

Garibaldi's recently published letter on the part which he took in the Franco-Prussian war is characteristic in the last degree. Whatever his qualities as a military leader may be, those he possesses as a writer are certainly nearly unique. For invective, for lack of argument, and for unsupported assertion, his peer could hardly be found—save, perhaps, in the person of Victor Hugo—in this generation. A report was recently presented to the French Chamber in which the part which Garibaldi's Army of the Vosges took in the French War was severely criticised. The charge was brought against the general that he did nothing to check that great advance of Manteuffel's corps which resulted in the French Army of the East, under General Bourbaki, being compelled to cross the Swiss frontier and to lay down its arms. The expression that he did nothing was undoubtedly a too severe one, but if the word *efficacious* had been added, Garibaldi could hardly have justly found fault with it, and the sense of the passage would not have been materially altered. During three days some severe fighting went on round Dijon, but in the end the guerilla chieftain had to retire, having effected no real good, in order that he might avoid, as he himself allows, being "surrounded and crushed by superior forces." He speaks vaguely of what he would have done, under certain conditions, in the way of harassing the left flank of the enemy, but throws all the blame of his inactivity and failure on the Government, because they did not send him supplies of men and munitions of war in time to effect any real good.

From a military point of view, the fact of the case appears to be simply that Garibaldi was helpless for good in the presence of an enemy superior to himself in skill, in men, and in equipments. That the remembrance of his impoency in the campaign of the Vosges is galling to him, we can well believe; but it seems to us to be quite unreasonable on the part of both of the general and of his admirers, that the world should expect to sympathise with one who, having shown himself once great, exhibits a certain kind of unwillingness to allow that he can ever be altogether as other men are. Garibaldi writes:—"These are the barricades that saved the south of France," said a French peasant, pointing to a shred of red cloth which his plough had turned up, together with the bones of one of the brave defenders of Dijon. And the word of sympathy and fellowship of the French peasant is sufficient to compensate us for the coarse, envenomed and contemptible invectives launched against us by the priests and the rustics."

The claim implied in these words appears to us to be astonishing in its vastness, and—to use no stronger word—in its inaccuracy. The plain truth is that our hero is apt to lose himself a little in mazes of words; as, for instance, when he seems to ascribe the ruin of France to a strange alliance between the aristocracy, the priesthood, the marshals, and the rustics. France has suffered enough, God knows, without having this kind of feeble rhodomontade shrieked over her. Unpleasant as it is to write disrespectfully of one so gentle and so good as Garibaldi has shown himself to be in his past life, we cannot help feeling that, in the interests of truth and common justice to France, his last utterance should be vigorously protested against by all men of common sense.

A Berlin despatch to the *Times* says, Prince Bismark has given no intimation to any one that he intends to resign, and he is likely to remain in office as long as his health permits.

General M'Murdo on the Indian Army.

In a letter to the *Times*, called for by the Calcutta correspondence of that journal on the state of the India Army, General M'Murdo makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the subject. He refuses to believe that the Native Indian Army is merely an aggregation of men, and asserts that the British officers are, as a class, remarkably well informed (indeed, are above the average of officers of other armies), while the men are well trained, clothed and appointed. The body, however, is not well jointed, and the native officers constitute the weak part. He then proceeds:—

"The recruiting of the army becomes year by year a more difficult question, from causes, however, which are natural and intelligible. The progress of civilisation, the extension of agriculture and public works, are not only diminishing the warlike tastes of the races that have been subjected to our rule, but the rates of wages are augmenting in proportion, nevertheless, the Sepoy's pay (about 14s. per month) has received no increase, and *point d'argent, point de Suisse*—the soul of the Sepoy is concentrated in his pay. The recruiting, therefore, has already extended in some degree beyond our frontiers, to these races that are still poor and unacquainted with any other pursuit than that of robbery and bloodshed. The introduction of such restless characters into the Native Army is, I think, a mistake. The army can be amply recruited within our own dominions by the adoption of a measure suited to the times. I am disposed to think, moreover, that the principle of obligatory military service might be applied to India with success, and that this measure could be greatly facilitated by confining the range of the relief of regiments to their respective provinces. It appears an unnecessary operation in time of peace for a regiment from Assam, for example, or Lower Bengal, to find itself in the course of a few reliefs at Peshawur, on the North West frontier—a distance of over 1500 miles.

"Again, I endeavoured, when in India, to draw attention to the expediency of providing employment to some extent for the Christian converts and half castes, by the enlistment of a proportion of them in native regiments. The principle being now fully established of mixing companies of distinct and opposing classes in the same battalion, I am convinced that the measure would be successful, despite the fears and prejudices of many. An experiment on wrong principles was made in 1857, by raising a regiment or two of 'Eurasians' on the same terms as Europeans (at least, they proved to be quite as expensive), whereas the classes I refer to should be on the footing of Sepoys. About a score of these are always enlisted in native regiments as bandsmen and drummers. They could be augmented to the establishment of a company or two without violating the slightest pledge or understanding.

"I am aware that an idea prevails that these poor despised people do not possess fighting qualities, and I was asked lately if I would think even of taking one of them as a servant. This reminded me of the advertisements for servants at home, which used to be common, ending with 'no Irish need apply.' Of course, when a race is trampled on it becomes morally debased; yet the Irishman taken from the gutter in those days made as noble a soldier as he does now.

"The next question is the native officer, and this is one of vital importance; because,

according to the existing system, the tactical command of infantry has been taken from the British officer and given to the native. Sir Charles Napier used to say that he considered the captain of a company to be the most important rank in the army, and with regard to Asiatic warfare my impression is that our success is due not only to European tactics, but to those superior mental circumstances of pressure and danger. But the native captain does not, as a rule, possess such qualities. In *physique* he is usually nearly worn out. He has clung to the service through its lower grades, keeping studiously clear of punishment, obtaining promotion too often, to the exclusion of younger and more able men, for the commanding officer has no decided reason to offer to headquarters for overlooking 'his long and faithful services.' Socially considered—that is, in his relation to the Sepoys under his command—he commonly (if I may use the term) travesties his rank and position by his intimacy with them. He may be the father-in-law, or perhaps the son-in-law, of a Sepoy. I had occasion to speak to the quartermaster of a native regiment once about room to store some arms, and he suggested the appropriation for that purpose of the native officers' guardroom. On my inquiring what, in that event, would become of the native officer on guard, he replied that it was never occupied by him, for the native officer always stayed with the men in the common guard room.

"Another incident, related to me by an officer under my command will, perhaps, explain more clearly the false position of the native officer. A regimental officer, while shooting in the district about Unrisur, overheard an altercation on the other side of a hedge near a village. The officer fancied he knew the voice, and on passing into the field he saw a man, whom he recognised as a Sepoy of his own company, angrily directing another who was ploughing; and this other was a *jamadar* (lieutenant) in the same regiment, both of them being on furlough. But the Sepoy was the owner of some land, and 'long and faithful services' had not altered the real status of the old *jamadar* in his own village.

"It is evident, therefore, that the native officer of infantry is taken from a wrong class, and his promotion is made upon a weak principle. The only really good native officer of infantry that I met with, having high character and ability, was a native gentleman who had not served as a Sepoy. This officer was respected alike by British officers and Sepoys, connecting them by a real link. The rest of the native officers of this regiment were denounced to me by their commanding officer as being only one degree above monkeys in intelligence. The incident which had elicited so severe an expression is worth relating, as it brings us at once upon tactical relations of the British officers with their men. In the course of some manoeuvres on the previous day, I had observed the men of this regiment break their ranks and run in upon a British regiment opposed to them with a loud shout. With the assistance of the Staff this irregularity was checked and order restored; but I had to wait several minutes before the British officers of the regiment made their appearance upon the scene. The ground which the battalion had traversed when it thus 'got out of hand' was broken and difficult, and these officers being, by regulation, on horseback, were left behind entangled in a ravine, and in entire ignorance of what had been done. Had this occurred in action the regiment would have been destroyed; as it