




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


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O F T H E
M I N I S T R Y

Impartially examined, &c.



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T H E
C O N D U C T
O F T H E
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Impartially Examined.
And the P A M P H L E T entitled
C O N S I D E R A T I O N S
O N T H E P R E S E N T
G E R M A N W A R,
Refuted *from its own Principles.*

Cette Nation, toujours echauffé pourroit plus aisement etre conduite par ses passions que par la raison, et il seroit facile a ceux qui la gouverneroient de lui faire faire des enterprises contre ses veritables interets.

L'ESPRIT DES LOIX.

L O N D O N:
Printed for R. GRIFFITHS, in the Strand.
M.DCC.LX.

THE HISTORY

OF THE

REIGN OF

CHARLES

THE FIRST

BY

JOHN

WILKINS

ESQ.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

LONDON

1725

Printed by J. Sturges, at the Sign of the Sun in St. Dunstons Church-yard

T H E
C O N D U C T
O F T H E
M I N I S T R Y

Impartially examined, &c.

THE author of the following sheets, is sensible of the disadvantages he lies under, in attempting, thus late, to oppose the popular prejudice, which has been industriously raised in favour of the spirited and specious *Considerations on the present German War*. But, if his remarks on that pamphlet are just and impartial, truth, however slowly, will force its way in opposition to fallacy: if, on the contrary, they are frivolous and ill grounded, their earlier appearance might perhaps have better answered the interest of the bookseller, but would not have been of any service to the public.

B

Upon

Upon a candid Review of these *Considerations*, it must be owned that there is merit in the composition; and there are some animadversions in it, to which every man, who is not a bigot to party, must readily assent. The writer's ridicule, for instance, on the national idolatry of the K—g of P——a, is, in some respects, not ill placed. And it must be confessed, that the regard we have paid to that monarch, by our public illuminations, extravagant elogiums, and other testimonies of indiscreet attachment, have been carried to an excess, which has done no credit to the wisdom or spirit of Great-Britain.

But our Considerer's Antiprussian sarcasms are too indiscriminate; and it is the intent of these sheets to shew that his reflections throughout are either false, or exaggerated and fallacious: that, in short, he has either been deceived himself, or, what is more to his dishonour, has endeavoured to deceive others.

He writes, it is true, with great *appearance* of disinterestedness and moderation. He has too much judgment, to be abusive or scurrilous in *terms*: but an acute observer may be led to conclude, from his *matter*, that he has no sincere disposition to candor and impartiality.

Was the writer of these sheets inclined to imitate the Considerer, by indulging himself in personal reflections, it would not be difficult

cult, perhaps, to conjecture the motives of the Considerations, from the well known connections of the author.

The malice of party is dormant, but not extinct. The veterans in state intrigue know when, and by what arts, to work upon popular instability. When they find a proper time to set fire to the brand of faction, their adherents stand prepared in every corner to hurl it about, till they have enkindled a general flame.

To speak without a metaphor. When the leaders of a discontented party, *being strengthened by new confederates*, find a seasonable opportunity of practising upon the public, their obsequious emissaries are at hand to diffuse their sentiments, and instill prejudices into the minds of people. Some perhaps, of greatest weight among their dependents, may be instructed to echo those sentiments in a certain assembly, where no one *ought* to speak by direction: and there are so few who judge from their own perceptions, that the multitude are readily disposed to believe, that arguments, so powerfully urged, and so solemnly adopted, are *unanswerable*; without considering that all these echoes of applause, are nothing more than the cry of faction reverberated.

But if the deluded public are so far blinded by prejudice, that they cannot attend impartially to any reasoning against the *Considerations*,

tions, at least, it is to be hoped that they will believe the *Considerer* against *himself*. It is from his own principles that I propose to refute him, and to expose the fallacy of his conclusions.

For this purpose it will be proper, first to take a view of his general propositions, and then to consider his particular applications of them, with respect to the German and French war.

Page 9. He assures us, that “ From the
 “ time when the whole of France was united
 “ to the crown, and the liberties of the
 “ states and nobility absolutely subjected to
 “ its power, the kingdom of France has
 “ been, in the extent of its country, the
 “ number of its inhabitants, and the great-
 “ ness of its revenue, superior to Britain.”

The first and second of these propositions we may readily grant, without allowing the inferences which he afterwards draws from them; and as to the third, it will be animadverted upon in its proper place.

He proceeds in the next place to establish the following principles: “ France is stronger
 “ at land, not only than England, but than
 “ any power in Europe. The empire of
 “ Germany in the extent of its country, and
 “ the number of its inhabitants, *may be*
 “ *equal*, if not superior to France; but the
 “ division of it into a great number of sepa-
 “ rate independent states, while France has
 “ its

“ its whole force united under one absolute
 “ monarch, renders Germany greatly infe-
 “ rior to France. Hence it is that France
 “ for a century past has been formidable to
 “ the rest of Europe; and has twice been
 “ able to support a long war *against the uni-
 “ ted alliance of the whole.*”

“ Whenever any power in Europe shall
 “ have grown up to a degree of strength,
 “ much greater than that of any other
 “ power, it from thence forward becomes
 “ the interest of the other states to be watch-
 “ ful over it, to guard against the growth of
 “ it, and mutually to *assist each other, when
 “ they are attacked by it.* This is the univer-
 “ sal maxim of politicks, which has been held
 “ good in all ages, from the first establishing
 “ of governments. *Dum singuli pugnant,
 “ universi vincuntur,* (that is) *while the sever-
 “ ral powers fight singly, the whole are subdued,*
 “ is related by the historian as a cause of
 “ extending the Roman monarchy, and must
 “ be a principal, or at least a concomitant
 “ cause in the growth of every other.”

Here we may without scruple join issue
 with the Considerer. These propositions are
 uncontravertible: and the reader is desired
 to keep them in view throughout, for by re-
 ferring to them, and some which follow, we
 shall be able to refute the Considerations.

Having established these just principles,
 he proceeds to observe, that “ The three
 “ powers

“ powers of Europe which are most endan-
 “ gered by France, and which by their
 “ union alone can carry on an effectual land
 “ war against France, are Germany, Hol-
 “ land, and England. Spain and Savoy,
 “ Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, may any
 “ of them accede to such an alliance ;
 “ but Germany, Holland, and England,
 “ must be the basis of every confederacy,
 “ which can be of any avail against the land
 “ power of France.”

Let us admit that these three powers ought to be the basis of every confederacy against France. But what if the first, to gratify present malice and revenge, should ally with it's natural enemy ; and the second, from fear, or sordid motives of immediate gain, should violate its engagements, and secretly abet the common foe,—what is England to do in such an inverted system of affairs ? Is she to sit still, and see their ravages on the continent ? Is she passively to behold the strong towns in Flanders ceded to the French, and suffer them to extend their conquests over the rest, one after another, till, to adopt the Considerer's quotation, *Dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur* ? Is she to act this impolitic part, or, abandoned by confederates who prefer a temporary advantage to their true and lasting interest, shall she not endeavour to repair their loss by engagements with Prussia, Hanover, &c. &c. &c. ?

The

The Considerer's system is speculatively right. But the fallacy of his reasoning lies in this: that he condemns connections entered into under particular exigencies, because they are inconsistent with that confederacy, which ought to take place, if every party pursued its real interest.

States too often act from passion, as well as individuals. Private pique, ambition, or avarice, frequently make them abandon their friends, to embrace their enemies. But shall not the party thus basely deserted, endeavour to form new attachments? It is certainly against the general principles of true policy for England and Austria to measure swords, but if the latter will confederate with the common enemy, our opposition is a necessary consequence of that unnatural alliance.

The Considerer however, for a present answer, may argue that we were the occasion of her taking that unnatural step. This, as will appear hereafter, from his own confession, is not the case; but, for the present, admitting it to be so:—yet, if by a wrong stroke of policy, we forced Austria into the arms of France, shall we back one blunder with another, and suffer them to act in concert, to the ruin of the liberties of Europe? Shall we, as the Considerer would advise us, abandon Hanover, &c. and give up all concern for the continent? Shall we be credulous enough to take his word, and trust that the

French

French will only raise contributions, and not attempt to keep what they acquire? But more of this as we proceed.

In the ensuing pages, he speaks in high terms of the two grand alliances formed by king William the third. Upon this head, I am by no means inclined to dispute with him, being persuaded that the system of our great deliverer claims our most grateful acknowledgments; and we might wish that the conduct of our allies at that time likewise deserved our thanks. After having magnified the power which France exerted in opposition to that confederacy, the Considerer makes the following reflections.

“ We have since heard so much of the
 “ attempts of France towards universal mo-
 “ narchy, and the balance of power necessary
 “ to be preserved in opposition to it; and
 “ have seen it made a pretence for so many
 “ meaner purposes, that we now nauseate
 “ the subject, and do not like to hear any
 “ more of it. Yet a measure which was
 “ once right, must continue to be right to
 “ eternity. And though France may not
 “ have a prince, equally able and enterpri-
 “ zing with Lewis the Fourteenth, yet the
 “ kingdom is the same, and its land forces
 “ are still formidable to Europe: at least, it
 “ is the only state which either Europe in
 “ general, or England in particular, can be
 “ en-

“ endangered by, and the only state which
 “ England is now at war with.”

In this paragraph, there appears to be a twofold fallacy. First, we may deny “ that
 “ a measure once right, must continue to be
 “ right to eternity.” It was once right for all Europe to join with France in opposing Charles the Vth, when Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, with the Indies were united under one head. But that measure did not long continue to be right ; for after the decay of the Spanish monarchy, it became right to oppose the growing power of France.

Again, admitting a measure once right, to be right to eternity, yet it does not follow, that a measure once *practicable*, will be *practicable* to all eternity. Though King William had the good fortune to effect an union among the powers of Europe, yet they may since have been so much corrupted or infatuated, that it might not have been in the power of his successors, to bind them to their true interest.

That the kingdom of France, that is, that the *terra firma*, is the same now as in the days of Lewis the XIVth, is certain : but it is as certain, that neither the spirit of the people, or the power of the nation, is the same now that it was then. Then they were able to contend against the troops of all Europe : now, though combined with Austria, Russia,

C

Sweden,

Sweden, &c. they are not able to subdue the king of Prussia and his allies.

But as I am not disposed to dwell upon objections not essential to the main argument, I will readily grant, that nevertheless, the land forces of France are still formidable to Europe, and that “ every measure which has
 “ a tendency to the uniting the powers of Eu-
 “ rope among themselves, and against France,
 “ must therefore be for the general good of
 “ Europe, and the particular interest of Eng-
 “ land. And every measure which tends to
 “ set the states of Germany, Holland, and
 “ England, either at war with each other, or
 “ amongst themselves, must be a measure cal-
 “ culated for the good of France, and the
 “ prejudice of the other powers of Europe.”

All this is true, but before the Considerer can draw any inferences to the prejudice of our conduct in the present war, he must shew that our measures have disunited the powers of Europe, and that we set Prussia at variance with Austria, which was the beginning of the present war. This we apprehend, however, he will appear as little able to do, as to support the following conclusion :

“ If every war, which arises between any
 “ two particular states of the empire, be it-
 “ self a misfortune, and contrary to the inte-
 “ rest of Europe, the evil will be still the
 “ greater, and the mischief so much the
 “ more extensive, if France shall make it-
 “ self

“ self a party in the war, and shall join it-
 “ self to either of the two sides, to keep the
 “ dispute alive so much the longer.”

It is to be wished that the Considerer had given a solution of this paradox; for to plain common sense, it seems evident, that if two powers are engaged, and France sits still while they weaken each other, the evil will be greater, than if France by joining one side, exhausts herself in proportion. Her engaging indeed will extend the mischief of war wider, but cannot make the evil greater with respect to any apprehensions from her power, since her interfering will necessarily draw some other great potentate to espouse the other side, in order to counterbalance her weight.

Page 20. The Considerer proceeds to examine into the rise and progress of the present German war. “ Germany, says he, has
 “ been so unhappy as to have a dispute arise
 “ between two of it’s leading princes, about
 “ the right to four great dutchies in one of
 “ it’s remotest provinces. . . However, as the
 “ revenues of neither of the parties are inex-
 “ haustible, the probable issue of such a war,
 “ if they were left to themselves, would be,
 “ that one or the other of them would find
 “ their revenues brought to an end, and
 “ would be obliged to submit. Whether
 “ Prussia or Austria carried it’s point, cannot
 “ be a matter of the least consequence to
 “ England; for besides that, the country it-

“ self is at too great a distance for us to be
 “ affected by it, England has actually taken
 “ both sides of the contraverfy, and cannot
 “ be really interested in either.”

Had the Considerer received his education at St. Omers, he could not have argued more sophistically : but we shall see how easy it is to entangle a sophister in his own fine spun web. First, We may freely grant, that if Austria and Prussia could have been left to themselves, it would not have been a matter of the least consequence to England, which of them carried it's point : but there was not the least prospect that they could be left to themselves, and we were well assured that France would intermeddle in the dispute. I am the more confident on this head, because I have the Considerer on my side.

Page 15 and 16 he says, “ We find that
 “ it has been the constant policy of France
 “ to mix itself in all quarrels in the empire,
 “ and keep up the disputes of the contend-
 “ ing parties, as long as it can, &c.” Again,
 page 103, “ We knew that the king of Pruf-
 “ sia could at any time join with his *sure*
 “ friends the French.”

This, upon his own authority, being the true posture of affairs, How was England to act at such a crisis? On one hand we had experienced the expence of Austrian alliances, the slowness of Austrian councils, and the caution of Austrian troops. On the other

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hand, we had seen proofs of the capacity, the vigour, and resolution of the Prussian monarch, whose arms were at that time so victorious, that they out stripped all opposition. Now, not to mention that we had actually guaranteed Silesia, was it not the most adviseable measure which could be adopted, to detach so able a statesman, and so active a warrior, from the alliance with the common enemy? Will not any man who does not judge from events, admit that this was the most probable means to unite the contending powers, and bring the house of Austria to terms of accommodation? Tho' we knew that the French were intriguing at the court of Vienna, yet would any one have gained credit, who had surmized that Austria would throw herself into the arms of France, surrender her fortified towns to her implacable enemy, and form an unnatural alliance, which nothing but the present gratification of the most rancorous revenge could dictate?

But admitting that we had been certain of the event, yet as affairs were circumstanced at the time of concluding the Prussian alliance, it was the most eligible measure. That monarch had then made himself master of Saxony, bid fair for the conquest of Bohemia, and was in the full zenith of glory and reputation. Russia had not commenced hostilities against him, and Sweden stood aloof. In

what

what condition we stood at that time, I will not give my readers the pain to recollect. It is well known, that public dejection cast her eyes on Prussia as her protector and deliverer. Thank Heaven we have since wiped off the disgrace of our pusillanimity, and are now in a capacity to give that protection, which we had then need of ourselves. If the Considerer meant to examine public measures impartially, he would not argue from consequences, but consider how circumstances stood at the time those measures were adopted.

But he says, "England has actually taken both sides of the contraversion, and therefore cannot be really interested in either." This again is fallacious: it is so far from being true, that we may be alternately interested on both sides; that is, though it may be of no consequence to us, whether the provinces in *Silesia* remain with *Prussia* or *Austria*, yet we are interested, upon the Considerer's own principles, to oppose that side, which ever it be, that leagues with France the common enemy.

The legality of the claim, politically considered, is no part of our concern. A claim may be legally just, and yet it may be politically expedient to oppose it; and so *e converso*. If a kingdom should either by legacy, descent, or conquest, vest in a potentate already too powerful, though his title may be good, yet it is the common interest to prevent it's taking place. In short, as the Considerer

very

very justly observes, and we want no better authority, it is our interest to act in opposition to our rival France, " who is still formidable to Europe." Consequently her natural enemies, are our friends: but if they will not be true to their own interest, but, to indulge some present gratification, act to the prejudice of the common cause, we must change our system, and treat them as temporary enemies.

Page 22d, we meet with some very extraordinary reflections. " If, says the Considerer, " as often as France declares on the one side, " England adopts the other; How is Germany relieved? France will always take care to send troops enough to keep the balance even, and all that England can do by it's officiousness, will be drawing so many more parts of Germany into the quarrel, and enabling the Germans to cut each other's throats so much the longer. " That is, leave the French to themselves, " doubtless they will do as much mischief as they can; but in time they may make themselves generally hated, and the Germans wise enough to agree." Again, page 23d, " If any country in Europe is to be over-run by the French, Whither can their armies, (especially when we are at war with them) be better turned, than into Germany? A country, *which they can never conquer*, which can best bear their

" in-

“invasions, and the powers of which are by themselves able, when united, to repel them.”

It is certainly as great an affront as ever was offered to the public judgment, to attempt to reason upon such absurd maxims of policy. Shall we leave the French to do what mischief they can, in hopes that Germans will at length unite? What if they should not unite till it is too late? History will tell us that this has frequently been the case, and that states have beheld, with unconcern, the downfall of rival neighbours, till at length they have fallen victims to their own jealous and mistaken policy. What did the Macedonian, what did the Roman, what have all the antient and modern great states, owed their grandeur to, but to this principle of disunion among other powers? And shall we suffer the French to pursue conquest in Germany, in vain expectation of an uncertain union, till, “by attacking them singly, the common enemy has subdued the whole.”

If we were to act so imprudent a part, how might the Considerer upbraid us for departing from those principles, which he has so justly established, and by which alone I desire to try the force of his arguments. “France,” he has told us, and we believe him, “is the only state by which Europe in general can be indangered. . . . It therefore becomes the interest of the
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“*other states*, to be watchful over it, to guard
 “against the growth of it, and *mutually to*
 “*assist each other*, when they are attacked by
 “it.” Thus, from his own reasoning, it is evi-
 dently our interest to oppose the progress of
 the French arms in Germany, and not to
 wait till, *dum singuli pugnant, universi vincun-*
tur.

But suppose that the Germans could be
 persuaded to unite before it was too late.
 What then? Why then, the Considerer tells
 us, the French *can never conquer Germany*.
 Indeed! This is a bold affirmation, and per-
 haps, in point of argument, it might be suf-
 ficient to answer it with a positive negative.
 By good luck, however, we are provided
 with a fuller answer, and one which the Con-
 siderer himself has furnished us with.

If France can never conquer Germany
 when united, What shall we say to the ac-
 count of it's strength before given, page 9?
 where the Considerer says, “The empire of
 “Germany, *may be equal*, if not superior to
 “France, but the division of it into separate
 “states, renders it inferior.” Now, if it is
 a doubt, whether Germany, when united, be
 equal to France; nay, if we even suppose it
 to be somewhat superior, with what confi-
 dence can he assure us, that France *can never*
 conquer it? I will not refer him to conquests
 made by the Greeks and Romans, over states
 vastly superior to themselves, because such

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references are unfashionable, but if he will only recollect what has passed under his own eyes, he will be convinced, that even small potentates, may prove an over-match for an overgrown confederacy among the greatest powers. But the Considerer compares the strength of kingdoms, as a New Market jockey, would calculate weight and inches.

From page 24 to page 29, The Considerer takes a great deal of pains to prove, what no man of sense ever doubted, that this is not a religious war; and then he proceeds to affirm that "No one who is the least acquainted
 " with the state of Europe, and the consti-
 " tution of the empire, can suppose the crown
 " of France should entertain a thought of
 " making a real and permanent conquest of
 " Hanover. France enters Germany as a
 " friend and ally of the empire, and as gua-
 " rantee of the treaty of Westphalia; and
 " as such, cannot pretend to make a real con-
 " quest there: that would be quarelling with
 " their allies in the very act of assisting them.
 " ... For a king of France to make himself
 " elector of Hanover, and eject a whole fa-
 " mily out of it's rights, would be so great
 " an act of violence, that every member in
 " the empire would rise against it... 'Tis
 " the very thing which England should wish
 " the French to attempt, in order to unite
 " all Germany against them."

It must be confessed, that it is the very quintessence of refinement, to suffer an enemy to take, in confidence that he will not hold. I grant that the French have no *just* pretence for making a conquest of Hanover, and I believe that it will be difficult for the Considerer to shew, that they had any just pretence for *invading* it. Nay, page 38. he owns that they had not. Many, however, who have entered as allies and guarantees, have afterwards kept possession as conquerors. The French have done it, and we have no security, but the Considerer's word, that they will not do it again.

Perhaps it might provoke the members of the empire, to see a family ejected out of it's rights: yet we have known a protestant elector turned out of his dominions, and sent a begging with his family from country to country, and yet all Germany did not unite, and move Heaven and earth to restore him. We have lived to see a king of England reproached, and the national councils stigmatized in history, for not yielding timely and powerful assistance to that distressed elector.

But, what if after the French have conquered Hanover, and shewn a disposition to retain it, all Germany *should* unite against such injustice, to what purpose would their union serve, when, according to the Considerer, it is only a *may be*, whether they are equal, when united, to France? Therefore,

at last, we must be obliged to throw our weight in the scale ; and every quack will tell him, that it is prudent *venienti occurrere morbo*. Political as well as natural evils, are best and easiest resisted at their first beginning.

Page 31. The Considerer pleasantly tells us, that “ a small state, which is invaded by
 “ the armies of one infinitely greater than
 “ itself, is doubtless under a great misfortune;
 “ all resistance is useless, and it has nothing
 “ to do but to submit. But there is a way
 “ of doubling this misfortune, and that is,
 “ by having another great state, almost equal
 “ to the invader, undertake the defence
 “ of it. If the country submit, it has but
 “ one army to maintain, and may in the beginning
 “ yield upon terms that are tolerable :
 “ but if it be defended, it has then two armies
 “ in it, and is sure to be oppressed by
 “ them both.”

The Considerer's reasoning is so whimsical, that it does not deserve a serious answer. He certainly means to sport with his readers : for if a small state when invaded, has nothing to do but to submit, to what purpose does he establish this principle, “ that the lesser
 “ states should mutually assist each other,
 “ when attacked by the greater power ?” How is one state to assist another against an invading army, but by marching an army to it's defence ? But, says the Considerer, “ the
 “ defending army ought to have as many
 “ mouths

“ mouths as the attacking.” What then? Surely that must be a state of singular œconomy, and must rate it's religious and civil liberties at a very low estimation, which should think much of giving it's defenders a morsel of bread.

In the ensuing pages, the Considerer talks a great deal of “ the humanized laws of war, which do not admit of burning towns, and destroying of countries:” he adds, that “ nothing of this kind was practised in Hanover, while the French were victorious, and in quiet possession of it: they would not, says he, destroy that country then, for their own advantage. We have now,” he continues, “ made the experiment and known the worst of it. The French have already been in possession of this country. Did the sun refuse to shine, or the rivers cease to flow upon that account? They certainly did not here in England. Britain still continued an island, and it's government still subsisted, though the French had seized on the government of Hanover.”

Is this arguing like a man of candor and a lover of truth? Do these flourishes of declamation, and little sallies of wit, speak the language of a disinterested and dispassionate Considerer? We all remember that the sun did shine in England, while Hanover was in the hands of France, and we are persuaded, that if this kingdom was a province to France,

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the sun would not refuse to shine upon it: but we may likewise be assured, that the inhabitants of this island, would not behold it's rising with that pleasure and satisfaction, with which every free Briton now salutes it's welcome rays.

To what purpose is it for the Considerer to talk of humanized laws of war, and to tell us, page 36, that "the French are a fair enemy?" Does he expect that we will be so credulous as to take his word against facts, against Richelieu's conduct, and against Belleisle's letter to Contade's? It is true we felt no immediate inconvenience while the French were in possession of Hanover, but it does not then follow that we know the worst of it, because they were not in possession long enough for us, or their nearer neighbours, to feel the ill consequences of their acquisition.

Page 38, He confesses, that "the electorate is invaded merely on an English account. "Is it possible," says he, "for that country to give our enemies less ground of offence, in any future quarrel than it did in this? Who does not see then that the single reason why it is attacked, is, because the French know that we shall defend it? That the French therefore only march their troops thither, because, as we, by our superiority at sea, have the advantage in attacking the French settlements in America,

“ and east and west Indies, so the French
 “ by their superiority at land, and their
 “ greater nearness to Hanover, are sure to
 “ have the advantage, by meeting the Eng-
 “ lish troops there. They would not go
 “ thither, unless they were sure of finding
 “ us there.”

Perhaps not; neither should we go there, unless we were sure to meet them there; and wherever they attempt to extend their conquests, and repair their defeats, it is our business to oppose them. The Considerer, however, in this paragraph, makes the fairest concessions we could wish, and we desire that the reader will not forget them. Here he acknowledges, that the French had no pretence for attacking Hanover, and that “ the electorate had not taken any part in the dispute between the two nations, about our possessions in America.” This being the case upon his own stating, and it is certainly truly stated, we would ask him, whether France has not as good a pretence for attacking any other power on the continent, to indemnify herself for the losses she sustains by our superiority at sea? We agree with him, page 39, that “ no particular district in north Germany, is rich enough to make it worth the while of a great kingdom, like that of France, to march it's troops so far out of it's own dominions, merely for the sake of maintaining them at free quarter.”

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Therefore we may conclude, from his own positions, that was France suffered to remain in quiet possession of Hanover, she would not only keep it, but find or make pretences for enlarging her conquests. Who would answer, that in such case they would not invade the Dutch, whom they have already awed, or otherwise influenced, to be false to their engagements, or at least compel them to furnish shipping, that they might make a descent on this island? As our superiority at sea, is confessed by the Considerer, as it is notorious, that the French trade is ruined, their most valuable colonies in our possession by conquest, is it to be supposed, that unable as they are to resist us at sea, or attempt an invasion of this kingdom, that they will sit still and mourn over their defeats, without attempting to repair their losses by invasions on the continent? And will any friend to Great Britain endeavour to persuade the public, that it is for the interest of this kingdom to remain calm spectators, and see them extend their dominions on the continent, which may more than counter-balance our acquisitions, and render the hopes of peace more distant than ever? No! no matter for spot, whether it be Hanover or Hesse, Hamburg or Holland, wherever the French carry invasion, the invaded become, at least, our temporary allies, &c. and it is our interest to oppose

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the invader, in order to stop the progress of
the common enemy.

Page 44. He ventures to affirm, that the
Russian treaty was made in order to find
the king of Prussia employment at home,
and prevent his invading the electorate.
We afterwards (says he) perceived that
this Russian diversion, which was to
march through Poland, would be ineffec-
tual; what then was to be done? That
was the only resource which Britain had
for defending it; and that failed. We
were then forced to see our inability;
and in renouncing our treaty with Russia,
and giving up our old allies, were made
to buy off an evil, which we could not
repel." Here it is necessary to advertise
the reader, that the Considerer himself con-
tradicts this passage, of which we shall take
notice in its proper place.

" Being thus (he adds) brought into a
state of dependence upon a single ally,
he knew how to improve it from one
step to another, till we are at length re-
duced to an appearance of being tributa-
ries to the k—g of P——a. Here (he
continues) a generous English breast may
revolt against the expression, and disdain
to own that the money we pay to Prussia,
is a tribute. He is our ally, and we pay
him a subsidy, but not a tribute. Let us
consider the nature of *each*, and what it

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" is,

“ is, which constitutes the difference between them.”

Here the Considerer has forgotten himself. For he only considers the nature of a subsidy, without saying a syllable of the nature of a tribute. As he has thought proper, however, to decline it, I will do it for him. A tribute, in the original, or derivative sense of the word, was a sum assessed upon, and exacted from the Roman tribes, *a tributibus*, according to the proportion of their estates. The money therefore that we pay to the k—g of P——a, cannot be of this tributary nature.

In the appropriated sense of the word, a tribute is a sum of money, or other acknowledgment, which an inferior state is forced to pay to a superior, in token of subjection; without any condition, either express or implied, on the part of the receiver. Now let us examine the treaty, and see whether the money we pay the k—g of P——a, is of this kind: and if we find conditions, both express and implied, then we are not tributaries, or under subjection.

In the second clause of the treaty, we find these words: — “ His majesty the king
 “ of Prussia, *engages on his part*, to employ
 “ the said sum in keeping up and augment-
 “ ing his forces, who shall act in the most
 “ advantageous manner for the common
 “ cause, and for the end proposed by their
 “ aforesaid

“aforesaid majesties, of reciprocal defence
“and mutual security.”

Here then we find a general engagement to act for the common cause, and for the end of reciprocal defence, and mutual security. Are here any of the qualities of a tribute? Did a tributary ever bind a receiver by any covenant?

But the Considerer asks, “What is the
“common cause between two parties, who
“have no common enemy? We are not
“at war with Austria, and he will tell us
“she is not at war with France.”

This, the reader will perceive, is a quibble which turns upon their being no formal declaration of war between her and France, &c. But a reference to the treaty will destroy this quibble, and shew us what the common cause is, and who is the common enemy. The preamble recites the treaty of January, 1756, “The stipulations whereof
“tended to the preservation of the general
“peace of Europe, and of Germany in particular.” And it recites farther, that
“Whereas since that period, FRANCE has
“not only invaded the empire with numerous armies, and attacked their aforesaid majesties *and their allies*, but has also
“excited other powers to act in like manner, &c.” It then sets forth the prejudice the king of Prussia has suffered by his extraordinary efforts against his enemies,

mies, and concludes that “ Their majesties
 “ having mutually determined to continue
 “ their efforts for their reciprocal defence
 “ and security, for the recovery of their
 “ possessions, for the protection of their al-
 “ lies, and of the liberties of the Germanic
 “ body, &c. His Britannic majesty has re-
 “ solved to grant a succour in money to his
 “ Prussian majesty, as the speediest and most
 “ effectual means to obtain these purposes.
 Then follow the articles.

Here then we find an express declaration, denoting who is the common enemy, what is the common cause, and what are the ends to be obtained by the treaty. But if no common enemy had been named, yet common sense would tell us, that when two powers enter into alliance, the state which invades or commences hostilities against one, becomes the common enemy of both. But the third article of the treaty sets this point in the clearest light, and more particularly demonstrates that the money we pay his Prussian majesty, cannot, by the most forced and invidious construction, be deemed a tribute.

By that article, “ The high contracting
 “ parties engage, not to conclude any treaty
 “ of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any
 “ other convention or agreement whatsoever,
 “ *with the powers who have taken part in the*
 “ *present war*, but in concert, and by mu-

“ tual consent, and expressly comprehending
 “ each other therein.”

Here we see there is a particular express covenant on the part of his Prussian majesty, besides the general engagement in the preceding article. By this last article, he engages not to conclude any treaty of peace, &c. *without the powers who have taken part in the present war.* This is so fully worded, as to take away all subterfuge. Should his majesty tell us, he is not at war with France, we answer, France has taken part in the present war. Should he tell us, he is not at war with Russia, Sweden, &c. we give him the same answer. This article therefore not only points out who is the common enemy, but who are the common enemies. And a sum of money given under such restrictions, differs as much from a tribute, as a free gift does from an extortion. We should not have insisted on this point, had not the Considerer attempted to inflame the passions of his readers, by invidiously representing the nature of the Prussian subsidy.

“ But (says he) the treaty does not oblige him to yield us any specific assistance. “ He is not obliged to send a man to us.” These, it must be confessed, are specious objections, and will, no doubt, strike the inconsiderate. This the writer is so sensible of, that he expatiates greatly on this head, and throws out all the power of his rhetoric,

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to render the Prussian cause unpopular, not without casting some very indecent reflections on his majesty's person.

Declamation however is not argument: and when we come to weigh these objections in the equal scale of reason, we shall find that they amount to nothing. First, it is necessary to premise, that, in forming alliances, the contracting parties cannot always secure a specific *quid pro quo*. All the relative circumstances between the parties should be considered; their different degree of power, and the particular circumstances in which each of them stand at the time of making the treaty, should be attended to. If a greater power enters into an alliance with an inferior one, who is attacked by unequal force, the only reasonable object which the former can propose, is, not to obtain a specific assistance of men, &c. but, to enable the latter to strengthen and defend himself against the common enemy; lest, by the destruction of the *lesser* state, the common enemy should grow too powerful against its rival, the *greater*.

This is the case between us and Prussia. Whatever consequence that kingdom may desire from the abilities of its present sovereign, it is but an inconsiderable state in comparison with that of Great-Britain: and we could not expect that his majesty so powerfully pressed; could yield us any specific assistance. Nevertheless, it is our interest to support him,

him, against the common enemy, lest the latter should gain strength by his fall.

But the Considerer rants away in the common stile, and asks, — Whether we are to be the knights errant of Europe? I answer, Yes. From his own principles, it is evident that we must in some degree. It is a tax we pay for the power and grandeur of our kingdom. We are the great rivals of France, “who is formidable to all Europe.” And when she attempts to aggrandize herself by attacking any of the lesser states, it is our interest, let them be who they will, to take them under our protection. But in such alliances we are not always to expect a specific assistance; for it may not be in the power of our ally to stipulate any thing specifically. This was the case with his Prussian majesty; though perhaps it had been more prudent, for form sake, to have mentioned the number of troops he was to keep up. But we all know that this is mere form, and we well remember in what manner our allies, in the grand confederacy, furnished their stipulated quotas. Had the Considerer argued with the candor he professes, he would have distinguished between a general alliance of reciprocal defence and security, and a particular *treaty*, like that with Russia, for the hiring a specific number of men, at a stipulated sum.

From

From page 52 to 60, the Considerer labours, with great learning and ingenuity, to prove that the engagement of parliament does not bind us to defend the electorate. Here he distinguishes very accurately between a perfect and imperfect obligation; and his whole argument, on this point, does him credit as a writer. We could only wish that such abilities had been better employed. On this head, however, I willingly agree with the Considerer; and I am moreover persuaded that had it been a *perfect* obligation, yet no engagement whatever can bind future parliaments to adhere to measures against the interest of the nation.

In the course, however, of this argument, he takes occasion to cast some reflections which must not pass unnoticed. “Possibly, “says he, there may be those, who, after “having made their court, by running the “nation into a greater expence for the German war, than it had then the least idea of, “may hope to make their excuse to the people, by pretending that they have done it “only in consequence of a former vote.—If “it has been wrong, and no one will avow “the past, let no one adopt the future. “---Now they may put a stop to the ruinous part of the war, and save their country; and save themselves from the charge “of having gained the good opinion of the
“ public,

“ public, by expressly declaring against these
 “ measures, and then making use of that
 “ popularity, to carry them to an infinitely
 “ greater height, than any other men could
 “ have thought of.” Again, page 57, “ If
 “ the nation stood bound by the obligation
 “ of such a promise, why did any gentleman
 “ mislead the public, by assurances to the
 “ contrary? If the address did not contain
 “ any such promise, whence this failure in
 “ his own?”

Here we may discover the *anguis in herba*. A man must be extremely short-sighted, who does not, in these pages, perceive the features of party: and yet the Considerer assures us, in the beginning, that “ He intends to write *without any view to particular men.*” It is a pity he so soon deviated from his intentions: but how well his practice corresponds with his professions, the above passages will declare, without any comment of mine. I will only observe, that when a writer indulges himself in personal reflections, that circumstance alone is sufficient to weaken his credit with the judicious and impartial.

I am not concerned to vindicate any particular man or minister; but with respect to public measures, I think them not only defensible, but highly deserving our applause: and the Considerer himself shall be their

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champion. He is so able and so *unanswerable* a reasoner, that I chuse to draw my vindication of those measures from his own words.

Page 133. He combats the opinion that the German war has been a diversion of the French forces or treasure, or prevented their attention to their marine, and the security of their colonies. " The only prospect (says " he) which the French had of invading us " with success, was, by surprizing us in " the beginning of the war, before we were " prepared for them.—All their attempts " since have been the effects of desperation, " rather than of council. But during all " the year 1756, while the French had " any hopes left of invading us, they never " thought of entering Germany; and so far " was the electorate from being in any " danger of an attack, that we brought " troops from thence over hither. England " was then too great an object in the French " councils, for them to trifle away their " money and troops in Germany. But the " next year, when they found themselves " totally falling from that great hope of " ruining us at once, then they took the af- " ter game of trying to do it more gra- " dually; and therefore thought of Ger- " many. And whatever may be now pre- " tended of our having chosen the German

war

“ war as a diversion, every one must re-
 “ member, that the army of observation
 “ was an army of defence, and not of diver-
 “ sion. ’Twas the child of our fears, and
 “ our fond concern to keep the French out
 “ of the electorate, and not of any councils
 “ of diversion to draw them into it. Then
 “ only it was when our enemies found that
 “ we had raised a sufficient land force to
 “ guard our coast from surprize, and to re-
 “ pel any invasion, that they began to think
 “ of sending troops into Germany: and
 “ when, by the vigilance of our squadrons,
 “ at the mouth of their harbours, and the
 “ loss of so many of their transports in their
 “ passage to their colonies, they found it
 “ impracticable to go any where else, then
 “ it was that they passed the Rhine; still
 “ making every effort, and running every
 “ hazard, to succour their colonies. At
 “ length they found to their cost that they
 “ could not go thither; but they knew that
 “ the English forces could, and that they
 “ could not be resisted there: that was the
 “ part where only they were vulnerable;
 “ their best trading interest lay in their
 “ islands, which were now naked and ex-
 “ posed; and therefore it was a diversion of
 “ the French choosing, and not of the Eng-
 “ lish, to draw the British force into Ger-
 “ many, where they knew themselves to be

“ invulnerable, and were always sure to be
 “ superior to us.”

Here I most willingly subscribe to the Considerer's general principles, and I will venture to say, that there cannot be an higher encomium on the conduct of the administration, than is contained in the above extract. In the beginning of the war, he owns, we paid no regard to Germany; we fixed all our strength to the principal objects of our concern. We disabled their marine, we block'd up their harbours, we gained possession of the colonies in dispute, we added others to them by right of conquest, we made acquisitions in every quarter of the globe. Till these essential points were obtained, and the enemy thereby made desperate, the ministry (for I do not, like the Considerer, distinguish between a noble Lord and an honourable commoner, neither do I care which of them it was) I say the ministry, very wisely opposed our detaching any of our force to the continent. They said, and they said truly, that the nation stood bound by no obligation to pursue such measures.

But, when these purposes were fulfilled, when our successes “ drove our enemies to
 “ desperation,” when they found it “ im-
 “ practicable to succour their colonies,” when they found the English arms “ irresistible,” where it was most their interest to oppose them,

them, — then, as the Considerer confesses, without any just pretence of hostility, and in a fit of “desperation,” they “sent their troops into Germany.”

In this case what was to be done? We had already secured the territories we claimed, we had acquired others to indemnify us for our expences. — Thus circumstanced, should we send our fleets in parade to plow the ocean without a cock-boat to oppose them; should we go on adding colony to colony, and island to island, till we excited the jealousy of other powers, and threw them into the arms of our enemy? While we were thus extending our conquests, and provoking rivalship by triumph, should we suffer our enemies to ravage Germany unmolested; should we permit them to possess themselves of defenceless dominions, by which they might secure a balance in their favour against our ill-judged conquests, and thus render the peace of Europe hopeless? No; the ministry judged better. While our enemy bent their force against us *directly*, they, as the Considerer acknowledges, took care of our immediate interest, and would not suffer any collateral views to take place. When they had not only provided for our safety, but procured us an indemnification, and the enemy “in despair,” attacked us *indirectly* through the sides of our allies, then they found themselves

selves at leisure to attend to collateral concerns; and then, and not till then, they applied their attention to the defence of our German allies. Thus therefore they fulfilled their promises, and acted a consistent part: for the diversion, as the Considerer rightly observes, was not of their, but of the French choosing. As to the French "invulnerability" and superiority," let the plains of Minden, and almost every engagement we have had with them, testify.

Page 63. He assures us to go on, and "by one more easy conquest, disable the navy of France from ever rising again; and the peace of this island (he assures us) is then fixed on its firm and proper basis: and we may thenceforward look on all the quarrels of the continent with indifference."

This, I believe, is the first *principle*, in which I have been so unlucky to differ from him; and this I must contravert with all my might: for I am persuaded, that were we in possession of all the French settlements, and our enemies without a single ship, yet the continent would not be a matter of indifference to us. On the contrary, it seems evident that the greater and more commercial we grow, the more closely we shall be interested in, and connected with the continent. It is absurd to suppose that a nation which depends upon commerce, can be detached

tached from the continent by which it subsists, and have no occasion to give or receive succour from their continental friends, when their very being depends upon their reciprocal support and defence. As a trading nation, we have more reason to be attached to the continent, than the continent has to be allied with us; and we may add, that, in times of danger, we may, as we have done, stand in need of succour from our continental allies, as well as they occasionally require assistance from us.

Page 66. The Considerer asks,—“When Britain is already engaged in a war with France, can it be stronger, for adopting another prince’s quarrels with the house of Austria?” No: but it is the stronger for detaching that prince from the common enemy, whom the Considerer himself calls, “the sure friends” of that prince.

That it was absolutely necessary for us to strengthen ourselves by detaching him from that interest, we again appeal to the Considerer’s own authority. Page 45, where he says, “The Empress-Queen refused to defend the electorate.”—She alledged her own danger. Here it is manifest, from his own confession, that we did not drive her into the arms of France, but that she refused to embrace our cause. She alledged her danger, as a reason why she could not act against the common enemy. Could there
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be a better reason on earth for closing with the king of Prussia, and detaching *him* at least from the interest of our great rival? If the empress's danger was then so great, that she could not assist us, her danger, and the danger of all Europe, would have been greater, had Prussia combined with France, and by their confederacy have drawn, as they certainly would have done, Sweden, &c. into their scale.

Page 76. The Considerer enters into a minute calculation and comparison of the revenues of France and England. He cites the authority of some nameless speaker in the last sessions, whom he leaves us to guess by his office, for the following account.

“ The standing revenue of France, we
 “ were then told, is twelve millions, five of
 “ them were anticipated, and the remaining
 “ seven, subject to any deficiencies in the
 “ other five, make the present revenue of
 “ France. Besides this, they have bor-
 “ rowed two millions, and these nine mil-
 “ lions make the whole fund of France for
 “ carrying on the war.

“ The standing revenue of England (he
 “ adds) is the land and malt tax, which
 “ amount to two millions seven hundred
 “ and sixty thousand pounds: to which
 “ may be added, so much as can be taken
 “ out of the sinking fund. Allowing, how-
 ever,

“ ever, a million and a half to be taken
 “ thence, we have then four millions to
 “ oppose to the French revenue of seven
 “ millions. But, besides this, we have bor-
 “ rowed for this year twelve millions. Go
 “ on therefore for two years longer on this
 “ plan : France, at the three years end, will
 “ be six millions in debt, and England, if
 “ we reckon the twelve millions, will be
 “ thirty-six. If we allow but the eight
 “ millions, England will be twenty-four
 “ millions in debt. Can we, he concludes,
 “ need a more convincing proof, that this is
 “ a ruinous war.”

What avails this calculation? We need no proof that our expences are greater than theirs. But if every stroke we strike, we recur to our numeration table, our arms will make but a slow progress. It is more than probable, however, that the Considerer, who took this account from word of mouth, misunderstood the speaker, for it is agreed by the most authentic accounts, that the standing revenue of France, even in the year 1742, when they themselves allow it was at the highest, did not exceed eleven millions, and even in time of peace, they frequently run behind hand. In the year 1722, for instance,

The receipts amounted to	-	-	livres	202,535,994
The expences to	-	-	-	208,108,505

The expence exceeds the receipt by 5,572,511

We might bring the account as low as the 1742, but it would be more matter of curiosity, than use. For to what purpose is it to say that their standing revenue is greater than ours? Who does not know that the standing revenue of an arbitrary sovereignty, where the substance of the people is applied to gild the trappings of monarchy, and furnish out a gaudy nobility, will be greater than that of a free kingdom? But is the *nation* the richer? Can they raise such sums to answer pressing exigencies! No, he admits they cannot: if they could, they would not be in the condition they are. We believe the Considerer is the first politician who ever brought the poverty of a nation, as a proof of their power.

But he would frighten the readers by dint of arithmetick, and shew how much greater our expences are than theirs. True: and are not our operations more extensive, our advantages infinitely superior? Have we not numerous fleets to support, and have they not well deserved their pay? By their means have we not gained every thing we contended for, and made acquisitions to reimburse our charges? Have we not destroyed the French marine, and ruined their trade? Have we not likewise a powerful army in Germany, which has withstood their progress, and defeated their views?

What have the French done? They have spent less money: right; because they could

not

not raise so much ; and to their inability we may partly attribute our successes. The Considerer observes, that we are inferior to France in number of men. We are so: our superiority consists in length of purse. Our debt, it is true, is large: their's however is above treble the sum*, and they borrow money at near treble the rate of interest: it should be considered, moreover, that allowing for the different rate of interest now and in king William's time, the interest of our present debt, is not equal to the interest paid when it was but seventy millions, and there needs no stronger proof of our credit.

But he takes upon him to say, page 89, " This is a war, which France never can be hurt by, and never can be weary of. A land war with England *alone* is an advantage, and which France has not enjoyed these hundred years:" and again, page 127, he argues, that " the war in Germany is not a diversion of the *treasures* of France.

What, will not France be hurt? Will she never be weary of maintaining immense armies in Germany, without gaining any thing but shame and defeat? Are the loss of her men nothing to her? Does it cost her nothing to subsist her vanquished forces? Is it nothing to have buried 200,000 men in Germany this war, not to speak of those who

* Their national debt in 1745 was 140 millions sterling.

have fallen by the sword? As to their carrying on a land war with England alone, the Considerer, I had almost said the prevaricator, recurs to his old quibble, and would persuade us, that we stand alone, because our allies have not formally declared war against France. But would a candid reasoner, whose pursuit was truth, cavil about words? It is plain that if the Hanoverians, Hessians, Prussians, &c. are not at *war* with France, they nevertheless *fight* with us against France, and France fights against them, and they cut one another's throats, with as little remorse, as if a party coloured herald had denounced war by the sound of trumpet.

But the German war, he would persuade us, is no diversion of their treasures. Indeed! What then has diverted them? He owns himself, that for a long time past, they have had no other object of attention, and yet it is certain that they are reduced to the greatest straits. Will he not credit their own representations? Will he not believe the remonstrances of their parliament, particularly of Rouen, which exhibits the most deplorable picture of the poverty and misery of the people, and their inability to pay the taxes, &c.? Will he not believe marshal Belleisle's letter to Contades, which specifies their incapacity to continue the war? Will he not believe they melted their plate? But says he, the next year they brought two armies into the field. Be it so: but extraordinary efforts of this kind are like

convulsions before death: there are, as he himself well observes, "acts of desperation." And after a measure denoting such uncommon distress, we might reasonably expect some extraordinary attempts.

These are incontestible authorities: but let us consult reason, which is superior to all authority. On one side, let us place a kingdom, which is forced to draw it's subsistence from it's own vitals; which has lost all nourishment from it's members, that is, it's colonies; whose trade it utterly destroyed; whose marine is ruined; a kingdom, which has been defeated and disappointed in the important object of it's pursuit, which is "reduced to desperation," and obliged, as the Considerer confesses, to prosecute the war where she would least choose to wage it.

On the other hand, let us view the nation which has reduced it's enemy to the above desperate and deplorable condition; who has secured her own rights, and obtained deposits over and above; whose trade is flourishing in the midst of war, and daily increasing; and who is able to raise immense sums at a moderate interest. Let us thus fairly state the comparison, and then let reason determine which of the two kingdoms is most likely to be tired of the war.

But indeed, the Considerer's own contradictions, are sufficient to betray his cause. One while he tells us, page 89, that "it is the *triumph*, and not the trial of their arms

" to

“ to fight us in Germany:” then he calls it an “ act of desperation.” Again, page 134, that “ it was a diversion of the *French choof-* “ *ing*, and not of the English;” and yet, page 129, he affirms, that “ France does not “ send it’s army to invade the German do- “ minions from *choice*, but *necessity*.” In a passage above quoted, he speaks of *triffling* away their *money* and *troops* in Germany.— Now he says, “ they cannot be hurt by the “ German war, and that it is no diversion “ of their treasure, &c.” Was ever any thing so contradictory?

The Considerer however does not scruple to say and unsay; tho’ it must be observed, that his contradictions are not obvious to a cursory reading: as he abounds in repetitions, and leads the reader into a maze, in hopes, I suppose, to elude detection; for to do justice to his abilities, he seems capable of writing with more method and precision.

I have taken notice of so many of his inconsistencies, that I am weary of the office; nevertheless, I must not omit taking notice of one, which I have already referred to, page 100. After playing off his wit upon the Russian treaty, he says, “ the *dread* of these “ guests diverted his Prussian majesty from “ his intended attack on the electoral domi- “ nions, and brought him three months af- “ ter, to sign the treaty of Westminster.”

Here the reader will recollect the passage we desired him to note before, where the

Considerer affirms, that “ we perceived that
 “ this Russian diversion, which was to march
 “ through Poland, would be *ineffectual*. . . .
 “ We were then forced to see our inability,
 “ and by renouncing our treaty with Russia,
 “ and giving up our old allies, were made to
 “ buy off an evil which we could not repell.”

Now we may defy the most subtle sophi-
 ster to reconcile these passages. If the Rus-
 sian treaty was *ineffectual*, how came his
 Prussian majesty to *dread* it? If he was
 frightened at it, and not only diverted by it
 from his intended attack, but brought to
 sign the treaty of Westminster, how can it
 be said, that we bought off an evil, which
 we *could not repell*?

In truth, however all these assertions and
 surmizes are nothing to the purpose, we
 might ask the Considerer, how he became
 acquainted with the king of Prussia's inten-
 tions to invade Hanover! That monarch is
 generally pretty close in his councils, and
 seldom declares his intentions, till his motions
 speak them: and we do not remember that
 his troops ever made any advances that way.

But, in fact, one of the chief ends of the
 Considerations, is to render the king of Prus-
 sia, and those who are known to have
 espoused his cause, unpopular. For this pur-
 pose he throws out such invidious sarcasms,
 as are calculated to influence the mob of
 readers. He even goes so far as obliquely
 to call his magnanimity in question, and he
 sneers

sneers at the authority which used that epithet in speaking of the Prussian monarch. " He has, says the Considerer, been called "*magnanimous*, by too great an authority to admit a doubt, of his having it in his power to do great things for us. For the sake of such persons, it may be of use to think of his will." Who used that epithet we well remember, and the world can testify that it was not misapplied; therefore, it would have been decent in the Considerer, to have spared the reflection. But judgment never harbours with malice.

As to the king of Prussia's good will towards this nation, or the good will of any one nation towards another, it is not, I apprehend, much to be relied on, beyond the bounds of *political* interest. I am not so thoroughly Prussian, as to imagine, that on some future occasion, that prince may not again be our enemy: and if the Considerer had not addressed himself to the passions, instead of the understanding of his readers, he would not have insinuated suspicions, which are totally immaterial to the argument. Whatever the king of Prussia's will may be, at present our interests are connected. If from the revolution of things, they should hereafter be divided, and he should prove an enemy, I trust there will be both spirit and power in this kingdom, to convince his majesty, that he has as much to dread from our opposition,

tion, as he has now to hope from our protection.

After ringing the changes on the same sentiments, running over the hackneyed declamation against German subsidies, quitting the king of Prussia in one page, and worrying him again in another; in short, after saying what has been said a hundred times before, and what he himself has repeated over and over, he comes at last to consider the nature of continental connections.

Here he affects to be witty, and sports with the different meanings which may be annexed to these terms. As I write only with a view to plain truth, I shall not attempt to rival his pretensions to wit and humour; but shall proceed to animadvert upon the following reflections, which are so extremely singular, that I cannot forbear giving them in his own words.

“ Till such great occasions (alluding to
 “ the grand alliance) shall return again for
 “ Britain to act in conjunction with Holland
 “ and Germany, and the other parts of
 “ Europe, united in a real alliance against
 “ France, the true interest of Britain, or of
 “ any part of Germany, can never call for
 “ our troops upon the continent. We have
 “ been indeed too long making ourselves
 “ parties in the internal quarrels of the em-
 “ pire, to hope soon to see that and the
 “ other state of the continent united in such

“ an alliance : but till that we can have no
 “ connection with it. Previous to Britain’s
 “ having any continental connection, that
 “ continent must be connected in itself.
 “ To talk of forming a connection with
 “ that, which itself is unconnected, is a con-
 “ tradiction in terms.”

Let no one then attempt to form a con-
 nection with the Considerer, who is himself
 unconnected : so unconnected, that it is im-
 possible to collect the heterogeneous parts of
 his argument, and combine them into any
 consistent proposition.

First, he tells us, we can have no call for
 our troops on the continent, till we can act
 in conjunction with Holland and Germany,
 and the *other parts of Europe*, united in a
 real alliance against France. By the other
 parts of Europe, I suppose, he means the
 parts engaged in the grand alliance : for he
 cannot think it necessary that we should
 wait till we get all the powers of Scandinavia,
 and the Grand Turk, &c. on our side. But
 though we agree with him, that France is
 still formidable, yet we are warranted, by
 his own confession, page 13, to conclude
 that it is not so formidable as in the days of
 Lewis XIV. Consequently, from his own
 proposition, the same strength of confede-
 racy is not necessary now as was then. And
 thus he destroys his own argument.

And in *Letter* : *introd* *of* *the* *same* *letter* But

But admitting that it was necessary, yet is it so easy a matter to convince so many different powers of such necessity? It is next to a miracle that they united under king William; and nothing but a sense of *immediate* danger from an ambitious and enterprizing prince, who had manifested to all Europe, that, according to his principles, might was right, could have joined their interests then. Such an union never may, probably never will, and; what is more, never need be effected again. Europe is not now what it was at that time. Some great powers, such as Prussia for instance, bear their heads aloft, who were then inconsiderable potentates. A writer therefore who contends for the necessity of adapting present measures, to the standard of antient systems, without allowing for change of circumstances, what time produces, either wants judgment or integrity. And we may add, that a writer of candor would not have forgotten; that at the time of the grand alliance, little or no attention was paid to our colonies and marine, which have been the *principal* objects in the present war.

He argues farther, "that, previous to Britain's having any continental connections, that continent must be connected in itself." Must it so? Then we are afraid it will be difficult to shew that there ever was a continental connection: and we may

add, that probably there never will be one. Even the grand alliance was not a continental connection, since France, which makes so great a part of the continent, stood unconnected with, and in opposition to, the far greater part of the other powers.

But not to waste time in disentangling these knots of sophistry, let us appeal to any man of plain sense and impartial judgment, — If, as the Considerer allows they did, the Austrians pleaded their danger and inability to act against the common enemy, and our natural allies the Dutch tendered the same plea, — whether thus deserted, not only policy, but necessity, did not direct us to form alliances elsewhere. We find that jealousy, or sordid views of present gain, has made the Dutch as much our enemies as they dare to be. It is they, and other partizans of France, who have magnified the power and revenues of France: who have some of them gone so far as even to over-rate it at eighteen millions a year; whereas we find it but eleven: and an able French writer has assured us, that, in time of war, an additional sum of five millions, six hundred eighty-seven thousand, five hundred pounds, is necessary to prosecute it with effect. — It is they, in short, who would persuade us to abandon our allies.

As to the remainder of the Considerations, it tends to prove that the German war is not

a war of diversion. This I am not inclined to dispute: I will readily agree with him that it was of the French choosing, not of our own, and that they went there as an act of desperation, because they could go nowhere else.

In short, the single point, which the Considerer labours to establish is this,—that we ought to prosecute the war in the East and West Indies, detach ourselves from the continent, and leave our allies there to shift for themselves.—All the rest of the pamphlet is nothing else but flourish, declamation, and invective.

With respect to this point, I have shewn that as a commercial nation, it is impossible for us to be detached from the continent, from whence, in a great measure, we draw our subsistence. From the earliest times to the present period, it has been deemed good policy to attend to the concerns of the continent, when we have had no German or other territories, under the dominion of this crown.—If therefore we cannot engage our natural allies, we must form such connections as bid fairest to make amends for their desertion. And I will add that Prussia and Hanover, &c. are for this purpose the most eligible confederates.

With regard to the pursuit of our conquests in the East and West Indies, it may be observed in general, that extended conquests

quests are not for the interest of this nation ; that we have already, besides securing our rights, acquired as much, or perhaps more, than we shall be able to retain ;—that an attempt to farther acquisitions can only serve to move the jealousy of other nations, and incline them to side with our enemies.—To this may be added, that if we go on and get possession of the French settlements, and at the same time suffer them unmolested to ravage the continent, their acquisitions may more than counterbalance ours, especially if they make themselves masters of the maritime provinces ; whereas by opposing their progress, and disappointing their views, we leave them nothing (except Minorca) to set off against all our conquests.—Not to mention that were we in possession of the French settlements, the acquisition could be of little use to us, if we suffer them to extend their arms over the greater part of the continent. For in that case, we should be stocked with commodities, without any customers to take them off our hands, but on their own terms.

It will be said, however, that the French can have no just pretence for making such conquests, and some have imagined, that we should have had no war on the continent, but for our alliance with Prussia : but I refer them, for an answer, to the Considerations. It appears from the Considerer's own principles, and they are so far just, that whenever
the

the French cannot defend their colonies, nor invade us, they will carry their arms into Germany: no matter whether their pretence is just or not. He admits that they had no just pretence for invading Hanover, and by the same rule they might turn their arms on any other part. In short, it is evident from the Considerer's own shewing, that whenever we are at war with France, if we are successful against them, they will seek their vengeance on the continent; and surely it is better for us to oppose them abroad, than for them to attack us at home. That being now our main object, we may narrow our expences, and to defeat them there, is the only means now in our power to reduce them to the necessity of begging peace.

Upon the whole, when we consider that there is nothing in these Considerations, but what has been repeated over and over, without meeting with any attention, we cannot but be persuaded that some extraordinary endeavours have been used to influence the public. When the sheets of discontent issue from the press, we know by what industrious arts they are circulated, and how loud-tongued party bawls in every company, in defence of the principles they contain. I cannot but lament, that my countrymen should be the dupes of such artifice, and that with all their experience, they are still the same fickle creatures, which the celebrated Montesquieu

tesquieu has characterized them: " A na-
 " tion always violent, governed more by
 " passion than reason, and easily influenced
 " to pursue measures against it's real interest."

F I N I S

E R R A T A.

Page 3, l. 18, instead of *minds of people*, read *minds of the people*.—Page 22, l. 16, for *then*, read *thence*.—Page 25, l. 27, *no matter for spot*, read *no matter for the spot*. Page 29, l. 8, for *without*, read *with*.—l. 23, for *representing*, read *misrepresenting*.

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