

settle in. And its new and affiliated roles in monitoring elections, operating police forces, helping refugees and combatants resettle, and managing transition governments is an important and valuable asset for the United Nations.

But the point has to be made that the ability to stand between combatants who have agreed to stop fighting does not amount to one ounce of deterrence or one iota of ability to stop wars once they have started. What peacekeeping role would exist in the Gulf if Iraq's aggression against Kuwait had been allowed to go unchecked? What peacekeeping role now exists while fighting is under way and there is no truce to supervise, no armistice to audit? There can only be peacekeeping when there is peace. There was no peace after Saddam Hussein declared war on Kuwait. There is no peace now that the world is acting to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Peacekeeping follows peacemaking. It is no substitute.

Some worry that our participation in peacemaking in the Gulf rules us out of future peacekeeping there, or elsewhere. I don't believe that. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom I talked to just a few days ago, does not believe that. Foreign Ministers in the region with whom I have spoken do not believe that. Canada's efforts in Korea did not preclude 43,000 Canadians from serving the UN abroad. Canada will continue as a peacekeeper and we will continue as a peacemaker.

Just as the architects of the United Nations equipped that organization with the ability to go to war to reverse aggression, they also intended that the Members of the United Nations use diplomacy and other means to secure compliance with the international will. War was not meant to be automatic.

In the Gulf, war was not automatic. It was the last resort after diplomacy and sanctions failed. Some Canadians have disagreed. While they do not dispute the principle of acting with the UN -- or indeed with the proposition that force might be necessary in the end -- they do declare that peace was not given a chance.

This is a serious debate. War must always be the last, most reluctant choice. Would sanctions have forced withdrawal from Kuwait if we had waited longer? Perhaps, but probably not. It is our view that the risks of waiting were unacceptable. What could those risks have been?

Risk Number 1

The plunder of Kuwait would have continued. We know now the terror Saddam's army brought to Kuwait. Amnesty International has documented that terror. We know that half of