

no reason to doubt it--is to deter aggression by providing firm evidence that aggressors would be quickly and successfully met if they should attack any member of the Alliance. In NATO there is a formidable capability--as General Norstad stated in Ottawa ten days ago--to deter aggression. In this connection he also said that this capability is not altered or modified by the possession by any other power of a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile.

"This is a field, I am aware, where theories abound and often conflict. I do not intend to do more at this point than to state the Government's position, indeed its conviction, that the value of NATO as a deterrent remains intact and that it is incumbent upon us--we who have banded together in NATO--to exploit the opportunities which exist for closer co-operation in the fields of military, economic and scientific affairs.

"We must seek for co-operation by increased exchange of scientific and technical information and from the stimulation of scientific education and research in the NATO countries. We should be able to find that further co-operation is possible in the economic production of modern weapons.

"Military problems will loom large on the agenda of the NATO meeting which is to be held next month in Paris but, in the minds of many governments and of many peoples, that meeting will be judged just as much by its achievement in the non-military field as in the military field and, with the challenge of communism all the time advancing, NATO must move with the times in the field of politics.

"It is...essential that we of the NATO alliance should intensify and develop our military contribution. But that is not enough. It is essential that we should work together to improve our machinery for consultation and promote the intimacy of our intramural understanding. These obligations are with us and they must be observed, but they are limited. To confine ourselves in NATO to attaining them alone would be to cultivate our own interdependence as members of NATO without realizing that the health and strength of the Alliance depend on its relations with the world outside. There is, in other words, a global interdependence in this age of scientific discovery and nationalist ferment, and it is important for us and important for NATO not to underestimate that need.

"No one should think of letting down his guard at the present time; no prudent man can deny the need for defence insurance. What I am suggesting is that the security organization will be successful or unsuccessful according to the degree of intelligence with which its political policies are formulated and pursued.

"To give an example, I turn for a moment to the problem of (Soviet activity in) uncommitted neutral States. This is a serious and growing danger. How are they going? Are they

going toward the U.S.S.R. or toward the West? This cannot be ignored by NATO members, and yet NATO as such is perhaps not well equipped to deal with such a problem... The Asian and African nations which are uncommitted have no more desire than we have to see greater domination of other countries by the U.S.S.R. but, having regard to the historic relations they have had with the West and having regard to their desire to flex their muscles as new and independent nations, they might think that the steps which are being taken at NATO are designed for our security, and of course they are, and they would not necessarily adopt them whole-heartedly as their measures.

"We must recognize, too, that nationalism is not necessarily synonymous with communism in young countries, but we have to realize also that nationalism has been exploited by communism. There are real risks in dealing with these uncommitted nations. Their peoples may succumb to the blandishments and to the plausible and insidious appeal of Soviet tactics, but we must respect them as independent nations. We must work with them and assure them that we regard them as independent nations, and try to establish a mature and wise relationship with them. Or, to put it another way, unless we assure them by word and deed that our participation in NATO is complementary to and not in conflict with our membership in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations we may not be able to make much appeal to them.

"Canada is a middle power with roots in the three Associations, in NATO, in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations. I think Canada has a special reason for avoiding an absolutely rigid dependence on any one of these organizations as the sole instrument or channel of its foreign policy.

"I come now to my final point in relation to the NATO meeting projected for Paris in December. The House will not expect me--and even if it did I could not do this--to predict the specific terms of the agenda or the likely outcome of the deliberations. I am more concerned to suggest to this House the general philosophy which I think should govern our approach to that meeting. We must...start from the premise that new and intensified efforts at military and scientific co-operation are essential, and we must be prepared to do our part in developing that co-operation. We must, in the second place, in view of the unhappy events of the last two or three weeks, renew our determination to consult frankly on issues which have caused, or are likely to cause, divisions in NATO. And, thirdly, to return to the point I was trying to make a few moments ago, we must assure the world outside NATO that no one need fear aggression from us; that far from regarding the forthcoming meeting as an end in itself, the whole world, including ourselves, regards it as a symbol of our determination to protect our-

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