

that is at the heart of the so called "democratic deficit". The IGC is supposed to address this issue, but the proposals on the table, such as increasing the powers of the European Parliament, extending the use of qualified majority voting, and altering the relationship between the Council, Commission, and Parliament, even in the unlikely event that they were all accepted, would in practice not address the problem. Again, a solution would require a more definitive agreement on a political programme for the Union than presently exists or is likely to appear. Continued progress in the direction of economic and political union requires political support, and it is by no means certain that such support will be forthcoming. Moreover, the process could be reversed if governments become politically vulnerable to policies determined in Brussels. Rather than the European idea legitimizing and consolidating the liberal-democratic state in Western Europe as it did during the crucial period of reconstruction following the Second World War,³ some governments are now in danger of being threatened by it. As many commentators have pointed out, the idea of a common foreign and security policy goes to the heart of traditional conceptions of sovereignty.

Briefly summarized, the external developments bearing on the CFSP are related to the transformed political and strategic environment that has emerged following the ending of the Cold War. The ending of the armed confrontation between East and West and the associated collapse of the Communist system in Europe have challenged many of the conceptual foundations on which the European enterprise was constructed. NATO's central security role is being redefined, and along with it a redefinition of the transatlantic relationship is occurring. Not only do these developments affect the security relationship between the European allies and Canada and the United States, but in addition they raise the question of what role the North American powers should and could play in the construction and guaranteeing of the emerging European system. How this will work out will depend in large part on the role that will be played by the European Union in the stabilization of Europe to the East and South. In other words, the character of the Union in both its internal and external dimensions will affect how North Americans define their European commitments and interests. This may be seen as one expression of the Union's structural power; however, whether the Union can equip itself to play a constructive role through the exercise of this power is by no means certain. The record is at best a mixed one (*viz* Yugoslavia), and it is quite possible that with respect to many key issues, particularly those having to do with international security, the Union will be a helpless giant and a hindrance and problem for both member states and others. A key argument favouring a common foreign and security policy has always been that without it Europeans will continue to be restricted to the exercise of relational power, and will be constrained by an international environment structured by others. Whatever the superficial appeal of this line of argument, it confronts the issue of whether Europeans are prepared to create the procedures and institutions that would indeed provide

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³This thesis is advanced in Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1992.