

*undertakings*. Ultimately, these judgements take place at the national level, although contributory assessments also may be made at the multilateral level. Some accounts also include, as an integral component of the verification process, the collection of information relevant to compliance assessments, both as a product of agreed cooperative provisions in an agreement and from broader (usually unilateral) sources outside the scope of an agreement. This is sometimes termed the *monitoring* function. Confidence building, to the extent that it contributes to the development of an information framework, can play a role here.

Typically, "verification" is operationalized in an international agreement by including specific provisions or measures that mandate or facilitate some form of inspection and/or observation activities that permit participating states to determine, within specified limits, certain facts relating to compliance with the terms of an agreement.

Because the confidence building process also develops measures that provide information on a cooperative basis, some of the specific measures typically associated with confidence building can play a role in the verification process, as well, to the extent that they make information available that can be used directly or indirectly for compliance assessments. Conceptually, this brings them within the scope of the verification process's monitoring function. While this is not the central purpose of confidence building, it can be a worthwhile product of some confidence building measures. It is easy to see, therefore, how confidence building measures and "verification measures" can work together in a verification regime. It must be remembered, however, that verification is a narrow process that is employed *in the service of agreements* and that it has little meaning when isolated from that context.

To put these observations in terms that have meaning for the CCW and how it may evolve constructively, we can say that including a package of information-oriented confidence building measures — whether called transparency measures or CBMs — in a revised version of the CCW will provide the opportunity to create a framework of information and knowledge about the use of land-mines. However, without at least a modest inspection measure of some type, there is little chance that limited information exchange measures will accomplish anything positive, either in the short-term or the long-term. Thus, CBMs without some form of meaningful verification, will not go far to allay substantial concerns about compliance.