




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

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
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A  
L E T T E R

FROM A

Member of the Opposition

TO

L O R D B-----.

---

Quoth *Hudibras*, you lie so ope  
That I, without a Telescope—  
Easily can vie,  
Where you tell Truth, and where you lie.  
HUD.

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for G. BURNET, at Bishop Burnet's-Head,  
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A

L E T T E R, &c.

My L O R D,

**Y**OU may, perhaps, be surpris'd at this public address, after so long a silence. But as I find the advocates of your party have lately rais'd their voices high against us, I think it is time to answer their charge, in the same manner they have attacked us; and as they have list'd under your banner, I know no where so proper to apply as to the head-quarters.

Were I to enter into all the *minutiæ* of your adm——n, and the measures you have pursued, which has given rise to the present opposition, I should swell this letter into a volume; and must therefore leave them to your future biographer, who, in giving your character at length, will necessarily blazon our glory; to dwell upon such facts as have  
B  
been



been so strikingly obvious, and so manifestly prejudicial to the nation, that every eye has been witness to their effects, and every tongue has re-echoed the disapprobation of.

We are charged with *personal disgust and national antipathy*, as the principal foundations whereon we have raised the fabric of our opposition—that it is not particular measures, but particular men, that we dislike—and that we have a good employment more at heart than a good peace.

Had we not concurred with you in all your measures in the beginning of your adm——n, without testifying the least disapprobation, either to your person, or your country—had we not applauded every expedient that was devised, and partook of their success—and had not *most of us* resigned our employments at a time, when no others were vacant that *we could reasonably expect* would fall to our share; such accusations might bear at least the semblance of probability: But these are facts so notoriously known, that they only require being mentioned, to be incontestably proved, and evince the falsity of our enemies insinuations.

The object of Mr. P—'s resignation was so manifest to all the world, that it is amazing any writers, however servily disposed to vilify, could ever attribute it to any other cause, than the disapprobation of the measure he so earnestly

earnestly recommended, and which he so *evidently proved*, to be the only expedient, for giving a greater lustre to our arms, and more permanent security to our constitution, in church and state—I mean a declaration of war against Spain in October 1761. This was rejected—he foresaw all the dishonour and misfortunes that would necessarily accrue from this inattention. Notwithstanding the proposal was approved the ensuing month, notwithstanding his ——— rewarded him with a handsome pension for his past services, and a title for those of his wife —He foresaw the loss of Newfoundland, and the present (What shall I call it?) peace; and would therefore no longer have the guidance of that adm——n, whose lustre might have been tarnished by such inglorious events.

When I say Mr. P—— foresaw the loss of Newfoundland, I do not mean *that he wished it*, to give a colour to planning an opposition, which till then there was little or no pretext for (save the non-declaration of war against Spain in October instead of November). Far be that from *me*, or any of us, who form the present antiministerial party; I only mean, that there being no other fortifications raised during the whole war, and to the end of his resplendent adm——n, or any more men of war kept upon that station, during that pe-

riod, than at the time of its being *surrendered* to the French, he had reason to be apprehensive of its dismemberment from the first commencement of hostilities—and he had also reason to think himself very lucky the event did not happen whilst he was at the head of affairs; not that it could have been imputed as any crime to so popular a m——r, for the nation to have sustained one loss (even though we had never regained it) after such signalised and repeated successes: but his glory might hereby have been diminished, and the people might have perceived, or imagined they perceived, infallibility was not the lot of any man, and the *Patriot* could not always *conquer*.

It is true, the retaking of this island, in some measure, wiped off the slur of negligence and inattention which you, my Lord, so greatly merited, in not having more *seasonably* provided for the defence of that valuable possession, at a time you *ought* to have been acquainted with the designs of the French thereupon, though four frigates only might have taken it. And it is to this insight of all the operations of the French navy, which we were so minutely acquainted with during Mr. P——'s administration, that we may attribute his *intentional remissness*, (or, in other words, *national aconomy*) in not fortifying and securing that island; being certain that

no ships could be destined against it, though they might accidentally escape out of Brest, whilst our fleet in the Bay so compleatly blocked up the French navy.

But when any the least merit is imputed to the retaking of Newfoundland, it should be remembered, that no person in England could participate of it, as there was no plan laid here for such an attempt. The Americans atchieved it, and therefore engross all the honour. Upon the same principles, the then m——y were, in every sensible man's eye, exculpated from the shame attending the surrender of Minorca and Braddock's defeat. Blakeney never received any orders to capitulate, nor in all likelihood would, if he had held out six months longer; nor did the American commander follow his instructions from home. So that there is scarce any prince or minister in Europe, except the King of Prussia, that is answerable for their generals conduct, as circumstances must necessarily vary the execution of the plan of operations, however well laid; and scope must be left for the judgment of a commander upon the spot. The King of Prussia being most frequently with the active part of his army, is an exception to this; and to the want of this allowance to the Imperial generals, whose instructions must be tenaciously followed, we may impute many of their defeats;

feats; as they are obliged to send to Vienna for fresh orders upon every the least alteration of affairs, and to wait for the return of the courier, though they may in the mean time have the finest opportunity of charging the enemy to advantage. This they have as frequently lost, and with it a battle, instead of gaining a victory.

If it should be asked, as the m——y derive no merit, then, from the recovery of this island, how were they blameable for its loss? The answer is ready, because they should have secured it from any attempts of the enemy; or, if they left it in the same defenceless state they found it, without its being attacked for six years; because they did not procure intelligence of the destination of every frigate that sailed from France, or any of the islands belonging to that crown, and because *individuals* suffered by its being a short time in the hands of the French, and individuals have a right to complain; and no man has ever yet thought himself *unauthorised* to abuse a m——, or condemn a measure, that did not chime in with his particular interest.

Though the m——y derived no *personal* merit from the retaking of Newfoundland, and suffered greatly in their reputation by its loss; yet the slur thrown upon them was in some measure wiped off by this recovery,  
—with

—with what reason I will not pretend to determine. No sooner was that island in the hands of the enemy, and the report of a peace being upon the carpet, but the *policy* of the m——r was seen through, in yielding up Newfoundland to the French, that they might restore it to us as an apparent equivalent for Cape Breton, or perhaps Canada. This your Lordship was publickly accused of. You alone know the sincerity of your intentions; and if you have derived no merit from our being so early repossessed of it, you have at least thereby cast off this imputation. But as we are to look upon the recovery as an accidental stroke, *planned without your knowledge, and atchieved without your desire*; so the impartial world cannot perceive any other honour you derive from it, but that of having it put out of your power to play this political humbug with the court of Versailles.

Thus, my Lord, you see, that, on whatever side we view the loss of Newfoundland, all the blame, all the negligence, all the dishonour, will rest upon your Lordship, without any part of it falling upon Mr. P—, or any of his coadjutors.

This, then, was certainly one of the principal causes of our resigning our employments; for though we were convinced of your Tory principles, and your being a Scotchman, we had nevertheless till now

united

united with you, acted in concert in the same adm——n, and believed you an honest man. As you never pretended to support *indefeasible hereditary right*, gave the least glance of bringing in the pretender, but seemed the most strenuous of any courtier for the Protestant cause, and the house of Hanover, we had no room to think you a Jacobite. You entertained no high notions of arbitrary power; but justly considered our constitution composed of the three states, King, Lords, and Commons, without whose concurrent aid no law could be framed, no supplies could be granted. The liberties of the people you seemed to have a just and valuable sense of, and at the same time considered it necessary to support the legal prerogative of the crown. These, which we found the prevalent principles of the modern Tories, we could discover no impropriety in; and, though we professed ourselves Whigs, we thought a coalition of parties under these circumstances was no way incompatible. If it should be asked, as we made part of the Tory adm——n for a time, were we not become Tories? No; we had blended the parties in so nice and curious a manner, that it was difficult to discover where the *Whig ended*, or where the *Tory began*. But we were nevertheless Whigs—staunch Whigs—which we now approve ourselves, in opposing every step of the Tory adm——n

adm——n which is not thus *properly leavened*.

Should this carry the face of any seeming contradiction, let it be remembered, that parties are only names; that a man's actions constitute him a good or a bad man—As long as the first characterise him, he is to be esteemed and associated with, let his political principles go by whatever title they may; but if the latter should distinguish him, it is not his being called a *Whig* that will recommend him to the honest part of mankind. Bolingbroke was by turns both *Whig* and *Tory*, and he was equally despised by both—More recent examples might be produced. But to the point.

I say, my Lord, as your political principles so nearly chimed in with our's, we thought it no blot in our escutcheon, to make part of a *Tory adm——n*, though we professed ourselves *Whigs*, as long as the measures you pursued were suited to those professions, and tended to the good of your country; but when we found you even negligent in one part of the world to the defence of our valuable possessions, and even attentive in another to terms of pacification, which we could not expect (in the beginning of a Spanish war) could yet be very honourable for us—we thought it was time to take ourselves out of the *Tory adm——n*, and profess ourselves *Whigs*.



*Venal and corrupt administrations*, are so much the phraseology of disappointed ambition, that though I could prove that of your Lordship's both the one and the other, I should be loth to attempt the task, lest it should be suspected I gave up my share in it, because my authority was limited, or my rapacity circumscribed; as it might be shrewdly suspected that my extent of power being called in question, or the war being nearly at an end, whereby the pecuniary profits of my office would be greatly lessened, I was disgusted with the infraction, or thought myself qualified for other departments of more future value and importance. No, my Lord, far from this; I will give you all your due; avarice is the least of your vices: to evince this, we need recur only to that part of your adm——n, when you filled the post of S——y of St—e, and so beneficently diminished your own revenue to increase that of your clerks to double their salary. Your ample fortune certainly sets you above any mean artifices to amass riches; and if you cannot *live upon an egg a day*, as a great orator declared in an honourable house, *he could*, in order to prove his patriotism, and the small influence pecuniary advantages could have upon him; you certainly may have as much reason to despise money, and have the good of your country

at heart, as your own private stake is to the full as great as his.

You see, my Lord, I make you all the allowances that can reasonably be expected from an adversary. I exculpate you from avarice, and want of generosity; nor do I directly tax you with *venality* and *corruption*; but that part of your *political principles* so immediately connected with the great rule of your adm——n, now become so glaring, is what can never be reconciled with sound Whiggism, is what can never be approved by true Englishmen, and the real *lovers* of their country. What I mean, my Lord, is, that *unbounded prerogative* you allow your Sov——n, to appoint his own officers, and continue them in post as long as suits his pleasure: this the Whigs have strenuously and effectually opposed ever since the house of Hanover came to the throne, down to the present time. It is impossible for a Prince to acquaint himself with the passions, dispositions, and abilities of individuals, who always appear in mask before the throne, so as to chuse those who are the properest qualified for filling posts of consequence; and with regard to inferior employs, it is still more impracticable: so that it is properly the province of a sagacious m——r, or his coadjutors, to select suitable objects, make their ap-  
 C 2 pointments,

pointments, and regulate their posts. No man was ever better qualified for this province than Sir Robert W——e, who never let his master have the least trouble upon his hands in these respects : but having people of integrity and capacity always ready, he filled up every place as it became vacant with the utmost ease, dispatch, and propriety. Hence that good order and harmony which subsisted during the greatest part of his adm——n ; hence that expedition in business of a public and *private* nature ; hence that national œconomy upon every occasion — that good understanding at home and abroad, but particularly the latter so clearly manifested upon the most important occasions—elections ! and hence that unusual acquiescence to every measure proposed by the m——r, and secured by a maj——ty !

These were some of the many advantages derived to the nation from the limitation of prerogative by the Whigs. His successor Mr. P——, who followed the footsteps of Sir Robert in every thing that tended to the public good, was equally assiduous in taking off all trouble and care from his master in these appointments and nominations ; and had not his death (which every honest Whig may lament) that has since occasioned so many changes and innovations, unluckily happened, we might still have seen things  
 — conducted

conducted in this happy course. It must, however, be acknowledged, that, even in his days, there were envious courtiers, who would sometimes tingle in the ears of their master, that he submitted himself entirely to the government of his m——r ; and that his late M——y once went so far as to promise the Duke of R—— a small post for a person he had recommended ; the vacancy was however filled up by Mr. P—— in favour of his *able* friend. The Duke took an opportunity of reminding his M——y of his promise, who frankly acknowledged, *That King G—— had promised it to his Grace, but that King P——m had given it to another.*

From this time his M——y never attempted to nominate for any employment, and P——m, with his confederates, were secure of every post of honour or profit, from Lord Ch——r down to the lowest branch of the Excise-Office. This despotism, it is true, they carried with somewhat too high a hand ; and it were to be wished, for the honour of the Whigs, that the *general resignation in one day*, when the late rebellion was at its crisis, did not find a place in the annals of our times. Had they not before so manifestly proved their attachment to the h——e of H——, their enemies might have given some groundless insinuations not highly favourable of their  
zeal

zeal to the Protestant cause, and the present happy establishment.

All the happy effects of this limitation of prerogative are at an end—Your master appoints his own servants, and you have lately instilled such notions of power in him, that he thinks he has a right to keep you at his elbow, in despite of all the representations that have been made against you, in despite of all the hideous characters that have been drawn of you, in writing and prints, in despite of all insinuations to your disadvantage, with regard to your intimacy with the——, —in despite of the Whigs—in despite of the opposition.

This, my Lord, is one of those alarming circumstances, that has raised so many enemies to your adm——n : had there not been a new bridge erected over the Tweed, or had not you yourself been born in Scotland, I very much question whether you could have escaped censure from the Whigs, as soon as the fundamental principles which lay for some time dormant, was so compleatly manifested.

At so critical a period, was it not the highest pitch of imprudence in your Lordship to set on foot a negotiation between us and France, for bringing about a peace? Was it not flying in the face of the *opposition*, to publish the preliminaries at the beginning of  
the

the session, before the supplies for the ensuing year were granted? Could you expect them to be silently read, without being canvassed or criticised? Had we not the negotiation of the preceding year before us, with which we might compare, and at all events draw conclusions in favour of the terms offered in 1761, though then rejected? Had we not the *ultimatum* and the *uti possidetis* to recur to, whereby we might prove that a peace would have been more eligible last year than now? However far advanced the negotiation might have been, it was the highest pitch of rashness to divulge the secret till the close of the session, when all the business was over: the members had then retired to their sylvan pastimes, and would have forgot the terms of pacification by that time they met again. The curiosity of the people would have subsided; the worst peace that could have been made, would have been but a nine days wonder; the supplies for the current year would have been abundantly granted, and every thing would have been conducted without debate or animosity.

But, as you have risked the publication of the sums at this period, every body, in and out of doors, will canvas them; every body will condemn them. Though the primary object of the war, that is, ascertaining  
the

the limits of our North American Colonies; and securing them from future incursions, is more than compassed, by our retaining all Canada, and that part of Louisiana, extending from the Apalachean mountains to the river Mississippi: though we have also acquired and retained Cape Breton, the Dunkirk of America, and key to the Gulph of St. Laurence; though we have divided the neutral islands in our favour, and gained Granada and the Grenadillas therewith; — added Florida, as a barrier to our continental possessions in America, have gained the liberty of cutting logwood without interruption at Honduras and Campeachy, and possess that valuable acquisition of the island of Senegal, and therewith the trade of the whole river of the same name in Africa: no body can dispute that we have made concession, greatly inglorious, highly dishonourable: it is in vain to urge with your partisans, it is the best peace England ever made, and call upon the negotiation of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to compare the terms of the definitive treaty of 1748 with those of 1762. Our affairs were then very differently situated from what they are at present; and though we had then made ourselves masters of Cape Breton, it was our only conquest: it is true we gave it up, and sent hostages to bind the bargain; but what was the restitution of a single

single place, compared to that of the valuable islands of Martinico and Guadalupe? As to the noble Lords who went as sureties for the execution of that article, they were treated with the greatest respect at Versailles, and not thrown into the Bastile, as the scandalous prints of those times suggested.

The advocates for the preliminaries lay great stress upon our being repaid the charge we have been at in supporting the French prisoners during the war, as an object that was not in the least attended to in the former negotiation; and they take for granted, the court of Versailles gives up all claim to the captures made before the declaration of war, because no mention is made of them in the preliminary articles, though Mr. Buffy so strongly insisted upon this point in 1761.

We have been repeatedly assured from various hands, that the preliminaries made public do not contain all the terms that were signed at Fontainbleau the 3d of November, and since ratified; but that there are several other articles kept secret, some of which have, however, transpired in the political world, and amongst these is the provision of indemnification we are to make the French for the above-mentioned captures. Some insinuate, that the other secret articles regard the dispositions that are to take place in favour of the King of Prussia and the Queen  
D of



of Hungary in Germany; but the more sanguine anti-pacific-investigators insist upon it, that they relate to other restitutions, or cessions that we are to make to France and Spain, and which you, my Lord, did not dare publickly avow.

If this is the case, you have made a fine piece of work of it indeed; and as sooner or later the nature and tendency of those secret articles will come out, what do you imagine will then be the consequence?— There is but one argument that leads me to think these suggestions may be premature, and that is, if your Lordship had intended to have dealt thus underhandedly with the people, it certainly would have occurred to you, that there was no reason for publishing the restitution of Martinico and Guadalupe, or indeed any part of the preliminaries; at least till the close of the sessions, when the supplies being granted, as in full time of war, if this indemnification for the French captures made before the declaration of war had been to take place, you might easily have drawn it out of the surplus of the grants for 1763, without the least noise being made about it.

To support the argument, then, we will suppose that no other restitutions or cessions are to take place, but those mentioned in the public preliminaries; are they not sufficient

to stigmatise this nation for ever as thick-  
 sculled negotiators? Do they not corroborate  
 what we have been so often rallied upon,  
 that, let us gain ever so many victories over  
 the French in the field, they always conquer  
 us in the cabinet? Not but I think we re-  
 tain land and islands enough in America; for  
 I see no likelihood of our settling all Canada,  
 and that tract of land between our back set-  
 tlements and the Mississipi, or indeed of what  
 service it would be, without we had a mind  
 to make our colonies rival the mother-coun-  
 try in power and riches, which many pa-  
 triots and politicians have long been appre-  
 hensive of, before we were in possession of  
 such a great extent of territory. Were land  
 the only object of war and conquest, we need  
 not go so far as America; we have some hun-  
 dred miles of good soil in Scotland, Wales,  
 and Ireland, which remain uncultivated, for  
 no other reason, that I could ever find, except it  
 were the want of hands, or a proper spirit of  
 industry being excited amongst the people.  
 Either of these causes will occasion our new  
 acquisitions in North America remaining a  
 desert. And as to islands in America, if we  
 had been in want of them, I apprehend the  
 Bahamas, so numerous, and, I doubt not,  
 fruitful, if properly cultivated, would not  
 have remained so long in our possession, with-

out being settled, or made any use of, by the English.

Hence, my Lord, it will appear the restitutions we have made do not so much affect our interest as our honour. It would have been glorious for us to have made a peace upon the basis of an *uti possidetis*. It would have deterred the French from ever insulting us again, and kept all the powers of Europe in awe, lest they should have incurred our displeasure, and sustained such losses as they would have had no hopes of regaining.

The writers who attempt to support the measures you have pursued, pretend the greatest regard has been paid, in framing the preliminaries in question, to the trade and commerce of Great Britain; that new branches are hereby struck out in every quarter of the globe, and new channels opened to the remotest, and as yet unknown parts of America. This they attempt to exemplify in our acquisition of Canada, which they assure secures us all the fur and beaver trade of that quarter of the world, and enables us to fabricate various branches of manufactures wherein they enter, at a much cheaper rate than we could before, whereby we shall not only rival all the other commercial powers of Europe in the peltry trade of North America alone, but also in all those other manufactures whereof they make a part, by being enabled  
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to undersell them at foreign markets. They then endeavour to point out the immediate advantages resulting from our being in possession of the island of Senegal, which gives us the command of the trade of the whole river of that name, and the country adjacent, and pretend we shall save near half a million yearly in the single article of gum, which we used to pay to foreigners, besides the negroe, tooth and gold-dust trades, which are carried on from thence. They then stretch away to the continent of South America, and talk loudly of the benefits which will accrue to us from the unlimited permission we have obtained of cutting logwood at Campeachy and Honduras; a privilege we could never before obtain in all our treaties with the court of Madrid. Nay, they would go as far as Asia, and have the confidence to tell us the advantages we have gained there, and still retain, will enable us to rival all the East India companies of Europe, as we have so compleatly secured the Nabohs interest and good opinion; [have destroyed the trade of the French there some years, notwithstanding the restitutions made them, and as the Dutch are there upon the decline. In answer to this, it will be only necessary to observe, that our present trade to Canada is so far from being of that importance it is represented, that those who  
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have dealt in the peltry of that country, since we have been possessed of it, have been losers, by reason of the full resolution taken by the Hudson-bay company, to undersell individuals in every article they deal in ; so that till some regulation is made upon this head, this trade is not likely to produce the promised happy effects.

As to our trade to Senegal, it certainly is a very advantageous and lucrative one, and will necessarily lower the price of printed cotton and linens, as so great a quantity of the gum coming from thence is used in those manufactures, and as this can now be bought at so small a proportionate price to what we used formerly to pay foreigners. But as a monopoly of this trade has been *promised* to a certain considerable dealer, we cannot reasonably expect he will have the good of his country so much at heart, as to preponderate against his private interest, and prevail upon him to sell this commodity at its present low price.

The privilege of cutting and shipping logwood at Honduras and Campeachy, without annoyance or interruption, is certainly an object of some consequence to the West Indian traders ; but as the point so much contended for under Sir Robert's adm——n, (which to be sure he could not obtain, any more than the privilege now granted) of *no search*, is not

not acquiesced to, we imagine this trade will not be productive of those great emoluments which were at first expected from it, as it is well known, it is the interloping trade of negroes to the Spanish main, which are paid for in hard dollars, that makes this trade so lucrative and desirous. As the Spaniards are perfectly acquainted with this circumstance attending the logwood trade, it is not to be expected they will ever give us a public grant of a thing so detrimental to them.—But the object still remains.

I must acknowledge, I believe our East India company is at this time the most opulent and best established of any in Asia, and that the reduction of Pondicherry, and the other French settlements there, must greatly interrupt their trade for some considerable time: but as it has long since been a moot point, whether our East India trade, as it is now carried on, though of infinite profit to individuals, is of any real service to the nation; so, till this is decided, it will be impossible for me to perceive the advantages we can reap, as a people, from our successes, and the present thriving state of our affairs in Asia.

Thus, my Lord, you see the pretended emoluments we are to expect from the acquisitions and restitutions we make by the peace, however pompous an appearance they  
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may parade upon paper by the writers of your party, lose the very semblance of advantages, when put to a close and impartial examen.

It is evident, *from what I have said*, that we have more lands in our possession than we shall people and cultivate, unless, with our usual friendship and politeness, we provide for the Germans better than their own princes and masters will, and make an emigration of some thousand more Palatines to America, in furnishing them with all the necessaries both for their voyage, and future settlement. This would be but common gratitude in us, as we have conquered *America* in *Germany*, to enable the conquerors to retain their acquisitions; and who so proper as a colony of *Brandenburghers*, who have so eminently distinguished themselves as soldiers and Protestants this war? This would be a measure highly eligible, if there were not reason to fear some *future* ambitious king of Prussia might discover a prior right than us, or the French, or the natives, to those lands, and support his claim by the loyalty of his subjects upon the spot.

Our trade to Canada, so far from being a benefit to the nation, appears evidently a loss to individuals, and must continue so, as long as the Hudson's Bay company are permitted to monopolise at one time, and undersell at another,

another (for sinister reasons) the fair and open trader, who, without combination, cannot long carry on a losing traffic.

The commerce to the island of Senegal is of little or no consequence, as gum, which is its principal commodity, can be an article of no great import, without it be to the linnen manufactures.

The privilege granted for cutting and carrying away logwood at Honduras will only prove an encouragement to a parcel of infamous freebooters settled there, who living a most abandoned and profligate life, are a scandal to the people from whom they are an outcast.

And as to the advantages the East India company will reap from the peace, and the present flourishing state of their affairs in Asia, as that is a most destructive monopoly, draining us of our silver, both specie and bullion, for unwholesome herbs and crockery ware, so the more thriving and extensive their trade is, the more pernicious it must prove to the nation.

After this, my Lord, I think your most zealous advocates for the advantages we gain by the preliminaries, must be forced to avow them merely chimerical; whilst the dishonour we sustain by making the important restitutions is and ever will be indelible. Perhaps, my Lord, some of your partisans may ask, how came it that so many of the resignees still condescend-



ed to remain in post after the preliminaries were signed, and even ratified? They could not be ignorant of their contents, or the supposed dishonour that is thereby cast upon the nation: why then did they not throw up their places upon their first appearance? Can Mr. T—, who was so strenuous in recommending and defending the preliminaries the day they were canvassed in the H—e of C—s, be convinced of the disingenuity of his reasoning, or the fallacy of his own arguments? Or, are his eyes opened all of a sudden by inspiration, which has enabled him to discover the shamefulnes and ignominy of the terms? These questions may be very easily answered. Mr. T—, nor any other of the resignees, since the signing of the preliminaries, were *then* acquainted with the tenor and drift of the *secret articles*—whose dangerous consequences and malignant influence—no true patriot, no honest man would countenance.

I am sorry, my Lord, to make use of such harsh expressions; but I acknowledge the good of my country, which I have so greatly at heart, operating strongly upon me, in the heat of argument, an unguarded word may escape me.

Had we carried on the war with the same spirit that we have these three last years, we might in a short time have made ourselves masters of all Louisiana, without being  
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cooped up with that narrow boundary the Mississippi, possessed ourselves of all Cuba, St. Domingo and Hispaniola, and all the West Indian islands without exception: then made a descent upon Terra Firma, and become masters of all the Spanish provinces in South America. Having cut off this resource to the court of Madrid, their forces would soon have languished, and we might easily have turned the tables upon the Spaniards in favour of the Portuguese, and soon brought the first under the latter's subjection. Having accomplished this great point, in favour of his most Faithful Majesty, we might by the same means, that is, having all the trade and treasures of North and South America in our hands, have enabled the King of Prussia to defeat all the wicked designs of the Empress Queen, and his other enemies against him and the Protestant cause. Thirty million of money would purchase all the inhabitants of Germany (though by the bye we have spent forty millions this war there, and are now just where we set out) which might soon have been brought from the new world; and having furnished his Prussian Majesty with an army of 800,000 effective men, he would soon have been in a condition to dethrone her Imperial Majesty, and we should have had the satisfaction to see a Protestant Emperor of our own election. This great

stroke being effected in favour of the liberties of Europe, we should then have had nothing to do but to attack the Grand Signior, dethrone him, and place a Protestant Prince upon the Ottoman throne. We then might have carried our successful arms farther East, and in a short time have made ourselves complete masters of Asia — and then — what then? Why, like Alexander, we should have mourned we had not more worlds to conquer.

However romantic this may at first appear, it must have been the necessary and inevitable consequence of having pushed the war with vigour, and not submitted to the present inglorious terms of pacification. I know but two arguments that can with any face be opposed to this. The first is, that, before we had entirely accomplished this great plan of operations, our national debt might have been so immensely increased, that we could not have been able any way to pay the aggregate interest, and the nation must have become absolutely a bankrupt. The second is, that had we succeeded to the utmost of our wishes, and gained every one of these dominions, we could neither have defended, or expected to have remained in quiet possession of them, since we must have excited the jealousy of all Europe, and even our own created Protestant Emperor.

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In answer to these opposed arguments,

I believe it is a received maxim in politics, that no people, or set of people, either natives or foreigners, whose interest it is to support a government, will ever (as long as such their interest remains) either directly or indirectly undermine it. This being a settled axiom, that even *Machiavel* could not contradict, it must necessarily follow, that the greater number we interest in the fate of the nation, so many more we establish friends to the state. Now, as we have already gained the cordiality, *in this respect*, of about one million three hundred and sixty thousand individuals (at a hundred pounds a head) foreigners and natives, by the national debt; if we could increase it to three times the sum of 136,000,000 l. which it now amounts to, we should make sure of the greatest, that is, the richest part of Europe, as our attached and certain friends; which might easily be done by pursuing the war for *only* twenty years,—a belligerant period of no great extent, considering the forty years war we often read of in the annals of *Brandenburg*. With respect to the interest of the national debt, if that should amount to more than we could conveniently pay in specie, which it might easily do upon these principles,

ples, considering we are only reckoned to have about twelve millions in all Great Britain; it would be necessary to create a sufficient number of additional *Bank bills*, and other paper currency, which fully answer the intent of specie, are more portable to individuals, and less burthensome to the state. And, if it should ever be though expedient to pay off the *national debt*, not with a sponge, we have always projectors in such numbers to assist us, that the thing might be done *by calculation* in a fortnight. *Henriques* will throw as many figures upon paper, as will fill a sheet in an instant, and in another divide them into so many parts, that there will scarce be left a shilling in the pound—and *Massy's* sliding rule will multiply them into farthings, before we know whether they are pounds, shillings or pence.—Such geniuses are useful to a state; I wonder they do not meet with greater encouragement.

As to the second objection, when once we had made ourselves masters of all America, Asia, and I might throw in Africa, with the connexions and possessions we should then have in Europe; we certainly should be a match for all the Princes of Europe leagued together, and, in despite of all jealousy and envy at our success, they would find it their true interest to keep in with us, lest we should serve them just as we had served the  
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other three parts of the world: so that France, Spain, Ruffia, and even the Protestant Emperor himself, notwithstanding his craving and enterprizing spirit, would be glad to court our friendship, if not pay us tribute. The difficulty of peopling and defending these vast possessions, I acknowledge is not so easily got over—but as we might embody the militia of Africa, and march the trained-bands of Asia, if necessity should require, by incorporating a few of our regulars with, and establishing a proper discipline in those quarters, this obstacle would not be insurmountable; especially as our continental friends, ever ready at emigration, would flock thither in shoals upon the least encouragement. The Germans would certainly be glad of any other country, since they will not defend their own, without being paid for it by foreigners, who have no interest in their protection.

Our missing of these great and extensive conquests may, my Lord, be looked upon amongst the most striking disadvantages of patching up this rash and precipitate peace. It is true, they cannot be considered as more than negative disadvantages, whilst the benign influence and blessings of tranquillity are sure and permanent—nourishing our manufactures, cherishing our trade, and circulating our riches to every corner of the island,

island; but then, how far greater would have been this circulation; how much more extensive would have been our exports! and how still more flourishing would have been our commerce to every quarter of the globe.

It were needless to labour at any argument to evince this; common sense must at the first glance prove it to every man's understanding; and if the members of the opposition should be hard driven to assign a reason for their resignations and attack upon your Lordship's adm——n, they may always have recourse to this invincible and solid argument, the *negative loss* of all Asia, Africa, South America, and the remainder of the West Indian islands.

I believe, my Lord, you will labour under no small difficulty, when called upon, as *doubleless you will be, by public* inquiry into your adm——n, to vindicate this part of your conduct; not to mention such other points of *malversation* as I have already cited. In this dilemma, I think the most friendly advice that can be given you, would be to retire from power and employment, into the most sequestered part of Scotland, and there, by a recluse and penitent life, make all the atonement in your power for the manifold sins and crimes you have been guilty of towards G—d, your S—n, and the Nation.

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This might carry the air of envy, and a desire to supplant you in some important post, had I not already so clearly set forth the causes of our disgust, and the full resolution of every man of us not to *submit* to let ourselves be appointed to any place, however important, however lucrative. The present opposition avows the same principles, and acts upon the same generous and national plan of all the great oppositions since the revolution, who having nothing but the real good of their country at heart, could never be biassed by personal interest, deluded by profits; or seduced by titles; it would therefore be fruitless to attempt silencing us by a ribbon or a place—we soar above such mean influence.

It is publicly reported, that your Lordship intends to use your interest to take off the late additional tax upon porter, so burthensome to the poorer sort of people, particularly labourers, to whom it is both food and nourishment, in order to lay it upon some article that is not so immediately connected with the necessaries of the working part of the nation. Indeed it is said that your Lordship strenuously opposed this tax at the time of its being laid on, representing the hardship it would be to the mechanical world, and was inclined to produce the sum required by an additional impost upon rum and melasses, articles of luxury and superfluity; but that

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for some private consideration, this was rejected. Doubtless, this popular measure, your Lordship has been excited to, in order, if possible, to wean the publick from that prejudice and disgust they have to you and your adm——n : but can it be believed that the people of England will ever approve the conduct of a *Scotchman*, when even his fellow countrymen, and those of some rank in the state, unite against him, not through any personal pique, private resentment, disappointed ambition, or in the expectation of *opposing* themselves into power or office ; but merely and sincerely for the good of their country, which they have so tenaciously at heart, and to frustrate such dangerous and destructive measures as your Lordship has lately pursued, and I have taken upon myself thus to expose in vindicating the conduct of the members of the present *glorious Opposition*.

If this should any way look like an acknowledgment, that it were possible for a *Scotchman* to be honest and patriotic, and such a concession were to be made in favour of the four Scotch Members of the opposition ; it would be necessary to observe at the same time, they are the only exception to the general opinion so universally and justly entertained of that nation.

It were almost unnecessary at this time to remind your Lordship, of what has been so often

often and loudly complained of by every Englishman and Hibernian, who has been disappointed of promotion during this war : I mean the striking partiality in favour of the Scotch. This object alone, one would have imagined, should have prompted you to have pursued the war at all events, till such time as you had amply and compleatly provided for all your friends, on the other side of the Tweed. I say, my Lord, from this consideration, one would have imagined, a French and Spanish war would have been the most eligible measure for the security and support of your adm——n, though additional supplies had been ever so difficult to raise, and though honourable terms of accommodation had been offered on the part of the belligerent powers. It is true *even then*, you never would have been able to gain over the four Scotch members of the opposition, but perhaps some indirect method might have been found to have softened their resentment, by providing for some of their friends and relations in the army and navy. This may indeed, my Lord, be looked upon as a great oversight in your politics, at a time you should have taken every possible step to insure your tottering power, especially amongst your fellow countrymen, whose opposition must convey a very unfavourable idea of your conduct and designs. Such mistaken policy was a sure pre-

sage of the blunders and inattention to our proper interest which we were to expect at the hands of such a statesman in the framing of a peace.

As this *grievous* complaint is now in a great measure at an *end*, by reason of the pacific measures that are taking place: so we are rather led to consider the consequences of your not more amply pursuing it, than to manifest our resentment at your former partiality; a partiality so great, that we have always seen Scotch troops employed upon the most arduous and dangerous enterprizes, whereby you furnished them with an opportunity of signaling their courage and vigilance in so striking a manner, as to give colour to many promotions, which looked like a recompence for their past services. By these glorious occasions, you enabled them to risque their lives in pursuit of honour and preferment, which many English and Irish officers, for want of these *favourable* opportunities, could not gain.

As this channel of national partiality is now stopped, we must expect to see it stream in other courses: all Canada, will perhaps, be settled by Scotchmen, especially if the English should not chuse to flock there in numbers sufficient to people and cultivate so cold and extensive a country: we may expect to see half a dozen more new bridges erected

erected over the Tweed—All foreign snuffs prohibited, and nothing but Scotch allowed to be taken, even at court; nor need we be surpris'd if her ——— should appear the next birth-day, in plaid colour silk, to make it a reigning fashion; or that a jaunt to Edinburgh should be as common as one to Kew. One of the writers on our side of the question, has indeed, suggested, that if things went on so swimmingly for a few years in favour of Scotland, we might expect to see a Royal Palace built there for the fixed residence of the court; but this I cannot persuade myself, will take place any time these ten years, considering the preparations that must be previously made.

The writer of the North Briton, our favourite author, has so *amply* and *decently* evinc'd the political tenets of the present Tories (in one of his late disquisitions \*) that it is matter of wonder and astonishment to me, how they will ever be able to answer him, or henceforward hold up their heads. He has clearly proved, that they would certainly have joined the rebels, both in 1715 and 1745, if their courage had been equal to their affection for the Pretender. Another reason might, I think, with due submission to that learned writer, be assign'd, is, that their regimentals were not ready in time, by reason of the number of  
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\* Saturday, January 8.

journeymen taylors then employed in bearing arms. They would, nevertheless, certainly have marched to join the rebels in 1745, if their arms and ammunition had not been so opportunely seized in Lincoln's-Inn-Fields Playhouse. It is, however, a happy consideration, that they have not courage sufficient to support their evil designs in the field; as, however deep their political machinations may be, however notorious their principles and attachments, and however numerous their body, their *poltroonery* will always keep them in due subjection.

There is one circumstance, which the North Briton has in this Portrait of the modern Tories, so nicely touched upon, that nothing but the pencil of so great a master, could so judiciously have hit off; I mean the entire reformation of the political principles of the Tories, during Mr. P—'s adm——n. He does not, indeed, assign any reason for this *extraordinary temporary* change, which clearly evinces the Tories are attached to *men* and not *measures*.

I may, indeed, be asked, since this writer has so amply proved all the Tories rank Jacobites, and every one of them desirous of bringing in the Pretender; how came it that knowing by experience, and convinced of their principles, we ever united with them in the same adm——n, in the pursuit of the same  
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objects, in support of the same Prince? In answer to this, let it be remembered, that it is not individuals but expedients we oppose. In one word, we chimed in with the *Tories* till the loss of *Newfoundland* (which so greatly flurred the reputation of the Scotch M—r) till their avowed arbitrary tenets, which I have already mentioned, became manifest, and the present inglorious peace took place.

I have not in this place insisted upon the negative disadvantages we sustain by a suspension of arms in the four quarters of the world, or the imputation of ingratitude we shall lay under by all Europe, for having brought the King of Prussia into this war, and left him in the lurch—without attending to those glorious motives—the support of protestantism in the empire, and the ballance of power, in pursuit of which we have so zealously raised our national debt to 136 millions. By this one step we have given up all future pretence to determine the quarrels of the princes of Germany, a privilege we have never yielded to any other power since the revolution.—This claim, which we have supported for almost a century at the price of so much blood, and treasure; which we have hitherto considered as much our birth-right as the sovereignty of the sea, we have thus ingloriously yielded, thus pusillanimously given up.

If after this, my Lord, you should not be

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convinced of the upright motives, which have influenced the present Whig opposition—of the impracticability of ever regaining their affection, or re-uniting with them--if you should not be convinced of the impropriety, disadvantage, and danger, (to say no worse) of the leading rule of your administration, in granting your S—n the full liberty of naming his own servants, and keeping them in power as long as they please—if this unconstitutional prerogative (never before allowed any prince of the house of H—r upon the British throne) should not appear to you in its most glaring and baneful light—if you should not be convinced of the dishonour of the terms of the present peace, with the *secret articles* suppressed to public eyes: in a word, if your Lordship, should not, immediately upon your reading this, insist upon resigning your employments, that more able, faithful and popular M—rs may take the reins of government into their hands; you must be callous to all conviction, blind to your own personal security, and resolved to complete the sacrifice of the nation, So that, if it were not impossible, it would be fruitless in me to urge these points any stronger; or display the contrast of your and former administrations. But, being convinced of the force of my reasoning, and the likelihood there is of your taking my advice, I subscribe myself

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