

1962) the President was told by the State Department that it was unwise to press the matter, but he disagreed and told them that he wanted the missiles removed. In Robert Kennedy's words, "the President believed that he was President and that, his wishes having been made clear, they would be followed and the missiles removed . . . The State Department representatives discussed it again with the Turks and, finding they still objected, did not pursue the matter. And so the international situation was seriously aggravated at a crucially dangerous point in human history, not by a conspiratorial plot, not by a mentally-deranged or drug-addicted military officer, not even by stress, monotony, or familiarity-induced failure of vigilance, but simply by bureaucratic inertia.

As far as Dumas was concerned, no aspect of the human reliability problem can ever be fully eliminated: "We cannot circumvent this dilemma by turning control over to machines, by somehow automating the human element out of the nuclear forces. For who designs machines and who will build them?" This being the case, he argued that we should exercise two other aspects of our humanity, namely, our wisdom and our instinct for survival, in order to recognize that ". . . the only effective military strategy for increasing national security is general nuclear disarmament."

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett's paper reported their research on sixty cases of "extended deterrence" which had occurred in the international system since 1880. Deterrence was defined, in this instance, as one nation threatening the use of force to prevent the first use of force by another nation. "Extended deterrence", on the other hand, meant to prevent an attack on another party such as an ally, client state, or friendly neutral. These cases of extended deterrence were analyzed statistically, in order to determine the circumstances under which deterrence was likely to succeed and the circumstances under which, if it failed, the crisis was likely to escalate to full-scale war.

The study examined four factors which affected the success of deterrence. First, deterrence tended to be successful in cases where the immediate balance of forces favoured the defender. This suggested that the attacker was probably dissuaded if there seemed little chance of being able to accomplish a quick *fait accompli*. However, the long-term balance of forces, which might ensure a defender's ability to prevail in a war of attrition, was not relevant, nor was a defender's possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons. Second, ties between the defender state and its protégé (for example, geographic proximity, alliance, military sales and assistance, and trade) seemed on the whole to be irrelevant, though military ties were of some importance before actual interstate bargaining began. Third, firm-but-fair and tit-for-tat diplomatic military behaviour was associated with successful deterrence, while either disproportionately bellicose or disproportionately concessionary behaviour were not. Fourth, clear-cut victory or defeat in previous encounters seemed to embolden