

*External Affairs*

United Nations. One reason why the United Kingdom government, in my view, got the worst of both worlds was that it recognized the communist government in Peking diplomatically, and then voted against the communist government of China taking the Chinese seat at the United Nations and voted in favour of a moratorium on the discussion of it. Naturally this action was not well received in Peking and the United Kingdom was not able to get any advantage, if advantage was to be received, from recognition.

Then the minister brought up the question of trade. He said we must not attach an exaggerated expectation to increased trade because of diplomatic recognition, and of course I agree with him. There has been a lot of loose talk about what recognition would do to trade. It would be some help, but it would be making a mistake in any way exaggerate the nature of the trade that would follow from recognition. Nevertheless, it is going to be increasingly difficult to push trade in a country to which you do not give recognition and where the words—I am talking about our country—of the Prime Minister still stand on the record that there could be no recognition until this regime has expiated her wrongdoing.

Then, what should we do? The minister and the government are no doubt giving consideration to this matter. Perhaps he will pardon us for being a little confused on this side as to the nature of that consideration because of certain contradictory statements which emanated from various members of the government last autumn.

I suggest we should do four things. I suggest that we should send not a trade commissioner from Hong Kong to Peking—useful as no doubt that visit was—but should send a trade mission; I refer to a governmental trade mission. Second, if this has not been done by the government, I think the position should be made perfectly clear with regard to Formosa, namely that recognition or no recognition of the government of Peking, the people of Formosa should not be handed over to that government without some opportunity to express their own views on the matter. By that I do not mean—and I would not wish to be so interpreted—that we recognize what has come to be known as the doctrine of the two Chinas. That doctrine will never be accepted in Peking and it will never be accepted in Formosa. But by the same token we do not recognize that doctrine of the one China if it means the transfer against their will of nine million Formosans to the communist regime in Peking.

The third thing that I think should be done is this. Any influence which we may have on those most concerned—and by that

[Mr. Pearson.]

I mean the United States—should be exercised to persuade the United States to persuade the government in Formosa to evacuate the positions in the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu. If, as Chiang Kai-shek now has formally stated—and the minister repeated it this afternoon—that government has no intention of using force to get back on the mainland, what possible good can these islands be to that government except for the maintenance of face which is the Chinese word for our word prestige.

If the situation becomes quieter out there in respect to those islands, surely it would be possible then to evacuate those islands. As I see it, it would strengthen the defensive position of the government of Formosa. It would be possible to evacuate those islands without any great loss of face, as I think we were told by the United States government some years ago would be done. As long as those islands which are two or three miles off from the continent of China are heavily armed and are facing the mainland and as long as the Red government in Peking interprets the arming of those islands and the dispatch to those islands of a relatively large army from Formosa as a threat to its position on the mainland, it does not seem to me that there is going to be peace in that particular area.

Then the fourth suggestion I make to the minister is this. Why should not our government now initiate discussions with a few friendly governments which have not recognized Red China in order to try to work out an agreed attitude and agreed approach before the next assembly when this matter is certainly going to come up for serious consideration. I am thinking of such countries—and the list is certainly not exclusive—as Ireland which supported discussion of this matter at the last assembly France, Italy, Belgium, Australia and New Zealand. It seems to me that might mean a useful initiative for Canada to take in this matter.

The minister mentioned some other questions that came up for consideration at the United Nations assembly and I was interested—

**Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac):** I wonder whether the Leader of the Opposition would permit a question at this stage?

**Mr. Pearson:** Yes; of course.

**Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac):** I am trying to phrase my thoughts in the form of a question. Is the Leader of the Opposition advocating immediate recognition? He paid me the compliment of being mystified. I do not know what he stands for. Can he help me?