

said country, to aid in the execution of these presents, for such is our pleasure.

"Given at St. Germain en Laye, the 12th day of May, 1678, and of our reign the 35th.

"LOUIS,
"COLBERT."

On receipt of this commission, La Salle, together with Father Hennepin and the Chevalier de Fonti, set sail from Rochelle on the 14th July, 1678, with thirty men, and arrived at Quebec about two months afterwards, and proceeded at once to Fort Frontenac; and on the 18th November, in the same year, launched the first vessel that ever floated on the waters of Ontario, and started immediately afterwards on that voyage of discovery which has made his name so famous in the world. In La Salle's absence, and during his voyages, his discoveries created for him many enemies, including M. de la Bane, who succeeded De Frontenac in the Government of Canada; and although Sieur de la Forest was left in charge of the fort, he took possession of it, pretending, amongst other things, that La Salle had abandoned it. Thus will it be seen that in 1682 this unprincipled official sequestered Fort Frontenac.

M. de Denonville was appointed Governor of Canada in 1685, and on his arrival proceeded to Fort Frontenac with about 2000 troops, which in those days was considered a great force, and showed the very great importance attached to the maintenance of the fort at that time.

No events of any serious moment occurred at Fort Frontenac until July, 1687, when the same governor was guilty of an act of treachery, which not only reflected eternal disgrace upon his name, but was the ostensible cause of embroiling the country in a war with the Five Nation Indians, of the tribe called Ganneyousses and Kentes. He invited them to the fort to confer with him, and then seizing about forty or fifty men and about eighty women and children, took them as prisoners, sent them to Montreal, whence they were forwarded to France.

Fort Frontenac was besieged in 1687 for one month by the Indians, who were unsuccessful. In 1689 it was blown up and abandoned by the French, who found it inconvenient to maintain the fort at so great a distance from Montreal. The fort was then under the command of Sieur de Valrenne, and the order for its destruction was given by M. de Denonville, much to the disgust of M. de Frontenac, who succeeded him in the government.

In August, 1695, M. de Frontenac caused the fort to be rebuilt, and sent seven hundred men there to complete the work. This scheme was strenuously opposed by M. de Champigny, then Intendant; but notwithstanding the efforts put forth by him, they had no effect upon De Frontenac, and he subsequently had the satisfaction of learning that the King and his minister had approved of the course he had pursued.

The revictualing and re-establishing of the fort cost about 12,000 livres (\$3000), a large sum in those days. The precise position of the fort is not now known, but from the evidence of a manuscript published in 1838, under the direction of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, entitled "Memoires sur les Affaires du Canada, depuis 1749 jusqu'à 1760," it is thought that it was situated not far from Tête du Pont Barracks. The following is a translation of the description given at page 115 of the manuscript: "Fort Frontenac was built by the Count of the same name, then Governor-General of Canada, to restrain the Five Nations. It was situated at the bottom of a bay, which a little river flowing into Lake Ontario forms, close to the junction of Lake Ontario and the river St. Lawrence. It consisted of four stone curtains, 120 feet each, defended by four square bastions. The walls were not good (this was written of them in 1758), and were defended by neither ditches nor palisades. There was no terrace to sustain it on the inside. A wooden gallery was built all around for communicating from one bastion to another. The platforms of these bastions were mounted on wooden piles, and the curtains were pierced for loop-holes." For more than half a century nothing very remarkable appears to have taken place at the fort beyond the ordinary business—the transmission of troops, ammunition, and goods, except, indeed, an occasional unpleasantness with the Indians.

In 1758 the commandant at Fort Frontenac was a Monsieur Payan de Noyan, a gentleman of Normandy, and King's Lieutenant at Three Rivers. His command, which was much beneath his rank, had been given him, it is said, to enable him to arrange his business affairs, which at that time were not in a very satisfactory condition.

He was apprised that the English were busily engaged in collecting forces at Fort Buril for the special purpose of attacking Fort Frontenac. He warned M. de Vaudreuil, then Governor-General, of their intention, and asked for reinforcements. To these applications M. de Vaudreuil paid little or no attention—in fact it is asserted that on receipt of his last letter for assistance, the Governor-General shrugged his shoulders and said, "Qu'il fallait que cet officier eût peur." The result proved the correctness of De Noyan's repeated warnings, and the folly of the Governor in disregarding them, for on the 25th of August, 1758, Colonel Bradstreet, the English General, appeared before Frontenac, and in the short space of three days M. de Noyan surrendered as prisoner of war, and the English first possessed the site of the present city of Kingston.

The object at that time was to destroy the fort, and having taken all the valuables, provisions, munitions of war, and merchandise, intended to supply the posts at Niagara, Detroit, and others, Colonel Bradstreet burned down the fort and the vessels, and left with his troops prior to the reinforcements leaving Montreal.

A small detachment of troops and Canadians under the command of Chevalier Bénéot was sent to Frontenac in the fall of 1758, partly to protect merchandise and ammunition passing up and down, and partly to rebuild the fort, and afterwards the Sieur de Cresse, an assistant engineer, with Captain Laforce, a sailor, were sent there to build two new schooners, to endeavor, if possible, to maintain the supremacy on the lakes, and also to furnish Fort Niagara with supplies with greater facility.

This was the concluding act of the French here, except to abandon it, which was done the following year, soon after the capture of Fort Niagara, on the 24th of July, 1759. Quebec was captured on the 14th of September, in the same year, and all French interference effectually prevented. From this year, therefore, we may date its change of rulers, although it was not settled by the English until long after this period.

In connection with this part of our sketch the following postscript of a letter from M. Doreil to Marshal Belle Isle, dated Quebec, 31st August, and 1st September, 1758, may be interesting:

"News from Montreal of the 29th informs us that the English force which proceeded to Lake Ontario with cannon, rendezvoused at the Bay of Bombardure, and sent a vanguard of 2700 men against Frontenac, a miserable *bicoque*, having a garrison of only fifty men. It is our entrepôt of provisions and goods for all the upper-country posts, which constitute the entire resource of Canada. It is the key of Lake Ontario, the port which holds all our navy, consisting, in part, of the vessels taken at Chouaquen by M. de Montcalm, two years ago. The enemy no doubt is master of it at present; whilst another force is proceeding, perhaps, against Niagara, a very important post, which has been skilfully fortified by a captain belonging to the battalion of La Reine, but equally bare with the other. All the upper-country posts, of which Duquesne forms a part, fall of themselves. We have more than 2000 men scattered among them, and that accelerates the total ruin of Canada. All the Canadians, who were beginning their harvest, are put in motion to proceed to that quarter, but they will certainly arrive too late; the harvest will suffer, and the Marquis de Montcalm, who, since the fall of Louisbourg, is menaced by the strong army in his front, will not be reinforced. What would it be were he beaten and cut off? 'Tis impossible, reasonably, to con-

ceal the fact that everything is to be feared, and very little to be hoped. M. de Vaudreuil has remained in too great security in regard to the important post of Frontenac, and he is the dupe of the over-confidence he has placed in the Indians, whose services he needs; but they must always be treated with caution and distrust. More foresight, activity, and vigilance are, besides, necessary when one has to do with a powerful enemy who is always superior in force and means. I tremble with fear that we have not had the precaution nor time to burn the sloops and bateaux which we had at Frontenac, and that the enemy will profit by them to cut us off absolutely from all access to Lake Ontario, whereby all our people beyond it will be made prisoners. It is no less to be feared that the Indians, who usually side with the strongest, or most fortunate, will all abandon us to range themselves alongside the English.

"September 3d. My fears are too well-founded, my Lord; the enemy is master of the Fort of Frontenac, or Cataragui, since the 27th of August. No precaution was taken with our navy. The English, more careful than we, have burnt it, with the exception of two twenty-gun brigs, which they have preserved, the more effectually to exclude us from Lake Ontario.

"The provisions and merchandise destined for supplying all our posts in the upper countries, to which Frontenac had, as it was, served as an entrepôt, are lost, and what is still more vexatious, is the loss of a considerable artillery. This principally consisted of the cannon taken from the enemy at Braddock's affair, in 1755, and at that of Chouaquen, in 1756. There were at least eighty pieces of cannon there. Everything is now to be feared for Fort Niagara, which indeed is good, but as bare as Frontenac."

Conditions on which M. de Noyan, Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, King's Lieutenant for the Town of Three Rivers, Commandant for the King at Fort Frontenac, proposes to surrender it to His Britannic Majesty.

1. Sieur de Noyan promises to surrender Fort Frontenac generally, with all its dependencies, to Colonel Bradstreet, commandant of the troops of England.

2. The officers and soldiers of the garrison, and others actually at this post, shall remain prisoners of war, until an agreement be concluded for their exchange by the Marquis de Montcalm and the English General.

3. The sick and wounded shall be attended at the expense of the King of Great Britain.

4. He shall guarantee against all insults, on the part of the English soldiers and Indians, the officers, soldiers, and all other persons whatsoever, now actually in the Fort.

5. The Colonel shall permit the ornaments and sacred vessels of the chapel to be removed in the baggage of the chaplain, and Sieur de Noyan promises to give up, faithfully, all the munitions of war and provisions, and generally all the goods and implements that are actually in the magazines of said Fort.

6. Sieur de Noyan demands that there be furnished him, his soldiers, and the rest of the persons with him in the Fort, conveyances to transport their baggage and necessities for the voyage.

FRONTENAC, 27th August, 1758.

Colonel Bradstreet, in consideration of the infirmities of M. de Noyan, commandant of this Fort, permits him to return to Montreal, and to take four men; the same to Madame Duvivier, Madame Barollon, and the other women belonging to this Fort, who are without men.

(Signed)

JN. BRADSTREET and DE NOYAN.

M. De Noyan engages to procure Colonel Schuyler in exchange for himself, or some other person, should it happen that Mr. Schuyler has been already exchanged.

After the capitulation was concluded, Colonel Bradstreet permitted all the French in Fort Frontenac to depart for Montreal, in Canada, under the promise M. De Noyan has given to have a like number of persons and ranks surrendered as soon as the same can be done, and conveyed to Fort George.

(Signed)

DE NOYAN and JOHN BRADSTREET.

Fort Frontenac, 27th August, 1758.

On the 12th or 13th of August, 1758, Bradstreet started from Fort Craven with 2737 men under his command.

We must not close this chapter of French events without referring once more to the eminent founder of the first settlement in Upper Canada—Count de Frontenac. His noble descent and military education made him somewhat proud and overbearing. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, it was his nature to command; he wished to rule alone, and consequently he rendered himself unpopular. Nevertheless, he was possessed of many sterling qualities. In 1672 he was Governor of Canada, and for the second time occupied the same distinguished position in 1698. After having raised New France from a miserably low condition to an exalted state of material advancement, the brave and talented Count de Frontenac died at Quebec, on the 26th November, 1698, in the seventy-seventh year of his age, respected and beloved by thousands of the Canadian people.

We now enter a new state of affairs, and Canada must be looked upon as a British colony, under the protection of the greatest power on earth. Instead of portraying the vicissitudes of a military settlement, governed by arbitrary lawgivers—a sanguinary penal code, and oppressed by a proud and poor nobility—we have now to record the progress of a peaceful community, enjoying the inestimable blessing of a larger liberty.

There is nothing of any considerable importance to record for many years after the treaty of peace had been signed. The people had willingly laid aside the implements of warfare to devote themselves to agricultural and other useful pursuits, and very rapidly found themselves, as the natural results of their labors, in possession not only of the necessities but comforts of life. In the early part of their history, these people were taught to expect every outrage at the hands of the British, and were agreeably surprised at the humane manner in which they were treated. Their gratitude was further awakened by the large sums of money which were forthcoming to alleviate their sufferings during the pinching times of famine and distress.

In order to give the reader some information as to the circumstances which led to the settlement of Upper Canada, we must unfortunately refer to the element of discord which made its appearance in 1776 among the subjects of the British realm in America, and which finally culminated in rebellion—without the slightest intention to wound the feelings of our friends in the United States of America, we must record the facts, humiliating though they be, after the Declaration of Independence, the result of which was averse to those who were loyal to the Crown of England, who adhered to the old flag under which they had been born, had come to the New World and had prospered—a rebellion which was attended and followed by persecution, violence, imprisonment, confiscation, banishment, and too often death. Under these circumstances a stream of refugee loyalists, who could not separate themselves from allegiance to the Throne of England, set in towards the wilderness of Canada, many of whom settled in these counties, especially along the Bay of Quinte.

The contest was originally between Old England and New England, while the Middle and Southern States were for peace. By disseminating specious statements and spreading abroad partisan sentiments, Massa-

chusetts took the lead. Founded by Puritans (who themselves were the most intolerant bigots, and became the greatest persecutors America has seen), these States possessed the proper elements with which to kindle discontent. Thus we learn that independence was not the primary object of revolt, and we have seen that the leaders in rebellion were principally New Englanders, and were actuated mainly by mercenary motives, unbounded selfishness, and bigotry. So assiduously have our fathers, who are now known as the United Empire Loyalists, been branded by most American writers as altogether base, that it becomes us to cast back the misstatements—to tear away the specious covering of the American Revolutionary heroes, and throw the sunlight of truth upon their character, and dispel the false, foul stigma which the utterances of nearly a hundred years have essayed to fasten upon the noble band of loyalists. Up to 1776 the Whigs as well as Tories were United Empire Loyalists, and it was only when the King's forces required taxes; when the colonists were required no longer to smuggle; when they could not dispossess the Tories of the power and emoluments of office; it was only then that the Declaration of Independence was signed.

John Hancock, whose name stands first upon the document in such bold characters, had been a successful smuggler, whereby he had acquired his millions, and no wonder he staked his thousands upon the issue.

Evidence is not wanting to show that many of the leaders of the rebellion, had they been holders of office, would have been true to the British Crown, as were those whom they envied. Every man who took part on the rebel side has been written a hero; but it is asking too much to request us to believe that all the holders of office were base and lost to the feelings of national independence and patriotism; more especially when a large proportion of them were admittedly educated and religious men, while on the contrary the rebels alone were actuated by patriotism and the nobler feelings of manhood. Apart from the merits or demerits of their cause, it must be admitted that the circumstances of the times force upon us the thought that a comparatively few needy office-seekers or lookers after other favors from the Crown, not being able to obtain the loaves and fishes, began to stir up strife. A few possessed of sufficient education, by aid of the wealthy contraband traders, were enabled, by popular sensational speeches and inflammatory pamphlets, to arouse the feelings of the uneducated; and finally to create such a current of political hatred to the Crown that it could not be stayed, and which swept away the ties which naturally bound them to Great Britain.

We may easily imagine the surprise which many experienced in after days when the war had ended, and their independence was acknowledged, to find themselves heroes, and their names commemorated as fathers of their country; whereas, they had fought only for money, or plunder, or smuggled goods, or because they had not office. In not a few cases it is such men whose names have served for the high-sounding Fourth of July orations; for the buncombe speechifier and the flippant editor to base their eulogistic memoriams. Undoubtedly there are some entitled to the position they occupy in the temple of fame, but the vast majority seemed to be actuated by mercenary motives. We have authenticated cases where prominent individuals took sides with the rebels because they were disappointed in obtaining office, and innumerable instances where wealthy persons were arrested, ostensibly on suspicion, and compelled to pay large fines and then set at liberty. No feudal tyrant in Europe in the olden times enforced blackmail from the traveller with less compunction than rebel committees exacted money from wealthy individuals who desired simply to remain neutral. They held the opinion that to rebel was not only unnecessary but wrong. They believed the evils of which the colonists had just reason to complain were not so great as to justify the extreme measures taken by those who had signed the Declaration of Independence; that any injustice existing was but temporary, and would, when calmly and legitimately represented to the Home Government, be at once remedied; that to convulse the Colonies in war was an unjustifiably harsh procedure, and entertaining such a belief it is contended that they were noble, indeed, in standing up for peace, for more moderate measures. Moreover, in all probability, many were impressed with the view that the disaffected were laboring under an erroneous idea of oppression; that the training incident to pioneer life, the previous wars with the French Canadians, and the ceaseless contentions with the Indians, had begotten false views of their rights, and made them too quick to discover supposed wrongs. Honestly impressed with such thoughts, they could not be otherwise than true to their principles and natural instincts of their nature, and refuse to take part or acquiesce in throwing overboard the Government of England, and so become aliens to the flag under which they were born, and had lived, and for which they had fought. Few men can forget the land of their birth or cast aside their feelings of nationality, and fewer still will bury the hallowed associations of a lifetime without the strongest reasons; and doubtless the Anglo-American who honestly and bravely adhered to the old flag possessed all the ardor of a lofty patriotism. But the American writer, unluckily, has obliterated all this from his memory. In the full blaze of national prosperity he has not discovered the intense longings of the United Empire Loyalists for the Union Jack. Looking at the momentous events of 1776 by the lurid glare of civil war, his eyes are blinded from the fact that a noble band, possessing equal rights with the rebels, loved England with all her faults, and for that love willingly sacrificed their all of worldly property. The majority of the citizens of the United States would prefer to have it said in history that the loyalists in every instance voluntarily left their homes during the war or at its termination; the loyalists are thereby no doubt made to appear more devotedly attached to the British Crown.

It is remarkable that the United Empire Loyalists are so very imperfectly known, their history unwritten, their tales of sorrow unattended to, their noble and manly doings unsung. Had there been a hand to guide a describing pen to portray the generous actions, the keen sufferings, the self-denying heroism of the loyal few, to recount the motives underlying all they did, and had there been ears as willing to listen, and eyes to read, and hearts to receive the facts as those of a contrary nature have obtained, then a far different impression would have been made and fixed upon the world.

In September, 1783, upwards of 12,000 men, women and children embarked at New York, Long Island and Staten Island, for Nova Scotia, Bahamas and Canada. It is generally estimated that at the close of the struggle there were distributed upon the shores of Canada about 10,000 persons, of whom a large number were located in the counties of Frontenac, Lennox, and Addington.

At the close of the conflict it was a question of vital importance, what can be done to ameliorate the condition of those who had sacrificed their all of worldly goods, and had been loyal to their rightful sovereign? while the commissioners, who completed the terms of peace at Paris, inconsiderately chose to forget or neglect the interests and welfare of the loyalists in their unseemly haste to transact the business and complete the treaty. The officers commanding in America, everywhere, felt the deepest sympathy and keenest compassion for the refugees. Among these was the officer commanding at New York. At this juncture of affairs, when the people were undecided whether to embark for Nova Scotia or Lower Canada, it came to the ears of the General that one Michael Grass, of New York, had been a prisoner of the French before the conquest at Cataragui. He summoned that gentleman to appear before him, and report as to the character of the country, and the probability of its being a suitable place for the refugees to seek homes. Mr. Grass, having rendered a favorable report, the result was that he was commissioned captain and placed at the head of a band of loyalists stay-