

greater cooperation with the socialist countries as a means of bolstering their independence in the face of American economic penetration. Accordingly he suggested it was appropriate to take a "merchant's approach" to European matters, putting forward a programme of political and economic cooperation of the kind advocated by Lenin. In effect, by patterning their behaviour on selected aspects of the Genoa precedent, Moscow and its allies could further reduce the myth of socialist "aggressiveness," undermine the influence of "Atlanticist hard-liners" in Western Europe, and ultimately convert Europe from an American to a Soviet sphere of influence after an initial phase of encouraging West European independence of the United States.

The element of ambiguity in Soviet policy on European questions in 1922 is thus replicated in the early 1970s. But while some in the CPSU twist the Genoa precedent to serve the offensive purposes of neo-Stalinism, the essential point for our purposes here is that a full and proper construction of the Genoa policy is also employed for purposes of long-term East-West stability and cooperation consonant with the reform trend in Soviet behaviour. It would of course be a mistake to suggest that contemporary European issues are viewed primarily through the prism of Genoa. Circumstantial evidence does however indicate that a knowledge of what happened in 1922 can be applied in the interpretation of the