

# STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 51/42

## REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Mr. L.B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons, on  
October 22, 1951.

### Relations with the United States

... In making what I might call a "tour d'horizon", I think it is desirable that I should begin with our relations with that country which is nearest to us, the United States of America. The day-to-day problems between Canada and the United States are growing in complexity and number and scope, but are approached in almost every case from either side with a desire to find fair and mutually satisfactory solutions. It is natural that these contacts between our two countries, especially in the field of defence and defence supply, should have increased as we work together with other states in a closely knit coalition to safeguard the peace. The United States is the powerful leader of that coalition, I suppose by any test.

Of course it is quite normal that we in Canada should be preoccupied with that leadership and with the power behind it. Not long ago the spectre that haunted Canadian policy makers in this field of foreign affairs was that the United States would remain aloof from international efforts which were being made to protect the peace against nazi and fascist aggression. We sometimes worry now lest the United States may feel it necessary to pursue policies inside our coalition which the other members cannot wholeheartedly follow, or that inadequate co-operation from those other members may discourage American effort and leadership to the point where Washington may even decide, on some unhappy day, to go it alone.

Any Canadian government is bound to do what it can to remove either of these unhappy possibilities. This may mean at times expressing its own views forthrightly in other places including of course Washington itself. This is indeed a first principle of Canadian diplomacy deriving from the inescapable fact that no country in the world has less chance of isolating itself from the effect of American policies and decisions than Canada. We must recognize, however - and I am sure we do recognize - that a diplomacy of this kind, depending as it does on the influence we exert with greater powers, can only be carried out successfully if our interventions are restrained, responsible and constructive, and if we act in discharging our own obligations in a way which deserves the respect of our friends.

In addition, all of us inside the coalition must avoid words, actions or reactions which will weaken our unity without any compensating advantage to the national interest. I do not mean by this that we should hide our differences by pretending that none ever existed. In any coalition, indeed in any neighbourly relationship, there are bound to be honest differences,

and unless they are examined and discussed frankly they may fester underground and poison the relationship. It is, however - and I am sure all hon. members will agree with me - of vital importance that in any such discussions of differences we should act with good temper and in good faith; that we should always display a sense of responsibility, a sense of proportion, and indeed I suggest at times a sense of humour. Our efforts should constantly be not to score points at each other's expense but to come to agreed solutions.

#### St. Lawrence Seaway

There is one question in our relations with the United States, that of the St. Lawrence seaway, concerning which we have not been able to reach such an agreed solution. We would like to see that seaway built as an international project as a witness to our good neighbourhood and close co-operation. That, however, has not been possible, and the action, or rather the inaction, of the United States Congress, which adjourned last Saturday night, shows, I think, that it is not going to be possible to secure agreement with the United States on this matter at an early date. Therefore we are prepared to recommend that this seaway should be built by Canada, and we shall soon request and expect to receive that co-operation from the United States government which it must be remembered is required under the boundary waters treaty.

The following steps remain in fact to be taken before the Canadian development can take place. In Canada, authorizing legislation, as announced in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present session of Parliament, is required and will be introduced to provide for the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, and to provide for an appropriate agency of the Federal Government to deal with the construction of the seaway. Then an agreement, the terms of which have already been worked out, must be concluded with the Government of Ontario for the construction by the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission, together with the appropriate authority in the United States, of the power development in the international rapids section of the river, and with respect to the division of costs between power and navigation. There must also be an agreed division of responsibility with the United States agency for the construction of these power development works. Then, although the situation is somewhat different because the international section of the St. Lawrence stops before the Quebec border is reached, steps are being taken to work out an agreement with the province of Quebec covering possible power developments in that province arising out of the Canadian waterways construction.

And, finally, from the point of view of Canadian action, an application by the Ontario authorities for the construction of the power works must be transmitted by the Canadian Government to the International Joint Commission for approval there.

Then on the United States side, a decision must be made - and I am now talking of the construction of the Canadian seaway - a decision must be made and approved by the President as to what agency in the United States will be responsible for constructing the United States part of the power project in the international section of the St. Lawrence River. That is a complicated problem in which many United States political considerations are no doubt involved, and the solution of the problem may take some time. At least, it cannot I suppose be reached overnight.

Secondly, for United States action, the agency which is to be responsible for the construction of the United States part of the power development must obtain a licence from the United States Power Commission. The procedure for obtaining such a licence involves public hearings before the Commission, to which all interested parties must be given an opportunity to present their views.

And thirdly, for United States action again, an application by the agency responsible for the construction in the United States must be transmitted for approval by the United States government to the International Joint Commission in conjunction with a similar application by Ontario.

So far as Canadian action is concerned, that part of it which is a responsibility of the Federal Government will be pressed without any delay. That is all I wish to say this afternoon though I could say much more if time permitted, on our relations with our great and friendly neighbour.

#### Relations with the Commonwealth

May I say a word at this time about our relations with the nations of the Commonwealth? Those are, as usual, on a good and friendly basis. There is full exchange of information and adequate consultation. We are satisfied with the existing position. ...

There is nothing static about our Commonwealth of Nations, nor is there anything static in Canada's attitude to this Commonwealth of Nations. ... Our attitude has I think altered somewhat toward the Commonwealth in recent years. During the period when Canadian political leaders of all parties were achieving and consolidating autonomy for Canada in her domestic, and later in her external relations, it was I think natural that appreciation of the value of the Commonwealth association should not exclude in many quarters some degree of what I might call wariness. This wariness was kept alive by repeated proposals for centralized machinery which would have given institutional form to the very close and continuous, but often informal, co-operation which existed between the members of the Commonwealth. Canada consistently opposed these proposals, because, to many Canadians, collective action in those days seemed likely to be overly influenced by imperialist interests, also because such Commonwealth arrangements might have appeared to be an obstacle to closer co-operation with the United States. Though Canadian opinion is I think as strongly opposed as ever to a separate and centralized Commonwealth, that problem is no longer a serious one because the new Commonwealth, with its three Asian members, lends itself less to centralizing proposals than the old one did.

The nature of the present-day Commonwealth, based on complete freedom of its members, along with the accepted obligations of those members to work together to the greatest possible extent, is now well understood in all the member countries. For this reason, I think the reservations and indeed even the hesitations that have sometimes marked Canada's attitude in the past have largely died away. At the present time Canadians have been discovering new and positive advantages in their membership in this association of free nations. The life blood of the modern Commonwealth is constant exchange of information, free and full consultation and a strong and genuine desire to co-operate. That process brings Canada into

close and friendly touch not only with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which share this heritage of western civilization, but also with some of the most important countries of Asia. In a world so plagued by division and misunderstanding as ours is today, it is no small advantage that Asian and Western leaders should be able to sit down together in Commonwealth meetings in an atmosphere of close, friendly and complete equality.

There are other links which connect the countries of Asia to the West, and in the course of time I hope there will be many more. Of those which exist at the present time, in my opinion, the Commonwealth nations provide the most important. It is essential that it should be maintained in the interest not only of its members but of all free states.

#### North Atlantic Treaty Organization

There is another group of free states with which we are proud to be associated, namely, those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The seventh meeting of the Council of the organization took place in Ottawa in September last. I think we were proud and privileged that Ottawa should have been chosen as the scene of that meeting. It was the first time that the North Atlantic Council meeting met under the new order by which it is a council of governments rather than a council merely of foreign ministers. On this occasion the countries were represented by two or three members of each government.

It was a successful meeting itself, and also a great deal of valuable preparatory work was done towards the next meeting which will take place in Rome near the end of November. This may prove to be an even more important session than the recent one. I believe it would be agreed by all those who had the privilege of attending this meeting that the habit of consultation is growing up amongst the North Atlantic group, and that a feeling of community is being developed. We have come to the conclusion that meetings of this Council should be held, not merely to settle crises, but for the continuing business of co-operation. Meetings for that purpose, and it was agreed we should have more of them than we have had in the past, should become as normal as meetings of Parliament.

At this council meeting two goals of the North Atlantic organization were discussed, the short term goal and the long term goal. The short term goal is how to increase our security against military aggression, and the long term goal is how to promote economic and social stability among all the nations of the North Atlantic community; how to bring those nations that make up that community closer together. As for the short term goal, we reviewed our defence programme, and we took an important step which is, I think, related to this programme. We recommended the admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A protocol for that purpose was drawn up and signed in London on Wednesday last by, among others, our representative, the High Commissioner. This protocol will be submitted to this Parliament later for approval before ratification by the Government.

In this connection it might be desirable to postpone that discussion until we see what happens in regard to ratification in other countries which are even more directly concerned with this matter than we are, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. To my mind there is no question

about the desirability of bringing Greece and Turkey into closer association with North Atlantic defence plans. In recent years these two countries have stood in the forefront of the common defence against communist imperialism and aggression. They have given proof of their devotion to the cause of freedom and collective security, not only at home but on the hills and plains of Korea. I believe it is true to say that a full-scale attack on either of them would vitally weaken the defence of Western Europe, and would probably mean a general war.

The problem, then, is how to remove the temptation for such an attack by building up collective defence arrangements in the areas of the Mediterranean. It was felt by some members of the North Atlantic group that probably the best way to do this would be by agreement on a Mediterranean security pact which could have some form of association with the North Atlantic pact. That was a non-NATO solution, and was attractive to some members of the Council but was opposed by others, more particularly the United States of America. Indeed, it was opposed by those countries most concerned with this matter, Turkey and Greece, as well as by the military authorities of the North Atlantic Organization. It may be argued that the full membership of these nations in the North Atlantic group will mean the extension of our commitments. In theory, that is the case, but I suggest it is more than compensated for by the deepening of our security, adding greatly to our collective defensive strength and thereby making an attack on any one of us less likely.

In any event, the extension of our commitments in this way is more theoretical than actual. If an attack took place on Greece or Turkey, it would not really make very much difference in regard to the extension of the war whether or not they were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whether or not they belonged to a Mediterranean pact, or indeed whether Turkey or Greece had only their existing treaty obligations. I, for one, agree it is normally unwise to extend the specific commitments of this country, in contrast with our general commitments under the United Nations Charter which, as we know from Korea, can be specific enough. I agree it would be unwise to extend these additional specific commitments, unless such extension is effective from the point of view of enlarging the defensive strength of the coalition and strengthening peace. It was felt by the Council that the admission of Greece and Turkey to the council would have this result. It is not, I submit, a provocation to any power that does not contemplate aggression, any more than the membership of Norway on the north flank of the North Atlantic community is a provocation.

In any event the greatest provocation to Soviet imperialism is not strength but is weakness. It was Karl Marx himself who said that the Russian bear is capable of anything, especially when he knows the other animals are capable of nothing. Well, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be capable of doing much more for the defence of peace with Greece and Turkey as members. I hope, therefore, that the Russian bear will be capable of doing much less against us.

Other defence questions were discussed at this Council meeting. The Council received the report of the Financial and Economic Board and the Defence Production Board, which were concerned with two more forms of the problem of creating the necessary military strength for General Eisenhower's integrated force in Western Europe. It was realized by the Council that the studies which had been under way in this field through

subordinate agencies of the Council had reached the stage where they should be coordinated, and that this could be achieved by a consultation on the high political level, to reconcile the political, economic and military aspects of the problem. This problem is not simply one of providing forces. The European members of the organization made that quite clear to us. It is also the problem of preserving the economic stability of the member countries, so a temporary ministerial committee was set up by the council to solve this fundamental problem. Lest it be thought that this is just another high level piece of international machinery being created for an indefinite time, it was made clear that this committee was set up for the single purpose of recommending a course of action and reconciling, and I quote:

... the requirements of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe, and the realistic politico - economic capabilities of the member countries.

That committee is to report at the next meeting in Rome.

So much then for the short term objective. The long term objective of the North Atlantic pact was also given much more serious discussion at this meeting of the Council than it had received at any time previously. It was admitted by all that that is not an objective of prior and immediate importance. Defence must come first. In our preoccupation with anything else, we must never forget that. We did feel, though, that it was important also to give serious examination to the non-military objectives of NATO, especially as some of them have a direct bearing on defence itself. They include the closer association of member countries for the promotion of collective well-being and economic and social stability. It became increasingly clear at the Council meeting that particularly those countries in Europe which were feeling most the economic burden of their defence contributions needed a long term aim for the backing of faith and confidence which is so necessary if this organization is to succeed.

To them the problem is not merely to provide for military defence from an abundance of resources; it is a peacetime struggle for stability and indeed for survival after a period of great difficulty, distress and even destruction. So we thought that this required that attention should be paid to the non-military aspects of the treaty which are described in Article 2 of that treaty; to the building up of the North Atlantic community. One often hears this term "Atlantic community" these days without any clear idea what it means. I readily admit that I am probably one of those most guilty of using it without a definite picture of what path its development may follow. But I believe this lack of precision is the result of the healthy circumstance that this community is growing out of satisfactory and practical solutions to common problems, not from preconceived plans for a grandiose if airy structure. At the Ottawa meeting it was clear that a spirit of community, as I have already stated, was developing on solid foundations; that these foundations should now be strengthened; that they should form the basis for closer consultation on foreign policy matters so that decisions would not be made, or certainly would not be announced by any one member of the group without discussing that problem with the other members of the group.

It was also felt that we should work for greater co-operation in the economic sphere, for the strengthening of our free institutions, and for promoting a better understanding between and conditions of well-being among our various peoples.

To promote this development a ministerial committee of five was set up in Ottawa, representing Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Canada. It will begin its work at Paris on Monday next, though useful preparatory work has been done in London by a group of officials under the chairmanship of a member of the Department of External Affairs. The chairmanship of this ministerial committee falls to me as the next president of the Council; so, as the Prime Minister has indicated, I shall have to attend its meetings when I am in Europe for the meetings of the United Nations Assembly. We have welcomed the appointment of this committee but we do not expect, nor should we expect, immediate or, indeed, early concrete results. Indeed, the Atlantic community is something which will take many years, many decades to develop. That does not mean, however, that we should not work and plan towards this great end now.

To work towards the establishment of a North Atlantic community of nations, all sharing in the great legacy from the past, all with their own special contributions to make in the future, all pledged to be of mutual assistance to one another, is surely a task worthy of our finest efforts and of our greatest zeal. The goal of such a society, strong, varied and secure but not self-centered or exclusive, and anxious to profit by contact with other civilizations, is, it seems to me, an ideal which can support and encourage us all through all the difficulties of the present time.

#### The Position of Germany

There is one great Western European state which was absent from our Ottawa meeting, but which was very much in our thoughts. I refer to Germany, a country which has made such a great contribution to the growth of and indeed to the destruction of European civilization.

At our Rome meeting the question of free Germany's association in our common defence will be considered, and some highly important decisions may require to be taken then.

I am sure that all hon. members of the House are familiar with the reasons which have made it impossible to conclude a peace settlement with Germany. The main one is the continued division of that country into two areas of occupation, and the refusal of the U.S.S.R., which occupies one area, to permit any German unity except on a basis which they think will ensure communist control - that is Russian control - of the united country. Unity, based on free self-government, must one day soon come to Germany; and, if it is on the right basis, the sooner the better; but it must not come in such a way that a united Germany will be forced to go the way of a united Poland and Czechoslovakia, and become a united Russian satellite.

In the absence of a peace settlement, I think it will be agreed that this nation, whose continued democratic and peaceful development is so important to all of us and to the future of Europe, should not remain indefinitely in its present position. It is in all our best interests that Germany should be encouraged to assume increasing responsibility for the guidance of its own destinies, on the basis of equality within

but not domination of the European community. We therefore welcome the progress that has been made toward the closer association of Western Germany with the free world, both at the political level and in terms of German participation in European defence. We also share the desire that a satisfactory conclusion of arrangements for a new contractual relationship replacing the present occupation statute should be achieved in the near future in such a manner as to secure the wholehearted co-operation of the German people. Yet it must be recognized that the path towards this goal may not be an easy one and that many difficulties lie ahead. However desirable may be the integration of Western Germany in the European community, we must not forget, nor must the Germans forget, the fact that co-operation involves a sharing of responsibilities and that no encouragement should be given to any tendency in Germany to look upon the present negotiation as an opportunity to obtain unconditional guarantees of German security or to assume that we are willing to pay almost any price for German assistance in the defence of Western Europe, even to the extent of accepting with complacency neo-nazi tendencies.

#### The Middle East

I should like to cross the Mediterranean and say a few words about the Middle East, which is very much on our minds these days, and about which I spoke in a special connection in the House last week. The crisis in Egypt follows close on the heels of another dispute in the Middle East which for a time threatened to erupt into violence and which still smoulders. This Anglo-Iranian oil dispute which had been developing for some time, began its present phase on March 20 with the passage of the oil nationalization law by the Iranian Parliament. It has since witnessed the complete shutdown of the vast Iranian oil industry, the expulsion of all United Kingdom oil personnel from that industry, and a reference of the dispute to the United Nations Security Council, the inconclusive result of which brings little credit to that body.

I do not intend to review in detail, because I have not sufficient time in which to do so, the events which have taken place in Iran, in Egypt and elsewhere throughout the Middle East in recent months; but I should like to refer briefly to some of the forces which are at play behind the present unrest in this strategic Middle East area and to try to place them in perspective against the wider background of the security of the Western world. The Iranian and Egyptian disputes have many elements in common; and indeed there is reason to believe that one is the emotional and possibly the political consequence of the other. Both disputes have been characterized by the unilateral breach of a solemn pledge, thereby injuring the structure of international law. Both have had as their original inspiration the natural and justifiable wish of states which have experienced periods of foreign intervention to assert their right to be masters of their domestic affairs, even if in the pursuit of this understandable objective they may do great damage to their own countries.

What is happening in the Middle East is another manifestation, if a distorted one, of the national awakening which in so many parts of the Middle East has led to revolt against outside influences, which often has very quickly deteriorated from legitimate nationalism to militant xenophobia, and indeed now threatens to upset by force all stability in the Middle East, and possibly also in North Africa.



It would be folly indeed to underestimate the strength of this movement, as it would be folly to misunderstand the basis of its inspiration. The tragedy for these countries and a danger to themselves, and indeed to world peace, lies in their blind refusal to recognize that, in their anxiety to gain full control of their affairs by the elimination of foreign influence, they are exposing themselves to the menace of communist penetration and absorption - absorption into the Soviet sphere.

Certainly there is no assurance that countries of the Middle East are capable of defending themselves from outside attack, and with their present stage of economic, political and social development, it is doubtful whether, without the support which the West is able and willing to give them, these countries are capable of maintaining a sufficient level of internal stability to resist the relentless pressure of international communism. On the contrary the unsatisfactory social and economic conditions which prevail throughout this area render that whole area a fertile ground in which communism, which has already succeeded in falsely identifying itself with nationalism, will thrive and eventually dominate, if allowed to grow unchecked.

Surely it must be abundantly clear that such a development would remove at one stroke the independence which the countries concerned claim to be their only objective. The Middle East is strategically far too important to the defence of the North Atlantic area to allow it to become a power vacuum or to pass into unfriendly hands.

It is therefore a matter of major importance to the security of the whole free world, and that includes us, and in the interest of the Middle Eastern states themselves, that the situation in the Mediterranean area be stabilized as quickly as possible, and that the principle of collective security and collective action be extended to embrace this vital area. And indeed a proposal to that effect, as I said last week in the House, had already been made to the Egyptian Government just before they took the action they did take. As we know in the North Atlantic pact, there is no incompatibility between responsible participation in such a collective system and the full exercise of national sovereignty.

#### The Situation in Korea

Now I turn for a moment to the Far East, to Korea, where a war sometimes called, but is not in our minds, the forgotten war, drags on its weary and bloody way. The aggressor there shows no disposition to cease his aggression. However, the United Nations forces, more broadly representative than when I spoke on the subject last, are showing at heavy cost to themselves, but far heavier cost to the enemy, that aggression does not pay.

The temporary optimism from the initiation of the cease-fire talks was not maintained for very long, but there has been better news in the last few days, and I hope that the period of delaying tactics by the communists may be now over, and that an armistice can be arranged. Certainly the United Nations are not rebuffing any move which might lead to the end of the war. But certainly we also have to be careful in how we deal with any such proposal made from the other side.

If I may adapt a quotation, our motto in that part of the world at the present time might well be: Trust in Kaesong but keep your powder dry. I think it is fair to say

also that the United Nations Supreme Commander in the field, General Ridgway, is handling these negotiations with skill, patience and an unprovocative firmness which must command our wholehearted admiration.

Korea is only one problem. There are other Asian questions. So far as we are concerned in this government, we remain willing to discuss these other Asian questions with all those concerned, and to negotiate in respect of them through the United Nations.

There is very real danger in having our diplomacy frozen in the Far East and allowing ourselves no room to manoeuvre. So I suggest we should keep our policy in that part of the world, even now, as flexible as possible. However - and this is important - before we can proceed to any of these further Asian matters which are dealt with in the United Nations resolution of last February, which I think is still valid, the aggression in Korea must first be brought to an end. That is the immediate danger, and that is our immediate purpose, to end that war on honourable terms. If and when that can be done we will not refuse to discuss any other Asian questions relevant to the situation out there.

But aggression is not the only enemy in Korea. There is the enemy of hunger, poverty and misery, the source and the strength of that communism which the Russians have used in other countries for their own unworthy purposes.

I know the House will be glad and proud to know that in the matter of relief of distress in Korea in recent months no country has made a greater contribution than Canada. Indeed I do not know whether any country has contributed as much as Canada. I think however it is true to say that no matter what happens in Korea, the people there have already lost. They are disillusioned and desolate. In that sense the West has also lost; and this is not the least of the tragedies arising out of the Korean aggression.

#### The Colombo Plan

In referring to this important matter of fighting communism by fighting distress, hunger and privation in Asia I should - perhaps I should apologize for the length of time I am taking - say a few words about the development of the Colombo plan since we last met.

On May 14 last I reported that shortly after our contribution of \$25 million had been voted by this Parliament we took steps to implement our share of the plan by asking the Indian and Pakistan Governments to send over representatives to discuss with us the projects we might finance, or help to finance, having in mind those items which Canada is best fitted to undertake.

Since then we have made some considerable progress, and have had discussions with representatives of those two Governments. In the case of Pakistan, to which we have allocated approximately two-fifths of the total contribution, several interesting projects have been selected. Among those, to name only a few, are an experimental and demonstration livestock farm which we are undertaking, jointly with New Zealand and Australia, and for which Canada expects to supply machinery; an irrigation

project for which we expect to provide some pumping equipment; a large colonization or settlement project in the Thal area of the Punjab, for which we hope to provide such items of equipment as dump trucks, motors, pumps and some electrical and transport equipment.

So far as India is concerned, as was foreshadowed in my earlier statement, we have been asked by the Indian Government, and have agreed, to make available a large part of our allocation to that country in the form of wheat. The provision of food-stuffs was clearly envisaged in the original Colombo plan report, and we think will provide a most welcome support to India in her efforts to combat famine and basically to strengthen her economy. The Indian Government intends to set up what are known as counterpart funds. The rupee equivalent of the value of the wheat we are providing to them will be used as internal financing for development projects they are undertaking under the plan. Those funds would be available for purchases of material within India and of course for Indian labour. We are continuing at the present time to explore with the Indian authorities projects requiring external finance to which we could apply funds over and above those which are being used for wheat. One particular project is an irrigation project in west Bengal to increase rice production in that area.

#### Japanese Peace Treaty

I cannot leave this part of the world without making a reference, which I shall keep as brief as possible, to the Japanese Peace Treaty ... which was signed at San Francisco on September 8. That was a conference called, not to negotiate a treaty but to sign a treaty. The signature took place only after eleven months of serious diplomatic discussions during which time all the governments concerned including the government of the U.S.S.R., had ample opportunity to express their views. Certainly we expressed our views in regard to the draft which had been submitted originally to us by the United States of America. As a result of those views certain changes were made in the draft. Not all the changes were made that we wished to have made, but in a treaty of this kind you cannot get unanimity with perfection.

On the whole, the treaty as it was signed was considered by the Canadian representatives there to be a good treaty. Of course there were some important omissions in the countries represented at San Francisco, particularly China and India. As far as China was concerned, the reason for that omission was obvious. If the representatives of the Chinese Government on Formosa had been invited to attend that conference, certain delegations would not have turned up. If the representatives of the Communist Government in China had been invited to attend that conference, then more delegations would not have turned up. The obvious thing to do under the circumstances was to postpone the problem of Chinese representation and Chinese accession to the treaty. We regretted also the absence of India for reasons which seemed good to that Government.

But there were other free Asian nations which were present at San Francisco and they spoke in no uncertain way. In signing this treaty we did so, not as a treaty of revenge but of reconciliation. Of course the treaty leaves Japan a much weaker state than she was when she entered the war, and that is as she should be. She has been stripped of all her outer islands and has been reduced to the four main islands. Her capacity to commit aggression again in the future has been very

sensibly and very rightly diminished. But although Japan is weaker as a result of this treaty, she is not prostrate, nor, I hope, bitter. I like to think also that this treaty is one treaty after a war which does not bear within it the seeds of future wars. We do not know about that, of course, for sure, and we may not know for many years. In signing a treaty of this type you have to take a calculated risk, but in view of the alternatives those risks on this occasion were worth taking.

This treaty brings Japan back into the family of free nations on the Pacific and gives her an opportunity to contribute to the peace and security there. We hope that she will take advantage of that opportunity. In any event 83 million disciplined, frugal, hard-working and intelligent people cannot be ignored, whether we sign a treaty with them or not.

We also had some special interests in this treaty and we made those known at the conference. We expressed the hope that Japan would not return to certain international trade practices of before the war which had caused so much trouble to so many countries, including our own. We were also interested in the fisheries question. We had hoped at one time that a fisheries agreement would be included in the peace treaty, but that was not possible. However, there was included in the treaty a clause which made it incumbent upon Japan to begin discussions with the United States and Canada for a fisheries arrangement. Those discussions have been going on since the treaty was signed. Satisfactory progress has been made and I hope that an announcement in regard to that progress can be made within the next day or two.

The treaty is now ready for ratification. I think it would be wise on our part before it is submitted to Parliament for approval or otherwise, before ratification, to wait and see what happens in Tokyo and Washington, especially in Tokyo where it is now being considered by the Japanese Legislature. It opens a new chapter in our relations with Japan. I hope it will be a happier chapter than that which we have just closed. I think it also opens a new chapter in the security of the Pacific which is just as much a Canadian interest as is the security of the Atlantic.

#### Pacific Security Arrangements

It may be asked, indeed, and it has already been asked, "why not try to guarantee peace in the Pacific with a pact as you have tried to guarantee it in the Atlantic?" Within a few hours of signing the Japanese Peace Treaty the United States signed a defence pact with Japan. Recently she signed a defence pact with the Philippines, I think on August 30 last. She signed a security arrangement on September 1 last with New Zealand and Australia. But none of these arrangements, not even the tripartite arrangement which I referred to last, constitute anything like a Pacific pact.

Mr. Truman called the New Zealand-Australia-United States security arrangement a natural initial step in consolidation of peace in the Pacific, and that is what it is. It differs from the North Atlantic pact in another way. The obligation assumed under this tripartite Pacific arrangement is to be found in Article 4 which reads:

That an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

As far as this government is concerned, I think we could almost accept that obligation at the present time, without any Pacific pact, with most of the countries with whose security in the Pacific we are concerned. But this is not a Pacific pact, so the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra asks why we do not take the lead in negotiating such a Pacific pact. Leaving aside for the moment the propriety of Canada taking leadership in this effort, I suggest that it would be impracticable at the present time to negotiate a Pacific pact similar to the North Atlantic pact. The best proof of that fact is that the United States has separate pacts with Japan, with the Philippines, with New Zealand and with Australia. If the United States has made separate pacts with those countries she did so because she did not think it desirable or practicable to make a general pact.

I think this reasoning of the United States and the other governments referred to seems sensible. If you tried to negotiate at this time a general Pacific pact, whom would you include and whom would you leave out? What about China? Would you include the Chiang Kai-shek Government in Formosa as part of a general Pacific pact, along the lines of the Atlantic pact? If you did not include that Government, would it be easy in the eyes of some governments to leave them out? Would you include the three Indo-Chinese states? Would you include Thailand? Would you include an Asian state that wished to join? If not, how would you exclude them if they wished to join? I suggest that any attempt to negotiate that kind of general Pacific agreement at this stage would not strengthen but weaken security in the Pacific. But I can assure the House at the same time that this Government is vitally interested in security in the Pacific. We are a pacific country in a geographical as well as in a political sense, and we desire to play our proper part in the Pacific in political and economic as well as in diplomatic matters because that area is becoming of great and growing importance to Canada.

Speaking in Vancouver immediately after the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, in a statement to which my hon. friend, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra made reference the other day I said:

We have now in the Pacific certain defence arrangements. The United States and Japan have one. The United States and the Philippines have one. The United States, Australia and New Zealand have one. Canada and the United States, both Pacific powers, have one. It may well be that in the future we will be able to gather together these arrangements into a general Pacific pact, and if that time comes -

And I suggest it has not come yet.

- I am sure that Canada will show her appreciation of the importance of collective security in the Pacific as we have already done in the North Atlantic ....

The United Nations

My last subject in this survey - and it may be one I should have mentioned first - is our relations with the organization which still remains, with all its weaknesses and its disappointments, our best hope for peace, the United Nations. I do not think I should close my statement without some reference to our world organization, the Assembly of which is to meet very shortly in Paris, and the Canadian Delegation to which it has already been appointed. In that Delegation we have continued what I think is the useful principle of all party representation. This forthcoming meeting of the Assembly may be a very significant one. There are a good many important subjects on the agenda, but even more important than the actual subjects on the agenda is, I think, the feeling in the minds of most delegations which will attend this meeting that the United Nations is now either at or coming close to the crossroads.

There are two main developments which lead me to say that. One is the division of the world which has now become hardened into competing and conflicting blocs, and which has been reflected at the last two Assemblies in every discussion there. If this is going to continue indefinitely, it certainly is going to undermine the usefulness of the Assembly as a universal organization. For that development we of the Western world are not of course primarily responsible, but whoever is responsible is doing his part in undermining the foundations of our world organization. We are in danger of that organization becoming nothing more or less than an instrument in the cold war. We have to be on guard against that, because if it does become that then we will have completely altered the ideals which we had for this organization when we signed the Charter, long years ago now, as it seems.

Another danger, and it seems to be an increasing one too, is that some members of the United Nations, and not always those who do the most to promote its principles, treat its resolutions almost with contempt. They certainly ignore them if they happen to be against their national policies, and if it becomes the accepted practice of this world organization that any resolution which is against the national interest of any member state can be ignored because of that fact, then it will not be very long before the United Nations will go the way of the League of Nations. We must be on guard against that development and do what we can to stop it.

On the more positive side, the United Nations has shown of course in the last year since the last Assembly what it can do in stemming aggression in Korea. The Prime Minister said in this House on April 29, 1948:

Our faith in the United Nations as an effective organization for peace and security has been pretty severely shaken.

However, he added:

What is unshaken is our determination to make of it or within it an effective organization for this purpose.

We have endeavoured to respond to this determination in Canada by supporting, as the Security Council becomes less effective, measures taken within the United Nations Assembly

itself to increase its capacity for dealing effectively with any active aggression it might be called upon to meet. However, far more notable than any resolution or any step of that kind taken at the Assembly is the application of the principle of collective resistance to aggression by those men who are actually fighting for the United Nations in Korea. The Korean experience has provided the free nations with a number of lessons which, if carefully studied and properly interpreted, can be of great benefit to the United Nations in the days ahead. There can be little doubt that the first application of the principle of collective security - and this is an optimistic observation - has strengthened both the principle of collective security and, indeed, the United Nations itself.

There are developments of danger and developments of hope in this organization, and I hope that in the forthcoming Assembly we may be able to do something which will advance the hopeful developments and cause the dangerous developments to recede. I believe, I have always believed, and most members in this House believe that collective security is a necessity for Canada, and so I believe that we should support all responsible and reasonable proposals for achieving it. Having said that, I would add that, though aggression of all kinds and in all places should be met and condemned, we must face the fact that at the present time - and the lesson of Korea is very much in my mind when I say this - the free world may not possess the necessary strength to make that principle of collective action effective in every part of the world. Carried to an extreme degree, the theory of unlimited collective security everywhere might, because of the dissipation of strength its application would involve, mean no security anywhere. On the other hand, failure in any instance to defend collective security would deal a serious blow to the hopes of millions who have placed their trust in the United Nations.

This certainly involves us in a dilemma. Those of us who are charged with responsibility in these matters have therefore to exercise pretty careful judgment as to how on any given occasion this principle of collective security can best be put into effect without fatally weakening us for other and possibly more difficult tests. What is involved is essentially an ad hoc calculation of the political, strategic and moral factors which will be present in any particular issue.

#### The General Outlook

... I am sure the House would expect me to make a few general concluding observations on the situation as I see it, and what my own views are about the days immediately ahead. I think myself that there has been a little general improvement in the international situation in the last six months. I doubt, however, whether there has been any substantial easing of world tension in any respect. It is true I think that in the countries of Western Europe, which I had the privilege of visiting this summer, and where I discussed with those concerned with foreign affairs the possibilities and dangers that lie ahead, it is true in those countries morale is higher, and the persistent and pressing fears of an immediate armed aggression seem to have lessened somewhat. However, against this possible brightening of the picture in one area is the fact that in the Middle East, as I have tried to indicate, there are grave and growing dangers to stability and peace, and that in the Far East the aggressive forces of communist imperialism remain as militant and as defiant as ever. Even in Western Europe itself, the danger of

military aggression is ever present, while economic and social difficulties remain a constant threat to stability, and one which the forces of Soviet imperialism are exploiting and will continue to exploit to the limit. Furthermore, if the strictly military picture has improved in the European area, that has been, I think, owing to the certain realization by any country which may now be tempted to break the peace that a group of free countries stand together in resistance to any such aggression, and that the ground on which they stand is becoming firmer. The moral to be drawn from this is therefore not that we should slacken our efforts, but that we should go ahead steadily and with determination to complete the job.

However, there are two types of aggression that we have to fear. There is military aggression, expressing itself in armed action, but there is social and economic aggression which expresses itself through the subversive activity of international communism. As to the first, military aggression, our military weakness - and in the face of Soviet land and air strength it is still a weakness - has been a standing temptation to Soviet attack. In strengthening ourselves, as we have done, and rightly so, to remove that temptation, we have, of course - and this I suppose applies particularly to the European countries - to be careful not to weaken ourselves unnecessarily in the economic and social field, and by doing so encourage the other kind of aggression. How to maintain this proper balance in the days ahead between military power, economic stability and social progress is probably the paramount problem of the free world today and will only be solved by co-operative action which takes into account every factor, moral, social and economic, as well as military, that makes for strength.

It may well be that the Soviet Union, impressed by the action of the United Nations in Korea, and aware of the far greater residual strength of the West, will now wish, for tactical reasons, to avoid an open conflict, and try to sap our strength by other means. It may even attempt - indeed it has already attempted and with some effect - to deceive and divide us by false peace campaigns, by exploiting economic and social difficulties. In short, as it has been put very graphically, it may put poison in our soup instead of cutting our throats.

It is, I think, necessary for free countries to take counter measures against this danger as well as against the danger of military aggression. We should, for instance, never lose a chance to drive home the fact - it may be more obvious to us than it is to others - that we are for peace alone; that while we in NATO, for instance, are determined to press forward with our defence programme, undeterred either by threats of war or phony promises of peace, nevertheless our primary purpose is always to prevent war and not to fight one; to ensure that D-day like tomorrow never comes; to underline our desire to use our energy and wealth not for arming but for peaceful, social and economic progress in a world where armaments will not be necessary.

In the kind of situation with which we are faced today, it may be that if we have achieved our defence objectives by, say, the end of 1954, we will have surmounted the most acutely dangerous period; but that in its turn may be followed by the longer term phase of the conflict, the marathon race as opposed to the sprint, and that may last for many, many years. It will require discipline, steadiness and perseverance; a refusal also to yield to the temptation to adopt the policies or even the



tactics of those who would destroy us. We must not only maintain, as a normal part of national activity, the level of defence effort required, but also prove to our own and other people that our civilization and our way of life are worthy of this effort.

The achievement of military and social strength, of short-term and long-term objectives, is now a main feature of the policy of every free state. To secure these objectives there must be mutual understanding and confidence. This can be blocked by a feeling, on the one hand, that there is an unequal sharing of the burden of defence. It can be blocked by a feeling on the other hand that there is an unequal sharing of the burden of existence.

This partnership of the free world must then be founded on mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual aid. It is now backed by increasing strength. With that strength, we can defend ourselves if we have to. From it we can negotiate, if we are given a chance. From strength, used with wisdom and restraint, through negotiation, carried on with realism and sincerity, to a peace which rests on a more solid foundation than any that we have today; that is the course which the governments and peoples of the free world have set, and one which this Government in its foreign policy, and indeed which this Parliament and this people of Canada, will do their best to follow.

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