelyan, we said that this Soviet initiative was a most welcome development in the ongoing negotiating process on a ban on chemical weapons, and represented a significant step forward. We also said that we hoped that this Soviet proposal had broader implications. We reaffirm our satisfaction at this Soviet initiative, which we are confident will assist in providing impetus, along with the recently-tabled United States draft on a chemical weapons ban, to our negotiations on this subject.

The unpalatable truth about chemical weapons is that restraint in their use in many cases has been motivated more by fear of retaliation than by legal considerations. Whatever one's legal position may be about the universality of the legal principles embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, we must assume that there is sufficient general agreement on the need for the banning of the development, production, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons that there is a realistic prospect for agreement. Similarly, however,

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

it is our view that there must be acceptance of the principle that unless there is adequate assurance of verification of compliance with the terms of the Convention by all parties, States will be extremely fearful of giving up their deterrent.

Many are still studying the United States draft treaty submitted by Vice-President Bush last week; many are also awaiting further elaboration of the Soviet position on on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical-weapon stocks. The test is now whether these two related proposals will give the needed impetus to the negotiation -- and, we trust, general acceptance -- of the essential agreement we are pursuing.

The United States proposal is, as already pointed out, the most comprehensive and, not surprisingly, the most detailed. Like the USSR approach, it also embodies a bold step forward on the path we all wish to follow. With respect to the United States proposal, we should recognize this initiative as a genuine attempt on the part of a super-Power to bring about disarmament on chemical weapons. Whatever the reaction to the specific provisions, the draft treaty must be recognized as a development of major importance. While there are stipulations, particularly in the compliance aspects of the treaty, which may be viewed as stringent; nevertheless, these provisions are intended as mutually applicable, indeed generally applicable. By including them in the draft, the United States has signalled, in advance, its willingness to comply. It is fundamental, in our view, to recognize at the outset of our negotiations on treaty language that the alternative to effective verification is either complete trust or continuing reliance on a State's own capabilities; the former is perhaps the ideal, but is unfortunately unrealistic; the latter is the reverse of the ideal, and it is obviously undesirable. Clearly, only very stringent verification measures would motivate States to put their faith -- and their national security -- in treaty provisions rather than self-help. This is an apparent truism, but one which warrants most careful consideration. Stringent verification provisions may be not only our best alternative to self-help, with all the attendant horrors, but the only alternative.

The United States initiative, which is directed at replacing deterrent stockpiles of chemical weapons by treaty safeguards, thus constitutes a very significant contribution towards our common goal of achieving a global ban on chemical weapons, a long-standing Canadian objective of prime importance. We pledge our readiness -- indeed our determination -- to participate actively in achieving this objective, and we encourage all members of the Conference on Disarmament to approach the proposal in an open-minded and co-operative manner. We must bear in mind that we are all here not only as representatives of our respective governments but in a broader capacity representing the international community as a whole. If problems are encountered, they should be met with alternative practical suggestions.

It is essential also as we see it that we recognize that a chemical weapons convention could serve a double objective. If successfully negotiated and concluded, it will contribute to mutual security by defining and controlling a ban amongst those who now possess chemical weapons. Of equal importance, however, a treaty banning chemical weapons would have a horizontal dimension to

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

complement this vertical dimension: it would regulate and control the enforcement of a ban amongst countries not now possessing chemical weapons. It is in this sense of non-proliferation as a fundamental objective, that such a treaty could have truly universal implications. Its effectiveness, however, and even the degree of its universality, could be proportional to its enforceability, a point we have already emphasized.

There is yet another consideration of potentially far-reaching importance: while our negotiating process on chemical weapons is significant in its own right, it may have implications going well beyond chemical weapons. Even our progress to date provides evidence that mutual security -- and the mechanisms necessary to ensure it -- are not simply the product of a process whereby gains in security by one or more parties result in a lessening of the security of others. Surely it is obvious that the successful negotiation of a generally acceptable convention prohibiting the proliferation of chemical weapons would contribute to the security of all.

There are, of course, political and even legal as well as practical technical and procedural difficulties. Each government has its own perception of its respective national interests as regards a chemical weapons Convention, and understandably so. All these interests must be fully taken into account through the negotiating process in order to create a document representing the highest common denominator of agreement on the essential goals we are pursuing. If the negotiating process is to work, these difficult issues mentioned must be faced squarely and honestly, without, I suggest, resorting to polemics or casting doubt upon one another's motives.

The reality of the use of chemical weapons in some areas of the world serves to underline the urgency and importance of the task which confronts us. This Conference has, we think, been wise to isolate such tragic events from our ongoing negotiations, except as a constant reminder of the immediacy of our work.

Before concluding our comments on the subject of chemical weapons, I should like to point out that our experience in this matter proves definitively that we can overcome procedural problems when there is a common desire -- in this case, perhaps a determination -- to do so.

We are, of course, gratified that procedural problems were overcome, and that the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group for the period 16 January - 6 February was adopted by consensus at this session. We are mindful of the fact, however, that notwithstanding the recommendation in that report that negotiations on a chemical-weapons convention begin immediately, procedural difficulties again prevented such an immediate commencement of negotiations by this body. That such procedural difficulties should occur, in the light of a carefully-negotiated pre-existing consensus document -- one of the major aims of which was to avoid such delays -- is particularly regrettable, and, I suggest, provides a lesson to all of us concerned to preserve both the effectiveness and credibility of this forum. This is a matter to which we should give most careful consideration,

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

not merely because, as I mentioned earlier, we are here in a representative capacity, but because we are all answerable -- admittedly to varying degrees -- to our respective publics. Like it or not, we are collectively answerable to world public opinion, and we would do well to remember this and ensure that this forum is not misused.

I should like to take this opportunity of singling out Ambassador Ekéus as a classic example of a "servant of the Conference" who, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has shown us how it is possible, given patience and perseverance, coupled with concern and commitment, to move our work along, in the face of a series of procedural problems, some familiar and some new. It is to his credit, and to his Working Group Co-ordinators, Messrs. Akkerman of the Netherlands, Duarte of Brazil and Thielicke of the German Democratic Republic, that we have been able to resume our work which was as we see it unnecessarily interrupted. Indeed, Ambassador Ekéus has shown us, as did his predecessor Ambassador McPhail, how we can pick our way through a procedural maze, when we are sufficiently motivated to do so.

I might mention that we are honoured that Ambassador Ekéus has asked Canada to undertake consultations on his behalf to determine how the question of use may best be incorporated into the terms of the convention. We for our part shall undertake these consultations objectively and impartially with a view to achieving the best possible result for all.

(Mr. Sutowardoyo, Indonesia)

On the matter of chemical weapons, I should like to say a few words. First of all I wish to express my delegation's sincere appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, for his exemplary devotion and untiring efforts in the preparation of a working structure for the negotiations on chemical weapons.

My delegation welcomes the readiness of the Soviet Union, announced by Ambassador Issraelyan last February, concerning the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the permanent presence, for verification purposes, of representatives of international control at specialized facilities during the process of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. My delegation likewise welcomes the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons presented by United States Vice-President on 18 April. We hope these two important developments will facilitate the work of the Conference so that we may have an agreed text, acceptable to us all, soon. The urgency of a convention on chemical weapons has been brought home to us once again in the statement of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran which we all have heard here this morning.

My delegation stands ready to do its part in that process of attaining a convention on chemical weapons. But let me emphasize here that my delegation is not prepared to do that if it would involve in practice assigning lesser importance to other items on the agenda to which my delegation attaches high priority.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

One clearly positive development during the part of the session that is closing today was the presentation to the Conference by the United States Government of a draft treaty on chemical weapons. On the day that that treaty was presented to the Conference I spoke on behalf of my Government saying that the United States Government has given us an opportunity that we must not lose, and that we would not be forgiven if we lost it. This remains my Government's view.

We reject utterly the assertions that have been made here today, that the United States has acted in some way insincerely and that the terms of its draft suggest that it is not serious in wanting a chemical weapons convention. In our view the United States has acted in good faith and Australia proposes to take part vigorously in the negotiation of an effective chemical weapons treaty, and we assume that the substantial majority of all other delegations in this Conference will do the same.

Mr. SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The question of Iraq's request to participate or make a statement in the plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament is being raised at a time when the world has condemned Iraq's massive use of chemical weapons against military targets as well as the civilian population, and the Government of Iraq has still not desisted from the use of such inhumane weapons which the United Nations Organization has profoundly deplored.

Some two thousand military as well as civilian persons have been the victims of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. This does not merely concern the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; rather, what is at issue is the damage done to the common human conscience. The contemporary civilized human community cannot and should not tolerate such crimes; we are sincerely thankful and appreciative to those delegations who share our view and have expressed their condemnation of the continuous use made of chemical weapons by Iraq. The Government of Iraq has used chemical weapons also in the last week, and the latest use of such weapons has been made early this week. Iraq has never desisted from the use of such weapons although it has requested the Conference on Disarmament to give it the opportunity to participate in its work — it did not even resist from using chemical weapons when the mission of the Secretary-General was in Iran in order to investigate the use of such weapons. It did not even refrain from using chemical weapons on that occasion. This august body, is a disarmament conference, and it respects and honours the very humane responsibility assigned to it. It is not an armament conference that Iraq is going to address. In the face of the grave assault done to the conscience of all men due to the use of internationally prohibited chemical weapons by Iraq and the continuation of that crime, we oppose any kind of participation of Iraq in the Conference's 1984 session. We do not believe that the Conference should accept the humiliation done to it by this request.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): During this session, the Conference has received numerous requests from various States not members of the Conference to participate in its plenary meetings and make general statements on the various agenda items. The Conference has, so far, acceded to all of those requests and, although it was sometimes felt that some delegations might have reservations concerning some of those requests, no delegation has objected to their acceptance since the Conference fully recognizes the interests of all, as well as the right which the Final Document gives to all States to express their views on issues of vital importance such as disarmament. In accordance with this principle and in keeping with this tradition, we had hoped that Iraq's request would be treated in the same manner and that Iraq would be permitted to make general statements before the Conference. However, since we are working on the basis of consensus, the objection of a single State implies rejection of that request. Nevertheless, we hope that informal consultations will continue in an attempt to find a solution to such problems in the future.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): We recently learned that Iraq wished to make a statement to our Conference. Already, on 2 April 1984, that country submitted a request to us that it should be allowed to participate in our work. As everyone is aware, as a result of the objection of a member State of the Conference, it was not possible to reach a consensus to accede to this request. Today, the point at issue is a request different from the preceding one. Indeed, in a gesture of goodwill, Iraq wishes to express its views on a matter which concerns us all, since there is every reason to believe that the statement by the Iraqi representative will focus on the problem of the use of chemical weapons. It seems to us that all the members of the Conference, without any exception, would find it useful to hear the Iraqi point of view in order to be in a position to form a clear opinion and also in order to define the responsibilities in that regard.

The Moroccan delegation would like to express its sincere regrets that it was not possible, as the result of the attitude of one delegation, to reach a consensus on the request made by Iraq to participate in our work, particularly since thus far the Conference has never barred representatives, who so desired, from addressing us.

In view of the serious charges that have been made against Iraq, it would have been fair and equitable to allow the Iraqi representative to come before us and to present the point of view of his Government on the unquestionably important issue of the use or non-use of chemical weapons.

Mr. SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I will make a brief statement to respond to the statements of the distinguished delegates of Egypt and Morocco.

With regard to my Egyptian colleague who said that the Conference has accepted, on many occasions, such requests, I think that is a very good point; I think that should be the case. But, the very fact that the Conference has to decide on such requests reflects the concern that the Conference should have the option of making a selection with regard to such requests. Not every State can have the right to comment, to take the time of this important body, when it is itself violating the very principle that this body is going to promote. Who is going to address the vital matters discussed in the Conference? I ask my Egyptian colleague: Who is going to address these vital matters that the Conference has before it? The State which is openly violating it? And what does it want to say here? My colleague from Morocco says that the representative of Iraq should be given a chance to come here to bring clarifications concerning the accusations levelled against it. I think, and I think everybody knows here, that the report of the Secretary-General's mission to Iran to investigate the use of chemical weapons is very clear and contains all necessary clarifications. I think only that the participation of the Iraqi representative in this Conference is nothing but a humiliation of this august body. We reiterate once again that as long as Iraq is using chemical weapons, and I said that early this week Iraq again used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, as long as this continues, there is no chance of Iraq taking part in this honoured body.

(The President)

Another item of importance during this session will, of course, be continued work on a chemical weapons convention. We are obviously faced here with the eminent risk of uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons to more and more countries. It is therefore necessary that these negotiations are carried on swiftly and efficiently and in a spirit of constructive co-operation. If so, a draft convention can be put together soon and be presented to the members of the Conference and other States for their consideration.

It is gratifying that the Conference has been able to establish an ad hoc committee for the item of radiological weapons. With the skilled and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Vejvoda, there are good prospects for some tangible progress with regard to this question.

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

Next, I must not fail to mention the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

Chemical weapons cause far-reaching injuries and effects, extensively as well as indiscriminately, not only on combatants but also on ordinary citizens. The fact

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(Mr. Abe, Japan)

that chemical weapons are actually incorporated in the weapons systems of a number of countries and are stockpiled in enormous quantities on this Earth poses a grave threat to the peace and security of international society. In fact, there occurred this year an inadmissible event in that chemical weapons were actually used in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

This is eloquent testimony of the need for us not only urgently to reduce and destroy the existing large amount of chemical weapons stocks, but also to seek the early conclusion of a global and comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons so as to preclude their development and production.

In April this year, Vice-President Bush of the United States, by attending in person a meeting of this Conference and presenting a draft convention, expressed the positive attitude of the United States Government toward this particular issue. Prior to this, in February of this year, the Soviet Union also gave a positive sign regarding verification matters, though limited in scope to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.

I appreciate and welcome such concrete proposals put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan will continue to participate actively, as in the past, in the deliberations and negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons at this Conference. I wish Japan's advanced technologies would make some contribution in this field.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The last contribution during the spring session to the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction was made by the United States delegation through the submission of their text of a draft convention. In our view, this and other proposals considered in the Ad hoc Committee offer a sound basis for the Conference to present already this year in its report to the General Assembly the first agreed provisions of the convention and to finalize it next year. Less than this would be equal to failure of the Conference.

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(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

Assurance of this is given by the outstanding qualities displayed by our Swedish colleague, especially at the head of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The Swedish delegation is pursuing here with the greatest distinction a lofty national tradition to which the French delegation is pleased to pay tribute. Sweden has, indeed, won for itself a leading place in the international community by reason of its participation in co-operative efforts, particularly in the field of disarmament.

Today we open the second part of our annual session. It is the firm hope of the French delegation that it will be marked by progress. First of all in the sphere of chemical disarmament. We are resuming our task with proven methods and on the basis of particularly comprehensive documentation. Our wish is the same as regards radiological weapons, an item on which negotiation must be continued in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee that we have re-established. We also hope that the committee dealing with negative security assurances will be able to resume a task in which we continue to be very keenly interested. Finally, the Conference will have to consider what is to be done with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, concerning which we have also re-established an ad hoc committee.

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(Mr. Flores Olea, Mexico)

Recent events compel us, likewise, to accord priority to the conclusion of a treaty that would completely remove the danger of chemical warfare. We are encouraged by the proposals submitted in this connection by the two super-Powers.

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(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, some progress was achieved during the spring session, particularly in the drafting of certain key definitions. Progress should also be possible in the field of the elimination of stockpiles and of their verification. Most of us have just returned from Munster, where the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany organized, admirably, a seminar on these issues. I wish warmly to congratulate Ambassador Wegener and, through him, his authorities on the success of that initiative. I was, unfortunately, unable to participate personally in the seminar, but I know that it fully achieved its objective: consequently, far from being an academic exercise, it represents a part of the negotiating process and will, I am sure, prove a positive contribution to its progress.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Just before the end of the spring session, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to us document CD/CW/WP.81 containing compromise proposals drafted in the form of treaty articles. My delegation supports that initiative by Ambassador Ekeus. At the present stage, the impulse-giving and mediating role of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee may prove of capital importance. Document WP.81 recognizes that no thorough consideration has been given to the structure of the future convention. We think that this question, as well as that of the procedure to be followed in embarking upon the drafting of the convention, should be tackled forthwith. Working paper CD/435 submitted by a group of socialist countries contains useful suggestions in that respect.

The negotiations which will be held during the summer session will have the benefit of the draft treaty that the Vice-President of the United States presented to the Conference on 18 April last. This draft contains a coherent set of provisions regulating all aspects, down to the smallest details, of the highly complex problems of a universal and global prohibition of chemical weapons. It therefore takes the negotiations a stage further. It is, so far, principally the provisions on verification that have been the subject of preliminary reactions.

It has to be recognized that the production of chemical weapons is intimately linked with production for peaceful ends in civil industry. For the monitoring of the non-manufacture of chemical weapons to be effective, States parties to the convention must accept international inspection.

The problem of possible clandestine stockpiling and that of possible clandestine production exist and are formidable indeed; the United States draft treaty supplies a courageous and efficient answer to them. That answer compels us to think seriously, since it represents not only a technical solution but also, above all, a new approach to inter-State relations in the security field.

In his statement on 26 April last, Ambassador Fields furnished important explanations, stating that the "open invitation" approach was not intended to impose a heavier burden on some States than on others. We hope that this clarification, which indicates that the "open invitation" approach is to be applied fairly to differing economic and political systems will be rightly understood. It bears witness to the readiness of the draft's authors to negotiate in a constructive spirit.

Chemical weapons remain weapons of fearful efficiency. The use made of them in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and, probably, in other parts of the world as well, has surprised and aroused public opinion. The specialized press recently reported the testing of new missiles specially designed to carry chemical charges. This shows once again to what an extent chemical weapons remain an important element in General Staff plans and in the qualitative development of military arsenals.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Before acceding to a convention prohibiting chemical weapons for all time, each State will wish above all to make sure that the convention will be strictly respected by all parties.

With the exception of chemical weapons, the other matters appearing in our programme of work still await substantive consideration. The appointment of so experienced a colleague as Ambassador Vejvoda to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons ensures that a fresh impulse will be given to negotiations on that subject. A convention prohibiting radiological weapons would, in the present poor international climate, have a political significance well above its intrinsic value. A success in this field would testify to a revival of confidence.

Agreement on agenda item 5 is possible, as we all know. All that is needed is to want it. By comparison with last April, I see at least two new reasons which should induce us to try to reach a positive conclusion to our consultations and to establish an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. First, there is the session of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which is taking place in Vienna at this very time. Owing to a confusion as to competence that we consider deplorable, the question of what is termed the "militarization" of outer space appears as the first item on the agenda for that session. It must be admitted that the lack of any progress in the Conference on Disarmament, the appropriate forum for discussing matters of this kind, is obviously conducive to such regrettable dispersion of effort.

The second reason is the contents of the report to the United States Congress on United States space policy which was distributed to us on 12 April last. I am sure that all delegations found that document as instructive and interesting to read as did my own. It is a document of a global and detailed nature which tackles frankly the salient aspects of the military uses of outer space. It explains, inter alia, the factors which, in the view of the authorities in Washington, stand in the way of the identification of effective measures that could be negotiated at once. Differing opinions are, of course, possible, but they ought to be expressed with a comparable degree of precision. If a discussion of that kind took place within the framework of an ad hoc committee with a general mandate of an exploratory nature, we would be able to perform the important background work that is required. By doing so we would accomplish the first step which, at this stage, can only be the identification of the questions connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A whole session would not suffice for an in-depth discussion of all the issues raised by the report I have mentioned.

The penultimate chapter of this report contains a preliminary evaluation of initiatives taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. If, within the framework of an ad hoc committee, the Soviet delegation could reply to the comments made in the report, we could do the work which the distinguished representative of India eloquently requested on 26 April last.

Furthermore, some detailed views on the subject were put forward by our distinguished French colleague, Ambassador de La Gorce, on behalf of his Government at our last meeting. They deserve our full attention.

(Mr. Valtasaari, Finland)

I have the honour today to introduce to the Conference on Disarmament a working document on the subject of chemical weapons with the title "Technical evaluation of selected scientific methods for the verification of chemical disarmament" (CD/505). This document is the seventh publication in the series of technical handbooks, the so-called Finnish Blue Books, introduced to the Committee and the Conference on Disarmament by the Finnish delegation since 1977 under the general title "Methodology and instrumentation for sampling and analysis in the verification of chemical disarmament".

The prohibition of chemical weapons continues to receive particular attention within Finnish disarmament policy. In our view the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on chemical weapons would be an important contribution, not only in eliminating completely a category of weapons of mass destruction, but also in a broader perspective of international relations. Recent developments involving the use of chemical weapons remind us of the urgency of concluding, at the earliest possible time, a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons.

The question of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for a long time. The complex nature of the problem has been fully revealed in the course of the negotiations. The differing perceptions of individual States on the central issues have been clarified. Yet, the process of negotiations has demonstrated the importance given by all parties to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive treaty. It has also yielded a degree of common understanding on the main elements to be included in it. This is well reflected in document CD/416 describing the status of the work at the end of the summer part of last year's session and the many valuable contributions submitted until then.

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(Mr. Valtaseari, Finland)

During the spring part of this year's session of the Conference important new contributions were made. I should like to recall inter alia the statement by the Soviet Union on some aspects of verification, the documents submitted by delegations, notably of the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, China, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, as well as the draft convention presented by the delegation of the United States in April. The proposals made by you, Mr. President, in your capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and by the Chairmen of the three Working Groups equally deserve appreciation.

One of the most difficult problems in negotiations on banning chemical weapons has been verification. Many delegations have focussed on this crucial question in their contributions. Finland on her part has endeavoured to contribute to the advancement of the negotiations by initiating in 1973 a project on technical aspects of verification. Our work has concentrated on the creation of an analytical capability for verification on chemical warfare agents. The goal of the work has been to develop procedures which could be internationally applied when a comprehensive treaty is concluded. Our purpose has been to accumulate knowledge on and develop modern analytical procedures with the potential of providing technical means for verification. We hope such work could contribute to the progress of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament or at least be useful once a treaty has been concluded.

Starting in 1973 from a general review of suitable methods and techniques,<sup>1</sup> the work of the Finnish project advanced towards a more systematic phase comprising development and application of selected technical procedures, establishment of a data bank and building up of reference and standard compound collections. During its ten years of existence, the Finnish project has developed detailed procedures for systematic identification of nerve agents, their precursors and degradation products as well as of potential non-phosphorous agents. Methods of sampling and the trace analysis of nerve agents from environmental samples have been elaborated. The results of the work have been published and submitted in seven working documents to the Conference on Disarmament, beginning in 1977. The list of these documents appears at the beginning of document CD/505.

The document now submitted by the Finnish delegation aims at being simultaneously a summary of previous work and a concise description of the present state of the methodology of the Finnish project. The objective of the report is to evaluate the potential of existing technical means for verification tasks requiring chemical expertise. The report is, not meant to be a proposal for future verification procedures, but an evaluation of the technical means of handling possible verification tasks, presented for the purpose of advancing discussion. Furthermore, the report is not a collection of detailed analysis of procedures but a general description of the application of different technical means to selected verification tasks. The purpose is to provide a picture of all the analytical methods needed for the completion of each of the tasks. In order to meet a wide range of verification tasks a number of analytical methods have been developed and described.

(Mr. Valtasaari, Finland)

Chapter 2 of document CD/505 discusses the possible verification tasks which might be required in the future Convention, in the context of destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, prohibition of production and development and verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. In chapter 3 the different verification ranges — on-site, near-site and off-site — are discussed. Chapter 4 presents a summary of the technical means for verification of chemical agents which can be utilized by both national and international organizations to collect information on compliance with the Convention. Automatic monitoring, sample collection and methods for analysis in two types of laboratories, a so-called central laboratory and a mobile field laboratory, are discussed in detail in chapters 5 to 8.

In chapter 9 it has been assumed that verification tasks could be handled with different combinations of automatic monitors and laboratory analysis. Whenever possible, use of tamper-free automatic monitors of the "black box" type is preferred. For control of the destruction of stocks and of production facilities, these monitors could be used in combination with inspections carried out by qualified inspectors capable of doing field tests and of collecting representative samples for scientific analysis and identifications of prohibited compounds. Samples can be analysed either in a mobile field laboratory or in a central laboratory.

The most demanding analytical task is obviously met when only a small amount, of a previously unknown agent is found in a complex environment, such as soil, possibly in an advanced state of decomposition. Two aspects of this general problem are discussed in chapter 11.

This publication, CD/505, completes a cycle of work on systematic identification of chemical warfare agents. The Finnish project will now concentrate on two areas: first, on the development of instruments with better performance in order to meet the requirements of very fast progress in the field of instrumental analysis, and second, on the special requirements of verification of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, particularly on developing selected monitors with very long time recording capability. The selection of future priorities will of course depend not only on the findings of the project but also on the progress of the negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

With regard to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, my delegation is gratified that the Ad Hoc Committee resumed its work without delay. We hope that the constructive spirit which characterized its first meetings will prevail in the future. Our delegation shares the view already expressed by others that the document prepared by the Committee's Chairman, CD/CW/WP.81, constitutes a good basis for the continuation of the Committee's work. We would hope that by the end of this session it will be possible to agree on the scope of a future convention and definitions and to reach agreement on the destruction of stocks. It should also be possible to reach agreement on the structure of a convention. It may be possible as well to narrow divergencies on verification, provided that all delegations will demonstrate objectivity in their approach and readiness to compromise and concessions. One of our distinguished colleagues has, recently and openly, although not in this room, deplored the lack of political will on the part of the delegations of socialist countries in these negotiations. In this connection I should like to stress that the political will on their part, or our part, exists, but not to accept unrealistic verification concepts such as presented in the United States draft convention.

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I am referring to the United States document on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the introduction of which was so highly advertised. The document is actually far from being an expression of any desire to resolve the issues of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons. Its essence has already revealed itself clearly enough: it puts up additional hurdles in the way of solving the extremely important problem of banning chemical weapons. This applies first of all to the United States "initiative" which will have and, unfortunately, has already had a negative impact on the course of the negotiations. We urge all of our partners to show a fitting sense of responsibility and political will. The global interests of maintaining international security and stability must finally prevail over selfish considerations and ambitions.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

On 18 April of this year, the Vice-President of the United States, the Honourable George Bush, introduced in this conference a draft convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, contained in document CD/500. This draft convention contains the United States proposals for the contents of an agreement that would provide a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. It was introduced in order to help accelerate the work of the Conference on Disarmament in achieving such a ban. The introduction of this text is the most recent in a long series of United States efforts and initiatives towards the achievement of this goal. Our draft is intended as a contribution to the Conference's work and will provide the basis for other papers to be presented by the United States delegation on specific issues as they are discussed. But, as I indicated in my statement of 26 April, my delegation does not have a monopoly on creativity. We are ready and willing to consider any alternative approaches as long as they would satisfy our fundamental objective, and that is an effective ban on chemical weapons.

The efforts of many interested delegations have gone into the process of this important undertaking, and much more remains to be done. A week ago today, many now in this Chamber had just returned from the chemical weapons workshop sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany. The workshop was a significant contribution to our work on a chemical weapons ban, and all of those in attendance have a

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(Mr. Fields, United States)

better understanding of the complexity of the problems associated with the destruction of chemical weapons. Moreover, they have clearer insights into the verifiability of this process and the importance of on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons to the effectiveness of a convention. We are indebted to the Federal Republic of Germany for this excellent manifestation of its continuing support of this critical negotiation.

Today I want to emphasize our readiness to continue to work intensively and constructively to reach a ban on chemical weapons. Not only is my delegation here in full force, but we have brought with us several experts, including a lawyer, who will work full-time on the Conference's effort to conclude a chemical weapons ban so that such a ban can be a reality as soon as possible.

Today I would like to begin a review of the current status of the issues involved in a chemical weapons ban, and explain how the United States draft convention approaches each of these issues. Basically, a ban on chemical weapons must deal with four types of issues: first, what a party to the convention is prohibited from doing, that is, what it must not do; second, what a party may do; third, what a party must do; and fourth, the verification measures that will be necessary to provide confidence that States are complying with their obligations.

Today I will discuss the first set of issues -- what a party must not do under a chemical weapons ban. In this area agreement appears to have been reached on the key issues, although a number of secondary issues remain. You will notice that in this area the United States draft draws extensively from the results of the Conference on Disarmament's past work.

A statement of what must be prohibited by a chemical weapons ban can be summarized in a single phrase -- a party should not have anything -- anything at all -- to do with chemical weapons. This basic prohibition is expressed in the first article of the United States draft convention. The parties must not develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons. To understand the scope of this prohibition, however, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the term "chemical weapons". This term is defined by article II. "Chemical weapons" are defined as, first, "super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals and their precursors" of types or in quantities not justified for permitted purposes. Thus, the definition of "chemical weapons" incorporates a general "purpose" criterion.

"Super-toxic lethal chemicals" are extremely dangerous and toxic chemicals, such as mustard gas and the nerve gases, that have little or no use other than in chemical warfare. "Other lethal chemicals" are chemicals

(Mr. Fields, United States)

that are somewhat less dangerous and less toxic, chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide or phosgene, that can be used in chemical warfare but also have uses in the chemical industry. "Other harmful chemicals" are chemicals that are less toxic still, and therefore less dangerous, but which nevertheless have potential uses in chemical warfare and which need to be regulated. The term "precursors" includes any chemical which may be used in production of these chemicals. I emphasize again that all of these chemicals -- "super-toxic lethal", "other lethal", "other harmful", and "precursors" -- are included in the definition of chemical weapons.

There are also certain chemicals which are specifically excluded by this definition, namely less toxic chemicals that are used for domestic law-enforcement and domestic riot control purposes. Also excluded are less toxic chemicals used as herbicides. The hostile use of such chemicals as herbicides, however, is already effectively banned by international law. We recognize that many advocate the inclusion of such chemicals in a chemical weapons ban. In view of the widespread development, production, and use of these chemicals for permitted purposes, we have not been persuaded that including them would increase the effectiveness of the convention.

But the scope of the definition of "chemical weapons" in the United States draft does not stop with toxic chemicals. Also included are munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or harm through the release of the various chemicals I have discussed. Thus, not only are chemicals included in the definition of "chemical weapons", but also any type of munitions or devices used to release them on the battlefield. Finally, the definition of "chemical weapons" includes any equipment or chemical specifically designed to be used in conjunction with such munitions or devices. Thus, for example, a chemical specifically designed to make a gas mask ineffective by neutralizing its charcoal filter is considered to be a chemical weapon.

The basic prohibition contained in article I goes beyond the obligation that I have discussed thus far -- this article also provides an obligation not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons. This reflects an idea proposed in this forum by the delegation of Sweden, that such activities as the training of troops to use chemical weapons be banned along with the chemical weapons themselves. Further refinement of this concept is necessary to make it more precise and to ensure that legitimate protective activities are not hampered.

Subparagraph (c) of article I would prohibit the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict. This provision was incorporated in recognition of the importance attached by States to a provision banning use of chemical weapons. The language proposed by the United States provides for a

(Mr. Fields, United States)

comprehensive ban without undermining the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The prohibition in the United States draft is similar to, but distinct from, the prohibition contained in the Protocol. The Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons in war, although many Parties have explicitly reserved the right to retaliatory use.

Article I must be read in conjunction with article XIV, which stipulates that nothing in this Convention shall detract from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which would continue in full force. Thus, in effect, the proposed chemical weapons convention would broaden a State's obligation but not replace the Protocol. If for any reason a party to the convention should withdraw from the chemical weapons convention, the 1925 Protocol would still be in place -- as a sort of "safety net" -- to continue to regulate that party's actions. However, as I suggested moments earlier, the proposed prohibition on use has several important differences from that now in existence pursuant to the Geneva Protocol. For one thing, combined with the prohibition on possession, there would be effectively no right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons after the existing stocks of a State have been destroyed. Second, the proposed provision prohibits use in any "armed conflict" rather than in "war". The concept of "armed conflict" is well-defined in the laws of war; the most recent revisions to the laws of war contained in the 1977 Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, have taken great pains to emphasize that they will be applicable in all "armed conflicts" rather than only in "wars of national liberation" where some have argued that international law pertaining to "war" does not apply.

Finally, sub-paragraph (d) of article I of the United States draft is an undertaking not to assist, encourage, or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to the parties. This, in essence, is a non-circumvention clause, if you will. It means that no party could circumvent the convention by aiding any other States, organizations, or individuals in doing something that it could not do itself under the convention.

Thus, we can see that article I contains a comprehensive set of provisions designed to prevent chemical warfare. The situation once the treaty becomes effective would be in sharp contrast to the current situation. States would not have the capacity to wage war with chemical weapons, whereas today the most common way of deterring chemical warfare is by threatening retaliation in kind. By seeking to eliminate the capacity to wage chemical warfare and not merely to deter the use of such a capability, we are seeking a more stable international situation and enhanced security for all.

Today I have outlined what in our view should be prohibited under a chemical weapons ban. This area is perhaps less controversial than others, but it is fundamental to a sound convention. As I have mentioned, I will return to our draft convention in later interventions to address other aspects of the United States approach.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

I should like to address briefly certain aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the working body of which is under your guidance.

The proposals you tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in document CD/CW/WP.81 reflect a purposeful approach towards the implementation of the Committee's mandate. It is positive that these proposals have the form of draft articles of a future convention. We regard the texts in document CD/CW/WP.81 as an example of the significant work carried out in the working body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The continuity in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons is a much needed element, conducive to the creation of a businesslike atmosphere.

A case in point is the issue of diversion of chemical weapon stocks for permitted purposes. The formulations on this issue contained in your document reflect the continuity in the positions of participating delegations -- with regard to both the applicability of this method and to its technical definition. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which has made its own modest contribution to the elaboration of this definition, considers the parts of document CD/CW/WP.81 which deal with the issue of diversion as a very positive development. The participants in the negotiations have made known that they are convinced in principle of the technical feasibility of this form of destruction, which is laid down in numerous documents.

Scientific circles are also unanimous with respect to the possibilities of converting chemicals from chemical weapons into useful products. In the course of the negotiations, many examples have been given on the application which toxic chemicals have in the civil industries.

And yet one delegation has now departed from this understanding, indeed from its previous position. In the draft convention on the banning of chemical weapons, proposed by the United States (document CD/500) the issue of diversion of chemical weapons has been disregarded.

We look upon the issue of diversion in a larger socio-economic aspect. The conversion of part of the current chemical-weapon stockpiles, to be accomplished as a result of the application of a future convention, will materialize the long-standing yearning of United Nations Member States to divert for peaceful purposes the means and resources released as a result of disarmament.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

Instead, I have asked for the floor to introduce to you three documents which have been prepared as new Norwegian contributions to the work of the Conference in connection with agenda item 4 concerning chemical weapons and item 1 concerning a nuclear test ban.

The first two documents of the Conference on Disarmament relate to the most important and promising negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons. These negotiations are being most efficiently led by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, to whom we wish to pay special tribute. Norway supports the initiative which he has taken with a view to promoting the negotiations, including his proposals in document CD/CW/WP.81 for draft articles for parts of a chemical weapons convention.

The Government of Norway has expressed its appreciation for the tabling of the United States draft treaty on 18 April by Vice-President Bush, which represents an essential and most positive element in the negotiations. It has also welcomed the important statement made by Ambassador Victor Issraelyan of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 21 February with regard to verification of a chemical weapons ban. Finally, let me today also mention the most successful demonstration of destruction of chemical weapons at the workshop in Munster, Federal Republic of Germany, on 12-14 June, which will no doubt give a further impulse to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

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(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

The Norwegian research programme on sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions, which was initiated in 1981, is already known to the Conference through documents CD/311 and CD/396, and two previous research reports.

Working Paper CD/508, which I have the honour to present today, outlines the results of, and the conclusions which can be drawn from, the third part of the research programme, which was carried out during last winter. The research report itself is circulated as an annex to document CD/509.

I would like to underline that our research programme is based on experiments carried out under field conditions. This implies that samples of chemical agents are kept outdoor to deteriorate by exposure to the prevailing weather conditions, such as wind, changing temperature and snowfall. By doing this we have wanted to make sure that our findings have as realistic a basis as possible and that they are of direct relevance to the verification mechanisms to be agreed upon in a future chemical weapons convention.

During the winter 1983/1984 the investigations were extended to examine in depth those chemical warfare agents which are particularly unstable, and where verification may be a problem within a four-week timeframe. This period, we believe, is a reasonable time for an international inspection team to be organized and sent to select samples from an alleged contaminated area. Those agents are the so-called G-nerve agent such as sarin and soman and the blister agent mustard. In order to increase the possibility of definite verification of the two unstable nerve agents sarin and soman, we included analysis of their decomposition products and also the two main impurities formed during their production. In addition, we studied the effect of droplet size and carried out several experiments under different climatic conditions with the three warfare agents. The three research reports presented to CD so far contain, therefore, detailed information on several different factors which will influence the possibility of verification of use of chemical agents, namely: penetration in snow, coverage of snowfall, temperature, wind speed, droplet size and interference from battlefield background.

Experiments carried out last year showed that temperature was a very important factor as regards the possibility of verification under winter conditions. Low temperatures increased greatly the possibility of obtaining positive verification of the three unstable agents, whereas temperatures close to zero led to rapid deterioration of the samples. In the latter case verification by means of decomposition products or production by-products proved most important and greatly facilitated the verification efforts. It should also be mentioned that as regards mustard gas, verification was made easier the larger the droplet size.

The experiments carried out so far prove that use of selective and sensitive analytical methods make it possible to verify use of a number of agents -- which are specified in the research report and in the Working Paper -- well beyond four weeks.

During the winter 1983/84 a new line of investigation was also initiated in order to gain practical experience in the problems of sample collection, sample preparation and transportation of samples. The first experiment took place 100 km from the main laboratory, whereas a second test took place 1,400 km from the laboratory. The results from these experiments seem to be interesting and highly relevant to the role which the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies may be called upon to perform within a future convention.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

The results show that with regard to effects there are large differences between the different methods of preparing the samples for transportation. Without any special effort to preserve the samples the unstable agent will deteriorate within 24 hours. As an example I can mention that from samples of mustard gas only 2-9 per cent was left after 24 hours of transport without any precaution. It is clear that this finding has a very significant bearing on the future procedures to be selected for sampling and transport of any agent. A good method was shown to be extraction of the snow samples with an organic solvent. Furthermore, I should like to emphasize that extraction of samples was found possible even with simple equipment and under improvised field conditions. This is a consideration that must be given due emphasis in this respect.

I hope that the conclusions of the Norwegian research programme so far, as described in documents CD/508 and CD/509, can be of use for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, including its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. As I have already stated, our main focus has been to assist the Conference as regards the elaboration of the role of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies within the framework of a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

In my statement before this Conference on 21 June, I discussed a fundamental requirement for any successful chemical weapons ban, the requirement that such a ban be comprehensive. I explained how the United States draft convention would provide such a comprehensive ban. I described, in essence, what we believe that a party to a convention must not do. I mentioned that certain "permitted activities" are not included in our proposed ban -- in other words, there are certain things that a party may do. In my remarks today I will describe more completely the United States views on permitted activities under the chemical weapons convention.

Let me begin by stating our objective in this regard. The primary objective of all the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations is to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. But many of us also share another objective -- an important objective -- that the legitimate, peaceful chemical activities in our countries be allowed to continue and expand without being unduly hindered by a chemical weapons convention.

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(Mr. Fields, United States)

These legitimate, peaceful uses of toxic chemicals generally are regarded as uses for "permitted purposes". This term is defined in paragraph 3 of article II of the United States draft convention. By "permitted purposes" we mean, first, industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or other peaceful purposes. Uses of chemicals for such purposes have obvious benefits, not only to the countries represented in this distinguished forum, but to all mankind. The use of certain pesticides, for example, can greatly increase the yield of agricultural lands, thus enabling the world's population to be nourished better.

The problem with permitted uses of toxic chemicals is that they pose a potential for misuse and a corresponding problem for verification. We all want peaceful uses of chemicals to continue, but none of us wants such activities to be used for clandestine chemical weapons production. This is a very serious problem, since many chemicals that are used in industry can also be effectively used in chemical warfare. Thus, we recognize that a certain degree of regulation of permitted activities will be necessary in any convention banning chemical weapons. The United States proposal for such regulations, and their implementation, is presented in article III and annex III of our draft convention. In paragraph 1 of article III we propose that a party may only possess or use chemicals for permitted activities in types and quantities consistent with such purposes. Thus, if anyone, whether linked to the government or not, purports to be engaged in permitted activities but possesses chemicals inappropriate to that activity or in amounts in excess of that legitimately needed for the activity, then that would be a violation of the convention.

Moreover, although any chemical may be used for one or more permitted purposes, there are some specific chemicals which pose special risks for diversion to chemical weapons purposes, and we believe that these chemicals must be subject to particular regulation, depending on the degree of risk they pose and the degree to which they are used in industry. To this end, Annex III presents three schedules of chemicals that are subject to special regulation if they are used for permitted purposes.

First, there are some chemicals -- for example, super-toxic lethal nerve gases -- that are extremely dangerous, but also have limited applications for research, medical, or protective purposes. These chemicals are listed in Schedule A. Paragraph 3 of article III proposes that the production and use of such chemicals shall be in "laboratory quantities", that is, a few kilograms. In other words, no large-scale commercial uses of such chemicals would be allowed.

Second, there are other chemicals, such as hydrogen cyanide and phosgene, which are used for permitted purposes in large quantities, yet which also pose a particular risk for diversion to chemical weapons purposes. This category includes both precursors and toxic chemicals. These chemicals are listed in Schedule B. The United States believes that each party should be required to make annual reports concerning the production and use of such chemicals. Because of the large-scale production and widespread use of these chemicals, more stringent verification measures, such as on-site inspection, would not increase confidence in compliance.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Finally, there are some chemicals which are used for permitted purposes that are not as widely used as those listed in Schedule B, and which pose a greater risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes. These chemicals are listed in Schedule C. They are largely "key precursors", although some toxic chemicals should also be included. The United States proposes not only that production and use of such chemicals be declared, but also that their production should be subject to systematic international on-site inspection on the basis of random selection of facilities. Our approach in this area is based on earlier proposals by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

But the list of activities that should be permitted does not stop with these peaceful uses that I have discussed thus far. We believe that any convention must also have provisions, such as those in articles II and III of the United States draft, which allow the use of certain chemicals for "protective purposes". "Protective purposes" are defined as a subset of "permitted purposes"; they are purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons, rather than directly related to the weapons themselves. For example, while a party may not produce mustard gas so as to be able to engage in chemical warfare, it may produce a small amount of mustard gas necessary to test clothing designed to protect its troops from chemical attack.

Obviously, to prevent a party from using the "protective purposes" exception to maintain an inherent chemical weapons production capability, the amount of chemicals that a party may have for "protective purposes" must be carefully regulated. This is true for all toxic chemicals, but especially for super-toxic lethal chemicals and their precursors. Paragraph 2 of article III of the United States draft provides for such detailed limitations. Specifically, the amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors that a party may produce or use for these purposes is strictly limited to the amount that can be justified for protective purposes, and in no event may the total amount exceed one ton per year. Once a party has produced or acquired its one ton limit, even if it has used some of that amount, it may not produce or acquire additional chemicals until the following year. If a party chooses to produce super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes, such production may only occur at "a single specialized facility"; that is, a single, declared facility of limited capacity. This facility would be subject to special verification measures. While a party may transfer such chemicals for protective purposes to another party, the amounts of such transfers are limited, and such chemicals may not be transferred to a non-party State or re-transferred to a third State. If a party transfers such chemicals for protective purposes, it must declare these transfers.

Thus, as is clear from paragraph 8 of article II, the United States believes that permitted activities should include those related to peaceful uses of chemicals in our chemical industries and to protective activities. Paragraph 8 also includes as a "permitted purpose" any military purpose that does not make use of the chemical action of a toxic chemical to cause death or injury. This is an important, but relatively technical exception, which permits, for example, the military to use a toxic chemical as a rocket fuel. This provision would not provide a party with a capability for chemical warfare, since the chemicals involved are not suitable for this purpose.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

There are two other reasonable activities that would be allowed under the United States draft convention. Paragraph 4 of article III allows one party to assist another in the destruction of chemical weapons. Also, paragraph 5 of article III specifically protects activities for economic and technical development and co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, including the exchange of toxic chemicals and equipment for peaceful purposes, from undue interference.

Though it is important not to hamper unduly the activities of our chemical industries, we must ensure that such industries are not misused for the clandestine production of chemical weapons. This is the most important unresolved issue in the area of "permitted purposes". In attempting to develop a general approach for providing assurance of the proper use of a party's chemical industry, a number of constructive and comprehensive proposals have been made by western delegations. But there have been no responses to these proposals nor any counter-proposals on this vital question. Progress simply cannot be made when members of the Conference choose not to participate actively in this crucial area of discussion.

I believe that I have demonstrated today that the United States approach would not unduly interfere with necessary, permitted activities and yet would be effective in ensuring that such activities were not abused for prohibited purposes. We look forward to receiving comments from other delegations on the United States approach to this important issue. I will continue to explain the United States draft convention in subsequent statements.

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(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The Group of 21 wishes to express its satisfaction that the Conference has pursued its negotiating mandate and made progress in the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Group considers that in view of recent events the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should continue the drafting of the convention with the greatest urgency and with a view to ensuring that a draft text of the convention should be submitted in the report of the Conference to the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly or as soon as possible.

(The President)

The talks on the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons also offer little hope for success. The latest developments on these issues hardly advance the negotiations towards mutually acceptable agreements.

(Mr. Brunner, Switzerland)

Following these remarks on arms control and disarmament in general, I should like to make some observations on chemical weapons.

The threat which these weapons represent is at present once again sadly topical. The danger they constitute is enhanced for two reasons. Firstly, the technology of chemical weapons is relatively simple and cheap, and is therefore within the reach of many States which might face greater temptation to employ them. Secondly, the effects of such weapons are such that it may justifiably be asked whether they should not be classed in the category of particularly hateful weapons in that they provoke unnecessary suffering.

Switzerland was one of the first States to sign the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which it ratified on 12 July 1932. It is also a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons of 10 April 1972, which it ratified four years later.

The value of the Geneva Protocol is undiminished. It is therefore important for all States to accede to it, so that it can be genuinely universal in scope. Switzerland therefore urges all States which have not yet acceded to the Protocol to take that step as rapidly as possible. The Geneva Protocol will thus become, while awaiting something better, a general prohibition on the first use of such weapons.

However necessary it may be, this international instrument on the prohibition of use is not enough to eliminate the danger of the use of chemical weapons in case of armed conflict. Only disarmament measures which include the unqualified abolition of this category of weapons and the destruction of existing stocks will make it possible really to eliminate the danger.

This type of issue is inherently one which must be settled primarily at the world and universal level. Only if a universal prohibition cannot be negotiated should one fall back upon a less ambitious level. As far as we are concerned, this might be the Stockholm Conference, and we have taken in this spirit the proposals to that effect made in the Swedish capital. Switzerland thus attaches enormous importance to a convention on the general and universal prohibition of chemical weapons. It welcomes the efforts made in this field in the Conference on Disarmament to achieve this goal, and hopes that the negotiations on this subject will be crowned with success. For its part, my country remains determined to contribute actively to the work of the group on these weapons within the Conference.

Our interest in the conclusion of such a convention stems from security considerations, and this implies in particular that the convention should include suitable verification procedures, a condition sine qua non for the renunciation of costly national measures of protection and defence.

(Mr. Brunner, Switzerland)

Switzerland is nevertheless aware of the fact that such work requires time, time which the alarming situation in this sphere may not allow us. Immediate intermediary measures appear essential. Thus, if a general and universal agreement, whose technical modalities could give rise to lengthy discussions, cannot be signed shortly, Switzerland proposes that all States should forthwith make a solemn undertaking, in a suitable universal forum, to renounce the use of chemical weapons. Such an undertaking, of a political nature, which could be made under the auspices of the United Nations, for example, would immediately palliate the fact that not all States are parties to the Geneva Protocol. It would therefore make it possible to await with greater peace of mind a general convention to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons for all time, and solemnly confirm the undertaking made by the States which have ratified the Geneva Protocol.

As you know, Switzerland, which possesses a highly developed private chemicals industry, nevertheless does not produce any chemical weapons, and therefore does not export any such weapons. Furthermore, Switzerland has not acquired chemical weapons abroad. Thus it does not possess any stockpiles of such weapons. Our army's equipment serves solely to protect combatants against the effects of toxic chemicals in case of conflict. Army training is confined to the proper use of the available means of defence. Civil defence is aimed at ensuring that in the event of conflict the civilian population is protected against the effects of chemical weapons and other means of mass destruction.

To conclude, I should like to invite members and observers of the Conference on Disarmament to visit, during the first part of the 1985 session, the Swiss Army's laboratories for protection against chemical weapons at Spiez. They will be able to visit an institution that the present times render necessary, and one which would be useful for verification purposes if a general convention were signed.

(Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Egypt)

Egypt looks forward to pooling efforts in order to speedily conclude a convention banning chemical weapons which provides principles and provisions that enhance its credibility and reinforce the security of its parties. We have no doubt that building up on what has been achieved so far will contribute to the Conference's efforts to attain this goal.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

Mr. President, today I will continue my series of statements to the Conference explaining how the United States draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons approaches each of the four major issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical weapons ban. Today I will consider the issue of what a party must do under such a ban.

There are two main actions that a party is required to take under the convention. First, a party must declare its activities related to chemical weapons and declare the areas and facilities where these activities take place. Second, a party must destroy the production facilities and stockpiles that provide it with a capability to wage chemical warfare. I will deal with each of these requirements in turn.

In order to establish the locations and facilities that will be subject to systematic verification, article IV of the United States draft convention requires a party to provide detailed information concerning all its activities that have a bearing on its capability to wage chemical warfare. The first of these "declarations" would occur even before the convention has entered into force

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(Mr. Fields, United States)

for a party. The United States has proposed in document CD/500, its draft convention, that a party be required to state when it signs the convention whether chemical weapons or chemical weapons production facilities are located on its territory or are under its control anywhere in the world. This declaration would provide a foundation for aiding the verification of the convention and would be an important confidence-building measure.

Thirty days after the convention has entered into force for a party, more detailed declarations must be made concerning a party's chemical warfare capability. If a party in fact possesses chemical weapons, that party must precisely state the location of those weapons and the inventory of chemicals and weapons at each location by name, chemical structural formula, toxicity, and weight. Moreover, a party must declare whether it has any super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes, since these chemicals have a relationship to a party's capability to wage chemical warfare and thus must be closely monitored and regulated. If a party does not possess chemical weapons, this must also be declared.

To give a more complete description of a party's potential chemical warfare capability, other types of chemicals that pose a risk of being diverted to chemical weapons purposes must also be declared on an annual basis. The extremely dangerous chemicals on schedule A of the draft convention, though permitted in very small quantities for research, medical, or protective purposes, pose a high risk for diversion to chemical weapons. Information on the persons authorized to possess those chemicals and the quantity produced and uses made of them must be reported annually. Chemicals on schedule B have large-scale peaceful purposes but also pose a particular risk for diversion to chemical weapons. Annual reports must be made on the quantities of these chemicals produced, imported, and exported, and on their end uses. Annual reports on chemicals listed on schedule C, which also pose a particular risk of being diverted to chemical weapons, must be submitted on the amount produced, imported, or exported, if that amount exceeds a specific limit per year.

Thus, the United States draft convention requires information of varying detail on all the chemicals that have some bearing on the capability of a party to wage chemical warfare. This information is necessary to ensure that these chemicals are being destroyed, used, or monitored in accordance with the provisions of the convention.

It is equally necessary to have detailed information on production facilities that produce or have produced chemicals which could be used as chemical weapons. The definition of a "chemical weapons production facility" is contained in paragraph 10 of article II. The United States draft convention would require parties, within 30 days of entry into force, to declare their chemical weapons production facilities and give their location, nature, and capacity, along with other information specified in annex II. Annex II requires that chemical weapons production facilities be declared even if they have been destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes, or were or are dual-purpose facilities. Conversely, a party

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must declare if it does not have any chemical weapons production facilities. The convention also requires the declaration of any production facility of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes and of any facility producing the chemicals on schedules B and C. Declarations must also be made concerning facilities used for developing and testing chemical weapons. All the facilities declared are those either directly connected with chemical weapons or those producing chemicals that pose a particular risk of being diverted for chemical weapons purposes.

The information contained in the declarations would not only be necessary to help the Consultative Committee in determining which locations and facilities on the territory of a party would be subject to systematic international on-site verification. It would also help specify those facilities and chemical stocks that will have to be destroyed under the provisions of articles V and VI of the draft convention. These articles require a party to destroy all of its chemical weapons and all of its chemical weapons production facilities.

Along with the initial declaration concerning its chemical weapons, a party must submit a detailed plan for their destruction, including the locations and manner of their destruction, schedules of quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed, and the end-products of the destruction process. Pursuant to article V, destruction of chemical weapons must begin not later than 12 months and finish not later than 10 years after the convention enters into force. This destruction process would be subject to systematic international on-site verification, including the continuous presence of inspectors and the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments. In accordance with article V, a party would also be required to make annual reports concerning the implementation of its destruction plan.

Paragraph 1 (E) of article V provides that the destruction of chemical weapons is to be controlled by a time-table contained in annex II. This time-table is not specified in the United States draft and needs to be the topic of negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament. It is vital that the time-table for the destruction of chemical weapons be such that, during the destruction period, no State can gain a military advantage over another due to the pace of its destruction activities. The negotiation of this time-table will require the consideration of many factors to achieve a fair and balanced result. Because of the importance of this time-table to a party's national security, it is necessary that it be specified before the convention is opened for signature. We cannot delay consideration of this crucial provision of the convention until after entry into force, as some have suggested. I urge delegations to begin to examine this basic issue.

Before leaving the subject of destruction of chemical weapons, I would like to discuss one other issue. Some delegations have urged that diversion of chemicals contained in chemical weapons to permitted purposes be allowed in addition to destruction. The United States has opposed the concept of diversion, primarily because of concerns about how to verify that the items involved are not placed in clandestine chemical weapons stockpiles. Clearly, additional,

(Mr. Fields, United States)

very intrusive verification measures would be necessary to ensure that such a prohibited action was not taking place. In view of the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union and others about international on-site verification, the United States chose the approach which would minimize the need for such inspection, that is, to require that all chemical weapons be destroyed. However, the United States delegation is willing to consider any proposals for diversion, as long as these proposals specify in detail what could be diverted and the verification measures that would apply to such diversion. This would enable members of the Conference on Disarmament to determine whether the requirement for effective verification will be satisfied by those proposals.

Article VI of the draft convention requires a party to cease production of chemical weapons immediately and then to destroy its chemical weapons production facilities within 10 years. A party must submit a plan for the destruction of these production facilities that explains the method that will be used to close and destroy the equipment and structures comprising the facility, and that specifies the time periods when each specific production facility will be destroyed. As with chemical weapons, production facilities must be destroyed in accordance with an agreed time-table that ensures that no State will gain a military advantage during the destruction process. This time-table would also have to be negotiated before the convention is opened for signature. The destruction of these facilities would be subject to systematic international on-site verification, and annual reports on the destruction process would be also required.

Pursuant to the definition of chemical weapons production facility in the draft convention, parties would not only be required to destroy facilities that actually produce chemical munitions. Parties would also be required, with one exception, to destroy any facility that was designed, constructed, or used since 1 January 1946 to produce for use in chemical weapons any toxic chemicals or key precursors. The only exception to this broad requirement would be for facilities that in the past produced a toxic chemical listed in schedule B of annex III that was used for chemical weapons purposes.

The effect of the combined action of article VI and the definition of the term "chemical weapons production facility" can best be illustrated by a few examples. A facility that was built for the production of toxic chemicals solely intended for chemical weapons but that was later converted to other purposes would have to be destroyed, since it was designed and built for chemical weapons purposes. A dual purpose facility — that is, one that produces toxic chemicals for both chemical weapons purposes and for permitted purposes — would also have to be destroyed, in order to provide complete confidence that it will not clandestinely produce chemical weapons in the future. These examples illustrate the requirement to destroy facilities that have had a direct connection with a party's chemical warfare capability.

On the other hand, a facility that has produced hydrogen cyanide — a chemical listed on schedule B — and, in the past, sold some to the military for chemical weapons use, would not have to be destroyed under the United States draft convention. Since the chemicals on schedule B are produced in such large quantities

(Mr. Fields, United States)

for permitted purposes, requiring the destruction of a facility that at one time in the past happened to sell such chemicals to the military would not increase confidence in compliance. In any event, the production of schedule B chemicals is subject to the verification requirements contained in annex III.

Some have argued that the United States approach on this issue requires the destruction of too many facilities that are put to peaceful uses in addition to uses involving chemical weapons. But the United States objective in these negotiations is to eliminate now and forever the capability of a party to wage chemical warfare. In order for there to be the highest degree of confidence that this objective has been achieved, it is necessary that all chemical facilities that were either designed, constructed, or used for the production of chemical weapons be destroyed. My delegation acknowledges that there might be some economic costs in connection with this approach, both to other countries and certainly to the United States. However, the United States is willing, and believes other countries will be willing, to pay this modest cost in order to assure the world that it will not be possible for a party to this convention to wage chemical warfare.

The most important unresolved issues regarding declaration and destruction involve chemical weapons production facilities. Belatedly, in this fifth year of the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on chemical weapons, serious efforts to define this term have begun. We welcome these efforts and urge that they be continued and expanded. Also, positions remain far apart on both the timing and the content of the declarations of these facilities. Some delegations have not presented any views on important aspects of this problem, arguing that these issues should be dealt with at a later time. We cannot make progress in this way. I hope that those delegations will begin to participate actively in efforts to find solutions to these unresolved problems.

In brief, the United States draft convention provides that a party must supply detailed information on its chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities, and other activities that relate to its capability to wage chemical warfare. Once that information has been provided, the draft convention provides that a party must destroy its chemical weapons and those production facilities that have a direct relationship to its chemical warfare capability. These two actions that a party must take will, along with other provisions of the draft agreement, provide for a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons.

In my next statement, I will continue to examine the manner in which the United States draft convention addresses the major issues involved in a chemical weapons ban.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

This objective may appear unrealistic or illusory. However, it is in fact the sole objective which can bring peace to mankind. The captious argument to the effect that nuclear weapons already exist and cannot be disinvented should not be accepted as valid. If this reasoning were sound, it should have prevented the adoption of, for example, the Convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons, and should now lead us to give up any attempt to prohibit chemical weapons, which have also been invented.

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(Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

I note with satisfaction that effective negotiations have begun regarding a convention on the prohibition of the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. This has been received as evidence of a laudable political will. Without underestimating the complexity of the problems involved in this question, I would urge that all the necessary efforts should be made to negotiate realistic compromises in the interests of mankind. The time has come to conclude this convention, for which the world is waiting.

(Mr. Mertes, Federal Republic of Germany)

We all know, nevertheless, that the work of the Conference has been beset by great difficulties and that progress has been slow. Let me assure you, nevertheless, Mr. President, that the German Bundestag and public of the Federal Republic of Germany watch the proceedings of this Conference closely. It is the wish of my Government to contribute to the proceedings to the best of its ability. Only recently the German Bundestag has forcefully supported the commitment of the Federal German Government to a world-wide verifiable interdiction of all chemical weapons. In this spirit, the German Bundestag has welcomed all recent initiatives that have been submitted to this Conference, most recently the draft convention submitted by the United States.

In the views of the legislators of the Federal Republic, this draft with its built-in flexibility provides a concrete and realistic contribution to the permanent abolition of a whole category of weapons. The German Bundestag and the Federal Government are unanimous in their position that a global interdiction of chemical weapons for all times is vastly superior to any regional solution, for example in terms of chemical-weapon-free zones. Any regional approach would divert attention from the global effort and, in all likelihood, prove ineffective, given the complexity of the verification issues. Regional negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban would also exclude Third World countries from the solution of a problem which they, too, perceive to be of global importance.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

My delegation welcomed the establishment this year of four subsidiary bodies. It was and continues to be ready to take active part in the work of all of them. Certainly there are great differences in the activity and indeed in the momentary possibilities of individual Ad Hoc Committees. But we maintain that in all four Ad Hoc Committees useful results could be achieved if delegations from all groups of States displayed the necessary flexibility. A compromise approach limited to only some delegations and groups of delegations is not sufficient in a body of a multilateral nature.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The largest volume of work has been done, as usual in recent years, in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Although the spring activity of the three working groups established within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was marked to some extent by the delaying influence of some delegations, the groups finally managed to undertake at least some work with texts on the provisions of the future convention.

This trend seems to be continuing in the summer, with one improvement: no delegation is trying to misinterpret the wording of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, which happened frequently during the spring part of the session. But let it be noted that the progress is painfully slow. We are still witnessing the practice whereby some delegations ignore the positions of other delegations and persistently put forward their often maximalistic requirements without regard for the considerations of other delegations, and exceeding by far the real needs of the convention's implementation. Let me give you one example. The problem of initial declarations has already been discussed quite extensively within the Conference. It is clear that numerous delegations, including western ones, do not consider it necessary to indicate, apart from relatively detailed information on volume and types of chemical weapons, the precise location of these weapons too.

It so happens that chemical weapons are very often stored at military sites, relating not only to chemical warfare and having general importance for the maintenance of national security. Moreover, if a country wanted to hide some stockpiles of chemical weapons it would be much easier not to declare them. Various alternative proposals for the verification of stockpiles have been advanced. Nevertheless, some delegations stubbornly continue to press for the inclusion of description of localities in the initial declarations. Thus, an absolutely superfluous requirement continues to complicate unnecessarily negotiations on a given aspect.

In this connection I would like to stress that we fully understand the desire of the United States delegation to propagate its draft convention submitted by Vice-President Bush on 18 April. It is only natural that delegations defend their proposals. But we would expect the United States delegation to defend its proposal not only by the repetition of its provisions in the plenary or in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons but also by reacting to questions and comments of other delegations on the draft. In my statement of 26 April, I put forward some comments and drew attention to certain aspects which my delegation considers inadequate for inclusion in the future chemical weapons convention. We have already heard three statements by Ambassador Fields dedicated to the explanation of the United States draft convention. However, these statements merely amount to a restatement of basically understandable parts of the draft, while not responding to inquiries and comments of delegations. We also have not heard the slightest argument supporting the need for the concept of verification by "open invitation". Thus, comments on all weak points of the draft were ignored and these points were neither covered nor improved in the statements by Ambassador Fields.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Here I would like to say again, that we fail to see the logic, for example, of arbitrary scattering toxic chemicals and the precursors in Schedules A, B and C, as proposed in document CD/500 and explained by Ambassador Fields on 5 July. The construction of these schedules is clearly overly generous to the United States chemical weapons. In Schedule A we cannot find QL, which is the key precursor for the most dangerous chemical warfare agent VX which forms, as is well known, a substantial part of the United States chemical arsenals. This generosity, however, is not accorded to chemicals supposed to be important for the arsenals of other countries.

Much has been said in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons about confidence. The notion of confidence is not a simple one, but I do not intend to go into details now. I would simply like to stress that confidence, or lack of it, is the result of many factors. Thus, it can hardly inspire confidence that, as Scientific American of 26 April puts it: "... While Bush delivered the olive branch in Geneva, administration officials in Washington were cajoling Congress to break a 15-year moratorium on new chemical weapons and spend \$95 million to make binary nerve gas munitions ...". These weapons are certainly not meant to be put in a museum, if produced. The words of General Bernard Rogers, published in Jane's Defence Weekly recently, are quite clear in this regard. The NATO Commander-in-Chief considers that NATO should deploy binary rounds being developed in the United States; NATO needs both long-range rounds with a long-acting lethal chemical, which would be carried by bombers or as a missile warhead, and a shorter-range artillery shell loaded with a lethal chemical of shorter duration.

(Mr. Rowe, Australia)

The Australian delegation is inscribed on the speaker's list today to address the subject scheduled for this week -- that of chemical weapons.

Hardly a plenary meeting goes by without some speaker emphasizing that this body, the Conference on Disarmament, is a multilateral negotiating forum. My delegation shares the regrets of those delegations which lament the fact that so little negotiating is, in fact, taking place. We are pleased, however, to note that chemical weapons is one area where such negotiations are currently under way.

It is of the essence of negotiation that one seeks to define clearly the areas where consensus has been reached and, then, to consider remaining areas of divergence with a view to achieving compromise or agreement. Unfortunately, this does not always seem to be the case in our present negotiations. I am thinking particularly of areas where consensus has been reached only to be eroded.

I am also thinking of instances where a number of cogent arguments in favour of positions have been put forward by different delegates and other delegations have refused to address or to rebut these arguments. Accusations that one or another delegation is specifically at fault in this regard are, in our view, pointless. The point really is that we should simply, all of us, participate in the negotiation in a positive and constructive manner.

There is an urgent need to make progress in the chemical weapons convention. We must make every effort to resolve those areas of the future convention on which divergences of view remain: that must be our priority. We have an opportunity to demonstrate the capability of the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate -- to negotiate a treaty as important and as complex as the chemical weapons convention. It is an opportunity that must not be missed.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Rowe, Australia)

I referred earlier to areas of agreement and areas of divergence. In our work on this convention we have established agreement on the principles governing most areas. We have agreed, primarily, that the purpose of the convention is to make it impossible for the peoples of the world to use chemical weapons to wage chemical warfare. To achieve this, we are in agreement that the single most important step is the destruction of existing stockpiles and facilities. This destruction should start as soon as possible after entry into force of the convention and be completed within 10 years. Destruction must also proceed according to a schedule to be determined, and must encompass a balanced reduction in the capability of States to carry out chemical warfare.

Thus far we are in agreement. However, the countries of the world need to be assured that the purpose of the convention has been fulfilled, and to this end each stage of the destruction process must be verified.

As we have said the measure of agreement that exists already is quite considerable. This could be extended if thought were given to what may be called the interdependence of all aspects of the destruction of chemical warfare stocks and facilities.

Destruction must be: verifiable; balanced; complete; and it must be carried out in a manner that is visible to the countries of the world.

This will only be possible if declarations and plans for destruction are detailed as to quantity, type, location, etc. Time-tables for destruction cannot be worked out in vacuo but must be based on detailed knowledge of what exists, where it is, and how it will be destroyed.

Provisional plans for destruction will be deposited with the Consultative Committee soon after entry into force. It would seem logical, however, for these plans to be revised by the Consultative Committee, in order to fulfil the requirement for a verifiable, balanced, complete and visible destruction to take place. Thus, States possessing chemical weapons should expect the Consultative Committee or its executive body to revise time-tables, and specify verification procedures. This type of revision will only be possible after entry into force, when all details of stocks and facilities are available to the Consultative Committee.

General principles relating to a phased and balanced destruction can be negotiated and laid down in the convention. However, detailed plans and time-tables must be achieved by consultation between the Consultative Committee and those States which possess chemical weapons. Detailed plans must be based on a detailed knowledge of what is to be destroyed.

The principle of a balanced destruction of stockpiles and production facilities, so as not to afford any State a temporary military advantage, is accepted. However, States not possessing chemical weapons will be to some degree at a military disadvantage until the process of destruction is complete. These States will be interested to

(Mr. Rowe, Australia)

ensure that the chemical capacity of States possessing these weapons is reduced as fast as possible. The concept of a balanced destruction of chemical stockpiles between possessor States could be fulfilled if old, obsolete stocks were destroyed first. Such a procedure would, however, be unacceptable to States not possessing such weapons, since the early years of implementation of the convention would involve very little reduction in chemical capability.

The equation for the phased destruction of stockpiles and facilities will be very complex. A prime consideration must be that chemical capability is reduced as rapidly as possible. Thus, operational weapons and operational facilities must be destroyed early in the period of implementation of the convention.

Where obsolete stocks present a hazard to the environment, they should be disposed of expeditiously. It is to be hoped that the destruction of such stocks will not await the entry into force of the convention.

We are aware from Workshops held in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, which have made a valuable contribution to the work of this Conference, that such stocks are at present in the process of destruction. It is conceivable that obsolete stocks may be largely destroyed before entry into force. Should this be so, it would reduce the complexity of the equation needed to bring about a phased and balanced reduction in chemical capacity. There is also the obvious corollary that if obsolete stocks are destroyed prior to entry into force, this would substantially reduce the burden of verification.

We must exercise ingenuity in devising effective regimes which produce the minimum degree of intrusion and the minimum effort in terms of manpower. This aim is achievable, but an effective regime must be based on the maximum amount of information possible.

The power of computer techniques is such that it would be possible for an executive subgroup of the Consultative Committee to store all data relevant to the process of destruction. It would then be possible to follow this process, and interrogate on-site computers as appropriate.

Much thought will be required to set up appropriate procedures, which to date we have addressed only in rather general terms. It seems self-evident that verification will be effective and not unduly burdensome if procedures are worked out as complete a data base as is possible. This will require a maximum frankness and openness in the early stages of the convention. States are accustomed to thinking of national security in terms of protection of information private to the State. In the situation presented by the convention, national security will be best served by full and detailed declarations.

(Mr. Rowe, Australia)

The maintenance of a central computerized data bank would ensure that all States parties can follow the orderly process of destruction. Regular updating by remote sensing techniques, verified by reports from inspection teams, would monitor all stages. The computer-controlled process which we envisage would be similar to that used by manufacturing industry. The techniques are known, and can be adapted to the requirements of the Consultative Committee.

At this point, it may be asked whether the computerized control of the destruction process would obviate the need for continuous on-site inspection. Such an idea would involve a misconception of the capability of computers. Computers are an extension of the human mind, not a substitute for it. They can reduce manpower requirements, and should do so in the situation of verification of destruction. They cannot, however, replace it. In particular, these techniques should reduce anxieties as to compliance, and therefore reduce the number of challenge inspections. However, the continuous presence of the human intelligence in the form of an inspection team will not be obviated by even the most sophisticated monitoring regime. Verification would be greatly simplified if this style of control were implemented.

In summary, my delegation is suggesting that the process of destruction should be controlled by a centralized computer facility. To be effective this will require that the maximum amount of information regarding stockpiles and facilities be available when the programmes are written.

In conclusion, the Australian delegation wishes to emphasize and recognize that the tasks of monitoring of destruction and the verification of compliance of a convention are extremely complex ones. It is essential that we meet the challenge and seek practical solutions. Our intervention will, we hope, provide a basis for discussion of some aspects of these tasks. We can make progress through constructive dialogue on these and other issues.

The delegation of the United States has recently made several very useful and informative statements in the plenary reviewing the current status of the issues involved in a chemical weapons ban and explaining how the United States draft convention approaches each of these. These statements have been a positive contribution to the work of the Conference. It is our hope that other delegations will put forward proposals which are equally well defined and relevant to the negotiation of a comprehensive convention.

For our part, the Australian delegation intends to continue to participate actively in these negotiations. The Australian Government is committed to the conclusion of a convention which will eliminate chemical weapons -- a convention which will ensure that chemical weapons can never again be used.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

Of these disarmament issues, it is chemical weapons that is on the agenda for today's meeting, and I shall now address that question. It is an issue which is not only on the agenda for today's meeting but which, following the shocking events which have recently occurred in the Gulf war, is acquiring a tragic dimension which should lead some of us to make every effort to find a solution as rapidly as possible. In this connection, of course, I must once again pay tribute to Chairman Ekéus, who has devoted himself unstintingly to this objective, and I should like to tell him how grateful we are.

Belgium believes that all the conditions currently exist to bring the negotiations on chemical weapons to a successful conclusion.

With regard to substance, major proposals are on the table. The United States has submitted the most complete draft treaty to be presented so far, and our colleague from the United States has declared that his proposal is negotiable in all its aspects, thus demonstrating his readiness to settle the issues which have not yet been resolved. In a series of statements here, he has been illustrating and spelling out the United States proposals, and also answering the questions which those proposals must have raised. Your country, Mr. President, the USSR, has made various proposals, some of which, in particular as regards the definition of the scope of the convention and the verification of the destruction of stocks, indicate a possibility of agreement.

With regard to the structure of the negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has set up three well-conceived Working Groups, thus making it possible to work methodically and study systematically the main aspects of the convention. The Chairmen of these Working Groups are experienced diplomats, and I pay tribute to their dedication and competence. I have in mind not only the Chairman seated behind me, Mr. Duarte, but also our other colleagues, who have impressed us by the energetic manner in which they are carrying out their functions.

Despite these favourable points, however, the state of the negotiations is unsatisfactory. With regard to substantive issues, the discussions for the most part amount to the reiteration of already familiar positions, which gives the impression that we are wandering in a kind of maze. As for the negotiating methods, they give an impression of nebulosity which prevents those concerned from obtaining a clear view of the present state of the problems entrusted to them.

In such complex negotiations, method is a crucial element of success. The structure of the convention has been agreed upon de facto since 1980. The Belgian delegation believes that it would be best to adhere to it, and henceforth focus the discussion on the remaining critical issues. I would venture to suggest that this should be done with the help, for example, of documents giving a clear synopsis of the alternative proposals on the fundamental questions outstanding. I suggest that the Chairmen of the three Working Groups should be systematically associated with the multilateral negotiations at all levels.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

At the risk of incurring unpopularity here, I would also suggest that we should raise the question of the desirability of convening the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons after the closure of the session for this year and before the resumption of our work in 1985. There must be some way in which, during the very long period between September and February, useful meetings could be organized which could considerably speed up our work.

In any event, I think that it is essential to preserve what has been achieved in our work over the last four years. One solution would be that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its 1984 session should systematically add to the 1983 report, issued as document CD/416, and I would recommend this suggestion to Ambassador Ekéus. We would thus begin the 1985 session on the firm basis of the results already achieved, thus motivating ourselves rather than becoming demoralized by the awareness that the work of one session is largely neglected at the next.

The problem of verification is obviously a key issue. Here, as elsewhere, as regards verification, a subject which is inherent in all disarmament negotiations, the difficulty is to reconcile the situation of an open society, such as ours, with the situation of a closed society, that of the Eastern countries. We all know that there is virtually no possibility that a serious violation of the convention would not immediately be detected in our Western societies. On the contrary, the secrecy characteristic of the Eastern countries warrants suspecting the worst as much as hoping for the best: however, we must concern ourselves with the worst-case hypothesis. When the security of our States and the freedom of our citizens are at stake, we must be able to guarantee to our peoples that the other party has, without any possible doubt, performed to the letter the obligations it has undertaken, and that the two situations are symmetrical as regards security.

I should like to add here that the quotation which our colleague from Czechoslovakia has just made from General Rogers' statement did not seem to me to be complete. General Rogers, whose statement I read but do not have before my eyes, pointed out that if the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban failed, it was necessary for the Atlantic Command also to have modern chemical weapons. I do not think that he went beyond that. He adopted the pessimistic hypothesis that our negotiations might fail.

The convention on chemical weapons must therefore have effective verification machinery. Such machinery must operate on two levels. The first is that of systematic on-site international verification: this concerns the entire process of elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. It is also necessary, with different modalities, to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced in civilian industry. So far the negotiations have only seriously tackled the question of the verification of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. I believe that it is high time that the other two aspects of the problem were also tackled.

The second concerns verification in case of suspicion or complaint by one State party with regard to another. There is no question, in our opinion, of impinging on the national sovereignty of States by providing for a system of verification at will, in which States would have immediately to submit,

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

without argument, to arbitrary checks dreamed up by meddlesome inspectors. It will be necessary to establish objective conditions, time periods, and prior consultations to be specified in the current negotiations. We must also be aware that the final consequence of a refusal of international on-site inspection (a refusal, and therefore a hypothesis, that cannot be ruled out) at the request of the Consultative Committee following a complaint, could be the denunciation of the treaty. This seems to be the balance of the respective legal obligations.

On these difficult issues, for which greater serenity should prevail in the negotiations, we consider it essential that dialogue be resumed between the two major Powers possessing chemical weapons. We welcomed the offer made by Vice-President Bush for the holding of bilateral consultations on this subject with the Soviet Union.

Belgium believes that bilateral consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States on disarmament are a demonstration of those two States' awareness of their outstanding responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. These negotiations cannot fail to benefit multilateral negotiations, and such bilateral consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States are therefore always to be encouraged, in our opinion.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, in my statement today, I will begin my explanation of how the United States draft convention addresses the last of the four major issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical weapons ban. This is the vital issue of verification.

Chemical weapons are much too dangerous a means of warfare to permit any uncertainty in an agreement banning these weapons. An agreement with the objective of banning chemical weapons that is not effectively verifiable would be less than worthless. It would, in fact, be dangerous. If such an agreement entered into force, there would be inevitable and continuous concern and uncertainty whether the other parties to the agreement were living up to their commitments. The uncertainties and lack of confidence that would flow from such an agreement would create tensions in the international community and could weaken confidence in other existing and proposed arms control agreements. This situation must and can be avoided.

While acknowledging that effective verification provisions are necessary for a successful chemical weapons ban, we must acknowledge at the same time that negotiation of such effective verification provisions will not be easy. Chemical weapons are not very different in appearance from conventional munitions, except on close inspection. Also, chemical weapons production facilities are not easily distinguished from peaceful chemical production facilities.

There is already widespread recognition in this Conference that national technical means of verification will not be sufficient to assure confidence in compliance with a chemical weapons ban. This task will require, therefore, a more intrusive means of verification, in particular, on-site measures. The United States has not sought and is not seeking absolute verification. But the United States is seeking those measures that will provide the necessary confidence that the chemical weapons ban is being complied with.

In his speech before this body on 18 April of this year, the Vice-President of the United States, the Honourable George Bush, cited four points with regard to which parties to a convention must be assured that the relevant provisions of the convention are being complied with. Let me cite these four points again: first, that all declared chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed; second, that all declared chemical weapons have been destroyed; third, that the declared chemical weapons indeed constitute all of the chemical weapons of a party; and fourth, that the declared chemical weapons production facilities are all such facilities possessed by a party. The verification requirements regarding these four points can be described within two broad categories. First, the declared chemical weapons and production facilities -- that is, the chemical weapons and production facilities whose existence and location have been declared by a party pursuant to the applicable provisions of the convention -- will be subject to systematic international on-site verification. Second, for assurance that undeclared chemical weapons or chemical weapons production facilities do not exist, or that prohibited activities are not occurring, States must rely largely on challenge verification procedures. Today, my statement will focus primarily on the regime of systematic international on-site verification that would be established by the draft convention.

Pursuant to the provisions of the United States draft, chemical weapons would be subject to systematic international on-site verification from the moment they were declared to the moment they were destroyed. A party's declaration would be

(Mr. Fields, United States)

subject to an initial on-site inspection to confirm the accuracy of the declarations. Then the chemical weapons would be subject to continuous monitoring by on-site instruments and periodic on-site inspections to ensure that they are not removed from their declared locations except to be moved to a declared destruction facility.

At this time I would like to introduce a United States Working Paper on the declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles, which my delegation is tabling today. This Working Paper contains a detailed outline of one possible approach for declaring chemical weapons and for monitoring them until they are destroyed, based on the approach contained in the United States draft convention. The Working Paper focuses on types of on-site monitoring devices that could be utilized for this purpose. We hope this Working Paper will stimulate discussion on this important issue in a way that will aid in resolving it as soon as possible.

Because of the danger of diversion and other forms of evasion during the destruction process, the United States has proposed that the actual destruction of chemical weapons be monitored continuously not only by means of on-site instruments but also by the continuous presence of inspectors. Inspectors would always be on hand during destruction operations to monitor the destruction process itself and to ensure that the monitoring instruments were functioning properly. Thus, under the draft convention, chemical weapons would be closely monitored until they ceased to exist.

The types of procedures the United States believes are necessary for the destruction of chemical weapons were described in Working Paper CD/387, tabled by my delegation on 6 July 1983. These procedures were demonstrated during the Workshop which was held at Tooele army depot in Utah in November 1983. The briefings presented to the Workshop were distributed to the Conference as Working Paper CD/424 on 20 January 1984.

While still on this subject, I would like to refer to the Soviet statement made on 21 February that the Soviet Union is willing to accept the continuous stationing of international inspection teams at locations where certain types of chemical weapons are being destroyed. We welcome the explanation of this Soviet proposal that is contained in document CD/CW/WP.78, dated 2 April 1984. We would like to ask the Soviet delegation to clarify two points in regard to its proposal. First, would the continuous presence of inspectors during the destruction of chemical weapons be supplemented by continuous monitoring with instruments? Second, under the Soviet proposal, would continuous presence of inspectors be limited only to the destruction of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their corresponding munitions and devices? We look forward to receiving answers to these two important questions.

In our draft convention, the facilities for producing chemical weapons would also be subject to systematic international on-site verification from the moment their location is declared until they are destroyed. This verification will ensure that the production facility ceases to produce chemical weapons and that it is eventually destroyed. During the initial inspection after declaration, the international inspectors will prepare an inventory of key equipment at the chemical weapons production facility. When the facility is destroyed, the inspectors will make sure that this key equipment is also destroyed. Unlike the destruction of chemical weapons, inspectors need not be continuously on site during the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. However, on-site instruments will have to monitor the plant continuously to ensure that the facility remains inoperative during the destruction process. Of course, inspectors will be permitted to visit the facility periodically during the destruction process.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In addition to chemical weapons and their production facilities, systematic international on-site verification would be applied to other facilities that are designated in the draft convention. The single specialized production facility envisioned by the draft convention for producing super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes would be subject on on-site verification, consisting of both on-site sensors and inspectors. Also, facilities producing the chemicals listed on Schedule C would be subject to periodic on-site verification based on a random selection of facilities. The purpose of these inspections is to ensure that the chemicals produced by these facilities are not being diverted to chemical weapons purposes.

Mr. President, the issue of which verification measures are to be applied to chemicals of types listed on Schedule C and those produced by the single specialized production facility is one of the important unresolved verification issues. The United States and Western delegations have proposed methods for verifying that such chemicals are not being used in a manner prohibited by the draft convention. However, other delegations have neither responded to these proposals in detail nor made their own comprehensive proposals on how to deal with such chemicals. This issue of verification of "non-production" can be resolved only if these delegations actively participate in exchanges of views on this important matter, so that a mutually acceptable solution can be negotiated in this body. I hope those delegations will soon make their positions known on this important issue.

There are a great many detailed, technical provisions that need to be negotiated in order to implement systematic international on-site verification. Annex II of the United States draft convention contains an outline of the provisions that we see as necessary for the successful operation of the verification regime. For example, to ensure that inspectors can effectively perform their functions, they need to be granted specific privileges and immunities. Inspectors should be granted entry visas promptly. Although a party subject to an inspection has the right to have its representatives accompany the inspection team, these representatives must be ready to accompany the inspectors immediately. The international inspectors should not be delayed because the host party claims its representatives are temporarily unavailable. Also, no bureaucratic constraints -- for example, the need for approval by the host party for inspectors to travel to the location to be inspected -- should be allowed to delay the inspectors. Of course, the inspections themselves should be carried out in such a way as to avoid hampering the economic and technical activities of a party and to be consistent with the safe operation of the inspected location. Many other details will have to be worked out between the Executive Council of the Consultative Committee and the party that will be inspected. For example, they will need to agree on subsidiary arrangements that specify in detail how on-site verification will be applied to each location subject to such verification.

These proposals for procedures to implement systematic international on-site verification represent what the United States believes is necessary for the successful operation of this verification regime. They are subject to further modification, elaboration, and refinement. We hope other countries will have their own ideas on this subject and will put them before the Conference on Disarmament for consideration. We look forward to developing the contents of this part of Annex II in conjunction with our colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The regime of systematic international on-site verification that I have outlined today is designed to ensure that declared chemical weapons and their production facilities are destroyed and that prohibited activities do not take place at other declared locations and facilities. We believe that this regime is both comprehensive and effective, certainly as it applies to those declared locations and facilities. However, the regime I have outlined today is inadequate by itself to provide the necessary assurance of compliance required for an agreement banning chemical weapons. It must be complemented by an effective challenge inspection system. In another statement, I will examine the challenge inspection provisions that the United States believes are necessary for a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The subject for this week on the programme of work of our conference is one which has long been of great importance to my Government, that of chemical weapons.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlawed the use of chemical weapons, has been and remains of inestimable value to mankind. There has, however, developed a broad consensus that the prohibition of use in the Protocol needs to be buttressed by a convention under which parties would undertake not to possess or manufacture chemical weapons. Recent confirmation by the United Nations of the use of these weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq reinforces the urgent need for the conclusion of such a convention. Work on this subject here in the Conference on Disarmament over the past five years has identified a very considerable measure of common ground on the contents of such a convention. This common ground was set out clearly in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year, document CD/416.

My delegation is most grateful to this year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden for the hard work that he has done to transform the common ground identified last year into a form to facilitate further progress this year. My delegation warmly supports his tireless efforts to build on what has already been achieved with a view to the early conclusion of the convention to ban chemical weapons completely. My delegation pledges its full support to him and to you, Mr. President, for the accomplishment of this important task. The tabling on 18 April by Vice-President Bush of the United States of a draft convention on chemical weapons has already been warmly welcomed by my Government and by this delegation.

The United States document (CD/500) is a far-reaching one. My Government congratulates the United States Government on its scope and comprehensive approach. It builds upon the flow of ideas and initiatives already on the table to which the United Kingdom has contributed. It sets out clearly the fundamental requirements

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

for a comprehensive and fully verifiable ban, to enable us finally to rid the world of all chemical weapons. My delegation is grateful to Ambassador Fields for his valuable series of statements, of which we have heard the latest today, explaining in detail the thought behind the provisions of the United States draft convention.

My Government have considered the text of document CD/500 with great care. It is our firm view that its approach, particularly on verification, points to the direction in which we must go, if we are to find the means to assure full compliance. My delegation therefore stands ready to proceed with others along the path identified by document CD/500. Just as the United States delegation has already indicated its readiness to consider alternative approaches, we too shall be flexible; we shall try to be imaginative, where imagination is required. In our view, effective compliance can be achieved, if there exists the political will to agree to a solution guaranteeing it.

There is a broad consensus among all delegations round this table about what needs to be prohibited. But we all need to work together to develop provisions that will create confidence that all parties are fulfilling their obligations under the convention. This confidence is needed to make it possible for governments to sign and parliaments to ratify the convention, and to give it stability after its entry into force. The need for provisions to create confidence that all parties are fulfilling their obligations is increased by the nature of the chemical weapons themselves. Some of those which have actually been used in past conflicts are based on simple chemical substances, which are not difficult to make, and in some cases are made and used on a substantial scale for legitimate civil purposes, with which none of us intends, or, indeed, would wish to interfere. Even the super-toxic nerve agents can be made from fairly readily accessible materials of simple chemical structure. The practical difficulties of manufacturing them stem from the super-toxic character of the agents themselves, which necessitates complex safety arrangements. In addition, chemical munitions, once they have been made, are not difficult to conceal, because they can only be conclusively distinguished from other munitions by close inspection. In order, therefore, to give assurance that a chemical weapons ban is not being evaded by the clandestine manufacture of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents, or by retention of undeclared stocks, it will be necessary to embody in the convention a number of mutually reinforcing verification methods on lines that have been already indicated. It will be necessary to build up confidence in the convention by all possible means if it is to command wide acceptance.

In this connection, my delegation welcomes the tabling by the distinguished representative of Finland of document CD/505, the latest in the series of blue books embodying the results of the research of Professor Miettinen and his collaborators on scientific methods for the verification of chemical disarmament. This valuable contribution, which represents the fruits of 10 years of research, provides the Conference at an opportune moment with a comprehensive picture of the techniques available as a result of the latest scientific advances. The instrumental methods they have developed could play a valuable part in reducing the need for the

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presence of inspectors on the ground. It should be our aim to make use of instrumental methods where appropriate, both for reasons of economy, and to reduce the intrusiveness of verification. The physical presence of inspectors will, of course, still be needed to maintain the instruments, as well as for the on-site inspections which will be required to ensure compliance with the convention.

One essential element in the verification regime must be provision for challenge by a party which is not satisfied that another party is fulfilling its obligations under the convention. The views of the United Kingdom Government on this subject were set out in detail in Working Paper CD/431 which was introduced on 14 February this year by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The system of challenge leading to on-site inspection provides the ultimate assurance that States parties will not be able with impunity to evade their obligations under it. It would be essential that any suspicions of non-compliance should be rapidly and conclusively allayed. This challenge system would apply to all aspects of the convention and would thus provide its safety net. It is however important to the stability of the convention that assurance of compliance should be based as far as possible on routine methods of verification, which involve no suspicion, and do not therefore weaken the convention; and that too much weight should not be put on the safety net provided by challenge verification.

The first type of measure of routine verification in point of time must be the verification of destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. In this field the conference has made some progress. Members of the conference had a welcome opportunity to see on the ground how chemical weapons can be completely and safely destroyed at two workshops organized by the United States Government at Tooele last year and by the Federal German Government this year at Munster. My delegation is grateful to the host governments for an opportunity to see these plants at work, and, in particular, for the way in which it was made clear that the destruction can be carried out in a manner that lends itself to verification, by impartial observers, that the declared stocks have indeed been destroyed. I think that it was clear to all of us who visited the plants that it would be necessary to have observers on the spot throughout the period of destruction at the site chosen for the purpose. The statement on 21 February by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that his Government would in principle be prepared to accept the continuous presence of observers on site while chemical weapons were being destroyed gives grounds for hope that this aspect of the problem will be soluable.

A related problem, also limited in time, is the verification of destruction of production facilities which has been actively considered in Working Group A of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My own Government demonstrated to the members of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 the complete demolition of the only facility in the United Kingdom for the manufacture of nerve gases after the remaining stocks of these agents had been destroyed.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

In order to give stability to the Convention it will also be necessary to include in it provisions to give assurance that chemical weapons are not being made clandestinely, especially after the destruction of existing stocks has been completed. To this end my delegation introduced last year document CD/353 on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons. This included suggestions for declarations on the production for civil use of certain compounds, and, in some cases, verification by random routine inspections of the declarations, and of the fact that the compounds in question were not being transformed into chemical weapons. This type of random routine inspection was proposed for certain key precursors, which are not themselves chemical warfare agents, but are important intermediates in their synthesis. The aim of such routine inspections would be to provide assurance that chemical warfare agents were not being clandestinely produced by providing a routine check on the main synthetic pathways by which such agents might be made.

The annex to the United Kingdom Working Paper CD/353 contained a list of key precursors which had previously been drawn up at a meeting of experts, under the aegis of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka. Document CD/353 contained a request to other delegations for information about the extent to which these compounds were made in other countries for civil purposes. We are grateful to those delegations which have responded. Some of the data they gave us were circulated at the end of the 1983 session in Working Paper CD/CW/WP.57. We hope that other delegations will provide similar data in time for inclusion in a further working paper at the end of the current session.

After consideration of these data and discussion with other delegations, the United Kingdom delegation has now circulated a further Working Paper with the symbol CD/514, which I have pleasure in introducing today. In this Working Paper a classification of compounds is proposed according to the risk that they might be used as chemical warfare agents or as precursors for them. It is hoped that this classification, based on objective criteria, will help the Conference towards a consensus on the identification of compounds that need to be subject to declarations and monitoring. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has rightly drawn attention, in its Working Paper CD/439, to the fact that a similar list is required in connection with the transfer of key precursors to other countries. As pointed out in that Working Paper, some of the compounds in question have significant civil uses. In the view of my delegation it would not be possible to exclude from control all substances in this category. We also share the doubts of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany as to whether it would be practicable to determine the list of key precursors entirely on the basis of theoretical criteria. These would be helpful in guiding the choice of compounds for the list or lists, but we believe that for operational purposes, whether declaration, export control, or routine inspection on the territory of a State party, it will be important that the compounds be listed by name. The United States delegation has used this approach in the schedules contained in document CD/500. The initial lists would clearly need to be agreed as an integral part of the convention we are negotiating. My delegation believes, however, that a mechanism for modifying the list or lists under the aegis of the Consultative Committee should be incorporated into the convention to take account of possible future advances in technology. The present paper is designed to stimulate discussion of these issues and provide a basis for further work.

The need to agree internationally a list of these important precursors has been underlined by confirmation by the United Nations of the use of mustard and the nerve agent Tabun in the Gulf war. In the light of this report the United Kingdom Government has imposed new export controls on compounds which could be used to

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

make such weapons. Similar action has been taken by other governments, in particular by the governments of our partners in the European Community and by the United States and Canada. The need for this action has emphasized more than ever that a mechanism is required for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons to give assurance that these precursors are not being made in quantities unjustified by civil uses and transformed into chemical weapons.

In the view of my delegation a regime on these lines to verify non-production would make a valuable contribution to confidence in the convention without intruding unnecessarily in the chemical industry of States parties. The Netherlands delegation has provided a valuable analysis in their Working Paper CD/454 of the practical implications of such arrangements. The size of the inspectorate required for this purpose would seem to be a manageable one. Unlike the verification of destruction of stocks and of production facilities, which would be limited in time, it would be a continuing task for the Consultative Committee and its secretariat, which would also have the separate task of monitoring the possession and very limited production of super-toxic lethal compounds for permitted purposes.

Close consultation with national chemical industries will be needed both in the formulation and in the implementation of arrangements for verification of non-production. The example of the IAEA system of safeguards shows how inspections can be carried out in close co-operation with the industry being inspected. The IAEA secretariat enjoy the confidence of the nuclear industry in the wide range of countries all over the world where their safeguards system is in operation. At the same time they command international respect for the thoroughness and reliability of their operations. My own Government has consulted fruitfully with representatives of the British chemical industry, through its co-ordinating body, the Chemical Industries Association. We have been heartened by their positive response and encouraged by their interest in our negotiation for a convention to ban chemical weapons.

The task of concluding a chemical weapons convention is an urgent one. All delegations agree on the end in view and the Conference has made substantial progress towards it. We should redouble our efforts with a view to reaching early agreement on the complete text of a convention to eliminate chemical weapons entirely from the arsenals of the world.

On 14 February, the United Kingdom Minister responsible for arms control and disarmament, Mr. Luce, said in this Chamber that the international community has placed squarely upon this Conference the heavy responsibility to agree upon such a convention banning chemical weapons completely. He urged the Conference to discharge its responsibility with despatch and to present at the earliest possible moment to the United Nations an effective convention for signature and ratification.

The following week, the group of socialist countries said in document CD/435 that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the ad hoc subsidiary body should start as early as possible and should proceed without being limited by the time-frame of the work of the Conference, in other words, the possibility should be envisaged of continuing them, if necessary, after the spring and summer parts of the session of the Conference. We would share that view.

Since February the need for a convention has become even more urgent, because since then we have seen the use of chemical weapons confirmed. If we can make progress on the principles of a convention by further contact -- albeit informal -- in New York or Geneva later this year, then we should grasp it, so that when the Conference resumes its work in early 1985 we may be that much nearer to the conclusion of a convention.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The participants in the Moscow meeting reiterated the extremely topical significance of such proposals of the socialist countries as that on the reaching of agreement on a general and complete nuclear test ban; on the prohibition of the militarization of outer space and the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth; and on the world-wide prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Other exceptionally important proposals include the proposal to conclude a treaty on mutual non-use of armed force and maintenance of peaceful relations between the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO, as well as the Soviet Union's appeal to other nuclear-weapon Powers which have not yet done so to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.

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(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The main purpose of my intervention today is to introduce Working Paper CD/518 that records the results of the recent Workshop on the Verification of the Destruction of Stocks of Chemical Weapons organized by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in Münster, Lower Saxony. The Workshop, to which member and observer delegations of the Conference on Disarmament were invited was intended to acquaint these delegations with the procedures used by one of the few existing destruction facilities of chemical weapons, and to provide a forum for discussion of all aspects relating to the destruction of such weaponry. The destruction facility in Münster undertakes to eliminate old stocks of chemical weapons that were found after World Wars I and II. The Federal Government had chosen to devote its 1984 Workshop to the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons because it holds the view that the destruction of stocks deserves a particularly high priority in the negotiations on a future chemical-weapons ban. The current threat emanates in the first instance from existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Furthermore, the Federal Government considers the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks to be a key problem of the entire verification complex of a future chemical weapons convention. If it proves possible to reach agreement on the verification issue, it should also be possible to agree on the necessary inspections for the other areas of the convention.

The Federal Government draws the following conclusions from the Workshop in Münster:

Firstly, the requirement of effective verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons can be met only with a monitoring system operating on a continuous basis;

Secondly, a continuous monitoring system should comprise a mutually complementary combination of checks by inspectors and monitoring by tamper-proof measuring devices;

Thirdly, the integration of technical monitoring devices should aim at reducing the number of inspectors required to be present at all times, thus diminishing the degree of intrusiveness that inspections can imply;

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Fourthly, at the present juncture, all technological prerequisites exist to solve the verification problems inherent in the destruction of chemical weapons.

The failure or success of any workshop depends largely on the contributions that come from the participants themselves. I should like to express our gratitude to all those delegations who enhanced the effect of the workshop by their valuable participation.

Few will dispute that workshops of this nature -- and aside from the visit to Münster, I would equally like to mention the workshop in Tooele, Utah, of late last year -- provide interesting insights and learning experiences. But what is the direct relevance to our negotiating tasks in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons? I realize that this question has frequently been asked, and the question certainly deserves an answer. Obviously, it is nobody's intention to write into a future chemical weapons convention norms which oblige the parties to the treaty to embark on particular technical processes, or to buy and employ specific apparatuses of particular brands. But the link is there, and it is direct. Workshops of this kind demonstrate both the necessity and the feasibility of certain technical processes. They thus show how planned prescription can be translated into law-abiding action, and at what cost. The obligation the parties are to undertake in the future treaty will be simple. They will be expressed in abstract legal language. But behind the normative language, knowledge looms. Negotiators, with the aid of such technical experience as the workshops have given them, have assured themselves that it is possible to translate treaty obligations, such as are now envisaged, into effective action, and that the most practical and least costly and intensive approach has been chosen in defining obligations and selecting legal language.

If we attempt to digest the negotiators' lessons out of the Tooele and Münster experiences, the usefulness of the exercises is amply born out. On the basis of a general consensus that is forming on the subject matter in the field of the verification of destruction of stocks, formulations like the one in Article V (1) (f) of the draft convention contained in document CD/500, or the corresponding draft provisions in document CD/326, now prove themselves to be so drafted that, if accepted, they would stand the test of eventual implementation with the assistance of current-state technology, and at low and adequate cost levels.

If satisfaction and, indeed, a measure of accomplishment derive from the recent technical workshop in Münster, my delegation is much less optimistic with regard to the general level of progress in the chemical weapons negotiations. Although the negotiating process is manifold -- if somewhat over-complicated in its structure -- the general state of negotiations is hardly encouraging and leaves much to be desired.

This is all the more deplorable because this year we should have been particularly concerned about making progress rapidly. The findings of a team of experts charged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conformity with the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions, revealed that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. However, not even the actual use of chemical weapons in an ongoing conflict and the unfortunate likelihood of further proliferation of these barbaric weapons have prompted the Conference on Disarmament to speed up negotiations and to produce decisive results. Yet, the 1984 session had commenced under particularly favourable conditions. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was placed under the skilful and competent guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands, Mr. Duarte of Brazil and Dr. Thieliicke of the German Democratic Republic

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have once again proved their high abilities in chairing their respective Working Groups. Many delegations have introduced important working papers or initiatives.

In spite of these favourable conditions, the positive momentum that had marked previous years of work is about to peter out. My delegation has no explanation for this unfortunate state of affairs. It cannot but urge all delegations to contribute fully to the negotiations by demonstrating more flexibility and readiness to compromise. The urgency of achieving results does not only bear upon the chemical weapons convention itself. This segment of our work constitutes an important test case for the over-all commitment of governments to the task of disarmament.

In spite of a negative over-all assessment of the negotiations my delegation, of-course, does not wish to belittle the efforts to come to a closer understanding in certain areas of the convention and the progress that has been achieved so far. In the area of elimination of stocks a consensus is now emerging. My delegation is equally hopeful that a solution of the question of verification of initial declarations can be found on the basis of discussing further the ideas of subjecting the declared stocks to verification measures either at intermediate storage sites or at the destruction facility. My delegation also welcomes the endeavour to provide a complete structure for the future chemical weapons convention as has skilfully been elaborated by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

One obvious task before the negotiators at the present moment is to look to the scheduled end of the annual session. The form and status of their report will be of great importance for the further course of work. The primary responsibility of the negotiators should be carefully to preserve the results of the work accomplished during the previous sessions as well as during the present one. The forward movement may have been limited, but no backward movement should be allowed to occur. We must make absolutely sure that the next round of negotiations will start on the basis of present accomplishments, and does not embark on yet another round of needless and frustrating rehashing of past work. The decisive contribution of Chairman McPhail during the preceding session was his skilful compilation of the results of the 1983 session in one comprehensive document which all delegations could underwrite. This has been the conceptual basis of our negotiations this year and largely foreshadows the shape and contents of the future convention. It is therefore of overriding importance that an amplified and developed version of his comprehensive paper, in the more advanced version which we owe to the Swedish delegation, in document CD/CW/WP.67, be accepted as the general format of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this session.

My delegation is grateful to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, for having given considerable thought to the annual work product of his Committee. Many of his ideas are fertile, and greatly to the credit of his own delegation. It is without doubt within the prerogative of the Chairman to formulate his own views and instill them into the future negotiating process under his own responsibility. It is, however, even more important that the structure of document CD/CW/WP.67 is preserved and further developed. The vital feature of the Committee's report at the end of the session should be a comprehensive consensus text which can fully serve as a reference document, accepted by all, for the next round of our negotiations. My delegation will find it difficult to agree to any document that would not comply with these criteria.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The annual report of the Committee is not an end in itself. It is designed to be a tool to facilitate further work. Concentration on its elaboration should, therefore, not deduct from our ongoing negotiation effort and should not preclude reflections on the future timeframe of negotiations.

One of the interesting features of the present negotiating phase is the vivid interaction between scheduled meetings of the various working units, and a great number of bilateral consultations between delegations. The latter are characteristic of a very advanced negotiating process. Delegations find that there is a need for detailed discussions designed to explore the viewpoints of particular delegations. Their frequency is thus a positive sign, provided that the findings of delegations are channelled back into the multilateral process. This appears even more necessary when the Chairmen of the various working units are themselves involved in consultations of this kind. It is certainly the prerogative of these Chairmen to obtain the fullest possible information by contact with delegations, as much as it is their obligations to bring their unique quality as officers of the Conference to bear in the interest of progress and compromise. However, particular care should be taken that the transparency and multilateral nature of these processes be fully observed. In the view of my delegation it would therefore appear indispensable that the Chairmen of the working organs provide a clear picture to all delegations and at all times about their particular transactions. It is also desirable — yes, indeed, indispensable in this multilateral framework — that all negotiating activities conducted by the Chairmen themselves are in principle open-ended and accessible to all delegations that have a legitimate interest in participation. I am confident that the officers of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons are aware of these necessities, and that they will continue to preserve the necessary transparency of the negotiating process during the remainder of our session.

The more negotiations on chemical weapons progress and the more the treaty to which all delegations aspire comes within reach, the more it is incongruous that we indulge in the seeming luxury of adjourning negotiations so early in the year to resume them only four or five months later. The need for negotiators to pause and reflect, and to seek instructions is obvious. But such long intermissions are quite evidently to the detriment of the negotiating momentum and may even imply a backward movement. It is also beyond the comprehension of our general population which feels the need for urgent action while the negotiators have dispersed and seem to have abandoned the negotiating table.

From the viewpoint of the chemical weapons negotiations, then, the annual meeting cycle of this body is highly unsatisfactory. I realize that remedies are not easy to find, and that earlier attempts to schedule resumed sessions of the chemical weapons working group have not proved conclusive. Under the supervision of a "lame-duck" chairman who had already submitted his final report, and without the necessary political interaction with, and simultaneous presence of Conference delegates, these meetings remained on the level of technical exchanges, and produced very little movement. It is imperative — and will become more so during the final negotiating stages of the convention — to look for a format which will to some extent bridge the time gap between official annual sessions, and yet generate true political momentum. This need must be taken into account when the Conference takes another look at its general working pattern. My delegation is ready to participate in any appropriate new format, even if it deviates from our ingrained habits, and implies additional sacrifice in terms of meeting time.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, in my statement on 12 July, I began to address the last of four major issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical-weapons ban, that is, the vital issue of verification. I described in detail the regime of systematic international on-site verification established by the United States draft convention in document CD/500. I also stated that that regime, by itself, would be inadequate to provide the required assurance of compliance with all the provisions of the draft convention. Today, I will examine the system for dealing with compliance issues that is a necessary and vital complement to the systematic verification regime I described last week.

In the United States view, the future chemical weapons convention should set forth a range of actions that can be taken by a party to resolve compliance concerns. The convention should also set forth the obligations of a party to co-operate in the prompt resolution of such concerns. The arrangements should be designed to prevent dilatory tactics and to promote clarification at the lowest possible political level. However, the right to escalate an issue politically, if necessary, should be built into the arrangements to serve as an important stimulus to provide resolution of compliance problems. A party should be able to select the course of action it believes will resolve its concerns most effectively and expeditiously.

The United States draft convention incorporates a number of provisions for dealing with compliance concerns. These provisions are contained in articles IX, X and XI, as well as in annex II. Taken together, these provisions would provide an effective system for resolving compliance concerns.

Should a party to the convention have reason to believe that another party is not completely fulfilling its commitments under the convention -- if, for example, that party suspects that chemical weapons are being stored at a location that the other party had not declared to be a chemical weapons storage location -- then that party could initiate bilateral consultations with the other party, as provided in article IX. Article IX would require the party receiving such an inquiry to provide sufficient information to the inquiring party to resolve the latter's doubts concerning compliance. If both parties so desired, article IX would permit them to arrange a bilateral inspection to aid in resolving any lingering questions.

When necessary -- if, for example there continued to be concerns over whether the party was complying with its commitments under the convention -- either party involved in the dispute could request the Executive Council of the Consultative Committee to initiate fact-finding procedures. Upon receiving such a request, the Executive Council would request the party whose actions were suspect to clarify these actions. If the clarification provided still did not resolve the question, the fact-finding panel of the Executive Council would immediately begin an investigation. The report of its investigation would then be made available to all parties to the convention. If still unsatisfied, the inquiring party could initiate a special meeting of the Consultative Committee to consider further the compliance question.

It is hoped that most compliance questions can be resolved through information exchanges that occur either bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee. However, in some instances assurances more persuasive than the uncorroborated statements of a party will be necessary. In other cases, the assurance will be required more rapidly than the time periods contained in article IX. Articles X and XI of the draft convention were designed to meet the needs of such situations.

Under article X of the draft convention, procedures for special on-site inspection will apply to any facility either already subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to other articles of the convention or to

(Mr. Fields, United States)

any facility or location owned or controlled by the government of a party, including military facilities. Annex II would contain provisions aiding in the specification of such facilities and locations. For these locations and facilities, a party to the convention is deemed to have issued an "open invitation" with regard to the possibility of their inspection. This means that a party must permit an on-site inspection of the location or facility within 24 hours of receipt of a request from a member of the fact-finding panel for such an investigation. Members of the panel could initiate such an inspection on their own or on behalf of a party not represented on the panel. A party cannot refuse a request for a special on-site inspection.

My Government recognizes that these special on-site inspection procedures will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all countries that become parties to the convention. The United States also recognizes that such openness could potentially pose a risk to sensitive activities not related to chemical weapons. However, the United States strongly believes that a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons, which would provide substantial security benefits, must, if it is to be truly effective, contain an "open invitation" inspection scheme along the lines I have sketched out today. Thus, the United States has decided that the benefits flowing from such an inspection scheme greatly outweigh the risks.

The United States seriously considers that any risks can be minimized and managed through appropriate procedures for initiating and conducting special on-site inspections. The United States draft contains a number of provisions designed to do just that. In the United States view, the inspection procedures should be designed to resolve the issue at the lowest possible level of intrusion. For example, the inspectors' access should be unimpeded, but the procedures could stipulate that the least intrusive steps be taken first. More intrusive steps would be implemented only to the level needed to resolve the specific issue in question. We would welcome other suggestions for minimizing the risks that might result from a special on-site inspection.

I want to assure all delegations in the Conference on Disarmament that my Government did not take the decision lightly to include this "open invitation" provision in our draft convention. There should be no question that the United States is willing to accept the consequences of these provisions. I hope that other States will display a like amount of political will and accept this "open invitation" concept, because it is essential for an effective chemical-weapons ban.

I would also like to respond to some criticisms that have been publicly voiced concerning the article X provision on special on-site inspection. The statement has been made that, since the provision applies to government-owned or government-controlled facilities, it discriminates against some economic and political systems. The argument seems to be that, since the civilian chemical industries in some socialist countries are owned by the government, these facilities would be subject to article X, whereas the chemical industries in the United States or other western countries, since they are privately owned, would not be covered by article X. In passing I would like to note that the countries voicing this and other criticisms of the convention have done so without accepting the invitation of my delegation to meet with any interested delegation to explain fully our draft convention. If they had availed themselves of this opportunity to meet with us, this matter could have been clarified privately. Article X covers not only those locations and facilities that are owned by the government, but also those controlled by the government, whether through contract,

(Mr. Fields, United States)

other obligations, or regulatory requirements. The privately-owned chemical industries of the United States are so heavily regulated by the United States Government that this equates to the term "controlled" as used in the draft convention. Thus, the private chemical industry of the United States is fully subject to the inspection provisions of article X.

In addition, I will repeat a statement made many times by me and by other representatives of the United States Government. No imbalance in inspection obligation is either desired, intended, or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes any suggestions concerning ways to improve the procedures for the "open invitation" inspections, as long as an equivalent level of confidence is maintained. It is easy to criticize a proposal. It is much harder to work out mutually acceptable solutions to difficult problems. I hope that delegations that have concerns about the "open invitation" approach of article X will join with us in a constructive manner to seek effective solutions.

For locations and facilities not subject to article X, "ad hoc on-site inspections" are provided by article XI of the United States draft. A party may request the Consultative Committee, at any time, to conduct such inspections in order to resolve doubts and concerns. The fact-finding panel shall convene within 24 hours to determine whether such an inspection should be granted. The panel will make its decision based on guidelines contained in annex II. If the panel decides to request an inspection, the requested party shall, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, provide access to the inspectors. If a party refuses an inspection, it must fully explain its refusal and suggest concrete alternative methods for resolving the compliance concern. The fact-finding panel will review these explanations and suggestions to determine if they resolve the question raised. If the problem is not deemed to be resolved, the panel can again request an inspection. If it is refused again, the Chairman of the Consultative Commission shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations.

As with systematic international on-site inspection, there are many detailed, technical procedures governing the conduct of special and ad hoc on-site inspections that need to be negotiated. Section H of annex II contains a list of the areas where the United States believes there must be an agreement on procedures. Some examples of these areas are: a requirement for definition of the area to be inspected, types of equipment to be used, and protection of proprietary or confidential information. These procedures should be negotiated in connection with our consideration of the inspection provisions contained in articles X and XI.

In two statements I have outlined in detail the provisions contained in the United States draft convention dealing with the verification issue. The regime of systematic international on-site inspection, and the compliance resolution system outlined today, combine to provide the confidence in compliance necessary for a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical-weapons. These provisions are central to the United States draft convention. No chemical weapons convention can be achieved without agreement on effective provisions for verification.

This statement also concludes my series of statements dealing with the four main issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical weapons ban. I have explained how the United States draft convention deals with what a party must not do, what it may do, what it must do, and finally the verification provisions that provide confidence in compliance. I hope these statements have been helpful. My delegation is ready at any time and any place to work with any delegation to answer questions concerning our draft convention and to try to achieve mutually acceptable solutions to the many problems in this area which remain to be solved.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Little, if anything, has thus far been achieved in this year's sessions of the Conference, despite the efforts of delegations to move forward, but, in some areas progress has been made. During the spring part of the session, for example, a sound basis was laid for substantive work on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

Let me mention in particular the tabling by the United States of a full draft treaty of such a chemical weapons ban at the end of the spring part of our session. My delegation welcomes this initiative as a particularly valuable contribution to our work in this field. This draft provides us with a detailed analysis of ways and means to rid the world of an entire class of -- indeed appalling -- weapons. On an earlier occasion my delegation already expressed its satisfaction on the Soviet willingness to accept permanent on-site inspection of the destruction of stockpiles. We express our sincere hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on a chemical weapons treaty in the near future.

In due course, I hope to address the subject of chemical weapons in detail. I now only wish to pay tribute to the perseverance with which Ambassador Ekéus, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, furthers a successful outcome of our work during this session. Permit me to add that, in our view, the importance of an early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban would warrant a continuation of our work during the autumn, provided we could reach agreement before the end of this session on a suitable basis to do so.

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Once again I would like to devote my intervention to the question of chemical weapons, concentrating on some aspects of the ongoing process of negotiations. I think, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at the stage of determining exceptionally important questions. This is perhaps the reason why the results of its work are not at present as visible as one would wish them to be. On the other hand, some problems under active consideration become more and more clear and more and more understood by those most concerned. There is no doubt that further continuation of bilateral and other informal consultations between the most interested delegations will contribute to the achievement of better results by this Conference.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I would like to thank, as a number of other colleagues did earlier, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the Chairmen of the Working Groups who, in organizing numerous meetings and informal consultations, spare no efforts to achieve as much progress as possible. It seems at the moment that if the Committee could agree on the most important questions regarding the destruction of stockpiles and on the verification of this process, together with the procedure on submission of the initial and detailed plans for destruction, then the question of how and what to do with facilities would also be easier to solve. Let me say that an understanding on the questions mentioned above would make it possible to establish the main trunk of the future convention. The Polish delegation persistently works towards this end. Of extreme importance at the present stage would be the elaboration of guidelines for initial plans for destruction. Based on such agreed guidelines, the States signatories of the future convention who are in possession of chemical weapons could, after its entry into force, agree between themselves the detailed contents of such plans and submit them to the Consultative Committee. Any action in this respect at present would enhance an outlook on the whole process of destruction and verification. In other words, we consider that further work in this field will be both prospective and useful in all respects.

I would like to devote also a few lines to the question of the diversion of stocks. As is well known, different misunderstandings or lack of understanding concerning this problem have impeded progress of negotiations. We note therefore with satisfaction that a considerable degree of mutual understanding is emerging. It was especially encouraging to hear in this connection that the United States delegation would show flexibility to consider any proposals in this respect. All of us should have in mind that regardless of destruction or diversion, both these kinds of elimination of chemical weapons will have to be exactly reflected in future plans of destruction which the States parties concerned will have to submit at the mutually agreed time to the Consultative Committee. Thus the problem as such will be in full sight of all participants to the convention.

It is obvious that the diversion process will have to be adequately controlled.

Let me say also a few words on the forms of verification, particularly in the context of the United States draft convention contained in document CD/500. As I observed in my intervention on 15 March this year, no verification, however intensive and elaborate, can provide absolute certainty that no violation, even the least meaningful, occurs. The United States draft contains and proposes the widest and most demanding system of verification. Has it been justified by a real need or by an excessive care for the obligations to be fulfilled by future signatories of the convention? I shall try to make a short analysis of different requirements for the verification systems. Out of numerous requirements, the following could be mentioned:

- first, correspondence of the verification system with international law and with the provisions of law of the States parties concerned;
- secondly, correspondence of the verification system with the principle of the inviolability of security interests of the States parties concerned;
- thirdly, the intrusiveness of the verification system should be reduced to minimum and justified only by the nature and the dimensions of the scope;
- fourthly, the verification system should be reasonable in the sense of costs involved which are to be covered by the future signatories.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We are of the opinion that the most appropriate verification system is one which ensures, in practice the effectiveness of verification on one hand and is acceptable to the interested parties on the other. It seems, in this connection, that the intrusiveness of the system proposed by the United States is incommensurable with real needs. Some proposed methods of verification overlap, although that does not double the control effects and does not increase the volume of information achieved. As an example I quote from the statement of Ambassador Fields on 12 July. What is proposed is "... systematic international on-site verification of chemical weapons, from the moment they were declared, to the moment they were destroyed ...". In a system thus proposed there should be: immediate verification of the initial declarations, verification of the declared stocks between the declarations and elimination, and the verification of the destruction of stocks. In fact, such a system could allegedly reduce to a minimum the eventual cases of violation of the convention but, on the other hand, it may bring distrust among States parties as to the real intentions for conducting at least some on-site inspections. What can be achieved as a result might be the reluctance on the part of certain States to participate in the convention. This result would be exactly the opposite of what I believe we want to achieve.

In another statement, namely that of 19 July, the distinguished Ambassador Fields tried to answer some criticisms and dispel some legitimate questions and doubts many delegations, including mine, have with regard to article X of the United States draft convention by saying, inter alia, that "... the private chemical industry of the United States is fully subject to the inspection provisions of article X ...". I must say, however, that our doubts have not been dispelled. They are further strengthened by the opinions of some United States experts; for example, in a serious work on the subject entitled "Arms Control and Inspection in American Law", an American author, Louis Henkin, suggests that the question of on-site inspections in case of private industry, and that would of course pertain also to chemical industry, may go even as far as to require amendment of the United States Constitution.

During the last plenary meetings we have listened with great attention also to several other statements devoted to chemical weapons. Some of them, containing interesting ideas, are subject to careful study by my delegation. Today, without going into details, I would like to dwell on two of these thoughts. We have no doubt that chemical weapons must be destroyed, and this should be done as soon as possible, without any artificial complications. Thus we sympathized very much with the idea voiced by the delegation of Australia that obsolete stocks of chemical weapons, which sooner or later will have to be disposed of, could be destroyed as an act of goodwill, before entry into force of the Convention.

Such a step could not only reduce the burden to be carried by verification but would also build up the confidence necessary for the early elaboration and implementation of the convention banning the chemical weapons.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We are also in favour of the practice suggested by Ambassador Wegener in his plea that we should take more care in preserving the results of the work accomplished during previous sessions. Indeed the proposals of the past should serve not only future research workers but also, and in the first place, the negotiators.

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Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

The Soviet delegation would like to dwell today on a question which seems to be raised most often at plenary meetings of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament. This is the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. I think, however, that all will agree that in the broad range of problems concerned with the limitation of the arms race, the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons does not have the highest priority and is not the most important. Like the majority of delegations, and like the overwhelming part of the world community, we regard the prevention of nuclear war as the primary issue of contemporary world policy. At the same time, chemical disarmament can play an important positive role in resolving the tasks connected with the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

The majority of those who have spoken on the subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons, while noting some progress in the negotiations on this question, have also expressed dissatisfaction with their pace and character.

We share this feeling. On the one hand, the negotiations are continuing and the Soviet delegation recognizes the efforts of, and personal interest in the work taken by, the Chairman of the Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus and his staff. On the other hand, however, these negotiations are still very far from the ultimate goal. Perhaps even further from that goal than they were, let us say, a year and a half ago.

What are the reasons for this state of affairs in our work on the prohibition of chemical weapons?

There are certainly many. In our opinion, however, there are two main reasons. We have already had an opportunity to point out that the United States draft convention, even before it saw the light of day, hampered the negotiations. It is a well-known fact that in February, March and April of this year, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was almost fatally blocked. It is true that at that time delegations of one group of countries did not manifest any concern over that situation and did not call for any acceleration in the Committee's work. If only the matter had been confined to that! When the United States of America presented its draft convention in April, it became clear that it was not making a constructive contribution to the work already done at Geneva, and that it was creating a number of major insoluble problems which had not existed before. However much the United States delegation now tries to paint this draft in the most radiant colours, the main point is that it does not promote mutual understanding but, on the contrary, deepens the differences between the partners in the negotiations and, on a number of questions, particularly with regard to monitoring, sets the negotiations back. We have, of course, listened carefully to the clarifications given by the Head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Fields, concerning the individual sections of the United States draft, but that has in no way changed our general evaluation of this document. We shall talk about this in greater detail in one of our subsequent statements.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Another reason for the lack of progress and even regression is to be found in the fact that several delegations have, in our opinion, adopted a faulty approach. They have begun to complicate the talks, to burden them by constantly introducing new issues whose absence would in no way affect the chemical weapons ban, cause it to lose its comprehensive character or make it less effective. The trouble is that these issues in turn give rise to new questions and, as a Russian proverb states, the deeper one goes into the woods, the more firewood there is. It is becoming increasingly difficult for delegations to find a common language; secondary and tertiary questions push the main issues into the background and sometimes no way out of this situation can be seen. It is to be hoped that this is not being done deliberately, but that does not change the results.

We are resolutely against such an approach. Of course, the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, taking into account the object of the ban and its specific character, will inevitably be a complex international document. However, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that we are conducting political negotiations aimed at the solution of knotty problems which would predetermine the successful functioning of the convention. In any event, we shall not succeed in forcing all possible situations connected with the operation of the convention into a Procrustean bed, since life is considerably more diverse than any human fantasy. We are in favour of concentrating attention on the main elements — on the rules, not on the exceptions. It is precisely for this reason that international agreements on disarmament, including the convention being prepared by us, provide for the establishment of a consultative committee to be entrusted with the function of examining all situations that may arise, whether they can be foreseen or not. That is why we also wish to put forward in our statement today some general considerations concerning the activity of this very important machinery of the future convention.

Before touching on the specific content of our considerations, I should like by way of an example to refer to a few questions whose consideration and solution, it seems to us, could be entrusted to the consultative committee. They are primarily questions which are clearly not ripe for solution at the present time. For example, the proposal put forward by one or two delegations concerning the inclusion in the basic prohibition contained in the future convention of an undertaking by States "not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons". The participants in the negotiations have a more or less clear idea of the basic obligations which they would accept under the convention: not to produce chemical weapons, to destroy stocks, etc. But what are the other activities which they should not conduct? There is no clear reply to this. It is not possible to separate, let us say, activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons from activities relating to the preparation of armed forces as a whole. On this question, it is clear that no progress has been made towards reaching agreement.

Is it not better to proceed from the basis that the consultative committee consisting of all parties to the convention, as a forum for discussing all questions connected with the implementation of and compliance with the convention, might resolve any specific problem, including that to which reference has just been made, as soon as it acquired specific form, of course.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Yet another example. It has been proposed -- by the delegation of the United States of America -- to prohibit in the future convention some almost mysterious chemical, specially designed to intensify the effects of the use of chemical weapons. After persistent requests to clarify everything involved, it was stated that the matter concerns substances capable of acting as solvents in chemical weapons or as thickening agents, of changing the viscosity of chemicals or their local stability, of increasing their capacity to penetrate the human skin or the charcoal filter of a gas mask, etc. Even from this list -- and it can, of course, be expanded -- it is clear that the matter does not concern a particular specific chemical, but a great number of chemicals. It is true that, in this connection, we have not been given the name of a single chemical. It is proposed, consequently, that substances unknown to anyone should not be developed, produced or stockpiled and that they should be destroyed. Can this be serious? Here, too, if a genuine need to resolve the above-mentioned question arose, the consultative committee would be able to take the appropriate steps.

In a word, we attach very great importance to the consultative committee and consider that it and its subsidiary organs should be assigned the task of the solution in practice of the broadest possible group of questions connected with the practical implementation of and compliance with the convention.

We proceed from the basis that the consultative committee, if reference is made to it as a collective body, would receive, have custody of and distribute information furnished by States parties in accordance with the requirements of the convention, would provide to States parties at their request assistance in the conduct of consultations among them, would work out recommendations and individual technical questions, etc.

It would also have to perform a considerable number of responsible functions with regard to the implementation and co-ordination of all forms of verification. In particular, we consider it important that the consultative committee should work out standardized verification methods and verify reports of cases involving the use of chemical weapons. The convention must also include a clear provision under which the consultative committee would determine the procedure and periods for carrying out verifications at facilities for the destruction of stocks and at facilities for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes. It would take into account the size and characteristics of the stocks, data on the destruction facilities and on the permitted production, and a great deal more.

A most important task under the future convention will be the proper organization of the working interaction between international and national monitoring bodies. They should complement one another and assist one another, for otherwise, unless one is under the illusion of "constantly valid invitations", monitoring might prove to be imperfect. In this regard, too, it is clear that the consultative committee might have an outstanding role to play. It will have to concern itself even with such matters as the special training of national staff for carrying out inspections, the sealing of chemical weapons production facilities, the handling of seals, etc.

One would hope that these considerations will facilitate and speed up the preparation of the section of the future convention devoted to the consultative committee.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In connection with the consultative committee, I should like to draw attention to a matter of primary importance -- the composition of its main subsidiary organ, the executive council. We propose that this council should consist of 15 members, representatives of States parties to the convention, 10 of whom would be elected by the consultative committee on the principle of a two-year term for each party, five members being replaced each year; the remaining five seats would be set aside for the permanent members of the Security Council parties to the convention.

This machinery should be seen primarily as an earnest of the effectiveness of the future convention, ensuring compliance with the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties.

A very important problem is the elaboration of a procedure, acceptable to all the States parties to the future convention, for the adoption by the consultative committee and its subsidiary organ of decisions relating to substantive questions. Many far-reaching proposals of every kind have been submitted on this subject, but no reply has yet been forthcoming. This is not surprising, since the question really is complex. Yet, in our opinion there is a solution -- as in many other questions which have arisen in the process of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons, it lies in a realistic view of matters. We proceed from the basis that the best means of adopting decisions is by consensus. However, if it is not possible to reach a consensus within strictly stipulated periods, reckoned in some cases in days and in others in hours, then, in our opinion, there is only one practical -- I repeat, practical -- possibility: to bring to the notice of the party or parties the individual views on a given question of the members of the consultative committee or the executive council. The opinions of States, set out in the manner established by international law, would together constitute for many States a serious political factor which it would not be possible to ignore. As a last resort, it would always be possible to use other procedures, which would be provided for in the convention.

Those are some considerations which the Soviet delegation would like to put forward in connection with the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference.

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(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

Following nuclear disarmament in these various respects, the greatest efforts should be deployed for arms limitation and disarmament measures concerning other weapons of mass destruction. Overcoming demagogical, vacillating manoeuvres, the Conference on Disarmament must press towards the finalization of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, among which binary weapons are the subject of a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. As the victim of the biggest chemical war in recent decades, Viet Nam is particularly interested in this issue and informed the Committee on Disarmament of its experience last year.

(Mr. Birbaum, Austria)

Much work has been done by this Conference in the field of chemical weapons, whose topicality was sadly spotlighted by recent events. Austria is formally bound not to possess nor acquire nor test chemical weapons under any circumstances. It is thus greatly interested that this category of weapons be banned altogether. We trust that under the able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the momentum achieved can be carried further. We take the readiness in principle to accept permanent on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons expressed by the Soviet delegation on 21 February 1984, and the tabling of a full treaty text by the United States in April, as good signs that in this difficult area real progress can be achieved.

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(The President)

Although the Committee on Disarmament had no completed agreements to show for its five years of work, it made substantial progress in one very important field. It laid the foundations for a convention on chemical weapons, designed to rid the world completely of one whole class of weapons, long regarded with a particular abhorrence, which found its expression, after the appalling experiences of the First World War, in the Geneva Protocol, concluded in this city in 1925. I hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able and tireless chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus will be able to report to the Conference further progress in this field in time for inclusion in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly; and that we can then look forward to the conclusion of a Convention in 1985.

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(Mr. Walschap, Belgium)

The adoption of concrete and verifiable measures should also be possible for the Conference on Disarmament. The intensification and reorganization of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons would be a step in that direction, to which we attach the greatest importance. To a lesser, though still significant, extent, the time for compromise arrived long ago in negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons. Otherwise, we will have to resign ourselves to failure ... probably for a long time to come. We are still hoping that the Western proposals on mandates for subsidiary bodies on a nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space will help prepare negotiations at a later date. If not, if we do not begin to tackle the heart of the matter, we shall have to admit to a state of default which is as alarming as it is regrettable.

(Mr. Hayden, Australia)

A chemical weapons convention is also a high priority objective for the Australian Government. We believe there is a general will within the Conference on Disarmament to establish a convention requiring the declaration and destruction of existing chemical weapons and the means of producing them. Such a convention would prohibit the manufacture, stockpiling or use of such weapons and set up an effective system of international measures to demonstrate full compliance with all these provisions.

In this connection, the Australian Government particularly welcomed the tabling of a draft convention by Vice-President Bush of the United States in April. That action gave new impetus to the objective of achieving such a convention. The United States draft contains (by and large) the prohibitions which the Government of Australia would like to see in the future convention -- in particular, an absolute prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It also provides verification and compliance provisions of the standard which Australia believes is necessary if such a convention is to attract the adherence of all relevant States and to be fully effective in its physical and political objectives.

Australia wants an intensification and acceleration of the Conference's work on chemical weapons. The critical task is to resolve differences over the verification provisions. A striking example of this has arisen in connection with the United States draft convention and its provisions for ad hoc and special on-site inspections. Some delegations have argued that the draft provisions make a distinction in the verification regime from one country to another, depending on the degree of State ownership of the chemical industry.

The Australian Government holds that the verification provisions of the future Convention should apply with equal effectiveness to all countries, whatever their economic, social and political systems, and that comparable facilities should be subject to comparably effective controls, regardless of their ownership.

These are thoroughly legitimate, realistic considerations. The United States delegation has, I understand, said that no such imbalance was intended and that it is ready to work with others to ensure that its verification proposals apply fairly to differing economic and political systems. I suggest to the delegations most concerned to address the difficulties which they see in the United States draft by proposing alternative arrangements which are equally effective but do not suffer from the problems they see in the present draft. This would be an act of positive negotiation, and such proposals would be considered.

I should like to mention briefly Australia's contribution to verification. In the field of chemical weapons, Australia has long been conscious of the fact that the 1925 Protocol lacks verification provisions. For this reason we supported the General Assembly resolution initiated by France (37/98D) inviting the Secretary-General to establish a list of experts and laboratories on which we could draw to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Following adoption of the resolution, Australia nominated the Materials Research Laboratory of the Australian Defence Department to the Secretary-General's list. We are now making plans to expand the capabilities of that laboratory to:

(Mr. Hayden, Australia)

contribute such expert services to international verification of reports of use of chemical weapons. Indeed, even before the Secretary-General had completed the task of implementing resolution no. 37/98D, he had occasion to establish an investigatory team of specialists to investigate reports of the use of such chemicals in the Iran-Iraq war. Australia contributed an expert to that mission. By virtue of our geographical location, Australia is in a position to make a unique contribution to verification and information gathering related to the implementation of nuclear-arms control.

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Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The subject of my statement today is item 4 of our agenda, Chemical Weapons. In focusing on this issue I would like to make it clear that my delegation is by no means signifying any priority to this issue. We continue to uphold United Nations General Assembly resolutions 38/62, 38/183D and 38/183G which regarded nuclear issues as the priority issues in the discussion of disarmament. This priority was reflected in the statement dated 28 June of the Group of 21. However it is a fact that in the 1984 session, while we remained locked in disagreement on the nuclear issues, we have witnessed a heightened interest in achieving an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. It is perhaps not without significance that the first ad hoc committee to be established this year was on chemical weapons -- even before we had reached consensus on the term for the designation of our subsidiary bodies. Thereafter we heard the important statement of Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February on the verification question of a chemical weapons ban. On 18 April the Vice-President of the United States of America introduced document CD/500, a draft convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, various facets of which have been elaborated upon by Ambassador Fields in a series of statements. As we approach the end of the current session it appears to my delegation that if any progress has been achieved by us at all it is under item 4. Perhaps for the first time in the history of the Conference on Disarmament we have actually begun drafting a treaty. This is not an inconsiderable achievement, even though we may have a long way to go.

My delegation is pleased to note the signs of progress in negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons last year and this year. The progress achieved signifies not only the collective will of the international community to outlaw this particularly odious and abhorrent form of mass destruction, but also the vitality and viability of the multilateral process of disarmament which is very often brought into question by the manner in which we conduct our work in this forum. The wide acceptance now enjoyed by the proposal to include a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the future convention is a clear example of the effectiveness of the multilateral process of disarmament negotiations. My delegation does not consider that the inclusion of an undertaking in the convention not to use chemical weapons will in any way undermine the importance or utility of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It should not be beyond our negotiating capacity to formulate a provision in the convention which establishes an appropriate link with the Geneva Protocol. After all, what we seek in prohibiting the acquisition, stockpiling, retention or transfer is the prohibition of use in the final analysis. Chemical weapons are most often manufactured in developed countries but used in developing countries. This is a transfer we can well do without.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

We support the prohibition of the manufacture and transfer of chemical weapons. The use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and not merely in armed conflict, should be banned. Pending this global ban, the proposal to ban the use of chemical weapons in certain regions should be implemented, if at all, first in the regions where they have been used and then extended thereafter.

There is a considerable degree of agreement on the substance of the treaty elements relating to definitions and scope. The degree of agreement is the cumulative result of five years' work. This is not to say however that one should belittle the importance of remaining issues which may or may not relate to these particular elements. I refer here to the questions relating to irritants, herbicides, etc. It is to be hoped that solutions to these questions could be found without having to erode the degree of consensus already achieved. In this regard my delegation would like to pay tribute to the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, and the Chairmen of the three Working Groups for their efforts at building upon the progress reflected in the document CD/416. My delegation particularly commends the drafting efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee "in order to arrive at workable definitions". Considering the interrelationships that exist between various elements of the convention, such concretization will certainly help overall progress of negotiations. Whilst on the question of methodology, my delegation would like to draw attention to the useful suggestion made by the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium on 10 July with regard to the desirability of having a "clear synopsis of the alternative proposals on the important questions outstanding". This would not only facilitate a clearer picture of the present state of negotiations but would also help orientate negotiations in a problem-specific manner.

I referred earlier to the questions relating to definitions. As regards herbicides my delegation agrees that this question could best be handled outside the definitions in view of the conceptual and practical problems, including verification problems, it entails. This should not however, belittle the need for the future convention to take cognizance of the concerns expressed. Coming from a tropical developing country where the natural cover and ecology is an important element of our agro-based economy, we share the concerns about the hostile use of herbicides. We therefore believe that the absence of an undertaking against such use will be a lacuna in the convention. There is an important need to define permitted purposes and activities in such a manner that no loopholes are left, while recognizing that loopholes will always be found where the political will to honour a treaty is absent.

There is agreement that one of the most important elements, if not the most important of the convention is the elimination of existing stockpiles and facilities. The negotiations in Working Group B showed that there is also agreement that elimination of stocks should be undertaken according to an agreed schedule which takes into account the security interests of all States. We also would like to be optimistic about the emerging consensus on on-site monitoring of destruction or diversion of stocks. These areas of agreement however cannot mask the differences that remain. The issues relating to the timing of declarations and locations of stocks should be addressed in a realistic way in accordance with the principles already agreed upon such as the principle of having an agreed schedule or time-frame for elimination of stocks. It is regrettable therefore that more thought could not be given to the possibilities of finding realistic solutions to these outstanding problems without indulging in circular discussions of arguing for and against well-known positions. Whilst noting the constructive trend of

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

emerging understanding on the question of verifiable diversion of components of existing stocks, my delegation regrets the lack of similar understanding on the need to have as comprehensive information as possible with regard to the plans for destruction. It would be important for the States parties who do not possess chemical weapons as well, to know that chemical warfare capability is reduced and eliminated without prejudice to the security of any State party. This would promote the stability of and wider adherence to the convention. It is to be hoped that an acceptable compromise could be found on the basis of the suggestion for the redeployment of stocks before declaration. We welcome the willingness displayed to share expertise over the destruction of chemical weapons. Document CD/513 of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the kind invitation of the Government of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament to visit the facility in Spiez are examples of this. So also are the statements of the representative of Finland on 19 June and the representative of Norway on 26 June.

Much has been said about verification. It has been accepted by all that absolute verification is a chimera. Let us therefore save our energy by not chasing after it. There is no doubt that a convention as complex as the one being negotiated now should necessarily have a carefully worked out verification procedure to promote confidence of States. The technological capacity to verify a chemical-weapons ban is not in doubt so long as the political will to comply with the ban and mutual confidence exists. My delegation regrets the political debate on verification which has blocked progress on more than one disarmament agreement. Refusal to accept nothing less than total intrusiveness or rejection of that optimum degree of the intrusiveness necessary for the viability of the agreement, would not be compatible with the declared commitment to outlaw these weapons in the interest of all States. We should also bear in mind the necessity of not burdening prospective States parties with cumbersome and expensive verification procedures relating to monitoring of production for permitted purposes. Similarly verification must be protected against misuse through irresponsible, mischievous and provocative challenges which could lead to counter-challenges and a consequent over-burdening of the verification machinery as well as a jeopardizing of the stability of the Convention. If the Convention is to be of a truly multilateral character, it should not give rise to additional investments on the part of the developing countries for the setting up of institutional mechanisms to monitor the civilian chemical industry. The common denominator of verification should be found not only among the possessors of chemical weapons but also among the possessors and non-possessors. With regard to the Consultative Committee and the institutional arrangements envisaged for verification, my delegation would like to see the principle of universality maintained with democratized decision-making procedures. We cannot subscribe to the view, that has been disproved over and over again, that power begets responsibility, justifying a weighted scheme of decision-making. Peace and security is the common right of mankind. It is too important to be put in charge of a few countries who happen to monopolize weapons of mass destruction.

As our session draws to an end, it is important that the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should continue at least informally. The momentum must be maintained. My delegation shares the concern of Ambassador Depasse in his statement of 10 July and Ambassador Wegener in his statement on 19 July that negotiations on chemical weapons should be restricted to the time-table of the Conference on Disarmament. We are aware that the Chairman

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, has certain proposals in mind and my delegation would be interested in these when they are formally presented to the Conference on Disarmament. The task of achieving a chemical-weapons ban is too urgent to allow our negotiations to be interrupted by a five-month interval between our 1984 and 1985 sessions.

The Sri Lanka delegation continues to believe that disarmament is an indivisible continuum. It is manifestly wrong to identify one area for negotiation to the exclusion of other issues. We have however embarked upon a negotiating course on banning chemical weapons on which consensus exists in the Conference on Disarmament. Let us conclude this course while at the same time pursuing our discussion of other issues, including the priority nuclear issues. Sri Lanka has been spared the horror of chemical warfare in her history. However, in the eloquent words of Wilfred Owen, perhaps the finest war poet in the English language:

"Foreheads of men have bled where no wounds were  
I am the enemy you killed, my friend".

Significantly, Owen, who wrote on the "pity of war" and whose "poetry is in the pity", fought in World War I where chemical warfare was widespread. We need a convention, and now. As the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in this forum on 10 July, "The time has come to conclude this convention for which the world is waiting".

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

In my delegation's opinion, efforts to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical means of warfare should be placed within the setting of the general concern of States to outlaw all weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. The convention on chemical weapons should therefore be global in character, covering all toxic warfare substances, including non-lethal ones, the means of using them and production facilities, even those which at present are not operational but may become so within a very short time. We believe that the basic undertakings of the future convention should cover the prohibition of the use and the threat of use of chemical weapons. At the same time, the convention should encourage the broadest exchange possible of technical information as well as co-operation in the peaceful use of the chemical industry, above all for the benefit of developing countries. Special provision should be made to guarantee open and free access for all States parties to the processes and licences required both for the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and for the verification and monitoring of the obligations undertaken, the starting point being, naturally, the experience already acquired by some countries in this field. At the same time, the convention should permit the production, transfer and storage of toxic substances and their precursors, in strictly specified quantities, for protection, as well as for industrial, agricultural and medical uses, etc. It may be assumed that the chemical agents in this category should not exceed 1,000 kilos per year and that the national authority responsible for implementing the convention will inform the Consultative Committee in writing each year of these activities. The production of these agents should be carried out within a single industrial unit, designated by each State and subject to verification.

It is in this light that we have appreciated the Working Paper submitted by the United Kingdom delegation (document CD/514, of 1984) on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons, as a suggestion for ensuring that such activities do not become a source for the production of chemical agents for hostile purposes.

The convention should allow the transfer of toxic substances used for protective or research purposes to member countries which do not possess production facilities. Such transfers should not exceed a total of 1,000 kilos and should be monitored by the Consultative Committee, with a view to preventing the acquisition of stockpiles through purchases from several suppliers.

Concerning the declaration of stockpiles, production facilities and transfers of chemical agents, we support the idea that each State party should report, within 30 days at the most following the entry into force of the convention, on quantities of toxic warfare substances, according to categories, types and characteristics, as well as their means of use, year of production and origin. In our opinion, declarations should also indicate programmes for the destruction of stockpiles of chemical agents and their means of use. The respective operations should begin at the latest within six months of the entry into force of the convention and should continue, though not beyond a period of 10 years. In addition, provision should be made for dismantling facilities for the production of chemical warfare agents and for the filling of chemical munitions.

The verification of the substantive provisions of the future convention naturally represents a fundamental element of this international instrument. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, verification should consist in a combination of national and international means, including an obligatory system of systematic inspection, including on-site inspection, as an important instrument for creating and maintaining a climate of trust between the States parties. An important role should be attributed to the national authority, which each State should constitute with a view to

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

acquiring appropriate instruments for the analysis and rapid appreciation of all relevant developments. The structure and composition of this authority should be such as to permit both specific activity on an internal plane and efficient co-operation with other similar agencies and international verification bodies. We attach full attention to the important proposals submitted in this respect by the Yugoslav delegation (document CD/432).

The Romanian delegation considers that, in order to increase the credibility of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, as well as of production facilities, national measures should be supplemented with international means, including on-site inspections. We also support the setting up of a Consultative Committee and of subsidiary bodies, based on the principle of the equality of all States parties to the Convention, working on a basis of consensus. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, the task of the Consultative Committee could be to verify the declarations of States, to co-operate with national authorities and ensure an exchange of information, to analyse requests for on-site inspection, to resolve any differences which may arise and to inform all the States parties each year on the way problems related to the Convention have developed. We would also like to record our support for the idea of setting up an interim body, to prepare the application in practice of the Convention prior to its entry into force. Setting up such a body, through a General Assembly resolution, the same as would open the Convention to the signature of all States, would in our opinion be a good solution.

I would not like to conclude my remarks today without expressing our appreciation to Mr. Sergio de Quéiroz-Duarte of Brazil, Dr. Hubert Thielike of the German Democratic Republic and Mr. Robert Jan Akkerman of the Netherlands for their untiring and skilful efforts as Chairmen of the three Working Groups set up within the Committee. We owe them a great deal and I would like to assure them of our feelings of gratitude.

At this moment it would be presumptuous of me to try to draw conclusions regarding the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, chaired with such skill and devotion by Ambassador R. Ekéus of Sweden. The Committee itself will review its activity in the report which it will shortly be adopting. Nevertheless, I would like to say that the Romanian delegation has appreciated the generally constructive approach to discussions on subjects which have at times been very technical within the Ad Hoc Committee. We received many explanations and we think that a positive appreciation is appropriate for this activity, to which many delegations have contributed both through their statements and through the submission of various working papers.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany for the working meeting organized in Münster, in Lower Saxony, from 12 to 14 June 1984. The demonstrations provided and the discussions which took place undoubtedly contributed to a better understanding of the many aspects of the verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We warmly thank Switzerland for its invitation to us to visit the facilities at Spiez.

One of the most important questions at this point of our work is to consider how we may continue our activities on chemical weapons. It would be advisable, in our opinion, to avoid interrupting negotiations for too long a period, so that next year the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons may continue efforts already under way. For this purpose, we believe that both in New York and in Geneva

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multilateral contacts at expert level should be continued. In addition, we are convinced that the most active delegations will take this opportunity to undertake bilateral consultations. Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should, in our opinion, resume its activity before the beginning of the Conference's work, for example, towards the middle of January 1985.

We are of the opinion that in this way our Conference may next year take the decisive step expected of us and submit a first draft convention on chemical weapons to the General Assembly. The submission by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic of a draft structure for the future convention will no doubt help to speed up our efforts in this direction, and we thank the Polish delegation for the proposal. The Romanian delegation considers that all the conditions are now right to achieve this objective. There only remains for us together to produce the necessary political will to outlaw as rapidly as possible these weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons.

CD/PV.280

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Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Mr. President, in its statement today the Soviet delegation would like to address once again the issue of banning chemical weapons.

About two years ago the Soviet Union submitted to the Conference draft basic provisions for a convention on that subject. We have since repeatedly adjusted and supplemented important elements of that draft so as to accommodate the positions of the parties to the negotiations, in particular with regard to the scope of the ban and its verification. This was welcomed at the Conference. The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced that the proposals of the USSR provide a real basis for a mutually acceptable agreement on the totality of issues related to a chemical weapons ban, including, naturally, those of verification.

However, as in the case of many other arms limitation and disarmament negotiations, certain delegations made verification of compliance with the future convention a major obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on this issue. The Soviet delegation therefore feels obliged to present once more our views on the issue of verification.

The main purpose of verification is to promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Our assumption in this context is that the very conclusion of an international agreement is itself an expression of mutual trust between the parties to the agreement. As to the verification provisions, they should increase that confidence through the presentation of relevant information on the practical and effective compliance with the convention and by carrying out other

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adequate forms of verification. For all their importance, the verification measures have only a secondary role, while the central role belongs to the agreement itself which provides for arms limitation and reduction and should be subject to verification. If isolated from actual arms limitation measures, verification loses its meaning and becomes pointless. It should enhance the security of the parties, rather than undermine it.

The existing arms limitation treaties and agreements bear no evidence to the undisputable priority of national technical means of verification -- I repeat, the undisputable priority of national technical means of verification -- which are best suited to serve the security interests of States. At the same time the Soviet Union believes that, where necessary, additional measures may be adopted (depending on the nature of possible arms limitations) to increase the effectiveness of verification. However, in no case should those measures be used to interfere in the internal affairs of States or to damage the security of any of the parties. The Soviet Union is interested in effective and reliable verification as much as any other nation, including the United States. Naturally, this also applies to the prohibition of chemical weapons, in view of the current large-scale United States programmes for chemical rearmament.

As is known, the Soviet Union has proposed using diverse forms of verification to provide assurance of compliance with a chemical weapons convention. Those would be in the first place national verification measures, which are especially useful in view of the extremely broad scale of chemical production in virtually all countries of the world. In addition, there are national technical means which are now already fairly varied and will doubtless improve in the future. In this connection we assume that the parties having such national technical means in their possession can make available to the other parties, as necessary, the information obtained by those means which is important for the purposes of the convention. We also have in mind systematic international on-site inspections in connection with certain provisions of the future convention; and finally, on-site verification on request, the role of which is hard to overestimate in view of its very broad nature.

Our approach to verification is confronted with another approach, one that can hardly be called anything but extremist. Its most striking element is the so-called "open invitation" concept formulated in the United States draft chemical weapons convention. This concept has already been mentioned repeatedly in the statements of many delegations. We too would like to set forth our views regarding that concept.

In the first place it is unrealistic. It has to be taken into account that every State in the world has certain areas of activity, agencies, institutions and facilities, an open access to which would require a change in their existing legislation. It would be sufficient to cite the national gold reserve and security depositories, institutes that use sensitive devices and equipment kept in special premises and made accessible only at strictly defined time intervals, or archives, not to mention military facilities and defence agencies having nothing to do with chemical weapons. The adoption of this concept would result in the disclosure of the political, economic, scientific, military, commercial and other secrets of the States parties unrelated to the production, stockpiling and storage of chemical weapons, and the disorganization of various branches of industry.

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Secondly, this concept discriminates against parties with State-owned or partly nationalized industry, putting them in an unequal position compared to the States where private enterprise predominates. This has repeatedly been pointed out in the Conference, including at the meeting on 7 August. Such an approach is especially unacceptable given the possibility of the production of binary weapon components by private enterprises.

Thirdly, this concept is, in our opinion, inherently flawed since it proceeds from total distrust between States and is an expression of outright nihilism with regard to international law. The inference present in this concept that any State party may be expected from the outset to violate its international obligations means that any State can be regarded as potentially in violation of international law. The application to the States of a concept contrary to the presumption of innocence would be counter to the principle of the voluntary nature of international obligations. By embracing this approach we would call into question the binding nature of the principle "Pacta sunt servanda" which is one of the foundations of international law, or what is known as "jus cogens", norms that no State can disregard if it is to remain a part of the international community.

And finally, the adoption of this concept can only complicate international relations and even give rise to international friction and conflicts. Hardly anyone fails to perceive that an international inspection conducted under the "open invitation" scheme, for example, at military facilities that have nothing whatever to do with chemical weapons, would provoke countermeasures on the part of the State subjected to such an unwarranted inspection. The consequences of this kind of an "inspection" are difficult to foresee.

The Soviet delegation shares the concern expressed on this subject by Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, who said on 7 August: "Verification must be protected against misuse through irresponsible, mischievous and provocative challenges which could lead to counter-challenges and a consequent overburdening of the verification machinery as well as a jeopardizing of the stability of the convention". The "open invitation" concept is an attempt at achieving absolute verification. Here again we support the view expressed by Ambassador Dhanapala, who called such absolute verification a chimera. He suggested that we save our energy by not chasing after it. We call upon everyone to respond positively to this appeal.

For all these reasons the Soviet Union, like many other countries, rejects the "open invitation" concept. It has to be added that this concept is also an expression of the United States demand that other States, and the Soviet Union in the first place, shall open up their entire territories and disclose their military activities. And this is being demanded at the very moment when a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign is under way, when the Soviet Union has been called the "empire of evil" and plans for an all-out or a "limited" nuclear war against it are being discussed. It would be at least naive to expect the Soviet Union to meet such a demand. Indeed, that demand is only advanced in the calculation that it will inevitably be rejected, thus complicating or even disrupting the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban.

The problem of verification must not become an obstacle blocking the way to a chemical weapons convention. As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,

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K.U. Chernenko, put it, "when there is a real desire to agree on arms reduction and disarmament measures, verification has never been and cannot be an obstacle".

The Soviet delegation suggests that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should concentrate first of all on working out measures and forms of verification that would be both effective and practically feasible, rather than indulge in discussions around extravagant and deliberately unrealistic and irrational proposals. There is still plenty of serious and vitally important work to be done, including even in such apparently "advanced" areas as the destruction of stockpiles or permitted production at a specialized facility. We are convinced that a considerable potential for progress exists also with regard to the procedures for taking decisions on verification in the Consultative Committee and its organs, the procedures for conducting the actual inspections, etc.

I shall now deal with another fundamental problem related to the future chemical weapons convention. The Soviet delegation, like many others, is firmly convinced that the question of banning binary chemical weapons as a qualitatively new, and most dangerous, type of such weapons, described by its creators as the weapon of the future, should be among the central issues of the future convention.

However, a look at the United States draft reveals that the question of banning binary weapons is obviously being downplayed. The United States representative, Ambassador Fields, said in one of his statements at the Conference that the convention should ban "any type of munitions or devices used to release the chemicals on the battlefield". One possible understanding of this formula is that it covers the binary chemical weapons as well. But if so, why is this most advanced type of chemical weapons not referred to by its proper name, while it is included in the United States chemical rearmament programmes quite independently and is regarded as most promising?

One cannot avoid the conclusion that all this vagueness and lack of definition serves to conceal the intention to leave open a possibility of mounting the mass production of this latest generation of chemical weapons in the United States. The repeated statements by the NATO armed forces commander, General Rogers, regarding the importance of binary chemical weapons being deployed in Europe only confirm this understanding of ours.

The time has come when the question of banning binary weapons must be clarified once and for all if we are to move forward in our negotiations. We consider it necessary, in particular, to work out, for the purposes of the convention a definition of a "key component of a binary chemical system" so that it could not in some way or another entirely vanish from the scope of the convention, and then to compile, on the basis of this definition, a list of such components which should be kept in mind when formulating the relevant provisions of the convention.

There is another issue in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons that must be completely clarified. It is the question of prohibiting the use of herbicides in military operations, as well as the use of irritants in military and other conflicts. Their exemption from the ban is counter to the Geneva

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Protocol of 1925 and is aimed at legalizing the production of those chemicals which, as we all well remember, were widely used by the United States in Viet Nam.

We support the position expressed on this subject by Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Argentina, Viet Nam and some other States and believe that the convention we are discussing should absolutely ban the use of herbicides for military purposes. Regardless of the eventual decision on the relationship of the convention with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and other international agreements, such a ban on the use of herbicides would introduce utmost clarity and would therefore be very useful. Naturally, the future convention should also ban the use of irritants in armed and other conflicts. As to the possible use of irritants for "riot control", which includes suppression of peaceful public rallies (demonstrations, meetings, etc.) the Soviet side believes that such a provision would be far-fetched, incompatible with the dignity of people and tending towards human rights violations.

I would also mention that from our study of the proposed United States definition of chemical weapons we have been unable to understand the United States position on incapacitants, namely, whether their use for law enforcement should or should not be banned.

I should also like to point out the following. In the context of permitted activities, the United States draft convention focuses entirely on the relatively small quantities of supertoxic lethal chemicals that could, under the future convention, be produced or retained by the parties for protective purposes. At the same time the draft actually ignores the same chemicals, regardless of their quantity, once they are officially intended for peaceful purposes. Production of such chemicals is permitted at all commercial enterprises, with no restrictions whatsoever on the number of such enterprises or on the transfers of such chemicals. The proposed quantitative limitations are also unclear. This approach provides a basis for any State, should it choose to violate the convention, to produce the most dangerous of the prohibited chemicals in any amounts it might need.

And finally, I will touch upon one more issue which the Soviet delegation gave special attention to in its last statement on chemical weapons. I am referring to the tasks and functions of the Consultative Committee to be established under the future convention. As we have already emphasized, we attach great importance to formulating the provisions on the organization and functioning of such a Committee. In order to facilitate further negotiations on this issue, a group of socialist countries intends to submit to the Conference a working paper devoted to the organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee. We hope that the working paper of the socialist countries will be taken as a basis for the solution of this issue.

These are our views on a number of important issues relating to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons; they stem from the desire of the Soviet delegation to make progress in resolving the problems concerning the prohibition and abolition of those weapons.

The reason for my taking the floor today is to introduce, on behalf of a group of socialist States, a working paper, to which Ambassador Issraelyan referred in his statement today, entitled "Organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee of a CW Convention", issued under the symbol CD/532, as well as CD/CW/WP.84, and as you undoubtedly noted, distributed at the beginning of today's plenary meeting.

The paper's main outlines are based on previous proposals of socialist States as well as on proposals of other delegations. It contains also some new elements such as for example, on co-operation of international and national verification bodies. This subject is covered in Chapter III of the Working Paper.

In our view, closer co-operation between these bodies should contribute to implementation of the Convention.

By introducing this document we would also like to contribute to the further development of the concept of the organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee.

The basic provisions of the Working Paper are contained in three chapters concerning: General provisions and structure; functions; and co-operation with the national verification bodies of the States Parties.

I should like to stress that we are ready to co-operate and to work together with all other delegations in the search for mutually acceptable solutions for the work of the Consultative Committee.

Again in this respect the socialist States are ready to demonstrate their flexibility, willingness to compromise as well as understanding of other delegations' positions, and we hope that such an approach will be reciprocated.

Our aim is to establish the machinery of the Consultative Committee such as would ensure the best possible co-operation among the States Parties to the future Convention in order to prevent any possibility of its violation. This should be secured by means of consultations, broad exchange of information and effective co-ordination of the work of the international and national control and verification bodies.

The first chapter of the document contains general provisions, such as, those relating to the establishment of the Committee, representation of the States Parties in the Committee, its sessions, decision-making, and presentation of the results of its sessions. It also contains a structure for the Committee, the structure of the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat, as well as the way in which decisions will be made by the Executive Council.

The second chapter deals with the functions of the Consultative Committee. Chief among these are the following: co-ordination of all forms of verification; elaborating standard verification techniques; receiving, storing and disseminating information on compliance with and implementation of the convention; consultations; determining the modalities and time-frames of international on-site inspections; verifying reports on the use of chemical weapons; and considering requests for on-site inspections.

The third chapter touches upon a problem which so far has not been discussed, or only to a small extent, in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It refers to one of the important, practical elements of the future convention.

In that chapter the socialist countries try to provide a preliminary description of the principles on which the co-operation between the Consultative Committee with the national verification institutions should be based.

To sum up, I wish to emphasize again that our document contains all the basic provisions regarding the Consultative Committee, provisions which are considered to be our contribution to the wide-ranging discussion of the concept of that Committee, in a spirit of good co-operation and mutual understanding.

Mr. MONTASSIER (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, on 5 April the French delegation presented its general views on the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and the dismantling of their production facilities; these views and proposals are set forth in document CD/494.

In a matter of weeks, under the very active chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and spurred on by the Chairmen of the Working Groups, to whom my delegation wishes to pay tribute collectively, some progress has been made, some problems have been identified more clearly, and it would appear that opinions have developed in a direction which favours the speeding up of negotiations.

Finally, the draft treaty submitted by the Vice-President of the United States on 18 April was brought to our attention and we have studied it carefully. The French delegation stated at the time that it considered the draft treaty a positive contribution to our work. It believes that the assurances given by the United States delegation concerning its willingness to find mutually acceptable solutions on a number of points which have been raised in the course of our discussions confirm the interest of this document, which is the only coherent and complete draft and remains, in our opinion, an essential basis for pursuing our work.

Taking account of all this work, not to mention the other highly interesting contributions of other delegations (Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and China) and the extremely instructive visit organized in Münster by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, my delegation today wishes to outline some suggestions for resolving a number of difficult issues. I shall therefore successively deal with some problems of definition, and then of co-ordination of plans for destruction; and I shall also comment briefly on the prohibition of use and the organization of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

With regard to definition, we have often run up against a particularly difficult problem: that of key precursors, a crucial point at which the problems of stocks, production and verification all meet. There are two opposing viewpoints on this subject; those who wish to negotiate on lists of products, category by category; and those who call for a global definition to serve as a universal criterion. After carefully studying various possibilities, my delegation proposes a combination of the two approaches: it suggests a generic definition which would identify families of products and make it possible to draw up lists of products. In the case of each product, it will be necessary to carry precision to the point of determining, first, the degree of toxicity and therefore of risk; then use, exclusively military or partially for civilian purposes; and finally conditions of production, and control over it.

The French delegation intends to submit, at the next session, a technical document in which this outline will be developed.

With regard to the destruction of stocks, useful work has certainly been carried out at this session in bringing us nearer to reasonable solutions. However, two points deserve particular attention.

The French delegation has long stressed the dangers inherent in all reconversion formulas. It is nevertheless ready to display a spirit of compromise and accept the possibility of the conversion of toxic warfare stocks for

(Mr. Montassier, France)

peaceful purposes, on two conditions: that lethal supertoxic chemicals and single-purpose precursors should be destroyed and not converted, apart from those produced for permitted purposes; and that the conversion process should be subject to strict control.

The fact remains that the destruction or conversion of stocks could not take place instantaneously. It would therefore be desirable to provide for co-ordination among States which declare that they possess chemical weapons to enable them to harmonize their destruction plans. What is at stake here is something essential: nothing less than the security of each State.

Side by side with the negotiation of the Convention, and throughout the process leading to its signature and subsequent ratification, it will be necessary to ensure this co-ordination of destruction plans. This is a fundamental point: it is sometimes just as important to know how and at what pace the clauses of the convention will be implemented as to define flawless machinery.

The disappearance of stocks and production facilities is obviously the best guarantee against recourse to chemical weapons in case of conflict; in the interim, a threat will always exist, and current events demonstrate that this is not a theoretical danger. To avert this threat, which will last as long as there are chemical weapons which can be used, and which will reappear rapidly once a signatory State decides to withdraw from the Convention, protection exists in the form of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It is therefore in no one's interest to weaken this bulwark.

Furthermore, the Geneva Protocol can itself resolve some problems which have arisen from time to time to complicate the drafting of the convention.

From this standpoint, it is quite useless to cover these various points in the convention, provided, of course, that the authority of the Geneva Protocol is expressly maintained and that it is clearly interpreted.

My delegation therefore proposes the inclusion in the convention of a clause which would provide for: "the exclusion of the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict by the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, which are complementary to the Geneva Protocol, the prohibitions in which must be respected by all States Parties to the Convention".

We are aware that a formulation of this kind may perhaps have to be altered to take account of the legal system in some countries, but as far as substance is concerned the idea must be retained, however it is set forth, as a general formula such as we have suggested, or a more detailed clause.

Finally, I should like in a few words to comment on the institutional machinery of the future convention, in particular the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council.

In our view, every signatory State will be an ex officio member of the Consultative Committee, which must take its decisions by consensus, like the Executive Council. On the other hand, the membership of the future Executive Council seems a more difficult matter. We should not try to seek a magic formula, but rather be realistic, in order to be effective. What, then, are the ways open to us?

(Mr. Montassier, France)

The regional approach as a way of selecting the candidates for the Executive Council is certainly not to be ruled out. The desire for effectiveness also suggests that, whether a regional or some other criterion is adopted, the States whose technological, financial and military potential make them essential partners in the sphere of a chemical weapons convention should be permanent members. Thirdly, the possibility of access to the Council for all States Parties to the convention by means of election should obviously be recognized.

Consequently, to combine these various criteria it cannot be ruled out that the membership of the Executive Council must be raised to 20, perhaps 25, but certainly no more.

I shall not dwell at any greater length today on the details of the problems raised by the draft convention on chemical weapons. In a later statement my delegation will deal with all the problems raised by verification, whether of stocks, production facilities or the use of chemical weapons. It will also put forward its views on the institutional machinery of verification. These are controversial and thorny problems which show us how great the task before us would be even if it were merely a question of settling those questions alone.

Unfortunately, many other controversial issues remain outstanding. These considerations, which cannot be disputed, lead us to make a dual appeal: for the acceleration of the negotiations and the prolongation of our work. Of course, these two appeals are linked: there would be no point in meeting if it were to do nothing. However, with prospects of progress, it might be considered that at an appropriate period, in October-November, the discussions could be pursued in Geneva, and our work at the beginning of the winter session might be brought forward, although this is a matter for discussion. My delegation would support such proposals, while remaining open to other suggestions, as we are all well aware here that every solution has its drawbacks.

In any event, at the end of this session, which has brought us some moments of hope as well as the usual series of disappointments, we must more than ever call upon that contradictory virtue to which we owe our best progress, namely, reasonable impatience.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation is not happy with the work done at this year's session towards negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons. We had earlier welcomed the statement made by the distinguished representative of the USSR in February this year which showed forward movement on the question of verification. My delegation had also expressed the hope that the United States draft of a chemical weapons convention would provide added impetus to our work on the subject. I must regretfully note that this has not been the case. The work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has reached a stage where we can well do without polemics. It is most important that the delegations cease to view the issues involved in an East-West context. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been fortunate in having a Chairman of the calibre of Ambassador Ekeus, but the extent of success that a Chairman can achieve depends in very considerable measure on the co-operation that he receives from other delegations.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Three weeks ago I addressed nuclear issues and outer space in my first speech before this Conference. Today my intervention will be devoted to the other major issue of the Conference on Disarmament, chemical weapons.

I believe we all agree on the urgent character of the negotiations on chemical weapons. For too long the goal of a convention effectively and comprehensively banning chemical weapons has remained elusive.

It is obvious that, in particular with respect to the verification of the future ban, certain immensely difficult hurdles must be overcome. This prompts me to focus in my intervention on some general aspects of the role of verification in a chemical weapons ban, as well as on some of the main related problems.

Let me state at the outset that it is no surprise that questions of verification continue to present major obstacles in the search for a chemical-weapons agreement: chemical weapons have only too effectively been used throughout this century and even in the recent past we have been witness to the horror of chemical war. Chemical weapons have been and continue to be stockpiled in militarily relevant quantities, thus forming a threat to mankind. Eradicating chemical weapons would therefore amount to a major disarmament effort aiming at the removal of a redoubtable and viable weapons-system. It is only too understandable that for such an effort to be successful, confidence in the compliance with the provisions of the agreement should be assured. This can only be achieved in the form of a set of inevitably elaborate and in themselves unprecedented verification arrangements.

This alone would sufficiently explain the formidable task the present negotiators are confronted with. Unfortunately, however, there are other complicating factors inherent in the nature of chemical weapons themselves.

A great many potential chemical warfare agents and precursors thereof are produced in the civilian chemical industry and for perfectly permissible and legitimate purposes. On the one hand we recognize that measures to verify the non-production of those agents and precursors for hostile purposes in the civilian industry should not interfere with production for legitimate purposes -- production which takes place, moreover, in a highly competitive context. On the other hand we must insist that measures to contain and reduce the risk of circumvention or evasion of the rules are essential, especially in an area where possible loopholes appear to be abundant.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

An additional related complicating factor is the emergence of highly developed chemical industrial activities for civil purposes in an increasing number of countries. Thus there is an increasing risk of proliferation of chemical weapons to be taken into account. This underlines the importance of a truly multilateral agreement.

Do these complicating factors render our goal well-nigh out of reach? This certainly is not the case. We witness progress in the Ad Hoc Committee and in working groups. We have listened to very constructive and thoughtful interventions on the matter in these last weeks. I mention the very interesting and comprehensive clarifying contributions made by Ambassador Fields of the United States, and by Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, the important observations which the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, made in particular on the verification issue, as well as Ambassador Dhanapala's lucid remarks that brought certain problems into their proper perspective. Permit me also to mention the interventions of Ambassador Issraelyan, on 9 August, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, Mr. Montassier of France and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Mr. Brunner, to whom we are grateful for inviting us to visit his country's protection facilities in Spiez.

We share the views of those who stated that obtaining a hundred per cent assurance of compliance is beyond our reach. The other day Ambassador Issraelyan made the plea that "presumption of innocence" rather than mutual mistrust should be the guiding principle in our work for the convention. We wish to add, however, that "presumption of innocence" is only valid once a verification regime will ensure that the present alarming situation, which certainly did not arise out of acts of innocence, will effectively be tackled.

In our view, we should seek, so to speak, "adequate" assurance of compliance through a package of verification measures which complement and mutually strengthen each other. At the same time, we should not dissimulate that ultimately the decision whether or not to agree on any draft of a chemical weapons convention is a political one, requiring both courage and, of course, confidence. Courage, because certain risks cannot fully be covered. Confidence, because, after all, the most likely risks under a regime banning chemical weapons will have been dealt with and the remaining risks can be minimized.

Let us take a closer look at some of those risks. The first such risk is the continued existence of stockpiles, in contravention of the ban. Therefore parties to the convention should first be enabled to assure themselves that declared stocks fully coincide with existing stocks. There is a limit to the degree of certainty that can be obtained, because the possibility for a State to hide stockpiles can never totally be precluded. But provisions should be such that a State contemplating doing so -- in militarily significant quantities -- would be deterred by a serious risk of detection warranting a challenge inspection.

We believe that there seems to emerge a consensus that international on-site verification of the declaration of stockpiles could be made less sensitive by having it organized at relocation sites where chemical weapons will be regrouped, in lieu of in military arsenals.

(Mr. van SCHAIK, Netherlands)

However, so far, no agreement has been reached on the time span within which and the schedule according to which, all declared stocks would have to be open for verification.

Ambassador Dhanapala expressed some views on this matter, underlining the need for comprehensive information with regard to the plans for destruction and for a phasing-out scheme that would not prejudice the security of any State party. We agree with him. Indeed, we think that we should seek agreement on a phased scheme for verification of declarations of stocks, to be put on a parallel with a time-table to be agreed upon for the phased destruction of stockpiles. Such time-tables should meet certain criteria, so as to ensure: first, that the most dangerous chemical weapons will be destroyed in the early phase; and second, that each country will gradually and proportionately dispose of its stocks.

In order to meet the first criterion -- most dangerous weapons first -- the toxicity of each category of weapons should be a determinant, while at the same time a distinction must be made between agents placed in weapons and those stored in bulk form. With respect to the latter distinction we agree with the approach chosen by the representative of Australia, Mr. Rowe, on 19 July, when he rightly pointed out that operational weapons must be destroyed first. The operational utility of a chemical agent is greater if weapons have been filled with it and such weapons pose a greater risk than those stored in bulk. Also the percentage which a particular category constitutes of the total over-all stockpile of a State should be taken into account when determining its relative danger.

As to the second criterion -- the proportionate reduction for each party -- this appears to be important, in order to leave to each possessor State a proportional share of its stocks during the interim period. Declarations and verifications should, moreover, in each phase precede destruction. Thus the location of a party's entire chemical-weapon stockpile would not have to be declared at once and would therefore not be exposed to the risk of attack, in case of a breakdown of the convention, unexpected delay in the implementation of its provisions or other unforeseen adverse developments.

In short, we think that we should seek formulas for destruction schemes through which the most dangerous weapons will first be destroyed and which, on the other hand, ensure that the mutual security of possessor States will not be reduced.

Parties should, of course, be assured that declared stockpiles are actually being destroyed. Here again agreement seems to emerge on obtaining such assurance by a combination of permanent on-site inspection by international inspectors during the entire destruction operation and the use of monitoring instruments for the most dangerous chemical weapons. The question remains whether an equally stringent monitoring of chemical weapons in a lower risk category is necessary. We on our side believe that a reasonable solution to that question can be found without too much difficulty.

(Mr. van SCHAIK, Netherlands)

More complex, however, is the question under what conditions a diversion of certain chemical warfare agents outside the supertoxic range can be accepted for permitted purposes. On this the representative of France, Mr. Montassier, made some pertinent remarks. Two types of approach to this issue are under discussion. The regime for diversion could be generally applicable to all non-supertoxic agents, in which case the quantities involved and the operations carried out would be declared and verified in accordance with the relevant regime to verify non-production. Alternatively, diversion should rather be treated as an exception and be verified according to the arrangements applicable to the verification of destruction of the same agents.

We believe that already for economic reasons (high costs) diversion to civilian purposes will remain an exception. We suggest that a specific regime should be established by the relevant States possessing chemical weapons for categories of specific agents for which diversion could exceptionally be envisaged. In our view a stricter regime would apply to agents that pose the greater risk, also in the manner in which they are stored, in other words, those placed in munitions. Agents in bulk pose the same risk, irrespective of their ultimate purpose. In that case the same verification regime could apply, namely the less strict regime for the verification of non-production.

Besides the stocks of chemical weapons, the capacity to produce chemical weapons poses a major risk. The significance of the destruction of stockpiles would severely be reduced if readily available production capacities are left untouched. Therefore, destruction of stockpiles should be seen in combination with measures to prevent production.

We believe we all share the view that facilities for the production of chemical weapons should be closed down and eliminated after entry into force of the Convention. A list of specific types of facilities should be drawn up including indications of the modalities of elimination that seem to be appropriate for each type of facility (e.g. total physical destruction, partial physical destruction, re-use of components for permitted purposes etc.). In this context the feasibility of temporary conversion of production facilities into destruction facilities could and should be further studied.

There is still a lot of work to be done in this field and abundant material to be investigated without delay. It cannot be denied, of course, that progress in other fields of the Convention which I addressed before will foster a favourable climate for progress on the question of production facilities. However, we would have serious objections to the suggestion of postponing the consideration of the facilities issue, pending progress to be made in other fields, which, if I understood him well, was Ambassador Turbanski's suggestion. Linkages of this sort could only delay the ultimate outcome.

For the effective elimination of chemical-weapon production facilities, a solution must also be found for the sizeable problem of the residual capacity to produce chemical warfare agents in the civilian chemical industry. The spread of advanced chemical and pharmaceutical industries to the developing countries points to the truly global nature of that problem. We believe that the size of the problem may make it very difficult to enter into elaborate verification arrangements on a continuous or semi-continuous basis. The competitive nature of the chemical and

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

pharmaceutical market forces us moreover to admit that highly intrusive arrangements are undesirable and unrealistic. By the same token, however, the scope of the problem cannot serve as a pretext to simply ignore it.

We believe that a differentiated approach based on risk assessment, as proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom in document CD/514 can be a viable one. In document CD/445, submitted by my delegation some months ago, an attempt was made to demonstrate that such an approach would be manageable from an institutional and organizational point of view. The inspection scheme for high-risk chemicals would have to function on a random basis, using weighing factors depending inter alia on the size of the plant. For medium-risk chemicals, less intrusive verification arrangements, such as surveillance by the Consultative Committee based on data exchange on production statistics, should suffice.

No arrangement or set of arrangements of a routine nature can be considered to provide "adequate" assurance of compliance with the treaty. It is for that reason that we need a challenge inspection mechanism as well. Such a mechanism should serve both as a generally applicable verification device, and as a safety-net to be used in case of lingering doubts, after more routine type verification procedures have been exhausted.

In the view of most delegations the Consultative Committee would play a central role in such a challenge procedure. Challenge requests should not be allowed to be frivolous in nature; they should contain all facts that prompted the request. Unfounded allegations can adversely affect the viability of the Convention. As a general rule, a country ought to accept requests for an on-site inspection resulting from a challenge made. We believe, however, that in exceptional cases a State Party may have legitimate reasons for refusing such a request. In that case it should provide an indication of the nature of those reasons. The question then remains of what step should next be taken if such a refusal only adds to the existing doubts on the Party's compliance.

At this stage I do not wish to enter into the subtleties of arbitration or other procedural mechanisms in situations which, we hope, will prove to be exceptional cases. The procedures to be elaborated should in our view be such that they contribute to a maximum extent to preventing a break-out from the convention. It is the threat of the ultimate break-down of a convention that may provide us with the most forceful incentive for the settlement of such issues.

Mr. President, allow me also to dwell for a short while upon some of the remarks made by the distinguished representative of the USSR in his statement of 24 July. He suggested that the present negotiations are somewhat bogged down on issues, some of them new, of minor detail, perfectly dispensable in a chemical-weapon convention; Ambassador Issraelyan argued that those issues can be adequately catered for by the Consultative Committee once the convention is in force.

My delegation agrees with the underlying assumption in the Soviet statement that certain unresolved issues could be left to the institutions of the convention. However, matters to be dealt with in a chemical-weapons ban are so serious that we cannot be satisfied with the establishment of a sort of "cadre-agreement", leaving major policy issues to the discussion of a future Consultative Committee. Often our present dispute over the very issues mentioned in the Soviet statement is a mere reflection of deeper differences on fundamental questions of substance. We fail to see how the Consultative Committee would be better equipped to solve these problems than we ourselves together with our experts, here and now. I note, in passing,

(Mr. van SCHAİK, Netherlands)

that a discussion on the decision-making powers and the functioning of the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council could perhaps be more productive, once we agree on the major outlines of the more substantive provisions of the agreement we are aiming at.

I think no delegation having participated in the three Working Groups or in the drafting sessions under Ambassador Ekéus' wise supervision would upon reflection maintain that the major differences have been resolved. However, progress is being made. Our assessment of the work in this summer part of the session is not negative. But progress in such a complex area as that of a chemical weapons ban is necessarily slow and painstaking, demanding a maximum effort of participating delegations.

The time-table of the Conference on Disarmament with its regular interruptions when the yearly spring and summer parts of the session end, constitutes an undesirable loss of momentum in the chemical weapons negotiations. In the past the Netherlands has proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should remain formally in session the year round. Thus its subsidiary bodies would, apart from other advantages, be allowed maximum flexibility to define their own schedule of meetings. In the two years behind us a hesitant attempt in this direction has been made when the session of the chemical weapons subsidiary body was extended for a period of two or three weeks in January. This experiment has not been very productive, however.

My delegation is interested to hear the views of Chairman Ekéus on how this year we can prevent an abrupt interruption of the work for four or five months. We understand that many amongst us wish the negotiations to be continued this autumn. We on our part would be prepared to participate in any meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to be convened in Geneva between 15 October and the beginning of December, 1984. In informal consultations on this option we have so far heard two main reservations. One concerned manpower problems, in view of the coinciding session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. We submit that the importance of early progress on chemical weapons negotiations in itself outweighs the obstacles of a practical nature, which can be overcome if the political will is there to resolve those difficulties. How can we convince the public at large that we mean business, if at the same time we fail to produce the experts to conduct that business? Another observation we heard is that no effort should be made to meet in the autumn unless there are good prospects for results. This argument does not appear to be convincing to my delegation. If we were to lend any credit to such reasoning, we would set another precondition to the conducting of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and in so doing, put the cart before the horse.

Geneva would be our preferred location for the meeting in the autumn, where delegates could concentrate on substantive work, whereas in New York their attention may be diverted to matters pertaining to the First Committee.

As I stated earlier, the very serious issues at stake in the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban warrant a continued effort to bring them to a successful solution. At a time when, alas, the use of chemical weapons is, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol, a bitter reality, we, as negotiators, should not be held responsible for any undue delay.

(Mr. Guerreiro, Brazil)

The mechanisms for disarmament established by the first special session, of which the most important is this Conference, have sought to discharge their grave responsibilities with zeal. However, due to the narrow limits for negotiations imposed by the national will of the great Powers, such fora have only exceptionally fulfilled the objectives assigned to them. For this reason, I acknowledge with satisfaction the ongoing progress in the work on the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which allow us to expect, in not too distant a future, the realization of an important step toward genuine disarmament in the field of weapons of mass destruction. Such an outcome would greatly contribute to stimulate other concrete measures in the priority field of nuclear weapons.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

If that is not the case, as announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I intend now to put before the Conference for decision the request, addressed to us by the Chargé d'Affaires of Iraq, to make a statement at a plenary meeting during this session in connection with the agenda item dealing with the prohibition of radiological weapons. Is there any objection to this request?

(Mr. Sirjani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

In expressing our view on the question of the Iraqi regime's request, I would like to remind the Conference of the very controversial nature of that request, by calling attention to the following facts of direct relevance to the issue under consideration.

Firstly, the Iraqi regime has been proved, by the recent report of the Secretary-General's expert team, to be in gross violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in war, although being a signatory to this Protocol; but what is even more to be condemned is the fact that within the short period of nearly two months from the date of dispatch of the expert team to Iran on 13 March 1984 up to 29 May 1984, the Iraqi regime has made use of chemical weapons 23 times.

Secondly, the Iraqi regime has failed to respond to the Secretary-General's purely humanitarian request not to use chemical weapons, (Security Council document S/16663, dated 29 June 1984), in spite of the fact that the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran commended the appeal and immediately forwarded his positive response. A much more serious indication of the Iraqi regime's failure to respond to the Secretary-General's appeal is the horrifying conclusion that the Iraqi regime intends to make further use of chemical weapons in the future. It is obvious that such blunt manifestations of intentions to violate international law and codes of conduct is significantly more detrimental to the fate of international peace and security than low-profile, clandestine violations of those principles.

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Therefore, Mr. President, in view of the unprecedented notions that we have experienced and learned about the irresponsibility and unreliability manifested by the Iraqi regime, out of respect for international law, my delegation, in accordance with the international obligations and undertakings of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and out of respect for the values and principles vital to the interest of all nations, is bound to strongly reject the highly hypocritical request of the Iraqi regime.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

One of the few more or less positive aspects of the 1984 session now coming to a close has been the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, whose mandate is directed towards a specific objective "... to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention ...". In reply to the question "Have we begun to fulfil this mandate", we must acknowledge that much more could have been achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee and in its three Working Groups. This year saw a further useful exchange of views and many informal consultations, and work was finally begun on drafting and compiling the texts of some articles relating to certain aspects of the future convention. For all these efforts we should like to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the Chairmen of the three Working Groups. At the same time, like many other delegations, we should like to draw attention to the fact that the position adopted by a very limited number of delegations or, to be more precise, by one delegation, which so far has not displayed sufficient flexibility and good will and is not making the necessary effort to overcome the remaining differences, may in future constitute an obstacle to progress in negotiations on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

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Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, earlier this summer I made several statements outlining the provisions of the draft chemical weapons convention presented on 18 April by the United States delegation in document CD/500. Now, as the 1984 session of the Conference draws to a close, I want to return to the subject of prohibition of chemical weapons.

I want to emphasize at the outset that my Government is not satisfied with the snail's pace at which the Conference on Disarmament is progressing toward a completed convention. Over the last 18 months the United States has made a series of major initiatives in an attempt to speed things up. And we welcome such initiatives by others -- for example, the recent proposals by a number of representatives that negotiations be conducted in the autumn rather than having a hiatus of almost six months. This is a very constructive move that the United States strongly supports.

In this connection, I am very disappointed that the United States draft convention -- a noble contribution presented to this Conference by the second highest official of my Government -- has not been given serious attention by the Soviet delegation. There has been no response to the offer made by Vice-President Bush on 18 April -- and repeated since -- to meet with the Soviet delegation members to explain any provisions that might have been unclear. Nor, judging from the Soviet statement of 9 August, have they taken any account of the explanations provided by the United States in its plenary statements. Rather than a constructive, positive response, the United States initiative has received only rhetorical questions and critical comments from the Soviet delegation.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Most recent plenary statements about the chemical weapons negotiations, however, have been more constructive in character. Specific suggestions and proposals have been put forward. Among these are recent statements by the representatives of Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom. Yet, on a few occasions charges have been made that some delegations are deliberately complicating the negotiations, that proposals are being made which are designed to be rejected, and that efforts are being made to create loopholes for continued production of chemical weapons. Such statements are demeaning and are frankly unworthy of this Conference. Questioning the motives of one's negotiating partners in fact can only poison the atmosphere and make successful negotiation more difficult.

I appeal to all to put aside inflammatory rhetoric. My delegation is not here to attack, ridicule or summarily dismiss ideas or proposals put forward by other delegations. We are here to negotiate, as I trust are most of the members in this chamber. Therefore, let us all devote our energies to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the many complex and difficult issues remaining in this important negotiation. And in particular, let us focus on the truly pivotal issues — the issues whose resolution is the key to progress. In simple terms, let us negotiate with each other, rather than nag at each other!

At the current stage of the negotiations, three issues seem to my delegation to be the keys to progress. One is the declaration of locations of chemical-weapon stocks and chemical-weapon production facilities. A second is how to help ensure that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production. The third is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Today I shall discuss each of these pivotal issues in turn.

The United States has proposed that the locations of chemical-weapon stocks and of chemical-weapon production facilities be declared within 30 days after a State becomes a party to the convention. In itself such a declaration could contribute greatly to building confidence that States are prepared to reduce — and eventually eliminate — their reliance on chemical weapons. But declaration of locations is also an essential element of the verification measures designed to provide confidence that all stocks and facilities have been declared, as well as to provide confidence that the declared stocks and facilities are not misused before they are destroyed.

Let me elaborate. The completeness of declarations cannot be assessed unless a basis for such an assessment has first been established. With adequate information about existing stocks and facilities that have been declared, parties will be able to obtain adequate confidence that there are no stocks and facilities that have not been declared. Declared locations are essential to such an assessment and thus to building confidence in compliance. Once locations have been declared, then any stocks or facilities discovered at undeclared locations would clearly represent a violation of the convention. Furthermore, the systematic international verification measures needed to provide confidence during the period between declaration and destruction cannot be carried out unless such locations are declared. For example, it is obvious that international sealing of stocks or production facilities to prevent their illicit use would not be possible unless these locations are known to the technical secretariat.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We note, however, that the approach proposed by the Soviet Union is quite different. As my delegation understands it, no information on the locations of either stocks or facilities would be provided until just before their destruction. In the case of stocks, the location declared would be adjacent to a destruction facility, whose location would already be known. Thus, no meaningful information about the location of stocks would be given. In the case of production facilities, under the Soviet approach no information on locations would be made available for the first eight years of the convention.

This approach makes sense only if one assumes that verification would be solely the responsibility of the State possessing stocks and facilities — in other words, that the only means of verification would be self-inspection. No one, however, is proposing such an absurd system.

Even the Soviet Union has proposed that national technical means of verification and challenge inspection be key aspects of the verification system for monitoring stocks and facilities. Therefore, the Soviet position regarding the declaration of stocks and facilities and the verification of this declaration appears to be internally inconsistent. How, for example, can one use national technical means to confirm that production facilities are inactive if their locations are unknown? How can one tell if a State is attempting to hide stocks if it refuses to reveal the location of those that have been "declared"? If the location of each chemical-weapon stockpile and production facility is not separately specified, it would be impossible to know whether any particular stockpile or production facility had been included in a party's declaration. Without declaration of locations, neither national technical means nor challenge inspection would have any utility in verifying the completeness or accuracy of a party's declaration.

Nor do the reasons given to justify unwillingness to declare locations hold up under close examination. It has been argued that the declaration of locations of stocks will reveal the location of front-line military units and make the stocks vulnerable to attack in the event of war. It is highly unlikely that a prudent military command would store the bulk of its chemical weapons with front-line units. Most of the stocks would normally be in regional and central depots. Furthermore, considerable information is already available about the location and identity of front-line units. Moreover, in the event of war, all ammunition storage sites are subject to attack, whether or not they have been specifically identified as chemical-weapon storage sites.

In developing its position on declarations, the United States carefully conducted an analysis of the military implications of declaring the locations of chemical-weapon stockpiles and production facilities. My Government reached a conclusion diametrically opposed to that put forward by the Soviet Union. In the United States view, the benefits of assuring an effective convention far outweigh any military risks flowing from the disclosure of locations. The fact that the Soviet Union apparently considers the military risks of disclosure to be very high suggests that chemical weapons play a much larger role in Soviet military plans than in Western plans.

For all of the above reasons, the Soviet approach is simply not realistic. Only if locations of stocks and production facilities are declared promptly, as proposed by the United States, can a practical and effective verification system be put in place to provide the necessary confidence in compliance. Would any Government rest its security on anything less?

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to consider the possibility that a party could move its chemical-weapon stocks before declaration from their original storage sites in combat units to regional depots. Since only these regional depots and not the combat units would contain chemical weapons, only the locations of these depots would have to be declared. Thus, the locations of combat units would not be revealed. The location of such depots would be declared within 30 days after the convention enters into force for the State.

The second pivotal issue I want to discuss today is the problem of providing confidence that chemical weapons are not being produced under the guise of commercial chemical production. The United States strongly supports the approach outlined by the United Kingdom in its recent Working Paper CD/514. High-risk and medium-risk chemicals would be identified in lists. The level of verification would depend on the level of risk, with high-risk chemicals being monitored by systematic international on-site inspection on a random basis.

This approach would provide effective verification without jeopardizing commercial secrets. We believe that it should meet all of the concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation about misuse of the chemical industry.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly emphasized the importance of ensuring that commercial facilities are not used for the production of chemical weapons. But what is the Soviet solution to this problem? To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive Soviet proposal has yet been presented, although the problem has been recognized for years.

The Soviet Union has proposed to prohibit production of methylphosphorus compounds for commercial purposes. The stated objective of this proposal is to eliminate the possibility that certain nerve-agent precursors, which contain methylphosphorus bonds, could be produced clandestinely in commercial chemical plants. This proposal, however, does not take into account the realities of modern chemical technology. In fact, chemical plants which produce ethylphosphorus compounds could, in most cases, easily produce methylphosphorus compounds. But under the Soviet proposal such plants would not be affected at all.

Here again, the Soviet position appears to be internally inconsistent. It would fail to achieve its stated objective. Yet at the same time, it would interfere substantially in the important and legitimate uses of chemicals for peaceful purposes.

Progress on this pivotal issue requires first of all that the Soviet Union present a clear and comprehensive proposal of its own, if it disagrees with the proposals of the United Kingdom and the United States. In developing its position I hope the Soviet delegation will reconsider its unworkable proposal to ban the production of methylphosphorus compounds.

The third pivotal issue is challenge inspection. I have already described the United States "open invitation" approach in my statement of 19 July. This approach has been rejected by the distinguished Soviet representative, Ambassador Issraelyan, as unrealistic, discriminatory, nihilistic, tension-provoking, and purposely unacceptable. But Ambassador Issraelyan has not denied that our proposal would be effective. To paraphrase Shakespeare, "the (gentleman) doth protest too much, methinks".

While the Soviet position has not been presented to the Conference in a clear and comprehensive way, its outlines are readily apparent. It is an approach designed to provide absolute protection from any challenge inspection that the

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Soviet Union does not want to accept. It would allow the Executive Council to endorse a request for challenge inspection only by consensus. In other words, the State to be inspected would control whether a request was even made. Furthermore, even if a request were made, the State to be inspected would have, under the Soviet proposal, complete freedom to reject the request whatever the circumstances.

The Soviet approach can only be termed as a "double-veto" approach. There is no other term for it. Except possibly the term "totally ineffective". It has a built-in guarantee of failure. It would produce a convention with noble aims but no effective mechanism to ensure compliance. It would thus fit the lamentation of Macbeth — "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing".

It has been wisely said in this body — by Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and others — that parties to a chemical weapons convention must accept some risks. A convention without risk cannot be achieved in the real world, nor can it even be designed. I completely agree with that. Absolute verification is fantasy and we should not waste time pursuing illusion. The United States recognizes that even the most effective verification system that can be conceived does not eliminate all risks that any deliberate violation of obligations undertaken will not be detected. The United States is prepared to accept such risks.

There is another fantasy that must be avoided — the notion that an effective verification system can be designed to eliminate all risks that that system might be abused or that some confidential information might be disclosed. While steps can and should be taken to minimize the potential for abuse and for disclosure of confidential information, it is inevitable that risks will remain. The United States is willing to accept these risks to obtain the benefits of an effective verification system. Those countries that desire effective verification should also be willing to accept such risks.

If an effective verifiable chemical-weapons ban is to be achieved, all States must be willing to accept risks. But we must not let the twin fantasies of absolute verification and risk-free verification consume our energies. Let there be no doubt however that we will press for the most effective and verifiable convention that can be negotiated.

The purpose of my statement today has been to promote a common effort to identify and resolve the pivotal issues in the chemical-weapons negotiations. I have presented the proposals of my delegation and commented on the proposals made by the Soviet Union. In each case I believe a fair comparison shows that the proposals of the United States are more effective and realistic. But my delegation welcomes constructive comments from others, both positive and negative. That is the process which will lead to solutions that will be acceptable to all. If there are proposals for other ways to achieve a chemical-weapons ban that would provide the same level of confidence and effectiveness, the United States is ready to consider them.

In conclusion, I would like to remind the Soviet delegation of the words of the late Leonid Brezhnev in his statement to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

"Everything should be done to eliminate chemical weapons from the world. The Soviet Union is a convinced champion of this approach. We are prepared to reach agreement without delay on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles."

I trust that the Soviet delegation will match his words with their deeds.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With regard to the statement today by the representative of the United States, I think that the Soviet delegation has given a more than sufficient assessment of the American draft convention — the assessment which it deserves. We shall not give any other. The draft has set the negotiations back, and we shall once again see this confirmed next week when the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is adopted. I do not intend now to return to comment on the United States draft merely because there is no need whatsoever to do so. Perhaps the United States delegation would have liked the United States draft convention to have become, so to speak, the centre of the universe, the basis for all negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. It will not be the basis of the negotiations. If it pleases anyone, in particular some allies of the United States, we have no objection. That group of States can sign among themselves whatever convention they please. But if you wish to have a multilateral, universal convention, then it is necessary to take account of the positions of other countries too. Generally speaking, the United States delegation gives the impression that it believes that it can expect a special attitude from other delegations to its proposals and to its draft, while it can pass over in silence and without comment the proposals and drafts of other States. I should like to ask through you, Mr. President, what was the reaction of the United States delegation to, and how often did it comment on, the Soviet draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon testing which was tabled in the Conference. They just said one sentence. I should like to ask the United States delegation through you, Mr. President, how often and in what manner it commented on the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, which has been tabled in the Conference. I should like to ask the United States delegation through you, Mr. President, how often and in what manner it commented on the Indian draft convention on a nuclear-test ban. I should like to ask through you, Mr. President, how often and in what depth the American delegation commented on the Swedish draft treaty on the prevention of nuclear weapon testing. I should like to ask the United States delegation through you, Mr. President, how often and in what manner it commented on the Pakistani draft international agreement on strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The United States delegation considers that it has the right to remain silent on the proposals of other States. But now that it has submitted a proposal, it considers that we must all devote our statements only to the United States proposal. By what right, I should like to ask

(Mr. Field, United States)

On no issue have I spent more time during this year and the preceding two than on the vital and urgent task of banning forever chemical weapons.

Over these three years, under the able leadership of Ambassadors Sujka, MacPhail and Ekéus, a certain amount of progress has been made in defining the issues and possible approaches to them and producing a clear record of the areas of agreement and disagreement. This year, Ambassador Ekéus has led the work into an important new phase, that of preliminary drafting of provisions for a future convention. My delegation welcomes and strongly supports this development.

I regret that the work on the chemical weapons convention has not made the progress that many of us had expected. The United States has invested a great deal of effort over the past two years -- the detailed views presented in early 1983, the verification workshop held in Tooele, Utah, in late 1983, and culminating in the draft convention tabled by Vice-President Bush in April 1984 -- and we had high hopes that these efforts would stimulate progress, but, unfortunately, such has not been the case. This is certainly no reflection on the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its working groups. They have laboured long and hard. My delegation is happy and proud to have been associated with them in this effort.

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Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany):

On 19 July, I tried to evaluate the progress in our negotiations on a ban on chemical weapons and arrived at a moderately positive assessment. Indeed, the report of the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as now successfully agreed and about to be formally adopted, provides the negotiators with a comprehensive reference document, largely in treaty language, that constitutes an unprecedented qualitative improvement. For the first time, the final annual work product of our negotiating process is fully structured -- sub-divided in preambular paragraphs and articles of the future convention -- and contains, where differences still subsist, juxtaposed versions of various articles in formulated legal language. That document will become a precious tool in our preparations for the next annual round. All delegations should seize the necessity at this juncture to put aside parochial perspectives of their own, even where it means deviating from working

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

documents which they themselves have submitted, and should now prepare for a meeting of minds on the greatest common denominator of all delegations, provided their essential security interests are, in an objective view, fully covered. I need not reiterate the fervent commitment of my delegation to the early conclusion of a permanent and comprehensive, reliably verified chemical-weapons ban. I feel confident that when the Conference resumes its negotiations by mid-January — the early meeting date towards which my delegation had worked — all delegations, by intensive and conscientious work in capitals will have created the prerequisites for making next year's annual session into an even more fruitful endeavour towards the final objective of a fully negotiated convention. This time we have been able to smoothen the transition into the next session by agreeing on the mandate of our negotiating organ and about its future chairman ahead of time. With my gratitude to Ambassador Ekéus for his farsighted stewardship in 1984, I would like to combine my good wishes to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, for a successful tenure as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1985.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

On 18 April 1984, Vice-President George Bush presented to this Conference the draft text of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons. He stated that the draft both represented the views of the United States and incorporated the views of many other delegations reflected in years of deliberation on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament. Most importantly, he stressed that our text is negotiable and my delegation is ready — indeed, eager — to negotiate with our colleagues in this Conference an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Let me say once again that our text is negotiable. Its words, and the approaches to its objectives, are ours. The draft represents our best effort to accomplish the type of convention which, we believe, is the shared desire of all delegations. But if there are other approaches or words to accomplish an effective and verifiable ban, then we are quite prepared to consider them seriously. This, after all, is the very essence of negotiation.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

With regard to the agenda item concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries deplore the meagre results that were achieved during this session despite strenuous efforts to make progress. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons does not allow for satisfaction. We are firmly convinced that the proposals introduced by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provide a realistic basis for a mutually acceptable agreement on banning chemical weapons. Verification problems should not be used to impede reaching such an agreement. Unfortunately, the draft proposed by the United States delegation (CD/500) has set the talks back by its unrealistic demands in the field of verification. Verification measures should not be discriminatory and in no case be used to interfere in the internal affairs of States or damage their security. The primary task of the Ad Hoc Committee in this respect is to work out such measures and forms of verification that would be both effective and practically feasible. We reiterate that if there is the will to agree on specific disarmament measures, the question of their verification has never been and cannot be an obstacle. Furthermore, the banning of binary chemical weapons should be among the central issues of the future convention. Statements by representatives of the United States Administration and top-ranking NATO officials about the importance and the substantial role played by these weapons in military plans only confirm that binary weapons must be clearly and specifically banned by the convention.

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(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

In the framework of the issues concerning the Conference on Disarmament, during the course of this year events occurred which were unfortunate both from a global and a national point of view. From the global point of view, 60 years after the date of the establishment of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, this Protocol was violated by the massive use of chemical weapons on the part of a Member State. At the same time, from the point of view of my country, this has been an unfortunate year as it was the victim of chemical warfare. It should be appreciated that for the first time in history the use of chemical weapons was discussed, reviewed and acknowledged by international organizations.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

This savage action was reflected in the international mass media and various countries of the world, while condemning such a vile act, placed their medical possibilities at the disposal of those afflicted by chemical weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross and a number of specialists and medical laboratories did not fail to condemn this act.

It was encouraging to note that within this Conference itself a number of esteemed Ambassadors and other high-ranking dignitaries condemned this act in their statements and called for urgent steps to curb such genocidal acts. Of course, a number of countries, for reasons known to all, have refrained from reflecting their views and opinions.

Although the reaction of the world with regard to the use of chemical weapons was appreciable, yet, with regard to such a regime which deems itself not bound by international law and principles, even those to which it is itself a signatory, it does not appear to have been sufficient. The inadequacy of the reaction is reflected in the non-adherence of the Iraqi regime to international undertakings by the re-use of this weapon after the return of the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations from a fact-finding visit to the Islamic Republic concerning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. These weapons have, since then, been used on more than 24 occasions against my country, the latest being two weeks ago against the city of Abadan. Another statistical example of the inadequacy of the world reaction with regard to the use of chemical weapons is the refusal of Iraq to answer the call of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to renew its pledge to respect the 1925 Geneva Protocol calling for a ban on the use of chemical weapons.

In his appeal, the Secretary-General points out that "It is a deplorable fact that chemical weapons have been used in contravention of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as substantiated by the specialists' mission in March 1984". Then he voices his serious anguish by the following words: "For those reasons I cannot remain indifferent to the advancing indications that such weapons might be used again" and he makes the appeal that "... in order to alleviate the inhumanity of warfare, each undertakes a solemn commitment not to use chemical weapons of any kind for any reason". The Secretary-General rightly concludes his appeal by the just indication that "this will be highly significant not only for its immediate effects but also for its future implications for other States which might be involved in conflict".

The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran commended the appeal made by the Secretary-General and responded immediately to his request. The response from the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran pointed out that despite the fact that the Iraqi regime, in contravention of all international norms and conventions, has resorted to extensive use of chemical weapons against our people, the Islamic Republic of Iran is by no means inclined to make use of such weapons of mass destruction.

An alarming indication of possible future uses is to be inferred from this situation. The refusal is expressed in a manner so blunt as to indicate the horrifying intention on the part of the Iraqi regime to make further use of chemical weapons today and in the course of the future.

It is because of these sad developments that we are of the view that in the new convention on chemical weapons, effective international measures and collective actions should be envisaged to provide assistance to the victims and to punish

(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

violators on every occasion that such a violation might occur. Otherwise the new convention will suffer the same fate as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and other related instruments. Due to the importance and urgency of the preparation of a new instrument on the prohibition of chemical weapons every effort should be made to speed up the processes of finalization of the convention.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that prime importance should be given to the prohibition of the manufacture, the acquisition, the stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and serious speedy measures should be taken to realize these objectives. One of the main elements in guaranteeing the non-use of chemical weapons is the elimination of existing stockpiles and facilities. The idea of on-site monitoring of the destruction and diversion of existing stockpiles is a sound one and we believe it should be given unreserved support. In this respect we all owe a great deal to the valuable contribution of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany which arranged a workshop in Munster in June 1984.

The countries which fall victim to the use of chemical weapons or are subjected to the threat of such use should be supported by other States in the elimination of the grave consequences of the use of chemical weapons by which they have been afflicted. One suggestion in that regard is that they should be assisted in every possible way to combat the effects of these horrible weapons by defensive and protective measures and that they should be equipped medically to provide care for the victims who have been so afflicted.

We propose that a fact-finding team should be automatically sent out by the Executive Council in response to a request made by a State Party which is the victim of the use of chemical weapons, for inspection to be carried out in territories under its control. In this regard the importance of the existence of a permanent fact-finding team which can act promptly on such requests is evident.

I would like to refer to paragraph 7 of the recent statement of the Group of 21, contained in document CD/513 in which the Group, confronted with the complete violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Iraq as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General's Expert Team who visited Iran (Report No. S/16433) declared that "in view of recent events the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should continue the drafting of the convention with the greatest urgency" and I hereby convey the sincere appreciation of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Swedish delegation, particularly Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, for the excellent chairmanship of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and to the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Duarte of Brazil, Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands and Mr. Thieliicke of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, as I indicated to you I will also add, at the end of my statement, some remarks as the representative of Sweden with regard to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, but I start with the submission of the Report.

As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons I have the honour to submit the report of the Committee to the Conference on Disarmament, document CD/539, which has been distributed earlier today. The report with its annexes was adopted by the Committee on 28 August and thus agreed to by all members of the Committee.

Before I continue I will draw your attention to a mistake on page 6, paragraph 10 of the report, on the second line from the bottom. The words "during the 1984 session of the" should be replaced with the words "in the" so that the entire sentence reads "Annex III contains some proposals introduced in the Conference on Disarmament as formulated and presented in Conference Documents."

Delegates will recall that the Conference at its plenary meeting on 28 February 1984 adopted a mandate, contained in document CD/440, to the effect that an ad hoc subsidiary body (on 8 March designated "Ad Hoc Committee") be established "to start the full and complete process of negotiation, development and working out the convention on chemical weapons, except for its final drafting". The Committee, thus provided with a negotiating mandate, had to define and develop procedures for pursuing negotiations inside the framework of this multilateral body, as now, for the first time since the Committee on Disarmament was established in 1978, actual negotiations on the text of a Convention were to be embarked upon.

I will give a short description of the negotiating process followed by the Ad Hoc Committee.

The starting point was the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chem. Weapons on the 1983 session (CD/416) which was reorganized to get a more convention-like structure and presented to the Committee as CD/CW/WP.67. us of this report were presented by the Chairman to the three Working Groups & the Committee, charged with addressing specific aspects of the Convention follows:

1. Working Group A on Scope, Chairman: Mr. Duarte of Brazil.
2. Working Group B on Elimination, Chairman: Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands.
3. Working Group C on Compliance, Chairman: Dr. Thieliicke of the German Democratic Republic.

The Working Groups dealt with the material thus provided by the Chairman of the Committee as well as with other material introduced by the Chairmen of the three Working Groups. The results from the Working Groups were presented in reports to the Committee by the Chairmen of the Working Groups. These reports reflect different views held by delegations. The Chairman of the Committee then drafted compromise proposals in treaty language on the basis of some of the material from the reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups. All delegations were invited to give their comments upon these compromise proposals by the Chairman. Extensive consultations were undertaken with those delegations which expressed views on the proposals.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

At this stage the Chairman of the Committee convened and led regular drafting sessions on this material constituting possible wordings of articles or parts of articles to a Convention proposed by him on the basis for the consultations just mentioned. All delegations were informed about time and place for the drafting sessions. For practical purposes the drafting language used was English.

The drafting has resulted in texts for parts of a convention. Differing or alternative positions of delegations are presented within brackets in the texts. The articles or parts of articles thus drafted are organized following the preliminary structure for a convention which was introduced in the Committee during the second part of the session. In this connection I want to thank Ambassador Turbanski of Poland who undertook the work of elaborating this structure.

The preliminary structure complemented by the likewise preliminary drafted texts can be found in Annex I of the report. Such texts are marked with two lines in the margin of Annex I. Other texts, which have not been subject to extensive drafting, but which have to a varying extent been consulted upon by the Chairman of the Committee or by the Chairmen of the Working Groups also appear as articles or parts thereof in the preliminary structure. Such texts are marked with one line in the margin of Annex I. As is stated in the Annex, these texts, whatever their status, are not binding for any delegation.

Due to the extensive and complicated nature of the substance and the limited time available, it was not possible to consider all parts of the convention during this session. Those parts of CD/CW/WP.67 which have not been dealt with during this session are indicated in Annex I by the respective heading and the numbers "67" in the margin. It was, however, possible to draft the main parts of the scope of the Convention. An interesting development with regard to the problem of herbicides took place as it appears that this problem can be linked to a prohibition of the use of herbicides under certain circumstances. Still remaining in the context of scope is a solution to the question of how the prohibition of use should be formulated in the convention. Here I wish to thank Ambassador Beesley of Canada for the work he undertook to solve this difficult problem.

The crucial issue of the definition of chemical weapons appears essentially to be solved. Furthermore, a solution to the question of the concept of chemical warfare agents has been formed.

The issue of declaration of chemical weapons has partly been subject to drafting. Consultations with regard to the declarations of locations of such stocks are under way. The problem of destruction, including the question of diversion, as well as schedules for a balanced destruction of chemical weapons, has been elaborated upon. The issue of production facilities, especially so-called single-purpose facilities, has for the first time been treated in parts.

Concerning compliance, considerable work has been done, the result of which appears in the Annex as material which has been the subject of consultations. In addition a first text, concerning the Preparatory Commission to be entrusted with the task of preparing the work of the Consultative Committee, has been elaborated and consulted upon.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups can be found in Annex II to the report. They give, in a comparison with Annex I, a picture of the amount of material which has been treated in different ways — be it drafting, consultation or otherwise — in the framework of the activities of the Committee.

Annex III represents a political solution to the problem of how to present extensive material emanating from delegations within the framework of the report.

If delegations consider it useful, and if they present actual proposals to this effect, the Chairman has the intention of up-dating document CD/CW/WP.67 as regards the presentation of the position of delegations. Such a revision would then be done before the January session.

The report contains a recommendation that the Committee continue its work during three weeks immediately before the beginning of the 1985 session, and "that the work cover the two specific issues of permitted activities and verification on challenge including related issues with regard to the Consultative Committee, as well as further negotiations on the material in Annex I which has been subject to preliminary drafting". As Chairman, I will prepare this resumed session by undertaking consultations in the meantime.

The report further contains a recommendation that a decision be taken in the first part of the 1985 session concerning intersessional work also between September 1985 and January 1986 so that this period "is more fully utilized for negotiations". The words "more fully" reflects the wish expressed by some delegations that this period should amount to something like six weeks.

Another important recommendation of the Committee is that Ambassador Turbanski of Poland should be appointed Chairman for the 1985 session. I sincerely wish him success in this important task.

Mr. President, I would not conclude my introduction of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference without expressing my gratitude to all the delegates of the Committee for their excellent co-operation with me and my delegation. May I note the serious and constructive approach by the delegates in the extremely complicated and sometimes arduous consultations, drafting sessions and other meetings within the Committee work structure. I am deeply impressed by the energy and the co-operative spirit demonstrated by delegates from all sides of the political spectrum. I also wish to especially mention the three Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Duarte of Brazil, Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands and Mr. Thielicke of the German Democratic Republic for their exemplary skill and energy displayed in the difficult tasks entrusted on them, as well as for their support and advice to me, not least in the context of the work of the Bureau of the Committee.

I would like to direct special gratitude to the other member of the Bureau and Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, for his commendable work for the Committee during the whole session, characterized by a combination of the highest professional skill and sound judgement in all situations. The willing support of Mr. Bensmail and of his staff, in particular Ms. Sue Johnston, as well as of the interpreters, contributed in an indispensable way to the endeavours of the Committee.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

With that, Mr. President, I have concluded the submission of the report but permit me now, as the representative of Sweden, to make some reflections on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

I would like to point out and underline three important results of the work during this session.

First, a method for multilateral negotiations has been developed, with a view to arriving at a full text of a convention. As this is the first time since its establishment that the Committee has been entrusted with a negotiating mandate, it is obvious that the methods now developed could be refined. The approach so far has been to start by using available basic material from the work during earlier years (CD/CW/WP.67) which to a varying degree has been transformed, through elaborations in the Working Groups, into treaty language. The Committee Chairman has thereafter reworked that material into compromise proposals, which have been consulted upon and then subject to drafting. The result of this process is preliminary drafted treaty texts, containing alternative language.

This process facilitates an overview of the development of the negotiations on different elements of the convention and makes possible a reasonable co-ordination of the process. In this context I wish to stress that the preliminary structure will be a useful tool for the organization of the future negotiations and the text of the convention.

Second, there is an undisputable tendency towards convergence of views on several or most areas of substance in the Committee work. However, differences on a few issues have arisen. Nevertheless, the work during the year must be summed up as steady but slow progress. The report speaks for itself in this respect. It must be kept in mind that the substantive material, in the process of being transformed from descriptive language into treaty language, has been quite thoroughly penetrated and now is better prepared and ripe for decision and instructions from the capitals.

I consider it a large step forward that the definition of chemical weapons is now essentially worked out. This will facilitate the further development and solutions of outstanding issues. It should therefore be possible to considerably speed up work during the 1985 session.

The serious tension between the two major Powers has made itself felt in the Committee, especially during its final week. It is therefore very important and satisfactory that it was possible, literally within minutes of the conclusion of the work, to adopt a substantive report.

Third, there is a consensus in the Committee that more time should from now on be devoted to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. A definite decision has not been taken yet as to exactly how this agreement in principle should be transformed into a detailed work plan. The recommendations adopted by the Committee should however be enough for delegations to plan their resources to this effect in a preliminary manner.

If the Conference approves the recommendations of the Committee, a first modest step will be taken with the planned meeting of the Committee for three weeks in January. This is a short time, and therefore it is necessary that the meeting should be well prepared. To this end the Committee has recommended that I undertake consultations. It is certainly my intention to do so and I hope that delegations will be prepared to fully participate in such consultations.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Due to the short time available for the Committee meeting in January, it is not my intention to re-establish the Working Groups within the Committee. Instead I intend to use the services of the Chairmen of the Groups to the fullest possible extent for the consultations envisaged during the meeting.

Mr. President, let me add to these three observations the importance of time. The dangerous international situation is a continuous and mounting threat to our negotiations. Use of chemical weapons in ongoing or future conflicts can jeopardize the progress of the negotiations. And worse, a breakdown of our negotiations would have most serious implications, and most certainly open the way for an arms race in chemical weapons with the gravest consequences for all aspects of all disarmament and arms control efforts: All delegations must therefore continue to work constructively — and with the greatest speed.

(Mr. Naumov, USSR)

However, the Soviet delegation has now asked the floor not so much to give its opinion of the results of work on the prohibition of chemical weapons in 1984, as to correct an omission which has appeared in the report, due to the atmosphere in which the last meeting of the Committee took place yesterday afternoon. I am referring to Annex III of the Report of the Committee to the Conference on Disarmament, which reflects the positions of individual delegations or groups of delegations. One of the documents contained in the Annex indicates one of the positions presented in the negotiations from A to Z, so to speak, covering all aspects of the future convention. With regard to the other document contained in Annex III, reflecting the other position and also tabled for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, i.e. document CD/294, in section III, dealing among other things with the Consultative Committee, this omission has occurred on page 7 of the English text. In paragraph 3 of the subsection in question it is stated: "Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Consultative Committee, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties and methods of work, its role in on-site inspections, forms of co-operation with national verification organizations and other matters are to be elaborated." Thus, document CD/294 sets forth the position as it existed when this document was submitted. A somewhat different situation now exists, and there is the document of a Group of Socialist States which was submitted here in the Conference, containing their position on the whole range of issues which I have just quoted from document CD/294. Consequently, without this document Annex III would not fully reflect the real state of affairs. The Soviet delegation therefore considers that it would be correct to include that document in Annex III, as indeed it intended to do yesterday when the relevant proposals were submitted, but it was subsequently overlooked. We consider that the inclusion of this document in Annex III would complement the report with regard to an aspect not elucidated in it, and from every standpoint this would be a fair and correct solution to the problem. We therefore submit this proposal for consideration by the Conference.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, the proposal of the Soviet Union has been the subject of informal consultations by my delegation today and I have been informed that it appears from those consultations that there are no objections to the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union. I would therefore propose that this additional arrangement be made with regard to Annex III, so that the document quoted, CD/532, will accordingly be reflected in Annex III.

Mr. MIKULAK (United States of America): Mr. President, we too are gratified to see that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has successfully produced a report. Up to the last minute there was, I think, some doubt about it and I think we owe a lot to the skill of the Chairman and the initiative, which finally succeeded, taken by the delegation of France. My delegation expresses its very strong appreciation for the very constructive proposal and the skill of the Chairman in bringing it to fruition.

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(Mr. Mikulak, United States)

I must say we share the view just expressed by the Chairman that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has made slow but steady progress this year. With his untiring work and that of his associates, we have entered for the first time into the stage of actually drafting treaty text for a chemical-weapons convention. This I think marks a real watershed in the work conducted in the Conference on a ban on chemical weapons.

At the same time I would also share his view that progress is much slower than certainly my delegation would have liked; we share his sense of urgency. And we very much welcome his expressed intention not to give up the mantle of the Chairmanship but to continue with consultations during the autumn and to hold a resumed session of the Committee during January. It is certainly the view of my delegation, and I think he correctly reflected the view of many delegations, that these negotiations are too important to allow them to lie fallow for almost half the year. So we admire his patience, his persistence and his dedication to our common objective, and in the time remaining before the 1985 session of the Conference begins he will certainly have our full co-operation in trying to move these negotiations ahead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If that is not the case, I suggest now that we take up, for decision, the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/539. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Conference adopts the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the Geneva Conference, this tactic is being used in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Even prior to the submission of the United States draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, Washington officials were saying that the text would, I quote, be totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union and, as you know, they were not far from the truth. Their only error was that the draft was to prove unacceptable not only for the Soviet Union, but also for a significant number of States, as the summer session of the Conference has shown. What is particularly disturbing is that various United States political figures keep repeating that, should its draft not be adopted, the United States will undertake the mass production of binary chemical weapons. What can be said about such declarations? Just one thing: if the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons are also wrecked, if they are wrecked like many other talks, everybody will be well aware who is responsible. Unacceptability for the other participants in the talks and a lack of constructiveness have been the distinguishing features of all the disarmament "initiatives" by Washington of which Ambassador Fields reminded us yesterday. Is it then any wonder that the results of those initiatives are the breakdown of negotiations or deadlock? It would really be hard to expect anything else from proposals that increase the differences rather than bring positions closer together. The talks on the banning of chemical weapons are unnecessary proof of that fact. The peaceful-sounding words that are heard from time to time from the other side of the ocean -- alternating it is true, with various "jokes" -- do nothing to change the situation. As Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has pointed out, and I quote: "In politics we believe only in deeds, not in words. Arms reduction means actual, mutual reduction. The elimination of nuclear weapons means actual elimination on both sides. If the United States and NATO accept that, we shall not be found wanting".

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese):

The item on the prohibition of chemical weapons had been considered the most hopeful one. At the beginning of this session, an Ad Hoc Committee was soon set up and under the experienced guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus, and the chairmen of the various working groups, negotiations were initiated on the drafting of a treaty and certain progress made. However, in spite of such an encouraging start, the momentum was gradually lost and the pace of work slowed down. There still exist serious differences on certain crucial points. The elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is still an arduous task.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Last but not least, in submitting proposals of which it knew in advance that they were unacceptable to the majority of States at this Conference, the United States has rendered the work of the committee on chemical weapons more difficult, to put it mildly. Here, as in other cases, a so-called verification question has been invented to hide the real intentions.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In our view, there were sound prospects for progress at the outset of this year's session. The work of the subsidiary body on chemical weapons had been quite advanced. A new, forward-looking mandate for the Committee was quickly agreed upon. The new Chairman Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, had carefully prepared this session of the Committee. I would like to take this opportunity to thank him for his committed efforts in chairing the Committee.

All in all, my delegation, like many others, had, therefore, hoped at the beginning of this session that the "full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention" would start, as required under the new mandate. However, the country which had been telling us for quite some time that it was more than keen on quick progress in that field in fact tried during the first part of this session to block the beginning of the real drafting. Then, on 18 April, the United States delegation submitted its draft treaty to this Conference. Taking into consideration other proposals and what has been worked out already in the Committee, we have carefully examined this draft, on which I would like to make the following observations:

First, we share the assessments given by the delegations of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sri Lanka and many others with regard to this draft treaty. As far as its scope is concerned, the document contains loopholes to safeguard well-known United States interests and intentions. Many of its verification provisions, especially the so-called open invitation concept, are in flagrant contravention of basic principles of international law and represent a complete departure from the consensus that had been emerging on challenge inspection. Small wonder, therefore, that this concept has been dismissed by many delegations. In fact, we have not heard any delegation clearly supporting this concept, apart, of course, from the United States delegation;

Second, as far as the work of the committee on chemical weapons is concerned, we have not been able to discern any sign of the promised flexibility on the part of the United States delegation. Instead of advancing the negotiations by joining in the efforts to search for mutually acceptable compromises the United States is stubbornly sticking to positions which are not acceptable to many delegations. This attitude became clear again when the report of this committee was drafted, with the United States delegation insisting by all means on the insertion of the notorious Article X into this report.

Let us be quite frank with each other: negotiations are a give-and-take process. No delegation is allowed to impose its will on others.

Therefore, we appeal to the United States to review its approach to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Otherwise, the prospects for progress may be rather gloomy.

Let me emphasize again that, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, greater efforts are required if the Conference is to make headway on the vital issues it is called upon to solve.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French):

The only issue which has been the subject of real negotiations is that of chemical weapons. It is of the greatest importance to the international community. Chemical weapons exist; they can be manufactured in numerous countries and, what is more serious, they are used. The experience of this year underlines the urgency of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons; it underlines the need for international verification measures relating to the various aspects of chemical disarmament and to presumptions of use of chemical weapons.

I would like now to make a rapid assessment of the negotiations over this year and submit some suggestions for the future. But I must first pay tribute to Ambassador Ekéus, who presided over the work with great competence and skill; he never lost heart and his good-humoured patience made it possible to overcome many difficulties. The French delegation has pleasure in expressing to him its congratulations and its gratitude.

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(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

It also wishes to thank the chairmen of the working groups, Mr. Akkerman, Mr. Duarte and Mr. Thielicke, for the remarkable work they did. We appreciate the efforts made in the working groups to reduce the substantive problems and Ambassador Ekéus' part in formulating certain provisions -- a difficult drafting exercise that the Chairman of the Committee more often than not undertook personally.

However, if we weigh the efforts against the results, we must acknowledge that they are not equally balanced. Although the report records some progress, particularly on stocks and destruction operations, annex I, which sets out the positions, is still studded with square brackets bearing witness to the continued existence of divergent views. But the report reflects only a part of the truth; it leaves aside what is undoubtedly its most important aspect.

On various delicate points, which had hardly been tackled previously, such as production facilities, their status and monitoring, exploratory discussions have taken place which should bear fruit at the next session. Similarly, as regards the institutions without which the Convention could not function, the problems have been better defined, the possibilities of agreement better identified and outline solutions sketched out. Those invisible steps, which no report can reflect, should not be underestimated in negotiations as arduous as ours in which progress is perforce slow.

Lastly, there has perhaps been evidence in various statements of an increased awareness of the problems to be solved. My delegation has been impressed by the appeals which have been made for more realism and less legal perfectionism; we also think, like others, that not all the risks can be eliminated and that the convention cannot provide for every eventuality in the same minute detail.

However, we do consider that certain aspects should be covered by provisions formulated with particular care; the products and the production facilities, whether prohibited or permitted, must be classified with exactitude so that the monitoring procedures best suited to each case may also be fully and precisely stipulated; in addition, the institutional structures will have to be simplified. To achieve that most effectively, it will no doubt be necessary to ensure that those bodies have by their very composition the appropriate permanent assistance in the technological field; finally, with regard to the methods of taking decisions, the respective advantages of the various possible procedures, namely consensus, vote by a qualified majority and in some expressly stipulated cases, automatic decisions, must be carefully weighed up according to the circumstances.

The French delegation proposes to submit at the beginning of the next session a number of technical documents in the hope of promoting progress on certain particularly controversial issues. It is gratified that there will be a little more time for negotiations both at the beginning of the year and during the autumn of 1985. While we have no illusions in that respect, we can, I think, hope that on some problems, such as that of stocks, we may reach an agreement which can be translated into articles of the Convention and that, perhaps, on the particularly thorny questions of production, we may make a significant breakthrough.

(Dr. de la Torre, France)

It also seems to have the approval of the working group, Mr. Karsman, Mr. Durie and Mr. ... We appreciate the efforts made in the working group to reduce the substantive problems and ... part in formulating certain provisions -- a difficult ... that the Chairman of the Committee was able to ...

However, if we bring the efforts against the results, we must ... they are not equally balanced. Although the report ...

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