

foreign relations. In cases where such occur, we find both the opposing parties uncompromising, implacable, and obstinate, in the last degree, as the history of all civil wars abundantly testifies. Thus where a rupture is once made, between the local and the general Government, it cannot reasonably be supposed that anything but coercive measures will bring them together again. Probably if the member of the Federal and local legislatures had, in the first instance, belonged to the same legislative body, the question between them, would, by an interchange of views and by mutual explanations have been satisfactorily and amicably arranged, after a few hours discussion. But where they separately and at a distance from each other, and each collective body with its particular bias, legislate upon the same subject, there is little probability of its merits being fairly discussed by either body; and, under such circumstances, each is extremely liable to mistake, or distort, the opinions and feelings of the other. When a Confederation embraces a considerable number of States, or when its members are separated by geographical position, local prejudices, or interests, it is quite obvious that the probabilities of a collision are largely increased. When a dispute of this kind comes to an open rupture, whichever of the two conflicting parties may prove successful, the result cannot but prove highly injurious to the welfare of the Confederation, and ultimately fatal to its existence as a *Confederation*. The invariably disastrous consequence to society generally, of a serious civil contest of this kind, need only be alluded to.

If, in such a struggle, the Federal Government prove victorious, it will take care, by some means or other to weaken the power of the refractory State and abridge its privileges, with a view to lessen the probability of any future collision. The discomfited State, on the other hand, cannot but regard itself in the light of a conquered country; and, as such, any terms whatever imposed by the Federal authorities, will be felt as an infringement of its constitutional rights. Its position and still existing political organization will afford opportunities of both evading those terms and openly setting them at

defiance. Thus, if the Federal Government persists in the course first adopted, jealousies and heart-burnings must continue to exist on the part of both the contending parties; and open hostilities must become frequent until the individuality of the single State is entirely destroyed.

But suppose the single State in question proves the better of the two in the contest. This is a state of affairs which the evidence of history proves to be the much more probable result of such a contest; and the reasons why it must be so, it is not difficult to discover. In this case, the General Government being foiled by that which is, nominally, its subordinate, must in consequence lose immeasurably both in moral weight and physical strength. The successful issue, on the part of the single State, of one contest with the Federal Government, will naturally lead to renewed contests, on its own part, and to the encouragement of similar attempts, on the part of others, until the Federal Government must, in the natural course of things, become utterly powerless—an object of contempt both at home and abroad; and each individual State will become, to all intents and purposes, an independent country.

It may be said that sectional revolts may take place in any country not having a Federal Government. True, they *may* do so; but the probabilities of their taking place are infinitely less than where the Federal form exists. When the Government is not a Federal one, the popular representatives from every section of the country meeting in the same Parliament, their local prejudices are softened down by this general intercourse; differences are compromised at their inception; misunderstandings are, almost immediately, discovered and rectified, and the whole country assumes the character, in the estimation of those representatives, of a compact unity in which the interests of each section are considered as subordinate to the interests of the whole. If a complete disruption of the representatives of any one section of the country did take place, it could not, in any ordinary case, be productive of very serious results; because the complete political local organization which, under a Federal