

tion of the number remaining at home. I have myself seen the spectacle—the sublime spectacle I might say—of perhaps two hundred thousand persons massed together along the banks of the Thames on the day of the University boat race; but whilst this monster gathering was witnessing the contest between Oxford and Cambridge, the streets of the great city which had sent it forth seemed as thronged as ever, and its multifarious activities to proceed as if nothing were occurring outside.

There are not a few thoroughfares in London where human beings press and jostle each other at a fearful rate. Notably among these is that of the southern angle of the Bank of England.

This is the great money centre of London, and, I might say, of the world. The daily stock and banking operations which are transacted here are felt throughout both hemispheres. A large proportion of the travel by omnibuses and other vehicles between east and west London passes at this point. Six great streets converge here—discharge here their swollen currents of human life, so that it swells and surges and eddies as if would sweep away the massive walls of the channels which confine it.

I have often wondered what would be the emotions of a lad who had been reared in some quiet country place, should he be put down suddenly on this spot. Methinks he would, first of all, feel concerned for his personal safety, lest he should be squeezed or trodden to death. Then, having composed himself, he would probably marvel how so many people could each follow the thread of his own business without mistaking that of somebody else for it.

GENIUS.

“Genius is that faculty of the mind which calls forth and combines ideas with great rapidity and vivacity, and with an intuitive perception of their congruity or incongruity.” Such is the definition given by a deep thinker and profound scholar. Though from so high

an authority as Dr. Good, yet we are led in part to call in question its correctness. Genius seems rather a quick and intense direction of any or of all the faculties, than being itself a distinctive faculty. “By faculty is meant any particular part of our constitution, through which we become affected by the various qualities and relations of beings (or things) around us.” Regarding genius as a faculty, it will follow, as all men have not genius, that one man may have an entire faculty which another has not. From this, it would appear that there are “qualities and relations of beings around us,” by which some are not only unaffected, but are destitute of all susceptibility of being affected thereby. The actual impression and the *higher degree* belong to the man of genius only.

The addition of a single faculty, as we think, would make a man more than human; so the abstraction of a faculty would make him less than man. Take away, for example, the power of conscience, and he would no longer rank among human beings. Let but a faculty become latent and inoperative, and how does it press the individual to the confines of a class for which we have no name. To this view analogy lends its aid. To an already existing substance, add another element, and the resulting compound is wholly different from the original.

Genius is an inspiration of nature, placing its possessor on an eminence which seems to reach ends without means. That it is less a distinct faculty than a quick concentrative power, appears by comparing it with the imagination. The latter coincides with the former in its ready originating power and vivacity; but whilst the one quickly perceives the congruity or incongruity of ideas, the other does not. In such a perception the exercise of judgment is implied. To imagination, then, add the element of intuitive judgment, and the result is genius. This resultant presupposes and necessitates the prompt, exact use of every faculty. All will no doubt admit this as true of the loftier genius. Extended vision and vast compre-