




**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic  
Sciences  
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET  
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580  
(716) 872-4503

0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

**CIHM/ICMH  
Microfiche  
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH  
Collection de  
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

**© 1983**



The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



National Library of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol  $\rightarrow$  (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol  $\nabla$  (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole  $\rightarrow$  signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole  $\nabla$  signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

aire  
détails  
ues du  
modifier  
ger une  
filmage


ées

re

y errata  
d to

nt  
ne pelure,  
çon à






---

**National Prejudice,**  
Opposed to the  
**NATIONAL INTEREST.**

---

( Price One Shilling. )



# *National Prejudice,*

Opposed to the

# National Interest,

Candidly Considered in the *Detention* or *Yielding* up GIBRALTAR and CAPE-BRITON by the Ensuing Treaty of Peace : With some *Observations* on the *Natural Jealousy* of the *Spanish* Nation, and how far it may Operate to the Prejudice of the *British* Commerce if not removed at this CRISIS.

In a *Letter* to Sir JOHN BARNARD, Knight.

---

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for W. OWEN, near *Temple-Bar* ;  
and J. SWAN, near *St. Martin's-Lane*  
in the *Strand*. 1748.



Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a title or header.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or series of entries.

---



---

# National Prejudice,

Opposed to the

NATIONAL INTEREST.

*April 2. 1748.*

S I R,

**T**HOUGH it be a well known Truth that too many Gentlemen in the Opposition to the late Sir *Robert Walpole* had urged on the present War with *Spain*, more out of Pique to that Minister than Concern for either the Trade or Honour of this Nation ; yet, Sir, it was never so much as suggested that Sir *John Barnard* was of the Number. If you disapproved of the *Convention*, it was because you thought it dishonourable and unsafe : and if you gave your Suffrage for the Support of a War with *Spain*, it was not to distress the Minister, but to repair the Honour,

B

nour, and secure the Trade of your Country. And for this Reason, I assure myself, you will give your Sanction as a Legislator to, and approve as a Trader, any Peace that shall seem to you to answer the Ends for which the War was begun.

It need not be told you, who are so thoroughly versed in the Theory and Practice of Commerce, that a trading Nation should enter, reluctantly, upon even a just War, and should embrace, chearfully, Overtures of Peace, be such a War never so successful. This will ever hold a standing, as it is a salutary, Maxim, in regard to the whole World; because it can never be the Interest of a People subsisting by Trade and Industry, to be at Variance with any that take off their Products and Manufactures, not to mention the Expence and commercial Impediments that are the natural and necessary Concommitants of War.

But if it be sound Policy in a trading Community, if it be unalterably their Interest to live upon good Terms with all Nations with whom they have, or may hope to have Intercourse of Commerce, how much more necessary does it appear that a Nation subsisting by Trade, should seek the Friendship, and cultivate the Esteem of a People from whom more commercial Advantages may

may be expected than from half the Globe besides ?

The false Policy of many, and the Ambition of more, plunged this Nation into a War with *Spain*, the Country in the whole World whom we should most avoid quarrelling with. And what still aggravates the Mistakes of those who precipitated their Country into this expensive Contest, is, that our Trade had been on the Wean for many Years before, and required rather to be cherished and nursed than cramp'd and impeded by affording our Rivals an Opportunity, by our Absence, of nestling among a People from whom we drew so great Advantage.

But it was the Business of the Ambitious in those Days of Party and Opposition, to hang out false Lights in order to deceive the unwary Multitude, who seldom judge for themselves, or indeed preserve such Temper as qualify Man to judge impartially. And yet how essentially is it the Concern of the People to guard against Deception ? For when they are deceived, they are soon influenced. When angry, they are unfit to judge properly ; and when very angry, they are unable to judge at all. And thus by Degrees they are often wrought upon to their own Undoing, blindly submitting to be the Tools of Leaders who consider them only

as Builders do the Scaffolding of an Edifice, which is thrown aside as soon as the Work is finished.

Without intending to asperse any Set of Men whatever, I think I could prove that the present War with *Spain* might have been avoided with Honour and Safety, if the Minds of the People had not industriously been put into a Ferment, by Men who have not since proved themselves to be equal to their Professions. But, Sir, 'tis evident from your Conduct down to this Time, that you acted from Conviction; but a Conviction, which, I beg Leave to say, was ill founded; and which, I am assured, you yourself are by this Time convinced not to have been founded on such Principles as are shaped to the true Interest of a trading People.

But I will suppose, like many other worthy and well-meaning Gentlemen, that you expected our naval Force would have brought *Spain* to Submission in a few Months. But had you thought the War would hold to this Time, I am satisfied you would have advised the grafting a Peace and Harmony on that *Convention* which you join'd to oppose:

I have already said, that you opposed that Compact, as thinking it an unsafe Measure. But, Sir, let me ask you, now you are cool,  
and

and have had the Experience of the War, whether you did not then suffer yourself to be carried away, perhaps interceptibly, by the Tide of Party? If it be so, you need not blush at the Avowal, the Current of Party having often swept away the Resolution, and even the Understanding of Men of the greatest Probity and Fortitude.

Party Animosity has been productive of infinite Evil among us in latter Days; yet of all the Evils it has produced, you will agree the *Spanish* War not to have been the least. It has already subsisted too long; wherefore it should be not only the Desire of every good Subject to wish it ended, but his Business to contribute the putting a good and speedy End to it.

'Tis therefore, because I think it my Duty to offer my Mite, while a Congress for a general Peace is subsisting, that I venture to publish my Thoughts concerning the Difficulties that appear to me most likely to retard or impede the Peace.

Could we detach *Spain* from *France*, and wean ourselves from an Appetite for a Land War, I should not care how long the Contest with *France* continued. But as we can have but very distant, if any Hopes of either, I am for a general Peace, if it can be  
obtained

obtained on reasonable Terms. 'Tis not for Loofers to carve, nor for a loofing Gamefter to continue playing, if he can throw up the Cards with any tolerable Grace. What more would we have; what more could we expect, even had we been fuccefsful, than the Security of our Trade on one hand, and of our Allies on the other?

But fuppose our Allies fhould not care for fubmitting to fuch Terms as we fhould deem reasonable, in the prefent Nature of Things, ought we to continue the unequal Burden we bend under, becaufe of their Waywardnefs? For Inftance, ought we to continue the War, rather than agree to a moderate Settlement for Don *Philip*, becaufe *Spain* can't in Honour end it without obtaining fuch a Settlement for that Prince? How fhall the Poffeffion of *Parma* and *Placentia*, by a Son of *Spain*, affect the trading Intereft of thefe Nations; or even the *Balance of Power*, a Phantom we have been vainly hunting after many Years?

The Enemy has already that Pledge in his Hands, which muft command fuch a Settlement, as is contended for in Favour of Don *Philip*. And unlefs the King of *Sardinia* can wrefte by Force the Dutchy of *Savoy*, the County of *Nice*, and *Villafranca* from

from *Spain*, I cannot see, that he ought, in Justice to himself, or this Nation, to wish the Continuance of the War, rather than part with, as an Equivalent, that Part of the Dutchy of *Placentia* ceded to him by the Court of *Vienna*. And as for the other Part of the ancient Inheritance of the House of *Farneſe*, the Dutchy of *Parma*, I have too high an Opinion of the Justice as well as Gratitude of the Empress Queen, to suppose she would contribute to the Continuance of the unequal Burden, born by this Nation since the War, by a wilful Detention of so small and insignificant a Territory, which could make no Addition to her Power should she detain it.

In this View then it may be presumed, that a reasonable Settlement for Don *Philip* in *Italy* would not be any great Obstruction to the Work of Peace. Nor can I suppose any thing so unwise and unjust of our Statesmen here at home, as to think their Country so far engag'd by the Treaty of *Worms*, that they can't put an End to the War, unless the House of *Savoy* be indulged with the Possession of the Marquisate of *Final*, or some other Territory belonging to the Republic of *Genoa*.

With regard to the commercial, that is, the true Interest of these Nations, it can never



never be advantageous to us to have the whole, or best Part of the Trade of *Genoa* transferred to any Port under the Jurisdiction of an absolute Prince; which would inevitably happen, should *Final* be ceded to the King of *Sardinia*. . And as for our political Interest, I think it is evident that it must be less affected by *Final* and *Savona* remaining to the *Genoese*, than if such excellent Ports should get into the Hands of a despotic Prince, who might very naturally have future Views to Commerce and a naval Force.

But laying aside the Consideration of *Self-Interest*, with regard to *Final*, which certainly preponderates more in Favour of *Genoa* than the Court of *Turin*, what is there so alluring in the Treaty of *Worms*, that it should be deemed binding at all Events? Sure I am it is not the *Justice* of that Compact that can warrant our continuing the War, till we obtain the intire Execution of it by Force of Arms. And now I am treating this Part of my Subject, give me leave to say, that the *Injustice* of carving out a Dominion for the House of *Savoy*, at the Expence of the State of *Genoa*, by the Treaty of *Worms*, has given no small Disgust to the honest and considerate Part of these Nations. Was it for a Nation that had expended *four hundred Millions*, within the  
last

last half Century, in Support of *Liberty*, to stipulate that a rightful Possessor, shall be strip'd of his Property, unheard and unprovoking? That the State of *Genoa* had preserved the strictest Neutrality between the Powers at War, till after the Treaty of *Worms* had forced her to seek Alliances for her own Safety, is notorious and indisputable. So that it may be justly said that that Republic had been *unprovoking*, when the hardest Measure had been dealt out to her. And as for the Conduct of that hapless, brave People since, I persuade myself there is not a virtuous *Englishman* living, who won't hold them much more excusable than those that had forced them to Extremities, by the most flagrant *Injustice* on one hand, and the most unheard-of *Cruelties* and *Exactions* on the other.

Thus, Sir, you may perceive me clearing my way to the main Difficulties that are most likely to impede the desirable Work of Peace. I flatter myself to have shewn, that no Consideration, relative to *Italy*, should induce us to continue the enormous Burden of the War, should our Allies be more tenacious than becomes Powers so immensely obliged to this Crown.—And if it be true, that *France* offers to restore her Conquests in the *Netherlands*, the small and

C

infig-

insignificant Fortrefs of *Furnes* excepted, I should think that common Prudence might incline us rather to Peace, on Terms so advantageous and honourable, than to the Continuance of a War with no very auspicious Aspect.

For with regard to the Safety of the *Dutch*, or the vague Balance of Power, how can either be affected by the Detention of so inconsiderable a Place as *Furnes*? And with regard to the trading Interest of these Nations, which should be the constant Object of our Attention, I believe it won't be controverted, that it is clearly out of the Question. Sure I am that the Trade and Independency of *Great-Britain* can never be affected by *Furnes*, or any other inland Fortrefs sever'd from the *Austrian Netherlands*.

Not but that I should be as averse as any Man in *England* to every Increase of the *French* Power or Territory. But in such a Case as the present, I am for bending to Necessity, rather than holding out too stiffly against all Conviction. The Condition of *France* may be bad, tho' I am persuaded 'tis not so desperate as some among us affect to paint it. But let us look at home, and see if we be in Plight to support an Increase  
of

of the Burthen we groan under, in order to maintain an unequal, unsuccessful Conflict. But this being a Subject as ungrateful to myself as it must be to you, and withal too delicate to be treated publickly, I chuse to wave it at present, in order to come to that which chiefly occasioned this Address to you.

As then I can't gain upon myself to believe, that any Difficulties will arise, in regard to *Italy* and the *Netherlands*, which can weigh with a *British* Ministry, to continue the War, under almost insuperable Hardships, I must suppose that *Spain* and *France* may insist on certain *Restitutions*, which may afford a colourable Pretext for its Continuance. This is the Point I would discuss; this the Obstruction I shall endeavour to remove, because I think the removing it would be serving my Country essentially. I am sensible of the unpopularity of the Task I have imposed on myself; but so strong is my Bias to serve a bleeding, brave Nation, that I scruple not hazarding the Loss of their good Opinion, in attempting to wean them from *Prejudices* injurious to their Interest and Welfare. And, Sir, I address my Thoughts on the Subject to you, because I think you most capable of any Gentleman in the Kingdom

to judge of the Rectitude or Incongruity of what I shall advance.

'Tis probable that *France* may insist on the Restitution of *Cape-Breton*, and *Spain* on that of *Gibraltar*. The Question then remaining to be discussed, is, whether we should give those Places up for the Sake of Peace, or keep them at the Expence and Hazard of continuing the War? Methinks I hear already the full Cry of *popular Prejudice* against me.—“ What, part with  
 “ *Cape-Breton*, that puts us in Possession of  
 “ all the Fish and Furr Trade; and with  
 “ *Gibraltar*, the Flower of our Conquests  
 “ in the glorious Days of *Queen Anne*,  
 “ which besides is a Curb to *Spain* and  
 “ *France*, and a Key to the *Mediterranean*.”

—Such, and much more to the same Purpose, very likely will be the Language of *Prejudice*, when this Epistle makes its first Appearance in the publick. Nor shall I wonder if I am painted out as an Agent for the Ministry, or even for the Enemy, after such a Deluge of Ink as has been already spilt to decorate the Conquest of *Cape-Breton*, and cry up its Importance. But nor the dread of personal Altercation on one Hand, nor that of being borne down by the Tide of *Prejudice*, on the other, shall deter me from pursuing my Plan for unsealing the Eyes of my Countrymen, when I  
 conceive

conceive their Interest requires the Operation.

As the unexpected Conquest of *Cape-Breton* raised the Reputation of the *British* Naval Force beyond what it had been during the then and present Administration, it was natural for the Ministry and their Friends to enhance its Importance, not because they really thought it of Importance, but because the Belief of it contributed to exalt their own Reputations, and to create an Opinion in the Publick, that there was an Intention to pursue *British* Measures only, in the future Operations of the War, which had been 'till then, too visibly pursued on on a different Principle. But what was thus propagated only to amuse the Publick, was not only swallowed, but digested by the Populace, who seldom examine the Truth of any Assertion, or the Rectitude of any Measure, if the Pill be but gilt with Speciousness and Plausibility.

Thus came *Cape-Breton* to be thought of so great Consequence, that for a time, I don't know whether it might not have been safer for the Ministry to cede the *Isle of Wight* to *France*, than yield up that of *Cape-Breton*; so dangerous it is to instil vague and false Notions in the Minds of an undiscerning

discerning Multitude. But such are the Arts of Courts, such the Mysteries of some Cabinets, which have an Eye more to present or near, than distant Objects.

At the very time that such Industry and Art were used here at home to magnify the Importance of that Conquest, I saw a Letter from the principal Commander on the Spot, an ingenuous and intelligent Gentleman, and allowed such universally, giving such a Description of the Soil, Air, Harbour, Fortifications, and Situation, as would be no Incentive to an *Englishman* to refuse the restoring it for the Sake of Peace, or even for an equivalent of no very great Consideration.

It must however be admitted, that the fortuitous Consequences attending the Possession of the Harbour and Fortress of *Louisbourg*, rendered the Conquest of greater Importance than it was, or could be, independent of such Consequences. If the Capture of the *French* East-India Ships, and the *South-Sea* Man, that had taken Shelter there, believing it still in the Possession of *France*, had not suddenly followed the Conquest of the Island, the ministerial Partizans, with all their Address, would not have been able to persuade the Publick into

into so strong a *Prejudice* in favour of the Conquest, as we have experienced.

But tho' the Conquest of *Cape-Breton* may have answered the Purpose of the Ministry at that time, I could not help looking on them as very bad *Englishmen*, should they postpone so desirable and necessary a Work as Peace for the Sake of indulging to a sickly *Prejudice* they themselves had industriously created, to serve private Ends; should they, I say, affect to detain that useless, expensive Island, to the Obstruction of Peace in our present Situation, I should look on them as the least discerning and unfaithfullest Servants the Publick ever had in these Nations.

For, I assure myself, they are by this Time highly sensible, as I doubt not you are, and every other intelligent Adventurer in the Kingdom, that the Benefits arising from our Possession of that Island for fifty Years to come, would not compensate for the Expence of maintaining it for a single Year. The Soil produces nothing, or next to nothing; the Climate is so excessively bad and unwholesome, that not many survive a very few Months Residence there; and the Nature of the Stone is such as well as that of the Air, that the present Fortifications



tions of *Louisbourg*, which cost *France* so many Millions since the Peace of *Utrecht*, are now ready to crumble to pieces ; inso-much, that in very few Years, if we should detain the Island, we should be obliged to expend perhaps half a Million in rebuilding that Fortrefs, and the adjacent Works, on desert that Island.

But this is not all neither ; for whether *Cape Breton* be considered as an Accession or Enlargement to our Fishing Trade in the *North*, or as an additional Security to that lucrative Commerce, we shall find it equally inconsiderable. The Island is contiguous to none of the noted Fishing-banks, nor are its own Coasts abounding in Fish, which we must suppose was the Reason why the *French* had never established a Fishery there. And, by casting an Eye on the Map of that Part of *America*, it may be soon perceived that it ought never to be reckoned upon as any additional Security to our general Fishing Trade in those Parts.

In War time, the best Security we can have is our Ships of War, which will always be the best and aptest Protection our Fish Traders can wish for ; and these, on all Occasions, and in all Seasons, may find  
Safety

Safety and Shelter in the Roads, Bays, Rivers, and Harbours already in our Possession, and infinitely more contiguous to our Fishing Settlements than *Cape-Breton*. And in times of general Tranquility, I believe it won't be controverted that the Possession of that Island would be as *useless*, as it would be prudent for a Nation, groaning under a Weight of *Debts* and *Taxes*, as we are, to get rid of all Articles of a superfluous and needless *Expence*.

Therefore, Sir, you will perceive clearly, I am satisfied, that the Possession of *Cape-Breton* can answer no Purpose of this Nation, either commercial or political. Unless we can drive the *French* from *Canada*, and be able to maintain ourselves there, the Detention of the Island in question can, in no light, be supposed to contribute either to the Security or Extension of our Trade; and with regard to Policy, I leave you to judge if it be consistent with its Maxims to postpone so necessary a Blessing as *Peace*, by insisting to detain an useless Conquest, which *France* would scarce yield to if the Fortune of the War on the Continent had

D

been

been as inauspicious to her as it has been hitherto to us and our Allies.

But, it may be urged, if *Cape-Breton* be so useless, so insignificant as not to be worth the keeping, how comes it that *France* insists so strenuously on the Recovery of it? Why, for the very same Reason, perhaps, which may induce *Spain* to insist on the Restoration of *Gibraltar*. It was part of her Possessions before the War, and she might think it a Wound to the Honour of her Grand Monarque, a Stain to his Glory, to yield an Inch of his own, while he is conquering whole Provinces with Rapidity. Besides, tho' *Cape-Breton* be of no use to us, who have so many better Settlements in its Neighbourhood, it may be of some Conveniency to *France* while she possesses *Canada*. But supposing the *French* and *Spaniards* have their *Prejudices*, and think better of our Conquests than they deserve, should we, *English*, of all Nations, who have stronger and worse-grounded *Prejudices* than any People in the World, build on their Weakness, and make it a Rule to ourselves not to part with *Cape-Breton*, because the *French* might think it to be  
of

of more Importance than it really is; or with *Gibraltar*, because the *Spaniards* may have set their Hearts on the Recovery of it? The Question therefore, with a wise People, ought to be, not whether the Enemy vehemently wish'd the Recovery of the Conquests we luckily made upon them, but whether they be of that Importance to us, either as to our Trade or Power, which should induce us to detain them at the Hazard and enormous Expence of continuing an unsuccessful War.

Having thus, Sir, so amply, and I hope, so satisfactorily, treated the first Point which I intended to discuss for the sake of such of our Countrymen as may have contracted an unmeaning *Prejudice* with regard to *Cape-Breton*, it follows of course that I now enter on the Discussion of my second Point, which is relative to the giving up *Gibraltar* to *Spain* for the Sake, not only of immediate Peace, but of cultivating perpetual Harmony with the *Spanish* Nation.

The Conquest of *Gibraltar* was a great and necessary Acquisition at the Time in which it was made; and it was extreme-

ly proper to detain it in our Hands while the Contest for the *Spanish* Crown remained undetermined. But I was ever of Opinion it would have been our Interest, as a trading Nation, to have had it restored to *Philip V.* on the Conclusion of that general War. We might have had any commercial Concessions we would, any Advantages, over other trading Nations, we could wish for, if that Fortrefs had been yielded to *Spain* by the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

But as much as it would have been for the Benefit of the Nation to barter away *Gibraltar* in Exchange for solid and substantial Advantages in Trade, it might have been dangerous for the then Ministry even to make the Proposal, considering how impetuously the Current of the *national Prejudice* ran in Favour of the Detention of the Conquest.

Besides, seeing the domestic Opposition Lord Treasurer *Oxford* met with in perfecting the Work of Peace, he might very well be excused suffering himself to be carried away with the Tide of *Prejudice*, and even to avail himself of  
the

the Foible of his Countrymen, for the better extricating himself out of the Difficulties which the violence of Party in those Days, had raised against him.

That sagacious Minister, who had projected and procured the *South-Sea* Trade for his Country, could not but have foreseen that the Advantages accruing from that lucrative Commerce, might, in Futurity be diminished, or perhaps quite taken from her by means of Brangles, Quarrels, and Heart-burnings, arising from our Possession of that Nook of the *Spanish* Empire. And certainly that Great Man must, at that time, as little think, as you and I do at present, having a long Experience to guide us, that *Gibraltar*, in any Sense, deserves to be deemed the Key of *Spain*, or even of the *Streights*, as too many of our Fellow-Subjects affected to call it. But of what Use could all his great Stock of Knowledge and Penetration be, at a Time when, if an Angel had come to inform the Nation of what we have seen since, he would have met with but little Credit?

I am sorry to say it, but true it is,  
that

that no People in *Europe* are more easily wrought into *Prejudice* than our Countrymen, nor any got out of it with more Difficulty. They too suddenly take Fire, but cool too slowly. And, as if they thought it a Reflection to own being in Error and reform, even *Experience* has not always had that Weight with them, which might be expected from a wise and prudent People.

If this had not been too truly the Case, would the whole People, a few sedate and considerate Men excepted, have taken the Alarm, in the late Reign, at the tacit *Royal Promise* made for the Restitution of that Fortres? How many Millions, since expended on that useless Place, had been saved, if his late Majesty, who so well judged of its insignificancy, had not had his wise Purpose cross'd, by the unwise *Prejudice* of his People? How many more *Millions* have been lost to the Nation, by commercial Restraints and Impediments brought upon our Trade by our Bickerings with *Spain*, incens'd, that the wise Monarch was not able to perform his Promise, or answer his own Intentions?

For

For Gentlemen may ring the Chimes as much as they please on the present Queen Dowager of *Spain's* Ambition, but I am well warranted to believe, that our Possession of *Gibraltar* had much more Weight with the late King, her Consort, and the *Spanish* Ministry, with regard to the frequent military Preparations of that Court in the late Reign, than the Sollicitations of that Princess. By being continually armed, it was thought some lucky Moment, some favourable Opportunity, might offer of wresting that Pledge from us, which *Spain* could never hope to effect by plain and open Force. What was the Invasion of *Ceuta* in 1720, but to cover a Design of surprising *Gibraltar* under colour of those Preparations? And had not the late King, who was willing to procure commercial Advantages for his People in Exchange for the Place whenever he should find them in a Cue to part from it, prevented the *Spaniards* by early Care and Vigilance, in abundantly supplying the Fortress, the Duke *de Lede* had not pass'd the *Gut* to *Barbary*, but had stop'd short to possess himself of the most *Southern* Spot in *Europe*.

But



But admitting this Insinuation to bear too hard on the Memory of his late Catholick Majesty, who was known to be a Prince of great Honour and Integrity; or to be over refined and speculative in itself, is there any want of plain Evidence, that *Spain* has embraced all Opportunities of convincing us she bears us no Good-will? And have we not abundant Reason for believing that she never will be heartily and sincerely in Friendship with us, 'till we agree that her Kingdom shall be unsever'd and intire. For 'tis not the Court alone that stomachs our Possession of *Gibraltar*; 'tis the whole Nation; insomuch that there is not an individual *Spaniard* in the Kingdom that interests not himself as deeply as the Prince and his Ministry, and that thinks not himself dishonoured in the having a Foot of *Spain* in the Power and Possession of Foreigners.

Such patrial Love may seem, to the Tepid and Lukewarm, to be enthusiastic and romantic, but it will be deemed otherwise by the virtuous and warm Patriot, whose Breast glows with Love of his Country. How should we like that *Plymouth* or *Falmouth* were in the Possession

session of *Spain*? Is there one among us, who bears, or deserves the Name of *Englishman*, that would not spill his Blood spontaneously to wrest such a precious Pledge out of foreign Hands? Yet might we be a great and happy Nation, tho' any one or both those Ports had not been in our Possession. What else then but that national *Prejudice* natural to Man, that patrial Love impress'd on his Mind, should cause such Anxiety as would certainly engross every *English* Heart if the Fate of War had obliged us to yield up to an Enemy any Port and Fortrefs in this Part of the United Kingdom?

I mention this Part, because I think *Englishmen*, for I judge by my self, would not be so strongly affected with an Encroachment on the *Northern* as on the *Southern* Part of our Island, tho' with regard to Safety or Interest, the Damage would be equal: And what, but that Love which one bears to the individual Place of his Birth, could occasion the Partiality?

But besides this Inclination of Nature to the Place of one's Nativity, there are

E

to

other Motives that weigh with *Spain* to wish getting Possession of that Fortres. The Court particularly wishes it, to prevent the Smuggling which may be carried on from thence with the neighbouring Towns and Villages ; and the whole Nation have Reason to wish it, that they may more securely protect their Coasting Trade from the Pyracies of their Neighbours of *Barbary*, with whom *Spain* is ever at War. But none of these Motives can be of any Weight with us. As any illicit Trade from *Gibraltar* to the adjacent Parts of *Spain*, must lessen our legal Imports into that Kingdom, it must therefore necessarily be injurious to our general Trade. And while we are in Possession of *Minorca*, we shall always hold the Rod over all the Infidel Sea-Rovers of those Southern Seas.

This last Consideration leads me to examine the greater Importance of *Minorca* than *Gibraltar*, or rather how useless the Possession of the latter seems to be to this Crown while we are Masters of the former. *Portmahone* is allowed to be one of the fairest and best Ports in all the *Mediterranean* ; and 'tis so situated, that with our superior naval Force  
we

we may command, by means of it, all those Seas, and equally bridle the *French*, *Spaniards*, *Italians* and *Barbarians*. But *Gibraltar*, either by its Nature or Situation, can never answer those Ends; nor indeed any essential Purpose that can weigh against the injurious Effects that attend our Possession of it.

We may perceive in this Instance the Force of national *Prejudice*. *Minorca*, in the Hands of an Enemy, is of ten times the Damage to *Spain* that *Gibraltar* is, yet we have not found the *Spaniards* make much Complaint of our Possession of the former, but have never ceased complaining of the latter. So, probably, should we murmur much more at *Plymouth's* being in the Hands of *Spain* or *France*, than the Islands of *Scilly*, which commands both Channels, and from whence, consequently, an Enemy might annoy our Trade much more than from the former.

But were the Situation of *Gibraltar* by Nature, what it is not, better situated for the Protection of our Trade than *Minorca*, it is become almost intirely usefess to us since the Court of *Spain* has caused such

Fortifications to be erected near the Fortrefs, as render the safest Anchorage in the Bay dangerous, if not impracticable. Our Ships of War, to keep out of the Reach of the *Spanish* Batteries, are obliged ever since the War, to anchor in such foul Ground, that in every fresh Gale of Wind they are forced to put to Sea to prevent being driven ashore. And so much safer and securer is that Part of the Bay in the Possession of the *Spaniards*, that they may, and do daily issue out from the Ports there, and take our small Vessels in the very Bay, and in Sight of the Fortrefs and our Ships of War.

Thus, even with regard to Safety and Conveniency, is the Possession of that Place become of little or no Use to these Nations; tho' if *Spain* had not rendered the *Bay* less useful than it would have been if we had commanded it as formerly, I am still of Opinion we ought to sacrifice it for the sake of retrieving the Cordiality of the *Spanish* Nation, and of acquiring substantial Benefits in Trade by the Recovery. And it is not improbable but *Queen Anne's* late Ministry might, for these Reasons, have had the *Restitution* in View, and therefore insisted  
on

on no specific Territory, or Tract of Ground to be yielded up along with the Fortrefs.

However it be, 'tis evident, from the artificial as well as natural Power of the *Spaniards* in the Bay of *Gibraltar*, that that Possession is not, nor can ever be as useful to us as it has been, or might be if we had been Masters of the Bay, and had a Tract of Land from whence the Garrison may be supplied on Emergencies. As the Case stands at present, if the Winds and Seasons should prove unfavourable for any length of time, both the Garrison and Inhabitants may starve together, if the former should not chuse to exchange the Place for Bread with those that now pin them in within their barren Rock.

Thus then, abstracted from any Views to those important Benefits arising from our being on good Terms with the *Spanish* Nation, and growing into the Confidence of that jealous People, by removing the Cause that estrange them from us, it is manifest, that, in the present Situation of Things, *Gibraltar* would be of no great Use to us in time of War, as  
the

the present but too truly confirms, and that it would be of none at all in a Season of general Tranquility, unless to serve the Court and Ministry as a pretext for keeping up a *standing Army*.

Need you, Sir, who have so steadily opposed all dangerous, unwarrantable and needless Increase of the regal or ministerial Power, be told, that Ministers seek all Pretexts for *arming* the Crown in times of Peace, and that none is more colourable than the having Garrisons abroad. Therefore, I assure myself, that to cut off all such frivolous Pretences for keeping up a *standing Force* in times of no Danger from abroad, you would be of Opinion with me and every other *Englishman*, who wishes warmly to our happy Constitution, that we ought to get rid of all such foreign Possessions as require strong Garrisons, and are of no Consequence as to the Extension or Security of our Trade.

The present War is a Proof that *Gibraltar* contributes little to the Protection of our Trade even while we are at open Enmity with *Spain*: And if we were at Peace with her, all Security, as to that  
Crown,

Crown, would be needless ; and as to *France*, *Minorca* will always much better answer our Purpose. Then, as for the Extension or Enlargement of our Trade, we bid much fiercer for it by reconciling the *Spaniards* to, than by estranging them from us, by the mistaken Policy of appearing to hold a Lash over them, which in Reality they have no Reason to dread, nor we any Reason to brag of.

And here I cannot help observing how incumbent it is on a trading People, not only to avoid coming to Extremities with other Nations, but to be circumspect and cautious in averting all future Quarrels, and removing the remotest Causes that could possibly occasion a Breach. And, has been occasionally observed before, if this Maxim hold good in the general, how much the more binding will it appear with Regard to *England* and *Spain*?

Every Gentleman in *England*, I suppose, believes that we were always Gainers by the *Spanish* Trade. But, Sir, as few, if any, know as well as yourself how much more lucrative our Commerce to *Spain* was that our Trade to all the rest of *Europe* besides, I beg Leave to sum up succinctly,



succinctly, not all, but Part of the Benefits accruing before the present War, from our Trade with the *Spaniards*, that it may appear how essential it is to our well-being, to endeavour acquiring the Confidence of that honest, but jealous Nation. Under the Pressure of our present Load of Debts and Taxes, how necessary is it for us to cultivate the Affection and Benevolence of a People, by whom chiefly we may hope to be exonerated ! How necessarily are we obliged to remove all Obstructions to their Cordiality, and use every Means for recovering their Confidence !

Our Trade to *Spain* was not confined to any one or a few Commodities, or to any one or a few of our Ports ; but was general in every Sense. We vended to the *Spaniards* some of every Species of Goods, either simple or manufactured, which our Country or our Colonies produced. And there is not a Nook of this united Kingdom or *Ireland*, or of our Colonies unrestrain'd by Act of Parliament, that did not traffic with *Spain*. There was not a Port, Creek, or River of *Spain* in which the Colours of *Great-Britain* were not daily display'd : And in  
the

the Bay of *Cadiz* particularly, it was usual to behold Two and *Three hundred* Sail of *British* and *Irish* Trading Vessels at a time. Our Trade with that indolent Nation was so extensive, that I am morally sure it gave full and constant Employment to *Five hundred* Sail of our Shipping, which is more than can be urged in Favour of our Commerce with all the rest of the Nations of *Europe*.

But the *Spanish*, above all other Trades, has this Advantage, that most of its Returns are in *Bullion*, or in Commodities of greater Value to this Nation than *Bullion*; that is, in *Wool* and *Iron*, manufactured here, and returned back to the *Spaniards* at an immense Profit; in Salt for the Cure of Fish imported into *Spain*, and in Oyl, Drugs, and dying Ingredients, which are of absolute Necessity for carrying on our Trade, not only to *Spain*, but to the rest of the World. As for the Wine and Fruit which we take off the Hands of the *Spaniards*, they are Articles of little Value, compared with those we vend to them; and even these can't properly be deem'd Articles of Luxury, since the Nature of our Climate renders the Use of Wine and foreign Fruits of some

F Necessity

*Necessity* among us. Thus then, in every Light, may we look on the *Spanish* Trade to be superlatively beneficial, whether considered in our Exports for *Spain*, or Imports from thence.

You, Sir, that have been bred up in the *Spanish* Trade, and had followed it, usefully for your Country before the present Broils had rendered it impracticable, best know if I exaggerate in the Sketch I have drawn of that lucrative Commerce. You know it was this Trade that furnished most Employment for our Artizans of all kinds, and particularly for the Manufacturers of our Staple, that is, our *Wool-len* Goods. Of this the *Spaniards*, both in *Europe* and *America*, consumed more than all the other Nations of the Continent.

Thus, by Consequence, were it the *Spaniards*, who gave most Value to our *Lands*, who increased our national Stock the most, and who contributed most to our Opulency and Power ; to that Power, which I am sorry, we have employed against those very commercial Benefactors more and oftner than perhaps became us as a trading *Nation*.

We

We complained before this War, and very justly, that the *French* had rivall'd us in the *Spanish* Trade. But had not our own Conduct towards *Spain*, from the Accession of *Philip V.* given occasion for the Encouragement which those Rivals had had among the *Spaniards*? The *French* were not encouraged, as they were more agreeable to the *Spaniards* than the *English*; but because the Court of *England* had sought all Occasions to disgust the *Spanish* Nation; and particular in the Detention of *Gibraltar*, which every true born *Spaniard* looks upon as an indirect Badge of Infamy, an Insult, a Stain on the Honour of his *Nation*.

If then the *French* have supplanted us in any Branch of this beneficial Trade, we may thank ourselves. We were more the commercial Favourites of the *Spaniards* than any *Nation* in *Europe*, before the Politics of our Cabinet had estranged them from us: And there is scarce a Doubt that we shall again return to their Favour and recover their Confidence as much as ever, if we are not wanting to ourselves in the present Conjunction.

We are, 'tis to be hoped, at the Eve of a general Peace, which in all human Appearance, will be durable, at least 'twixt us and *Spain*. The present, therefore, is the Season for recovering the Confidence of that useful *Nation*. This is the Time for healing Animosities and removing Prejudices. But you will agree, that unless the Cause be removed, it cannot be expected that the Effect will cease. *Gibraltar* is that Cause; and till it be restored 'tis vain for us to hope for the cordial Friendship or Confidence of the *Spanish* Nation.

This should be considered as a lucky Conjunction for the Removal of all Jealousies 'twixt both *Nations*. The Court of *Spain* is no more what it had been from the beginning of the present Century. It may now be deemed to be intirely *Spanish*; so that we shall be greatly wanting to ourselves if we don't lay hold of so favourable an Opportunity for turning the Tables on the *French*, and worming them out of any Branch of that Commerce wherein they interfered with us.

But the more *Spanish* the Court of *Madrid* is become, the more jealous of the Honour

Honour and Interest of the *Spanish* Nation. We are to suppose at present, that the Court and People have the same Views and Interests, that they are actuated by the same Motives, and act upon the same Principles, what I should be glad could be said of all Courts and Nations. But this close Union of Interests between that Court and People helps to connect their Resentments and Jealousies the firmer. Wherefore it now behoves us, more than in the late Reign, to reconcile ourselves to both, as both are now so much more firmly connected than they were.

Besides, as the present War has given the *French* and *Dutch* great Advantages over us in regard to the *Spanish* Trade, from which we were precluded, we should redouble our Efforts, on a Peace, in the reconciling ourselves to the *Spaniards*, the sooner to beat those Rivals out of that *Trade*, which should be at all times the principal Object of our Attention. And as this so desirable a Reconciliation is never to be wrought while we hold the *Pledge* which so much wounds the *Spanish* *Puncto*, I should hope the *national* *Interest* will at last so far prevail over the *national* *Prejudice*, as to induce our People,

ple, one and all, to join in wishing the Recovery of the *Spanish* Trade by a Recovery of the Confidence of the *Spanish* Nation.

This Consideration alone were sufficient to wean us from any *Prejudice* in favour of a Conquest more useful and necessary than *Gibraltar* ever was, or can be. In Peace, the Place is of no manner of use to us, and the Expence is a dead Weight upon us ; and during a War, even with *Spain*, which it will ever be our Interest to avoid, 'tis of very little Significancy while we possess *Minorca*.

But supposing that Fortres were of greater Utility than it possibly ever can be, would it not be abundantly over-balanced by the Recovery of the *Spanish* Friendship and Confidence, which would enable us to beat our Rivals out of such Branches of the *Spanish* Trade as interfere with ours ? And if our *Saving* by the yielding up that Place, be taken into the Account, it will not a little add to the Merit of the Measure. For surely, a Saving of about *Two Hundred Thousand Pounds a Year*, which *Gibraltar* has stood us in one Year with another since we have had it,

it, would be well worth the Attention of a People, almost *Ninety Millions* in Debt, and panting under the Pressure of more and heavier Taxes than any Nation in *Europe*.

As we are a trading Nation, it would be our Business to cultivate the *Olive* at all times ; but as we are an over-burden'd Nation, it should be now more essentially our Care than ever to embrace all reasonable Offers of Peace : And sorry I am, that since I have sat down to this Epistle, the Prospect of the War is become less alluring and promising : 'Tis to be hoped it may mend ; but I confess the Chance against us appears in such a Light to me, who have the trading Interest of my Country so nearly at Heart, that I could wish the Work of Peace might be expedited before the Enemy grows stronger at the Expence of our best and dearest Ally, and perhaps more tenacious and insulting.

The more *France* enlarges her Conquests on the *Dutch*, the less pliable we shall find her in the main, tho' in appearance she may affect Peace as much as ever. Our Business therefore is to sever  
*Spain*



*Spain* from her, or at least wean her so from her, as that she may be rather a Clog upon, than a Help to her in the Continuance of the War.

Whatever the Views of *France* may have been at the Commencement of the War, or be at present, 'tis certain that *Spain* had none but the Settlement of Don *Philip* in *Italy*, and the Recovery of *Gibraltar*. As for the commercial Disputes between that Court and ours, they may be soon and easily adjusted. Since the Death of *Philip V.* and the Removal of the Dowager Queen from the Councils of *Spain*, the Settlement of the Infant is become but the Secondary View of *Spain*; and therefore we may suppose that the Recovery of *Gibraltar* is now become the primary Object of her Attention.

It is lucky for us that it is in our Power to gratify that useful People at a very easy Expence. 'Tis indisputable that Don *Philip's* possessing the Patrimony of the *Farnese* Family, can affect neither the Commerce of these Nations, or the *European* Balance of Power: And it is no less

less so, that neither can be affected, in any Light or Sense, by our parting from *Gibraltar*.

This, I think, I have made evident in the Opinion of all who wish for the Recovery of the *Trade of Spain*, and Confidence of the *Spaniards*; of all who wish to see *England* eased of an *Expence* she is ill able to bear; and of all who wish to see taken away from the *Court* all Colour and Pretext for keeping up a *standing Army* in time of Peace.

These, Sir, are the Points I have endeavoured to elucidate in the Course of this Work, in order to wear off any *Prejudice* that might yet weakly remain on the Minds of any of our People in favour of *Gibraltar* and *Cape-Breton*. As I look on the present as a Crisis proper for retrieving our declining Trade, I thought it incumbent upon me to contribute, as much as lay in me, towards our acquiring the *Blessing*. And as I cannot suppose we can retrieve our *Trade* without the Aid of the *Spaniards*, I thought it necessary to clear our Way to the Acquisition of their Confidence and Esteem. How I have succeeded, I submit to your super-

rior Judgment, in an Assurance that you  
will readily pardon an Address calculated  
purely for the Good of your Country.

I am, &c.

*F I N I S.*

---

---

ou.  
ed

