

them in Asia, and this free coalition would be very great. We must not delude ourselves that all the non-Communist countries in the United Nations automatically and approvingly range themselves in our camp in every conflict with the Soviet bloc at Lake Success. Moreover, much of the support we do get from these "third force" countries on many issues is due, not to their conviction that we are 100 per cent right, but to the extreme and uncompromising policy of the U.S.S.R. which at times seems to invite and even encourage opposition.

These considerations were kept clearly in mind when the United States Government framed their proposals last September at the General Assembly, by which the United Nations would be enabled to resist aggression even if the Security Council were unable to act. The aim of their proposals, indeed, was to go as far as possible in giving the Assembly the right and power to organize resistance to aggression without running any risk of so transforming the Organization that the Soviet Union might feel impelled to withdraw. The United States proposals, which were later embodied in the resolution of the General Assembly entitled "Uniting for Peace", were well adapted, I think, to achieve this aim. They provide that if the Security Council has failed to discharge its primary responsibility in the case of a breach of the peace, then the General Assembly may be called into session within forty-eight hours to deal with the matter. They also recommend that each member of the United Nations should "maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained and organized that they could promptly be made available for service as a United Nations unit or units upon recommendation by the General Assembly or the Security Council". If member states carry out this recommendation, the United Nations should never again be in the position in which it found itself last June when smaller countries not in possession of large standing armies had to improvise as best they could in order to make a suitable contribution to the collective forces in Korea.

Our security machinery is now streamlined so as to circumvent the Security Council veto, and to permit quicker and more broadly based United Nations action, through the Assembly. But we are faced now indeed more directly than ever with the question whether the United Nations should try to take military enforcement measures against a secondary aggressor when that action might either dissipate our strength in the face of the main aggressor or lead to a new world war in which our strength would be so dissipated. What should we do if the main aggressor should exploit the provisions of the Charter for the maintenance of the peace everywhere, in order to weaken us so that one day the peace cannot be maintained anywhere? What can we do to prevent the principle of collective security being used to weaken collective security in practice? There is no doubt that this poses a serious problem and one which we should think over very carefully.

The outlines of a way out of this dilemma, what the role of the United Nations should be in trying to maintain general security in a two-power world, are beginning to emerge. Those outlines require acceptance of the following principles:

- (a) In every situation, our obligation under the Charter to do whatever we can to maintain the principle of collective security should be discharged. In other words, we must recognize