

to allow him to actually starve; so that the direct cost and outlay is reduced to the difference between the expense of keeping a soldier, and the expense of keeping an unemployed or half-starved labourer, or pauper. Against this difference in expense, whatever it may be, is, independently of the sense of security conferred upon the nation by the possession of a large and efficient army, the difference between a man who has had the advantages which an enlightened system of military training for three years or longer can confer upon him, and the crude untrained labourer or peasant. Now, this difference, if it be admitted that there is a difference in favour of the well-trained soldier, is a gain in wealth to the nation of so much per man; it is an economical product, so to speak, which the nation obtains for its outlay. We are not proposing now to enter into the general question, which is a very large one, nor are we to be understood as positively advising that England should keep an average number of a million soldiers. Our object in writing this notice is to point out, as already stated, the importance of taking the actual circumstances of the country, in respect to the proportion between the labourers and the quantity of productive or useful work to which their labour can be applied, as one of the essential elements in the consideration of the case.

Nearly at the close of the same article a subject of an entirely different character is brought particularly under consideration, and in regard to which, also, the judgment expressed by the writer is, we opine, open to grave objection. That subject is the question whether England ought, or ought not, under particular circumstances, to protect and help a weak state against aggression and injustice on the part of a stronger nation. To decide this question with certainty in its application to any particular case, there would have to be a sufficient and correct knowledge as to the circumstances, and if such