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*Note du chef de la Direction européenne
pour le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Head, European Division,
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 7, 1958

CYPRUS

The Turkish Ambassador came to see me this morning about the Cyprus issue in the UN. He had received instructions from his Government to call on the Minister to ask that we vote against the Greek position in the UN. In the Minister's absence he had come to see me to convey this request. He received at length the history of the NATO discussions and expressed the view that on the Cyprus issue, where the UK and Turkish positions coincided, we would presumably support Turkey since he considered it inconceivable that we would vote against the UK.

I asked whether he had any information on what the Greeks would propose in New York, but he could only speculate that they would seek to get the General Assembly to support a plan for self-determination. Since the Turks believed that this would inevitably place the Turkish minority under the domination of the Greek Cypriot majority, they would vote against any such proposal, and he sought assurances that we would do likewise. I said that since the situation he was describing was as yet hypothetical, I could not say what the Canadian Government's attitude would be. We had all along considered that the complex issue on Cyprus could more profitably be examined directly by those principally concerned — a conference of three, or of five by adding representatives of the two Cypriot communities, or a somewhat larger group such as that proposed in NATO should those concerned consider it would be helpful to have others associated with them to facilitate finding a solution. On this last point the Turkish Ambassador said his Government would never agree to go past five, although they had agreed in Paris to the Chairmanship of the Secretary General and also the presence of the US in an observer capacity.

The Turkish Ambassador said that with this reservation his Government remained willing to participate in a conference which would examine the problem in the terms of the British proposal and modifications thereto, and would also be prepared to consider the shape of the final settlement. On this they hold firmly to the conviction that only partition would be satisfactory, since they did not believe that independence, even internationally guaranteed after the Austrian model, would be satisfactory or permanent. It would be unsatisfactory since it would put the Turkish Cypriot minority under the control of the Greek Cypriot majority, and it would not be permanent since the UN could not indefinitely reject a majority vote for annexation to Greece.

When he could not get me to say that the Canadian Government would vote against a Greek proposal whatever it might be, he attempted to get me to say that we did not want the issue to come up in the UN. I repeated that the Canadian interest was to facilitate a solution satisfactory to those directly concerned, and that it appeared to us that a conference composed in a way satisfactory to these interests would be the most likely way to advance the solution of the problem.

HENRY F. DAVIS