




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


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A N  
ADDRESS TO THE ARMY;

IN REPLY TO

STRICTURES,

BY

RODERICK M·KENZIE,

(LATE LIEUTENANT IN THE 71ST REGIMENT)

ON

TARLETON'S HISTORY

OF

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1780 AND 1781.

---

BY THE HON. GEORGE HANGER, X

Major to the Cavalry of the British Legion, Commanded by  
Lieut. Col. Tarleton, and Captain in the Hessian Jäger Corps.

---

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGWAY, YORK-STREET, SAINT  
JAMES'S-SQUARE.

MDCCLXXXIX.

*Afterwards Lord Coleraine*

ADDRESS TO THE ARMY

BY

STATIONER

BY

ROBERT M. KENNEDY

(LAWYER AND MEMBER OF THE BAR)

BY

TARLETON'S HISTORY

BY

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1780 AND 1781

---

BY THE HON. GEORGE HANDEY

Major to the County of the British Legion, Commanded by  
Lieut. Col. T. Hankey, and Captain in the British Legion Corps.

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L O N D O N

Printed by J. G. Smith, York Street, Strand

Printed by J. G. Smith, York Street, Strand

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**INTRODUCTION.**

**TO THE ARMY.**

**GENTLEMEN,**

**I**T is generally understood, when a dedication is not *satirically* prefixed to a book, that it has previously obtained the approbation and protection of the person to whom it is dedicated. Our *Stricturist* presents to *the* public his *profound* and *extensive* disquisitions and tactical animadversions, under the patronage of



a very splendid, senatorial, and military character; and by the aid of so respectable a sanction, would persuade his readers, that he is attacking the personal veracity, and professional fame, of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, under the auspices of so highly distinguished and judicious a patron as Lord Rawdon.—Herein the Stricturist has shewn no little sagacity. At setting out, therefore, I consider it as a duty to the public, to expose so sinister a purpose. The rank and weight of that nobleman, whose name is most judiciously chosen by the Stricturist, if used with authority, would be a just and secure passport to his production. If daringly and presumptuously usurped, will only operate to his disgrace.

In

In the latter case, the insidious artifice, instead of fostering malevolence under the wing of virtue, will effectually defeat its own intention. It will baffle the views of the dedicator; and far from affording the sanction of Lord Rawdon's name to his work, will detract from the credit that might be due to his own. I will not attempt to pass any panegyric upon Lord Rawdon; he is far above my praise; nor can his fame be affected by direct or implied detraction, or by any surreptitious use or abuse of his name. I take upon me to charge the Stricturist with this abuse.

It is not my intent or desire that the world should be informed whether Lord Rawdon does now approve

prove of the whole of his work, or of any part of it, or of no part of it; but whether it was written and published under his sanction and auspices, which I believe I may venture to deny.

In effect, the majority of the world have been induced to believe, that the *Strictures* were published under the sanction of a character equally distinguished in private life, in the senate, and in the field.

To whatever imputation however any part of these *Strictures* may be liable, it must at least be admitted, that they are uniform and consistent from one end of them to the other. One black and unvaried die, taints the whole production; one uninterrupted strain of rancour in every

every page, continually revolt the noble and generous mind. Yet the meanest person in the streets may, equal with our Stricturist, be master of abuse, although he has no better argument than his fists to justify it. The Stricturist too, in support of the gross abuse which he has substituted in the place of conclusions from reason, facts, or argument, would, I doubt not, (his abilities failing him) readily fly to his sword. But let me intreat him to spare my life; my language shall be that of a gentleman, though my arguments may embarrass both him, and the faction with whom he is united; though I may be obliged to assert and to prove that his whole production is unfair, uncandid, and unsupported by

by military knowledge; and though I may shew, that while he presumes to declare "That Tarleton's assertions are absurdities hitherto unparalleled," he opposes nothing to these *absurdities*, but vain attempts at ridicule, vainer assertions of his own, and an endless string of vague *ipse dixit's*.

I do not aim at literary fame, nor have I attempted the language of a Tarleton, or the *borrowed one* of Roderick M'Kenzie; my trifling observations result from a real affection for a man with whom I am most intimately connected, and who, by the author of the *Strictures*, has been most grossly misrepresented and aspersed. I am acquainted with his abilities, his honor his, courage,  
and

and his real zeal for the cause in which his country was engaged.

For the justice of this praise, I refer to your own sentence, when you shall have perused the Strictures, and the answer to them. For the *last*, I claim the indulgence which is due to the pen of a soldier; fairly and honestly, yet warmly, engaged in the cause of truth and friendship.

Though I blush not oftener than my neighbours, yet I trust it will be understood that I submit these remarks, with all becoming modesty, to you, Gentlemen, to whom I have the honor of addressing myself; to a tribunal who have already had opportunities of judging me; and before now have probably passed decision; to whom I would willingly

b

entrust

entrust my life, my honor, and reputation ; conscious, that although there are rancorous individuals in all professions, yet, let me be tried by the voice of the army, in any part of my conduct through life. With respect and confidence I will bow to the court, and await my sentence.

Malevolent critics and rancorous detractors of public and private honor, will most likely attack me and my production. It will not require much art, or refinement of sophistry, to torture and pervert my meaning; but such serpent-headed monsters, I despise, as much as I honor and respect you, Gentlemen, to whom I appeal. By your judgment, and yours only, shall I be affected; judge me as you would wish to be judged.

judged. A soldier addresses you in defence of an injured friend; under your banners I enlist, and seek for protection. Where I have erred, with due humility I will stand corrected. — To the literary critics I surrender my language and my syntax. Before I committed my thoughts to the press, I was well aware that I lay under the misfortune of wanting all literary excellence, or even the advantages which I might have obtained from a most liberal education.

The indulgence I expect for myself, I shall shew to the Stricturist, when he affords me occasion. Every generous and unprejudiced reader would willingly overlook many errors, and forgive inaccuracies. But



one of his fundamental pretences, is too gross to escape animadversion; surely the *Strictures* is not serious, but expresses himself ironically, when he informs us, in page 197, "That if to be disinterested, is necessary to the investigation of truth, he comes so far qualified." In a simpler period, and a less experienced age, these Caledonian professions of candour might have gained credit with a credulous public; but at this time of day, the Southern world is too enlightened to be so egregiously humbugged. Again in the same page we read, after having perused so much of his *very candid* production, "Devoid of spleen, and unconnected with Party."— He may as well attempt to make  
 one the

the world believe, that Roderick  
McKenzie is not a native of North  
Britain.

He may, perhaps, imagine that  
this is written at Tarleton's instance;  
on my honor, as an Officer and a  
Gentleman, it is not; for his pri-  
vate opinion is adverse to a reply, as  
he holds the Strictures justly be-  
neath his thoughts or attention. It  
is a voluntary act of my own, aris-  
ing solely from friendship, feeling,  
and the love of truth.

He is extremely pointed in his re-  
marks, relative to Tarleton's rapid  
rise in the army.—I beg leave to be  
permitted to pay him those compli-  
ments, which his Strictures, as a lite-  
rary production, so justly deserve;  
and at the same time to rejoice with  
him

him on the most *gigantic* improve-  
 ment his *pen* has attained in elegance  
 of language during that *very short*  
 period between the publication of his  
 Strictures, and those *elegant elegiac*  
 letters (vide *elgiac* Strictures, line 12,  
 page 135) he favoured us with, in  
 the newspapers, some few months  
 back, signed An Officer on that Ser-  
 vice. Had Tarleton rose as rapidly  
 in the army, as this gentleman's pen  
 has improved during the short pe-  
 riod of a few months—the very first  
 campaign he would have been *gene-  
 ralissimo*. It affords me infinite plea-  
 sure when I compare the style of the  
 Strictures's former productions with  
 the latter; and reflect with infinite  
 satisfaction on the rapid improve-  
 ment the human mind is capable of  
 acquiring

acquiring from intense application and study. For though I do not approve of his Strictures, they being unsupported by argument and a candid state of facts; yet the language is to be commended. And, setting aside its merit or demerits, as a military performance, it must do *him* infinite credit as a literary one, with *that* part of the world who believe *him* to be the *author*.

I wish to write in the plain and simple language of a soldier, not attempting to embellish my productions with flowery subterfuges, or sophistry, which he so often flies to, instead of stating plain facts, or supporting his contradictions by argument.

From

From my connections with gentlemen of the first literary abilities in this country, my production might have come forth in a far more conspicuous point of view, had I imitated the Stricturist, and, like him, borrowed another man's pen.

I have this most satisfactory excuse for my feebleness, that this reply is entirely my own—the correction of gross violations of syntax and daring outrages on the nominative case, and the verb, excepted.

\* From delicacy and respect for the character of Lord Rawdon, whose name I have unavoidably been forced to mention in the Introduction; I have submitted the first two pages to the judgment of some friends who have made considerable alterations in that part.

STRICTURES

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## STRICTURES, &c,

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STRICTURES, PAGE 7,

“THE perusal of the following letters  
“ will discover that our author was  
“ destitute of many qualifications essential  
“ to his undertaking.”

“ To supply these material defects, he  
“ (Colonel Tarleton) appears to substitute  
“ a professional experience, so limited, as  
“ scarcely to exceed the duration of a but-  
“ terfly's existence.”

“ Natural historians relate, that this in-  
“ sect is, in the first period of its existence,

B

“ a

“ a crawling grub ; in the second, a fluttering uselefs fly ; and in the third, it dies.”

Both these passages are low and vulgar attempts at wit and satire ; full of rancour, malevolence, and puerile abuse ; and by every generous soldier will be treated with the contempt they deserve.

STRICTURES, PAGE 8.

“ Earl Cornwallis was at the time Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton published his History, and at present, Governor General in India.”

The fact stands thus : Mr. John Tarleton, brother to the Colonel, called on me some time previous to Earl Cornwallis's departure for India, and shewed me a letter which he had received from Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, dated Aix-la-Chapelle ; in which he desired particularly that Earl

Corn-

Cornwallis might be informed that he had then begun, and intended to publish; a history of the campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Carolinas and Virginia. Mr. John Tarleton requested of me, as a favour, to wait on Earl Cornwallis, and inform his Lordship of the Colonel's resolution. I waited on Lord Lothian, knowing him to be a very intimate friend of the Noble Earl, and communicated my instructions to him. Lord Lothian requested I would write him a letter on that subject; which request I complied with. His Lordship returned me the next day an answer, informing me that he had shewed my letter to Lord Cornwallis. The copy of my letter, together with Lord Lothian's written answer, I gave to Mr. John Tarleton, who may perhaps have them now in his possession; but it surely would be of no use to publish them, when I call



on two respectable witnesses for the veracity of my assertions.

STRICTURES, PAGE 14 AND 15.

“ The author (Tarleton) reasoning on  
“ some subsequent operations of the Ameri-  
“ can army, is as unfortunate as in his pre-  
“ ceding remark. He says, page 13 and 14,  
“ the body of regular troops destined for this  
“ service, (the siege of Charlestown) could  
“ have been more usefully employed in  
“ the field ; where judicious operations, af-  
“ fisted by the resources to be found in the  
“ country, and by the approaching heat  
“ of the season, could have protected the  
“ greatest part of the fertile province of  
“ South Carolina, would have soon over-  
“ balanced the present superiority of the  
“ British forces, and would have effectually  
“ prevented the co-operation of the royal  
“ navy and army. General Washington  
adopted

“ adopted this line of action when he abandoned York Island for the Jerseys.”

To prove whether Colonel Tarleton's opinion is an absurdity hitherto unparalleled, as our Stricturist expresses himself, page 17, it shall be my endeavour to point out the real situation in which Carolina most probably would have found itself, provided the 6000 men taken in Charlestown had escaped that capture. Sir Henry Clinton well foresaw the advantages that would accrue to the General who was to be left with the command in Carolina, from not letting one single man of that numerous garrison escape ; for which purpose, as soon as possible, before he began any decisive operations against the town, he dispatched Earl Cornwallis and Colonel Webster to invest it on the other side of the Cooper River, to prevent the escape of the garrison by that quarter, whilst Admiral Arbuthnot  
effectually

effectually prevented the same by water: You, gentlemen, must recollect a considerable reinforcement being thrown into the garrison at Charlestown in sloops and schooners, by the channel of the Cooper River, leading from Monk's-corner, before we had possession of the navigation of that river, by the exertions of Captain Elphinstone, and the unwearied perseverance of the British sailors, who passed gun-boats over the neck of land which forms the peninsula.

I remember well being in company (shortly after this reinforcement had passed) with Sir Henry Clinton, who remarked on that event, "so much the better; the more are to be captured in the town, the fewer will be left to disturb the future tranquility of the province."

To discuss the point in dispute between our Stricturist and Tarleton, and to place both authors' remarks in a fair and candid light,

light, you must permit me, gentlemen, to suppose these 6000 men to have escaped capture in Charlestown; let them be supposed to have marched out of the town by the rout of Monk's-corner, before ever we had landed on Charlestown neck; or to have passed over the Cooper River before Earl Cornwallis had invested it on that side; either of these routs they might have taken, and have marched until they had placed themselves on the other side of the the Santee River. In the course of that march they would have disputed the ground advantageously at many places where we must have passed; the situation of the country would have enabled them to have harassed us at various swamps and defiles, although it might have been imprudent in them to have attempted a general action. On the other hand, Sir Henry Clinton, whose presence with a considerable part of  
the

the force was necessary at New York, must have left a greater number of troops behind him with Earl Cornwallis to oppose those 6000; the same number perhaps as were sent in the autumn following, under General Leslie.

We will suppose these 6000 men in the field, and to retreat as fast as the British advance; let me ask the Stricturist, how far he will have the British advance?—to Camden?—or if he does not think that far enough, one hundred miles further? Although I myself must confess that I would not wish to see the noble Earl over the Santee River; but place him at Camden, or any where else the Stricturist pleases. Now gentlemen, I entreat your attention:—General Gates, on the 16th of August, at the memorable action of Camden, brought 6000 men into the field; these joined to the 6000 captured in Charlestown, would

have

have made 12,000. You will say that I have exaggerated the force, as numbers would have been sick and dead of the Charlestown troops ; to which I reply, that as many, or more in proportion, of the additional reinforcement would in like manner have suffered\*.

The British that day were not 1500, including the cavalry. I will now ask any of you, gentlemen, opposed by such a numerous and powerful body of troops, what could the noble Earl have done possessed of all his gallantry and good conduct ? I hope I shall not be deemed too presumtuous when I say, he would, upon the approach of such

\* This gentleman's own regiment, the 71st, when they marched to the Cherraw Hills in June, were 700 strong, under arms ; and they did not bring above 230 men into the field of battle the 16th of August. The whole army was extremely sickly ; but this regiment more so than any other, owing chiefly to the unhealthy situation they were stationed at.

a formidable force, fall back behind the Santee; happy, if in his power, to cover the rich part of that province behind the river: a very arduous and doubtful task to perform!

STRICTURES, PAGE 16.

“ Of the political propriety of maintaining this post (Charlestown) the Americans must have been more proper judges than our author.”

Without mixing ideas of political propriety with military monœuvres, the question is simply, whether or not General Lincoln acted as an able General, in voluntarily submitting himself, with 6000 men, to be shut up and besieged in Charlestown; the result of which, in the end, must be a capitulation? He gallantly defended the town to the very last extremity; but he surely never could imagine that he would be able to prevent our taking it. I myself have too  
good

good an opinion of General Lincoln, as an officer, to imagine that he would have thus committed himself, unless he had been obliged, by instructions from the Congress, or the state of Carolina, to defend the town.

“ It cannot by any means be admitted, that *six thousand American* troops, indifferently disciplined, should, in any situation, be able to counteract the measures of a British force consisting of *ten thousand*; and to assert that a few regiments, the weak state of which is acknowledged by himself (Tarleton), would have actually prevented the co-operation of the royal army and navy, is an absurdity hitherto unparalleled.”

I must here, gentlemen, beg leave to draw your attention to three points in the above remarks:—“ *a British force consisting of ten thousand.*” In these words the Stricturist implies, that Sir Henry Clinton, whose pre-



fence with a part of the forces was absolutely necessary at New York, would have remained in Carolina, or have gone back alone, leaving behind him, to a single man, the whole army he brought with him:--an absurd and impossible supposition. In the preceding line he allows, "*the Americans to be six thousand strong* :--in the lines immediately following, he says, they were only "*a few regiments in a very weak state*;" and he closes this curious remark by saying, that Tarleton has been guilty of an absurdity hitherto unparalleled! Roderick, I recommend thee first to cast out the beam out of thine own eye, before thou attempt to take the mote out of thy brother's!

STRICTURES, PAGE 18, LINE 2 TO 15,

" The place (Fort Washington) was summoned in vain, and then attacked by General Knyphausen, Earl Percy, General Mathews,

“ Mathews, and Colonel Sterling, at the  
“ head of four separate divisions of the Bri-  
“ tish army. The assailants had near four  
“ hundred men killed and wounded ; and  
“ the fortress was not reduced until Earl  
“ Percy carried one of the out-works, by  
“ assault ; Colonel Sterling another ; and  
“ until Knyphausen, having advanced close  
“ to the parapet, was prepared to enter  
“ sword in hand.”

Our Strictures has here made a display  
of the names of Knyphausen, Percy, Ma-  
thews, Sterling, none of whom want his  
praise or comments. All he here reports is  
true ; but though honourable and great in  
the actors concerned, what has it to do  
with his reply to Colonel Tarleton ? His  
only business was to confute the words of  
Tarleton, as quoted in his Strictures, page  
7 :—“ General Washington adopted *this line*  
“ of

“ *of action*, when he abandoned New York  
“ island for the Jerseys.”

Tarleton first maintains, that the troops taken in Charlestown would have been more advantageously employed in the field ; and then cites, by way of example and precedent, the conduct of General Washington, when he previously quitted New York island for the Jerseys, a measure which contributed so much to his credit, and to our disadvantage, by *preparing the way* for the affairs of Trentown and Princetown. On this comparative censure, our Stricturist is contented with boldly asserting, that General Washington did not quit New York island for the Jerseys from motives of policy, but of necessity ;—and assertion is his only proof. He states indeed the situation in which General Washington left fort Washington, and the attack of that fortress ; and then, without advancing an argument to  
favour

favour his contradictions of Tarleton, he hastily concludes by saying, that when *these circumstances are considered*, it will appear that General Washington did not abandon New York Island for the Jerseys, from motives of policy, but from necessity.

With respect to Tarleton's specific censures of the conduct of the American General, at Charlestown, our Stricturist thinks himself as much at liberty to assert, " that Tarleton's assertions are absurdities hitherto unparalleled." With this flashing declaration he seems perfectly satisfied himself; and he has the modesty to expect that his reader will be equally satisfied with the following concluding, and most ingenious sentence:—

STRICTURES, PAGE 17.

" Whatever the faults of the American General might have been, it is obvious, " that

“ that his army, by quitting the only gar-  
“ rison, and principal port (Charlestown)  
“ in the province, and by retiring into the  
“ interior country, could not have retarded  
“ the above-mentioned co-operation: such  
“ a measure, instead of dividing, would have  
“ enabled the British to concentrate their  
“ force.”

I have already attempted, gentlemen, to lay before you some description of Carolina, and in what situation that province would have found itself, supposing the 6000 men under General Lincoln not to have been captured; but this is a topic which our Stricturist chuses to pass over with contempt.

He contents himself with asserting, that the whole British force, both navy and army, would have been *concentrated* by the move-  
ment

ment of General Lincoln's force into the country.

How such a concentration could have taken place upon the supposition that the 6000 Americans had quitted Charlestown, unless the Admiral had wheeled his ships up the country, on dry land, I must leave to the *concentrated* ingenuity of Roderick M'Kenzie, and Doctor Brown, to determine.

I return, for a moment, to the comparative consideration of the opposite measures adopted by Washington and Lincoln.

STRICTURES, PAGE 18.

“ When these circumstances are considered, it will appear, that General Washington did not abandon New York Island for the Jerseys, from motives of policy, as this author asserts, but of necessity.”

It is well known, that General Washington was not driven from New York Island

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by

by force, but that he voluntarily quitted it before Sir William Howe landed: the door was open to him to escape; so it was to General Lincoln; for the latter had full time to quit the town; but he adopted the contrary system, and, in consequence, was taken. The same fate would have befallen General Washington, had he remained twenty-four hours longer in his position near the fortress bearing his name. Sir William Howe would have landed behind him on the Continent. Few of his army could have escaped over the North River for the want of boats, and our shipping having in part possession of that river. By thus judiciously moving from New York Island, he protected the fertile country of the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, and the city of Philadelphia, which otherwise must immediately have fallen into our hands. General Lincoln, by suffering himself, with an army consisting of

6000

6000 men, to be besieged and taken in Charlestown, sacrificed the rich province of South Carolina to our will and jurisdiction.

In a word, our Strifturist condemns Tarleton for maintaining, that General Washington adopted this line of conduct when he quitted New York Island for the Jerseys ; arraigns his judgment, and contradicts him flatly ; but at the same time never attempts to confute his arguments ; but substitutes in lieu of solid reasoning, a pompous display of cannon, magazines, and storming sword in hand ! You, gentlemen, to whom I address myself, I hope will not think me too presumptuous, when you have considered the situation both of General Washington, and General Lincoln, if I take upon me to say, that I do not believe General Lincoln to have been master of his own motions : for Lincoln, as well as Wash-  
 D 2 ton,



ton, could certainly have moved where he pleased, and ought to have used his forces to distress, harass, and entangle the English in the interior of the province.

STRICTURES, PAGE 18.

“ When false inferences, like these, supported by erroneous illustrations, appear in the front of a performance, we listen with caution to the sequel ; which indeed is the more necessary when it is *considered that official dispatches, and private letters, are adduced as vouchers, though these were written under impressions from erroneous reports, founded on misrepresentations by our author himself, whole garrisons have fired volleys, bells have rang, and bonfires have been raised to commemorate advantages which never existed.*”

Whatever commanding General you here mean to allude to, I return you his sincere  
thanks

thanks for your opinion on his conduct, and report of actions under his auspices. There are but two you can possibly here allude to:—Sir Henry Clinton, and Earl Cornwallis: they both have reported Colonel Tarleton, and his actions, in the most brilliant terms; recommending him for his gallant exertions, in a most particular manner, to the notice of Government, and protection of his king; they, certainly, Sir, have to thank you for the pains you have taken to make the world believe that the subject of their official letters have been mere matter of moonshine, ideal engagements, like castles in the air; simply, and only, the fiction of a few moments of invention, and calculated only to deceive their king and country.

STRICTURES, PAGE 21 AND 22.

“ The Corsican Chief, Paoli, devised an  
 “ excellent method of promoting bravery  
 “ among

“ among his countrymen : he wrote a cir-  
“ cular letter to the priests of every parish  
“ in the island, desiring a list to be made  
“ of all those who had fallen in battle. No  
“ institution was better contrived ; it might  
“ be adopted by every nation, as it would  
“ give double courage to soldiers, who would  
“ have their fame preserved, and, at the  
“ same time, bear to their relatives the va-  
“ luable legacy of a claim to the kindness  
“ of the state. In addition to this first  
“ principle, it certainly affords a melancholy  
“ satisfaction to find in the page of history,  
“ that justice is done to the memory of the  
“ dead ; it mingles sympathy with the  
“ fears of the widow and orphan,” &c.  
&c. &c.

“ Liberal minds only are influenced by  
“ these exalted maxims ; but let us consider  
“ the light in which they have been view-  
“ ed

“ ed by the journalift of the Southern American campaigns.”

Had you given this hint to Tarleton, previous to his publication, to oblige you, I dare fay he would have fent to all the parifhes both in England and Ireland, but moft particularly to the parifh priefts of Scotland, for an accurate lift of thofe of their countrymen who fell and bled in the fouthern provinces of America : and as we might moft affuredly rely on a moft faithful account from *that* clergy, then fould we have feen the name of Roderick M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie come forward with gigantic honour, and his fcars would increafe the *fympathy* which mingles with *the tears of the widow and the orphan*.

This practice, which you have recomended to Tarleton, though extremely prайse-worthy, you yourfelf have not adopted ; fince it is pretty well known that you have chofen

to

to call in medical\*, instead of ecclesiastical assistance. Every generous soldier laments the loss of blood that flowed from Roderick's wound ; and, lamentable indeed would it have been, if that wound had bled afresh as often as you have recited the incident in your Strictures.

STRICTURES, PAGE 23.

“ Describing the attack of the legion-  
“ infantry, when they mistook the corps  
“ under the command of Major Ferguson  
“ for enemies, page 7 and 8, he (Tarleton)  
“ entirely neglects to mention the wounds  
“ which that active officer received.”

Here, sir, if you could not stop your ran-  
corous censure on Tarleton, decency ought  
to have forbidden your reviving this unlucky  
event : the whole army felt on every occa-  
sion for the gallant Ferguson. This affair

\* — Brown, M. D.

was

was most truly shocking and melancholy.—The less said on this subject is best.—It was a night attack upon an enemy's camp by the two above-mentioned corps:—the enemy evacuated the post on hearing of the approach of the British. Ferguson arriving first, took possession; and was mistaken by the legion-infantry for the enemy; some blood was spilt on both sides, and Ferguson had very near lost a life, equally valuable to the whole army, and to his friends.

STRICTURES, PAGE 24.

“ An action which a detachment from the garrison of Ninety-six, had with an American corps, upon the 19th of August 1780, would certainly have excited the attention of a correct historian.”

Relative to this action on the Ennorvee River, I have no remark to make. The commanding officer (Colonel Innes) if in

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his

his present retired situation your Strictures can be supposed to fall in his way, will have less reason to be pleased with them, than to be offended with Colonel Tarleton for the omission with which you reproach him, since you have not attributed to that officer his real merits.

STRICTURES, PAGE 26.

“ In our author’s description of the action  
“ at Hanging Rock, the partiality which he  
“ entertains for his own corps, is evident :  
“ the gallantry of officers, and of a detach-  
“ ment with which he was not immediately  
“ connected, is consigned to oblivion. This  
“ assertion is justified by his silence on the  
“ loss of Lieut. Browne, of the North Caroli-  
“ nians, who fell in a desperate charge, which  
“ the crisis of the action rendered inevitable.  
“ Besides him, not less than seventy men of  
“ the same regiment were killed and wound-  
“ ed,

“ ed, of which however no mention is made,  
 “ as it would appear a participation of the  
 “ credit ascribed to the legion.”

Here, fir, you attack Colonel Tarleton with more than your usual inveteracy. I hope I shall be able to prove to those gentlemen to whom I address myself, that your assertions are founded on no other principle, but a determined resolution to follow him through his history with malevolence and ill-applied satire, equally destitute of candour, argument, and military knowledge. Tarleton, in this instance, certainly has not given to his own corps the degree of praise which they deserved. I will not be so arrogant as to give my own *ipse dixit* on the merits of this most singularly gallant action; but I will lay the minute particulars of that affair before the officers to whom I address myself, who, from their vicinity to the field



of action, cannot be ignorant of the truth of what I shall state.

Colonel Bryant's militia were attacked by General Sumpter, were beat, and driven out of the field—the North Carolinians suffered nearly the same fate. The loss the Prince of Wales's regiment sustained was heavy ; that corps, both officers and men, were nearly destroyed\*. The British legion were then attacked by the whole American force,

\* The Prince of Wales's American regiment consisted of about eighty or ninety men. Every private, except eighteen or twenty, and every officer, were killed or wounded. The cause of this heavy loss was owing to their mistaking the enemy for our royal militia, (they being both dressed exactly alike), until they approached within forty yards, and threw in a destructive fire.

Not one word has the Stricturist said on this subject ; he has not even informed us, in his description of the action, that the Prince of Wales's regiment was in the field, although two-thirds of the private men were either killed or wounded, and every officer. But this *correct* Stricturist often times condemns Colonel Tarleton for omitting the wounds of a *single* officer.

Captain

Captain M'Culloch, before the attack became general, was mortally wounded: the command of the legion devolved on Captain Rouffelet. He charged the enemy; repulsed, and drove them. This officer, possessing happily not only valour, but also good conduct, joined with it, instead of permitting his victorious troops in a broken and irregular manner to pursue the enemy, (which in cases I could mention, has proved fatal; where British valour, intoxicated with a momentary success, has lost sight of *discipline, regularity*; and *order*; which neglect of regularity may in future wars, if not corrected, be *more severely felt*\*) halted, convinced of the advantage

\* My friend, Lieutenant Colonel Dundas, at the attack on James River, by the Marquis La Fayette, proved the good effects of a contrary conduct. After repulsing the first line of the enemy, instead of permitting his men, elated with the mere appearance of victory, to pursue (a la debandade) the flying foe, this able officer ordered his men to halt, formed them in regular order,  
and

advantage of the ground he had been attacked upon, he marched back and took possession of it again. Sumpter renewed the attack; he was again and again beat off, charged, and pursued, *but with regularity*. These operations of a gallant few, gave time for a few of the scattered troops to rally and join the legion, while the approach of the detachment under Captains M'Donald and Stewart, &c. &c. as related by Colonel Tarleton, obliged General Sumpter to quit the field, and desist from any further attack on that post.

Here again, sir, as in many other parts of your work, you make use of particular words and expressions to set yourself off in a literary point of view. I do not mean to

and then moved on in a collected body. He was presently opposed by a fresh body of Continentals in reserve, whom he repulsed, because he was ready to receive them; and he gained all the advantages which were the natural consequences of his judicious conduct.

enter

enter into a contest about *expressions*, where they are not erroneous, and calculated to mislead in point of fact ; still less do I wish to depreciate the gallantry of Lieutenant Browne. But surely, sir, the *crisis* of this affair, as far as I am capable of understanding that *medical* term, existed in the exertions of the *British legion, and no where else*.

But to place what I have said beyond the reach of doubt, Lord Rawdon judged the conduct of the British legion, on that occasion, to be so highly meritorious, that his Lordship actually proposed to make an application to Earl Cornwallis, for some badge of honour to be granted to that corps, for their gallant conduct on that day.

STRICTURES, PAGE 27.

“ From too great attention to his own  
 “ exploits, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton  
 “ pays not that decent regard to those of  
 “ others,

“ others, which historical truth indispensa-  
“ bly requires. He has not recorded the  
“ fall of several officers at the siege of Au-  
“ gusta ; and the whole of those who dis-  
“ played such distinguished bravery in the  
“ defence of Ninety-six, are, without excep-  
“ tion, passed over in silence. Of the for-  
“ mer of these sieges, he appears to know  
“ little indeed ; and of the latter, though  
“ one of the most brilliant affairs which oc-  
“ curred during the war, he seems to be  
“ full as ignorant as he possibly may be of  
“ those of Candia or Rhodes.”

At the time of the sieges of Augusta and  
Ninety-six, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was  
some hundred miles distant from them ; of  
course it was not in his power to give an  
authentic account, from his own knowledge,  
of those operations, which, however con-  
spicuous for their gallantry and exertions,  
were performed at so great a distance from  
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him, and were conducted under the immediate inspection of Lord Rawdon. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was in Germany when he wrote his history, and had there no connections that could have given him the minute particulars of either of those transactions. The gallant defence of Augusta and of Ninety-six are well known to the world, and have been publicly described with justice, but not with more praise than they truly deserve. But as our Stricturnist does not profess to send forth his book as a history, it seems full as absurd in him to introduce the siege of Ninety-six, in Strictures on Tarleton, as it would be in me to add to my remarks, a detail of the siege of Gibraltar, which I hope had *its* merits also.

In like manner, the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Devaux had undisputed merit in the capture of the island of New Provi-

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dence;

dence ; but that tranſaction is as extraneous to your confutation and attack on Tarleton, and his history, as a narrative of Captain Cook's adventures at Otaheite or Kamfchatska, would be to my defence of my friend.

The event of Candia and of Rhodes, are, I am persuaded, better known to Tarleton than to the Stricturist, or myself.

The Stricturist indeed, however conversant in ancient or modern history, might perhaps, do better to confine himself to the battles of Culloden and Preston Pans.

STRICTURES, PAGE 27 AND 28.

In page 505, he (Tarleton) asserts, " two  
" officers, with forty dragoons, and their  
" horses, were all taken without a blow ;  
" but the fact is, that Lieutenant Suther-  
" land, of the South Carolina dragoons, one  
" of the officers thus censured, being on a  
" foraging

“ foraging party, fell in with a considerable  
“ corps of the enemy’s cavalry, and defended  
“ himself, when attacked, with a degree of  
“ valour bordering on excess. He was so  
“ desperately wounded in this rencounter,  
“ that the infantry, who had now advanced  
“ to his support, left him on the field for  
“ dead. This gentleman, however, still lives,  
“ though his recovery is held by the me-  
“ dical faculty, as an event next to a pro-  
“ digy. So far was he from not exchanging  
“ blows with the superior force by which  
“ he was attacked, that a considerable  
“ portion of his skull was proved to have  
“ been cut out with a sabre, the manifest  
“ proof of which is displayed by the per-  
“ ception of the movements of the brain  
“ upon an application of the hand: he is  
“ now in Nova Scotia, and our author proba-  
“ bly conceived that he might hazard such  
“ a reflection upon his conduct, as he has



“ made upon that of other absent officers,  
 “ without risque of contradiction.”

Lieutenant Sutherland's gallant resistance is certainly highly to be commended : but neither does his personal bravery, or your account of his sufferings, confute Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's statements : you contradict Tarleton, but you advance nothing in support of that contradiction ; but instead of history or argument, you shock us with a long indelicate chirurgical account of the motion of that officer's brain, to be perceived, as you assure us, by an application of the hand. That officer is truly to be pitied ; yet what have his sufferings to do in support of your argument against Tarleton ? This passage may be very interesting to the gentlemen of the faculty, and a *certain Doctor* might turn it to account in an anatomical lecture ; but such pictures cannot edify military men ; nor will they be  
 led

led aside from the points in view, by the numerous delusions with which you attempt to distract them throughout your whole Strictures. Ad. rem, Stricturist; you shall not fly off from the point, and attempt to bewilder our judgment, nor break the thread of the subject in discussion, by foreign subtrefuges, Leonidas, Ganganelli, Thermopylæ, Candia, Rhodes, Mary Queen of Scots, Corsica, Paoli, and Parish Priests, instead of real substance, truth, and argument. Ad. rem, ad. rem, Roderick!

In your Strictures, page 31, you request the friend to whom you address your letter, (who, by the bye, I believe an ideal one, or in the moon), as a grand leading rule to judge of Tarleton's history, to keep continually in view his estimation of one of his dragoon horses in preference to the life of an officer;—this is certainly giving your friend a very *sensible* and weighty advice!

but

but I hope, fir, without much presumption, to point out to the gentlemen to whom I address myself, a more striking and leading feature throughout *your* production; namely, a virulence and rancour, pointed against that officer personally, and more pointed against him than against his history; continually contradicting; and vainly attempting to turn him into ridicule, but without assigning an argument, or good military suggestion in confutation of him.

You seem to think that your own malevolence, *ipse dixit*, may supply all reasoning on the subject.

STRICTURES, PAGE 30.

“ From such anxiety in our author, not  
 “ to omit the smallest loss sustained by his  
 “ own corps, this reflection naturally oc-  
 “ curs, that the *fall of horses*, in actions where  
 “ he was concerned, is intitled to a prefera-  
 “ ble

“ ble attention in his work, to officers of  
“ equal, perhaps superior, merit to himself,  
“ who suffered upon other occasions.”

This paltry sneer is too idle, too insignificant to merit refutation; and must be passed over with that contempt which most justly belongs to weak scurrility.

STRICTURES, PAGE 33.

“ Even Lord Rawdon escapes not the  
“ acrimony of his pen,” &c. &c.

Permit me to assure you, sir, that no person can have a greater respect for Lord Rawdon, both as an officer or a private gentleman, than Colonel Tarleton; nor is there any one more ready to render that tribute of praise to his Lordship, which his good conduct always intitles him to. But the best of men, and the best of officers, have found themselves in a perilous situation, without any misconduct to be laid to their charge.

charge. Such was the situation of Lord Rawdon in the instance alluded to, and he extricated himself like an able officer.

The approach of the American army, *in force*, from Quaker Meeting\*, where they lay under the command of General Du Culb, from whom, at the above place, General Gates took the command, was so sudden and unexpected, that it was not known on the other side the Santee River, until Gates was actually encamped before Lynche's Creek. I hope, gentlemen, I shall not be deemed too presumptuous when I submit the following observations to your superior judgment:—

Had Gates, when he took the command at Quaker Meeting, instantly marched towards Camden, without hesitation, delay, or halting any longer than to refresh his troops,

\* 140 miles from Lynche's Creek.

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he then would have had the choice of three decisive objects ; namely, to cut off the detachments at Hanging Rock and Rocky Mount--to prevent the two battalions of the 71st regiment, who were stationed at the Charraw-hills, on the Pedee River, from joining the royal army---or, to attack Lord Rawdon before these detachments had joined him. I leave it to your judgment, gentlemen to decide upon the event of the measures I have suggested.

STRICTURES, PAGE 36 AND 37.

“ Our author, in arraigning the penetration of General Gates, is rather unfortunate ; his animadversions,” &c. &c. &c.

“ From his (General Gates’s) known character, there is not left a shadow of doubt, that if the measures suggested by the author had been the most proper, they would not have been neglected.”

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I have

I have already stated the different plans of operation of which General Gates certainly had his choice; and which, by attacking us in detail, might have been fatal to our army. Instead of adopting this mode of attack, he lay for several days before Lynche's Creek, permitted all our detachments to join the army, and gave time for Earl Cornwallis also to join it; to effect which his Lordship was forced to travel night and day, and he arrived in camp but one day before the action of Camden. Earl Cornwallis, after mustering every foldier able to bear arms, did not bring 1500 men into the field that memorable day; Lord Rawdon had not two-thirds that number at Lynche's Creek, before the detachments above-mentioned joined him, and not above 40 cavalry, the superiority of which, on the 16th of August, rendered that day complete, by the pursuit of the enemy two and twenty miles from

from the field of battle ; and by a total destruction of their baggage, replete with an immense quantity of *arms* and *ammunition* for the supply of the *whole* province of Carolina, who were *then ripe for a revolt* from the British Government. I have attempted both honourably and candidly to point out the situation of his Majesty's troops at that time in the vicinity of Camden ; and I leave it, gentlemen, to your superior judgment to determine upon the merits of Gates's conduct, and Tarleton's remarks upon it, whether it would have been more prudent in General Gates to have *attacked our army in detail*, which I hope I have proved *he was able* to do, or to act as he did.

I have neither blindly supported Tarleton, nor rancorously censured Roderick M'Kenzie ; I have assigned my reasons for both ; could we say the same of our Stric-  
turist, he would appear not only in a more



amiable point of view, but every generous, liberal, and candid reader would listen to him with more attention, and give greater credit to his Strictures.

STRICTURES, PAGE 38.

“ And he (Tarleton) has left us to lament, with Ganganelli, that there are some authors who, in their attempts to rise into the uncommon, have fallen into the absurd.”

You have reason to lament, for had you (previously to the publication of your Strictures) perused the works of that amiable Pope, they might have profited not a little.

The mention you make of the celebrated Ganganelli, has led me to peruse a work that has afforded me much amusement.

I hope, sir, I may, without offence, be permitted to paraphrase, with very little alteration, his twenty-ninth letter from

Rome,

Rome, of the 2d of March, 1750, to the Abbe Lami, periodical writer, at Florence, and in *my own person*, address it to you.

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**I** ALWAYS read your *Strictures* with pleasure, my dear *Roderick*, but I wish you would always give the reasons of your *Strictures*, instead of saying, for example, that *Tarleton's* assertions are absurdities hitherto unparalleled; that the style of such a work is incorrect; that there are trifles which disfigure the beauty of the book--you should plainly *prove the charge*. Rules have always need of examples. There is hardly any book of which it may not be said that it contains some careless or affected expressions. When you speak in general, it gives room to believe that you have only glanced your eye over the work which you are giving an account,

account, and that you are in haste to get rid of the trouble.

Another omission is, your not shewing *the best part of the work*\*. The good taste of the Stricturnist requires that he should be attentive to *this*:—if a work is not worth the trouble of reading, it is better not to announce it at all than to rail at the writer. It is illiberal to abuse a work, merely to make the public merry at the expence of the author.

Were your Strictures *severe* without *satire*—*exact* without *trifling*—*just* and *impartial*, they would discharge their duty to the satisfaction of the public:—mine is com-

\* The reader will please to observe, that our Stricturnist has most carefully omitted touching on many signal actions gained by Tarleton, which has done him much credit; viz. Beauford's defeat—the defeat of the American cavalry at Lenoo's Ferry—Sumpter's defeat near Camden—the affair of Monk's-corner—and the affair of Tarrent's-house, in North Carolina.

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plete every time that I can renew to you  
the sentiments of esteem and affection with  
which

I am, &c.

GEO. HANGER.

STRICTURES,

STRICTURES, PAGE 39 AND 40.

“ It is well known that the public service  
“ required Earl Cornwallis to mount dra-  
“ goons, by the expedient just mentioned ;  
“ and that the British Government is too  
“ just to deprive its subjects of private pro-  
“ perty, without an equivalent, I readily  
“ admit ; but that the proprietors have re-  
“ ceived payment for these horses, is deni-  
“ ed. A number of officers, now in this  
“ kingdom, are in possession of receipts pas-  
“ sed on this occasion by Lieutenant Colo-  
“ nel Tarleton, which remain to this hour  
“ undischarged. Many of these gentlemen  
“ are reduced to the scanty pittance of half  
“ pay, and it would afford them much satis-  
“ faction to know through what channel  
“ they are to make application for pay-  
“ ment.”

I assure

I assure you, sir, on this subject my indignation will hardly permit me to keep within the bounds of decency; as any deviation from that line, tending to scurrility or abuse, ever disgraces both the officer and the gentleman, and must inevitably recoil on the person it proceeds from. I shall most carefully curb my pen; though I cannot help expressing my sentiments and opinion, and declare, if I had my will, I would order this paragraph to be torn from the whole production, and burnt at the head of the British army. Permit me, sir, to inform you, although it may not perhaps be absolutely *actionable*, yet it has a *strong* tendency to a *libel*,

The exigencies of the times required of Earl Cornwallis to give out an order, that all persons having horses fit for the cavalry service, should deliver them at Col. Tarleton's camp, where receipts would be given for them,

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I my-

I myself, in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, signed several receipts for horses delivered at our camp God ; knows there may be some now extant with *my* signature ; if there are, let them be produced ; I am ready to present them to Government. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton will do the same : but it is most audacious of you to attempt to make the world believe that he has unjustly deprived officers of their property.

STRICTURES, PAGE 39.

“ Such effusions of vanity as these have  
 “ a very disgusting effect. To other officers,  
 “ from a General of such high birth, and  
 “ length of service, it was sufficient to *be*  
 “ *commanded* ; but this gentleman must be  
 “ *desired* and *requested* to do what was  
 “ merely his duty,” &c.

With respect to the words, *desired* and  
*requested*, which Tarleton often makes use  
of

of when he treats of different services on which he was employed, and which you are pleased to point out as effusions of vanity,—if you will refer to dispatches and letters, in various situations of the war, you will find the same language held by many officers. But in this particular part of your *Strictures*, finding yourself without even a shadow for a charge, or cause for censure, you find yourself obliged to maintain your consistencies by sticking to aspersions, by an unusual exertion of that rancourous severity with which you follow Tarleton through your whole *Strictures*.

STRICTURES, PAGE 42, 43, 44.

“Earl Cornwallis, with the principal  
 “column of the army, &c. &c. and Hamil-  
 “ton’s corps, marched by Hanging Rock.  
 “He (Colonel Hamilton) was left with his  
 H-2 regiment



“ regiment to garrison that post (Camden);  
“ nor did a single soldier belonging to it  
“ appear in his Lordship’s camp from Sep-  
“ tember to November. Thus an increase  
“ of more than five hundred regulars, is  
“ made to be his Lordship’s force.”

This is certainly an inaccuracy in Lieu-  
tenant Colonel Tarleton; but as Hamilton’s  
corps was ever before this time a part of  
Earl Cornwallis’s army, a generous and  
candid observer would forgive this small  
error; but Roderick M’Kenzie never lets  
pass an opportunity of censuring Lieutenant  
Colonel Tarleton.

Instead of dwelling with so much satisfac-  
tion upon the minutest error in his history,  
it would be a more liberal employment to  
bring forward the particulars. The various  
instances of distinguished services performed  
by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, Roderick  
M’Kenzie is careful never to touch upon,  
because

because they bid defiance even to his venom and malevolence.

STRICTURES, PAGE 45.

“ The assertion therefore, that he (Lieut. Colonel Tarleton) moved up the east side of the river, is a misstatement of the fact, and calculated to produce conclusions remote from the truth.”

Here, sir, you charge Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton with an error relative to the move of his own corps. Every liberal reader must observe that this is an error of the printer ; all books are liable to such inaccuracies ; and Tarleton, I dare say, will allow you all the triumph you can derive from an error in the press.

But I intreat you, gentlemen of the army, to read the whole of this passage in Tarleton's book, and inspect his march as traced out in the map, and your liberality will instantly

stantly point out to you that the error lies in the prefs only.

STRICTURES, PAGE 47.

“ That a charge was ordered, is readily admitted; that the Major was wounded in attempting to lead the dragoons to this charge, is well known; but no intreaties of his, no exertions of their officers, could, upon this occasion, induce the legion cavalry to approach the American militia;—they retreated without fulfilling the intention of the General. He therefore, much dissatisfied; ordered the light and legion infantry to dislodge the enemy, which they immediately effected.”

I am extremely averse to treat on this affair at all, being myself the principal person concerned; but our Strictures's malevolent aspersions force me not to pass this over in silence.

I acknow-

I acknowledge that I was guilty of an error in judgment, in entering the town at all with the cavalry, before I had previously searched it well with infantry, after the precaution Earl Cornwallis had given me\*.

But when I risked so few lives in drawing the fire from the enemy, I trust *that*, in some measure, palliated the fault. None but the advanced guard were with me till most of the enemy had given their fire.

A part of the cavalry in reserve, whether from perceiving the enemy planted behind the houses, and imagining they were impervious to my view, (which they were, until I was considerably advanced into the town), or for other reasons best known to themselves, at this advantageous instant of

\* Earl Cornwallis ordered me to be very cautious how I advanced, as he expected a very large body of militia to be either in the neighbourhood, or town of Charlotte.

time,

time, did not advance. My intent of charging through the town, after having drawn the enemy's fire, now became too late and too dangerous ; and I was happy to draw the cavalry off as quick as I could, and with so trifling a loss.

STRICTURES, PAGE 48.

The Stricturist says, " Lord Cornwallis " being dissatisfied, ordered the light infantry to dislodge the enemy."

This I positively deny—the truth stands thus :

We had a part of the legion infantry mounted on inferior horses, to enable them to march with the cavalry, ready to dismount and support the dragoons. These infantry, of their own accord, *very properly* had dismounted, and formed before the cavalry were near out of the town. I ordered them to take possession of the houses to  
the

the right, which was executed before the light infantry, and the remainder of the legion infantry, came up, who were left behind with Earl Cornwallis to march at the head of his column.

I appeal for the truth of this assertion to Captain Campbell, who, as their senior Captain, commanded them, came running up to me, when our dismounted infantry had advanced, and in a most friendly manner intreated me not to impute any blame to him, for not running up with the remainder of the light and legion infantry instantly on the first hearing of the firing; for Earl Cornwallis had ordered him to keep them with his Lordship. At this moment Earl Cornwallis appeared in fight, having been but a very short distance behind with the army, and ordered the whole to halt. The enemy had by this time all quitted the town for the woods and swamps

close behind it. The whole light troops now advanced. You will please to recollect, Captain Campbell, whose name I have just mentioned, was not wounded in the town, but above half an hour afterwards, and full one mile further on.

It was a trifling insignificant skirmish, which no person but the malevolent Scurrilist (happy at all times to detract from public or private honour) would have attempted to have made of such magnitude, or even have ever mentioned.

It would have been but liberal and just in you to have related the conduct of the cavalry that whole day; in the afternoon, as well as the morning. These troops, whom you say, neither my intreaties, nor the exertions of their officers, could induce to face the American militia, were left unsupported in the evening, under my command, by Earl Cornwallis's express orders, when he  
took

took post at Charlotte Town, and left me to engage a corps of state horse and mounted crackers that had been very troublesome the whole day, perpetually skirmishing and harrassing the front of our line of march. This service they performed with spirit, alacrity, and success. We had not moved on above one mile in search of the foe, when we fell in with them, attacked them instantly whilst they were attempting to form, dispersed them with some loss, and drove them for six miles, forcing them even through the very pickets of a numerous corps of militia, commanded by General Sumner; who, supposing a large part of the army to be near at hand, broke up his camp, and marched that evening sixteen miles. Lord Rawdon is well acquainted with the truth of my statement of this affair. Let the whole army judge, whether it was liberal, honourable, or just,



thus to suppress one part of the conduct of the cavalry on that day, which certainly gained them some credit; and whether it does not manifest the extreme of rancour and malice, thus to dwell upon, and give an air of considerable consequence to a trifling skirmish in the morning, not worthy to be mentioned, or even thought of after it was over, by an officer acquainted with active service.

STRICTURES, PAGE 48 AND 49.

“ The king’s troops left Charlotte Town  
“ the evening of the 14th, to march to the  
“ Catawba Ford. Owing to the badness of  
“ the road, the ignorance of the guides,  
“ the darkness of the night, or some other  
“ unknown cause, the British rear guard  
“ destroyed, or left behind, near twenty  
“ waggons.”

This,

This, gentlemen, is Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's account ;—now for Roderick M'Kenzie's:

“ After such a progress of six hours, the  
“ General grew impatient ; the alarmed  
“ guide eluded the vigilance of the dra-  
“ goons, and escaped unobserved. Left in  
“ such a situation, an army, where not one  
“ of the individuals which composed it knew  
“ where they were, might be well contented  
“ to come off with a loss so trifling as that  
“ of a few waggons.”

I must confess, I cannot myself find out the great difference between Tarleton's account, and that of our Stricturist: but Tarleton must be condemned. Let me intreat you, sir, to peruse Tarleton's account, and your own, with cool deliberation, if you can bring your mind to a state of serenity for a few moments ; and then let me ask you, whether, in condemning Tarleton, you do  
not

not reflect on yourself. In my own humble opinion, gentlemen, had Tarleton substituted, instead of the *ignorance* of the guides, *the treachery of the guide*, who was a presbyterian, and a great scoundrel, his account would have been most perfect. The fact is thus :—the army was that night lost in the woods, through the villainy of the guide, who designedly led them out of the road, and then made his escape. Every officer present must know this to be the real truth ; nevertheless our Stricturist accuses Tarleton with real or pretended ignorance in this affair.

STRICTURES, PAGE 51.

There are certain topics, gentlemen, discussed by the Stricturist, in which I shall decline following him so minutely as I have hitherto done. We are now advanced in these historical Strictures, to the period  
when

when the name of Earl Cornwallis is continually introduced:—sacred shall that name be held by my pen. I direct myself to Roderick M'Kenzie, and to him alone. My production proceeds from a heart overflowing with friendship; and indignant when it finds the character of an honourable and gallant officer cruelly attacked, and wantonly aspersed; and I am happy, gentlemen, in addressing my sentiments to those whose liberality, candour, and honour I have often experienced, in the course of a six years' service in America, and who will not wish me to enter into invidious subjects.

STRICTURES, PAGE 53.

“ His rout (Earl Cornwallis) thither,  
 “ through the Waxhaws, was judiciously  
 “ chosen. That powerful and inveterate set-  
 “ tlement was *soon crushed.*”

I will

I will not presume to comment on any of the noble Earl's operations; but our Stricturist's remarks upon them have not the same title to my respect. In exposing them, I shall not be thought to deviate from the sentiments which I profess for the noble Earl, and for his conduct.

If, on the approach of the British army to Waxhaws, a total desertion of that settlement by the efficient inhabitants, who joined the American army, leaving behind them only the aged and the women and children, could be construed as a proof of the *crushing* of that populous district, I should agree in opinion with the Stricturist; but the statement he has given of the case being equally repugnant to common sense, military ideas, and matter of fact, I trust, gentlemen, I shall have your sanction for differing as widely from him on this occasion, as on most other occasions.

STRIC-

## STRICTURES, PAGE 53 AND 54.

“ The author is condefending enough to  
 “ admit, that Charlotte Town affords some  
 “ conveniences, blended with great disad-  
 “ vantages. The mills in the neighbour-  
 “ hood were supposed of sufficient conse-  
 “ quence to render it, for the present, an  
 “ eligible position ; and, in future, a ne-  
 “ cessary post when the army advanced.—  
 “ But he (Tarleton) further says, the apt-  
 “ nefs of its immediate situation, between  
 “ Camden and Salisbury, and the quantity  
 “ of its mills, did not counterbalance its  
 “ defects. The town and environs abound-  
 “ ed with inveterate enemies ; the planta-  
 “ tions in the neighbourhood were small  
 “ and uncultivated ; the roads narrow and  
 “ confined in every direction ; and the  
 “ whole face of the country covered with  
 “ close and thick woods.”

If I attempted to decide upon the propriety or impropriety of occupying Charlotte Town, it would be sitting in judgment upon the conduct of Earl Cornwallis, whose name shall never be mentioned by me but with all the reverence and respect that is due to so distinguished a soldier.

Honour and truth, however, call aloud upon me to lay before you the local circumstances of that place, its resources, the temper of the inhabitants, its advantages and disadvantages.

Our Stricturist asserts, " that the roads  
" leading from Charlotte Town to Salisbury,  
" to Camden, and to Tryon County, are  
" perfectly good."—Thus far I admit. All  
the *main* roads, leading to populous districts, large towns, or settlements, even in the most intricate parts of America, are spacious, and, in general, extremely good. But you, gentlemen, know full well, that  
forage

forage and provisions are not to be found solely and only on the edge of the great public roads leading through any country. The most difficult situations must be explored in every district, to maintain and support an army, which remains for a length of time at any given place. Therefore, I trust, you will allow, that the whole feature of the country must be considered, and not only those particular parts that are the most cleared, which, of course, lay nearest the great main roads. I will be so bold as to assert, that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's words are strictly true; founded in a real knowledge, and just view of the country:

*“ the roads narrow and crossed in every direction, and the whole face of the country covered with close and thick woods.* No disastrous event, inferior to that which befel Ferguson, could possibly have given effect to the exertions of the inhabitants, inimical



“ to the British government, around Char-  
 “ lotte Town: their whole force, though  
 “ directed against a detachment consisting  
 “ of thirty men, under the command of  
 “ Lieutenant Guyon, of the 23d regiment,  
 “ was repulsed with disgrace.”

Though Lieutenant Guyon, of the 23d regiment, much to his credit, repulsed a very superior force, with only thirty men, this was a particular instance ; for, in fact, the foraging parties were attacked by the enemy so frequently, that it became necessary never to send a small detachment on that service. Colonel Tarleton, just then recovered from a violent attack of the yellow fever, judged it necessary to go in person, and with his whole corps, or above two-thirds, when he had not detachments from the rest of the army. I will aver, that when collecting forage, I myself have seen situations near that town, where the woods were so intricate,

cate, and so thick with underwood, (which is not common in the southern parts of America) that it was totally impossible to see our videtts, or our centries from the main body. In one instance particularly, where Lieutenant Oldfield, of the Quarter-master General's department, was wounded; the enemy, under cover of impervious thickets, impenetrable to any troops except those well acquainted with the private paths, approached so near to the whole line of the British infantry, as to give them their fire before ever they were perceived. Charlotte Town itself, on one side most particularly, where the light and legion infantry camp lay, was enveloped with woods. Earl Cornwallis himself, visiting the pickets of these corps (which from Tarleton's sickness I had the honour of commanding at that time) ordered me to advance them considerably further than usually is the custom, and

and connect them more closely one with the other. I am not so daring as Roderick M'Kenzie, to give my own *ipse dixit* for my assertions; but I appeal to my friend Lieutenant Barrington M'Kenzie, who must recollect attending the noble Earl, with me, on this business, and hearing him deliver to me his *commands*, I dare not say requests.

That in Polk's mill a very large quantity of flower was found, is admitted, and that from other mills in the neighbourhood there was more collected; but it was not all the produce of the country directly near Charlotte Town, but brought thither to be ground from various and distant parts. I will declare also, that the plantations were not any thing like so large or well cultivated as lower down in South Carolina. As to the disposition of the inhabitants, they totally deserted the town on our approach; not above three or four men remained in the whole town. I beg leave to decline any  
discussion

discussion of the supposed move of Earl Cornwallis, either through Tryon county, or to Cross Creek, for the reasons which I have repeatedly stated, and by which I shall continue to be governed in all questions affecting Earl Cornwallis.

STRICTURES, PAGE 57.

“ Several very extraordinary circumstances, and such as no human foresight could guard against, contributed to Ferguson’s melancholy catastrophe.”

Whether Ferguson exceeded, or only obeyed the orders of his General, it is not my business to determine ; or whether his unbounded zeal for his country’s cause ever left him dissatisfied when he barely performed his duty, without giving his General unexpected proofs of an enterprising spirit, and exhibiting extraordinary powers, certain it is that he was defeated, *for this plain reason*—he was *beyond the reach of support*—  
he

he was too far advanced on the left of the British army to retire on the approach of a very superior force. *Detachments* have been the *ruin* both of *modern*\* and ancient armies, and will be again: they must sometimes be risked, but they are ever attended with *danger*. *Every* detachment employed at *such* a distance that it *cannot* fall back safely on the main army, or be *supported* from it, must ever be looked upon as *in the air*. King's Mountain, where Ferguson halted and fought, was fifty miles in a direct line from Charlotte Town.

Our *Stricturist*, however, determined to abuse Tarleton in the teeth of facts, says, "circumstances, such as no human fore-  
" fight could guard against, contributed to  
" Ferguson's catastrophe."

\* Every officer, conversant in the American war, by tracing the progress of our armies from Canada to the *most southern* parts of the United States, will find *various* instances of the fatal effects of detachments, and their ruinous consequences.

STRIC-

STRICTURES, PAGE 70 AND 71.

\* With all due respect for the character of  
“ Earl Cornwallis, as being much above any  
“ suspicion of wilful intention to mislead, I  
“ must, however, take the liberty to say, that  
“ his Lordship’s testimony, in the present case,  
“ is entirely out of the question. The Ge-  
“ neral detaches Lieutenant Colonel Tarle-  
“ ton on an expedition a considerable dif-  
“ tance from the army, and receives a re-  
“ port from him of a victory. Upon this  
“ report he founds his official dispatches ;  
“ and our author is for some time hailed as  
“ victor from Wynneborough to Camden,  
“ from Camden to Charlestown, from  
“ Charlestown to New York, and from  
“ thence to London ; at Liverpool bonfires  
“ are lighted up in honour of their fa-  
“ vourite hero. After several years have  
“ elapsed, he still presents the world with

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“ his

“ his claim to victory. He goes further,  
 “ and with a truly curious address, holds  
 “ forth the dispatches of Earl Cornwallis,  
 “ though entirely founded on his own re-  
 “ ports, as vouchers for the veracity of his  
 “ assertions.”


This specious, but insidious assertion, might lead astray such perusers of the Strictures as made no part of Earl Cornwallis's army. It relates to a matter of infinite delicacy to the feelings of an officer, and is craftily made the ground work of the most odious censure on Tarleton's history. I will however take upon me to contradict the assertion; but not (like the Strictures) without confuting what I contradict; not without the support and demonstration of time, place, and circumstances. To you, gentlemen of the army, I submit the accuracy of the facts I shall state,

state, and the integrity and validity of my proofs.




Roderick M'Kenzie, or myself, on the following points, must stand convicted of the most glaring unpardonable misrepresentation. He pretends that all the credit Tarleton has gained, was founded on his own statement of his own actions ; on his own official letters to Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis, which furnished the materials of the reports of those Generals to Government. I am now, gentlemen, going to demonstrate, that this indelicate imputation has no foundation whatever, but in the bold assertion of the Stricturist. I shall maintain the well earned reputation of my friend, by a detail of *actions, distances, and situations*, and prove to you plainly, that both those Generals had it *in their power* to inform themselves of the *most minute* particulars of the transactions they







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applauded, by other evidence than Tarleton's letters. I appeal to you, as to gentlemen awake to every professional feeling. I make no apology for dwelling upon this topic. It is the grand foundation on which our Stricturist builds his satire; his sarcasms; and invectives against Tarleton, I have no argument to encounter. But even his *sneers*, on an occasion so interesting not only to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, but to Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis, whose characters are equally attacked, should undergo a most accurate and *minute* investigation, I shall, therefore, recapitulate a few of the actions in which Tarleton either commanded, or was principally concerned.

The affair of Monk's Corner, where my gallant, most intimate, and much lamented friends, Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, and Major Cocheran, were jointly concerned  
with

with Tarleton, was carried on under the command of Colonel Webster. That officer's report to the head quarters was formed upon his own immediate inspection; and the engagement happened so near to our army, that both Generals Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis must have been minutely acquainted with its just merits.

The scene of action, where Tarleton defeated the American cavalry under Colonels Lee, Washington, and White, at Lenoos Ferry, was so contiguous to Earl Cornwallis's camp, that Tarleton moved from camp on the morning of the action. A party of our light infantry had been taken by the enemy; Tarleton flew to their relief, rescued them, destroyed totally the American cavalry, and returned the same night to Earl Cornwallis.

Tarleton's

Tarleton's written report of the action, in which he so completely defeated General Sumpter, near Camden, was not drawn up until he had rejoined the army with his whole corps; Earl Cornwallis, therefore, could not be in want of other, and what the Stricturnist would insinuate to be better, authority than Tarleton's report of himself, to justify the praises which his Lordship bestowed upon Tarleton on that occasion, in the presence, and with the concurrence of the whole army.

In like manner, though the business of Blackstocks happened at some distance from the Camp, yet Earl Cornwallis had the means of obtaining whatever information he might judge necessary from the wounded officers, and from those who escorted them to his camp, and cannot be suspected of having formed his official dispatches on the influence  
solely

solely of Tarleton's own report of the action.

And even after the unfortunate affair of the Cow Pens, many officers who escaped capture, arrived that same day at Earl Cornwallis's camp, and were *interrogated by the noble Earl* on the *subject* of the defeat, *before ever Tarleton had made his appearance, or had even written to Earl Cornwallis.*— Tarleton did not arrive *till the next day.*

This enumeration of facts, gentlemen of the army, cannot be contradicted. I have shewn you, that Earl Cornwallis had it in his power to investigate, and did, in fact, investigate the material points, as it was his duty to do, all affecting the real and intrinsic merits of Tarleton's conduct in these gallant actions. I trust you will concur with me in the sentiments I have expressed, concerning this indelicate, but vain attack upon Tarleton's fame, by attempting

to

to trace its existence to his vanity, instead of his military merits and achievements. Finally, gentlemen of the army, I leave it to your knowledge of the honour and integrity of the noble Earl, and to your own candour, feeling, and judgment, to decide whether that noble General was a likely man to hold out to the admiration of the world, and to recommend to the protection of his king and country, any officer who was not entitled by his services to so honourable a distinction.

As to Tarleton's falling back, or shifting his ground, after the action of Blackstock's Hill, I appeal to you, gentlemen, whether, in the present instance, it would not have been both unmilitary and dangerous, to have encamped all night on a spot of ground so well known to the enemy.—An enterprising officer might have ruined Tarleton by a night attack. The material circumstance



stance is not contested. Sumpter moved off that very night over the Tyger River, in order to avoid Tarleton's attack on the next day. Here, gentlemen, I beg leave to submit one decisive question to your superior judgment:—Had Sumpter obtained any advantage, as Roderick M'Kenzie wishes the world to believe, would he not have pursued Tarleton, at least, till he had driven him back on the remainder of his corps that were coming up with the cannon? The truth is, that one single hour more of daylight would have ruined Sumpter. The loss Tarleton sustained certainly was heavy, but it proceeded from his not being in force. Perhaps it would have been more prudent had Tarleton, in the past instance, fallen back on his reserve, without risking an action with part of his force.

His zeal for the cause in which he was engaged, the confidence he reposed in his few gallant soldiers, and his own ardent

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desire

desire to meet the enemy, would, I doubt not, in your opinion, gentlemen, more than excuse an occasional indiscretion. But let it be remembered, that Tarleton's conduct, in the present occurrence, was justified by reasons of expediency: the only possible means by which Tarleton could bring Sumpter to action was, by giving him this advantage. In any other circumstance, Sumpter would not have risked an engagement: Tarleton, in that case, must have continued the pursuit, and might never have come up with him\*, or might have

\* The crackers and militia in those parts of America are all mounted on horse-back, which renders it totally impossible to force them to an engagement with infantry *only*. When they chuse to fight, they dismount, and fasten their horses to the fences and rails; but if not very confident in the superiority of their numbers, they remain on horse-back, give their fire, and retreat, which renders it useless to attack them without cavalry: for though you repulse them, and drive them from the field, you never can improve the advantage, or do them any material detriment.

been

been forced to engage him on worse terms.

Let me now submit the whole of this affair, briefly, faithfully, and respectfully, gentlemen of the army, to your deliberate and candid judgment.

Sumpter seeing Tarleton not in force, began the attack; was repulsed; immediately the 63d gallantly advanced; but being opposed by a great superiority of numbers, their situation was found dangerous. To extricate them, Tarleton ordered a part of his cavalry to charge; this point was accomplished, but at so late an hour of the day, that the charge was performed, when all but dark. Night immediately separated the contending parties. Thus, gentlemen, in honour do I believe, that in five lines I have given the true, candid, and liberal account of the action at Blackstocks, upon which Mr. M'Kenzie

has written some pages. The 63d did not consist of above seventy or eighty men; these few, with about 160 of our cavalry, were opposed to General Sumpter's *whole* force. Sumpter moved off—Tarleton took a fresh position that night, contiguous to the field of battle; in my humble opinion, judiciously, (for reasons I have already given,) and was joined by the remainder of his corps. Let us consider this in a general military point of view: I have ever understood, from the best military writers, that the advantageous consequences which may *follow* an *undecided* action, may entitle it to greater praise than might be due even to a momentary victory. It must be allowed that, by this action with Sumpter, Tarleton cleared that country of a numerous and lawless banditti, (for they can bear no other name,) by forcing Sumpter to retreat over the Tyger River; which is  
a fact.

a fact. It must therefore be allowed surely, that the object which Tarleton wished to attain, was acquired. Upon the whole, gentlemen, I presume to hope, that I have confuted the insinuations of the Striçturist, without placing the laurels on the head of Tarleton that ought to adorn the brow of Sumpter. With respect to the men in buckram, Tarleton was forced to take his account from the people of the country. Sumpter was badly wounded; Colonel Thomas was killed in the first attack, his body left on our ground, and the arms taken from it, are now in London.

The Striçturist informs us, that Ramsay, in his history of the American war, does not mention the loss of the American Colonels at Blackstocks. Any author who can daringly assert so base a falsehood, as that only twelve Americans fell in the action of the Cow Pens, has totally forfeited all claim  
to

to belief in his report of *that*, or any other actions.

Tarleton, after stating that Sumpter perceiving him not to be in force, began the attack, proceeds with his account in the following words :—

“ The ardour of the 63d carried them  
“ too far, and exposed them to a con-  
“ siderable fire from the buildings and the  
“ mountain. Though the undertaking ap-  
“ peared hazardous, Lieutenant Colonel  
“ Tarleton determined to charge the ene-  
“ my’s center with a column of dragoons,  
“ in order to cover the 63d, whose situation  
“ was now become dangerous. The attack  
“ was conducted with great celerity, and  
“ was attended with immediate success.—  
“ The cavalry soon reached the houses,  
“ and broke the Americans, who, from  
“ that instant, began to disperse: the 63d  
“ immediately rallied, and darkness put an  
“ end

“ end to the engagement. A pursuit across  
“ a river, with a few troops of cavalry, and  
“ a small body of infantry, was not advi-  
“ ble in the night ; a position was therefore  
“ taken adjoining to the field of battle, to  
“ wait the arrival of the light and legion  
“ infantry.”

STRICTURES, PAGE 80:

“ Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton landed in  
“ America in the year 1777, with the rank  
“ of Cornet of Dragoons; and in the begin-  
“ ning of January, 1781, we find him the  
“ *primum mobile*, the master spring which  
“ puts the whole machinery of the army  
“ in motion.”

Here, sir, you have deprived Lieutenant  
Colonel Tarleton of a considerable share of  
merit, which he acquired in a most active  
campaign in the Jerseys and Pennsylvania ;  
for Colonel Tarleton came to America in  
*the*

*the year 1776.* That distinguished officer, Sir William Erskine, quickly perceived the abilities \* and gallantry of this young officer, and appointed him his Major of Brigade, and to the whole cavalry.

STRICTURES PAGE 105.

“ Leaving then to the judgment of others,  
“ the propriety of producing a confidential  
“ letter, written by his Lordship in the  
“ goodness of his heart, evidently with a  
“ design to console our author under a  
“ severe misfortune, and never meant for  
“ publication. I only contend, that this

\* Tarleton distinguished himself on many services in the Jerseys and Pennsylvania; particularly in the attack on a stone house, commanded by Colonel Lee, and miraculously escaped with his life, having his horse wounded in three places, his helmet shot off his head, and shot through his light dragoon jacket. He also was at the taking of General Lee; commanded Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt's advanced guard, and contributed not a little to the taking of that officer.

“ letter



“ letter is altogether inadequate to the  
“ purpose to which this Journalist has con-  
“ verted it,—that of transferring the blame  
“ from himself to the troops.”

I have not the audacity, gentlemen, to tread in the steps of the Strictures, to substitute assertion for argument, and to contradict him, as he does Tarleton, without producing the shadow of a reason, or manifesting any attention to facts.

Look only at the date of Earl Cornwallis's letter to Tarleton;—between the date of that letter from the noble Earl, and his unfortunate action, you will find an intermediate space of thirteen days. In that interval, the noble Earl had sufficient time to confer with as many officers as he pleased, and to attain as much information as was necessary to form his judgment upon the subject; and that he had time for enquiry, is not more evident, than it is noto-  
N rious,

rious, that he did in fact enquire before he approved. But, in honest truth, is it likely that, without the most minute enquiries into the particulars of that action, the noble Earl should refuse to grant Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton a court of enquiry on his conduct, which Tarleton so *earnestly requested*\*, and *anxiously demanded*? I may safely leave it to your own breasts to determine, whether an officer of the high and

\* Vide Extract Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780, and 1781, page 22 and 222.—“ Other circumstances, perhaps, contributed to so decisive a rout, which, if the military system admitted the same judicious regulations as the naval, a court martial would, perhaps, have disclosed. Public trials of commanding officers, after unfortunate affairs, are as necessary to one service as the other, and might, in some instances, be highly beneficial to the military profession. Influenced by this idea, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, some days after the action, required Earl Cornwallis's approbation of his proceedings, or his leave to retire till enquiry could be instituted to investigate his conduct.”

unimpeached

unimpeached integrity and honour of the noble Earl, ought to be accused, or even suspected, of throwing an unmerited censure on so many hundreds as were concerned on that fatal day, merely *to console one single individual under a misfortune?* No, gentlemen, that letter § was given to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton publicly and avowedly as the real and deliberate opinion of the noble Earl upon the action; it was intended as an honourable testimony to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, that *he* had not forfeited the esteem of his General, by his conduct on that unfortunate day.

§ Copy of a letter from Earl Cornwallis to Colonel Tarleton.—“ You have forfeited no part of my esteem, “ as an officer, by the unfortunate event of the action “ of the 17th; the means you used to bring the enemy “ to action were able and masterly, and must ever do “ you honour; your disposition was unexceptionable: “ the total misbehaviour of the troops could alone have “ deprived you of the glory which was so justly your “ due.”

At that time Tarleton never dreamt of publishing a history of the Southern Campaigns ; but he always thought himself at liberty to publish a letter, which, in its own nature, was public.

Let any candid, liberal, and disinterested officer suggest any other purpose for which the noble Earl could have given Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton that letter, but for the purpose of a public vindication of his conduct.

Had Tarleton never produced this letter, after having been refused an examination by a court martial, his character and conduct might, indeed, have been exposed to attacks, not more sinister, but far more formidable than those of our Stricturist.

Had I been present\* at that unfortunate affair, (Cow Pens,) I should not hesitate

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\* When the army quitted Charlotte, I myself, with four or five other officers, sick of the yellow fever, were conveyed

one instant to declare my sentiments *most fully* to the whole world; but not having been an eye witness, I am obliged to bury in my own breast *many particulars* that I am strongly inclined to believe.

From my situation in the province of South Carolina, at that time (being at Camden), I had an opportunity of obtaining every information relative to that unfortunate action, by daily, nay hourly, conversing with various officers who had been present at that action, many of whom were uninfluenced by prejudice or *party*, and who, from their military abilities and well known honour, were incapable of misrepresenting the real facts, for various reasons

conveyed away in waggons. I was the *only* one that survived a week's march. From the inclemency of the season, and being frequently wetted by crossing rivers, I lost the use of my limbs for some months.

which

which I need not here enumerate. Interested as the world may well imagine me to have been, both on the defeat of my friend, and a corps I belonged to, I was most particularly induced to attempt to make myself master of the subject. I have given unwearied attention to every officer's account of that action, and have continued to seek for further information even to this hour. Without being too presumptuous, I think I may declare, that I am as fully master of that subject as it is possible for any one to be who was not actually present.

I shall now proceed, by stating a few extracts from different authors, and then reply to the errors in judgment imputed to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, by Roderick M'Kenzie.

The Marquis de Chastellux, whom our Stricturist brings first on the carpet, after censuring General Morgan for a manoeuvre  
he

he caused his troops to make during the action, concludes his remarks in the following words ; — *Strictures*, page 94.—

“ Whatever was the motive of this singular  
 “ monœuvre of General Morgan, the re-  
 “ sult of it was the defeat of Tarleton,  
 “ whose troops gave way on all sides with-  
 “ out the possibility of rallying.”—Our  
*Stricturist* next produces the account from  
 the *Annual Register* of 1781. He then be-  
 gins his own remarks in the following  
 words—*Strictures*, page 95—“ The Mar-  
 “ quis’s (de Chastellux) exposition of the  
 “ cause of the defeat, in spite of his asser-  
 “ tions that it has the sanction of General  
 “ Morgan, is flimsy and erroneous. The  
 “ editor of the *Annual Register* has been  
 “ deceived ; consequently, of these several  
 “ accounts, that given by Doctor Ramsay  
 “ deserves most attention.” Pray, gentle-  
 men of the army, why is the Marquis de  
 Chastellux’s exposition, *sanctioned by General*  
*Morgan,*

*Morgan*, who commanded against Tarleton, to be deemed flimsy and erroneous? And why is a notorious and avowedly rebellious writer (Dr. Ramsay) to be credited in preference to the Annual Register, or any other periodical writer? Is no person except our Stricturesist, and his favourite author (Ramsay), to be credited? But let his evidence be produced—Vide Strictures, page 117—“Of all improbable events, none “seemed to him (Earl Cornwallis) more “improbable, than that an inferior force, “two thirds militia, should gain such a “decisive advantage over his favourite “hero.” Thus says Ramsay; and in my humble opinion, *not much in favour of the British*. Let the Stricturesist make the most of this declaration of his favourite author. If either Earl Cornwallis’s, or Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton’s, dispatches or letters have thrown censure on any particular corps



corps employed that day, I am far from imagining that he will be thought to have removed it by the authorities he has quoted. Without confuting a single allegation in the accounts of that action, as given either by the noble Earl, or Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, he ventures to accuse Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton of four errors in judgment, which, with your permission, gentlemen of the army, we will separately investigate.

“ The first error in judgment to be im-  
 “ puted to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton,  
 “ on the morning of the 17th of January,  
 “ 1781, is, the not halting his troops be-  
 “ fore he engaged the enemy. Had he  
 “ done so, it was evident that the following  
 “ advantages would have been the result of  
 “ his conduct:—General Morgan’s force  
 “ and situation might have been distinctly  
 “ viewed, under cover of a very superior  
 Q “ cavalry ;

“ cavalry; the British infantry, fatigued  
“ with rapid marches, day and night, for  
“ some time past, as has been already ob-  
“ served, might have had rest and refresh-  
“ ment; a detachment from the several  
“ corps left with the baggage, together  
“ with batt-men, and officers’ servants,  
“ would have had time to come up, and  
“ join in the action. The artillery all this  
“ time might have been playing on the ene-  
“ my’s front, or either flank, without risque  
“ of insult; the commandants of regiments,  
“ Majors M‘Arthur and Newmarsh, officers  
“ who held commissions long before our  
“ author was born, and who had reputa-  
“ tions to this day unimpeached, might  
“ have been consulted; and, not to dwell  
“ on the enumeration of all the advan-  
“ tages which would have accrued from  
“ so judicious a delay, time would have  
“ been given for the approach of Earl  
“ Cornwallis

“ Cornwallis to the preconcerted point,  
 “ for the unattainment of which he has  
 “ been so much and so unjustly censured.”

The truth is, gentlemen, that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton did halt the troops for near half an hour, and made them throw of their knapsacks and blankets to render them lighter for action. It is equally true, that the troops did not receive all the *rest* and *refreshment* which our Stricterist wished them. They were not ordered to stack their arms before an enemy who were already formed in battle array; nor did they commence cooking their camp kettles under the protection of a cannonade; a fashion of feasting which I acknowledge, would have had the recommendation of novelty. I have the most perfect respect for Majors M'Arthur and Newmarsh; most particularly for the former, with whom I ever lived on service upon the strictest footing of friendship.

Consulting them perhaps might have been of use; though, in my humble opinion, (to borrow an idea from the Stricturist's cannonading dinner,) too many cooks generally spoil the broth. Earl Cornwallis judged Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to be sufficiently qualified for this business. He had commanded often times with distinguished perseverance and success, in at least *as arduous* situations\* as that of the unfortunate 17th of January. The idea of a cannonade that should have given Earl Cornwallis time to arrive at the scene of action, (to use the Stricturist's own words,) is an absurdity hitherto unparalleled. The

\* Vide the description of Beauford's defeat, where Tarleton, with the British Legion alone, a new corps, and had not seen much service, (at that time,) attacked Beauford with a chosen body of Continentals, killed a number, and made prisoner the whole corps, excepting about seventeen or eighteen.

army

army being near thirty miles distant, marching at the rate of four miles an hour, they could not have arrived under seven hours. This, in my opinion, would have been a devilish long cannonade indeed; and tho' the Stricturist remarks, that during this time the British might have rested and refreshed themselves, we are not to suppose that the Americans would have gone to sleep. Really, gentlemen, throughout this first criticism upon the action of the Cowpens, the Stricturist is so incomprehensible in any military sense, and shews himself so destitute of military knowledge, that I cannot treat it seriously.

“ The second error was, the un-officer  
 “ like impetuosity of directing the line to  
 “ advance before it was properly formed,  
 “ and before the reserve had taken its  
 “ ground; in consequence of which, as  
 “ might

“ might have been expected, the attack was  
 “ premature, confused, and irregular.”

While Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was reconnoitering the enemy on his right, a scattering fire commenced by some recruits of the 7th, who had but newly joined their regiment, and seen no service. This unsteady behaviour he silenced to the utmost of his power, and then led the line to action. In your description of the action—*Strictures*, page 97, you say:—“ The light  
 “ legion infantry and fuzileers were ordered  
 “ to form in line. Before this order was  
 “ put in execution, and while Major New-  
 “ marsh, who commanded the latter corps,  
 “ was *posting* his officers, the line, far from  
 “ complete, was led to the attack by Lieu-  
 “ tenant Colonel Tarleton himself.” The  
 idea of posting officers I am at a loss to  
 comprehend; such an expression was never  
 before used in any military production,  
 nor

nor was such a practice ever adopted in the field.

Every officer, when a regiment is ordered to *form*, of course knows his proper station without being *posted*\*. Again, in the same page, *Strictures* 97, you say;—  
“ The 71st regiment and cavalry, who had  
“ not as yet disentangled themselves from  
“ the brush wood with which Thickett  
“ Creek abounds, were directed to form,  
“ and wait for orders.” And in the following page, *Strictures* 98, thus you inform us; “ The reserve, which as yet had  
“ no orders to move from its first position,  
“ and consequently remained near a mile  
“ distant, was now directed to advance.  
“ When the line felt the advance of the

\* The idea is equally new and curious; and could only have been brought to life by the fertile and military genius of Dr. Browne and Roderick M'Kenzie,

“ 71st,

" 71st, all the infantry again moved on ; the  
" Continentals and backwoods-men gave  
" ground ; the British rushed forward."

First, sir, I will be so free as to tell you, that the action was fought very near two miles from Thickett Creek, in an open pine barren, and not one single *bush* on the field of battle to entangle the troops, as you are pleased to assert.

Secondly, sir, I will take upon me to maintain, that the 71st were not one mile in the rear, as you absurdly relate ; they were not three hundred yards distant ; they were equally concerned in this affair with the rest of the line. They moved up ; and when moving up to form in line with the rest of the troops, whether from their not taking ground enough, or from some other circumstance, their right flank *brushed* the left flank of the 7th regiment, and intermixed one with the other. Major M'Arthur,



thur, who commanded them, will not deny this fact. This, I hope, gentlemen of the army, is a plain proof they could not have been a mile distant. The whole front line might have been destroyed before they could have moved to that distance. Finally, fir, I must now inform the public, that *you* have *acknowledged* to officers that have conversed with you on these two subjects, since the publication of your Strictures, that you have mistated those facts.

You complain of the want of cannon and cavalry to support our troops. General Morgan had no cannon in the field to induce his troops to rally ; so far the Britn. were upon equal terms with him. And although the *main body* of the cavalry (in a most unaccountable manner) fled, your own account has proved there was a *sufficient force of cavalry* left in the field to repulse Washington's horse, although they were

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supported

supported by their Continentals--Vide Strictures, page 100. — " Lieutenant Colonel  
" Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse,  
" hesitated not to charge the whole of  
" Washington's cavalry, though supported  
" by the Continentals ; it was a small body  
" of officers, and a detachment of the 17th  
" dragoons who presented themselves on  
" this desperate occasion; the loss sustained  
" was in proportion to the danger of the  
" enterprize, and the whole body was re-  
" pulsed."

" The third error in this ruinous busi-  
" ness, was the omission of giving discre-  
" tional powers to that judicious veteran  
" M<sup>r</sup>Arthur, to advance with the reserve,  
" at the time that the front line was in  
" pursuit of the militia ; by which means  
" the connection, so necessary to troops en-  
" gaged in the field, was not preserved."

It may be proper, in every action, to give  
certain discretionary powers to experienced  
officers

officers. In the present instance, the arrangements made, as I have just shewn, by Colonel Tarleton himself, rendered such a power less necessary; but with or without discretionary powers, communicated in express terms, I have too high an opinion both of the courage and judgment of Major M'Arthur, to imagine that, commanding the reserve, he would remain three-quarters of a mile in the rear.—He might as well have been in England as in such a situation. In a word, the fact was not as you relate it—He was not three hundred yards in the rear. But I shall dwell no longer on this subject, as I believe your own confessions, subsequent to your publication, are on my side. You have acknowledged your misstatement in this instance, as well as in your description of the nature of the ground on which the action was fought, to officers who are ready to attest your confession.

The rest of this third error in judgment, imputed by you to Tarleton, has been sufficiently expatiated on in the remark on your second accusation.

STRICTURES, PAGE 109,

“ His fourth error was, ordering Captain Ogilvie, with a troop consisting of no more than forty men, to charge, before any impression was made on the Continentals, and before Washington’s cavalry had been engaged.”

Although I should sincerely have regretted the loss of Captain Ogilvie, not only as one of my most intimate friends, but as a distinguished and gallant officer, yet, had he, together with his whole troop, been massacred and annihilated to a man, this partial misfortune could not have lost the day.

STRIC-

STRICTURES, PAGE 109.

“ The next, and the most destructive (for  
“ I will not pretend to follow him through  
“ all his errors) was in not bringing up a  
“ column of cavalry, and in completing  
“ the rout ; which, by his own account,  
“ had commenced through the whole Ame-  
“ rican infantry.”

Two separate times Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton sent for the cavalry to advance ; but, regardless of his orders, and their own honour, they went off the field without engaging. Be this known to the world.— Their most sanguine friends can never speak one word in behalf of their conduct on that day. They did not advance. But, gentlemen, why is Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to be condemned for their misconduct ? This accusation of the Stricturist's, is the height of injustice and malevolence. If  
they

they were determined not to advance, how could he compel them to do it? It is *well known*, that in personal gallantry, Tarleton shewed them a most brilliant example on that occasion.—He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving *beir* disgrace. Exertions were used, and most vigourous ones, to enforce obedience to the orders, of the gallant commander: some officers went so far as to cut down several of their men, in order to stop the flight. The conduct of the cavalry was most astonishing; for they certainly had served well, and with distinction, before that day: they had often charged when exposed to a heavy fire.

I need not be diffident in giving my opinion of the disposition Tarleton made of his troops that day, when it is sanctioned by the opinion of so distinguished an officer

officer as Earl Cornwallis. Vide extract from Earl Cornwallis's letter to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, *Strictures*, page 105, and in Tarleton's *History*, page 252, " *your disposition was unexceptionable.*"

But setting aside the noble Earl's opinion for a moment only, I will ask any man, who claims a share of military knowledge, if it were possible for any officer to have drawn up his forces in a more military and advantageous order? He was opposed to a numerous enemy, in an open pine-barren, with no natural strength to protect his flanks; the militia and backwoods-men) from their loose manner of fighting, were in a situation to out flank him.—His force consisted of the light and legion infantry, the 7th regiment, the 71st, and a body of near *three hundred* horse. The light infantry, legion infantry, and 7th regiment, were drawn up in front,  
with

with a squadron of cavalry to protect each flank—a most military substitute to supply the want of a natural defence. The 71st regiment, and the remainder of the cavalry, were in reserve. I will boldly assert, that it was not possible to dispose of his troops more judiciously.

The means Tarleton used to bring the enemy to action, would do honour to any officer. The unwearied attention and perseverance he shewed to oblige them to fight, must ever do him credit; and even defies the rancour and malevolence of Roderick M'Kenzie, who in this point is forced to admit his merit.

Earl Cornwallis pays the highest tribute of praise to Tarleton, for his vigorous exertions in compelling the enemy to halt and engage. Vide extract from Earl Cornwallis's letter to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, *Strictures*, page 105. “ The means  
“ you



“ you used to bring the enemy to action  
 “ were able and masterly, and will ever  
 “ do you honour.”

Your account of the action at Cow Pens, was confessedly written with an intent to vindicate the conduct of the troops, and to impute the whole blame and misfortune of that day to several errors in judgment committed by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; yet in your own account of that business, you furnish proofs against yourself; as for instance, vide page 100:—“ The advance  
 “ of the British fell back, and communi-  
 “ cated a panick to others, which soon be-  
 “ came general.” Is not this passage, in plain English, as follows:—“ The advance  
 “ of the British *fled*, and were *soon accom-*  
 “ panied by the *rest of the line*, who *fled*  
 “ likewise, but *never rallied?*” To construe this as good behaviour in the troops, I find a very difficult task; but your opinion

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and

and mine may, perhaps differ on this subject.

Your own account allows also, that the British had once gained the victory, but did not chuse to keep it :—you aver even that the enemy fled in all quarters. Vide *Strictures*, page 98 :—“ The Continental  
 “ and back-woods men gave ground, and  
 “ the British rushed forward.” *Strictures*,  
 page 99, “ They (the cavalry) stood aloof,  
 “ without availing themselves of the fairest  
 “ opportunity of reaping the laurels which  
 “ lay before them ;—the infantry were not  
 “ in a condition to overtake the fugitives.”  
 Again, in *Strictures*, page 99, “ General  
 “ Morgan ordered Colonel Washington,  
 “ with his dragoons, to cover his retreat,  
 “ and to check the pursuit.”

In pages 98 and 99 of your *Strictures*, you acknowledge the Americans were beaten, and flying, but rallied ; and, in page  
 100, you

100, you allow " The British, in their turn,  
" fled, but never rallied."

I must confess, I cannot myself find out where, in your description of this action, you have confuted Earl Cornwallis's opinion of the conduct of the troops, and Tarleton ; and therefore, until you give me very different arguments to bring me over to your opinion, I shall adopt the noble Earl's. You meant well, sir ; but a bad advocate employed in a cause, does more harm than good. That is exactly your case ; for your own description of the action, intentionally meant to vindicate, condemns the very cause you wish to defend.

You inform us, that your account of the action has been submitted to the judgment of several respectable officers who were in this action, and that it has met with their entire approbation, I hope I shall

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not

not incur the displeasure of thol. officers, when, with the most perfect respect, I inform them, they have sanctioned an account, replete with erroneous statements of facts\*, and glaring absurdities§.

After all you have written—after various quotations from different authors—after having charged Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton with four particular errors in judgment—you cannot deny this plain fact: The Americans, both militia and Conti-

\* Surely it must be allowed most erroneous to state, that the 71st were a mile in the rear, when they were not three hundred yards; and that the reserve were entangled in the brush-wood with which Thickett's Creek abounds, when the action was fought very near two miles from the Creek, on an open pine-barren, and not one single bush on the field of battle.

§ Surely no person, after a moment's reflection, can suppose that a cannonade could have been kept up long enough to bring Earl Cornwallis, with the army, to that spot, from which he was thirty miles distant; nor can any man support so unmilitary an idea, as *posting* officers in action.

mentals,

mentals, fled, but rallied, and renewed the engagement; when the British, in their turn, fled, but never rallied. It is certain, the British had once gained the victory, but did not keep it: your own, and every other account, agree in this point.

In two instances you reprobate Doctor Ramsay's conduct, and reproach him with the baseness of charging the brother of an English Duke with a desire to receive a commission from Congress, and justly stigmatize him for his arrogance in daring to censure the honourable and distinguished character of a Montcrief; but yet you are happy in quoting every passage from that notorious author, that you imagine may tend to degrade Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, or detract from his military fame. I have honourably related, according to the best information I have been able to obtain, the various conduct of the different corps;

corps; and having justly censured those who deserve censure, I cannot, sir, permit the regiment to which you belonged to, (the 71st), to retreat unnoticed. I trust, the army, to whom I address my discourse, will allow them an equal share with the rest of the line, both in the merits and demerits of that day; though you wish to make the world believe, by your description of that unfortunate affair, that they had no share in the action until all the other infantry were totally beaten. I tell the world positively, sir, they were engaged (vide page 104); and although the utmost exertions were used by their officers, they, with the rest of the line, fled. Though I know full well the Highlanders are a *gallant and bold race*, please, sir, to recollect, *they are but men*.

STRICTURES, PAGE 89 AND 90.

“ To examine whether proper use was  
“ made of the advantages which occurred  
“ on the morning of the 17th of January,  
“ both before and during the action ; and,  
“ to trace to its very source, a fountain that  
“ overflowed with blood, and swept along  
“ its torrent destruction to the interest of  
“ Great Britain.”

Here indeed you rise into horror.—  
“ *Fountains overflowing with blood! destruc-*  
“ *tion! bloody torrents!*” *Ghosts, hobgoblins,*  
*Demons, Tartarus,* I imagine follow! I  
was terrified, and shut the book! Had  
I been aware that I should meet with such  
a bloody description of the fate we poor  
soldiers are doomed to suffer, I should have  
been afraid to open it.

STRICT-

STRICTURES, PAGE 107.

“ If to be disinterested is necessary to  
“ the investigation of truth, I come so far  
“ qualified for this task. Unconnected  
“ with party, devoid of spleen, and too  
“ unimportant, to be affected by general  
“ reflections on collective bodies of military  
“ men—candour and impartiality may be  
“ allowed me.”

I cite this passage neither to laugh at it,  
nor treat it seriously.—It carries its answer  
with it. Those who have read the preced-  
ing part of your Strictures, may possibly  
conceive, that intense application may have  
distracted your mind, and affected your  
understanding. After cramming one hun-  
dred and seven pages with abuse, malevo-  
lence, and scurrility, can you, in your sober  
senses, expect us to believe that your pen  
is guided by candour and impartiality?  
and



and that you are uninfluenced by *interest*, *party*, or spleen.---Such an insult upon the common sense of the world would be too gross.

STRICTURES, PAGE 136.

“ He (Ramfay) has engaged my esteem  
“ for having done no more than justice  
“ to Ferguson, and no less than jus-  
“ tice to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton.---  
“ His sentiments of the former are already  
“ in your possession; and with respect to  
“ the latter---read, and judge.”

Whenever your favourite author (Ramfay) makes an attack upon any officer in the British army, excepting Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, you immediately reprobate him, and lament that “ you are compelled to deplore such a mixture of alloy, “ with his shining abilities.” Page 136.)

But whenever you can find any passage in

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this

this author tending to detract from Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's character as an officer, you adopt it with avidity, and give it all the aid of your own *candid* remarks.

Let us examine whether it be true, that the following passage, which you have transcribed in triumph from your congenial historian, "does no less than justice to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton."

" Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton had hitherto acquired distinguished reputation ;  
 " but he was greatly indebted for his military fame to good fortune and accident.  
 " In all his previous engagements he either had the advantage of surprising an incautious enemy --- of attacking them when panic-struck after recent defeats--- or of being opposed to undisciplined militia. He had gathered no laurels by hard fighting against an equal force ;  
 " his repulse on this occasion (Cow Pens) did

“ did more essential injury to the British  
 “ interest, than was compensated by all  
 “ his victories. Tarleton’s defeat was the  
 “ first link in a grand chain of causes,  
 “ which finally drew down ruin, both in  
 “ North and South Carolina, on the Royal  
 “ interest.”

Out of the mouth of your own witness,  
 I will judge both you and him ! This un-  
 happy quotation contains the antidote to  
 its own venom, and establishes the military  
 fame which it professes to depreciate. If  
 you had consulted Lloyd (vide page 145 of  
 his work) instead of Ramsay, you would  
 have learned that victory is the result of  
 action. “ *No army conquers merely by resist-*  
 “ *ing : you may repel an enemy ; but victory is*  
 “ *the result of action.*”

You having studied in a different school,  
 may naturally condemn Tarleton for the  
 enterprize and perseverance which enabled

his to surprize his enemy ; for the celerity of his marches ; for his instant decision ; for that quickness, that rapidity of attack, which prevents an enemy from forming, and *insures* victory with *inferior* force ; for every quality, in short, and for all the talents which constitute the very excellence and perfection of a *partizan*. Upon your principles, it must be admitted, that the attack on the the American cavalry at Leno's Ferry was extremely unmilitary. Neither was it civil to force Colonels Washington and Lee to save their lives by swimming the Santee river with their dinner in their mouths. It would certainly have been more polite in Tarleton to have offered them a boat. Had this affair happened in the winter season, it certainly would have been a most inhuman action ; but the warmth of the weather in some measure palliated the incivility. The defeat of Sumpter, near Camden,

den, was still more horrible! It was a barbarous and inhuman murder! Some of those poor devils were killed (with their spoons in their mouths, eating omminey,) before ever they could stand to their arms. There can be no excuse pleaded for such an act of cruelty. Besides, where was the bravery of surprizing and attacking that General so suddenly as not to give him time to put his coat on\*?

But now, Sir, to be more serious;---your favourite author (Ramfay) is as incorrect

\* An officer well known in India sent to Tippoo Saib, when at the head of one hundred thousand troops, requiring him to meet him (honourably) with one hundred men on each side. Tippoo, on receiving the challenge, said to a colonel in the Imperial service, who happened to be in his camp; "What would your master say to this?" The German officer, who probably possessed some of Tarleton's *unmilitary* ideas, perceived that Tippoo did not expect an answer. The magnanimity of Ramfay, Roderick M'Kenzie, and Dr. Brown, would doubtless have exhorted him to accept the challenge.

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in his description of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's successes, as you are malevolent. Be pleased, Sir, to recollect the defeat of Colonel Beaufort, with a *chosen body of Continentals*, shortly after the surrender of Charlestown. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton sent an officer to Colonel Beaufort, when he found he had approached him so close, that an action could not be avoided, to inform him, that if he chose to surrender his corps as prisoners of war, they should receive the same terms as their fellow soldiers that were captured in Charlestown. This Colonel Beaufort positively refused; halted, and formed his troops for action. Tarleton advanced, attacked the Americans, killed 90 on the spot; and every other individual of his whole corps was either wounded or taken prisoners, excepting the commanding officer and about seventeen or eighteen men, who mounted themselves

elves on the waggon horses and escaped by flight. Surely, Sir, this cannot be construed a surprize or sudden attack, for Colonel Beaufort had above an hour's notice to form his troops and prepare for battle.

The numbers on each side were nearly equal, but rather in favour of the Americans.

Your favourite author (Ramsay) has harped very much on the defeats of Ferguson and Tarleton, at King's Mountain and Cow Pens ; and attributes greatly the destruction of the British interest in the southern parts of America, to these events. Although the actions of King's Mountain, and Cow Pens, were severely felt at that instant of time, they were only partial misfortunes. I will be so bold as to assert, that these misfortunes did not in any degree contribute to the loss of America, nor could many such misfortunes have produced that calamity. Our  
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ruin was completed by permitting a *superior French fleet* to ride triumphant on the American seas the autumn of 1781. That, and that only, ruined our cause in America, and disgracefully put an end to the war.—There the nail was clinched!—

Wherever an opening is to be found for detraction, or reflections on Lieut. Col. Tarleton as an officer, Roderick M'Kenzie is sure to come forward, but as cautiously does he avoid touching on particular events to which the most envenomed pen must render a tribute of praise: as for instance, the action of *Monk's-Corner*; *Lenor's-Ferry*; *Colonel Beauford's defeat* in the upper parts of Carolina; and *Sumpter's defeat near Camden*. Not one single comment has this *candid* Strictures made on either of these actions: though in Page 107 of his Strictures, he declares himself so *disinterested*, *candid* and *devoid* of spleen; and *impartial*. You, Gentlemen,



tllemen of the Army, are well acquainted with their merits ; so is Roderick M'Kenzie ; but he cautiously avoids saying one single word on any of those gallant, conspicuous, and decisive actions, knowing they tend so much to the credit of Tarleton and his corps. But still our Sticturist assures us that he is impartial, candid, and devoid of spleen. I am not one of those credulous mortals who put faith in such professions of candour and impartiality. I would as soon believe that the Begums of Oude were coming from India to appear in behalf of their much injured friend, Mr. Hastings.

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## IN CONCLUSION.

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**T**HE Stricturist is armed at all points against Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; he reproaches him with a desire of appearing as great *in the cabinet as in the field*.

Yet surely he need not be jealous of Tarleton's literary merit, after having himself displayed such extensive knowledge and talents which he must have acquired from an intimacy with so many celebrated authors, one of whom he *gives us a quotation from*, almost in every page of his Strictures. His memory must have been very retentive, as we cannot imagine him to be so wanting in truth, merely to have made a pompous display of their names *at second hand*, and never to have perused them.

I cannot

I cannot but remind him (at parting) of his most elaborate studies, and bring them all concisely to view, with his own words and quotations. And a very pretty little library he brings before us.

Strictures, page 4; The discriminating talents of a Hume, a Sewart, or a Gibbon, which are fatellites of true genius.—Page 7; Goodall, Tytler, Stewart, and Whitaker; writers of honor, discernment, and veracity, who penetrated the thick cloud of misrepresentation, and placed that much injured Princess (Mary Queen of Scots) in the genuine light.—Page 11: He professes himself well acquainted with the deep discernment of a Machiavel.—Page 21 and 22; He sings the praises of a Leonidas at Thermopylæ; the immortal Wolfe at the Heights of Abraham; the Corsican Chief, Paoli, and his historian Boswell.—I beg pardon, I had like to have forgot the Parish Priests of Cor-

fica.—Page 27; He seems well informed of the History of Candia and Rhodes.—Page 38; he laments with the celebrated Ganganelli.—Page 125; he produces Tacitus and Livy.—Page 135; by his introducing the talisman of a necromancer, we may with propriety suppose that he may possess some skill in the *black art*, and be a greater conjurer in that science than in the art of war.—Page 142; Keewee and Cherokee, plainly evince that his geographical knowledge of America, extends even to the remote settlements of the Indians.—Page 143, Muller's Elements of Fortication, are brought in evidence to his skill as an engineer. — Page 147; Kokenso proves also, that he has some cursory connection with Poland; nor can he be wanting in philosophy mathematics, or astronomy; and the situation both of the heavenly and earthly bodies.—As in page 125, he is ostentatious of  
of

of his knowledge of a certain author's description of the world,

“ He now to sense, now nonsense, leaning,

“ Means not, but blunders round about a meaning,

He here happily mixes the dulce with the utile. He shews a pretty taste for poetry ; though it must be confessed that he is not equally fortunate in the application of these verses ; which his readers, I believe, will think, might have been more properly addressed to his own compositions than to Tarleton's.

Nor shall Ramsay, the Annual Register, or the *Scots Magazine*, pass unnoticed in the catalogue of his studies ; but as they do not carry with them such fine pompous names, I thought fit to place them last.

Was I to make known my own extensive knowledge of the celebrated histories of Jack the Giant-Killer, and the mighty

Tom

Tom Thumb, who was swallowed up by a cow, the world certainly would not render me the same tribute of praise on the improvement of my mind, as they must to him for such superior studies. But in my humble opinion, the *one* would be full as *appropos* to the American war as the *other*.

“ Most learned young man ! a second “ Daniel ! ” What a fund of knowledge has he treasured up in his capacious mind !

I beg leave to compliment him on the secret happiness and satisfaction he must enjoy from such extensive, profitable, and elaborate studies ; and at the same time, condole with myself, and avow my own inability and idleness ; for, by heavens, I never read one fiftieth part, during my whole life, of such edifying productions.

But although our *Stricturist* has plainly proved his application and extensive knowledge as an historian, a philosopher, a poet,  
and

and a necromancer; which must tend ever greatly to his advantage. Permit me, Gentlemen of the Army, to ask you what have Hume, Gibbon, Stewart, Goodall, Tytler, Whitaker, Machiavel, Lemonidas, Wolfe, Ganganelli, Mary Queen of Scots, Boswell, Paoli, and Parish Priests) to do with the American war, or Tarleton's conduct as an officer?

It grieves me much whenever I find a foldier disgrace his pen with indelicate abuse and vulgar wit; throughout our Stricturist's whole book, he is exposed to the reproach of gross personality against Colonel Tarleton; in one part he has no scrupled to compare him to a butterfly—vide Strictures, page 7. “ He (Tarleton) “ appears to substitute a professional experience, so limited as scarcely to exceed “ the duration of a butterfly's existence.” And, with the addition of the following elegant

elegant note, " Natural historians relate,  
 " that this insect is, in the first period of its  
 " existence, a crawling grub ; in the se-  
 " cond, a fluttering uselefs fly ; and that  
 " in the third, it dies."

I surely may, in return, be allowed to  
 present him with the opinion of a Huron  
 on such productions, when confined in the  
 Bastile with Gordon the Janfanist, who  
 gives him several books to read, during  
 their confinement ;—the story is Voltaire's,  
 and none of mine,—(vide the Sincere Hu-  
 ron, as translated from Voltaire.) " The  
 " good man had some little books of cri-  
 " ticism, some of those *periodical* pamphlets  
 " wherein men, *incapable* of producing any  
 " thing themselves, blacken the produc-  
 " tions of others ; where a Vifé insults a  
 " Racine, and a Fardit a Fenelon. The  
 " Huron ran over some of them.

‘ I com-



‘ I compare them to certain gnats, that lodge their eggs in the posteriors of the finest horses, which do not, however, prevent their running.’

The two philosophers scarce deigned to cast their eyes upon these excrements of literature.

For the great pains our Stricturist has taken to ridicule and abuse Colonel Tarleton, he really deserves some reward. If he should emigrate from hence to the East, I think a contract for opium and elephants would not over reward the labours of his pen; but should those torrid regions not be congenial to his constitution, what think you of his being made Purveyor to the Lions in the Tower\*? It is a good thing where he may be able to serve

\* This place is worth £1000 per annum, and in the gift of the Constable of the Tower (Earl Cornwallis.)

his

his friend Dr. Brown \*, by appointing him Head Keeper, a proper employment for such a shameless destructor of public or private fame, who should be banished the society of all human beings, and destined to live with savage beasts.

\* Although Dr. Brown died some time this winter, I have not deviated from the old adage " De mortuis nil nisi bonum." This book was written, and the greatest part printed last July.

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