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The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, MONDAY, MAY 6, 1872.

LIEUT-COLONEL WAINSWRIGHT GRIFFITHS, at present on a tour through British Columbia, has kindly consented to act as the Agent for the VOLUNTEER REVIEW in that Province.

ENGLISH Military Journals criticise the *Brighton Review* on Easter Monday with undue severity, and it would appear for no better or more intelligible reason than that the force was composed of men serving voluntarily.

A careful analysis, however, demonstrates the fact that the volunteers as soldiers marched well, and worked splendidly over exceedingly difficult ground, that they are moderately well handled (in this case a marked improvement on Sir Hope Grant's was manifest) and that in fact they made as creditable a display for the hour and one half the field evolutions lasted, as any troops regular or otherwise could do over ground so entirely new to them, with a course of evolutions in strategy and tactics hastily and loosely improvised at short notice.

It is very evident that the patriotism and military spirit that could bring together over 24,000 men for the hard work of a field day like that described, is capable of far greater development than its critics are willing to afford it credit for, and the hostility manifested towards such a valuable force can only be explained on the grounds of the utter disbelief of the English Press in anything but a Regular Army.

The complicated system known as Mr. Cardwell's "Reorganization of the British Army" may work well, but of that we have grave doubts, the retention within Great Britain of a force of 130,000 men, the localization of battalions and the putting up of commissions to competition like starships in a primary school, will in the end smother what military spirit may remain amongst the people while the improvement of the ballot will distribute the burthen of military service unequally.

There seems then to be little wisdom in decreeing a force which would leave the whole population with trained soldiers whose knowledge was acquired for the mere love of military life and not mechanically.

In illustration of this quality and its value every regular officer who has come in contact with our Canadian Volunteers are unanimous in describing them as the very best military material they ever saw, the easiest drilled and most intelligent soldiers, and that not in one arm of the service but equally so in the Artillery or Cavalry.

If our militia law forced into the rank the idle, unwilling coward, or men whose labors would be better and more profitably employed elsewhere, such a result would not be possible, we would have material that could be drilled like machines if time were allowed, but not intelligent soldiers.

As the pleas on which the Whig Radicals succeeded in withdrawing the Regular troops from the Colonies and concentrating them in Great Britain were *economy* and *Defence*, the employment of a volunteer force would alone answer all the conditions, and it is an enigma why they have persistently neglected the development of such a force.

Great Britain will always require a large force for foreign service that must eventually be drawn from the Volunteer Force, and the result of the whole will be the latter will alone be looked to as capable of affording the necessary security against foreign invasion.

We are perfectly secure without a regular soldier, because our whole population are enrolled, a large portion have served in the Volunteer Force, and we could at any moment assemble in forty eight hours twenty thousand men at any threatened point.

With the experience England has had with the difficulty experienced in many a small corps (for her) of regular troops, it is wonderful that she has not profited thereby, and by encouraging the volunteer element have the force always at the threatened point.

The safety of any nation will be only assured by training all its population possessing military instincts to the use of arms, and providing in an emergency for arming the whole; with the large population England possesses no difficulty could exist in confronting an invader at any point with an over

whelming force of local troops, and in such a case the value of the volunteers is apparent; but to have that force efficient it is not at all necessary to turn them into barrack yard soldiers, or do more than give them a good rough drilling in which the intelligent and accurate use of the rifle would be the principal feature.

Such field days as that at Brighton are indispensable to soldiers whose periods of training are intermittent; if properly placed under the command of an officer who thoroughly understood the organization of the force and their capabilities, the volunteers would acquire an idea of their duties in the field, and if ever the time comes to test their value the importance of those field days would be very soon apparent.

Indeed it does not appear that on the late occasion within the one hundred minutes or so the troops were engaged that greater or more egregious blunders were perpetrated than at any time during the course of the celebrated autumnal campaign.

In all such cases a series of blunders will be perpetrated, especially with troops unused to such work, and the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe owing to sameness of uniform, but such will be merely regarded as accidents quite as likely to occur in real warfare and with well trained troops.

At the time of Sir Hope Grant's famous report we advised the British Volunteers to avoid in future the error of being commanded by Brigadiers unacquainted with the troops, although the late Review has been better handled in this respect, we see no reason to change our opinion; the establishment of the Volunteer Force should be independent of the Regular Service for the greater part of its staff.

With an intelligent and zealous officer at its head, like our Adjutant-General, the volunteers would have a very different experience and a far more practical knowledge of what field work really was like as well as a more satisfactory record at each anniversary of their now historical Easter Monday Review.

THE United States Army and Navy Journal of the 27th April has an article entitled "1861 and 1872" which merits grave attention from the calm and dispassionate manner in which the real basis of the now celebrated *consequential damage* question is treated.

It opens with great contempt of expression for the proposition so strongly insisted on by the supporters of the monstrous claims put forward by the Washington Government, "that the escape of the Alabama and the countenance given to the Southern Confederation by England prolonged the war," and while insisting that it was a fact for the historian to deal with if not the jurist, boldly declares that the real cause of its prolongation was the un