ought to give them a draft treaty or elements of a draft treaty.' And I said, 'Good, that's a wonderful idea.' And he said, 'But look, if they go home without a piece of paper and a draft treaty, we'll have to start the whole discussion over again.... We have got to have a draft treaty for them to take home now, so that they can start arguing about it in their governments and be ready for the next session.' And I said 'What does "now" mean?' He said, 'Like tomorrow morning.' And I said, 'I don't believe you!' He said, 'Yes, because we are going to end things tomorrow. (This was Thursday.) Oh, you know, you've drafted lots of treaties. Put down the best you can. You can have the legal adviser of my department to help you.'

"So his legal adviser, Sergio Gonzales Galves, and I sat down at five o'clock and they gave us a bottle of Scotch and plates full of lots of sandwiches and, by God, by five o'clock in the morning we had the draft of not a complete treaty with all the usual clauses but the guts of the treaty. And we sent it to him and he was delighted and said, 'Fine.'

"I never thought we could do it. We argued all night long, because we had to work out the provisions banning nuclear weapons and the verification measures. Tlatelolco has got the best verification provisions of any treaty ever entered into, except of course the Antarctic Treaty which says anyone can go anywhere with advance notice. We spent about an hour arguing about the principle of verification by the public, which we called psychological verification. Members of the public (or so we argued) should have the right to notify the agency of suspected violations by their own government. We argued about that for a long time and finally decided that, if we put that in, it would scare too many people off the whole treaty. So we dropped the idea—a pity.

"Still, we had lots of ideas about verification. Article 3 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was copied directly out of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and it is a standard now. On certain occasions in the treaty we permit on-site inspection but, if they don't find anything, the country that asks for the inspection has got to pay; and there are a few other things like that. The supervisory council in Mexico could ask for much more information than could the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Anyhow, we had a barrel of fun that night—in 12 hours, we drafted the elements of the treaty. Afterwards, we had two or three more sessions of the Committee before it was adopted. Yes, it was a wonderful treaty.

"Brazil signed and ratified it. Brazil said it would do this only if four conditions were met. The first was that all the nuclear weapon powers should sign Protocol 2 of the treaty, undertaking to abide by the treaty and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a member of the zone. The second was that foreign powers administering territories in the area would accept their being part of the nuclear weapons-free zone. That is Protocol 1. The third was that all members had to accept IAEA safeguards. I forget the fourth.

"The United Kingdom and Netherlands were the first to meet these conditions. It took a long time for the United States to do it. Part of U.S. territory is now subject to the Treaty of Tlatelolco: the U.S. cannot station or send nuclear weapons to Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, which are within the area of the nuclear-free zone.