

his army forward, and fight the sanguinary battle of Guad-el-Ras (popularly Gualdras), so called from the name of the river and valley near and in which the greater part of the conflict took place. Since the battle, we have been told by the Moors themselves that the Spaniards had forestalled them but by one day, and that it was their intention to have attacked them on the 24th. Every means had been employed to stimulate the warlike ardour and fanaticism of the Moors, and oaths had been administered to them to fight to the death. By not a few of them this vow was faithfully observed; I mentioned at the time instances of desperation and self-sacrifice similar to those occasionally witnessed during the late mutiny in India or among Schamy's Murides in the Circassian war, when a few men rushed upon overpowering odds, careless of death so long as they inflicted it. All agree that the Moors never fought so well as they did upon that day, and more than one superior officer has since confessed to me that there were moments when he thought the battle lost. Considerable bodies of Spanish troops were repeatedly driven back; the Moors seem to have, in a great measure, overcome their old fear of the artillery, and braved its fire at a very short distance from the muzzles of the guns. The Spanish loss was heavier than in any other action of the war, and the quantity of ammunition fired away was so large that it was necessary to halt the next day while fresh supplies were sent for. It is the misfortune of the Moors that, after a defeat, their ill-organised forces cannot be kept together, or even rallied within any moderate time. They scatter over the country; and the tribes especially—who form no part of what are called the regular forces, but are a sort of *levy en masse* for the emergency—are apt to quit the army altogether and return to their own districts. They depart, considering that they have done, all that can be expected of them, and that Allah is angry with their lord the emperor. Thus did they disperse after the battle of the 1th of February, and again after that of Gualdras. In the latter fight they were very numerous, and, although their loss may have been heavy, could the survivors have been kept together and have been induced to fight another battle or two as stoutly as on the 23rd, the Spaniards would have been ultimately defeated. But, as the Moors themselves would doubtless say, it was otherwise written in the book of fate, and the preliminaries of peace were signed, upon terms extremely advantageous to Spain, within forty-eight hours after the close of the battle.

There can be no doubt that the campaign in Morocco has done credit to the Spanish army, and has deservedly raised its reputation, although it has not placed it on that pinnacle of superiority assigned to it by the ill-judging zeal and patriotic enthusiasm of certain Spanish writers. In Spain the events of the war have been generally exaggerated; and a prominent cause of the coldness with which the news of a most favourable treaty of peace has been received, is to be found in the tone adopted by the Spanish press, and in the flattery it has lavished upon the nation and the army. After largely contributing to force the Government into war, it did its best, when the proper time for making peace arrived, to prevent the contest being brought to an honourable and advantageous close. It had so vaunted the prowess of the army, so unduly exalted the expectations of the people, that there was no account made by the multitude of the difficulties and dangers in-

separable from a continuation of the struggle. In the popular idea, the Spanish soldier had but to show himself to vanquish, and there was no reason why peace should not be signed at Fez instead of at Tetuan. The army, on the other hand, conscious of the sufferings and sacrifices by which its successes had been won, judging of future difficulties by those it had surmounted, appreciating at his just value a brave and warlike, although un military foe, and also, as I believe, forming a more modest estimate of its own prowess and efficiency than that which had been proclaimed by the Spanish journalists, thought that the time had come for peace, and rightly judged that Spain would gain nothing by prolonging war. The day before I left Africa news had reached the camp that the treaty had given but little satisfaction in Spain, and I heard among the officers more than one expression of disgust at the intelligence. My inquiries here, however, and information on which I can rely from Madrid and other large towns, induce me to believe that the sensible part of the nation, the intelligent, the industrious—all, in short, who have something to lose, and taxes to pay, and who are not interested in stimulating discontent with the present Government—are well pleased that the war is over, consider the conditions of peace highly favourable, and desire only that they may be faithfully executed.

As a result of the Spanish campaign it soon became quite clear that it was a great mistake. The minister, Herrera, and his friends, entertained dreams and projects which they were utterly incapable of realising.

What France has done in Algeria they seem to have aspired to do in Morocco—a country of twice or thrice the population of that which France has conquered in Africa, at an immense expense of men and money, and after thirty years of obdurate struggle. They thought that extensive possessions in Africa, and the protracted hostilities entailed by their conquest and retention, would form a good school for the Spanish army. In fact, they were bent upon a parody of France. They lost sight of a few important differences. They forgot that, while France has a population of 36,000,000, Spain has but 15,000,000 or 16,000,000; that France can keep Algeria in order with a tenth part of her enormous standing army, while Spain, although she may be, as she now boasts, able on an emergency to send into the field upwards of 200,000 efficient troops, has no need to maintain one-half of that force, and would be draining her exchequer and plunging into financial embarrassments by doing more, and by protracting a war of conquest in Morocco. I have heard it urged in conversation, by persons from whom sounder views might have been expected, that extensive possessions in Africa would be advantageous to Spain, as an outlet for the considerable number of emigrants that now annually resort to Montevideo and other distant places, as well as to Algeria. Now, there can be no reason for emigration from a thinly peopled and naturally rich country like Spain, except that of misgovernment. Spaniards in general are much attached to their native land, and when they abandon it to seek a precarious existence in unknown and distant regions, we may be sure that it is misery and want of employment that drive them forth. If Spain wishes to retain her children at home, where there is ample room and much need for all of them, she will employ her increasing resources, not in Quixotic wars, but in domestic improvement. What great good might have been done,